16.1 Background
The immense violence that has been inflicted upon civilians throughout the world from anti-personnel landmines has led to the growing international acceptance of the necessity of their eradication. On 5 December 1997, in response to this realization, 122 countries came together and signed the Mine Ban Treaty (also known as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction). In opposition to the worldwide trend however, Burma has to date not acceded to nor signed the treaty and continues to be not only a regular user of landmines, but also a producer. Since the Mine Ban Treaty’s inception in 1997, Burma has abstained from voting on every resolution of the UN General Assembly which supports it and continues to state that the problem of insurgency prevents them from signing the treaty.
Anti-personnel landmines are victim-activated weapons that indiscriminately kill and maim civilians, soldiers, elderly people, women, children and animals. These devices can remain functioning long after military personnel have departed and even after the cessation of hostilities. As a result of their autonomous nature, landmines often inflict injury in situations that might otherwise appear peaceful. Civilians often perceive environments to be safe after the cessation of open conflict and attempt to resume their means of livelihood. Accordingly, one study suggests that a third of Burma’s landmine casualties are civilians. (Source: Analysis of the Impact of Landmines in Burma, Nonviolence International, 2002)
Despite the numerous ceasefires that have been signed between the Burmese government and various insurgent groups, landmine casualties in the country still appear to be rising. Burma currently suffers amongst the highest numbers of landmine victims each year of any country. Despite the growing carnage resulting from the use of landmines, Burma remains, along with Russia, the only other country to have been deploying them on a regular basis since 1999. (Source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004)
The atrocities related to landmines in Burma are not limited to the injury and death of non-military personnel but also include their use to violate Article 13 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights (that of an individual’s freedom of movement both domestically as well as to and from their home country). In order to restrict the movement of supplies and information to insurgent groups, well-established routes to and from villages have been mined. Villages themselves have also been mined in attempts to prevent the return (and in some cases departure) of both forcibly relocated communities as well as, in some areas, refugees.
In 2004, the UN pursued a more direct approach to landmine issues in Burma. In their April 2004 resolution, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged Burma to “consider as a matter of high priority becoming party to … the Convention on the Prohibition on the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.” (Source: "Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar," Sixtieth Session of the Commission on Human Rights, United Nations Economic and Social Council, 9 April 2004)
Despite the Burmese government’s dismissal of the issue, three armed groups came forward in 2004 and signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, thereby forswearing the use of anti-personnel mines. These three groups were: the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation, the National United Party of Arakan, and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (based in India). Despite the Burmese government’s reluctance to pursue a restrictive landmine policy, they did send a representative to attend the Humanitarian Mine/UXO Clearance Technology and Cooperation Workshop in Kunming, China, on 26-28 April 2004. (Source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004)
16.2 Human Minesweepers
The Burma Army’s practice of forced conscription of villagers for use as porters continued in 2004. Forced portering was normally conducted in states along the Thai, India, or Bangladesh borders where the majority of military campaigns were carried out. These are also the areas where landmine deployment and density is the greatest.
As in previous years, civilians conscripted as porters in 2004 were forced to carry heavy loads of food and ammunition and were regularly sent ahead of troops in order to act as human minesweepers. Prisoners have also been used as porters and minesweepers. In such cases, porters are forced to walk over minefields so as to trigger the detonators. They are also forced to employ more systematic methods of de-mining such as dragging logs across minefields in front of military troops. According to a survey cited in the 2004 Landmine Monitor report “more than seven percent of interviewed refugees identified being ‘forced to walk on minefields'” as a source of trauma in their lives in Burma (source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004).
16.3 Situation in Border Areas
As a consequence of Burma’s many lasting conflicts, much of the countryside has been left heavily mined. Landmine deployment tends to be concentrated in the border areas where the scale of insurgent warfare has been the highest. Border areas have been mined by government troops in order to both prevent insurgent forces from penetrating the central region of the country and also as a means of controlling the movements of villagers in conflict areas.
Villagers are seen by government troops as sources of logistical support for insurgent forces. As a result, villagers have frequently been forcibly relocated to areas under Burma Army control and their former villages and fields have been heavily mined in order to dissuade them from returning. According to a report by the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), this is becoming an increasingly common practice employed so as not to leave evidence of the forcible evacuation (source: Enduring Hunger and Repression: Food Scarcity, Internal Displacement, and the Continued Use of Forced Labour in Toungoo District, KHRG, September 2004). Villagers forcibly relocated often return to their former farmlands in order to tend and harvest their crops. This results in frequent civilian casualties. Roads and paths are also regularly mined, thus creating barriers to movement that villagers will not easily cross.
Insurgent forces are also regular users of landmines in Burma’s border areas. Mines are laid by opposition forces throughout border states as a means of protecting secured areas and blocking the advancement of government troops. The combined landmine deployment by both government and opposition forces has effectively littered border areas with hidden barriers and no-mans lands.
In past years, Burma Army forces have been accused of laying mines across the border in neighboring Thailand and Bangladesh. These accusations have created tension between governing powers and the 2004 joint-country border demarcation programs between Burma and Bangladesh were suspended after extensive landmines in the region prevented the project from being carried out. (Please see section 16.7 Bangladesh-Burma Border, below)
16.4 Mine Deployment
There remain numerous countries that have yet to sign the Mine Ban Treaty, though Burma, along with Russia, is the only other country that continues to deploy landmines on a regular basis (source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004). The Burma Army has pursued two separate strategies in order to maintain their landmine stockpiles.
The Burmese government has, in the past, imported and deployed anti-personnel landmines manufactured in China, India, Italy, the Soviet Union and the United States. The state-run Myanmar Defense Products Industries has, however, become the army’s major supplier and produces MM1, MM2 and Claymore-type mines, which it produces in its No. 4 plant in Pyay (Prome) in central Burma (source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004). According to the KHRG “The MM-1 is a copy of the Chinese-made PMOZ-2 stake fragmentation or 'corncob' mine, and the MM-2 is a copy of the Chinese-made PMN blast mine” (source: Enduring Hunger and Repression: Food Scarcity, Internal Displacement, and the Continued Use of Forced Labour in Toungoo District, KHRG, September 2004). Each SPDC battalion in Karen State is reportedly given an arsenal of 50 "blast" landmines (MM1 and MM2) as well as 30 directional fragmentation mines (Claymore-type) and is likely to be re-issued supplementary mines when their initial stock has been used up. There have been no reports of the Burmese government exporting any foreign or domestically manufactured mines to other countries, though they did present an offer of sale to Bangladesh in late 2003, which was declined (source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004). The government continues to remain silent on the types and quantities of landmines which they retain in their stockpiles and estimates of their possessions can not be accurately made. Along with this, the Burmese Ministry of Defense denies that their troops use landmines and even the existence of them within the country (source: Landmines: When Repatriation Becomes an Act of Murder, BI, 1 October 2004).
The Burma Army’s most intense campaign of landmine deployment has been focused in the border areas along the east of the country in Karen, Karenni and Shan States, as well as in west of the country in Arakan and Chin States. In 2004, 9 out of Burma’s 14 States and Divisions were mine-affected as well as cross-border areas in Thailand, Bangladesh and India. Mines have been laid in these regions during counter insurgency campaigns for militarily strategic goals as well as to restrict the movement of forcibly relocated villagers who are suspected en masse of offering logistical support to insurgent forces. The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), a pro-junta militia based in the east of the country, has regularly received landmines from SPDC troops. These have been deployed, like those of government troops, in campaigns against opposition forces as well as to control civilian movement. Landmine deployment in civilian areas is so great that a multi-year survey found 14% of civilian mine victims had been injured within half a kilometer of the center of a village. (Source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004)
Despite the renunciation of landmine deployment by three armed opposition groups, the number of such groups using landmines has increased over the years from 10 in 1999 to 15 in 2004. Those groups, as reported in the 2004 Landmine Monitor Report, were “the Shan State Army; Karenni Army; Karen National Liberation Army; All Burma Students Democratic Front; People’s Defense Forces; Myiek-Dawei United Front; Wa National Army; Pa-o People’s Liberation Front; Chin National Army; All Burma Muslim Union, as well as a cluster of smaller organizations in southern Karen State who field a few combatants under the banner of the DAB Column. Other armed groups that use landmines, but currently have non-hostility pacts with the ruling authorities, include the United Wa State Army and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army. A splinter faction, the Hongsawatoi Restoration Party, also used mines.” (Source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004)
Insurgent groups in the past have been able to purchase American and Chinese made landmines on the black market, though this practice has become more difficult in recent years. These groups have therefore predominantly been using SPDC-laid mines, lifted from their place of deployment or stolen from Burma Army stockpiles, as well as an increasing number which they have manufactured by themselves. (Source: Enduring Hunger and Repression: Food Scarcity, Internal Displacement, and the Continued Use of Forced Labour in Toungoo District, KHRG, September 2004)
Locally made landmines have been constructed out of materials like PVC piping, bamboo, wood, scrap metal, shotgun pellets, empty bottles and milk cans (source: Enduring Hunger and Repression: Food Scarcity, Internal Displacement, and the Continued Use of Forced Labour in Toungoo District, KHRG, September 2004). These mines typically use batteries as their source of power to ignite the detonator. As a consequence of this, the mines are rendered ineffective after about six to nine months when the batteries die, thus limiting their long-term potential to inflict civilian casualties. Several armed groups reportedly have the capacity to manufacture blast mines, fragmentation mines and Claymore-type mines. A reporter with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines was shown one locally made mine which employed an anti-tilting mechanism so as to prevent its removal by the enemy (source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004). According to one opposition soldier, these locally made landmines cost the groups an average of US$ 1 per unit. Component parts for these mines have been bought from various armed opposition groups as well as Thai businessmen who operate logging concessions in border areas within Burma.
16.5 De-mining
Within Burma there has been an appalling lack of de-mining activities and this trend continued into 2004. There were no de-mining activities carried out in 2004 for humanitarian purposes. The limited de-mining that did take place was done for the purpose of achieving militarily strategic goals. De-mining in these situations was typically done by civilian porters or convicts. As mentioned above, conscripted villagers or convicts were regularly forced to walk in front of government military personnel through minefields in order trigger the explosions. The KHRG reported that convicts had been forced to detect and clear mines using sticks and their bare hands and that at least three had died during such a procedure (source: Karen Human Rights Group Information Update, KHRG, 23 March 2004).
There has been no systematic recording of mine locations either by Burma Army troops or insurgent forces. Some armed opposition groups have claimed that they inform local villagers of mine locations, though no civilian mine survivors who were interviewed during a survey by Non-Violence International reported having heard any such warnings. There were infrequent reports in 2004 of minefield labeling, such as signs on the road from Hpa-an to Myawaddy in Karen State which read "mines" in Burmese. In Toungoo District, Karen State, an area mined by government forces was marked by military personnel with a red and white hand-painted sign. (Source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004)
The lack of systematic recording and marking of landmine locations is a likely contributor to continued civilian casualties. If and when future de-mining activities are attempted, the absence of records will prove to be a significant hindrance in the achievement of a landmine-free country.
16.6 Thailand-Burma Border
The eastern region of Burma which runs along the border with Thailand continued in 2004 to be the most extensively mined area in the country. The density and expanse of landmine coverage in Karen, Karenni and Shan State is the result of decades of civil warfare which has seen both government and opposition forces deploying mines. SPDC and DKBA troops have made regular use of landmines throughout the region in amongst civilian habitation and transport routes. Both groups have also made use of local villagers as forcibly conscripted porters and minesweepers.
A systematic policy known as the “four cuts” campaign has been employed to remove civilians out of villages situated in areas where resistance forces are suspected of operating. Under the program, landmines have been heavily laid in and around the emptied villages and fields, which have both often been burnt to the ground once villagers are expelled. The “four cuts” campaign is intended to separate opposition forces from their sources of logistical support, which the villagers are perceived to be. Along with landmine deployment in villages and fields, paths and roadways have also been covered in attempts to restrict the movement of both soldiers and villagers alike. Pathways leading to Thailand have also been mined in order to restrict refugees from both leaving for Thailand and returning to Burma. This last policy has had the duel effect of creating landmine victims and hindering their efforts to seek treatment in Thailand.
Thailand is seen as a location of both medical treatment and refuge. As a result, 46% of landmine victims in Karen State make the journey to Thailand through jungle and militarized areas in order to receive some form of treatment. Functional medical facilities along the Burma side of the border are rare and mostly without the capacity to properly treat landmine victims. With an estimated one civilian landmine amputee each day in Karen State, this leaves a significant amount of survivors in hazardous health conditions each year who do not make it to adequate medical facilities. (Source: Landmines: When Repatriation Becomes an Act of Murder, BI, 1 October 2004)
Further mine related issues arose in 2004 as a result of developments in the proposed construction of a new hydroelectric dam on the Salween River in eastern Burma. Since beginning the development of the Salween Dam, government troops have concentrated their efforts along the river and the roadways and paths that have been constructed to connect the dam with the country’s central region. Mines have been laid all along these new roads in order to fend off incursions from insurgent groups. From March to April 2004, Burma Army troops constructed a new road which ran from Kor Pu to Paw Hta, which was to allow supplies to be brought in from Papun and would also connect to the SPDC garrison at Dar Gwin. Landmines have been laid along this road as well as along the previously constructed Papun - Kor Pu-Dar Gwin road. Karen Rivers Watch, an NGO which monitors the impact of developments in the construction of the Salween Dam, reported that “landmines which have been laid beside the roads have frequently proven deadly for villagers in the area.” (Source: Damming at Gunpoint: Burma Army Atrocities Pave the Way for Salween Dams in Karen State, Karen Rivers Watch, November 2004)
In 2004, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees began preliminary negotiations with the Thai government for the repatriation of Burmese refugees (source: Landmines: When Repatriation Becomes an Act of Murder, BI, 1 October 2004). Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and therefore is not obligated to follow any international norms or standards in the protection and treatment of refugees. The Thai government considers the refugees to be temporarily seeking shelter from situations of conflict. When armed opposition groups in Burma sign ceasefires with the SPDC, the Thai government claims that the refugees no longer require a place of asylum and can therefore return to their country of origin. Unfortunately, the areas along the Thai-Burma border where the majority of the Burmese refugees in Thailand have fled from are so densely covered in landmines that repatriated refugees are certain to traverse over dangerous terrain. Many of the villages where refugees once lived are also heavily mined and the former inhabitants will therefore require a different place of residence until the landmines have been cleared and the area is deemed safe enough for their return. The landmines in the border areas will continue to pose a grave threat to civilians long after the cessation of open conflict and will prevent the area from being a place to where refugees can be safely repatriated until much work has gone into mine clearance.
16.7 Bangladesh-Burma Border
The border dividing Bangladesh and Burma stretches along 208 kilometers of extremely rugged terrain and continues to be one of the most heavily mined areas in the country. The Burmese army has planted landmines along the Burma side of the border since 1991 when 250,000 Rohingya Muslims fled to Bangladesh from Arakan State. A report released in 2004, however, claimed that mines had been laid along the border-line and into Bangladesh since 1997 (source: "List of Landmine Deaths on Bangladesh-Burma Border," Narinjara News, 20 July 2004). The mines were allegedly laid to restrict the cross-border movement of insurgent forces and smuggled weapons. A consequence of this is that subsequent travel has become extremely dangerous for both refugees fleeing from and returning to Burma as well as for economic migrants and traders.
It was further reported in a Bangladesh paper that, since 1997, there have been 16 landmine related deaths on the Bangladesh side of the border as well as countless animal casualties (source: "List of Landmine Deaths on Bangladesh-Burma Border," Narinjara News, 20 July 2004). Narinjara News later reported over two dozen victims of SPDC-laid landmines along the Bangladesh-Burma border during the few years prior to the article’s release in late 2004 (source: "Border Landmines Have Far Reaching Effects," Narinjara News, 14 December 2004).
One problem relating to both landmine deployment and conventional military campaigns is the lack of a clearly demarcated border between the two countries. Joint Burma-Bangladesh attempts to mark out the borderline were suspended in 1998 when it was realized that extensive landmine coverage was posing too great a risk to those involved (source: "Border Landmines Have Far Reaching Effects," Narinjara News, 14 December 2004). The undefined border continues to cause tension between the two countries and in March 2004 it was reported that Nasaka (Burma border security force) troops had abducted 13 Bangladeshi loggers from the Bangladesh side of the border (source: "Burma and Bangladesh Clash Over Abduction of 13 Loggers," Narinjara News, 28 March 2004).
16.8 India-Burma Border
The potential for landmine victims along the India-Burma border remained throughout the year despite the fact that there were no reports obtained by this organization regarding new incidents of landmine casualties in this area for 2004. The continued state of insecurity comes as a result of landmines which, according to earlier reports, were laid throughout Naga areas in Western Burma during the SPDC’s military campaign there in 2001 (source: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2003, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 25 February 2004). Government forces allegedly laid landmines in the villages of Naga refugees who had sought shelter in India as a result of the conflict. The situation for the Naga has been further exacerbated by pressures put on them in India to return to Burma.
In 2004, there was one armed group along the India-Burma border that consciously abstained from the use of anti-personnel landmines. The National Socialists Council of Nagaland, which claims to represent the Naga people, singed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment on 21 October 2003, thereby forswearing mine use (source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004).
16.8 Mine Risk Education
Mine Risk Education in Burma has typically been a poor recipient of domestic and international attention. This trend began to change in 2003 and gained increasingly more attention in 2004 with an expansion of programs related to landmine dangers. Nonviolence International, a human rights organization, continued in 2004 to run their advanced mine risk education program in Karen State. The program consisted of training local trainers of Mine Risk Education. The International Committee of the Red Cross conducted an assessment in February 2004 in order to determine whether to begin a Mine Risk Education program (source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004). The Burmese government showed some interest in Mine Risk Education by sending a representative to the Humanitarian Mine/UXO Clearance Technology and Cooperation Workshop in Kunming, China, on 26-28 April 2004. (Source: Landmine Monitor Report 2004 (Burma), International Campaign to Ban Landmines, November 2004)
16.8 Landmines – Partial List of Incidents for 2004
Note: Dooplaya, Pa-an, Papun and Thaton Districts, as reported below, are all areas demarcated by the KNU as Karen territory. Thaton District falls mostly in the SPDC demarcated area of Mon State, while the area to the east of the Donthami River lies within SPDC demarcated Karen State. Thaton District is under the patrol of the 1st Brigade of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). Dooplaya District falls mostly in SPDC demarcated Karen State and partially in SPDC demarcated Mon State. Dooplaya District is under the patrol of the 6th Brigade of the KNLA. Papun and Pa-an Districts fall entirely in SPDC demarcated Karen State. Papun District is under the patrol of the 5th Brigade of the KNLA and Pa-an is under the patrol of the 7th Brigade of the KNLA. The SPDC does not recognize these as official districts. Instead, the SPDC considers there to be 3 districts (North to South: Kawkareik, Pa-an and Myawaddy) and 7 townships (North to South: Than Daung, Papun, Hlaing Bwe, Pa’an, Kawkareik, Myawaddy, and Kya In Seik Gyi) within SPDC demarcated Karen State. These townships do not correspond with the KNU demarcated districts and townships, even for those which share the same name.
Pa-an District
In November, Battalion Commander Chit Thu of DKBA 999 special battalion instructed his troops to plant landmines extensively. He also ordered villagers together with their cattle and buffalo to come back and stay in the village after harvesting their paddy. (Source: KIC, 2004)
On 16 November 2004 at 7:15 pm, Saw Po Du (age 30) of Pa Kloo village, Na Boo Township, stepped on a landmine planted by DKBA troops near Pa Kloo. (Source: KIC, 2004)
Papun District
In January 2004, the Burma Army increased its patrolling of the east-west road from Kaukkyi to Saw Hta on the Salween River. The troops involved also laid mines along the road and posted additional positions to guard crossing routes and shoot on sight anyone attempting to cross the road. (Source: "Ongoing Burma Army offensive in the Northern Karen State and Southern Karenni State," FBR, 26 January 2004)
On 7 January 2004, a 17 year old boy stepped on a MM2 style landmine of either Burmese of Chinese manufacture outside of Ka Lae Lo village and lost his leg from the knee down. The mine had been laid by Burma Army troops during their campaign to clear all Karenni refugees out of southern Karenni State. The troops had crossed into Karen State and chased out villagers from Ka Lae Lo, Lay Wa, Say Ba Ti and Marmee villages. The troops then burned down 3 rice barns at Ka Lae Lo village and planted a landmine on the main trail out of Ka Lae Lo village about 500 meters from the village. (Source: FBR, 12 January 2004)
On 23 January 2004, Burma Army troops arrived at Siday village in northern Karen State. They encountered previously laid landmines and subsequently retreated to Sa Kee village, Eastern Toungoo District, after suffering an unknown number of casualties. (Source: FBR, 26 January 2004)
On 23 December 2004, troops from SPDC LIB 439 led by Battalion Commander Aung Htay Win ordered 4 women and 14 men from Klay Soe Khee village to clear landmines from the road to Bu Hsa Khee camp and repair it. As a result, Klay Soe Khee villager Saw Ta Po Dee (age 15) was wounded by a landmine. (Source: KIC, 2004)
On 10 May 2004 at 11:00 am, a 30 year old Karenni man was killed when he stepped on a Burma Army landmine while trying to return to his village south of Mawchi near the Karen State border. (Source: FBR, July 2004)
On 26 May 2004 at 9:00 am, Naw Ger Moo Paw (female, age 16) stepped on a landmine near Htoo Ka Htoo village northwest of Mawchi. She lost her leg and was sent to a mobile clinic in Karen State. (Source: FBR, July 2004)
In February 2004, it was reported that a Buddhist novice monk was injured by a landmine while trying to evade SPDC soldiers who were patrolling around the monastery near Krein Kanyar village in southern Ye Township. (Source: "Landmine Use by Both Parties," Kao Wao News, 29 February 2004)
On 29 February 2004, it was reported that 3 porters and 2 SPDC soldiers were wounded after stepping on landmines near Krein Kanyar village in southern Ye Township, Mon State. The porters had been forced to walk ahead of the patrolling troops. The 2 injured soldiers were taken for treatment to the military hospital at Southeast Command in Moulmein. One of the porters, Nai Bee (age 33), lost his leg and was sent to a public hospital. His family was required to pay a huge sum of money for his treatment. Another of the porters, Nai Hlear, fled to Thailand. (Source: "Landmine Use by Both Parties," Kao Wao News, 29 February 2004)
Note: Both Nyaunglebin District and Toungoo District are areas demarcated by the KNU as Karen territory. Toungoo falls partially in SPDC demarcated Pegu Division and partially in SPDC demarcated Karen State. Toungoo is under the patrol of the 2nd Brigade of the KNLA. Nyaunglebin falls in SPDC demarcated Pegu Division and is under the patrol of the 3rd Brigade of the KNLA. The SPDC does not recognize Nyaunglebin or Toungoo as official districts.
Nyaunglebin District
On 12 December 2004, after a dry season campaign through KNU territory, SPDC LIB 589 started the construction of a new military camp on the site of Su Mu Klo village on the south bank of the Bolo Chuang River, approximately 20 kilometers north-east of Shweygyn City. This camp was 1 of 3 that were built on the site of razed Karen villages which, at the time this was reported, marked the eastern most front of the SPDC's penetration into KNU territory. The second camp was started by SPDC IB 20 on 19 December on the site of Wa Law Thae village, 15 kilometers east of Shweygyn and the third camp was begun on 21 December on the site of Mae Tae Ta village on the Taungale River, 15 kilometers east-south-east of Shweygyn, under the direction of SPDC LIB 350 and LIB 598. The approaches to all 3 of these camps/former villages were extensively mined. Other sites of razed villages that the SPDC passed through in there eastward campaign were also heavily mined so as to prevent anyone from returning to their former homes. (Source: FBR, 27 December 2004)
On 20 December 2004, Company Commander Yan Naing Soe and Bo Ko Lay of SPDC LIB 599 ordered 1 person from each household of Mar Lar Daw village, Mone Township, to clear their military compound at Wah Mi Soe. At 1:30 pm, a villager named Saw Paw Baw stepped on a landmine and was severely wounded. (Source: KIC, 2004)
Note: Mergui-Tavoy District is an area demarcated by the KNU as part of Karen territory. Mergui-Tavoy falls into SPDC demarcated Tenasserim Division and is under the patrol of the 4th Brigade of the KNLA. The SPDC does not recognize Mergui-Tavoy as an official district.
On 25 February 2004, an 8 year old boy stepped on a landmine that had been planted by the Burmese army. Saw Wah Lay's son was playing beside his village in Htee Seh Baw Htee Hta, Tenasserim Township, Mergui District, when he stepped on a landmine. He survived but lost his left foot. (Source: Monthly Human Rights Situation Report; Tenasserim Division, Mergui-Tavoy District Information Department, KNU, February 2004)
On 25 July 2004, about 60 troops from SPDC LIB 350 led by Lieutenant Colonel Aung Min Thein came and planted landmines in the Peh-htaw-khee area. Tha-may-plaw villager Saw Thoo Meh (age 24), son of Saw Po Shaw, was killed by 1 of those landmines. (Source: KIC, 2004)
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~