Labour Pains
1 September -
ALTSEAN
Published March 2002
Introduction 2
Dialogue & Democracy 3
What
are concrete steps?
1.
Tripartite Dialogue 2. Release of political prisoners 3. Political freedom
International Relations 7
The Military
Red Carpet, Than Shwe in
Humanitarian Assistance
8
Spdc
Plea Continues, European
Economic Situation 12
Economic
Delusions, A not so merry go-round, Currency & the Kyat, Rampant
Inflation,
International Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, Thailand & Border
Trade,
Drugs 19
United
WA State Army (UWSA): Not in my
backyard, Spdc and Drugs, Drug
Eradication
sham, Money Laundering
Thai-Burma Relations 25
Drugs,
Tensions
The Military 27
Effects
of Militarisation, Reshuffles
Health 29
HIV/AIDS
Human Rights 31
Forced
Labour, Extortion, IDPs, Landmines, Freedom of Expression,
Pinhero’s
first report
Women 41
Refugees & Migrants 43
Refugees,
Migrant Worker Registration –
Ethnic Relations 49
Religious Persecution
51
Chronology 54
Appendix 1: Military
Structure 56
Appendix 2: RTM Statement,
15-16 November 57
Bibliography 63
ISBN: 974-90250-9-1
Published
INTRODUCTION
The people of
Meanwhile, the process of genuine dialogue between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC is experiencing severe labour pains itself. The talks remain shrouded in secrecy and do not appear to have progressed beyond the confidence building stage. There is no tripartite dialogue, only 10% of political prisoners have been released and political freedom remains highly curtailed.
The overall picture of
Those who have fled
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
The talks continue to be plagued by
a cloak of secrecy. Initiated in October 2000, they still have not been
officially announced to the Burmese public. Calls for the talks to be made
transparent have borne no fruits and they remain surrounded by speculation,
uncertainty and irritation. Even
September was a month of
optimism. Not only were the SPDC and Chavalit (based
on a conversation with Khin Nyunt[2])
speaking highly of the talk’s progress, but also Razali was ‘quietly
optimistic’ and U Tin Oo even told Reuters, “I
am more optimistic about the talks. I feel we are gaining more understanding.”[3] However,
the leak of a ‘confidential’ report stating that Aung San Suu Kyi has agreed to
grant military representatives 1/4 of all seats in any
future parliament is considered by Burmese activists to have been manipulated and
purposely leaked and hence reveals a lack of genuine commitment. NLD spokesman,
U Lwin, categorically stated he had no knowledge of a power sharing arrangement
and that in early September “there was in
fact no dialogue process going on.”[4] Denying a Thai source’s claim that
Khin Nyunt was meeting Aung San Suu Kyi every 2 weeks,[5] U
Lwin declared they had not met for several months.
The talks remain in the
confidence building stage one year after their initiation. Even Than Shwe’s statement that “if Suu Kyi were to be elected in an
election, that is democracy and not something we could interfere in”[6]
does not amount to anything more than an interesting comment. To become a
genuine step towards political change, such a statement needs to be firmly
reiterated and developed as one of the key premises for a genuine dialogue
process.
Chavalit’s expectation that “every party in Burma [will] join together
to set up a government to work for the people and the country,”[7]
has yet to be fulfilled. According to Maj.Gen. Kyaw
Win, deputy chief of Military Intelligence, the November reshuffle of the
Burmese authorities [p28] will serve
to benefit the progress of the talks,[8]
but pro-active steps are the crucial element required for such progress. The
troika of Sr.Gen. Than Shwe, Vice-Chairman Gen. Maung
Aye, and Secretary-1 Lt.Gen. Khin Nyunt must take
what Pinheiro has referred to as “bolder
moves”[9]
in order to prove the talks are more than a public relations exercise to
enhance the regime’s international reputation.
Opposition groups and activists
continue to call for increased transparency around the talks and concrete signs
of progress towards political change. To help facilitate this progress, there have
been calls for Razali (latest visit: 27 November-3 December) to play a more
integral role and, on behalf of NCGUB, for Japan in particular to take “more active roles” in promoting
democracy and national reconciliation. NCGUB stressed that granting aid at this
time is not considered to be an
‘active role’ in promoting political change.[10]
What are concrete signs?
Immediate indicators that long-time Burma analysts are
watching out for are:
·
Release of politically significant prisoners including
U Win Tin, U Win Thein and U Aye Thar Aung
·
Release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest
·
Open discussion of the talks in the national Burmese
media.
In the mid-term, the concrete developments that signal
imminent reform are:
1. Establishment of tripartite dialogue
Tripartite
dialogue must be established in order for any political agreement to be
accepted in the long term. Although ethnic leaders have expressed support for
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her role in the talks, this does not eradicate the
necessity for the talks to be tripartite - include the SPDC, NLD and
representatives from ethnic groups. As Khun Tun Oo has said, trust in Aung San
Suu Kyi is a separate issue from the right of ethnic nationalities to speak for
themselves in talks for national reconciliation.[11]
Representatives of ethnic nationalities better know the situation and
experiences of their people and must be actively involved in discussions
concerning their future. While 2-way talks may
be acceptable as a step towards confidence building, leaders of ethnic groups
argue that Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC cannot embark upon national
reconciliation and political change alone, ethnic groups must be included at
every stage of the process.
Ethnic groups have been meeting together, in
order to prepare for tripartite talks.[12] Representatives
from 7 ethnic nationalities established a working committee in August called
the ‘Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Co-operation Committee (ENSCC). The
Committee was established as a framework for different nationalities to work
together for democracy and peace in
Prisoner releases continue to strategically
coincide with visits of UN officials. Razali, Pinheiro and the ILO High Level
team. Long seen as a measure of goodwill, the release of prisoners has been –
and continues to be - extremely slow. Only 10% of all political prisoners –
approximately 200 - have been released since September 2000, most of who had
already completed their sentences and should not have been imprisoned in the
first place.
Members of the Burmese opposition
and UN officials continue to demand the release of all remaining political
prisoners - approximately 1,500, with the NLD 13th anniversary (27
September) bringing a call for the “unconditional
and immediate release”[13]
of Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners. The UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention stated on 12 September, and publicly announced on 26
October, that the SPDC was contravening the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) by arbitrarily detaining 7 political prisoners – the Secretary of
the CRPP and 6 elected MPs.[14]
Political freedom remains
severely curtailed. Only a small number of NLD offices have been permitted to
re-open, most of which are in
The re-opening of NLD offices
appears to be in name only and is not an indication of a genuine improvement in
the political situation, particularly when attacks on political personnel and
most political parties continue. For example, Sai Panlu,
secretary of a township branch of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy
(SNLD) was reportedly forced to resign in September after pressure from the
military.[15]
Decrees suppressing political parties and activities remain firmly in place. Detentions without trial continue, trials do not conform to international standards and people continue to be harassed and imprisoned for dissension with the regime. Such arbitrary punishment for political activity serves to impose upon people’s political rights and has grave ramifications.
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
It will be interesting to see the impact of the re-appointment of George Fernandes, supportive of the Burmese pro-democracy movement. Economic ties and efforts to counter opposition and/or rebel groups have recently been clear focuses of Burma-India relations, without due attention to human rights and democracy processes.
The regime continues to be
bolstered by its more congenial international relations, which have occurred
alongside a decreasing focus on human rights abuses by some members of the
international community.[16]
SPDC officials are increasingly getting the red carpet treatment abroad,
particularly lavish treatment being shown during Khin Nyunt’s visit to
The driving forces of improved international relations
continue to be economic (see Than Shwe in
In a pact of cooperation,
On the invitation of Prime
Minister Mahathir, General Than Shwe visited
HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE, Update
SPDC’s
Plea Continues
The SPDC continues its strategic plea for aid, most notably
following the ILO HLT report and in the regime’s message of congratulations to Annan on winning the Nobel Peace Prize.
Urging the UN to support the regime’s ‘efforts’ to promote
development whilst simultaneously holding a Nobel Peace Laureate under house
arrest for non-violent political activity, Khin Nyunt unwittingly mocked
himself and the regime. Aid was called for again in Khin Nyunt’s speech on the
UN Anniversary, 24 October, where he urged the body to support development in
developing countries.
The SPDC is consistent in pleading poverty and complaining
that Burma receives low amounts of foreign aid, only US$73.2million ($1.6 per
person) from the UN in 1999 -
lower than 11 neighbouring countries.[20]
Some
UN bodies and the
Japanese government –
Until the regime demonstrates political will to protect and provide for the people of
While maintaining trade sanctions
against the regime, the EU – according to an article in the Myanmar Times - has allocated over US$2
million for health care and other humanitarian assistance projects in 
Union General Affairs Council statement, Oct 8). EU has donated over US$6
million since 1996. (see Figure 1)
The EU has also increased its contribution to the UN’s Aids Plan of Action by US$2.2million and is hoping to raise at least US$20m from individual European countries. Aid by the EU is clearly increasing rapidly and it is unclear what conditions are attached to such humanitarian assistance, if any. The EU is a consistent critic of the regime’s political and human rights records and such large packages from this body indicates that much more money will come from other, less critical, bodies. It must be insisted upon that humanitarian aid is accompanied by strict conditions and comprehensive monitoring that ensures aid benefits the people and not the regime.
In what is thought to be a new
player in humanitarian assistance in
After re-engaging with the regime
in July, in recognition of what
Controversy regarding the Baluchaung dam continues. While the regime urges the Japanese Foreign Minister that aid for rehabilitation is crucial, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), human rights and environmental NGOs continue to oppose the aid. The KNPP (22 October) appealed to the Japanese government to reconsider their offer of aid for this project stating “this is not the right time to provide this kind of assistance, as it will not reach the majority of the people who need it most. Since the completion of the power plant […] the people have never benefited from it.”
The KNPP argues that instead of
benefiting civilians in
An MP from
Based upon
interviews by Mekong Watch, there are
3 main points of concern:
1.
2.
The
Tatmadaw continues to use forced labour [in the area].
3.
The
SPDC policies aimed at prioritizing water use for the hydropower plant has had
a serious impact on agriculture in the region.[26]
![Text Box: In 1998, […] the military commander told all the village heads that in Yangon [Rangoon], they were suffering from electricity shortages. The headman said, “electricity for Yangon [Rangoon] is more important than our fields, so even if we cannot farm any more, we cannot complain.” The village head had tried to tell the military commander that they needed water for their field, but he had not listened. – Male, 27 (Mekong Watch interview)](Labour_Pains_files/image006.gif)
There is a strong possibility that repair work on the hydropower station will result in increased conflict and human rights abuses in the area. While the Japanese government says it will “request that [the SPDC] guarantees the security of the area,”[27] it is this same body that is responsible for the immense civilian suffering and hence cannot be trusted to protect the security of the people.
Despite the continuing human
rights violations and lack of concrete progress in the talks, ‘rewards for
dialogue’ continue. In a continued
process of granting debt relief,[28]
* Improving * Stagnant
R Deteriorating
At the 10th ministerial
conference of the Greater Mekong Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (GMS)
countries held in
Although official growth rate figures of
5.9% per annum since 1988 have not been disputed by the report, the ADB maintains
that this growth is closely linked to the agricultural sector which accounts
for 60% of GDP. The potential for further growth in this sector, which employs
66% of the workforce and provides 51% of
Agricultural Woes
Impaired land rights hobble the flow of agricultural
credit and curb investment. State procurement systems impose large implicit
taxes on farmers. For example, in 1999 the procurement policy for rice amounted
to a tax of about 36 percent on farm gate prices, and export restrictions on
rice implied an additional export tax. Productivity growth is also held back by
under-investment in irrigation and the use of fertilisers.
- Asian Development Bank
A
not so merry go-round
Consider one simple case why the
Burmese balance sheet just doesn’t add up. Based on official statistics, tax
revenues in Burma have increased by 6.8% in the first half of 2001 compared
with the same period last year.[36]
An unremarkable statistic - until one considers that even the most conservative
guesstimates of inflation in Burma this year run upwards from 20% per annum.[37]
Coupled with this, the Kyat continues
to depreciate at an alarming rate [see
‘Currency and the Kyat’ below] - it has lost 40% of its value since the beginning
of the year. All other things remaining equal, these two factors should have the effect of increasing tax
collections by an equally large margin – certainly exceeding the reported 6.8%
increase. The fact that this has not happened suggests that business activity
has either decreased substantially or shifted to the untaxed black economy – or
both.[38]
More worryingly, perhaps, for the country’s finances is the fact that Burma’s
rate of taxation, already one of the world’s lowest relative to GDP[39],
continues to fall in real terms and these poor tax revenues contribute to an
ever worsening fiscal position.
The junta reacts in the only way it knows how: by printing more money – as then Deputy Minister for National Planning and Economic Development Zaw Tun[40] admitted in July 2000, “We have been printing money to carry out reforms, development, and constructive tasks. The necessary revenue to run the government is not there and there are no back-up or reserve funds.”[41] This inevitably creates a vicious circle of even more inflation, further depressing the value of the Kyat, which drives even more people into the black economy (for that may be the only viable alternative to financial ruin and bankruptcy) and ultimately, further reducing tax revenues. To make matters worse, the use of these scarce funds are prioritised not to crucial services like health and education but to defence (which accounts for over 50% of government spending) or diverted to bail-out loss making state enterprises. A merry go-round - this most certainly isn’t.
Currency & the Kyat
The Kyat
continues its general downward slide against the US dollar. There was a brief
period of relative - albeit artificial - stability when the open market rate
hovered around the Kt650-680 mark
following the revocation of FEC currency dealer licences in June. However, in a
system where financial opacity is the norm, it takes very little to fuel a
crisis; and rumours circulating Rangoon in November of the possible withdrawal
of large-denomination notes resulted in panic selling of the 500- and 1000-Kyat notes.[42]
Although the junta’s denial that such a plan was afoot (“as long as the military government is in charge, there will be no
withdrawal of the official currency notes”[43])
did help to stop some panic selling, it didn’t stem the fall of the value of
the Kyat which plunged further to Kt720 by the end of November. Money
changers in Rangoon expect it to fall even further.
Worthless Kyat: It's been sliding downwards
for several months now; it's virtually in a free-fall against the dollar.
- Analyst based in
This new low, representing a discount of
40% from the Kyat’s
value at the beginning of the year, reflects the increasingly sorry state of
the Burmese economy which the Asian Development Bank describes as ‘constrained
by growing macroeconomic imbalances and impediments to structural adjustment.’[44]
With an official rate that values the Kyat
a whopping 120 times[45]
over its market value, there’s certainly no fear of the ADB overstating its
case.
Rampant Inflation fuels
looming catastrophe
With a rapidly depreciating currency,
spiralling inflation is taking hold of the lives of ordinary Burmese. Long used to annual rates of inflation as
high as 50% for basic goods and rationing of commodities such as fuel[46],
Burmese now face a hyperinflationary situation where staples such as eggs,
vegetables and peanut oil have more than doubled in price in the period from
September to November 2001. Some families
are reported to have
given up eating meat
altogether in order to be able to
afford essential foods.[47] The prices of gold and motor vehicles have also increased disproportionately as these assets become choice investments in a natural hedge against inflation.[48] Despite government intervention to control the price of rice, reports from western Burma suggest that increases in the price of rice are to blame for several cases of starvation there.[49] There are grave concerns that in the face of this economic crisis, a humanitarian catastrophe is looming – it has been estimated that in Burma, already one child in three is malnourished and within one year, this figure is set to double if the current state of affairs is perpetuated.

International Trade
Foreign trade is up sharply for the first
eight months of 2001. Compared with the same period in 2000, an increase of 33%
was recorded. Transactions totalling US$3,666 million were recorded, comprising
imports of $2,032 million (up 19%) and exports of $1,634 (up a spectacular
53%).[50]
Although still leaving a trade deficit of US$398 million, this appears to be a
major improvement over previous years when trade deficits have habitually been
in the region of US$1,200-1,600 million.[51]
It is interesting to note that exports for the first eight months of 2001
exceed total exports for the whole of
2000 by over US$500 million.[52]
The figures for 2001 are even more remarkable when one considers that they
include a border trade which must have decreased in value following arbitrary
border closures during the period.[53]
Although exports of beans and pulses rose (export earnings up 67% to US$223 for
the first 8 months)[54],
this was countered by a corresponding decrease in forestry product exports of
13% for the first four months of 2001[55].
Equally perplexing is the increase in imports, especially following the
introduction of import restrictions and a ‘Buy Myanmar’ ruling; suggesting that
this policy is perhaps not as effective as hoped.
However one chooses to interpret these
trade figures, the fact that they understate the true size of Burma’s trade and
current account imbalances must be recognised. Missing from the statistics is
the very large proportion of Burma’s trade that takes place via the black
economy – from smuggling and ‘border’ trade, to the tendency to under or
overstate exports and imports to minimise tax and to circumvent exchange controls,
as well as data on trading in illicit drugs.

Pulling Out
Pressure
from human rights and labour groups (as well as the realisation
that being associated with forced labour ain’t so good for sales) has succeeded
in getting more companies, notably apparel firms from the United States, to
withdraw from Burma. The companies which
have given their pledge not to import from Burma include Hanes, Pottery Barn, Crate and Barrel, Williams-Sonoma, Jones Apparel
Group, Jos. A Bank, Phillips-van Heusen, Tommy Hilfiger and Wal-Mart.[56]
Despite these high profile withdrawals, the United States remains the
largest importer of textiles from Burma with trade valued at US$454 million
last year and rising.[57]
Foreign
Direct Investment
In sharp contrast to the figures for foreign trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Burma continues to fall. During the first eight months of 2001, total approved foreign investment projects amounted to a paltry US$50 million, representing a 35% decrease over the same period last year.[58] Neighbouring Asian countries Thailand, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia remain among the strongest investors.[59] Overall however, FDI in Burma has been on a decreasing trend since fiscal year 1998 when FDI, exceeding US$800 million, was at its peak.
Through a combination of
sanctions and a general global economic slowdown, both the quantity and quality
of foreign investment in Burma appears to have been affected with more major names
not wishing to be seen associated with the regime. Foreign businesses with
dealings in
w
A joint venture between Services International,
a local firm, and Chengda Chemical Engineering
Company, a Chinese concern, who are reported as being involved in building an
electricity generator and a urea fertilizer plant in Tanintharyi
Division.[63]

w Mitsui, a
Japanese conglomerate, which has been mentioned in connection with a cement
plant at Myaing-gale in Karen state.
w Petronas, Malaysia’s
national oil company, which is said to be interested in developing a US$100
million extraction plant for the production of butane and propane at Kanbauk.[64]
w A possible venture
between India’s national gas authority and Korea’s Daewoo Corporation to
jointly exploit a gas field in Burmese waters off Arakan state.
Relationship with Thailand
& Border Trade
Burma’s relationship with Thailand improved during the period with Prime Minister Thaksin’s administration’s new Forward Engagement approach. [p25] Business opportunities and money run high on the agenda of both countries: Thai entrepreneurs are keen to exploit Burma’s untapped natural resources, while the Burmese side is desperate for foreign investment and development aid to stave off economic collapse. Following Thaksin’s visit to Rangoon in June, Thailand has agreed to provide funds to build the cross border Kanchanaburi to Tavoy road. In return, Burma has promised Thailand priority fishing rights in the Andaman Sea.[65] Waiting in the wings, as a result of this latest rapprochement effort, are Thai road contractors, mining companies, hotel operators and factory owners who are expected to get lucrative new contracts in Burma.[66] A visit to Rangoon by the Thai-Burmese friendship group in early October enhanced relationships further and laid the groundwork for more trade, fishery and tourism ties.[67]
Friends Again
We
worry very much that the Thais will rush in there without checking to see what
harm they might do. There will be a time to invest, but it must be the right
time.
- Member of
Parliament in exile, on Thailand’s renewed economic interest in
With the thaw in relations between the two countries, border trade has picked up again following the re-opening the Mae Sai-Tachilek crossing. There have even been talks about a second cross-border bridge. Import restrictions on 15 items from Thailand have also been lifted.[68]
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
According to the UNDCP, Burma’s opium gum
production fell from 1,085 metric tons in 2000 to 865 metric tons in 2001[69].
Claiming success for the UN’s continued existence in Burma, the UN agency is asking
for more funds for its crop substitution programmes[70]
for ‘humanitarian reasons’. There are already indications that countries may be
responding – Thailand has recently pledged some 20 million baht for anti-drug
measures and others may be tempted to follow.
However noble these intentions may be,
there is every reason for donor countries to pause and carefully consider the
underlying causes behind Burma’s drug problem. It is not a case of pure poverty
that has driven Burmese farmers to grow opium. Nor is Burma’s position as the
world’s leading drug producer an accidental one. The many (and growing numbers
of) heroin and methamphetamine factories are not
located on the Burmese side of the Thai, Laotian and Chinese borders by
coincidence. Nor are the poor seizure rates of drugs in Burma (while its
neighbours make ever larger seizures) a result of poor intelligence.
The fact is drugs in Burma has been and
continues to be inextricably linked to, and wholly supported by, the ruling
SPDC. However much is said about rebel groups, insurgency, poverty or
‘humanitarian reasons’ to justify the giving of aid – the fact remains: without
any change to SPDC’s overall governance of the country, there will be no
significant change in drug policy. Under prevailing circumstances, anti-drug
aid will help perpetuate the status quo.
Lt Gen Khin Nyunt, on his visit
to

Anti-drug experts, however, remain deeply skeptical - and for good reason.
Sources at the border report that a directive had been received from

Far from giving up drugs, some other reports suggest that the Wa are looking at
alternative routes and markets for their products. The interception of two
boats carrying five million methamphetamine tablets
and 100 kilograms of heroin destined for Singapore in January revealed the
existence of a new smuggling route that stretches from the Burmese border town
of Tachilek to the sea, via the newly opened deep
water port in southern Burma, dubbed the ‘Silk Road of Drugs’.[75]Some
anti-narcotics officials believe this route unites the Wa with Lo Hsing Han, a former drug baron whose Asia World Corporation
is conveniently involved in port operations, and who has strong business
connections in
SPDC
and Drugs
Joint Venture Drug Partners
Many
of the top generals in the SPDC have benefited personally and directly from drug
trafficking activities. Some such as Khin Nyunt have organised their own shares
in drug production and movement operations. Others have made lucrative deals
with drug gangsters… - Professor Desmond Ball
The reluctance and inability of the SPDC to
effectively tackle the drug problem suggests the complicity of the junta in the
highly profitable smuggling network, both at a national and local level. With
an economy on the verge of collapse [see
Economic Situation] drug smuggling remains one of the few viable businesses
in Burma – yielding high returns for a relatively low outlay. The extent of the
SPDC’s involvement is also set to increase as the economic downturn affects
Burma and further reduces the government’s meager revenue.
Not content with ‘taxing’ the trade, the military,
which takes the largest share of government expenditure and thus most affected
by the country’s economic woes, has now been encouraged to partake in the
business of drug trafficking itself. Bereft of funds, many battalions have been
left to their own devices and are being directed to carry out any business –
whether legal or not.
Anecdotal evidence from various sources suggest that
the involvement of the SPDC in illegal businesses is already widespread
throughout the country, in both the trafficking and production of drugs.
Examples abound. In
Relationships between the military and the UWSA are
also believed to be increasingly symbiotic with regular high level meetings
held between the area battalion commanders and Wa officials. A recent meeting
apparently concluded with a series of ‘agreements’[80]
which included:
·
Proceeds from the sale of drugs to be divided equally
between the Wa and SPDC
·
One baht from the sale of each methamphetamine
pill (current price 11 baht per pill) to be contributed towards the cost of
running the army
Drug
Eradication Sham
It’s a Show
There
is no question that the Burmese government is using the drug issue to “sell”
itself internationally; being unable to show a decent human rights record, it
believes that it would be re-accepted into the international community if it
can show some impressive seizures of drugs and other statistics, which actually
bear little resemblance to the reality on the ground in the Golden Triangle.
- Bertil Lintner
The SPDC’s public relations exercise continues relentlessly – with news of drug seizures and public demonstrations of drug eradication efforts dominating mass media reports in Burma. The fact that these seizures represent a negligible proportion of the entire trade in Burmese narcotics [see Figure 2] is not mentioned; nor is the freedom of the country’s largest drug barons to live very comfortably in Rangoon’s posh suburbs ever questioned.
Much of the fanfare surrounding
the improving relationship between
However, despite the rhetoric,
drug seizures by Burmese authorities have been on a declining trend since 1998.
During the first six months of 2001, a measly 28 kilograms of heroin and 475
kilograms of opium were seized[83] –
this is just 30% of total heroin and opium seized in 2000 and less than 10% of
the 1998 haul. Even if one discounted the SPDC’s new outwardly anti-drug stance
as pure rhetoric, such poor seizure rates are starkly inconsistent with what should have been expected from a country
which reclaimed the dubious title of ‘world’s biggest producer of opium[84]’ in
2001. Based on the statistics, it is difficult not to conclude that the SPDC’s
much publicised drug seizures and burnings are done
purely as a public relations stunt for the consumption of potential foreign aid
donors - and there is very little, if any, real commitment to eradicate drugs
in Burma.
Money Laundering
Burma continues to be a haven for
money launderers. According to the US State Department, Burma’s weak anti-money
laundering laws and under-regulated financial systems make it easy for money launderers
to funnel funds through and out of the country. The importance of drug
trafficking, and the fact that the SPDC positively encourages ex-drug barons to
make
The enactment of tough
legislation to combat money laundering in neighbouring Thailand has resulted in
an increasing number of cases and arrests specifically linked to the drug trade
– and these inevitably involve a Burmese connection. Much money laundered
through Thai banks and stock markets,[86]
are believed to be linked to the UWSA – with the fear that that there is plenty
more which goes undetected through
In Burma however, drug barons have much less to fear and the peace of mind to launder their money in the safety of friendly ‘no questions asked’ banks. That is perhaps why, despite the poor state of the economy, some local banks are doing a roaring trade[87]. In fact, the distinction between illegal activity and the legitimate economy is becoming increasingly blur - whether it be the Wa announcing the opening a factory in Sagaing to produce cables for electronic products[88] or Lo Hsing Han’s Asia World building a new wharf in Rangoon[89] - for Burma, perhaps, the drug business is the legitimate economy.
R Improving * Stagnant * Deteriorating
Thailand, under the Thaksin
government, seems to have fully adopted the ASEAN way of non-interference and
is failing to mention human rights abuses on all counts. The only mention of
the talks with Aung San Suu Kyi is in a context of support for the process of
national reconciliation. This, despite international outcry at continued human
rights violations forcing many to flee to
While some may feel that Thaksin and his government are eager to improve relations
with Burma to overcome the ‘drug problem’, the wider picture is clearly
business oriented. During Khin Nyunt’s trip to
It is thought that Khin Nyunt’s
trip was to pave the way for Gen. Than Shwe to visit
Key
results arising from the visits include:
·
Enhanced
economic projects and agreements
·
Normalised
trade relations
·
Agreement
regarding establishment of a Thai-Burma cultural and economic association
·
Burma released
some 60 Thai prisoners[91]
·
Agreement for
joint-task force to handle repatriation of ‘illegal’ migrant workers from
Thailand to Burma
·
Thai funds to
assist in drug efforts
·
Preferential
treatment to be granted to crop substitution imports to
·
Thai-Burmese
Joint Commission, scheduled to meet in Phuket in December to discuss border
issues. (It was agreed during the 19th Regional Border Committee meeting,
Pattaya (September) that there would be no reinforcement or moving of Thai and
Burmese soldiers in the disputed areas of Doi Lang, Chiang Mai and Kuteng
Nayong, Chiang Rai. It was also agreed that the Township Border Committee will
meet monthly from now on.)
The trafficking of drugs from
Burma remains the biggest problem between the 2 neighbours. Khin Nyunt told
Despite the glossy veneer that has been slathered onto Thai-Burma relations, there remain tensions. It is proving to be an arduous task for Thailand to convince Burma that they are not in the business of providing support to armed insurgents, as this issue is raised periodically.[92] It remains to be seen whether enhanced diplomatic ties between the Thai government and Khin Nyunt will extinguish these accusations. Of more immediate concern to Thailand, a report from Shan State indicates that Burmese troops moved up to the Thai border were still present in September with tanks and arms.[93] Furthermore, armed violence continues to spill onto, or directly cross into, Thai soil. In mid-October an unknown armed group fired from the Burmese side, at a Thai Border Patrol Police near Mae Hong Song, injuring 4 Thai police.[94] There was also violence rumoured to occur on Thai soil, targeting a refugee camp. [p43]
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
Burma’s military and subsequent militarisation is set to
increase with Malaysia-Burma
military ties strengthening. Such a situation can only have negative consequences
for civilians in Burma. High degrees of militarisation in
Furthermore, a militarised state breeds fear among the
wider, particularly civilian, community and further desire to arm; force and
violence, even the threat of it, induces further force and violence in
response. The SPDC and its allies encourage violent acts against the state by
legitimising such acts in their own actions. A recent example of retaliatory
violence was the September bomb planted at the Arakan State Union Solidarity
and Development Association (USDA) Annual General Meeting, attended by several
SPDC officials, including Brig-Gen Than Swe,
commander of military operations, and over 400 USDA members.[96]
The civilian community often suffer disproportionately from armed conflict and terrorist attacks, as was the case in late October when a group of unknown gunmen ambushed the Tavoy-Ye passenger train. 1 passenger was killed and 6 others wounded.[97] Militarisation and continued armed conflict also disrupts infrastructure and other projects (aside from this, note that these projects are often arenas for forced labour), for example the inauguration ceremony at the Thai border for the Kachanaburi-Tavoy international highway was postponed due to fighting.[98]
There were further reshuffles among many important SPDC ranks, including air force, defense and intelligence officers in September. Col. Thein Swe was appointed chief of Air Force external intelligence while Lt.Col. Sithu, in favour with Khin Nyunt, became deputy chief of Border Security with the Air Force’s Intelligence Unit.[99] In parallel to this, a report referenced by NCGUB suggested that the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) had been downsized.[100] Many speculate that these changes were part of the power struggle between Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, who leads the intelligence wing, and Gen. Maung Aye, head of the combat wing.
Retirement was taken by Vice Admiral Maung Maung
Khin (72), Lt.Gen. Tin Tun (70), Win Sein (Minister
for Culture, around 60), Aung San (Minister for Cooperatives, around 60) and
Saw Tun (Minister for Immigration and Population, around 60). Due to the
secrecy and unaccountability that surrounds the SPDC and its actions, it is not
known if the 5 were all in fact ‘retirements’ or if dismissals occurred.
Similarly, it is unclear whether changes are part of a
political power struggle, connected to the forced labour issue and the ILO,[101] the talks with
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or “simply
to inject young blood into the Ministry of Defence and to improve the
efficiency,” as
the SPDC reported.[102]
(Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia denied allegations that he was behind the
changes.) The only certain thing is that the size of the cabinet has shrunk,
and power is now firmly concentrated among the top 3 Generals: Leader Senior
Gen. Than Shwe, army chief Gen. Maung Aye and Lt.Gen.
Khin Nyunt, benefiting the latter the most as he is in full control of
intelligence.
Ne Win was treated for a serious medical
condition, reportedly a heart attack, in a Singaporean hospital in early
October. He returned to Rangoon soon after.
* Improving R Stagnant
* Deteriorating
The health situation in Burma remains a disaster, with the regime failing to take appropriate steps to provide for basic health needs. The Burma representative at the Regional Committee Meeting of the World Health Organization (WHO) - held in Burma in early September – propagated health as a priority and 4th largest recipient of the government budget after agriculture, construction and education. The glaring omission of military funding - a much vaster amount (see figures in Burma’s Plea (October 2001)), attempts to deny the regime’s gross misuse and misdirection of budgetary funds. The SPDC continues to use the degenerate health care system (largely a result of its own doing, for which it takes no responsibility) and the ill effects on the people of Burma as a political tool, complaining about inadequate available resources at the Regional Committee Meeting of WHO. This tactic is a continuation of previous ploys to obtain international aid.
The latest line is that heath services
and utilities are strained as a result of urbanisation. Population Department
Director, Khin May Aung, stressed that people, especially children, are better
off in rural areas than urban and said that continued migration to urban areas
will lead to labour shortages in the agriculture sector. [103] Although the higher salary in urban areas was
noted, there was very limited understanding of the push factors of migration
such as human rights abuses in rural areas which include extortion by military
personnel and numerous forced relocation programmes. There was also no discussion
of the extremely inadequate health services in rural areas where population
densities are among the lowest in the region. (The SPDC has a vested interest
in limiting the numbers of people in urban areas as these have been arenas of
political dissent.)
HIV/AIDS
At the WHO meeting, the Health
Minister continued to deny the HIV epidemic inside
The Health Minister insisted at
the WHO meeting that the West has vested interests in portraying a “gloomy picture” and that in reality the
regime is committed to addressing HIV/AIDS by “using all its available resources.”[106]
According to a SPDC-run radio programme, the regime is “systematically carrying out anti-HIV and AIDS works, [though] it is not
widely publicized in the international circle.”[107]
The message on the AIDS poster, defended by Khin Nyunt at the WHO meeting as an
effective method of tackling the spread of HIV/AIDS, reads: Aids kills, no cure, no hope. Such grim
reaper tactics have proven to be limited in their effects, with condom usage
and community initiated projects much more rewarding. (Khin Nyunt insists that
people in Burma will not accept condom usage due to ‘cultural beliefs’ –
clearly a topic open to much dissension, and community based projects require
freedom for individuals and groups to organise and move freely – something the
totalitarian regime vehemently suppresses.)
The SPDC unsurprisingly used the
WHO meeting as an opportunity to highlight the limited international assistance
that Burma receives,[108]
but clearly failed to acknowledge that it must show genuine commitment in tackling HIV/AIDS before international
assistance will be unhindered. For this to be done effectively, the regime must
acknowledge the severity of HIV/AIDS and allow for accountable health practices
within a democratic space allowing people to organise, speak and be heard. To
quote Dr. Khin Saw Win, “While health is
understood to include physical, mental and social well-being, it is concluded
that the violation or neglect of any human right will impact adversely on
health.”[109]
* Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating
Forced Labour The HLT’s Itinerary:
17-22 September Rangoon; meetings: ministers, deputy ministers & senior
officials, Lt.Gen.Khin Nyunt, leadership of the NLD,
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (19 September), diplomats, UN Country Team,international
and national business communities, local and international NGOs, ICRC,
ceasefire groups, ethnic nationalities representatives of the CRPP &
religious leaders
23-27
September field trips in
various parts of Burma, 2 groups
28-29 September comparison meeting of 2 groups,
30 September-4 October field trips
5 October Rangoon; meetings:
Implementation Committee, Sen.Gen.Than Shwe, Gen.Maung Aye, Lt.Gen.Khin Nyunt,
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, diplomats, UN country team, business community
7
October Bangkok, meeting: 2
researchers stationed in Bangladesh
7-11
October Thai-Burma border;
meetings: NGOs, other groups & individuals in
Reports of forced labour continue,[111] with a report in Shan State coinciding with Gen. Maung Aye’s visit to the area. The ILO High Level Team (HLT) which team visited Burma found reports of forced labour to be substantiated in areas beyond central Burma, with high levels remaining in militarised & remote areas, particularly southern Shan State & eastern Kayin State.[112] The situation is also particularly severe in northern Rakhine State, disproportionately targeting Muslims, while Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD provided 2 documents with numerous allegations of forced labour in central Burma.
The HLT stated that many people did not feel free to speak
openly with them, some interviewees explicitly saying so. (It has currently not
been determined whether the regime delivered its guarantee of protection to all
who spoke with the ILO.) The picture portrayed by interviews in Burma were then
considered to have underestimated the problem, especially when people along the
Thai-Burma border – not fearing retribution by the military – described a much
more devastating situation: “Forced labour in most of the forms previously
identifies seems still to prevail, particularly in villages which were close to
a military camp. All too often it was accompanied by acts of cruelty.”[113]
Evidence of forced labour collected by the HLT often
paralleled with reports by NGOs and ethnic groups,[114]
strengthened the opinion that the SPDC has not taken sufficient action to stop
the practice of forced labour. The HLT found that dissemination of the Order
banning forced labour was far from adequate. There were vast geographical
variations regarding knowledge of the ban among the general population.
Significant numbers had never heard of the ban, while in many cases
dissemination of information
A major obstacle to implementation of the order is the lack of an adequate legal structure, meaning there is no course for complaint or redress. A document passed to the HLT by the Ministry of Home Affairs document regarding ‘action taken’ “was a totally inadequate response […] yet no other response was made, nor, it seems, could be.”[116] Complaints are to be made to the very same people issuing forced labour orders. Interviewees stated they were scared of reprisals and the HLT received accounts of beatings, detention and other violations in return for lodging complaints of forced labour. Others stated that language, cost and distance barriers effectively prevented them from being able to seek redress for forced labour orders.
A second major obstacle is seen to be the
doctrine of ‘self-reliance’ among battalions. Battalions are usually granted
insufficient resources, including food, and hence have no incentive to cease
using forced labour. Rangoon presented no evidence to the HLT to show budgetary
allocations to pay for alternative sources of labour, suggesting that none have
been made. It further appears many officers consider it their right to demand
forced labour. It is thus clear that publishing the order is not sufficient,
but a genuine campaign against forced labour must be undertaken.
The HLT report expressed profound concern that
forced labour continued in
As a step towards this end, the HLT recommended that the ILO be granted permission to form a permanent presence in Burma to monitor the credibility of the junta’s commitment and to provide means for investigations and redress. Burmese authorities rejected the proposition “as it was a delicate matter involving Myanmar’s sovereignty.”[120] The regime also rendered all accounts of forced labour raised by the HLT as unfounded,[121] exposing Khin Nyunt’s invitation to the HLT (to inform him of violations) as a façade of good intention. Predictably, the Burmese ambassador used his address to call upon the ILO to lift sanctions at the next assembly in June 2002.
Members of the European
Parliament are beginning to call for the EU to ban all new investments in
Burma, as the US has done. Following accusations made in the European Parliament
of Premier and Total’s complicity in human rights abuses in Burma (based upon a
report by Earth Rights International), the Chairman of Premier Oil wrote a
letter denying use of all forced labour.[122]
This echoed testimonies given at the parliament’s Development and Co-operation
committee hearing. However, the corporate responsibility officer has admitted
that they are not fully aware of the situation. “We do not have the capacity ourselves at this point in time to give
everybody a full assurance that we understand exactly what is going on in the
pipeline area.”[123]
Meanwhile, a trucker’s
Unocal failed in its bid to dismiss claims that it facilitated and abetted human rights abuses on the Yadana Pipeline project. California Superior Court Judge, Victoria Chaney, has facilitated the suit by Burmese villagers against Unocal to proceed in the State court. The charges are that Unocal, a Los-Angeles-based corporation, violated the Californian constitution and unfair business law. US Federal charges are still on appeal at the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
Unocal is also the target of student activism
and 6 Nobel Laureates. The laureates wrote a letter supporting a resolution
passed by the University of Virginia Student Council calling for the UVA Board
of Visitors to divest the University’s 50,000 shares of Unocal stock.[124]
The stock was sold, but officials, said the decision was based solely upon
financial reasons and did not imply a change of policy. Students are continuing
to exercise pressure on the Board to adopt an ethical investment policy and
agree not to add Unocal back into the portfolio at a later date, as is
currently possible.
In a misguided attempt to reduce international criticism, the authorities in certain locations have increased the use of prisoner forced labour instead of civilian forced labour. This has meant a dramatic increase in sentences for minor, even non-criminal “offences” in order to increase the supply of prisoner labourers. According to an NDD statement, “From 6am to 6pm they [prisoners] are made to work without a break. Clearing jungle, removing tree stumps, digging ditches and dams and weirs, ploughing fields, planting and harvesting are some of the work.”[125]
In October it emerged that 200 prisoners in Monywa were to be sent to hard labour camps in Tamu district on the Indo-Burma border. The 200 were to replace over 120 prisoners returned to prisons on the recommendation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) due to health and age concerns. Similar replacements were made using prisoners from Kalay prison, this time before ICRC had visited. Conditions at the labour camps, or ‘new life projects’, are bad with prisoners suffering from exhaustion due to physical abuse, long working hours, insufficient food and drinking water, health concerns and inadequate healthcare. The death rate at the labour camps, according to leaked SPDC figures, varies between 24-30% annually.[126]
The Police Director-General's Office has reportedly issued
an emergency directive that criminals should be charged, sent to court, and
sentenced immediately so that they can then be used as porters and fighters. 475 prisoners
were reportedly sent to a logistics battalion in Pa-an to be deployed in
offensives in Karen State,[127] while in October
500 Moulmein prisoners were sent to work at the
Military headquarters in Ye Township, Mon State and used for portering. Of these, 32 prisoners have
died and 127 absconded, reportedly resulting in a request for an emergency
supply of 500 more prisoner porters to help search for the NMSP splinter group.[128]
[p50-51]
Extortion in the form of forced requisition, forced
procurement and ‘taxation’
continues, sometimes to pay for labour costs to replace forced labour.[129]
Below are some examples:
Villagers in Wanzing were faced with a 37-man patrol demanding 3 tons of teakwood (a major export) in August. The area is known not to be a teak one and when villagers had to tell this, the officers demanded Kt210,000 instead. Knowing they would face punishment upon refusal, money was collected along with 50 viss (1 viss=1.6 kg) of chicken, 5 pairs of shoes and 13 sacks of peanuts.[130] Other villagers, in Natkyizin, were ordered to supply materials for infrastructure projects.[131]
Soldiers continue to demand forced purchase of goods by threatening
punishment for non-compliance. Villagers in Wanzing
were forced to sell 520
viss of peanuts for
Kt250 per viss (market price Kt450),[132] farmers in Kengtung
to
sell 12 baskets
of unhulled rice per acre of field land at Kt350 per basket (market price Kt1,300)[133]
and villagers
in Shan State were forced to purchase rice they had previously been forced to
sell. To quote a villager, “they
had paid us only Kt350 per basket during their forced purchase, we had to pay
them Kt2,000 to get our rice back. The officials, as a result, cleared nearly
Kt500,000 from us."[134]
Regional commanders continue to confiscate farms belonging to local people, and in mid-September it was reported that former owners were subsequently forced to ‘volunteer’ their labour on now-military agricultural projects.[135] Land confiscation is particularly abhorent as it denies people the ability to provide food, work and own property.
IDPs
The SPDC is continuing its attack of Karen in Papun, Taungoo and Nyaunglebin districts, resulting in hundreds
more internally displaced persons (IDPs). There are reported to be 37,007 IDPs
in Papun district, with over 50 villages forcibly relocated, over 13,000 IDPs
in central and eastern Nyaunglebin district with 370,000 displaced in
relocation sites in the western lowlands and 9,600 IDPs in Taungoo
district with 15 relocation sites. IDPs are subjected to high levels of militarisation
and numerous and grotesque human rights violations including: destruction of
rice supplies, looting, forced relocation, rape, torture and murders, blocked
passage and mobility restrictions, forced labour, military portering and human
landmine sweeping.[136]
According to the KHRG, people in at least 25-30
villages were forbidden to leave their villages from the period of September -
November, even to attend to their fields. The military prohibited movement as it
had reportedly planned a major offensive against the Karen National Liberation
Army (KNLA). This was disastrous for the villagers as this is the last part of
the growing season and rice harvest, and this is predicted to “ lead to starvation within the next few
months.”[137]
Landmines continue to be used against armed and civilian
targets, both by the SPDC and their opposition.[138]
Border security forces and Burmese forces have embarked in widespread new
landmine planting along the Burma-Bangladesh border since 15 October, the end
of the rainy season. Within 2 weeks 7 mines had exploded, creating fear among
local populations. Numerous landmines are also planted along the Thai-Burma
border, killing one monk and injuring another in early November as they walked
to a religious festival. (Travel restrictions had been imposed on villagers in
the area due to reported insurgent activity.)
The November meeting of South East Asian officials, social
activists and victims of landmines was concerned with raising money for
landmine clearance and increasing the social status of survivors. A Burmese
representative agreed to attend when it was decided there would be no political
discussion.
The September 11 attack in the US provided the SPDC with further excuse to crack down on Muslims. [p51-52] Severe punishments were promised to the distributors of anti-American pamphlets, reportedly distributed widely among Muslim communities. The pamphlets allegedly accused the US of blaming Muslims and Osama Bin Laden for the attacks without evidence. Echoing sentiments expressed throughout the Muslim world, the pamphlets also allegedly called on Muslims from Burma to join the global jihad (holy war) against America.[139]
Generally, freedom of expression continues to be strictly controlled for political reasons. A special investigation team questioned all official staff in Kawthaung regarding the leak of departmental information to foreign broadcasting stations. The investigation was clearly political in nature as personal political histories, particularly association with the NLD and the democracy uprising of 8.8.88, were the focus questions.[140]
Myo Myint Nyein, imprisoned since
1990 for exerting his right to freedom of expression, received the 2001 Canadian International Press Freedom Award
on 11 November 2001. To quote the Burma Media Association President, Maung Maung Myint, “this
precious award has now highlighted the plight of these courageous people and
the oppressed Burmese media society.”[141]
In the context of the regime’s totalitarian control and increasing distribution of its print mouthpieces,[142] increased numbers of satellite licenses and 4,000 email accounts do not promise greater freedom of information or expression. Issuance of thousands of satellite licenses is a great money maker for the regime, costing at least Kt12,000 (US$20) each.[143] Satellites and email accounts are registered, giving the regime greater knowledge of who is accessing what information. While it is certain that the new state run MRTV 3, which ‘tells the truth’ about Burma, will be a certain satellite channel listing, it is equally certain that restrictions upon TV viewing, email and the internet will be maintained.
The UN Special Rapporteur’s report for the period January to mid-August 2001, including his first visit to Burma in April, was made public on 2 October[144] His report was largely uncontroversial and seemingly encouraging of the regime’s ‘progress’ in the context of human rights.
Professor’s Pinheiro’s lack of realism did not inspire faith among human rights activists. While making supportive noises to engage the regime’s, he omitted the fact that the human rights situation had not significantly improved, illustrated by continued reports of human rights abuses – including forced labour, and the lack of redress available.
Pinheiro’s
Itinerary:
9 October Rangoon,
meetings: Khin Nyunt, Government officials, representatives of political parties
including Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD Central Executive Committee, Chairman &
Vice Chairman, secretary & spokesperson, ethnic minority leaders,
journalists, business men, educational, religious, academic & other
institutions, UN country team, diplomats, international civil society
organisations (meeting with NLD central leadership, scheduled Friday 12
October, was cancelled)
13 October Shan State: Lashio, Wa cease-fire area, Muse, Lashio prison
14
October Mandalay, meetings: local authorities, NLD office, Mandalay central
prison, Hton-Ba labour camp, Univeristy
in Sagaing Division
17 October – mission suspended due to illness
Cancelled itinerary: Kachin State, Insein prison, labour camp near Rangoon, higher
education institutions, interviews with recently released political prisoners.
Pinheiro was generous in his thanks to the regime for their
cooperation. Pinheiro clearly wishes to establish good working relationships
with the SPDC in order that he is allowed to re-enter and continue with this
mandate inside the country. We can therefore be assured that Pinheiro will not
rock the boat too much. (Lallah
was outspoken in his condemnation of human rights in Burma and was never
allowed to visit the country.) Speech
of ‘improvements’ and “several positive
initiatives”[145]
including the controversial Australian government human rights workshops and
the establishment of a ‘governmental’ Committee on Human Rights, with no details or
reservations, supports this opinion.
However, this paper was more encouraging than his previous comments.
Pinheiro spoke of the release of political prisoners and
while he was clear that approximately 1,500-1,600 remain incarcerated, he did
not state
that a significant number had already served their sentences and that they
should not have been incarcerated in the first place. Pinheiro also spoke of the cessation of media criticism of the NLD
and permission of parties to re-open offices, although he failed to directly follow
these improvements with facts pertaining to remaining political restrictions severely
limiting political behaviour and imposing upon political rights. He also failed
to emphasise that only limited
numbers of political offices have been granted permission to re-open and that
most of these are NLD offices in Rangoon. He presumes that all legal parties
are allowed to open offices; he
does not know. [see Dialogue &
Democracy for further details & discussion]
Pinheiro did report that women NLD members were particularly at risk to dangers posed by constant surveillance; that freedom of expression is drastically and unduly curtailed and violation subject to extreme punishment; that political arrests are ongoing, albeit reduced; that Muslims are violently targeted as a result of their faith; and that civilians, or in his words “pawns of war”,[146] suffer from arbitrary and discriminate violence. While clearly stating, “I have received reports of gross violations of human rights of civilians living in areas of conflict between the army and armed groups […] many of which are substantiated by reliable evidence,”[147] there was however no mention of human rights abuses in non-conflict areas.
Pinheiro spoke of the highly autonomous and highly controversial Wa cease-fire area. Welcoming the ‘achievements’ in this area, Pinheiro however did state that, “A regular, substantive and transparent access to those areas to conduct factual research is required before [he] can speak fairly and authoritatively about the multiple factors which contributed to these developments.”[148]
The report continued by asserting
that while prison conditions remain inadequate, they had experienced “incremental improvements in the areas of
sanitation, food quality, access to basic medicine and medical treatment, and
family visits in recent years,” partly thought to be a result of SPDC
cooperation with ICRC’s prison protection mandate since 1999 and prison
regulations in 1997.[149]
Disappointingly and crucially, there was very little mention of safety and
human rights abuses in prisons. While Pinheiro was told of violence, he claimed
he “was not in a position to assess to
what
extent.”[150] Furthermore, while speaking of the high mortality in labour camps, he failed to categorically condemn them as institutions.
Pinheiro’s commitments for future
action:
w
Closely
examine the issue of deaths in custody
w
Look into
violence against Muslim communities
w
Look into
denial of access to education
w
Further visits
to prisons
Hoping to develop a detailed account of the human rights
situation in Burma, it is vital that Pinheiro heeds U Lwin’s criticism – that he has not yet spent enough time
consulting local communities, including prisoners, opposition activists and
ethnic minorities.
The registration of migrant
workers in
Figure 1: Registration
of Women Migrant Workers from Burma
(Source:
Labour Dept, RTG)
|
Sector |
Number of
registrations |
|
1. Domestic services |
53,744 |
|
2. Agriculture |
28,595 |
|
3. Fishing |
27,637 |
|
4. Construction |
11,411 |
|
5. Livestock |
5,525 |
|
6. Transport |
1,851 |
|
7. Rice mill |
1,279 |
|
8. Pottery |
1,128 |
|
9. Mining |
383 |
|
10.1.
Others |
53,757 |
|
10.2.
Without employer |
8,555 |
|
TOTAL |
193,865 |
It is well established that thousands of women from Burma are forced into sex work in Thailand. Many women sex workers are grossly exploited by traffickers, officials, employers and clients, and life is more dangerous with the registration process as the clamp-down on undocumented migrants is increasing.
Particularly concerning is the
Burmese junta’s recent agreement to accept repatriation of women who have
worked in the sex industry. A World Vision aid package is facilitating the
supposed ‘rescue’ of women from the sex
industry, ‘rehabilitation’– seemingly a few months education on the border, and
repatriation to
The
vision, aimed at preventing trafficking, appears severely short-sighted as
these women have fled Burma for various and often horrific reasons and may face
untold misery upon return. Although at the time of writing exact conditions and
details of the programme are not known, reports of harsh treatment of returning
sex workers do not inspire hope for the women’s safety, particularly as they
are delivered into the hands of the Myanmar Department of Social Welfare.
Discrimination and violence against women in and from Burma continues to be largely unreported. As is common in most communities, due to overlapping prejudices and voyeurism, gender violence that receives the most attention is that targeting sex workers. In a November report telling of a woman’s violent murder, along with 4 policemen, readers are told that the woman was reported to be a sex worker. [152] This information is irrelevant to the story and was unconfirmed.
The tragic murder of Deena Naw in Canada in early September bears testament to the fact that gender violence and discrimination can target any woman and urgently needs to be addressed within communities, both in and outside Burma. Denna Naw was violently beaten to death in her home, allegedly by her husband.[153] While speaking of the injustice of the murder, newspaper reports only hint at, but do not directly confront, the sexism that ignores women and their valuable contributions and, far too often, literally batters them.
* Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating

Figure 1: Population
receiving BBC assistance, 2001[154]
In early September Thai military authorities increased security around Ban Bae Koh refugee camp on the Thai-Burma border, home to 37,000 Karen, following rumours that the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) had targeted it for attack, as a revenge attack against the Karen National Union (KNU). [p50] The KNU leadership however suspected that the smaller Mae La camp was the target.[155] Safety of the camps and their inhabitants is an issue of ongoing concern and will continue to be a particularly urgent one as ‘persons of concern’ (POCs), are moved to border camps after Maneeloy safe camp closes in December. POCs have been granted their status on the basis of their political background that make them targets of the SPDC. Their positioning so close to the border will not be a safe one.
Over 300,000 Shan who arrived in Thailand 1996-1998 have recently sought refugee status and a camp for refuge but were rejected by the National Security Council (NSC) which declared them economic migrants. The NSC has clearly chosen to ignore the forced relocation of Shan, human rights abuses and ongoing armed conflict. Shan have never been granted refuge in Thailand. Thousands of Shan continue to cross the border however, fleeing the lived experiences and fear they encounter in Shan State.
Efforts to close border points during the lead up to the deadline for work permit registration by both Thai and Burmese authorities [see below] inevitably placed people needing to flee abuses in Burma under undue pressure as their space to move was curtailed.
The President of the Arakan Muslim Development
Foundation, Mr. Rahim has been an asylum seeker in
Bangladesh since February 2001. He claims persecution and torture, targeted
because of his faith.
Burmese authorities went back on
their promise to accept the return of 129 people from
There are approximately 900 Burmese prisoners in Bangladesh, 144 in Comilla prison, 126 of whom are Muslim. Many people from Burma held in Bangladeshi prisons have finished serving their sentences, some as long as 6 or 7 years ago.[156]
As of 14 August 2001, out of 156 applications, 37 people had been granted refugee status and 52 ‘Special Permission for residence’. However, 6 asylum seekers from Burma were (as in September) detained in detention centres, one for over a year. Life in Japan is fraught with fear of arrest and detention without advance warning or notice, with at least 17 asylum seekers being detained so far, 2 of them twice. Upon release high sums must be paid to the authorities as a ‘deposit’. Burma Office Japan notes the irony - the Japanese government claims humanitarian concern in their engagement with the SPDC but treats asylum seekers from Burma harshly.[157]
Approximately 50,000 Chins from Burma are in refuge in Mizoram. The community is not concentrated but is dispersed and life is uncertain, with the Mizoram government arresting about 1,000 and deporting 181 over the last year. Possible reasons for the increasing targeting of Chin include allegations that some have reportedly registered to vote in the State, some have been involved in the production of liquor in a dry state and, most seriously – and denied, allegations of involvement in drug trafficking.[158]
Migrant
Worker
There are an estimated 3 million Burmese in Thailand.[159] In order to prevent a “flood” of new arrivals from Burma (Thai authorities firmly believe that unregistered migrant workers are a threat to security), security at border checkpoints was heightened with 300 soldiers posted in Tak. It is estimated that 200 crossed into Thailand daily (without returning) in the lead up to the 31 August registration deadline, and numbers increased as the deadline was extended to 13 October. Burmese authorities also attempted to stem the flow of migration to Thailand by imposing fines and prison sentences, enacted 5 October as follows:
· Persons under 35 years, resident in Kawthaung: 18 month sentence / Kt15,000 fine
· Persons over 35 years, resident in Kawthaung: 2 yr sentence / Kt20,000 fine
· All Burmese nationals living outside of Kawthaung: 3 yr sentence / Kt30,000 fine
· Residents of Kawthaung housing individuals planning to illegally enter Thailand: same as above
· Subsequently, movement will be restricted.[160]
Benefits of
registration to the Royal Thai Government (RTG):
1. They can have a ‘legally’ determined number of workers
2.
Registered workers can better access healthcare,
making diseases easier to monitor
3.
RTG will use it as an impetus to repatriate ‘illegals’;
raids began immediately after the deadline with penalties for illegal work
increasing (17,592 migrant workers (from all neighbouring countries) were
arrested in August 2001.[161]
There are currently around 700 Burmese prisoners in Mae Sot.[162])
4.
RTG earned in excess of Bt1.7billion[163]
5.
The business
community is appeased – the workers they needed could register
Workers were slow to register and the 559,541 workers who registered (19,600 of whom were without work at the time, ‘Labour without Employer’) fell well below the government expected figure of 700,000.[164]
Figure 2: Registration
of Migrant Workers from Burma (3 largest sectors)
(Source:
Labour Dept, RTG)
|
Sector |
Number of registrations
|
|
1. Agriculture |
90,189 |
|
2. Fishing |
78,160 |
|
3. Domestic services |
60,180 |
|
4. Construction |
40,321 |
|
5. Livestock |
22,560 |
|
6. Transport |
8,923 |
|
7. Rice mill |
5,900 |
|
8. Pottery |
3,376 |
|
9. Mining |
1,321 |
|
10.1.
Others |
118,292 |
|
10.2.
Without employer |
19,766 |
|
TOTAL |
448,988 |
Reasons for
non-registration include:
· high cost (Bt3,250 for the 1st 6 months)
· There is uncertainty as to what will happen to migrant workers once Thailand decides it has no further use for them. Registration is only effectively a safeguard for 6 months at a time.
· All Thai laws and labour regulations are written in Thai language only. It was up to NGOs to provide translation and explanations.
· Concerned NGOs unable to gain adequate access to workers.
600
‘legal’ Burmese factory workers at the Hyadd Knitwear
Co. Ltd. protested in Mae Sot in early November after their employer reneged on
a pre-negotiated wage. 20 of the demonstrators were fired for their involvement
in the protest, according to the Burmese Labor Solidarity Organization.
Emerging problems regarding
registration:[165]
· Many employers pay only ½ registration fees and hold registration cards. Workers are therefore still open to abuse by officials and often forced to pay ‘fines’ to the police. Body searches are often imposed upon women.
· Long working hours are still demanded, often 07:00-24:00.
· Children of registered workers cannot attend school or receive healthcare.
· Protection is extremely limited and in most cases working conditions have not improved. Many workers are sacked or salaries withheld according to employers’ whim.
· Many workers are now indebted to employers for the cost of registration.
· Workers must work for their registered employer for 12 months.
· Movement of workers has been restricted. Employees are often forbidden to leave factory compounds. This severely limits contact with families.
Highlighting Thailand’s urgency not to host people from Burma, bodies in Thailand have called on the Asia Development Bank to push for border development projects. To quote Suchart Triratwattana, vice-president of the Chamber of Commerce, Tak, “If the projects were under way, a large number of jobs would be created. It would encourage Burmese people to stay in their own country.”[166]
During Khin Nyunt’s visit to Thailand in early September it was agreed that the 2 countries would form a joint task-force so that ‘illegal’ migrant workers could be repatriated to Burma. Plans are in the making that returnees will be located in settlements on the Burmese side of the border, receiving vocational training from international agencies, possibly the International Organisation for Migration. Such repatriation would be the first step towards repatriation of all people from Burma, including those given refugee protection.
According to Senator Udon’s opinion, during a panel of October talks between the
Senate and representatives from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), “Some refugees didn’t
flee from unrest. They fled from poverty. When they were arrested they sought
shelter in the refugee camps.”[167]
Labeling those who flee
Udon
was explicit in the link between his accusations and his call for repatriation,
particularly as he considered that ties with
Forced repatriation of 63 Karen
in early November – mostly women and children, fleeing forced labour and other
human rights abuses including torture, was opposed by the Thai National Human
Rights Committee (NHRC). It was feared their return to
NGOs continue to stress that
refugees must not be repatriated until there is firm ‘proof of peace’ and
respect for human rights within the borders of
In a similar mindset, NHRC announced it would propose the RTG review its refugee policy and has announced plans to set up a sub-commission to monitor treatment of refugees. It will be interesting to see developments made on this front as the RTG seems steadfast on its forced (not ‘voluntary’) repatriation plans.[171]
* Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating
In
a measured reconciliatory move, the Ministry of Immigration and Population has
announced that members of cease-fire groups who have resided in
Armed conflict between the
military junta and armed rebel groups continues, resulting in deaths and
injuries on both sides. Waste of life continues to plague
Men are expected, and often
forced, to fight for a cause that is constructed for them. Whatever the merits
of the cause they may be fighting for, the reality remains that a life in any
army in
Karen
The Karen National Union (KNU) denied rumours
of ceasefire talks with the SPDC declaring the 12,000 strong KNU to be in armed
conflict throughout KNU controlled areas. Tensions escalated between the KNU
and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) in September. Rumours told of the KNU
capturing high-ranking DKBA leader Kyaw Than and in retaliation the DKBA were
to attack a refugee camp along the Thai-Burma border. [p43] The KNU however denied the capture, declaring that they had
attacked the DKBA headquarters where they seized 4 lower-ranking officers, not Kyaw Than.
Conflict is ongoing in
In early November, 400 Wa arrived
in Mongton township under the annual resettlement
program. Locals were reportedly told “to
expect 2,000 families between 1 November [2001] and 5 May next year [2002].”[178]
The Wa are unfamiliar with the weather and environmental conditions in this
part of
The Wa are forcibly ‘resettled’
into
Cease-fires have not brought
peace, and the recent split among Mon groups illustrates this. The New Mon
State Party (NMSP) has been in a cease-fire since
Following
the terrorist attacks of 11 September, there were several reports suggesting
possible links between terrorist organizations and the 2 bodies of the Arakan Independence
Alliance (AIA) (Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) and National
United Party of Arakan (NUPA)). In response, AIA issued a statement in which
they denied such links and accused the SPDC of “practic[ing] state
terrorism on all its people, including ethnic cleansing by way of
Burmanisation, forced marriage and religious persecution.”[180]
It
is expected that the shift of the
[see Human Rights for further discussion of non-Burman civilians]
* Improving *
Stagnant R Deteriorating
![Text Box: Through its pervasive internal security apparatus, the [SPDC…] systematically restricted efforts by Buddhist clergy to promote human rights and political freedom, discouraged or prohibited minority religions from constructing new places of worship and, in some ethnic minority areas, coercively promoted Buddhism over other religions, particularly among members of the minority ethnic groups.
- US State Department, 2001](Labour_Pains_files/image025.gif)
Muslim
leaders claim there is an ethnic cleansing campaign in
In a move to protect ‘National Security’, the border between
Maungdaw and Teknaf was
formally closed in October, there have been arrests of people wearing Bin Laden
t-shirts, security has been heightened around mosques and Muslim areas,
particularly targeting Muslim leaders. Mass meetings of Muslims is forbidden
(SPDC directive, 5 November), discriminatory charges are imposed on Muslims
(Figure 1), many are no longer able to attend mosque; one mosque in
Rioting and violent clashes between
Muslims and Buddhists continued in October in Prome (Pyi), Pegu township and
A report of an Arakanese student
who has fled to
Figure 1:
Arbitrary fines imposed upon Muslims in Arakan State[189]
|
“Offence” |
Fine &
sentence (kyat)
|
|
each
person who dies |
3,000 |
|
each
birth |
2,500 |
|
each
buffalo that dies |
5,000 |
|
each
newborn buffalo |
3,000 |
|
each
cow that dies |
2,000 |
|
each
newborn calf |
1,500 |
|
each
goat that dies |
500 |
|
each
newborn goat |
1,000 |
|
each
newborn chick |
100 |
|
each
person found staying in the home of another |
10,000
& 6 months imprisonment |
In an ironic twist, the US State
Department blacklisted
Christianity
Burmese
authorities have been accused by a human rights group (
The US State Department report highlighted the violent prohibition of Christian proselytizing, restrictions on local publications of religious material, including the Bible, and extreme difficulties encountered in building new churches.[192]
CHRONOLOGY
World Conference against Racism
and Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and related intolerance,
54th WHO Regional Committee Meeting [p29]
3-25 September
4th meeting of 2nd Party Conference of Chin National Front
4-6 September
Khin Nyunt visits
Mon break-off group re-engages in
fighting SPDC troops [p50-51]
Special investigation into leaking of news to foreign media [p37-38]
14 September
Regime announce all who apply can
get satellite license [p38]
17 September
¬ ILO
HLT starts 3 week assessment of SPDC’s forced labour ban. [p31-34]
¬ 33rd
meeting of National Health Committee,
21-23 September
5th Annual Working Conference of Free
Karenni Army troops attack army
battalion in
26-28 September
9th Meeting of Task Force of
ASEAN on AIDS,
NSC Meeting to discuss ‘illegal’ migrants & refugees, Mae Sot
Riots between Muslims and
Buddhists, Prome
[p51-53]
9-11 October
Thai-Burmese friendship group
visits
9-17 October
Pinheiro visits
13 October
Migrant registration deadline
(extension),
15 October
New landmines start to be planted along Bangladesh-Burma
border [p37]
15 October – 30 November
45 day state of emergency, in the
name of preventing religious violence [p52]
Unknown armed group fire at Thai
BPP unit [p26]
SPDC reports 9 October religious riots
2 landmines explode on
Bangladesh-Burma border [p37]
Around 100 people killed in
anti-Muslim riot [p52]
29 October
5
landmines explode on Bangladesh-Burma border [p37]
31 October
NMSP issue
statement disassociating itself from break-off group [p51]
5 November
Ban on all mass gatherings by Muslims [p52]
1 Monk killed by landmine, another injured, on Thai-Burma
border [p37]
5-6 November
600 Burmese factory workers protested in Mae Sot [p46]
6-8 November
ASEAN countries meet to discuss
aid for landmine clearance & victims [p37]
10-11 November
Major cabinet resfuffles [p27-28]
Myo Myint
Nyein receives 2001 Canadian International Press
Freedom Award [p38]
4th anniversary of formation of SPDC
Thai-Burma Cultural and Economic Association meeting
Chairman Senior Gen. Than Shwe, Commander-In-Chief (Defense Services)
Vice Chairman Gen. Maung Aye, Vice Commander-In-Chief (Defense Services)
Secretary Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, Director General of Defence Services Intelligence
Bureau (resulting from a merge of the Office of Strategic Studies and Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence)
Maj.Lt.Gen. Thura Shwe Mann,
Joint Chief of Staff (Army-Navy-Air Force)
Maj.Lt. Thein Sein, Adjutant General
Maj.Lt.Gen. Tin Aung Myin Oo, Quarter Master General
Maj.Lt.Gen. Ye Myint, Chief of Staff (Army)
Maj.Lt.Gen. Tin Aye, Military Training General
Maj.Lt.Gen. Khin Maung Than, Commander of
Maj.Lt. Gen. Aung Htwe, Army Group Commander
Maj.Lt.Gen. Kyaw Win, Army Group Commander
Maj.Lt.Gen. Maung Bo, Army Group Commander
Maj.Lt.Gen. Soe Win, Army Group Commander
SITUATION
IN
Alternative
ASEAN Network on
Regional follow-up to International Strategy Meeting on
[for ISM Statement see Tentative Steps (Mar 2001) (Appendix 2)]
The Regional Team Meeting, comprising 17 participants representing 12 organisations
from 6 countries, with input from other key international organisations,
Reaffirming support for the current talks between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC, as stated in the statement made at the International Strategy Meeting on Burma (ISM),
Reaffirming also confidence in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership of the NLD and her commitment to tripartite dialogue and national reconciliation,
Reaffirming also support for efforts made by non-Burman nationality groups towards national reconciliation,
Noting the observation made
by the former UN Special Rapporteur that the absence of, and lack of respect
for, democratic governance is the underlying cause of all human rights abuses
in
Asserting that peace,
democracy and stability in
Recalls the ISM statement of 17-19 March 2001 in which participants, representing 53 organisations from 28 countries, demanded:
1. the release of all political prisoners,
2. freedom for the NLD and all political parties to function,
3. cessation of all military hostilities and cessation of all forms of forced labour,
Welcoming the release of almost 200 political prisoners since September 2000 up until the Regional Team Meeting,
Noting that many of those released were youth
arrested at the train station with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on
Gravely concerned that between 1,500-1,600 political prisoners, at least 100 of whom are women, remain incarcerated, including 22 MPs, at least 827 NLD members and 300 members of other political parties as noted by the Special Rapporteur (9 November 2001),[194]
Gravely concerned that political prisoners, and other prisoners, are reportedly forced to work at labour camps where poor treatment and high mortality rates are reported,
Deploring the continued incarceration of student leader Min Ko Naing of over 12 years despite his deteriorating health,
Further
deploring political arrests over the last
13 months, including Pastor Gracy - a female Chin
Baptist pastor - sentenced to 2 years hard labour,
Gravely concerned that the lack of an independent judiciary obstructs many from exercising their legitimate political rights, further that arbitrary arrests and detentions continue to be a symptom of the lack of the rule of law,
Reiterates the demand that the SPDC releases immediately and unconditionally all remaining political prisoners, especially the aged, ill, or those who have completed their sentences, ceases politically motivated arrests and meets international human rights standards within a system based on the rule of law,
2. Freedom
for the NLD and all political parties to function
Gravely concerned that
political freedoms remain severely and systematically curtailed. Only limited
numbers of NLD offices have been allowed to re-open, mostly based in
Further concerned that female members of political parties, the NLD in particular, are thought to be especially vulnerable and at risk, as noted by the Special Rapporteur,[195]
Noting with concern that the NLD have reduced their public activities and statements in order to appease the SPDC,
Demands the SPDC respects internationally recognised human rights such as the rights of assembly, association, expression, information, communication and movement in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so as to create an environment conducive to genuine political dialogue. We particularly call for the release from house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and permission for her and/or the NLD to release a statement regarding the talks,
3. Cessation of all military hostilities and
cessation of all forms of forced labour
Gravely concerned regarding ongoing and arbitrary military hostilities, disproportionately perpetrated against non-Burman civilians. We are particularly concerned about crimes against women and the use of child soldiers.
Noting with concern that these hostilities result in increasing displacement of people – both internally and across international borders. We are particularly concerned about the vulnerability of displaced women and children,
Reiterates the demand that military hostilities are ceased immediately by the calling of a nationwide cease-fire,
Furthermore concerned that abundant reports continue to disclose accounts of forced labour and portering, often accompanied by acts of cruelty. Also concerned regarding the continuation of forced monetary and non-monetary requisitions - or ‘taxation’ - which the ILO Committee of experts also recommended should be prohibited.[196] We are particularly concerned about the disproportionate burden placed upon the poor and Rohingya, and women and child forced labourers,
Noting with regret the
conclusion of the International Labour Organisation High Level Team, based upon
the recent trip to
Regarding with caution the continued Human Rights training of police and public officials supported by the Australian government and the establishment of the governmental Committee on Human Rights. There is no tangible commitment by the SPDC to meet international standards and categorically stop human rights abuses as necessary structural, budgetary, legislative, judicial and political changes have not been made,
Joining the ILO in its belief that ‘alternatives to forced labour can be found where the [political] will exists’[197] and that there are ‘no grounds for complacency’,[198]
Reiterates the demand for a clear and unobstructed political commitment to effectively stop forced labour by a network of legislative, executive and administrative means. Steps taken should be in accordance with the International Labour Convention 1930 (No.29), the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry and the resolutions adopted by the International Labour Conference at its 87th and 88th sessions,
Demands adequate, effective and across the board means of redress be established for those whose human rights are contravened so that justice can be served, particularly in the context of crimes against women as recommended by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
Reiterates the appeal for governments, trade unions and employers organisations worldwide to maintain and further action to implement the ILO resolution against forced labour,
Disturbed to learn the talks are still only at the confidence building stage and have not taken any concrete steps towards political change,
Deeply regretting that the talks remain secret and that there has been no attempt by the SPDC to refer to these talks in the national media. This emphasises the allegation these talks are for international consumption only,
Deeply troubled the talks
remain limited to the SPDC and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and do not include
representatives of non-Burman nationalities, Noting that many are concerned about the slow pace of the talks, including the
UNGA and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar who talks of the
need to increase the pace and take ‘bolder moves’[199].
The Japanese Foreign minister, the EU, other governments and organisations have
expressed similar concerns,
Greatly alarmed by the SPDC claims to speak on behalf of Aung San Suu Kyi in their dealings with the international community, particularly as she is not in a position to refute any of their statements,
Welcoming recent SPDC statements made by Senior General Tan Shwe regarding non-blockage of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi should the people democratically elect her,[200]
Demands the SPDC makes a genuine commitment to the dialogue process and engages in genuine discussion about aforementioned power sharing, taking concrete and irreversable steps towards democracy,
Reiterates the demand that the SPDC makes known the contents of the talks and broadens the dialogue to include leaders of other political parties and representatives from non-Burman nationality groups so that genuine progress towards democracy and national reconciliation can be made. In this context we express support for the Committee Representing the People’s Parliament,
Again urges ASEAN to support and promote genuine tripartite dialogue and the efforts of the UN Special Envoy during this critical time,
Continues to appeal for civil society organisations and other sectors of society, including women’s organisations, human rights and environmental groups, religious groups and students in all countries to step up the momentum to achieve human rights and justice in Burma,
Regarding Humanitarian Assistance:
Critically aware of issues of humanitarian concern in Burma, particularly among the most vulnerable groups of women, children, non-Burman nationalities and internally displaced persons, especially in regards to matters of health and the HIV epidemic,
Noting with concern the
SPDC’s intensified campaign for humanitarian assistance using the poverty of
people in
Reminds concerned bodies that NGOs must currently operate under highly restrictive measure which severely limit their effectiveness,
Stressing it is not in the
interest of the SPDC to make progress towards democracy and national
reconciliation if they receive ‘rewards’ at this early stage when no concrete
steps have been taken. We are therefore particularly concerned regarding recent
moves by
Urgently highlighting that aid given within environments of non-accountability have shown to escalate conflict and stressing that it is highly plausible this may happen in Burma,
Strongly urges the international community, in recognition of the role of economic and political pressure in pushing the SPDC to establish the talks, to adhere to the ILO resolutions in the fight against forced labour. We further encourage sustaining and intensifying national and regional economic pressure on the SPDC, including investment and trade sanctions,
Further urge the
international community, governments and non-governmental organisations, to
wait for an official request from opposition forces within
Commits the Alternative ASEAN
Network on
All
FTUB (December 2001) ‘Situation Report: Migrant Workers from
ILO, HLT (November 2001) ‘Developments concerning the question of the
observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930
(No.29), Report of the High Level Team, ILO Governing Body, 282nd
Session, 4th item on agenda,Geneva,GB.282/4 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb282/pdf/gb-4.pdf
Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) (October 2001) ‘Flight, Hunger and Survival: Repression and Displacement in the Villages of Papun and Nyaunglebin Districts’
Karenni
National Progressive Party (KNPP) (
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“…this is a
time when we have got to see what the government is going to do, how much
goodwill they are going to demonstrate towards the people, and towards the
movement to democracy.
After all, they have always claimed that they want to democratise
- Aung San Suu Kyi
[1] Reuters (
[2] BBC (
[3] NCGUB News (
[4] BBC (
[5] BBC (
[6] Reuters (
[7] NCGUB News (
[8] DVB (
[9] Pinheiro (
[10] NCGUB (
[11] DVB
(
[12] The United Nations has already put forward guidelines for
tripartite dialogue.
[13] Reuters (
[14] Aye Tha Aung (Secretary of CRPP); Do Htaung
(MP-elect for Kale Constituency (1), Sagaing Division); Khun Myint Tun
(MP-elect for Thaton (1) Constituency, Mon State); Dr
Min Soe Lin (MP-elect for Ye-1 Constituency, Mon State); Saw Naing Naing (MP-elect for Pazundaung
Constituency, Rangoon Division); Saw Oo Rah (MP-elect for the Phruso Constituency, Kayah State); Toe Po (MP-elect for Yebyu Constituency, Tenasserim Division). [AAPP,
[15] Shan Herald Agency
for News (
[16] See Altsean-Burma (September
2001:10-11)
[17] The Indian Express
(
[18] Chinese Defense Minister met the commander-in-chief of the
Burmese Air Force, while Than Shwe headed a delegation of the Union Solidarity
and Development Association and minister at the Prime Minister's Office as
guests of the Chinese Association for International Understanding. Diplomatic ties
are bound to strengthen with an upcoming trip to
[19] The
[20] Xinhua (
[21]
[22] Foreword to the Workshop on
Humanitarian Aid to
[23]
[24]
[25] KNPP (
[26]
[27]
[28] Continued debt-relief packages are aimed at writing off the
debt
[29] Kyodo (
[30] Xinhua (
[31] BBC (
[32] Statistics from the SPDC can vary widely. According to the
permanent mission of
[33] A rare white elephant found in
[34] Asian Development
Bank (November 2001) 'Economic Update:
[35] Reuters (
[36] Xinhua (
[37] Unites States Embassy estimate
[38] BurmaNet (
[39] Burma Economic Watch
and Macquarie University – Sean Turnell ‘
[40] Brigadier General Zaw Tun delivered a surprisingly frank
speech on the state of the Burmese economy in July 2000. He was later sacked
and arrested.
[41]
[42] The Straits Times,
[43] AFP (
[44]
Asian
Development Bank (November
2001) ‘Economic Update:
[45] Official rate of exchange: US$1: Kt 6.3 (approx)
[46] Asian Development
Bank (2001) ‘
[47] The Straits Times,
[48]
[49]Narinjara News (
[50] Xinhua (
[51] According to IMF figures,
[52] According to IMF figures, total exports in 2000 amounted to
US$1,132 million
[53] The Mae Sai-Tachilek border crossing was closed in March and re-opened on
[54]Xinhua (
[55] Xinhua (
[56] Bloomberg (
[57]
[58] Xinhua (
[59] Xinhua (
[60] DVB (
[61] ADB (November
2001) ‘Economic Update:
[62]
[63]
[64]
[65] BBC (
[66]
[67]
[68] DVB (
[69] UNDCP Rangoon-based representative, Jean-Luc Lemahieu, was
reported as saying in January 2002.
[70] Currently, the
[71]
[72]Reuters (
[73]Shan Herald
Agency for News (
[74]Shan Herald
Agency for News (
[75]
[76] Narinjara
News (
[77] Shan EU News (
[78] DVB (
[79] Shan Herald Agency
for News (
[80] Shan Herald
Agency for News (September 2001) ‘Wa
and Burmese commanders strike new deal’
[81]Reuters (
[82]
[83] Xinhua (
[84] Accoding to UNDCP Rangoon-based representative, Jean-Luc
Lamahieu
[85] ‘Retired’ drug barons like Khun Sa and Lo Hsing Han have
not only been given their freedom but currently run some of
[86] AP (
[87]
[88]
[89] AP (
[90] Inter
Press Service (
[91] This is not an unusual gesture by the Burmese authorities.
[92] see DVB (
[93] SHAN (
[94] DVB (
[95] NCGUB (
[96] [USDA is aligned to the SPDC.] DVB (
[97] DVB (
[98] DVB (
[99] Transfers in the Air Force, as of mid-Septenber,
were: Lt Col Ko Ko Maung, General Staff Officer of
Air Force Intelligence, appointed as military attache
to
[100] NCGUB News (
[101] see DVB (
[102] Associated Press
(posted on BurmaNet News 18 November 2001) ‘
[103]
[104] Associated Press
(
[105] BBC (
[106] Associated Press
(
[107] Radio Myanmar, Rangoon (15 September 2001) ‘Burma's
Khin Nyunt on "false accusations" against country's AIDS campaigns’
in Burmese 1330 gmt, translated by BBC Monitoring
Service, UK
[108] The combined budget of the regime, the UN, local and
international NGOs is estimated to be about US$3 million annually [Xinhua (
[109] Maykha
(posted on BurmaNet News 5 November 2001) ‘Medicine
is Politics’
[110] Shan Herald Agency
for News (
[111] for example see: Shan Herald Agency for News (2 November 2001) ‘Forced labor for yet another death railway’; Shan Human Rights Foundation (October 2001) ‘Killing at Forced
Labour Site in Murng-ton’; Irrawaddy (4 September 2001) ‘Junta Prepares for ILO Visit’; Shan Herald Agency for News (13
September 2001) ‘Thai-Burma Relations--Brothers but still enemies, says traveler’
[112] This is contrary to statements made by the junta that forced
labour has been diminished by improved roads and increased usage of mules.
[113] ILO, HLT (November 2001:para.56)
[114] for example, researchers based in
[115] In the lead up to the visit, military forces were reportedly
ordered not to use forced labor until the HLT had left and the Ministry of Home
Affairs directed an intense ‘awareness campaign’ - to make villagers aware of
Bill 1/99, instruct them to deny forced labour and forcing some – notably in
Mon state - to sign petitions to this effect. The HLT did not receive any such petitions, however they were
aware of a “very intensive preparation by
the authorities for the purpose of giving as favourable an impression as
possible of the forced labour situation.” [HLT, ILO (November 2001:para.23)]
[116] HLT, ILO (November
2001:para.52)
[117] The HLT saw no evidence of ‘current use’ of forced labour
in civil infrastructure projects, such as road construction & building
sites. Infrastucture projects, such as
road, railway & irrigation, are often now tendered to private companies,
soldiers not fighting become labourers & NGOs and UN agencies are involved.
[HLT, ILO (November
2001:para.55,57,64)]
[118] HLT, ILO (November
2001:para.82)
[119] HLT, ILO (November
2001:para.73)
[120] AFP (
[121] Reuters (
[122] Guardian,
[123] BBC (
[124] The letter was signed by Betty Williams (
[125] Nation (
[126] Burma Courier/Network
Media Group (based on news from the Network Media Group 17 October 2001)
‘Red Cross Declares Prisoners Unfit for Hard Labour’; Network Media Group (2 November 2001) ‘ICRC suggests some prisoners
not suitable for hard labor’
[127] DVB (
[128] DVB
(
[129] see Narinjara News (
[131]
[133] Shan Herald Agency
for News (
[134] Shan
Herald Agency for News (
[135] NCGUB (
[136] see AP (posted on BurmaNet News 24 November 2001)
‘Relief group:
[137] KHRG (October
2001:13)
[138] see Altsean-Burma
(October 2001:65-68)
[139]
[140] DVB (
[141] BMA (
[142]
[143] Over 20,000 license applications were made in February with
the actual number thought to be much higher.
[144] see Altsean-Burma (September
2001:42)
[145] Pinheiro (
[146] Pinheiro (
[147] Pinheiro (
[148] Pinheiro (
[149] Pinheiro (
[150] Pinheiro (
[151] AP (posted on BurmaNet News on
[152] Arakan News Agency
(27 November 2001) ‘Four Policemen, one woman killed by unknown assailants at
Laung Dun police outpost in northern Arakan 24 firearms stolen, curfew imposed
along the border’
[153] The Ottawa Citizen
(
[154]Only a limited number are absorbed into the camps, meaning
it is impossible to categorically state how
many refugees from
[155] AFP (
[156] Narinjara News (
[157]
[158]North East Sun
Magazine,
[159]
[160]
[161]
[162]
[163] Premsak Piayura,
House labour committee chairman, has demanded money be used transparently &
for the benefit of local communities which hired the immigrants.
[164] FTUB (December
2001:1)
[165] source FTUB
(December 2001)
[166]
[167]
[168] Xinhua (
[169]
[170] Signatories of the letter included the Yuwathipat
party, Chiang Mai University, Project for Ecological Recovery Foundation,
Community Theatre, Foundation for Women, Campaign for Popular Democracy,
Empower Foundation, Centre for the Co-ordination of Non-Governmental Tribal Organisations,
Institute for the Development of Education for Sustainable AgricultureOthers
were the Centre for Ethnic Nationalities Development, Community Forest Support
Group, and Thai Volunteer Service. [
[171] Shan Herald Agency
for News (
[172] The Kokant are from Shan state. [
[173]
[174] for example see Narinjara
News (
[175] see AFP (
[176] SHAN (
[177] see SHAN (posted
on BurmaNet News 1 October 2001) ‘New militia leader
chosen’
[178] SHAN (
[179] SHAN
(
[180] Arakan
[181] Narinjara News (
[182] The Independent
[183] Arakan
[184] All
[185]
[186] Mizzima (
[187] Network Media Group (
[188] Narinjara News (
[189] Arakan News Agency
News Release (
[190]
[191] AFP (
[192]
[193] UNGA A/56/112 by the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of
Human Rights in
[194] UNGA A/56/112
[195] UNGA A/56/112, paragraph 14
[196] ILO GB.282/4 Report
by the High-Level Team, 282nd session, Agenda Item 4, paragraph 33,
November 2001,
[197] ILO GB.282/, paragraph 76
[198] ILO GB.282/4, paragraph 82
[199] UNGA A/56/112, paragraph 36
[200] see Kyodo (