CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION: THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN DOMINATION


The Diversity and Complexity of Military Intervention and Authoritarian Regimes  
          Soldiers in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand have participated in politics and related processes in roles that are "normally" associated with politicians and political parties.  The armed forces, by being deeply involved in politics and the socio-economic affairs of the state, have become the power base and political instrument of their respective chiefs and strongmen-rulers. 
          Military leaders who have "captured" the state have established authoritarian orders which they believe are most congruent with their goals and vision of state-society order.  As David Beetham found, they imposed an authoritarian domination of the state over society by removing the freedom (or autonomy) of organized groups to pursue their interests independently of the state.[1]  Typically, power is concentrated in the hands of the strongman-ruler, trusted subordinates, or the bureaucracy, as noted by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Fred Riggs, Juan Linz, Gerald Heeger, and Beetham.  Importantly, intermediary institutions that mediate state-society relations are abolished or manipulated and marginalized by the state. 
          The country studies (Chapters 3-5) show that military intervention occurs in complex, diverse historical, socio-economic, and political settings, and is triggered by diverse events and factors, in line with the observations of Christopher Clapham, Edward Feit, T.O.Odetola, and others.  That political orders established by the military and its chief-turned-ruler are not identical, as Clapham, Samuel Finer, Harold Crouch, among others, note, has also been shown in these chapters.  Although "military regimes" are authoritarian, this thesis has shown that the complexity and degree of authoritarian control exercised by the state varies from regime to regime.  It has also been found that these regimes vary not only in the degree of authoritarianism imposed, but also in the extent to which the military is autonomous vis-à-vis other state actors and elites, and relative to social forces. 
          I have examined the phenomenon of military intervention in
Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand, in the context of three interrelated factors that delineate the variance between military-authoritarian regimes.  To reiterate briefly, they are:   (1) the military and the politics of military intervention as they relate to the reorganization of power in the state;  (2) the pivotal role of, and strategies employed by, the military strongman in the reorganization of political power, and the relationship between the ruler and the military; and  (3) the degree of authoritarianism exercised, and the extent of military dominance. 
          Four interrelated questions that are crucial to understanding military rule have been posed in this thesis.  They are, first, why the military decides to stay on to rule and to reorganize political power;   second, how the military decides to reorganize state power;   third, what kind of military authoritarian pattern emerges when the military chief becomes the state strongman-ruler;   and fourth, how the differences between, and within regimes, over time, are to be explained?

Military Intervention, the Politics of "Staying On", and the Reorganization of State Power
          With respect to the politics of military intervention, I have found, in agreement with Crouch, that the phenomenon is related to what he calls "the total situation" of politics, where the military is a participant in a "free-for-all" struggle for power, dom-inance, control, and advantage, within a Huntingtonian "praetorian" environment.[2]  In this struggle, the prize is the state, and, as Clapham observes, it is almost inevitably won by the military. 
          I have found, first, that the military stays on to rule because of its close identification, and self-image as, the creator, guardian, protector, and savior of both the nation and the state, and as well, as Samuel Fitch notes, the redefinition of its role expressed in terms of "national security" imperatives, broadly defined.  The subsequent extension of military activities into non-military spheres, combined with the perception of its indispensibility, and/or perceived threats to the state itself or national unity, strongly compell it to take charge of, and run, the state and the political arena.  In consequence, it is more closely linked to the "new" state, serving as its power base and the political instrument of its chief-and-ruler and his regime.  Once in charge of the state, the military gains one more incentive to "stay on":  the perquisites of political and economic power and enhanced status.  Effective intervention and the military's ability to reorganize power is, however, contingent on its political cohesion, forged by a military strongman-and-unifier.  
          In Burma, as in Indonesia (examined in Chapters 3 and 4), soldiers were polit-icized as part of the respective anti-colonial, nationalist movements.  As discussed, after independence, the newly-installed powerholders -- the AFPFL Thakins and Sukarno, respectively -- depended heavily on the military to fend off a variety of forces which challenged the state in each of these.  Moreover, military elites in both countries subscribed to a vision of state-society order which, as Manuel Garreton, Heeger, and Feit note, precludes the political participation of social forces which, in the military's view, exacerbates social conflicts, leads to general disorder, and subverts national unity. 
          As shown, however, military intervention has not always led to the reorganiz-ation of political power as desired.  In Burma (as seen in Chapter 3), the Tatmadaw stepped in to "save" the country from being fragmented due to the split within the rul-ing AFPFL party in 1958.  The intervention was short-lived primarily because, as discussed, Ne Win was apparently not yet in undisputed control of the armed forces.  He returned power to civilian rule.  Military intervention in 1962, after Ne Win unified the military, led to the reorganization of power. 
          Likewise in Indonesia (examined in Chapter 4), although the military strongly claimed dominance for itself as a revolutionary, socio-political force, its early incursions were ineffectual.  It was only in 1959 after Nasution gained control of ABRI (after numerous failed regional-military rebellions), that ABRI was able to play an effective role in helping to reorganize the state, but in subordinacy to Sukarno.  In 1965, ironically, it was the trauma of Gestapu in 1965, endangering both the state and the military itself, that united the military behind Suharto.  It was this very tight cohesion, never before achieved, which allowed ABRI to assert its dominance effectively. 
          In Thailand (Chapter 5), the phenomenon of military intervention has been, as in Burma and Indonesia, closely tied with the politics of the state.  The military first participated in politics in 1932 as a political instrument of the "Promoters," whose goal was to reorganize power after the overthrow of the absolutist monarchy.  However, due to the frequency of coups -- fifteen successful and failed coups between 1932 to 1991 --  the phenomenon is more complex, and even quite confusing.  I have classified Thai coups into four general categories: one, coups that are aimed at re-organizing political power;  two, those arising from problems with the functioning of the democratic process as being tried by authoritarian rulers;  three, coups arising from a crisis situation, where the military can claim to have "saved" the state;  and four, those arising from intra-military friction.[3] 
          I have found that the Thai case highlights a situation where military intervent-ion, in the absence of an authoritarian strongman-unifier, does not lead to the reorgan-ization of power or the state.  The military was not unified between the fall of Thanom and Praphart in 1973 and Krit's death in 1976.  After that, Prem, a de facto military strongman and yet democratically inclined, refused to restore military author-itarian rule.  Thus, despite their importance as "king-makers" and "spoilers" from 1976 to 1985, the Young Turks were not successful in restoring authoritarianism or the military to political dominance. 
          Secondly, regarding the question of how the military reorganizes the politics of the state, I have found that the organizational configuration of the state is restructured by the military so that political roles and institutions are transformed into bureaucratic ones.  These are then usually placed under military control, or tutelage.  Typically, the military regime seeks to limit participation by closing or restricting intermediary institutions and societal associations.  This results in high state autonomy vis-à-vis society, and, correspondingly, the low autonomy of society relative to the state.  However, military rulers  -- Ne Win, Suharto, Thanom and Praphart -- have also set up political parties (or ruling parties) aimed at controlling, channeling, and limiting political participation, while at the same time, using them to gain legitimacy (with varying results).[4]  
          In Burma, Ne Win -- the undisputed military leader in 1962 -- employed the Tatmadaw to set up a military-"socialist" authoritarian state, where it served as the sole constitutive element of the BSPP regime.  All political roles were bureaucratized, and, as discussed, were monopolized by soldiers.  The political arena and legislative sphere were insulated by the military from society, and the state was made non-malleable, even by civilian bureaucratic elements, unlike in Indonesia and Thailand. 
          In Indonesia, investigated in Chapter 4, I have found that since both the Guided Democracy and the New Order state are based on the 1945 Constitution, there is a continuity in the organizational configuration of the state.  Suharto skillfully made the constitution work for him.  Suharto and ABRI quite effectively depoliticized and deprived most of society of meaningful access to the state and politics, thus insulating the state and making it somewhat non-malleable by, and highly autonomous from, society.  However, Suharto and the regime have established a quite effective mechan-ism to respond to the needs, mainly economic, of the politically subordinated (especially, rural) segments via patrimonial linkages and networks through village heads.   
          However, in contrast to the BSPP regime, Suharto's New Order has allowed for a degree of what Linz terms as "limited pluralism": an ostensibly "open" political arena with more than one political party participating in politics.  Also, in recent years, some Islamic elements have been given some access to politics as part of Suharto's power-balancing strategy.  Those with economic clout -- ethnic Chinese business elites -- have also been provided with some access to the state, mainly via patrimonial, informal, mutually beneficial links with Suharto and other subordinate power-holders and/or officials, armed and unarmed, in the state's bureaucracy. 
          In Thailand, the military's endeavors to reorganize political power in an author-itarian direction were, I have found, constrained by the institutions of the constitution-al monarchy, which the Promoters and Pibul, the first military strongman, accepted because the monarchy was (and is) the font of legitimacy, and is held to be by the majority of Thais as a mystic embodiment of Thai nationhood.  There are, therefore, found in Thailand, three types of regimes: one, a less authoritarian military regime (which I term, the "Pibul system");  two, a more authoritarian military regime (the "Sarit system");  and three, the non-military, "Thai-style democracy" regimes that have existed  or operated between coups.  
          The Thai military, unlike its counterparts in Burma and Indonesia, has not been able effectively to deny civilian elites and social forces access to the state, or to effectively restrict the operation of intermediary institutions and associations for long periods.  However, Sarit did succeed in establishing a military-authoritarian regime for a time.  This he accomplished by associating his personal authoritarian rule with the populist-paternalistic kingship style of the Sukothai period, and by elevating the status of the then young King and Queen, and exploiting their youthful glamor and the history, pomp, and legitimacy associated with the monarchy (which had been downplayed after 1932).  However, by the end of the Thanom-Praphart regime in the early 1970s, the King's political stature had grown, and he had accumulated de facto power by "out-lasting" military strongmen, governments, and constitutions.  The monarchy -- an institution which, although of the state, was also above the state -- became accordingly more autonomous .  It became quite impossible for the military, or military-backed rulers, to manipulate, as in the past, the monarchy or the King.  Rather, it was the monarchy which became a pivotal force in Thai politics. 

Military Strongmen as Rulers, and the Military and Authoritarian Regimes   
          With reference to the question of what kind of military authoritarian pattern emerges after the military captures the state, I have found that in military-authoritarian regimes, as observed by Heeger, the armed forces as a whole do not rule.  It is the military strongman-ruler who exercises significant power, while the military plays a pivotal role as the subordinated political instrument and primary power base of the regime and the ruling strongman.  The military is therefore dominant relative to societal forces, but its dominance vis-à-vis other state elements will vary -- being contingent on the vision, goals, and strategies of ruling strongmen to consolidate first, their personal control of the state, and second, the state's control over society. 
          The relationship between the military chief-turned-ruler and the military, in terms of their respective autonomy, or dominance vis-à-vis the other, has been found to be a dynamic one.  The military-authoritarian regimes investigated -- being basically systems where the military leader-rulers are personally dominant -- share many features in common with the system of personal rule, as theorized by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, among others.  As discussed in Chapter 2, this system is characterized by a political arena where rules and institutions do not effectively govern the conduct of rulers and other political actors.  There obtains a situation where the system is structured by the politicians themselves, in particular by the person who wields the most power -- the personal ruler or, in "military" regimes, the strongman-ruler.  In this respect, I have found that Burma's Ne Win, roughly fits the type of personal ruler classified by the authors as a tyrannical ruler.  Thai strongmen-rulers, Pibul and Sarit, and Suharto in Indonesia, are, I have found, less tyrannical, and fall broadly into the categories of princely and autocratic rulers.[5]  The type of ruler, his mind-set, style, and vision, in turn, determines the contours and complexion of the system that emerges as a result of the ruler's endeavours.  
          I have found that the relationship between the strongman-ruler and the military is contingent on the personal skills of the military ruler in playing intra-military politics -- in rewarding, manipulating, purging, and shuffling subordinates, thus diminishing their ability to mount any challenge to the ruler.  It is also shaped, as I have maintained, by the strongman's agenda, his vision, goals, and style, and hence it varies from regime to regime.  In this regard, in Burma, the relationship has, as found in Chapter 3, been mutually close, with the military remaining highly dominant, despite the "civilianization" of the ruler, Ne Win.  In Indonesia (Chapter 4), the relationship has changed.  Suharto has, as a ruler of the whole nation, counter-balanced the military's dominance with Golkar politicians, government "legislators" and "representatives", presidential aides, favored ministers, valued and useful techno-bureaucrats, business associates, and so on.  In Thailand, typically, the military returns to the barracks after its chief captures the state, although some top brass are given cabinet portfolios, and some are rewarded with position in state, or military-owned, enterprises.[6] 
          Regarding the re-shaping of the state by strongman-rulers, in Burma, Ne Win drastically reorganized power in a highly authoritarian direction and manner -- and attempted to reorganize the economy as well.  His power base was the Tatmadaw, and he relied on it alone to maintain his grip on power.  The BSPP party-state structures set up in 1974 were dominated by the military which, in turn, enabled it to exclude all non-military elements, even those within the state's bureaucracy, from meaningful roles in the affairs of the state and politics.  It has been found that the military penetrated almost completely the administrative, political, and economic ("socialist") bureaucracy of the state at all levels, and also controlled the legislative-representative sphere. 
          In comparison, Suharto has, as mentioned, been a much more astute, sophisticated soldier-politician.  He did not abolish the constitutional framework of the "old order", but reorganized power by manipulating its provisions.  Primarily reliant on the military, Suharto was careful to entrench the military in politics through "constitutional" and "institutional" channels, interpreting and using the provisions of the 1945 Constitution.  The vehicle he chose was Golkar, the government's large, civilian- and military-based, bureaucratically-organized party.  Golkar enabled Suharto and the military to manipulate the political arena and control the legislative sphere, ensuring a quite high degree of dominance for ABRI, relative to other constitutive elements of the state and also to other social-political groups and segments.  Golkar's dominating presence in the political arena and the legislature, coupled with the "floating mass" concept that disallowed politicking in the rural areas, has resulted in the depoliticization of a large part of society.  I have found that Golkar is not a mass party, but rather an election vehicle for the government.    
          The examination of the New Order state shows that Suharto has made effect-ive use of Golkar.  Its electoral "successes" have given the New Order regime a semblance of legitimacy and a "civilian", more inclusive, and "democratic" mantle.  Over time, it has also established Suharto's stature as a somewhat inclusive, broad-based, "father of the nation" type of ruler, and has ensured his many terms as Presid-ent.[7]
 In recent years, as the regime "matured" and Suharto's position solidified, Golkar officials, along with favored ministers, bureaucrats, and technocrats have been used to counter-balance the military's dominance.  This development underlines the shift in the hitherto very close relationship between Suharto and his military power base.  
          I have found that ABRI's dominance in the bureaucratic sphere, compared to the early years of the regime, has been somewhat diluted.  However, it still maintains a territorial, quasi-administrative framework, and in this aspect, the military is still more or less involved, especially, at the local level in administrative affairs.  Military personnel also control, or are present in, the many state agencies, especially those dealing with security and commerce.[8]   
          In Thailand, the inquiry in Chapter 5 shows that parliamentary politics and institutions, along with the constitutional monarchy, co-existed with authoritarian rule.  This contradiction between authoritarianism and the parliamentary form and practices was resolved for a time by Sarit who, like Ne Win, abolished parliament and related processes in 1958.  His co-successors, Thanom and Praphart, carried on with the "Sarit system" until it was challenged and toppled (in 1973) by new forces that emerged as a result of deep socio-economic changes, in a environment of regional uncertainty and tension. 
          With reference to the relationship between the strongman-ruler and the mil-itary, the inquiry shows, that successful strongmen-rulers -- Ne Win, Suharto, Pibul, Sarit (and co-successors) -- dominated the military, and ensured its subordinant status by a system of purges, surveillance, transfers, promotions, appointments to high or lucrative positions, ample budgets, funds for projects, and opportunities to make money or engage in business and commerce.  Importantly, they juggled and shuffled military positions, and manipulated and exploited personal rivalries and interpersonal tensions, even among and between close aides and loyalists.  However, soldiers in Thailand have, as mentioned in Chapter 5, been more professional and less involved in everyday political or administrative roles than those in Burma and Indonesia. 
          In the Thai case, the frequency of coups and coup attempts seems to contradict the subordinant status of the military to its chief-and-ruler.  However, I have found that the soldiers have been, for the most part, loyal to ruling strongmen.  There have, nonetheless, been occasions when the military has decided not to defend unpopular ruling strongmen being challenged by other forces, especially those who have lost royal support, such as Thanom and Praphart (and their designated successor, Narong).  
          Of the Thai strongmen, only Prem has been actually challenged by segments of the military: the attempted Young Turks coups in 1981 and 1985.  This was because Prem was a democratically-oriented strongman who opposed military intervention and who was engaged in restoring parliamentary politics.[9]

State Autonomy, Military-Authoritarianism, Differing State-Society Configurations
          Concerning the differences between military-authoritarian regimes and within regimes over time, I have found that the variations stem largely from the differing patterns of autonomy relations.  They differ in terms of the extent to which the state dominates and is autonomous from society, and/or is unresponsive to society.  They also vary in the pattern of autonomy relations between, in particular, the strongman-ruler and the military, and the military and other non-military elements of the state.  The differing patterns shape not only variances between regimes, but also within regimes over time.  Finally, owing to the different patterns of autonomy relations established, long-term regime outcomes also vary. 
          The subject of state autonomy lies at the heart of state-society relations, in particular, relationships between and among elements, classes, groups, and so on, that co-exist and interact politically within a "nation-state".   It is about who dominates, and to what degree;  how dominance is imposed;  and what structures regulate, constrain, or facilitate dominance.  Likewise, it also concerns the questions of who exercises greater or lesser degrees of relative autonomy, how autonomy is obtained, and what the structures are that limit or reinforce autonomy of various actors, groups, institutions, and so forth.  Further, it is, as Theda Skocpol implies, linked also to resp-onsiveness -- the responsiveness of the state to societal demands, and vice-versa. 
          Skocpol, Finer, and Eric Nordlinger argue that state autonomy (or obversely, society's autonomy from, or relative to the state) is contingent on two factors.  These are, first, factors internal to the state (i.e., the will of state actors or elites to assert autonomy and the resources available to them in this regard), and second, the avail-ability and autonomy of intermediary institutions and channels to societal forces. 
          The second factor is in turn dependent, as Skocpol maintains, on how the state is configured organizationally.  In military-authoritarian states and regimes, where power is concentrated in the hands of the strongman-ruler and the military, and where intermediary channels are subdued or monopolized by state elements (in particular, by the military), the state will be more or less, and in varying degrees, rather highly autonomous. The military-authoritarian state is one that is, in Nordlinger's words, non-malleable by, and highly insulated from society. 
          The country studies (Chapters 3-5) show that the pattern of authoritarian domination and autonomy relations established in each case is largely contingent on the political sophistication of the ruling strongman: particularly, his appreciation of the complexity of politics and the recognition of the need to win wider support, beyond his primary military power base.  As found, in
Thailand and Indonesia, ruling strongmen like Pibul, Sarit, and Suharto possessed those qualities.  They were careful not to exclude or alienate the civilian bureaucracy and selected elite groups.  In both, even though strongmen-rulers and soldiers were highly autonomous vis-à-vis society as a whole, they -- more or less and to varying degrees (more in Thailand than in Indonesia) -- included non-military segments in the political process, as discussed.  
          In some cases, owing to considerations of legitimacy, ruling strongmen have clearly been constrained by their respect for, and the utility of certain constitutional forms, and have worked within such structures.  In
Thailand,  most strongmen-rulers, other than Sarit, have felt the need to promulgate a constitution calling for a return to a parliamentary system of government, under a constitutional monarchy, and with a civilian bureaucracy intact.  While the actual democratic elements were often more fictional than real, they did prevent these rulers from excluding non-military forces from access to politics and the state.  In Indonesia, it was the 1945 Constitution -- which called for functional group representation and the participation of societal forces -- towards which Suharto felt obliged to conform.  
          The above factors -- the political sophistication of ruling strongmen and the constraints on him --  resulted in the construction by military rulers of quite convinc-ing, stable institutions that bequeathed an aura of legitimacy and constitutionalism to the military-based regimes.  This enabled them to win over important non-military elite elements, both within the state sphere and in society.  Thus they accomplished several important goals: one, they created an elite consensus (and wider public support);  two, they retained the military as their political instrument and pivotal power base, and three, they counter-balanced its dominance at the same time. 
          There are however ruling strongmen who are of rudimentary persuasion and who are not constrained by considerations of legitimacy or pre-existing constitutional forms.  As the investigation of military intervention and rule in
Burma shows, Ne Win set up a quite simple military dictatorship.  His BSPP state was characterized by a pattern of autonomy relations where the state vis-à-vis society was highly autonomous, highly insulated, and non-malleable.  The pattern was the opposite with respect to the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis the ruler, Ne Win, and the military: the state was not very autonomous nor insulated, and was quite highly malleable.  Ne Win's BSPP regime was one where the military was, next to the ruler, highly dominant, and was moreover allowed to exercise more or less arbitrary power.  As shown, having excluded, and alienated, all social forces, and even civilian state elements, and lacking in political sophistication, Ne Win was reduced to relying solely on the military and coercion (or state violence) to stay in power -- which he success-fully did, for a quarter of a century. 
          However, like the "Sarit System" in the time of Thanom and Praphart, Ne Win's military-dominant regime was, as found, incapable of responding constructively or positively to problems, or to challenges that emerged over time.  The reliance on repression, combined with its inability to win legitimacy through performance, result-ed in the quite sudden collapse of the regime when confronted with a country-wide, "people's power" uprising in 1988.  However, brute military force again won the day, and SLORC -- the current regime -- is, like Ne Win's, a straight-forward military regime. But with Ne Win declining physically, the junta's (and the country's) future is uncertain.[10] 
          The future also seems more and more uncertain in
Indonesia.  As discussed, although Suharto has successfully established a "constitutional", somewhat "institut-ionalized", quite stable, and durable military-authoritarian order, the question of succession poses a potentially serious problem.  This is all the more so with Suharto getting on in years and about to begin to serve what will most likely be his last term as President (1998-2003).  As the study has shown, the succession question is becoming increasingly worrisome because the regime's stability and effectiveness are dependent on Suharto's manipulative skills and political savvy, and his ability to maintain a power equilibrium, which stabilizes the system. 
          Concerning the pattern of authoritarian rule in
Thailand, the country study (Chapter 3) has shown that the pattern is, compared to Burma and Indonesia, quite dynamic.  There has occurred a quite dramatic, fundamentally substantive, change in the pattern of autonomy relations: Thailand has since the 1970s been moving away from authoritarianism.  The evidence indicates that the military has since then been constrained, even thwarted, in its attempt to continue to dominate politics and maintain an exclusionary, highly autonomous authoritarian order.  An important factor in this respect is a situation where there exists a very important institution, one which is of the state, but which, at the same time, stands high above it -- the monarchy.  It is "insulated" from, and cannot be captured or manipulated easily by the military and its ruling chief. 
          Over time, as shown, as the monarch has gained greater stature and accumulat-ed a reservoir of de facto power, the King by the 1970s was able to assert his auton-omy  and to use his stature in ways not always to the military's liking.  For instance in 1981 the Young Turks captured
Bangkok -- the "seat" of the state and the center of political power -- but they were not able to hold on to the prize.  The insulation and the "independence" of the monarchy from the state and the military, and the King's assertion of this autonomy -- in the show of royal support for Prem -- left the military with no choice but to surrender the "prize" they held in their hands.[11]   
          The substantive change in the nature of political power and its organization toward a more open, democratic direction, initiated by Prem -- on behalf of, and with the support of the King -- illuminates what may be a phenomenon of some theoretical import.  Despite the 1991 military coup, Suchinda failed, due to widespread demonstration against him and ensuing violence in 1992, to keep power after having himself named Prime Minister following an election .  Also, the King's role was decisive in getting Suchinda to step down.  This strongly suggests that political power in
Thailand can no longer easily be the personal prerogative of the military leader-unifier or the military.  Political power has shifted to the monarchy and to civilian politicians, particularly, a new, powerful social group, the economic elites, who now dominate the political arena and intermediary institutions.  Power has also devolved, to a lesser extent into the hands of rural and urban NGOs organized and led by socially-conscious members of the "middle class" (who are generally opposed to the new economic power elites).[12]  This trend is indeed a discouraging one for political soldiers and aspiring strongmen in Thailand. 
          The question of whether political power in Burma and Indonesia will undergo a similar change as their economies develop, become more complex, more closely integrated with the transnational regime of trade and investment, and a large "middle class" emerges, is beyond the scope of this thesis.[13]  What can be safely said is that the process of "democratization" in
Thailand is largely the result of factors peculiar to Thailand.  These include the centrality of the monarchy;  its situation "above" the state and its "insulation" and autonomy from the military;  the democratic orientation of an enlightened King;  the availibility to the monarch of a loyal royalist, democratically inclined, de facto military strongman, Prem.  Much of Thailand's future depends on the transition to, and consolidation of, democracy while the present King is on the throne. 

Variations in Military Authoritarian Regimes:
Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia
          The military-authoritarian states in
Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand are not identical.  They vary, as this thesis shows, in the organizational configuration of the state and correspondingly, in the degree or extent of authoritarianism they exhibit, and in their domination of, and autonomy from, society.  They are also different in the degree to which the military is dominant, and they yield different autonomy patterns in regard to the relationships between the military strongman-ruler and the military, the military and other elements and actors within the state, and between elements within the state and social forces in society.  I have argued that the differences can be "illustrated" by placing military regimes along spectrums that "measure" certain dimensions that are common to such regimes, but vary from regime to regime. 
          As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, the dimensions to be compared are, one, the extent to which the military penetrates the bureaucracy;  two, the existence and auton-omy of elected legislative bodies and political parties;  and three, the degree to which the state responds to societal demands. 
          Below, these spectrums illustrate some salient differences and variations found over time in the military-authoritarian regimes in
Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand: 


                                                         SPECTRUM 1
                  The Extent of Military Penetration of the Civil Bureaucracy.  

    (x.1) = Extensive Military Penetration of the Civil Bureaucracy
   (x.2) = No Military Penetration of the Civil Bureaucracy
           (x.1)                                                                                                            (x.2)
___A_____B_______C_________________________________________D____
                                   (A)
BURMA, 1962-current. 
                                   (B)
INDONESIA, 1965-71.
                                   (C) INDONESIA, 1971-current.
                                   (D)
THAILAND, 1932-current.

          Spectrum 1, which illustrates the degree of military penetration of the civilian administrative bureaucracy, also indicates the extent to which the state is insulated by the military.  In
Burma, all key administrative positions have been and are still controlled by military officers (active and retired).  This is nearly the case in Indonesia as well, but not as extensively as in Burma.  The military in Indonesia penetrated the civilian bureaucracy more extensively in the early years of the New Order regime, as the spectrum indicates.   
          In
Thailand, although there have been many coups, the civilian bureaucracy has carried on in a largely undisturbed fashion.  The penetration by the military of the administrative bureaucracy has been virtually non-existent.  Therefore, Thailand stands out as quite different from the situations in Indonesia and Burma. 


                                                        SPECTRUM 2
                    The Degree to which the Legislature and Political Parties
                         are Autonomous in Military-Authoritarian Regimes. 

   (x.1) = No Legislature; No autonomy
   (x.2) = Parties and an Election, but Results ignored and Legislature does not Sit
   (x.3) =  Rubber Stamp Legislature; the Government's Party Dominates
   (x.4) = Democratically Functioning Legislature following Competitive Elections
   (x.1)  (x.2)             (x.3)                                                                              (x.4)
___A___B__________C__________________________F_E______D______
                                    (A) BURMA, 1962-74;  THAILAND, 1958-73.   
                                    (B)
BURMA, current
                                   (C) BURMA, 1974-88;
INDONESIA, 1965-current. 
                                   (D)
THAILAND, 1973-76.  
                                   (E)
THAILAND, 1976-80 (Prem years)
                                   (F)
THAILAND, 1986-current (post-Prem).

          Spectrum 2, which illustrates the extent to which the legislature and political parties -- intermediary institutions and channels -- are autonomous in military-authoritarian regimes, also indicates the degree the state becomes (or is made) non-malleable by society.  The legislature and political parties in
Burma at present are shown as having very little autonomy.  Although elections were held in 1990, the results, which gave the opposition a landslide victory, have been ignored, and there is at present no legislature, and no constitution.  In the early years of military rule (1962-74), there was no legislature or constitution, and political parties and activities were banned, and hence Burma is shown as being at the far end of the spectrum.  In the BSPP years, both the government party (the only party) and the legislature were dom-inated by Ne Win and the military, and thus are shown as rubber stamps.  The state in Burma since 1962 has been in this respect highly non-malleable by societal forces. 
          In
Indonesia, the legislature has been more or less a rubber-stamp body, and elections are dominated by Golkar, the government's party.  Indonesia, at present, is shown as occupying point (C) along with Burma in the BSPP years, but with some significant differences.  In Indonesia there are opposition parties and legislators.  In the legislature, the government will sometimes amend or withdraw a bill which encounters strong opposition, despite its large majority.  Indonesia has also allowed a wide array of NGOs, including some directed at human rights, and the government has established a national Human Rights Commission, which is getting high marks from Western observers.  However, despite these advances in general, the state in Indonesia (1965-current) remains quite highly non-malleable by societal forces. 
         
Thailand at present is shown near the other end of the spectrum.  There is currently a democratically functioning legislature, parties which operate relatively free of state control, and the multi-party elections are fiercely competitive.  The state is in this respect quite malleable by societal forces.  Thailand has come a long way from where it was under the "Sarit system" (1958-1973) at the far left of the spectrum.


                                                      SPECTRUM 3
                 The Autonomy of the State vis-à-vis Society in terms of
                 Responsiveness to Society (Societal Forces and Demands).

    (x.1) = High State Autonomy, Not Responsive
   (x.2) = Relatively High State Autonomy, Relatively Responsive
   (x.3) = The State is Relatively Autonomous, and Quite Responsive
      (x.1)                                            (x.2)                                                            (x.3)
____A__________________B__________________________________C_____
            (A)
BURMA, current.    (B) INDONESIA, current.   (C) THAILAND, current.

          Spectrum 3 looks at the response-autonomy nexus of state-society interaction.  The state in
Burma since 1962 has been highly autonomous in that it has, for the most part, not provided societal forces with the means to make effective demands on the state.  Alternatively, the state has subdued societal demands with the use of force, and by controlling or manipulating intermediary institutions and channels, and, after 1988, by intimidating or repressing opposition activists and leaders.  On this spectrum, Burma currently occupies the end of the spectrum that indicates high state autonomy and low response to societal forces and demands. 
          Likewise, the state in
Indonesia has used force to subdue some societal demands, controlled or manipulated intermediary institutions and channels, and intimidated or repressed opposition activists and leaders.  The state in Indonesia is likewise highly autonomous, but not as unresponsive as in Burma.  Opposition parties and leaders, and societal associations -- in particular, the NGOs (in the spheres of labor, human rights, legal aid, and so on), the print media, even semi-political Islamic groups and organizations -- are allowed to organize and, within limits, or from time to time, raise their voices on issues that concern them. The state responds to these voices when expedient (or when it is wiser to do so, than to repress them).  Also, the level of repression, intimidation, and coercion varies or fluctuates, depending on the situation and/or locality.  Indonesia is currently situated on a point that indicates on the spectrum some, if selective, responsiveness of the state to societal demands.
          The state in
Thailand is currently "democratic", and appears to be somewhat constrained by societal forces which have access to intermediary institutions and channels, and organized groups have been able to participate in politics independently of the state.  Thailand is currently situated far to the right of Burma and Indonesia on the spectrum. 

Comparing Military-Authoritarian Regimes: Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand 
          Examined together, the above spectrums illustrate variations between military-authoritarian regimes in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand, with respect to two import-ant dimensions relating to the nature of the relationship of the state to society, and vice versa.  They are (1) the exclusion/inclusion of societal forces vis-à-vis the political process;  and (2) the political distance between the state and society, which throws light on the degree of "fit" in the relationship between society and the state.  In the context of the above dimensions, we can classify Burma , in the period covered by this investigation, as the most authoritarian, Thailand as the least authoritarian, or even semi-democratic, with Indonesia in the middle, but somewhat closer to Burma than to Thailand.  A brief elaboration of the dimensions follows. 
          Concerning the first dimension, spectrums 1 and 2 show the extent to which society was/is excluded from access to the state and politics (or conversely, the degree the state was/is insulated from, and non-malleable by, society).  By examining the degree to which the military penetrates and controls the bureaucracy, and the extent to which legislatures and parties are autonomous or not, we can infer that society in
Burma is the most excluded, followed by society in Indonesia.  Society in Thailand is the least excluded since the insulation of the state by the military is low, and the state is relatively malleable, for the most part, by societal forces.
          Concerning the political distance between the state and society, which throws light on the nature of state-society relation and interactions, spectrums 2 and 3, exam-ined together, show the degree to which the state is autonomous from and non-malleable by society.  Wide political distance -- as expressed by the non-autonomy of legislatures and political parties, together with the unresponsiveness of the state -- also implies a lack of "fit", or serious dysfunction in political interactions between society and the state.  It is clear that in
Burma, the political distance (and lack of "fit") between the state and society is greatest.  Indonesia lies somewhat in the middle, but closer to Burma.  Since the mid-1970s, the political distance in Thailand between society and the state has been the narrowest. 
          In investigating the phenomenon of the military in politics in
Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand, I have found that the military is a very important, quite unique, political entity. 
          The militaries in these countries view themselves as extraordinary entities upon which the very existence and continuity of the country and nation is crucially depend-ent, and they believe that they are "saving" the country and nation when they inter-vene.  Once the country is "saved", the militaries in these countries tend to stay on because they see themselves as the only force capable of imposing unity, and creating an orderly, disciplined society.  The militaries in these three countries have, at times, therefore engaged in the reorganization of the political process and the state, and have established new orders of state-society relations, with soldiers figuring prominently.  Over time, they become -- as the power base and political instrument of the chief-turned-ruler --  the "core" of the state, and, in the process, also become privileged ruling sub-stratums that dominate, in varying degrees, the political lives of their states.  
          I have found, in examining the phenomenon of military rule, that an extraordin-ary military leader -- usually its chief, or the head of the most dominant, cohesive faction -- plays a vital role in ensuring that intervention is effective, and also that the re-shaping of the state structures and the state's relationship with society -- according to the military's vision -- are both successful.  A strongman-ruler is the most crucial element: he is the one who transforms the military into an effective, politically cohesive instrument and stable political power base of the new order. 
          Importantly, the military strongman, being the chief architect of the new order, is the one upon whose shoulders rest the durability, stability, even the very existence of the military-backed state.  Most crucially, he is responsible for ensuring the military's privileged and prominent place in the new order -- which in turn is vital, in many ways, to the ruler's control of the state, and the state's control over social forces, classes, and segments in the societal sphere. 
          I have found that the durability and stability of military-authoritarian regimes in
Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand are owed largely to ruling strongmen, such as Ne Win, Suharto, Pibul, and Sarit.  What these countries have now become has been shaped by the ways these rulers have established and maintained the organizational configuration of the state;  shaped relationships and patterns of autonomy relations between and among elements, and different parts, of the state;  maintained the system's equilibrium;  fashioned structures and processes that underlie interactions between social forces on one hand, and the state or state actors and institutions, on the other.  They have also established the domination-subordination patterns obtaining in these polities.  However, possessing different visions, goals, personalities, and styles, I have found that  military rulers have created a variety of "military" regimes, of vary-ing complexity, with varying degrees of authoritarianism practiced.  
          However, since nothing lasts forever -- not even "strong" military-authoritarian regimes and their chief architects -- and since changes take place in socio-economic conditions, in relationships, in the environment (especially external), and, importantly in the age of the strongman-ruler, there comes a time when these regimes have to con-front problems arising from change, and often, the crisis of decline and/or renewal. 
          The military in
Thailand, as the study shows, has been persuaded, for the most part, to withdraw from politics (despite its brief return in 1990-1991), thanks largely to the efforts of the King and Prem, the de-facto military strongman-ruler.  In Burma, the military has clung to power, relying completely on the instruments of coercion.  Military unity, a critical factor in SLORC's continuing rule, has been cemented by a fear that binds, and also by Ne Win, who, although greatly aged, is nonetheless still the strongman of Burma. 
         
Indonesia is at the moment entering a period of uncertainty, arising from the probability that Suharto might not be around or in full control for much longer.  Its future stability and the long-term viability of its now more or less viable institutions will likely hinge on how Suharto resolves the problem of succession.   Needless to say, the successor-ruler will have to achieve a number of things Suharto has achieved: simultaneously ensuring the military's dominance and subordination, and its political cohesion;  granting the government's political party (Golkar) some autonomy vis-à-vis the military;  balancing military and other power factions;  maintaining the operational autonomy of the civilian administrative bureaucracy vis-à-vis the military and governmental politicians; co-opting potential opposition forces and neutralizing the actual opposition;  keeping the masses depoliticized by various means (through coercion, restrictions, and patrimonial responses to their needs, especially economic), while cautiously liberalizing to defuse pent up urban demand for more political participation, in addition to overseeing important policy issues and affairs, so as to retain performance legitimacy.  Because Suharto has succeeded in these endeavors, he epitomizes the kind of ruler that fulfills the military's vision of the type of state-society order it prefers, the kind that inspires soldiers to "stay on" in politics.  The successor-ruler will have to accomplish all these things while possessing, at least initially, less power and legitimacy.  If he cannot, then the system will change, and there is a good possibility that the military will try to reassert its full political dominance. 

          To conclude, this thesis has attempted to fill a gap in the literature about what happens when the military intervenes to oust the leaders of a state, and then decides to retain power and to reorganize the political system into a military-authoritarian state.  For two of the states investigated, the military has held power, although not identical power, for more than three decades, and for the third, fifteen coups have brought the military regularly to power, where it has ruled for varying length of time.
          This investigation has shown that there are a number of overlapping political motives and justifications for intervening that show considerable similarity in the cases studied, and, second, that the question of whether or not the military stays on to rule seems to depend on the presence of an effective military strongman, backed by a unified military. 
          It is clear that the military will not be unified unless a strongman emerges to impose his will on the organization.  If the military strongman cannot unify the military and keep it unified, his position will be jeopardized.  This may lead to coups or the military's temporary retreat to the barracks.  The military strongman's position will also be complicated and weakened when he has to depend upon the sanction of an important legitimizing force, such as a highly esteemed constitutional monarch. 
          This investigation has also shown that the type of military-authoritarian system that results when the military reorganizes the state can vary considerably.  The three cases studied, all from the same region geographically, illustrate the diversity.  In one case, there exists a nearly pure praetorian state where the military is involved in, and controls virtually all aspects of, state activity, and the state is highly autonomous from society.  In the second case, there is an authoritarian state where power below the top is shared among military and civilian elites, and, while the state is highly autonomous, it is also somewhat responsive to society.  In the third case, a state with a tradition of military intervention, and military-authoritarian rule co-existing with a stable civilian bureaucracy, appears to be undergoing a transition to democratic civilian rule, operating in the face of a military that is politically interested, but currently reluctant to intervene without the sanction of the monarch. 
          Further, it has become clear from the inquiry, that whether the state is highly autonomous from society or not, the state has not been sufficiently insulated or autonomous from its own political elites, and corruption and abuse of power have been found to be excessive in all three cases investigated.  Only in the nearly pure praetorian state, however, could the system be termed a "kleptocracy". 
          Finally, it has become apparent from this thesis research that, although the global democratizing trend is hopeful, it is not so easy to get the politicized military to go back to the barracks to stay. 




------------------------------------  E N D N O T E S  -----------------------------------------
CHAPTER SIX:  CONCLUSION: THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN DOMINATION



[1]  David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillian, 1991), pp.228-236. 

 

[2]  To avoid the impression that "praetorian" conditions are to be attributed to, or blamed wholly on, society or social groups (and their "low", or "uncivil" political culture), I believe that elites, leaders, and elements within the state must also share the blame. It is the state, state elites, and political-social elites who, in their search for support (against rivals), frequently manipulate or whip up "mob-like" crowds, or encourage "praetorian" participation of social groups and segments. Thus, it would not be far too wrong to say that elites and leaders, rulers, and state managers, often reinforce "praetorian" conditions and politics, in order to manipulate and exploit such conditions.

 

[3]   As discussed in Chapter 5, notable in the first category are the 1932 coup by the Promoters, and 1957 and 1958 coups by Sarit. Examples of the second category are the 1958 coup by Sarit against his own government, and a similar coup in 1971 by Thanom and Praphart. The clearest example in the third category is the 1976 coup by Sangad which ended a period of open, quite turburlent, politics (1973-1976), in a tense international (regional) climate. And in the fourth category are the Navy's 1951 "Manhattan" coup, the 1977 Chalard's coup attempt against Thanin (or rather, the Sangad's Navy clique), and the attempted coups in 1981 and 1985 by the Young Turks against Prem, involving con-flicts between military factions and figures:  Arthit, Kriangsak, the Suchinda's group, Serm na Nakorn, Sant, and so on.

 

[4]  Ne Win established the BSPP party in 1974, Suharto set up Golkar in 1970-71, and Thanom and Praphart established the UTPP (United Thai People's Party) in 1969 (which was abolished, together with other parties and the 1969 Constitution, when the duo staged a coup against their own regime in 1971). Ne Win's BSPP did not manage to win legitimacy for the regime, although it was effective in "sterilizing" politics. Only Suharto has managed to use his and the regime's party, Golkar, to more or less gain a legitimate mantle.

 

[5]  Robert H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, Jr., Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). As defined by the authors, a tyranny is a system of personal rule where constrains are absent, and power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by the ruler and his agents (pp.80, 234-265). Princely rulers are astute observers and manipulators, and they are flexible and accommodating to a degree, but maintain control by encouraging and manipulat-ing struggles between subordinate power-holders and contending elite or oligarchical groups (pp.77-78, 83-142). Autocratic rulers are rulers who dominate the oligarchy, the government, and the state, and maintain their dominance by eliminating the autonomous political power and influence of others, and by reducing politics to subordination and administration (pp. 78-79, 143-181). 

 

[6]  In fact, except during coups, the military is virtually invisible. Even during coups, troops and tanks are visible only in Bangkok, and usually only at strategic and symbolic points. Having had contacts with army officers, and having lived in Thailand for over twenty years, I have found that, unlike in Burma (where I was born), officers below the rank of general-officer, do not ordinarily have the oppor-tunity to exercise non-military power. Nor do they have the opportunity to extort or make money. Only intelligence officers have the power to exercise influence in the non-military sphere, but only within limits, and only with great discretion. 

 

[7]   As discussed, Golkar's dominance in politics also served to marginalize the two regime-sanctioned, non-governmental political parties and "opposition" politicians and legislators. This also made it easier for the military and Suharto to neutralize, if not co-opt, individual politicians via intra-legislative polit-ics of making deals and bargains. 

 

[8]  The Defence Ministry complex is also still very powerful, although not as powerful as during Murdani's tenure as ABRI commander and later, Defence Minister.

 

[9]  One could say that Prem's democratic inclination was/is contingent on the political orientation of the King. Had the King been authoritarian, Prem -- a staunch royalist -- would likely have attempted to become a Sarit-like ruler, or alternatively, served as a "front man" to facilitate the dictatorial exercise of royal power. And he would have been successful too, given his political skills. Prem's actions and success as a "democratizing" military strongman, raises the question of whether other really "strong" strongmen could, likewise, have reorganized power and the state in a democratic direction. It is quite probable that, had they been democratically inclined, Sarit, Suharto, even Ne Win, could have carried out what Prem has achieved.

 

[10]  According to knowledgable sources (and a person close to several of Ne Win's children), Ne Win is up to now the "cement" that holds rival military factions and figures together, and is still "calling the shots". It is reported that Ne Win has designated Maung Aye as SLORC's chairman, replacing Than Shwe. Khin Nyunt will remain as the pivotal No.2 man. However, relations between Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt are as inamicable as ever, despite the resolution, for now, of the tension between the two factions decreed by Ne Win. 

 

[11]   However, as observed, the King must strike a delicate balance between upholding the image of  a monarch who reigns, but does not rule, and exercising the reservior of de-facto powers he has over time accumulated. He cannot "touch politics" too often, nor remain aloof in severe conflict situations as dur-ing the 1973 "October revolution", and the "Bloody May" incident in 1992. Also, the King is not always able to prevent coups or show disapproval of every unconstitutional act, whether they come from the military or popular forces and civilian power-holders. The King must be very careful in exerc-ising power, and must be, or be seen to be, effective. Any failure would do irrepairable harm to the awed regard by the peasant majority, especially, of the monarch/monarchy as the possessor of the highest power in the land -- as expressed by the peasants' term for the monarch, "Chao Yoo Hua" (literally, "The Lord Who Stamps On, or Stands Atop, Every Head", or in rough translation "the Lord Who Exercises Power and Rules Over All"). The present monarch, King Bumipol Adulyadej, has proven to be very able and astute in this regard. 

 

[12]  Some Thai and Third World "bourgeoisie" elements are conservative and authoritarian in that they fear disorder as much as any autocratic, authoritarian leader or ruler, and are moreover in position to get whatever they need or wish from collaboration with authoritarian regimes and dictators (of almost all stripes). Some are very "traditional", even "anti-modern", having benefitted enormously from the hierarchical, "traditional" social-cultural-ideological and other inegalitarian arrangements still firmly in place. Some are "modern" and cosmopolitan, so much so that they have very little concern for "national" societies, and view them merely as small segments of a regional-global marketplace and/or business arena. But, of course, there are always some "bourgeoisie" elements that think and act like their historical (and contemporary) Western counterparts, and are willing to fight for democracy, civil liberties, human rights, equitable development, and so on. For a brief, but most insightful, analysis of the "middle class" and democratization in Thailand -- it evolution and prospects -- see Somkiat Wanthana, "The Difficult Track of the Middle Class", Bangkok Post, May 17, 1997, pp.8-9.  

 

[13]  The debate about whether the dilution of authoritarianism, or democratization, will result from economic development and growth is an ongoing one, and it is as yet unresolved.  One school of thought, as represented by Francis Fukuyama, very optimistically believes -- or at least implies -- that free trade and transnational investment will lead to economic liberalism, which will be followed by political reforms, and eventually, lead to the downfall of authoritarian regimes and the emergence of democratic, liberal orders. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books,1993).