lenhart | philosophy






Are there regularities in scientific development? What results does science typically achieve? Why does science achieve those? These questions--broadly the subject of scientific progress--are the topics of my dissertation research. Science, I argue, progresses toward greater accuracy. To do so, it depends on incorporation of diverse methods, beliefs, and goals. Rather than eliminating all suboptimal sets of methods, beliefs and goals, science integrates diverse practices. Any consensus that results in such a group is quite likely select accurate representations that are more accurate than previously available representations. Hence, science progresses toward greater accuracy.

In addition to the topics I pursue in my dissertation, I am interested in social epistemological questions, especially as they relate to the ability of groups (such as, for example, scientists) to produce representations whose reliability exceeds that conferred by the justifications that individual members of the group possess. Additionally, I would like to understand the relationship between the history and the philosophy of science, especially the methodological issues (both difficulties and constraints) between these two subjects. The relationship between science and philosophy, which is in some respects similar to those between history and philosophy of science, also interests me. My reliance in accurate representation demands answers to (antecedently interesting) metaphysical questions about approximation, vagueness and representation in general.


Last updated 21 June 2003