INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN MYANMAR.

 

Submitted by:

Burma Ethnic Research Group [BERG]

July 1999

 

 

Introduction

 

Internally displaced populations, defined as:

 

‘Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border'—

 

...is certainly not a new phenomenon in Myanmar [Burma], but then internal displacements are all too common throughout the region (Global IDP Survey 1998).  Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines have all been cited in such reports on the problem. The scale of such evictions in Myanmar, however, may well overshadow those which are occurring in other countries of the region, with the possible exception of Laos and Vietnam (UNDP 1997; Jamieson, Le Trong Cuc and Terry Rambo 1998).

 

In recent years displacements in Myanmar, which have occurred as a result of coercive measures against populations have possibly been most visible and hence most documented in urban areas. However in rural remote areas, away from independent scrutiny, the forcible displacement of populations—particularly ethnic minority populations—have been, and are still, going on, on a vast scale. Most notably affected have been the Muslim Rohingyas of Arakan [Rakhine] State, the Shan, Karen [Kayin], Kachin and the Karenni [Kayah] each within their own state, as well other smaller ethnic populations that also live in these same lands.

 

The internal conditions of conflict and coercion within Myanmar that have given rise to such displacements are long-standing, dating back in many areas to the 1950s. Such massive displacements of peoples, however, are only now being reported, or acknowledged, though accurate numbers are difficult to assess due to difficulties of access caused by ongoing civil strife and restrictions on travel imposed by the Myanmar government. The breakdown of public institutions (constituting civil society), a general disregard for legal norms over much of the country, and a lack of consistent data collection by the affected ethnic groupings themselves, have all compounded the difficulties of gathering reliable statistics on the problem.

 

From a humanitarian angle there is great concern being expressed for the victims of these displacements, especially in the border states of the country which are- inhabited largely by ethnic minority groups. Many such displacements are the results of systematic patterns of human rights abuses by warring parties associated with conflicts in ethnic minority areas. Unable or unwilling to cross international borders, and hence to be recognized, at least in international law, as a de facto refugee, these forcibly displaced people become internally displaced persons (IDPs).

 

Whilst the needs are manifold and the total affected population is large, spread over a wide area, the problems of delivery of assistance in such a complex environment are not to be under-rated. Without an understanding of the issues causing the displacement, it is difficult to deliver assistance to the affected population, as well as provide what may be truly essential. International experience (most recently in the Balkans) has confirmed that this is not a unique problem of Myanmar. Indeed, well-intentioned interventions could potentially further aggravate the situation rather than ameliorate it, this being the case as much for interventions from inside the country as those using cross-border channels. 

 

As a result of this complexity evidence-based policies based on active data assessments by agencies need to be developed. Such data assessments should, wherever possible, involve the local communities themselves. Routes to deliver assistance to the displaced communities both from inside and from outside the country should be explored.

 

In the case of Myanmar there seems to have been little serious analysis of the problems of migration and population displacement, its causes, and its various manifestations. This void is especially striking given the scale of the problem. 

 

— Urban displacements in Myanmar

 

According to a 1994 report of the US State Department, an estimated half million residents in Rangoon [Yangon] had been forcibly relocated from the city centre to new satellite settlements on the outskirts of the city between 1988 to 1994. Prior to this, a 1990 UNCHS/Habitat report indicated that between 1989-1990 some 1.5 million people throughout the country (4% of the entire country's population) had been relocated or resettled. Given the small urban population of Myanmar this represents some 16% of the urban population. More than half of this massive social engineering exercise took place in only four cities – Rangoon, Mandalay, Bago [Pegu], and Taunggyi. (BERG 1998) In secondary towns the populations relocated accounted for 22% percent of the total town populations, respectively 120,000 out of 754,520 persons.

 

Considered by UNCHS/Habitat in their 1990 report as unprecedented internationally, for both the scale and the time period involved, these urban relocations or resettlements were undertaken by the government for purposes of land development planning and other urban works. These included development of: housing for civil servants; road, rail and pedestrian passageways; parks and gardens; commercial and residential use; clean up and beautification; and drainage systems and water bodies. An additional cause for much concern, was the accelerated forced relocation of poor communities to new, ill-prepared relocation sites, which was combined with a heavy handedness on the part of the military government to impose law and order standards in newly resettled areas.     

 

Urban displaced people, particularly those- poorest households, have frequently been described in government documents as squatters, although some of them were previously renters or owners of permanent houses. They were often evicted at their own expense to new resettlement sites where conditions were difficult and where social services were lacking or scarce. Some such squatter clearance projects in Mandalay and Rangoon appear to have taken place to punish people after the 1988 upheavals, while ‘fire’ became an effective way of clearing squatters, as old plots are rarely returned to fire victims.

 

The most controversial of these urban displacements were those which concerned the relocation of urban communities to schemes designed as new rural communities. Throughout the early 1990s the government moved squatter communities and other urban populations from urban to border areas where people were to inhabit low population density areas and provide labor for construction and other infrastructure or development activities. Examples of this have been reported in the Kabaw Valley of Sagaing Division and in the Dimosoe area of Karenni State. 

 

— Rural displacements in Myanmar

 

Rural populations in Myanmar have also been characterized by forced resettlement of populations. Natural disasters, economic development projects and the extensive use of forced labor have all accelerated rural displacements. Of these, displacements due to conflict between the military and various ethnic armies have been particularly harsh and have historically produced movements of refugees to neighboring countries, especially Thailand and China.    

 

Myanmar’s rural population has remained around 75 percent of the total population since the 1970s. The majority of the non-ethnic Burmans live in the seven Border States (Kachin, Shan, Chin, Karenni, Karen, Mon and Arakan) which are predominately rural, sparsely populated and located in highland areas. These populations, which include many ethnic sub-groups within each state, have been particularly hard hit by displacement. In some cases displacements appear to be ethnically motivated.

    

Karen State and Tenasserim [Tanintharyi] Division

At war since 1949, the Karen have been much divided by warfare and forcible relocations. Particularly pronounced in the Irrawaddy [Ayeyarwaddy] delta region throughout the 1960s and 1970s, warfare and civilian displacements in the 1980s and 1990s shifted to the Karen National Union’s (KNU) self proclaimed Karen Free State of Kawthoolei on Burma’s eastern border. While accurate figures of displacements in rural areas are hard to access, estimates made in 1998 of the IDPs in Karen State and Tenasserim Division found between 100,000 and 200,000 Karen were internally displaced. The government has been reported to implement forced relocations of small villages to larger villagers or to relocation sites in order to control conflict areas. When combined with the number of people who were then currently in refugee camps in Thailand, it was estimated that approximately 30% (or 480,000) of the rural Karen population of southeastern Burma were currently displaced (BERG 1998).

 

Karenni State.

In Karenni State, in which the Karenni and particularly the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) claim a separate and independent state, conflict has been perpetrated by successive military governments as a way to curtail demands for independence (Smith1994).  Fighting for autonomy or independence since 1948 has (amongst others) resulted in major population displacements in Karenni State. Situated to the north of Karen state, some 25,000 people are thought to have been moved in the mid 1990s to 'relocation sites'—the largest of which Shadaw was alleged to have held [mid-1996] perhaps over 20,000 people from 104 villages. In Karenni State alone some ten 'relocation sites' have been known to exist. The exact situation in each of these sites is not well known. It would appear that evicting villagers from their houses, impounding them in new sites with little in the way of services or opportunities is part of the military government's struggle to wrest control of the territory out of the hands of Karenni insurgents.

 

 This strategy, known as the 'Four Cuts' programme, is undoubtedly based on the anti-communist programme carried out by the British in Malaysia after the Second World War, as well as the 'Strategic Hamlets Programme' of the Americans fighting in Vietnam (Smith 1991). Relocations may also be connected to economic interests in the area. Karenni State has always had an economy based on teak-- some of the biggest stands of teak trees left in Asia are alleged to be in these northern hills. For the government to gain access to teak resources, and of equal importance, hydroelectric power and mining concessions, it may be seen (from their perspective) as a necessary first step to 'pacify' the area, ridding it of its insurgency problem first.

 

Mon State

In Mon State, the Mon have suffered serious displacements after Mon nationalists, under the New Mon State Party (NMSP) took up arms against the military government after the 1962 military coup. Reported to be more urbanized than either Karen or Karenni state to the north, where most inhabitants are mainly rural dwellers, forcible or compulsory displacements have occurred largely in urban areas such as in the environs of Moulemein [Mawlamyaing] city. Whilst displacements in rural areas have taken place, this situation has decreased somewhat, since, following the cease-fire between the government and NMSP, in mid-1995, there is no longer any active fighting in Mon state, except in areas overlapping with Karen-insurgent held areas.

 

Regarding urban displacements between 1995-96, the government announced a plan to construct a new road to circle the city of Moulemein, starting from Nyaungbinzeik village and connecting up with Mupon ward. Hundreds of households were evicted from their homes to make room for this planned road without being given any compensation or housing assistance. The road construction has yet to be completed.

 

Similarly, in 1990 the military government evicted some 3000 families living in Kyettan, Mandalay and Milaungbyin ward of Moulmein for construction of unspecified 'modern buildings'. The approximately 18,000 persons were ordered to move to new relocation sites without compensation—the new sites had no water or electricity supply. Inexplicably, the land vacated has, to date, only been used to build one hotel (Mawlamyaing Hotel), and the rest of it is reportedly standing vacant (Unpublished, 1998).

 

Shan State

Massive internal displacements have occurred in Shan State since the 1950s. Multiple insurgencies have resulted in continued fighting between a variety of armed ethnic groups and the central government into the 1990s. Conflict and displacement has also been compounded by the entry of two other armed parties in Shan State, Kuomintang  remnants from China in the 1950s, and the China backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) between 1968 and 1989. In addition to the ethnic Shan majority, other ethnic inhabitants of Shan State have been affected, including the Pao, Palaung, Wa, Lahu, Kachin, Akha, and Kokang.

 

Since March 1996 internal displacement has again accelerated, despite cease-fires between the government and minority forces in a number of regional areas. 1400 villages spread over an area of 7,000 square miles in central Shan state, affecting an estimated 300,000 people, are reported to have been evicted from their homes and made to move to strategic relocation sites. During 1997 and 1998 it is even said that some of the resettled people were then relocated a second time to yet another site. At no time was any compensation given for loss of property or agricultural livelihood (Shan Human Rights Foundation, 1996/1998).

 

Fig. 1: Total number of villages in Shan state forced to move, since 1996, and since remaining relocated

 

Township

No. villages

No. households

Kun Hing

185

9551

Nam Zarng

181

7296

Lai Kha

201

8796

Ke See

364

11663

Murng Kerng

186

8681

Murng Nai

99

3870

Larng Kher

31

1157

Murng Pan

61

2031

Murng Paeng

24

285

Loi Lem

129

2445

Ho Pong

17

243

TOTAL

1478

55957

[Source: Dispossessed: Forced relocation and extrajudicial killings in Shan State. Shan Human Rights Foundation. April 1998]

 

Arakan State

The situation of the Rohingyas, Muslim inhabitants of this state, has been particularly grim. From December 1991 to March 1992, some 250,000 people left and fled to Bangladesh. The refugees reported that they has been forced to leave their homes because of killings, rapes, forced labour, forced portering and religious persecution by members of the Myanmar army.

 

Human Rights Watch-Asia reported that Muslims were being forcibly moved into two townships of the state (Maungdaw and Buthidaung), and that Burman and Arakanese ethnic families (the latter of which constitute the majority population in the state)  were simultaneously being moved into 'model villages' in the wealthier parts of these same two townships. Many of the new families who are moving in to the area are reported to be military families and their relatives. This process of moving in a new population from outside the area and the confiscation of Muslim-owned land is, along with a prevailing background of human rights abuses, a prime factor for Rohingyas  fleeing to Bangladesh (Human Rights Watch Asia, 1997).

 

The Rohingyas face another hurdle in that they are not considered citizens of the country. They have no ID cards and have to seek permission even to travel outside their own village. Thus, having had their land or property confiscated, they are not even free to travel and settle elsewhere—difficult though even that would be in Myanmar.

 

Other states and divisions of Myanmar

The situation in Chin State and Kachin State has not been well reported, hence the scale of the problem is not known. However, estimates by the Chin and the Kachin peoples themselves reflect large-scale displacement of populations. The Chin National Front (CNF) a pan-Chin nationalist movement, report displacements taking place and estimate that there are between 40-50,000 persons displaced from their homes, many of whom have fled to Mizoram State in northeast India. Figures from Kachin State suggest that perhaps 100,000 were forcibly relocated from their homes by counter-insurgency operations between 1988 and 1992, while other estimates suggest numbers of around 67,000 persons displaced in 1994 alone. Indeed despite the negotiated cease-fire arrangements between the central government and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), who had been fighting each other for over three decades, there continues to be problems of displacement and confiscation of land. In the vicinity of Tanay some 7,000 acres were reported to have been confiscated, in 1he past few years by the army from farmers to be used by the military, principally to grow food. Recently the government put up 27,000 acres of fallow land for paddy production and has opened a land title registration office in Myitkyina to facilitate the transfer of such lands to their new owners. Under the cease-fire agreement between the government and the KIO in February 1994, the issue of resettling previously displaced populations has remained obscure and recurrent and widespread small-scale policies of forced relocation in the state continue.

 

Many such border area 'development' programs, entailing resettlement of populations are carried out under the auspices of the Ministry for the Development of Border Areas and National Races, set up in May 1989. Initiated in the border states where successive central governments have been involved in long–standing conflicts with ethnic insurgent armies, its objectives amongst others, are carrying out ‘all round development’, promoting national unity and termination of poppy cultivation. This program was to extend to 19 distinct border zones with an estimated population of 4,000,000 (MPBANRDA, 1994).  In these zones two groups were eligible for resettlement-- former insurgents who laid down their arms in so called ‘welcome’ sites and populations displaced by military action between the army and insurgents.

 

In the seven largely Burman-inhabited divisions [with the exception of Tenasserim Division], the situation is little better as regards displacements despite the absence of an insurgency war in these areas. Evictions for reasons of city beautification, urban development and infrastructure construction (particularly roads, railways and dams) are likely to be the same as in the seven ethnic-majority states. The construction of the KalayGangaw railway line in Sagaing Division illustrates clearly that the problem of forced displacement are not confined to the war-affected zones. The line crosses mostly flat farmland and paddy fields—these were destroyed without any compensation being paid by the government (Images Asia/KHRG/ Open Society Institute, 1998).

 

Fig. 2: Compilation of some recently reported figures for population displacements[S1]  in Myanmar.

 

State and

Divisions

No. villages

No. households

No. persons affected

Date of data

Source

Karen State

423

21,039

108,280

Dec.  1997

1

Shan State

1,478

55,957

>300,000

April 1998

3

Mon State

?

?

>20,000

Sept. 1998

4

Karenni State

161

?

31,620

Dec.  1998

5

Chin State

?

?

40-50,000

-

6

Kachin State

?

?

67,000

Jan.1994

7

Arakan State

?

?

>250,000

Aug. 1997

12

Yangon

?

84,017

504,000

Oct.1994

20

Mandalay

?

25,000

150,000

May 1990

21

Bago

?

6,000

36,000

May 1990

21

Magwe

-

-

-

-

-

Sagaing

-

-

-

-

-

Ayeyarwaddy

?

?

18,000

May 1990

21

Tanintharyi

?

?

37,000

May 1990

21

 

The Context

 

A preoccupation with the insurgency problem by military dominated governments in the capital has allowed security issues to come to dominate all aspects of government policy making. With state coffers devoid of cash, and a huge army to feed and accommodate, the on-going civil strife needs to be funded by economic activities. The exportation of primary products, such as timber, mining and illicit drugs generate quick cash and are principally located in the border areas. On the side of the insurgents too, cash is required to continue on with insurgency campaigns, which are in some cases, now a half-century old. Hence, winning the war could become equated, for all sides in the conflict, with gaining control over strategic resources.

 

A further concern about the link between strategic resources and warfare which has had a crucial impact on many populations displaced in border states, is that the counter-insurgency campaigns and continued turmoil have led to the confiscation of traditional and ancestral lands from many ethnic minority populations. Even armed groups operating under actual or defacto cease-fires, such as groups of Mon, Pao, Palaung, Wa, Lahu, Kachin, Naga, and Arakan are operating in environments where there is no or little legislation which recognizes traditional or ancestral lands.

 

Lack of Independent Judiciary.

 

In Myanmar today there is little or no rule of law, hence economic projects—be they logging, mining, fishing, road building, construction, or beautification of sites for tourists—offer opportunities to make money for anyone involved. The land laws offer little protection to the rural farmer who in any case would be frightened to take any case against the military for fear of reprisals.

 

The arbitrariness of the confiscation of farmland without compensation of any kind has been detailed by the Mon Information Service (Mon Information Service, 1998).

 

'...confiscation of land, of either agricultural land or 'real estate' has become common and widespread. There are no instances of the authorities' provision of compensation for any confiscation of farmland or real estate'

 

'...according to the 1954 Agricultural Land Nationalization Act, all cultivated lands of the country are owned by the State, and can be repossessed by the State.'

 

Offensives and counter-insurgency operations that contravene the 1949 Geneva conventions ratified by the government in 1992 directly affect a large number of civilian populations. The status of full citizenship is in many cases denied to ethnic minorities, who have a weakened access to basic political and civil rights, not to mention social rights (Article 19. 1996)   

 

Summary

 

Forcible displacement continues throughout Myanmar, both in the ethnic states as well as in the divisions of the country. Evictions are widespread both in the rural and urban areas. Lack of recourse to any independent legal system in present day Myanmar gives many citizens little option but to flee, becoming either internally displaced or refugees in neighboring countries. Warfare, the need for strategic resources and other economic interests are closely linked to forcible displacements in many of the border states. One area for consideration is how all parties, including ethnic groups may be contributing to maintaining this situation, albeit inadvertently. The above indicates the need for urgent and determined attention to this protracted situation.    

 

 

Burma Ethnic Research Group

 

The Burma Ethnic Research Group was formed in 1997 to research, amongst others, displacement amidst ethnic communities in Burma. Working within an applied research environment, BERG focuses on defining the needs of displaced and resettled communities and advocates culturally appropriate, gender sensitive solutions that are implemented in collaboration with local institutions. Drawing on a range of international experience, the group are currently involved in research projects with local partners in the Karen, Karenni and Mon areas. This paper was written for BERG by Steven Lanjouw, Graham Mortimer and Vicky Bamforth.

 

 

 

Sources:

 

1.        Forgotten Victims of a Hidden War: Internally Displaced Karen in Burma. BERG/ Friedrich Naumann Foundation.  April 1998. Chiang Mai, Thailand

 

2.        Uprooting the Shan: Shan Human Rights Foundation. December 1996. Chiang Mai, Thailand

 

3.        Dispossessed: Forced relocation and extrajudicial killings in Shan state: Shan Human Rights Foundation. April 1998. Chiang Mai, Thailand

 

4.        Forced relocation in Mon state, Burma: Unpublished report. October 1998.

 

5.        Unpublished data from Karenni state

 

6.        Unpublished data from Chin state

 

7.        Unpublished data from Kachin state

 

8.        Logging Burma's frontier forests: resources and the regime. World Resources Institute.  August 1998. New York, USA.

 

9.        Forced Evictions and Housing Right Abuses in Asia: 1998. Eviction Watch Asia. Karachi, Pakistan.

 

10.     TOTAL Denial: EarthRights International. July 1996. Bangkok, Thailand

 

11.     Burma: Insurgency and the politics of ethnicity. Martin Smith. 1991. Zed Books, London, UK

 

12.     Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh. The search for a lasting solution. Human Rights Watch Asia. August 1997. London. UK.

 

13.     Abuses against peasant farmers in Burma. Mon Information Service. July 1998. Bangkok

 

14.     All Quiet on the Western Front?  Images Asia / Karen Human Rights Group / Open Society Institute. January 1998. Chiang Mai, Thailand

 

15.     Resettlement & Social characteristics of New Villages in Laos PDR: An Orstrom Survey. Vol. 1 & 2. UNDP/UNESCO 1997. Vientiane, Laos PDR

 

16.     The Development Crisis in Vietnam's Mountains. Neil L. Jamieson, Le Trong Cuc and A. Terry Rambo.                                                        November 1998. East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii.

 

17.     Consice of Master Plan for the Development of Border Areas and National Races. Ministry for Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs 1994. Yangon, Myanmar

 

18.     Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey. Global IDP Survey 1998

 

19.     Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 UNCHR. Ferbuary 1998

 

20.     A Report of Construction. Vol. 1.  Department of Human Settlement and Housing Development 1988-1994 Ministry of Construction. Yangon, Myanmar

 

21.     Human Settlement Sector Review. UNDP Myanmar. May 1990 

 

22.     Ethnic Groups in Burma: Development Democracy and Human Rights.  Martin Smith 1994  Anti-Slavery International

 

23.     Burma Beyond the Law. Article 19. August 1996

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


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