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Coping with drought in the drylands of Zimbabwe
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Subject: Coping with drought in the drylands of Zimbabwe
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From: biotec@goliat.ugr.es (a.o.)
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Date: 13 Jun 1996 07:26:04 GMT
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Article: 13023 of alt.sustainable.agriculture
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Newsgroups: alt.sustainable.agriculture
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Organization: Centro Informatico Cientifico de Andalucia
Coping with drought in the drylands of Zimbabwe
Drought is a regular occurrence in dryland Zimbabwe, part of the normal
pattern of life. In most years, opportunistic farming combined with off-farm
work and remittance flows provides enough. However, occasionally the
situation gets worse. This was the case in 1991-92 when the whole southern
African region suffered a major drought, the failure of crops and the running
out of national food reserves. For many the situation was critical.
The situation during 1991-92 was monitored in detail by research carried out
by the Farming Systems Research Unit of the Department of Research and
Specialist Services in Harare in collaboration with International Institute
for Environment and Development and with the support of the EC Science and
Technology for Development Programme. From the study a picture of coping
responses was built up. A classic pattern of sequential responses was seen,
building up from minor adjustments, such as diet changes or increased reliance
on off-farm income sources, to the disposal of assets, notably livestock to
major shifts in practice, such as out-migration.
Non-farm income generating activities were critical. With the reduction in
real wages and retrenchments due to structural adjustment the value of
remittance incomes had dramatically decreased and other sources of income had
to be sought. The increase in trading activities and the sudden explosion of
gold panning were both responses to this. In addition government relief was
vital. Following many delays the food aid arrived in the country during
early 1992. This was just in time. The relatively efficient distribution
and the wide availability saved many from further suffering.
Policies for resilience Drought is a regular occurrence in Chivi, and will
continue to be so.There is a need to plan for drought and centre rural
development programmes on ensuring that rural livelihoods are resilient to
drought impacts.This requires investment not only in agriculture (notably
irrigation, water harvesting options, drought resistant varieties/breeds), but
also in off-farm activities (such as trading, small-scale mining, crafts
etc.). Over-regulation of such activities (eg. through excessive licensing
restrictions) may restrict opportunities unnecessarily.
Rural and urban development tends to be seen separately, but the livelihood
linkages intimately bind the two sectors together. It is absurd to suggest
that successful agricultural production can proceed (particularly in the dry
areas) without investment from income generated in town. The notion of the
independent, small-scale farmer who does not receive remittance income is a
fallacy in dry areas with limited available land. Instead of pursuing this
route (as in the resettlement conditions), mechanisms for the more successful
channelling of money into rural investment are needed. The impact of
policies that impinge on the formal labour economy (eg. structural adjustment
programmes) need to be examined in relation to the rural sector too.
The pace of resettlement since Independence has been very slow. It has not
really had an impact on the viability of places like Chivi. Most people
resettled from Chivi have been moved to similar drought-prone areas within
Masvingo province. Although settlers have larger land areas than they had
before, they often do not have sufficient draft power, labour or inputs to
invest in ensuring high productivity. The result has been the disappointing
performance of most resettlement schemes. The response has been to change
the criteria for selection, with more “qualified” farmers now being favoured.
However without good soils and reliable rainfall, agricultural production
will continue to be a risky enterprise, hence the need for maintaining
rural-urban links and remittance flows to offset uncertainties.
Large investments have been made in complex early warning (EW) systems at both
the national and regional level. While they provided timely, and largely
accurate, information during 1991-92 on the state of the national food stocks,
the warnings were basically ignored by government. As with most other early
warning systems in Africa, there appears to be a “missing link” between the
warning signal and action. Complex, centralised systems tend to be
distrusted and excuses for inaction can always be found. Early warning
systems are most effective if based on a decentralised district level network,
where decision-makers are close to the problem and the people affected. They
are most credible if they are transparent, accountable and jointly “owned” by
all actors - local and central government, donors and the people themselves.
Flexibility is enhanced with a pre-programmed response system, a contingency
plan, where the most appropriate response from a range of options is chosen in
relation to particular early warning indicators based on an understanding of
local livelihood systems.
Further information from: FSRU/DRSS, Box CY 594, Causeway, Harare, Zimbabwe
and Drylands Programme, IIED, 3 Endsleigh Street, London WC1 HODD, UK.