CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION: THE MILITARY AND THE
POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN DOMINATION
The
Diversity and Complexity of Military
Intervention and Authoritarian Regimes
Soldiers in Burma, Indonesia,
and Thailand have participated in politics and related processes in roles that
are "normally" associated with politicians and political
parties. The armed forces, by being
deeply involved in politics and the socio-economic affairs of the state, have
become the power base and political instrument of their respective chiefs and
strongmen-rulers.
Military leaders who have
"captured" the state have established authoritarian orders which they
believe are most congruent with their goals and vision of state-society
order. As David Beetham
found, they imposed an authoritarian domination of the state over society by
removing the freedom (or autonomy) of organized groups to pursue their
interests independently of the state.[1] Typically, power is concentrated in the hands
of the strongman-ruler, trusted subordinates, or the bureaucracy, as noted by
Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Fred Riggs, Juan Linz, Gerald Heeger,
and Beetham.
Importantly, intermediary institutions that mediate state-society
relations are abolished or manipulated and marginalized by the state.
The country studies (Chapters
3-5) show that military intervention occurs in complex, diverse historical,
socio-economic, and political settings, and is triggered by diverse events and
factors, in line with the observations of Christopher Clapham, Edward Feit, T.O.Odetola, and
others. That political orders
established by the military and its chief-turned-ruler are not identical, as
Clapham, Samuel Finer, Harold Crouch, among others, note, has also been shown
in these chapters. Although
"military regimes" are authoritarian, this thesis has shown that the
complexity and degree of authoritarian control exercised by the state varies
from regime to regime. It has also been
found that these regimes vary not only in the degree of authoritarianism
imposed, but also in the extent to which the military is autonomous vis-à-vis
other state actors and elites, and relative to social forces.
I have examined the phenomenon
of military intervention in
Four interrelated questions that
are crucial to understanding military rule have been posed in this thesis. They are, first, why the military decides to
stay on to rule and to reorganize political power; second, how the military decides to
reorganize state power; third, what
kind of military authoritarian pattern emerges when the military chief becomes
the state strongman-ruler; and fourth,
how the differences between, and within regimes, over time, are to be
explained?
Military
Intervention, the Politics of "Staying On", and the Reorganization of
State Power
With respect to the politics of
military intervention, I have found, in agreement with Crouch, that the
phenomenon is related to what he calls "the total situation" of
politics, where the military is a participant in a "free-for-all"
struggle for power, dom-inance, control, and
advantage, within a Huntingtonian
"praetorian" environment.[2] In this struggle, the prize is the state,
and, as Clapham observes, it is almost inevitably won by the military.
I have found, first, that the
military stays on to rule because of its close identification, and self-image
as, the creator, guardian, protector, and savior of
both the nation and the state, and as well, as Samuel Fitch notes, the
redefinition of its role expressed in terms of "national security"
imperatives, broadly defined. The
subsequent extension of military activities into non-military spheres, combined
with the perception of its indispensibility, and/or
perceived threats to the state itself or national unity, strongly compell it to take charge of, and run, the state and the
political arena. In consequence, it is
more closely linked to the "new" state, serving as its power base and
the political instrument of its chief-and-ruler and his regime. Once in charge of the state, the military
gains one more incentive to "stay on": the perquisites of political and economic
power and enhanced status. Effective
intervention and the military's ability to reorganize power is, however,
contingent on its political cohesion, forged by a military strongman-and-unifier.
In Burma, as in Indonesia (examined
in Chapters 3 and 4), soldiers were polit-icized as
part of the respective anti-colonial, nationalist movements. As discussed, after independence, the
newly-installed powerholders -- the AFPFL Thakins and Sukarno, respectively -- depended heavily on
the military to fend off a variety of forces which challenged the state in each
of these. Moreover, military elites in
both countries subscribed to a vision of state-society order which, as Manuel Garreton, Heeger, and Feit note, precludes the political participation of social
forces which, in the military's view, exacerbates social conflicts, leads to
general disorder, and subverts national unity.
As shown, however, military
intervention has not always led to the reorganiz-ation
of political power as desired. In Burma
(as seen in Chapter 3), the Tatmadaw stepped in to "save" the
country from being fragmented due to the split within the rul-ing
AFPFL party in 1958. The intervention
was short-lived primarily because, as discussed, Ne Win was apparently not yet
in undisputed control of the armed forces.
He returned power to civilian rule.
Military intervention in 1962, after Ne Win unified the military, led to
the reorganization of power.
Likewise in Indonesia (examined
in Chapter 4), although the military strongly claimed dominance for itself as a
revolutionary, socio-political force, its early incursions were
ineffectual. It was only in 1959 after Nasution gained control of ABRI (after numerous failed
regional-military rebellions), that ABRI was able to play an effective role in
helping to reorganize the state, but in subordinacy
to Sukarno. In 1965, ironically, it was
the trauma of Gestapu in 1965, endangering
both the state and the military itself, that united the military behind Suharto. It was this
very tight cohesion, never before achieved, which allowed ABRI to assert its
dominance effectively.
In Thailand (Chapter 5), the
phenomenon of military intervention has been, as in Burma and Indonesia,
closely tied with the politics of the state.
The military first participated in politics in 1932 as a political
instrument of the "Promoters," whose goal was to reorganize power
after the overthrow of the absolutist monarchy.
However, due to the frequency of coups -- fifteen successful and failed
coups between 1932 to 1991 -- the
phenomenon is more complex, and even quite confusing. I have classified Thai coups into four
general categories: one, coups that are aimed at re-organizing political
power; two, those arising from problems
with the functioning of the democratic process as being tried by authoritarian
rulers; three, coups arising from a
crisis situation, where the military can claim to have "saved" the
state; and four, those arising from
intra-military friction.[3]
I have found that the Thai case
highlights a situation where military intervent-ion,
in the absence of an authoritarian strongman-unifier, does not lead to the reorgan-ization of power or the state. The military was not unified between the fall
of Thanom and Praphart in
1973 and Krit's death in 1976. After that, Prem, a
de facto military strongman and yet democratically inclined, refused to restore
military author-itarian rule. Thus, despite their importance as
"king-makers" and "spoilers" from 1976 to 1985, the Young
Turks were not successful in restoring authoritarianism or the military to
political dominance.
Secondly, regarding the question
of how the military reorganizes the politics of the state, I have found that
the organizational configuration of the state is restructured by the military
so that political roles and institutions are transformed into bureaucratic
ones. These are then usually placed
under military control, or tutelage. Typically,
the military regime seeks to limit participation by closing or restricting
intermediary institutions and societal associations. This results in high state autonomy vis-à-vis
society, and, correspondingly, the low autonomy of society relative to the
state. However, military rulers -- Ne Win, Suharto,
Thanom and Praphart -- have
also set up political parties (or ruling parties) aimed at controlling, channeling, and limiting political participation, while at
the same time, using them to gain legitimacy (with varying results).[4]
In Burma, Ne Win -- the
undisputed military leader in 1962 -- employed the Tatmadaw to set up a
military-"socialist" authoritarian state, where it served as the sole
constitutive element of the BSPP regime.
All political roles were bureaucratized, and,
as discussed, were monopolized by soldiers.
The political arena and legislative sphere were insulated by the
military from society, and the state was made non-malleable, even by civilian
bureaucratic elements, unlike in Indonesia and Thailand.
In Indonesia, investigated in
Chapter 4, I have found that since both the Guided Democracy and the New Order
state are based on the 1945 Constitution, there is a continuity in the
organizational configuration of the state.
Suharto skillfully
made the constitution work for him. Suharto and ABRI quite effectively depoliticized
and deprived most of society of meaningful access to the state and politics,
thus insulating the state and making it somewhat non-malleable by, and highly
autonomous from, society. However, Suharto and the regime have established a quite effective mechan-ism to respond to the needs, mainly economic, of the
politically subordinated (especially, rural) segments via patrimonial linkages
and networks through village heads.
However, in contrast to the BSPP
regime, Suharto's New Order has allowed for a degree of what Linz terms as "limited pluralism": an ostensibly
"open" political arena with more than one political party
participating in politics. Also, in
recent years, some Islamic elements have been given some access to politics as
part of Suharto's power-balancing strategy.
Those with economic clout -- ethnic Chinese business elites -- have also
been provided with some access to the state, mainly via patrimonial, informal,
mutually beneficial links with Suharto and other
subordinate power-holders and/or officials, armed and unarmed, in the state's
bureaucracy.
In Thailand, the military's endeavors to reorganize political power in an author-itarian direction were, I have found, constrained by the
institutions of the constitution-al monarchy, which the Promoters and Pibul, the first military strongman, accepted because the
monarchy was (and is) the font of legitimacy, and is held to be by the majority
of Thais as a mystic embodiment of Thai nationhood. There are, therefore, found in Thailand,
three types of regimes: one, a less authoritarian military regime (which I
term, the "Pibul system"); two, a more authoritarian military regime
(the "Sarit system"); and three, the non-military, "Thai-style
democracy" regimes that have existed or operated between coups.
The Thai military, unlike its
counterparts in Burma and Indonesia, has not been able effectively to deny
civilian elites and social forces access to the state, or to effectively
restrict the operation of intermediary institutions and associations for long
periods. However, Sarit
did succeed in establishing a military-authoritarian regime for a time. This he accomplished by associating his
personal authoritarian rule with the populist-paternalistic kingship style of
the Sukothai period, and by elevating the status of
the then young King and Queen, and exploiting their youthful glamor and the history, pomp, and legitimacy associated
with the monarchy (which had been downplayed after 1932). However, by the end of the Thanom-Praphart regime in the early 1970s, the King's
political stature had grown, and he had accumulated de facto power by
"out-lasting" military strongmen, governments, and
constitutions. The monarchy -- an
institution which, although of the state, was also above the state -- became
accordingly more autonomous . It became
quite impossible for the military, or military-backed rulers, to manipulate, as
in the past, the monarchy or the King.
Rather, it was the monarchy which became a pivotal force in Thai
politics.
Military
Strongmen as Rulers, and the Military and Authoritarian Regimes
With reference to the question
of what kind of military authoritarian pattern emerges after the military
captures the state, I have found that in military-authoritarian regimes, as
observed by Heeger, the armed forces as a whole do
not rule. It is the military
strongman-ruler who exercises significant power, while the military plays a
pivotal role as the subordinated political instrument and primary power base of
the regime and the ruling strongman. The
military is therefore dominant relative to societal forces, but its dominance
vis-à-vis other state elements will vary -- being contingent on the vision,
goals, and strategies of ruling strongmen to consolidate first, their personal
control of the state, and second, the state's control over society.
The relationship between the
military chief-turned-ruler and the military, in terms of their respective
autonomy, or dominance vis-à-vis the other, has been found to be a dynamic
one. The military-authoritarian regimes
investigated -- being basically systems where the military leader-rulers are
personally dominant -- share many features in common with the system of
personal rule, as theorized by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg,
among others. As discussed in Chapter 2,
this system is characterized by a political arena where rules and institutions
do not effectively govern the conduct of rulers and other political actors. There obtains a situation where the system is
structured by the politicians themselves, in particular by the person who
wields the most power -- the personal ruler or, in "military"
regimes, the strongman-ruler. In this
respect, I have found that Burma's Ne Win, roughly fits the type of personal
ruler classified by the authors as a tyrannical ruler. Thai strongmen-rulers, Pibul
and Sarit, and Suharto in
Indonesia, are, I have found, less tyrannical, and fall broadly into the
categories of princely and autocratic rulers.[5] The type of ruler, his mind-set, style, and
vision, in turn, determines the contours and complexion of the system that
emerges as a result of the ruler's endeavours.
I have found that the
relationship between the strongman-ruler and the military is contingent on the
personal skills of the military ruler in playing intra-military politics -- in
rewarding, manipulating, purging, and shuffling subordinates, thus diminishing
their ability to mount any challenge to the ruler. It is also shaped, as I have maintained, by
the strongman's agenda, his vision, goals, and style, and hence it varies from
regime to regime. In this regard, in
Burma, the relationship has, as found in Chapter 3, been mutually close, with
the military remaining highly dominant, despite the "civilianization"
of the ruler, Ne Win. In Indonesia
(Chapter 4), the relationship has changed.
Suharto has, as a ruler of the whole nation,
counter-balanced the military's dominance with Golkar
politicians, government "legislators" and
"representatives", presidential aides, favored
ministers, valued and useful techno-bureaucrats, business associates, and so
on. In Thailand, typically, the military
returns to the barracks after its chief captures the state, although some top
brass are given cabinet portfolios, and some are rewarded with position in
state, or military-owned, enterprises.[6]
Regarding the re-shaping of the
state by strongman-rulers, in Burma, Ne Win drastically reorganized power in a
highly authoritarian direction and manner -- and attempted to reorganize the
economy as well. His power base was the Tatmadaw,
and he relied on it alone to maintain his grip on power. The BSPP party-state structures set up in
1974 were dominated by the military which, in turn, enabled it to exclude all
non-military elements, even those within the state's bureaucracy, from
meaningful roles in the affairs of the state and politics. It has been found that the military
penetrated almost completely the administrative, political, and economic
("socialist") bureaucracy of the state at all levels, and also
controlled the legislative-representative sphere.
In comparison, Suharto has, as mentioned, been a much more astute,
sophisticated soldier-politician. He did
not abolish the constitutional framework of the "old order", but
reorganized power by manipulating its provisions. Primarily reliant on the military, Suharto was careful to entrench the military in politics
through "constitutional" and "institutional" channels,
interpreting and using the provisions of the 1945 Constitution. The vehicle he chose was Golkar,
the government's large, civilian- and military-based,
bureaucratically-organized party. Golkar enabled Suharto and the
military to manipulate the political arena and control the legislative sphere,
ensuring a quite high degree of dominance for ABRI, relative to other
constitutive elements of the state and also to other social-political groups
and segments. Golkar's
dominating presence in the political arena and the legislature, coupled with
the "floating mass" concept that disallowed politicking in the rural
areas, has resulted in the depoliticization of a
large part of society. I have found that
Golkar is not a mass party, but rather an election
vehicle for the government.
The examination of the New Order
state shows that Suharto has made effect-ive use of Golkar. Its electoral "successes" have
given the New Order regime a semblance of legitimacy and a
"civilian", more inclusive, and "democratic" mantle. Over time, it has also established Suharto's
stature as a somewhat inclusive, broad-based, "father of the nation"
type of ruler, and has ensured his many terms as Presid-ent.[7] In recent years, as the regime
"matured" and Suharto's position solidified, Golkar
officials, along with favored ministers, bureaucrats,
and technocrats have been used to counter-balance the military's
dominance. This development underlines
the shift in the hitherto very close relationship between Suharto
and his military power base.
I have found that ABRI's dominance in the bureaucratic sphere, compared to
the early years of the regime, has been somewhat diluted. However, it still maintains a territorial,
quasi-administrative framework, and in this aspect, the military is still more
or less involved, especially, at the local level in administrative affairs. Military personnel also control, or are
present in, the many state agencies, especially those dealing with security and
commerce.[8]
In Thailand, the inquiry in
Chapter 5 shows that parliamentary politics and institutions, along with the
constitutional monarchy, co-existed with authoritarian rule. This contradiction between authoritarianism
and the parliamentary form and practices was resolved for a time by Sarit who, like Ne Win, abolished parliament and related
processes in 1958. His co-successors, Thanom and Praphart, carried on
with the "Sarit system" until it was
challenged and toppled (in 1973) by new forces that emerged as a result of deep
socio-economic changes, in a environment of regional uncertainty and
tension.
With reference to the relationship
between the strongman-ruler and the mil-itary, the
inquiry shows, that successful strongmen-rulers -- Ne Win, Suharto,
Pibul, Sarit (and
co-successors) -- dominated the military, and ensured its subordinant
status by a system of purges, surveillance, transfers, promotions, appointments
to high or lucrative positions, ample budgets, funds for projects, and
opportunities to make money or engage in business and commerce. Importantly, they juggled and shuffled
military positions, and manipulated and exploited personal rivalries and
interpersonal tensions, even among and between close aides and loyalists. However, soldiers in Thailand have, as
mentioned in Chapter 5, been more professional and less involved in everyday
political or administrative roles than those in Burma and Indonesia.
In the Thai case, the frequency
of coups and coup attempts seems to contradict the subordinant
status of the military to its chief-and-ruler.
However, I have found that the soldiers have been, for the most part, loyal
to ruling strongmen. There have,
nonetheless, been occasions when the military has decided not to defend
unpopular ruling strongmen being challenged by other forces, especially those
who have lost royal support, such as Thanom and Praphart (and their designated successor, Narong).
Of the Thai strongmen, only Prem has been actually challenged by segments of the
military: the attempted Young Turks coups in 1981 and 1985. This was because Prem
was a democratically-oriented strongman who opposed military intervention and
who was engaged in restoring parliamentary politics.[9]
State
Autonomy, Military-Authoritarianism, Differing State-Society Configurations
Concerning the differences
between military-authoritarian regimes and within regimes over time, I have
found that the variations stem largely from the differing patterns of autonomy
relations. They differ in terms of the
extent to which the state dominates and is autonomous from society, and/or is
unresponsive to society. They also vary
in the pattern of autonomy relations between, in particular, the
strongman-ruler and the military, and the military and other non-military
elements of the state. The differing
patterns shape not only variances between regimes, but also within regimes over
time. Finally, owing to the different
patterns of autonomy relations established, long-term regime outcomes also
vary.
The subject of state autonomy
lies at the heart of state-society relations, in particular, relationships
between and among elements, classes, groups, and so on, that co-exist and
interact politically within a "nation-state". It is about who dominates, and to what
degree; how dominance is imposed; and what structures regulate, constrain, or
facilitate dominance. Likewise, it also
concerns the questions of who exercises greater or lesser degrees of relative
autonomy, how autonomy is obtained, and what the structures are that limit or
reinforce autonomy of various actors, groups, institutions, and so forth. Further, it is, as Theda
Skocpol implies, linked also to resp-onsiveness
-- the responsiveness of the state to societal demands, and vice-versa.
Skocpol,
Finer, and Eric Nordlinger argue that state autonomy
(or obversely, society's autonomy from, or relative
to the state) is contingent on two factors.
These are, first, factors internal to the state (i.e., the will of state
actors or elites to assert autonomy and the resources available to them in this
regard), and second, the avail-ability and autonomy of intermediary
institutions and channels to societal forces.
The second factor is in turn
dependent, as Skocpol maintains, on how the state is
configured organizationally. In
military-authoritarian states and regimes, where power is concentrated in the
hands of the strongman-ruler and the military, and where intermediary channels
are subdued or monopolized by state elements (in particular, by the military),
the state will be more or less, and in varying degrees, rather highly
autonomous. The military-authoritarian state is one that is, in Nordlinger's words, non-malleable by, and highly insulated
from society.
The country studies (Chapters
3-5) show that the pattern of authoritarian domination and autonomy relations
established in each case is largely contingent on the political sophistication
of the ruling strongman: particularly, his appreciation of the complexity of
politics and the recognition of the need to win wider support, beyond his
primary military power base. As found,
in
In some cases, owing to
considerations of legitimacy, ruling strongmen have clearly been constrained by
their respect for, and the utility of certain constitutional forms, and have
worked within such structures. In
The above factors -- the
political sophistication of ruling strongmen and the constraints on him -- resulted in the construction by military
rulers of quite convinc-ing, stable institutions that
bequeathed an aura of legitimacy and constitutionalism to the military-based
regimes. This enabled them to win over
important non-military elite elements, both within the state sphere and in
society. Thus they accomplished several
important goals: one, they created an elite consensus (and wider public
support); two, they retained the
military as their political instrument and pivotal power base, and three, they
counter-balanced its dominance at the same time.
There are however ruling
strongmen who are of rudimentary persuasion and who are not constrained by
considerations of legitimacy or pre-existing constitutional forms. As the investigation of military intervention
and rule in
However, like the "Sarit System" in the time of Thanom
and Praphart, Ne Win's military-dominant regime was,
as found, incapable of responding constructively or positively to problems, or
to challenges that emerged over time.
The reliance on repression, combined with its inability to win
legitimacy through performance, result-ed in the quite sudden collapse of the
regime when confronted with a country-wide, "people's power" uprising
in 1988. However, brute military force
again won the day, and SLORC -- the current regime -- is, like Ne Win's, a
straight-forward military regime. But with Ne Win declining physically, the
junta's (and the country's) future is uncertain.[10]
The future also seems more and
more uncertain in
Concerning the pattern of
authoritarian rule in
Over time, as shown, as the
monarch has gained greater stature and accumulat-ed a
reservoir of de facto power, the King by the 1970s was able to assert his auton-omy and to use
his stature in ways not always to the military's liking. For instance in 1981 the Young Turks captured
The substantive change in the
nature of political power and its organization toward a more open, democratic
direction, initiated by Prem -- on behalf of, and
with the support of the King -- illuminates what may be a phenomenon of some
theoretical import. Despite the 1991
military coup, Suchinda failed, due to widespread
demonstration against him and ensuing violence in 1992, to keep power after
having himself named Prime Minister following an election . Also, the King's role was decisive in getting
Suchinda to step down. This strongly suggests that political power
in
The question of whether
political power in Burma and Indonesia will undergo a similar change as their
economies develop, become more complex, more closely integrated with the transnational regime of trade and investment, and a large
"middle class" emerges, is beyond the scope of this thesis.[13] What can be safely said is that the process
of "democratization" in
Variations
in Military Authoritarian Regimes:
The military-authoritarian
states in
As mentioned in Chapters 1 and
2, the dimensions to be compared are, one, the extent to which the military
penetrates the bureaucracy; two, the
existence and auton-omy of elected legislative bodies
and political parties; and three, the
degree to which the state responds to societal demands.
Below, these spectrums
illustrate some salient differences and variations found over time in the
military-authoritarian regimes in
SPECTRUM 1
The Extent of Military Penetration
of the Civil Bureaucracy.
(x.1) = Extensive Military
Penetration of the Civil Bureaucracy
(x.2) = No Military Penetration of the
Civil Bureaucracy
(x.1) (x.2)
___A_____B_______C_________________________________________D____
(A)
(B)
(C)
INDONESIA, 1971-current.
(D)
Spectrum 1, which illustrates
the degree of military penetration of the civilian administrative bureaucracy,
also indicates the extent to which the state is insulated by the military. In
In
SPECTRUM
2
The Degree to which
the Legislature and Political Parties
are Autonomous
in Military-Authoritarian Regimes.
(x.1) = No Legislature; No autonomy
(x.2) = Parties and an Election, but
Results ignored and Legislature does not Sit
(x.3) = Rubber Stamp Legislature; the Government's
Party Dominates
(x.4) = Democratically Functioning
Legislature following Competitive Elections
(x.1) (x.2) (x.3)
(x.4)
___A___B__________C__________________________F_E______D______
(A)
BURMA, 1962-74; THAILAND, 1958-73.
(B)
(C)
BURMA, 1974-88;
(D)
(E)
(F)
Spectrum 2, which illustrates
the extent to which the legislature and political parties -- intermediary
institutions and channels -- are autonomous in military-authoritarian regimes,
also indicates the degree the state becomes (or is made) non-malleable by
society. The legislature and political
parties in
In
SPECTRUM 3
The Autonomy of the
State vis-à-vis Society in terms of
Responsiveness to
Society (Societal Forces and Demands).
(x.1) = High State Autonomy, Not
Responsive
(x.2) = Relatively High State
Autonomy, Relatively Responsive
(x.3) = The State is Relatively
Autonomous, and Quite Responsive
(x.1)
(x.2) (x.3)
____A__________________B__________________________________C_____
(A)
Spectrum 3 looks at the
response-autonomy nexus of state-society interaction. The state in
Likewise, the state in
The state in
Comparing
Military-Authoritarian Regimes: Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand
Examined together, the above spectrums
illustrate variations between military-authoritarian regimes in Burma,
Indonesia, and Thailand, with respect to two import-ant dimensions relating to
the nature of the relationship of the state to society, and vice versa. They are (1) the exclusion/inclusion of
societal forces vis-à-vis the political process; and (2) the political distance between the
state and society, which throws light on the degree of "fit" in the
relationship between society and the state.
In the context of the above dimensions, we can classify Burma , in the
period covered by this investigation, as the most authoritarian, Thailand as
the least authoritarian, or even semi-democratic, with Indonesia in the middle,
but somewhat closer to Burma than to Thailand.
A brief elaboration of the dimensions follows.
Concerning the first dimension,
spectrums 1 and 2 show the extent to which society was/is excluded from access
to the state and politics (or conversely, the degree the state was/is insulated
from, and non-malleable by, society). By
examining the degree to which the military penetrates and controls the
bureaucracy, and the extent to which legislatures and parties are autonomous or
not, we can infer that society in
Concerning the political
distance between the state and society, which throws light on the nature of
state-society relation and interactions, spectrums 2 and 3, exam-ined together, show the degree to which the state is
autonomous from and non-malleable by society.
Wide political distance -- as expressed by the non-autonomy of
legislatures and political parties, together with the unresponsiveness of the
state -- also implies a lack of "fit", or serious dysfunction in
political interactions between society and the state. It is clear that in
In investigating the phenomenon
of the military in politics in
The militaries in these
countries view themselves as extraordinary entities upon which the very existence
and continuity of the country and nation is crucially depend-ent, and they believe that they are "saving" the
country and nation when they inter-vene. Once the country is "saved", the
militaries in these countries tend to stay on because they see themselves as
the only force capable of imposing unity, and creating an orderly, disciplined
society. The militaries in these three
countries have, at times, therefore engaged in the reorganization of the
political process and the state, and have established new orders of
state-society relations, with soldiers figuring prominently. Over time, they become -- as the power base
and political instrument of the chief-turned-ruler -- the "core" of the state, and, in
the process, also become privileged ruling sub-stratums that dominate, in
varying degrees, the political lives of their states.
I have found, in examining the
phenomenon of military rule, that an extraordin-ary
military leader -- usually its chief, or the head of the most dominant,
cohesive faction -- plays a vital role in ensuring that intervention is
effective, and also that the re-shaping of the state structures and the state's
relationship with society -- according to the military's vision -- are both
successful. A strongman-ruler is the most
crucial element: he is the one who transforms the military into an effective,
politically cohesive instrument and stable political power base of the new
order.
Importantly, the military
strongman, being the chief architect of the new order, is the one upon whose
shoulders rest the durability, stability, even the very existence of the
military-backed state. Most crucially,
he is responsible for ensuring the military's privileged and prominent place in
the new order -- which in turn is vital, in many ways, to the ruler's control
of the state, and the state's control over social forces, classes, and segments
in the societal sphere.
I have found that the durability
and stability of military-authoritarian regimes in
However, since nothing lasts
forever -- not even "strong" military-authoritarian regimes and their
chief architects -- and since changes take place in socio-economic conditions,
in relationships, in the environment (especially external), and, importantly in
the age of the strongman-ruler, there comes a time when these regimes have to
con-front problems arising from change, and often, the crisis of decline and/or
renewal.
The military in
To conclude, this thesis has
attempted to fill a gap in the literature about what happens when the military
intervenes to oust the leaders of a state, and then decides to retain power and
to reorganize the political system into a military-authoritarian state. For two of the states investigated, the
military has held power, although not identical power, for more than three
decades, and for the third, fifteen coups have brought the military regularly
to power, where it has ruled for varying length of time.
This investigation has shown
that there are a number of overlapping political motives and justifications for
intervening that show considerable similarity in the cases studied, and,
second, that the question of whether or not the military stays on to rule seems
to depend on the presence of an effective military strongman, backed by a
unified military.
It is clear that the military
will not be unified unless a strongman emerges to impose his will on the
organization. If the military strongman
cannot unify the military and keep it unified, his position will be
jeopardized. This may lead to coups or
the military's temporary retreat to the barracks. The military strongman's position will also
be complicated and weakened when he has to depend upon the sanction of an
important legitimizing force, such as a highly
esteemed constitutional monarch.
This investigation has also
shown that the type of military-authoritarian system that results when the
military reorganizes the state can vary considerably. The three cases studied, all from the same
region geographically, illustrate the diversity. In one case, there exists a nearly pure
praetorian state where the military is involved in, and controls virtually all
aspects of, state activity, and the state is highly autonomous from society. In the second case, there is an authoritarian
state where power below the top is shared among military and civilian elites,
and, while the state is highly autonomous, it is also somewhat responsive to
society. In the third case, a state with
a tradition of military intervention, and military-authoritarian rule
co-existing with a stable civilian bureaucracy, appears to be undergoing a
transition to democratic civilian rule, operating in the face of a military
that is politically interested, but currently reluctant to intervene without
the sanction of the monarch.
Further, it has become clear
from the inquiry, that whether the state is highly autonomous from society or
not, the state has not been sufficiently insulated or autonomous from its own
political elites, and corruption and abuse of power have been found to be
excessive in all three cases investigated.
Only in the nearly pure praetorian state, however, could the system be
termed a "kleptocracy".
Finally, it has become apparent
from this thesis research that, although the global democratizing
trend is hopeful, it is not so easy to get the politicized
military to go back to the barracks to stay.
------------------------------------ E N D N O T E S -----------------------------------------
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION: THE MILITARY AND THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN
DOMINATION
[1] David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillian, 1991), pp.228-236.
[2] To avoid the impression that "praetorian" conditions are to be attributed to, or blamed wholly on, society or social groups (and their "low", or "uncivil" political culture), I believe that elites, leaders, and elements within the state must also share the blame. It is the state, state elites, and political-social elites who, in their search for support (against rivals), frequently manipulate or whip up "mob-like" crowds, or encourage "praetorian" participation of social groups and segments. Thus, it would not be far too wrong to say that elites and leaders, rulers, and state managers, often reinforce "praetorian" conditions and politics, in order to manipulate and exploit such conditions.
[3] As discussed in Chapter 5, notable in the first category are the 1932 coup by the Promoters, and 1957 and 1958 coups by Sarit. Examples of the second category are the 1958 coup by Sarit against his own government, and a similar coup in 1971 by Thanom and Praphart. The clearest example in the third category is the 1976 coup by Sangad which ended a period of open, quite turburlent, politics (1973-1976), in a tense international (regional) climate. And in the fourth category are the Navy's 1951 "Manhattan" coup, the 1977 Chalard's coup attempt against Thanin (or rather, the Sangad's Navy clique), and the attempted coups in 1981 and 1985 by the Young Turks against Prem, involving con-flicts between military factions and figures: Arthit, Kriangsak, the Suchinda's group, Serm na Nakorn, Sant, and so on.
[4] Ne Win established the BSPP party in 1974, Suharto set up Golkar in 1970-71, and Thanom and Praphart established the UTPP (United Thai People's Party) in 1969 (which was abolished, together with other parties and the 1969 Constitution, when the duo staged a coup against their own regime in 1971). Ne Win's BSPP did not manage to win legitimacy for the regime, although it was effective in "sterilizing" politics. Only Suharto has managed to use his and the regime's party, Golkar, to more or less gain a legitimate mantle.
[5] Robert H. Jackson and C.G. Rosberg, Jr., Personal Rule in
Black
[6] In fact, except during
coups, the military is virtually invisible. Even during coups, troops and tanks
are visible only in
[7] As discussed, Golkar's dominance in politics also served to marginalize the two regime-sanctioned, non-governmental political parties and "opposition" politicians and legislators. This also made it easier for the military and Suharto to neutralize, if not co-opt, individual politicians via intra-legislative polit-ics of making deals and bargains.
[8] The Defence Ministry complex is also still very powerful, although not as powerful as during Murdani's tenure as ABRI commander and later, Defence Minister.
[9] One could say that Prem's democratic inclination was/is contingent on the political orientation of the King. Had the King been authoritarian, Prem -- a staunch royalist -- would likely have attempted to become a Sarit-like ruler, or alternatively, served as a "front man" to facilitate the dictatorial exercise of royal power. And he would have been successful too, given his political skills. Prem's actions and success as a "democratizing" military strongman, raises the question of whether other really "strong" strongmen could, likewise, have reorganized power and the state in a democratic direction. It is quite probable that, had they been democratically inclined, Sarit, Suharto, even Ne Win, could have carried out what Prem has achieved.
[10] According to knowledgable sources (and a person close to several of Ne Win's children), Ne Win is up to now the "cement" that holds rival military factions and figures together, and is still "calling the shots". It is reported that Ne Win has designated Maung Aye as SLORC's chairman, replacing Than Shwe. Khin Nyunt will remain as the pivotal No.2 man. However, relations between Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt are as inamicable as ever, despite the resolution, for now, of the tension between the two factions decreed by Ne Win.
[11] However, as observed, the King must strike a delicate balance between upholding the image of a monarch who reigns, but does not rule, and exercising the reservior of de-facto powers he has over time accumulated. He cannot "touch politics" too often, nor remain aloof in severe conflict situations as dur-ing the 1973 "October revolution", and the "Bloody May" incident in 1992. Also, the King is not always able to prevent coups or show disapproval of every unconstitutional act, whether they come from the military or popular forces and civilian power-holders. The King must be very careful in exerc-ising power, and must be, or be seen to be, effective. Any failure would do irrepairable harm to the awed regard by the peasant majority, especially, of the monarch/monarchy as the possessor of the highest power in the land -- as expressed by the peasants' term for the monarch, "Chao Yoo Hua" (literally, "The Lord Who Stamps On, or Stands Atop, Every Head", or in rough translation "the Lord Who Exercises Power and Rules Over All"). The present monarch, King Bumipol Adulyadej, has proven to be very able and astute in this regard.
[12] Some Thai and Third World
"bourgeoisie" elements are conservative and authoritarian in that
they fear disorder as much as any autocratic, authoritarian leader or ruler,
and are moreover in position to get whatever they need or wish from
collaboration with authoritarian regimes and dictators (of almost all stripes).
Some are very "traditional", even "anti-modern", having benefitted enormously from the hierarchical,
"traditional" social-cultural-ideological and other inegalitarian arrangements still firmly in place. Some are
"modern" and cosmopolitan, so much so that they have very little
concern for "national" societies, and view them merely as small
segments of a regional-global marketplace and/or business arena. But, of
course, there are always some "bourgeoisie" elements that think and
act like their historical (and contemporary) Western counterparts, and are
willing to fight for democracy, civil liberties, human rights, equitable
development, and so on. For a brief, but most insightful, analysis of the
"middle class" and democratization in
[13] The debate about whether the dilution of authoritarianism, or democratization, will result from economic development and growth is an ongoing one, and it is as yet unresolved. One school of thought, as represented by Francis Fukuyama, very optimistically believes -- or at least implies -- that free trade and transnational investment will lead to economic liberalism, which will be followed by political reforms, and eventually, lead to the downfall of authoritarian regimes and the emergence of democratic, liberal orders. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books,1993).