HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP SLAMS "INDEPENDENT" REPORT AS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC
The Alternative
ASEAN Network on
The
"independent" report for the European Commission titled
"Supporting
Ironically, this
push to erode the EU's commitment to democracy in
The authors say
the outlook for establishing a nominally democratic government in the near
future is positive. It is strange that they would recommend the EU
"nominally" support democracy, reconciliation and human rights in
The October purge
of Khin Nyunt resulted in the loss of the main communication channels between
the international community and the regime. This has in turn led to a sense of
desperation amongst those foreigners whose careers depend on
"engagement", who now advocate appeasement disguised as engagement.
They hope that such bribery will allow them a foot in the hardliners' door.
Altsean-Burma
wishes to respond to some of the points made in the report as follows:
1. The report
dismisses Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD as being incapable of drawing public
support.
Aung San Suu Kyi
and the NLD drew huge crowds during her travels throughout the country in
2002/2003. The signature campaign calling for her release has already attracted
500,000 signatures in Burma, despite intimidation and harassment by the
military authorities.* This has reinforced awareness of the national aspiration
for democracy, as expressed in the 1990 elections, in which the NLD won 82% of
the parliamentary seats.
*(During a recent
meeting at the NLD headquarters in Rangoon, a member of the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines discovered that 500,000 people has signed the
petition calling for Aung San Suu Kyi's release. When
asked whether the people were afraid to sign the petition, the NLD members
replied "Yes people are afraid but they are signing anyway").
2. They argue that
civilians in
The argument is
arrogant and condescending - the SPDC is clearly inept at economic and policy
reform. The SPDC has purposefully undermined capacity development opportunities
as a strategy to subjugate the people of
The authors appear
to suggest that a regime which continues to loot, rape, perpetrate forced labor
and forcibly recruit child soldiers will somehow transform into a capable
government, once given enough money. This is tantamount to saying the Ukrainian
dictatorship should have been supported because Ukrainians were too
inexperienced for democracy.
3. They say
This argument has
long been used by the SPDC
it ignores the fact that the military junta has facilitated
ethnic and religious conflicts in order to justify their continued dominance.
It also ignores
the inspiring solidarity that has been demonstrated amongst ethnic nationality
groups in recent years, for example the formation of
the Ethnic Nationalities Council (comprising ceasefire and non-ceasefire
groups), and the joint proposals of ceasefire groups to the National
Convention. All the major ethnic nationality groups have advocated for a
united, federal system.
4. They claim the
difficulties experienced during
This plays into
the SPDC argument that the country is "too fragile" to survive on its
own under civilian rule. Strong governments are those where the stakeholders
are invested and people are represented. The people's will was made obvious in
the Burmese general elections, and clearly still applies.
It is disgraceful
that a report that reeks of colonialism, and to a certain extent, racism, can
have currency today. Such assertions seem to be informed by the attitude that
somehow the Burmese are less deserving of democracy and are less capable of
sustaining democracy.
At this point,
Altsean-Burma wishes to acknowledge that while many people from Burma may not
have the ability to glibly spout political science terms, they definitely know
what they want, and have faced great dangers to express their wishes.
5. The authors
also make the hollow argument that enhanced engagement is more likely to
influence the SPDC and its institutions, a point disproved by the experience of
corporate engagement in the 1990s.
Further, they
argue that to contribute to social change, international actors need to be
"engaged on the ground" in close proximity to the people/institutions
want to influence. EU policy should aim for constructive dialogue with the SPDC.
UN Envoys
including Razali Ismail, Sergio Pinheiro, several Nobel Laureates and
6. One of their
main arguments is that the country is more open to foreign influence than
previously: e.g. having senior officials exposed to the outside world helped
overcome their fear of foreigners.
This logic is
based on the assumption that dictators like Milosevic, Marcos and Suharto would have changed if only we had spoken nicely to
them. The regime's receptiveness to "foreign influence" has been a
response to pressure. Key overtures to engage foreign governments have taken
place only when there has been pressure. For instance, the regime paid
significant amounts to
On the business
front, the SPDC's monopoly over
7. They say that
renewed pressure is more likely to disrupt domestic process of change and
further punish the general population.
The "domestic
process of change" is a euphemism for reconsolidation of the dictatorship.
Nine political parties that won 91% of the seats in the election are absent
from the National Convention.
The authors use the
KNU gentleman's ceasefire as an example of a positive development. This
overlooks the actual dynamics of a ceasefire zone: Reports from Karen areas
since the gentleman's ceasefire in December 2003, have pointed to heightened
insecurity for civilian populations, including a raid on a Karen community
during Karen New Year on
The authors
congratulate the SPDC's "infrastructure development program".
SPDC-style "development" has meant improved military access to commit
forced labor, exploitation of natural resources and exploitation of the
civilian population.
8. They argue that
there is little room for negotiating genuine political reform given the
"very obvious corporate and personal interests they [the SPDC] have in
maintaining power."
This undermines
their entire argument -
if you recognize that there is no desire for political reform,
why advocate rewarding the regime for this? This is precisely why the EU should
adopt comprehensive sanctions. When the personal interests of the generals are
directly at stake, the dialogue table might finally get some meat on it.
9. The authors
argue that sanctions should be revised in favor of more realistic benchmarks
for progress whereby the EU reciprocates with concrete, positive gestures when
steps are taken. The authors berate the international
community for "failing" to promote economic reform, but absolves
the SPDC of all responsibility.
The international
community HAS promoted economic reform it has always been very clear that
sanctions and International Financial Institution prohibitions were a direct
response to poor economic management and governance. Were those management
policies to change, the international community would change alongside.
Benchmarks have been offered
for example, the initiation of a genuine tripartite dialogue.
10. They make a
particular point of arguing that the SPDC is not vulnerable to pressure.
This argument is
based on the fact that the SPDC controls "every lever of power" but
ignores the fact that this control is also vulnerability. Without the backing
of public support, and without commitment to delivering positive economic
reforms, the SPDC is slowly imploding. Pressure is what has made the SPDC
react. Pressure, when backed by the power to implement tough
economic measures, from the ILO and FAT-F have elicited response. Firm,
consistent pressure is what is needed
11. They argue for
an increase in aid.
The best aid for
12. The authors
are dismissive of the ethnic nationalities and local populations.
On the National
Convention, they recognize that ethnic participants will be unhappy with the
process. Yet, they "view their compliance as assured, as they have no
other viable options," thereby suggesting that coercion is acceptable and
the ethnic nationalities are a problem to be overcome. Accepting coercion is
perverse and unacceptable: the ethnic nationalities make up a substantial
portion of the population; preventing their involvement in politics cannot bode
well for the future. Without genuine political franchise a cohesive and stable
governing structure cannot emerge.
It is curious why
the authors have not directed their efforts to convince the SPDC that they have
no other "viable option" than genuine democratic reform and
reconciliation. Perhaps they have other priorities.
ENDS