8. Rights of Ethnic Minorities

 

In conclusion, I would like to stress again that the right of “self-determination” that we are struggling for is what we call “internal self-determination”: which will guarantees our collective rights; the right to rule our homeland by ourselves, the right to practice our religious teaching and culture freely, the right to teach, learn and promote our language freely, and the right to up-hold our identity without fear and live peacefully together with others. I can assure you that we are not separatists. We are for a united Union of Burma, but what we want is a genuine federal union where all ethnic groups in Burma can live peacefully together ­[sic].

 

– Dr Lian H. Sakhong General Secretary of the United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD-LA) and Ethnic Nationalities Council – Union of Burma (ENC). (Source: “A Struggle for Self-Determination in Burma: Ethnic Nationalities Perspective,” delivered at the Conference on Indo-Burma Relations, India International Center, 16-17 September 2004)

 

8.1 Background

 

Burma is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, with over 135 different ethnic groups and its population speaking over 100 different languages and dialects. The population of Burma is estimated to be 50 million people, with over 20 million people referred to as “ethnic minorities." Therefore, the ethnic minority civilians constitute one third of the population, living on 55% of the land area or 371,000 sq. km. The major ethnic groups include the Chin, Kachin, Karen (or Kayin), Karenni (or Kayah), Mon, Rakhine (or Arakan) and Shan. These major ethnic groups are predominantly located in the border areas. The ethnic groups in Burma are frequently referred to as “ethnic nationalities.” At the same time, they are also defined by the international community as “ethnic minorities” because they represent a marginalized people. Morevoer, the ethnic minorities have been subject to exclusion and oppression imposed upon them by the dominant Burman majority (source: Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics, ICG, 7 May 2003).

 

The impressive and unique diversity found in Burma has been a source of conflict throughout Burma’s history and in the more recent attempts to create a democratic nation state. Throughout its entire existence as an independent state, Burma has experienced a complex set of conflicts between the central government and ethnic minority groups. More than half a century of civil war has caused immense suffering and devastation for Burma and its people. A series of ceasefires between the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and armed ethnic opposition groups since the late 1980s have brought relief in some areas but no real solutions and fighting continues. The government’s determination to preserve a unified state remains the main justification for military rule, and armed conflict is a root cause of ongoing human rights abuses and a deepening humanitarian crisis in ethnic minority areas. (Source: Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics, ICG, 7 May 2003)

 

Before the British annexed the territory of Burma, as a province of British India, the people inhabiting the land were ruled by various separate kingdoms and local tribal leaders. The kingdoms in the central Irrawaddy plains made successive attempts at pushing the boundaries of their territories further into the hills but the geography of the land served to isolate those in the hills from those in the plains. Before Burma achieved independence in 1948, there had been no political integration of the minority national territories with the Burman areas. The non-Burman indigenous nationalities in Burma were politically autonomous before and during the time of British colonial rule. Under colonial rule, ethnic differences became further amplified through the system of government under which Burma was administered as two separate territories: "Ministerial Burma", areas predominately Burman, and the "Frontier Areas", where ethnic nationalities lived.

 

In Ministerial Burma, the traditional monarchy was abolished and a form of parliamentary home rule was introduced. For the most part, the frontier areas were left under the local authority of their traditional headmen and chiefs. Ethnic minorities, principally the Chin, Kachin and Karen, were preferred for recruitment into the colonial army and the natural resources of minority areas were the most heavily exploited, with little investment in return. By dividing the country into "Ministerial Burma" and "Frontier Areas" the British system not only created divisions and resentments which carry on until this day, but it ultimately set the peoples of Burma on different paths of political and economic development. (Source: Smith, Martin, Burma (Myanmar): The Time For Change, Minority Rights Group International, May 2002)

 

The Burman majority has always held the roots of anti-colonial sentiment, while after early resistance, many of the hill peoples were more welcoming to the British than the Burmans. Like the Burmans, plains or valley-dwelling minority groups, notably the Mon and Shan, have languages with long and rich written traditions. With British annexation, Christian missionaries promoted education and the transcription of minority languages into writing for the hill peoples, galvanizing a sense of modern ethnic or national identity among peoples that previously had been scattered or politically disparate. Cultural and political organizations swiftly followed, the most important of which, the Karen National Association (KNA), was formed in 1881. Such new influences and institutions, however, created a sense of unease among many Burman nationalists who regarded Christianity, like Indian and Chinese immigration, as a divisive element in the British arsenal of "three Ms": missionaries, merchants and military (source: Smith, Martin, Burma (Myanmar): The Time For Change, Minority Rights Group International, May 2002).

 

During the Second World War, Burman nationalist forces aligned with the Japanese Imperial Army and were involved in a series of bloody clashes with ethnic minority groups who stayed loyal to the British. They later turned against the Japanese and cooperated with the returning British army. However, atrocities committed during the early months of the Japanese campaign, particularly in Karen communities in the delta, left deep-seated enmity among many ethnic nationalists that remain today (source: Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Report, ICG, 7 May 2002).

 

From 1945 to 1948, a new state structure had to be developed in order for Burma to become independent. General Aung San, the Burman independence leader, stated: "In my opinion it will not be feasible to set up a unitary state. We must set up a Union with properly regulated provisions to safeguard the rights of the national minorities." Independent Burma was created on the understanding that it would be a federal union. The separate political rights of the minority national areas were recognized in the January 1947 agreement between General Aung San and the British Prime Minister Attlee. The rights of the ethnic national groups were also recognized in the February 1947 Panglong Agreement between Burman leaders and other national groups, in the commission of inquiry on the frontier areas and in the independence constitution of 1948. Each of these fundamental political and legal documents recognized rights of self-determination of the indigenous nationalities.

 

The Panglong Agreement, between General Aung San and Chin, Kachin and Shan leaders, is the closest that the minority ethnic groups and the majority Burmans have ever come to having a successful and peaceful union and is often considered the starting point for future negotiations. The challenge to create a sense and structure of national unity in the new Union from peoples that had formerly been administered separately, while still respecting their rights to ethnic autonomy, was first attempted here. However, the Karen – which constituted one of the largest minorities – boycotted these negotiations, believing that the British would grant them an independent state, and there were strong critics also among other ethnic groups. The agreement is also important because it, in many respects, is what led to independence a year later. Respected Shan resistance member and scholar, Dr. Chao Tzang Yawngwe, has noted, "The Panglong Accord and its principles or the Panglong spirit is at the very heart of our past, present, and future. The Panglong vision, shared by all non-Burman leaders and by General Aung San, was to establish a democratic, federal Union, based on federalism, the equality of states, and their self-determination. In the final agreement of 12 February 1947, ‘full autonomy in internal administration’ (Article 5) and the enjoyment of democratic ‘rights and privileges’ (Article 7) were guaranteed for the Frontier Areas, and hence some ethnic minority peoples. No one state was envisioned as being the mother-state (Pyi-Ma), superior to or above other states. The Panglong spirit is critical to future attempts at building the nation because it provides a solid and historical basis for democracy, peace, and real people’s power" (source: "An Evening with Dr Chao Tzang Yawngwe," Kao Wao, 16-20 February 2002).

 

The 1948 constitution gave each nationality representation in a Chamber of Nationalities at the national level. Yet, it specifically only recognized four states for the Karen, Karenni, Shan and Kachin. Only the Shan and Karenni were granted the right to separate from the Union after 10 years. For other groups, territory was not provided for in the constitution. Many groups felt that the constitution did not grant equal rights and representation to the ethnic groups, which led to increased tensions and numerous armed resistances.  In the case of the Karen, these began as early as 1949.

 

The present constitution of Burma, enacted in 1974 under General Ne Win, gives no autonomy to the ethnic nationalities. Under the SPDC, there is no respect for minority languages, cultures, or political aspirations. The government’s response to the minority nationalities is purely militarized. In spite of this reality, Burma still claims to be a "union", and the anniversary of the Panglong Agreement has been celebrated every year since 1962 as "Union Day." (Source: Smith, Martin, Burma(Myanmar): The Time For Change, Minority Rights Group International, May 2002)

 

8.2 Ethnic Politics, Nationalism, Armed Resistance, and Ceasefire Groups

Prior to independence from the British, the ethnic nationalities were self-ruled and autonomous from other ethnic groups. Hence, the Burmese government and military has long viewed the ethnic minority population as a threat to centralized state control and the unity of Burma. The diversity of religions and languages found in the ethnic areas is also perceived by the SPDC as a barrier to “modernization” and economic progress  (source: “USDA Say Teaching Mon a barrier for reconciliation,” Kao Wao News No. 73, 21 August 2004). The rich cultural diversity expressed by the ethnic minority populations represents a stark opposition to the apparent aims of the military government to create a homogenous culture, with one language, one religion and one rule. Consequently, the ethnic minority populations have been subjected to discrimination and cultural repression for decades under the rule of successive military regimes. The ethnic minority groups have long expressed their resentment towards the military government’s oppressive strategy of “Burmanization”, employed by the government in order to eliminate cultural diversity and resistance in the ethnic areas (source: Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics, ICG, 7 May 2003).

In addition to cultural repression, ethnic minorities have been denied the opportunity to represent themselves in the political sphere. Consequently, not only the political interests but also the economic and social interests of the ethnic minority communities of Burma are completely disregarded by the government.  Lack of access to the political system within Burma has severely restricted the ethnic nationalities' ability to control their own lives and the future of their communities. As a result, the ethnic nationalities have campaigned against the centralized and exclusive political system in Burma since the country gained independence in 1948. This has been the seed for the formation of numerous armed resistance groups in the ethnic minority areas, some of which have been fighting with the government in Rangoon for over 50 years.

In 1976, the ethnic nationality armies formed an alliance called the National Democratic Front (NDF), with the aim of finding political solutions to Burma’s non-democratic political system by creating a federal union that represents all ethnic nationalities in Burma. Member groups of the NDF included the Karen National Union (KNU),  New Mon State Party (NMSP), Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Chin National Front (CNF), Lahu Democratic Front (LDF), Palaung Liberation Front (PLF), Pa-O Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Wa National Organisation (WNO). In 1989, the NDF was responsible for forming a new group called the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), which encompassed member groups from the Burman opposition movement, to further campaign for a federal union in Burma. (Source: Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics, ICG, 7 May 2003)

Since 2001, the NDF has been engaged with a state constitution process, which encourages both “inter and intra dialogue” among ethnic minority groups. The member groups have been working together to create a legal and political framework for Burma that recognizes seven main ethnic minority states; Arakan, Chin, Karen, Kachin, Karenni, Mon and Shan. (Source: “A Struggle for Self-Determination in Burma: Ethnic Nationalities Perspective,” Dr Lian H. Sakhong, General Secretary of the United Nationalities League for democracy (UNLD-LA) and the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC), 9 September 2004) (Note: A speech delivered at “Conference on Indo-Burma Relation,” India International Centre, 16-17 September 2004)

The NDF has stressed that the current ethnic nationalities’ democracy movement is striving for an “internal” self-determination that encompasses individual rights as well as “collective” rights, political rights and the right to autonomy. This objective stems from the NDF’s belief that the vast cultural diversity within Burma warrants more than individual rights. Dr Lian H. Sakhong, the General Secretary of the NDF, clearly articulated this idea at a conference in September 2004: “Individual rights is not enough for us; we need our collective rights as a people, as an ethnic group, as a nationality who speak different language, who practice different culture, who worship different religion and who also has different historical background and, above all, all of us have territorially clearly defined homelands and nations since time immemorial. And the simple fact is: We want to rule our homeland by ourselves. But we also know that we have to live together with other peoples and other ethnic groups who practice different religions and cultures and speak different languages [sic].” (Source: “A Struggle for Self-Determination in Burma: Ethnic Nationalities Perspective,” Dr Lian H. Sakhong, 9 September 2004) Therefore the NDF has been developing a constitution that will allow all ethnic nationalities to practice these rights without fear of oppression and abuse. Dr.Lian H Sakhong further argued that in order to achieve a balance between “self-rule” for the different ethnic groups and “shared-rule” for all the people of Burma, a federal system is needed, referred to as “pyi-daung-suu” in Burmese. Through a federal system, the NDF believes that ethnic groups can achieve local autonomy while also participating in state political mechanisms. Ethnic minorities would be able to make decisions at a "local government" level and maintain their ethnic identity. At the same time, they would be empowered to contribute to the social, economic and political development of Burma and exist peacefully with other ethnic groups. (Source: “A Struggle for Self-Determination in Burma: Ethnic Nationalities Perspective,” Dr Lian H. Sakhong, 9 September 2004)

Despite the fact that armed ethnic groups have always been represented in the NDF, the organization has historically tried to encourage a political rather than military strategy to achieve democracy. This strategy has involved promoting ceasefire agreements between the armed resistance groups and the military government. However, in spite of the NDF calling for a united ceasefire in Burma, whereby all armed ethnic groups participate in one ceasefire agreement with the military government, some member groups have established individual ceasefire deals with the government. These groups include the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO).

Under the State Law and Order Resoration Council (SLORC) in the 1980s, Lt General Khin Nyunt initiated and led the ceasefire movement. This initative aimed to "conquer and divide" the ethnic minority groups. Through brockering individual ceasefire agreements the SLORC fragmented the unity of the enthic minority groups and thereby weakened their opposition to the State. By the mid 1990s ceasefire agreements had been made with armed groups from the Kachin, Karenni, Mon, Palaung and Shan ethnic groups, who had previously been members of the NDF (source: Blurred Vision, ALTSEAN, 1 January –31 March 2004). Moreover, in the mid-1990s numerous groups splintered away from the central armed ethnic groups and formed alliances with the Burmese military. These defections occurred within the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the military wing of the KNU, with the formation of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and in the Shan State National Army (SSNA), with the formation of the United Wa State Army (UWSA). These breakaway groups, like other ceasefire groups, have been given elevated political and military power through control over territory, materials and business opportunities in return for forming alliances with the military government against the remaining NDF member groups (source: Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns Volume 1, ALTSEAN, November 2004).

During 2004, the main military strength within the ethnic minority armed resistance lay with the KNU, KNPP and the SSA. These groups all maintained strongholds along the Thai-Burma border. Also in the eastern border areas are the Arakan Liberation Army (ALA), based in KNU areas, and the Wa National Army (WNA), located in Karenni and Shan State. As the ALA and WNA have no territory of their own and have very small armies, they operate under the control of the three larger armed groups. On the western border with Bangladesh, the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) and the National United Party of Arakan (NUPA) maintain some military control. In addition, the Chin National Front (CNF) and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NCSM) maintain some military activity along the India-Burma border. (Source: Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics, ICG, 7 May 2003)

In late 2003, the KNU and SPDC reached a verbal ceasefire agreement, giving rise to hopes of an improved environment for human rights and political stability in Karen areas. Formal ceasefire talks continued in 2004 with the aim of consolidating the talks into a formal agreement, in addition to discussing the issue of mass internal displacement of the civilian population within Karen State (source: Blurred Vision, ALTSEAN, 1 January-31 March). Yet, despite the verbal ceasefire agreement, also known as the “gentlemen’s agreement", abuse and repression continued to be documented in Karen areas throughout the year. Both during and following ceasefire talks, fighting persisted between KNU and SPDC forces and the civilian population continued to be subjected to human rights abuses perpetrated by the SPDC and their allies. For example, in January 2004, SPDC attacks resulted in the displacement of over 3,000 civilians in Papun District alone (source: Ehna, Saw and Zaw, Khaing Mar Kyaw, “Peace Talks: ‘I Want to Go Home’,” Irrawaddy, 25 February 2004). Several human rights organizations observed that the ceasefire provided the military with an opportunity to expand and consolidate its presence in Karen areas by building more troop camps, roads and increasing supplies.

Following the KNU-SPDC verbal ceasefire agreement, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) also announced its intentions to engage in ceasefire discussions with the military government. Although the KNPP and the military regime had reached a ceasefire agreement in 1995, it was broken only three months later when fighting recommenced. Talks scheduled for late March 2004 were postposed due to disagreement over the KNPP’s position of negotiation. While the Karenni delegation referred to itself as the "Karenni Government Delegation" and wished to negotiate as a government, the SPDC rejected the term and indicated that they would only engage in ceasefire negotiations with the KNPP as a party (source: “Karenni Peace Talk Halted,” NMG, 2 April 2004). Despite the KNPP’s expressed desire to engage in ceasefire negotiations, fighting ensued throughout the year in Karenni areas causing displacement of civilian populations along with other human rights violations. For example, in December 2004, the SPDC military launched a major offensive against the KNPP stronghold at Nyamu Hill in eastern Karenni State along the Thailand border (source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July- December 2004).

On 19 October 2004, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt was removed from his position and placed under arrest, creating an environment of uncertainty for ethnic groups with whom he had brokered ceasefire agreements or those with whom he was engaged in negotiations, such as the KNU. Although the Burmese military announced that his dismissal was due to health problems, sources external to the SPDC have attributed his removal to internal power struggles and an attempt by Sr General Than Shwe to consolidate power. This initially fuelled anxiety among the ethnic groups, as Khin Nyunt was replaced by Lt General Soe Win, notorious for his hardline attitude towards the ethnic minority movement and the National League for Democracy  (NLD) as well for his primary role in engineering the 30 May 2003 attack on the NLD and the pro-democracy movement (source: “Burma Ends Rebel Talks Early,” Irrawaddy, 21 October 2004). However, in the same month, Sr General Than Shwe reassured the ceasefire groups that the changes within government would not interfere with the ceasefire agreements established by the efforts of Khin Nyunt  (source: "Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar," Fifty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly, Item 107 (c) of the provisional agenda, 30 August 2004).

Moreover, whilst the newly appointed Prime Minister General Soe Win was famed for publicly stating that “the SPDC not only will not talk to the NLD but also would never hand over power to the NLD,” his attitude towards the ethnic nationalities has remained consistent with that of the former prime minister (source: World Report 2005: Burma, Human Rights Watch, 13 January, 2005). Like Sr General Than Shwe, Prime Minister General Soe Win assured ethnic armed groups that there would be no changes to the foundations previously laid for ceasefire agreements with ethnic armed groups. He asserted that ethnic armed groups would continue to receive limited autonomy, assistance with development projects and access to business opportunities. Furthermore, in an effort to maintain the confidence of ceasefire groups, Prime Minister Soe Win carried out visits to meet former insurgents in Kachin State to reassure them that ceasefire policies would remain unchanged (source: “Myanmar's New Prime Minister Moves to Shore Up Relations with Former Ethnic Rebels,” Irrawaddy, 21 October 2004). Yet, despite these reassuring claims, increased military presence in ethnic minority areas has been reported since Soe Win’s appointment, paralleled by the continued perpetuation of human rights abuses committed against ethnic civilians by the Burmese military (source: Burma’s National Convention; Illegitimate, Unrepresentative and Oppressive, ALTSEAN, 16 February 2005).

Furthermore, fighting resulting from SPDC counter insurgency campaigns was reported throughout 2004 in various areas of the country. In Mon State, the SPDC military engaged in operations throughout the year in an attempt to eliminate the Hongsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP), a Mon splinter group which broke away from the NMSP in late 2001. Throughout the year, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) reported ongoing human rights abuses such as arbitrary arrests, torture, killing, restrictions on movement and forced labor, which often occurred in conjunction with the SPDC’s counter insurgency efforts. At the same time, fighting recommenced between the SPDC and the SSA-South in Shan State when the SPDC launched a surprise attack in the townships east of Tachilek on 11 January, killing 6 SSA-South officers. The SSA-South responded by attacking the SPDC headquarters in Takun village, resulting in persistent, daily fighting in Monkerng, Laikha, Namzarng, Kurihing, Mongnai, Longher and Mongpan villages. The SSA-South reported that it will only agree to a ceasefire with the SPDC if two pre-conditions are met. Firstly, that a national ceasefire takes place, involving all armed groups. Secondly, that open dialogue is held between all ethnic nationalities. These two pre-conditions coincide with the principles of the NDF to maintain unity within the armed ethnic resistance movement. (Source: Blurred Vision, ALTSEAN, 1 January–31 March 2004).

8.3 Need for Tripartite Political Dialogue

In October 2000, political dialogue transpired between the General Secretary of the NLD, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the ruling SPDC. The dialogue gave hope to pro-democracy groups and the international community that the military regime was beginning to take steps towards achieving a democratic political framework in Burma. However, the talks excluded ethnic nationality organizations, therefore ignoring the views of the ethnic nationalities who represent 55% of the population. In 2002, the continued exclusion of ethnic groups provoked campaigns from ethnic groups themselves and from international human rights advocates, who urged the SPDC and pro-democracy activists to involve ethnic groups in political discussions. Consequently, pro-democracy groups from eight of the larger ethnic minority groups established a coalition called the United Nationals Alliance (UNA), with the aim of discussing the political goals and needs of the ethnic nationalities in preparation for their participation in tripartite dialogue with the SPDC and pro-democracy groups.

However, progress with the NLD-SPDC dialogue was thwarted throughout the first half of 2003 as the SPDC continually stalled in scheduling new talks. On 30 May 2003, the dialogue process came to a complete halt when Aung San Suu Kyi and members and supporters of the NLD were attacked by state sponsored forces near Depayin, Sagaing Division. The attack, which was led by the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA), a mobilization organization created by the SPDC, resulted in the death, injury and arrest of an unconfirmed number of people. According to the SPDC, the attacks were instigated by the NLD and resulted in the death of four people and injury of 50.  However, unofficial sources quote these numbers as much higher. Moreover, it is widely believed that there is ample evidence to prove that the attacks were well planned by state sanctioned actors. The attacks also resulted in the re-arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whilst over 90 NLD members and supporters were arrested and detained for over two months. On 25 August 2003, the SPDC reshuffled with Lt General Soe Win being promoted to Secretary 1, in place of General Khin Nyunt who was moved to the newly created position of Prime Minister. Critiques argued that this move was an attempt by the SPDC to deflect international condemnation of the events referred to as the “Depayin Massacre”, by softening their image in the international community. Following Khin Nyunt’s appointment as Prime Minister, he announced the SPDC’s "seven-point roadmap to democracy", with the aim of resuming the stalled 1993 National Convention, followed by a national referendum and national elections. Although the roadmap initially excluded the participation of ethnic nationalities in the National Convention, by late 2003 the SPDC’s policy of exclusion had reversed, with an emphasis on political engagement in return for ceasefire agreements with the government while sidelining the role of the NLD. In 2004, the SPDC continued to promote ceasefires as a fundamental component of the roadmap to democratic reform. (Source: World Report 2005: Burma, Human Rights Watch, 13 January, 2005)

In February 2004, 61 representatives from 25 ethnic nationality groups rejected the regime’s roadmap for national reconciliation and transition to democracy during the Third Ethnic Nationalities Seminar held in Law Khee La, Karen State. The ethnic nationalities made their rejection stating that the roadmap “would not lead to democratization and establishment of a federal union but only sustain a military dictatorship in the country.” Furthermore, member groups drafted an “alternative” seven-point roadmap to democracy, entitled “Rebuilding the Union of Burma,” which places an emphasis on tripartite dialogue between the military, ethnic opposition groups and the establishment of an interim government with proportional representation of the SPDC, NLD, other political parties and the ethnic nationalities. The alternative roadmap has been praised by pro-democracy groups, including the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), the government-in-exile comprised of representatives elected in the 1990 general elections, and the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB). Supporters of the alternative roadmap argue that it correctly articulates the aims and objectives of the democracy movement. (Source: Blurred Vision, ALTSEAN, 1 January-31 March 2004)

As part of the SPDC’s roadmap to democracy, the National Convention resumed on 17 May 2004, receiving strong criticsm from the NLD, other opposition parties and various ethnic nationality groups. Despite claims in late 2003 that the SPDC would release political prisoners and involve both ceasefire and non ceasefire groups, the NLD, the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and the UNA refused to participate in the National Convention due to the continued house arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the imprisonment of political party members. The SPDC’s rhetoric in 2003 clearly did not become a reality in 2004 (source: World Report 2005: Burma, Human Rights Watch, 13 January 2005). Furthermore, the National Convention received strong opposition from the KNU, the Arakan political parties, whose representatives didn’t receive an invitation to the convention, and Karenni, Palaung and Shan ceasefire groups (source: “ANC Strongly Protest Against National Convention,” ALD, 2004).

Opposition to the National Convention stemmed from several fundamental objections. The most prominent objections focus on the “6 objectives” and “104 principles” drafted by the SPDC during the 1993 National Convention, which are a pre-defined framework for the reconvened National Convention in 2004. These objectives and principles will inform the constitutional drafting process at the National Convention, in spite of the fact that they were created without consultation with the delegates (source: Blurred Vision, ALTSEAN, 1 January -31 March 2004). Moreover, the 6th objective secures the military’s domination in national politics, stating that any future president must have 10 years military experience. The second main objection lies in the fact that the National Convention does not represent genuine tripartite dialogue because some ethnic nationalities continue to be excluded from the process. A further objection lies with Law 5/96 which dictates that the government has the right to arrest and imprison for up to 20 years anyone who openly opposes government policy during the Convention. On 11 May, six ceasefire groups released a joint statement calling for modification to the National Convention, including the elimination of Law 5/96. The National Convention Convening Committee responded that it did not have the authority to meet these demands and that they therefore would not deal with them. (Sources: “Mon Leadership Meeting Boycotts Convention,” Kao Wao News No.68, 22 May 2004; “Junta Scraps Ceasefire Groups’ Demands,” SHAN, 22 May 2004)

Although the National Convention was initially met with strong opposition from both Burman pro-democracy and ethnic nationality groups, 34 ceasefire groups attended the convention when it reconvened in May 2004. These 34 groups included the 17 main ceasefire groups along with various splinter groups which had separated from the main groups. Among the attendees was the New Mon State Party (NMSP), who reported harsh restrictions on freedom of movement and speech throughout the convention. Attendess were unable to  access other groups or organizations for consultations between meetings. Moreover, under Law 5/96 attendees did not have the freedom to express oposition to policies put forward by the SPDC (source: “Ceasefire Groups Muzzled at the National Convention,” Kao Wao News No. 68, 31 May 2004). Prior to the conclusion of the 2004 session of the National Covention, 13 ceasfire groups submitted a joint proposal addressing the SPDC’s provisions for a centralized military controlled state. Among other things, the group’s proposal made clear the constituent states’ demands for a high degree of legislative control and the right to maintain independent armed forces. The SPDC rejected the joint proposal and placed pressure on individual delegations to submit independent propsals. Following additional meetings aimed at excerting pressure on the ceasefire groups to act individually and not collarboratively, the groups agreed to adapt their proposals. The Convention recessed on 9 July and by late 2004, following the removal of Khin Nyunt, the SPDC was publicizing reconvening the National Convention in early 2005 under the same conditions as in 2004. (Source: Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns Volume 1, ALTSEAN, November 2004) (Please see chapter on freedom of expression for further information.)

Many international observers have argued that the SPDC has attempted to marginalize the NLD while actively encouraging dialogue and co-operation with ceasefire groups. However, ceasefire agreements only create an illusion of greater participation for ethnic nationalities in political decision making processes, as was evidenced in the National Convention in 2004. The autonomy of ethnic ceasefire groups is limited, in the form of land control and access to resources for development projects and business ventures. Furthermore, the agreements do not involve taking real steps to empower communities to participate in the social, economic and political development of the country. Moreover, the seven-step roadmap for democracy and the National Convention exist within a political framework dictated by the SPDC, placing the military as the dominant force in informing national politics in Burma (source: Burma’s National Convention; Illegitimate, Unrepresentative and Oppressive, ALTSEAN, 16 February 2005). The KNU and other groups such as the NMSP have urged the government to review the seven-point roadmap and the “6 objectives” and “104 principles” which will inform the constitution drafting process. These groups continue to argue that in order to achieve real democratic reform in Burma, tripartite dialogue must be the first  step in the roadmap to democracy (source: Blurred Vision, ALTSEAN, 1 January-31 March 2004).

8.4 SPDC Campaigns of Abuse against Minority Villagers

“This evidence of continuing atrocities amounts to a policy of protracted cultural and physical genocide of death by a thousand cuts. Therefore, the SPDC’s much-vaunted roadmap to democracy must be seen as a hypocritical propaganda exercise which should be treated by the international community with the contempt it deserves.”

Baroness Caroline Cox, representative of Christian Solidarity Worldwide. (Source: “Fresh Evidence of Ethnic Cleansing in Burma to be Given at Briefing on April 27,” CSW, 27 April 2004)

Over five decades of armed conflict between successive military governments and armed ethnic resistance groups has had a particularly devastating impact on the lives of civilians living in ethnic minority areas. Over time, ethnic resistance groups have progressively lost control of border territories and the Burmese military has augmented its presence in these areas. In conjunction with an increased military presence,  there has been a marked escalation in the perpetration of human rights violations in ethnic minority areas throughout the country. According to the U.S. Department of State, the perpetration of human rights violations against ethnic minority groups by the military government and its allies actually "worsened" in 2004, with increased incidences of rape, forced labor, forced relocation and the looting of agricultural produce. Moreover, violations frequently do not occur independently of other violations. For example, while ethnic minority villagers are forced to relocate members of the community are subjected to rape, execution and forced labor for road construction and the construction of military infrastructure. (Source: Country Report on Human Rights Practices-2004, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 28 February 2005)

The SPDC has employed a long-term and widespread strategy of exploiting ethnic minorities to expand and strengthen its military control in these areas. Since 1997, the abuse and exploitation of villagers in ethnic minority areas has intensified due to financial difficulties within the department of the Ministry of Defense. Local commanders have been instructed to fund the needs of their soldiers locally, leading to increased demands for food and other resources needed by the troops. In addition, through the construction of roads and army bases in ethnic areas, the SPDC has demanded support from the local civilian population, in the form of forced labour, building materials, livestock and money. Villagers are consistently forced to work as porters for the army, carrying building materials, military equipment and rations. Furthermore, villagers are also forced to serve as human mine sweepers whereby they must walk ahead of the troops to detonate any landmines that may have been laid along the way (source: Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas, ICG, 9 September 2004).

Attempts to eliminate all ethnic armed resistance through the implementation of the “four cuts” counter insurgency strategy is another cause of severe human rights abuses committed against ethnic minority villagers. The “four cuts” strategy is a brutal counter insurgency campaign established in the mid-1960s and has been utilized by successive military regimes.  The strategy aims to cut off the four main supplies of food, funds, recruits and intelligence to armed ethnic groups by targeting the local civilian population. Although the “four cuts” strategy has effectively weakened the armed resistance movement, it has done so through the perpetual abuse and exploitation of ethnic minority civilians. The abuses committed include forced labor, extortion, land confiscation, torture, extrajudicial killing, forced relocation and displacement. As a result, whole communities have been driven into abject poverty. According to Thailand-Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), over 2,500 villagers have been relocated, destroyed or abandoned since 1996 in eastern Burma, including 240 villages in the past 2 years alone. Furthermore, the Burmese military campaigns to eliminate ethnic resistance and exert total control over the whole country is estimated to have displaced over 526,000 ethnic people in eastern Burma. The majority of this population is beleived to be in settlements located in areas administered by ceasefire groups.  However, an estimated 77,000 IDPs (internally displaced persons) reside in government designated relocation sites.  Conditions in relocation sites are extremely harsh and IDPs are subject to demands for forced labor and denied freedom of movement outside the relocation sites (source: Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2004).

SPDC campaigns of abuse in Karen State

In 2004, SPDC troops continued to commit human rights abuses against civilians in Karen State despite the existence of the KNU-SPDC verbal ceasefire. As the conditions of the verbal ceasefire made no provisions for troop movement, SPDC troops continued to augment and reinforce their presence through the construction of new army camps and roads. In turn, government troops perpetrated abuses including arrest, torture, forced labor, extortion, extrajudicial killing, destruction of crops and food supplies, land clearance, forced relocation and restrictions on freedom of movement. For example, it was reported that on 27 January 2004, troops from SPDC LIB 117, under LIB 55, came to Kaw Thay Doe village, Tantabin Township, Toungoo District, and destroyed 48 houses and looted items such as rice, salt fish paste and clothing. These troops also destroyed the villagers remaining possessions, worth 910,000 kyat. Moreover, it was reported that the troops killed and ate villagers' cats, leaving the skulls of the cats in the villagers' houses and also defecating in the houses. The troops threatened the villagers that they must not tell anyone about their actions (source: CIDKP, 2004). In another incident on 26 March 2004, it was reported that SPDC troops based at Pa Yah Ngote Toe camp, Dooplaya District, demanded 20,000 kyat from Htee Plaw villagers who were going from Pa Yah Ngote Toe to a religious ceremony at Wah Ma Hta. When the villagers were unable to pay the amount demanded, the soldiers ordered them to stand in the sun for more than an hour (source: CIDKP, 2004).

SPDC campaigns of abuse in Mon State

 

Throughout 2004, Mon civilians were subjected to perpetual human rights abuses, including forced relocation, land confiscation and forced labor. In particular, many of the abuses suffered by villagers in Ye Township, southern Mon State, resulted from the SPDC’s efforts to eliminate the Hongsowatoi Restoration Party (HRP), a Mon splinter group which broke away from the NMSP in 2001, and other splinter groups. Villagers were faced with strict restrictions on movement and were often prevented from leaving their villages to tend to their fields. Villagers suspected of being rebel supporters were subject to arbitrary arrest, torture and other abuses. For example, in the first week of January, commanders of SPDC IB 31 ordered 150 households in Day-bound village to relocate within three days. The commander indicated that the village was too far from other villages and was therefore suspected of providing shelter to rebel soldiers. Over 40 families lost their homes, plantations and many belongings. Those who did not comply with the order risked being shot if found in the village after the deadline (source: Terror in Southern Part of Ye Township,” The Mon Forum, HURFOM, 29 February 2004). Furthermore, on 27 August 2004, soldiers from LIB 273 killed a villager and arrested eight others from Mi Htaw Hlar Kalay village, Ye Township, on the suspicion of being rebel supporters (source: “Gross Human Rights Violations in Ye Township, Southern Part of Mon State,” The Mon Forum, HURFOM, 30 September 2004).

 

SPDC campaigns of abuse against the Chinese and Indian population

 

Despite the Chinese and Indian civilians constituting 3% and 2% of the population respectively and making a major contribution to the economy, they are not recognized as citizens of Burma by the SPDC. According to the 1982 Citizenship Law, ethnic groups determined to be non-indigenous by the government are required to prove that their ancestors lived in Burma prior to the British annexation of Burma in 1823 in order to be granted full citizenship. Most Chinese and Indians are only permitted to have a Foreign Resident Card (FRC). Without citizenship, many Chinese are unable to access government services such as healthcare and further education opportunities. Furthermore, their freedom of movement is restricted as those who possess the FRC must seek authorization from local authorities to leave their hometowns. In addition, ethnic Chinese and Indian who hold FRC cards are denied the right to own property. In 2004, the SPDC continued to enforce these discriminatory policies. (Source: Aung Lwin Oo, “Aliens in a Bind,” Irrawaddy, June 2004)

 

8.5 Abuse of Ethnic Minorities by Ceasefire Groups

 

The 1980s and 1990s saw the establishment of ceasefire agreements with over 17 ethnic insurgent groups, including the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF). However, the ceasefire agreements have not brought peace, stability and democracy to civilians living in ethnic minority areas. In many cases, these agreements have lead to ceasefire groups becoming powerful allies to the SPDC, as they are sometimes given local autonomy, material support, business opportunities and development projects in return for supporting the SPDC’s strategy of controlling the ethnic civilian population and oppressing cultural and religious diversity within ethnic minority areas. Furthermore, some of the ceasefire groups have developed an aggressive sense of ethnic nationalism, which has propelled inter-ethnic conflicts and resentment, further weakening the unity of the ethnic minority struggle in Burma. As a result, ceasefire agreements have been denounced as a tactic used by the military regime to create conflicts and divisions between and within different ethnic groups. (Source: Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics, ICG, 7 May 2003)

 

Although the ceasefire movement has arguably lead to a decrease in more severe human rights abuses, guerilla warfare and counter insurgency campaigns have continued in many of these areas. Moreover, in order to advance their own political and military control, some ceasefire groups perpetrate human rights abuses against members of their own ethnic group or other ethnic minority groups in their areas. As a result, the ethnic minority civilian populations endure greater suffering from the military regime’s "divide and conquer" strategy of forging ceasefire agreements. Facing oppression, abuse and discrimination both at the hands of the SPDC military authorities as well as by the ceasefire groups, security and economic stability become greater challenges for civilians in these areas. (Sources: Myanmar: Aid to the Borders, ICG, 9 September 2004; Thornton, Phil, “A Journey Out of the Crossfire,” South China Morning Post, 5 November 2004)

 

Abuses by the United Wa State Army

 

The United Wa State Army (UWSA), which signed a ceasefire on 5 September 1989, has received extensive material benefits and control of territory in return for sabotaging resistance among non ceasefire groups. In addition, the UWSA is notorious for carrying out drug production and trafficking in Shan State and along the Thai-Burma border, whilst publicly denying any responsibility for the drug problem in Burma. The SPDC overlooks the illegal production and trafficking of drugs in return for the UWSA’s co-operation in leading forced relocation campaigns in Shan State. Furthermore, the UWSA is well known for extorting high opium and rice taxes in Shan State, impoverishing the local community. Members of UWSA have been reported to perpetrate other human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings. For example, on 9 October 2004, approximately 30 UWSA soldiers shot and killed a Lahu couple who were inside their farm hut. The UWSA soldiers had shot at the hut without warning as they passed the couple’s farm in Nawng Mai Hok Pha village, Me Ken village tract, Murng-Ton Township. (Sources: “A Lahu Couple Shot Dead by Wa Soldiers in Murng Ton,” SHRF Monthly Report, SHRF, February 2005; Country Report on Human Rights Practices-2004, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 28 February 2005; Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics, ICG, 7 May 2003)

                                                                                         

Persecution by the Pa-O ceasefire group in Shan State

 

The Pa-O ceasefire group in Shan State is also known as a perpetrator of human rights abuses against ethnic minority groups in Shan State. For example, from August to November 2004, the Pa-O ceasefire group based in Nawng Mai Sak village, Murng-Nai Township, forcibly conscripted villagers from Murng-Nai, Nam-Zarng and Larng-Khur Townships to cultivate corn for the ceasefire group. After the corn was harvested, the ceasefire group offered the villagers paid work growing opium. Workers were provided with rice rations and told that they would receive their salary at a rate of 500 kyat per day once the opium cultivation was complete. According to the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF), 277 men and women accepted the offer and worked for the Pa-O ceasefire group. Yet, shortly before the opium was to be harvested, the ceasefire group informed the workers that deductions for the cost of the rations had been taken from their salaries rendering their per diem salary to approximately 250 kyat per day. As workers had been able to take advances on their salaries, many had borrowed more than the total they were to receive and were subsequently forced into debt. Several workers who had not taken any advances only received a total of 1,500 kyat for the entire three months of work. (Source: “Labor and Extortion by a Ceasefire Group in Murng-Nai, Nam-Zarng and Larng-Khur,” SHRF Monthly Report, SHRF, April 2005)

 

Human rights violations committed by the DKBA

 

The DKBA was formed as a result of a division within the KNU in late 1994, between Christian and Buddhist Karen. Buddhist members of the KNU felt discriminated against by the Christian majority leading to internal conflicts and eventually culminating in an armed conflict. As a result, several hundred Buddhist soldiers separated from the KNU in order to form their own army. Following this separation, the newly formed armed group surrendered to and engaged in a ceasefire deal with the military regime. In return for material support and control over areas of Karen State, the DKBA agreed to work with the SPDC to destroy the KNU’s political and military hold in Karen State. The allegiance between SPDC military forces and the newly formed DKBA resulted in a military offensive in January 1995, which succeeded in over running the KNU headquarters in Manerplaw. In 1997, a second military offensive destroyed the remaining KNU base areas along the Thai-Burma border. The DKBA’s headquarters are situated in Pa-an District with other bases in townships in both Karen and Mon States, such as Kawkareik, Kyainn-Seikyi, Three-Pagoda-Pass and Kyaikmayaw. (Source: Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics, ICG, 7 May 2003)

 

Following the SPDC's occupation of areas previously controlled by the KNU, the SPDC cut off food and monetary assistance to the DKBA, encouraging them to find their own means to meet their needs. As a result, the DKBA has committed many of the same human rights abuses as the SPDC military.  In 2004, reports documented the perpetration of human rights abuses by the DKBA, which included forced labor, forced relocation, unfair taxation, extortion and forced conscription of child soldiers. Furthermore, the DKBA has been supported by the SPDC in their own business ventures and trade goods across the border to Thailand. It has been reported that DKBA trade primarily involves trade in lucrative timber resources and narcotics. (Source: A Failing Grade, ALTSEAN, November 2004)

 

Since the SPDC offensives in 1995 and 1997, the SPDC and the DKBA have been working to secure their control over areas previously under the KNU’s control. As the DKBA has succeeded in doing so, Karen civilians who were previously living as internally displaced persons have been able to build "permanent" homes in these areas, acknowledged by the SPDC and DKBA as “established villages.” At the same time, by living in DKBA areas, villagers are more easily exploited by both the DKBA and SPDC forces. Villagers are regularly conscripted for forced labor and forced to provide food, building materials and money for military and “development” projects. (Source: Eastern Pa’an District: Forced Labour, Food Security and the Consolodation of Control, KHRG, 23 March 2004)

 

The DKBA, through being a purely Buddhist Karen armed group, have developed a strong sense of ethnic nationalism, which has spurned abuse and discrimination against non-Buddhist members of their own ethnic group. Between December 2003 and April 2004, DKBA soldiers demanded that Christian villagers in Papun District relocate from their homes unless they converted to Buddhism. In April 2004, a 19 year old Karen Christian woman from Pa Zone Chak village and a 19 year old Christian Karen man from Pa Zone Chaung village, both in Papun District, reported that DKBA troops ordered them to leave their villages. They were only given two days to pack their belongings and therefore were unable to prepare all that they needed. That which they were forced to leave behind, including houses, gardens, rice fields and possessions, was confiscated by the DKBA. In Pa Zone Chak village, the DKBA also ordered a monastery and pagoda to be built in  place of the Saturday Christian Church, and in Pa Zone Chaung village, a pagoda. (Source: BI, 2004) (Please see chapter on freedom of religion for more information.) 

 

The terrorizing of civilians by the DKBA is also reflected in the abusive strategies used by the group to strengthen their military power and protect their business interests. In 2004, the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) documented human rights abuses perpetrated by the DKBA against the civilian population in Pa’an District, including the forced conscription of villagers into their army from areas including Lu Pleh, Ta Greh, and T’Nah Hsah Townships. In all villages in Ta Greh Township, the DKBA continued to demand one person per year; alternatively villagers faced a 400,000 kyat fine. (Source: Eastern Pa’an District: Forced Labour, Food Security and the Consolodation of Control, KHRG, 23 March 2004)

 

Furthermore, the security of civilians subject to the demands of the DKBA is further threatened by KNLA soldiers who demand that the villagers ignore the DKBA. In 2004, it was reported that the village head from Thi Wa Pu village tract did not send anyone to join the DKBA in response to the KNU’s request that they ignore the order. As a result, villagers fled from their villages because the DKBA had threatened to impose forced labour on anyone who did not comply with their demands for soldiers. Thus, the civilian population is often caught in power struggles between the DKBA and KNU, impeding upon their security and quality of life with devastating consequences for the well being of households and the community as a whole. (Source: Eastern Pa’an District: Forced Labour, Food Security and the Consolidation of Control, KHRG, 23 March 2004)

                                 

Abuses by the Karenni National Solidarity Organization

 

The Karenni National Solidarity Organization (KnSO) formed in 2002, breaking away from the KNPP in Pasaung Township, Karenni State. In 2004, the KnSO reportedly worked alongside SPDC troops to perpetrate human rights abuses such as forced relocation, extrajudicial killing and torture against the ethnic Karenni people. In December 2003, the SPDC issued a relocation order to all villagers north and south of the Mawchi road, in southern Karenni State, and redeployed approximately 1,000 troops from Nyaunglebin District, Karen State, to Karenni State. However, many villagers refused to obey the relocation order fearing forced labor and beatings in the relocation sites.  Consequently, in early 2004, the SPDC and the KnSO carried out a joint attack on villages in southern Karenni State and across the Karen – Karenni border in Muthraw and Toungoo  Districts. All villagers who did not obey the December 2003 relocation order were considered supporters of the KNPP and SPDC and KnSO troops were ordered to shoot any villagers in the area on sight.  It was also reported that SPDC and KnSO soldiers burnt down villages and laid landmines on and around villages to stop IDPs from returning home.  Some reports have sited the SPDC's desire to cut support to the KNPP as the main reason for the attacks. The Free Burma Rangers (FBR), a Thai based humanitarian relief organization, reported that some villagers believed that the SPDC forces were taking advantage of the verbal ceasefire with the KNU to concentrate their forces against the KNPP (source: FBR, 2004). In another incident on 28 September, the KnSO reportedly assisted SPDC LIB 428 in attacking Karenni IDP hiding places in northern Karen State near K’Si Kee. The attacks resulted in the flight of the IDPs as well as the death of a 20 year-old IDP. According to FBR, the continued attacks on IDPs by SPDC and KnSO soldiers has rendered the IDP situation in Karenni State critical.  Not only are IDPs forced to constantly move from one hideout to another but they also face food shortages and a lack of necessary medicines (source: FBR, 26 November 2004). (Please see chapter on IDPs for more information.)

 

 

8.6 Obstruction and Interference of Holidays and Other Cultural Events/ Denial of Cultural Expression and Identity

 

The SPDC views the diversity of culture and religion among the ethnic nationalities as the root of economic instability and underdevelopment. Therefore, the SPDC employs a brutal, systematic and widespread strategy of repressing religious and cultural practices which are different to the Burman majority and which are not perceived as in alignment with the objectives of the SPDC to form a homogenous culture and a centralised political order. Although all civilians in Burma are subjected to socio-economic oppression by the militray regime, the ethnic minority nationalities must also face a daily struggle to ensure the survival of their cultures. Through determination and community strength, the ethnic groups have found ways to express their cultural identity, despite the SPDC’s continued repression of cultural expression through language, education and cultural events.

 

Mon villagers tortured for not speaking Burmese

 

In January 2004, it was reported that SPDC soldiers forced villagers in southern Ye Township to sit in the sun as a punishment for not speaking Burmese. The victims were forced to sit in the sun from 7.00 am to 6.00 pm.  According to a refugee from the area who arrived to Thailand, "The SPDC captain said we were like animals because we didn't understand their language [Burmese], so they treat us as such." (Source: “Villagers Tortured for Not Speaking Burmese,” Kao Wao News No 60, 6-23 January 2004)

 

Salon Sea Gypsies forced to live on land

 

In January, it was reported that ethnic Salon sea-gypsies, who had been forced to abandon their traditional lifestyle on boats, were facing difficulties enduring life on land. Military authorities had forced the Salon people to abandon their boats to live on Nyaughwi, Lanpi, Kyuntale and Phila islands. The authorities reportedly hoped to charge tourists a fee to view the Salon people. (Source: “Burmese Sea-Gypsies Forced to Live on Land for Tourists,” DVB, 13 January 2004)

 

Salon Sea Gypsies forced to perform traditional dances for tourists

 

In February, it was reported that local authorities were arresting ethnic Salon (Moken) sea gypsies in Tenasserim Division in order to force them to perform traditional dances in a “Sea-Gypsy” Festival organized for tourist purposes. The authorities were reportedly arresting five young Salon people from each island for the 14 to 17 February festival which was organized by the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism. (Sources: “Burmese Authorities Rounding Up Sea Gypsies for Show,” DVB, 10 February 2004; “Thirty-Seven Killed At Sea,” Irrawaddy, 4 February 2004)

 

Mon villagers fined for not speaking Burmese

 

In November 2004, it was reported that civilians from Wae Kwao village were subjected to fines between 100,000 and 300,000 kyat as a reprimand for not speaking Burmese. Furthermore, because they could not answer the soldier’s questions, the troops assumed they were supporting the insurgent group HRP (Hongsawatoi Restoration Party); this resulted in the soldiers torturing many Mon civilians. (Source: “Speak Burmese or Pay the Price,” Kao Wao News  No. 78, 9 November 2004)

 

8.7 Discrimination in Education

 

Ethnic minority children suffer disproportionately from the military regime’s severely low spending on education. In the 2003-2004 fiscal year, the SPDC allocated 1.3% of the national budget to spending on education. This minimal amount of the budget is unevenly distributed between urban and rural areas. Ethnic minority areas frequently receive the least amount of government support, leaving schools critically under funded, poorly resourced, and without adequate teachers’ salaries. As part of the government’s self-reliance program, ethnic minority schools in rural areas are encouraged to raise the funds for the school from the local community. While the government has frequently reported the construction of new schools in rural/ethnic minority areas, the schools often lack any resources or teachers, rendering them useless to the community. In addition, these schools are often built with the use of forced labor or funds extracted from the village community. Most children in these areas do not receive an education beyond fourth standard.

 

Political instability and ongoing armed conflict have also contributed to the poor state of education in ethnic minority areas. Ethnic minority communities in areas of armed struggle face widespread poverty due to the demands placed on them for food and funds by the SPDC military units active in their areas. In many villages, particularly in Karen and Karenni State, school attendance is very poor because children are frightened to go to school due to active fighting or due to the fact that schools are frequently closed down because of forced relocation orders. As part of forced relocation campaigns, villages, including schools, are frequently burned down causing many villagers to flee into the jungle and live as internally displaced persons (IDPs). Children growing up in these isolated areas are often deprived of an education because of a lack of resources and teachers. Some IDP communities attempt to establish makeshift schools in the jungle or wherever they may be hiding. Classes often take place outside, under the trees, where the only resources teachers have is a small blackboard and chalk, leaving them vulnerable to bad weather. Teachers are usually volunteers who have only attained an education up to tenth standard, working with no books or other teaching aids in a stressful and volatile environment due to fear of attack by the military. (Source: Enduring Hunger and Repression Food Scarcity, Internal Displacement, and the Continued Use of Forced Labour in Toungoo District, KHRG, September 2004 )

 

Ethnic minority children who are able to attend state schools face discriminatory policies which deprive them of the opportunity to learn their ethnic languages and culture. The SPDC prohibits instruction in any of the ethnic minority languages in all state education institutions. This policy not only poses a threat to the survival of ethnic minority languages but also impedes the educational development of those students whose first language is not Burmese. The suppression of ethnic minority languages is believed to be part of a larger system of oppression taking place within educational institutions, referred to as "Burmanization”; a systematic process of eliminating cultural and religious diversity within Burma (source: Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics, ICG, 7 May 2003). The SPDC’s strategy of “Burmanization" is particularly evident in the state curriculum, which promotes the notion of mono-culture, military rule and Burman history. Most students cannot relate to the information because it is not multi-cultural, or relevant to their lives. Often the only opportunity children have to study about local history or language is through extra-curricular activities, private education, parents or the community. By restricting freedom of cultural expression through language and education, it is argued that ethnic resistance to the government in Rangoon will weaken. (Source: Year 2004 Education Report, ABFSU-FAC, February 2005)

 

Discrimination in education against the Karen

 

In September 2004, it was reported that the Burmese government continued to prohibit the teaching of Karen language as well as a "localized" and culturally appropriate curriculum. Villagers from Nyein Chan Yay villages (peace villages in territory under the control of the SPDC) in Toungoo District reported that the government only permits Burmese language textbooks to be used in the schools. Furthermore, villagers reported that politics and democracy studies were also “strictly forbidden” in the schools, repressing opportunities for children to engage in critical thinking. A villager in Tantabin Township reported, “They do not allow us to write about Karen history. They cannot teach about democracy. The people can only learn about their (SPDC) work. If we do not praise them, but instead say that they are wrong, we are sent to prison. Recently, they have paid a lot of attention to the children so that they can change their (the children's) opinion of the SPDC and so that they have to rely on them (the SPDC)." Moreover, KHRG reported that these villagers were subjected to derogatory remarks by SPDC soldiers who told them that whether they received an education or not they would never be able to become any thing more than hill farmers. (Source: Enduring Hunger and Repression Food Scarcity, Internal Displacement, and the Continued Use of Forced Labour in Toungoo District, KHRG, September 2004)

 

Discrimination in education against the Mon people

 

The NMSP has administed Mon national schools within its areas of control since 1972. Following the 1995 SPDC-NMSP ceasefire agreement, the SPDC initially agreed to allow the NMSP to continue the teaching of Mon language within these schools. However, the SPDC later violated this agreement, viewing such institutions as a “barrier to national development and solidarity”(source: “USDA Say Teaching Mon a Barrier for Reconciliation,” Kao Wao News No. 73, 21 August 2004). In many cases, the SPDC has closed down these schools and destroyed the buildings to make way for development projects and the construction of local government offices.

 

On 29 January 2004, Colonel Myo Winn of the Burma Army stated at a meeting with Mon teachers in Kwan Ta Moi Tao Tak village that all Mon national schools must convert to state schools, teach Burmese language and raise the Burmese national flag. Schools which disobeyed risked forced closure. Again, on 19 March 2004, Colonel Myo Winn made the same announcement to teachers in a meeting in Kao Jaer village, emphasizing that the curriculum must be altered and instruction of Mon language halted. In addition, on 8 March 2004, the SPDC army commander instructed education officials from the Mon National Education Office not to travel without official permission from the military authorities. According to a local teacher, the Burma Army increased pressure on the Mon education system in conjunction with their counter insurgency efforts to eliminate the Hongsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP). (Source: “Military Bans Mon National School in Ye,” Kao Wao News No. 66, 27 April 2004)

 

In April 2004, SPDC authorities confiscated land in Lamine, northern Ye Township, which included the property of a Mon national primary school. The land was confiscated for the purposes of building a government office and subsequently the primary school was forced to close, depriving 425 children of their learning environment. One teacher reported that Colonel Myint Aung, a local SPDC military official, had claimed the Mon school was contending with the state school. The Mon national school had been built eight years prior to the closure, following the NMSP-SPDC ceasefire agreement, and had Mon teachers teaching a Mon national curriculum. (Source: “Mon Forced Out of Their Schools,” Kao Wao News No. 67, 15 May 2004)

 

In October 2004, it was reported that Ye Township Military Intelligence (MI) personnel were threatening teachers from the Mon national school in Lamine not to teach the Mon language. When the village was promoted to town status, the MI indicated that instruction of Mon language and the existence of the school were not appropriate in the town. One woman from Lamine reported that MI personnel visited the school every few days to threaten the teachers.  In addition, MI personnel visited the homes of villagers with whom teachers resided threatening them to stop providing accommodation for the teachers. (Source: Taramon, “Mon Teachers Warned By Military Intelligence,” Kao Wao News No. 76, 9 October 2004)

 

Discrimination in education against the Rohingya

 

The 1982 Citizenship Law denies the Rohingya population the right to citizenship as the Rohingya are not recongnized as one of the "135 national races" of Burma and are generally unable to prove their ancestory prior to the British annexation of Burma in 1823. Consequently, the Rohingya are considered illegal immigrants in Burma and suffer from severe human rights abuses, such as strict travel restrictions, forced labor and land confiscation. Furthermore, only citizens are allowed to attend school past primary school level in Burma.  Therefore, Rohingya children are denied access to higher education. While primary schools do exist in most village tracts, poverty forces most children to contribute to their family’s survival and therefore many Rohingya children are unable to attend school. In addition, the Rohingya speak a dialect of Bengali and as the language of instruction in schools is Burmese many Rohingya children are unable to comprehend their lessons. The only university in Arakan State is located in Sittwe, the capital. Yet, Rohingya have been banned from tavelling to Sittwe since the beginning of 2001 and therefore are only able to study through distance education programs. (Source: Forum-Asia, 2003)

 

8.8 Land Confiscation and Burman Resettlement

 

“Right now, our lives are under a modern slavery of the government. We have to pay forced labor, money, constructional materials, and farmlands, etc. Even though our valuable trees have been forcibly taken by the Nasaka for the construction of new settlers’ houses. This construction of model villages entails us forced relocation and relegated to the poorest [sic].”

 

- Rohingya school teacher in northern Arakan State. (Source: “Forced Labor for Newcomers and Relocated the Rohingya Villagers in Northern Arakan,” Kaladan News, 23 June 2004)

 

Since the early 1990s, the SPDC has carried out a systematic campaign of forced relocation in northern Arakan State, in order to establish “model villages” for Buddhist Burman and Rakhine civilians. The construction of model villages increased after 1992 and the formation of the Nasaka, or border security forces. While the Nasaka was disbanded following the ousting of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt on 19 October 2004, prior to this the Nasaka oversaw the construction of "model villages." The "model village" program is officially under the charge of the Ministry for Development of Border Areas and National Races. The Ministry is also known by its Burmese acronym, NaTaLa, and therefore "model villages" are often referred to as "NaTaLa villages." As of May 2004, Amnesty International reported a total of 26 model villages in Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships. As a result of the construction of "model villages," vast amounts of Rohingya land has been confiscated in the border townships of Maungdaw, Rathedaung and Buthidaung. Consequently, whole communities have been forced to leave their homes and relocate. (Source: The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, Amnesty International, May 2004)

 

Model villages usually consist of approximately 100 families of either Rakhine, Burman or a few smaller ethnic minority groups which reside in the western border areas. Among those of Burman ethnicity, the SPDC authorities have reportedly relocated released criminals, HIV patients, drug addicts, homeless people and retired armed forces personnel. Those who are relocated to model villages are reportedly offered incentives to encourage resettlement. Residents of model villages are provided with a home, one to four acres of land and a pair of oxen. Other reports indicate that settlers receive food supplies and amenities such as generators and refrigerators. Despite these incentives, many settlers are allegedly unhappy and attempt to return to their homes.

 

Those who are forced to relocate from their land, mostly Rohingya and some Rakhine villagers, are usually not provided with compensation or assistance. Without their farmlands through which to maintain a livelihood, many villagers are driven deeper into poverty. In addition, the Rohingya who have been forced off their land have frequently been required to provide labor for the construction of new homes for settlers. In some cases, they are also forced to provide the materials and/or funds to construct the houses.

 

From the end of May 2004, the Nasaka Director Lt. Col. Myint Oo ordered the evacuation of 130 Rohingya houses from Myaw Taung (Wa-beg) and Kyi Kan Pyin (Kawa Bil) villages in Maungdaw Township, as well as the construction of a "model village".  Rohingya villagers were ordered to build houses for newly arriving settlers from central Burma. Rohingya villagers from nearby villages were forced to work on the "settlement program" while no alternative arrangements were made for the evacuated Rohingya families, who were living in harsh conditions in nearby villages. Under the construction scheme, the villagers build 120 houses, a monastery, a school, a health center, wells and several ponds. The nearby villagers were compelled to abandon their agriculture works in order to undertake the construction works demanded by the Nasaka authorities. The villagers were not paid and, in addition to labor, were required to provide house building materials, including pillars and bamboo, and to pay 3,000 to 6,000 kyat per family according to their financial status.  The Nasaka authorities also confiscated 260 acres of land from surrounding Rohingya villages in order to provide the new settlers with farming land. As a result of the measures imposed, some villagers’ family members were reportedly facing starvation. (Source: "Forced labor for Newcomers and Relocated the Rohingya Villagers in Northern Arakan," Kaladan News, 23 June 2004)

 

8.9 Appendix I

 

SPDC List of the Composition of the Different Ethnic Groups under the 8 Major Ethnic Races in Myanmar

 

A. Kachin comprises 12 different groups.

 

(1) Kachin

(2) Trone

(3) Dalaung

(4) Jinghpaw

(5) Guari

(6) Hkahku

(7) Duleng

(8) Maru (Lawgore)

(9) Rawang

(10) Lashi (La Chit)

(11) Atsi

(12) Lisu

 

B. Karenni (Kayah) comprises 9 different groups.

 

(13) Kayah

(14) Zayein

(15) Ka-Yan (Padaung)

(16) Gheko

(17) Kebar

(18) Bre (Ka-Yaw)

(19) Manu Manaw

(20) Yin Talai

(21) Yin Baw

 

C. Karen (Kayin) comprises 11 ethnic groups.

 

(22) Kayin

(23) Kayinpyu

(24) Pa-Le-Chi

(25) Mon Kayin (Sarpyu)

(26) Sgaw

(27) Ta-Lay-Pwa

(28) Paku

(29) Bwe

(30) Monnepwa

(31) Monpwa

(32) Shu (Pwo)

 

D. Chin comprises 53 different ethnic groups.

 

(33) Chin

(34) Meithei (Kathe)

(35) Saline

(36) Ka-Lin-Kaw (Lushay)

(37) Khami

(38) Awa Khami

(39) Khawno

(40) Kaungso

(41) Kaung Saing Chin

(42) Kwelshin

(43) Kwangli (Sim)

(44) Gunte(Lyente)

(45) Gwete

(46) Ngorn

(47) Zizan

(48) Sentang

(49) Saing Zan

(50) Za-How

(51) Zotung

(52) Zo-Pe

(53) Zo

(54) Zahnyet (Zanniet)

(55) Tapong

(56) Tiddim (Hai-Dim)

(57) Tay-Zan

(58) Taishon

(59) Thado

(60) Torr

(61) Dim

(62) Dai (Yindu)

(63) Naga

(64) Tanghkul

(65) Malin

(66) Panun

(67) Magun

(68) Matu

(69) Miram (Mara)

(70) Mi-er

(71) Mgan

(72) Lushei (Lushay)

(73) Laymyo

(74) Lyente

(75) Lawhtu

(76) Lai

(77) Laizao

(78) Wakim (Mro)

(79) Haulngo

(80) Anu

(81) Anun

(82) Oo-Pu

(83) Lhinbu

(84) Asho (Plain)

(85) Rongtu 

 

E. Burman (Bamar) comprises 9 ethnic groups.

 

(86) Bamar

(87) Dawei

(88) Beik

(89) Yaw

(90) Yabein

(91) Kadu

(92) Ganan

(93) Salon

(94) Hpon

 

F. Mon comprises 1 ethnic group.

 

(95) Mon

 

G. Rakhine comprises 7 ethnic groups.

 

(96) Rakhine

(97) Kamein

(98) Kwe Myi

(99) Daingnet

(100) Maramagyi

(101) Mro

(102) Thet

 

H. Shan comprises 33 ethnic groups.

 

(103) Shan

(104) Yun (Lao)

(105) Kwi

(106) Pyin

(107) Yao

(108) Danaw

(109) Pale

(110) En

(111) Son

(112) Khamu

(113) Kaw (Akha-E-Kaw)

(114) Kokang

(115) Khamti Shan

(116) Hkun

(117) Taungyo

(118) Danu

(119) Palaung

(120) Man Zi

(121) Yin Kya

(122) Yin Net

(123) Shan Gale

(124) Shan Gyi

(125) Lahu

(126) Intha

(127) Eik-swair

(128) Pa-O

(129) Tai-Loi

(130) Tai-Lem

(131) Tai-Lon

(132) Tai-Lay

(133) Maingtha

(134) Maw Shan

(135) Wa

 

8.10 Appendix II

 

Ceasefire Status of Ethnic Opposition Groups

 

Group

Leader

Ceasefire

Arakan Liberation Party (ALP)

Khine Ye Khine

 

Chin National Front (CNF)

Thomas Thangnou -

 

Communist Party of Burma (CPB-Arakan State)

Saw Tun Oo

1997

Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)

U Thuzana & Kyaw Than

12/1994

Gods Army (Kersay Doh)

Johnny & Luther Htoo

not active

Kachin Defence Army (KDA)

Mahtu Naw

13/1/1991

Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)

Lamung Tu Jai

1/10/1993

Karen National Union (KNU

Saw Ba Thin Sein

temporary

Karen Peace Force

Saw Tha Mu Hei

24/2/1997

Karenni National Defense Army (KNDA

Zaw Hla & Lee Reh

1996

Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF)

San Tha & Tun Kyaw

 

1994

Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)

* Hte Bupeh

1995

Karenni State Nationalities Peoples’ Liberation Front (KNPLF)

Sandar & Htun Kyaw

9/5/1994

Kayan National Guard (KNG)

Gabriel Byan & Htay Ko

27/2/1992

Kayan New Land Party (KNLP)

Shwe Aye

26/7/1994

KNU Special Region group (Toungoo)

Saw Farrey Moe

8/11/1997

Lahu National Organization (LNO)

Paya Ja Oo

-

Mergui-Tavoy United Front

Saw Han

-

Mon Army, Mergui District (MAMD)

Ong Suik Heang

1997

Mong Tai Army

Khun Sa

2/1/1996

Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army (MNDAA-Kokang)

Phone Kyar Shin

21/3/1989

National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA-east Shan State)

Sai Lin (Lin Ming-xian)

1989

National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)

NSCN East

NSCN Main faction

Khaplang

Isaac & Muivah

-

National United Party of Arakan (NUPA)

Shwe Tha

-

New Democratic Army (Kachin) (NDA-K)

Sakhone Ting Ying

15/12/1989

New Mon State Party (NMSP)

Nai Shwe Kyin

29/6/1995

Palaung State Liberation Party (PSLP)

Aik Mone

21/4/1991

Pa-O National Organization (PNO)

Aung Kham Hti

11/4/1991

Rakhine State All National Races Solidarity Party

Saw Tun Oo

24/2/1997

Rohingya National Alliance (RNA)

Nural Islam, Dr Yunnus -

-

Shan State Army (SSA) (aka SSA-South)

Yord Serk

-

Shan State Army-Shan State Progress Party (SSA) (SSA-North)

Sai Nawng & Loi Mao

2/9/1989

Shan State National Army (SSNA) (aka SSA-Central)

Karn Yawd

1995

Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organization (SSNLO)

Tha Kalei

9/10/1994

United Wa State Army (UWSA)

Pao Yuchang

9/5/1989

Vigorous Burmese Student Warriors (VBSW)

Kyaw Ni ‘Johnny’

-

Wa National Organization (WNO)

Maha San

-

 

(Source: Burma Briefing: Issues and Concerns Volume 1, ALTSEAN, November 2004)

 

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