Opinions are divided on the impact the Japanese occupation on Burma and on Southeast Asia more widely. Harry Benda summed up the Japanese occupation as 'a distinct historical epoch in Southeast Asian history' (Benda 1972:148-49). He viewed it as introducing discontinuity from the past colonial order, and as facilitating important changes, including in particular the mobilization of youth and the disruption of traditional patterns of authority (Benda 1969:78). In his useful work, Yoon (1971a:293) summed up its significance specifically for Burma saying that ‘the Japanese occupation directly affected and greatly accelerated the realization of Burmese independence’.

Guyot (1974: iv, 43, 55, 222) viewed the Japanese occupation of Burma as marking ‘an important threshold in Burma’s political evolution’, since it ‘created the political elite’; in particular, it empowered a young generation of students, Burmanized the army, and helped rally and unify Burmans against British rule.

The disruptions wrought by World War II shaped Burma’s politics in various ways for many decades to come. This was most obvious, of course, with the training and other assistance the Japanese provided to the Thirty Comrades to form the Burma Independence Army (BIA) led by Aung San. The Japanese helped found Burma’s first national army since colonial conquest had brought Burma under British control in 1885. These young nationalists had hopes of liberating Burma by themselves, but in the event, they became part of a full-scale Japanese invasion into Burma. The Japanese occupation of Burma had no enduring popular basis, however, and once it was realised that the promised national independence was without any form of sovereignty, and once the Japanese position became untenable, a broad front openly united against the Japanese from around September 1944 under the umbrella of the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO) led by Aung San. The AFO morphed into the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), which eventually became the ruling party at national independence.
Plagued by splits, the AFPFL was in power for almost fifteen years until the military took over in 1962.3

The Japanese occupation ceased once the Japanese army left but, as I argue here, the consequences continue. The Japanese occupation of Burma, though perhaps not always explicitly seen as such, precipitated a structured political unity in opposition, initially to fascism (eventhough some Burmese earlier welcomed the Japanese as liberators from British colonialists). Having had the benefit of military, administrative and organizational experience in government, subsequent opposition against the Japanese also provided the necessary political structure to oppose the British once they returned, as is clear from the history of the AFPFL at the time (indeed, Aung San judged Japanese and British forms of colonialism as both ‘fascist’).

The consequences of the Japanese occupation for Burma even survived Ne Win’s 1962 coup and the disintegration of the AFPFL. Here I contend that the Japanese military involvement with Burma lives forth politically and academically in the form of an artificially constructed legacy surrounding Aung San dating back to the preparations for the Japanese occupation.

Dr Maung Maung (1949, 1962a, 1962b, 1969c, 1969d) documented Aung San’s life and communications in detail. He had privileged access to sources at the Defence Services Historical Research Institute, founded in 1955 to house correspondence and papers related to the army that Aung San had founded. Himself a biographer of Aung San, Dr Maung Maung (1969a, 1969b) volunteered as a soldier in the Burma Independence Army at the end of 1942. He became Ne Win’s official biographer and eventually briefly formal successor as President of Burma. Dr Maung Maung was ‘selected’ to become BSPP Chair by the Central Committee of BSPP on 19 August 1988 and as President by the Pyithu Hluttaw on 20 August 1988.

Silverstein (1973:3) noted that ‘although Burma and its modern history have commanded the attention of both Burmese and foreign scholars’ he found that ‘only one, Dr Maung Maung, has attempted to discover, interpret, and relate the ideas of Aung San to the march of events in his nation during the initial two critical years following the end of the Second World War’. A prolific writer, in his numerous publications Dr Maung Maung portrayed Aung San as a martyr for the county, but he portrayed Ne Win as Aung San’s inheritor. Below I show how Dr Maung Maung conjured up an impression of Aung San as a decisive authoritarian figure of a particular kind. Dr Maung Maung shored up his image of Aung San ostensibly on the Blue Print, a communication dating from before the Japanese occupation of Burma that he attributed to Aung San. Aung San’s authorship is very much in doubt. Also, unlike other plans by the Japanese military and by Burmese nationalists, this document did not play an historical role of any particular importance. Nevertheless, this did not prevent Dr Maung Maung from using it to help legitimate one-party rule after 1962. Many scholars have accepted Dr Maung Maung’s attribution of this document to Aung San without

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1 AFPFL split in June 1958 and Ne Win’s ‘care taker’ government ruled the country from 27 October 1958 to 4 April 1960. The elections held on 6 February 1960 and 29 February 1960 were won by U Nu’s ‘Union Party’ and at least formally was no longer be the ‘original’ AFPFL which took over in times of Burma’s independence in January 1948.
question, and have come to rely on Dr Maung Maung as a useful source. This legacy therefore needs explicit deconstructing.

To raise questions about this document is also to raise questions about a document implicated in the legitimisation of Burma’s military political history. The Burmese army was born in Japan, and justification of army rule hitherto has necessarily involved rooting out what Aung San’s ideals were purported to have been at the time of its birth. The Blue Print is one of very few such documents. It is ironic, however, that this document refers less to the spirit of Aung San’s ideas, than to writings dictated by ‘foreign’ Japanese soldiers with strategic military interests in Burma at the time. The error of locating Burman national ideology in a fascist document goes some way to explain the state that Burma is in today. Furthermore, since Aung San Suu Kyi has repeatedly expressed her politics as having continuity with Aung San’s as a struggle for freedom conjoint with national independence, this question is of more than passing interest even today.

**Aung San’s lan-zin and the Blue Print**

Characterised in Burma as the ‘father of the union of Burma’ and as the ‘great architect of national independence’ Aung San continues to be immensely popular. His communications continue to have political influence in Burma, even today. Seeking to appropriate his reputation, the military junta and aspiring politicians have routinely targeted Aung San’s communications.

In his introduction to a volume of biographical sketches of Aung San, Dr Maung Maung (1962a:viii) asserts that Aung San had his own distinct ‘way’ or ‘roadmap’ (*lan-zin*) that was to remain relevant to the nation long after his death:

> The name Aung San does not merely bring back tender memories in Burma, it awakens the political conscience as well. People remember what he stood for: honesty and hard work, unity and discipline, and such homely virtues they talk of these as the ‘Aung San way’ or his *lanzin* [path], the way they must, or should try to go. Politicians always claim that they are the faithful followers of the *lanzin*.  

Dr Maung Maung here interprets Aung San’s *lanzin* as essential political capital abused by the early inheritors of Burma’s national independence:

Early in 1958, when the party which Aung San led as a united front broke into two factions, both proclaimed themselves to be such followers and promptly marched off in opposite directions. The Aung San Park in Rangoon is where the children come to play, and the politicians to pledge. Aung San’s pictures on the ballot boxes doubtless won the then-undivided party many seats in the parliamentary elections of 1951-52, and 1956, and it was only in 1958, when the two contending factions could not agree on which of them should enjoy the exclusive use of the vote-winning picture that an election rule was added disallowing candidates and parties the use of it.

Dr Maung Maung presents Ne Win’s Caretaker Government in 1958 as having brought order to what was by then a divided AFPFL, in which two factions bickered over Aung San’s legacy. He also describes how Ne Win put an end to anyone claiming Aung San’s legacy, namely by forbidding use of Aung San’s portrait in political campaigns. The Ne
Win regime thereby constrained use of Aung San’s image by anyone but itself. This attempt to monopolize the Aung San image fell apart in 1989, once Aung San Suu Kyi claimed his heritage as his daughter, leaving his heritage as a dangerous legacy outside of military control.\(^4\)

One reason why Ne Win did not permit any political factions to claim Aung San was that he had decided to claim Aung San for himself. In fact, by the time of the 1962 coup, Ne Win had himself completely appropriated Aung San’s legacy (lanzin) for the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), also known as the Myanma Soshelit Lanzin Pati, or more simply, Lanzin Party, when ‘the Socialist way’ (Soshelit Lanzin) was proclaimed as that of Aung San’s.\(^5\)

In his two biographies of Ne Win, published seven years after he published his research on Aung San, Dr Maung Maung (1969a:294-300, 1969b:427-431) marries the lanzin of the Burma Socialist Programme Party under Ne Win to his construction of the lanzin of Aung San. Despite Aung San’s clear-stated post-war preferences for democracy as necessarily preceding socialism,\(^6\) Dr Maung Maung condemns democracy as unworkable and selectively dated Aung San’s vision of politics back to the Blue Print, a document that supported Dr Maung Maung’s ideal of one-party rule.

Why did Dr Maung Maung feel the need to validate BSPP ideology in terms of a document composed just as Burma was about to come under the sphere of influence of Japan? Dr Maung Maung (1925-1994), was one of the earliest academics to research Aung San’s life, and, apart from authoring an early biography, he also edited Aung San’s earliest academic portraits and bibliographies. However, Dr Maung Maung was by no means a ‘mere’ academic alone. Despite his considerable academic qualifications (with a doctoral degree from Utrecht and academic research at, and a further doctorate from Yale University), Dr Maung Maung was first Assistant Attorney-General in the Ne Win caretaker government between 1958 and 1960. After the 1962 military coup, Ne Win appointed him first as a Judge of the Chief Court on 11 July 1962 and in early June 1965 as Chief Judge (later they changed its nomenclature to ‘Chief Justice’). From 1971, he also became a member of the central committee of the Burma Socialist Programme Party. He was one of the main drafters of the 1974 constitution and designed important changes to the judicial system. Apart from having been Ne Win’s sanctioned biographer, he briefly acted as Ne Win’s successor as President of Burma during the turbulent end of the BSPP period between August and September 1988.

Dr Maung Maung developed a strong personal political loyalty to Gen Ne Win, in terms of which he interpreted Aung San’s legacy. Virtually all academics concerned with Burma, and these includes contemporaries and even relatives of Aung San, cites and

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\(^4\) Aung Pe was arrested on 14 February 2005 and sentenced to three years in prison by Twante Township court for saluting the portrait of Burma’s national hero and father of NLD leader Aung Suu Kyi, Gen Aung San, and singing a song honouring him, with his pupils. ‘Burmese tuition teacher gets three years for saluting national hero.’ Democratic Voice of Burma News, 26.08.05; ‘Burmese private tuition teacher Aung Pe’s appeal rejected’. Democratic Voice of Burma News, 26.10.05.

\(^5\) On the use Ne Win made of Aung San see 8-104

\(^6\) Aung San’s address at the AFPFL Convention, Jubilee Hall, Rangoon, 23.05.1947 in Silverstein (1993:154) and Aung San (1971:295).
rely upon Dr Maung Maung’s writings and edited materials as accurate. However, Dr Maung Maung’s writings have come under criticism on several counts. Silverstein (1972:2), in the introduction to his 1992 revised edited collection of Aung San’s speeches, sounded a warning of Dr Maung Maung’s tendency to ‘edit’ and ‘rewrite’ Aung San’s speeches:

Although Dr Maung Maung had access to all the papers and documents at the BDSHRI [DSHRI] and to many in the possession of individuals who had known Aung San, he chose to include very few in his collection. Those he selected, he either edited or rewrote extensively. While the Dr Maung Maung collection offers some insight into Aung San’s character and ideas, it must be treated as an interpretation and tribute rather than as a scholarly and authoritative study of the man.

Aung San’s legacy lives forth among the Burmese populace, who have little need for constructing artificial images. However, Aung San’s legacy needed interpreting for non-Burmese and in particular for the academic community. In addition, the post-1962 regimes sought to legitimate their vision of the country in terms of Aung San. Dr Maung Maung has been involved in both of these. Major sources on Aung San’s life have relied on Dr Maung Maung’s portrayal, and so Dr Maung Maung’s portrayal of Aung San demands further scrutiny.

Blue Print for Burma

The military, in power since 1962, use the Blue Print document to justify one-party rule. This means that it is not without considerably significance politically whether Aung San composed this document or not, and under what circumstances. Any doubts about this document would render doubtful more than half a century of political ideology as promulgated by the military.

Omar Farook in *Asiaweek* (31.07.98) hints at the doubtful status of the Blueprint with some insight, when he wrote:

‘Whether the father of Burma’s Independence believed in the blueprint is open to question. But 20 years later, the document became state policy. In 1962, radical leftists and Aung San’s army comrades justified seizing power from U Nu “as being in line with the original desire of the nationalist leader.” Indeed, the Burma Socialist Program Party, which tyrannized the nation from 1962 to 1988, claimed the blueprint to be in accord “with the tone and temper of the Burmese Way to Socialism.”’

More important, in the introduction to the 1993 edition of his book on Aung San, Silverstein (1972:18) confesses that it was Dr Maung Maung’s stress on this document as a reflection of Aung San’s ideas that swayed him to include the Blue Print (in both the 1972 and the 1993 edition):

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7 Myint Zan. Misremembrance of an uprising. Review article. *The Newcastle Law Review*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2000: ‘His story, not History’. *Irrawaddy*, 1 August 2000. Tucker (2001:151) cites an anonymous source to the effect that the transcripts of the trials of the murder of Aung San ‘was last checked out to Dr Maung Maung and never returned’ and that perhaps Maung Maung was complicit in a cover-up concerning the true assassin of Aung San.
The document [The political legacy of Aung San] generally follows a chronological order, beginning with the only doubtful item – ‘Blue Print for Burma.’ As indicated in the headnote of the document, it is said to be a copy of a copy of an essay Aung San wrote while in Japan just prior to the war. It is included in this collection only because Dr Maung Maung laid such heavy stress upon it as a reflection of Aung San's ideas. When it is read in conjunction with other documents its importance fades and it can be seen in the correct perspective.

Though including it because of Dr Maung Maung’s stress on it as a reflection of Aung San’s ideas, Silverstein thus paradoxically alerts us that the Blue Print document is a ‘doubtful item’ that is in some ways out of character for Aung San. This deserves further investigation. Silverstein (1972:8) furthermore observes that Dr Maung Maung ‘selected a single item from Aung San’s legacy [the Blue Print] and seized upon it as though it alone were the true mirror of the man’s ideas’. Nevertheless, Silverstein ends his introduction by saying that ‘there are excerpts, whole speeches, and documents attributed to Aung San in other writings which are not included here because the editor was unable to verify their authenticity’ (ibid: 18). This suggests that, after all, despite his suspicions, the Blue Print was not so ‘doubtful’ as to require elimination as the result of his own scrutiny, for it was included in both editions.

With these reservations buried and seemingly forgotten, the mere fact of its inclusion among Aung San’s speeches, however, has led most academic analysts to make the unwarranted assumption that Aung San definitely composed this document on the future of Burma in his own words. Apart from Dr Maung Maung, for example, see also Ba Maw (1968:126-29), Nyunt Han (1970:71,95), Maung Maung Gyi (1983:161-162), Aung Thwin (1998:156-58), Callahan (1998:53) and Steinberg (2001:315). Seasoned observers such as Yawnghwe (1997:n170,n171) take Dr Maung Maung’s word for it, and attributed the Blue Print to Aung San. Even Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:20), in the biography she wrote of her father back in 1982, refers to the Blue Print as a document ‘he [Aung San] had drawn up for Suzuki in 1940’. 8

Largely because they all rely chiefly on Dr Maung Maung and on Silverstein (whom, as we have seen, in turn justified its inclusion by means of Dr Maung Maung’s emphasis on this document as a reflection of Aung San’s ideas), the Blue Print is normally included within the bibliographical entry under Aung San. In the case of Aung San Suu Kyi, this is not without irony, as six years after she originally composed this, she formed the National League for Democracy in the face of Dr Maung Maung’s disapproval during his own brief presidency. Dr Maung Maung recounted this episode in his memoirs (e.g. Maung Maung 1999:209-210). Her argument, and indeed her popularity, had much to do with her father’s legacy that Ne Win and Dr Maung Maung had helped shape or, as the case may be, distort. Her popularity put an end to the claim the regime made of representing Aung San’s lanzin. This marked the moment the regime dropped Aung San’s image from the bank notes in favour of harps and lion statues (guarding pagodas). Material culture has replaced biography as the unifying factor: Myanmar(r) Culture in the singular (Myanmá yingyeihmú) has now replaced Aung San as the unifying symbol for the country.

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8 Note that in Aung San Suu Kyi's essay on her father, a total of 13 out of 21 citations come from perspectives associated directly with Dr Maung Maung (7 citations from Maung Maung, 6 from Silverstein).
As widely disseminated, the Blue Print advocates what, from the post-War standpoint looks like particularly unfashionable and unpopular authoritarian measures. It was an early draft for Burma’s fate under Japanese occupation (indeed, it bills itself as ‘a draft constitution’). It denigrates parliamentary government that ‘fosters the spirit of individualism and thus gives chance to individualistic disruptors and obstructionists to disturb or delay the course of administration’. It advocates a ‘strong state administration as exemplified in Germany and Italy [in the 1930s]’, the pursuit of a ‘eugenic policy’, setting up of ‘racial units’, and dividing our people into ‘backward’ and ‘administered’ sections, where ‘all the backward people must be raised to one level’. It argues that ‘there shall be only one nation, one party, one leader’, and ‘no parliamentary opposition, no nonsense of individualism. Everyone must submit to the State which is supreme over the individual’.

Burma’s economy was to rely on Japan based on ‘exchange of mutual goods such as Japanese manufactured goods for our raw materials and rice’, and ‘Japanese investment in Burma, preferential treatment for Japanese goods, joining the yen block will be part of our new economic life’. Furthermore, ‘all questions of the state … in fact, all such questions revolve around the central necessity for national defence’. It is dependent on Japan, for ‘we shall have to build a powerful Army, Navy and Air Forces, and here the help of Japan is imperative’. Here, ‘in administrative as well as judicial and financial matters, the rule of authority more than the rule of law should prevail’.

On several occasions Silverstein has emphasised the need to remember that the document is uncharacteristic when looked at in the context of Aung San’s other writings. If we look carefully, we do detect a small glimpse of what might well conform to some of Aung San’s ideas, such as his dislike of the monarchy. However, overall, the document bears the imprint of his Japanese officer handlers and their military objectives. Aung San was a nationalist at heart. Nowhere else in his writings did he describe Burma as a vassal state to Japan. The document does not mention socialism at all, which was surely a major influence on Aung San’s political ideas and the entire phrasing of this document, along with its history, has the Japanese military imprinted on it. Yet Silverstein stops short of asking material questions about this document in any detail.

Silverstein (1972:19) included at the top of the Blue Print reprint in his volume, in both the 1972 and 1993 editions, one of the two editorial notes that accompanied its original publication in the Guardian of March 1957.9 namely the signed note by R. Sawante. This note was actually published at the end of the text (with a different unsigned editorial note on top, which I will deal with separately later):

According to Mr Mitsuri [Mitsuru] Sugii’s10 explanations, who gave us this copy, General

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9 A typo on p 19 in the 1993 edition resulted in the date of publication of the Blue Print accidentally coming out as March 1947. Since the Guardian newspaper was not founded until 1953, the Blue Print could not have originally been published in the Guardian, March 1947. Silverstein assures me that the 1972 edition included the correct date of publication. Personal correspondence, Josef Silverstein, 3.3.2006, 20.7.2006.

10 Mitsuru [not Mitsuri] Sugii worked at the Defense Services Historical Research Institute (DSHRI) in Rangoon in 1950s with another ex-Minami Kikan member Hachiro Takahashi. They worked on the translation of the Japanese documents into Burmese at DSHRI. This means that he was able to comment on the Blue Print of Burma to the Army and government authorities. Both Sugii and Takahashi are dead, but they were respected by Ne Win and other officers of ex-BNA. They were among few Japanese military advisers who contributed to the building of the BNA and understood the Burmese nationalists’ aspirations towards full independence. Nemoto (personal correspondence, 10.11.2005).
Aung San was accustomed to discuss about the future of Burma with Col. Suzuki, Mr Sugii, M Tekeshi Higuchi and others day after day sometime around January, February 1941. One day they came to a conclusion that it might be better to put these in order, and General Aung San started scribbling on pieces of straw papers. This is the real copy of it then.

Mr Sugii made a copy from the original, which was the manuscript written by Aung San himself and this was abandoned in the same way of other drafts.

Mr Sugii made a fair copy again from his own copy in his note-book. Lately, this note-book was found along with the personal belongings of the late Mr Takeshi Higuchi which had been kept in the hands of Mr Monoru [Minoru] Takamiya who is the nephew of Mr Higuchi. This copy is a true copy of Mr Sugii’s without any amendment or supplement.

Consequently at present when there is no way to have the autograph by Aung San himself nor the first copy by Mr Sugii we believe this copy is the almost perfect copy which can tell us the real idea of the late General Aung San for the reconstruction plan of Burma in those days.

To date, there has been no further authentication of this document.

The inconsistencies and doubtful assertions in Sawante’s editorial note alone might have motivated Silverstein not to include it in the volume, especially in the context of his own doubts about Dr Maung Maung’s motivations as expressed in his introduction to the second edition as cited above.

Though the Blue Print is proclaimed as ‘the almost perfect copy [i.e. of the version around February 1941] which can tell us the real idea of the late General Aung San for the reconstruction plan of Burma in those days’ and as ‘the real copy of it then’, there are some obvious discrepancies that need explaining.

Sawante asserts that ‘We believe this copy is the almost perfect copy which can tell us the real idea of the late General Aung San for the reconstruction plan of Burma in those days’. But, of course, to ‘believe’ is by no means verifiable certainty based on sufficient evidence. Furthermore, ‘almost perfect’ is a matter of judgment of prevailing practices (e.g. as in contrasting legal or academic versus journalistic practices).

It is stated that neither Aung San’s original manuscript nor Sugii’s immediate copy of it are available any longer. In addition, that the notebook in which this copy was found was neither in possession of the presupposed original author (Aung San) or apparently the person who first made a copy of Aung San’s writing (Mitsuru Sugii). So what happened to the original and its immediate copy? Without these, how can anyone possibly verify or assure themselves that what was published is indeed an exact copy? Sawante proclaimed that what the Guardian published is the ‘real’ copy. Then why did Sugii abandon Aung San’s original manuscript ‘in the same way of other drafts’? Why draft something if intended as a copy? The processes of drafting (‘prepare, make
preliminary version of e.g. document’) and copying (‘transcribe’, ‘imitate’, a copy is a ‘thing made to look like another’) are surely distinct.

The claims are inconsistent. Sugii does not seem to acknowledge the difference between a copy and a draft. How can Sugii, after abandoning drafts he himself made of Aung San’s original, end up handing over, as is claimed, a ‘truthful’ copy of Aung San’s original? Can we be certain, furthermore, that the published version is indeed ‘a true copy of Mr Sugii’s without, as stated, any amendment or supplement’? We are surely entitled to doubt that the Blue Print, as published, should closely resemble Aung San’s version, had he written it. Furthermore, why did Mr Sugii need to have ‘made a fair copy again from his own copy in his note-book’? Why work so hard to ‘normalize’ and explain the absence of an original manuscript in Aung San’s handwriting and bearing Aung San’s signature?

Since Aung San appears not to have been part of the decision making process to record this plan, this suggests the document more likely serves ends of these Japanese officers than Aung San’s own aspirations for his country. Yes, the note states that Aung San, without prompting, ‘started scribbling on pieces of straw paper’. However, did Aung San write down at this point his own plans or, as I shall argue in a moment, perhaps the ideas of these Japanese officers?

Also, Sugii gave a copy to ‘us’? Who is ‘us’ – R. Sawante plus who else? Aung San is said to have written at the behest of Suzuki, Sugii and Higuchi ‘and others’ - who else? If written down at the behest of his Japanese officers, then might this not be better described as a plan of his Japanese superiors in the first place?

Sawante’s note points at Mitsuru Sugii as the source of the claim that the Blue Print was Aung San’s. I have been unable to consult Mitsuru Sugii’s (1944, 1956) History of Minami Kikan, originally published in Japanese in 1944, and translated for publication by Takahashi Hachiro, Ne Win’s former aid, in 1956, the year before the Blue Print was published in the Guardian. So I have been unable to confirm the truth of this matter. Nevertheless, it must be noted that those scholars with the closest readings of Japanese sources, such as Izumiya (1991), Yoon (1971a,1971b), Guyot (1974), as well as those who heavily rely on these, such as Naw (2001), make no reference to the Blue Print document whatsoever. Since it was allegedly composed in Japan, were it indeed as important a document as Dr Maung Maung seems to think, these scholars were surely in the best position to judge its relevance and would have mentioned it.

Furthermore, except for the history of the army and Ne Win’s biography, as described below, to my knowledge no Burmese sources republished the Blue Print with its full historical context. This document therefore lives forth in a rarefied atmosphere, serving the regime’s historians and journalists justify the unjustifiable through propaganda.

The Blueprint ‘composed’, ‘drafted’ or ‘dictated’

Nemoto has looked at recollections by Suzuki for the period under consideration, and found no claim that Aung San himself composed the Blue Print, only that he wrote a plan down. In a manuscript, ‘Interview with Keiji Suzuki (ex-Colonel Suzuki)’ (d.d. 7,8,9 February 1957), Ex-Major General Rikichiro Sawamoto, one of the major
Japanese military figures during the Japanese occupation period as member of the advising group to the BNA, conducted in 1957 a private interview with Suzuki. They had graduated in the same year as army cadets.

Sawamoto describes Suzuki's explanation about Aung San's blueprint as follows;

After Aung San and Thakin Hla Myaing's arrival in Tokyo, it became difficult to hide them (they had violated immigration rules), so we had to move them along. They moved altogether five times, and finally shifted to Mr. Tanaka’s residence in Koenji (Tokyo). Here, Aung San and Hla Myaing practised Kendo, and studied military manoeuvres under our (Suzuki and Sugii's) instructions. Aung San, Hla Myaing, Suzuki and Sugii discussed the matter of independence of Burma. As a result, Aung San wrote the Blue Print of the Rebuilding of Independent Burma. It was on this occasion that Aung San wrote a basic plan for Burma’s independence. (summary translation by Nemoto)

This is all Suzuki appears to have mentioned about this document. Aung San thus was claimed to have written down the so-called blue print based on discussion with Japanese officers (Suzuki and Sugii) in Tokyo in the beginning of 1941 before the establishment of Minami Kikan (Minami Agency).

However, writing a plan is not the same as composing one, and composing one for Japanese officers is not the same as composing one for one’s trusted compatriots. Aung San’s own account of his first visit to Tokyo immediately before the Japanese occupation can be found in ‘The resistance movement’ (29.8.45) as taken from ‘Burma’s Challenge’ (AS 1946; AS 1971.2:11-12; S 1973:85):

Col. Suzuki first told me a plan and he asked me to write it in English. I innocently wrote it down thinking that I would have to discuss it later. But that plan was never discussed. That plan mentioned something about a limited invasion of Burma in the Shan States. I somehow tried to say something about it to his assistant, that it was purely a military plan. Judging from later events, I think Col. Suzuki took that plan to the Tokyo General Staff and perhaps showed it as my plan. This plan, however, was revised without the invasion part and given finally to me in a more complete form to be communicated to my comrades in Burma. I brought it back to Burma secretly, met my comrades and explained it to them. [my italics]

In his own words, therefore, Aung San interpreted any plans he was involved in prior to the Japanese invasion as ‘military’ (not ‘political’ as Dr Maung Maung claimed) and unambiguously Suzuki’s, whom Aung San understood to have ended up parading it with his superiors as if it was that of Aung San’s. Aung San, furthermore, recounts in his own words how Suzuki ‘gave’ him a ‘revised’ version of Suzuki’s very own plan to give to his comrades back in Burma. Aung San himself had no input into this plan. This is why I classify the Blue Print in the bibliography under Suzuki, not Aung San.

Yet Dr Maung Maung (1962a:35) was economical with the truth, for he had, in his collected biographical sketches Aung San say this very same episode very differently:

Colonel Suzuki asked me to write a plan for Burma in English, and unsuspecting, I wrote one, expecting to discuss and elaborate it later. I mentioned in the plan a limited manoeuvre

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11 See also Kyaw Yin (1969b,1:188-189) for the Burmese version.
into the fringes of Burma. That was only the military part of the plan, but Suzuki took the plan to the general staff and showed it to be my completed plan. He later revised it, without the military part, and gave it to me for communication to my friends in Burma. I took it back to Burma, going under disguise, and showing it to my friends. [my emphasis in italics]

Unless Dr Maung Maung had something to hide, it is difficult to understand how he could have presented Aung San’s own words at such variance with what Aung San himself had written about this episode. In Burma Challenge Aung San says that, since the plan was dictated (‘Col. Suzuki first told me a plan and he asked me to write it in English’), the document was not actually his (Suzuki showed it ‘as my plan’). Furthermore, Aung San claimed he himself had no opportunity to write his ideas into the document before it was returned to him to pass on to his colleagues in Burma and so, even had he composed it, Suzuki’s rewrite itself should have denuded any remaining vestige of Aung San’s apparent authorship of the ‘Blue Print’.

Dr Maung Maung shamelessly reworded Aung San’s words and meanings to convey the impression that Aung San actually did compose and write this down himself originally, and that he had shown it as his own plan (‘asked me to write a plan’, ‘showed it as my completed plan’). Nevertheless, Dr Maung Maung himself actually demonstrated the fallacy of this, since he retained any plans being at the behest of, and subsequently revised by Col Suzuki (‘He [Suzuki] later revised it’). This did not stop him, however, from claiming this document as Aung San’s. If Dr Maung Maung admitted that Suzuki had in any case revised Aung San’s wording, why did he go so far as to alter Aung San’s own words in relation to these plans in his redrafting? Is it that he sought to legitimate the Blue Print as Aung San’s for some particular reason? Was there a shortage of useful historical documents by Aung San that might secure the path the army was about to embark upon?

Evidently, there are serious discrepancies in the explanations of how Aung San himself described these plans as regards the Japanese occupation and – in later years – Dr Maung Maung recounted Aung San’s biography. Dr Maung Maung has persistently held onto his claim that the plans for the Japanese invasion were Aung San’s. This goes back to as early as Burma’s constitution, first published in 1959 (a revised edition was published in 1961), where he says that younger leaders had no interest in democracy, and where he attributes to Aung San a real desire for one party rule as in the Blue Print:

In Japan with the ‘30 comrades’ Aung San had been asked by the Japanese to prepare a plan for Burma’s future and he had written: ‘What we want is a strong state administration as exemplified in Germany and Italy. There shall be only one nation, one state, one party, one leader. There shall be no parliamentary opposition, no nonsense of individualism’ (Maung Maung 1959: 91-92).12

Germany and Italy were partners of Japan, not Burmese freedom fighters. Further, in his biography of Aung San:

[Aung San] was asked to write a blueprint for free Burma, and that he did, writing

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12 Dr Maung Maung proceeds to argue that it was the war that changed Burmese views towards democracy.
forcefully, pouring out his heart, gathering together the dreams he had always dreamt. His plan for Burma’s government was an enlightened but absolute rule by one or a few for the good of the many; he had not much hopes for democracy. But he meant well, and the Japanese grew to believe in him and respect his patriotism and his truth. (Maung Maung 1969d:31).

This assertion that Aung San ‘had been asked by the Japanese to prepare’ and thus had ‘written’ down his own plan for Burma’s future is, as we have just seen, incorrect. First, Aung San himself does not refer to having composed any such plans. He only refers to plans given him by the Japanese. Second, he never referred specifically to the Blue Print in any of his writings, so to assert that Aung San had particular feelings about this document were entirely imaginary on the part of Dr Maung Maung unless he had the opportunity to speak to Aung San personally on this matter, which he has never claimed.

Third, peculiarly, Dr Maung Maung does not refer to any other plans, whether by Aung San’s colleagues, by Minami Kikan, or by the Southern Command. These actually did exist, as all of these developed plans of much greater historical significance than the Blue Print.

In collapsing all plans into Blue Print, and attributing this to Aung San, is Dr Maung Maung not severely oversimplifying the history of this period? His placing of the weight of war effort planning and national liberation on the sole shoulders of Aung San is without basis. Is Dr Maung Maung falsifying or merely oversimplifying history, or both?

The date of publication

Quite apart from these inexplicable discrepancies between Dr Maung Maung’s and Aung San’s own version of events, another important question concerns the date of its first publication. The Blue Print contained, from the Japanese point of view, classified information about the conduct of war. The Japanese would not have published the Blue Print until after they had gained control over Burma in March 1942, that is, if there were any reason to do so. The declaration of National Independence on 1 August 1943 would have been the perfect moment to publish it, both for the Japanese, and for Aung San, had he actually claimed it as his. The Japanese declared Burma an independent State and co-equal member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a status the Blue Print aspires to.

Given its supposed importance, surprisingly, however, this document remained unpublished until 1957, nearly one-and-a-half decade after this event, a decade after Aung San’s assassination, and long after the Japanese had left. By this time, this document had become meaningless or at least irrelevant as far as the Japanese role in the development of the Burmese state was concerned.

Aung San was no longer alive to deny it. The *Guardian* (itself founded only in 1953) first published the Blue Print in March 1957, the year before Gen. Ne Win’s Care Taker government took power. It follows increased activity by the Psywar (Psychological Warfare) Directorate, originally founded in 1952. This extended to influencing the mass media to ‘provide balances’ in a press generally critical of government. Projects
included sponsorship of radio shows and founding the Myawaddi magazine to counter Shumawa. During this period, the army was in search of a political ideology that would justify their values to the country and help combat insurgency, and in 1956 composed the earliest drafts that became the core for the later BSPP ideology, though at this time chiefly targeted within the army and not yet released for mass consumption.

The Blue Print document would appear to have come up as part of a trawl for useful materials as input for such an ideology. There were too few documents related to Aung San’s founding of the army in Japan for the period at the end of 1940 and the first months of 1941. To my knowledge, there were only two documents in the whole of 1941, both of which were at the end of the year rather than the beginning. Therefore, the Blue Print provides more of a wished-for document with a content that appealed to military in the early stages of preparing to seize control.

This period had broader political dimensions of its own. In the course of the 1950s, the army gained a lot of self-confidence politically, and began to challenge parliamentary control. Callahan shows how by 1955 the army began to operate with some autonomy, which led to increasing tension with civilians. Comparatively underfunded and feeling neglected by parliament in the early 1950s, the army was allowed to increasingly carry on business through the Defense Services Institute (DSI) founded in 1951 under Col. Aung Gyi, gradually making them financially less dependent on politicians and tax payers. In search of a new army ideology of sorts, the Defence Services Historical Research Institute (DSHRI) emerged in 1955 to house correspondence and papers related to the army. In 1955 also, Col. Aung Gyi threatened that the army would intervene if the AFPFL could not run the country, and the agendas of conferences by commanding officers began to take in matters of national policy. Politicians, in turn, responded in kind, expressing their worries about increasing political interference by the army in Parliamentary affairs. A number of splits had severely weakened the AFPFL, which was much less strong politically after the 1956 elections. U Nu resigned his premiership in June 1956 to reform the AFPFL party, and did not return as premier until 1 March 1957, the month in which the Guardian published the Blue Print.

In my view, the date of first publication is as significant as the historical moment in which the Blue Print was purported to have been composed. It was part of a search for documenting and enhancing the role of the army and generally to help improve its public profile. This historical context of publication becomes material when addressing the second unsigned editorial note that Silverstein did not include. In its earliest published form of March 1957, Sawante’s editorial note comes at the very end, not at the beginning of the Blue Print (the way it was republished in Silverstein’s volume see above). The following unsigned editorial note that Silverstein never included or mentioned is included on top:

This is a draft of Aung San’s plans for an independent Burma, plans which he formulated as a young man of 27, in Tokyo, on the eve of Japan’s entry into the War. Today when we pay so much lip service to democracy and everyone is a loudly professed and proclaimed democrat, including the insurgents, Aung San’s strong views about having “no nonsense of

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individualism and no parliamentary opposition’ will perhaps sound ugly to our democratic ears. But Aung San was honest and burningly sincere; his draft of a blueprint for free Burma shows that even if not anything else. And it is also interesting to notice that a much more restrained intellectual writing earlier than Aung San expressed similar suspicions of “democracy” in its to absolute, too crude form, saying “Democracy is lovelier at a distances Seen at close quarters it is nothing to sing hymns about”. (U Thant’s “Thoughts on Democracy”, Guardian, September 1956). However, this is no indictment of democracy, nor a defence of Aung San; this is only to point out that Aung San in drafting the blueprint, was guided more by love of his country than by love of theories and forms.

This blueprint was, as the appended note explains, discovered among the personal belongings highly treasured, of the late Mr Higuchi, one of the closest colleagues of Aung San in building the Burma Independence Army, and its idea, in Japan. Mr Mitsuri [Mitsuru] Sugii, another close associate who came with Aung San to Burma in 1941 to smuggle back to Japan some of the “30 comrades”, is now head of the Kyodo News Agency in Rangoon, and with his help and the help of Col. Suzuki (Bo Moegyoe) now a businessman in Japan, and other BIA founders, the history of the BIA is being reconstructed by the Defence Forces [Services] Historical [Research] Institute from which this draft has been obtained.

First, this unsigned editorial note ends up with the admission that ‘the history of the BIA is being constructed by the Defence Forces [Services] Historical [Research] Institute [DSHRI] from which this [Blue Print] draft has been obtained’. This would suggest that the appended editorial note by Sawante was itself not actually derived from direct first-hand dealings by a reputable journalist with the person originally found in possession of the manuscript (an impression one might gain by reading the version published in Silverstein). Sawante’s was a note republished as passed on from the [DSHRI] along with the manuscript.

This, of course, changes the entire nature of this document, for the Guardian had not obtained the Blue Print directly from Mitsuru Sugii himself, or via his friends or relatives, but from third parties found in the possession of a document by the intermediary of the Defence Forces Historical Institute.

Second, who might have originally written this unsigned editorial note? As already noted, Dr Maung Maung was one of the co-founders of the Guardian that first published the Blue Print. In his publications, he has repeatedly asserted the Blue Print as the true expression of Aung San’s political vision for the country.

Furthermore, given his publication record on Aung San, if he had not written this note himself, he would likely have reviewed it for accuracy. Given Dr Maung Maung’s persistent citation of and support for the circulation of this document so far, I looked for possible circumstantial evidence of Dr Maung Maung’s personal involvement in its first publication. Are there any aspects of this editorial note that might lead back to Dr Maung Maung?

In his memoirs Dr Maung Maung (1999:210) similarly introduces the Blue Print by first referring to U Thant’s critique of democracy immediately, though he cites U Thant from a very different source (The World of Books rather than a piece written by U Thant in The Guardian itself), namely as follows:

U Thant, who served as secretary general of the United Nations for ten years, naturally
professed to be a democrat. But as a young man in 1936 he wrote in the *World of Books*, “Democracy is lovelier at a distance. Seen at close quarters, it is nothing to sing hymns about.”

Interestingly, in his memoirs, Dr Maung Maung seems to have reconstructed the tone of the earlier unsigned editorial note from the *Guardian*, for he again refers to U Thant (he cited Silverstein’s version of the Blue Print that did not include the U Thant episode). Dr Maung Maung’s fingerprints are all over the document. Josef Silverstein only included the Blue Print as one of Aung San’s communications because of Dr Maung Maung’s ‘heavy stress upon it as a reflection of Aung San’s ideas’. Josef Silverstein knew Maung Maung well, both when he first came to Burma in 1955-56 and again when he was lecturing at Mandalay Univ. in 1961-62.

I submit that Dr Maung Maung’s role in goes beyond the following: influencing Silverstein to include the Blue Print as Aung San’s, purposely rewording Aung San in relation to the relevant episode in Aung San’s life, and in giving circulation to the BSPP *lanzin* as Aung San’s. There is circumstantial evidence now to indicate that Dr Maung Maung was himself additionally involved in composing the unsigned editorial note that prefaced first publication of the Blue Print. Furthermore, I submit that if he saw fit to release his editorial skills on the manuscript itself in the same manner as he has on Aung San’s original communications, this would be a further reason to distrust the Blue Print as published in the *Guardian* and elsewhere.

**The ‘English’ and the ‘Burmese’ Blue Print**

The Guardian sourced the English version of the Blue Print not from a journalist, but from the DSHRI, which was not impartial to a political interpretation of history. Dr Maung Maung had access to this Institute, and Dr Maung Maung’s close involvement in its editing and publication, both in the *Guardian* and subsequently in Silverstein, suggests that its first publication took place to justify new political ends prevailing in 1956-57, not to help understand the true historical conditions as they prevailed in 1941.

If the claim that this document was independently verified as authentic can no longer be sustained, this raises a question of how the military position and present this document within its own history. The army published a modified Burmese version in the multi-volume official history of the Burma army in 1998 (*Sitthamaing Pyádaik hnin Tatmadaw Mawgún Taikhmüyön* 1998:102-5). Its original language of composition is not indicated (though it must have been English, since Suzuki and his colleagues knew insufficient Burmese), nor is the name of a translator given. Entitled ‘A substantial draft of the Reconstruction of the Independent Burma’ (*Lutlakhaw Myanmapyei pyan le htuhtaungyei simangein*), this document is presented, as in the *Guardian*, as having been copied down by Mr Sugii from a document handwritten by Aung San.

The claim is made that Aung San originally wrote this text down (in one session *tit yat?*) after discussion with Suzuki at Mr Tanaka’s house. Aung San is purported to have ‘explained’ (*Thahkin Aung San í hpo pyá htà lei thi*) verbatim all that is in this

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15 Josef Silverstein, personal communication 3.3.2006.
document. However, the circuitous route by which the document arrived in the hands of the army is not stated. The Burmese version is claimed to have been included in a book entitled *Growth of Burma army observed from the Japanese viewpoint* composed by the Tokyo Research Unit, an unknown entity (in Japanese, n.p., n.d.), suggesting that it would have been first translated from English into Japanese, and then into Burmese, though no mention is made how and by whom. In a footnote, the admission is made that this document is Aung San’s according to Mitsuru Sugii’s recollection. However, as we know from Sawante’s editorial note, what Aung San had written down was copied and redrafted, but no mention is made of this. Dr Maung Maung’s books on Aung San and on Ne Win are extensively cited on the episode in question, eventhough these are not reliable first-hand sources by any means.

In this Burmese incarnation, the document seems to have been adapted to conditions prevailing after the events of 1988. No reference is made to either the English title or the March 1957 *Guardian* version. However, upon comparison (for detailed differences between the two documents see Appendix B), it becomes clear that this is a selectively thinned out version of the Blue Print. The Burmese version significantly omits the following: reference to the Blue Print being a ‘draft constitution’, sections condemning the Burmese monarchy as an irrelevance to modern Burma, reference to the possibility of Burma becoming a republic, and all aspects of the relationships with Japan. Among mistranslations, it prejudicially translates ‘individualism’ as ‘selfishness’, itself a common view among the Japanese military of the time. The book presents it without the numerical points, as if it were a continuous and coherent speech by Aung San, not a formal plan.

As a selective adaptation of the Blue Print to political conditions prevailing after the 1988 events, this leaves any Burmese readers quite ill informed about this document. This reminds me of the introduction by Soe Nyunt, Chairman of the ‘Media Group of the Committee for Propaganda and Agitation to Intensify Patriotism’, to the 1991 edition of Izumiya (1991). After erasing retrospectively references to ‘Burma’ and ‘Burmese’ throughout the book and replacing these with ‘Myanmar’, Soe Nyunt paradoxically proclaims that ‘historians should not falsify history but write the truth’. This introduction expresses much gratitude to the Japanese military: ‘it is clear that in history that the Minami Organ deserves gratitude for its having given military training to the Thirty Comrades and provided the base for the emergence of the Myanmar Army for the struggle for Independence’. It furthermore cites extensively Dr Maung Maung’s account of Ne Win’s role in the founding of the army, and finally concludes with the importance of understanding Suzuki as ‘a benefactor of the Tatmadaw’. However, neither Izumiya’s introduction nor the book’s content itself paradoxically make any reference to the Blue Print at all.

The Burmese and the English versions of the Blue Print do not match, and selective manipulation has taken place between versions to suit the new times, in which monarchy takes on a different significance as the historical source of power that replaces Aung San himself. After 1988, Culture (Myamā Yingyeihmú) has replaced Aung San as the unifying factor of the country. The regime has rebuilt royal palaces

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16 Nemoto, personal communication 7.3.2006
from the past, and royal symbolism has been re-established. With royal airs taken on by the top generals, including finding and keeping white elephants, one can perhaps understand why the military would not be in favour of dismissing the concept of the monarchy after 1988.

**Whose plans?**

Aung San himself never mentioned the existence of a separate Blue Print. It would appear that Japanese army officers and Dr Maung Maung, who have claimed this document as authentically Aung San’s based solely on the argument that it was found in his handwriting, conferred upon the Blue Print a false authenticity. However, these same sources have never explained the full biography of this document in the context of Aung San’s own recollection of events, which recounted that he was dictated documents by Japanese officers. Furthermore, as I have already asserted, academic specialist sources on the Japanese period do not tend to include this document at all into their deliberations suggesting that they, too, must have had doubts about its provenance.

After the war, Aung San himself refers to the purpose of his return to Burma from Tokyo on 15 February 1941 as, ‘to communicate the plans given him by the Japanese to his comrades in Burma’ (AS 1946; S 1973:76, my italics). This suggests that from a post-war perspective at least, he clearly marked ‘the’ (not his) plans as ‘given him’ by the Japanese – he did not claim these as his plans. Therefore, on this account, also, Aung San contradicts Dr Maung Maung’s deceptive claim, made long after Aung San’s death, that the plans he communicated were his own.

Though a few communists like Thakin Soe came out strongly against collaboration with the Japanese early on, most Burmese were initially optimistic about Japanese military intervention in Burma to begin with. This was so in particular thanks to Col. Suzuki’s persistent assurances and seeming personal aspiration also, that Japanese involvement would bring Burma its national independence. From a study of archival documents, it is evident that Col Suzuki did genuinely try to establish an independent Burma, pitching himself against the Japanese Southern Forces, which did not express the desire for an independent Burma. Suzuki had aimed in his December 1941 Minami Kikan ‘Plan for Burma conquest’ for ‘establishment the foundation of an independent Burma regime and complete the independence of Burma’. The Southern Forces, however, rejected this document, proposing instead that: ‘The new regime shall have on the surface the appearance of independence, but in reality it shall be induced to carry out Japanese policies’.

Yoon (1971a:7) indicates that ‘there is no doubt in my mind that the Minami Kikan under Colonel Suzuki… was genuinely desirous of promoting Burma’s independence’. This must be correct, but I have one reservation. Col. Suzuki did ultimately also prepare and submit the plans for the Japanese invasion in a manner that he knew nationalist

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17 Note that Aung San referred to himself in the third person.
Burmese would disapprove of, which is why Suzuki hid this part of his plans from these nationalists.

The Japanese occupation quickly turned unpopular, largely because other forces than those under Suzuki gained the upperhand. For any admission that Aung San played any role in devising the plans for the Japanese occupation, we have to look to his communications during the Japanese occupation period. There is only one instance during this period I could find where he mentions such plans, but here he also did not claim these as his. He said that ‘after three months in Tokyo working out the future programme with Colonel Suzuki, we returned to Myanmar [Burma] in a Japanese ship to so inform our colleagues.’ (AS 43.08.01b). Here he referred to ‘the future programme’, not ‘my’ or ‘our’ future programme. This was during the war. In his post-war account, he perhaps made a clearer distinction between his own and Japanese plans. Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that he would have entitled any plans from which he had evidently distanced himself, a ‘blue print’, for that would bestow on the plans a degree of fixity unwarranted by the uncertainties that prevailed at the time.

Aung San distanced himself from the plans Suzuki made during the war, but particularly strongly after the war. Their contents and tone reflected mostly those of his Japanese superiors. This contention finds further support in the cautious editorial note to the readers of Guardian that accompanied publication of this document. My construction of this editorial note is not that those who wished to see it published had necessarily lied about it. None of the following – Mr Sugii, Tekeshi Higuchi, or especially his cousin, Minoru Takamiya – need have known that the document was not of Aung San’s composition (indeed, they would have naturally assumed that since he had written it, he had also composed it). Therefore, since they were not witness to the event where Suzuki had originally dictated to Aung San, their claims were not actually false; their claims followed on from faulty assumptions and imprecise language.

It is more difficult to find a charitable explanation for Dr Maung Maung falling into the same error for, as I noted earlier, despite his academic training, Dr Maung Maung systematically distorted the provenance of any plans in his writings. Why otherwise would he reword Aung San’s own communications? In the cold light of day, this looks like a deliberate obfuscation of this episode. Also, as Silverstein put it, the ‘heavy stress’ Dr Maung Maung placed on the Blue Print as ‘a reflection of Aung San’s ideas’, and the subsequent reliance placed on it by scholars afterwards, all seem engineered to achieve a particular outcome, namely to legitimate one-party military rule by means of a document created and composed at the behest and under the control of the Japanese military.

Another point concerns whether Aung San had any concrete plans ‘of his own’ when he left Burma in search for foreign support. Any plans Aung San had would likely have remained mostly unspoken in Japan.

Aung San and his Japanese superiors would each have had their own plans, the exact details of which they did not entrust to one another. Though the Blue Print begins by referring to a ‘draft constitution’ for ‘the establishment of an independent Burma’, it then links Burma’s economy, foreign policy, and defence to the Japanese concept of the ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’. This reveals that genuine national independence was not really on offer. Though Suzuki had promised independence, there was no intention to grant it on the part of the military and
as it turned out, any prospect for real independence became increasingly remote as time passed. As Yoon points out, Suzuki was in favour of granting independence, but his superiors changed their plans and cut him out of it, leaving the nationalists in the hands of less sympathetic and more hard-headed Japanese military officers.

Aung San actually had very different plans from the Japanese military. As he repeatedly stressed, ‘the Japanese were very suspicious of us from the very beginning’. The Japanese command dispersed his troops without means of communication and they dissuaded him from visiting his troops. He also said that:

“I had my own plans that could be executed whichever way. At first the Japanese … widely dispersed [our troops] over the country. I just looked on, for if I have my opinion (they asked us to give our opinion frankly which was their usual trick), they always did just the opposite of what I said, good or bad. So whenever they asked my opinion about any proposal of their own, I readily agreed with it, since I could plan whichever way against them….. In short, I okayed all their proposals and plans…. Only certain preparations were needed, particularly some preliminary preparations of the masses for the final action and the counter-measures against the possible Japanese retaliations upon innocent people.’ (AS 1945.08.29; AS 1946; S 19:89).

According to Aung San’s own logic, then, had he taken the attitude above during the war at the time of the Blue Print of approving Japanese plans, this did not imply that he thereby agreed with or followed them. So were he to have had any input into the plans, we cannot discount that the resulting document might likely have actually expressed the reverse of what he himself planned.

Indeed, aware that he had only one document by means of which he could justify military government, Dr Maung Maung excused the omission of reference to the word ‘socialism’ in the Blue Print by stating exactly that Aung San ‘did not use the word “socialism”, for he was in Japan, among military leaders who had no great fondness for the word’ (Maung Maung 1969a:298). Well, this at least suggests that Dr Maung Maung was clearly aware that the document did not therefore express Aung San’s real ideas.

This suggests the need for a more refined understanding of how Aung San’s ideas actually would have made it into the various formal and informal communications. Aung San distanced himself from Japanese plans at every opportunity. After the war, he outlined ideas towards ‘a rough plan of my own’ and ‘a very grand plan of my own’. This was so that ‘we would try to forestall a Japanese invasion, set up our own independent State, and would try to negotiate with Japan before it came into Burma; only when we could not stop Japan’s coming into Burma, then we should be prepared to resist Japan’ (AS S:82-83). This expresses a very different sentiment from the Blue Print. Most likely, therefore, there were other versions of his plans that ran very much counter to what was contained in the Blue Print, some of which arguably reflected his ‘real views’. Aung San’s plans had remained unwritten until much later.

**Suzuki’s plans**

To understand plans before the occupation, we have to understand the historical context under which Suzuki received clearance to establish the Minami Kikan, as recounted by
Tatsuro Izumiya. Col Keiji Suzuki, as an intelligence officer from the Army Division of the Imperial General Headquarters, had been building up a network of contacts in Burma from his assignment there in June 1940, after which he met several thakin, including Thakin Kodaw Hmaing, whom he promised military aid and national independence.

The Japanese government formulated the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in August 1940, a block of Asian nations that Japan expected to lead and keep free from occupation by Western powers. Initially, Suzuki was something of a freelancer with hardly any support, and he was not popular at army headquarters, which saw him as going out on a limb. When Aung San and Hla Myaing arrived in Japan, Suzuki took them to General Staff HQ, which ‘showed no interest in the two young men’ so that he was saddled with them at his own expense. However, once the British reopened the Burma Road on 18 October 1940, the urgency of preventing supplies from reaching China increased. This enhanced the value Suzuki’s connections had built up with nationalists in Burma, and by early January 1941 Suzuki was given two officers ‘to provide a preliminary staff’, so that ‘preparations were begun for establishing an organization and for forming a concrete plan to aid Myanmar independence’ (Izumiya 1991:25).

This was the context for Suzuki to draft plans for military action in Burma. The plans Suzuki developed in conjunction with the Japanese army involved entirely different strategic interests from that pursued by the Burmese, to whom he would not fully reveal these. The Japanese Army and Navy had a joint meeting on 16 January 1941 to determine the parameters of this intended organization, and to discuss the ‘Plan for Burma’s Independence’ drawn up by Suzuki and Kawashima (not Aung San). They sought support from higher authorities for a project to control access to the Burma Road leading to China (e.g. see Izumiya 1991:34).

Once Suzuki had Aung San in Japan, he sought to formulate and present a plan that would conjoin Burmese aspirations for national independence with the war objectives of his superiors so that he could show them to his superiors in order to secure funding. Aung San had little reason or need to write anything down, as he was not working to a formal hierarchy of command. But for Suzuki, having formal plans written down enabled him now finally to achieve his objectives at the time in the face of considerable opposition and scepticism from military headquarters, which was to sway the Japanese military to commit resources to his own plans with these young Burmans.

In the event, he was smart enough to have gained favour with the Burmese nationalists, and received the resources he wanted. The Minami Kikan (Minami Intelligence Organization) was formally established on 1 February 1941, and its first orders came through on 14 February and 15 February as a result of ‘the February Plan’, resulting in Aung San’s departure back to Burma to recruit soldiers on 15 February. In that sense, the Blue Print was a document written in the context of a larger Japanese military strategic plan that aimed to achieve specifically Col. Suzuki’s aspirations – it was his

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19 Izumiya (1967:25) and Yoon (1973:92) have 8 and 18 October respectively.
plan. This is evident even in Tun Aung Chain (Izumiya 1991:ii)’s characterisation of the Minami Kikan as follows:

In establishing the Minami Organ, the Imperial Japanese Army looked to its own interests. Its main purpose was to mobilise a fifth column under the direction of the Imperial Japanese Army which would provide support for Japanese military operations in the event of a war against the British. The Minami Organ was staffed by professionals of the Imperial Japanese Army, men who had been inculcated with the prevailing Japanese militarist ideology, and men who had been given special training in the Nakano Military Intelligence School.

As it turned out, of course, like Lawrence of Arabia (as Ba Maw (1968:111) referred to Suzuki), Suzuki’s plans had to some extent been shaped by the Burmese he had met, for he wanted to phrase his plans in a manner that would retain their support. Nevertheless, he also needed the support of his superiors in command. Communicating different plans for different parties, he got approval from both. However, Suzuki himself eventually deviated from the plans of his superiors by ending up personally supporting the Burmese in their quest for independence. As a result, his superiors moved him aside prematurely, delaying the Burmese in their quest for national independence.

Therefore, Suzuki did play around with several plans from the beginning – keeping distinct the plans for the Burmese nationalists from those for his superiors. What worries me about Dr Maung Maung’s construction, then, is that he does not distinguish between the various plans, their stages of development, or their readerships. He inappropriately ascribed the entire planning for the Japanese occupation to Aung San and Suzuki in an over-romantic singular manner, as if they were the only two who mattered in this equation with no other parties structuring their deliberations:

Together, then, the young man from Burma with the mission of his country's liberation from foreign yoke, and the older adventurer whose ambition was to engineer Japan’s expansion into further shores, worked on their plans for Burma, each in his way feeling that the destiny of that country lay in his hands. (Dr Maung Maung 1959:51)

Plan[s] for Burma's Independence

In the event, the Blue Print never actually constituted a formal planning document for the Japanese or the Burmese nationalists. Another, much more important plan from both a Burmese nationalist and a Japanese military standpoint was ‘The Plan for Burma’s Independence’, originally devised between Dr Thein Maung, Thakin Mya and Col Suzuki before Aung San even arrived in Japan. This has three stages: smuggling out nationalists, give military training, and send them back into Burma to rise up against British. This document seems to have undergone, much as the note explains about the Blue Print above, several drafts, beginning with Burmese nationalists but ultimately ended up as part of a larger document by the Minami Kikan, which achieved the opposite of what nationalists wanted, namely a full-scale Japanese invasion.

After reciting its details as recounted by Izumiya, Yoon (1971a:93n5) assumes that Aung San claimed this document as his own, for he asserts that:

On February 3, a meeting held by key members of the Minami Kikan and the representatives of the IGHQ, discussed the “Plan for Burma's independence”, which had
been drawn up by Suzuki and Captain Kawashima on January 16, and adopted it as guiding principles for the Minami Kikan [FN5]. The text of the “Plan for Burma’s independence”, which was actually a revised draft of the earlier one drawn up by Thakin Mya, Dr Thein Maung and Col Suzuki in August 1940 in Rangoon…. 

Yoon’s footnote 5 [FN5] runs:

[Sugii 1944:20] Aung San mentioned that while he was in Japan, at the request of Col. Suzuki, he wrote an original draft of ‘the Plan for Burma’s Independence’ but it was later revised by Col. Suzuki. Aung San’s speech, August 29, 1945, Aung San of Burma, p 35. Sugii, however, stated that the draft was actually drawn up by the two army officers, namely Col. Suzuki and Captain Kawashima. Sugii (op cit p 17).

Unfortunately, like most scholars in this field, Dr Maung Maung’s book has misled Yoon. He overlooked, as it turns out, that Aung San did not claim to ever have composed this document, but that Aung San (AS in S 1973:85) claimed that he was first dictated a plan by Suzuki that ‘mentioned something about a limited invasion of Burma in the Shan States’. This leaves intact the assumption that the Blue Print was part of Suzuki’s requirement to, in the end, develop what was principally a Japanese plan.

It was Thakin Mya and Dr Thein Maung, jointly with Suzuki, who developed the Plan for Burma’s Independence. This specified a plan for liberation of Burma by Burmese forces as supported by Japan. But Suzuki had these later revised into plans for his superiors to include a full-scale Japanese invasion, as was indeed the case in the final plans (‘Plans for the Burma operation’) Suzuki submitted in December 1941 (Trager 1971:25-33; Sit Thamaing Pyádaik 1998:349-343). The aim of these latter plans was ‘to stir up disturbances throughout Burma in order to hamper the enemy’s operations and to induce the Burmese to cooperate wholeheartedly with Japan’. Suzuki, despite his promise and support for national independence, inserted an invasion into Burma on the part of the Japanese into his dictation to Aung San of these plans in order to pretend to his superiors that Aung San’s own plans accepted the Japanese invasion. However, he was sufficiently wise to remove the invasion part when having these communicated back in Burma. As Aung San recounted it, Suzuki revised this plan and returned it, ‘without the invasion part’, which worried Aung San, as he was dictated a plan elaborated by Suzuki that including ‘a limited [Japanese] invasion of Burma in the Shan states’, eventhough he returned to Burma with a plan revised by Suzuki without this invasion. This revealed Suzuki was not straight on this issue of the Japanese occupation by Japanese forces. As he put it, ‘I was a bit taken aback because I didn’t very much like the idea of the Japanese invasion in Burma’.

So when Aung San arrived back in Burma to communicate ‘the’ (not ‘his’) plans, he could still claim that ‘understandings had been reached with the Japanese who would support our rising with arms and money, but would not, themselves invade Burma’ (Let Ya 1962:44). This corresponds, broadly speaking, with the plans developed by Thakin Mya and Dr Thein Maung, however, not as Dr Maung Maung would have it, the Blue Print. Suzuki (1962:57) himself does not refer to equitably developing any plans with Aung San, but he does mention his prior contacts with Dr Thein Maung.
Yoon (1971a:90) attributes the ‘Plan for Burma’s Independence’ to the joint drafting originally by Col. Suzuki, Thakin Mya, and Dr Thein Maung:

According to the “Plan for Burma’s independence’ drawn up in August 1940 by Col. Suzuki, Thakin Mya, and Dr Thein Maung, independence was to be achieved in three stages. In the first stage, a group of young Burmese nationalists would be smuggled out of Burma. Col. Hiroshi Tamura, the Japanese military attaché in the Japanese Embassy in Bangkok, would receive the Burmese youths slipping out of Burma and would send them to the camps which would be established for that purpose. Second, the Burmese youths would receive at least six months of military training by Japanese instructors. In the meantime, supply bases would be established along the Thai side of the border. Finally, those trained youths would be sent back into Burma to lead an armed uprising against the British.

However, later Yoon (1971a:93) and Naw (2001:69) assert that Suzuki and Capt Kawashima actually incorporated this into a plan by the same title on 16 January 1941 which was ultimately adopted as the guideline for the Minami Kikan. Not only was this plan very different from Dr Thein Maung’s, but more important, the principal plan Minami Kikan seemed to have acted upon was therefore not Aung San’s. Furthermore, the Southern Forces were not in agreement with this plan on several points when presented to them on 5 January 1942, including the establishment of a provisional government under Minami Kikan and involvement in government by the volunteer army. This then resulted in their own revised plan ‘Matters concerning the enforcement of strategy in Burma’, adopted on 8 February 1942.

Dr Maung Maung does not refer to any of these other historically significant plans. In Dr Maung Maung’s entangled and deceptive account, there is another inconsistency. Sugii contradicts Dr Maung Maung, for he asserted that Col. Suzuki and Captain Kawashima themselves had composed ‘The Plan for Burma’s Independence’ without involvement either of Thakin Mya or Dr Thein Maung (or Aung San). Therefore, Sugii clearly indicated the nature of planning, which is that after the plan was solicited it got redrafted further along the chain by Japanese officers and became essentially their own plans.

The question of who originally composed any of these plans, whether the Blue Print or the Plan for Burma’s Independence, is, of course, less relevant than whoever redrafted it last to pass it onto the highest command in the Imperial Army to help facilitate a full-scale Japanese invasion. Like the Plan for Burma’s Independence, the Burmese army also redrafted the Blue Print in 1988 and possibly in 1956 also. We cannot possibly make any claims about its authorship based on any accurate historical record in the face of the political manipulations for strategic and political advantage we have uncovered.

The plans for Burma’s Independence therefore had little to do with any plans Aung San might have thought up during his stay in Japan between his arrival at Haneda Airport on 12 November 194020 and his departure on the Shunten Maru ship on 15 February 1941. Aung San was acting within a plan previously drafted already back in August 1940 by Thakin Mya (formerly Chair of the Peoples Revolutionary Party), Dr Thein Maung and Col Suzuki.

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20 Different dates have been given for this: Izumiya (1989:23) has 8 November, but most other sources have 12 November.
Dhammika U Ba Than (1962) did not acknowledge the existence of this document in his history of the army, but instead asserted that ‘Plans were made [by Japanese officers] in consultation with Thakin Aung San and the “Draft for Burma’s Independence” was drawn up in Tokyo on January 1941... Aung San was to make preparations, based on the “Plan of Independence”, while in Burma and then return to Japan if possible.’

In short, the thrust of my argument is that the Blue Print played no particular strategic or historical role in this series of plans devised over a period of six months or so that started with the relationship between Col Suzuki and Dr Thein Maung (who had been Chair of the Japan-Burma Society in Tokyo since end 1939). Dr Thein Maung was much more important to these plans than Aung San. This is evident not just from the way he passed onto Suzuki Aung San’s location, but also from the way the secret Japanese aliases Aung San and Hla Myaing derived from the elements in Dr Thein Maung’s name (Izumiya 1967:23). References to other plans exist by yet others in advance of the Japanese invasion, and these particular plans therefore had their origins before Aung San had made it to Japan or had ever met Col Suzuki, and so he did not have much to do with it.

If Aung San himself was not the originator, he nevertheless did end up playing a central role in enacting this plan, taking a lead role as the chief actor in the longer range planning by the Japanese military. However, he himself had little or no input of his own, except as an actor performing a role assigned to him. He relished this role, but it was not quite of his own making.

I do not have access to early Minami Kikan plans as submitted to military command before end 1941, but its final plan ‘Plan for the Burma Operation’ dating from December 1941 is very clear about the need for recruitment of Burmese nationalists to help facilitate Japanese military plans, and not the other way around. This plan inserts three stages into a very small section of a much larger plan where it specifies the ‘volunteer army operations’ of the nationalists (uprising and establishment of provisional government, seizure of Rangoon, conquest of Upper Burma). The Blue Print for Burma similarly starts with ‘three stages’ through which the Burmese must pass for the establishment of an independent Burma (preparation period, consolidation period, post-war reconstruction period), as does the original Suzuki-Thein Maung-Mya ‘Plan for Burma’s Independence’ (smuggling out nationalists, give them military training, and send them back into Burma to rise up against British).

There is thus a tenuous connection between all of these plans. However, it is as well to bear in mind that none were under sole control of or in the hands of the Burmese themselves – all three of them exist by virtue of their Japanese military handlers,

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21 It should be noted that others, such as Thakin Ba Sein, had already developed similar plans already by mid 1940, referred to ‘A secret plan for Burma’s independence’ but this plan was aborted by Ba Sein’s arrest by the British (Naw 2001:59). Aung Than had handed over a 150 page ‘Plan for Burmese Independence’ to Kokobu that went to the Naval General Staff (Izumiya 1991:40). Trager (1971:) lists several Japanese plans for Burma’s conquest and for the independence of Burma in the course of 1941. It is interesting that none of these sources refer to the Blue Print at all.

and rely on Japanese agents who chopped, changed and redrafted them at will to fulfil ultimately their own country’s strategic military ends.

**Why claim the plans for Burma as Aung San’s?**

There are thus major problems in disentangling Burmese nationalist from Japanese wartime plans for Burma, and in disentangling Aung San’s plans from those of his other comrades. Furthermore, the Thakins had actually managed to influence Suzuki’s thinking, who had learnt how to present Japanese intentions towards Burma as necessarily flattering to the aspirations of these nationalists, meaning that it is also difficult to disentangle some of Suzuki’s plans from those of the nationalists. This did not prevent Suzuki, however, from also dictating plans to Aung San and presenting handwritten documents to his superiors to justify ‘native’ support for a full-scale invasion. There is every reason to believe that the Blue Print suffered this kind of fate, as the note that accompanied it demonstrates it had undergone redrafting by the officers who commissioned it. It then fell into the hands of the Burmese military, who submitted it to the *Guardian* in 1957 to suit their own ends. The document reads like a plan the Japanese hatched for the occupation for Burma where major strategic military interests were at stake.

Aung San was clearly not the lead author of the Plan for Burma’s Independence or of the Japanese plans for the invasion of Burma. Had he written down a Blue Print at all, these were based on plans the Japanese provided, and these had been furthermore subjected to redrafting by his Japanese officers. We may now ask why, then, is this document so widely and persistently attributed to the person of Aung San?

Dr Maung Maung has persistently associated Aung San with ‘Blue Prints for the country’. However, I have found no early references to the Blue Print as Aung San’s in other sources that is, except those that lead back in one way or another Dr Maung Maung, including the *Guardian* were it was originally published.

Dr Maung Maung would appear to have had a motive to incorrectly, perhaps falsely, attribute this document to Aung San, namely political opportunism. In the context of Ne Win’s official biography, Dr Maung Maung interpreted the Blue Print as a central pillar for the *lanzin* of the Ne Win regime. Dr Maung Maung (1969:82-83; 298-300) says nothing about the complex biography of this document in his historical discussion of that period, nor the comparative status of the many other plans nationalists and Japanese developed, but cites virtually the entire Blue Print in justification for the Ne Win regime to have seized power in Aung San’s name. He says that ‘When he was in Japan with the “Thirty Comrades” he wrote a “Blueprint for Free Burma” which, re-read today, rings in many places with the tone and temper of the Burmese Way to Socialism.’ There is a paradox that he tries to justify socialism by means of a document that avoids mentioning it – so he explains this away by noting that Aung San found himself in the company of Japanese unsympathetic to leftwing politics. But we may ask whether the document reflected any of Aung San’s views at all. He repeats sections of the Blue Print

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23 Even in his biography *To a soldier's son*, in an episode when he visited Aung San after the war, he referred to ‘white papers and blueprints for the country’ (Maung Maung 1974:26).
in his memoirs thirty years later, still as verbatim Aung San’s, even though by this time he qualifies these charitably as ‘no doubt influenced to an extent by the time and the place’ (Maung Maung 1999:210).

Dr Maung Maung thus ends up stating, based on the Blue Print, the opportunistic claim that ‘a one party political system is neither new to Burmese thinking, nor alien to the Burmese temperament’. With Aung San’s demise, ‘Gen. Ne Win provides the needed leadership in these crucial times’ and hence Ne Win’s political goals with the Socialist Lanzin have been legitimated by means of Aung San’s lanzin that justified one-party military control.24

The nature of Aung San’s politics

Aung San cooperated with the Japanese up to a point. His own communications about some events, such as his first encounter with and opinions of the Japanese, may exhibit slight differences depending on whether he himself recounted these before, during or after the war. There is a need for taking his communications in their own historical and political context, and to bear in mind the nature and audience of his communications. The issue of what happened between Aung San and Suzuki in Japan between November 1941 and January 1942 is of more than passing interest, for the Blue Print has been published or cited not only to discredit any demands for democratic reform during the BSPP era but also subsequently. For example, the state press cites the Blue Print to reveal the ‘real’ Aung San and denigrate Aung San Suu Kyi’s interpretation of her father’s legacy. Pei Kan Kaung (1996) cited the Blue Print or, as the military prefer to call it, the ‘Substantial draft of the reconstruction of the independent Burma’, at length to show why Aung San Suu Kyi’s demands for freedom in the name of her father were wrong. Pei Kan Kaung claims she was no rightful inheritor of Aung San’s politics, only the army was.

However, I have established here that Aung San may well have been involved in writing down a version of Japanese plans for Burma, but no convincing evidence exists that he himself freely composed the varieties of the Blue Print document that found its way into the Guardian and military history books. In fact, Aung San explicitly denied composing these plans, and distanced himself from the versions in Japanese hands as ‘their plans’. Nevertheless, Dr Maung Maung and official army historians have seen fit to present Mitsuru Sugii as the authoritative source to prove the contrary. As I have shown, this evidence is third-hand, and has not been verified independently. It has also been distorted across different revisions and is furthermore presented through sources with close connections to particular factions in the army, and in particular to Gen. Ne Win (Sugii’s history of Minami Kikan was translated by Ne Win’s aid).

Yet historians of Burma have made unquestioning use of this document where it suits their argument. For example, Michael Aung-Thwin (1998:157) refers to the Blue Print as evidence of his own academic ability to discern ‘today’s mythmaking’ as more ‘clearly separated from what actually happened’ than could be observed from the royal

24 Guyot (:315) refers to the Lanzin as ‘an army based cadre party’ that ‘monopolized the political side of government’.
chronicles. However, he unquestioningly asserts that ‘Aung San’s “Blue Print for Burma”’, is ‘a treatise he [Aung San] wrote in 1941 reflecting his vision for the country… He was not the democratic visionary he is touted to be. His work reveals a plan that stressed a strong, centralized government’. He cites from the Blue Print as Aung San’s ‘own words’ in order to demonstrate that Aung San’s vision of Burma ‘were a far cry from his daughter’s public rhetoric on individual freedom and democracy’.

Given the lack of independence in academia and investigative journalism in Burma since 1962, objective analysis of historical sources is hardly the strongest point for Burmese historiography. Nevertheless, in the absence of conclusive evidence, and given the historical context and motives on the part of those who pressed for its publication, however, we must now rescind any idea that Aung San composed this document, though we could accept that he may well have originally written a version down by dictation.

We may now ask what the corner stones of Aung San’s politics were, if not about establishing the much-cited one-party state as asserted in the Blue Print. In this respect, Aung San’s interest in reaching out and making his political message intelligible, on the one hand, to Burma’s oppressors (the British and the Japanese), and on the other hand, to his own people, are important aspects often ignored. He juggled two languages, namely Burmese and English, and sought to bridge different sensibilities.

Silverstein (1973:6) wrote that Aung San ‘never identified with the Buddhist political leaders and did not employ religion in the service of politics’. In addition, he found that under his leadership ‘the movement was predominantly secular and impartial on religious grounds’. As I have pointed out in a chapter on Aung San elsewhere (Houtman 1999:243-64), this begs more questions than it answers. His early education in a monastery, his Pali studies, his early essays involving Buddhist ideas, and his common allusions to Buddhist ideas especially in his Burmese (as opposed to English) communications, set the stage for a politics that calls for a deeper analysis.

Guyot (1974:68) also effectively put her finger on a disjunction between the leadership itself and public perception of them, when she refers to ‘the disjunction between the Marxist dialectic of the leaders and the Buddhist cosmos of the followers’. Such overlooks, of course, that Marxist vocabulary has been translated into Burmese largely by means of Pali loanwords with Buddhist associations, which would suggest that, as long as Marx is discussed in Burmese, Marx was conveyed not as a ‘secular’ but as a profound Buddhist thinker. This confuses the distinction between sacred and secular, but then, in Buddhism a most important political concept, namely loka (domain, body, plane of existence, cosmology), is also one of the terms to translate ‘secular’. Aung San proclaimed politics as ‘knowing no end’, ‘it is Samsara in operation before our eyes, the Samsara of cause and effect, of past and present, of present and future which goes round and round and never ends’. Samsara is also known as loka. Practice of the byama-so tayà (the four brahma vihara meditations) overcomes differences of all kinds, and attains to the highest realms in samsara/loka; these are designated by Aung San as of
particularly high political value.  

Samsara/loka happen to encompass the gods. Can we here maintain a rigid distinction between sacred and secular? Most young Burmese nationalists at the time were genuine in their belief that Marx and the Buddha were both on their side.

Aung San’s overriding concern was to encourage a mass movement that would provide a sustained impetus, with foreign help if necessary, to wrest the country from foreign control – principally the British and Japanese. Aung San’s published communications during the Japanese period are not particularly good indicators of the fundamental views he had of politics as a process, not least because of the censorship, but also because, as an active member of government during the occupation, he continuously had to weigh carefully what he said. During and after the war in particular, he was not free to philosophize about his own ideal modes of politics or government.

Important to understand his politics is the only essay that he, properly speaking, devoted to this subject. He published Nainganyeì amyòmyò [Various arts of politics] (AS 02.1940) in Burmese around February 1940, almost five months after the British had declared war on Germany. Aung San had already booked considerable success with the Freedom Bloc as a mass movement. Here he identified the diverse ways of doing politics (e.g. the different political ideologies for the educated, prophesies for the peasants, etc). Ultimately, however, he asserts that a scientific view of politics means cause-and-effect (akyâung akyô), which he explains in their Buddhist meaning.

In Burmese, as Aung San explains, to be scientific means loká hdat, and politics deals with loka or the secular domain, which, as the Buddha teaches, is always subject to cause and effect. He then refers to the different planes (loka) of existence, e.g. of the animal and of the human world. The need for political leadership arose with the emergence of greed and the need to govern human affairs, after the end of the era of plenty (padeitha bin hkit). Government is required to restore order as the result of human greed based on the illusion of selfhood, which leads to anger and ignorance. Thus, politics deals with loka but is not itself the way to Nibbana. However, only when loka is appropriately ruled does nibbana become an option. Only when the stomach is full can one lead a moral life.

The ultimate aim of politics, he asserts, is therefore to create loka-nibbana, a heaven on earth, as Aung San repeatedly referred to his cherished ideal of national independence. Politics with this aim is not dirty work, but politics for personal fame or enrichment is. In this sense, Burma’s history of the monarchy is not a good example but Burma’s history consisted largely of the comings and goings of monarchies of this kind. At this point in his essay, he transits towards a Marxist idea of history, which also, like Buddhism, deals with cause and effect. Basic to this are the economic relationships

Aung San had an abiding interest in expressing his politics in the form of high ideals. In his last published speech before his assassination (AS 1947.07.13; AS 1971), he referred to Buddhist analogies for understanding important political aspects. He refers

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to the Burmese view that parliament and a new country originated with the election of Mahathamada at the beginning of the world by the people (p 363), the attainment of national independence as attainment of the wishing tree (*padetha bin*) (p 380,384). He also wrote that during the Buddha’s ‘reign’ (*hpayà let htet*) the Buddha himself was not free from having to struggle and fight, and so ‘nor can we’ (p 379).

Such references do not mean Aung San advocated Buddhism in Burmese politics, or that the Burmese peoples should be subjugated to a Buddhist government. Just as we need to understand Greek and Latin loanwords, and their association in past literary, religious and scientific works, to make fundamental points pertaining to high political values in English (e.g. ‘nationalism’ from L *natio*, ‘ethics’ from Greek *ethikos*, ‘polity’ from Latin *policia*, ‘state’ from Latin *status*), so also Aung San balanced his language. He brought into play the most valuable and complex ideas in the Burmese language for convincing Burmese of the nobility of his struggle: *metta, byamaso taya, loka, nibbana, samadhi*, and many others. He conceived of, and attempted to gain respect for, his political aspirations in a vocabulary that he shared with his people, namely through Burmese and Pali loanwords. He pitched this vocabulary as high as he could. On the other hand, he also sought to impact colonial regime by mastering the intricacies of the English language.

In his same essay on politics, Aung San advocated to ‘please practise politics by disposing yourself to uproot your inferior mind’. Aung San Suu Kyi (1991:8,191) has repeatedly claimed her father was engaged on a path to truth and perfection. She traced back her own perspectives on leadership back to those of her father’s. After spending a number of years studying Aung San’s speeches across both languages, I now see how much more work we need to do in order to make sense of what he was trying to say. These dimensions to his politics will not become apparent unless we set the Blue Print aside, and look instead across the broad range of his communications in the two languages, whilst paying due regard to language, time, place and context.

**Conclusion**

Despite reservations expressed by Silverstein, academics have invariably included the Blue Print in bibliographies on Aung San as Aung San’s. So far, none have explicitly addressed or problematized its provenance. Scholars have trusted the factual accuracy of Dr Maung Maung’s research and the research that relies on it, and Dr Maung Maung’s views have percolated from an effective army and BSPP propaganda campaign into a widely held academic perspective on Aung San. In brief, the effect of Dr Maung Maung’s insistence on the Blue Print as Aung San’s has resulted in a catalogue of misinterpretations.

Silverstein did not investigate the Blue Print further beyond providing some short notes, and so scholars are understandably confused over its actual status as a communication from Aung San. Despite his suspicions that Dr Maung Maung had doctored Aung San’s speeches more generally, his hunch that something is not right with the document, and his doubts about the editorial note with which it was originally published, Silverstein did in the end accept, albeit reluctantly, Dr Maung Maung’s word for it that this was
indeed an important communication by Aung San. His doubts were not sufficiently strong for him to exclude it from the volume.  

It is difficult to prove a document false if we only have two diverging documents that various third parties have interfered with, by copying and redrafting it to suit their purposes at the time. If an original did exist at one time, it has gone missing. Various personalities, including editors, furthermore have abused the text and the regime maintains a stranglehold over access to the archives that might more fully describe its context. We have ended up with the difficulty of untying Aung San’s lan-zin from the lan-zin constructed by those who hold the reigns of state power, who are subverting Aung San’s political image for their own ends. Dr Maung Maung presented Aung San as a young man with authoritarian one-party leanings by means of a document that was clearly not of Aung San’s composition.

Myths help make sense of discontinuities, and the Japanese occupation introduced a critical discontinuity that has been more mythologized than most, chiefly in the person of Aung San. The Japanese occupation period marked discontinuity not only in Aung San’s biography, but also in Burma’s national history. As Mya Han (2001:29, 36) put it, Aung San’s writings represent an autobiography of sorts, but also the nation’s history: ‘Bogyoke Aung San’s endeavours were for national freedom, unity and freedom… Bogyoke’s writings can be considered as his autobiography also’. In short, he asserts, ‘His writings prove that he was a good historian as well as a biographer.’

The Blue Print marks this discontinuity between biography and history, between Aung San and his beloved country. Until we come to an objective assessment of Aung San’s writings as a collection in their original state, and can compare their various versions, before, during and after the occupation, we are faced with an incomplete biography. Furthermore, we also face an incomplete national history of Burma. Writings wrongly attributed to Aung San from the Japanese occupation continue to preoccupy scholars: in that sense at least, the Japanese occupation is not yet over. We are still to come to terms with Aung San’s lanzin.

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26 Silverstein (1996) nevertheless continued to say that ‘it is believed that, following his arrival in Japan, he “wrote” Blue Print for Burma’ and attributed to Aung San ‘the language of fascism’.
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regime or the Aung San estate, in order to counteract the destruction of Aung San’s reputation and the attempt to hide Aung San related documents by General Ne Win and by the regime after 1988. I notice it has missing the last item).


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APPENDIX A. A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AUNG SAN

Despite his lead role in nationalist politics since 1939, and despite availability of a great number of sources in both the vernacular and in English, Aung San’s short life has not been subject to the same academic scrutiny as other Asian war-time national leaders. Dr Maung Maung produced a useful bibliography of Burmese sources by and on Aung San. However, since Aung San composed the majority of his communications originally in English, we are in need of a full chronological listing of all his communications across both languages, indicating when he wrote or spoke what, originally in which language, and under what exact historical circumstances. If translations were provided, who performed these, when, and on the basis of what sources (e.g. a broadcast or recording, a manuscript, etc).

In the last decade several useful publications have been published on Aung San’s life, including Angelene Naw’s study, and also Susanna Praeger’s thesis in German, which includes a useful short chronological bibliography of Aung San’s publications. However, with few exceptions, since manuscripts held in archives in Burma have not been opened up to independent academics, whether Burmese or foreign, such critical independent sources as there are, are inevitably still based chiefly on either British archives, or on secondary self-censored and/or censored accounts of his life without regard to original communications based on authenticated manuscripts. Though, as I show here, questions may be raised about some documents such as the Blue Print, there has so far been insufficient open discussion of the limitations of sources presented as Aung San’s.

There are several faces to Aung San, namely: (a) as a youngster growing up; (b) as a student and later thakin rebel in the fight against colonialism until mid 1940, (c) as a political and military leader who cooperated successfully with the Japanese to build a national army on the back of Japanese support for his fight against the British until March 1945, and (d) as an allied commander and later civilian in open fight against the Japanese, and (e) negotiator for national independence under the British until his assassination in 1947. The lionshare of his communications available in the public domain actually derive from the latter period.

Aung San’s recorded communications that I was able to trace:

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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pre-WWII communications: 14/186 (8%)

WWII communications: 58/186 (31%)

Post-WWII communications: 114/186 (61%)

His communications quickly became a focus for political legitimation, and there is therefore considerable uncertainty about the verifiability of many sources. The most reliable sources for Aung San will, on the whole, be the original manuscripts and recordings of his communications. Dr Maung Maung (1969:40,n44) claims that among all his papers only one was found in the Burmese vernacular. Since he usually wrote in English, manuscripts would mostly be in English, but he often delivered his communications orally in Burmese by a process of spontaneous translation, which should then also enter the record as such. In this case, his written communications may have been translated into Burmese and, conversely, his spoken communication into English, whilst exhibiting considerable differences between versions.

Otherwise many documents have been abstracted, reported, edited, translated and even retranslated (some documents were translated into Burmese only to be translated back into English again). Most of these should be considered highly doubtful and cannot be relied upon. Sources that purport to represent, report on or summarise Aung San’s communications (some of which were not published until after his death), are particularly vulnerable to distortion as when reports appeared in *Greater Asia*.

The Blue Print is in my view but one example of where these get confused. Reporting and abstracting has tended to be overtaken by strategic interests with which a publication is allied. Aung San (1946.05.16; S.1973:112-127) once complained, not only about the inaccuracy of intelligence reports about his activities, but about reporting about what he said and wrote in *News Review* and in the *New Times of Burma* (formerly *Rangoon Liberator*) which he felt were ‘the official organ of [British] Government’.

A distinction therefore needs to be made between Aung San’s original communications, mostly written in English, *as he wrote, spoke or broadcast them*, and the multiple editions, translations (and sometimes even retranslations). For example, the ‘self-portrait’ in MM (1961:3-6) is evidently a different translation or edited version of ‘Life sketch of an author’ in S (1972:74-77). The latter purports to be the original, and the former an edited version that substitutes the third with the first person, plus some other changes. Such claims are presently unverifiable.

The confusion is inherent in the literature. Naw includes Aung San (1971) in the list of primary sources. However, this collection of speeches was selectively published by the BSPP in its fight against communism (this covered the period during which Aung San eliminated the Communists from the AFPFL). The preface to this volume claims to
include his communications in the languages that they were delivered in, but for example, it includes one speech in two languages without explanation.

Without a detailed comparison of his original communications with originals, we simply cannot iron out the many irregularities in these texts. For example, Mya Han claimed (pp 45-46) that although AS wrote is own biography in English, it was never published and lost. But that English version was said to be translated by Col. Bo, edited by Deedoke U Ba Cho and first appeared in Bogyoke Aung San's biography edited by Thakhin Kodaw Hmaing. What is puzzling is, if the original English version got lost, how did Col. Bo get to translate it into Burmese? Mya Han did not provide a hint, but added Aung San's comment on the translated one. What we can ascertain from this is that Aung San's autobiography in Burmese was not originally written by him but translated from his original English writing.

Finally, there is the issue of censorship. Secondary sources on Aung San published between 1948-62, of which there are few, may prove more reliable than those published afterwards, not just because they were published closer to Aung San’s time, but because they did not suffer quite the same censorship laws. As Larkin (2003) has pointed out, from around 1910, British censorship laws quickly became the strictest in Burma of the whole of India, leaving many of Aung San’s communications during the British period vulnerable to interference, especially in the English language (they left vernacular communications mostly to self-censorship). The Japanese period that followed was no better, and in some sense worse. It is not until national independence in 1948 that a comparatively benign environment ensued for a period of under 15 years during which censorship did not operate. The Ne Win regime that took power in 1962, by end 1964, had nationalized all newspapers. Some sources have no censorship marking (KY 1966, 1969a, 1969b). However, most sources after 1962 have clearly been subject to censorship. Some indicate censorship through permit numbers for each press (e.g. AS 1971), some have separate permit numbers for the covers and for the text (ME 1998, 2003), and others have ‘permit relevant to political publications’ (e.g. MCH 1970).

A degree of political distortion has taken place of Aung San’s writings, where these have been selectively published to convey a particular image of Aung San. This has been particularly systematic by both the Japanese and by the Burmese military, though not exclusively so.

Abbreviations:
BTS: Bo Thein Hswei
CT: change-of-title of a communication. Since Aung San often was not in a position to entitle his communications, the titles under which communications are published vary.
?: indicates uncertain date
KY: Kyaw Yin
LDH: Ludu U Hla
MCH: Mein-myó Chit Swei
MM: Dr Maung Maung
MH: Mya Han
S: Silverstein
Aung San, U
1935.05.08 Letter to George, 08.05.1935, NP (:545-46).
1936.09.03 Sayagyi-khinbya (Honoured teacher, letter to Thakhin Kodawhmaing , 3.9.1936 (BTS 1951:45).
1937 Tekkatho ekúbadei sonsànyeìmyàbù komiti í asiyinhkansa hnín pat thek yweí asiyin hkan sa hnín pat thek yweí myamana naiingngannon hsaingya kyaungthà myà thameggà athin hmá hkan httà ak thàw tekkatho pyin hsìn yei komiti i hmatàn [Record by Committee to prepare a University appointed by All Burma Student Union regarding a report by University Act Commission Myabu committee] Zambu Meikhswei Pitakat Ponhneiktaik, 1937) (MM 1969c:29)
1938 Nyilagan (Convention) (In Moulmein convention's records, no publisher, 1938:1-4; MM 1969c:29) presumably in Burmese for it is written by AS then secretary of DBA to commemorate DBA's annual assembly held in Moulmein

WAR PERIOD BEGINS ---------------------------
1940EB1 Bamá lutlakyeìgaìnggyì í pyandànahmat 4 ingaleikgá bamaetwe kalà lauk gayúmasaik (English do not care for the Burmese as they do for the Indians). (Freedom Bloc's Gazette No. 4, signed by AS, Secretary Freedom Bloc; KY 1969b,1:50-52).
1942c...? Tatmadaw thamaing (History of the Army – extracts from letters in English translated into Burmese. (KM :

1942.06.05 Bámá lutlakyei tatmadaw Bogyok Bo Teizá í ameín [Burma Independence Army, Bo Teza's Order, 5.6.42] (MM 1969c:32).

1942.07.13 Bómógyò apyan nauk kyaung hlan laik thi bo Aung San meíngùn (13.7.42) (SHT 1985:26-40). (The speech was made in Bangkok and the attendee were Japanese military officials and members of Thirty Comrades).


1942.04.05 Bomá lutlakyeì tatmadaw Bogyok Bo Teizá í ameín (Burma Independence Army, Bo Teza's Order, 5.6.42) (LDH 1968,1:164; BIB 1943:5-6; KY 1969b,1:93-94).


1943a.?? Zati (Origins 1) . (KM 1951:1-12; BTS 1951:1-8; KY 1969a:1-12; MCH 1970:41-57). According to Maung Maung, ‘it is said that’ this is the only section of autobiography composed by AS during the Japanese occupation period in Burma.

1943c.?? Kyaùnthà bawá. (KM 1951:1-12; BTS 1951:1-8; KY 1969a:1-12; MCH 1970:41-57). Note that this is compiled from several fragments written by Aung San in English, translated by Bohmùgyì Bo into Burmese and edited by Didok U Ba Cho and accepted by Aung San himself.


1943.05.09 Gaungzaung go ñe gi yà ba [Support the leader]. [Speech at the lunch party hosted by patrons of Burmese Business Club, 9.5.43] (Bama Khit 11.5.43 (SHT 1985:64-66).

1943.08.01a Bámá lutlakyeì hkaing myè aung hsaung ywek yan ayeì gyì [It is important to try to sustain independence] (Speech in honour of Thakin Than Tin, Rangoon) (MM 1969c:34).

1943.08.01b Bámá lutlakyei ayeidawbon (Burma’s struggle for independence) (Bama Hkit, 01.08.43; BTS 1951:1-12; KM 1951:1-12; KY 1969a:1-12; MCH 1970:41-57). (CT: 'Struggle for Myanmar independence').


1943.12.08 Sitwungyì meínkyàgyet (Speech by the Minister of War, Shwedagon Pagoda, on the anniversary day of East Asia War, 8.12.43). (SHT 1985:75-76).


1944.01.31 Sitwungyì bogyok Aung San i meingùn. (Speech by the minister of War, Gen. Aung San, 23.1.44). (Bama Hkit, 25.1.1944:2; Extract in MDN 1954:16-17; KY 1969b,1:112,1944c. Tatmadaw thi kyésà mahok (The army is not mercenary, Speech on the occasion, Speech in honour of Thakin Than Tin, Rangoon) (MM 1969c:34).


1944.07.24 Kyok hmyaw lín saúng sà nei dé thadìn ha di thadìn be. (The events that I looked forward to have happened, AS speaks to journalists about the transgression by the Indian national army between Burma and India). Bama Khit, 23.4.1944:2. (LDH 1968,3:257-58).

1944.03.25 Tagé taikpèw yhákù sà pyì [The battle has truly started.] (Greater Asia 25.3.44; MCH 1970:54-55).

1944.08.01 Bámápyei kutlakyei adeikhtan [Burma Army's Independence pledge] (Speech to the press, Aung San's home, Rangoon, 1.8.44) (Bama Khit 3.8.44; SHT 1985:116-117).
1944.08.01 Sitwungyi i lutlakyei nei meingùn (Speech by the Minister of War on Independence Day, 1.8.44). (Bama Khit, 4.8.1944:2; KY 1969a:54-55).
1944.08.01. Bama lutlakyei hnit patle nei sitwungyi i meingùn (Speech by the Minister of War on the occasion of the anniversary of national independence, 1.8.1944). (Myan alin 6.8.44; SHT 1985:108-115).
1944.09.06. Sitwungyi major general Aung San gā mahabama thwei siyan pyokýagýin (Minister of War Major General Aung San speaks about the shedding of Burmese blood, Bassein, 6.9.44) (Yangon thiuriya thadinsa, 20.9.44; SHT 1985:118-121 (abstract))
1944.10.7. Amyò asà hkainma taúng tìn thaw in-à. (Speech in the Burmese Military Academy, 7.10.1944). (Myanmar Alin, 8.10.1944:3; Bama Hkit 1.10.44; KY 1969a:159-70; SHT 1985:122-124 [CT: Sitwungyi Bogyok Aung San meinkyà gyet]).
1944.10.10. Ahût amin ahmat (Special order, Ministry of War, 10.10.1944. (Summary MM 1969:39).??
1944.10.15. Myòlôn kyut asiawægyidwin mywetkyà thaw sitwungyi bogyok Aung Hsàn meingùn. (Speech by defense minister General Aung San at a meeting in Myolonkyut, 15.10.44). (Bama Hkit 18.10.1944:1-2; Summary MM 1969:39-40; SHT 1985:125-31)
1944.10.29. Bama tamadaw Myòlôn Kyut asiaaweigyi. (Burma Army's Mylon Kyut meeting, 29.10.44). (Bama Hkit, 31.10.44; SHT 1985: 132-33).
1944.10.29. À mashíhlyin luyamawin akhkwín ayeì yámi mahok. (If you have no courage, then you have no honour and no luck. Speech at the gathering of citizens of Rangoon, 29.10.1944.) (Bama Hkit 31.10.44; Myanma Alin, 2.11.1944:1-2; Summary MM 1969:40; SHT 1985:134-136).
1944.11.18. Kabà alàala hnin lungé tawun (The future of the world and the duties of the youth, Speech at the foundation of the East Asia Youth League, 18.11.44; Bama Hkit, 21.11.44; Summary MM 1969:40-41; KY 1969b,1:112-119; SHT 1985: 137-139).
1944.11.30. Bolûpwènwè kyà dó mi [You are going to celebrate the finals]. [Speech to cadets at graduation ceremony, Burma military university, 30.11.44] (Thuriya 02.12.44; SHT 1985:140-143).
1945.01.02. Bama tatmadaw neikyin pàgyin [Celebrating Burma Army's Day] (Speech to army officials and foreign press, Rangoon, 2.1.45); (Thuriya 4.1.45; SHT 1985:149-152).
1945.01.27. Sitwungyi hnin si theinapati bogyok Aung Hsàn i meingùn ahmat 1 (Speech by the Minister of war and chief commander Gen. Aung San, no. 1, 27.1.45). (Summary MM 1969:43-44).
1945.01.29. Sitwungyi hnin si theinapati bogyok Aung Hsàn i meingùn ahmat 2 (Speech by the Minister of war and chief commander Gen. Aung San, no. 2, 29.1.45). (Summary MM 1969:44).
1945.03.17. Tat htwet meingùn (March to battle, 17.3.45). (Greater Asia, 20.3.45; AS 1971:13; KY 1969a:57; S 1972:28).
1945.03.20. We will come back with victory news. Major General Aung San interviewed. Greater Asia, 20.3.1945 (S 1972:28-29).
1945.05.10. Thayekchaung Ywa meingùn (Thayetkaung village speech, 10.5.1945). (AS 1971:14-15).
WAR PERIOD ENDS
1945.05.28 Secret Enclosure to No. 201, 28.5.45. (T 1983-84, 1, No 201:328-331).
1945.06.10. Sittaung Myit hwun tawaik sit hsin taik likat lyei ney thaw bama tatmadawmya atwek hnyungyâgyekmyâ [Instructions to Burma Army fighting around Sittaung River Delta, 27.6.45] (MM 1969c:46).


1945.11.01. Kunyigyá ba (Please help. Request for the public to donate to AFPFL) (Journal, vol 1:5, 1.11.45) (MM 1969c:40).

1945.11.18. Thatti shi hlyin yweik kauk pwè lok kyá yá aung (If you have the courage, let us have the elections, Speech at the AFPFL meeting at Shwedagon Pagoda, 18.11.45). (AS 1971:38-47).


1946.03.09 Cutting from The Burman, 9.3.46. President Aung San explains the part played by communists in the resistance movement. (T 1983-84, 1, No.416:676-78).


1946.03.27. Ngadò thweï anipyang gé thaw neí (The day on which we compared the redness of our blood, Speech at the Cantonment Park, 27.3.46). (Sipwâyeithadinsa 28.3.1946; AS 1971:117-22).


1946.04.24 Kaleingyondwei go hpwín machà lo ba bù [I don’t want to reveal the web of deceit] (Sìpwàyeï Thadìnsa, 946). (MM 1969c:52).


1946.05.01. Kabì alokhánâm na meingûn (Speech on the occasion of the first International Labour Day after the war, 1.5.1946. (Pyethû athan Thadinza 1.5.46; AS 1971:128-29).

1946.05.08. Cutting from The Burman. People’s Volunteer Organization: General Aung San replies to Govt communiqué, 8.5.46. (T 1983-84, 1, No. 500; 783-786; S 1972:42-45).

1946.05.12. Sitpyinyago abé gyaûng leikyin taik the ni [Why should military training be undergone?] (Pyethû Athan...
Thadinsa, 12.5.46) (MM 1969c:54-55)
1946.05.16. Critique of British Imperialism. Presidential address at the Second Session of the Supreme Council of
1946.05.22. Bogoyoke Aung San to T.I.Hughes, Rangoon, 22.5.46. (T 1983-84, 1, No. 520:804-805).
1946.06.01. The economic situation. (Burma Digest, 1.6.46; MCH 1970:1-6, 7-15[Burmese:Sìpwàyeì achei anei])
1946.06.07. Pyithu lutlakhmu chokgyeygynnán kángwetpwè meíngùn (Speech against oppression of the peoples’
freedom, at a protest meeting at Cantonment Park, 7.6.46). (AS 1971:130-34).
1946.06.14. Bamapyei anashin be thu lè [Who is Burma's dictator?] (Interview with a representative of Delhi Statesman
Newspaper, London Daily Sketch and Sunday Times Reporter, 14.06.46) (Bama Shayasuang, 17.06.46; SHT
[A collection of speeches collected by Aung San himself in July 1946 aimed to ‘challenge the world’s attention,
understanding, sympathy and positive support for Burma’s case, the case for independence.’.
(2000:7) this was being composed (in English) shortly after the British reoccupied Rangoon. It covers AS’s life
from birth to September 1946 talks with the governor on AFPFL participation in Governor’s Executive Council.
1946.07.24. Welcome India. Address given at the Rangoon reception for Sarat Chandra Bose, at he City Hall of the
1946.08.01. Burma Today (Burma Digest, 1.8.46; MCH 1970:16-19).
1946.08.11. Translation of speech by Bogoyoke Aung San to All-Burma Postal Employees Conference, 11.8.46. (T
1983-84, 1, No. 655:946-47).
1946.08.25. The situation and tasks. Presidential address, AFPFL, Supreme Council Session, 25.8.46. (AS 1946:167-
1946.08.25. Bogoyok Aung Hsàn gá ma aung hnaing ló atíalìn hpwín chá pyì [Bogyoke Aung San speaks out now].
[Speech at the third all Burma AFPFL central committee meeting, Rangoon, 25.8.46] (Thakin, 27.8.46; SHT
1985:171-175).
1946.10.20. Kunmyinitdwei go bágyaún htok pit yá thalè. (Why we expelled the communists, Speech at the mass rally
(English)).
1946.10.28. Lutlakyei go ahlyin lok yá mi (We need to first achieve independence (or freedom). Speech to the PVO
1946.11.19. Hpasapala hnin communnist party kyaik ya go à pei naing thi. (Speech, Pyinmana, 15.11.46) (Ludu thadinza,
19.11.46; MCH 1970:64-76).
1946.11.23. Sittakhma nyiyìn ako lounyi nyut yámi (In the army we must be united as brothers, Speech by the Minister
1946.12.01. Bogoyok metta gyinhpaw hma (The General’s loving-kindness towards the Jinghpaws, Speech in
1946.12.18. An address to the Anglo-Burmans (Delivered at the meeting of the Anglo Burman Council at the City Hall,
(English: Fascist Barbarism); KY 1969a:143-145).
1946.12.24. Kyundaw-dó ahsò ma hso ba né (Let us not say that we are bad. Speech in Taunggyi, 24.12.46). (Didok,
1946.12.26. Shànpyei go pa lutlakseigyin de (I want the Shan states to be independent, Speech in Nyaungshwe,
1947.01.01. À shíhmá ahkwín ayeì yá me (Only through strength does one have opportunity, Speech for AFPFL before
the journey to England, 1.1.47). (Broadcast 1.1.47; Zawana 5.1.47; AS 1971:163-169; KY 1969a:172-179; MCH
1947.01.05. U Aung San’s press conference at New Delhi subsequent to his speech at a reception of the Committee of


1947.01.29. Lutlakyeì bamá lek hma shíbi hsogyìn (We can say independence is in our hands, London, 29.1.47). (Bamasheizaung, 31.1.47; SHT 1985:232-236).


1947.02.08. Lutlatyeì ma yá da ma taùng ló hú bogyok gà hso pyi. (The General has already said that if we do not ask for independence we will not achieve it, On Aung San’s return from Britain, 6.2.47). (Thuriya 8.2.47; SHT 1985:249-252).


1947.02.09. Thweìhkwè hmúmyàgo ma hkan yan bogyok metta yak hkan gyin (Gen . Aung San’s request not to divide our blood, speech to Shan students, 9.2.47) (Bamasheizaung, 13.2.47; SHT 1985:265-268).


1947.03.01. Message from Bogyoke Aung San to all units of the Burma Army, 1.3.47. (BS12 No.308: 443-444).

1947.03.03. Bogyoke Aung San to General Secretary, Karen National Union, 3.3.1947. (BS12 No.309: 444-446).


1947.03.17. Japan go chúáhalou chá ma (We have to fight the way we did with the Japanese. Election speech in Moulmein, 17.3.47). (AS 1971:225-228).

1947 .03.19. Lutlakyeì mayaïn ba lokmalei. (If you we do not achieve independence what shall we do? 19.3.47) (Bamasheisaung, 19.3.47; SHT 1985:275-278).

1947.03.13. Naingyaei sahpagyidwei [Politicians who are like toads], Radio Broadcast, 13.03.47) (MM 1969c:76B).

1947.03.20. Myitta póyon hnin ma lutlak [It is not enough to send metta] (Speech to Mandalay public during the election campaign, 20.03.47) (Bamá Sheiziaung Thadinma, 26.03.47) (MM 1969c:67).

1947.03.20. Meingùn (Speech, to Kyauhsi public during the election campaign, 20.03.47) (Bamá Sheiziaung Thadinma, 28.03.47) (MM 1969c:67).
1947.04.05. Làn hnit hkwá (We are at a junction, Radio speech about the election boycott, 5.4.47). (AS 1971:243-253; KY 1969a:247-258).
1947.05.19. Htúdù hkhàka maik yin hkinbyàdó hpinsok kon me [You will all be in deep trouble if you don’t behave]. (Speech at Pyithù yèbaw htanaýok, Bamá Sheíhsaung Thadìnsa, 20.05.47) (MM 1969c:73).
1947.05.19. Makyeinathlyin ht wetpeì me (If you are not satisfied, I will withdraw. Press conference, 20.05.47).
1947.06.10. Amyèdàn ahsin thin shi yámé (We must be ready. Speech at the gathering in Bandoola-Park, 10.6.47). (AS 1971:341-343).


APPENDIX B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TWO VERSIONS OF THE BLUE PRINT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Par. No.</th>
<th>Paragraph/Sentence</th>
<th>English Version</th>
<th>Burmese Version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>p 2/s 2</td>
<td>A draft constitution is herewith submitted. It shows roughly on what basis the new independent state of Burma will be constructed. In this connection, it might be pertinent to answer the question whether or not a monarchy would be suitable for the new Burma that is to be resurrected.</td>
<td>[not found in Burmese]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>p 2/s 4-5</td>
<td>The history of Burma has shown clearly the weakness of this form of state [monarchy] particularly in a country like ours. In the olden days the stability of the administration was frequently disturbed because of the rivalry of claims to the kingship either in the life-time of a king or on his death. In the conception of the Burmese people, everything goes well if the head leads correctly but everything goes wrong if the head misleads or is unable to lead.</td>
<td>[not found in Burmese]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>p 2/s 6</td>
<td>There were several cases in our history in which chaos and confusion arose out of the debacle of the top leadership and discipline could not be maintained in that case.</td>
<td>[not found in Burmese]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p 2/s 7</td>
<td>Unfortunately the debacle of the top leadership has ended quite often in our country as we could not have a stable line of monarchy throughout, unlike Japan where the emperors maintain an unbroken line all along since the beginning.</td>
<td>[not found in Burmese]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>p 2/s 8 - p 3/s 2</td>
<td>The study of Burmese history shows that when a monarchic dynasty was set up it worked well only for two or three generations after which it gradually relapsed into futility for the simple reason that it was impossible for new successors to the throne to discharge the high office and duty of king in a capable manner. The idea of stability associated with monarchy generally is therefore not true in the case of Burma. A question might be interposed if we could not have such a thing as a constitutional monarchy, unlike in the style of the old absolutist form in the past. Our definite opinion on this question is that this form of state also will not do well. It is against the Burmese temperament</td>
<td>[not found in Burmese]</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
which demands always a strong capable leadership and does not want merely a figure-head.

parliamentary government fosters the spirit of individualism and thus gives chance to individualistic disruptors and obstructionists to disturb or delay the course of administration.

This form of state we call a republic for want of any other name, but it may become, when actually in existence and operation, quite a new state-form peculiar only to our country.

For the creation of the above state, the essential prerequisite is the building of one united nation.

In the emerging independent new Burma, our policy... eugenic policy.

In this building of the new economic life of our nation, the help of Japan is important.

, and here the help of Japan is imperative. In the process of our building Japan must help us with technical and military advice and assistance; the Japanese Imperial

Navy must protect the seaside. After we have built up our own defence forces Burma shall be responsible for the western defence of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere while Japan will guard over the East Asiatic Bloc from the last [East] side. A common defence policy for all East Asia with mutual cooperation and not with mutual suspicion. Such a policy Burma is ready to support and adopt.

(5) It follows from the above naturally that if we want to establish a common defence policy in East Asia as the best guarantee for the maintenance of the Greater East Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere, there must also be only one foreign policy in all East Asia. That policy, of course, must be evolved by mutual consultation and cooperation.

(6) In conclusion, we look forward to a time when we co-operate not merely in limited spheres such as economics and defence but in a more compact union like one brotherhood of nations. We hope such time will come soon.