CHAPTER THREE
BURMA: MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN DOMINATION
Introduction:
The Politics of the State and the Military in Burma
Military rule began in Burma in
1962, and was dominated by Ne Win (Thakin Shu Maung[1])
until the "people’s power" uprising of 1988. This was bloodily supp-ressed
by the military, which has remained in power to the present. In this chapter, because of the prolonged
presence of the military in politics and the important role it has played in
shaping the contours of state-society relations and the political land-scape, the examination of the phenomenon of military
intervention will go beyond the conceptualization of it as a response to
crises, implicitly connoting limitations to the intrusion of the military into
politics. Military intervention will be
analyzed as one intertwined with the reorganization of power, the
reconfiguration of state structures, and the re-ordering of state-society
relations.
As mentioned in the preliminary
chapters, military intervention occurs in complex, diverse historical,
socio-economic, and political settings, and is triggered by diverse events and
factors. Soldiers are motivated to
intervene by a mix of factors -- in addition to a situation of
"praetorian" politics characterizing the politics of many
The military in
The military Thakins,
like their counterparts in
In 1957, when the AFPFL,
ruling party, split into two camps and many cliques, the door was opened for
soldiers to enter politics. "Young
Turk" Brigadiers in the military stepped in as "caretakers" in
1958, to "save" the country from splitting -- as had the ruling party
-- into two, but returned to the barracks in 1960. As will be examined, the first military's
foray into politics was not led by the military’s chief, Ne Win, but by
"Young Turk" Brigadiers who placed their chief, Ne Win, as head of a
military caretaker government. Quite
uncharacteristically -- to judge from his later performance -- Ne Win chose to
rule as a constitutional military caretaker.
Elections were promised for 1960.
Even though the AFPFL (Stable) faction favored by the military was
humiliated in these elections, the military kept its pledge -- given by its
chief, Ne Win -- to return to the barracks.
In 1962, the
military, unified by Ne Win -- after the purge of most "Young Turks"
Brigadiers prominent in the military-caretaking
government -- stepped dramat-ically onto the
political stage. This time, it was led
personally by Ne Win, now the undisputed leader, and he meant business. As will be discussed, he proceded
to re-organize political power in an authoritarian direction. Like Sarit in 1958
(in Thai-land), he abrogated the 1947-1948 Constitution; abolished parliament;
banned political parties; detained the Prime Minister, U Nu, cabinet members,
the Chief Justice, Members of Parliament, leaders of non-Bama
ethnic segments (especially of the Shan), politicians (both of the left and the
right political spectrum), and so on; closed down papers and imposed censorship
and, just three months after the coup, had a number of protesting Rangoon
University students killed. In contrast
to Sarit and
Ne Win’s military-run Lanzin,[7]
or BSPP (Burmese Socialist Program Party) state, was well in line with the
authoritarian, nationalist-socialist Dobama
creed. He reorganized political power
and the order of state and society in ways that shut out not only the
population at large, but also most non-military (or civilian) elites, both
bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic, from the political arena and limited their
access to the state. Laws instituted to
promote and protect the "
In 1988, owing in large part to
the extreme hardships associated with "socialist" economic failures
and the monopolization of political and economic resources by the military, Ne
Win’s state "of soldiers, for soldiers, by soldiers" was confronted
and challenged by popular forces in a country-wide, urban "people’s
power" uprising. Seemingly
invulnerable, the BSPP state nonetheless collapsed almost overnight. The power base of the "old" regime,
the military, did not collapse, however.
It was still held together by Ne Win’s authority, or by fear of the
leader. This, together with fear of popular
retribution that might await them, spurred the military to carry out a bloody
coup to re-establish military-authoritarian rule, and restore the status-quo
ante and with it, the military's dominant place. This time, the military -- represented by the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) -- claimed it would hold onto
power only to restore law and order and promote free-market economic
development. Nearly a decade later, it
still rules at gunpoint.
State
and Society in
I stated in the theoretical
framework that the military intervention in politics and the reconfiguration of
the state-society order are closely linked.
As a point of departure in the examination of the military as an armed
political actor involved in the politics of the state, a brief survey of the
nature of state orders and state-society relations in
The genesis of
the Burmese state in its modern form lies in the economic expansion of the West
and its political by-product, colonialism.
It is a classic case of the flag inevitably following trade, as John Furnivall notes.[10] Over time, "planting the flag"
became a larger project involving the reorganization and restructuring of
pre-capitalist, agrarian societies, and the erosion of their political and
socio-cultural "superstructures."
This led to the "modernization" and
"rationalization" of politics and governance to ensure a smooth ride
for capitalism. Furnivall’s
comment that the tropics were "colonized with capital" might be
reworded as " colonized with capital, for capital."[11] The establishing of European colonies changed
the colonized entities in two main ways.
Old "kingdoms" were transformed into "modern"
territorial, political-administrative units along Western lines. Also, colonial methods of man-agement founded on notions of market rationality,
commercial efficiency, and so on, forcibly imposed on "native"
societies a European-capitalist universalizing hegem-ony.[12] Despite
Robert Taylor’s view -- influenced by nationalist rhetoric, perhaps -- that
British rule in
In the way the
British reorganized political power in colonial
Referring back to the discussion
in the theoretical framework of the ways polit-ical
power is organized to yield authoritarian or democratic outcomes, it can be
said that the colonial state in
On the other hand, state
officials were public servants in the real sense of the word. They were forbidden to be closely involved
(or interfere) in politics or to use their office to advance their personal
preferences. T
class=Section2>
he state, in other words, was gen-erally non-malleable vis-à-vis officials’ private agendas. In this sense, the autonomy of the official class, from the Governor downwards, vis-à-vis both society and the state was moderated by legal-rational bureaucratic norms and the rule of law. Also, the gradual introduction of a more or less open, somewhat democratic political arena and a representative-legislative sphere from the 1920s onward, as noted, meant that the autonomy of the colonial state -- and its officials -- was moderated by their malleability by societal forces.
The British
may have been laying the foundation for
A
Decade of Democracy: The State of the Moderate Thakins,
1948-1958
Power in post-war Burma did
not devolve into the hands of the "old time" pol-iticians
-- U Saw, Sir Paw Tun, U Ba Pe,
U Pu, and so on -- who had been "trained"
and were experienced in the ways of parliamentary politics and governance.[20] It fell into the hands of the Thakins. They were politicized
young men who emerged in the 1930s as extreme and impatient nationalists. They were the product of a time when the
world was gripped by a severe economic depression; when anti-capitalist
sentiments were as strong as nationalist ones, not only in the world’s
peripheral regions but in
The Thakins
-- from whose ranks sprang the military Thakins --
were mostly from the "educated" (pyin-nya-tat)
sub-stratum. They were inspired by Saya San, by "past glories" of the Bama lu-myo (race),[22] and as well by Karl Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mussolini,
Hitler, and other Western figures. They
were politicized, too, by the dismal prospect of employment in the lower ranks
of the colonial bureaucracy, serving the imperial power as school-teachers and
clerks.[23] It was these men who shaped
They called
themselves thakin ("lord" or "master," a form of address used
towards Europeans). They belonged to the
Dobama Asi-Ayone,
the Dobama, "We Bama,"
movement.[24] Their platform was independence, and their
version of nation-alism rested on negative sentiments
-- anti-White, anti-foreign, anti-capitalist.
They rejected liberal democracy, espoused a foggy notion of
"national" socialism, and held to a vague vision of a "golden
past" that depicted the Bama as a conquering
master race (lu-myo), which dominated and
ruled over other lesser lu-myo, until it was
defeated by the British, and its kingdom disembered.
As it was spelled out in 1941 by
Aung San (then an obscure supplicant in Tokyo), the Dobama
creed aspired to "a strong state ... [as] in Germany and Italy, [of] only
one nation, one state, one party, one leader." It would be a state without parliamentary
opposition or the "nonsense of individualism".[25] In
Josef Silverstein’s view, Aung San later repudiated the authoritarian statism attributed to him.[26] None-theless, like
their nationalists counterparts in
Despite its
authoritarian, unitary orientation, the Dobama was
actually a loose-ly structured political front,
composed of shifting cliques and factions, headed by leaders with diverse and
changing beliefs.[28] Among its leaders, some in time became
"moderate socialists," like Thakin, later
General, Aung San, and Thakins Nu (later U Nu), Ba Swe, and Kyaw Nyein, to name a few.
Then there were staunch Marxists like Thakins Soe, Than Tun, Ba Hein, and Thein Pe Myint,
along with rightwing nationalists such as Thakins Ba Sein, Tun Ok, and Shu Maung
(Ne Win). The result was much jockeying
for dominance among Thakin groups and leaders.
The fortunes of war and politics
determined that some became ministers, "national" leaders, and high
officials, first in the Japanese-sponsored "independent state" during
the war years (1943-1945), and later in post-independence
The AFPFL
emerged after the war as a formidable force.
It was another broad nationalist front organized by Aung San against the
Japanese, which he dominated. Its
members established themselves in the structures of power (left vacant after
the British retreat from
It was fortunate for the AFPFL
that
As
"moderate socialists," AFPFL powerholders,
like "socialists" counterparts in
The state’s
structure was decentralized to a degree in the wake of the 1947 Panglong
Agreement signed by Aung San and the Yawnghwe chaofa
(prince), Sao Shwe Thaike, and later the first Union President, along with
other non-Bama leaders. In keeping with the 1948 Constitution, based
in part on the Panglong Agreement, non-Bama states
enjoyed some political-administrative autonomy.
Each non-Bama state had its own government,
legislature, and its own administrative setup.
In this sense, the AFPFL state was ethnically inclusive in that the
rights and autonomy of larger non-Bama ethnic segment
were recognized and respected, in principle at least.
The recognition of ethnic
diversity, or ethnic inclusiveness, went against the military's notion of
national unity which is one that is based on, as discussed in the theoretical
chapters, the notion of "one-ness", or the absence of conflicts (and diss-ent, or even differences). Likewise, the military in
However, although the non-Bama states were "autonomous", they were
subordinated to the government of Bama Pri-Ma (the Bama
mother-state), which was concurrently the government of the union: there did not exist what one might describe
as a federal government. The
quasi-federal/semi-unitary arrangement was a compromise that satisfied the
moderate Thakins’ need to claim they had
"recovered" all territories which were "lost" when the
British administered the non-Bama areas as separate
entities.[35] On the
down side, however, it did not satisfy in particular the military Thakin, who viewed the quasi-federal arrangement as
detrimental to unity. At the same time,
many non-Bama saw the "union" as a Bama ploy to "Burmanize"
them and destroy their "national" identity.[36]
On the whole, the AFPFL state was, in the way power was organized, democ-ratic in form and to a degree in content. It sought the institutional separation of the state, government, and powerholders, and kept open the political arena. There were many different and competing power centres, interest groups, and political parties, with one of the latter, the AFPFL, winning elections and exercising power. The ability of AFPFL leaders, especially U Nu, to maintain this complex state-society configuration in a more or less democratic environment for about fourteen years, despite extreme praetorian conditions and regular rebellions, is impressive.[37]
To appreciate
just how impressive, it should be noted that on assuming power, the AFPFL was
everywhere challenged, and severely wounded by the loss of its most vital
asset, Aung San. His death weakened the AFPFL’s cohesion as his charisma had cemented it. With Aung San went the AFPFL’s
hold on the majority of the milit-ary Thakins, both in the armed forces and in the party’s
private "army," the Pyithu Yebaw (PVO). Thakin officers in three of the four Bama
"class" battalions[38]
defected to the communist Thakins, as did the PVOs. An exception
was Ne Win’s Fourth Burma Rifles, which included Maung Maung,
Aung Gyi, Tin Pe, Sein Lwin, "Em-I" Tin Oo,[39]
and others.
The AFPFL’s
weakness emboldened communist Thakins to rebel soon
after independence; their revolt lasted until the collapse of communism in the
late 1980s.[40] In turn, the many tasks which confronted
AFPFL power-holders as rulers -- such as combating communism (or specifically,
fending off communist Thakin rivals), keep-ing the country together, extending the reach of the state,
repulsing foreign intruders, and so on -- resulted not only in their growing
dependence on the military, but also in the expansion of the military's role
and, correspondingly, its importance and political leverage. It also reinforced the military's perception
of itself as an indispensible guardian-protector and
savior of the state. This suggests the
strengthening of factors that encourage, as discussed in the preliminary
chapters, the military's propensity not only to intervene in politics, but also
to "stay on", as theoretically discussed, to re-fashion the state and
take on the task of ruling.
Next to the communist Thakins, the most serious challenge to the AFPFL state and power-holders was posed by the Karen. In 1948, a year after independence, the fragile truce patched up with the Karen following the wartime BIA massacres of Karens dissolved into Karen-Bama clashes. The "loyal" Karen who fought against the Japanese had, in a sense, won the war. But in its aftermath, they were faced with the prospect of being ruled, from their standpoint, by "deceitful" Bama -- by those who had betrayed not only the British, but their own Japanese mentors as well. Their position was desperate. U Nu and Saw Ba U-Gyi, the top Karen leader, tried to defuse the tension, but they could not prevent the Karen rebellion, which continues at a reduced level still today.[41] The Karen were joined in revolt by the Mon, Pa-O, and Kachin mutineers.
Compounding
the AFPFL’s problems with internal challenges, Chiang
Kai-Shek’s defeat in
Despite these
many problems and internal wars, however, the AFPFL continued to respect the
parameters of parliamentary politics.
They held and won elections in 1952 and 1956. The 1956 vote was especially pivotal: the
opposition, the National Unity Front (NUF, a moderate leftist front) won 45
percent of the popular vote and 47 seats.[43] The NUF’s electoral
gains convinced significant "underground" elements that parliament
was a viable venue of politics. In 1958,
responding to U Nu’s "Arms for Democracy" program, they abandoned the
armed struggle.[44] By most indicators, it seemed democracy in
On the other
hand, although the AFPFL Thakin were more or less
able to main-tain a parliamentary, quasi-federal
order until 1962, the commitment to democratic process that they displayed was
rather ambiguous. First, the AFPFL
openly aspired to rule for forty years. They
stacked the administrative apparatus, the military, state agencies, and even
municipal bodies with their supporters and clients. This under-mined the state’s autonomy from
key power-holders, undercut the institutional integ-rity
of the bureaucracy, and eroded democratic norms.
Second, the AFPFL interfered in
the politics of the non-Bama states. Opposit-ion leaders
and groups received help from the AFPFL, the military, or its intelligence
services (MIS, the Military Intelligence Service).[45] The
military was particularly active not only in "mopping up" rebels, but
in imposing its presence, via "pacificat-ion"
marches into the rural areas to intimidate the non-Bama
populace ("showing the flag", so to speak).
It also established garrisons,
set up check-points, and in many areas took direct control of administrative
functions. For example, in areas put
under martial law, the military set up a hierarchy of Security and
Administrative Committees (SACs), head-ed by the
local military commander. The heads of
the SACs, being military officers, held the balance
of power vis-à-vis local civil officers, and reported to their superiors in the
military chain of command. Thus, in the
non-Bama states, the power exercised by military
commanders over-shadowed those vested in local officers, and even the
constitutionally vested powers of the non-Bama state
governments.[46] Moreover, MIS personnel busied themselves
with "rooting" out "secessionists", and terrorized the non-Bama populace, so as to dissuade them from even harboring
the idea of secession. The policy of
"Burmanization" -- the central pillar of
which was making Burmese (the Bama language) the
official language -- predictably caused non-Bama much
distress. It gave rise to suspicions
that the "Bama" government had a hidden
agenda aimed at cultural genocide. The
apparent unwillingness or inability of the AFPFL to put a stop to atrocities by
the Bama military further fuelled these
suspicions.
Third, the AFPFL’s professed adherence to democracy was undermined by
its socialist statism, as this was proclaimed in the
1947 Sorrento Villa Conference, enshrined in the 1948 Constitution, and
reiterated in the 1952 Pyidawtha Plan.[47] AFPFL socialism resulted in what one American
analyst called a "socialist economy" based on grandiose,
ideologically-driven planning.[48] The implementation of some socialist
policies, the rhetoric portraying capitalism and capitalists as evil, strength-ened the hegemony of this left-socialist world view. It kept alive the Dobama’s
creed of national-socialist authoritarianism, especially among military Thakins who, like soldiers in
The
First Military Foray Into Politics: The Military Caretakers, 1958-1960
Politics in any democratic polity
are complex. In a multi-ethnic state
like
The split stemmed from the fact that the AFPFL was a coalition of rival fact-ions led by AFPFL "bosses" like U Ba Swe, Kyaw Nyein, Thakins Tin, and Kyaw Tun.[49] The split stemmed basically from competition between AFPFL factions (or party "empires" and party "czars") over the spoils of office and power, and jockeying among top leaders to get their respective loyalists appointed to strategic party posts. Such intra-party conflicts are common to many political parties. What made them deadly was that U Nu, regarded as standing above the factions, ended up joining the Clean camp. The split paralyzed the government: all of the national and sub-national state machinery were filled by the AFPFL’s allies, clients, and supporters. Anyone of importance was sucked into the fray: politicians, civil servants, mayors, editors, businessmen, even the third Union President – U Win Maung, a Karen. With the ruling party and its member organizations split, the bureaucracy paralyzed, and even society-based institutions divided into Stable and Clean camps, it seemed the govern-ment and the state itself were in danger of splitting asunder.
In 1958, as the theoretical
discussion of the previous chapters would predict, the military, feeling its
privileged place in the state hierarchy threatened along with the state itself,
intervened in the political sphere. The
military intrusion was led by "Young Turks" Brigadiers like Aung Gyi,
Tin Pe, Maung Maung, Than
Sein, Hla Myint, and
others. Well-informed Burmese with good
military connections insist that the young Brigadiers who "persuaded"
U Nu to hand power over to Ne Win -- did so without Ne Win's order or direct
involvement.[50] As such,
the intervention took on the complexion of an "aid to civil power"
operation by the military at the request of the Prime Minister, to restore
stability and prevent the break-up of the country. It did not lead to the reorganization of
political power -- which is in agreement with the theoretical discussion where
I stressed the importance of a military strongman-unifier, who must transform
the military into a cohesive political instrument.
The official -- and U Nu's and the
military's -- version is that U Nu, worried by the party split which affected
the whole country, especially the elite segments in government, politics, even
societal associations, made use of a clause in the const-itution
allowing for the appointment of a non-MP to the government, to invite the armed
forces chief, Ne Win, to assume temporary control.[51] There was, officially, no
"coup". However, there were
troops and armoured cars posted at strategic points
in Rangoon for several weeks, and there were as well checkpoints manned by
soldiers in full battle gear on the outskirts of the capital, again, for
several weeks.[52] The fact of the matter may lie in-between
those who believe that the Brigadiers staged a coup, though indirectly, and the
official version.
The situation was complicated by
the struggle -- at its height then -- between two ruling factions, and Aung Gyi
was close to U Ba Swe, the
co-leader of the Stable faction that failed to oust U Nu from government. Moreover, U Nu's decision to
"invite" Ne Win in as a caretaker was made soon after a visit by
Maung Maung and Aung Gyi -- but not much is known, up
to now, about what was actually said and what transpired. The decision to hand over power to the
military was U Nu's, and his alone. It
came as a surprise to most cabinet members.[53] According to Richard Butwell,
U Nu had no choice but to agree to hand over power: the choice was between
inviting the military to power, or "inviting" a coup.[54] It was, as Dr. Ba
Maw, a very prominent Burmese former mentor of the Thakins,
put it, a "coup by consent".[55]
Soldiers ruled as caretakers for
two years. Compared with the second
intervention in 1962, though, they performed well.[56] Especially praised was the encouragement of
capitalist development, as provided for in the 1959 Burma Investment Act. It offered domestic and foreign investors a
20-year guarantee against nationalization; looser restrictions on the
importation and repatriation of capital and earnings; and exemptions for new
investors from custom duties and taxes for three years. All of this was drastically reversed in 1962
-- when Ne Win gained undisputed control of the military and was able to
reorganize the state in accordance with his "Burmese socialist"
agenda.[57]
The soldiers-caretakers
launched "annihilation" operations against insurgents, and as in
What is of particular theoretical
relevance about this first military intervention is how different it was from
the second. It came more in the form of
an "aid to the civil power," rather than a seizure of power. Parliament was only suspended; political
parties were not banned. In fact, Ne Win
insisted on obtaining a parliamentary mandate to rule as head of the caretaker
regime.[60] The
administrative machinery of the state was neither seized nor subordinated to
the military. And, importantly, the
military caretakers chose to recognise (in form at least) the autonomy of the
non-Bama states, as constitutionally provided. In the appointment of new heads for these
states, for examples, they accepted candidates chosen by the state
legislature. Unlike in 1962, there was
almost no change in ministerial-administrative personnel at the state level.[61]
Further, as promised, Ne Win held
an election in 1960, and handed power over to U Nu and his Union Party
(formerly the Clean AFPFL), which had won a landslide victory. Ne Win thus gained fame as a
"no-nonsense" statesman-soldier.
He so impressed the outside world with his competence and
professionalism that he was nominated for the prestigious Magsaysay
prize, which he declined.[62] His image as a constitutional, professional
soldier was further boosted when he dismissed the "Young Turks" who
figured prominently as military caretakers -- Maung Maung,
Kyi Win, Aung Shwe, Tun Sein, Chit Khaing, and
others. This also restored U Nu’s trust
in Ne Win.[63] Lulled by a sense that parliamentary democracy
had been restored, legislators, politicians, and community-communal leaders
went about their business as usual. No
one then realized the magnitude of the change in the balance of power at the
heart of the state that the AFPFL split had brought in its train. Surprise was thus the order of the day when,
in the pre-dawn hours of
An explanation of the differences
between the first and second military inter-vention
may lie in the actions that Ne Win took following the announced handover of
power in 1958. He insisted on being
"elected" by the parliament in October 1958, to effect a legal
transfer of power for a year. Again in
September 1959, parliament was convened to extend his tenure for a year
further. His concern for constitutional
legal-ity can be interpreted as actions of a
politically unambitious professional soldier, or
alternatively as those of a military chief unprepared to try to run the country
-- the former interpretation contradicts his later actions.
Knowledgable
Burmese maintain that the Tatmadaw was then dominated by "Young
Turk" Brigadiers, who were ambitious, capable, and did not hold Ne Win in
awe, as would those who followed them.
They believe that had Ne Win been in undis-puted
control in 1958, it is likely that military rule would have lasted much longer.[64]
That this is likely the case is
reinforced by Ne Win's dismissal, before his 1962 coup, of the "Young
Turks" who were prominent in the caretaker regime, and the dismissal soon
after of Aung Gyi, one of the masterminds of the 1958 "handover", and
leader of a strong Tatmadaw faction.
The analysis indicates support for
the theoretical observation advanced earlier that effective, prolonged military
intervention that results in the reorganization of political power depends to a
large extent on the military being unified by a strongman; and if an undisputed
strongman is lacking, the military will most likely restore civilian rule -- if
only temporarily.
As shown, military intervention in
1958 did not lead -- as it would in 1962 -- to the reorganization of political
power and the state. Ne Win had not at
the time become what he was to become two years later: the undisputed, military
strongman-unifier. Therefore, upon being
handed power in 1958 by the "Young Turks", Ne Win -- most
uncharacteristically -- played the role of a professional, constitutional
leader and reluctant military ruler. He
saw to it that elections were held in 1960 as he promised, and led his soldiers
back to the barracks.
Ne
Win’s Bama Tatmadaw: The Power Centre Within the
State
Although the military seized
complete control of the state only in 1962, its history is inextricably linked
to politics. In this context it is worth
noting that the notion of the military as a specifically-organized coercive arm
of the state, subordin-ated to the civil power and
led by an apolitical officer corps, is quite novel in many Third World
polities. As Dorothy Guyot
notes, the Tatmadaw was at its inception a "political movement in
military garb": its founders and leaders -- the military Thakins -- were politicians first and foremost.[65]
The Tatmadaw’s history is
shaped primarily by politics. It
originated in the plan of a Japanese intelligence officer, Colonel Keji Suzuki (
But the plan for a Burmese guerrilla
force was shelved when
After a few months, the Japanese
disbanded the BIA, now filled mostly with new Thakin
recruits, many of whom were little more than drifters. Thereafter, the Burma Defence Army (BDA) was
formed from selected BIA members. In
1945, when Aung San and the Thakins turned on their
Japanese sponsors shortly before the Allied victory (after
The above account of the various
"armies" shows that from 1942 to 1948, mil-itary
Thakins commanded or served in four
differently-composed and -organized forces.
Only a handful served in all of them; of these, only a few served in the
post-1948 armed forces. As such, the
conventional view of the Tatmadaw as a direct descendant of the
"armies that fought for independence" is inaccurate. The current Tatmadaw is essentially
the child of Ne Win and the Fourth Burma Rifles who stood by the AFPFL in
1948. Nonetheless, the military has
persisted with its claim that it expelled both the British and the Japanese,
"winning" Burmese independence, and therefore it is the rightful
guardian of the state and nation.[71]
But there is no questioning the
debt AFPFL power-holders owed to the military Thakins
in the first fragile years of independence.
It was the Tatmadaw, its ranks reinforced by Chin, Kachin, and
Shan recruits, that blunted the offensive capabilities of both the communist Thakins and the Karen.
In this it was assisted by friendly governments, including the
Even though the military quickly
became an autonomous centre of power, one crucial to the survival of AFPFL Thakins prior to the 1958 AFPFL split, its chief and future
strongman-ruler was apparently not very engaged politically. Ne Win led the high life of wine, women, and
pleasure. He attended the races
regularly; travelled abroad for the nightlife and
horses; was involved in scandals with European callgirls
and local starlets; broke up the marriage of Daw Khin May Than, a prominent
social-ite, and then married her, though he was
already married [73] As such, he commanded little in the way of
public esteem, and almost no Thakin superior – not U
Nu, not Kyaw Nyein, not Ba Swe – thought of him as a threat or rival.
On the other hand, top brass such
as Aung Gyi, Maung Maung, and Tin Pe,
those who believed in the Dobama creed and the
founding myths of the military, resented the civilian Thakins. In their view, those who had not risked their
necks in the independence struggle, civilian Thakins
and others now enjoying the "fruits of independence", were
necessarily less capable, less patriotic, and "unrevolutionary."[74] As true believers, they were unhappy with
two main features of the AFPFL state.
One was its underpinnings of
parliamentary democracy, which they saw, like their Thai and Indonesian
counterparts, as a dangerously unstable system that would only hamper the
state’s ability to perform its tasks.[75] Accordingly, the Burmese military hardly
welcomed the outcome of the 1956 elections, which gave the moderate-left NUF a
full 45 percent of the votes. The
military was also deeply suspicious of U Nu’s "Arms for Democracy"
program, which included the 1958 surrender of a number of rebel armies and
their embrace of parliamentary politics.
Soldiers (and analysts like Frank Trager)
viewed this as "crypto-communist" subversion, and saw the need for
the military to step in and "save" democracy and the nation.[76] For the military, the years of democracy under
the AFPFL were years of incompetence, corruption, and weakness that demonstrated
the inability of the state to counter the communist threat.
The other aspect of the AFPFL
state that fuelled military disgruntlement was the semi-federal arrangement
between the centre, the Bama mother-country, and the
non-Bama states.
This constitutional arrangement was seen as encouraging
"narrow" non-Bama nationalism. In
The military’s growing
disenchantment with the AFPFL state, and its wider distaste for democratic
politics, was matched by its growth as an autonomous centre of power, a
"state within a state." First,
military officers had usurped administrative-political power while conducting
military operations in "insecure" areas of the non-Bama states and the Bama
hinterland itself. They exercised wide
administrative powers as heads of the SACs, and
enjoyed authority over regular civilian administrat-ors. Second, the MIS, responsible for rooting out
"enemies of the state," had grown very powerful thanks to its key
role in the internal war. It was
accountable to Ne Win alone; he personally supervised its staffing and
operations. Third, not only was the
military well-funded, and its members and their families well cared-for by the
state;[80] but it had also become, by the mid-1950s,
an economic powerhouse. Its Defence
Service Industry (DSI), headed by Aung Gyi, enjoyed non-profit status and ready
access to foreign currency and investment capital (both foreign and
domestic). It was also exempted from all
fees and customs duties. Over time, it
became an econ-omic empire dominating the
"modern" sector – shipping, banking, imports-exports, hotels and
tourism, and so on.[81]
The first military intrusion into
politics, from 1958 to 1960, was a sign of things to come. However, although the AFPFL split and the
"caretaker" interlude signified a radical shift, with power flowing
from the hands of civilian power-holders into the hands of soldiers at the very
core of the state, few seemed to grasp the deeper implications. After the 1960 elections, political actors
continued to participate in "normal" politics, unaware of the
vulnerability of the democratic arena itself.
Non-Bama leaders, mistaking U Nu’s popularity
for strength, came up with the Federal movement to redress imbalances between
the centre and states. Worse still --
and foolishly, in hindsight -- U Nu went ahead with his most divisive election
promise: making Buddhism the state religion.
The non-Buddhist segments of society, including Christianized Chin,
Kachin, and Karen, rallied in protest.
In politics, it goes without
saying that what is "normal" depends on who defines what is
"normal" and how it is defined.
For soldiers, whose vision of a "normal" politics is a
hierarchical order managed by those who know best (as Manuel Garreton notes[82]),
parliamentary politics was abnormal and dangerous, and promoted and exacerbated
social conflicts. Democratic politics in
1960-62 was decidedly "overheated."
U Nu appeared directionless and often disengaged, his party wracked by
internal squabbling. Widespread
political disorder -- as perceived by the military -- gave it an opening to
spring its political surprise on a March morning in 1962.
The analysis, above, highlights
the observation in the opening chapters that military intervention is bound up
with the the military's role in the state and its
affairs, and that it is connected to its vision of how state-society relations
is to be ordered and political power organized.
The military in
The military's expanded role and
dominance that resulted, reinforced not only the military Thakins'
self-image as guardians and protectors of the state, but also their dislike and
distrust of democratic politics.
Likewise, they viewed the "Federal" movement as a threat to
"national unity" and an attempt to dismember the country. U Nu's poor performance after the 1960
elections and the protests against making Buddhism the official state religion,
convinced the military Thakins that it was time to
re-configure state-society relations and re-arrange the way power was organized.
Ne
Win’s Military-Socialist Authoritarian State, 1962-1988
Ne Win’s coup ended fourteen years
of parliamentary politics. It also
trans-formed the status of the non-Bama states, from
co-dependent and theoretically coequal entities to tightly-controlled units of
a centralist state. The new state order
was one in which political, administrative, and legislative bodies at all
levels were occupied and controlled by military officers responsible only to their
superiors in the chain of command. A
politically closed, ethnically exclusive, highly authoritarian
"socialist" state was imposed.
The state-society arrangement was classically authoritarian, with power
concentrated in the hands of officials (i.e., military officers, in
particular), politics shut down, and dissent forbidden.
This second military intervention
was clearly different in scope and direction.
This time it was led by Ne Win, now the undisputed strongman. He not only dominated the armed forces, but
had won his political spurs (along with international accolades) as a stern,
effective military "modernizer" -- a leader who had outperform-ed the
politicians. Ne Win was prepared, indeed
determined, to take sole charge of the state.
As Aung Gyi (second in the hierarchy in 1962) put it, "the Bogyoke" -- Ne Win himself -- "planned, manoeuvred troops, gave commands, and everything
else."[83]
It has been suggested in the
theoretical discussion that after the military captures the state, political
centre of gravity shifts towards the one who unifies the military under his
command and becomes the head of state.
In keeping with this prediction, Ne Win set about reorganizing political
power to conform to his own agenda, founded in part on the Dobama
creed: a centralized, authoritarian "socialist" order, to be achieved
by "Burmese methods" and cast in a "Burmese mode."[84] Once Ne Win ordained a "uniquely
Burmese" path to socialism, Aung Gyi’s rival,
Tin Pe – advised by Ba Nyein, Chit Hlaing, and a monk, U
Okkata – concocted the doctrine of Anya-Manya Th’bawtra (the System of Correlation of Man
and his Environment, or SCME), on which ''Burmese socialism'' was to be
built. Although touted as based on a
non-Marxian "objective dialectical realism," it was in Moshe Lissak’s words, a "hazy elaboration," whose
uniqueness rested on oversimplified generalizations of both socialist and
liberal principles, and Buddhist principles as well.[85]
During the first few years of
military rule, Ne Win and the Revolutionary Council (RC) seemed amply aware of
their lack of legitimacy. Undoubtedly,
the killing of protesting university students on
In an effort to improve its image,
the RC made periodic overtures to the armed opposition. In 1963, it invited Thakin
Soe’s Red Flag communists and Thakin
Than Tun’s White Flag communists (the BCP, later the
CPB) for "peace talks." These
proved unproductive when it became clear that Ne Win was interested only in the
rebels’ surrender.[88] In 1968, Ne Win released U Nu, Ba Swe, Kyaw Nyein
and other prominent political prisoners, and asked thirty-three of them to
share their suggest-ions on national unity.
The majority recommended a coalition government, the restoration of an
open political arena, and negotiations with armed rebels. But Ne Win ignored the advice he himself had
solicited.[89] General amnesties were pro-claimed in 1963,
1974, and 1980, but were largely ignored by the rebels.[90]
The alienation from the regime of
AFPFL leaders, civilian elites, and "under-ground" forces tells only
part of the story, however. Another
important consideration were Ne Win’s characteristics as personal ruler. He was an autocrat and a tyrant, as these
terms are deployed by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg:[91]
an autocrat because he dominated the state completely and was able to
prevent the emergence of rivals, and a tyrant because in addition to
unrestrained power he also controlled the only viable instrument of rule – the
military.[92]
Ne Win’s vision was of soldiers
leading a vanguard party of the "uniquely Burmese" socialist
revolution. The very idea of an
apolitical, professional military was dismissed by the Vice-Chief of Staff, Sun
Yu, as "most harmful to the people."[93]
Ne Win's "new" order was
one where the political sphere was encapsulated with a single, military-run
vanguard party. Reflecting the
military’s aversion to democratic politics -- as suggested in the theoretical
chapters -- the goal was to create "orderly politics" that denied
participation to "unruly, divisive" elements. Justificat-ion for
the military’s monopolization of power was found in the idea that, because of
its "historic" role and "sacrifices," only the military
could serve as the tried and tested guardian of the nation.
The Revolutionary Council (RC),
employing the state’s coercive capacity, set out to exclude most of society
from the political arena. It outlawed
all political parties and organized groups; nationalized or shut down newspapers;
imposed con-trols and censorship over all manner of
publications; and imprisoned activists and politicians from the political right
and left alike. After clearing the
political decks in this fashion, the RC then established a ruling party, the Mranmah Sosheilit Lanzin party, or BSPP.[94] Its function, in theory, was to control the
articulation of interests and to aggregate demands deemed acceptable; to manage
political participation; to mobilize the population; and to oversee the work of
the organs of state.
In 1974, a constitution to
enshrine the single-party state order was adopted after a symbolic
plebiscite. In accordance with the
theoretical premise advanced earlier, the constitution signified a shift in the
centre of political gravity towards the military strongman-ruler. In form, the new order was a one-party
edifice. In line with the principle of
democratic centralism, the BSPP, claiming to represent the luptha-prithu
(working people), penetrated and controlled all executive, administrat-ive,
legislative, and judicial bodies right down to the level of the township
councils.[95] In reality, however, the BSPP was a hollow
shell. Unlike
To prevent the party from ever
challenging the military and Ne Win, it was kept on edge by frequent
purges. For instance, in 1974, when the Taze town party branch in upper
An even worse fate was visited
upon civil servants. Instead of running
the state administrative and regulatory machinery, they became the "errand
boys" of under-qualified military placed above them. In this respect, Ne Win differs significantly
from the Thai strongman-rulers and
The legislative branch fared no
better. The Prithu
Hluttaw (parliament) and a hierarchy of people’s councils were never really
invigorated. The top brass selected the
candidates, mostly former military men.
Ne Win, of course, stood at the zenith of this selection process. "Legislators" acted out their roles
according to scripts written by the military men in control of the
assemblies. In exchange, they could take
advan-tage of various perks, including access to
scarce goods that could be converted into small fortunes on the black market.[100]
With reference to the theoretical chapters
of the new patterns of autonomy relations in military-authoritarian orders, the
above analysis suggests the emergence in
On the other hand, the BSPP state
was not insulated from Ne Win and the military – in the sense that the state's
institutions were highly malleable by Ne Win, and after him, by subordinate
military power-holders, and in varying degrees, by military officers holding
party or state positions. In other
words, the BSPP state was almost solely responsive to the preferences of the
ruler and the military. And being
narrowly-based in this fashion, it was cohesive, and strong in its coercive
capacity.
Ne
Win: Personal Rule and the Politics of Authoritarianism
The BSPP Order, as Mya Maung puts
it, was one where "an all powerful milit-ary
elite [occupied] the top social layer, [with] some lesser elites clinging onto
the coat tails of the military commanders, [while] simple folks survive[d] in
the base layer as subscribers to the capricious laws and dictates of the
military rulers."[101] Notwithstanding the green uniforms at the top
of the hierarchy, though, the military was neither all-powerful nor fully
autonomous. Rather, it was highly
submissive toward and dependent upon one man.
Like successful personal rulers in
These purges at the top meant that
hundreds in the patrimonial chain, at times a thousand or more, were also sacked
and/or imprisoned. In keeping with Ne
Win’s reputed paranoid tendencies,[104]
moreover, officers with "the right stuff" – those who foolishly
showed signs of ambition or independence – were weeded out, sent to the various
fronts as cannon-fodder.[105] Those whom Ne Win trusted and liked were,
just as arbitrarily, rewarded with high and lucrative posts in the BSPP
state-party hierarchy.
Ne Win’s style was replicated in
the military chain of command: there, too, merit and performance mattered
little. The key to getting ahead, to
avoiding frontline duty, to preserve oneself from being sidelined or dismissed,
was to curry favour with patrons and superiors.
This meant providing them with regular cash payoffs or "tributes,"
obtained through the misappropriation of public funds, plunder, extortion,
bribes, and blackmarket dealing in contraband goods
or narcotics. For example, those posted
to Mogok and Hpa-kan, noted
for rubies and jade respectively, were expected to provide gems and cash
"tributes."[106] Wives of officers were and are required to run
errands for the wives of superiors, thereby promoting their husbands’
careers. The tribute-based,
patronage-oriented system regarded offices and ranks as opportunities to be fully
exploited. The notion that rank and
position were not personally owned was an irrational one in the patrimonial
environment of the BSPP and post-BSPP military.[107]
Within this patrimonialized
and de-institutionalized hierarchy of domination, Ne Win stood supreme.[108] Like the kings of old, his every whim was
law. Ministers and generals trembled
before him like children or personal retinues, and he treated them as such:
insulting, assaulting, and dismissing them at will. Cabinet meetings were rare. Instead, ministers and high officials were summoned
to join a circle of his tea-sipping, rustic cronies. Direct instructions were seldom issued. Rather, the acolytes had to guess Ne Win’s
wishes from the meandering talks he delivered on every topic under the sun.[109] Many decisions were, to say the least,
idiosyncratic-ally arrived at – based on numerology or astrology, or personal
whims. These included the decisions to
discontinue the teaching of English in schools, and then the abrupt reversal of
the policy (in 1962 and 1980 respectively); the change of the traffic system
from left-hand to right-hand drive, in 1972; and the demonetization
of certain kyat notes and their replacement by odd-numbered denominates (kyat
15, 25, 35, 45, 75 notes -- and, the 90 kyat note, the number nine being a
lucky number). With such power at his
command, Ne Win could have emulated Sarit and Suharto, and made a degree of positive contribution to his
country’s well-being. It is
An important key to Ne Win’s
control over both the military and the population at large was the MIS,
accountable to him alone. The agency was
empowered to censor mail, tap phones, spy, conduct searches, make arrests on
mere supicion, detain without warrant or charges
laid, imprison without trial or formal sentencing, torture, maim, and kill with
impunity.
No one was safe, not even the
agency’s own personnel -- they were spied upon and frequently purged.[110] The MIS kept tabs on prominent figures inside
and outside the military, providing the strongman-ruler with a handy weapon
against foes and challengers, real or imagined.
MIS spies were attached to military units, with the information obtained
filed away for future use. Thus, the MIS
effectively paralyzed not just the military brass but the entire officer corps,
prevent-ing the emergence of autonomous power centres.[111] Owing to the untrammelled
use of its arbitrary powers, the MIS gained the image of being all-powerful,
all-knowing, and all-seeing. That was
enough to depoliticize the general population,
causing them to fear and shun politics.[112]
At least for the armed elites,
however, servile loyalty generally had its compen-sations. Prime among them was Ne Win’s "cradle to
grave" welfare system. He was
generous with the state resources at his disposal, and his
"generosity" earned him the status of Abha
(Revered Father) among soldiers. A small
example of this generosity was the fact that the houses of current and former
senior officers are his personal "gifts" to them.[113] Loyal officers were made ministers,
ambassadors, heads of party and state bodies, legislators, judges. They received the usual perks – freehouses, cars, the best medical services, foreign
travel, and imported luxuries. Their
power was constrained only by Ne Win.
Access to "special privileges and sanctioned corr-uption"
put the armed elites at the mercy of the "Revered Father" and his
MIS.[114]
For ordinary soldiers, standing
above the law represented a huge upward leap for poor rural youths or
unemployed urbanites. They could swagger
and throw their weight around without fear of disciplinary action. Even for serious crimes like rape, looting,
and assaults they were seldom disciplined.[115] Victims, of course, had no avenues of
redress: lodging complaints against a soldier was tantamount to suicide. Moreover, in addition to these
"in-house" benefits, common soldiers had access to scarce fuel
(gasoline, kerosene), medicine, ammunition, and army-issue goods: uniforms,
boots, blankets, rice, cooking oil, tinned milk, sugar. These could then be sold on the blackmarket to middlemen, who would sometimes resell the
same goods to the rebel opposition.[116]
Given Ne Win’s almost sole
reliance on the military to consolidate authorit-arian
rule and his personal dominance, and given too the use of state resources to
preserve personal control, there occurred changes in the nature of the state
and its institutions, as suggested in the theoretical framework. The above analysis shows -- in line with the
theoretical observation made concerning the state, its autonomy, and its
insulation from society -- the emergence in Burma of a state-society order where (a) both strongman-ruler and the military
became so closely identified with the state that their interests (personal and
corporate) could not easily be distinguished from the those of the state or its
institutions; (b) the military became a
highly cohesive, but thoroughly patrimonialized stratum
of armed officials, thereby effectively insulating the state from society; (c) as a result, the autonomy of the state
vis-à-vis the private preferences of the military and Ne Win was greatly
eroded; and (d) although the state’s coercive-repressive capacity was
considerably strengthened, its ability to implement its goals and resolve
economic and social problems, or capacity to gain legitimacy through
performance, was drastically weakened, thanks to its patrimonial and
non-institutional mode of functioning.
The BSPP’s
main goal, a socialist society, remained unattainable. Instead, as will be shown, the socialist
economy was penetrated by outside capital, and pervaded by the private
interests and agendas of the officials (mainly military) who were responsible
for making socialism work. Furthermore,
due to the state’s weak problem-solving capacity, only one ready instrument
existed to meet challenges and opposition from societal forces below: brutal
repression.
The
Ne Win’s establishment of a closed
and narrowly-based state-society order reduced politics to a single leader, a
single ideology, a single party, a single path, and a single vanguard body –
the military. As noted, though, this
posed problems of its own. The state's
insulation, coupled with the decay of its institutional capacity, made it less
able to achieve its proclaimed goals.
The BSPP could only fail in its stated goal of uplifting the luptha-prithu ("working people"),
the supposed foundation of its regime.
After promising the masses a greater political say in a series of
highly-publicized peasant-worker rallied in the mid-1960s, the regime turned
against them. Workers in state
enterprises were taught bloody lessons when they staged strikes in the Insein
work-shops (1967), the Chauk Oilfields (1974), and
the Sinmalaik dock-yards (1975). In all cases, strikers were met with massed
firepower.[117] The peasant-ry was
scarcely better off, as David Steinberg has argued. "Socialist" agriculture turned out
to mean the forced sale of prooduce at fixed
prices. In 1981, almost nine out of ten
rural families were living below the poverty level (US $40 a month), and one in
four had become landless. Far from being liberated from landlords, peasants
were delivered into the hands of a more powerful one – the BSPP state.[118]
The regime also failed to end
rebellions, despite thousands of annual skirmish-es
and regular offers of amnesty. Sporadic
peace talks took place, but the demand for unconditional surrender proved
futile.[119]
Moreover, a problem of truly
global import -- the production and export of opium and heroin -- linked to the
armed rebellion in
Most significantly, Ne Win’s state
failed to keep its promise to create "a new world" of
prosperity. The coup-makers, alluding to
a Bama-Buddhist spiritiual aspir-ation, promised a world without the social suffering
that stems from human wants or the inability to meditate because of an empty
stomach.[121] The regime contented itself, instead, with
passing laws: the Law to Protect the Construction of the Socialist Economy and
the People’s Corporation Law, both in 1963; the 1964 Law to Protect the
Construction of the Socialist Economy; and numerous others. It also chose to decree all private economic actvity illegal. All
enterprises, shops, hospitals, schools, newspapers, printing presses, cinemas –
even corner kiosks – were nationalized.
But because the state maintained
only a low degree of autonomy from the priv-ate
interests of the military-socialist personnel who staffed it, the agencies
created to facilitate "socialism" – the people’s store and
corporations and banks – scarcely functioned as they were intended to. Everything produced, procured, or distributed
by the state found its way into the "illegal" economy, where it was
resold at a profit by military-socialists, their families and cronies. Military socialism meant misman-agement,
corruption, and severe shortages, together with the growth of an informal
economy that overshadowed the formal (and formally socialist) one.
Ordinary people constituted the
base of this economy, engaging in all manner of buying and selling of scarce
goods and services. Next up the ladder
came the financiers, money lenders, currency dealers, providers of security at
depots and on trade routes, transporters within and across the state’s
boundaries. Further up were the major
financiers, often overseas Chinese with links to the local Chinese commun-ity; warlords of the Chinese KMT; and the commanders
of rebel or homeguard "arm-ies"
(the KKY/Ka-Kwe-Ye), who controlled trade routes and
taxed passage along them.[122] Then,
there were the protectors to ensure that formally "illegal"
transact-ions took place unmolested -- MIS and BSPP-military personnel who
oversaw the "socialist" economy and at the same time profited from
the "non-socialist" one; and, finally, the officials and
entrepreneurs of adjacent countries involved in the cross-border trade in
contraband and narcotics.
This dual economy –
"socialist" and moribund on the one hand, and on the other, the
informal and thriving "non-socialist", "illegal" economy --
greatly benefitt-ed external financial interests and
those domestically who controlled the varied means of accumulation. For the majority of the population the blackmarket was a blessing mixed with costly risks. It offered some relief from chronic shortages
of goods, but at inflated prices. It
provided many with jobs as hawkers of contraband wares and providers of illegal
services, but also put them at risk as "economic insurgents." Some earned income as poppy cultivators, but
were at the mercy of the state and local loan sharks. Many were forced into dangerous employ as
soldiers in rebel or KKY armies, coolies on trade routes (which would take them
through mine-fields and thick jungle), petty smugglers, drug pushers, or
prostitutes in Thai brothels. For the
majority, then, the dual economy brought with it the worst excesses of
socialism and capitalism.
Adding to the hardships and
restrictions that pervaded the BSPP state,[123]
was the exclusion of the ruled from the political sphere and all access to the
state. Armed struggle, together with the
"unlawful" protests that occurred on an almost annual basis,[124]
became the only ways of making demands and articulating interests. Once again, violence was the only response on
the state’s part to these societal demands and dissent.
The strength of Ne Win's BSPP
state lay in the cohesion of its narrow, highly-militarized base; its high
degree of insulation and non-malleability by society; and its control over the
apparatus of coercion and repression.
Its very strength, however, resulted in an atrophying of its capacity to
resolve problems in positive and constructive ways, and it became the kind of
state which, as indicated in the theoret-ical
framework, was not able to gain minimal legitimacy, or build a broader elite
consensus -- one that extended beyond Ne Win's military power base. Thus, as will be seen, when mass firepower
failed to drive peaceful protesters from the streets of Rangoon and other
cities in 1988, the regime collapsed -- in a large part because non-military
elements deserted their posts.
The
Fall and Reconstruction of Authoritarianism in
Prior to 1988, institutional decay
and state-society dysfunction were obscured by a patina of austere strength and
autocratic control. Many were misled
into think-ing that, despite, the familiar litany of
woes, the BSPP order harmonized somehow with the cultural and political values
of the Bama majority.[125] In fact, though, popular resentment had been
building under the seemingly stagnant, placid surface.
The event that tipped the scales
was a demonetization in 1987 (following one in 1985)
which wiped out nearly all savings.
Protests erupted in
Students initiated the uprising,
but by mid-1988 the protesters included people from all walks of life, former
leaders (including ex-military brass),[128] police and soldiers, and the surviving
"Thirty Comrades," contemporaries of Aung San and Ne Win. The military, it seemed, was beaten. The spotlight now shone on Aung San Suukyi, daughter of Aung San, whose name the regime had
long exploited as "father" of the Tatmadaw and the
"socialist revolution."
Amidst the euphoria, Saw Maung and
Khin Nyunt (head of the feared MIS) staged a bloody "coup." Thousands were killed. One scene, showing cowering teen-agers being
picked off systematically by military snipers, was captured on video-tape and
shown world-wide.[129] To wash away the stain of violence that had
shocked the world, the new junta, SLORC, promised multi-party elections and a
transfer of power to civilians.
Elections were held in May 1990, under restrictive conditions. Despite the constraints, despite the ample
resources of the recycled BSPP (the National Unity Party, or NUP), and despite
Aung San Suukyi’s detention under house arrest, her
NLD (National League for Democracy) won 392 out of 485 seats. Its ally, the SNLD (Shan National League for
Democracy), claimed 23; the NUP won only 10 seats. Most damning of all was that the NUP lost
even in pre-dominantly military areas such as Dagon and Hmawbi
townships and the Coco-Gyun naval base.
But SLORC refused to step
down. It declared it would rule until a
new constit-ution was promulgated.[130] In early 1993, it called a "National
Convention." Elected MPs were
coerced into participating, along with other handpicked delegates. Judging from its frequent, unexplained
postponements, however, things have not been going well for the regime. Stiff opposition appears to exist to the
junta’s overriding objective: the legitimation of the
military’s role in politics along the lines of
Still, there are differences from
the previous era of military rule.
Because neither Than Swe nor Khin Nyunt really
dominates, changes in the modus operandi have been evident within the
military-cum-ruling stratum. In the
context of an "open" economy, the absence of the much-feared
strongman has meant more freedom of action for bogyoke-wungyis
(general ministers) and the top brass.[131] Now they can enrich themselves without fear
(of the "Old Man").[132] The result has been an "open season for
corruption" and the rise of what Burmese call "capital-less capitalists":
children and kin of former BSPP and current military bosses.[133] The patrimonialization
of the state, or the relative non-autonomy of the state and its institutions
from the private agendas of power-holders and high officials, seems even
greater.
The
Military Junta and the Politics of Transition
The situation in
Despite the 1988 uprising and many
changes, the Burmese state remains "of soldiers, for soldiers, by
soldiers." The SLORC generals who
are now in control have three alternatives to choose from. One is to restore the old authoritarian
status-quo: a state order similar to the one Ne Win presided over, with
political power monopolized by the military, with the state insulated from
non-military elites and societal forces, but highly malleable with regard to
the private agendas and personal interests of power-holders and their
allies.
Another option is to widen the
support base of the still-authoritarian state, by co-opting and selectively
empowering civilian elites. For example,
bureaucrats, technocrats, and the more important economic and commercial
figures could be brought into the ruling circle and made a part of
decision-making processes. This would
entail counter-balancing, even subordinating, the military to some extent to a
new ruling bloc that consists of a mixture of military and civilian power
factions, all held in check by an astute and skilful strongman-ruler along the
lines of Sarit or Suharto. Yet a further option is for the military
reach a compromise with what one diplomat called "an unmovable
obstacle" -- Aung San Suukyi, whose nationalist
pedigree is impeccable and whose personal safety seems quite assured, given
that she is linked by blood to Aung San, mythic founder-hero of both modern
The first alternative is one the
junta has not yet abandoned. The most
central problem remains the absence of a clear strongman who can unify the
military and prevent coups and counter-coups as armed factions compete for
dominance. As mentioned at a couple of
points, the absence of such a unifier can lead to intense intra-military
conflict, and possibly to the military’s withdrawal from politics, in orderly
fashion or otherwise. (Ne Win engineered
an orderly withdrawal in 1960 when he believed his grip on the military was
uncertain.).
At present, the military and SLORC
generals are unified by the residual author-ity of Ne
Win, and by the necessity of hanging together lest they hang separately. Recently, with Ne Win (who is nearing ninety)
declining physically, General Maung Aye is reported to be manoeuvring
to become the next strongman. He is
currently third in the SLORC hierarchy after Khin Nyunt and Than Shwe. Though it is uncon-firmed,
he is also reported to have been behind the "mob attack" on Aung San
Suu-kyi’s motorcade in November 1996. He is also said to be in control of the most
hard-line segment of the USDA (the Union Solidarity Development Association), a
milit-ary-sponsored "mass organization"
that is slated to become the military’s political party, as Golkar
once was in
If Maung Aye is successful, change
is unlikely. Like Ne Win, he can be
expected to depend in large part on the military to maintain his power and
personal control. It is uncertain,
though, whether his power-play will be successful. Much depends on whether he is able to win
over MIS cliques, factions close to SLORC chairman General Than Shwe, and the
cliques of fence-sitting ''business generals,'' the bogyoke-wungyis
(general-ministers).
The second alternative – widening
the support base of authoritarian rule via selective inclusion – is apparently
Khin Nyunt’s strategy.[136] He has been primarily responsible for some of
the SLORC’s successes in this area, and is well-regarded by SLORC’s newly-vigorous
foreign patrons and defenders: the leaders of China, Sing-apore,
Thailand, Malaysia, and other governments of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN).
Among Khin Nyunt’s succcesses, two stand out as being of special strategic
significance. The first is that he has
won for SLORC the acceptance of some moneyed elements of society by initiating
the transformation of
Second, credit is due to Khin
Nyunt for a move that enabled SLORC politically to outflank the DAB (Democratic
Alliance of Burma) -- the opposition front led by the Karen and Dr. Sein Win
(who is Aung San Suukyi’s cousin). Khin Nyunt neutralized the non -Bama resistance "armies" in the alliance by
co-opting their military leaders. The
move has weakened the DAB and simultaneously boosted SLORC’s image as a
"peacemaker." It has also
allowed SLORC to concentrate on keeping the deeply-alienated Bama majority in line.[139] Khin Nyunt’s success in this area, though, is
largely due to a number of fortuitous circumstances. After the BSPP’s
sudden demise in 1988, its most formidable foe, the White Flag CPB, also collapsed
in the wake of mutinies by non-Bama units. The dissolution occurred just as SLORC was
desperately seeking allies. Fortunately
for the junta, Chinese authorities stepped in and persuaded the junta and the
CPB mutineers to agree to a cease-fire.
In exchange, the non-Bama, ex-CPB warlords
were given a free hand to exploit border trade and "development."[140] A
similar deal was struck in 1993 with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), again
with Chinese help.[141]
It seems that with Khin Nyunt's
partial recognition of important economic-commercial elements and non-Bama military leaders, the groundwork is being laid for a
"softer" and relatively more inclusive military-authoritarian order,
so long as Khin Nyunt's views prevail.
The "National Convention", the body established to formulate a
new constitution, could bring this order about by opening the political arena
in a limited way, such as in Suharto's
It is not clear, however, that the
"Indonesian model" – a quasi-multiparty arrangement dominated by the
government party, Golkar – is exportable, and it may
not be possible for SLORC to establish a system that works in a similar fashion
to that of Indonesia, or to emulate Suharto’s successes. Moreover, there has not yet emerged in
post-1988
There are other obstacles. For one thing, the domestic commercial class
that benefits from SLORC’s "open economy" is at best a "fair
weather" ally. Many comprising this
class are of dubious political value, being either former "economic
insurgents", ex-communists, alleged drug kingpins, overseas Burmese
investors with roots and interests elsewhere, or what local people call the
"new Burmese" – Chinese from
The third obstacle is the
emergence of a highly credible, popular, and internationally-respected
challenger, Aung San Suukyi.[143] She is the daughter of the fabled Bogyoke (General) Aung San, the father of
independence and the Tatmadaw, whose name has been exploited by Ne Win
and the military to bolster their own legitimacy. She remains a formidable obstacle to the attainment
of SLORC’s goal of prolonging the military’s monopoly of power, and, by
extension, wealth.
In its attempt to resolve the
problem of succession and transition,
the military has set in motion a process to legalize and institutionalize the
role of the military in politics through a new constitution being slowly
formulated by the "National Convention", which first convened in
1993. From this exercise, SLORC has to
accomplish two major interrelated tasks:
first, to organize power in such a way that the state will not only be
strong in purely a coercive-repressive capacity, but also in terms of
legitimacy based on the ability to solve problems and to remedy the country’s
many ailments; and second, to deal
effectively, using a minimum of force, with challenges arising from society,
particularly the aspirations for a democratic alternative being articulated by
Aung San Suukyi.
Because of who she is, and what she represents, the challenge she poses
to the military is the most difficult one for junta to overcome. As such, the best possible option for the
military would be to come to terms with the democratic opposition.
One important development is Aung
San Suukyi’s "unconditional" release,
granted in July 1995. It is said this
was ordered by SLORC chairman Than Swe and his
trusted aid, Kyaw Sein, deputy head of the DDSI (Directorate of Defence Service
Intelligence).[144] This has led to hope that there will
eventually be a dialogue between the junta and the democratic opposition in
order to start addressing
It is difficult to predict
As I have shown in this chapter,
the military in
The Tatmadaw has always
closely identified itself with the state and viewed itself as the creator,
guardian, and savior of the state and national unity. Mainly because the new state was challenged by armed
rebellions (communist, and ethnic) at independence, the role of the military,
in both combat and non-military spheres, expanded rapidly. This in turn reinforced the military's view
of itself as indispensible to the existence of the
state and nation.
The pattern of military
intervention in
In the military-authoritarian
state set up by Ne Win, state-society relations have been characterized by a
state that is highly autonomous from society.
The state in
------------------------------------ E N D
N O T E S
-------------------------------------
CHAPTER THREE:
[1] Ne Win’s given name is Maung Shu Maung. He became "Thakin
Shu Maung" when he joined the Thakin (Dobama) group. "Ne
Win" or "Bo Ne Win" is the name he adopted while undergoing
Japan-ese military training on
[2] "Bama" and "
[3] The Thakins
were young nationalists whose aim was total independence. Most were
"educated" (that is, they had attended "modern" schools). A
few were graduates of
[4] The new state, the Union of Burma, was
composed of Ministerial Burma (Burma Proper) and hitherto indirectly-ruled
Excluded or Frontier Areas inhabited by the non-Bama
peoples (the Rakhine, Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen,
etc.). These politically and administratively separate parts were brought
together when the AFPFL (represented by its supreme leader, Aung San) signed
the Panglong Agreement in 1947 (a year prior to independence).The
co-signatories were non-Bama leaders organiz-ed by the Shan Yawnghwe prince, Sao Shwe Thaike,
who became the Union’s first President. The "Independence
Constitution" of 1948 granted the non-Bama
states some autonomy, with each having its own government and legislature.
However, the Union Government was not a federal one. The government of the
[5] The full name of the armed forces in
[6] The
earliest challenge to the AFPFL state, in 1948 (the year of independence), were
in the form of armed rebellions by disaffected Thakins,
mainly, communist-, and left-oriented Thakins (allied
to army mutineers, and the AFPFL's own "private
army", the PVO or People's Volunteers Organization) and the Rakhine ethnic group. They were followed by Karen
dissidents in 1949 (and their allies, the Mon and PaO)
who were joined in the late-1950s by the Shan and the Kachin. In the early
1950s, defeated Chaing-Kai-Shek's Kuomintang (KMT)
units fled into
[7] The full name
of the Lanzin party is Mranmaah
Sosheilit Lanzin Party.
The first word is also spelt as "
[8] For a masterly analysis of pre-colonial Southeast Asian "kingdoms", see Renee Hagesteijn, Circles of Kings: Political Dynamics in Early Continental South-east Asia (Dordretch-Holland: Foris Public-ations, 1989), esp., Ch. 1, "Regional and Supra-regional Political Systems", pp. 9-24, esp. pp. 14-15. For a more general discussion of the subject, see David J. Steinberg, et al., In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 1985), pp. 59-66 (The Buddhist Kings), pp. 66-67 (The Lao and Shan World), pp. 73-79 (The Malay Sultans), and pp. 80-86 (The Javanese Kings). See also Anthony Reid and David Marr, eds., Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979).
[9] For analyses of "kingdoms" in the
countries selected for this study, see Michael Aung-Thwin,
Pagan: The Origins of Modern Burma (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii
Press, 1985); Khin Maung Kyi & Daw
Tin Tin, Administrative Patterns in Historical
Burma (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973); E.R Leach, "The Frontiers of
‘Burma’", in John T. McAlister, ed., Southeast
Asia: The Politics of National Integration (New York: Random House, 1973),
pp.315-35; V. Sangermano,
The Burmese Empire (London: S. Gupta, 1966 edn.).
For
[10] John S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (New York: New York University Press, 1956; 1st edn., 1948), and Netherlands India: A Study of the Plural Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1939).
[11] Furnivall, Colonial Policy, p. 1.
[12] By
European capitalist "universalism" is meant a set of orientations
based on money and the profit rationale. Because a monetary profit-loss
calculus has helped reduce human aspirations and needs to a common numerical
calculus, it has become a universal "language". This
"universalism", now taken for granted, was in fact imposed on
societies where status and wealth were calculated according to non-monetary
values. This is not to say that
"old" ideologies and cultures have disappeared. Some strands have
persisted, and have been "grafted" onto "modern"
structures, where they can be manipulated by elites and rulers to reinforce the
sociopolitical status-quo. For an insightful exposition of the develop-ment of capitalism as applied to the Third World (Africa),
see Thomas M.Callaghy, "The State and the
Development of Capitalism in Africa: Theoretical, Historical, and Comparative
Reflections", in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., The Precarious Balance: State and Society
in Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 67-99. An equally
provocative discussion on the differences between Western and Non-Western
societies with regard to economic activity is found in Hoselitz
and Lambert, "Western Societies", in Richard D.Lambert
& Bert Hoselitz, eds., The Role of Saving and
Wealth in Southern Asia and the West (Paris: UNESCO, 1963), pp. 9-43. The
title is misleading, since the chapter deals as well with
[13] Robert
H. Taylor, The State in
[14] The years
1942-1948 (when independence was granted) are counted as transitional years.
British rule was imposed only reluctantly. Had Bama
kings, like their Siamese counterparts, recognized that European intrusions
required adaptation rather than prideful resistance, outright annexation might
have been avoided. Also see Oliver B.Pollak, Empires
in Collusion (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1979), esp. pp. 3-8,
179-84. The annexations and related events are covered in standard works, e.g.,
John L. Christian, Burma and the Japanese Invaders (Bombay: Thacker
& Co., Ltd., 1945); John F. Cady, A
History of Modern Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); Frank N. Trager, Burma:
From Kingdom to Republic (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Publishers, 1966); and Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: A Study of the First
Years of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). See also
Fred Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity
(Honolulu: East-West Center,1966), pp. 15-64, for a comparison of the Thai and
Burmese kings to colonial powers, mainly
[15] The phrase is borrowed from Victor
Lieberman’s excellent work on the Restored Taungoo
Dynasty. He argues that the dynastic cycle arises from the competition and conflict
for resources between different segments of the administrative elites and,
importantly, on the changing distribution of resources from the throne to the
elites. As a result, the throne became more dependent on powerful elites, who
in turn grew more independent or rebellious; eventually, a new
"warrior-leader" arose and set up a new dynasty. See Victor
Lieberman, Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest, c.1580-1760
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), esp. pp. 3-14 (Introduction), 271-92 (Conclusions and
Analogies).
[16] In many
respects the British did indeed modernize
[17] For a
comprehensive account of what might be called "political
modernization" in
[18]
[19] See Robert H.Taylor,
"Politics in the Late Colonial Period: The Case of U Saw", in Modern
Asian Studies, Vol.10., No.2, (1976), pp. 161-193; and "Party, Class
and Power in British
[20] Ibid. The two articles by
[21] Prior to 1900, there was resistance from the
Burmese peasantry. But from the turn of the century onwards, there was rural
peace until the rebellion of Saya San, who has been
glorified by SLORC as
[22] In Burmese, no distinction exists among race, ethnic group, or nation – all are lu-myo (meaning, in rough translation, "humankind").
[23] The
colonial state was for them, as
[24] Accounts of the Thakin
movement are found in all standard works on modern
[25] Aung San, "Blue Print for
[26] Silverstein, The Political Legacy, p.
8. The author even suggests that Aung San might have been overly influenced by
the Japanese in writing "Blueprint for
[27] See Furnivall, The Governance, p. 116.
[28] Khin Yi, The
Dobama Movement, esp. pp.133-136.
[29] These were the BIA (Burma Independence Army),
the BDA (Burma Defence Army), and the BNA (Burma National Armies). The armies
will be briefly discussed in the relevant sections. The Thakins'
armies are well covered in early standard works on
[30] PVO units were composed of veterans of the Thakins’ war-time "armies" who were rejected when
the British re-formed the Burma Army in 1946. After Aung San’s assassination in
July 1947, most PVO leaders switched their allegiance to the communist Thakins, and joined the leftist rebellion against the AFPFL
state after independence.
[31] British decisions surrounding
[32] Many knowledgable Burmese surmise that Aung San, unlike other Thakins, clearly saw the waning of British power. He
astutely calculated that the main British concern would be the question of to
whom to transfer power. It must be noted that his closest advisor during the
period of transition and negotiations with the British (1946-1947) was U Tin Tut, a senior member of the Indian Civil Service (ICS).
During the war, U Tin Tut worked closely with Sir
Reginald Dorman-Smith in Simla, the head-quarters of
the Government of Burma-in-exile.
[33] Old time politicians such as Sir Paw Tun, U Ba Pe, U Pu,
and others were all swept aside by the tide of global war that also destroyed
the prewar economic elites.
[34] U Saw’s assassination of Aung San, together
with almost all members of the interim government, in July 1947 is covered by
all standard early works. However, it is curious that Maung Maung
– ex-Brigadier, a former military Thakin, and once a
"Young Turk" – should mention that the assassins were dressed in the
uniform of the 4th Burma Rifles (of which Ne Win was second in command under a
British officer). He does not deny the implications of the report: that Ne Win
might also have been involved. Reading Maung Maung’s
statement in a very Burmese way, one could infer that the author had his
suspicions. See Maung Maung, Burmese Nationalist,
p. 317. It is well-known that Ne Win at
the time was on very good terms with U Saw. From interviews with knowledgable Burmese, I also learned that Ne Win personally
looked after the well-being of U Saw’s children and family as late as the
1980s.
[35] The prevailing view among Bama
elites, especially military nationalists, is that the British partit-ioned a properly unified Burmese kingdom like the
European kingdoms, and the fragments were then governed indirectly, through
native rulers. As such, the "Burmese" nation fragmented, assuming
separate identities as Bama, Shan, Mon, Rakhine, Karen, etc. In this view, post-independence
[36] The problem of national unity could be
managed only by wise leadership, meaningful dialogue, and frequent adjustments.
This was not to be, however, as we will see. For a discussion of the Burmaniz-ation policy, see Josef Silverstein, Burmese
Politics: The Dilemmas of National Unity (New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 1980), esp. pp. 220-229. There are two aspects to Burmanization.
One is the replacement of "foreigners" by Bama
in the bureaucracy and the economy. The second is the elevation of Bama culture, language, identity, and history as the
official national culture. This touches on a contradiction that may be inherent
in the Europeans’ creation of "nation-states" from weakly
interconnected, largely disparate entities, each with its own history,
experience, and culture. The contradiction is certainly evident in
[37] The following brief account of rebellions is
based on standard works (Cady, Tinker, Trager, etc.,
as cited). Also very useful is the government publication, Burma and the
Insurrections (Rangoon: Government Printing Press, 1949). For a pro-BSPP
analysis, see R.H. Taylor, "Government Respon-ses
to Armed Communist and Separatist Movements:
[38] In British military parlance, a
"class" battalion is one composed exclusively of one ethnic group.
When the Burma Army was formed in 1945-1946, Aung San proposed its formation
along "class" lines. One reason given (by Silverstein, in The
Legacy, p. 11) was that Aung San wanted a multi-ethnic army so as to
reflect a multi-ethnic union. However, the contrary could also be argued: that
he feared the separation of Bama soldiers from Bama military Thakin officers,
and wanted to keep them together for political reasons. Ironically, as it
transpired, the majority of Bama soldiers and Bama Thakin officers in the
"class" battalions mutined against the
AFPFL, albeit after Aung San’s death. As well, a majority of PVOs, along with many Thakin
civil servants and peasant and labour leaders, were won over by the very able
and charismatic communist leaders, Thakin Than Tun
and Thakin Soe.
[39] "Em-I"
stands for the MIS, or the Military Intelligence Service, regarded in terror by
the Burmese as an all-seeing, all-knowing, all-powerful entity.
[40] During the Communist rebellion, the AFPFL was
able to fend off the Communists and other armed challenges, thanks to the
support shown U Nu by Shan chaofa (princes),
Karenni saw-phaya (lords), Kachin duwa (chiefs), and Chin leaders. This, in turn,
greatly reinforced its external legitim-acy. At the
height of the insurgencies, the AFPFL received aid from the
[41] The Karen situation differed from that of the
Kachin, Shan, and others, since they never had a sep-arate
"home" territory and were not included in the negotiations leading up
to the 1947 Panglong Agreement. Although the Karen rebellion has raged since
1949, it has been largely neglected by scholars. This may be due to the
predominance, until recently, of the "military-as-modernizers" para-digm, whereby Karen and non-Bama
rebels were dismissed as marginal, backward "tribal outlaws". Only
after 1988 was the Karen question linked to the deeper state-society problem in
[42] For accounts of the KMT in Shan State, the
opium-heroin problem, and the Shan rebellion, see Bertil Lintner, Cross-Border
Drug Trade in the Golden Triangle (Southeast Asia) – Territorial Brief-ing No.1 (Durham: Boundary Research Press, 1991);
Yawnghwe, "The Political Economy of the Opium Trade: Implications for Shan
State", Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vo.23/3 (1993), pp. 306-326,
and "Shan Opium Politics: The Khun Sa Factor", Burma Debate,
Vol. 2, No. 1 (February/Mar-ch 1995), pp. 22-28. See
also Lintner, "The Shans and the
[43] Butwell, U Nu of
[44] These rebel organizations were: U Seinda’s Rakine People’s Liberation Party; the Shan State Pa-O National Liberation Organization under Thaton Hla Pe; the Shan State Communist Party; the Mon People’s Front; the PVOs; and some Red and White Flag Communists. According to Smith, 5,500 in-surgents surrendered officially. His view is that as many "simply returned home to their villages", see Smith, Insurgency, p. 168.
[45] In
[46] Defence -- the responsiblity
of the center -- was a thorny issue since the military, beholden to the central
government, was not in the least accountable to state governments and
regulations, and reg-ularly perpetrated grave
atrocities. The most pressing problem for Shan and other non-Burman governments
and leaders was the erosion of their autonomy by Bama
military officers, who behaved as occupiers and tolerated or encouraged the
atrocities their soldiers committed. The solution favoured by them was
constitutional reform, making the central government a truly federal authority,
rather than one dominated by the Bama
"Mother-state". Non-Bama leaders and
governments organized what is known as the "Federal" movement -- a
move to redress the imbalance between centre and periphery, and defuse armed
rebellion provoked by "Bama" military
atrocities. See Memorandum, The Constitut-ion
Revision Steering Committee,
[47] Walinsky, Economic
Development, pp. 61-68. The AFPFL’s aspirations
and plans for "socialist" industrialization are covered in the
standard works by Furnivall, Cady, Trager, Butwell, and others. See also Frank Trager,
Building a Welfare State in
[48] The AFPFL government pursued socialist
strategies such as the nationalization of some private enterprises (mainly
British, Indian, and Chinese); economic restrictions (including monopolies on
imports and exports in some areas); programs to nationalize and redistribute
land; and "socialist industrialization" projects. See Walinski, Economic Development, pp. 491-506. To be fair,
[49] The AFPFL split is dealt with in all standard
works on
[50] The following -- the views or convictions of knowledgable Burmese -- is obtained from 1993 interviews in
[51] See the
1947-48 Union Constitution, article 116, which provided for the appointment of
a non-Member of Parliament to the cabinet for six months. This article was
suspended in parliament in 1959, to allow Ne Win to continue as head of the
caretaker government for another year (instead of six months only). Also see,
[52] The above is based on personal observation. I
was in
[53] Most knowledgable Burmese agree that the 1958 intervention was
an indirect coup, staged not by Ne Win, but "Young Turks" factions.
The master-minds of the 1958 intervention reportedly were Maung Maung and Aung Gyi.
[54] Butwell, U Nu of
[55] Ibid.,
p.206.
[56] For a typical highly positive assessment of
the caretakers, see Walinsky, Economic Development,
esp. Ch. 15 (pp. 252-266). For a later, more balanced assessment of the
caretakers’ performance and the post-1962 military-socialists by the same
author, see Walinsky, "The Role of the Military
in Dev-elopment Planning: Burma", The
Philippines Economic Journal, No. 8, Second Semester 1965, Vol. IV, No.2:
pp. 310-326. The caretaking interlude is assessed in
all standard works on
[57]
[58] The bulk of NSA members were army veterans. Civil servants were also "encouraged" to join the NSA, and were compelled to attend its rallies. In a sense, the NSA was the forerunner of the BSPP party. The present junta has set up a similar body, the USDA (Union Solidarity Development Assoc-iation), which likely will be transformed into a government party once a new constitution is in place.
[59] Coincidentally, "democracy" (or
parliamentary rule, of a sort) in
[60] See
[61] See John Seabury
Thompson, "A Second Chance for
[62] See Maureen Aung-Thwin,
"Burmese Days", Foreign Affairs, Vol.68, No.2 (Spring 1989),
pp. 143-161. The unofficial reason given for his declining the prize was that
its acceptance might compromise
[63] According to a family friend of U Kyaw Nyein, leader of the Stable AFPFL faction, U Nu was prepared to dismiss Ne Win and sent him into de facto exile as an ambassador. Ne Win is said to have appealed to U Kyaw Nyein for help, who was able to change U Nu’s mind. Perhaps this was weakness on U Nu’s part, but it must also be recalled that personal and social ties still linked AFPFL leaders even after the split.
[64] Interviews with Burmese academics in
[65] Dorothy Hess Guyot,
"The
[66] U Saw is a godfather-like figure who served
as Prime Minister of Ministerial Burma. He was on a foreign tour when the
Japanese invaded in 1942, and was detained by the British, who consigned him to
a camp in
[67] Ne Win was a university dropout and obscure postal clerk who did not even belong to Aung San’s Thakin faction, but to Thakin Ba Sein’s rightist-nationalist group. Aung San and Ne Win were probably never acquainted previously.
[68] For a comprehensive account of the
clandestine Japanese activities in
[69] Aung San, "The Resistance", pp. 77-93.
For an account of the BIA’s minor role in the
fight against the British in 1942, see the firsthand account by Dr. Ba Maw, a major player and supreme leader of wartime
[70] The Thakins’
"resistance" to the Japanese occupiers, declared in March 1945, was largely a polit-ical gesture. Allied forces were already on their way
to
[71] The claim of military Thakins
and the present military that nationalist armies fought both the Brit-ish and the Japanese has also become a "fact"
through repetition, and has been repeated by those writing about
[72] See Foreign Relations of the
[73] Ne Win’s weakness for women is well known,
and is frowned upon by the somewhat prudish Bama. In
[74] See Richard Butwell,
"Civilians and Soldiers in Burma",
in Robert K. Sakai, ed., Studies on Asia (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1961), pp. 74-85, esp. p. 74. Buttwell
quotes Brigadier Maung Maung as saying, "[It is]
irksome to find those who could not hold their own in the army becoming [our]
superiors". Contempt for civilians and democratic politics is, as noted, a
major characteristic of
[75] F.R. von der Mehden, "The Burmese Way To Socialism", Asian Survey, Vol. III, 3 (March
1963), pp. 129-35 (quote, p. 131). See
also
[76] The period when democracy was "taking
root" has not been positively assessed, but rather smothered in
anti-communist anxieties. Trager portrays it as a
time of unruly politics, incompetence on the part of both U Nu and the AFPFL,
and the infiltration of parliament by (in his words)
"crypto-communists".
[77]
[78]
[79] In the summer of 1961, I recall reading a Burmese language daily, Bama Khit, alleging with ref-erence to the Yawnghwe prince (my father) that someone "as prominent as the sun and the moon" was behind a plot to dismember the Union. The newspaper was shut down in the 1960s, and it is imposs-ible to trace the issue in question. However, many people I interviewed recalled those headlines.
[80] See Moshe Lissak, Military Roles, p. 157; also American University, Area Handbook For Burma (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp.339-40; and Walinsky, Economic Development, p. 261.
[81] The DSI began as a post-exchange cooperative,
then expanded into books and stationery (the Ava
House), government contracting (the International Trading House), and, with
Japanese partners, pearl and fisheries (Burma Fisheries). In time, its
subsidiaries dominated banking, the import business, trade in coal and coke,
construction, shipping, consumer retailing, tourism and hotels, the service and
sales of automobiles, and the assembly and manufacture of cars, radios, shoes
and boots. Accounts of the DSI are found in all standard works on modern
[82] Manuel Antonio Garreton, The Chilean Political Process (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 68-72.
[83] Aung Gyi made this statement 26 years after the coup in the now-famous Open Letter which fuell-ed the "people’s power" uprising in 1988. He claims that he refused to lead the coup and wept on the morning it began, because it meant "cremat[ing] the whole democratic system". Although the letter is self-serving, its value lies in the light it sheds on the personalities concerned (including, unwittingly, his own), as well as the inner workings of the military at the time of the coup. The letter reveals that after the coup, the majority of the top brass, though jubilant, did not know what to do next – every-thing was in Ne Win’s hands. See Aung Gyi, "The Truth Revealed: An Open Letter to Ne Win, May 9, 1988" (Falls Church, VA: Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma, 1988).
[84] Aung Gyi, "The Truth Revealed", p.
4. It also did not fit in with his image, especially in
[85] Lissak, Military Roles, pp.166-67. For a less skeptical, more mainstream analysis that sees the SCME doctrine as a synthesis of Buddhism and socialism, see F.R. von der Mehden, "The Burmese Way to Socialism", Asian Survey, Vol.III, 3 (March 1963), pp. 129-35.
[86] Prior to the July 7th Massacre -- as it is now known -- many Burmese adopted a neutral, "wait-and-see" attitude. But after the killings, and especially after the demolition of the Students Union building (a "home away from home" for Aung San and other leaders who led the country to independ-ence), it became morally impossible for prominent figures to support the regime. The July 7th Massac-re was the first of many coercive responses from the regime and Ne Win, its strongman-ruler, to the disaffection and discontent of societal forces. For an excellent account of the July 7th massacre and other urban protests, including the largest and bloodiest ones in 1988, see Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Co., 1989).
[87] An alliance between the regime and the Stable AFPFL was out of the question, mainly because the latter was closely connected with Aung Gyi. Ne Win did not trust Aung Gyi, and had him sacked shortly after the coup. For details of intrigues leading to his expulsion, see Aung Gyi, “The Truth Revealed,” pp. 14-15, 17-21.
[88] According to Karen and CPB sources,
[89]
[90] The 1980 amnesty offer was the most successful,
taken up by U Nu from his exile in
[91] Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black
[92] Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule, pp.143-145, 234-240.
[93] San Yu’s speech at the
[94] Mranmah is a
variation of Mranmaa or
[95] For a comprehensive analysis of the military’s Lanzin or BSPP establishment, its structures and formal power relationships, see Silverstein, Military Rule, esp. Chs. 4 and 5 (pp. 80-147).
[96] On the SACs, see Silverstein, Military Rule, pp. 93-94. SACs were headed by military men, with civilian functionaries attached for gloss. The SAC formula was replicated in SLORC, in that Law and Order Restoration Committees (LORCs) at all levels are headed by military officers.
[97] They were purged probably because they were
his followers, or were seen by Ne Win and the military-BSPP leaders as
insufficiently loyal. As in
[98] For accounts of the BSPP’s powerlessness and the various purges, see David I. Steinberg, Burma’s Road Towards Development: Growth and Ideology Under Military Rule (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 70 (on the Taze township purge), 74. See also Jon Wiant, "The Political Symbolism of the Taw-hlan-ye-Khit", in F.K. Lehman, ed., Military Rule in Burma: A Kaleidoscope of Views (Sing-apore: Institute of S.E. Asian Studies, 1980), pp. 59-72; John Badgley and Jon Wiant, "The Ne Win-BSPP Style of Bama-Lo"; J. Silverstein, "From Soldiers to Civilians", in Silverstein, ed., The Future of Burma, pp. 43-62 and 80-92, respectively; Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Co., 1989), p. 79; Maung Maung Gyi, Burmese Politic-al Values: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarianism (New York: Praeger, 1983).
[99] Maung Maung Gyi, Burmese
Political Values, p. 194. For a good journalistic account of the decay of
government bureaucracies and institutions, see "Masses in Revolt Against
Stifling Authoritarian Grip", Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER),
[100] Interviews in Chiangmai
and
[101] Mya Maung, "The Burma Road to Poverty: A Socio-political Analysis", Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (Summer 1989), pp. 271-294.
[102] "Em-I" Tin Oo had grown so powerful by the late 1970s that he was regarded as the real power in the military hierarchy (and thought of as an annointed "heir").
[103] Lintner, Outrage, pp. 92-93.
[104] Ne Win’s psychopathic behavior is common knowledge among the Burmese. For example, on Christmas night in 1975, in the presence of diplomats, he stormed into a hotel and beat up members of a rock band. He also assaulted an academic on a golf course who had accidentally touched Daw Khin May Than, the dictator’s wife, at a reception. Ne Win is also reported to have kicked a diplomat in a rage.
[105] This was the fate of "misfit" Bama officers. For non-Bama officers, however, it was the rule. The highest rank the latter could aspire to was captain. A Shan officer who (in 1948) held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the British Army, and had been awarded the Military Cross, was never promot-ed, and was retired in 1963 with the same rank.
[106] Interview with Bo Hla Tint, Member of Parliament and member of the government-in-exile; also, interviews with two former MIS-personnel-turned-gem-traders and other gem and jade traders in Chiangmai and Bangkok (March, 1993).
[107] The institutional decay and corruption within
the Tatmadaw is so widespread that it is common knowledge in
[108] Ne Win’s personal dominance of the military
and the BSPP order is widely acknowledged.
In the early years of BSPP rule, he was often portrayed as an austere, Cromwellian, "warrior-king" type (see
[109] These passages are based on conversations in
[110] For example, Major Charlie Thein Shwe, a former No. 2 man in the MIS, was so badly tortured in prison that he lost his sight. The son of Bo Ba-Htoo (a BIA/BDA martyr) was similarly tortured and blinded. Sources: communication from Tin Maung Win, a prominent opposition figure.
[111] Interview with a relative of the present head of the Northern Command, General Saw Lwin (who was made SLORC’s Minister of Labor in mid-1996). According to this source, during the BSPP years the general lived in constant fear of the MIS. Often, he would communicate with trusted family memb-ers only on paper, which he destroyed immediately afterwards.
[112] So powerful was this image that Burmese in
[113] They include houses belonging to current top military bosses (Khin Nyunt, Abel, Tun Kyi, Kyaw Ba, etc.), former top brass (Tin Pe, San Yu, Kyaw Htin, Aye Ko, Saw Maung), and even the disgrac-ed (for example, "Em-I" Tin Oo was given a plot of land and a "loan" to build a house, after his release from jail in 1989). Needless to say, the houses and land were not Ne Win’s to give away: they were either state-owned or "nationalized" property.
[114]
[115] Atrocities, primarily by Bama
soldiers, have been endemic in non-Bama areas since
1948. How-ever, they tended to be dismissed as rebel propaganda until Amnesty
International’s report on
[116] From personal experience while serving with the Shan State Army/SSA, 1963-1977. Medical items such as drugs, needles, morphine, and bandages, along with ammunition, uniforms, ponchos, and boots, were all obtained from black-market middlemen.
[117] Silverstein, Military Rule, pp. 49, 141.
[118] Steinberg, Burma’s Road, pp. 79, 128.
Also, Nobuyoshi Nishizawa and Mya Than, "Agricultur-al Policy Reforms and Agricultural Development
in
[119] In this respect, SLORC’s ceasefire offer can be seen as a slight improvement. However, it is at best a stopgap measure. Such issues as the military’s monopolization of administrative and political power, military atrocities, and the shape of future relations between centre and states have yet to be resolved.
[120] From the mid-1970s to 1988, however, the
regime did successfully exploit the opium-heroin problem, enabling it to
buttress its external legitimacy and obtain aid, loans, and grants. Despite
anti-narcotics aid from the
[121] The Revolutionary Council, The
[122] The KKY, or homeguards,
were local militias led by an ethnic Chinese leader like Lo Hsing-han,
the "heroin king" of the 1970s. They were usually backed by
mafia-like, pan-Asian, ethnic-Chinese drug and trade "syndicates".
The KKY supported the regime in exchange for a free hand in cross-border trade,
military protection for heroin refineries and opium convoys, and use of
military vehicles for transport. At one time (until 1971), Khun Sa was the
unofficial head of all KKYs in
[123] Besides restrictions on foreign travel and censorship, including a ban on foreign publications, regime actions against the people included frequent harassment by MIS agents, soldiers, and party officials. In addition, citizens were required to carry identity cards wherever they went, obtain permits even for domestic travel, submit to searches at numerous checkpoints, report overnight visitors to authorities, and fill out forms at party and government offices (to buy a tin or two of condensed milk from the people’s stores, for instance). Except for the last, these restrictions remain in place.
[124] Unarmed protests occurred in 1962, 1963,
1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1970, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1987, and 1988. They are
familiar to those who follow events in
[125] For typical analyses that record the familiar woes inflicted by the regime, but underestimate the depth of resentment and ignore the pressure then building, see Hugh C. MacDougall and Jon A. Wiant, "Burma in 1984: Political Stasis or Political Renewal?", Asian Survey, Vol. XXV, No. 2 (February 1985), pp. 241-248, and "Burma in 1985: Consolidation Triumphs Over Innovation", Asian Survey, Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (February 1986), pp. 186-195; Robert O. Tilman, "Burma in 1986: The Process of Involution Continues", Asian Survey, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (February 1987), pp. 254-63.
[126] For accounts of the March-July protests and
the brutality of Sein Lwin’s riot squad (lon-htein), see Aung Gyi’s
second Open Letter. His exposure of the atrocities outraged the people of
[127] According to a few Burmese with inside
contacts, Sein Lwin, as head of a "hardcore" faction, opposed Ne
Win’s multi-party proposals. This led to the latter withdrawing in a huff from
the BSPP, and taking his men with him -- including San Yu and his cabinet. Thus
Sein Lwin was left "holding the bag", and became President for about
a month. According to some Burmese interviewed, they believe that Sein Lwin is,
like Ne Win, still influential behind the scenes and quite powerful. He is
believed to be the "patron-godfather" of hardliners and the USDA --
an outfit nicknamed by a
[128] These were U Nu, Mahn Win Maung (third Union President), Bohmu Aung, Thakin Soe (Red Flag leader), Aung Gyi (former No. 2 in the military brass), Tin U (ex-defence minister), and other former top brass (including Kyi Maung, Maung Shwe, Aung Shwe, Chit Khaing, and Sein Mya).
[129] For an excellent journalistic account of the
“coup” and its bloody aftermath, see Stan Sesser, "A Rich Country Gone
Wrong", The New Yorker (9 October 1989), pp.55-64, 96. The "coup" was well
covered by regional newsmagazines such as FEER and Asiaweek,
and also by global ones like Time and Newsweek. An example is
Melinda Liu, "Inside Bloody Burma", Newsweek (
[130] The core of SLORC’s argument is contained in
its Announcement No. 1/90,
[131] This does not mean that Ne Win is now
irrelevant. Like
[132] To name just a prominent few "generals-entreprenuers": Kyaw Ba (former head of the Northern Command), Tun Kyi (former head of the Central Command), and Maung Aye (current army comm-ander and aspiring strongman) have all reportedly accumulated fortunes. The usual avenues include deals with foreign partners and local investors for natural resource extraction ventures (teak, mineral ores, gems, precious metals, fish, etc.), along with rice exports, hotels, tourism, heavy construction (roads, airports, seaports), real estate development, and commercial projects (shopping malls, depart-ment stores, and so on).
[133] For example, Ne Win’s daughter, Sanda Win, and her husband, Aye Zaw Win, are among the top "entrepreneurs". His other daughters, Kyemon and Thawda, along with their husbands and in-laws, are thriving by brokering foreign deals. SLORC chairman Than Shwe’s son and wife are likewise occupied. These individuals have been labelled by local wags "capitalists without capital", since their only capital is their famous fathers and uncles, and their links with the top military brass.
[134] The point that USDA may be transformed into a future Golkar-like party is also discussed by David I. Steinberg, "The Union Solidarity Development Association: Mobilization and Orthodoxy", Burma Debate, Vol.IV, No.1 January/February 1997, pp. 4-11.
[135] The particulars about Maung Aye were obtained
from talks in
[136] Khin Nyunt is officially the No. 2 man in the SLORC hierarchy. But as the "Old Man’s" protege, formal head of the MIS, and often SLORC’s prime spokesman, he is in many respects No. 1.
[137] Some of the early and influential overseas "Burmese" entrepreneurs include: Kyan Kin (ethnic Chinese, based in Hong Kong and Singapore); Motiwallah (Bama-Muslim, Singapore); B.P. Win (Chinese, Hong Kong); Sein Tun and Sappan (Chinese, Bangkok); Kyaw Zin (Chinese, Singapore); Zaw Win (Chinese, USA); Tin Tut (Chinese, USA); R. Tun Maung (Rakine, Canada); Michael Myo Nyunt (Bama, Australia).
[138] For example,
[139] Only in 1988, it seems, did the military realize that the real threat to its power resided in the Bama majority. Before that, its attention had been focused almost entirely on the non-Bama. The military was for a long time able to sow confusion among the Bama majority with allegations that, for example, Shan princes and Karen rebels were plotting to dismember the union.
[140] Source: communications with KIA chairman Brang Seng, now deceased (1992);
with E.M. Marta of the Karen External Affairs office in
[141] Source: Brang Seng, Kachin (KIO) chairman, and M. Jala, a Kachin activist and confidential aide to Brang Seng (Interview in 1993).
[142] The abuses and atrocities suffered by the
vast majority of people, especially the non-Bama, are
dealt with in Martin Smith and Annie Allsebrook, Ethnic
Groups in
[143] Her image among the Bama
is that of a refined, beloved daughter or younger sister of high moral calibre and intellect. From this perspective, it can be
said that support for Aung San Suukyi, and revulsion
towards SLORC, is emotionally entrenched, and hence difficult to counter. Her
popularity and legitimacy have been boosted by the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize and
other international awards. Other awards she has received include: the Thorolf Rafto Award (Norway,
1990), the Sakharov prize (European Parliament,
1991), the Humanistas Human Rights Award (United
States, 1991), the Marisa Bellisario prize (Italy,
1992), the Simon Bolívar prize (UNESCO, 1992), Les
Nouveaux Droits award (France, 1992), the Premio Mujer Progresista
award (Spain, 1993), and the Victor Jara
International Human Rights Award (United States, 1993). See
[144] It is also alleged that the release took place without Khin Nyunt’s knowledge. Source: Confident-ial communication (August 1995) from a person with links to SLORC higher-ups, especially Kyaw Sein, the DDSI’s No.2 man. According to this source and others, the military is divided at the time of writing (1997) into three major factions. One consists of Khin Nyunt and his allies, which enjoys the blessings of Ne Win or his daughter, Sanda Win. Another is led by Maung Aye, an ambitious hard-liner, under the patronage of Sein Lwin, "The Butcher of Rangoon". A third revolves around Than Shwe, SLORC’s chairman. In addition, there are a number of "floating" or "fence-sitting" cliques, including several military-intelligence cliques; cliques of general-ministers (the "business generals"); cliques in the navy and the airforce; and smaller cliques of officers, formed for self-protection, which attach themselves to major factions as expediency or circumstances dictate.
[145] In addition to problems associated with the
grave state-society dysfunction, additional problems that discourage long-term
development include widespread corruption; unsettled politics; the lack of
physical and other infrastructure; an overvalued kyat; and the flood of cheap
outside manufactures, especially from