Colophon
The Burma Center Netherlands (BCN) is an
independent foundation that aims to inform the Dutch society on developments in
Burma. BCN initiates and coordinates activities that benefit
democratisation, respect for human rights and sustainable development by lobby
and advocacy on EU level. BCN also aims to contribute to a constructive
dialogue between the various groups in Burma.
Burma
Center Netherlands
Paulus
Potterstraat 20
1071 DA Amsterdam
Tel : +31 (0) 20 6716952
Fax : +31 (0) 20 6713513
E-mail : bcn@xs4all.nl
Website : www.burmacenter.nl
Author
Peter Ras
Pictures
Peter Ras
Cartoon
Alberts Art Productions
Editors
Peter Gutter
Eric van Vessem
Contents
1. From the author … 3
2. Introduction … 5
3. Summary … 6
4. Background Rohingya Refugees …
9
5. Continuing Repression in Arakan, Burma … 11
6. Burmese refugees in Bangladesh … 15
7. Increasing pressure on the
recognized Rohingya refugees … 16
8. An uncertain future for
undocumented Rohingya refugees … 23
9. Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh … 26
- The eventual solution … 27
- Conclusions … 30
- Recommendations … 31
- Just a few stories … 33
- Travel schedule … 36
- Organizations visited … 37
1. From the author
First of all, I
am grateful to all representatives and individuals for the time and information
they shared to support my research.
Second, many
thanks to the organizations and individuals who concretely supported and helped
me to visit all areas and locations of concern. Without them, I would not have
had the opportunity to experience the actual reality of the Burmese Rohingya
refugee population and their poor living conditions.
Last but not
least, with utmost respect, I would like to thank the refugees and the
representatives of Burmese (refugee) organisations who spent time to inform me
about their real circumstances and the problems they face day to day. Their
efforts to tell me their stories were certainly not always without serious personal
risks.
BCN is impressed
with the good work of so many organizations and individuals who go great
lengths to render practical support to the refugees of the still continuing
repression in Burma. BCN feels very inspired by the continuing commitment of so many
Burmese refugees, to do whatever possible to contribute to the process towards
democracy and reconciliation in Burma in
general and Arakan State in particular.
Peter Ras,
Coordinator, Burma Center Netherlands
2. Introduction
“I was born in Burma, but the Burmese
Government says I don’t belong there.
I grew up in Bangladesh, but the
Bangladesh Government says I cannot stay here.
As a Rohingya, I
feel I am caught between a crocodile and a snake.”
From: 10 Years
in Bangladesh, published by
Médecins Sans Frontières, 2003
In April and May 2003, a
representative of Burma Center Netherlands (BCN) undertook a fact-finding
mission to Bangladesh and India. BCN organized this mission primarily because of serious concern
about the situation of Burmese (Rohingya) refugees in Bangladesh. BCN has been alarmed by disturbing stories about the changing
(possibly even withdrawing) role of UNHCR in the Burmese refugee crisis in both
countries. Moreover, BCN was informed about the increasing pressure on Burmese
refugees in general and on the Rohingya population in Bangladesh in particular. BCN became worried about some specific cases of
refugees threatened by the authorities in these two countries neighbouring Burma.
Generally, BCN
felt that there is a lack interest for the fate of the Burmese refugees,
especially those residing west of Burma,
and a lack of close contacts with relevant Burmese democratic and ethnic
opposition organizations in Bangladesh and India by Western pro-democracy movements. BCN strongly believes that
there is a need for increasing contacts with, and knowledge about, the Burmese
refugee communities in Bangladesh and India with their specific backgrounds, concerns, problems, suggestions
and activities.
The representative
of BCN met with a large number of different (local and national) organizations,
institutions, political parties, ethnic groups, INGOs, diplomats, health
workers and, of course, the Burmese refugees themselves.
Not all of the
information that was collected, and certainly no names, have been mentioned in
this report because of the high political sensitivity and confidentiality. The
author of this report has witnessed the exceptional sensitivity and pressures
from various sides during his visits of some Burmese ethnic organisations and
the Rohingya-refugee camps in Bangladesh. The BCN-representative has seen with his own eyes the major
differences of behaviour of the refugees between private and official meetings.
The private meetings were much more relaxed, friendly and open, such as for
example with refugees in Nayapara and Kutupalong refugee camps. It was in
practice quite hard to organize meetings because of strong monitoring of camp
authorities. The meetings with refugees in official companionship with camp
authorities, were characterized by more distance, less warmth, while
participants were not at liberty to speak out freely.
This report, of
our latest fact-finding mission, focuses on the topic of Rohingya refugees.
There are no
religious or ethnic minorities in Burma who
have suffered more hardships than the Rohingya Muslims in Northern Arakan State. The
repression of the Burmese junta against them continues, in spite of the regular
(faulty) reports by officials of the Bangladesh Government, the UNHCR, and the
SPDC of course. The Rohingyas face severe difficulties in their own country,
which forced them to leave. Still, small numbers of new refugees arrive in Bangladesh almost every week or month. Hundreds of thousands fled to Bangladesh in the (recent) past and although many returned of their free will
or not, many others are still there. It is obvious that the Burmese junta does
not like this people. The junta does not want them in Burma and
tries to do whatever it can to pressurize them by causing serious difficulties.
In practice, there is a clear policy of discrimination against the Rohingyas in
Burma. But also in Bangladesh the Rohingyas are less and less welcome, and the pressure on them
to return to their ‘homeland’ from local as well as national Government
officials is certainly growing. It seems that the Rohingyas are not welcome
anywhere, as if they are denied real citizenship by any state. The Rohingyas
even face hostilities by the Arakanese-Buddhist people because of sensitivities
of the past. Rohingyas feel pressure everywhere, and the pressure is certainly
not decreasing. Rohingyas have no home, no safe place to go, no shelter and no
guarantee for a safe and peaceful future anywhere, anytime.
BCN did not have
the intension to write an extensive report with all details about historical
topics regarding Burma in general, Arakan State, or the position of the Rohingyas. BCN just intended to write a
compact report, focusing on the actual concerns and recommendations regarding
the Rohingya refugees. BCN believes that there is a necessity for international
donors, (Western) Governments, the European Union, etc. to use their contacts
and efforts to promote positive changes that benefit the Rohingyas in Burma and
Bangladesh.
Burma Center Netherlands
3. Summary
In Arakan (Rakhine)
State in Western Burma, the Burmese military regime (SPDC) and border
police (NaSaKa) are still committing serious human rights violations. Although
both peoples in Arakan (Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims) are victims of
these crimes, especially the Rohingyas living in Northern Arakan are marginalized as a people. By definition,
the Rohingyas do not have full citizenship, still suffer from gross human
rights violations, are still forced to perform unpaid labour (especially in the
countryside) and are not free to practice their religion. The Rohingyas in
Arakan/Burma are often denied basic freedoms like the right to marry, and they
are forced to pay the military authorities for all basic necessities. Rohingyas
have no freedom of movement. Finally, often the military orders them to handle
over all there belongings, including their land, without any compensation. The
future of Rohingyas in Arakan still looks grim.
The Burmese junta
accused Rohingya armed groups (fighting SPDC) of getting support of the
Al-Qaeda terrorist network, unsuccessfully hoping for US-support for their
stance. However, there is no proof of any direct links between the Rohingya
armed groups and Al-Qaeda.
In Bangladesh, some 21,000 Rohingya refugees still live in
two refugee camps. They are recognized refugees by UNHCR and the Bangladeshi
authorities, and could officially only be repatriated to Burma voluntarily. UNHCR is responsible for the
voluntary repatriation process and the protection of the refugees in the camps.
A few international organizations such as WFP, MSF and Concern render practical
assistance to these refugees, including food and health care.
However, refugees as
well as (inter)national parties complain about Bangladeshi camp authorities who
are pressing the refugees to sign for repatriation back to Arakan/Burma. A
number of refugees were highly probably repatriated because of increased,
direct or indirect, pressure by the camp authorities. Refugees feel a constant
pressure by the camp authorities or the mahjees. These are camp group leaders
having close contacts with the camp authorities. Nowadays, almost all refugees
are reluctant to repatriate because of fear about the Burmese military’s
repression. In recent weeks and months, the pressure on the refugees to
repatriate has increased. May 2003 saw a significant increase in the
repatriation of refugees to Burma. In May, 704 refugees were repatriated. The
atmosphere has grown increasingly tense now. This causes doubt and serious concern.
Large numbers of refugees have openly stated to be against repatriation back to
Burma because of the grave military repression in
that country.
UNHCR in Bangladesh
plays the complaints down, regarding the use of force and pressure by the camp
authorities and mahjees, and does not seem to understand that many
(inter)national parties, as well as vast numbers of refugees feel that there is
a serious and increasing problem now. UNHCR does also minimize the actual
repression in Arakan/Burma. This repression has been described, for example, in
a number of reports by ILO, US State Department and Human Rights Watch,
published over the last twelve months.
Furthermore, UNHCR has
made a plan to stimulate ‘self-sufficiency’ for the remaining, recognized
Rohingya refugees in the camps. This process will already get started by 1 July 2003. According to UNHCR, this is partly because of
‘donor fatigue’ resulting in decreasing funds for UNHCR’s programs in Bangladesh. The role of international organizations will
be decreased, according to the plan, and the role of the Government of
Bangladesh needs to become prominent. UNHCR itself plans to phase out all
assistance by the end of 2004. As a first step, UNHCR will hand over the actual
repatriation process to the Government of Bangladesh by the first of July,
although UNHCR stresses that it will remain responsible for monitoring the
voluntary aspect of repatriations. Although all (inter)national parties
directly and indirectly involved are willing to cooperate with a plan to
promote self-sufficiency, they all complained about the complete lack of
information and consultation by UNHCR. This results in serious uncertainties
among the organizations what to do in the near future. All parties are
extremely worried about the fate of the refugees when international
organizations are not able any more to play a ‘night watcher’s role’, to
prevent any further increasing pressure on, or force toward, refugees to
repatriate. Very concerning is the fact that the Government of Bangladesh still
not recognizes the UNHCR plan. Even worse, UNHCR has never consulted the
refugees about the plan. It seems therefore extremely unclear whether for
example UNHCR’s time frame to implement the plan is realistic, and whether
basic safety and even survival guarantees are included in UNHCR’s current plan.
In a second plan,
UNHCR has dictated that it will ‘streamline’ the health care in the camps by 1 July 2003. Nowadays, MSF, Concern and the Bangladeshi
Ministry of Health (MoH) are responsible for health care. UNHCR wants MoH to do
this on its own. Again, there has not been any consultation and serious
discussions about it with the involved parties. Moreover, many directly and
indirectly involved parties have serious doubts whether MoH is capable (and even
willing!) to guarantee the current quality level of care provided.
Apart from the
officially recognized Rohingyas in the camps, there are still at least 100,000
(but maybe even 200,000 to 300,000) more Rohingyas living in Bangladesh. They are not recognized and are seen by UNHCR
and the Government of Bangladesh as ‘illegal immigrants’. Many doubt if this is
really true, and blame the government and UNHCR for not being willing to
conduct a new investigation as to why the refugees came to Bangladesh. Almost all (inter)national actors believe
that these refugees certainly had political reasons to leave Burma, because of the continuing repression. These
people usually work in the informal sector as illegal, low-paid laborers and
are extremely vulnerable to harassment by local people and police.
A few hundred
Rohingyas, most of them residing illegally, are currently detained. Some were
arrested for petty criminal offences, but more often only because of their ‘illegality’ or false accusations made
by mahjees or local police. Especially the non-recognized Rohingyas in
detention do not receive any legal assistance, and are often still detained
although they should have been released already.
Extremely worrying is
the situation of illegal refugees in the newly established Teknaf ‘makeshift
camp’. More then 4,000 refugees live there under abominable conditions. They do
not receive any aid and many believe that the monsoon (starting early July)
will flood everything and will create a human disaster.
There are a few
thousand more Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh. The vast majority of them live in the areas
along the Burmese border and are not recognized by UNHCR. Only about 40 of them
are recognized and mainly live in Dhaka. They
face language problems and believe that UNHCR should extend their language and
skill training to increase their chances for employment. They have also
requested UNHCR to recognize more Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in the border
areas, for example former members of armed groups fighting the SPDC.
Finally, the relations
between both main population groups of Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists,
and their representatives including politicians, intellectuals, and armed
groups, are still very tense, because of historical hostilities. These
sensitivities and hostilities have always been exploited by the former and
current military regimes in Burma. Many organizations believe there is a need
for reconciliation in Arakan, although this will be a complicated process.
However, reconciliation in Arakan will also benefit a future ‘tri-partite
dialogue’ between the ethnic peoples, NLD and SPDC, as well as a future
democratic Burma. Reconciliation in Arakan could perhaps even prevent new waves of
Rohingya refugees to neighbouring countries in the future. Very obviously, it
seems that without significant political and human rights improvements in Burma, the current refugee problems will continue.
Therefore, the need for political and economical pressure on the Burmese
military regime, in order to force the junta to reform and democratize, is seen
as utterly important by practically all refugees and Burmese organizations in Bangladesh.
4. Background Rohingya Refugees
Rohingyas in Burma
Out of Burma’s
population of 50 million, there are some two million Rohingyas. According to the Arakan Historical Society
(AHS), there are some 200,000 more Rohingyas living in Pakistan already for some time. 500,000 more live in
Saudi-Arabia. Some hundreds of thousands Rohingyas live in Bangladesh.
In Burma, the Rohingyas predominantly live in Arakan
(Rakhine) State, bordering Bangladesh. After the occupation of Arakan State by the
British in 1826, many Islamic Bengali settled in Northern Burma, between the
Buddhist (Rakhine) population and the Islamic Arakanese (Rohingyas) who had
been living there already for centuries. This immigration continued until the
1930s. From 1936 onwards, mistrust grew between Muslims and Buddhists in
British Burma. This led to large-scale riots in 1942 between Muslim-Rohingyas
and Buddhist-Rakhines in Arakan State, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. Probably the later
dictator Ne Win played a role in stimulating these riots. Still, the 1942
incident is widely regarded as a main reason for the current serious
sensitivities between the Rohingya Muslims and the Rakhine Buddhists in Arakan State. Arakan
had its own identity and it was one of the first areas where an uprising was
started against (colonial and Burman) rule in 1947. Former dictator Ne Win
eventually gave the Arakanese their own state within Burma,
but a number of groups continued their struggle for independence. Some groups
actually supported the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), and some others
supported democracy or were Muslim freedom fighters.
Even nowadays,
some guerrilla activities continue by some armed guerrilla groups (Rohingya
organizations as well as Rakhine Buddhists groups). They are mainly fighting
the SPDC for self-determination and democratic/cultural rights, in the remote
forested and mountainous Bangladesh-Burma border regions.
Refugees
Tensions between
Buddhists and Muslims in North Arakan created serious agitation in the 1970s. General Ne Win ordered the
army to suppress this, resulting in large-scale killings and plundering in
1978. Some 200,000 Rohingya-Muslims crossed the border then and fled to
neighbouring Bangladesh. According to the Burmese military government, these people were
only Bengalis and did not recognize them as Burmese citizens. Some 10,000
Muslims died in the refugee camps. The majority of the refugees returned to Burma
after a few years.
The period
1991-92 saw a new wave of refugees who left Burma
because of an increase of large-scale repression. This time, some 250,000
Muslims crossed the border. Again, the Burmese junta, now under the acronym
SLORC, stated that these refugees were Bengali. As before, SLORC denied them
Burmese citizenship. The Muslims settled in about 20 refugee camps. Because of
intense international pressure, the majority of these refugees were permitted
to return to North-Arakan State. However, they still face many serious difficulties and oppression
in Burma. Every month, small numbers of new refugees from Burma
arrive in Bangladesh.
Official Rohingya refugee population in Bangladesh
Out of the
mentioned 250,000 refugees, in Southeast
Bangladesh (between Cox’s Bazaar and
Teknaf) there are still some 21,000 Burmese Rohingyas living in the two
official remaining refugee camps of Nayapara and Kutupalong. The Rohingyas in
these camps have been officially recognized by UNHCR as ‘refugees’. Therefore,
UNHCR is responsible for their survival and safety. UNHCR is responsible for
their protection and their eventual voluntary repatriation to Burma.
Officially, no refugees are forced to repatriate to Burma.
UNHCR has requested some INGOs and UN agencies to actually support the refugees
in health care (MSF, Concern) and food rations distribution (WFP).
However, safety,
law and order, including police, in the camps are the responsibility of the
Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commission (RRRC) under the auspices of the
Bangladeshi Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief. RRRC has installed a
Camp in Charge (CiC) as leading officials in both camps. Some other Bangladeshi
ministries are also involved in rendering some support to the refugees, such as
the Ministry of Health.
Undocumented Rohingya refugee population in Bangladesh
Apart from the
21,000 Burmese Rohingya Muslim refugees officially recognized by the UNHCR and
the Government of Bangladesh, there is an even much larger number of undocumented Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Their number seems to be at least 100,000, but probably 200,000
(as regularly mentioned in the local Bangladeshi press) or even 300,000
(according to the Arakan Historical Society). They have no rights, no help or
assistance from anyone. They are denied citizenship by the authorities of Bangladesh as well as by the Burmese junta (SPDC). The refugees mainly live
under extremely difficult circumstances in the Bangladesh-Burma border areas.
They often work in the informal sector (for example as rickshaw drivers) or as
low paid labourers in factories without any rights. They are constantly
threatened with (police) harassment. Some refugees returned to Bangladesh for other reasons and are now living as illegal residents.
Since early 2003,
a new (unofficial) ‘refugee camp’ has arisen in Teknaf in the far southeast of Bangladesh. At least 4,000 refugees are living there now under horrible
circumstances.
A few hundred
refugees (mainly those residing illegally, but also some recognized refugees
from the camps) are currently in detention. Some may have committed criminal
offences such as possessing illegal arms, and others are there only because
they are ‘illegal residents’ or because of arbitrary allegations of police or
camp authorities.
Non-muslim Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
A very small
Rakhine Buddhist refugee population of approximately 40 people currently lives
in and around Dhaka. They fled Burma in 1988 when the democratic uprisings were quelled by the junta.
Almost all of these refugees are recognized by the UNHCR, which gives them a
‘lump sum’ (small fund) to survive. Finally, there are some thousands of
non-recognized Rakhine Buddhist refugees, particularly in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts.
5. Continuing
repression in Arakan, Burma
Worldwide concern for human rights in
Arakan State
During the past 12
months, the harsh repression in Arakan (Rakhine) State was described in a
number of reports by the United Nations, US State Department, ILO, and Human
Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch, for example, wrote in its ‘World Report 2003’: “In the wake of
international press reports alleging ties between Al-Qaeda and the Burmese
government, the government launched a broad crackdown on Rohingya Muslims. (…) Tensions
between the Buddhist majority and Muslim minority were still apparent in 2002,
and restrictions were tightened in late 2001. Restrictions on travel by Muslims
were far more rigidly enforced,
especially in Arakan State, and the government limited the number of Muslims allowed to travel
to Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage. Muslims claimed they continued to have
difficulties getting passports to travel abroad and in building mosques.” In
its report ‘Crackdown on Burmese Muslims’ (July 2002) HRW wrote: “In Arakan
State, a predominantly Muslim area, human rights violations, including forced
labour, restrictions on the freedom of movement, and the destruction of
mosques, have been commonplace.”
The UN-Commission on Human Rights
again adopted a resolution on Burma in April 2003 on its 59th
session, and included that it “strongly urges the Government of Myanmar (…) to
end the systematic enforced displacement of persons and other causes of refugee
flows to neighbouring countries, to provide the necessary protection and
assistance to internally displaced persons and to respect the right of refugees
to voluntary, safe and dignified return monitored by appropriate international
agencies.”
The 2002 US State Department Country
Report on Human Rights in Burma
said, for example, “During the year, the regime reportedly implemented policies
to consolidate the border with Bangladesh and to further control the movement of Muslim Rohingyas in Rakhine State. (…) On
the country’s western border, 22,000 Rohingya Muslims remained in refugee camps
in Bangladesh. More than 100,000 Rohingyas lived outside the refugee camps in Rakhine State with no
formal documentation as refugees. In addition, Rohingyas who have returned to Rakhine State claimed
that they faced government restrictions on their ability to travel and to
engage in economic activity. (…) The Government continued to discriminate
systematically against non-Burmans. Because the regime reserved secondary state
schools for citizens, Rohingya Muslims did not have access to state run schools
beyond primary education and were ineligible for most civil service positions.
There were reports that forced labor of Muslims occurred in Rakhine State. (…) Members of
the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State, on the
country's western coast, continued to experience severe legal, economic, and
social discrimination. The Government denied citizenship status to most
Rohingyas on the grounds that their ancestors did not reside in the country at
the start of British colonial rule in 1824, as required by the country's highly
restrictive citizenship law. Persons without full citizenship faced
restrictions in domestic travel. They also were barred from certain advanced
university programs in medicine and technological fields.”
Last March, the ILO
Liaison Officer for Burma, Mrs. Perret-Nguyen,
gave a statement about the actual situation of forced labour in Burma,
saying that, “The situation is really very serious and people continue to
suffer from practices of forced labour. (…) The situation in areas near to the
Thai border where there is continuing insecurity and a heavy presence of the
army, as well as in northern Rakhine state, is particularly serious and appears
to have changed little.”
UNHCR and Bangladeshi authorities
about human rights in Arakan
In spite of all these
documents, UNHCR in Bangladesh repeatedly stated towards refugees in the camps
that the human rights situation in Arakan in ‘normalizing’, ‘improving’ and
‘stabilizing,’ for example during discussions about repatriation. A clear
example of this kind of statement was made by UNHCR during an extensive camp
meeting in Kutupalong on 9 April 2003. UNHCR (and the camp authorities) tried to
convince the refugees to repatriate and to sign a so-called ‘affidavit’. UNHCR
did not succeed, because almost all refugees made clear that they were not
willing to repatriate to Burma because of a continuing fear that the
situation has not improved at all. Towards the BCN representative, UNHCR indeed
recognized that the human rights situation in Burma is not well. However, UNHCR at the same time
stressed that according to them, the situation has improved in the last couple
of years. It felt as playing down the actual problems.
The Kutupalong – Camp
in Charge (CiC) even said, “When some refugees say that they are still afraid
about the situation in Burma, we tell them that now the situation in Burma is good. Refugees who were repatriated in the
past are in a happy mood – we met so many repatriated families in Myanmar! – we tell the refugees here.”
Forced labour
Many organizations
believe that the use of forced labour by the Burmese military and the NaSaKa
(Burmese border police) is still significant. It seems as if there is a
decrease in the enforcement of forced labour in the main towns of (Northern) Arakan State, such as in Maungdaw and Buthidaung. This is probably the result of
intense ILO pressure in recent years, although one representative of a relevant
Rohingya organization denied this and believed that this was mainly because
almost all major infrastructure projects were completed and, therefore, there
was some decrease of forced labour in the last couple of years.
At the same time,
however, the enforcement of forced labour by the Burmese authorities and NaSaKa
in more remote areas of Arakan State has remained unchanged. Some Burmese stressed the point that before any
ILO or other international delegation arrives in Arakan to collect information
regarding forced labour, the regime ‘mobilizes’ the local people to deny that
there is any forced labour continuing in the area where they live.
The practice of forced
labour in Arakan especially continues nearby army camps (and there are many of
these), for example for the cultivation of land or the cutting of wood. Some
Burmese are afraid that the military will conduct forced labour for the
building of a new gas pipeline in Arakan, which is a joint project of oil
companies from Burma, India and Bangladesh.
No freedom of movement
The junta’s control on
the restriction on movement has intensified. The restriction on movement is now
even worse then under Ne Win, some Buddhist Rakhines stressed. One Rohingya
representative said that even two years ago, Rohingyas were still allowed to
travel to for example Sittwe (Akyab, the capital of Arakan), but now even this
is not allowed any more. Rohingyas are normally only allowed to travel 4
kilometers of their homes. If they want to travel to a nearby village, they
need a permit of the authorities, which is often denied. Travelling for longer
distances, for example to Sittwe or Rangoon is impossible for almost everyone, a Rohingya
academic said.
A senior UN official,
working in Burma but visiting Bangladesh, was very concerned and critical on the
situation in especially North Arakan State, the main area where the Rohingyas live. He
called the area “a prison for Rohingyas”. The severe restrictions on movement
do also create major economic problems for the Rohingyas. Doing business, for
instance, has been made virtually impossible. The Rohingyas who are financially
better off have to hire Buddhist Rakhines to do business for them outside the
region where they are allowed to stay. The lack of freedom of movement also
causes serious limitations on the number of Rohingyas to finish their higher
education. Of course, this has a negative impact for their (and their people’s)
future.
No freedom of
marriage
SPDC introduced
marriage control for Rohingyas. The SPDC has created a number of formalities to
discourage marrying of Rohingyas. Rohingya couples who wish to marry have to
request permission at many different levels (township administration, village,
sector commander, military commander). Second, in the nine sectors of the
NaSaKa, it seems that in every sector the rules are different and dependent on
the individual NaSaKa commander. In every sector, not more than one or two
couples get permission to marry each month. In reality, it takes a long time
before permission for marriage is granted. It costs couples a lot of money for
permits and bribes. Most requests for marriage are currently rejected, one
Rohingya leader said.
Arbitrary taxes and confiscation of
property
In recent years, the
military’s control on the local economy has increased. People have to pay more
bribes, such as bags of rice at military checkpoints. Even when crossing
rivers, people have to pay the military for it and there is more control in
this nowadays. A possible explanation for this could be the fact that the
monthly salary of the military is not enough to survive, so therefore they
‘need’ to make more money in order to make ends meet.
Rohingyas have to pay
arbitrary taxes on all sustainable goods. For example, there is a ‘roof tax’, a
‘men tax’, they have to pay fees if anyone dies or any new baby is born (5,000
kyats per baby). The military do also regularly confiscate land, belongings and
houses of the Rohingyas. These matters are seen as the root causes for the
suffering of Rohingyas by starvation.
No citizenship
Rohingyas do not
receive normal (red) Burmese ID cards, but instead have white ID cards. In
reality this creates serious difficulties for them, because the military put
pressure on all Burmese with no normal red ID card. The white ID card is widely
regarded as a discriminatory policy. Statements that Rohingyas with a white
ID-card have been given normal, official Burmese citizenship by the Burmese
junta, are nonsense. Rohingyas are still not seen as full Burmese citizens and
are, therefore, facing severe restrictions and pressure.
Human rights violations
There are still
serious concerns about beatings, rape and even killings in Arakan by the
authorities. Kaladan Press, for instance, mentioned the case of a man who was
killed on 13 February 2003 by the police because he refused to perform
forced labour.
Undermining of religion
In the past few years,
a number of mosques were destroyed by the Burmese military. Renovation of these
mosques by the local people is nearly always strictly forbidden. If people try
to renovate a mosque, they seriously risk arrest.
Role of
UNHCR in Arakan/Burma
Many Burmese are
worried about UNHCRs role in Arakan State. UNHCR’s official role is to protect the former, repatriated refugees
and stimulate self-sufficieny among them. “They compromise their mandate with
the regime, for example regarding the white ID-cards for Rohingyas. UNHCR
should more effectively monitor the safety and self-sufficiency of the
repatriated refugees,” one leader of a Rohinga organization said. A Rohingya
academic believed that “All Rohingyas hoped and expected that UNHCR would guarantee
their safety, but later we found out that UNHCR danced to the tunes of SPDC in
Arakan and the Government of Bangladesh”. Many repatriated refugees face
economic difficulties because of the pressure and problems mentioned before
(forced labour, arbitrary taxes, confiscations, lack of freedom of movement).
The Burmese MI
(Military Intelligence) has a close watch on UNHCR’s activities in Arakan and
local employees are almost daily asked what kind of activities they did, or
where they went. Foreign employees are afraid to become ‘blacklisted’ by the
Burmese regime.
It seems difficult for
UNHCR in Burma to actually do anything against the continuing human rights violations
committed by the Burmese military.
UNHCR is currently
decreasing its activities in Arakan: in recent years it decreased its financial
support for International NGOs in Northern Arakan State (working on development, infrastructure and
farming). At the same time, UNHCR-Burma tried to find some alternative new
funds. UNHCR was at least partly successful in this, a senior UN-official from Burma told. UNHCR in Burma hopes that these NGOs could continue their
work in Arakan as much as possible, although there are still some uncertainties
about this for the future.
6. Burmese refugees in Bangladesh
Introduction
As mentioned before,
there are Rohingya Muslim as well as Rakhine Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh.
From the Rohingyas,
some 21,000 refugees are recognized by the UNHCR and the Government of
Bangladesh. They live in the two remaning official refugee camps Nayapara and
Kutupalong in Southeast
Bangladesh. All other
Rohingyas in Bangladesh (between 100,000 and 300,000 people) are seen
as ‘illegal immigrants’ by the Government of Bangladesh and UNHCR. They are
mainly squattered in Southeast
Bangladesh too and
survive because of low paid (illegal) work, often in the non-formal sector.
There are some 40
Rakhine-Buddhist refugees recognized by UNHCR. They mainly live in Dhaka. A few thousand more are not recognized by
anyone and mainly live in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, not far from the Burmese
border.
7. Increasing
pressure on the recognized Rohingya refugees
Practical
organization in the official refugee camps currently
UNHCR is responsible
for the protection and eventual, only voluntary, repatriation of Rohingya
refugees to Burma. The importance and relevance of UNHCR’s mandate in Bangladesh in obvious.
Until now, UNHCR has
also been responsible for their welfare and has therefore signed Memorandums of
Understanding (MoU) with the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the
International NGOs Concern and MSF. WFP is responsible the providing of food in
both camps. They cooperate in this with the local NGO Bangladesh Red Crescent
Society (BDRCS), which actually transports the food from the three warehouses
to the camps. During the distribution of the food to the refugees, there is
always a representative of Concern or MSF monitoring this, to prevent any
unfair practices. Distribution of the food to all refugees in the camps is
actually performed by volunteers, refugees who receive some extra food in
return for their services.
MSF and Concern are
responsible for the health care of pregnant and feeding women and children
under 10 years of age, in Nayapara (MSF) and Kutupalong (Concern). Concern is
also trying to extend its current small-scale skills training programs for
women. Concern is finally responsible for a few more programs in both camps
such as tree plantations and primary education. The Bangladesh Ministry of
Health (MoH) is responsible for the health care of all other refugees in the
camps.
The Refugee Relief and Repatriation
Commission (RRRC) of the Bangladesh Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief
(MDMR) is officially responsible for safety, law, and order in the camps. In
both camps, RRRC has actually stalled a so-called a Camp in Charge (CiC) who
are the leading officials for daily affairs.
Forced repatriation
UNHCR denies any forced repatriation in the
camps right now. “Every refugee knows that voluntary repatriation to Myanmar
is his right. The Government of Bangladesh agrees with voluntarism. I do not
believe that there is any forced repatriation at all, ” a senior UNHCR
representative in Dhaka said. However, he mentioned that “sometimes there are some
‘over-enthusiastic’ people in the camps.” He also added: “I don’t think people
are afraid to talk with us in the camps. When I come, the refugees surround me.
They give us letters and we check them all. I don’t think people feel they
cannot reach us.”
UNHCR’s opinion on the possibility of any
enforcement of repatriation of the refugees to Burma
completely contradicts all comments made by all other local, international and
Burmese parties involved, as well as the statements made by a number of
individual refugees. And although, of course, it could be possible that some
individuals exaggerate the actual situation, it was obvious that UNHCR has a
much too naïve, rosy vision on this topic and does not recognize that there is
a serious concern. A number of parties, either directly or indirectly involved,
mentioned refugees complaining to their staff about pressure from camp
authorities, or problems created by the mahjees (group leaders). Moreover, the
camp authorities of both camps monitored (or at least tried to monitor) all
movements of the BCN representative himself, who experienced a tense
atmosphere. The BCN representative was not allowed by both CiCs to interview
refugees without the presence of any camp officials and he was not allowed to
walk around on his own.
Whenever the Government of Bangladesh is
asked about the refugees (for example by UNHCR, which regularly asked the
Government to give its support for its ‘self-sufficiency programme’), they
always stress that, “Repatriation is the best option for the refugees.” A Dhaka University
representative said: “The Government of Bangladesh will try to push the
refugees back to Burma. On all levels Government officials say that refugees are on mercy
here: they never really recognize their refugee rights!” A clear example of
this was given during the large camp meeting in Kutupalong on April 9, where
the RRRC official publicly demanded several times that the best option for the
refugees is to repatriate. They had organized a meeting because the
repatriation from Kutupalong had come to a complete halt in recent weeks. Like
mentioned before, he used faulty arguments egarding the real situation in
Arakan/Burma.
However, “the outcome was very clear and
negative for RRRC and UNHCR,” a witness of the meeting explained. “Almost
everyone raised both hands and said ‘no’ and ‘we don’t go’ when they were
ultimately asked to sign the affidavit. In Kutupalong, nobody wants to
repatriate.”
Another witness had
been at some meetings in Kutupalong of UNHCR, the CiC and small groups of
refugees in January 2003. “The CiC said to the refugees: ‘This is not your
future here. Your future is in your own country, Myanmar. If you say “yes” to going back, you get your
land back and money for half a year.’ Then the refugees replied: ‘It is not
safe there for us.’ Then UNHCR said: ‘The situation is becoming normal there.’”
Refugees told about the intense pressure
they felt from the camp authorities to repatriate. Especially the mahjees
(group leaders) use different methods to press them to sign the affidavit and to
sign that they are willing to repatriate ‘freely.’ For example sometimes the
mahjees fabricate false accusations against the refugees, some mentioned that
the mahjees used physical or psychological violence and others said that the
mahjees and ‘volunteers’ prevent ‘unwilling’ refugees for getting sufficient
rations or materials to repair their sheds. It is obvious that the mahjees have
a good relationship with the camp authorities (CiC), that they monitor the
activities of the refugees and tell the CiC about this. Refugees often feel
afraid to complain at UNHCR’s Protection Officer, who is formally responsible
for this. All foreigners (and their offices, including especially UNHCRs office
with the ‘complaints box’) are also closely watched by camp authorities and
mahjees. This makes it certainly more difficult for refugees to complain.
There are also concerning stories about
direct involvement of the CiCs in intimidation and even violence. Some mention
incidents of a few years ago, but other incidents happened more recently. One
serious example was about a refugee woman who accused the CiC of Kutupalong
camp of raping her on 18 February 2003. The CiC had
possibly threatened her not to tell anyone about the incident. However, the
victim gave a full verbal report to UNHCR and the RRRC. Later, she wrote a
letter to the Minister of MDMR on March 20. In May, there was still no reply.
A press agency said that more recently they
had heard about a new incident of another woman who was beaten by the same
CiC.
Nobody doubts that at least some of the
refugees freely decided to return to Burma. At
the same time, many refugees know other people who did not repatriate
voluntarily. Refugees regularly signed for repatriation but did not actually
want to go. They only signed because of fear towards the mahjees and camp
authorities. Many complain about this to the staff of the international
organizations. “For many years we hear allegations of abuses and forced
repatriation from the refugees”, one involved person explained. “We always
forward these signals to UNHCR.” Some refugees said they did not complain at
the UNHCR staff directly, because of fear of repercussions. They said they are
being monitored all day. Some refugees manage to give letters to the
international parties.
One example of a letter posted in May:
“Dear sister,
First take my lots of
honour to you.
Hope you are well. I
am also well with the mercy of God.
The next information
is that, earlier I gave five letters to you to send the correct authority. If
you can do this for me I would be pleased to you. If you don’t do that then I
will feel is problem. The Camp in Charge is trying to send me back to Myanmar by two or three days.
Yours,”
(Name)
Of course, the camp authorities deny all
these stories. “There is no pressure on the refugees to repatriate,” said the
CiC of Kutupalong. But then he continued: “Our Prime Minister has recently
visited Myanmar to solve the refugee problem. For solving this, we are making a
clearing list. We ask people to sign the affidavit.” He concluded with saying
that he always explains the refugees that the situation in Burma is
“very good” now.
One witness of the repatriation process at
the Naf riverside, bordering Burma,
explained that all the Rohingyas who were to be repatriated had to stand in a
row. Then the CiC said to the witness: “All these people are happy to
repatriate.” Then he asked the first man in the row: “Are you happy to
repatriate?” And the man replied, looking rather anxiously, “I am happy to
repatriate.”
Over the last couple of months, it seems as
if the Bangladesh Government pressure on refugees is intensifying with new
diplomatic contacts of the current BNP Government of Bangladesh. This
government is more ASEAN and Burmese junta-oriented than the former Awami
League Government. Some months ago, Burmese junta leader Than Shwe visited Bangladesh. After that, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Khaleda Zia visited Burma and
certainly discussed the ‘refugee topic’.
At the camp level, it is obvious that the
authorities nowadays intensify their efforts to convince the refugees to sign
the affidavit. By signing this, the refugees actually declare that they agree
to be repatriated. Hereby, the camp authorities and the RRRC use false
arguments about the situation in Arakan.
On 21 May 2003, The
Bangladeshi Daily Star wrote that, “The repatriation of Rohingya
refugees resumed on Monday May 19 with the return of 123 refugees from 20
families, and another 150 refugees were expected to return today”. According to
the newspaper, the refugees will be repatriated twice weekly on Monday and
Wednesday, and that “officials said 21,658 refugees are still waiting for
repatriation”. In May 2003, a total of
704 refugees from the two camps were repatriated. This shows that the
repatriation process has clearly intensified (until early May, 2003,
repatriation had significantly slowed down because of a lack of willingness of
refugees to repatriate voluntarily, because of fear about repression in Burma).
For some years, repatriation had been done only once a week on Wednesday. There
are serious doubts about the ‘voluntariness’ of the recent intensified
repatriation.
A number of external organizations
expressed their concerns that if WFP, Concern and MSF are not permitted
to play any more future role in the camps, a very relevant ‘night watchers
role’ is missing, probably resulting in a further increasing of pressure on the
refugees to repatriate to Burma against their will.
New UNHCR plan for promoting
self-sufficiency for recognized Rohingya refugees
In 2002,
UNHCR-Bangladesh made a concept plan (‘Self-sufficiency in Bangladesh: Refugees from Myanmar’s Northern Rakhine State’) to change the efforts of support for the
recognized Rohingya refugees, including:
- The handling over of the practical
repatriation exercise from UNHCR to the Government of Bangladesh by July
1st, 2003;
- The implementation of a self
sufficiency-project, starting from July 1st, 2003.
It seems obvious to
UNHCR that the vast majority of the remaining 21,000 recognized Rohingya
refugees in Bangladesh will not return to their homeland for some
more years, until the political and human rights situation in Burma has improved significantly. Therefore, UNHCR
believes that it is of great importance to stimulate self-sufficiency for this
group. Core elements of the plan include the gradual reduction of the presence
of international organizations starting from July 2003; the take-over of the
camp administration, including the responsibility for the assistance to the
refugees, by the Government of Bangladesh by the end of 2003; and the
stimulation of (at least the temporary) integration of the refugees in the
local communities by income-generating programs, skills training, and
education. The plan is to be completed before January 2004. The role of
international organizations will have to be decreased, according to the plan,
and the role of the Government of Bangladesh needs to become prominent. UNHCR
itself plans to phase out all of its assistance by the end of 2004. This clause
was included in the concept plan. UNHCR also stated they will close their Cox’s
Bazaar Office. However, this closure was strongly denied by UNHCR officials in Dhaka and Cox’s Bazaar, which is confusing. If UNHCR
is serious about closing their Cox’s Bazaar office, it would have devastating
impacts on the protection and monitoring role of UNHCR, because it seems
impossible to really protect refugees in the Bangladesh-Burma border regions
from an office based in Dhaka.
Almost all parties and
individuals who asked about this self-sufficiency plan, agreed with the
necessity of a change with the current situation of the refugees in the camps.
All argued that it is important to make the refugees more self-sufficient
because they have no future (neither in Bangladesh, nor in Burma) if they remain dependent on food and other
aid from donor organizations for many more years. It is important that as many
people as possible learn to stand on their own feet and to make them more
responsible for their own deeds. Also, many argued that they believe that
because UNHCR faces dificulties because of lack of funds, as well as possibly
‘donor fatigue’ (although some doubt this), they have made their plan. All
direct involved parties stated that they are most willing to cooperate with UNHCR
to implement the plan in a responsible way. Some other parties involved said
its UNHCR’s task to convince its donors to continue give support, because of
the continuing problems in Burma and Bangladesh. UNHCR should therefore significantally
increase its efforts to convince them that decreasing funds will create major
uncertainties for the refugees.
At the same time,
everybody (all international parties, Burmese groups and individuals) were
extremely critical towards UNHCR about their ‘self-sufficiency plan’:
- There is an absolute lack of communication
with UNHCR about the plan and its practical implementation. And although
UNHCR denies it, all parties directly or indirectly involved complained
about the lack of communication or even some ‘arrogance’ about this by
UNHCR. UNHCR did not even give their concept plan to its partners (such as
INGOs) in the camps. This suggests a lack of confidence of UNHCR in its
partners.
To date, nobody has seen any action or implementation plans of UNHCR.
One party, for instance, stressed the importance of getting sufficient
information on time about the future living situation of refugees (open or
closed camps/areas, or about the location of markets where the refugees can
sell their products) Even the CiC in Kutupalong complained that he did not know
what kind of changes he could expect after 1 July 2003. Some bitterly felt that
UNHCR was already in the process of finalizing/fixing everything without any
consultation. There is also confusion about whether or not the UNHCR is
planning to close its Cox’s Bazaar Office.
Still, the implementation of the plan has not been discussed with WFP,
Concern, or MSF. This should be done as soon as possible, and it should be done
on the right level (this means on a national, Dhaka level);
- There is broad and great concern about the
time frame of the plan, especially regarding the expected growing
uncertainties including food, health care, and safety of the refugees. The
Government of Bangladesh has still not agreed with the plan. UNHCR has
discussed it with the Government several times. However, until now the
Government has still not approved. UNHCR argues, “The Government did not
say ‘No’, so this means ‘Yes’.” This is widely regarded as hopelessly
naïve: at least it seems that the Bangladesh authorities did not decide about the
plan, but maybe their stance even means that they do not agree with the
plan at all. As long as the Bangladeshi authorities do not officially give
the approval, it will be very uncertain whether the plan actually can be
worked out in a meaningful way. Safety guarantees for the refugees are
necessary, regarding protection, food, and health care. Until now, the
Bangladeshi authorities have always prevented initiatives of extending
skill programs and higher education. Self-sufficiency of the refugees in a
human way is only practically possible when large-scale skill programs and
higher education are allowed by the Government;
- Finally, a ‘safety net’ for the transition
period (for example by guarantee of food during this time) as well as a
continuing ‘night watchers role’ by international parties is seen as
utmost important. Nowadays, it is completely vague if this ‘safety net’
for the refugees will be guaranteed in the future. A complexing factor is
for example the fact that WFP will normally only provide food through the
channels of international organizations such as UNHCR or INGOs, and not
directly through any Government channels, to prevent ‘leakages’. Nowadays,
WFP provides food in both camps because of an MoU they have signed with
UNHCR. If UNHCR’s role would become smaller in the future, food providing
could become uncertain. Regarding health care and the ‘night watcher’s
role’, there are uncertainties too, for example because of UNHCR’s plans
for streamlining the health and nutricion programs (more about this in the
next chapter of this report). It is unclear if for example Concern and MSF
will (be allowed to) play a role in the future too. For many reasons, a
safety net for the refugees is not yet guaranteed;
- It is very uncertain how the refugees
could become self-sufficient in a hostile local community (current
jealousy with the facilities of the refugees, and anxiety about all these
refugees who will have to search for jobs in their districts), and with a
lack of skills and education (also because of the fact that the
Bangladeshi authorities prevent any higher education, large-scale skill
training by for example Concern and WFP. These organizations have
regularly stated that they are willing to provide these programs);
- In spite of UNHCR’s statements, UNHCR did
not consult the refugees about their self-sufficiency plans. This is
widely seen as a mistake, and UNHCR should seriously consult them instead
of just ‘informing’ them.
UNHCR-plan for streamlining
healthcare
UNHCR has also stated
that it is willing to streamline the health care in the camps, by July 1, 2003.
In practice, they are willing to handle over all health activities, currently
done by MSF, Concern and MoH (Bangladeshi Ministry of Health), to MoH only.
This is because of a recommendation in a study of external auditors in 2002.
They argued that this is necessary because the circumstances have changed in
the last couple of years. Because there are less refugee camps now, there is a
need for simplifying the health care programs: they could be handled by just
one organization, MoH, the auditors argued. In connection with this, one Cox’s
Bazaar UNHCR official stressed that this ‘streamlining’ of the health care is
no part of their self-sufficiency plans, it is just because of the advice of
their auditors. However, on the Dhaka level, UNHCR said that the streamlining
of health care is part of their major plan for self-sufficiency. Again, this is
confusing.
All directly and
indirectly involved parties have complained a lot about this streamlining plan.
- First, again, UNHCR did certainly not
communicate well about the practical implementation of their plans with
all parties involved (of course, at first with MSF and Concern, but then
also with others like WFP). UNHCR sent a letter to the parties in April,
which created much unrest among them. The letter generates more questions
than answers. In the letter, UNHCR made clear that they had already
decided that Concern and MSF have to hand over their health programs (health
care for children under ten and supplementary, therapeutic feeding
program) to MoH and that there is no discussion possible whether or not
this will really benefit the refugees. None of the parties know what to do
exactly after July 1, and there has not yet been any serious consultation
about their own streamlining plans by UNHCR. The leading UNHCR
representative in Cox’s Bazaar said he is always willing to discuss the
matter, but that the INGOs do not respond well. This, again, contradicts
the view of the parties involved. However, all of them stressed the need
for tuning in on the national level (Dhaka level). National staff of all
involved parties should discuss the programs, and not the local-level
staff, they argued;
- Almost everybody involved is extremely
concerned about the quality of care the Bangladeshi MoH would be able to
provide to the refugees. A Dhaka University representative said he
believed that the quality of health care for the refugees will by
definition become worse, as soon as MoH is responsible for it. Refugees
will not have the possibility to complain about it then, like the local
Bangladeshi people could at least. He also expected ‘leakages’, and
pleaded for at least ‘minimal health criteria’ on paper before any
handover. “Ask any Bangladeshi people about the quality of the health care
of MoH and they will be extremely critical about it.”
A Dhaka based UNHCR representative said in response to
this, “The streamlining has been discussed with everybody extensively. We are
not pushing MSF and Concern out, but we have to streamline. Health care should
be given by only one organization: MoH. We believe MoH will be capable. We know
that the quality of care in hospitals in towns etc. is bad, but in the camps
this is much better. It is not a good attitude just to think MoH is not
capable. We will give trainings to MoH during the handover time.” But he also
agreed, “It’s a challenge for us.”
However, one involved party argued that the quality of MoHs current
health care in the camps is not sufficient because of lack of staff, as well as
that at least some of its staff is poorly educated. Second, MoH has not any
therapeutic feeding program elsewhere in Bangladesh, so how could they possibly take over the
current program from Concern and MSF? Therapeutic feeding is of great
importance for severely malnourished refugees, according to one of the directly
involved parties.
“MoH does not have the capability now to run therapeutic feeding
programs,” concluded another party.
8. An uncertain future for undocumented
Rohingya refugees
Political refugees with no rights
There are at least some 100,000
undocumented Rohingyas in Bangladesh. Probably their number is even much higher. The local Bangladeshi
press usually mentions around 200,000 and the Arakan Historical Society
believes there are even 300,000. These undocumented refugees mainly live under
extremely difficult circumstances in the Bangladesh border areas near Burma, in
the Cox’s Bazaar and Teknaf regions. Usually they try to survive by working in
the informal sector (for example as riksha drivers) or as poorly paid labourers
in factories without any rights or protection, and always in fear of police
harassment.
In the remote (mostly forested and
mountainous) Bangladesh-Burma border regions, there are also some small
Rohingya-guerilla groups active, fighting Burma’s
SPDC.
The undocumented Rohingyas do not receive
any assistance and are denied citizenship by both the Governments of Bangladesh
and Burma. Many parties said they believe that “every week or month” a couple
of new refugees and families newly arrive in Bangladesh. This continues all the time. Some say that they do not want to put
to much attention on this issue, because of fear that the Bangladeshi
authorities will force all these illegal Rohingyas to return to Burma,
with uncertain but severe effects.
UNHCR believes that these Rohingyas “are
not new refugees.” A Dhaka University representative heavily criticised UNHCR about its complete lack of
willingness to do anything for this marginalized group. “How does UNHCR know
that this large group of Rohingyas outside the camps are all just illegal
economic immigrants? A few years ago they interviewed a small number of them
and still they count on this research. UNHCR and the Government of Bangladesh
should do a serious investigation, or UNHCR should press the Government to
allow it to interview these illegal residents and do a survey on its own!”
An involved international party said,
“UNHCR considers all these people as ‘economic immigrants.’ The question is:
Why did they flee to Bangladesh? The answer is: Because of forced labour, forced conscription, no
freedom to travel etc. Is this really ‘economical’ or mainly ‘political’…?”
A political Rohingya organization
explained, “These people came to Bangladesh because of forced labour and human rights violations. They are
political refugees, no question about it. Everybody in Arakan had a garden or a
piece of land, so they originally had jobs and food.”
A Rohingya academic said: “Most people came
here because of forced labour and forced relocations. They were kicked out of
their villages and the military took their belongings. These people cannot go
elsewhere in Arakan or Burma, so where should they go?”
The extreme consequence: Teknaf ‘makeshift
camp’ (Tal)
Early 2003, a new unofficial refugee ‘camp’
was created in Teknaf, along the Naf River
bordering Burma. Nowadays, at least 4,000 undocumented refugees live here in
horrible conditions. It is just a large slum settlement of housing made from
plastic sheets. In late 2002, because of a Bangladeshi army exercise called
‘Operation Clean Heart,’ thousands of Rohingyas were forced to leave their
homes and had to settle in this area. Most of the Rohingyas living in the slum
came, or came back, to Bangladesh already several years ago, but some only came half a year ago,
according to some local workers. Some people were formally repatriated from the
official camps and returned to Bangladesh (but are not allowed anymore to stay in the official camps now).
Others had never been in the official camps before. They fled Burma
because of forced labour, rape incidents, and the fact that they were not
allowed to freely perform their religious life.
The refugees made it very clear that they
are certainly willing to return to Burma,
but only if the situation has normalized and improved. They even prefer the
current harsh conditions they face in Bangladesh than to return to their homeland in the current abominable
situation.
The living conditions in the ‘camp’ are
miserable, with no shade, no sanitary facilities and extremely small sheds made
of plastic sheets. Approximately 1,217 families (over 4,000 people) live here
in a very compact and over-inhabited area. Health conditions are extremely poor
and, because the Bangladeshi authorities officially prevent any health care,
diarrhoea, skin and other infection diseases, worms, malaria etc. are very
common. Because of repeated requests, at least MSF was recently allowed to give
some minimal health education but is still not allowed to provide any health
care.
The slum inhabitants are desperate for some
better conditions. Especially sanitation, shade, and health care. They
explained that during night time, nobody is allowed to enter or leave the camp.
The Rohingyas face hostilities from the local population, probably because of
jealousy when the men of the slum are given some low-paid, illegal work. The
police has told them that ultimately they have to leave the area, and the
people feel extremely uncertain where they have to go to.
A representative of UNHCR in Dhaka said, “The Government of
Bangladesh say that these people are no refugees, so therefore we have nothing
to do with them. They are squatters. They have been living in that area for a
long time and were forced to leave their houses by the Bangladesh police.” A UNHCR official from Cox’s Bazaar stated that he was not
able to visit the ‘camp’ to take a look at the circumstances, because he is not
allowed to go by the Bangladesh authorities. However this seems nonsense, because others such as
the BCN representative were able to visit the camp to get an impression of the
devastating conditions.
The most serious problem the inhabitants of
the slum will face very soon, is the monsoon-period (July-September). The
‘camp’ is in a low area. And although ironically Kutupalongs’ CiC will be right
that “this problem will be over as soon as the monsoon starts…”, of course it
would be extremely inhumane just to wait for this. It seems that time is
running out, and a serious human disaster will occur soon. Without any
assistance, probably the whole area will be flooded.
Returned repatriated refugees
An unknown but certain number of formally
repatriated people have returned to Bangladesh in the last couple of years. And although a Dhaka based UNHCR
representative played this down by saying that newly arriving Burmese are just
“normal in border areas, this happens everywhere,” a number of other
organizations and individual refugees do certainly not agree with this.
One refugee explained,
“I know a lot of people, for example my sister, who were repatriated before and
are now back. This is because they got rations for three months in Burma and these 3 months were OK, but after this
they had to earn money themselves and then they had to pay NaSaKa for
everything, even for newborn babies, marriages, and when someone died. Only 50
girls may be permitted to marry in a particular area. This is only for Rohingya
people.
In Burma UNHCR uses
Burmese translators instead of Rohingya people, and these translators
translate not good and fair. That is why they are afraid to complain at UNHCR.
It is very tough to talk with UNHCR in Burma. Rohingya people are always in fear.”
Refugees in detention
Probably some 400 Rohingyas are currently
in detention in Bangladesh. Part of them are recognized refugees from the two official camps.
According to Forum-Asia’s report of 12 February 2003,
there are 136, but according to UNHCR in May there are 73. Some were probably
detained because of criminal offences (for example illegal arms possession),
some others just because they are illegal and some probably because of false or
arbitrary allegations of police and camp authorities. Many refugees have
already been in prison for years, although according to the law they should
have been released already for some time. It seems as if really nobody cares
about them. UNHCR provides the
recognized detainees with legal assistence. The others do not get any
assistance at all. Even local Bangladeshi human rights NGOs
have not yet shown much interest in this topic. Many stressed the need to pressurize the Bangladeshi authorities to
release all non-criminal refugees.
The need for a ‘National Refugee Law’
A representative of
the Dhaka University pleaded for a ‘National Refugee Law’. The Government of Bangladesh
should adopt such a law to deal with all the current refugee problems,
including the undocumented people from Burma. Some Bangladeshi MPs have already strongly
argued against the idea of this kind of law, because they believe that adoption
of it would stimulate more refugees to come to Bangladesh, and the country is not able to deal with them
because of the current poverty and over-population. The University
representative strongly disagreed with this: “People do not flee depending on
the laws in their neighbouring country, but only flee their own country if the
repression becomes too severe!” The current Law Minister has at least promised
to discuss the ‘National Refugee Law’ with his colleagues of Home Affairs,
Foreign Affairs and Disaster Management and Relief, but at the moment there aro
no high expectations that they will agree with it.
9. Rakhine-Buddhist refugees
in Bangladesh
Currently, there are
some 40 recognized Rakhine-Buddhist refugees in Bangladesh, mainly in Dhaka. Most of them came soon after the 1988
demonstrations and the 1990 elections. There are a few thousand more of them
living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (and a few in Tenaf region), but they are
not recognized by the UNHCR.
The small group of
recognized Rakhine Buddhists receive some financial assistance by UNHCR, some
skill training and short-period language training.
The Buddhist Rakhines
face serious cultural and, particularly, language problems in Bangladesh. They have asked UNHCR to extend the current
language training. According to them, those courses need to last for 6 months
in order to be useful. The Rakhines state that they should be given some income
during this period. They feel that UNHCR should provide some semi-skills jobs.
Finally, they believe that UNHCR should officially recognize the former, often
disarmed soldiers of the armed resistance groups. In some remote
Bangladesh-Burma border regions, there are still some small Rakhine-Buddhist
armed groups fighting the SPDC.
Normally,
Rakhines-Buddhist refugees are in contact with the Social Counsellor of the
Refugee Counseling Services Union (RCSU). This NGO deals with the refugee
status with UNHCR. Some Rakhine-Buddhist organizations complained that,
although it was easy for them to contact the Social Counsellor, it usually
takes a long time before all papers and forms are forwarded to UNHCR. The
procedures take too much time. UNHCR replied that recently they have reduced
this period.
UNHCR did not respond
very positively on the other requests until now, stressing that they do already
quite a lot for these refugees. Especially the language problems of the
Rakhine- Buddhists are being played down by UNHCR: “People do not need a
language course for selling cigarettes in the streets”. Many disagree with
this. There are simply not enough opportunities to work in Bangladesh, and people with a different culture, another
language and not enough skills are not able to find jobs anywhere. As even the
refugees who were recognized by UNHCR do not have a residence permit, they do
not have any legal rights in Bangladesh. Therefore, they are particularly vulnerable
to police harassment. This often happens, especially in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts.
10. The eventual solution
SPDC’s increased repression of
(Rohingya) Muslims after September 11
After September
11, 2001, SPDC
intensified its repression against (Rohingya) Muslims. The Burmese military
junta accused Rohingya armed groups of getting support of the Al-Qaeda
terrorist network. It is more than likely that with the actions against
Muslims, the SPDC tried to improve its bad name in the United States. The SPDC hoped unsuccessfully that the US
Government would appreciate the junta’s ‘anti-terrorism’ stance and therefore
loosen its sanctions against the regime. However, none of the Rohingyas working
in academic fields and politics, as well as Rakhine-Buddhist representatives,
seemed to believe that there are any direct links between the Rohingya armed
groups and Al-Qaeda. The armed Rohingya groups do receive financial support
from organizations in Arab countries, but this does certainly not mean that
there is any evidence about links between these groups and Al-Qaeda. At the
other hand, some Rohingya people living in Pakistan for many years already joined the Taliban
during its war with the US in late 2001. However, again this does not say
anything about any kind of relation between the Rohingya armed groups and
Taliban or Al-Qaeda.
According to the
Arakan Historical Society (AHS), there are some 200,000 Rohingyas living in Pakistan already for some time. 500,000 more live in
Saudi-Arabia, 300,000 in Bangladesh and 2,4 million in Burma, an AHS representative said.
Need for economic and political
pressure on SPDC
The eventual solution
for almost all problems of Burmese refugees in Bangladesh is of course a structural political
improvement of the situation in Burma: democratization and respect for human rights
(including religious rights). Therefore, more political pressure on the Burmese
military junta is necessary. In this context, many Burmese organizations and
individual refugees stressed the importance of economic pressure such as trade
sanctions and a tourism boycott. Some also referred to the importance of
keeping the Asian neighbouring countries (including China!) involved and convince them of the need to
press the Burmese junta to normalize the political situation for the benefit of
all Burmese citizens and the refugees.
Active support for reconciliation in
Arakan
Many Burmese organizations
feel that, apart from political and economic pressure on the Burmese regime,
there is something else which is necessary. Many Rohingya-Muslim as well as
Rakhine-Buddhist organizations mentioned the serious sensitivities between both
populations in Arakan. The area has always been exploited by the former and
current Burmese military regime. In this light, many refer to the very sad
happenings in Arakan in 1942 as the cause of the still continuing distrust
between both peoples, “a turning point in Arakan history.” During this hectic
period in the Second World War, the British colonial power had to withdraw from
Arakan and Burma because of the Japanese army
invading Burma. Because of the power vacuum in that period, large-scale communal
violence in Arakan broke out, causing tens of thousands of deaths. It seems
that some nationalists in the local administration had initiated the communal
unrest in a kind of a ‘anti-foreigner hysteria’, trying to move the Muslim
Rohingyas out of Arakan.
Former dictator Ne
Wins’ BSPP (Burma Socialist Programme Party) Government, and the successive
government of SLORC/SPDC have always continued an anti- (Rohingya-)Muslim
policy.
A few armed groups,
Rakhine-Buddhist as well as Rohingya-Mulsims, still fight the SPDC today. They
mainly strive for the self-determination of Arakan. There are two
Rohingya-armed groups: Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) and
Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO). Both strive for self-determination and
recognition of the cultural/religious rights of the Rohingya Muslims in Arakan.
ARNO seems to be more secular and strives for
democracy, while RSO is a bit more Islamic, but seems to have been moderated in
recent years. The Buddhist-Rakhine armed groups are National Unity Party of
Arakan (NUPA) and Arakan Liberation Party (ALP). They both want democracy. ALP
strives for self-determination and NUPA is officially in favour of an
independent Arakan, although it realises that ‘self-determination’ is most
feasible. However, some Buddhist Rakhine and Rohingya Muslims argue that the
armed groups only play a minor role nowadays.
Although there are a
few positive developments in the last couple of years, such as the
establishment of the Arakan Independence Alliance (AIA) by ARNO and NUPA, the
majority of the Rohingya-Muslim and Rakhine-Buddhist peoples still distrust
each other. This also results in a continuing cold non-relationship between
most Rohingya and Rakhine-Buddhist organizations and armed groups. The move of
NUPA, probably the only armed Rakhine-Buddhist organization that de facto
recognizes the Rohingyas, in first instance resulted in a huge amount of
criticism from the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), ALP and Rakhine Buddhists
in general.
The SPDC is the only
party benefiting from the continuing, extremely sensitive relationship between
Rohingya-Muslim politicians, armed groups, journalists, intellectuals etc. and
their Rakhine-Buddhist counterparts. Some organizations and individuals seem to
have been rather narrow-minded until now, and mainly focus on internal
differences in Arakan instead of looking at the broader picture of how to
cooperate towards national reconciliation and democracy.
Therefore, serious
efforts are necessary in order to support a reconciliation process in Arakan.
This is also invaluable when Arakan has to play a role in a future tri-partite
dialogue between NLD, ethnic minorities and SPDC. Without an Arakanese
reconciliation process, a durable peace in Arakan, even in a future democratic Burma, will be extremely uncertain. New waves of
Rohingya refugees to neighbouring countries remain imaginable even when Burma becomes a democracy.
According to some
Rohingya and Buddhist-Rakhine organizations, the international community
(including EU and US), the main Burmese opposition parties (especially NLD,
NCUB, NCGUB, UNA, ENSCC) and the Arakanese Muslim Rohingyas and Rakhine
Buddhists) have to play an active role to achieve reconcilitation in Arakan:
- The international community should support
and wherever possible facilitate an Arakanese reconciliation process;
- The Burmese democratic opposition and
ethnic umbrella organizations should actively support a reconciliation
process in Arakan. They need to recognize relevant Rohingya organizations.
Formal contacts with these organizations should be increased. The Burmese
opposition should not just repeat ‘we will handle this affair after we
have achieved democracy’, but should instead play an active moderating and
mediating role between all relevant Arakanese groups;
- All involved Rakhine-Buddhist and
Muslim-Rohingya organizations, MPs, intellectuals, armed groups,
journalists etc. should play a constructive role and participate in the
much-needed reconciliation process. Therefore, it will be necessary that
representatives of both Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhiss recognize
and respect each other and try to move a step forward. Only repeating the
difficulties and sensitivities of the past would not be very constructive.
An Arakanese
reconciliation process will certainly be not easy, many organizations argued.
Some even feel that it will be a ‘mission impossible’. But at the same time,
the majority seem to understand that Arakanese reconciliation is of great
importance for today’s struggle for freedom and human rights, as well as for
tomorrow’s peace.
11. Conclusions
The
core problem of the Rohingya people is still the discriminatory and repressive
policy of the Burmese junta (SPDC) in Arakan State. Because
of the continuation of forced labour, restrictions on the freedom of movement,
discriminatory taxes, confiscation of land etc. Rohingyas continue to flee to Bangladesh. Many
refugees nowadays living in Bangladesh refuse to
repatriate to Burma
voluntarily because of their fear of repression.
At
the same time, Rohingyas are on a constant pressure by the Bangladeshi
authorities to repatriate to Burma. This
pressure has significantly increased in recent weeks and months. Camp
authorities in the two remaining official Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh use
different methods to press refugees, who are increasingly threatened by this.
UNHCR
has made plans to stimulate self-sufficiency for these recognized refugees.
Although all involved parties accept the relevance of this plan, there are
serious concerns about the lack of communication and consultation about this
plan by UNHCR. The same concerns are felt by UNHCRs second plan to ‘streamline’
its health care in the camps. There are serious doubts about the time-frame of
the plan and the impact of an eventual withdrawing of international
organizations (as ‘nightwatchers’) from the camps. There are also concerns
about the (lack of) possibilities and maybe even willingness of the Government
of Bangladesh (and for example its Ministry of Health) to agree with UNHCRs
plans and to actively support it.
Except
of the recognized Rohingya refugees, there are 100,000 – 300,000 undocumented
Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. They
survive without any rights and are in vulnerable condition. The current policy
of the Bangladeshi authorities (and UNHCR) which denies any involvement and
humanitarian support is not humane. The Bangladeshi authorities and UNHCR have
no sufficient information how many undocumented Rohingyas exactly live in Bangladesh and their
reasons for fleeing to Bangladesh. Because
these refugees are officially denied any kind of (humanitarian) aid, they often
live in unbearable conditions. An extreme example is the newly established
Teknaf ‘makeshift camp’, where 4,000 refugees are hiding now, and which will
possibly be swept away by the monsoon rains.
As
long as the current political and human rights problems in Burma/Arakan
continue, the responsibility of the Government of Bangladesh and UNHCR remains
to protect the refugees from Burma and to guarantee them protection and a
bearable life. Because the conditions In the camps are deteriorating, there is
now for them an even more urgent need to increase their efforts.
12. Recommendations
We call upon the
international (donor) community, including EU, EU-Member States, Japan and US, to:
1.
Request the Government of
Bangladesh to urgently allow UNHCR and INGOs to prevent a human disaster
by giving practical assistance to the refugees in Teknaf ‘makeshift camp’ (Tal)
as soon as possible;
2.
Increase their financial and
logistical support to UNHCR and WFP-programmes to the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh as long as there is no significant positive change in Arakan/Burma.
The safety of the Rohingyas in the refugee camps should be guaranteed;
3.
Request UNHCR, regarding its
‘self-sufficiency plan’ for recognized refugees, to start serious
communications with all involved actors (like WFP, MSF and Concern) about it,
start a real consultation process which should especially include the refugees
involved, guarantee a ‘safety net’ during the transition period and continue to
allow international organizations to support the refugees and to play a
‘nightwatchers role’;
4.
Request UNHCR, with regard to
its plan to ‘streamline’ the health care in the camps, to seriously consult all
involved actors (especially Concern and MSF), to actively cooperate with them
for the actual implementation of any new plans;
5.
Request UNHCR to extend its
current language teachings and skill training programs for Rakhine-Buddhist
refugees, and to recognize as refugees all politically involved
Rakhine-Buddhists who are currently mainly in the Bangladesh-Burma border
regions;
6.
Approach the Bangladeshi
authorities and raise the following issues:
a.
To halt the current pressure on
the refugees to repatriate and forced repatriation by the camp authorities in
the two official refugee camps;
b.
To agree with UNHCRs
‘self-sufficiency plan’ and to assist it in actively cooperating with UNHCR and
the other involved international organizations to implement it with safety
guarantees for the refugees;
c.
To allow a new and independent
investigation into the exact reasons why the 100,000 – 300,000 non-registered
Rohingyas in Bangladesh fled from Burma and give implementation to the outcome of this independent
research;
d.
To immediately release all
non-criminal refugees from detention, to release all refugees which have
finished their term and to give legal assistance to all other refugees in
detention;
7.
Call upon the Government of
Burma to stop its repression (including forced labour, lack of religious
freedoms and lack of freedom of movement) and discriminatory policy towards the
peoples in Arakan in general and the Rohingya-Muslims particularly;
All parties
involved, including the international community, the Burmese democratic and
ethnic opposition, Rohingya-Muslim and Rakhine-Buddhist representatives (of
armed organizations, intellectuals, politicians etc.) should:
8.
Actively support an ‘All
Arakanese Reconciliation Process’, with relevant representatives of both
Rohingya-Muslims and Rakhine-Buddhists. This includes recognition of
Rohingya-Muslims and their representatives by all involved parties;
13. Just a few stories
Refugee 1
Female
Date: May, 2003
Location: One of
both official camps
“I came to Bangladesh because the Burmese Government said to
us, ‘You don’t belong here, you are not a citizen of Burma.’ But we were born in Burma! Why can’t we be citizens of Burma? The Burmese Government took all our lands,
all our cows, all our belongings and noticed ‘you should leave for Bangladesh!’ Only in our area, 16 mosques have been
destroyed. The Burmese Government does not allow us to perform our religious
rights. In some cases they took some women from their houses and tortured them.
Girls were sometimes taken and tortured when they collected water. When we
asked for justice, we didn’t get anything. Men and boys had to do forced labour
for 3 to 4 months. Some of them never returned.
After coming here, we
got protection and rations. The problems in Burma were not solved. But here they want to send us
back to the same situation. The RRRC forces us to repatriate and asks for
ration books and fingerprints to sign for repatriation. When I refused to
repatriate, the Camp in Charge himself beat me: this happened already some
years ago, here in this camp. From that moment on I refused my ration.
The group leaders
(mahjees) mingle with RRRC and force people to repatriate. Whatever the mahjees
say, the RRRC accepts it. Sometimes the mahjees accuse refugees of this or
that. All these things are still happening.
Around here, there are
mahjees watching us what we are doing. We will be questioned as soon as we get
out here.”
Refugee 2
Female
Date: May, 2003
Location: One of
both official camps
“While my husband
earned money, the NaSaKa (Burmese border police) took him away. The Myanmar
Government took half of our harvest. My husband had to do forced labour for the
military: he had to construct roads. We complained, but the answer was, ‘You
have to tolerate this, otherwise you will have to leave.’
I want to go back, but
only if conditions are safe, if we get back our land and if they stop forced
labour. If there is social security, I want to go back now.
The camp authorities
request us to go back. They say that the situation has improved and that there
is peace now. But we are not sure if this is true.”
Refugee 3
Female
Date: May, 2003
Location: One of
both official camps
“We are in trouble
now: the camp-authorities force us to go back to Burma. The camp authorities force us to sign the
affidavit. If we refuse to sign, the mahjees and ‘volunteers’ always cause
problems to us. Male mahjees shout at us and some women mahjees beat our men.
Sometimes the mahjees make problems about our rations. And when we have a young
son they always say: ‘We send him to jail if you do not sign.’ So most men are
outside the camp.”
Refugee 4
Male
Date: May, 2003
Location: One of
both official camps
“I signed that I am
willing to go back to Burma, but I am not willing to go! I was afraid not
to sign, because the mahjees and ‘volunteers’ always cause problems to us. They
cause problems for getting rations and as a punishment they force us to go to
another block. I know someone who will be repatriated tomorrow, but who is not
doing this voluntarily. This man is separated from the other people and the
mahjees guard him. The mahjees insult the refugees if they refuse to
repatriate. I am afraid that if I talk with UNHCR or an International NGO, the
mahjees will create more problems.”
BCN: “Why do you not
complain at the UNHCR’s complaint box?”
Answer: “I am so
scared that I do not use this. I know someone who gave a written complaint to
UNHCR. He is in jail now, because of helping another refugee. The mahjees found
out about this, then they made a false accusation against him, and now he is in
jail.”
Refugee 5
Male
Date: May, 2003
Location: One of
both official camps
“I know a lot of
people, for example my sister, who were repatriated before and who are now
back. This is because they got rations for three months in Burma and these three months were OK, but after this
they had to earn money themselves and then they had to pay NaSaKa for
everything, even for newborn babies, marriages, and when someone died. Only 50
girls may be permitted to mary in particular area. This is only for Rohingya
people. In Burma, UNHCR uses Burmese translators instead of Rohingya people, and
these translators translate not good and fair. That is why they are afraid to
complain at UNHCR. It is very tough to talk with UNHCR in Burma. Rohingya people are always in fear.”
Undocumented refugee 6
Male
Date: May, 2003
Location: ‘Teknaf
makeshift camp’ (Tal)
“The men and boys work
outside the ‘camp’ to earn some money. We do not receive enough food. We work
as rickshaw drivers or as manual-labor workers, so we are not fully paid. The
local Bangladeshi people try to force us not to work. The local police does not
any harass us nowadays, but local people do. They do not like us. Since 6
months, more then 150 people have died in the ‘camp’ because of disease, mostly
children. We don’t get any medical help. The main illnesses here are malaria,
diarrhoea and other infectious diseases.
Every night after six pm the police arrives. Nobody is allowed to get
in or out any more during the night.”
Undocumented refugee 7
Male
Date: May, 2003
Location: ‘Teknaf
makeshift camp’ (Tal)
“I came to Bangladesh 6 or 7 years ago, because in Burma I had to do forced labor for a couple of
months. There are now 1,217 families here and maybe altogether even 10,000
people in this camp. We have been here in this camp for 6 months now. We were
expelled from other settlements.
If the situation in Burma is peaceful, then I agree to go back. But this
is not the case now.
People from the ‘camp’
don’t go back to Burma to smuggle, because of fear of getting shot or being sent to jail.”
Undocumented refugee 8
Female
Date: May, 2003
Location: ‘Teknaf
makeshift camp’ (Tal)
“When I was a little
girl, I came with my family to Bangladesh. I have one child now. I don’t know my age.
I am worried about the
rains: the sanitation will become worse. There is no shade here, and we don’t
have sufficient food.
If there is no peace in Burma, then I will not go back. I came here because
of forced labour in Burma and they (the Burmese military) took my land.
Local Bangladeshi forces sometimes came here to request us to leave the ‘camp’,
but they didn’t use any force. We are free to walk outside the ‘camp.’ We do
not get any assistance. Eventually we will have to leave this place, we have
heard.”
14. TRAVEL SCHEDULE
Sun April
27 Travel Amsterdam – Dhaka
Mon April
28 Dhaka
Tue April
29 Dhaka
Wed April
30 Travel Dhaka – Chittagong
Thu May
1 Chittagong
Fri May 2 Chittagong
Sat May
3 Travel Chittagong – Cox’s
Bazaar
Sun May
4 Cox’s Bazaar
Mon May
5 Teknaf (incl.
‘makeshift camp’)
Tue May
6 Nayapara refugee
camp
Wed May
7 Kutapalong
refugee camp
Thu May
8 Cox’s Bazaar – Dhaka – Delhi
Fri May
9 Delhi
Sat May
10 Delhi
Sun May
11 -
Mon May
12 -
Tue May
13 -
Wed May
14 -
Thu May
15 Delhi
Fri May
16 Delhi
Sat May
17 Travel Delhi - Amsterdam
15. ORGANIZATIONS VISITED
All Burmese Refugees Committee (ABRC)
Arakan Historical Society (AHS)
Arakan League for Democracy (ALD)
Arakan Liberation Party (ALP)
Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO)
Camp in Charge (CiC) – Kutupalong
Camp in Charge (CiC) - Nayapara
Concern
Dhaka University
Dutch Embassy - Delhi
Dutch Embassy - Dhaka
Kaladan Press Network
Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF)
Mizzima News
Narinjara News
National Council of Union of Burma (NCUB)
National League for Democracy (NLD)
National United Party of Arakan (NUPA)
The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)
United Nations High Commissioner For
Refugees (UNHCR)