13. Internally Displaced People and Forced Relocation
"The requisite imperative of housing for personal security, privacy, health, safety, protection from the elements and many other attributes of a shared humanity, has led the international community to recognize adequate housing as a basic and fundamental human right."
(Source: Report No. 1, Housing Rights Legislation, Review of International and National Legal Instruments, UN Housing Rights Program, UN-HABITAT and OHCHR, 2002)
13.1 Background
Large scale internal displacement and forced relocation within Burma continued throughout 2004. While systematic estimates for the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Burma are not available, government and non-government organizations monitoring the IDP situation within Burma estimate a current IDP population of some one million persons (source: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2004, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 28 February 2005). The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) has compiled findings from field surveys conducted in the eastern border areas, namely Karen State, Karenni State, Mon State, eastern Pegu Division, southern Shan State and Tenasserim Division, in the first half of 2004. In this report, Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC estimates the IDP population of these areas to be 526,000. The majority of this population is believed to be in settlements located in ceasefire areas administered by ethnic ceasefire groups. The remaining IDP population is believed to be either in hiding in contested "free fire" zones or residing in government designated relocation sites. 2004 estimates for the eastern border areas are significantly lower than estimates in 2002, which placed the IDP population of this area at 633,000. This decrease has been attributed to several factors, including sustainable return or resettlement, forced migration into urban and rural communities, cross border migration into Thailand and methodological differences in data collection. Despite this decrease, as many as 157,000 persons are estimated to have become internally displaced within the eastern border areas since 2002. (Source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004)
A table representing the number of IDPs in each state and division of eastern Burma together with a breakdown according to location for both 2002 and 2004 has been compiled by TBBC.
|
States and Divisions |
IDPs in Hiding or Temporary Settlements |
IDPs in Relocation Sites (& no. of Sites) |
Total IDPs |
||||
|
2002 |
2004 |
2002 |
2004 |
2002 |
2004 |
||
|
Free fire areas |
cease fire areas |
||||||
|
Southern Shan |
75,000 |
9,300 |
18,500 |
200,000 (40) |
21,800 (37) |
275,000 |
216,000 |
|
Karenni |
50,000 |
7,000 |
75,000 |
7,000 (9) |
6,400 (14) |
57,000 |
88,4000 |
|
Eastern Pegu |
10,500 |
13,500 |
0 |
18,000 (18) |
4,500 (25) |
28,500 |
18,000 |
|
Karen |
75,500 |
46,900 |
75,000 |
54,000 (42) |
13,400 (37) |
129,500 |
135,300 |
|
Mon |
50,500 |
2,300 |
25,000 |
28,000 (28) |
3,800 (16) |
78,500 |
31,100 |
|
Tenasserim |
6,500 |
5,000 |
5,000 |
58,000 (39) |
27,100 (38) |
64,500 |
37,100 |
|
Total |
268,000 |
84,000 |
365,000 |
365,000 (176) |
77,000 (167) |
633,000 |
526,000 |
(Source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004)
The large number of civilians displaced in the last two years in the eastern border areas can be attributed to the forced relocation campaigns, harassment and human rights violations perpetrated against the ethnic minority populations of these areas by members of the Tatmadaw (armed forces) or other state sponsored individuals or groups. Since gaining independence in 1948, successive military regimes have engaged in numerous armed struggles with ethnic minority nationalities who have been fighting for self determination. Since 1989, there have been 17 ceasefire agreements reached between Burma's successive military regimes and ethnic minority groups. Most recently, in the beginning of 2004 the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and the Karen National Union (KNU) reached a verbal ceasefire agreement. However, despite this agreement, there were reports of armed conflict between SPDC troops and the KNU in early 2004 and again at the end of the rainy session in September 2004 (source: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2004, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 28 February 2005). State sponsored attacks on villagers in Karen State and eastern Pegu Division during the last six months of 2004 have reportedly resulted in 8,000 IDPs and the destruction of almost 20,000 baskets of paddy. Human rights abuses, including forced labor for the construction of new military camps and to upgrade roads reaching from Toungoo and Kyaukgyi to the Thailand border have also been reported (source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July – December 2004). Such reports lend credence to claims by non-government organizations, such as the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), that ceasefire agreements have done little to address the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Tatmadaw against ethnic minority peoples (source: Thaton District: Continued Consolidation of SPDC and DKBA Control through the use of Forced Labour, Extortion and Movement Restrictions, KHRG, 21 February 2005). Consequently, despite the signing of ceasefire agreements between the Burmese military junta and ethnic minority groups, forced relocation and human rights abuses have continued in many ceasefire areas throughout Burma's ethnic minority areas. Such practices have contributed to the internal displacement of villagers within these areas throughout 2004.
In 2004 the Burmese military continued to forcibly evict and relocate villages in areas where active armed conflict persisted. The SPDC's policy of forcibly relocating ethnic minority villages has resulted in the destruction of approximately 3,000 villages and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of villagers in as many as 200 relocation sites. There are numerous reports of forced labor, extrajudicial executions, rape and torture of villagers in relocation sites (source: World Report, Human Rights Watch, 13 January 2005). Villagers forcibly relocated to these sites often flee to settlements located in ceasefire zones or hide in the jungle in contested "free fire" zones in an attempt to escape these human rights violations. This trend is typified by Daw Tama Gyi and Htee Poh Kloh relocation sites in Demawso Township, Karenni State, which were established in 1996. Both sites were abandoned by 2000 and have since been repopulated again in 2004 with newly relocated villagers (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
In areas with decreased instances of forced relocation, such as Shan State and Tenasserim Division, the number of displaced persons in 2004 remained high. The high number of displaced persons in these areas is attributed to the level of harassment and human rights abuses perpetrated by the Tatmadaw and other state sponsored agents against the ethic minority populations. TBBC's 2004 study records the instances of human rights abuses suffered by IDPs as indicators of the vulnerability of IDP populations in eastern Burma. TBBC found that IDPs were subjected to high levels of human rights abuses. These human rights abuses included, forced labor (57%), extortion in the form of arbitrary taxation (52%), travel restrictions (23%), food destruction (17%), arbitrary arrest (14%) and eviction (12%). Human rights abuses are therefore identified as a major cause of internal displacement within the eastern border areas (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
The UN defines forced eviction as the “permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to appropriate forms of legal or other protections" (source: "The right to adequate housing (Art. 11.1): forced evictions," CESCR General Comment 7, Paragraph 3, Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 1997). In the UN resolution regarding Forced Evictions, the UN states that “the practice of forced eviction constitutes a gross violation of human rights, in particular the right to adequate housing” (source: Paragraphs 1 and 3, UN Human Rights Commission Resolution 1993/77: Forced Evictions). The right to adequate housing is enshrined in Article 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The right to adequate housing is also provided for in Principle 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959). Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 1989), the obligation of state parties to provide assistance to families and children, particularly in regards to housing, is set out in Article 27(3). Internally displaced children are particularly vulnerable and make up the greater proportion of the internally displaced population in Burma. Child mortality rates and malnutrition rates are believed to be double the national baseline rate (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004). Burma is a signatory to the CRC. And yet, in June 2004 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed their concern at the high number of children and their families who were internally displaced in Burma due to armed insurgencies taking place in the country. In its concluding observations, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that the SPDC "Strengthen its efforts to provide adequate assistance to internally displaced children, including access to food, education and health and to support the return home of internally displaced populations and their re-integration into their communities" (source: "Concluding Observations: Myanmar," Thirty-sixth Session of the UN Committee of the Rights of the Child, UN Committee of the Rights of the Child, June 2004).
The obligation of state parties to eliminate discrimination against woman, particularly in rural areas, and ensure that they enjoy adequate living conditions, including adequate housing, is provided for in Article 14(2)(h) of the UN Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Woman (CEDAW, 1981). Females comprise more than half of the IDP population in Burma. While there are significantly more female children and working aged woman in the IDP population, females constitute the minority in the older age brackets (48% of the 45 – 59 years and 47% of the over 60 years). The higher rate of woman in the working age group is attributed to several factors. These factors include, that men are more at risk of being conscripted into the army and into the armed resistance, that men migrate in search of income for their families and that they flee to avoid forced labor and porter duty. The lower rate of woman in the older age bracket illustrates a shorter life expectancy. This lower life expectancy of women in the IDP population is attributed to the impacts of conflict, malnutrition and poor general health (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004). Burma is a signatory to CEDAW. And yet, it is evident from demographic indicators concerning IDP women that they are not afforded an adequate standard of living and that they lack adequate housing. Adequate housing is recognized by the international community as a "requisite imperative...for personal security, privacy, health, safety, protection from the elements and many other attributes of a shared humanity" (source: Report No. 1, Housing Rights Legislation, Review of International and National Legal Instruments, UN Housing Rights Program, UN-HABITAT and OHCHR, 2002).
In April 2004, the UN Commission on Human Rights expressed grave concern at the continued practice of forced relocation, destruction of livelihood and confiscation of land and other human rights abuses perpetrated by the Burmese military, particularly against ethnic minority nationalities. The UN Commission on Human Rights strongly urged the Burmese government to “end the systematic enforced displacement … (and) provide the necessary protection and assistance to internally displaced persons... (for) voluntary, safe and dignified return monitored by appropriate international agencies" (source: sited in Six-Month Report, TBBC, January – July 2004).
13.2 Causes and Situations of Displacement in Burma
There are several factors which cause people in Burma to flee their homes in search of safer environments. Internal displacement and forced relocation in Burma is induced by armed conflict, government sanctioned counter insurgency efforts, such as the “four cuts” campaign, development projects and scarcity of resources.
The Burmese government's "four cuts" campaign has resulted in the eviction and relocation of thousands of villagers in ethnic border areas. The “four cuts” campaign is a counter insurgency strategy targeting the civilian population and designed to undermine the opposition groups’ access to four main supplies; food, funds, information and recruits. The SPDC has divided ethnic minority areas into three types of areas: "black areas" are those that are ostensibly under the control of opposition groups, "brown areas" are areas under contested administration and "white areas" are those under SPDC control. In an attempt to gain domination of opposition controlled "black areas", the Tatmadaw has long implemented the “four cuts” strategy, which has resulted in the forcible relocation of hundreds of thousands of villagers to SPDC controlled relocation sites.
In border areas, which the SPDC has designated "brown areas", systematic forced relocation programs have been carried out. Villagers who are suspected of supporting opposition groups are detained, tortured, and sometimes executed. The Tatmadaw and other state sponsored agents systematically extort and pillage villagers’ crops, food supplies, livestock, cash and valuables. Villages suspected of supporting opposition groups are ordered to relocate. When this occurs, villagers rarely receive adequate notice and are therefore only able to take with them what they can carry. Villagers are not compensated for their loss of property or live stock and conditions within the relocation sites are extremely harsh. Villagers are not provided with either housing or food supplies upon arrival at relocation sites and must construct their own shelters from whatever building materials they can find in the surrounding area. Once an area has been cleared of villagers, it is designated a "free fire" area. Villages, fields and paddy barns in "free fire" areas are often pillaged, dismantled and/or burnt. Anyone found in the area after a relocation order has transpired is assumed to be a rebel supporter and shot on site.
In 2004, conflict induced displacement was most pronounced along the Karen – Karenni State border. In an attempt to "secure" this border area, villagers near the Mawchi road in southern Karenni State were ordered to move to relocation sites on the west bank of the Salween River. Ten SPDC battalions were deployed to the area to enforce the order. These battalions attacked villages that disobeyed the order. It is estimated that 5,000 villagers along the Karen – Karenni border fled from their homes in the first six months of 2004 as a result of this relocation operation. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, January – June 2004).
Displacement resulting from development projects in ethnic border areas has increased in recent years and remained a major cause of displacement in 2004. In May 1989 the State Law and Restoration Council (SLORC) initiated the Border Area Development (BAD) program. In November 2003 the Prime Ministers of Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia signed the Pagan Declaration which established an Economic Cooperation Strategy (ECS). Under the ECS, infrastructure and economic projects in Burma's border areas would be funded by grants and loans from Thailand. In turn, focus on border area development projects has contributed to the displacement of villages in these areas. The BAD program consists largely of infrastructure projects, including not only roads and bridges but also the controversial Salween dams and the Yadana and Shwe gas pipeline projects. Salween Watch has estimated that at least 2,000 households near the Tasang Dam site in Shan State were forcibly relocated in 2003 alone (source: "The Salween Under Threat," Salween Watch, September 2004).
In July 2004, drilling of the Shwe offshore gas field began in the Bay of Bengal, off the western coast of Burma. The Shwe Project Consortium consists of both South Korean and Indian entities and the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), which is owned by the Burmese military and which is responsible for coordinating the development of the joint venture within Burma. While the exact route of the gas pipeline has not been made publicly available, it is likely that it will affect both Arakan State and Chin States. The Burmese military's use of forced relocation without compensation, forced labor, torture, rape and extra-judicial execution was widely documented by human rights organizations during the construction of the Yadana gas pipeline. An estimated 36,000 people were forcibly relocated without compensation in order to secure the Yadana gas pipeline corridor. Given this trend of development induced displacement, it is feared by human rights organizations, such as EarthRights International, that the Shwe gas pipeline project will also result in the massive forced relocation of villages along the proposed gas corridor route through Arakan State and Chin State (source: Another Yadana: The Shwe Natural Gas Pipeline Project (Burma-Bangladesh-India), ERI, 27 August 2004).
Many human rights organizations have highlighted a correlation between the presence of the Burmese military and an increase in human rights abuses, including land confiscation, forced labor, excessive taxes and fees, destruction of property and looting. SPDC soldiers commonly confiscate land from villagers in order to establish new military bases in an area. These bases are not only constructed with the use of forced labor but SPDC soldiers also extort money, food and goods from the civilian population of nearby villages. Villagers who are unable to provide their share of the village quota to military camps often go into considerable debt in order to avoid punishment. Furthermore, soldiers passing through villages routinely loot rice, pigs, poultry and other items from the villagers. Many villagers live in poverty due to the constant demands placed upon them by SPDC troops. Even more pressing are villagers' fears of the consequences of being unable to meet soldiers' demands for food and other supplies. These consequences include torture, rape, arbitrary arrest and arbitrary killings. The excessive demands placed on villagers, compounded by their fear of punishment, leads many villagers to flee in search of safer locations where they are better able to provide for themselves and their families. (Please see chapter on deprivation of livelihood for more information.)
Most often, IDPs resettle to an area that falls into one of four groups:
1. A state-controlled relocation site or satellite town
2. An area under SPDC control
3. An area or camp controlled by an armed opposition group
4. The jungle, fields, or other remote, usually "free fire" or "black areas", of Burma
1. Displacement into State-Controlled Relocation Sites and Satellite Towns
Satellite Towns
Since the 1990's the Burmese government has forcibly relocated tens of thousands of impoverished citizens from urban centers to new "satellite towns". These towns are usually located a few miles outside a city where there are very few facilities available. Clean water is scarce and sanitation is poor in these areas. In addition, the relocated people face great travel difficulties, as public transportation into the cities is either nonexistent, or extremely poor and unreliable. Employment in the new satellite towns is scarce. Most often there are inadequately equipped schools in these towns providing some level of education for children. Access to healthcare is a serious problem and the few clinics that exist in these towns are critically understaffed and under supplied. Due to the lack of public transport available in satellite towns, most residents can not access city hospitals, which are also understaffed and under supplied.
Relocation Sites
“The fact that 42% of IDPs in eastern Burma choose to live on the run and in hiding rather than move to government-run relocation sites adds credence to the fact that many relocation sites resemble concentration camps.”
(Source: “Burma’s Internally Displaced: No Options for a Safe Haven," Refugees International, 10 October 2002)
Villagers in ethnic border areas who are forcibly evicted by SPDC soldiers are ordered to relocate to one of some 200 relocation sites throughout Burma. It is estimated that approximately 350,000 people currently reside in relocation sites throughout the country (source: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2004, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 28 February 2005). This estimate includes approximately 77,000 villagers from eastern Burma (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004). Relocation sites can be formed by either the relocation of villagers from one area to another or from the consolidation of dispersed villages into one densely populated site in the same area.
When relocation orders transpire, villagers are generally given little to no warning prior to the time that they must move. Villagers therefore have little opportunity to prepare for their departure and take only what they can carry. In most relocation sites villagers are not provided with any assistance upon arrival. The SPDC is unconcerned whether or not water, food, cultivatable land, employment or social services are available in the new areas. The burden of sheltering and caring for the displaced at relocation sites generally falls on the local community who were already residents of the area prior to the establishment of the relocation site. This results in further depletion of the resources available to the original population.
Services at the relocation villages vary from site to site, as each site is under the responsibility of the relevant state or township committees. However, in general there are no arrangements made to provide services for the relocated people. There is limited access to safe drinking water at most relocation sites. The Burmese government's Department of Health, in conjunction with UNICEF, defines safe drinking water as water obtained through pipes, tanks or protected wells. National baseline figures indicate that 72% of households in Burma have access to and consume safe drinking water. According to TBBC, uncovered wells are the main source of drinking water in relocation sites, with only 13% of households having access to safe drinking water. Limited access to safe drinking water contributes to health concerns as poor water quality is associated with the spread of diseases such as malaria. The majority of relocation sites are not equipped with sanitary facilities and IDPs are either required to build their own latrines or use outer areas of the sites for these purposes. Burma's national baseline rates indicate that 63% of households have access to sewers, septic tanks, pour/flush latrines or covered pits. This is in sharp contrast to relocation site statistics collected by TBBC, which indicate that only 18% of households in relocation sites in eastern Burma have access to these same sanitary facilities. Most relocation sites have either no healthcare facilities whatsoever or have healthcare facilities which are seriously under equipped and under supplied. TBBC asked IDPs in eastern Burma about which healthcare facilities they were able to access over the past year (2003-2004). IDPs indicated that they had varying degrees of access to government clinics, community clinics, cross border aid and traditional healers. Significantly, IDPs living in hiding in the jungle recorded a greater ability to access healthcare facilities than IDPs living in relocation sites.
There is no access to electricity in most sites, and in some sites, such as Shadaw relocation site in Karenni State, flashlights are banned and the sale of dry cell batteries is not permitted in the site. Among other effects, this lack of provisions for light at night increases the vulnerability of women. Education facilities are also insufficient or nonexistent. In most cases, IDPs establish makeshift schools themselves. If there are pre-existing schools, school buildings, teaching materials and teachers are never sufficient, and families often do not send their children to school as they cannot afford the school costs, or they require their children to help in the family’s attempts for survival. According to Burma's baseline rates, Burma's adult literacy rate is 90%. Adult literacy figures compiled by TBBC indicate that only 64% of adult IDPs in relocation sites are literate in either Burmese or an ethnic language script. Furthermore, only 67% of IDP child living in relocation sites in eastern Burma have access to primary school facilities all year round. (Source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004) (Please see chapter on health and education for more information.)
Relocation sites are often located on barren land near SPDC military camps. The location of relocation sites, together with population density, severely restricts people's livelihood options. The limited agricultural land available is usually already taken by the original inhabitants of the village or has been confiscated for use by SPDC troops. Furthermore, employment is difficult to obtain and while some IDPs work as day laborers, the money they receive for this work is typically not enough to support themselves and their family. The Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM), a Thai based Mon human rights organization, estimates that displaced persons in Mon State only have the opportunity for employment 3 months of the year and that the average daily income of IDPs is less than 50 baht (approx. US$ 1.25) per day (source: “Socio-Economic Conditions of Mon IDPs in Southern Burma,” HURFOM, 30 September 2004).
Forced labor is typically demanded from villagers in relocation sites. This forced labor includes clearing bushes and trees from the roadsides both inside and outside the relocation sites, cleaning military buildings, cultivating land for the military bases, hauling water for the troops, building fences around the military camps, digging bunkers, road construction, porter duty for the military and other general servant work. The villagers are also forced to work on infrastructure projects in the area. Furthermore, they are subject to various arbitrary taxes and fees.
Restriction of movement outside relocation sites further impinges on people's ability to survive. Villagers are not permitted to leave the sites without passes, which they must purchase from either SPDC soldiers or local authorities. The passes are usually only valid for 1 day, from dawn to dusk, although in rare cases week passes have been granted (please see chapter on freedom of movement for more information). This leaves the villagers little time to travel to their places of work, complete their work, and then return. In addition, security for the villagers outside of the relocation sites is notoriously bad. Villagers seen outside the camps are vulnerable to capture, arrest, torture and killing, even if they hold valid passes, as they are accused by SPDC troops of leaving the camps to support rebel forces. Women are especially vulnerable, and many cases of rape have been reported by women who have gone outside the camp to forage for vegetables or to collect water (please see chapter on the rights of women for more information). The local authorities do nothing when villagers report cases of abuse.
2. Displacement into Areas under SPDC Control
Many villagers suffering from human rights abuses as a result of the Tatmadaw's "four cuts" campaign, or who have fled in anticipation of orders to relocate, have chosen to settle in areas under SPDC control. While there are no estimates for the number of IDPs who have fled to rural and urban fringe communities, there is speculation that tens of hundreds of thousands of people could have fled to these areas in recent years (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
While many IDPs may feel that areas under SPDC control are safer and more stable than conflict areas, conditions are often extremely difficult. Displaced families often have little choice but to leave behind many of their belongings when they leave their homes. Although some IDPs choose rural or urban communities in which other family or friends already live, their family and/or friends are often unable to provide them with much assistance, as they too are struggling to survive. Employment is often difficult to obtain in these areas as most displaced villagers are farmers and available farmland is usually scarce. In larger towns or cities, farmers are often forced to work as day laborers in low paying jobs. In addition, IDPs living in areas under SPDC control are subject to the same abuses as the other villagers around them. These include demands for forced labor, fees and restrictions that are commonplace across Burma. Yet because the abuses committed are sometimes less then in areas under the "four cuts" campaign, many villagers choose to face the risk of moving to areas under SPDC control.
3. Displacement into Areas and Camps Controlled by Armed Opposition Groups
The majority of IDPs in the eastern border area are located in ceasefire areas controlled by opposition groups. Several of the armed opposition groups operate camps and resettlement sites in their areas of activity. However, in these camps and resettlement sites supplies and social services are very limited, and often temporary. Access to food, education and healthcare varies from area to area, as does the level of security. Furthermore, some ceasefire groups, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), continue to oppress the rights of IDPs.
TBBC has estimated that there are 365,000 IDPs living in ten ceasefire areas in eastern Burma. This includes 120,000 IDPs in areas controlled by the UWSA, 60,000 IDPs in areas controlled by the New Mon State Party (NMSP), 60,000 IDPs in Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF) controlled areas and 45,000 IDPs in Shan State Peace Council (SSPC) administered areas. There are also small IDP populations located in ceasefire areas governed by other ceasefire groups, including the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Karenni Solidarity Organization (KnSO) and a Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) splinter group led by U Goeri (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
Mon State provides an example of IDP flows from conflict areas to areas under the administration of the NMSP. In June 1995 the NMSP signed a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese junta. However, in November 2001, 153 people broke away from the NMSP to form the Hongsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP). Since this time, there has been armed conflict between the HRP, NMSP and the Tatmadaw. This has led to an increase of SPDC military in the area and a subsequent increase of human rights abuses against the civilian population, including land confiscation, forced labor, excessive taxation and increased restrictions on movement. Consequently, villagers in southern Mon State have fled to both resettlement sites in NMSP territory and to refugee camps in Thailand. While this has afforded villagers security from fighting and protection from human rights abuses, the lack of infrastructure, constant new arrivals, lack of access to agricultural lands outside of the ceasefire areas and a variety of other factors have resulted in poor conditions within the resettlement sites/camps. IDPs therefore remain dependent upon humanitarian assistance to meet their survival needs. (Sources: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004; HRW)
4. Displacement into Jungles, Fields, and Other Remote, Usually “Free Fire” Areas
There are believed to be tens of thousands of IDPs hiding in remote areas in Burma's ethnic border regions. TBBC estimates that there are 84,000 people living in such areas in the eastern border area. Many IDPs choose to remain in hiding in "free fire" areas close to their original villages rather than flee to far off settlements in opposition controlled areas or be forcibly relocated to government run relocation sites. This group of IDPs also includes those people who have previously been forcibly resettled and who, unable to stand the harsh conditions in relocation sites, have returned. However, as resettlement back into their homes is impossible due to SPDC harassment, people flee into hiding in the forests and jungles in the surrounding areas. (Source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004)
IDPs in "free fire" areas are considered enemies and rebel supporters by the Tatmadaw and risk being caught, tortured and executed if detected. Under the guise of ridding areas of opposition forces, the Tatmadaw and other state sponsored groups have launched several "search and destroy" operations, in which soldiers root out and destroy everything they see in a given area, including people. Government troops often plant landmines on paths that they suspect the IDP villagers use, and they practice a "scorched earth" policy of looting, destroying and burning any signs of habitation or food supply. Troops have even been known to cut down fruit trees growing naturally in the forest in these operations in an attempt to make it impossible for anyone to survive in the forests or jungles.
The risk of being killed and the need to constantly be prepared to move is highest among IDPs hiding in "free fire" areas. This is exemplified by TBBC's 2004 survey, which indicated that almost half of all IDPs killed or wounded by Tatmadaw soldiers in the past two years were in hiding in "free fire" areas. TBBC also reported that IDPs in "free fire" areas were forced to move location once every 8 months. Concurrently, community based organizations have reported in recent years that IDPs in "free fire" areas are forced to move as often as three or four times a year. (Source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004)
The precarious nature of life for IDPs living in "free fire" areas affects every aspect of their existence. Food security is a major issue as military patrols seek out and destroy crops planted by IDPs in upland fields. TBBC has reported that only 22% of households in "free fire" areas were able to eat two meals a day all year. Access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitary excretion disposal was also lowest among IDPs in "free fire" areas, with only 9% and 5% of households being able to access these respectively. Life in the tropical climate of Burma without shelter, adequate food, safe drinking water and adequate sanitary excretion disposal leads to high sickness and mortality rates from malnutrition, diarrhea, malaria, minor injuries and other easily preventable illnesses. IDPs in "free fire" zones are least able to access government or community healthcare facilities and rely heavily on traditional healers and cross border aid to meet their healthcare needs. Education is also severely restricted for IDPs living in "free fire" areas. While IDPs hiding in the jungle are sometimes able to operate temporary makeshift schools with volunteer teachers, these schools lack supplies, and they are forced to shift from place to place depending on Tatmadaw troop movements. According to TBBC, access to primary schools was most restricted for children living in "free fire" zones, with only 11% of schools being open all year round. (Source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004)
Border Policies Towards IDPs in Burma
"Many refugees only come to Thailand as a last resort, having tried for years to survive on the run."
(Source: "Myanmarese Refugees in Thailand: No Freedom," World Survey 2004, USCRI, June 2004)
There is an obvious relationship between IDP populations inside Burma and refugee populations in neighboring countries. Both IDPs and refugees have fled from their homes due to forced relocation, forced labor, torture, rape and other human rights violations perpetrated by the Tatmadaw or other state sponsored groups. However, unlike refugees, IDPs have not crossed an international border and remain inside Burma. According to the Global IDP Project, the majority of refugees usually live inside Burma for several years as IDPs and only flee across the border when they have exhausted all options for protection (source: "Burma: Internally Displaced Are Increasingly Vulnerable", Global IDP Project, 2004) Furthermore, adverse policies towards refugees in neighboring countries, together with tight border security, prevents many IDPs from seeking refuge across the border. There are an estimated one million IDPs currently in Burma who have the potential to become cross border refugees.
Refugees can also cross the border back into Burma and rejoin IDP communities. The return of refugees can occur through voluntary repatriation, be it through established repatriation programs or through a refugee's own motivations, through deportation exercises intended to clear a country of illegal residents and in some instances processes of forcible repatriation or refoulement. For example, approximately 10,000 refugees were repatriated from Thailand to Mon State as part of the 1995 ceasefire agreement between the NMSP and the SLORC. Fearing human rights abuses at the hands of the Tatmadaw, these villagers did not return to their villages but settled into NMSP ceasefire areas. The conditions within NMSP areas do not allow for the resettlement and reintegration of these refugees into the community. Therefore, the returning refugees have continued until today to survive in NMSP ceasefire areas as IDPs. (Please see section 13.6 for more information on Mon IDPs, below.)
According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, there are approximately 600,000 refugees seeking protection in countries neighboring Burma. These included 400,000 in Thailand (mostly ethnic Karen, Karenni and Shan), 50,000 ethnic Chin in India, approximately 120,000 Rohingya in Bangladesh and 10,000 Rohingya in Malaysia. These figures do not include the thousands of ethnic refugees living outside of camps in Thailand and Bangladesh who are classified as illegal migrants.
Significantly, Thailand, Bangladesh, India and Malaysia are not signatories to the 1951 International Convention on Refugees and its 1967 protocol. Nor do they have adequate legal frameworks through which refugee status determinations can be made. This creates an extremely precarious environment for those that flee across Burma's borders in search of protection and security. Following the uprising of 1988, tens of thousands of refugees fled Burma into neighboring Thailand, India and Bangladesh and refugee camps within these countries provided limited humanitarian assistance. However, these camps have now all been closed to new arrivals and UNHCR's access to both the remaining refugee camp communities and border areas with a high refugee population is either severely limited or prevented altogether. Newly arrived refugees in these countries are considered illegal migrants, are frequently denied access to humanitarian assistance, and remain liable to arrest and deportation by local authorities. Furthermore, as illegal migrants, Burmese refugees are vulnerable to extortion, theft, sexual abuse and many other difficulties. They also face a lack of access to medical care and educational opportunities. (Please see chapter on situation of refugees for more information.)
13.3 Situation in Arakan State
Northwestern Arakan State is home to the majority of Burma's Rohingya population, a Muslim ethnic minority nationality. The Rohingya are arguably subject to more discrimination in Burma than any other ethnic minority. Of Arakan State’s estimated population of 3 million, the Rohingya, concentrated in the northern townships of Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung, make up as much as 50% of the population, with current estimates placing the Rohingya population at between 700,000 and 1½ million. Other ethnic nationalities in Arakan State include the majority Rakhine Buddhist population and small numbers of Mro, Daignet, Kamein, Thet and Chin (source: The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, Amnesty International, May 2004). Policies of discrimination and exclusion against the Rohingya stem, in part, from the fact that the Rohingya are denied Burmese citizenship. The 1982 Citizenship Act defines citizens as those belonging to one of Burma's 135 "national races", of which Rohingya is not one, and those whose ancestors settled in the country before 1823, the British annexation of Burma. As few Rohingya have the necessary documentary evidence to establish proof of their ancestry, they are ineligible for Citizenship and therefore rendered de-facto stateless. As non citizens, the Rohingya are labeled as illegal immigrants and are subject to severe restrictions on movement, excessive taxation, extortion, forced labor, forced relocation and land confiscation. These human rights abuses impinge on the Rohingya population’s ability to actively participate within the political, economic, social and cultural life of Burma (source: Conflict, Discrimination and Humanitarian Challenges in Northern Arakan State, Forum Asia, 8 October 2003). The harsh conditions faced by the Rohingya have rendered widespread internal displacement and refugee flows into Bangladesh, which continued throughout 2004.
Forced eviction and land confiscation are widely practiced in northern Arakan State and this has led to the widespread internal displacement of Rohingya. Arakan State is heavily militarized and most forced relocation in Arakan State is connected to the SPDC's efforts to construct military and police camps, settle Buddhist people in "model villages" and establish farmlands to support SPDC security personnel and new settlers. There have also been reports of security forces evicting civilians in order to use land for commercial purposes, such as establishing rice and shrimp farms. Furthermore, evictions based on old land-use demarcations have reportedly become more frequent since 2002. People who have built their homes or farms on land which had decades ago been demarcated for other uses have been forcibly evicted and ordered to dismantle their homes/farms (source: The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, Amnesty International, May 2004).
The practice of establishing "model villages" intensified after the formation of the Nasaka (a border administration force which was comprised of police, military intelligence (MI), Lone Htein (riot police), customs and immigration officials) in 1992 and has resulted in the displacement of thousands of Rohingya. While the Nasaka were disbanded after General Khin Nyunt was ousted in October 2004, it is estimated that they coordinated the building of numerous "model villages" in northern Arakan State. Amnesty International and Forum Asia have estimated that there are approximately 26 "model villages" of about 100 houses each in northern Arakan State. Concurrently, Kaladan News, a Rohingya news organization based in Bangladesh, has estimated that as many as 39 "model villages" exist in this area (source: “Nasaka Forcibly Extracts Labor and Donation from Rohingya villagers,” Kaladan News, 18 October 2004). It was reported in October 2004, that there were plans to build an "ideal city" in Maungdaw Township, along the Burma–Bangladesh border. According to Kaladan News, the city has been designed to serve as both the main gateway to the Asia Highway and as an important trade center between Burma and Bangladesh (source: "SPDC Plan to Build The Village As Ideal City," Kaladan News, 15 October 2004).
"Model villages" typically consist of 100 houses and other facilities, including schools, healthcare centers, Buddhist temples and monasteries. Settlers are usually poor Buddhist Rakhine from other parts of Arakan State but may also include ethnic Burman from central Burma and Karnein, Daingnet, Mro and Thet from the highlands. It has also been reported that former prisoners and former insurgents have also been settled in "model villages". Settlers are reportedly provided with not only a house, but also one to four acres of land, a pair of oxen and rations during their initial settlement period.
Both the land for housing and the agricultural land allocated to settlers are confiscated from the Rohingya. While Free Burma Rangers reported in 2003 that the use of Rohingya for forced labor in the construction of "model villages" had lessened, there were credible reports of the continued use of Rohingya for forced labor in the construction of "model villages" in 2004. It has also been reported that settlers often do not farm their own land but rent it back to Rohingya villagers. In some cases the land is rented to the original Rohingya owner to cultivate. The forced eviction and confiscation of lands from the Rohingya has rendered thousands of Rohingya villagers homeless. No compensation is given and no alternative housing is provided for the evicted family. Therefore, thousands of Rohingya have become internally displaced within northern Arakan State (source: The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, Amnesty International, May 2004).
Significantly, the establishment of "model villages" has directly affected the ethnic composition of northern Arakan State. As mentioned above, settlers are typically Rakhine or Burman Buddhists from other parts of Arakan State or from central Burma. Many human rights groups have argued that this program of "colonization" is motivated by the SPDC's desire to "Burmanize" Arakan State. Some commentators have even gone so far as to suggest that the "model village" program, along with other policies of exclusion, are designed not only to "dilute" the Rohingya population in northern Arakan State but are policies of ethnic and religious "cleansing" designed to eradicate the Rohingya people and their Muslim faith from Arakan State (source: “Nasaka Forcibly Extracts Labor and Donation from Rohingya Villagers,” Kaladan News, 18 October 2004).
Human rights abuses, such as severe restrictions on movement and excessive demands for forced labor, have also led to the internal displacement of Rohingya. As non citizens, the Rohingya are required to apply to the SPDC to obtain a travel permit to leave their village. Travel permits range between 500 – 2,000 kyat and are issued for specific periods of time. As some 60% of Rohingya are poor day laborers, most can not afford to obtain the required travel permits to travel outside their towns or villages. These restrictions severely affect their ability to find employment and sell produce in other villages and towns. Furthermore, the Rohingya are often subject to demands for forced labor. According to reports by both Amnesty International and Forum Asia, in northern Arakan State only Rohingya are normally subject to demands for forced labor. The demands placed on the Rohingya for forced labor limits the amount of time they have to do paid work. This again affects their ability to provide a livelihood for themselves and their families. Such human rights abuses contribute to the internal displacement of Rohingya as it forces many people to flee in search of a location in which they can meet their survival needs (source: The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, Amnesty International, May 2004).
Forced Relocation in Arakan State - partial list of incidents for 2004
From the end of May 2004, the Nasaka (Border Security Force) Director Lt. Col. Myint Oo ordered the evacuation of 130 Rohingya houses from Myaw Taung (Wa-beg) and Kyi Kan Pyin (Kawa Bil) villages in Maungdaw Township and the construction of a "model village". Rohingya villagers were ordered to build houses for newly arriving settlers from central Burma. Rohingya villagers from nearby villages were forced to work on the "settlement program" while no alternative arrangements were made for the evacuated Rohingya families, who were living in harsh conditions in nearby villages. Under the construction scheme, the villagers build 120 houses, a monastery, a school, a health center, several ponds and wells. The nearby villagers were compelled to abandon their agriculture works in order to undertake the construction works demanded by the Nasaka authorities. The villagers were not paid and in addition to labor, were required to provide house building materials, including pillars, bamboos etc., and to pay 3,000 to 6,000 kyat per family according to their financial status. The Nasaka authorities also confiscated 260 acres of land from surrounding Rohingya villages in order to provide the newcomers with farmland. As a result of the measures imposed, some villagers’ family members have been facing starvation. (Source: "Forced Labor for Newcomers and Relocated the Rohingya Villagers in Northern Arakan," Kaladan News, 23 June 2004)
On 4 July 2004, Captain Aung Kyaw Moe, Nasaka commander of sector no. 4, called a meeting with the village chairman, village secretaries and the villagers of Kyein Chaung and Pruma villages in Maungdaw Township. In the meeting, the commander ordered Rohingya villagers to demolish houses which had constructed tin roofs. In 1999 – 2000, Gerneral Khin Nyunt, the then Prime Minister of the SPDC, visited the area and instructed villagers to decorate the town and construct quality roofing for houses in the area. Villagers therefore constructed tin roofs in accordance with this order and with the permission of the appropriate authorities. Captain Aung Kyaw Moe denied that this was the case and charged the villagers with illegally modifying their houses. To avoid having to destroy their homes, villagers had to pay a fine of 500,000 kyat ($556 USD). As this order came in the rainy session, participants requested the commander to withdraw the order as many villagers would have difficulty finding alternative accommodation if forced to destroy their homes. The commander would not withdraw the order and it is estimated that 120 houses in the 2 villages were affected by the order. While some villagers were able to pay the 500,000 kyat fine, most villagers were too poor to afford this. Nasaka forces also arrested and detained 3 villagers who were discussing the order after the meeting. They were later released after money was extorted from them. (Source: "Nasaka Issued Ultimatum to the Villagers whether to Pay Kyats 500,000 or to Demolish the Houses," Kaladan News, 20 July 2004)
In October 2004, a high level team including the Nasaka Western Commander Major General Maung Oo, the Tactical Operations Commander Col. Aung Naing Tun (Buthidaung), the Director of Nasaka Lt Col Myint Oo, Col. Aye Thite of Military Operation Command (MOC-15), Major Than Sein of Military Intelligence (MI-18) and other military officers visited Thet Khin Nyar village and inquired into the death of a junior military officer in the area and demanded the return of the dead soldier's gun. It was alleged that the junior officer, Ran Aung, had raped a 13 year-old village girl while drunk and had fled the village when villagers pursued him. It was also alleged that the junior officer jumped into a nearby stream to escape the villagers and drowned. His body was found 2 days later and his gun was never recovered. On 14 October 2004, Western Commander Major General Maung Oo demanded that the villagers return the missing gun or face forced relocation. Two hundred and fifty families fled their homes to avoid harassment and arbitrary arrest. By 19 September 2004, 172 of the 250 families had returned to the village. The remaining IDP families remained in hiding in the border area. (Source: "Western Commander Orders Villagers to Move Out," Kaladan News, 14 October 2004)
13.4 Situation in Chin State
Internal displacement continued to be a significant problem in Chin State throughout 2004. Of an estimated total population of two million, the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO) approximates that 60,000 Chin are taking refugee in neighboring countries and that several thousands of Chin remain internally displaced within Burma. There are several Chin tribes in Chin State, including Asho, Cho, Khumi, Kuki, Laimi, Lushai and Zomi. Conversion to Christianity has been widespread within Chin State in the past century and it is estimated that 90% of Chin are Christian (source: Religious Persecution: A Campaign of Ethnocide Against Chin Christians in Burma, CHRO, February 2004).
Since the 1990s there has been an increase in militarization within Chin State. This has been due to the formation of the Chin National Front (CNF) following the 1988 nationwide pro-democracy uprising. The CNF is an armed opposition group whose aims included fighting for the restoration of democracy in Burma and Chin self determination. On the pretext of fighting CNF opposition, the SPDC military has increased its army presence in Chin State, from one battalion prior to 1988 to at least 12 active battalions in the area at the beginning of 2004 (source: Religious Persecution: A Campaign of Ethnocide Against Chin Christians in Burma, CHRO, February 2004).
A direct result of the increased militarization of Chin State has been an increase in human rights abuses. Civilians are used as forced labor in the building and maintenance of military camps, on road construction projects and as porters for the army. Further human rights abuses in Chin State include excessive taxation, the destruction of houses and places of worship, the confiscation of land, food and livestock, arbitrary arrest, torture and extra-judicial execution. The demands for forced labor, food and money, as well as the risks to ones personal safety, has led many people to flee their homes in search of safer areas in which they can adequately provide for both themselves and their families.
Significantly, an estimated 90% of Chins are Christian and widespread religious persecution has also contributed to the Chin IDP and refugee populations. In conjunction with an increase in military presence in Chin State, Buddhist monks have also been dispatched throughout Chin State as part of the "Hill Regions Buddhist Mission". These monks, who reportedly hold more power than local army commanders, seek to coerce local residents into converting to Buddhism. Coercive techniques reportedly include subjecting only the Christian population to demands for forced labor and taxation while giving those who "choose" to convert to Buddhism numerous incentives, including monthly stipends, food rations and access to education. The policies of discrimination based on religious identity adopted within Chin State have led CHRO to go so far as to argue that the SPDC is actively attempting to inflict ethnocide on the Chin people. For those who refuse to convert to Buddhism, fleeing their homes to live as IDPs is often the only way to survive (source: Religious Persecution: A Campaign of Ethnocide Against Chin Christians in Burma, CHRO, February 2004). (Please see chapter on religion for more information.)
In 2004, continued harassment of Chin refugees in Mizoram, a northeastern state of India, by the Young Mizo Association (YMA) has led some Chin refugees to return to Burma, where they reportedly living as IDPs. In July 2003, the attack and rape of a nine year old Mizo girl, allegedly by a man of Burmese origin, led to increased tension between the YMA and Chin refugees living in Mizoram State. The YMA, with the knowledge of local and state authorities, ordered all Burmese, include Chin refugees, out of Mizoram State. The most recent deadline for eviction in Lunglei, the second largest town of Mizoram State, was the end of July 2004 (source: "Chin Refugees in Mizoram Face Threat of Deportation," Rhododendron News, Volume VII. No. IV. July-August 2004). CHRO and Refugees International have estimated that the harassment of Chin refugees in Mizoram has led as many as 6,000 Chin to return to Burma and tens of thousands to go into hiding in Mizoram. The situation of the 6,000 refugees who returned to Burma has remained to date unclear. (Source: “Refugees International Letter to Sonia Ghandi,” Rhododendron News, Volume VII. No. IV. July-August 2004)
Forced Relocation in Chin State - Partial List of Incidents for 2004
In March 2004, local SPDC authorities ordered residents of Tamu-Kalay Highway to vacate their houses by the end of March to make way for a planned highway extension. No alternate arrangements were made for the residents and no compensation was provided for the loss of property. The buildings destroyed as a result of the order included a Seventh Day Adventist Church, a Kuki Chin Baptist Association (KCBA), Kabaw Valley Thadou Baptist Association (KVTBA) Bible institution and other highly priced buildings. (Source: " Eviction Order Served to Rresidents of Tamu-Kalay Highway," Rhododendron News, CHRO, March-April 2004)
13.5 Situation in Kachin State
Geographical isolation together with travel restrictions into Kachin State has severely limited access to reliable information concerning the internal affairs of Kachin State. Both the size of the IDP population and their conditions remain unknown. However, Kachin State, like other ethnic nationality states within Burma, has a history of armed ethnic struggle resulting in the forced relocation of tens of thousands of villagers. Armed Kachin groups, such as the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), actively fought for independence from Burma from the 1960s to the 1990s. During this period it is estimated that the Tatmadaw forcibly relocated up to 100,000 villagers as part of counter insurgency operations (source: "Kachin State," BERG, September 2000).
Kachin State is rich in jade, gold, platinum and coal and there is little doubt that the current exploitation of these lucrative natural resources has resulted in the internal displacement of villagers. The SPDC has held nominal control over most of Kachin State since signing a ceasefire with the KIO in 1994. This has allowed the SPDC to capitalize on Kachin State's natural resources. In 2002, the Ministry of Mines identified 23 blocks of land within Kachin State as likely to contain gold and began taking bids for their excavation (source: Mining, Gender and the Environment in Burma, EarthRights International, November 2004 ). In 2004, a further three blocks for gem mining were identified in Phakant, Lonkhin and Nantyahseik, and concession grants were opened for bidding (source: Blurred Vision, ALTSEAN, 1 January–31 March 2004). Several companies, including mining companies operated by the KIO and the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K), have negotiated gold concessions with the SPDC and their private sector partner, northern Star Trading Company. EarthRights International has drawn attention to how the practices employed in gold excavation in Kachin State mirror those of the logging and mining industries in other areas of central and eastern Burma. EarthRights International found that "the rapid shift to large-scale forms of intensive mining has displaced local communities that historically used artisanal forms of mining to supplement their incomes" (source: Mining, Gender and the Environment in Burma, EarthRights International, November 2004).
The SPDC and private companies forcibly evict villagers and confiscate farming land in order to clear mining areas for which they have been granted concessions. Forced relocation has been reported in both Naung Hkin and Mali Zupi. Images Asia and the Pan Kachin Development Society, two Thai based NGOs, released a joint report in November 2004 which included photographic evidence of villagers in Hpakant area, an area mined for both gold and jade, being forced by armed soldiers to move a house located in a mining site (source: At What Price? Gold Mining in Kachin State, Burma, Images Asia and the Pan Kachin Development Society, November 2004). Such evidence suggests that forced relocation, together with other human rights abuses typical of development projects, such as forced labor, are widespread throughout Kachin State.
13.6 Situation in Karen State
Note: Dooplaya, Pa-an, Papun, Nyaunglebin and Toungoo Districts, as reported below, are all areas demarcated by the KNU as Karen territory. Dooplaya District falls mostly in SPDC demarcated Karen State and partially in SPDC demarcated Mon State. Dooplaya District is under the patrol of the 6th Brigade of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). Papun and Pa-an Districts fall entirely in SPDC demarcated Karen State. Papun District is under the patrol of the 5th Brigade of the KNLA and Pa-an is under the patrol of the 7th Brigade of the KNLA. Toungoo falls partially in SPDC demarcated Pegu Division and partially in SPDC demarcated Karen State. Toungoo is under the patrol of the 2nd Brigade of the KNLA. Nyaunglebin falls in SPDC demarcated Pegu Division and is under the patrol of the 3rd Brigade of the KNLA. The SPDC does not recognize these as official districts. Instead, the SPDC considers there to be 3 districts (North to South: Kawkareik, Pa-an and Myawaddy) and 7 townships (North to South: Than Daung, Papun, Hlaing Bwe, Pa’an, Kawkareik, Myawaddy, and Kya In Seik Gyi) within SPDC demarcated Karen State. These townships do not correspond with the KNU demarcated districts and townships, even for those which share the same name.
Despite the January 2004 verbal ceasefire agreement between the SPDC and the Karen National Union (KNU), the situation of IDPs in Karen State in 2004 remained grave. Successive military regimes have fought the KNU for control of Karen State for over 50 years. In 1995, with the help of the breakaway Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the SLORC successfully attacked and overran the KNU headquarters in Manerplaw. Since that time, the SPDC has progressively gained further control of KNU territory. The Tatmadaw has actively attempted to eliminate KNU forces and has infiltrated and consolidated its presence in Karen State. As the Tatmadaw has moved farther into Karen State it has brought the civilian population under its control through not only programs of forced relocation but through the perpetration of various human rights violations including forced labor, excessive taxation, detention, torture and extra-judicial killings. This has contributed to a growth in the IDP population in Karen State.
TBBC has reported that there were 135,300 IDPs in Karen State as of October 2004, with 13,400 IDPs living in relocation sites and the remaining 121,900 living in either ceasefire areas or in hiding in "free fire" areas. Major causes of displacement within Karen State during 2004 included continued conflict between the KNU and the SPDC. Despite the verbal ceasefire agreement, as many as 200 skirmishes were reported between the SPDC and KNU forces in the fist half of 2004 alone (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
Human rights abuses perpetrated by the Tatmadaw and their ceasefire partner, the DKBA, also significantly contributed to internal displacement within Karen State throughout the year. It has been widely reported by human rights organizations that the SPDC has used the ceasefire agreement as an opportunity to both consolidate and expand its military presence into previously KNU controlled areas of Karen State. This has resulted in an increase in human rights abuses, including the forced eviction and confiscation of land for new military barracks, forced labor for the construction and maintenance of military barracks and infrastructure projects, such as roads, extortion and demands for civilian porters. Furthermore, in an attempt to gain control of the area, the SPDC military and other state sponsored agents undertook a number of operations throughout the year designed to seek out and destroy IDP hiding places and force IDPs into SPDC controlled relocation sites (source: ‘Peace’, or Control? The SPDC’s use of the Karen ceasefire to expand its control and repression of villagers in Toungoo District, Northern Karen State, KHRG, 22 March 2005).
Major SPDC military offensives in early 2004 in southern Karenni State spilt over into both Toungoo District and Papun District, Karen State, resulting in the displacement of approximately 3,000 Karen villagers. Free Burma Rangers, a Thailand based humanitarian relief organization, reported that in December 2003 ten SPDC battalions forcibly evicted southern Karenni villages to designated relocation sites on the Mawchi road in order to "secure" the area. In order to avoid forced relocation, approximately 2,000 Karenni villagers fled into Toungoo District and Papun District. SPDC troops reportedly chased the Karenni villagers across the border and launched offensives against Karen villages. This resulted in 3,000 Karen villagers fleeing their homes. While FBR reported that most Karen villages were able to return home by June, the attacks disrupted the rice harvest and reportedly resulted in major food shortages in the area (source: FBR, 2004).
Other major SPDC offensives that resulted in large numbers of IDPs include attacks in both Shweygyin Township in southern Nyaunglebin District and Kyaukkyi Township, located in the north central area, in November and December 2004. The offensives displaced 4,781 villagers in the area and destroyed more than 20,000 baskets of rice paddy. SPDC troops reportedly patrolled the area and laid landmines to prevent the IDPs from returning home. The area east of Shweygyin is reportedly rich in both gold and timber. Villagers there believed that the attacks were motivated by the SPDC's desire to secure the area in order to exploit these natural resources (source: FBR, 2004). The SPDC military has consolidated its presence in this area by establishing a further three military camps. They have also forced villagers who have remained in the area to work on the upgrading of roads reaching from Toungoo and Kyaukkyi to the Thailand border (source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July – December 2004).
Internal displacement in both Thaton and Pa'an District throughout the year was attributed to human rights abuses perpetrated by both the SPDC and DKBA troops in the area. Human rights abuses, such as forced labor for the construction of military camps and road construction and demands for civilian porters to carry army rations and ammunition, were widely reported throughout 2004 in both districts. It was reported that the DKBA perpetrated some of the worst human rights abuses in these areas. For example, that DKBA troops threatened to fine and torture villagers from Bilin Township, Thaton District, if they left their villages to go to their fields during the November rice harvest period. Furthermore, DKBA troops reportedly worked in conjunction with the Tha Ka Hsa Pa, an SPDC controlled militia group. Villagers in the area reportedly believe that the DKBA is only working on instructions from the SPDC and that the SPDC is using the DKBA to deflect accusations that they have defied the verbal ceasefire agreement. KHRG contends that the military build up in this area could be in preparation for future military attacks (source: Thaton District: Continued Consolidation of SPDC and DKBA Control through the use of Forced Labour, Extortion and Movement Restrictions, KHRG, 21 February 2005).
There are an estimated 30,000 IDPs living in two NMSP ceasefire areas in Dooplaya District in southern Karen State and IDPs continued to flee to these areas in 2004 to escape both conflict and continued human rights abuses. There were reports in 2004 of skirmishes between the Burmese military and the KNLA, particularly in the southwestern township of Waw Raw. According to KHRG, demands by the Tatmadaw for rice and livestock resulted in a quarter of the population of Dooplaya District facing food shortages at the end of 2004. This, coupled with other human rights violations perpetrated by Tatmadaw and DKBA soldiers, contributed to both new IDPs in the area and refugee flows into Thailand. (Source: Dooplaya District: Fighting And Human Rights Abuse Still Continue After Ceasefire, KHRG, 18 February 2004)
Forced Relocation in Karen State - Partial List of Incidents for 2004
Dooplaya District
In February 2004, DKBA Battalion 907 led by Officer Soe Moe Oo ordered Ka Moh, Ah Pyauk and Klaw Hseh villages to relocate to a place they designated in Weh Taw Tay. All the villagers had to be there by March 2004. The officers threatened to take action against any villagers who did not go. (Source: KHRG, 2004)
On 6 October 2004, troops from SPDC LIB 63 gathered villagers from Choo Cha Plu village, Three Pagoda Pass Township, and ordered 40 house owners to move from their land. The confiscated land, 3 kilometers wide and 4 kilometers long, is to be used for the construction of a new army base. There were some rumors that the army would either pay the house owners half the price of the house or provide the land owners with alternative land. However, compensation was not discussed at the meeting and many villagers feared that no compensation would be provided. (Source: "Army Ordered Villager About They Are Going to Confiscate Land," IMNA, 7 October 2004)
Papun District
In January 2004, continued attacks by the Burmese military on Karenni villages along the Karen-Karenni border spilt over into Karen State causing 3,000 Karen villagers to flee their homes. The SPDC military, which attempted to clear Karenni villagers from the southern Karreni State border, burnt down rice barns, chased villagers from their villages and laid landmines around the abandoned villages. The Burmese military also crossed the Karen State border and chased villagers out of the following villages:
1. Ka Lae Lo village,
2. Lay Wa village,
3. Say Ba Ti village and
4. Marmee village.
Troops from SPDC LIB 586, LIB 512, LIB 18 and IB 3 under Military Command 2 and 3 of LID 55 also attacked villagers in Na Yo Hta village tract, Lu Thaw Township, during this offensive. The following villagers and number of persons were forced to flee their homes:
1. Keh Kho Mu Doe village, 71 families with 440 persons;
2. Kho Lay village, 25 families with 180 persons;
3. Bler Lu village, 17 families with 120 persons;
4. Kler Lor village, 30 families with 229 persons;
5. Thay Pa Hti village and Ma Mee village, 35 families with 230 persons;
6. Lay Wah village, 21 families with 125 persons;
7. Thoo Kler village, 33 families with 237 persons;
8. Po Khee village, 24 families with 166 persons;
9. He Po village, 17 families with 83 persons; and
10. Saw Mu Plaw village, 4 families with 23 persons.
CIDKP reported that 277 families with 1833 persons were forced to flee from the above villagers. CIDKP has also reported that a further 1000 villagers from Kaw Lu Doe village tract were forced to flee due to SPDC military offensives in the area. The affected villagers were:
1. Nu Thoo Hta,
2. Nu Thoo Khee,
3. Plo Ywai Mu Deh,
4. Thway Deh,
5. Lay Baw Mu,
6. Kya Lar Deh,
7. Kler Khee and
8. Htee Ta Hkay Hta.
The troops also burnt down 2 rice barns at Ka Lae Lo village and planted a landmine on the main trail out of Ka Lae Lo about 500 meters from the village. On 7 January 2004 at 11.45 am, a 17 year-old boy stepped on a landmine (Burma Army mine MM2 or the same type Chinese manufacture), outside of Ka Lae Lo village and lost his leg from the knee down. A FBR team, which was nearby, together with a KNU medic, attended to the boy. An emergency amputation was conducted and the boy was stabilized and then carried for 4 days to a mobile clinic. At the time of this report, he was alive and recovering. The SPDC military offensive ended in late January 2004 and by early June 2004 most of the displaced Karen and Karenni villagers had returned home. (Source: FBR, 2004)
Nyaunglebin District
On 16
January 2004, No. 2 Operation Command Commander Tin Maung Oo ordered Column
Commander Ko Ko Oo to relocate Ko Ni village, Mon Township, to Noe Nya Lar Kwet
Yhit by 2 February 2004. A list of those who did not want to relocate was sent
to the office of SPDC LIB 590 and each person had to pay 200,000 kyat. Due to
the forced relocation, the village school had to be closed and villagers' paddy
and bean crops were destroyed. The new relocation site was also a place were
bricks were baked and as a result many people, especially children and elderly
people, became ill. Six hundred people were affected by the forced relocation
order. (Source: CIDKP, 2004)
On 3 March 2004, the SPDC Operation Command No. 3 summoned heads of villages from villages located in the plain and mountain foot areas of Kyaukkyi Township and ordered the villages to relocate to new sites by 7 March 2004. The villagers made appeals to the authorities concerned but they were ignored. Ten thousand people from 13 villagers were affected by the forced relocation order. The following villages were ordered to relocate to the following relocation sites:
On 22 March 2004, SPDC Operation Command No. 3 Commander Htein Win issued an order that not all villages ordered to relocate now had to relocate. The following villages no longer had to relocate but instead were required to pay 100,000 kyat per village tract:
(Source: CIDKP, 2004)
On 20 April 2004, troops from SPDC LIB 389 departed from their base at Mu Theh camp, Kyaukkyi Township, and conducted military operations in Ta Kaw Doe and Hkeh Doe areas. Troops from SPDC LIB 381 were operating in Kwee Lah Meh Kho area in Kyaukkyi Township. For this reason, IDPs in these areas faced great difficult and had to abandon their hill paddy fields and hide in deep jungle. (Source: CIDKP, 2004)
From 14 November 2004 into 2005, 6 SPDC battalions, including LIB 589, LIB 350, IB 57, LIB 20 and LIB 264 launched attacks against villagers (IDPs) in Shweygyin Township in the southern part of Nyaunglebin District, Karen State. These attacks have resulted in 4,781 new IDPs and the destruction of 19,425 baskets of rice. The affected village tracts were:
The attacks included an attack on 14 November 2004 against Htee Township. During this attack SPDC troops burnt down over 30 homes, destroyed over 2,000 baskets of rice, looted homes and livestock and drove over 800 people into the jungle. (Source: FBR, 2004)
From 22 December 2004 to the date of this report, 27 December 2004, SPDC LIB 382 and LIB 368 began to attack villages in Kyauk Kyi Township in north central Nyaunglebin District. The SPDC operation, of smaller scale than that in Shwegyin Township, displaced 955 people from 13 villages. Most of the villagers were IDPs who had had to flee from their homes many times before. This year alone, they have had to flee the SPDC army twice, in June and September. The villages, families and numbers of persons forced to flee were:
(Source: FBR, 2004)
Toungoo District
In March 2004, 468 families with 2,658 persons from 8 villages in Than Daung Township, Toungoo District, were forcibly relocated by SPDC troops to resettlement sites. Due to the destruction of villagers by SPDC troops, 922 families with 4,590 persons from 30 villages already lived in these sites as IDPs. In Tantabin Township, 628 families with 3,362 persons from 15 villages were forcibly relocated by SPDC troops to resettlement sites where 865 families with 5,348 persons from 26 villages lived as IDPs. (Source: CIDKP, 2004)
13.7 Situation in Karenni State
Concerted attacks by the Tatmadaw against Karenni villagers in southern Karenni State throughout 2004 have resulted in a marked increase in the IDP population. TBBC estimates that there are now 88,400 IDPs in Karenni State, with the vast majority of 75,000 residing in ceasefire areas, 7,000 in "free fire" areas and 6,400 located in SPDC designated relocation sites. This is a significant rise of over 30,000 IDPs from estimates in 2002, which placed the IDP population of Karenni State at 57,000 (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
Forced relocation campaigns led by government troops have largely stemmed from motivation to eliminate Karenni armed resistance. The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) was first formed in 1957 and has sought to re-establish the right of independence which was originally part of the 1947 constitution but which was later removed in 1962. In 1978, due to ideological differences, a faction of the KNPP broke away and formed the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF). Numerous splits and factions have ensued since that time and as many as eight ceasefire agreements have been signed between the SPDC and Karenni ethnic insurgent groups (source: Conflict and Displacement in Karenni State: The Need for Considered Responses, BERG, 2000). Most notably, the KNPLF signed a ceasefire agreement in 1994 and since that time has established ceasefire areas within Karenni State. In March 1995, the KNPP also negotiated a ceasefire agreement. However, this agreement broke down within months when the SPDC began deploying troops into KNPP territory east of the Salween River. Following the breakdown of the ceasefire agreement in June 1995, the SLORC launched a massive relocation campaign in Karenni State that resulted in 25,000 IDPs in 1996 alone (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
The situation between the KNPP and the SPDC remained tense throughout 2004. In December 2003, the SPDC issued a relocation order to all villagers north and south of the Mawchi road, in southern Karenni State, and redeployed approximately 1,000 troops from Nyaunglebin District, Karen State, to Karenni State. Reports originally sited the SPDC's plans to build a new road from Mawchi to serve the Wolfram mine as the primary reason for the relocation order. Other reports have sited the SPDC's desire to cut support to the KNPP as the main reason for the renewed attacks. It was reported by FBR that some villagers believed that the SPDC was taking advantage of the verbal ceasefire with the KNU to concentrate their forces against the KNPP (source: FBR, 2004). At the beginning of 2004, the SPDC and KNPP began ceasefire discussions. However, these discussions quickly stalled when the SPDC refused to negotiate with the KNPP on a government to government basis. Instead, the SPDC insisted on negotiating with the KNPP as a party (source: “Karenni Ceasefire Talks Stall,” Irrawaddy, April 2004). In December 2004, the SPDC military launched a major offensive against the KNPP stronghold at Nyamu Hill in eastern Karenni State, along the Thailand border. This area has been virtually deserted since 1996 and hence concerns centered on the use of civilian porters rather than displacement (source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July–December 2004).
Many villagers refused to obey the relocation order issued in December 2003. TBBC reported that only 500 people resided in relocation sites around Pasaung Township in 2004. The low rate of compliance has been attributed to the harsh conditions faced by IDPs living in relocation sites. IDPs forced to move to relocation sites in early 2004 reportedly did not have access to their farms, a means of securing an income or medicine. There were also reports that IDPs in these relocation sites were subject to forced labor and other human rights abuses (source: FBR, 2004). The unsustainable nature of relocation sites is further evidenced by the fact that figures compiled by TBBC show that while there has been an increase in the number of relocation sites in Karenni State, the number of IDPs within these sites has decreased. According to TBBC, 7,000 IDPs were located in 9 relocation sites throughout Karenni State in 2002. In 2004, TBBC recorded fewer IDPs (6,400) in as many as 14 relocation sites throughout the state. This trend can be attributed to the unsustainable nature of relocation sites which has forced many IDPs to attempt to resettle in KNPLF ceasefire areas rather than following orders to move to, or remain in, SPDC relocation sites. (Source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004)
Following the relocation order issued in December 2003, southern Karenni State was designated a "free fire" area. All villagers who did not obey the relocation order were considered supporters of the KNPP and SPDC troops were ordered to shoot any villagers seen in the area on sight. SPDC troops attacked villages in the early part of 2004 and lay mines in and around villages to stop IDPs from returning home. There were also reports of SPDC troops, together with KNPFL and KnSO soldiers, conducting "search and destroy" missions designed to locate and destroy IDP hideouts. According to FBR, SPDC battalions were actively patrolling the area throughout most of 2004 and the situation for IDPs remained critical. It was reported that IDPs in the area were not only forced to constantly move from one hideout to another but also faced severe food shortages, lacked necessary medicines and where unable to light fires at night due to the proximity of the SPDC battalions. This caused particular hardship in January when temperatures were often at or near freezing (source: FBR, 2004).
Forced Relocation in Karenni State - Partial List of Incidents for 2004
In January 2004, continued attacks by the Burmese army resulted in 5,000 Karenni and Karen IDPs on the Karen-Karenni border, just inside northern Muthraw District, Karen State. Karenni villages along the border were ordered by SPDC LIB 249 to relocate to relocation sites on Mawchi road, including Mandaline, Mawchi, Bwa Doh, "8-mile" village and Ko Sa Kee relocation sites. Villagers, fearing forced labor and beatings by the SPDC military, did not comply with the order. The villagers would also be unable to farm their land and harvest their crops if they complied with the relocation order.
On 23 January 2004, SPDC LID 55 enforced the relocation order. On 26 and 29 January 2004 the Division 55 sent 10 battalions to attack the villages, resulting in over 2,000 Karenni IDPs: 1,000 people fled to Toungoo District, Karen State, while 1,000 fled into Papun District (Muthraw), Karen State. The following villages and number of persons reportedly fled to Lu Thaw Township, Papun District:
1. Pa Hko village, 39 families with 207 persons;
2. Ka Yai Khee village, 38 families with 186 persons;
3. Yu Heh Daw Kho village, 39 families with 167 persons;
4. Per Khee, Per Lor, Per Has Khee and Ka Waw Kyo villages, 215 families with 1055 persons; and
5. Kaw Kha Daw Kho, Htee Wi and Nu Hta villages, 99 families with 495 persons.
The SPDC military chased the Karenni villages into Karen State and then attacked Karen villages causing over 3,000 Karen to flee. (Source: CIDKP, 2004) (Please see section 13.4 "Forced Relocation in Karen State" for more information, below.)
The Burmese army offensive ended in late January 2004 and by early June 2004 most of the displaced Karen and Karenni villagers had returned home. Of the 2,000 Karenni IDPs, approximately 350-400 were still in Karen State at the time of this report, 25 June 2004. In Karenni State, some of the displaced returned but could not live in their villages. Instead they live in hiding nearby so that they are close enough to tend their fields but still relatively safe from attack. 600-700 people went to relocation sites during the offensive but had been allowed to return to their villages by the time of this report because they had no food in the relocation sites. Most were able to live in their old villages, but some were only able to stay near their fields.
During the January offensive, the IDPs received some emergency relief from FBR teams and once the offensive ended rice from the KSWC (Karenni Social Welfare Committee) was delivered to the IDPs. The rice was sufficient for the months of April and May and in June local villagers and the Karenni resistance provided rice. However, there was a need for rice in July for the Karenni IDPs who remained in Karen State (approximately 350-400 in Papun District (Muthraw), Karen State, and 30-40 in Toungoo District, Karen State). Even if they were able to return to their villagers it would have been too late to harvest for 2004. In May, plastic sheeting for shelter for these IDPs was sent from the KSDP (Karenni Student Development Program).
The SPDC military placed landmines extensively in the areas south of the Mawchi Road and near the village of Paho, three miles north of the Karen border. The Karenni resistance removed four landmines near the village. On 10 May 2004 at 11:00 am, a 30 year-old Karenni man was killed when he stepped on a landmine laid by the SPDC military while trying to return to his village. On 26 May 2004 at 9:00 am, Naw Ger Moo Paw, a 16 year-old Karenni girl, stepped on a landmine near Htoo Ka Htoo village northwest of Mawchi. She lost her leg and was sent to a mobile clinic in Karen State. (Source: FBR, 2004)
On 13 January 2004, approximately 100 SPDC troops from IB 3 under the command of Htun Oo came to Nuthu Htar village, west of Mawchi, and burnt the whole village to the ground. Villagers had already fled, abandoning the village just before the attack took place. (Source: KNAHR, 2004)
On 28 February 2004 at 6:00 am, troops from SPDC LIB 422 entered a hideout site near the Karenni-Karen border where some Karenni villagers from Hosarkee were taking refuge with local Karen. The SPDC troops opened fire without warning and killed three Hosakee villagers and wounded another. The villagers were:
1. Saw Bwemu, age 60;
2. Naw Kee Lei, age 45;
3. Saw Deh Tar, age 40; and
4. Saw Taw Htee, age 46, was wounded.
(Source: KNAHR, 2004)
On 25 June 2004, villagers of Pao village, Karreni State, fled into the jungle as SPDC LIB 135 approached the village. The fleeing villagers took with them only what they could carry. (Source: FBR, 2004)
On 28 June 2004, SPDC troops entered Paho village, Karenni State, and captured 1 villager. The villager had left his hiding place, where he had been hiding with other IDP villagers, to gather his possessions. The SPDC troops then approached the hiding place of the villagers causing the villagers to flee deeper into the jungle. (Source: FBR, 2004)
On 30 June 2004, SPDC LIB 428 approached Gay Lo village causing more than 100 villagers to flee. In this area, 200 people are in hiding and over 800 more, who were in the path of the operation, were preparing to flee at the time the incident was reported. (Source: FBR, 2004)
On 15 September 2004, SPDC troops called the village headmen and pastors of villages in the Mawchi area to a meeting at Saya Daw Temple. In the meeting the SPDC demanded that the villagers move to a relocation site no later than 16 October 2004. None of the villagers wanted to move so they were in hiding in the forest at the time of this report. Villagers who remained in their villagers are preparing to flee into the jungle rather than be forcibly relocated. (Source: FBR, 2004)
On 28 September 2004 at 2:00 pm, troops from SPDC LIB 428 led by Colonel Win Zaw attacked the Karenni Army and civilians in Nu Thu Hta village, Mae Chie District, southern Karenni State. The villagers fled into the mountains while 1 Karenni soldier was killed and 1 SPDC soldier was killed during the fighting. Following the attack, the SPDC troops entered and burnt down Nu Thu Hta village, arresting 1 villager, Kaloo Pah, without reason. After burning the village, the SPDC troops laid 18 landmines around the village. (Source: FBR, 2004)
On 28 September 2004, troops from SPDC LIB 428, guided by KNSO (Karenni pro-SPDC faction), attacked Karenni IDPs in their hiding place across the Karen border in the vicinity of K'Si Kee. The SPDC and KNSO attacked the IDP hiding place with sustained rifle and machine gun fire, causing the IDPs to flee. One family, including a 95 year old grandmother, her daughter, three grandchildren and one 20 year old grandson were unable to flee and huddled together in their hut. During the shooting the grandmother and grandson were each shot in the leg. When the SPDC troops and KNSO entered the hide site they found this family in their hut and yelled, "Go see if he is an IDP, and if he is, then kill him." The granddaughter held her 3 children and the soldiers fired a complete magazine of ammunition into the wounded grandson, killing him. The soldiers then left the hut. The grandmother, granddaughter and her 3 children followed them out of the hut and the grandmother confronted them saying, "Now that you have killed my grandson, kill all of us." The soldiers ignored her and began to burn all the IDP huts down. (Source: FBR, 2004)
In October 2004, militia groups (Pyithusit) ordered villagers in the western part of Mawchi to relocate to Su See village, Khamaphya, northern Mawchi, by 15 October 2004. According to U Khun Reh, joint secretary of the KNPP, the order affected approximately 40 villages from Mawchi and Baw Keh Townships and more than 3000 people. If the villagers failed to move to the relocation site by the deadline a military operation would be launched to arrest and kill the remaining villagers. Typically, the military shoots villagers who they find hiding in small groups in the jungle. They also force people who they arrest to porter for the army. According to U Khun Reh, becasue of the shooting some villages had sustained serious injuries and more than 10 villagers had been killed. The villages are being moved to Su See village so that villagers are kept close together. This ensures that it will be possible for the SPDC to conscript villagers to serve as laborers for building military camps and for road construction when needed. The villagers who do not want to move have been preparing to flee to avoid the military attack. They have asked KNPP to take care of them and find them a secure place to stay. U Khun Reh has stated that he has sent this request to the allied government and expects that the villages will be provided with support. (Source: "Many Villagers in Kayah State Are Ordered to Relocate,” NMG, 11 October 2004)
In November 2004, Shadow Police officer, Hla Shwe, and Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) member, Soe Soe Shwe, forced Thridah village tract chairman, Hla Reh, to sign an order which said all villagers located in Thiridah village tract, namely Thiriday and Daw Tadah, must relocate by 10 December 2004 at the latest. The order was signed by Shadow USDA's chairman on the 1st of November 2004. However, the order did not say where these villagers were to relocate. (Source: KNAHR, 2004)
13.7 Situation in Mon State
According to the October 2004 TBBC report, the number of IDPs in Mon State has decreased from 75,800 in 2002 to 31,100 in 2004. TBBC has reported that of the 31,100 IDPs in Mon State, the vast majority (25,000) live in New Mon State Party (NMSP) ceasefire areas, 3,800 live in hiding in "free fire" areas and 3,800 live in SPDC controlled relocation sites. Significantly, the decrease in IDP estimates is not attributed to the resettlement and reintegration of IDPs into the community but rather is a result of IDP population movements. TBBC has speculated that the decrease in estimates of IDPs in relocation sites stems from the unsustainable nature of relocation sites and can be attributed to the movement of Karen villagers in northern Mon State into urban fringe areas nominally under KNU control. While TBBC has not provided a specific explanation for the decrease in estimates of IDPs in both ceasefire and "free fire" areas, this decrease could also partly be explained by movement of IDPs in southern Mon State into urban fringe communities and partly to migration into Thailand (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004). According to the Mon National Relief Committee, a committee established by the NMSP to coordinate assistance to Mon refugees and IDPs, the number of IDPs in Mon State is significantly higher, at over 50,000 (source: “Socio– Economic Condition of Mon IDPs in Southern Burma,” HURFOM, 30 September 2004).
Some reports indicate that forced relocation decreased after July 1995 when the NMSP made a ceasefire agreement with SLORC, the military regime at the time. As part of the ceasefire agreement, the NMSP was given administrative control of twelve areas located within Mon State, Karen State and Tenasserim Division. Areas outside of the twelve designated NMSP ceasefire areas remained under the control of the SLORC. Significantly, the agreement also included the repatriation of over 10,000 Mon refugees from Thailand. The repatriation of Mon refugees was completed in 1996. However, as many of the Mon refugees had fled to Thailand to escape human rights violations perpetrated by the SLORC, they feared returning home to their villages. Therefore, many of the returning refugees did not resettle into their villages, which were located in SLORC controlled areas, but into the NMSP ceasefire areas, which offered some security (source: Unwanted and Unprotected: Burmese Refugees in Thailand, Human Rights Watch, September 1998).
The sustainability of resettlement into NMSP ceasefire areas has been limited and therefore both the returning refugees and other villagers fleeing to these ceasefire areas have remained internally displaced within Mon State. According to TBBC, the number of IDPs in NMSP ceasefire areas has increased to 25,000 in 2004. While the population within NMSP ceasefire areas has grown significantly, the size of ceasefire areas have remained fixed. This affects villagers' ability to access a sustainable livelihood. Cultivatable lands are limited and the SPDC severely restricts movement outside the ceasefire areas. Therefore, extending fields beyond the ceasefire areas is not possible and consequently there are severe food shortages in the ceasefire areas (source: Reclaiming the Right to Rice: Food Security and Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma, BBC, October 2003). While acknowledging difficulties in assessing food shortages due to its subjective nature, TBBC found that IDPs in Mon State faced the greatest levels of food shortages in eastern Burma. Concerning the sustainability of resettlement in ceasefire areas, TBBC concluded that "it is the inability of NMSP to offer both a protective and enabling environment which restricts the sustainability of resettlement in the ceasefire areas. Upland ceasefire areas are not suitable for low land farmers such as the Mon, but SPDC's counter insurgency campaign restricts the option of searching for fertile fields away from home. Yet without the restoration of rights, people do not feel safe to return to their villages or resettle elsewhere in Burma. Eight years after the refugees returned from Thailand, international humanitarian assistance has still not been able to reach these ceasefire areas via Rangoon. Relief aid from Thailand prolongs the viability of the ceasefire areas as temporary sanctuaries, but there has not been an end to displacement for 25,000 people currently residing there" (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
Areas of Ye Township, in southern Mon State, have remained contested areas where NMSP splinter groups have continued armed resistance. Between late 2003 and June 2004, the SPDC launched a military offensive in southern Ye Township against the Monland Restoration Army (MRA). The MRA is the armed wing of the Honsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP), which was formed in November 2001 when Col Nai Pan Nyunt and approximately 150 troops broke away from the NMSP. As a result of SPDC led counter insurgency campaigns and ensuing human rights abuses, approximately 16,000 IDPs fled from Ye Township in 2003 and 2004 (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004). The HURFOM reported that following military offensives in the first half of 2004, widespread human rights abuses continued as the SPDC military consolidated their presence in the area. Human rights abuses included arbitrary detention, torture and the killing of villagers suspected of being rebel supporters. The SPDC military also restricted the movement of villagers, often preventing them from attending to their fields. This, together with demands for both money and food, severely affected villagers' ability to provide for themselves and their families. The threat to personal security together with the lack of a sustainable livelihood has contributed to the sharp increase in the IDP population in Ye Township in the past two years (source: “Gross Human Rights Violations in Ye Township, Southern Part of Mon State,” The Mon Forum, HURFOM, 30 September 2004).
Internal displacement induced by counter insurgency activity has also been reported in northern Mon State throughout 2004. Northern Mon State is largely populated by Karen villagers and the KNU is active in this area. TBBC reported that the population of relocation sites in this area has decreased in the past two years. TBBC has speculated that this decease of IDPs in relocation sites is a result of villagers fleeing from relocation sites to villages afforded some protection by the KNU (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
Land confiscation also continued throughout 2004, which further contributed to internal displacement. Since 1998 the SPDC has confiscated over 8,000 acres of agricultural lands in southern Mon State. The SPDC military also often forces villagers to work in these plantations, further restricting their time to attend to their own fields. The threats posed to both villagers' personal security and livelihood in areas under contested administration has led thousands of villagers from southern Mon State to flee. According to TBBC, these abuses have led as many as half the population of over 20 Mon villages to become displaced in the past two years (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
There is a strong history of development induced displacement in Mon State which persisted through 2004. Most notable, large scale displacement was recorded during the construction of the railroad between Ye and Tavoy, which covered a distance of 160 kilometers, in the early 1990s. In 2004, there were reports that 1,200 families from six wards in Moulmein city, the capital of Mon State, were displaced as a result of the Rangoon to Moulmein railway project. The project aims to make Moulmein city the terminus for the Rangoon rail line. The railway route will run over a newly constructed bridge over the Salween River through to Moulmein city center. According to the HURFOM, the SPDC originally did not offer compensation to the city residents who were forcibly evicted to make way for the railway line through the city. However, following international outcry, the SPDC reportedly promised full compensation for the cost of the destroyed properties and the distribution of land allotments in a new Satellite town designed to house the evicted city residents. The land allocations were based on the size of the house destroyed and allotted on a lottery bases. According to HURFOM, as of March 2004, only 200 – 300 families had moved to the new Satellite town, while as many as 5,000 people have remained in the city as IDPs. This is partly attributed to the fact that the new Satellite town is located on paddy fields in a valley and prone to severe flooding in the wet session. Furthermore, many of the IDPs hold jobs as either vendors in the city center or as hard laborers on the sea bank in the western part of the city. They would therefore lose their employment if forced to move to the Satellite town, where very few employment opportunities exist (source: “Eviction by Salween Bridge (Moulmein) Project and Rangoon-Moulmein Railway Project in Mon State,” The Mon Forum, HURFOM, 31 March 2004).
Forced Relocation in Mon State - Partial List of Incidents for 2004
In July 2004, the Ye Township Peace and Development Council ordered 300 households to relocate and also confiscated nearby land. A public hospital and police station will be constructed on the confiscated land. The Village Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MCWA), an SPDC sponsored organization, has also been sent to households in the Township to collect 1,000 kyat per household to fund the construction of the hospital and police station. (Source: “Forced Relocation of 300 Houses in Northern Part of Ye Township,” The Mon Forum, HURFOM, 31 July 2004)
13.8 Situation in Shan State
Shan State is the largest ethnic nationality state in Burma and its shear geographical size together with issues of access have made both population and IDP figures difficult to ascertain. Despite these constraints, it is estimated by Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) that there are over 300,000 IDPs currently in Shan State. According to TBBC, the current IDP population of southern Shan State is 216,100, with the vast majority of 185,000 located in ceasefire areas, 9,300 in hiding in "free fire" areas and 2,800 in relocation sites. Furthermore, it was reported that throughout 2004 an average of 1,400 Shan refugees per month crossed the border into Thailand (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004). The large number of Shan IDPs fleeing into Thailand indicates that the conditions for IDPs in Shan State throughout 2004 remained desperate.
The people of Shan Sate have been the victims of one of the largest ongoing forced relocation campaigns in Burma. Beginning in 1996, the SLORC ordered the forced relocation and destruction of every village within a designated region of Central Shan State. The villagers were forced to move into sites directly under SPDC military control. By 1998, over 1,400 villages in 12 townships had been forcibly relocated and destroyed, displacing a population of at least 300,000 people (source: Charting the Exodus from Shan State: Patterns of Shan Refugee flow into Northern Chiang Mai Province of Thailand 1997-2002, SHRF, May 2003).
The Shan State Army South (SSA-S) formed in 1996 following the surrender of Khun Sa and the Mong Tai Army. The SSA-S are active in southern Shan State and the massive forced relocation campaign in Shan State can be partly attributed to the SPDC's counter insurgency efforts against the SSA-S. It is widely documented that the SPDC use forced relocation as part of their "four cuts" campaign to prevent civilian support of insurgents. Prior to 2002, approximately 120,000 villagers were relocated from northern and central Shan State into ceasefire areas controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). These areas are reportedly a major supply route for the SSA-S and are strictly controlled by both the SPDC military and the UWSA. According to TBBC, the "autocratic rule and the ongoing suppression of rights by the UWSA has obstructed opportunities for people forcibly relocated to re-establish their livelihoods. At the same time, further displacement has been induced amongst former land owners whose property has been seized to accommodate the new arrivals" (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
Forced relocation in Shan State often takes place in the name of crop substitution and drug eradication programs. For instance, the SPDC forcibly relocated tens of thousands of Wa and Lahu villagers from northern Shan State to low land fields in southern Shan State between 1999 and 2002. In July 2002 this area was then proclaimed as "drug free" by the authorities. However, recent reports on the drug trade in Burma have highlighted both the human rights abuses suffered by the relocated communities and the fact that drug production has continued at a high rate. Relocated farmers are neither provided with an alternative livelihood or with adequate infrastructure. Furthermore, crops are destroyed and no compensation is provided, further impoverishing the community. Opium farmers are also subject to detention and extra-judicial killings. ALTSEAN Burma has estimated that 260,000 households, or 1.2 million people on the opium zone, are facing starvation and death as a result of "drug eradication" measures. Furthermore, while areas of central Shan State have been deemed "drug free", there has been a marked increase in drug production in other areas of Shan State, such as in the northeastern townships of Mongpawk, Mongka, Mongngen and Mawfah on the east bank of the Salween River (source: A Failing Grade: Burma's Drug Eradication Efforts, ALTSEAN Burma, November 2004).
In May 2004, Free Burma Rangers (FBR) conducted a relief mission into the Mong Pan area in southern Shan State. This area is controlled by the SPDC military and their ceasefire partners the UWSA. The relief team documented cases of rape, torture and forced labor inflicted on IDPs. FBR also reported that IDPs continued to flee from SPDC controlled relocation sites and that they usually fled in groups of one to three families. The IDPs reportedly try to flee to SSA-S areas or into Thailand (source: FBR, 2004).
In 2004, development induced relocation resulting from the proposed Ta Sang dams continued. Ta Sang is located along the Pang River, which is the largest tributary of the Salween River. On 20 December 2002, MDX, a Thai based company, signed a Memorandum of Understand (MoU) with the Burmese government to develop the dam project. It is estimated that the main dam will be 188 meters and that the reservoir will flood hundreds of kilometers. The dam project has already attracted the attention of environmentalists and human rights activists because of expected environmental destruction and large scale forced relocation. According to Salween Watch and Southeast Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN), "If the Ta Sang Dam is built, about fifty of the original communities and the forests along both sides of the lower Pang River would be flooded." Salween Watch and SEARIN have estimated that at least 2,000 families have already been forcibly relocated from this area under the pretext of counter insurgency operations and that 600 of these families continue to live as IDPs close to their original homes on Pang Island. Salween Watch and SEARIN have gone so far as to argue that "the forced relocation program conveniently cleared out communities along the river so that if the dam is built, the military simply can say that no one is living in the area that will be flooded, thereby avoiding having to pay any compensation to those villagers who already were relocated" (source: The Salween Under Threat: Damming the Longest Free River in Southeast Asia, Salween Watch and Southeast Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN), September 2004). TBBC has also reported that attempts to consolidate control of the areas adjacent to the dam site resulted in villages being forcibly relocated from the Mong Nai area in the first half of 2004 (source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, January – July 2004).
Forced Relocation in Shan State - Partial List of Incidents for 2004
In January 2004, a patrol of SPDC troops from LIB 513 led by Commander Naing Win looted and then burnt down 12 houses of villagers in Tawng Laang village relocation site in Sanin village tract, Paang Long, Loi-Lem Township. The attack came after LIB 513 and Shan opposition soldiers clashed on 22 January 2004. Following the fighting, SPDC troops came to Tawng Laang village and accused villagers of harboring Shan soldiers. The SPDC troops then chose 12 of the biggest houses in the village and after looting them, burnt them to the ground. (Source: SHRF Monthly Report, SHRF, August 2004)
In July 2004, 150 acres of rice fields and gardens and a village adjacent to them were confiscated by SPDC troops of Central Command No.3, led by Col. Tint Lwin, in the Kaeng Tawng area of Murng-Nai Township. The land confiscation was ordered by Rangoon and affected 147 villagers, living in 37 houses and 150 acres of rice fields and gardens. The villagers were ordered to move away from the village within 15 days. The villagers were told that they could move where they wished to go and that they could take their possessions with them. They were also told that they could dismantle their homes and take them or sell them to the SPDC. The villagers requested that they be allowed to look after and harvest their rice fields before leaving their land and the SPDC commander stated that he had no objection to this as long as no further orders were received from Rangoon. All the villagers of Nam Tum Nur village moved out between 8 and 22 July 2004, many of them to Ton Hung village tract in Murng-Nai Township and some to other places. (SHRF Monthly Report, SHRF, September 2004)
On 23 October 2004, a patrol of SPDC troops from IB 248 came to villages in both Murng-Nai Township and Nam-Zarng Township and ordered villages to relocate. The villages in Murng-Nai Township were ordered to relocate to Naa Khaan village. These villages had previously been forcibly moved to Naa Khaan village relocation site by SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) troops in 1996 and allowed to return in 2000 by SPDC troops. The affected villages were:
The villages in Nam-Zarng Township were ordered to relocate to Wan Nawng Kung Mong village. These villages had also previously been forcibly moved to Wan Nawng Kung Mong village relocation site by SLORC troops in 1996 and allowed to return in 2000 by SPDC troops. The affected villages were:
The original order demanded that the villagers relocate within 7 days. However, according to later reports, villagers were allowed to remain in their villages if they paid 300,000 kyat to the SPDC troops. (Source: SHRF Monthly Report, SHRF, January 2005)
13.9 Situation in Tenasserim Division
Conflict and development induced displacement continued in Tenasserim Division throughout 2004. TBBC reported that there were approximately 37,100 IDPs in Tenasserim Division in 2004, 31,700 of which were living in one of 38 relocation sites. Five thousand IDPs were reported to be living in ceasefire areas and a further 5,000 in hiding in "free fire" areas within the state. TBBC also reported that over 100 villagers had recently attempted to return to their original villages. However, these efforts were reportedly not successful and resulted in further displacement (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
There were reports of continued conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Mon splinter group, the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA), throughout 2004 in the northern township of Yebyu. This conflict is reported to have led to the displacement of 1,000 people in Yebyu and Ye Township and to an influx of IDPs into the NMSP ceasefire area in northern Tenasserim Division. Counter insurgency operations and human rights abuses have been perpetrated by not only the Tatmadaw but also the MNLA in this area. Villages within the NMSP ceasefire areas have also been subject to these abuses, including the destruction of houses, the confiscation of food stocks, extortion, movement restrictions and killings (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).
Displacement due to development projects in Tenasserim Division continued in 2004. The Yadana gas pipeline was built through Tenasserim Division between 1993 and 1996 and there have been numerous reports of the forced relocation and other human rights abuses perpetrated by the Tatmadaw during its construction. More recently, development induced displacement has been related to the construction of the Ye-Tavoy road and railway project. In the second half of 2004 there were reports that the Tatmadaw ordered the relocation of approximately 2,000 villagers from villages adjacent to the project site (source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July – December 2004). It was reported that the vacated land was to be used for the construction of new military barracks and a hospital. Concurrently, households in Du Yah village were also ordered to contribute 1,000 kyat each for the construction of the buildings (source: Paung, Shah, "Army Orders Mon Villagers to Move," Irrawaddy, 27 July 2004). In November 2004, there were also reports of land confiscation in Tavoy Township where there are plans to construct a new airport (source: ABSDF, 2004).
Forced Relocation in Tenasserim Division - Partial List of Incidents for 2004
On 9 February 2004, 12 Salons (Mokens) escaped from their native islands in Kawthaung Township, Tennesserim Division, and fled to nearby Ranong in Thailand. Local SDPC authorities are rounding up and arresting Salons (Mokens) in southern Burma to make them partake in a sea gypsy festival starting on 14 February. According to the 12 Salons who escaped, the Burmese authorities arrested and detained 5 young Salons on each island and intend to force them to perform traditional dances for tourists. The Salon women were also treated with disrespect by the soldiers who arrested them. On 10 February 2004, the Thai authorities sent the escaped Salons back into Burma waters were they are in danger of being arrested and tortured by Burmese authorities. (Source: "Burmese Authorities Rounding Up Sea Gypsies For Show," DVB, 10 February 2004)
On 14 February 2004, 11 families working on their plantation up stream of Pa Wa Chaung in Tenasserim Township, Mergui District, were ordered to move to Pawa village where, along with local villagers, they were forcibly relocated to Pawa Plaw Hpa Htaw (Pawa Kwin She) monastery. Though the IDPs did not finish building their new shelters in the new site the houses they left were burnt down by SPDC troops. Seven hundred and fifty baskets of paddy rice, 100,000 betel nuts and 1 garden were also destroyed. (Source: Monthly Human Rights Situation Report; Tenasserim Division, Mergui-Tavoy District Information Department, KNU, February 2004)
In July 2004, SPDC troops ordered several hundred villagers in northern Ye Township, Tenasserim Division, to leave their homes by the end of the monsoon season. The military government plans to build a hospital and a military building on the vacated land. Army troops also ordered all households in Du Yah village, including those that had been displaced by the order, to pay 1,000 kyat for the construction of the new buildings. The villagers were not compensated for their loss of property and military authorities have also confiscated several of the villagers’ farms, rubber gardens and areca palm gardens. (Source: “Army Orders Mon Villagers to Move,” Irrawaddy, 27 July 2004)
On 27 September 2004 at 5:30 am, SPDC LIB 262 led by Commander Aung Kyaw Oo attacked Nah Ka Praw (Hsaw K'daw Hta) village, Mergui- Tavoy. The village was an IDP hide site. Three Karen villagers were killed by the SPDC troops. They were:
1. Saw Bua, male, age 46;
2. Saw Yin Poe, male, age 40; and
3. Naw Ah, female, age 45.
A KNLA medic, Saw See Pa Thru (age 27) was also killed. The troops destroyed 62 houses, 5 rice barns, a health clinic and a school. Two hundred and forty two villagers were displaced. (Source: FBR, 2004)
In November 2004, The District Development Council from Tavoy Township confiscated and destroyed residents' lands, gardens and materials in order to construct a new airport. In the beginning of November 2004, the construction engineers in Tavoy Township started taking measurements in the front and at the back of the old airport for the construction of the new airport. In that area, 2 monasteries and more than 20 houses were destroyed and forced to relocate. No compensation was provided to the residents who lost their land and property. There was also another monastery and over 30 houses in Let-wai-kyun section which were destroyed. (Source: ABSDF, 2004)
13.10 Forced Relocations in Other States/Divisions
On 1 May 2004 at 9:00 am, approximately 400 soldiers led by department authority director General Htin Aung Kyaw and the secretaries of the Section, Township and District Development Councils, including (Swun-ah-shin), raided and destroyed the houses of villagers in Shwe-lin-ban village, Hlaine-tha-ya Township, Rangoon Division. While the soldiers were destroying the houses, the villagers attempted to defend themselves and fight back as they did not agree. As a result, 1 policeman was seriously injured. On 3 May 2004 at 8:00 pm, the same group kidnapped villager U Tin Shwe and took him to the VPDC office and then handed him over to the police station.
There were approximately 40 families living in Shwe-li-ban village. The village had existed for approximately 50 years. The villagers were forced to relocate to a field by the riverside, approximately 800 yards from the original village site. According to U Thein Naing, who lived in Shwe-li-ban village, "We have been living and earning our lives in this village for over 50 years in peace. Now, our village has been destroyed by the authorities who claim that the village is situated where the road goes although it is not near the road. This will also affect the 2 second year students at my house who are going to have examinations. The authorities totally destroyed the houses in Shwe-li-ban village then forcibly relocated the villagers as the result." The villagers were not provided with any compensation for their loss of property. (Source: "Forced Relocation Village in Hlaine-Tha-Ya Township," Yoma3, 15 May 2004)
13.11 Interviews
Interview #1
Source: Free Burma Rangers
Date of interview: 16 April 2004
Name: Xxx Xxx (name withheld)
Age: 25
Address: Palawa Township, Arakan State, Burma
Occupation: Soldier
Marital Status: Single
Xxx Xxx fled from Burma Army Battalion 55, located at Capali Island. He became a soldier because he had gone to Bangladesh for two months and upon returning to his village he was arrested at the Ta Raw Li camp. While in custody, a Captain asked him to pay 10,000 kyat or join the military. He didn't have enough cash so he was forced to join the Burma Army.
He ran away from Mari Wa Camp on 12 March 2004 due to racial discrimination. There was only one other Arakanese soldier, most of the others were Burman in Mari Wa Camp, a border security camp near India. He says that his Captain did not issue him a gun because he was Arakanese. He was given a gun when he was on sentry, but he observed that all of the Burman soldiers had their guns all the time. He was not allowed to leave the camp, but all of the Burman soldiers were allowed to leave the camp and watch movies.
His Captain forced him to carry bamboo and supplies. He was paid very little. He fled to the Arakan Liberation Party with one G-3 and 200 bullets.
Interview #2
Source: Free Burma Rangers
Date of Interview: 12 May 2004
Name: Xxx Xxx (name withheld)
Age: 32 years old
Address: Withheld
Nationality: Karen
Religion: Animist
Family Status: 6 persons
Occupation: Cultivator
She said she was hiding with her father in a barn (storehouse) on the west side of her village. Her father, Saw Xxx Xxx, was 90 years old and could not see well. While she and her father were hiding, on 11 May 2004 at about 12:00 pm, the Burma Army troops from LIB 388 came into her village. They found her hiding place and she ran out and left her father alone. The troops captured her father and took him away. She said she saw three of the Burma Army soldiers come toward the barn and then they took all of her household and farming materials and destroyed the barn as well. There were 16 sacks of paddy in the barn. The owner of the barn was Naw Xxx Xxx. It is assumed that Saw Xxx Xxx was killed.
Interview #3
Source: Free Burma Rangers
Date of Interview: 16 May 2004
Name: Xxx Xxx (name withheld)
Age: 47
Address: Palawa Township, Arakan State, Burma.
Occupation: Cutting bamboo and farming
Marital Status: Married with 4 sons and 4 daughters
Xxx Xxx was forced to search for his son (please see interview above) who escaped from his military camp (Burma Army Battalion 55). Burma Army Battalion 33 forced Xxx Xxx to come to their camp, they asked about his son and searched him. He was afraid of being arrested, so he left his village and fled to India. Xxx Xxx is worried for his family now.
Interview #4
Source:
Free Burma Rangers
Date of Interview: 19 May 2004
Name: Xxx Xxx (name withheld)
Age: 47 years old
Nationality: Karen
Religion: Animist
Address: Withheld
Family Status: 5 persons
Occupation: Farmer
Saw Xxx Xxx was a village chief in X X and X XX, with 52 houses and 507 villagers. His villagers were under the control of Burma Army IB 60, based at Chein Ma Taung Camp. Because of this, his villagers are facing many problems. He said, "The Burma Army do not force villagers to be porters and demand money, but they still demand villagers to work for them, and to give food such as chicken, duck, pork, eggs, and cigars." He also said that the camp commander ordered one of his villagers to go and wait in the Burma Army office each day. Moreover, the Burma Army LIB 264 mobile troops took two villagers to work for them for a day whenever they entered and left the village. During 2004, his villagers were forced to relocate close to the Burma Army car road. The order came from the division commander.
Interview #5
Source: Free Burma Rangers
Date of Interview: 29 June 2004
Name: Xxx Xxx (name withheld)
Family Status:
Married, 12 children (oldest child is 17 years and the youngest child is 2
months)
Village:
Paho
The Burma Army from Mawchi gave an order for their village to move within five
days. This was after Christmas, late December 2003/early January 2004 when they
gave the order. His family had no time to get all of their possessions. They
went to X X for one month and after that moved to X XX. He is farming in this
village now.
In Paho his house was burnt twice within the past five years by the Burma Army
from Mawchi. The Burma Army troops who burnt his house also took his chicks and
other possessions. Many times the Burma Army took things from villagers in Paho.
The KNSO (Karenni National Solidarity Organization) also asked villagers to come
see them many times, but they never went. The KNSO came one time to Paho in
October 2003 and destroyed all of their banana plantations, rice and vegetable
farms. He never experienced forced labor. Seventeen years ago he was arrested by
Burma Army soldiers. They tied his hands and neck and kicked his stomach. They
accused him of being part of the Karenni resistance and asked for his gun.
"If they come, we run away."
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