14. The Situation of Refugees

 

Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

 

– Article 14, Paragraph 1, Universal Declaration of Human Rights

 

14.1 Background

 

According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), more than 600,000 Burmese refugees and asylum seekers remained in countries neighboring Burma at the end of 2004. Driven out by the ruling military regime’s policies and practices that suppress their freedom and violate their human rights, refugees and asylum seekers have fled to countries including Bangladesh, India, Malaysia and Thailand. Refugees flee forced labor, forced relocation, torture, rape and other human rights violations perpetrated by members of the Tatmadaw (armed forces) or other state sponsored individuals or organizations. As the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) continues to try and eliminate all armed and unarmed resistance, the military's presence and involvement in every area of the country and all aspects of life continues to grow, forcing many to leave their homes, fleeing to neighboring countries or to become displaced within Burma. There are an estimated one million internally displaced people in Burma who have the potential to become cross border refugees in times of increased military conflict.

 

In Thailand, the USCRI reported a population of approximately 453,500 refugees at the end of 2004, the majority of whom were from Karen, Karenni, Mon and Shan ethnic groups. At the same time, there were more than one million migrant workers in Thailand who traveled there for many of the same reasons as refugees yet identify themselves by their immediate economic needs. In Bangladesh, over 20,000 Rohingya refugees resided in the two remaining refugee camps as well as 100,000 others who were living and working among the Bangladeshi communities as they are denied access to the camps. Rohingya have also fled to Malaysia where the USCRI reported there were approximately 10,000 Rohingya as well as 15,000 Chin refugees at the end of 2004. In India, the refugee population of approximately 60,000 consisted of mostly ethnic Chin people. In smaller numbers, other ethnic groups including Burman, Kachin and Rakhine have also fled to Bangladesh, India, Malaysia and Thailand. (Source: World Refugee Survey 2005, USCRI, 15 June 2005)

 

The Refugee Convention states that refugee protection rests on the principle of non-refoulement, which dictates that no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group. This principle has been repeatedly violated by the governments of Bangladesh, India and Thailand, who continue to forcibly repatriate refugees back to areas where their safety cannot be guaranteed.

 

14.2 Situation of Refugees in Thailand

 

Refugee Demographics in 2004

 

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) reported a population of 155,785 refugees living inside the nine Thai border refugee camps at the end of 2004, which was an increase over the population from 2003. This increase has not been attributed to any major influx of new refugees, as the monthly arrival rate for 2003 and 2004 was lower than the previous five years. The camp population increase was partially the result of “hidden” refugees being included in some counts in some camps. The hidden refugee population is comprised of those who arrived to the camps after the Provincial Admissions Boards (PABs) ceased to function in late 2001, preventing them from registering in the camps. Because the PABs have remained dormant since that time, the Thai government has maintained the policy of “no new arrivals” and the hidden population has continued to grow. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) conducted the last official population headcount in 1999. As a result, there has been a growing discrepancy between the official camp population as recorded by the MOI and the actual population. In October 2004, the UNHCR commenced a new registration exercise in the camps. While only previously registered refugees were re-registered, the UNHCR also collected information about the non-registered population, to both create a more detailed representation of the camp population and in preparation for the reestablishment of the PABs. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004)

 

The breakdown by age and sex reported by the Karen, Mon and Karenni Committees in December 2004 was as follows:

 

Group

Families

Adult*

Children

Under 5 years

Total

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

Female

Karenni

4,463

7,725

6,511

2,488

2,728

1,518

1,570

22,540

Karen

17,906

34,495

33,093

12,019

11,236

6,761

6,398

104,002

Mon

2,194

3,898

3,982

1,556

1,441

599

697

12,173

Total

24,563

46,118

43,586

16,063

15,405

8,878

8,665

138,715

* For Karen and Mon, this is over 12 years old, for Karenni over 14 years old.

 

(Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004)

 

A significant number of Burmese refugees and asylum seekers reside outside of the camps. Due to a variety of factors, including ethnicity, political involvement or Thai policy, these groups are either not recognized as refugees, not accounted for in any official refugee population numbers or recognized as separate from the camp refugee population. According to the TBBC, there were approximately 50,000 ethnic refugees residing outside of the camps at the end of 2003 (source: “Overview of the Situation of Burmese Refugees in Thailand," Burmese Border Consortium, 6 November 2003). The USCRI reported a population of over 300,000 ethnic Shan refugees in the country in 2004 (source: World Refugee Survey 2005, USCRI, 15 June 2005). In addition, at the end of 2004, there were 2,500 Persons of Concern (POC) recognized by the UNHCR while approximately 6,000 people in urban centers had registered with the UNHCR in order to be reviewed by the PABs for entrance into the border refugee camps.

 

Thai Government Policy towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers

 

Situated on the eastern border of Burma, Thailand is one of the main destinations for refugees, political dissidents and others fleeing the oppressive policies and practices of the SPDC military regime. While Thailand directly borders Shan State, Karenni State, Karen State, Mon State and Tenasserim Division, refugees and asylum seekers from all states and divisions of Burma flee to Thailand in search of security and protection. However, Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and therefore is not obligated to follow any international norms or standards in the treatment and protection of refugees. Thailand also lacks an adequate legal framework through which refugee status determination can be made. This creates a precarious environment for those who come to Thailand seeking refuge. Thailand’s attitude towards refugees is based on the belief that any assistance provided by humanitarian non-government organizations (NGOs) or the UNHCR will serve as a “pull” factor, encouraging refugees to enter the country and deterring them from eventual repatriation. Only those determined to be fleeing from armed conflict have been permitted to remain in one of the nine border refugee camps. Yet, according to Thai policy, the 155,785 inhabitants of the camps are temporarily displaced persons fleeing the effects of fighting. Ethnic refugees outside the camps, refugees from Shan State, political dissidents in urban areas and migrant workers who are also refugees are all considered illegal immigrants by Thai law and are vulnerable to arrest and deportation at any time.

 

Thailand’s policies towards refugees and asylum seekers have become increasingly intolerant over the past few years as Thai-Burma economic and political relations have improved. Since Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra came to office in 2001, he has worked to improve the historically troublesome relations between the two countries. Economic and commercial agreements such as the Economic Cooperation Strategy to develop border areas of both countries, signed in November 2003, have coincided with Thailand’s public support of the SPDC. In 2004, it was reported that “Thailand is Burma’s third most important investment partner, and Thai exports to Burma generate around US$ 1.26 billion each year” (source: Kyaw Zwa Moe, “Commercial Interests Driving Refugee Policy,” Irrawaddy, 26 February 2004). The Prime Minister’s efforts have been supported by a government filled with a large proportion of high level businessmen who have little interest in Burmese asylum seekers and activists. The Thai government has been consistently criticized for compromising humanitarian standards for the sake of economic interests and appeasing the Burmese military regime.

 

Since December 2002, Thai authorities have expressed that foreign opposition groups working against Thailand’s neighbors would not be allowed to operate from Thai soil. Comprised of asylum seekers who have fled from Burma, Burmese political dissident groups fell into this category. In accordance with this policy, Thai authorities engaged in crackdowns in 2002 and 2003, confiscating possessions and documents, arresting and deporting activists, and closing offices of Burmese opposition groups in Sangklaburi, Chiang Mai, Mae Hong Song and Mae Sariang. Throughout 2004, the Thai government continued to exert pressure on and restrict the activities of Burmese political dissidents seeking asylum in Thailand. In April, local authorities and immigration officials in Mae Sot forced several pro-democracy organizations to cease and disperse from conferences and other politically related activities. The organizations affected included the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB), the National League for Democracy-Liberated Area (Youth)(NLD-LA (Youth)) and the Student Youth Congress of Burma (SYCB) (source: Kyaw Zwa Moe, “Mae Sot Opposition Meetings Stopped,” Irrawaddy, 27 April 2004). Again in May, Thai authorities reportedly instructed all Burmese organizations operating in Thailand to halt organizing, training and travel simultaneous to the period of the National Convention in Burma (source: “Threats to Burmese Refugees in Thailand Increasing,” Refugees International, 16 June 2004).

 

Refugees and asylum seekers in Thailand have also become increasingly vulnerable to Thailand’s tightening policies towards illegal migrants. Registered camp refugees outside of the camp, asylum seekers recognized by the UNHCR in urban areas and undocumented asylum seekers have all been subject to arrest on the charge of illegal entry as Thai authorities have cracked down on illegal migrants. The USCRI reported that the Thai authorities arrested approximately 100,000 people from Burma who did not have “proper documentation” in 2004. Approximately 10,000 Burmese were deported unofficially each month with the Thai authorities depositing those who were arrested at various border checkpoints. Yet, in accordance with a June 2003 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the SPDC and the Thai government, 400 illegal migrants have been returned officially to SPDC authorities each month. Both methods of deportation are alarming for asylum seekers who fear they may be recognized and face further persecution if sent back to Burma. Those who are recognized by the UNHCR or registered in the camps are sometimes able to contact the UNHCR for assistance to prevent deportation. In addition, the Thai authorities have permitted UNHCR to maintain a presence in the Immigration Detention Center (IDC) in Bangkok. However, asylum seekers are frequently unable to contact the UNHCR. Even when the UNHCR is able to intervene, refugees are not always spared from deportation. For example, the USCRI reported that in December 2004 the UNHCR intervened to assist three boys, all registered in the refugee camp, who were arrested outside of the camp and detained at the IDC in Kanchanaburi province. Despite the UNHCR’s attempts, the Thai authorities deported the three boys to Three Pagodas Pass. (Source: World Refugee Survey 2005, USCRI, 15 June 2005)

 

The UNHCR and the Refugee Status Determination Process

 

Until the end of 2003, an individual asylum seeker outside of the refugee camps could apply to the UNCHR for recognition as a refugee, also known as Person of Concern (POC) status, by the conditions in article 1(A) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. POCs received a document certifying that they are refugees under the UNHCR’s mandate. The document included their photograph, some biographical information and the UNHCR’s address and contact information in the event that a POC encountered difficulties with the Thai authorities. POCs recognized before April 2004 received a small monthly subsistence allowance from the UNHCR and tended to reside in urban areas. Refugees in the border camps were not eligible to receive POC status. Instead, the UNHCR granted POC status to asylum seekers who were not part of the border camp caseload. Asylum seekers who registered with the UNHCR but whose cases had not yet been determined were also provided with a certificate indicating that they were under the protection of the UNHCR (source: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Human Rights Watch, February 2004).  However, POC status and possession of UNHCR documents did not guarantee any greater protection as many POCs and those awaiting determination experienced harassment, extortion, confiscation of documents and arrest by both the police and immigration police. Some POCs have also been deported (refouled) back to Burma.

 

Following the 30 May 2003 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD members and supporters near Depayin, Sagaing Division, this option of seeking POC status from the UNHCR came under fire, making the already tenuous situation for refugees and asylum seekers increasingly so. When 11 Burmese dissidents were arrested for protesting outside of the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok and charged with illegal entry, their POC status drew Prime Minister Thaksin’s attention to the UNHCR’s refugee status determination process (source: “Police Chief Warns Burmese Dissidents,” Bangkok Post, 30 June 2003). In response, Prime Minister Thaksin accused the UNHCR of undermining the sovereignty of Thailand and operating without properly sharing information or informing the Thai government of their activities. Disapproving of the POCs’ ability to “roam freely around the country," Prime Minister Thaksin proposed that all POCs be transferred to a border refugee camp to which the UNHCR agreed (source: “Thai Border Camps to Take 1,500 Myanmar Refugees," AFP, 2 July 2003). Furthermore, in July 2003, the Thai government announced a new policy that all new asylum seekers from Burma should not go to Bangkok or other urban centers. Instead, all refugees and asylum seekers should seek admission to the border refugee camps through an admission procedure to be determined by the Thai government. This admission process was later revealed to be the PABs.

 

The UNHCR continued to process applications for refugee status determination until 5 January 2004, when the Thai government officially ordered the UNHCR to halt from doing so. In conjunction with the order, the UNHCR temporarily ceased receiving applications for the month of January while continuing to process applications received before the cutoff date of 1 January 2004 (source: “Suspension of Refugee Status Determination Processing for New Applications from Myanmar Asylum-seekers As of 1 January 2004,” UNHCR, 6 January 2004). On 1 February, the UNHCR resumed receiving applications from asylum seekers only for the purpose of referring the applicants to the PABs for entrance to one of the border camps. If admitted to the camps, they will receive the same support and services as all of the other camp refugees (source: “New UNHCR Registration Process for Applications from Myanmar Asylum-Seekers as of 1 February 2004,” UNHCR, 31 January 2004). A group of 100 applicants from 2004, considered emergency or urgent cases, were processed on an individual basis for refugee status determination by the UNHCR. Aside from these 100 cases, applicants during 2004 received a document from the UNHCR indicating their registration for admission to the camps, which could be presented to law enforcement or other Thai officials. Like POCs, 2004 applicants faced harassment and remained vulnerable to arrest and deportation.

 

By the end of 2004, approximately 6,000 applicants had registered with the UNHCR, waiting in urban areas to be processed under the new procedure of the PABs. At the same time, there were approximately 2,500 recognized POCs and the UNHCR faced a backlog of approximately 2,000 applications, which had been submitted before the 1 January 2004 cutoff date to be processed for refugee status determination. Aside from the risks of arrest and deportation, many faced difficulties maintaining their livelihoods as POCs recognized after April 2004 were not provided with a subsistence allowance unless considered a special or vulnerable case. These cases included those with medical issues, physical/mental disabilities, lactating women, women-at-risk, single parents, unaccompanied minors, former child soldiers, victims of torture, a couple with more than five children, unaccompanied women, survivors of gender based violence, or unaccompanied elders. Without legal permission to work in Thailand, POCs, those awaiting determination and 2004 applicants attempting to secure employment to support themselves faced many of the same obstacles as migrant workers. Those who found work were vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by their employers which often included unfair wages, excessive work hours and poor working conditions (please see chapter on migrants for more information).

 

In January, the United States announced their intention to consider recognized POCs for resettlement. Norway, Sweden, England, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland and Finland also agreed to resettle POCs in varying numbers. By the end of 2004, approximately 1,500 POCs had departed for resettlement in third countries while the resettlement process continued. However, the Thai government held firm that all POCs must be relocated from urban areas to the border refugee camps. The deadline for the relocation was postponed throughout the year until 31 March 2005. It was hoped that the majority of the POC population would depart for third countries before the relocation deadline to Nu Po, Ban Dong Yang and Tham Hin camps (source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004). POCs, along with various advocacy organizations, have great concerns for the security of the POCs if forced to relocate to the camps as the population includes many leaders and well-known activists from the pro-democracy organizations. The UNHCR’s non-permanent presence, close proximity to the border, Thai supervision of protection and lack of communication with the outside world has led to fears of abuse with no avenue to report or seek protection (source: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Human Rights Watch, February 2004).

 

The Provincial Admission Boards (PABs)

 

Newly arrived asylum seekers to the camps also face great obstacles obtaining official permission to remain in Thailand. The Provincial Admission Boards (PABs), created by the Thai government in 1999 to handle the cases of new arrivals to the refugee camps, stopped meeting at the end of 2001 and therefore have not examined any new cases since that time. During 2004, the Thai government announced that the PABs would be reestablished to process the unregistered camp population of over 30,000 persons. Moreover, the Thai government reported that the PABs would replace the refugee status determination process formerly conducted by the UNHCR for asylum seekers in urban areas.

 

While they were meeting, the PABs only considered those who were fleeing from fighting in border areas and the UNHCR was only granted observer status in the process. Moreover, since the middle of 2000, the PABs had been rejecting the majority of cases with the justification that they did not fit the required criteria. This is despite the fact that in the 1998 working arrangements made between Thailand and the UNHCR, it was noted that people fleeing "the effects of fighting" should also be given consideration. UNHCR’s statistics show that 38,088 persons sought admission to Thailand from May 1999 to June 2003. Of these, 11,731 were accepted as refugees (31%), while 10,408 were rejected (27%) and 11,288 (42%) were still waiting for a decision to be made regarding their status. UNHCR has stated that they believe that the 10,408 rejected cases have a legitimate fear of persecution if they return to Burma and that they were appealing the decision to repatriate these individuals. At the end of 2003, 5,541 of these cases had been reconfirmed as rejected with 330 people already repatriated. (Source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July-December 2003)

 

The future PABs will reportedly function differently, with the UNHCR having participant as opposed to observer status. In addition, the determination criteria will reportedly be expanded to include those fearing persecution. Without an expanded definition of a refugee, political dissidents and others fearing persecution will face a precarious environment with little to no option for obtaining protection against deportation and further persecution. At the end of 2004, the PABs had yet to resume functioning and both the finalized criteria and process for determination remained to be seen.

 

Situation in the Camps

 

Throughout 2004, villagers from Karen, Karenni, Mon and other ethnic border areas, aside from Shan State, continued to arrive to the nine existing refugee camps, fleeing from armed conflict and gross human rights violations. Because the PABs ceased to function at the end of 2001, Thai policy has not allowed for any increase in the camp populations. Newly arrived refugees have remained hidden in the camps unregistered and many fear deportation if they make their presence known. Since October 2003, the National Security Council has attempted to recruit refugees for repatriation by offering cash for those who volunteer to return. Registered refugees were offered 600 baht while unregistered refugees were offered 300 baht. The discrepancy in amounts offered came from the belief that unregistered refugees could easily return to the same or different camp locations. As of July 2004, 65 families or 285 people had accepted the money and volunteered to repatriate.

 

Refugees flee to Thailand in search of greater security. Yet, those residing in the camps still face many risks, including human rights abuses perpetrated by their own communities and by Thai citizens. In addition, their fundamental rights are limited because Thai policy confines refugees to the camps and does not allow them to go outside. If refugees do go outside of the camps, they are considered illegal migrants and face arrest, deportation and abuse from Thai authorities and the Thai population. Moreover, as camps are situated close to the borderline, refugees also face security threats from across the border. (Source: “Overview of the Situation of Burmese Refugees in Thailand," Burmese Border Consortium, 6 November 2003)

 

In the past, refugees only received partial assistance from humanitarian aid organizations and remained self reliant in many ways. When different ethnic resistance groups controlled greater areas of land near the border, the refugees were able to engage in black market trade and maintain small farms to provide for their needs. Others found employment in seasonal labor or raised small gardens to maintain a simple but poor life similar to living conditions inside Burma. As the Burmese Army dominated the ethnic opposition groups in the border areas, the Thai government tightened control of the refugees’ movement and made self-sufficiency increasingly difficult. In 1997, refugees in some camps were restricted from exiting, making foraging and gathering vegetables outside the camp impossible. Relief organizations have gone from providing 50 percent of staple diet needs in 1984 to 100 percent by the mid-1990s. In addition, refugees have become increasingly dependent upon relief organizations for other basic living necessities such as cooking materials, clothing, housing materials and cooking fuel.

 

Because refugees are no longer able to supplement their diet through foraging or additional wages earned from seasonal labor, nutritional intake has been impacted. Refugees receive a basic food basket of rice, salt, yellow beans, oil, blended food and fish paste from relief agencies. In 2001, the then BBC (known as TBBC in 2004) conducted a food consumption/nutrition status survey in Mae La and Karenni Camp 2. Again in May 2002, a rapid nutrition survey was conducted in Ban Don Yang, Tham Hin and Umpiem Mai refugee camps. The surveys revealed that refugee diets were lacking in micro-nutrients while excessive in carbohydrates. Despite the fact that most refugees living in Mae La and Karenni Camp 2 have been in Thailand for a considerable amount of time, they are very poor and are unable to supplement their rations. The BBC survey indicated that the average monthly expenditure for food is about 55-70 baht per family. In addition, registered refugees often share their rations with those who are unregistered and do not receive any. As a result, most refugees suffer from chronic malnutrition. The BBC study showed that as a result of poor living conditions, frequent infection and a diet lacking in animal protein and micro-nutrients, low-level, chronic malnutrition was prevalent among children in the camp. The survey indicated that the acute malnutrition rate for children averaged at 4.9%. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), less than 5% is acceptable. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July–December 2004)

 

Thailand does not permit refugees to build permanent structures in accordance with the policy that they are only temporarily displaced people. As a result, most homes and buildings are assembled with materials that are obtained locally, such as bamboo and wood. Most homes are not durable and suffer from damage each rainy season. Deforestation of areas local to the camps has become an increasing source of tension for the Thai authorities and forestry services. While various reports indicated that illegal logging activities in these areas has caused greater damage, Thailand started to impose restrictions on the refugees’ ability to cut bamboo in 1997. These restrictions have increased through the years and in 2002 it was reported that the sale of bamboo to refugees was barred in some areas. Consequently, refugees rely on humanitarian organizations, such as TBBC, to supply building materials as well (source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July–December 2003). In an attempt to prevent refugees from participating in illegal logging and environmental destruction, the Forestry Service constructed barbed wire and concrete fences around the perimeters of the border camps by the end of 2004 (source: “Tighter Conditions at Thai Camp,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 September 2004).

 

Deforestation and illegal logging practices were highlighted as some of the main reasons for the relocation of Mae Khong Kha refugee camp, located in Mae Sariang Township of Mae Hong Son province. The camp was situated in close proximity to the Salween National Park and Thai authorities had long demonized the refugees for their participation in or responsibility for the felling of timber in the area. In addition, Mae Khong Kha had been subject to several natural disasters which caused significant damage to the camp. Relocation to a new site, Mae La Oon, commenced in late 2003 and was completed in early 2004. Approximately 1,200 refugees returned to Burma out of fear of the new location, just four kilometers from the Thai-Burma border and opposite Manerplaw, the former KNU headquarters, now controlled by the SPDC. With the onset of the rainy season, it became apparent that Mae La Oon was prone to flooding.  This caused serious concern over possible erosion, landslides and lack of access to the camp. In June, more than 90 houses determined to be of particular risk were relocated to Pwe Ber Lu, which had been considered as a site for the camp relocation but was rejected on the grounds that it was too close to the border. In December, a landslide resulted in the destruction of 5 houses. By the end of the year, 96 additional families situated in high-risk areas were relocated to Pwe Ber Lu. In addition, UNHCR and humanitarian NGOs providing assistance in the camps reported that Mae La Oon was an unsuitable site necessitating the relocation of at least part of the camp. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004)

 

Tham Hin refugee camp, located in Ratchaburi province, was also determined to be an unsuitable living site by the end of the year. Since 1997 when Tham Hin was erected, the amount of designated space has been of concern as it is below international standards. A registered population of approximately 9,000 refugees, comprised of ethnic Karen and former residents of the Maneeloy Student Center, reside in a 16-acre campsite with each family living in a five square foot space. Refugees International reported that the average family size is seven to 10 people. The lack of space and overcrowded houses has caused ongoing concerns for the health of the camp population and sanitation conditions. Lack of personal space has also been reported as a source of tension within the community and within families. Despite efforts to obtain additional space, Thai authorities have not conceded, insisting that land is not available. At the end of 2004, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) reported that toilets built beneath the houses were full and could not be drained or replaced, necessitating a resolution to the space dilemma. While UNHCR had communicated the situation to the Thai authorities, there was no solution proposed by the end of the year (source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004). Organizations such as Refugees International (RI) have asserted that the Thai government should embrace resettlement to third countries as a solution for the Tham Hin residents who have endured such unsuitable conditions (source: “Thailand: Resettlement As A Durable Solution for Burmese Refugees in Tham Hin,” Refugees International, 29 November 2004). 

 

Situation of Women in Refugee Camps

 

Most refugees in camps live in family units, either arriving as such or reuniting after separate arrivals. The ratio of males to females is 51:49 and there are relatively few single mothers. The average family size is 5.6 people. Nearly 6% of households are headed by single women. Women tend to be under-represented in the committees that organize the day-to-day administration of the camps, but are active in areas such as teaching, healthcare work and home visits to gather information about the daily routine of refugees. Obstacles to increased participation of women in camp administration are lack of education and basic knowledge about their rights. There are various women’s groups in all of the camps, some focusing on the daily needs and welfare of women and some on the more political aspects of women’s rights. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004)

 

The majority of refugee women come from ethnic minority groups and have suffered from a wide range of human rights violations prior to their arrival in the camps. Ethnic minority women living in conflict areas are used as forced labor on infrastructure projects and as forced porters for the military, are subject to the constant threat of rape and have virtually no personal security. Conditions in the camps vary from place to place, but women have generally suffered from the recent tighter restrictions on movement outside the camps and have seen their ability to be self-sufficient decline. In addition, traditional ideas of gender-roles are contradicted by the strict regulations they live under, which force them to rely on humanitarian agencies for their livelihoods. EarthRights International, a human rights organization, argues that restrictions, which prevent refugees from being able to fulfill cultural gender roles, lead to a sense of frustration and powerlessness. In turn, this sense of frustration frequently results in domestic violence as refugees struggle to gain a sense of power over something in their lives (source: “Facing Violence Amongst Ourselves: Domestic Violence in Refugee Communities,” EarthRights International, 2003). The conditions of refugee women strongly effect children, of whom women are the primary caregivers.

 

Situation of Refugee Children

 

Although the decision to flee one’s home is usually made by adults, children are deeply affected by the situation. The physical dangers for children during flight are immense. They are threatened by landmines, shelling, sudden attacks and their health is put at severe risk due to long days of walking without adequate food and water. They become malnourished and their resistance to diseases, such as malaria, is lowered. Unaccompanied children are vulnerable to neglect, military recruitment, sexual assault and other types of abuse. Children also suffer greatly from the emotional effects of fleeing their homes. They leave behind friends, relatives, possessions and established social structures and witness the fear and uncertainty felt by adult authority figures. This is in addition to their exposure to the factors that caused their flight to begin with, such as the killing, torture, rape and use of forced labor of their family and community members. All of this, along with shortages of basic resources, can lead to harmful effects on the physical, psychological and social development of refugee children.

 

Children born of Burmese refugee or migrant parents in Thailand are not eligible for Thai citizenship due to their status as illegal immigrants. As a result, a growing population of stateless children is emerging, born from both migrant workers and refugees. While Thailand has signed the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), it maintains reservations concerning Articles 7 and 22 which address birth registration and citizenship for refugee children. At the same time, under Burma’s Citizenship Act, these children are ineligible for citizenship because they were born outside of the country by parents who left illegally. In addition, the Burmese government denies citizenship to these children on the grounds that they do not have birth certificates (source: “Stolen Future: The Stateless Children of Burmese Asylum Seekers,” Refugees International, 25 June 2004). Beginning on 1 July 2003, the Thai government allowed delivery certificates to be issued to babies born in the camps to registered camp refugees. Refugees are also eligible to obtain a delivery certificate in state hospitals. However, a delivery certificate is not the same as a birth certificate and does not grant citizenship to refugees. Yet, without legal documentation, children of Burmese in Thailand are “stateless and unable to prove they are from Myanmar [Burma] should they ever go there.” (Sources: World Refugee Survey 2005, USCRI, 15 June 2005; Six-Month Report, BBC, July–December 2003).

 

Children of refugee/asylum seeker populations residing outside the refugee camps face increased risk of exploitation and abuse at the hands of employers or other community members. In addition, without a citizenship, stateless children outside of the refugee camps in Thailand face even greater difficulties accessing education or health institutions. Under the provisions set forth in the CRC and the Thai Ministry of Education’s 1992 Regulation on Evidence of a Child’s Birth for School Admission, Thailand is obligated to allow non-Thai children to attend Thai schools. In addition, admission to a school should not be contingent upon possession of civil registration documents. However, in reality, Burmese children are rarely able to access Thai schools. At the same time, children of Burmese born in Thailand who are able to attend Thai schools reportedly “are unable to attain an official degree or certificate permitting the young person to pursue further education or to find a job.” (Sources: “Stolen Future: The Stateless Children of Burmese Asylum Seekers,” Refugees International, 25 June 2004; World Refugee Survey 2005, USCRI, 15 June 2005)

 

Situation of Specific Ethnic Groups of the Refugee Population

 

Situation of Karen Refugees

 

The Karen, like other ethnic minority groups, have settlements on both sides of the Thai/Burma border. With an estimated population of between 3 and 4 million, they are one of the largest ethnic minority groups in Burma. The majority of Karen support and consider themselves represented by the Karen National Union (KNU) and its army, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). Large numbers of Karen refugees began crossing from Burma in 1984, and since that time they have received assistance from the KNU-linked Karen Relief Committee (KRC). At the end of 1994, 400 former KNLA soldiers left to form the breakaway Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). They claimed that KNLA Christian commanders persecuted Buddhist KNLA soldiers. The split was partly engineered by the SPDC as part of their "divide and rule" strategy, and since 1994 the DKBA troops have attacked Karen camps inside the Thai border, sometimes in cooperation with the Burmese military.

 

After more than 50 years of armed struggle against the government in Rangoon, the KNU and SPDC agreed to a verbal ceasefire in late 2003. The verbal ceasefire agreement came after a SPDC delegation visit to KNU leaders in Thailand and a subsequent visit of a KNU delegation to Rangoon. From 15-22 January 2004, the KNU and SPDC held their first round of ceasefire talks in Rangoon. And again, on 22 February, a KNU delegation met with the SPDC in Moulmein, Mon State. While representatives from the KNU traveled to Rangoon to celebrate Thingyun, or Water Festival, as a gesture of good relations, the next round of ceasefire talks were not scheduled until October.

 

The commencement of KNU-SPDC ceasefire discussions coupled with the SPDC’s plans to move forward with reconvening the stalled 1993 National Convention both lent to what seemed an improving political environment in Burma. With this backdrop, the UNHCR believed that an appropriate time had come to commence a contingency planning process in the event that the political and security conditions inside Karen areas would be conducive for refugee return. The planning process moved forward with the cooperation of the Thai government, NGOs providing humanitarian assistance to the refugees and the SPDC. In March, the SPDC granted the UNHCR access to border areas in eastern Burma to evaluate the potential for return and to support infrastructure, health and education development projects (source: “UNHCR Gets Permission to Visit Easter Myanmar,” AP, 11 March 2004). These missions revealed that considerable infrastructure development was necessary before refugee return could take place (source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004).

 

The contingency planning process moved forward against a backdrop of ongoing fighting inside Karen State despite the verbal ceasefire agreement, the highly restricted nature of the National Convention in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) did not participate and the lack of progress in the KNU-SPDC ceasefire discussions. On 19 October, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt was arrested and replaced with Lt. General Soe Win, well known for his hardline stance against the NLD and believed to be responsible for orchestrating the 30 May 2003 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD in Depayin, Sagaing Division. Khin Nyunt’s removal occurred at the same time KNU-SPDC ceasefire negotiations were scheduled to transpire. As a result, ceasefire talks were not held at that time and the KNU returned to the Thai-Burma border after brief communication with members of the SPDC. Khin Nyunt’s removal and replacement with Soe Win dimmed hopes of political improvement and suitable conditions for refugee return in the near future. Thereafter, the voluntary repatriation contingency planning process reportedly came to a halt while the idea of skills and vocational training for refugees as a preparatory measure remained (source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004).

 

By the end of 2004, a formal ceasefire agreement had yet to be reached and SPDC forces continued to perpetrate human rights abuses in Karen areas. These abuses included forced labor, forced relocation, extortion, looting and arbitrary killing. Aside from ongoing skirmishes between KNLA and SPDC forces, the SPDC army took advantage of the verbal ceasefire agreement to develop and secure their presence in Karen State. This was executed through the construction of new army camps and roads. As a result of these conditions, Karen villagers continued to flee across the border to seek refuge in Thailand throughout 2004. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, January-June 2004)

 

Situation of Karenni Refugees

 

In 1989, Karenni State, with a relatively low population, had four separate armed groups. In the early 1990s, two of these groups signed ceasefire agreements with the ruling military regime, which left the two larger groups, the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF) and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), continuing their armed struggle against the Burmese government. In 1992, as a result of mass forced relocations carried out by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the ruling military regime at the time, in their area of operations, the KNPLF was forced into a ceasefire agreement. As the situation remained insecure, most people who had fled the area did not return. The KNPP also signed a ceasefire with the Burmese government in March 1995, but by June of the same year SLORC troops had violated the agreement and it was discarded. In 1996, the Burmese military began a large-scale forced relocation program in areas they perceived as sympathetic to the KNPP. By the end of March 1998, there were 12,500 Karenni refugees in Thailand.

 

In December 2003, the KNPP announced plans to engage in ceasefire talks with the SPDC, which were to commence in late March 2004. However, progress was thwarted when the SPDC and KNPP disagreed on the KNPP’s position of representation. The KNPP aspired to negotiate as a government while the SPDC wished only to recognize the KNPP as a party. In addition, the KNPP intended to negotiate a new ceasefire agreement as the 1995 agreement had failed. Yet, the SPDC wanted to base the new ceasefire on the 1995 agreement (source: “Karenni Ceasefire Talks Stall,” Irrawaddy, 4 April 2004). At the same time, Karenni State was host to continued armed conflict throughout 2004. Moreover, both the perpetration of human rights abuses by state sanctioned actors and continued fighting caused Karenni villagers to flee to Thailand throughout the year. The KNPP reported that their intentions to negotiate a ceasefire with the SPDC remained despite the ongoing-armed conflict. At the end of 2004, there were approximately 22,500 Karenni refugees in refugee camps in Thailand. (Sources: HRW, 2001; Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004)

 

Situation of Mon Refugees

 

The Mon have been struggling for autonomy since 1948, led by the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and its armed wing, the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA). There are nearly two million Mon people. When Mon refugees began to flee to Thailand in growing numbers, the NMSP, like the KNU, formed their own organization, the Mon National Relief Committee, to coordinate assistance to the refugees. In June 1995, the NMSP signed a ceasefire treaty with the Burmese military, which enabled them to retain their arms within a few areas in Mon State. The agreement also mandated that Mon refugees in Thailand be repatriated, which was done the following year. The newly repatriated refugees however remained afraid to return to their homes, and instead established new camps in NMSP-controlled territories. Currently, these individuals remain internally displaced within Burma, while a further 13,000 remain in camps in Thailand. In addition, due to the lack of infrastructure, constant new arrivals, lack of access to agricultural lands outside of the ceasefire areas and a variety of other factors, the resettlement sites/camps within Mon State remain dependent upon humanitarian assistance. (Sources: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004; HRW, 2001)

 

In November 2001, 153 people broke away from the NMSP to form the Hongsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP). Since its formation, fighting has ensued between the HRP, NMSP and the SPDC army, which continued through 2004. The SPDC army has reportedly increased its military presence in southern Mon State over the past three years in an attempt to overtake the HRP. The increased SPDC military presence has resulted in increased restrictions and abuses of Mon villagers. In addition, on 18 September 2004, the KNLA combined with the All Burma Muslim Union (ABMU) and attacked the HRP stronghold, killing two HRP soldiers and the leader of the HRP Colonel Pan Nyunt’s five children. The HRP also lost control of the base and many HRP members sought medical treatment in Thailand for injuries sustained during the attack, including Col Pan Nyunt. The KNU reported that the attack was a result of the HRP’s unsanctioned tax collecting activities in KNU territories. (Source: “Mon Splinter Group Under Pressure,” Irrawaddy, 12 October 2004)

 

Throughout 2004, Mon refugees continued to arrive at Halokhanee, Bee Ree and Tavoy resettlement-sites in NMSP territory and to refugee camps in Thailand. Mon villagers fled from various human rights abuses, including land confiscation, forced labor, excessive taxation and increased restrictions on movement. These abuses either caused displacement or created greater obstacles for maintaining livelihoods, which in turn caused villagers to flee their homes. It has been reported that certain human rights abuses, such as land confiscation, have increased in southern Mon State over the past three years due to the augmented SPDC military presence to combat the HRP (source: “More Mainland Lost to Burma Army,” Kao Wao News, 2 November 2004). At the same time, SPDC counter insurgency campaigns and concurrent human rights abuses in 2003 led to decreased agricultural production and the need for greater humanitarian assistance in the Tavoy resettlement site in 2004 (source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, January- June 2004).

 

Situation of Pa-O Refugees

 

The Pa-O live primarily in the Taunggyi area of southwestern Shan State. A smaller number live in the Thaton area of Mon State in Lower Burma. The Pa-O in the Thaton area have largely become "Burmanized", and like their neighbors the Mon and Karen they have adopted Burmese language, dress and customs. The Pa-O in southwestern Shan State have learned to speak Shan, but have maintained their own distinct language and customs.

 

Forced relocation programs carried out by the SPDC have been particularly sweeping in Mon, Karen and Shan States, the states where most of the Pa-O live. The Pa-O Nationalist Army signed a ceasefire with SLORC in 1991. Yet, because the Pa-O live in many of the areas where other rebel groups are still active, they have been swept up in the forced relocations and human rights abuses for which the ruling junta has become infamous. (Source: Pa-O Human Rights Watch)

 

Situation of Shan Refugees

 

Shan State is the largest ethnic minority state in Burma, and one of the most ethnically diverse.  While the Shan are the largest ethnic group in Shan State, there are many other ethnic groups inhabiting the state, such as the Akha, Lahu, Lishau, Palaung, Pa-o and Wa. At one time, Shan State was an autonomous region in Burma. The Shan were promised the right to secede from the Union of Burma after 10 years when independence from the British was gained in 1948. Yet, this agreement was not honored as civil war between the ruling authorities and the ethnic nationalities prevailed following independence. For decades, Khun Sa, the notorious drug warlord, ran his drug production operations in Shan State and along the Thai border with the support of various Shan armed groups. In January 1996, Khun Sa officially surrendered to the Burmese government and Burmese troops launched a major relocation program in an attempt to both eliminate all support for the Shan armed resistance groups and to also control the region’s natural resources. It is estimated that within a 6-month period, between March and September 1996, more than 450 villages in the area between Namsan-Kurng and Heng-Mong Nai were moved to relocation sites. By 1998, it was estimated that over 300,000 Shan in central Shan State had been affected by the relocation programs. In 1999, the SPDC sanctioned the Wa to lead resettlement programs relocating Wa people from the China border to the Thai border area across from Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai, Thailand. By 2002, between 50,000 to 100,000 people had been relocated with the intention of resettling 250,000 Wa people in total. (Source: Caouette, Therese M, and Mary E. Pack, Pushing Past the Definitions, Migration from Burma to Thailand, OSI & RI, December 2002)

 

The programs of forced relocation and other human rights abuses have led Shan and other ethnic groups from Shan State to flee across the border to Thailand. The USCRI reported that over 300,000 refugees from Shan State remained in Thailand in 2004 (source: World Refugee Survey 2005, USCRI, 15 June 2005). The Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) reported that the arrival rate to the Fang district area of Thailand alone reached approximately 1,400 people per month in the first half of 2004, while it was only 900 per month in the second half of the year (source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, January-June & July-December 2004). However, due to the fact that Shan language and culture is closely related to Thailand’s, many Shan people have been able to find temporary seasonal work across the border when fighting or economic factors made it difficult to survive in Shan State. As a result of their prevalence as migrant laborers, and more importantly, the large amount of illegal drugs produced in Shan State, Thailand has consistently refused to recognize any Shan people as refugees. Instead, the Thai government labels them as "economic migrants." As a result of Thailand’s position towards the Shan, NGOs are largely prohibited from providing them with any assistance. Access to healthcare is minimal, and children have little opportunity for education.

 

Many Shan and humanitarian organizations contest the Thai government’s notion that all Shan are economic migrants. In a report entitled Charting the Exodus from Shan State, the SHRF presented evidence illustrating that most new arrivals to Fang district, Thailand, originate from one of the twelve townships that were subject to the forced relocation programs which commenced in 1996. Prior to 1996, the numbers of Shan people arriving in Fang district were reported to be around 4,000 per year. These people would arrive during the dry season from January to May. In addition, most were men ranging in age from 20 to 40 years old. However, after 1996 the number of arrivals increased, ranging from 8,000 to 15,000 each year. Unlike those who arrived prior to 1996, there was no seasonal correlation to their arrival time. In addition, 32% were under 18 years old and 15% were 45 years or above, and approximately half were working age adults. SHRF argues that those arriving as migrant workers do not bring their families as it would only create complications for staying in Thailand. Instead, the difference in age groups indicates that full families were arriving in flight of persecution and not in search of work. (Source: Charting the Exodus from Shan State, SHRF, 2003)

 

The majority of the Shan people who have fled Burma live in the fields and orchards of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son provinces. Most are able to survive on the meager wages of seasonal work. Without any official status, Shan people in Thailand are subject to abuse by their employers and frequent arrest and detention. A health concern for Shan refugees is their unprotected exposure to pesticides in the orange orchards where they live and work. (Source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July-December 2003)

 

Shan refugees also settle in one of the two unofficial refugee camps located along the border. The camp populations range from 2-3,000. The camp locations are close to areas where the Shan State Army (SSA) has been carrying out anti-drug operations and continuing its opposition against SPDC/Wa troops. In these areas, the situation remains very volatile and insecure. If there is an SPDC/Wa attack, the refugees in these camps would almost certainly have to flee into Thailand.

 

Timeline of Major Refugee Related Events on the Thai/Burma Border in 2004

 

January

 

On 4 January, a group of 23 Burmese activists in detention in the Special Detention Center (SDC) in Bangkok engaged in a hunger strike protesting the Thai government’s intention to return all activists to Burma and the human rights abuses perpetrated against pro-democracy activists both in Thailand and in Burma. On 5 January, a representative from the UNCHR met with the protestors. However, the discussions did not yield any understanding between the two parties and the strike persisted. On 7 January, the activists halted the strike when UNHCR agreed to accept their applications for resettlement in third countries. (Sources: “Activists Stop Hunger Strike,” Irrawaddy, 7 January 2004; “Burmese Activists Stage Hunger Strikes in Thai Prison,” DVB, 5 January 2004)

 

On 5 January, the UNHCR announced that it would temporarily halt accepting applications for recognition as a POC under the refugee status determination process from asylum seekers residing outside of the refugee camps. The announcement was retroactive, causing all applications received from 1 January onward to be held and not reviewed. Applications received before the cut off date of 31 December 2003 were still reviewed. UNHCR’s actions came following a Thai government order. (Source: HRDU, 2004)

 

February

 

On 1 February, the UNHCR resumed accepting applications from asylum seekers residing outside of the refugee camps. Applications received after 31 December 2003 were not to be reviewed by the UNHCR’s refugee status determination process. Instead, all applicants in 2004 and beyond were to be reviewed by the Thai government under a new system yet to be announced with the goal of placing all asylum seekers in one of the border refugee camps. New applicants in 2004 received a document from the UNHCR indicating that they had applied to be considered for entrance to a border refugee camp.

 

March

 

On 3 March, the European Union (EU) announced the allocation of 9.5 million euros or 11.59 million dollars for humanitarian assistance programs for Burmese refugees both on the Thai-Burma border and inside Burma. Organizations to receive funding included the Thai-Burma Border Consortium, International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR. The EU also announced the intention to grant 1.78 million euros to the UNHCR to support repatriation assistance programs for refugees returning from both Bangladesh and Thailand. (Source: “EU Pledges 9.5 Mln Euros in Aid for Myanmar Refugees, Ethnic Groups,” AFP, 3 March 2004)

 

In the beginning of March, local authorities placed Burmese language signs throughout Mae Sot to inform undocumented Burmese migrant workers of an upcoming crackdown. Those arrested during the sweep were vulnerable to jail time along with deportation. In addition, landlords renting to undocumented migrants were also threatened with fines and possible jail time. In turn, many landlords were reportedly evicting tenants prior to the 15 March deadline. As all asylum seekers residing outside of the refugee camps are classified as illegal migrants, undocumented Burmese activists in exile were also vulnerable to the consequences of the crackdown. Out of fear, many undocumented workers returned to Burma prior to the crackdown on 15 March. For activists in exile, return to Burma was not an option. (Source: “Migrants Flee Arrest, Go Home,” Irrawaddy, 12 March 2004)

 

On 11 March, it was reported that the UNHCR and the SPDC agreed to commence creating conditions in Burma acceptable to allow for repatriation of the refugees in the camps in Thailand. Through the agreement, the UNHCR was granted access to the border areas. The UNHCR would operate from its offices in Rangoon and utilize local NGOs to provide health, education, infrastructure development and community support assistance. Any plans for repatriation would also be dependent upon the result of ceasefire discussions between the SPDC and ethnic opposition groups such as the KNU (source: “UN & Myanmar Strike Deal Possible Refugee Returns,” Scoop, 15 March 2004). The UNHCR announced that it would run three exploratory workshops in Karen State, Mon State and Tenasserim Division to measure the situation (source: Macan-Markar, Marwaan, “Refugees’ Return Won’t Be Easy or Quick,” Inter Press Service, 18 March 2004).

 

On 16 March, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that medical screening of POCs preparing for resettlement in the USA had commenced. (Source: “Thailand - Hmong and Burmese Refugees Prepare for US Resettlement,” IOM, 16 March 2004)

 

By 16 March and the commencement of the crackdown on illegal residents, it was estimated that 6,000 migrant workers had returned to Burma leaving Mae Sot, Thailand quiet and businesses lacking workers. In addition, unable to return to Burma while the crackdown ensued, many activists in exile without any documents went into hiding. (Source: Seng, Naw, “Mae Sot Very Quiet as Crackdown Starts,” Irrawaddy, 16 March 2004)

 

On 22 March, at the Repatriation of Burmese Refugees Seminar at Chulalongkorn University, National Security Council (NSC) deputy secretary-general Prakit Prachaonpachanuk reported that the refugee determination process would be performed by the Provincial Admissions Boards (PABs) while the UNHCR would maintain only an observer status in the process. The PABs are led by the governors of Chiang Rai, Kanchanaburi, Mae Hong Son and Tak provinces. (Source: Pinyorat, Rungrawee C, “Burmese Refugees: UNHCR Barred from Giving Status,” The Nation, 23 March 2004)

 

April

 

In April, UNHCR met with the Royal Thai Government, various donors and NGOs in separate meetings in an attempt to commence creating a contingency plan for the repatriation of refugees from Burma. The meetings were a preliminary step with the intentional that all groups would eventually meet together. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, January- June 2004)

 

On 7 April, Mae Sot customs chief, Surachart Jantawatchrakorn, reported that four customs checkpoints might open over the following three months in Umphang, Phoppra, Mae Ramat and Tha Song Yang. The opening of the customs checkpoints would follow the Pagan Agreement reached in March 2004 between leaders of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Burma to promote greater economic cooperation between countries in the region. (Source: Shin, Aung Su, “Four Border Checkpoints to Open,” Irrawaddy, 8 April 2004)

                     

On 16 April, a Thai military officer informed Maw Paw, the head of a Shan clinic near the border in Mae Fa Luang district, Chiang Rai province, that the clinic had to move. The clinic contained 12 beds and was established on 25 January 2001 following a Burma Army offensive against the Shan State Army (SSA), which caused the major displacement of Shan people. The clinic was also frequented by local Thai villagers. (Source: “Shan Border Clinic Told to Move Out,” SHAN, 4 May 2004)

 

On 24 April, local Thai authorities in Mae Sot, Tak province, ordered the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) to stop and dissolve a regular organizational meeting. The order to stop the meeting reportedly came from Bangkok level authorities. (Source: Kyaw Zwa Moe, “Mae Sot Opposition Meetings Stopped,” Irrawaddy, 27 April 2004)

 

On 25 April, the local Thai authorities stopped the National League for Democracy- Liberated Area (Youth) (NLD-LA(Youth)) organization’s tri-annual meeting on the third and final day. One member of the NLD-LA (Youth) reported that the Thai authorities photographed all 36 attendees and questioned them about the party and their activities. (Source: Kyaw Zwa Moe, “Mae Sot Opposition Meetings Stopped,” Irrawaddy, 27 April 2004)

 

On 26 April, approximately 20 Thai military, police and immigration personnel told the Students & Youth Congress of Burma (SYCB) to stop and disband a meeting of the organization in Mae Sot, Tak province. According to one member of the organization, the Thai authorities were polite in their request and remained to monitor as the participants exited the meeting. (Source: Kyaw Zwa Moe, “Mae Sot Opposition Meetings Stopped,” Irrawaddy, 27 April 2004)

 

May

 

On 18 May, it was reported that more than six pro-democracy activists and former political prisoners arrived to the Thai side of the Thai-Burma border fleeing an environment of heightened security and surveillance by military authorities during the first few weeks of May. The tenuous environment was believed to be a result of the SPDC organized National Convention, which commenced on 17 May. Several of the new arrivals indicated that they feared arrest for the smallest association with political activities at that time. (Source: “Burmese Activists Flee Rangoon for the Border,” Irrawaddy, 18 May 2004)

 

On 23 May, Maj. General Pongsapat Pongcharoen, spokesman for the Acting National Police Chief, reported that immigration police posted at border checkpoints with Burma, Cambodia and Laos were ordered to augment the screening process. Thai authorities believed that the labor registration process set to commence on 15 June would draw high numbers of migrants across the border. Immigration officials would also keep an eye on illegal border crossing points, while the military combined with immigration would crackdown on areas where illegal workers were housed in 30 provinces. (Source: “Clampdown Ahead of Worker Registration,” The Nation, 24 May 2004)

 

From 24 May to 28 May, the first group of 187 UNHCR recognized POCs left for the USA as part of a resettlement program. (Source: Naw Seng, “Burmese Refugee Set to Leave for US,” Irrawaddy, 10 May 2004)

 

On 27 May, 25 pro-democracy supporters-in-exile demonstrated outside of the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok in honor of the 14th anniversary of the 1990 elections and to protest the ongoing detention of Aung San Suu Kyi. Bangkok police arrested the group representing several ethnic groups from Burma, including Chin, Mon and Rohingya. Many members of the group were UNHCR recognized POCs and were released shortly after presenting documentation of their status. The others were charged with being illegal immigrants although it was reported that they had already applied for UNHCR status. (Source: “Thai Police Swoop on Protestors at Myanmar Embassy,” AFP, 27 May 2004)

 

In mid May, “Thai government authorities insisted that Thai-based Burmese NGOs, heretofore permitted by authorities to travel and provide training and aid to refugees, cancel all public meetings and travel. These NGOs are uncertain when, or if, they will be able to renew their activities. The Thai government told international NGOs to limit their presence in the border refugee camps to one to two staff and to get a schedule of visits approved a month in advance.” These instructions were issued around the same time that the SPDC organized National Convention was convened in Burma on 17 May. (Source: “Threats to Burmese Refugees in Thailand Increasing,” Refugees International, 16 June 2004) 

 

June

 

On 8 June, a delegation from Norway commenced interviewing approximately 100 UNHCR recognized POCs for resettlement to Norway at the UNHCR office in Bangkok. It was also reported that the Australian Embassy reinstated a resettlement program for Burmese with relatives already living in Australia. Both countries joined the USA as a recipient for resettling Burmese refugees from Thailand. (Source: Aung Lwin Oo, “More Burmese Refugees to Be Granted Asylum,” Irrawaddy, 10 June 2004)

 

In June, heavy rains caused significant erosion in Mae La Oon refugee camp which endangered both roads and houses in the camp. The heavy rains also caused the Yuam River to rise to flood levels which blocked road access to the camp. The effect of the heavy rains in the early part of rainy season raised concerns for potential damage following increased rainfall in the latter part of the season. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, January-June 2004)

 

July

 

From 6 to 7 July, UNHCR representatives conducted a mission to Kanchanaburi, Sanklaburi, Ban Don Yang camp and Tham Hin camp to evaluate needs and attitudes of refugees and stakeholders as part of the contingency planning process for voluntary repatriation pending suitable conditions. From 19 to 24 July, UNHCR conducted a mission to Mae Sot, Mae La camp, Nu Po camp and Umpeium Mai camp for the same purposes.

 

On 15 July, the first group of UNHCR recognized POCs who had been living in Mae Sot, Tak province, left for resettlement in the USA. The group included activists from the Democratic Party for A New Society (DPNS), All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) and the Mae Tao Clinic. (Source: Aung Su Shin, “First Batch of Refugees US-Bound,” Irrawaddy, 15 July 2004)

 

On 18, 20 and 23 July, more UNHCR recognized POCs living in Mae Sot, Tak province, left for resettlement in third countries. (Source: Aung Su Shin, “First Batch of Refugees US-Bound,” Irrawaddy, 15 July 2004)

 

On 21 July, the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) of Thailand issued an order under which all POCs recognized before 31 August 2003 were required to register with the Immigration offices in Bangkok and Mae Sot by the end of August 2004. This directive was one step in the process of relocating POCs to the border refugee camps. According to the order, those who did not register with immigration would be considered illegal immigrants. The deadline for the relocation was later pushed back and POCs continued to remain in urban centers beyond August 2004. (Source: Aung Lwin Oo, "Refugees Bound to Border Camps," Irrawaddy, 10 August 2004)

 

By the end of July, approximately 600 recognized POCs had departed for resettlement in the USA. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, January-June 2004)

 

August

 

On 7 August, Karen villagers from the Zami River area in Kya-in Sei-ki, Karen State, fled from their homes to escape forced portering for SPDC battalions 547 and 355 who engaged in an offensive against the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) Brigade 6. It was reported that approximately 80 people were taken for portering duties on the frontlines. At the same time, other villagers from Taung Zan, Than Pa Yar, Nat Eing and Sin Pyay villages were held with the troops for potering duties as needed. It was also reported that troops from these two battalions erected unofficial checkpoints to collect taxes from travelers. (Source: Taramon, "Karen Villagers Flee Military Operation," Kao Wao News, 10 August 2004)

 

On 7 August, the Burma Army and the SSA engaged in their first considerable battle of the year approximately one kilometer from the border with Thailand. The location of fighting was near Ban Piang Luang, Wiang Haeng District, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Due to the fighting, four mortars reportedly fell in the Thai forest while there were no reported injuries. (Source: Subin Khuenkaew, “Burmese Forces Wage Battle Near Thai Border,” Bangkok Post, 8 August 2004)

 

In August and September, heavy rains in Mae La Oon refugee camp posed threat of landslides and flooding. As a result, 73 houses determined to be most vulnerable were relocated to Pwe Ba Lu, a site near Mae La Oo which had been considered as a site for the camp when it was first relocated in late 2003. Pwe Ba Lu was concluded to be unsuitable because it was too close to the border. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004)

 

September

 

On 23 September, it was reported that the Thai authorities commenced construction of concrete and barbed wire fences around Mae La refugee camp in Tak province. The Thai Foreign Ministry reported that the fence was an attempt to stem refugees’ participation in deforestation and environmental degradation. It was also reported that foreign humanitarian aid organizations were facing increased restrictions on their activities in the camps. (Source: “Tighter Conditions at Thai Camp,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 September 2004)

 

October

 

In October, the UNHCR commenced registration of the refugee camp populations. This was the first official camp headcount in six years. The registration recorded greater details about the refugees, including original village. Only refugees who had previously been registered would be re-registered. Unregistered refugees would be counted and their information would be recorded with the intention for their cases to be presented for consideration by the PABs when they commence operations. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004)

 

On 9 October, it was reported that the governor of Tak province intended to propose the repatriation of Burmese refugees in Tak province to Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra at an 18 October mobile cabinet meeting. The proposal would target the 80,000 both registered and unregistered refugees residing in the province. Deputy Governor Suracahi Puengjitton insisted that the refugees faced uncertain futures outside of their homeland and return was in their best interest. In addition, he contended that unregistered refugees created a financial burden for the province. (Source: Supamart Kasem, “Tak Governor Wants 80,000 Burmese in Mae Sot Repatriated,” Bangkok Post, 9 October 2004)

 

On 18 October, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt was arrested on corruption charges. At the same time, representatives from the KNU arrived in Rangoon to continue ceasefire discussions. The delegation left Rangoon quickly without any formal discussions transpiring.

 

On 25 October, a drunken Karen man aggravated a Muslim man in Mae La refugee camp and a quarrel between the two men ensued. Shortly after, approximately 100 Muslim men joined the scene and beat the Karen man. As a result, in the following evening of 26 October, approximately 200 Muslim men and a large group of both Christian and Buddhist Karen fought again. The second fight reportedly resulted in the injury of two Karen men and one Muslim man. In addition, Muslim owned shops in the camp were temporarily closed. (Source: Shah Paung, "Fracas in Mae La Refugee Camp," Irrawaddy, 27 October 2004)

 

December

 

On 13 December, it was reported that approximately 5,000 ethnic Karen were hiding in the jungles of Karen State from attacks perpetrated by the Burma Army. The attacks had commenced in mid-November but had become worse around the time of the report. In addition, it was reported that approximately 8,000 Karen had fled to refugee camps in Thailand due to the same attacks, which included destruction of food stores and barns. The Karen hiding in the jungles were reportedly enduring dysentery and respiratory complications due to a lack of proper water supplies and overcrowding. (Source: "Thousands Flee Crackdown in Burma," AP, 13 December 2004)

 

By the end of 2004, Medicines Sans Frontieres (MSF), an NGO administering health programs in the refugee camps and along the border, reported that sanitation conditions in Tham Hin camp were unacceptable. MSF reported that the toilets built beneath the houses were full and could not be emptied or replaced. The toilet situation combined with the inadequate space for the high volume of refugees inhabiting the camp contributed to an ongoing argument that the living conditions should be improved, the camp relocated, or the refugees be offered the opportunity for third country resettlement. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004)

 

By the end of 2004, approximately 1,500 POCs had departed for resettlement in third countries. Approximately 1,250 were resettled in the United Sates, approximately 150 in Norway and the remainder in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden. At the same time, the pace of the resettlement program was reduced when POCs with multiple-drug-resistant-tuberculosis were discovered among those destined for the USA, forcing the health examination system to be reviewed. In addition, housing to accommodate 1,400 people was constructed in Ban Don Yang, Nu Po and Tham Hin camps in accordance with the Thai government’s order to relocate all POCs to the border camps. (Source: Six-Month Report, TBBC, July-December 2004)

 

14.3 Situation of Refugees in Bangladesh

 

The Burmese refugee population in Bangladesh can be divided into three categories; Rohingya refugees in the two official refugee camps, Rohingya refugees classified as illegal immigrants living outside the camps, and Rakhine Buddhist refugees mostly in Dhaka and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Bangladesh has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and does not have a legal framework through which refugees can find protection. Bangladesh only allows UNHCR to provide protection and assistance in the two refugee camps.  New Rohingya asylum seekers continue to flee to Bangladesh but access to the camps is denied and their only option is to stay outside the camps as illegal migrants unprotected and unassisted.  Refugees frequently report the appalling conditions of the refugee camps, slums, or jungle where they remain.  

 

Bangladesh has been burdened by two major exoduses of Rohingya refugees with steady trickles of new comers at all other times. The first occurred in 1978 following operation Naga Min or Dragon King, when General Ne Win ordered a crackdown to drive out all “foreigners” from the country. The campaign led to extra-judicial killings, rape, and other acts of violence causing approximately 200,000 Rohingya to flee across the border to Bangladesh.   Following the repatriation – often involuntary - of these refugees, the Burmese regime enacted a new Citizenship Law in 1982, which renders the Rohingya de facto stateless. The Rohingya are not considered one of the 135 national races. In 1990, the increased military presence in Arakan State caused an escalation in human rights abuses perpetrated against the Rohingya, such as forced labor, forced relocation, execution, torture, and rape. From 1991 to 1992, approximately 250,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. From 1992 to 1994, Bangladesh forcibly repatriated over 50,000 refugees from this group. In April 1994, the UNHCR gained access to the Burma side of the border and then oversaw a mass repatriation program.  The voluntary nature of the exercise was highly questioned by humanitarian agencies working in the camps.  There were reports that officials withheld food from and beat the refugees in order to coerce them to return.  In 1997, the repatriations halted and commenced again the following year but only in very limited numbers.

 

Since the mass repatriations in 1994 and 1995, access to the refugee camps has been denied to new arrivals. Despite the fact that similar oppressive conditions in Burma forced these new refugees to cross the border, the government of Bangladesh labels them economic migrants and they are considered illegal in Bangladesh.  New arrivals also include refugees who may have been repatriated but found the conditions in Burma unbearable and fled again. Since they are denied access to the refugee camps, they are not eligible for humanitarian assistance. They hide in jungle areas or in slums in Cox’s Bazaar. (Source: Myanmar: The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, Amnesty International, 16 May 2004)

 

Over the years, repatriation has continued in smaller numbers. According to Amnesty International, approximately 236,000 refugees have been repatriated to Burma with approximately 20,000 Rohingya refugees remaining in the two refugee camps at Nayapara and Kutupalong in the Cox’s Bazaar area at the beginning of 2004 (source: Myanmar: The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, Amnesty International, 16 May 2004). The Government of Bangladesh has consistently maintained the perspective that all the Rohingya must return to Burma and has worked to continue the process of repatriation. One obstacle to this goal had been the fact that the SPDC had not officially cleared the remaining refugees in the camps and had created extensive bureaucratic procedures that complicated the repatriation process. Marking improved diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries in 2003, the SPDC agreed to lift conditions obstructing repatriation and to accept the remaining refugees in the camps who opt for voluntary repatriation.

 

Throughout 2004, relations between the two countries continued along the same sentiment as economic cooperation blossomed. Bangladesh has embraced on a “Look East” policy with the intention of opening new routes for commercial opportunities. Specifically, Burma and Bangladesh engaged in discussions for the construction of a road running from Ramu, Chittagong, Bangladesh to Buthidaung, Arakan State, Burma, which would allow Bangladesh to access Burma and eventually the rest of the ASEAN region (source: “Why Bangladesh Choose ‘Look East’ Policy?” Kaladan News, 5 May 2004). In addition, on 24 July, it was reported that the two countries had nearly agreed upon the construction of a bridge over the Karniphuli River which would connect the road system between Thailand, Burma and Bangladesh. While the construction of the bridge was not anticipated to be completed before the end of two years, the road link is expected to provide opportunities for commercial growth (source: “Bridge to be Built on Karnaphuli Linking Road to Rangoon,” Kaladan News, 24 July 2004). Many speculate that the improved relations between the two countries will result in tougher policies towards refugees.

 

Situation of Rohingya in Nayapara and Kutupalong Camps

 

Of the 20 original camps that were erected to accommodate the masses of refugees in 1991, only Nayapara camp near Teknaf and Kutupalong camp near Ukhia remain. As of 31 December 2004, the population of Kutupalong camp stood at 8,280 and Nayapara at 12,035 people. According to the UNHCR/World Food Program (WFP) joint assessment mission conducted in September 2004, the average family was comprised of 6.8 persons. Moreover, 40% of the families registered were comprised of a minimum of 10 persons. Families and extended family members tend to share the same houses due to a lack of access to new living space. Overpopulation and overcrowded living conditions contribute to poor sanitation and a “high-level disease environment.” The government of Bangladesh prohibits any construction of permanent structures or improvements to old ones as the refugees’ stay is viewed as temporary. As a result, refugee homes, constructed from bamboo and thatch, are easily damaged in harsh weather.

 

Rohingya are also denied access to local education and health institutions, and prior to 1997, all education was prohibited in the camps. While education is available to children up to 12 years old, the level is reported to be low as most teachers are volunteer refugees who have received the same poor level of education. Children are taught for only two hours each day and camp literacy rates stand at 12%. Higher education or vocational training is not available. Refugee teachers are reportedly pressured and threatened by camp officials as they are suspected of organizing refugees or engaging in political activities. (Source: “Bangladesh: Burmese Rohingya Refugees Virtual Hostages,” Refugees International, 9 May 2005)

 

Officially, refugees are prohibited from exiting the camp or seeking employment and may be subject to punishment from camp authorities if they are caught. Despite this risk, the UNHCR and WFP reported that 40% of refugee families have secured external sources of income. Refugees who work outside the camp are vulnerable to arrest by local police and harassment from the local community. While some refugees have managed to procure employment, most refugees are dependent upon humanitarian assistance for their survival. A 2003 UNHCR nutrition survey showed that more than 65 percent of refugee children were chronically malnourished. (Source: Joint Assessment Mission Report, UNHCR and WFP Bangladesh, October 2004)

 

Both Nayapara and Kutupalong are organized and managed by the Bangladeshi authorities and corruption and violence within the camps has long been reported.  Majees, volunteer refugees who are selected by and work alongside the Bangladeshi camp officials as leaders of sections of the camps, also serve as intimidators and oppressors of the camp populations. Refugees do not have a camp committee of refugee representatives partaking in the decision making process or administration of any camp policies. They are prohibited from organizing meetings in the camp, and are threatened if they speak out against the conditions and treatment to either camp officials or foreigners who visit the camps. Some refugees have reported being subjected to jail time or other forms of punishment for being vocal about their situation. (Source: “Bangladesh: Burmese Rohingya Refugees Virtual Hostages,” Refugees International, 9 May 2005)

 

In response to the harsh treatment of camp officials and an incident on 7 June, the refugees of Kutupalong camp engaged in a hunger strike in June 2004. On 7 June, the Camp-in-Charge and police entered Kutupalong camp in the middle of the night to arrest one refugee. The refugee did not come out of his shed or respond when the Camp-in-Charge called him. As a result, the Camp-in-Charge “instructed the police to break into the room. (Bangladesh) law enforcement and camp officials beat his wife and young child and stole some of the family belongings.” The Camp-in-Charge also ordered the police to open fire upon several other refugees who had gathered around the area when they heard the disturbance. As a result, three refugees sustained injuries. While UNHCR representatives came to look into the incident the following day, there was no direct response. In reaction, refugees commenced a hunger strike on 9 June during which “they refused to collect their food ration and displayed banners demanding protection from abuses by camp officials.” Refugee advocates expressed concern that the Bangladeshi authorities “might use excessive force” to contend with the refugees (source: “Violence Feared Against Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh,” Forum-Asia, 18 June 2004). After approximately 21 days, representatives from the UNHCR met with the refugees. The UNHCR indicated that the authorities had agreed to allow the formation of a refugee committee elected by the refugees and to release protestors who had recently been arrested. As a result, the refugees commenced collecting their rations again. Yet, the strike had not entirely ceased. Tensions elevated again as the authorities did not honor their promises. (Source: Forum-Asia, 2005)

 

Following the hunger strike, incidents between refugees in Kutupalong camp and NGOs providing humanitarian assistance were reported. On 22 September 2004, refugees harassed a World Food Program employee. As a result, UNHCR increased their security measures, restricting movement for all UN staff and their implementation partners. On 12 October, a group of refugees attempted to halt a UN convoy which was passing Kutupalong camp in an effort to hand over petitions. Yet, the police made the refugees scatter. (Source: Forum-Asia, 2005)

 

On 18 November, a major altercation between refugees and Bangladeshi authorities transpired in Kutupalong camp. According to Refugees International, refugees had wanted to assemble to discuss the harsh ways in which they were treated by camp officials and majees. However, camp authorities prohibited the assembly and arrested one refugee leader. Subsequently, local people entered the camp and combined with the police. Together, they sought to arrest more refugees and the refugees attempted to block the groups’ passage. A conflict transpired when a majee reportedly threw a stone at and hit a police officer. In response, the police officer shot in the air and then at the crowd. The conflict resulted in the death of three refugees and injury of several others. The clash also resulted in the detention of 42 refugees. The following day, local people entered the camps again looting refugee possessions and destroying a few refugee sheds. (Sources: “Bangladesh: Burmese Rohingya Refugees Virtual Hostages,” Refugees International, 9 May 2005; Forum-Asia, 2005)

 

UNHCR Disengagement and Forced Repatriation

 

“There are clear indications that the repatriation process may soon quicken.  It is important that both Bangladesh and the UNHCR sustain and build upon the progress achieved so far.  I would like to conclude by reiterating that it is important not to digress from efforts towards encouraging the repatriation process, but to maintain this momentum.  People must be allowed to live in their homes, with dignity, and have the means to earn their livelihoods there.”

 

(Source: Excerpts of Statement by H.E. Toufiq Ali, Ambassador of the Bangladesh mission to the UN in Geneva, 5 October 2004)

 

In early 2003, the UNHCR announced a plan for “promoting self sufficiency pending voluntary repatriation," which proposed the transfer of responsibility for assistance programs in the two refugee camps to the Bangladesh authorities and the phasing out of UNHCR and partner NGOs’ presence. To enable the refugees to become self-reliant, the UNHCR proposal included income-generating projects, vocational training and quick impact projects, as well as the upgrading of facilities and infrastructure for the local community to increase absorption capacity. (Source: Forum-Asia, 2003)

 

The disengagement plan raised many concerns for the possible abuses that could ensue without the presence of the UNHCR as it is the only international organization with a protection mandate. On several occasions the Bangladeshi government expressed its desire for the UNHCR to remain an active participant in the repatriation process and a source of assistance for the camps. Aside from being ill-equipped to manage all of the assistance programs, the government of Bangladesh indicated that a program to promote self sufficiency might create a "pull factor" encouraging refugees to stay as opposed to returning to Burma, which is contrary to their aims of repatriating all refugees. (Source: Forum-Asia, 2003)

 

In May 2003, in response to UNHCR’s plan to disengage from the repatriation process, reports of harassment, coercion, intimidation, and forced repatriation came in high volume from the camps. The number of refugees repatriated dramatically increased from 93 in April to 704 in May. Evidence of forcible repatriation emerged, revealing coercion perpetrated by camp police, Camp-in-Charges, camp staff and majees. The methods of coercion included confiscation of ration books, arbitrary arrest and detention, confiscation of refugees’ property, detention in the Camp-in-Charge’s office, and relocation in the camp away from friends and family. Most forms of coercion presented the refugees with the option of repatriating as a means to prevent going to jail, not having food, or other forms of suffering. As a result of advocacy efforts, the forcible repatriations were brought to the attention of UNHCR in Geneva, leading to an increase in the number of protection staff in Bangladesh. While the reports of physical threats and numbers of refugees repatriated reduced, other methods of harassment and pressure were still exerted by the majees. (Sources: “We Are Like A Soccer Ball, Kicked by Burma, Kicked by Bangladesh," Forum-Asia, June 2003; “Thousands of Refugees Harassed to Return to Myanmar,” MSF, 17 September 2003)

 

According to the UNHCR, 210 refugees were repatriated in 2004, a significant decrease from the 3,000 repatriated in 2003. Several repatriations were forced in 2004. Yet, when the UNHCR in Burma discovered this, they sent the forcibly repatriated refugees back to the camps in Bangladesh. Concurrently, the Government of Bangladesh officially repudiated the UNHCR’s plan for local integration in September 2004 while highlighting repatriation as the only solution to the refugee issue. Furthermore, the government of Bangladesh indicated their intention to complete the repatriation process by the end of 2005, again raising concerns for the protection of refugees. By the end of the year, approximately 6,000 refugees had signed voluntary repatriation affidavits and had been cleared by the SPDC for re-entry, although it is believed that many of these forms were signed due to methods of coercion similar to those reported in 2003. (Source: Overview of the Bangladesh-Burma Border, Forum-Asia, 10 November 2004)

 

Despite the low numbers of refugees repatriated in 2004, camp officials, majees, and police continued to harass refugees who refused to sign the declaration of voluntary repatriation. In January 2004, Kaladan News reported the detention of six Rohingya refugees following their refusal to repatriate (source: “Detained for Refusal of Forced Repatriation in Bangladesh,” Kaladan News, 11 January 2004).

 

The Unofficial Rohingya Refugee Population

 

Outside of the two official refugee camps, the unofficial Rohingya refugee population has been estimated to be anywhere from 100,000 to 300,000 people. Access to the camps has been denied to those who arrived after the mass repatriation started in 1994. Therefore, they are considered illegal immigrants and have mostly settled in the Cox’s Bazaar and Teknaf areas of southern Bangladesh. The government of Bangladesh views them as “economic migrants” and not as refugees. In actuality, these refugees are continuing to flee conditions in Burma where they are unable to find suitable employment, feed themselves, or maintain a home as a direct result of the SPDC’s discriminatory policies and practices of forced labor, extortion, and land confiscation. Those considered new arrivals are both refugees fleeing Burma for the first time as well as repatriated refugees who found the conditions in Burma unsuitable and returned to Bangladesh. (Source: “The Situation of Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh,” Forum-Asia, 6 November 2003).

 

Because they are considered economic migrants, the unofficial Rohingya refugee population does not have access to humanitarian support. They are vulnerable to both harassment from authorities and also the local population. In particular, the Rohingya community is often targeted as the source of social problems, crime, and environmental degradation by the media, which results in tension and poor relations with the local community. Most Rohingya refugees find employment in low paying jobs such as rickshaw drivers, porters, factory workers, and domestic servants while some resort to begging on the streets for money. (Source: “The Situation of Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh,” Forum-Asia, 6 November 2003)

 

In November 2002, the Bangladeshi authorities forced several thousand Rohingya in the Teknaf area to vacate their homes. As the evicted Rohingya had nowhere to go, an unofficial makeshift camp in Teknaf near the Naf River was immediately created. Approximately 4,000 people lived in the camp which was essentially a slum with houses made of plastic sheeting. The conditions in the camp were reported to be extremely poor as there are only a few water pumps, latrines, and no proper sanitation.  Each hut housed approximately six or seven people (source: Burma's Rohingya: The fate of one forgotten community in Bangladesh, Refugees International, 20 May 2003). In addition, the camp residents were not eligible for health services from NGOs or the government. As a result, the Burma Centrum Nederland reported that diarrhea, skin and other infectious diseases, worms, and malaria were common (source: Caught Between A Crocodile and A Snake, Burma Centrum Nederland, April/May 2003). In May 2004, three young children reportedly died from diarrhea and lack of access to medical treatment (source: “Diarrhea Claims Three Infants in Teknaf Makeshift Refugee Camp,” Kaladan News, 23 May 2004). Moreover, the camp was located in a low level area that was prone to flooding which had raised great concern for the welfare of the residents during the rainy season (source: Burma's Rohingya: The fate of one forgotten community in Bangladesh, Refugees International, 20 May 2003).

 

Throughout 2004, the population of the unofficial camp increased to up to 10,000. Rohingya refugee residents were subject to several attacks and relations with the local community remained precarious. On 24 February, it was reported that four refugee women were raped when an altercation ensued between local residents and camp residents (source: “Four Refugee Women Raped,” Kaladan News, 14 March 2004). In addition, on 9 June, young local residents attacked the refugee residents of Teknaf using knives and sticks as weapons, causing injury to 20 refugees. Again on the following morning of 10 June, the group of young local residents attacked the camp resulting in the injury of 15 additional refugees. Moreover, the attackers continued to threaten and monitor the refugees’ movements preventing them from exiting the camp. The anti-refugee sentiment reportedly stemmed from the arrest of two local people who stole tube wells which had been provided by local NGOs for the refugees. When the Rohingya reported the theft and lodged a complaint against seven alleged perpetrators, two men were arrested and later released on bail. The two who were arrested were reportedly part of the group of attackers (source: “What A Fate of Unofficial Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh!” Kaladan News, 11 June 2004).

 

On 19 October 2004, the unofficial refugee camp at Teknaf was relocated to Dumdumia near Ukhiya, approximately 6 km north of Teknaf and formerly the site of another refugee camp. The relocation was the result of increased tension and anti-Rohingya sentiment among the local community due to the distribution of donated items from a local Islamic NGO (source: “Overview of the Bangladesh-Burma Border,” Forum-Asia, 10 November 2004). According to Kaladan News, the population of Dumdumia consisted of approximately 10,000 refugees (source: “Unofficial Makeshift Refugee Camp of Teknaf Relocation to Dhomdomia,” Kaladan News, 12 November 2004).

 

Situation of Rakhine Refugees in Bangladesh

 

At the end of 2004, there were 110 Rakhine, mostly from Rakhine State also known as Arakan State, and other Burmese in Dhaka who were recognized as refugees by the UNHCR. The Burma Centrum Nederland reported that a few hundred Rakhine refugees also reside in the jungles of the Chittagong Hill tracts who have not been recognized by the UNHCR. The population in Dhaka mostly consists of activists who left Burma following 1988 and the pro-democracy uprising. Those who are recognized by the UNHCR as refugees or POCs are allowed to remain in Bangladesh but are not provided work permits which would allow them to legally obtain employment. Until 1998, the UNHCR provided monthly financial support to the refugees. However, in 1998, the UNHCR began to promote refugee self-reliance by cutting monthly financial assistance. Instead, the UNHCR offered a lump-sum small business grant to the refugees and discontinued the monthly subsistence allowance. UNHCR also provides a degree of skill and language training (source: The Situation of Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh, Forum-Asia, 6 November 2003). UNHCR recognized refugees face many difficulties surviving due to cultural differences and the language barrier. Many refugees have reported feeling that they need further support from the UNHCR in terms of assistance with job placement and more skill and language training (source: Caught Between A Crocodile and A Snake, Burma Centrum Nederland, April/May 2003).

 

In 2003, a number of protests ensued calling for a faster process of receiving recognition for new applicants, an end to the lump-sum small business grant, and continuation of the monthly assistance allowance. Despite these protests, Rakhine refugees in Dhaka continued to endure the same difficulties throughout 2004. Many refugees who had lost their 1,300 taka monthly subsistence allowance after the six-month allowance period ended and accepted the lump-sum small business grant were reportedly facing increased difficulties in their daily survival. UNHCR grants usually amount to 15,000 taka while grants as much as 35,000 taka have been reported. Refugees who accepted the grant have indicated that the amount of money provided is inadequate for establishing a proper business which is able to compete with Bangladeshi businesses. In addition, the continued language barrier, racism, and other social stigmas remain obstacles. Single women face particular hardships due to the conservatism in Bangladesh society. (Source: “Forgotten Burmese Refugees in Dhaka,” Narinjara News, 21 June 2004)

 

A number of Rakhine refugees seeking UNHCR recognition reside in the Chittagong Hills. The lengthy duration of the application process for UNHCR recognition creates major barriers for these refugees as they do not have enough money to pay for repeated trips from the jungle to Dhaka, which may be necessary during the application process. Moreover, they do not have sufficient funds to stay in Dhaka while awaiting the UNHCR’s decision. Many refugees who have applied for UNCHR recognition reported rejection without an adequate explanation. (Source: “Burmese Refugees’ Hunger Strike in Dhaka: Respite after Talks with High Officials," Narinjara News, 8 February 2003)

 

Arakanese (Rakhine) exiles demonstrate in Dhaka
 

On 8 August 2004, approximately 80 Arakanese activists-in-exile from the Working Committee for Demonstration Restoration in Burma (WCDRB), Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), and All Arakan Students and Youth Congress (AASYC) demonstrated in honor of the 16th anniversary of the 8-8-88 uprising. Bangladesh police instructed the activists to relocate from in front of the Bangladesh High Court where they had assembled and not to shout too loudly. The demonstration ensued for only two hours before the police forced it to end. According to one participant, police had never interceded in demonstrations before. Moreover, the participant believed that the police intervention was indicative of the increasingly positive relationship between the SPDC and government of Bangladesh. (Source: “Arakanese Exiles Hold Demonstration in Dhaka,” Narinjara News, 9 August 2004)

 

Burmese in Bangladeshi Prisons

 

According to a report by Forum-Asia, there are more than 500 Burmese detained in Bangladeshi jails. These detainees are mostly "released prisoners" who have completed their prison sentences but because the SPDC does not recognize them as Burmese citizens, they can’t be released. Some have been detained for over 10 years past the finish of their sentence. Half of these detainees are Rohingya and half are fisherman from areas such as Mon State and Tenasserim Division, who were employed by Thai fishing boats and were arrested for fishing in Bangladeshi waters. (Source: Forum-Asia, 2004)

 

Following meetings between Bangladeshi and Burmese border authorities, some Burmese who completed their jail terms were returned to Burma in 2004. On 5 March 2004, in front of regional authorities and local people at a Buddhist celebration in Bandarban, the Burmese Ambassador to Bangladesh reported that citizens from Burma in Bangladesh’s jails would be received by Burma (source: “Burma Will Accept Its Citizens Jailed in Bangladesh,” Narinjara News, 11 March 2004). This statement gave rise to hopes for the remaining Burmese in the many Bangladeshi jails. On 28 February, the Bangladesh Rifles (border authorities) handed 72 Burmese who had completed their jail terms in Bangladesh over to the Nasaka border authorities of Burma. The majority of the group of 72 had served seven to eight year terms in jail for entering Bangladesh illegally (source: “72 Burmese Nationals Sent Back to Their Home,” Kaladan News, 3 March 2004). Again on 19 August, 133 Burmese were returned to Burmese authorities after having completed jail terms for illegal entry. The group was largely comprised of fisherman who had served three to six-month jail terms (source: “Bangladesh Hand Backs 133 Myanmar Nationals,” Reuters News, 19 August 2004). Those who were returned to Burma during the year did not include any Rohingya.

 

14.4 Situation of Refugees in India

 

The Burmese refugee population in India is mostly comprised of ethnic Chin people, with a small number of Kachin and Burman. According to the USCRI, there are approximately 60,000 refugees from Burma residing in India. Yet, refugees from Burma in India remain in unstable and precarious situations as the Indian government is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and nor does India have the legal framework through which refugee status can be determined. Following the exodus of refugees after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, the Indian government established refugee camps in Mizoram State. In 1992, these camps were closed and all humanitarian assistance provided to Burmese refugees was halted.

 

According to the CHRO, the arrival of Burmese refugees to India can be divided into two categories. The first is university students, activists, and others who fled to India following participation in the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. The second is ordinary people and villagers who have fled ongoing human rights abuses including religious persecution, forced labor, rape, torture, and ethnic discrimination since the mid-1990s. In particular, the majority of Chin, concentrated mostly in Chin State, are Christian and face a high level of persecution aimed at converting them to Buddhism. The SPDC often prohibits or limits religious gatherings and prohibits evangelists from giving sermons. In addition, Christians have been forced to engage in labor projects for Buddhist pagodas. The occurrence of human rights abuses has only increased as the SPDC military presence has grown in Chin State. (Source: CHRO, 2003) (Please see chapter on religion for more information about the situation of Chin in Chin State.)

 

Situation of Chin Refugees in the Northeastern States of India

 

Approximately 50,000 Chin refugees reside in the northeastern states of India, with the majority living in Mizoram State and a small proportion living in southern Manipur State. The Indian government does not allow foreigners or the UNHCR to access these areas. There is no refugee camp or humanitarian aid available to the refugees in this area. As a result, most Chin refugees find employment in low-paying jobs such as weaving or road construction and attempt to integrate into the local community in order to survive. Because the Mizo, the local ethnic group of Mizoram State, and the Chin are ethnically and linguistically related, the Chin were initially accepted in the local communities. In recent years, the Chin have met increasing intolerance as they are often blamed for social problems such as crime and drug trafficking. The refugees have often become targets for local political organizations like the Young Mizo Association (YMA) and are often threatened with eviction, arrest and deportation. In July 2003, the alleged rape of a nine-year old Mizo girl by a Burmese man led the YMA to launch the “Quit Mizoram Campaign” to evict all of the Chin refugees from Mizoram. As a result, an estimated 6,000 Chin were forced back to Burma while approximately 10,000 were rendered homeless.

 

Throughout 2004, over 50,000 Chin remained in Mizoram State with many reporting that they would prefer to contend with the ongoing threat and harassment of the YMA rather than return to the abuse and insecurity from which they fled in Burma. According to Refugees International, an estimated 30,000 Chin remained in hiding following the eviction and deportation campaign of 2003. While deportations of the same magnitude did not occur during 2004, Chin refugees endured ongoing risk of harassment, torture, arrest, eviction, and deportation perpetrated largely by members of the YMA. Local police have been reported to have gone with YMA members from time to time as they visited Chin homes. Some Chin, who received warning of an imminent YMA visit, hid in the forests returning after a few days to find their residence in disarray and many of their possession ravished. The YMA have also threatened landlords against renting to Chin, resulting in further difficulties for Chins in obtaining shelter and stability (source: “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Burmese Chin Refugees in India,” Refugees International, 22 July 2004). In June 2004, the Lunglei YMA issued an order that all foreigners without an Inner Line Permit had to vacate the Lunglei area by the end of July 2004. The YMA claimed that their order coincided with Indian government policy towards foreigners. The Lunglei YMA also announced that they would not be held accountable for the effects endured by those who did not follow the order. As of 1 August, at least 3 Chin people had been arrested in conjunction with the campaign (source: “Chin Refugees in Mizoram Face Threat of Deportation,” Rhododendron News, Volume VII. No. IV, CHRO, July-August 2004).

 

Refugees International reported that some local community members sympathized with the Chin and engaged in efforts to assist them. A police superintendent in Lunglei provided temporary permits to remain in the area for Chin who he concluded to have fled from oppression. Other local officials in Lunglei allowed Chin, who had a Mizo employer to verify employment, to apply for permission to remain in the area. (Source: “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Burmese Chin Refugees in India,” Refugees International, 22 July 2004)

 

Situation of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in New Delhi

 

According to the CHRO, there are approximately 1,500 Chin, Kachin and Burman refugees living in New Delhi. Refugees International reported that New Delhi holds the largest population of UNHCR recognized refugees, also known as Persons of Concern (POCs), in the world at approximately 15,000 refugees. However, only approximately 1,000 of these are refugees from Burma. Those who are recognized by the UNHCR receive residence permits but do not receive work permits, which makes obtaining employment both difficult and illegal, rendering the informal sector as one of the few possibilities for employment. For more than 10 years, the UNHCR provided a monthly subsistence allowance of 1,400 rupees (about US$ 30) per month for recognized refugees. The monthly allowance was meant to address food and housing costs. An education allowance was provided for each child to cover school costs, ranging from 2,500 to 3,100 rupees (about US$ 55-$ 68). Many refugees have reported that the subsistence allowance was not adequate as the cost of housing is approximately 1,500 rupees per month and education costs far exceed the educational allowance, which has caused many children to drop out of school. (Source: “India: The Situation of Burmese Refugees in New Delhi,” Refugees International, 24 November 2003)

 

In March 2003, the UNHCR announced a plan to phase out the subsistence allowance and promote a system of self-reliance. The UNHCR contended that the monthly subsistence allowance created dependency among the refugees and prevented them from properly integrating into the community, learning the local languages, and learning new skills. In an attempt to equip the refugee population for integration, the UNHCR has been providing Hindi, English, computer, and vocational training.  Despite the provision of training, many refugees have voiced concern that the lack of proper work permits, high levels of unemployment, and discrimination will still prevent them from obtaining jobs. (Source: “India: The Situation of Burmese Refugees in New Delhi,” Refugees International, 24 November 2003)

 

In 2004, UNHCR continued to implement the subsistence phase-out rendering many UNHCR refugees unable to meet their daily survival needs. Many refugees have reportedly been evicted from their homes and forced to live in overcrowded accommodation, as they were no longer able to pay their rent. Other reports indicate that refugees have turned to searching in markets after hours for repudiated food. As a result of these increased hardships, the CHRO argues that the subsistence allowance phase-out has created greater obstacles to local integration rather than promoting it. Moreover, CHRO contends that the lack of subsistence support has increased the vulnerability and instability of the refugees from Burma residing in Delhi. (Source: CHRO’s Presentation at the US State Department Bureau for Population, Migration and Refugees, CHRO, 12 October 2004)

 

Non-UNHCR recognized refugees residing in Delhi face the same difficulties in their daily survival. The formation of urban “camps” have been reported with approximately 30 to 50 people sharing small flats with extremely limited space. The refugees inhabiting these “camps” have reportedly been rejected for UNHCR recognition or have not yet applied. Moreover, obtaining refugee recognition from the UNHCR had become increasingly rare with few other options for assistance. (Sources: Razor’s Edge: Survival Crisis for Refugees from Burma in Delhi, India, Project Maje, November 2004; Visit to the Chin and Kachin Refugees in India, CSW, 2-9 March 2004)

 

14.5 Situation of Refugees in Malaysia

 

Asylum seekers and refugees from Burma make up the second largest group of refugees in Malaysia. According to the UNHCR, there are approximately 10,000 Rohingya refugees and 8,000 refugees of different ethnic groups from Burma. The Rohingya along with other ethnic groups flee religious and ethnic persecution along with other human rights abuses perpetrated by the Burma Army or other state affiliated bodies and actors. Like Bangladesh, India, and Thailand, Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees resulting in lack of security and protection for those who seek asylum there. According to Malaysian law, refugees and asylum seekers are considered illegal immigrants and are subject to severe immigration laws under the Immigration Act. At the same time, as illegal immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers from Burma are vulnerable to extortion, theft, sexual abuse, arrest, deportation, and many other difficulties. They also face lack of access to social services such as medical care and educational opportunities.

 

In 2002, the Malaysian government amended the Immigration Act to include harsher penalties for both illegal immigrants and those providing shelter to illegal immigrants. The authorities often attribute social problems and violent crime to illegal undocumented immigrants. In 2002, the Malaysian government adopted a zero-tolerance policy whereby an illegal immigrant or foreigner who has overstayed his or her visit is subject to a maximum fine of RM 10,000, up to five years in jail, and up to six strokes of the cane. Any person found to be sheltering an illegal migrant is also subject to a fine ranging from RM 10,000 to 50,000, up to five years in jail, and caning. When brought to court, most illegal or undocumented immigrants do not have access to legal representation and are often convinced to plead guilty (source: “Overview of the Situation of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Malaysia,” SUARAM, 6 November 2003). Malaysia and Burma do not have a repatriation agreement and Burmese refugees are often deported to Thailand where they fall into the hands of traffickers, frequently leading to work in brothels or on fishing boats.

 

A few asylum seekers attempt to apply to the UNHCR in Kuala Lumpur for recognition as refugees. Since 2003, Rohingya asylum seekers who approach UNHCR receive a temporary protection letter indicating that they are Rohingya Muslims registered with the UNHCR. The UNHCR reports that it recognizes that Rohingya are stateless in Burma. As a result, individual applications for recognition as a refugee have not been processed due to the length of time an asylum seeker must wait for an interview. The temporary protection letters for Rohingya are intended to serve as a faster solution (source: Yap Mun Ching, “Rohingya Discontent Troubles Malaysia,” Malaysiakini, 27 April 2004). Yet, those who are recognized by the UNCHR or those who have temporary protection letters have no greater sense of security as the Malaysian authorities have been reported to arrest, harass, detain, and deport both UNHCR recognized refugees and those who are under consideration for refugee recognition. In addition, the Malaysian police frequently block access to and arrest asylum seekers outside of the UNHCR compound, intimidating and preventing many refugees from registering. On 13 April 2004, Malaysian police arrested 30 asylum seekers from Burma who were outside of the UNHCR compound in Kuala Lumpur in a regular operation to crackdown on illegal immigrants. (Source: Ching, Yap Mun, “Burmese Nationals, Asylum Seekers in Police Dragnet," Malaysiakini, 14 April 2004)

 

Pro-democracy activists arrested outside of Burmese embassy

 

On 17 May 2004, 21 pro-democracy activists were arrested while peacefully demonstrating against the SPDC and the convening of the National Convention outside of the Burmese Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. The group of activists, which included a five year-old boy, were held at the Cheras police station. The police reportedly detained the group in order to determine the existence and/or status of their travel documents. In addition, the local police chief reported that while peaceful demonstrations were acceptable in Malaysia, without a proper permit the public assembly was deemed illegal. (Source: “Malaysian Police Arrest Activists Demonstrating for Democracy in Myanmar,” AFP, 17 May 2004)

 

Crackdown on Illegal Immigrants

 

In July 2004, Malaysian Home Minister Azmi Khalid announced a crackdown to sweep the country of illegal immigrants which would occur at the end of 2004 and beginning of 2005. Prior to the crackdown, the government announced an amnesty during which the estimated 700,000 to 1.2 million illegal immigrants could return to their home countries without punishment. Initially, the amnesty was scheduled for 29 October until 4 November, but was extended through to the end of 2004. Those who did not exit Malaysia and were arrested during the crackdown were to be subjected to punishment under the Immigration Act prior to deportation. This punishment includes caning, fine, and jail time. (Source: Malaysia: Human Rights at Risk in Mass Deportation of Undocumented Migrants, Amnesty International, 2 December 2004)

 

The impending crackdown raised many concerns for the safety and security of refugees and asylum seekers, most of who fall into the category of illegal immigrants. The Malaysian government indicated that during the crackdown, police and the Peoples’ Volunteer Corp, who would assist with the sweeps, would not arrest persons who posses UNHCR temporary protection letters. Yet, doubts remained because of the Malaysian authorities’ history of arresting asylum seekers with UNHCR documents and those waiting outside of the UNHCR office. Moreover, there was fear that the cash reward offered for each migrant arrested coupled with inadequate training or lack of comprehension of refugee rights would result in members of the Peoples’ Volunteer Corp not respecting UNHCR document holders. (Source: “UN Combs Malaysian Jungles for Refugees Ahead of Crackdown,” AFP, 1 December 2004)

 

The lack of adequate reporting mechanisms also raised many fears that refugees and asylum seekers who were arrested during the crackdown would not have an opportunity to contact the UNHCR to access protection while in detention and would subsequently be refouled. Furthermore, the poor conditions of detention centers coupled with overcrowding during the crackdown were feared to potentially lead to "constructive refoulement." In this circumstance, asylum seekers choose to voluntarily repatriate to an environment of persecution in their countries of origin rather than remain in detention. (Source: Malaysia: Human Rights at Risk in Mass Deportation of Undocumented Migrants, Amnesty International, 2 December 2004)

 

In October, the Malaysian government announced that the Rohingya population of approximately 10,000 people would be granted official identification cards allowing them to live and work legally in Malaysia. Furthermore, those who received the cards would not be vulnerable to arrest and deportation during the impending crackdown. Yet, by December, the government had yet to issue any documents raising concerns that the Rohingya refugees would not have them in time for the crackdown in January 2005 (source: “U.N. Refugee Agency Worried Over Looming Malaysian Clampdown,” AP, 3 December 2004). Chin and other ethnic groups from Burma remained susceptible to the consequences of the crackdown as they were not included in the Malaysian government’s offer (source: Malaysia: Human Rights at Risk in Mass Deportation of Undocumented Migrants, Amnesty International, 2 December 2004). In an attempt to provide documents and some level of protection, the UNHCR sent mobiles teams to jungles and outskirts of cities to register refugees in December (source: “UN Combs Malaysian Jungles for Refugees Ahead of Crackdown,” AFP, 1 December 2004).

 

14.6 Situation of Refugees in Other Locations

 

Japan

 

On 5 February, a 30 year-old man from Burma gained a second opportunity to apply for asylum in Japan when Judge Masayuki Fujiyama ruled to overturn the Japanese immigration authorities’ rejection of his application for asylum. The Burmese man had applied for asylum in 1999 with the claim that he was from a persecuted ethnic minority group, had actively participated in the pro-democracy movement since 1988, and had been unfairly detained and tortured due to his political activities. In 1999, the man had filed a lawsuit against the immigration department when his application for asylum had been rejected. Judge Masayuki Fujiyama ruled that the investigation into the Burmese man’s claims for asylum had not been adequate and therefore overturned the rejection. The ruling affords the Burmese man a second opportunity to seek asylum in Japan, marking the first case of its kind for asylum seekers from Burma. (Source: “Myanmar Man Wins Lawsuit in Seeking Refugee Status in Japan,” AFP, 5 February 2004)

 

On 19 February, a 39 year-old man from Burma received refugee status when Judge Masayuki Fujiyama overturned the Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau’s rejection of his asylum application. The Burmese man had participated in the pro-democracy movement, absconded to Japan in 1989, and applied for asylum in 1997. In 1998, his application was rejected and in July 2001 he was detained under an order for deportation. He was held in detention for approximately one year and finally filed suit for the withdrawal of both the rejection for refugee status and the order for deportation. The Tokyo District Court judge indicated that the man had a legitimate fear of persecution due to his political involvement if forced to return to Burma. (Source: “Tokyo Court Grants Refugee Status to Myanmar Man,” Japan Economic Newswire, 19 February 2004)

 

On 17 December, it was reported that a married couple from Burma living in Tokyo filed a suit protesting their detention in the immigration center and requesting that they be released. The couple had been detained for illegal entry to Japan and were separated from their 1 year-old son and 3 year-old daughter, who were placed in the care of a children’s facility in Tokyo. The couple reportedly arrived in Japan prior to 1999, fleeing persecution due to their ethnic background and participation in political opposition activities. On 21 December, the Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau agreed to release the wife on bail while the husband remained in immigration detention. (Source: “Myanmar Couple Protest Detention Separating Them from Children,” Japan Economic Newswire, 17 December 2004)

 

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Facts on Human Rights Violations