|
|
|
E |
|
|
ADVANCE EDITED VERSION |
Distr. E/CN.4/2006/34 Original: ENGLISH |
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Sixty-second session
Item 9 of the provisional agenda
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN ANY PART
OF THE WORLD
Situation
of human rights in Myanmar
Report
of the Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro
Summary
In
its resolution 2005/10, the Commission requested the Special Rapporteur to
report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session and to the Commission at
its sixty-second session. The Special
Rapporteur thereby submitted an interim report to the Assembly in accordance
with this request (A/60/221). The
present report is also submitted in accordance with the above request and is
based on information received by the Special Rapporteur up to
Throughout
the six-year period of his mandate, the Special Rapporteur received
substantiated reports of grave human rights violations on an ongoing
basis. Little evidence was available of
the existence of a serious commitment by the Government to addressing the
culture of impunity for State actors, with the vast majority of his
communications to the authorities not receiving a response.
With
regard to the transition process, the National Convention, having been
suspended for a further nine months following its last session held from 17
February to
The
Special Rapporteur regrets that, according to information received during the
last reporting period, the situation regarding the exercise of fundamental
human rights and freedoms remains grave.
The intimidation, harassment, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of
civilians for peacefully exercising their civil and political rights and
freedoms continue. Members of registered
political parties, human rights defenders and pro-democracy advocates are
particular targets.
The activities of political parties remain
severely repressed and subject to scrutiny by government agents. The offices of the National League for
Democracy (NLD), which won over 80 per cent of the seats in the 1990 election,
have been shut down, with the sole exception of the headquarters in
On
27 November, the Government issued a new executive order prolonging the
detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for a further six months. The General-Secretary of NLD and Nobel Peace
Prize laureate has now been in detention for over 10 of the last 16 years. The Special Rapporteur is gravely disturbed
that a legitimate political leader continues to be held hostage in solitary
confinement.
To
date, the total number of political prisoners in
The
Special Rapporteur draws attention to the marked decline in socio-economic
conditions, which has resulted in increased poverty countrywide. Urgent reform is required to prevent any
further degeneration of an already severely damaged economy.
The
humanitarian situation in
The situation then was particularly serious
in ethnic minority and conflict areas.
It has since significantly deteriorated, affecting the population now on
a wide scale.
The
human rights concerns enumerated in the present report are largely the same as
those which the Special Rapporteur highlighted when he commenced his mandate,
six years ago. Despite early indications
from the Government that it was willing to address these problems, he regrets
that all such willingness appears to have disappeared.
The
Special Rapporteur stressed that human development and economic reform must be
prioritized in order to defeat the poverty that is at the root of
Any
progress towards resolving ethnic conflict in
No transition process is worthy of the name as long as fundamental freedoms of assembly, expression and association are denied; voices advocating democratic reform are silenced; elected representatives are imprisoned; and human rights defenders are criminalized. No progress will be made towards national reconciliation as long as key political representatives are being locked behind bars, their constituents subject to grave and systematic human rights abuses and their political concerns disregarded.
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
Introduction ................................................................................................ 1 - 2 6
I. ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ..................... 3 - 8 6
II. OVERVIEW OF SIX-YEAR TERM .......................................... 9 - 22 7
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................... 23 - 36 9
A. National Convention ........................................................... 23 - 30 9
B. International developments .................................................. 31 - 35 11
C. Relocation of the capital of
IV. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ............................................ 37 - 70 12
A. General observations .......................................................... 37 - 39 12
B. “Security” legislation ........................................................... 40 - 41 12
C. Recent arrests and convictions ............................................ 42 - 50 13
D. Conditions of detention ....................................................... 51 - 58 14
E. Freedom of religion ............................................................ 59 - 60 16
F. Freedom of expression ....................................................... 61 - 70 16
V. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS ....................................... 71 - 81 18
A. General observations .......................................................... 71 - 73 18
B. Forced labour .................................................................... 74 - 77 18
C. Violence against women ..................................................... 78 - 79 19
D. Drug control programmes: the need for alternative
livelihoods .......................................................................... 80 - 81 19
VI. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION ....................................... 82 - 107 20
A. Overview ........................................................................... 82 - 84 20
B. Health ................................................................................ 85 - 89 20
C. Food security ..................................................................... 90 - 92 21
D. Government restrictions on humanitarian
actors ................................................................................. 93 - 98 21
E. Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) ................ 99 - 107 22
VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................ 108 - 119 24
Annex: List of severely ill political prisoners ............................................................................... 27
1. The
mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
2. In
the latter resolution, the Commission requested the Special Rapporteur to
report to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session and to the Commission at
its sixty-second session. The Special
Rapporteur thereby submitted an interim report to the General Assembly in
accordance with this request (A/60/221).
The present report is also submitted further to the above request and is
based on information received by the Special Rapporteur up to
3. The
Special Rapporteur presented his interim report to the General Assembly
on
4. During
the course of his mandate, which commenced in December 2000, the Special
Rapporteur has visited
5. Since
his last mission to
6. Throughout
the six years of his mandate, the Special Rapporteur has made a particular
effort to reflect in his reports the perspectives of the countries of the
region, having held consultations in
7. During
the current reporting period he visited
8. The
Special Rapporteur will be stepping down from his mandate, further to the six‑year term
limit following the submission of the present report. He wishes to thank all the
9. The
Special Rapporteur believes it is useful to give a brief overview of his
previous reflections on the situation of human rights in
10. His terms of reference as ascribed by the Commission on Human Rights requested that he “establish direct contacts with the Government and with the people of Myanmar, including political leaders deprived of their liberty, their families and lawyers, with a view to examining the situation of human rights in Myanmar and following any progress made towards the transfer of power to a civilian government and the drafting of a new constitution, the lifting of restrictions on personal freedoms and the restoration of human rights in Myanmar” (resolution 1992/58, para. 3).
11. In
April 2001, he began his mandate by undertaking an exploratory visit to
12. Following
his first visit, the Special Rapporteur was heartened by the fact that the then
Secretary-1, Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, recognized the necessity and value
of the political opposition and its potentially constructive role in the
transition to democracy. The inclusion
of all political representatives would be essential to building confidence in
the transition process, a point the Special Rapporteur was to make repeatedly
throughout his term. An enabling
environment needed to be created, wherein the inherent rights of the people of
13. The
Special Rapporteur emphasized the long overdue need for the dynamic activation
of the transition process, to which the Government had so fervently committed
itself following its failure to transfer power to those democratically elected
in 1990. He put forward basic
recommendations which were essential first steps in instituting democratic
governance. These would necessarily
include, inter alia: the unrestricted
participation of all political representatives in the transition process; the
full and unconditional release of all political prisoners; increased military
discipline and respect for international humanitarian law; the reform and
development of a State bureaucracy capable of operating within professional
norms; the enhancement of the country’s human rights capacity to address the
prevention and monitoring of human rights violations, including the
establishment of instituted mechanisms of accountability for State
actors; and the development of a legal culture supportive of constitutionalism
and the rule of law. He also stressed
the need to strengthen social capital and to encourage the development of a
dynamic civil society, so instrumental in the laying of a solid foundation for
democracy. These and related
recommendations put forward by the Secretary-General of the United Nations were
never implemented, but remain nonetheless imperative.
14. The seven-point road map for national reconciliation and democratic transition launched by Prime Minister Khin Nyunt in 2003, while it did not have democratic and human rights principles firmly entrenched therein, represented an acquiescence that the political life and future of Myanmar could no longer be held hostage to military rule. Its early promise has since then failed to deliver any tangible progress, as the political environment remains severely repressed and the inbuilt anti-democratic conditions of the National Convention remain firmly in place.
15. From the beginning, the Special Rapporteur has sought to acknowledge every positive development, such as the dissemination of human rights standards for public officials; the release of political detainees; the reopening of branches of NLD; the facilitation of a country visit by Amnesty International; and cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and other United Nations agencies. Unfortunately, many of these positive developments have been reversed in recent times. He welcomed the activities of the short-lived Human Rights Committee, which had been established in 2000, allegedly as an interim body leading to the establishment of a National Human Rights Commission, until its reported disbanding following the change of administration in 2004.
16. Throughout the six-year period of the Special Rapporteur’s mandate, substantiated reports of grave human rights violations continued to be received on an ongoing basis. Little evidence was available of a commitment by the Government to addressing the culture of impunity for State actors, with the vast majority of his communications to the authorities not receiving a response.
17. The
Special Rapporteur also highlighted abuses by non-State armed groups. He pleaded for the rights of the civilian
population, caught up in the ongoing conflict, violated and victimized
primarily by the military but also by non-State armed forces. Such violence was and continues to be largely
arbitrary, summary and indiscriminate, resulting in substantial internal
displacement within
18. Throughout
his mandate, he reiterated his belief that
19. During
his visits to
20. The
Special Rapporteur drew attention to many aspects of the humanitarian
situation, stressing that only 0.17 per cent of the gross domestic product in
1999/2000 was understood to have been spent on health care and a similarly
negligible amount on tertiary education.
In 2002, he called attention to the alarming speed at which HIV/AIDS was
spreading. He appealed to the Government
to coordinate with the political opposition and the international community to
plan the effective management of the humanitarian needs of
21. Despite
the lack of sustainable political or human rights developments in
22. The
Special Rapporteur stressed that human development and economic reform must be
prioritized in order to defeat the poverty that is at the root of
23. Having
been suspended for a further nine months, following its last session
(17 February‑31 March 2005), the National Convention reconvened
on
24. The Special Rapporteur is particularly concerned over reports received from the recent session of the National Convention that “the President of State is to serve as the Head of State and the Head of the Union Government ... the President shall not be responsible for answering to any Hluttaw [legislative body] or to any court for the exercise or performance of the duties and functions vested in him by the Constitution or any of the existing laws or for any of his actions in the exercise and performance of these powers and functions”, as cited by the Alternate Chairperson of the Delegate Group to the National Convention.
25. Concern has also been expressed by some delegates that amendments to the Constitution may only be made with at least 75 per cent of votes from parliament. However, as the Government continues to stipulate that 25 per cent of the seats in parliament are to be reserved for military personnel, it appears that any proposed amendment to the Constitution will require military approval.
26. The Special Rapporteur has received reports of the mounting frustration of various ethnic political parties and ceasefire groups, that the constitutional proposals which they submitted for consideration to the National Convention have not been raised for open debate. Their concerns about the guaranteed role of the military in Government and the extent of devolution of legislative authority to states remain outstanding.
27. The
Special Rapporteur has consistently indicated that national reconciliation
requires meaningful and inclusive dialogue with and between political
representatives and is severely damaged by silencing representatives. He is firmly of the opinion that national reconciliation
and the stability of
28. The New Mon State Party, an ethnic ceasefire group, although sending observers, took the decision not to formally participate in the recent meetings of the National Convention, dissatisfied that a joint proposal regarding legislative and judicial issues submitted by several ethnic ceasefire groups during the last session was not accepted by the military authorities. The procedural restrictions placed on the participants’ right to free speech which prevents open and frank discussion on the formulation of a new constitution were reportedly another reason cited by the ceasefire group for its stance.
29. The concerns of the ceasefire groups are compounded by reports of increased militarization in ceasefire areas. Contrary to expectations that entering into a ceasefire agreement would result in a loosening of military control, the confiscation of lands, the continued construction of military camps in ceasefire areas and other activities which have a negative impact on the civilian population, including forced labour demands, are leading many to query the dividends to be gained from entering into ceasefire agreements.
30. The recommendations advanced on several occasions by the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights calling for the National Convention to be placed on a solid democratic footing, have been disregarded by the current administration. Repeated requests for inclusive dialogue proffered by NLD and various other political representatives also remain unheeded.
31. The
Special Rapporteur regrets that the Government of Myanmar was not in a position
to assume the chairmanship of ASEAN in July 2006. He also noted the statement issued by the
Chairman of the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2005, which gave voice to the
regional concern at the pace of the democratization process in
32. On
various occasions, the Special Rapporteur has alluded to the vital role that
ASEAN member States can play in facilitating the political transition process
in
33. The
Chairman’s statement issued at the conclusion of the 11th ASEAN summit in
34. The Special Rapporteur took note of the “Threat to the Peace” report commissioned by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former President Vaclev Havel, published in September 2005, which calls for action to be taken by the Security Council, in the interest of regional peace and stability. He firmly believes that the report is a clear expression of the long-term frustration and grave concern of the international community at the lack of meaningful progress in the political transition and national reconciliation processes and the systematic human rights violations committed by the military authorities.
35. During
its informal consultations on
36. In
November 2005, the Government announced that it had commenced its relocation of
several ministries from the capital in Yangon to what it purports to be a
“command and control centre” currently under construction near Pyinmana, in
southern Mandalay Division. The Special
Rapporteur is concerned by reports of forced relocation of villages and the
alleged use of
forced labour in the construction of this compound. It has also been brought to his attention
that civil servants who refused to move might be criminally charged and that no
resignations or retirements were reportedly permitted.
37. The Special Rapporteur regrets that according to information received during the last reporting period, the situation regarding the exercise of fundamental human rights and freedoms remains grave. The intimidation, harassment, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of civilians for peacefully exercising their civil and political rights and freedoms continue. Members of registered political parties, human rights defenders, pro-democracy advocates are particular targets.
38. The
activities of political parties remain severely repressed and subject to
scrutiny by government agents. The
offices of NLD, the political party which won over 80 per cent of the seats in
the 1990 election, have been shut down, with the sole exception of the
headquarters in
39. The Special Rapporteur regrets that trial procedures of those detained on charges of a political nature fall far below international standards. Information on charges, trial dates, legal representation and the right of appeal are frequently not made available to political detainees; trials are often conducted in camera, and within prisons; and sentences are regularly handed down shortly after the trial has begun, with little or no opportunity for the defendants to call upon witnesses.
40. Political prisoners are detained under laws promulgated by the Government as “security” legislation, should they be considered to be acting in opposition to the policies of the authorities. Such legislation, which contravenes international legal standards by restricting the right to freedom of expression, association and assembly, includes:
(a) The Emergency Provisions Act (1950) is
frequently applied to those who “threaten the stability of the
(b) The Unlawful Association Act (1908) is frequently invoked to arbitrarily arrest and detain activists who are associated with what the Government deems as “unlawful” organizations and allows for prison sentences of two to five years to be imposed;
(c) The Printers and Publishers Registration Law (1962) deems those who print, publish or circulate written materials without seeking and receiving prior permission by the Government liable to seven years’ imprisonment;
(d) The State Protection Law (1975) is invoked by the Government to detain political activists without charge or trial for up to five years, should they be deemed by the authorities to constitute a “danger to the State”. It also allows for the extension of the detention of political prisoners whose sentences have already expired.
41. Political activists and human rights defenders are also susceptible to arbitrary arrest on criminal charges. In October 2005, Ma Su Su Nway, an NLD member was sued for a criminal offence after she won a lawsuit against the local authorities for forced labour practices. She was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment.
42. Since
July 2005, at least 44 people are believed to have been arrested and imprisoned
for their political beliefs and activities.
Many include members of registered political parties such as NLD
members, U San Shwe Tun and U Aung Ban Tha.
U Hla Aye and Thant Tin Myo, both NLD members, arrested in
43. Following a secret trial set up by the authorities inside Insein Prison, former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt was handed a 44-year suspended sentence on 22 July, on charges which included bribery and corruption. He is being held under house arrest along with his wife. His two sons received sentences of 68 and 51 years’ imprisonment respectively, for alleged economic crimes. Information on the names, whereabouts and charges against those individuals associated with the former Prime Minister currently held in detention has yet to be fully disclosed.
44. U
Kyaw Min, Muslim MP of the National Democratic Party for Human Rights from
45. Donald
Sao Oo Kya, a senior member of the Shan State Consultative Council, was
arrested on
46. On 28 August, the Government convened a press conference, announcing allegations against 10 individuals reported to have had contact with the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma (FTUB), an organization which it has outlawed. Notwithstanding reports that they were merely exercising their right to freedom of expression, nine were allegedly sentenced in November to between 8 and 25 years in prison. These were: Myint Lwin (aged 77), Win Myint, U Hla Myint Than, Daw Yin Kyi, Ye Myint, Wai Linn, Aye Thi Khaing, Ma Aye Chan and Thein Lwin Oo. The tenth person, Aung Myint Thein (son of Thein Lwin Oo) died in custody (see paragraph 58 below).
47. Seventeen
youth members of NLD were arrested on
48. In
spite of the various calls from the international community for their release,
the Special Rapporteur was deeply disturbed to learn of the inordinately severe
sentences of the nine Shan leaders who had been arrested in February 2005,
following their attendance at a political meeting in
49. On 27 November, the Government issued a new executive order prolonging the detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, for a further six months. The General Secretary of the National League for Democracy and Nobel Peace Prize laureate has now been in detention for more than 10 of the last 16 years. The Special Rapporteur is gravely disturbed that a legitimate political leader continues to be held hostage in solitary confinement. The military authorities have refused her access to ICRC, which the Special Rapporteur finds deplorable.
50. To
date, the total number of political prisoners in
51. Conditions of detention and treatment of political prisoners remain a cause for serious concern. The Special Rapporteur notes with dismay that ICRC is facing increased difficulties in visiting places of detention in Myanmar, no longer enjoying the full privileges of access it enjoyed six months ago, prior to August 2005.
52. Incommunicado detention continues to be a common practice, whereby having been arrested, often without any warrant being shown or charges indicated, civilians are transported to an interrogation or detention centre, where they are held for significant periods of time, often several months, without the knowledge of their families.
53. The diet of prisoners is reported to be severely lacking in basic nutritional value, resulting in a number of cases of malnutrition. The substandard quality of prison food is such a common complaint that prisoners are allegedly reliant on their families to provide supplements. Those incarcerated in prisons far from home, as is the case for many political prisoners, are not in a position to benefit from such family visits. In September 2005, an outbreak of diarrhoea in Tharawaddy Prison allegedly resulted in the deaths of 12 prisoners and the hospitalization of at least 40 others, following the serving of rotting food and unclean water.
54. Credible
reports received about the conditions in various prisons throughout
55. The Special Rapporteur is seriously concerned about the continued detention of a number of severely ill political prisoners, who should be immediately released on humanitarian grounds (see annex below).
56. He is also deeply saddened at the continued incarceration of older political prisoners, some of whom are over 75 years of age. Amongst those who should be released on humanitarian grounds are: U Aung Khaing (Arakan Communist Party); U Aung Thu (People’s Progressive Party); U Ba Chit (ex-captain); General Hso Ten (Chairman, Shan State Peace Council); U Hla Myint Than (NLD); U Khin Maung Swe (member of parliament, NLD); U Kyaw Khin (member of parliament, NLD); U Kyaw Min (member of parliament, NLD); U Kyaw San (member of parliament, NLD); U Maung Maung Oo (NLD); Saw Naing Naing (member of parliament, NLD); U Than Htay (member of parliament, NLD); Dr. Than Nyein (member of parliament, NLD); U Tin Oo (Vice-Chairperson, NLD); U Win Tin (Joint Secretary, NLD).
57. Reports of torture and ill-treatment of those held in pretrial detention and of political prisoners continue to be received. Allegations include food, water, sleep and light deprivation; harsh beatings; forced squatting for prolonged periods; shackling and solitary confinement.
58. The number of political prisoners who have died while in the custody of the military authorities since 1988 is currently reported to be over 90 persons. Between May and December 2005 alone, four deaths have been reported to the Special Rapporteur, allegedly as a consequence of torture, ill-treatment or inadequate medical attention. To date, no independent investigations are known to have been conducted into the recent deaths of the following persons:
(a) Aung Hlaing Win, a member of NLD, who
died in May in an interrogation centre, 10 days after his arrest, was cremated
without the knowledge of his family.
While the autopsy indicated clearly that he had been tortured,
(b) Saw Stanford, a teacher who had been
arrested on
(c) Min Tun Wai, a 40-year-old NLD member
from
(d) Aung Myint Thein, a human rights
defender based in
59. The
Special Rapporteur has been notified that restrictions continue to be imposed
by the authorities on certain religious activities. Obtaining permission to repair or construct
new churches, mosques and temples remains difficult for
60. Reports
received from
61. The
Special Rapporteur notes that
62. The Printers and Publishers Registration Law prohibits “anything detrimental to the State”, “any incorrect ideas and opinions which do not accord with the times”, “any descriptions which though factually correct, are unsuitable because of the time or circumstances of their writing” and “any criticism of a non-constructive type of the work of government departments”. When writing about a government ministry, journalists are allegedly required to name their source and obliged to obtain a letter of authorization from the ministry concerned, which may or may not grant approval for publication.
63. The Special Rapporteur regrets to learn that access to information, especially to the foreign media, has allegedly become more difficult over the past year. In 2005, censorship was reportedly extended to cover death notices.
64. With regard to the Internet, State censorship is reportedly exercised through the surveillance of e-mail activity, and the use of software-based filtering techniques to block access to any website, whose content the Government deems as being contrary to the national interest and the Internet Regulations of 2000. The majority of websites of the political opposition, pro‑democracy groups and human rights organizations are blocked.
65. While 30 new publishing licences were reportedly granted in the past 12 months, very few of them have resulted in the establishment of viable publications given the excessive restrictions and bureaucratic demands, insisted upon by the Government. The possession of fax machines, video cameras, modems and satellite antennas remains illegal and punishable with prison sentences of up to 15 years. All computers or networks, including fax machines, must be registered with the Ministry of Communications, Posts and Telegraphs, and a licence agreement obtained.
66. The
Special Rapporteur has learnt that the Ministry of Information Press Scrutiny
and Registration Division (PSRD) has in recent months promised a more
“flexible” approach to the press in return for a more proactive approach by the
press in supporting the policies of the Government. It was indicated that critical reports on
government projects may be tolerated as long as criticisms are deemed
“constructive”. Media coverage of
natural disasters and poverty, previously banned, may be allowed on condition
that it does not affect what the Government deems to be the “national
interest”. This notwithstanding, in
July, with the exception of the English-language Myanmar Times, none of
the media outlets were allowed to report Myanmar’s decision to forgo its
rotating chairmanship of ASEAN in 2006.
According to PSRD, negative reports and commentaries about
67. In August 2005, PSRD issued new publishing licence regulations, which further tighten control over the editorial teams of authorized publications. Under these new publishing rules, PSRD can also block the transfer of a publishing licence from one publisher to another.
68. The
Government continues to tightly control access by international journalists to
69. Amongst the political prisoners released in early July, to which the Special Rapporteur referred in his previous report (A/60/221, para. 42), there were several senior media figures, including Sein Hla Oo and documentary film-maker Aung Pwint. Seventy-year-old Sein Hla Oo was released from Myitkyina Prison after being held for nearly 11 years in harsh conditions. A freelance journalist, a former editor and an NLD member of parliament, he was arrested in 1994 and charged with “fabricating and sending anti-government reports” to foreign embassies, radio stations and journalists. Aung Pwint was arrested in 1999 and convicted on charges of “illegal possession of a fax machine” and of “transmitting information to banned publications”.
70. As
at November 2005, at least 17 editors, journalists, writers and poets remain in
captivity in
71. The Special Rapporteur calls attention to the marked decline in socio-economic conditions which has resulted in increased poverty countrywide. He notes that during the reporting period, the value of the Kyat sharply declined as inflation soared, leading to substantially increased hardship of the population. Commodity prices and public transportation fares escalated, as the cost of motor fuel reportedly rose ninefold. Urgent reform is required to prevent any further deterioration in an already critical economy.
72. A
quarter of the population is currently believed to live below the poverty
line. It is estimated that 70 per cent
of household expenditure is on food alone.
The rising costs of food commodities in recent months have further
eroded declining purchasing power.
Government expenditure on health per person is believed to be the lowest
in the world. Life expectancy is
60 years, 10 years less than in
73. The Special Rapporteur firmly believes that State-sponsored practices such as the imposition of arbitrary taxes, extortion, land and crop confiscation, forced relocations, travel restrictions, financial penalties for non-compliance with orders and the looting of possessions of civilians by military authorities, all continue to have a devastating impact on livelihoods.
74. The
Special Rapporteur continues to receive reports of widespread and systematic
forced labour practices and forced recruitment, implemented by State actors,
throughout
75. Obliging civilians to work without pay is detrimentally impacting upon their ability to make a living. Rather than pursuing their own livelihoods, the citizens of Myanmar are being obliged by the Government to dedicate themselves to such activities as the construction of military camps, including digging of trenches and bunkers; the construction of hospitals and roads and portering of military supplies, including ammunition; the forced cultivation of tea plantations; and the breeding of livestock for army troops. In the case of forced labour for development projects, construction materials and food supplies are frequently demanded of civilians, who are allegedly told that it is their “civic duty” to comply with army orders.
76. The policy of the Government to prosecute those who are considered to have lodged false complaints about such practices dissuades victims from reporting cases, for fear of prosecution. In this connection, the recent case of Ma Su Su Nway, the human rights defender, exemplifies the possible fate awaiting those who do attempt to seek legal redress for forced labour. Having successfully brought a case against local authorities in Yangon Division in January 2005 for forced labour imposed on her and on fellow villagers in connection with a road construction project, she found herself subject to harassment and criminal charges. In October 2005 she was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment in Insein Prison on charges of having defamed local authorities, following a trial which did not meet international standards of due process.
77. Having been released in January 2005 following a conviction for high treason for his contacts with ILO, U Aye Myint, a lawyer from Pegu Division, was sentenced on 31 October to seven years’ imprisonment for “spreading false information”, under the Emergency Provisions Act (1950). He was arrested on the grounds that he had submitted a letter of complaint to government authorities regarding a land confiscation case and had forwarded a copy to the ILO liaison officer.
78. Serious incidents of sexual violence against women continue to be reported throughout Myanmar. Women and girls in ethnic minority areas remain particularly susceptible to rape and harassment by State actors. As a consequence, their freedom of movement is unnecessarily restricted as they are often fearful of travelling unaccompanied.
79. The Special Rapporteur deeply regrets that the Government has not agreed to an independent investigation into allegations of systematic sexual violence in Shan State. Such a culture of impunity which continues to pervade in Myanmar, whereby State agents who perpetrate serious crimes are rarely prosecuted, is of grave concern to the Special Rapporteur. That those who lodge complaints to the authorities find no avenue of redress but, rather, are liable to reprisals is wholly unacceptable.
80. The Government has achieved notable progress in several areas of drug control over the past four years, with the assistance of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). According to a recent survey by UNODC, opium production in Myanmar declined by 29 per cent in 2004 from the 2003 level and by a further 26 per cent in 2005 from the 2004 level. However, eradication programmes, while achieving important successes, have also resulted in a number of undesirable consequences which have yet to be addressed, such as: out‑migration as a result of the loss of livelihood, population drops, lower school enrolments and declining health services in affected areas. Approximately 2 million farmers and their households have either lost or are about to lose their primary income derived from opium poppy farming. Income-generating alternatives need to be developed, if the successes gained in the opium eradication programmes are not to be rapidly undermined.
81. While
poppy-growing has dramatically declined, the production of synthetic drugs or
amphetamine-type stimulants is steadily rising.
A marked increase in heroin abuse amongst
Myanmar’s youth remains of concern, as does the exacerbating effect it could
have on transmission rates of HIV/AIDS.
The presence of cross-border criminal groups involved in drug
trafficking continues to affect drugs production and to aggravate the relative
lawlessness in the
82. The humanitarian situation in Myanmar, while not yet at the point of acute crisis, has shown marked signs of deterioration over the past year. In 2001, soon after the Special Rapporteur took up his mandate, the heads of eight United Nations agencies in Yangon expressed their concern over the “silent humanitarian crisis in the making”. The situation then was particularly serious in ethnic minority and conflict areas. It has since significantly deteriorated, affecting the population now on a wide scale.
83. Particularly vulnerable groups with acute humanitarian needs include: those living in areas of ongoing armed conflict; those forcibly moved to relocation sites who have not had their livelihoods substituted; internally displaced persons, especially those in hiding; those living in the vicinity of military camps who are particularly susceptible to forced labour and extortion; female-headed households; children and young people deprived of an adequate education and subject to forced labour practices; and the elderly who are deprived of appropriate community care and support.
84. The Special Rapporteur is particularly concerned that during the reporting period, the access of ICRC to the states of eastern Myanmar has been further restricted. The work of ICRC in assisting and monitoring the welfare of the civilian population is a basic humanitarian necessity, which the Government has an international responsibility to facilitate.
85. Many aspects of human suffering, most particularly HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, undeniably constitute a high degree of humanitarian need which the Government should address with the close cooperation and assistance of the international community.
86. In direct contrast to neighbouring countries such as Thailand and Cambodia, the rate of HIV/AIDS infection in Myanmar is rapidly rising. It is understood that 31.4 per cent of sex workers and 37.9 per cent of intravenous drug users in Myanmar are infected with HIV/AIDS. There is serious concern that the disease is currently spreading from these high-risk groups into the general population (with 2 per cent of pregnant women in Myanmar already estimated to be HIV-positive).
87. According
to UNAIDS, the number of people infected with HIV in Myanmar may be
as high as 620,000. Northern Shan
and Kachin States are reported to be particularly worst affected. The Government has acknowledged that the
rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, perceived by the international community as
presenting a significant regional threat, is a cause for concern and has
indicated its willingness to take action.
In this regard, the Special Rapporteur welcomes
reports that the implementation of the National Contraception Programme has
been significantly stepped up by the Ministry of Health, with the assistance of
the United Nations, from reaching only four townships in 2001 to covering
almost one third of the country today.
88. The Special Rapporteur notes that the United Nations Children’s Fund provides approximately 90 per cent of the vaccines used to inoculate children in Myanmar against seven major vaccine-preventable diseases, including tuberculosis (TB), polio and measles. Myanmar suffers from amongst the highest rates of TB in the world, with an estimated 97,000 new cases of the disease diagnosed annually. As is the case with HIV/AIDS, reports indicate that multi-drug-resistant TB is currently spreading to neighbouring countries.
89. Malaria is a leading cause of mortality in Myanmar. Eighty per cent of the population lives in areas where malaria is endemic. It is believed that 600,000 cases and at least 3,000 deaths are attributable to the disease each year. Such figures are conservative as less than 40 per cent of malaria suspects are understood to seek public health care. The under-five mortality rate as a result of malaria is allegedly twice the regional average. While neighbouring countries have achieved significant gains in malaria control, there is a risk that the situation in Myanmar, if not addressed, will negatively affect such positive regional developments. The combination drugs required to treat the widespread multi-drug-resistant strain of malaria are largely inaccessible for those sectors of the population most at risk.
90. The Special Rapporteur was disturbed to learn of impediments placed by the Government to the distribution of food supplies by the World Food Programme (WFP) to areas seriously affected by hunger in Rakhine State in July and August 2005. WFP, which is supporting the food needs of several hundred thousand people in Myanmar, found its programmes negatively affected by the reported delays in the issuance of permits for movement of food aid in Rakhine and Shan States, of up to three months. No reason had been given by the Government for the delays.
91. It has been also reported that there was an increase in the number of obstacles to the movement of rice within Myanmar in the past year, with special permission allegedly being insisted upon by the local authorities, both from where the procurement was being made and to its final destination. These increased restrictions have allegedly contributed to the rise in the price of rice.
92. As
at the time of writing the present report, the Special Rapporteur is pleased to
learn that access by the civilian population to food commodities provided by
WFP and other humanitarian agencies has improved in the
93. The Special Rapporteur has become aware that in the second quarter of 2005, a number of international agencies faced increased restrictions on their access to and activities in remote areas of conflict, ceasefire areas and those populated by ethnic nationality groups. Some international agencies have also been instructed that their expatriate employees may travel into rural and remote areas only in the company of officials from the relevant government department or ministry.
94. Bureaucratic
restrictions placed by the Government on the movement and activities
of humanitarian agencies and the resultant hampering of monitoring
procedures are having a seriously negative effect. The decision taken by the Global Fund To
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in August to terminate grants to
95. The Special Rapporteur wishes to note that during the six years of his mandate, the United Nations Country Team, despite an increasingly difficult operational environment, has continued to provide essential assistance to people in need. Other agencies are also determined to address the needs of the most vulnerable, notwithstanding mounting difficulties. The Special Rapporteur is pleased to note the recent establishment of an office of the European Commission’s humanitarian aid department (ECHO), which has more than tripled its humanitarian assistance in the past four years.
96. In his last report, the Special Rapporteur noted the severe restrictions placed by the authorities on the activities of the ILO liaison officer and the calls by government-affiliated organizations for Myanmar to withdraw from ILO (A/60/221, para. 69). Developments in recent months, however, indicate that the Government’s cooperation with ILO has deteriorated significantly.
97. In June, July and August, several mass rallies were held by official and government‑affiliated organizations, denouncing the activities of ILO and urging the Government to withdraw its membership. Disturbingly, the ILO liaison officer received 21 death threats, warning him to leave the country or else be killed. There has been no formal response from the Government of Myanmar to numerous expressions of concern by ILO, although verbal assurances about his security and indications that the matter was being investigated have been reportedly given to the liaison officer.
98. The Government’s commitment to eradicating forced labour and to implementing the recommendations of ILO increasingly appeared minimal, if non-existent, when in October it alluded to the fact that it was giving serious consideration to withdrawing from the Organization. However, following discussions with ILO, the Special Rapporteur is pleased to note that the Government reasserted its commitment to cooperate with ILO in November 2005. A clear demonstration of the integrity of its pledge to cooperate with ILO is now required.
99. The Special Rapporteur remains gravely concerned at the ongoing internal displacement and the exodus of civilian communities in Myanmar as a direct result of systematic human rights abuses and the conflict between the military authorities and non-State armed groups.
100. Myanmar produces the largest numbers of refugees in the region, which continue to leave the country for the neighbouring countries of Thailand, India, Bangladesh and elsewhere. While 150,000 persons have found refuge in camps on the Thai-Myanmar border, an estimated 1 million people originating from Myanmar are understood to be currently living in Thailand alone.
101. It is estimated that since October 2004, at least 87,000 people were obliged to leave their homes. As of late 2005, there were understood to be a total of 540,000 people displaced in eastern Myanmar alone, the area worst affected by armed conflict and systematic human rights abuses by government personnel.
102. In the ceasefire areas, there are believed to be 340,000 IDPs. Government troops have expanded their activities into these areas, in spite of ceasefire agreements, enforcing trade and travel restrictions on civilian communities. Pledges by the Government to provide economic aid to those administering ceasefire areas have faltered. One such example was the recent cut in aid from the Government to the New Mon State Party and the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front. Such cuts are likely to result in outflows of IDPs from ceasefire areas. As long as the dividends accruing from ceasefire agreements remain negligible, their validity and sustainability will be questionable.
103. The total number of persons currently residing in relocation sites is understood to stand at 108,000. Since 2004, at least 30,000 people are understood to have been forcibly transferred to such sites, having been evicted from their homes by government forces. The loss of livelihoods for those forced to move to relocation sites is substantial, as the camps tend to be located on barren land close to military bases (the proximity to which leaves civilians susceptible to forced labour demands). Alternative income-generating options are rarely available and travel restrictions are invariably imposed.
104. Fear of attack and subjection to human rights violations by the military in their “counter‑insurgency” activities mean civilians continue to flee their villages. It is understood that at least 92,000 civilians are hiding in those areas most affected by military conflict, in remote forests and mountainous regions. One such incident occurred on 26 November 2005, when 900 people fled Thandaung Township, Karen State, following an attack by government forces, which resulted in the burning of civilian dwellings and the laying of landmines. At the time of writing, those 900 civilians, many of whom are children, are in hiding, without adequate food or shelter. Southern Shan State has experienced the highest increases in the number of civilians fleeing into hiding, in the past year, largely as a result of the alleged harassment of civilians by the military over concerns that the Shan State National Army and Shan State Army South would constitute a full alliance.
105. In
areas of conflict, there appears to be no diminution in the Government’s
so-called “Four Cuts Policy”, which reportedly aims to eliminate the access of
the armed opposition to new recruits, information, supplies and financial
support, in order to extend its control over areas under the administration of
ethnic nationality groups. The purposeful
impoverishment and deprivation of civilians as a counter-insurgency strategy is
exercised through severe travel restrictions, forced evictions, expropriation,
the imposition of arbitrary taxes and the destruction of villages. Since 1996, an estimated 2,800 villages are
understood to have been destroyed
(invariably burnt), relocated en masse or otherwise abandoned due to armed
activities. While the populations
of a certain number of these villages have since been resettled, most remain
displaced.
106. The Special Rapporteur reminds the Government and non-State armed groups of their obligation to protect civilians from the effects of armed conflict. The current government strategy of targeting civilians in the course of its military operations represents a wilful abrogation of its responsibility under international humanitarian law.
107. He has also been notified of forced evictions due to State-sponsored development projects. The construction of the hydroelectric dam on the Salween River reportedly resulted in the forcible displacement of several villages in Shan and Karen States. Allegations regarding civilian land expropriation for natural resource extraction have also been received. Victims are rarely given compensation.
108. The human rights concerns enumerated in the present report are largely the same as those highlighted by the Special Rapporteur when he commenced his mandate, six years ago. Despite early indications from the Government that it was willing to address these problems, he regrets that all such willingness appears to have disappeared. Recommendations formulated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his Special Envoy as well as those advocated by the Special Rapporteur have not been implemented. Those detailed by the Special Rapporteur in his previous reports, therefore, remain valid, their implementation all the more essential given the stagnancy of the transition process, the lack of progress towards national reconciliation and the deteriorating humanitarian situation.
109. Meaningful
political, economic, legislative and judicial reform is essential to moving
Myanmar forward out of the current quagmire.
The refusal of the Government to acknowledge and address the declining
socio-economic conditions and mounting public dissatisfaction cannot be
sustained in perpetuity. In a region
which has experienced significant development in recent years, it is
unacceptable that the people of Myanmar are denied their inherent rights.
110. The
Special Rapporteur strongly supports the recent report of the Secretary‑General
to the General Assembly (A/60/422) requesting the Government of Myanmar
to resume, without further delay, dialogue with all political actors,
including NLD, and with all the representatives of the ethnic nationality
groups. By June 2006, all political
prisoners should be released; all constraints on political actors should be
lifted; all offices of NLD should be permitted to reopen and all political
representatives free to participate in the political transition process,
without restrictions. These are the
minimum steps required to establish confidence in the transition process.
111. The
procedures and principles which govern the National Convention remain
fundamentally anti-democratic. The
Special Rapporteur wishes to emphasize that the framework of reference for his
comments about the National Convention and the political
situation has not been attributable to any individual or group of Member States
but is firmly based upon the pledge repeatedly made since 1990 by the
Government to the people of Myanmar and to the international community to
institute a democratic Government.
112. The Special Rapporteur believes that it would be counterproductive to wait until the end of the political transition process to empower civil society. As in many similar humanitarian emergencies in nations undergoing political transition processes to democracy, the main challenge for the international community is to prevent social capital from being completely exhausted. As well as addressing the suffering of the people today, it is necessary to protect and strengthen the ability of communities and individuals to participate in the eventual political transition.
113. At
the conclusion of his mandate, the Special Rapporteur strongly commends the
determined efforts of those civil society organizations based both inside and
outside the country, who document human rights abuses inside Myanmar, assist
internally displaced persons and provide essential support to and empower
refugee and migrant communities. He
wishes also to acknowledge the contribution made by international
non-governmental organizations, which continue to operate in the country, under
increasingly difficult circumstances, towards providing basic social needs and
building the capacity of the people of Myanmar.
114. Deep-rooted
and worsening poverty, the continued violation of economic rights and the lack
of economic reform which is subjecting the population to unnecessary privation
are moving the country towards a humanitarian crisis. This worsening situation is not beyond
redress and must be addressed by the Government with the assistance available
from the international community, which has a duty to ensure that humanitarian aid
does not become hostage to politics. The
increased scrutiny and excessive bureaucratic restrictions to which
humanitarian organizations are being subjected should not deter the
international community from its duty to respond to the humanitarian crisis
within the country. There have been many
other contexts where humanitarian action has been implemented in a hostile
political environment.
115. The Special Rapporteur believes the Government’s failure to engage in policy-level dialogue and cooperate with international humanitarian agencies to address the acute protection needs of forced migrants is exacerbating an already very serious humanitarian situation. Evidently, the most effective and fundamental form of protection from forced displacement in Myanmar would be the cessation of human rights abuses and the resolution of the armed conflict through inclusive dialogue.
116. There
is also an urgent need to establish transparent mechanisms of accountability to
ensure that acute humanitarian problems are promptly identified and addressed
and to monitor the disbursement of financial assistance. In this connection, the
Special Rapporteur calls upon the Government to deepen its dialogue with
international humanitarian agencies, stakeholders and beneficiaries to
articulate an effective and coordinated strategy for action in tackling the
critical humanitarian exigencies in Myanmar.
The statement issued in September by “The Student Generation Since 1988”
Group encouraging the Government to work together with all stakeholders to
ameliorate the humanitarian situation in the country was a welcome development.
117. The
Special Rapporteur believes that the briefing to the members of the
Security Council in December provided an opportunity to build a
constructive and coordinated strategy towards Myanmar, in view of the urgent
humanitarian needs of the population. He
strongly hopes that such a positive step represents the beginning of a new
momentum internationally, to proactively facilitate the long overdue transition
from authoritarian to democratic rule in Myanmar. In this connection, he believes the
instrumental role of ASEAN and of neighbouring countries in promoting the
rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Myanmar is of key importance
in carrying this momentum forward.
118. The Special Rapporteur is convinced that any progress towards resolving the ethnic conflict in Myanmar is unlikely to be possible or sustainable without tangible political reform. The ongoing armed conflict in several ethnic minority areas continues to underpin the most grave human rights abuses in the country, to exacerbate Myanmar’s humanitarian decline and to inhibit socio-economic development. Without an inclusive reform process, such urgent challenges for the country will not be addressed by the Government’s current road map process.
119. No
transition process is worthy of the name as long as fundamental freedoms of
assembly, expression and association are denied; voices advocating democratic
reform are silenced; elected representatives are imprisoned; and human
rights defenders are criminalized. No
progress will be made towards national reconciliation as long as key political
representatives are being locked behind bars, their constituents subject to
grave and systematic human rights abuses and their political concerns
disregarded.
|
|
Name |
Place of detention |
Illness |
|
1. |
Aung Aung |
Mandalay |
Paralysis |
|
2. |
Aung Naing |
Mandalay |
Hypertension |
|
3. |
Aung Kyaw Oo |
Tharawaddy |
Liver and kidney complaints |
|
4. |
Aung Shin |
Insein |
Asthma |
|
5. |
Aung Soe Myint |
Insein |
Heart disease, diabetes, eye complaint |
|
6. |
Aye Aung |
Kale |
Malaria, typhoid |
|
7. |
Hla Win |
Moulmein |
Haemorrhoids |
|
8. |
Hla Aye |
Insein |
Paralysis |
|
9. |
Khin Khin Leh |
Insein |
Rheumatic arthritis |
|
10. |
Khin Maung Lwin |
Puta-O |
Heart disease, hypertension, malaria |
|
11. |
Kyaw Min |
Insein |
Rheumatic arthritis |
|
12. |
Kyaw Mya* |
Myaungmya |
Gastric ulcer |
|
13. |
Kyaw Soe Wai |
Bassein |
Chest pain |
|
14. |
Kyaw Kyaw Tun |
Myaungmya |
Haemorrhoids, hernia |
|
15. |
Lwin Nyein |
Myaungmya |
Hepatitis |
|
16. |
May Win Myint, Dr.* |
Insein |
Rheumatic arthritis, gastric ulcer |
|
17. |
Mu Tuu |
Myaungmya |
Neuropathy |
|
18. |
Myo Chit |
Tharawaddy |
Asthma |
|
19. |
Myo Thein |
Myaungmya |
Neuropathy |
|
20. |
Naing Aung Mon |
Tharawaddy |
Gastric ulcer |
|
21. |
Nanda Sit Aung |
Pa-an |
Migraine, inability to walk |
|
22. |
Nay Kyaw |
Pa-an |
Severe weakness. Illness unknown |
|
23. |
Nine Nine |
Insein |
Recovery from surgical activity |
|
24. |
Nyi Nyi Oo |
Taungoo |
Paralysis |
|
25. |
Phone Thet Paing |
Myaungmya |
Osteosclerosis |
|
26. |
San Aye |
Tharawaddy |
Severe weakness, unable to stand |
|
27. |
Saw Myint |
Tharawaddy |
Asthma, hypertension |
|
28. |
Soe Han |
Moulmein |
Eye disease |
|
29. |
San Hla Baw |
Thayet |
Paralysis |
|
30. |
Soe Moe Naing |
Taungoo |
Mental illness |
|
31. |
Soe Myint |
Tharawaddy |
Rheumatic arthritis, hypertension |
|
32. |
Su Su Nway |
Insein |
Heart disease |
|
33. |
Than Hteik |
Myaungmya |
Heart complaint |
|
34. |
Than Maung |
Myaungmya |
Heart problem |
|
35. |
Than Nyein, Dr.* |
Insein |
Cirrhosis of liver |
|
36. |
Than Than Htay |
Insein |
Rheumatic arthritis |
|
37. |
Than Win Hlaing |
Tharawaddy |
Diabetes, kidney complaints |
|
38. |
Than Zaw Htwe |
Taunggyi |
Mental illness |
|
39. |
Thet Naung Soe |
Insein |
Mental illness |
|
40. |
Thet Win Aung |
Mandalay |
Mental illness, malaria |
|
41. |
Thura Kyaw Zin |
Myaungmya |
Hypertension, gastric ulcer |
|
42. |
Tin Cho |
Mandalay |
Hypertension |
|
43. |
Tin Myint |
Myaungmya |
Malaria |
|
44. |
Tin San |
Insein |
Hypertension, heart disease |
|
45. |
Tun Linn Kyaw |
Insein |
Tuberculosis |
|
46. |
Tun Ngwe Thein |
Tharawaddy |
Fistula |
|
47. |
Tun Oo |
Thayet |
Gastric ulcer |
|
48. |
Win Naing |
Moulmein |
Heart ailment |
|
49. |
Win Tin |
Insein |
Osteosclerosis |
|
50. |
Win Maung |
Moulmein |
Hypertension, depression |
|
51. |
Yan Gyi Aung |
Tharawaddy |
Glaucoma |
|
52. |
Yan Naing Min |
Mandalay |
Hernia, mental illness |
|
53. |
Zaw Htoo |
Myaungmya |
Hypertension, gastric ulcer |
|
54. |
Zaw Min Oo |
Insein |
Coronary heart disease |
|
55. |
Zaw Min Tun |
Myaungmya |
Coronary heart disease |
|
56. |
Zaw Myint Maung, Dr. |
Myitkyina |
Depression |
|
57. |
Zaw Ye Win |
Taungoo |
Heart disease, hypertension, kidney ailments |
|
58. |
Zin Linn Tun |
Insein |
Heart disease, hypertension, |
-----
* The sentences of these prisoners have already expired, yet they remain in detention, further to the invocation of article 10 (A) of the 1975 State Protection Law.