Subject: Conservation Failing in the Case of Idaho's Wild Salmon

From: [email-masked] (Neal C. Wickham)
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 01:36:23 GMT

Idaho’s salmon runs are going.  I’ve been following this for years
believing something would be done to protect the salmon.

From:    State of Idaho Recommendations
               For a Balanced Resource Approach
               http://www.state.id.us/pr/1996/pr0220-1.htm

February 20, 1996

"Snake River wild runs have declined dramatically since the late
1960s, resulting in less than 1,000 spring/summer chinook and less
than 8,000 steelhead returning to Idaho and eastern Oregon this past
year. The runs are distributed into dozens of different populations,
so very few spawners were available for each population.

Marsh Creek, one of the most important spawning areas in the Middle
Fork Salmon River, had no chinook spawners last year, -- likely the
first time in over 10,000 years."

Wow!  Is that sick or what?.

My family camped on Beaver Creek this summer which flows into Marsh
Creek just two miles below where we camped.  I wondered if there were
*any* spawners in Beaver Creek or March Creek.  My dad tells stories
of camping out in the "salmon" country of Idaho in the 50’s and early
60’s and finding pools in the streams with "hundreds" of salmon in.
I've never seen a wild salmon in Idaho.

Neal

And for you reading malady,  the following came from:

http://www.desktop.org/iruf/migration96press#anchor7737385

...but who cares, right?

     Salmon and Steelhead Migration 1996

     A Study in Mismanagement by the Army Corps of Engineers

The 1996 seaward migration of salmon and steelhead from Idaho
officially began on April 10th. At this time the Army Corps of
Engineers should have been prepared to manage its dams in a fish
friendly manner until the end of the migration, June 20th. This year's
good water and the political unity behind an in-river migration with
beneficial river conditions should have been sufficient to provide for
an excellent migration season. But the Corps of Engineers proved
unwilling or unable to manage its dams for the betterment of Idaho's
salmon and steelhead.

The following is a partial list of the Corps' 1996 migration blunders:

Surface Collector Installation: The Corps' failure to install this
experimental research device before the fish migration began resulted
in detrimental in-river conditions. During installation, the Corps
took several turbines and spillways out of service. This resulted in
extremely high levels of uncontrolled spill causing very high levels
of dissolved gas in the water -- which led to gas bubble trauma in up
to 32% of monitored fish. This situation continued several weeks into
the migration season.

Surface Collector Operations: The Corps continued to manipulate flow
and spill to the detriment of migrating fish, once this device was
installed. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and state and
tribal fish agencies have established that certain patterns of spill
are most beneficial to fish. They have called for spill from 6 pm to 6
am. In the name of surface collector research, the Corps chose to
spill from midnight to noon instead. This went on for several weeks
andcreated an in-river environment that was detrimental to up-stream
migrating adults. 

Turbine Outages: Failure to operate turbines during periods of high
flow can result in increased levels of uncontrolled spill and
resultant high levels of dissolved gas in the water. The Corps failed
to properly maintain and replace its turbines. As a result, numerous
turbine outages have plagued this migration season. For the second
migration season in a row, the Corps has failed to repair a turbine at
Ice Harbor dam -- resulting in very high levels of dissolved gas at
this project. The gas levels at Ice Harbor have been exacerbated by
the Corps' failure to install gas abatement equipment. (See below)

Turbine Efficiency: Contrary to the recommendations of the NMFS, the
states and tribes, the Corps chose to operate turbine units outside of
the 1% peak efficiency. Doing so makes turbine passage more deadly for
young salmon and steelhead.

Flood Control: The Corps has been inflexible in its implementation of
flood control management, refusing to either alleviate adverse
conditions or to provide better migration conditions. For example, the
Corps drafted Brownlee and Dworshak Reservoirs in early April, prior
to the juvenile migration. If the Corps had maintained these
reservoirs at a level above the flood control level, this water could
have been used to augment the flows in the following periods when
flows dropped below optimum levels.

Failure to Reach Flow Targets on a Daily Basis: Between April 10 and
May 13, flows on the Snake River fell below 100,000 cubic feet per
second (100 Kcfs) for 14 days. During the peak of the juvenile
migration, flows were below 100 Kcfs for 11 consecutive days. As a
result, out migrating fish did not get the
benefits of increased river velocity, -- as called for in the NMFS
Biological Opinion. Meeting velocity and flow targets are also an
important component of Governor Batt's 1996 salmon policy, which you
have publicly supported in the past. The Corps could have taken
measures to augment the river's flow to 100 Kcfs, but chose not to.

Monitoring Equipment: The Corps failed to successful prepare for
monitoring dissolved gas levels during the migration. Even though the
official beginning migration date of April 10th has been set for over
one year, the Corps failed to provide reliable monitoring information
for the first several weeks of the migration. Absolutely no
information was available on Snake River gas levels until after over
400,000 fish moved passed Lower Granite Dam. During this same period,
Corps' delays with the surface collector caused uncontrolled spill
levels of over 100 Kcfs. As a result of the Corps' failure to have
monitoring  equipment operating, salmon managers did not have the
appropriate information to make management decisions during this
period. Periodic equipment failures have continued to plague the
system since then.

Lack of Market for Electricity: This year one of the major energy
imperatives was the need to avoid generating energy. The Bonneville
Power Administration and the Corps of Engineers were slow to develop a
fish-based plan for shedding excess energy. Additionally, the Corps
failed to optimize generation and spill patterns between projects in
the federal hydropower system for the benefit of migrating salmon and
steelhead. As a result, certain river stretches critical to listed
stocks of fish had inappropriately high levels of spill and gas --
needlessly endangering Idaho's migrating salmon and steelhead. The
Corps did not have a formal plan to deal with this situation until a
month into the migration season -- even though fish advocates brought
this issue to their attention well before the migration season began.

Failure to Install Gas Abatement Devices: The Corps of Engineers has
failed to install "flip lips" at Ice Harbor dam. These devices would
greatly reduce the amount of total dissolved gas in the water below
the dam. The Biological Opinion, the Northwest Power Council's
"Strategy for Salmon," and Congress have all directed that these flip
lips be installed by now. 

Failure to Pursue Studies of Drawdowns: The NMFS Biological Opinion
requires the Corps to proceed with studies related to drawing down the
four lower Snake River dams. The Corps has not done so.

Dewatering Screens at McNary Dam: As a result of malfunctions at the
McNary dewatering facility, the Corps did not begin sampling fish
until mid-April. This is a two week delay.

Malfunctions of Turbine Screens: The Corps' new full length screens
have malfunctioned at a number of projects. These screens were
designed to shunt fish away from the turbines. However, chronic
malfunctions have resulted in the removal of these screens. The repair
process requires that turbines be taken off line -- this has
exacerbated the dissolved gas situation at several projects. It is
unclear if these problems are due to poor design or poor
implementation. What is clear is that these new screens should be
removed and the old screens should be put back in to place. This would
eliminate the need for turbine outages while the new screens are
repaired. The Corps has failed to do this.