15. The Situation of Migrant Workers
15.1 Background
Throughout 2004, large numbers of people continued to leave Burma to seek work abroad. Approximately ten percent of Burma’s population migrates to other countries, according to a report, Migration, Needs, Issues and Responses in the Greater Mekong Subregion 2002, by the Asian Migrant Center. People leave Burma for a number of reasons. Rampant inflation, a deteriorating economy and general lack of employment and educational opportunities are factors that cause many people to emigrate. In addition to these hardships, many people living in rural areas are forced to pay heavy taxes to local officials and the military and to sell a large percentage of their crops to the government at below-market prices. The regime’s gross and continued violation of fundamental human rights resulted in the extension of U.S. trade sanctions and the institution of EU non-trade related sanctions in August 2004, placing further economic pressure on the citizens of Burma (source: World Factbook, CIA, 2004). For these reasons, many Burmese view their migration as less of a decision than an economic necessity.
Ethnic minority people living in civil war zones often have no choice about emigrating, as they are forced to flee their homes to avoid brutal campaigns of violence perpetrated against them by SPDC soldiers. Every year thousands of people flee across the border, primarily into Thailand, to escape human rights violations which include mass forced relocation, arbitrary arrest, torture, rape and extra-judicial killing. Some of these people are able to enter refugee camps in Thailand and Bangladesh. However, many of those fleeing human rights violations are not recognized as refugees by the governments of countries neighboring Burma to which they usually arrive. These individuals are left with the choice of trying to enter refugee camps illegally or else trying to survive as migrant workers.
Migration from Burma is facilitated by the fact that seven of Burma’s 14 states and divisions share borders with neighboring countries. In the west, Burma borders Bangladesh and India, in the north and northeast China, and in the east Laos, Malaysia and Thailand. In a 1999 report by Save the Children UK, Small Dreams Beyond Reach: The Lives of Migrant Children and Youth Along the Borders of China, Myanmar, and Thailand, the authors note that in the past ten years the largest flow of migrants in the Mekong region has been concentrated along the borders of China, Burma and Thailand, with Burmese people making up the largest percentage of the population migrating. The report goes on to note that while China, India, Bangladesh and Thailand have collectively reported hosting over two million Burmese migrants, the actual population of people from Burma living in these countries is likely to be much higher. However, it is extremely difficult to obtain accurate estimates as to the number of Burmese working abroad, as many are illegal, and the migrant population as a whole is highly mobile. In addition, some migrant groups are ethnically similar to indigenous populations of neighboring countries, making them difficult to identify as non-natives.
Throughout 2004, people from Burma continued to flee to neighboring Thailand to escape a deteriorating economy and widespread human rights violations by the military regime. Estimates on the number of Burmese migrant workers vary from 400,000 to 2 million, with the average estimate at 1.5 million. Migrant workers from Burma come from a variety of geographical locations and ethnic groups. There are both push and pull factors at work when people make the decision to migrate to Thailand. The pull factors include the close geographical location of Thailand to Burma, as well as the demand in Thailand for cheap labor. The push factors include the poor state of the Burmese economy and ongoing human rights violations, including demands for forced labor, that are specifically acute in areas along the Thai border.
As most people emigrate from Burma due to factors that are both political and economic, it is difficult to make absolute distinctions between economic migrants, political asylum seekers and refugees. The Royal Thai Government maintains a strict and sometimes arbitrary policy on classifying Burmese who arrive in Thailand as illegal immigrants. In turn, many victims of direct human rights abuses are refused access to refugee camps and international humanitarian aid. These people are faced with the choice of either trying to illegally enter the refugee camps or becoming migrant workers. (Please see chapter on refugees for more information.)
Burmese people coming to Thailand as migrant workers enter the country in a variety of ways. Some come legally with work permits and stay the registered length of time. Others enter at legal border crossings, such as Mae Sai and Mae Sot, on day passes and then disappear into Thailand. Previous Thai immigration records have indicated that up to 15,000 of the 50,000 Burmese people entering Thailand in a month do not return. Still others cross at illegal border points, swimming or wading across rivers, or hiking long distances through the mountains to enter the country secretly. People entering this way often have to pay large sums of money to be escorted across the border by human traffickers who have connections on both sides of the border, and can often provide cars for transport. One arrested trafficker estimated that 100 Burmese migrants enter Thailand illegally through Kanchanaburi province each day. He reported that traffickers received between 3,000 and 5,000 baht per trip, depending on the distance, moving people from the border to the central provinces of Nakhon Pathom, Samut Sakhon, Samut Prakan, Ratchaburi and Nonthaburi (source: “Thai Border Police Officer Arrested for Human Smuggling," Xinhua, 19 November 2003). Thus many migrants enter Thailand with huge debts owed to the people who helped smuggle them in.
Once inside the country, many migrants stay in the border areas because jobs are easy to find, there is already a Burmese community and further travel outside these areas is risky for undocumented people. In the border town of Mae Sot, for example, there are an estimated 100,000 Burmese migrant workers employed in some 200 factories, and on fruit and vegetable plantations and flower farms in the surrounding areas. Many Shan people work in the northern border areas; thousands of Burmese (mostly Mons) from Mon State work in the fisheries in the southern border town of Maharchai; with the rubber plantations and fishing industries of the six southern provinces of Thailand also hosting thousands of migrant workers.
The year 2003 saw change in migration patterns, with an increasing number of migrants attempting to travel further into Thailand to work. This pattern, in part, is due to heightened pressure on migrant workers and security crackdowns in the border areas. As a result, in April 2003, the cost of being smuggled into central Thailand from the border reportedly doubled to 10,000 baht per head (source: “Killing Seen as Warning to Others," Bangkok Post, 28 May, 2003). The increase in roadblocks along the Mae Sot to Bangkok highways affected the trafficking route to the inner provinces and meant that traffickers and the people they were aiding preferred to trek across the Tha Nong Thong Chai mountain range to reach Kamphengphet province. While it was possible in 2002 to arrange a car from Mae Sot to Bangkok for 2,000 baht, in 2003, migrants paid 6,000 baht from Mae Sot to Kamphengphet on foot, with the additional leg to Bangkok costing another 2,000 baht.
In 2004, the Thai government announced a new migrant worker registration process to begin in July, which reportedly prompted thousands of Burmese to attempt entry into Thailand. Security along the border was increased in response to the alleged large numbers of people gathering in Burmese border areas. In May, it was reported that traffickers were demanding over 7,000 baht per head from those who had gathered in Three Pagodas Pass, a Burmese border town. The traffickers were reportedly collaborating with Thai traffickers across the border, many of whom were believed to be police (source: Taramon, “Hundreds of Migrant Workers Waiting at the Border,” Kao Wao News, 10 May 2004).
In 2003, the Thai government announced that they were stepping up plans to control human traffickers, but no major policy changes were noted and there were no visible decreases in the trafficking market (source: “Migrants and Traffickers Arrested in Jungle," Irrawaddy, 25 June 2003). Moreover, in 2004, it was reported that a major impediment to the dismantling of trafficking networks in Thailand was the continued involvement of state officials. According to Physicians for Human Rights, the level of involvement and complicity of police, border and immigration officials in the trafficking of girls and women remained high despite the Thai government raising the issue of trafficking in persons to a national priority (source: No Status: Migration, Trafficking & Exploitation of Women In Thailand - Health and HIV/AIDS Risks for Burmese and Hill Tribe Women and Girls, Physicians for Human Rights, June 2004).
Thailand’s failure to combat the humanitarian threat posed by human trafficking resulted in its placement on the second tier of the United States' human trafficking monitoring system in 2004. The development of the system has followed the rise of human trafficking as the fastest growing transnational crime, and adopts a tiered system of classification, grading countries according to their records in countering trafficking. An enhanced monitoring system, or "watch list," has been created to alert tier-two nations in danger of slipping into the third and lowest category. Thailand was placed on this watch list for the first time in 2004. The specific reason for Thailand’s placement on the watch list was their inadequate response to protecting trafficked street children from Cambodia. (Source: Victims of Trafficking and the Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report, U.S. Department of State, June 2004)
At the same time, Burma remains on the third tier, the lowest of the U.S. government standards, for its failure to comply with the minimum standards of the 2000 Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Third tier ranking allows for the imposition of "non-trade-related economic sanctions.” In response to international criticisms and sanctions leveled at the country for its poor trafficking record, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the ruling military regime, has made trafficking part of its national agenda since 2003. During 2004, the SPDC made concerted efforts designed to signal Burma’s commitment to combating trafficking. In September 2004, government officials announced the intention to open three anti-human trafficking liaison offices in the borders towns of Tachileik, Myawaddy and Muse. In addition, the Myanmar Times reported “that 795 arrests were made, 335 prison sentences handed down in relation to human trafficking, and 2,181 victims “rescued” since 2002.” The Myanmar Times report came following the U.S.’s announcement to increase sanctions because of Myanmar’s lack of action to combat trafficking (source: “Myanmar Announces New Moves to Battle Human Trafficking,” AFP, 12 September 2004). (Please see chapter on women for more information about trafficking in Burma.)
Various measures implemented by the regime to combat trafficking have been criticized for failing to address the push and pull factors that perpetuate its existence. By way of example, the restrictions placed on the movement of women, particularly in border areas, simply places women in a position of greater dependence on a male escort. At the same time, increasing the number of checkpoints along travel routes has merely contributed to augment the costs of trafficking, due to the increased number of bribes required to complete the journey. According to the Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN), a Thailand based Shan women's organization, nine distinct groups of public officials share the profits of trafficking: Immigration, Military Police, Military Intelligence, Police Special Branch, Customs, Narcotics Control, Army, Township Peace and Development Council and municipal officials (source: Shan Women’s Action Network Newsletter, SWAN, September 2004). The most important contributing factors to trafficking; economic mismanagement, military offensives against ethnic minorities and human rights violations continue to go unchecked, ensuring that the push factors which underlie trafficking remain unaddressed
In 2004, it was reported that a trafficking operation based in Mongton Township, Burma, opposite Chiang Mai, Thailand, had agents working as far inside Burma as Mongkerng and Hsweni in northern Shan State. Agents reportedly liaised with the then local MI officers and informants to develop community based trafficking networks to identify possible targets for trafficking. This operation had three main trafficking routes which transported persons to Nakawngmu, Mongton Township. Traveling from Hsenwi, Mongkerng and Namzarng cost 75,000, 50,000 and 35,000 kyat per head respectively. In addition, drivers were required to pay 200 kyat per person at each checkpoint and 2,000 kyat for those without correct documentation. From Nawkawngmu, the trafficking network serviced either Chiang Mai (160km – 3,500 baht) or the Fang plantations by foot, across the mountains and the border (2,800 – 3,100 baht). This network involved a Thai village head (an appointed political position in Thailand) and serviced firms looking for cheap labor. Total trafficking costs from central Shan State were believed to be around 14,000 baht to Chiang Mai and an additional 4,000 baht to Bangkok. (Source: “Human Trafficking A Big Industry,” SHAN, 17 March 2004)
In 2004, a trafficking network based in Tak province, Thailand, and headed by a former Thai civil servant was reported. The network trafficked Burmese women to wealthy households to work as maids. The operation was reported to be worth over one million baht per month. Two hundred Burmese girls and women between the ages of 13 and 30 were reportedly trafficked each month at a cost of 5,000 baht per person to Thai employers, with costs of up to 8,000 for satisfying specific requests, such as language requirements or looks. Most of the clients “are senior police or military officers and high-ranking government officials whose mansions require more than one maid.” (Source: Punnee Amornviputpanich, “Illegal Workers: Confessions of A Burma-maid Smuggler,” The Nation, 7 June 2004)
Women make up a significant percentage of migrants from Burma. In Thailand there is a strong demand for female labor. Women who emigrate are more likely than men to work as undocumented or illegal workers. This is partly due to the fact that many women take jobs that are in the informal sector and not included in government registration. While women are subjected to the same poor conditions and abuses as men who are migrant workers, women also suffer abuses specific to their gender.
Many women face sexual harassment and/or sexual assault in the workplace, while they are in government detention centers, and/or in their homes and communities. Women migrant workers who are undocumented have little recourse when they are abused, as their abusers often threaten them with arrest and deportation if they complain to the authorities or try to escape their situation. Numerous allegations from human rights bodies alleging sexual molestation and rape of female migrant workers on the border by police and immigration officials continued in 2004. Mo Chu, secretary-general of an association working to protect Burmese workers’ rights in Mae Sot, reported that “many police officers hung around in front of factories or along roadsides arresting any Burmese they see…”demanding to sleep “with good-looking female immigrants. These girls are raped and sometimes gang-raped with no recourse except to “swallow their pain” (source: “IMMIGRATION: Police Prey on Burmese,” The Nation, 6 June 2004). In several cases, factory owners in Thailand have allowed police to enter the women’s sleeping quarters and intimidate the women. As a result of this sort of circumstance, a number of young migrant women have reported feeling pressure to get married in order to have some protection against unwanted sexual advances from others.
In December 2004, the situation for migrant women was placed in further jeopardy when the Thai Labour Ministry issued a statement, reminiscent of a January 2002 announcement, indicating that female foreign workers would be given a medical checkup and those found to be pregnant would be unable to renew their work permits and would be deported (source: “Thai Government To Deport Pregnant Foreign Workers,” ASEAN Watch, 27 December 2004). The December announcement met with the same outrage from labor and human rights groups as did the 2002 regulation. As a result, the government revised this policy, with female migrant workers entitled to remain in Thailand for a year after birth, or indefinitely in the event that they find employment or can be supported by their husband (source: “Thailand Not to Deport Pregnant Illegal Workers,” MCOT NEWS, 16 December 2004).
Despite the official line, for all practical purposes, pregnancy has remained grounds for dismissal by factory owners who place pressure on migrant women to be “productive but not reproductive” (source: Suzanne Belton and Cynthia Maung, “Fertility and Abortion: Burmese Women's Health on the Thai-Burma Border,” Forced Migration Review, Issue 19, January 2004). Confirming this position, Yaung Chi Oo Workers’ Association (YCOWA), a Burmese labor rights organization based in Thailand, reported, “in July [2003], 20 pregnant women were fired from a knitting factory because they were pregnant.” It was also reported that pregnant migrant workers were not offered maternity leave and breast-feeding was forbidden during work hours. (Source: Marwan Macan-Markar, “Thailand: Motherhood a Risk for Burmese Migrants,” IPS, 23 September 2003)
As in Burma, most migrant women suffer from a lack of access to reproductive healthcare, information on STDs and contraceptives. In Burma, it is estimated that only 28% of fertile-age women use a modern method of contraception, compared to 72% of Thai women in Thailand (source: Suzanne Belton and Cynthia Maung, “Fertility and Abortion: Burmese Women's Health on the Thai-Burma Border,” Forced Migration Review, Issue 19, January 2004). Furthermore, both women's rights advocates and health workers have indicated that migrant workers have limited access to free condoms. As the costs of purchasing condoms would mean losing over half a day's average wage, which ranges between Bt60 (US$ 1.50) to Bt80 (US$ 2), unprotected sex has ensured a high STD infection rate and placed intense pressure on pregnant migrant workers to procure abortions by whatever method possible. The illegality of abortion in both Thailand and Burma causes migrant workers to seek assistance outside formal channels.
Key findings from Suzanne Belton, a PhD candidate at the University of Melbourne’s Key Centre for Women’s Health in Society, and Mae Tao Clinic Director Dr Cynthia Maung’s research into Burmese women’s health on the Thai-Burma border, found that:
· At least a quarter of women with post-abortion complications have self-induced abortions.
· A third of women have five or more pregnancies, which is a health risk in itself.
· Most women and lay midwives classified menstrual regulation and abortion as traditional methods of fertility control.
· Unqualified abortionists and home remedies are the only recourse women have to end an unwanted pregnancy.
· Women used a wide variety of methods to end their pregnancy, including self-medication with Western and Burmese medicines, drinking ginger and whisky, vigorous pelvic pummeling and insertion of objects into the sex organs.
· Temporary contraceptive information or methods were not offered to women during post abortion care in the local Thai hospital.
· The Thai Ministry of Health has recorded the abortion rate among migrants as 2.4 times higher than that of Thai women.
It was also noted that the women interviewed had little to no education and nearly 25% could not read or write, making alternatives to written information on reproductive health a necessity. (Source: Suzanne Belton and Cynthia Maung, “Fertility and Abortion: Burmese Women's Health on the Thai-Burma Border,” Forced Migration Review, Issue 19, January 2004).
Numerous underlying causes place pressure on Burmese women to seek abortions in these difficult circumstances, with poverty, domestic violence, job retention, ill-timing and community pressure all cited as reasons for ending pregnancy. In order for “assistance and intervention to be effective and sustainable,” it is within this context of underlying causes that abortion as well as reproductive and maternal health related issues must be addressed. (Source: Suzanne Belton, PhD Candidate, Melbourne University Key Centre for Women’s Health in Society, Faculty of Medicine)
In their 2004 report “Fertility and Abortion: Burmese Women’s Health on the Thai-Burma Border,” Suzanne Belton and Dr Cynthia Maung noted that when staff from the Mae Tao Clinic, a clinic for refugees and migrants on the Thai-Burma border, offered female in-patients a range of temporary and permanent contraceptive methods, most women accepted these. The researchers noted that the women were "very interested" in talking about family planning. In Thai hospitals, however, health workers do not offer contraceptive information or methods to women receiving post-abortion care. The availability of such information and services could reduce abortions as well as being economical for the women, the Thai health system and NGOs providing services. A one-year contraceptive injection costs US$ 2.10 and female sterilization costs US$ 11.60. (Source: Belton, Suzanne and Cynthia Maung. “Fertility and Abortion: Burmese Women’s Health on the Thai-Burma Border,” Forced Migration Review, Issue 19, January 2004)
If a woman is referred to a Thai hospital by the Mae Tao Clinic, the clinic will pay for her treatment. However, if an undocumented migrant self-refers to a Thai hospital, she must pay her own bills. It costs approximately US$ 53 for a woman who is hospitalized for post abortion complications in a Thai hospital and about US$ 230 if she dies from pregnancy related causes. Burmese women in Tak province earn about US$ 45 per month, making hospital fees far beyond their reach. (Source: Belton, Suzanne and Cynthia Maung. “Fertility and Abortion: Burmese Women’s Health on the Thai-Burma Border,” Forced Migration Review, Issue 19, January 2004)
According to a 2004 report by Physicians for Human Rights, Burmese migrants face an increased risk of contracting HIV/AIDS as compared to the local population. Discriminatory treatment of minorities in such areas as access to healthcare, lack of protection for pregnant migrant workers in the workforce, the prevalence of trafficking, violence and exploitation are all major factors in “elevating their risk of HIV/AIDS and virtually assuring” the continuance of the problem in Thailand. (Source: No Status: Migration, Trafficking & Exploitation of Women In Thailand - Health and HIV/AIDS Risks for Burmese and Hill Tribe Women and Girls, Physicians for Human Rights, June 2004).
It has been reported that, “Although credible data is not available, infection rates among Burmese commercial sex workers in the border towns of Mae Sot, Mae Sai, and Ranong are considered high” (source: Aung Zaw, “The AIDS Embargo,” Irrawaddy, 1 January 2002). In addition, concern has been expressed that releasing precise figures of infection rates could further damage the already negative image of Burmese migrant workers and lead the Thai authorities, who attribute soaring health problems to Burmese migrants, to intensify their crackdowns. However, while there is a widespread prejudice that migrants "bring AIDS with them," research reveals that many migrants move from low HIV prevalence areas to those with higher prevalence rates, increasing their own risk of exposure to the virus. (Source: “2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic,” UNAIDS, July 2004)
Ranong, Thailand, has been identified as an area of particular concern, with migrant workers engaged in highly mobile work in the fishing and sex industries. According to one doctor working with an NGO addressing HIV/AIDS in the area, Dr Win Maung, 130 people were found infected with HIV between February 2002 and January 2004, with between 10 and 20 people dying each month in the port. Between 7,000 and 8,000 Burmese migrants work on the fishing boats and they are serviced by a growing sex industry in the port area. The high mobility of both fisherman and sex workers, coupled with low awareness and understanding of the disease, has contributed to high transmission rates. As a result, NGOs and Burmese organizations have led education projects aimed at reducing the infection and transmission rates in the port area. The trainings have promoted fidelity, condom use, moderate as opposed to excessive alcohol consumption and a stop to decoration or enlargement of the penis through insertion of studs, stones or oils. (Source: Pollard, Jim, “Struggling to Stem Ranong's Tide of HIV,” The Nation, 28 June 2004)
As sex remains a taboo subject in many parts of Burma, migrant workers continue to be placed, or place themselves, into high HIV risk situations without the background knowledge or education to protect themselves from such risks. References to condoms are still restricted in the media in Burma and interviews conducted with Burmese migrant workers have highlighted the various myths which are prevalent within migrant worker communities, including the potential for transmission via toilet seats, kissing and coughing. Of even more concern is the belief that contraceptive pills act as transmission preventatives (source: Aung Zaw, “The Aids Embargo: Cover Story,” Irrawaddy, 1 January 2002). Other reports have indicated the belief amongst fishermen that a “person’s HIV status can be discerned from appearances, citing fair-skinned women, and those with cool skin as ‘clean,'” (source: Inbaraj, Sonny, “Migrant Fishermen’s Risky Behaviour Spreads HIV,” Vietnam News, 17 July 2004).
Criticism has been leveled at both the Burmese and Thai governments for the lack of political will demonstrated in combating the vulnerabilities of those at risk. Although some efforts have been made to address the issue recently, Burma has been censured for effectively denying the existence of the problem while Thailand has been criticized for the discriminatory implementation of its anti-HIV/AIDS policies. The discriminatory provision of HIV/AIDS treatment in Thailand and the low levels of education concerning the virus have ensured the continued transmission amongst migrant worker communities. The inability of migrant workers to access health services without threat of deportation and associated problems in confronting language or cultural barriers have also persisted, effectively removing migrant workers from the national agenda for HIV prevention.
From April 1999 to March 2001, Save the Children UK conducted research along Burma’s borders with China and Thailand on the situation of Burmese children living in these countries. In the study, researchers found that the majority of migrants from Burma were young people. Beginning at age 13, children from Burma migrate on their own to search for work in neighboring countries. The majority of children age 13 migrate with their parents or relatives. After migrating, children and young people were involved in abusive, exploitative and sometimes violent situations or working environments. Young women and girls were frequently sexually abused. Moreover, many children were either not attending school or had an extremely minimal level of education. While economic hardships, political instability and armed conflict were all cited as reasons for this, the belief that practical skills were more valuable than a high-level education was also highlighted. In turn, working in foreign countries was considered to build both experience and skills. Yet, young people and children with minimal education faced greater vulnerability to exploitation and abuse in situations of employment.
The study further revealed “orphaned children along the border areas were found to be the most vulnerable, often living without assurance of their most basic needs. These children were the most likely to be exploited and trafficked. Abandonment was a common problem, related to drug trafficking and addiction, HIV and AIDS, and loss of contact with family during migration. In addition, migrants’ illegal status often led to arrest, detention and deportation, with children reporting being treated as adults during this process, often separated from their family and communities." (Source: Caoutte, Therese, Small Dreams Out of Reach, The Lives of Migrant Children and Youth along the Borders of China, Myanmar, and Thailand, Bangkok: Save the Children UK, 2001)
According to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Burmese children as young as 8 years-old can be found working in a number of industries in Thailand, including: textiles, garments, bottle making, tinning, domestic work, snack bars, dish washing, fishing, construction, agriculture etc. Children are also found as sex workers, although the Thai government’s battle against child prostitution has “dramatically decreased” the numbers involved. Yet, child prostitution has not been totally eliminated, particularly as the demand for younger sex workers who are presumed to be cleaner and safer continues. Ascertaining the numbers of child laborers is difficult, as their presence in a workplace is often clandestine. (Source: Growing up under the Burmese Dictatorship, ICFTU, August 2003)
An issue of increasing concern is the growing number of stateless children emerging from the Burmese migrant population in Thailand. The problems begin in Burma, particularly for ethnic minorities, who often do not receive birth certificates due to their marginalized status within the country. Under the 1982 Citizenship law, the Burmese government also refuses to grant citizenship to the children of parents who have left Burma illegally. Therefore, children born of Burmese parents in Thailand are denied citizenship in Burma. At the same time, Thailand denies citizenship to illegal migrants from Burma. In addition, Thai Ministry of the Interior (MOI) regulations prohibit the registration of the births of children born to illegal migrants. While children who are born in either refugee camps or government health facilities may obtain a delivery certificate (not the same as a birth certificate), few migrant births occur in these places. As a result, “the lack of legal documentation renders Myanmarese [Burmese] children stateless and unable to prove they are from Myanmar [Burma] should they ever go there.” (Source: “Prospects for Hope? Myanmarese Refugees in Thailand,” World Refugee Survey 2005, USCRI, 15 June 2005)
As a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Thailand is obligated to make primary education available to all. Under the provisions set forth in the CRC and the Thai Ministry of Education’s 1992 Regulation on Evidence of a Child’s Birth for School Admission, Thailand is obligated to allow non-Thai children to attend Thai schools. However, this rarely happens. Instead, the absence of a Thai identity card, language barriers, differences in schooling levels and the associated costs of education (materials, registration, transport) have meant that, in practice, the children of Burmese migrant workers are excluded from the formal education system. At the same time, they are unable to access the educational opportunities offered in the refugee camps, where only refugees are authorized entry. (Sources: Growing up under the Burmese Dictatorship: The situation facing children after 41 years of military rule in Burma, ICFTU, August 2003; World Refugee Survey 2005, USCRI, 15 June 2005)
As a result, migrant worker children, both those who migrate from Burma and those who are born in Thailand, are reliant on the informal schools established by various bodies, ranging from NGO’s, exiled trade unions and political groups, religious communities, small migrant associations, or motivated individuals in the community. However, the informal nature of these schools and their insufficient number and resources continue to mean that primary education possibilities are restricted. Furthermore, even when education is available, completion of courses is not recognized by the Thai education system. Another impediment to expanding the availability of education to the children of migrant workers is the illegal nature of their existence, which requires the payment of up to US$ 100 per year per person in bribe money to local police, municipal employees and immigration authorities. (Source: Growing up under the Burmese Dictatorship: The situation facing children after 41 years of military rule in Burma, ICFTU, August 2003)
In June 2003, Thailand and Burma signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on migrant workers, similar to the MoUs Thailand had previously signed with Laos and Cambodia. The bilateral agreement is meant to establish a legal labor import system in coming years, and also sets the terms for the repatriation of illegal Burmese workers.
The proposed changes to the regulations for migrant workers included requiring all legal migrants to have passports, visas, official contracts and limited terms of stay. The changes, aimed to start in 2004, mean that all imported workers would receive a two-year work permit, renewable only once. Fifteen percent of their wages would be deducted and returned to them when they return to their home country, theoretically to help with the costs of repatriation. Foreign workers would be charged a fee for medical examinations and work permits, and employers would be charged around 3,000 baht for permits and for arranging utilities and other services for their staff. Further changes to the permitted categories of labor for migrants are also expected. The Thai Ministry of Labor also plans to allow Burmese workers to come into Thailand for the day to work in border factories, as long as they return home in the evenings.
Doubts expressed in 2003 by labor experts on the likelihood of a successful transition to the terms of the MoU for the importation of legal labor proved correct, with the one-year transition period being an unrealistic time frame to institute such massive changes. The Burmese government continued to restrict the freedom of movement of its citizens with the fees required to obtain a passport (50,000 baht or US$ 1,220) prohibitively expensive. The Burmese government also continues to deny citizenship to many members of ethnic minority groups, making it impossible for many migrants to prove their Burmese nationality as required by the MoU. Further, migrant workers who fled Burma due to human rights abuses will be hesitant to return there in order to re-enter Thailand legally. Thai Labor Minister Suwat Liptapanlop said that Burma would have to address the passport problem, and stated, “I believe they will do what they must to support their citizens to come to work here for our mutual economic benefit.” (Sources: “Extension of Permits Urged," Bangkok Post, 30 June 2003; “Seeking Solutions That Work," Bangkok Post, 17 September 2003). By the end of 2004, the transition had yet to be completed.
In 2004, as in 2003, the implementation of the MoU had two main effects. Firstly, the number of labor sectors in which migrant workers were legally entitled to register for work was reduced. Secondly, the deportation process was expedited with Burmese authorities consenting under the agreement to accept all deported illegal workers regardless of ethnicity. In the past, Thai officials had to send the SPDC a list of names of any illegal workers being deported, and had to wait for Burmese officials to verify the workers’ citizenship before the Thai government could send them back. Thus, the Thai government was often required to hold deportees in detention centers for long periods of time while the SPDC decided whether or not to allow its nationals to return. (Please see section on deportation, below.)
Thai Migration Policy and Legal Registration of Migrant Workers
Thailand’s policy on migration prioritizes economic development and national security, often at the expense of protecting the rights of migrant workers. For the past eight years, Thai migration policy has been drafted through a series of cabinet resolutions that reflect the attitude of the administration in office. Contradictions between these resolutions have inhibited the formation of a coherent policy on migration and thus hindered the development of a consistent strategy for implementation. Compounding this problem is the traditional high degree of autonomy with which local police, military and immigration officials are allowed to operate, resulting in policy implementation difficulties.
Thai law defines an illegal alien as a person without Thai citizenship who has entered the Kingdom in violation of section 12 of the Immigration Act of 1979. According to this Act, migrants found to be in the country illegally will be repatriated to their countries of origin. In March 1992, the Thai cabinet passed the first of a successive number of resolutions that have allowed migrants to pay a fee and apply for a work permit that allows them to work legally in Thailand. The permit limits work to specific industries in designated parts of the country. Migrants with work permits are protected under the 1997 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand and covered by most of the provisions in the Labour Protection Act of 1998. Unregistered workers are also protected by various provisions of the Labour Relations Act. The work permit also grants migrant workers access to the Thai public healthcare system, subject to an initial medical check and payment of health insurance.
Unfortunately, enforcement of these protections for migrant workers has been lax, resulting in a large divide between policy and practice. Additionally, language barriers and a lack of political initiative have meant that many workers are not aware of what rights the permit entitles them to and how to respond if these rights are violated. Violations of these rights and the relatively high costs of registration saw a significant decrease in the number of registered migrant workers in 2003. In 2001, 568,249 workers were registered, 409,339 in 2002 and 353,274 at the beginning of 2003. However, by August/September 2003 only 110,000 migrant workers were registered. A dramatic turnaround occurred in 2004, with 1,210,633 migrant workers registering, including 852,758 Burmese.
Unlike the previous years, the 2004 registration process included three steps designed to increase security and certainty for migrant workers. The first step required all migrant workers, together with their landlords, to register their house or room. Completion of this step provided workers with a one-year permit to reside within Thailand. Possession of this permit would prevent arrest by police. The second step required all migrants to have a medical examination and to solicit health insurance. Finally, the third step was application for a work permit in one of the permitted industries. Only migrants who had completed the first two steps were eligible to apply for a work permit. In addition, only migrants possessing work permits had legal permission to work. Those who only possessed the housing permit of the first step were only legally permitted to live in Thailand and not to work (source: Arnold, Dennis, The Situation of Burmese Migrant Workers in Mae Sot, Thailand, SEARC Working Papers, September 2004). The three step process allowed migrant workers to register their families, designed to increase security for migrant worker families and provide the Thai government with more detailed information on the numbers of migrants in Thailand.
Following the terms of the MoU, the Thai government planned to send registered workers’ records to their country of origin. In turn, the Burmese government would be responsible for verifying workers’ information and issuing travel documents. It is believed that this step of the MoU will necessitate years to implement. (Source: Arnold, Dennis, The Situation of Burmese Migrant Workers in Mae Sot, Thailand, SEARC Working Papers, September 2004)
Withholding Work Permits
Employers frequently withhold work permits providing workers with either a photocopy or nothing at all. By retaining the permit, employers are able to protect their labor supply and costs by restricting the mobility of their workforce. Workers are still subject to arrest and deportation, while employers are exempted from penalties related to employing unregistered migrants. The practical result of this for migrant workers employed in factories is that they are often forced to live in the factory, further increasing the dependence of workers on their employer. In this situation, unlawful (contrary to s76 LPA) and disproportionate deductions are taken from a worker's wage to pay for accommodation, water and rice and is one reason cited for the low rates of remuneration received by migrant workers. (Source: Arnold, Dennis, “The Situation of Burmese Migrant Workers in Mae Sot, Thailand,” Working Papers Series, No. 71 September 2004)
In addition, without their original work permits, workers are unable to access healthcare services. One of the aims of registration was to bring migrant workers within the public health system, initially involving a medical check-up and payment of health insurance. As photocopies of the work permit are not accepted by Thai hospitals, access to the public health system is effectively prevented.
The Labor Protection Office (LPO) is responsible for ensuring adherence to Thai labor laws. The Office is invested with power to act as negotiator and arbitrator in disputes between employees and employers. Yet, criticism persisted throughout 2004 over perceived ambivalence to violations of labor rights and bias toward the interests of employers. In January 2004, there were reports that the LPO relayed a message to NGO’s focused on labor rights. The message “was to stop trying to utilize the labour protection mechanism and to stop calling for the enforcement of the legal minimum wage which is not enforced even for Thai workers, as these mechanisms were biased in the workers favor.” (Source: Arnold, Dennis, “Work, Rights, and Discrimination against Burmese Workers in Thailand,” Asian Labour Update, December 2004)
Many commentators cite the close relationship between the LPO and employer organizations such as the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI) as the reason for the Office’s failure to adequately respond to violations of labor law against migrant workers (source: Arnold, Dennis, “The Situation of Burmese Migrant Workers in Mae Sot, Thailand,” SEARC Working Papers Series. No. 71, September 2004). The influence of the FTI was evident in December 2003 when the Tak Chapter requested the Tak governor investigate the operations of NGO’s in the area on the basis that organizations such as the Yaung Chi Oo Workers’ Association (YCOWA) and the Migrant Assistance Program Foundation (MAP) were provoking workers strikes. Shortly after, prominent members of these organizations were targeted by thugs (source: Arnold, Dennis, “Work, Rights, and Discrimination against Burmese Workers in Thailand,” Asian Labour Update, December 2004).
Significant developments in labor activism on behalf of Burmese migrant workers in Thailand, particularly in the city of Mae Sot, Tak province, have highlighted the degree to which labor and human rights have been denied to this marginalized group in the past. Moreover, labor rights efforts have revealed the impediments to reform posed by employer organizations, police and immigration officials in the present.
Until recently, employers had been able to exploit the cheap labor flowing out of Burma, subjecting workers to poor working and living conditions, below minimum wage pay and overtime rates and sometimes no pay, with the ability to meet any form of resistance from their workforces with instant dismissals. Due to the collaboration of police and immigration officials, it has been possible for employers of migrant workers, factory owners especially, to summarily dismiss their workforces, have them arrested and deported. This has resulted in numerous instances of registered workers being denied the rights attached to their registration.
The growth of labor activism and the prominence of Burmese worker organizations, including exiled trade unions from Burma, have begun to address the labor and human rights abuses that have traditionally characterized migrant labor working conditions in Thailand. Worker organizations focused on the rights of Burmese migrant workers, such as Free Trade Unions-Burma (FTUB), the Migrant Assistance Program Foundation (MAP), Yaung Chi Oo Workers’ Association (YCOWA), Burma Labor Solidarity Organization (BLSO), Free Trade Unions-Kawthoolei (FTUK), shelter organizations and other smaller groups dedicated to promoting the observance of labor rights and continue to fulfill a much needed educative function. These organizations contribute in disseminating information about labor rights to migrant workers in their own language; issuing press releases; and assisting in the preparation of complaints used to initiate compensation proceedings. However, due to the restrictions on their activities, these organizations are as yet unable to represent the interests of migrant workers in the labor courts, or in the court system proper.
The 2004 registration process went some way towards ameliorating the legal power imbalance between employer and employee. Yet, the increased effectiveness of these groups, such as the Law Society of Thailand and Burmese worker organizations, has continued to result in their being targeted by employer organizations and the police. As a result, employers and Thai authorities have sought to discredit the workers’ organizations and those who work for them as trouble-makers. To this end, pictures of two prominent members of YCOWA were posted and circulated warning workers to stay away from the ‘trouble-makers’ upon pain of dismissal. According to the Asian Legal Resource Center (ALRC), police searched for the two activists displayed in the posters, who were consequently forced into hiding, fearing torture and long term imprisonment in Burma if deported. (Source: Arnold, Dennis “Work, Rights, and Discrimination against Burmese Workers in Thailand,” Asian Labour Update, December 2004)
Other methods of intimidation of and violence against members of these worker organizations also continued in 2004. There were numerous attacks against labor activists by hired thugs, death threats, raids on worker organization offices, confiscation of documents and the arrest of volunteer workers for their involvement in providing assistance for workers taking legal action against employers. (Source: “Abuses of Migrant Workers in Thailand,” ALRC, Sixtieth session of the Commission on Human Rights, United Nations Economic and Social Council, 12 February 2004) (Please see timeline of events for specific incidents, below)
Deportation of Migrants
When undocumented migrant workers are arrested in Thailand, they are dealt with in a number of ways. Some are quickly released, either after paying a bribe to police on the spot or after being held for a short time at a police station and then bribing their way out. Others are sent to the Immigration Detention Centers (IDC) – either in Mae Sot or Bangkok.
Once an undocumented migrant worker has been sent to an IDC, there are three possible scenarios. The vast majority of these migrants are "informally" deported. They are either dropped off on the Thai side of the border in Mae Sot, where most of them can easily bribe their way back into town, or they are taken across the river to areas controlled by the DKBA (Democratic Karen Buddhist Army), a military group that has signed a ceasefire with the Burmese government. On the Burmese side of the border, many of the migrants bribe their way back across the river and into Thailand, while others fend for themselves against the DKBA and SPDC armed forces. Thai Immigration statistics estimate that the number of unofficial deportations from Mae Sot in 2003 averaged about 10,000 people per month. These workers are caught in an expensive cat and mouse game, stuck in a cycle between the Thai authorities, the SPDC, armed ethnic groups, and traffickers – all of whom profit from the continued movement of migrant workers.
The second way out of an IDC is to the Special Detention Centre (SDC). The SDC is primarily for political activists, and it is very difficult for people held here to gain release.
The final way for an undocumented migrant worker to leave an IDC is by "formal" deportation, a process that returns Burmese migrants directly into the SPDC holding center in Myawaddy. The holding centre was established in February 2002 following negotiations between the Thai and Burmese governments on the repatriation of migrant workers. The holding center (in Burmese Ke Say Yee Sa Kan) is run by the Directorate of the Defence Service Intelligence (DSI) of the Ministry of Defence, and specifically by Military Intelligence Unit 25. At the reception center, deportees are reportedly placed under a combined police, military and DKBA guard. All returned migrants are screened through a series of interviews with immigration officials, public health officials and members of military intelligence. This screening process is particularly dangerous for any migrants seen to have political connections, or any who test positive for HIV.
Since August 2003, when the MoU was implemented, 400 migrants have been "officially" deported every month from Mae Sot directly to the SPDC holding center in Myawaddy. These formal deportations take place on the first and third Monday of every month, with 200 people being deported on both days. (Source: “Myanmar-Thai Meeting on Illegal Workers Ends in Myanmar,” Xinhua, 15 May 2003)
Thai immigration officials make no attempt to determine if any deportees are refugees or have any fear of persecution if returned to Burma. Instead, local Thai officials regularly assume that all people without ID documents outside the refugee camps are illegal immigrants or simply ignore documents a refugee or asylum seeker may have. The UNHCR has been invited to screen the IDC list of all formal deportees and to provide assistance to those claiming refugee status. It is also possible for individuals slated for formal deportation to make an asylum claim with UNHCR officials at the IDC in Bangkok. These individuals can then be removed from the formal deportation system; however the only option for these individuals is to be informally deported. (Source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July-December 2003)
The reality is that although many people do migrate to Thailand for economic reasons, many others are also refugees, political exiles and activists. Often an individual falls into more than one, if not all, categories. For example, many refugees attempt to supplement their inadequate diet by leaving their assigned refugee camps illegally and working for short-term labor projects or daily wage work. Others come to Thailand as either refugees or illegal immigrants, and then become involved with some of the many Burmese opposition groups based along the Thai-Burma border. Often people became refugees because they were politically active inside Burma.
SPDC officials at the Myawaddy holding centre specifically screen returned migrants for those who may be affiliated with political opposition groups. Thai authorities also submit personal data on deportees to SPDC officials at the time of repatriation. These officials then cross-check the information provided with their own files in search of dissidents. As most political activity is criminalized in Burma, this process places past and present politically active deportees at severe risk of arrest, interrogation, torture, and arbitrary detention.
In addition to political screening, returned migrants are also tested for a number of communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB, and Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs). A number of human rights organizations have protested this mandatory HIV/AIDS testing, and the reported separation of at least 20 individuals who tested positive for HIV/AIDS. Such mandatory testing contravenes UN HIV Principles and Guidelines to which Thailand and Burma are signatory. Moreover, aside from the ICRC, there are no international organizations regularly monitoring the conditions at the reception center. The ICRC was granted access to the reception center in April 2002 and has performed visits on both deportation and non-deportation days in coordination with the Burmese authorities.
Deportees have also reported that as part of an ongoing campaign to discourage illegal emigration, SPDC officials at the reception camp photograph and maintain records of personal data on all deportees. Those deported are informed that if the SPDC officials collect three photographs of one returnee, (i.e. if someone is deported through the reception camp three times) then that person will be arrested for illegal emigration. According to SPDC regulation 367/120-(b)(1), these individuals can be sentenced to up to 7 years imprisonment. (Please see chapter on assembly, association and movement for more information about the screening process in Myawaddy.)
At the end of the screening process, it appears that people are dealt with in one of two ways: those who are able to find a resident of Myawaddy prepared to vouch for them are simply released after paying between 2,000-3,500 kyat; while the remainder are transported by truck back to their home districts. Individuals transported back to their home districts are required to pay a transportation fee which varies according to distance. It costs, for example, only 150 kyat to be transported to nearby Moulmein but 1,400 kyat to be deported to Arakan State. People who have no relatives or friends in Myawaddy to vouch for them and who cannot afford to pay this transportation fee sometimes have to stay in the area working as lookouts to guard train tracks, bridges and government buildings until they can save up the cost of the repatriation fee.
Many people attempt to evade the screening process and/or forced transfer to their home districts by paying bribes to officials. Other deportees are able to bribe their way out at the customs checkpoint on arrival, or else manage to run away during transfer back to their home districts. Having escaped or bribed their way out of official custody, it is reported to be a relatively simple matter for migrants to secretly cross the border and re-enter Thailand illegally. Many people wade across the Moei River, which separates the two countries, everyday.
Some migrants have reported that once they are returned to their villages from the Myawaddy holding center, they are forced to sign pledges saying that they will never attempt to leave Burma again. They are threatened with prison sentences and heavy fines if they do so. (Please see chapter on freedom of assembly, association, and movement for more information.)
The Tsunami
On 26 December, tsunami waves ravaged the Andaman coastline causing unprecedented damage to the western coast of Thailand, specifically to the provinces of Ranong, Phuket, Phangnga, Trang, Satun and Krabi. According to Surapong Kongchanthuek, deputy chairman of the Law Society of Thailand's Committee on Human Rights for Stateless and Displaced People, 127,714 Burmese migrant workers were employed in the effected provinces. Of these, only 22,504 were registered with the Ministry of Labor.
A breakdown of Burmese migrant workers by province estimates the numbers of Burmese migrant workers as follows:
1) Ranong 47,501
2) Phuket 36,483
3) Phangnga 29,730
4) Trang 8,000
5) Satun 3,000
6) Krabi 3,000
The majority of these workers were employed in fishing, construction, on rubber plantations, as well as in various hospitality-related positions. (Source: "800 Burmese Workers 'Killed in Catastrophe'," The Bangkok Post, 30 December 2004)
There were a number of difficulties in determining the death toll and in estimating the number of Burmese missing in Thailand’s southern provinces following the tsunami. Estimates have ranged from 1000–3000 dead with thousands more missing. The absence of any form of response or assistance from the Burmese government, either in providing aid, transport or any kind of documentation to assist in the identification of bodies, including DNA or dental records, played a key roll in the uncertainty surrounding the numbers missing, affected and dead. Additionally, the illegal status of the majority of Burmese migrant workers located in the southern provinces also caused difficulties in estimating and determining casualties as only approximations could be made.
The activities of Thai relief agencies and the police were also questioned by numerous sources, the chief concern being that Burmese corpses were ignored upon discovery, to the extent that no official recordings were taken. There were also reports that police actively discouraged the identification of corpses by Burmese migrant workers, denying them access to these bodies. In one instance, Aung Myo Min, a Burmese activist-in-exile and director of the Human Rights Education Institute of Burma (HREIB), attempted to identify “several bodies of friends and tried to retrieve them” but was prevented from doing so by the local search and rescue teams. (Source: Sonny Inbaraj, “TSUNAMI IMPACT: Thai Compassion for Burmese Migrants Wears Thin,” IPS, 13 January 2005)
Difficulties in establishing the numbers of dead and missing were also related to the reluctance of Burmese migrant workers to claim the dead bodies of friends, families and co-workers in morgues or monasteries, due to fear of arrest and deportation. This fear surfaced as a result of the mass deportations undertaken by police in the wake of the tsunami. As many migrant workers lost their work permits during the tsunami, they were rendered unable to prove their legal status. This was compounded by the deaths of employers, which prevented registered workers from being "vouched for" by their employers. Allegations that police did not discriminate between registered and unregistered workers were not uncommon during this period, a procedure which failed to comply with assurances from the Labour Ministry that only unregistered migrant workers should have been targeted for deportation (source: Sanitsuda Ekachai, “Tsunami aftermath; Help or Hurt? An Uncertain Future,” Bangkok Post, Outlook, 16 March 2005). In turn, those without appropriate documentation were discouraged from entering areas with a police presence to identify the dead and report the missing (source: “AHRC UPDATE (Thailand): Updates on The Tsunami-Affected Burmese Migrant Workers,” AHRC, 16 February 2005). In the days following the tsunami, around 1,000 migrant workers were deported. In the weeks that followed, dozens of Burmese migrant workers continued to be arrested and deported each day.
Fear of arrest and deportation also prevented both registered and unregistered Burmese migrant workers from accessing humanitarian aid, despite the fact that the Thai government and the international community were quick to respond to the after-effects of the tsunami, with the delivery of humanitarian aid, air and ground support. In an attempt to escape the authorities, many migrant workers fled the beaches and their former workplaces and went into hiding, placing themselves in positions where they were unable to access aid. At the same time, problems at points of distribution of aid were also highlighted with numerous incidents of Burmese migrant workers being told that they were not entitled to humanitarian relief. This practice contradicted statements from Thai public health officials that Burmese migrant workers were entitled to relief and Thai law which provides for registered workers’ access to aid. (Source: Sonny Inbaraj, “TSUNAMI IMPACT: Thai Compassion for Burmese Migrants Wears Thin,” IPS, 13 January 2005)
In addition to the difficulties faced by Burmese migrant workers in accessing humanitarian aid, reports of Thais intervening to prevent aid agencies delivering assistance to Burmese also surfaced. In one incident, three World Vision aid workers reported being beaten up and placed in a cage by local Thais in response to assistance they were providing to migrant workers. A fourth World Vision worker sought to intervene and was also beaten up. The tension that flared was reported to be related to the potential loss of the cheap labor that migrant workers represent. (Source: “Burmese Migrant Workers in the Aftermath of the Tsunami,” APFWLD, 11 January 2005)
Thai media reports in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami were blamed for increasing tension between Burmese and Thais, with television and print media attributing responsibility for post-tsunami looting on Burmese migrant workers. These unfounded reports provided police with a reason to continue targeting unregistered migrant workers for deportation. The Thai reports were accused of being racially inflammatory in their use of pejorative terms for Burmese people. Criticism was also leveled at Thai police for providing false and misleading information to the media with regard to the role played by Burmese in the small scale looting which followed the tsunami. In addition, looting was used as a pretext by some police officers to strip migrant workers of their possessions and even cash. (Source: Inbaraj, Sonny, “TSUNAMI IMPACT: Thai Compassion for Burmese Migrants Wears Thin,” 13 January 2005)
Timeline of Events Relating to Migrant Workers in Thailand
In the beginning of January, two prominent members of the Yaung Chi Oo Workers Association (YCOWA) were forced into hiding fearing reprisals for their labor rights activism, specifically targeted at raising awareness among the Burmese migrant worker population. The two men who went into hiding, Ko Phyo and Moe Swe, believed that the threats of violence from those affiliated with factory owners was a result of their participation in organizing labor strikes and providing information and assistance on how to claim for minimum wage standards to be observed. (Source: Kyaw Zwa Moe, "Workers’ Advocates In Hiding,” Irrawaddy, 7 January 2004)
On 13 January, the brutal murders of 6 Burmese nationals on a rubber plantation about 460 kilometres from Bangkok were reported. Three men, a woman, a seven-year old boy and a three-year old girl were shot. (Source: “Six Myanmar Nationals Found Shot Dead in Southern Thailand,” AFP, 13 January 2004)
On 20 February, an immigration truck, deporting over 100 illegal Burmese immigrants, was involved in an accident in Kanchanaburi province in western Thailand, killing six people. Estimates placed the number of injured at nearly 100, who were deported despite the injuries. (Source: “Burmese Workers Killed in Thailand Again,” DVB, 20 February 2004)
On 9 March, hundreds of Burmese migrant workers were arrested in Mahachai, Thailand. Naing Aung Min, a Care International worker, estimated that up to 1,000 people were arrested, with more than 600 Burmese detained and awaiting deportation. According to the report, some of the people detained possessed valid work permits. (Source: Kyaw Zwa Moe, "Hundreds of Burmese Workers Rounded up Near Bangkok," Irrawaddy, 10 March 2004)
On 12 March 2004, reports detailed the mass exodus of illegal Burmese migrant workers from Mae Sot, a city in Tak province bordering Thailand. The exodus of illegal workers was aimed at pre-empting the repercussions of an impending crackdown, which would have included arrest, detention, a fine and deportation. Posters in Burmese language were placed across the district on Thursday, requiring voluntary deportation by 15 March. Six thousand illegal workers had reportedly left by the deadline, resulting in the closure of many teashops and restaurants throughout Mae Sot. (Sources: Aung Su Shin, “Migrants Flee Arrest,” Irrawaddy, 12 March 2004; Naw Seng, “Mae Sot Very Quiet as Crackdown Starts,” Irrawaddy, 16 March 2004)
On 25 March, the Thai Labour Protection Office ordered Nasawat Apparel Factory Co Ltd to pay 16.5m baht to 257 Burmese migrant workers for violations of minimum wage requirements over a two-year period. Workers received approximately 50 baht per day, significantly lower than the minimum of 133 baht required by the Labour Protection Act and set by the Central Wage Committee. Over time, rates were also far below the required minimum, with workers receiving 8 baht per hour instead of the prescribed rate of 25 baht. (Source: Rungrawee C Pinyorat, “Sweatshop Ordered to Pay Fired Burmese,” The Nation, 9 April 2004)
On 27 April, “a Thai immigration car carrying Burmese migrants back to Burma via Mae Sot plunged into a valley near Hwe Hin Phon village.” Of the 42 migrant workers on board, one passenger died, 18 suffered serious injuries and 21 were slightly injured. Two were unharmed. The immigration car was traveling from Samut Sakhon province to Mae Sot, Tak province, and was organized through a broker at 2,200 baht per person to voluntarily return registered migrant workers to Burma. The incident revealed new methods of brokers to transport migrant workers in and out of Thailand with the consent of police and immigration officials. (Source: Aung Shin, “New Way of Human Trafficking” Irrawaddy, 28 April 2004)
On 11 May, a YCOWA member and a Burmese migrant were attacked near the Mae Sot hospital in Mae Sot, Tak province. The two men were assaulted by six men on three motorcycles, armed with knives and sticks. The unprovoked attack left both men with head wounds. One of the men required hospital treatment and received stitches in his head. (Source: “Rights Activists Attacked in Mae Sod,” Network Media Group, 18 May 2004)
On 14 May, a labor rights activist from YCOWA, Moe Swe, and Bent Gehrt, a Danish member from the Washington based Workers Rights Consortium, were attacked in Mae Sot’s night market. The attack took place at around midnight, with Gehrt suffering stab wounds to the abdomen. The two thugs who attacked the men escaped. (Source: “Rights Activists Attacked in Mae Sod,” Network Media Group, 18 May 2004)
On 15 May, another attack was made on a YCOWA member who was taking labor rights worker Bent Gehrt, from Denmark, to the Mae Sot bus station. Four thugs followed the two men on motorbikes and attacked the YCOWA member with sticks, knocking him off his motorcycle before crowd intervention brought the attack to a halt. The four attackers escaped. (Source: “Rights Activists Attacked in Mae Sod,” Network Media Group, 18 May 2004)
In June, a night-time curfew was imposed on all alien workers in Ranong province as part of the authorities' efforts to manage the “influx of illegal foreign laborers into the country" and in an effort to protect national security. The terms of the curfew require that migrant worker remain indoors after 7:00 pm and bans were also placed on the use of mobile phones and motorbikes by Ranong governor, Winai Mongkholtharn. (Source: "Curfew Imposed on All Alien Labourers," The Bangkok Post, 30 June 2004)
In July, reports continued to relate the difficulties faced by Burmese labor rights activists in Mae Sot, particularly with respect to YCOWA labor rights activist Moe Swe. According to Moe Swe, a 100,000 baht bounty was placed on his head by Mae Sot factory owners in response to Moe Swe and Yaung Ch Oo’s continued fight for Burmese migrant workers labor rights. The bounty was believed to have been organized in December, just prior to Moe Swe going into hiding.
Reports of “malevolent surveillance” of the YCOWA compound and offices were also recorded. Pressure to halt its labor rights activism have increased since last year, following a number of factory strikes by migrant workers demanding the observance of their labor rights. The strikes sometimes led to short term factory closures and led to losses that ran into the millions of baht for factory owners. (Source: Kyaw Zwa Moe, “Hitmen Target Burmese Rights Champion,” Irrawaddy, 14 July 2004)
On 1 July, a new registration procedure for migrant workers was introduced. The registration process was divided into three stages. The first stage, from 1-31 July, required the registration of accommodation for migrant workers, which was followed by fingerprinting and the issuance of a registration book and ID card. The second stage, from 22 July – 31 October, involved medical checks on migrant workers and applications for health insurance. The third stage in the process, from 1 August – 30 November, required the migrant workers to register their employment for a period of 3, 6 or 12 months.
The repatriation of the young women was organized by the social development ministries of Thailand and Burma and lauded for the coordinated nature of the operation to return trafficking victims to Burma. The majority of the workers were rescued from massage parlors and brothels in Bangkok and Sing Buri. Prior to repatriation they were sent to the Ban Kredtrakarn Protection and Vocational Development Centre “for rehabilitation and job training.” (Source: Anjira Assavanonda, “Burmese Victims Reunited with Their Families,” Bangkok Post, 12 August 2004)
On 17 August, it was reported that overtime hours were extended while wages decreased in the wake of migrant worker registration. According to the head of the Mae Sot based YCOWA, traditional overtime hours of 6-9 pm had been extended to midnight in several factories, with workers receiving between 4-10 baht per hour instead of the regulated overtime rate of 25 baht per hour. (Source: Shah Paung, "Migrants Working Overtime Since Registration," Irrawaddy, 17 August 2004)
On 24 August, owners of Nut Knitting factory were ordered to pay 1.17 million baht compensation to Burmese migrant workers for the severe exploitation they had endured for over two years. The Thai Labor Court ordered “the Thai owner of a garment factory to pay 1.17 million baht (US$ 29,250) in compensation to 18 Burmese migrant workers” for its failure to observe the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Thai Labour Protection Act (source: “Migrant Workers Bask in Hope Offered by Key Verdict,” Mizzima, 27 August 2004). Beset with difficulties and stalled in the courts for over a year, the case is considered a watershed in terms of recognizing the rights of Burmese migrant workers in the Thai legal system.
In late August, it was reported that approximately 200 Burmese migrant workers from the Asia Apparel Knitting Co Ltd in Mae Sot were struck down with food poisoning. The workers were supplied with pre-cooked food by Thai contractors. The meal was supposed to consist of chicken, squash, beans and meat curry, although doubts remain over the exact content of the food. Around 200 workers became ill and were sent to the Mae Tao Clinic for treatment, as their incomplete worker registration precluded treatment in the Mae Sot hospital. Kyaw Myo, an Asia Apparel worker stated that, “We all had our dinner yesterday as usual, but at about 11:00 pm some workers started to vomit and others suffered stomachaches. [Before eating] we noticed that the curry smelled rotten, but we have no choice but to eat what we’re given.” (Source: Aung Su Shin, “Burmese Factory Workers Suffer Food Poisoning,” Irrawaddy, 31 August 2004)
On 2 September, it was reported that a child trafficking network was uncovered and two women arrested for their role in buying and intending to sell a baby purchased from a Burmese refugee woman in Mae La refugee camp. The baby was bought for 5,000 baht. Malaysia was the intended destination and the baby was reportedly worth 20,000 baht upon arrival. (Source: Aung Su Shin, “Child Trafficking Gang Arrested in Mae Sot,” Irrawaddy, 2 September 2004)
In October, Burmese migrant workers received 1.17 million baht compensation from Nut Knitting Factory, following the 24 August order of the Thai Labor Court, bringing a two year legal battle to an end. The sum compensates 18 migrant workers out of the original 38 who brought the action. Nut Knitting had initially been ordered to pay workers 4.6 billion baht in compensation by the Labor Protection Office in February 2003. When Nut Knitting refused to do so, legal action in the Labor courts ensued. Financial concerns, intimidation, threats of violence, arrest and deportation resulted in only 18 of the original plaintiffs involved in the case remaining until its conclusion. The rest either returned to Burma or settled out of court with the employer. The case marked the first legal victory for migrant workers in the Labor courts. (Source: “Migrant Workers Bask in Hope Offered by Key Verdict,” Mizzima, 27 August 2004)
On 25 October, 400 out of 700 workers at Khi Phone, a knitting factory in Mae Tao, Tak province, were dismissed without any prior notice. On the same day, the workers left the factory and were no longer able to live there. The workers believe that the employer did not want to purchase new work permits for all 700 workers and therefore dismissed them. During the previous work permit registration period, the employer had registered and obtained work permits for all 700 workers. Because the new work permit registration period had commenced, the 400 dismissed workers no longer had valid work permits. In addition, they had only been able to complete housing registration, the first step of the new work permit process. Yet, when they left the factory, their employer would not return the original copies of their housing registration papers.
On 27 October, 35 of the 400 dismissed workers organized and went to the Labor Office to file a complaint against their employer. The 35 workers reported that during the last two years they had received less than minimum wage salaries. Therefore, they requested that their employer provide remuneration for the unpaid wages. After an initial meeting with the labor officer and the employer, the employer offered to pay 10% of what was owed to each worker. The workers did not agree and the employer refused to compromise. By February 2005, the workers reported that they had meet with the labor officer and the employer over 10 times but had yet to reach an agreement. (Source: HRDU, 2005)
In November, the trial of Suchart Akkavibul and his wife Yuwadee for the brutal murder of their 18-year-old Burmese migrant worker, Ma Suu, who was set on fire, left unaided and then dumped by the roadside in Lop Burip province in early July 2002, was further delayed. In their initial appearance before the court in June 2004, Suchart and his wife were given bail on the grounds that Suchart is a state officer in the Royal Thai Airforce.
Testimony was given at two hearings on 26 July and 4 August 2004, by five Burmese workers who were employed by Suchart, all of which implicated Suchart and his wife in the severe beating of Ma Suu, with some also testifying that they saw the burn injuries after the incident. Finally, the Public Prosecutor charged Suchart and his wife with murder, confinement and harboring an illegal alien under Sections 289 and 310 of the Penal Code of Thailand and Section 64 of the Immigration Act B.E.2522 (1979).
The first hearing of the case was held at Uthaithanee Provincial Court on 1 November 2004, and despite the case being delayed for two years already, the court set the next hearing date for January 2006, due to the introduction of a new hearing system. This has prompted concerns that Suchart’s influence and position of authority is allowing him to escape justice. (Source: “UPDATE (Thailand): Case of the Killing of a Migrant Worker Dragged On by Apparent Delay of Trial,” AHRC, 10 December 2004)
On 5 November, YCOWA member Aye Salam was assaulted by three men on a motorcycle. The three thugs had followed Aye Salam after he left a mosque at around 9:45 pm. Salam was surrounded by the men, with one member of the group hitting Mr Salam with a club. Mr Salam was able to make his escape shortly after, preceding to a hospital for medical attention. Salam reported the incident to police. The assault was believed to be related to Salam’s work in the promotion of labor rights for Burmese migrant workers. (Source: “THAILAND: Migrant Workers' Rights Activist Facing Legal Prosecution and Death Threats,” AHRC, 22 December 2004)
On 6 November, Thai police arrested 30 illegal Burmese migrants attempting to make their way to Ratchaburi where, by prior arrangement, they were to be employed as factory workers. The Burmese migrants were in the back of a pick-up, which was followed by police after the driver had failed to stop at a checkpoint near the shared border between Burma and Thailand. The workers were taken into custody, while the driver escaped after abandoning his car. (Source: “Up to 30 illegal Myanmar Workers Nabbed in Thailand,” Xinhua News, 7 November 2004)
On 3 December, workers at Nun Cho Rune (a knitting and sewing factory in Mae Sot) approached their employer seeking a 3 day remuneration rate of 320 baht, increasing their daily wage from 60 to 106 baht, a figure still below the minimum wage requirements. This request was followed by 5 workers from the factory seeking assistance from the LPO in dealing with their wage concerns. An appointment was made for a meeting between employees, the employer and an LPO Officer on 27 December. On 20 December, 76 workers were dismissed by their employer and threatened with deportation before eventually being taken to a monastery. As a result, another group of workers visited the LPO in order to better determine their position. At this meeting the workers were told to wait for the meeting and that any moves made on their behalf to seek redress for violations of their labor rights would result in deportation. (Source: HRDU, 2004)
On 14 December, police raided the offices of YCOWA in Mae Sot, Tak province. The raid resulted in the arrest of YCOWA labor activist Aye Salam on the grounds that he was working illegally in Thailand. Salam assisted in drafting complaints for Burmese migrant workers who were paid below minimum wage and the arrest is believed to be related to his involvement in disputes between migrant workers and their employers. Subsequently, Salam was charged for working in an industry other than those prescribed by the government. During the raid, police confiscated 3kg of complaint forms prepared by the organization.
On 16 December, one day after being released on bail, Aye Salam received a death threat from an unknown source, threatening to kidnap and kill him unless he ceased his involvement in labor rights activism. (Source: "Thailand: Migrant Workers’ Rights Activists Facing Legal Prosecution and Death Threats," Asian Human Rights Commission, 21 December 2004)
On 19 December, 76 workers were dismissed from the Nun Cho Rune textile and garment factory and threatened with deportation by their employer and police. Workers visited the LPO on 20 and 22 December, seeking redress for their dismissal. On 22 December they were told to await the previously arranged meeting on 27 December. They were also told that any efforts to pursue their legal rights on or before the meeting would result in their deportation. (Source: HRDU, 2005)
On 26 December, the southern provinces of Thailand were ravaged by tsunami waves, leading to the deaths of thousands of Burmese migrant workers. Specific numbers have been difficult to document due to the lack of assistance rendered by the Burmese military government after the tsunami, the fact that a large proportion of the migrant workers were unregistered and the unwillingness of Thai authorities to collect accurate information concerning the deaths of Burmese in the region.
15. 3 Situation of Burmese Migrants in Malaysia
The Malaysian government estimated in August 2002 that there were approximately 16,000 people from Burma working legally in the country. The majority of Burmese migrants work in Malaysia’s construction, garment and food processing industries, and are reportedly paid around 700 RM (about US$ 184) per month (source: Xinhua, 2002). Other sources report that there are upwards of 750,000 undocumented workers in Malaysia, including many who earn well below the legal minimum wage. According to the UNHCR, there are approximately 15,000 Rohingya refugees in Malaysia, and according to the Chin Refugee Centre, there are about 5,000 Chin migrants in Malaysia. Members of both these ethnic groups face serious human rights abuses, specifically religious persecution, in Burma, which prompts their flight to countries such as Malaysia.
Malaysia has not ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and the Malaysian government does not, for the most part, differentiate between refugees and migrant workers. Under immigration policy, all undocumented people are considered “illegal immigrants” and are therefore subjected to harsh and arbitrary immigration laws. Due to their undocumented status, migrants are vulnerable to extortion from police and government agencies, harassment, and exploitation in their work.
Work is somewhat scarce for undocumented people in Malaysia because employers are reluctant to hire them without papers. The work that they can find is often daily work for daily pay and offers little security. According to one source, some Burmese working in Malaysia go unpaid for months at a time and they have no legal recourse against their employers. Undocumented workers also lack access to basic healthcare and education services. Further, according to Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM), a Malaysian human rights NGO, Burmese immigrants to Malaysia are demonized in the mainstream media, portrayed as parasites and law-breakers who contribute to crime and poverty in the country. SUARAM notes that, “Issues of supply and demand of foreign workers in Malaysia and their contribution to the economy, the smuggling syndicate of foreign workers, exploitation of these workers and conflict situation or persecution giving rise to refugees fleeing their home countries are almost always absent in the mainstream discussion.” (Source: “Overview of the Situation of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Malaysia," SUARAM, delivered at the Regional Conference on the Protection of Refugees from Burma, 6-7 November 2003)
In August 2002, the Malaysian Parliament implemented new laws for immigrants, including the allowance of jailing and caning for people caught without proper entry documents. Those found to have entered the country illegally or to have overstayed their visas were liable to a maximum fine of 10,000 RM (US$ 2,600), a jail term of up to 5 years and up to 6 strokes of a cane. Those who sheltered undocumented persons were also subject to severe punishments.
In April 2003, a decrease in the number of illegal immigrants had been reported since the implementation of the new laws, under which an estimated 9,000 undocumented people had been caned. Deputy Home Minister Chor Chee Heung told the Parliament that, “Operations and raids will continue to ensure that we further reduce the number of illegal immigrants. If we do not take action, the security of the country may be jeopardized.” (Source: “Overview of the situation of refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia," SUARAM, delivered at the Regional Conference on the Protection of Refugees from Burma, 6-7 November 2003)
Further, since the policy changes in 2002, undocumented people who are arrested have often been detained in detention camps for an unspecified length of time rather than being immediately deported. If a person wants to arrange a "quicker" deportation, their family or friends must pay their return fare to Burma. Otherwise, they are held in the detention centre until a mass deportation can be organized. According to SUARAM, there have been “severe reports of assault, sexual abuse, inadequate living conditions, lack of medical treatment and even death while in detention.” Some Burmese migrants have been held for up to a year or longer in these overcrowded prisons. (Source: “Overview of the situation of refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia," SUARAM, delivered at the Regional Conference on the Protection of Refugees from Burma, 6-7 November 2003)
In 2004, the Malaysian government planned a similar crackdown on illegal workers, in an attempt to gain greater control and regulation over its migrant workforce. Prior to the planned crackdown, illegal workers were given an amnesty period to leave the country, beginning on 29 October and coinciding with the Islamic holy fasting month of Ramadan (source: “Malaysia Warns Illegals: Amnesty Your Last Chance,” The Manila Times, 1 November 2004). This period was originally to end on 14 November, when arrests, punishments and deportations were planned to begin. In spite of the severity of the repercussions outlined by the government, a disappointing response to the general amnesty was reported. Consequently, the Malaysian government extended the amnesty period until the end of December (source: “Malaysia Extends Amnesty Deadline for Migrant Workers,” The Jakarta Post, 6 November 2004).
A number of reasons were cited for the poor response to the amnesty period. Of particular relevance to illegal Burmese workers in Malaysia is the cost of transport to return home, coupled with the likely prospect of arrest and detention upon arrival at the Burmese border for illegally leaving the country and the fear of human rights abuses and religious persecution once inside Burma.
The consequences for illegal workers who failed to avail themselves of the amnesty period were to include arrest, fines, caning and deportation. Government officers were expected to inspect building sites, plantations, factories, restaurants and even private homes with domestic servants to pursue arrests. To enforce the crackdown, 500,000 members of volunteer neighborhood security groups were to assist in the search for illegal migrants. Human rights groups expressed concern over the minimal training of these groups and the cash rewards for capture, suggesting these factors were likely to encourage vigilantism. Government releases have stated that the operation would be carried out humanely, although doubts have been cast over the ability of the government to control the volunteer groups entrusted with the power to arrest. (Source: "Malaysia’s Massive Crackdown on Migrants Sparks Rights Fears," AFP, 30 January 2004)
In the wake of the tsunami of 26 December 2004, however, the crackdown on illegal migrant workers was put on hold until 31 January 2005, following a request from Indonesia, the country worst affected by the disaster. The crackdown was primarily targeted at Indonesian migrant workers, who make up the majority of migrants working illegally in Malaysia. Prior to the tsunami, reports had estimated that 60,000 illegal migrants had been deported, with 18,607 caned for entering the country without valid documentation. At the time of writing, 1 March 2005 was viewed as a likely date for the commencement of the crackdown.
The amnesty period and the subsequent crackdown were aimed at evicting 400,000 of the 1.2 million migrant workers in Malaysia. Official statements acknowledged that expulsion did not preclude re-entering the country with legitimate documentation. In addition, the Malaysian government was already focusing on the regulated import of labor from Pakistan, Burma, Vietnam, India and Nepal (source: “Malaysia Widens Recruitment for Foreign Workers,” DVB, 4 April 2005). This would require the payment of a 1,325 RM (US$ 348) government levy and 180 RM (US$ 47) for medical tests. Yet, with monthly incomes estimated at US$ 144 per month, the costs become prohibitive for many migrant workers. Another problem for Burmese attempting to follow correct registration procedures is their lack of documentation. Very few have passports due to their prohibitive cost, while many ethnic minorities fleeing Burma do not possess citizenship papers due to their marginalized status within Burma.
In October 2004, the Malaysian government announced its willingness to issue official identity documents for Burmese Rohingya in order to allow them to work legally in Malaysia. In turn, these documents would protect the Rohingya from the impending deportation process. Mohamed Nazri Abdul Aziz, Minister in the PM’s department, acknowledged that the move was in response to the Burmese government’s failure to issue the Rohingya with citizenship and its policy of persecution against the Muslim minority. Procedures have yet to be confirmed for the estimated 10,000 Rohingya currently living in Malaysia. (Source: “Malaysia: Government Must Halt Deportation of One Million Migrants,” Amnesty International Press Release, 12 February 2004)
15.4 Situation of Burmese Migrants in Japan
There are an estimated 10,000 Burmese people living in Japan, according to the Tokyo-based People’s Forum on Burma. More than half of these people either entered the country illegally to find work or entered legally and overstayed their visas. The Japanese Immigration Department listed the number of illegal workers at around 230,000 in 2001, with 2004 estimates of up to 250,000. (Source: Naw Sen, “New Fees for Burmese in Japan,” Irrawaddy, 8 January 2004)
Until the beginning of 2004, Burmese migrants living in Japan were required to pay a monthly tax of 10,000 yen (US$ 93) to the Myanmar Embassy in Tokyo, and another 8,000 yen (US$ 74) for their spouses. Payments were required regardless of income and visa status. Due to the high costs of these tariffs, many undocumented Burmese migrants in Japan did not pay regularly. This fee structure was subject to scrutiny by the Japanese government in the past on the grounds that the levy may represent the exercise of sovereign power in a foreign country, in contravention of customary international law. No bilateral agreement between the two countries exists to prevent dual taxation, although Burma has traditionally sidestepped this issue of sovereignty by masking the fee as a voluntary donation to the government.
As of 1 January 2004, the Burmese Embassy in Japan introduced a new fee payment program for Burmese living there who wish to renew their passports. The new regulations require those seeking to renew existing documents and those applying for new documents to pay a fee as well as graded income tax. The new fee structure as of the beginning of 2004 was as follows:
Fee Income tax
Renewal 17,500 yen Graded
Passport expiry 1-5 years ago 17,500 yen 200,000 yen
Passport expiry 5+ years ago 17,500 yen 300,000 yen
No documents 35,000 yen 300,000 yen
Concurrently, the Japanese Ministry of Justice and the Tokyo government announced the intention to crackdown on the number of illegal workers in the country. The government aims to halve the size of the illegal population over the next five years through the enforcement of increasingly strict immigration laws. Therefore, the prospects for Burmese migrant workers of remaining in Japan or returning to Burma legally are dim, with the prohibitive costs associated likely to leave Burmese migrant workers in a state of uncertainty, stuck without visas to stay in Japan legally or documents to return home. Consequently, they are forced to live either in detention centers in Japan or on the margins of society, often without access to social security protection. (Source: Naw Seng, “New Fees for Burmese in Japan,” Irrawaddy, 8 January 2004).
15.5 Situation of Burmese Migrants in India
Migration from Chin State in Burma has continued throughout 2004 due to the Burmese military government’s campaigns against the Chin ethnic minority group. Fearing religious, cultural and political persecution, as well as economic destitution, many Chin Christians continue to flee across the border and into Mizoram State, India. However, India has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and nor does India allow the UNHCR access to Mizoram State. Therefore, those Chin Christians who are unable to make their way to New Delhi and access the protection and assistance of the UNHCR are labeled as illegal immigrants in Mizoram State and fall within the jurisdiction of India’s Foreigners Act of 1946. No distinction is made between refugees and illegal aliens in Mizoram State and ethnic Chin Christians are afforded little to no legal protection in this area.
Approximately 50,000 Chin reside in Mizoram State and an estimated 10,000 are thought to be engaged in illegal employment. The Mizo, the local ethnic groups of Mizoram State, and the Chin are ethnically and linguistically related and the Chin were initially accepted into the local communities. However, in recent years relations between the two groups have steadily deteriorated and the Chin are frequently blamed for social problems by political groups such as the Young Mizo Association (YMA). In July 2003, the alleged rape of a nine-year old Mizo girl by a Burmese man led the YMA, in collaboration with other organizations, to launch the “Quit Mizoram Campaign.” The campaign aimed to evict all Burmese people from the state and there were reports that to this end the Chin were subjected to threats, ultimatums and incidents of violence and property destruction. There were also reports that these acts were carried out with the full knowledge of state authorities.
While tensions between the YMA and the Chin have reportedly subsided since July 2003, there were continued reports of discrimination against Burmese Chin residents in Mizoram State throughout 2004. Chin residents continued to be harassed to leave Mizoram State. The most recent deadline for eviction in Lunglei, the second largest town of Mizoram State, was the end of July 2004. In some cases, Chin residents have been put in jail overnight in order to "teach them a lesson" (source: "Chin Refugees in Mizoram Face Threat of Deportation," Rhododendron News, Volume VII. No. IV. July-August 2004). It was also reported that Mizo landlords were told by the YMA not to rent their property to Burmese people and subsequently the Chin have had difficulty finding accommodation. Refugees International has reported that as many as 80% of the Burmese population in Langlei have been forced to return to Burma. It is further estimated that the campaign has resulted in the forced deportation of as many as 6,000 Chin, while an estimated 10,000 Chin have fled their homes and gone into hiding in Mizoram State (source: “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Burmese Chin Refugees in India,” Refugees International, 22 July 2004). The situation of the 6,000 Chin who returned to Burma has remained to date unclear. (Please see chapter on refugees for more information.)
15.5 Situation of Burmese Migrants in Singapore
For decades, Burmese migrants have worked legally in Singapore. The number of Burmese in Singapore began to increase in the mid 1980’s as a result of the country’s construction boom and simultaneous labor shortage. Some Burmese migrants in Singapore are highly educated and have obtained work as doctors and professors. However, the majority of Burmese workers labor in low-level jobs including construction work, carpentry, welding, and painting.
Before January 1998, travel to Singapore was facilitated by the fact that Burmese could obtain a visa-on-arrival for a seven-day stay. Currently, however, Burmese must apply for visas from the Singapore Embassy in Rangoon. People who wish to get a work visa must provide a work permit and a sponsor letter, documents that can only be provided by naturalized Singapore citizens, Burmese with Permanent Resident (PR) status, or to those who have already been granted an official Employee Pass (EP).
Only educated individuals are eligible to receive Singaporean work visas, and the prerequisites for an EP include a university degree from Burma or enrollment in one of Singapore’s polytechnic schools. Visa applicants who have no one to sponsor them must leave a deposit of 2,000 Foreign Exchange Certificates (FECs) in addition to the 18 FEC visa fee (one FEC is approximately 960 kyat). Individuals who overstay their visa lose this deposit (source: HRDU, 2004).
For many people, these fees are only part of the money that must be spent to obtain a permit to legally work in Singapore. In Rangoon, job broker agencies connected to Singapore businesses charge high fees to expedite the bureaucratic process of obtaining a work visa. These agencies charge between 1,000,000 to 1,200,000 kyat to arrange for applicants’ passports, air tickets and job training that can last up to six months. Some migrants find that it can take up to eight months after this initial payment before they arrive in Singapore and begin to work off this debt. There are also a large number of fly-by-night brokers who frequently swindle people out of their money. For the majority of Burmese citizens, these high associated visa costs effectively prevent them from being able to pursue the option of working legally in Singapore.
Approximately 300 Burmese go to Singapore each month for the purposes of either work or study. Two thousand two hundred and eighteen Burmese workers have been sent to work in Singapore through official channels, with the Departments of Labor between the two countries entering occasional agreements on the provision of skilled migrants to Singapore. Employment through this avenue requires prospective employees to meet the criteria established by the Department of Labor. (Source: “Singapore: Port Authority to hire Burmese workers,” Asian Labour News, 29 July 2004)
In July 2004, the Port Authority of Singapore announced its requirements for more electricians, container drivers and mechanics, with Burma targeted to provide 160 people for an October start. The rates of pay for container drivers mirrors the rates received by the majority of Burmese working in Singapore (US$ 550 per month), while the rates for mechanics and electricians is slightly higher (US$ 800 per month). The Port Authority was also expected to pay the costs of transport, provide accommodation and free medical care. (Source: Ye Lwin, "Singapore Port Hires Myanmar Workers," The Myanmar Times and Weekly Review, 7-13 February 2005)
While legal workers in Singapore earn vastly more than they could in Burma, their expenses can also be very high. Legal workers make an average of about US$ 16 (9,200 kyat) per day, while more skilled workers earn slightly more. Burmese workers make about US$ 600 (345,000 kyat) per month, with basic living costs running from US$ 80-100. In addition, the SPDC charges citizens a 10% tax on overseas earnings and workers must also pay a flat tax of US$ 30 to the Singapore government. If workers need to renew their passports they must pay the Burmese government US$ 300 and replacing a worn or lost passport costs US$ 1,400.
The majority of illegal Burmese migrants arrive in Singapore as stowaways on ships. These workers generally undertake menial labor in restaurants, factories and on construction sites. Without legal status they are often forced to pay inflated rent costs from corrupt landlords and can be subjected to arbitrary arrest by officials, even in their own homes.
Burmese arrested in Singapore for illegal entry are repatriated back to Burma, provided they have the money to pay the transport costs. If arrested migrants do not have this money, they are forced to stay in prison and work until they are able to earn the money needed. It has been reported that migrants caught working illegally have also been subjected to caning, a legal form of punishment in Singapore. (Source: "Laboring in the Lion City," Irrawaddy, October 2002)
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