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/* Written 5 Nov 6:00am 1995 by DRUNOO@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* ---------------" Comprehensive Response (reposted) "-------------- */

Part 2 of 2.

A Comprehensive Response to
Burma's Refugee and Displaced people problems

4.  Armed Conflicts in Burma
Concerned with the growing crisis of displaced Burmese in Thailand,
the UNHCR expressed its willingness, on 21 June 1994, to assist and
monitor  the  returnees  in  future  repatriation.   The UNHCR also
stated  the voluntary repatriation of Burmese refugees is  possible
only  if  all groups concerned implement a cease-fire and therefore
it urged Myanmar authorities and opposition groups to work  towards
that end [62].

There has been armed conflicts in Burma  since the time Burma gained
independence from British in 1948. The armed struggle in early period
evolved   from  the  ideological  differences  as  well  as  ethnic
nationality problems [63].  According  to  the  Burmese  army,  the
multitudes  of  armed  insurrections,  in  pursuasion  of communist
ideology as well as some ethnic groups' movement towards secession,
that threatened security of the nation  had  been  the  reason  for
Burmese military in seizing the state power in 1962.

There  has been a number of attempts by previous military regime to
make cease-fire with  the  rebels,  one  in  1963.  These  attempts
failed  because of Burmese military's insistence on total surrender
for the rebels and refusal to make political concessions on  ethnic
nationality  issues,  i.e. to give a greater autonomy. The presense
of communist rebels may also have   complicated  in  formulating  a
comprehensive political settlement at that time.

The  ethnic  nationalities'  struggle  for  varying  objectives  of
freedom and greater autonomy has, in time, evolved  into   that  of
establishing  the  federal  union of Burma; the National Democratic
Front was formed in May 1976 [64].  Some  groups  became  primarily
involved  in narcotic trades: appearing to have been driven by  the
complex  dynamics  of  underlying  ethnic  beliefs,  political  and
economic  factors [65]. The Communist Party of Burma army, which is
the strongest force against the Rangoon  central  government  since
1970s, split up into regional resistance armies after the Wa ethnic
faction mutinied against Burman communist leaders in 1989 [66].

Following  the  nationwide  uprising  in  1988,  the  urban  Burman
pro-democracy students fled to rebel controlled areas. In  November
1988,  the  National  Democratic  Front  formally  included Burmese
students and formed the Democratic Alliance of  Burma.  The  ethnic
nationalities'  struggle  for  a  greater freedom had reached a new
phase in 1991 when the elected  parliamentarians,  who  claimed  to
have  the mandate to form a parallel government, fled to rebel held
areas and signed an agreement to form the federal union of Burma [67].

By September 1993,  in an attempt to  attract  the  ethnic  freedom
fighters  to  enter  a cease-fire, the Burmese military have made a
promise to adopt a federal republic style constitution  [68].  This
can  be   seen as the Burman's concessions on the issue of autonomy
for the minorities.

These facts suggest, for the first time in Burma's post-independent
history, the ethnic nationality issues can be resolved  along  with
the  restoration  of  a  democratic government. With the  crisis in
Burmese politics, as the analyst had pointed  out  [69],  the  real
opportunities for the cessation of 45 year long civil war as well as
the  restoration  of  a  popular  government in Burma may have been
coming into a reality.

5.  Eliminating Root Causes
As it is explained in Sec 2. and  Sec  3.,  the  armed  hostilities
between  ethnic  nationalities  and  the Burmese army are seen as a
primary root cause for the occurrences of human rights abuses  that
consequently  cause  displacements.  Therefore the priority must be
given to implement a nation-wide cease-fire.

For a longer term settlement, the ethnic and political issues must be
resolved through constitutional reform. The  ethnic  nationalities'
demands  for  greater  autonomy  must  be  realized  in the form of
Federal Constitution.  Along  with  elected  parliamentarians,  the
ethnic  freedom  fighters  should  be  given  appropriate political
platform in drafting the constitution. The UN  Committee  on  Human
Rights should offer its help in drafting of the constitution.

Measures  must  be  made  to improve the human rights  situation in
minority areas. Efforts should be made  to  reduce  the  oppressive
activities by Local military authorities regarding forced labour and
informal taxations. Arrangements must also be made for the displaced
villagers  to  have  the  compensations  from  the Myanmar military

The growing humanitarian crisis in Burma must also be tackled.  The
immediate  attention  should  be  given  to  contain  the spread of
HIV/AIDS  throughout  Burma,  especially  in  minority  areas.  The
initiatives  must  be  made  to  curtail  narcotic  production  and
increasing cases of illegal drug uses.

5.1  The United Nations General Assembly:
In this UN General Assembly,  the  international  community  should
strengthened the resolution regarding Burmese refugees and displaced
people [70]. In particular, the UNGA should urge Myanmar government
to  make  measures   to rectify the human rights abuses in minority
areas and to eliminate the root causes of  the  refugees'  flights.
The  various parties in the conflict must also be urged  to seek an
end to civil war   and  to  implement  the  nation-wide  cease-fire

In  this  UN  General  Assembly, the international community should
recommand the deployment of a  civilian  peace-keeping  mission  to
Burma.   The  mission  should  be  given  the  mandate  to  monitor
cease-fire and human rights; and to promote  human  rights  and  to
improve  humanitarian  situation. The UN mission  should take the "
an  expanded  peace-keepers'  role"  in   Myanmar/Burma   [71].   A
crossed-mandate  approach  should  be made in regards to monitoring
and promoting human rights [72].

The UNGA should particularly encourage Myanmar military authorities
and  the  elected  representatives   to   form   regional   working
committees,  which  similar  to {\em Reception Committee} in Arakan
State, to carried out the humanitarian tasks under UN mission.

The UNGA should urge Myanmar authorities to allow UN  Agencies  and
non-governmental organizations to get free and unhindered access in
delivering humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar through
the regional working committees.

All  member  states  should  be urged to refrain from providing the
large-scale development assistance to Myanmar. The humanitarian and
small-scale development assistance should be allowed to be given to

In  this  UNGA,  the  international  community  should  promote  an
appropriate  legal framework that is necessary for the UN organized
repatriation of Burmese refugees and displaced  people.  Tripartite
agreements  should  be  completed by UNHCR, Myanmar authorities and
Myanmar's neighbouring governments - particularly  the  Royal  Thai
Government.  These agreements must observe the {\em non-refoulment}

5.2  Consolidation of Cease-fire:
Presently, the Burmese military had  signed  cease-fire  agreements
with  11  ethnic rebel groups. Although these cease-fire agreements
are (1) made to counteract the ethnic  federal  movement,  (2)  are
aimed  at  providing  a  short  term  solution  and (3) are lacking
credibility since the majority of groups entered are now engaged in
the  illegal  drug  trades;  nonetheless   these   agreements   are
important. By the time a comprehensive political settlement between
the  Burmese  army  and  the  Democratic Alliance of Burma has been
made, these existing cease-fire should be brought  into  line  with
the settlement.

In  this UN General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights should
recommend  Myanmar  Government  and  ethnic  rebels  to   enter   a
cease-fire and to make the political settlement. Detailed plans  of
how  to  implement a cease-fire and how to maintain and monitor the
cease-fire must also be worked out.

Ethnic freedom fighters have been deceived,in the 1963 Peace Parley
for example, with the promise of a cease-fire by the Burmese  army.
They  are  therefore  cautious  and  fearful  about entering into a
cease-fire agreement with Burmese army  and  request  the  presense
of   international observers. The UN Agencies and major democracies
should offer their presense in the implementation of a  cease-fire.
Furthermore,  there  have been concerns that once the cease-fire is
implemented, the deployment  of  the  Burmese  army  at   strategic
positions  may  disadvantage  the ethnic rebels. These details must
carefully be worked out and  planned to implement  the  nation-wide

It  may  become  possible  for  armed opposition groups, which have
genuine cause  for  political  freedoms,  to  enter  to  the  wider
settlement.   However,  there  can  be  difficulties  with  private
militia. In case of the  existence  of  such  an  obstacle  in  the
nation-wide  cease-fire,  efforts  should  be  made to contain such

Once a nation-wide cease-fire agreement has been  implemented,  the
UN  Security Council should impose an international arms embargo on
Burma. This is particularly necessary for both  ethnic  rebels  and
the  Burmese army not to arm themselves to get a greater advantage.
In order to maintain stability, provisions  must  be  made  in  the
cease-fire  agreement  so  that  the  armed  forces from both sides
should not  defect to one  another's sides.

5.2  Monitoring Human Rights:
In order to improve the human rights situation in  minority  areas,
especially those bordering Thailand, the UN General Assembly should
implement  the recommendations of the 50th session of Commission on
Human Rights [73]. Since  the  type  of  abuses  occur  because  of
weaknesses  in legislative and institutional sectors, the effort to
improve human rights should be aimed at building  institutions  for
the   long   term.   To   ensure   the   participation  of  elected
representatives of May 1990  in  institution  building  tasks,  the
implementations  of  this  recommendation must  be made through the
regional working committees. In particular, measure should be  made
to implement following recommendation:

      "(e)  The  Government  of  Myanmar  should take the necessary
      steps to bring the acts of soldiers, including privates   and
      officers, in line with accepted  international  human  rights
      and  humanitarian  standards  so  that  they  will not commit
      arbitrary killings, rapes and confiscations of  property,  or
      force  persons  into acts of labour, portering, relocation or
      otherwise treat persons without  respect  for  their  dignity
      as  human  beings.  When  the  hiring  of local villagers for
      porterage and other works may be  required  for  governmental
      purposes,  it  should  be  obtained  on a voluntary basis and
      adequate wages should be paid. The nature of work  should  be
      reasonable  and  in accordance with established international
      labour standards. When relocation of villages  is  considered
      necessary for military operations or for development projects,
      proper  consultation with the villagers should take place and
      appropriate compensation should be paid for those relocations
      which may be determined necessary for reasons of  the  public

Within  the  context  of  enforcing  this recommendation, the UNCHR
should recommend Myanmar authorities and also UN Agencies:

(a) To promote human rights and to carry out a smooth operation for
the UN Agencies, the `regional working committees' which similar to
{\em Reception Committee} in Arakan State must be formed [74].

(b) A tribunal must be set-up and operate under the supervision  of
the  United  Nations.  Various  compensation  claims: the losses of
properties in having to move to  concentration  camps,  the  monies
demanded by military for the loss of army's properties, etc, should
be assessed by this tribunal and the military government of Myanmar
give  compensation  to  these  people.  Efforts  should  be made to
initiate judicial reforms in Myanmar  and  UN  Committee  on  Human
Rights to offer its helps.

(c)   A  special  committee  consisting  of  respective  government
ministries, the UN agencies, elected  local  leaders  and  regional
army  commander should be formed to determine the maximum amount of
taxes that should be raised from the people. A  guideline  must  be
drawn  and  urge  the  Myanmar  authorities  to  follow it in their
taxations. The UN monitoring team should ensure that  the  taxation
is  not excessive. The respective UN agencies, such as UNDP, should
offer their helps  to  train  and  restructure  a  proper  taxation
department in Burma.

(d)  Myanmar  military government must reimburst the monies owed to
the villagers along the Ye-Tavoy railway routes as  well  as  other
development projects for their contributed labour.

(e) Investigations should  made into the incidences of extrajudicial
killings  occurred  within  the  context  of  military  operations.
Compensation must be given to those family members of those  killed
in such incidences.

(f) All UN Agencies and non-governmental organizations must respect
and  promote  human rights within Burma, regardless of their formal
mandates and humanitarian role.

5.4  UN High Commissioner for Refugees:
Presently, in Thailand there are 350,000 displaced  people,  72,000
ethnic  refugees  and  2500  student  refugees. An estimated 12,000
refugees from Kachin State are in China. Also a smaller  number  of
refugees and displaced persons in India.

Within  Burma,  there  are  estimated  800,000 internally displaced
people(idp) in Karen State, 50,000 idp in Kachin State. In addition
to  ethnic   freedom   fighters,   there   are   un-armed   Burmese
pro-democracy students within ethnic rebel controlled areas [75].

For  such  a  mixed  population  which  need similar protection and
assistance  as  returning  refugees,  the  UNHCR  should  make   an
innovative  plan  for  protection.  The  UNHCR  should  broaden its
mandate to protect returnees and internally  displaced  people.  In
particular,  unarmed student rebels in ethnic rebel controlled area
should be given `person of concern status'.

In order to protect refugees and people who have   higher  risk  of
persecution, such as internally displaced people, the UNHCR should
consider  creating   special  zones,  that  are similar to security
zones created for returning Kurds refugees in northern Iraq in 1991
[76]. In  the  process  of  creating  special  zones,  it  must  be
transparent   by   both   sides  not  to  build-up  their  military
capacities. This kind of arrangement will be  necessary  until  the
cease-fire   is  consolidated.  Restrictions  may  be   imposed  on
students  to be  confined  to  their  respective  areas  until  the
cease-fire  condition is consolidated. Other detailed arrangements,
such as visiting  by parents and relatives to those  students  must
also be allowed.

5.5  Humanitarian Agencies and NGOs:
The humanitarian agencies and non-government organizations have been
at the fore-front in advocating to increase humanitarian assistance
to  Burma.  It  is  reported  that  the  UNICEF and NGOs are now in
preparation to enter Burma [77].

Regarding  human rights monitoring missions, the UN  Agencies  have
often  been  described  as  silent witness [78]. There are concerns
already been expressed by NGOs for returning Burmese  muslims  from
Bangladesh.  Once  the  refugees  have  returned, the international
community need to be kept informed of  the  returnees'  situations.
The NGOs should fill such an information vacuum, ifthe UN Agencies'
mandate has limitations.

The  UNICEF  and  NGO's  should make a special effort to tackle the
HIV/AIDS problem in Shan State  and Kachin State. Special attention
should be given to  Burmese  women  returning  from  Thailand.  The
education  programs  for  the  local  population  as  well  as  the
information flow from these areas, especially Shan State,  will  be
particularly  useful to co-ordinate future drug eradication programs.

5.6  UN Drug Control Programmes:
The increasing illicit drug production and trafficking in Shan State
also  needs   attention.  In  the  past, the UNDCP efforts were not
yielding good results, probably because it can not operate  in  the
whole  Shan  State.  The main problem seems to be the difficulty to
work with the local population directly. Recent human rights  field
reports  suggest  that  the  confiscation  of  villagers  land  has
occurred  within   the  context  of   UNDCP's   income   generation
programme. Therefore, efforts must be made to avoid such incidences.

SLORC's  attempt to use the drug issue for its political legitimacy
has been a concern to human  rights  groups  and  oppositions.  The
UNDCP  should broaden its focus and consider promoting human rights
as suggested in the guideline.

Although the cease-fire situation in Shan State is believed  to  be
fragile,  the  UNDCP  should work closely with the regional working
committees, UNICEF and NGOs. Through gradual  contacts,  the  UNDCP
should promote its drug eradication programs.

5.7  UN Trusteeship Role in Burma ?
There  has  been  increasing  weariness  in donor countries and the
UNHCR,  in  particular,  to  meet  growing  needs  of  humanitarian
emergencies  throughout  the  globe. Although the NGOs may do their
best efforts  in searching for funds, it is quite impossible to get
at the level of needs. A greater amount of monies  will  be  needed
when  the  reintegration  program  has  started. Therefore,  the UN
should consider setting up a  trusteeship  for  future  development
projects.  At present, the currency in Myanmar is at a high rate of
inflation due to government over printing  of  notes.  However,  if
this  situation  can  be  brought  under  control,  the  UN  should
introduce a local financial institution - i.e. a  Bank  independent
of  the   Military  Government  -  for  development funds, with the
provision of handing-over the assets to the elected government when
the UN mission is completed. This kind of arrangement will also  be
beneficial  in  the  training  of  civil  servants  for banking and
financial matters.

6.  Towards the Reconciliations
At the time of preparing this paper, it is not known whether SLORC
will set a date to transfer power. One thing certain,  however,  is
that   the   building   of   democratic  institutions  as  well  as
reconstruction of national economy may have to be  carried  out  in
the  immediate  future. Efforts are also needed for reconciliations
between the army and civilian populations as  well  as  the  Burman
majority and ethnic minorities.

Societies that experienced violent oppressions inevitably have left
with residual tensions. It has often been the case that the fear of
retribution becomes the driving force for  oppressors to hold on to
power.  It  is  the  very  fear  that  has kept the present Burmese
military junta holding   together.  Therefore,  promises  from  the
opposition  forces  that  no  retribution upon transfer of power to
SLORC is necessary. One may often  feel  that  the  perpetrator  of
human rights abuses ought to be brought to justice. However, in the
best  interests  of national reconciliation and in order to avoid a
violent showdown,  it  seems  worthwhile  to  make  reconciliation.
Although  we  must  never forget about the violent past ({\em every
effort  must be made to  prevent  the  military  dictatorship  from
resurrecting}),  our  efforts  should  better  be used in promoting
peace and future prosperity of the nation [79].

There has been a policy dispute between the approach  presented  in
this  document  and  that  of priority given to restoring a popular
government. Although this is an obvious point that the  removal  of
the  leadership  of  the  junta  may  pave  the  way  to  establish
democracy, it is not necessarily  the  only  solution.  Of  course,
there  would  be  far less reasons to argue this point if SLORC set
the date to transfer power. However, for a country like Burma which
has little experience in  democratic government, there are  equally
important  tasks of building democratic institutions and  promoting
greater respect for human rights. In  building  such  institutions,
national efforts with international supports are necessary.

A  more fundamental approach is to consider SLORC  as the system of
repression and the violator of human rights. Therefore, the increase
in the reduction of SLORC's unlawful activities are equally as good
as removing the junta's leaders. From recent  developments,  it  is
evident  that the SLORC leaderships is increasingly disoriented and
also losing their control on the army rank and file. It is a  clear
sign  that  the  military  dictatorship  is breaking down in Burma.
Therefore efforts must be made in order to create a new  democratic
political  order  in  Burma.  The  strengthening  of the democratic
institutions and establishing the independent  judiciary  are  more
important and achievable.

The  curtailment  of SLORC's illegal and unlawful activities can be
made through external supports (and power) along with the  national
efforts.  The  returning  refugees, internally displaced people and
the peace-keeping  mission  that  bring  international  instruments
together  with  them  must be seen as part of the strategy. In this
case, the nation building tasks will be carried through by national
efforts with international supports. Bonuses in  this  process  are
peace and security for normal citizens and  regional stability.

It is necessary to balance the efforts to improve human rights with
political  realities.  For  Burma,  a country in which all forms of
freedom have been  severely  suppressed  for  a  long  period,  the
improvements  for  human  rights must be made in measured steps. At
the  same  time  the  confidence  building  between  army,   ethnic
nationalities  and  civilian  oppositions should be allowed to take

6.  Voluntary Repatriation and Confidence Building
Since displaced persons are  mixed  with  refugees,  the  voluntary
repatriation  to  Burma  should  be  carried  out  in parallel with
confidence building process in Burma.

As the first step, the UN mission should  be  mandated  to  monitor
serious  forms  of  abuses:  rape, extrajudiccial killing, torture,
detention without trial; and those described in Sec  2.  This  step
will  create  an environment conducive for the return of most of so
called `illegal immigrants' in Thailand. These so  called  `illegal
and economic immigrants' have lesser risk of  politically motivated
arrests and persecutions therefore this first step will enable them
to go  home. Since the majority of displaced population in Thailand
are  the  `illegal  and  economic immigrants', this step need to be
considered as major operation.

By the time a cease-fire condition is  consolidated -  probably  by
middle  of next year - the UN mission's mandate should be broadened
to include freedom of expression and association  (  this  may  not
include freedom to assemble in large crowds). This is to facilitate
the  populace  to have  free discussions for drafting constitutions
and forming parties. Amnesty to all rebels, refugees  and  detained
politicians should also be given.

This   step   will  encourage  the  return  of  the   students  who
participated in anti-government movements and ethnic  refugees  who
are in association with ethnic freedom fighters. These refugees are
expected  to repatriate as soon as the political climate within the
country is improved and the process of reconciliation is in progress.
The general amnesty which  combined  with  formation  of  political
parties  has  to be a primary deciding factor for those refugees to
return. This step would meet with the consolidation of  nation-wide
cease-fire with the army and rebels.

[ 1] John BAdgley, "Myanmar in 1993: A watershed year", ASIAN SURVEY,
     Vol. XXXIV, NO. 2, February 1994.
[ 2] Bangkok Post, 21 September 1994.
[ 3] The New Light of Myanmar, 16 September 1994.
[ 4] Country Human Rights Reports, US Department of States,
     February 1994.
[ 5] Janelle M. Diller, "Constitutional Reform in a Repressive State:
     The Case of Burma", ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXXIII, No 4.
[ 6] Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 January 1994.
[ 7] Economic Intelligence Unit Country Report, 2nd quarter 1994.
[ 8] This report mainly focus on the human rights abuses that produce
[ 9] see Amnesty International report, "Myanmar: Human rights development
     July to December 1993"; ASA 16/03/94.
[10] This concession, again, has been undermined by continuing detentions
     and renewed arrests of non-violent political activists in November
     1993 and July 1994; see Amnesty document, Urgent Action AI Index:
     16/08/94, 16/11/94.
[11] It is a sign of present military junta's lack of moral authority upon
     the army rank and file.
[12] Country Human Rights reports, US Department of State; February 1994.
[13] Project Maje, "A Swanp Full of Lilies: Human Rights Violations
     Committed by Units/Personals of Burma's Army, 1992-1993, Feb.1994.
[14] The four cut strategy:the military attempts to cut links of
     intelligence, food, money and recruit between armed opposition groups
     and local civilians.(see Amnesty International report, AI Index ASA:
[15] ( A - 1) One reliable source stated in 1993 that," The campaign is
     spread through Papun Sistrict in the north, through central Thaton
     District, to Pa-an District in the south. It is a large region about
     200km north to south, forming a large crescent behind SLORC line west
     of Manerplaw.
[16] An independent human rights group, which based in Manerplaw, have
     reported a series  of interview by both refugees at the border and, on
     occasions, people from the villages inside Burma. The series of
     interview are available on the Internet. The names of the interviewees
     have been changed as a protection.
[17] Karen Human Rights Group report: February 17, 1994: see testimonies of
     DAw Mya Thein.
[18] Karen Human Rights Group report: May 26, 1994; testimony by Naw Lar
[19] There had been reports of forced labour in Loikaw-Aungbann railways in
     Shan State in 1991-93. Dawn news bulletin, Vol. 4 No. 5.
     October-November 1993.
[20] This can be seen as the Burmese Army's atttempt to seek its political
     legitimacy: portraying itself as of having the support of masses at
     the same time trying to mobilize the public support for its agenda.
[21] ( A - 2) Burma Update, June 24, 1994.
[22] CPPSM, Committee for Publicity of Peoples' Struggle for Monland,
     Ye-Tavoy Railway Report, April 1994.
[23] Karen Human Rights Group report: April 13, 1994; testimony by Maung
[24] Karen Human Rights Group report: April 13, 1994; testimony by Hla Aye.
[25] CPPSM report, April 1994. See also New Era Journal(in Burmese),
     No 27, August 1994.
[26] re: the use of forced labour in counter-insurgeency operations.
[27] Karen Human Rights Group report: June 24, 1994; testimony by Nan
     Thein Thein.
[28] Karen Human Rights Group report: March 16, 1994; testimony by Maug
[29] Burma Action Group UK, "Burma and the United Nations: a roposal for
     constructive involvement", November 1992.
[30] Karen Human Rights Group report: June 24, 1994; tesetimony by
     Naw Paw Paw Htoo.
[31] Karen Human Rights Group report: June 24, 1994; testimony by
     Saw Hla Maung.
[32] Karen Human Rights Group report: May 26, 1994; testimony by
     Saw Lah Ghay.
[33] Karen Human Rights Group report: February 17, 1994; testimony by
     Daw Mya Thein.
[34] Karen Human Rights Group report: February 17, 1994; testimony by
     Htoo Htoo Mo.
[35] This appear that the army attempting to discourage the similar aggack
     by rebels and may also attributed to the practice of army
     extorting monies.
[36] Karen Human Rights Group report: April 23, 1994; testimony by Naw Say.
[37] Karen Human Rights Group report: February 17, 1994; testimony by H
     Htoo Htoo Mo.
[38] ( A - 3) Karen Human Rights Group report: April 23, 1994; testimony by
     Naw Eh Wah.
[39] Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 January 1994.
[40] ( A - 4) Burmese Relief Centre, July 1994.
[41] Karen Human Rights Groups report: 20 August 1994; testimony by Sai On.
[42] Amnesty International reports: September 1994, 26 May 1994.
[43] ( A - 5) Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 December 1993.
[44] Burma Students' League in India estimates, in their December 1993
     report, total number as: students 500, war victims 3,000 and
     economically-displaced 5,000.
[45] Bangkok Post, 17 September 1994.
[46] ( B - 1) Bangkok Post, 16 September 1994.
[47] Associated Press, 1 June 1994.
[48] Martin Smith, "Insrugency and The Politice of Ethnicity", 1991. The
     BSPP government was so embarrassed that they announced that news after
     4 months later.
[49] Economic Intelligence Unit Country Report, 2nd quarter 1994.
[50] David I Steinberg, "Neither Silver Nor gold: The 40th anniversary of
     The Burmese Economy" in Independent Burma at Forty Years,
     Ed. J Silverstein, Ithaca, N.Y. 1989.
[51] Human rights groups in their rcent field reports frequently mention
     the incidences of forced procurement of rice from villagers(and
     refugees). However, this provlem has been so profound in its
     underlying complexities and therefore do not nention in Sec 2.1.3.
[52] ( B - 2) All Burma Student Democratic Front(ABSDF) in Arakan have
     reported the situation in its 20 November 1993 statement. Clearly
     outraged at the sufferings of Arakanese masses, the report itself is
     strong in tone, but is the reflection of a deep sadness for rural
     population. Students seems to have exaggerated their status of as
     military component since there was no such military activity in
[53] Asia Watch/ Women's Rights Project,"A Modern Form of Slavery:
     trafficking of Burmese Women and girls into Brothels in Thailand",
     December 1993.
[54] ibid. pp45: The report said, "Of the thirty, nineteen had parents or
     guardians who were peasant farmers or farm laborers. They came from
     villages all over Shan State(Taichelek, Keng Tung and Taunggyi);
     Kachin State near the Chinese border; Kayin State; Sagaing division in
     central Burma; and even Rangoon, the capital city.
[55] ( B -3) FAr Eastern Economic Review, 21 July 1994.
[56] ( B -4) Jesuit Refugee Service in Asia-Pacific, Issue 31, November
[57] ( B -5) ICVA mission to Burma report.
[58] UN High Commissioner for Refugees, "The State of the Worlds Refugees
     1993: the Challenge of Protection", pp 5, "Many of the people in need
     of protection are fleeing from armed conflict, generalized violence,
     severe disrption of public order or widespread abuses of human rights.
     Their claims to international protection are widely acknowledged, even
     though they may not always conform to the notion of persecution found
     in the 1951 convention relating to the Status of Refugees(see box 2).
     The situations from which they flee do not necessarily entil
     individually targeted persecution but do provide fertile breeding
     grounds for it."
[59] Asia Watch, "Abuses against Burmese Refugees in Thailand", Vol. No 4
     Issue No 7, 20 March 1992.
[60] bangkok Post, 30 June 1994.
[61] National Democratic Front, 24 July 1994.
[62] ( C -1) Bangkok Post, 30 June 1994.
[63] ( C -2) Burma Action Group UK, November 1992. Martin Smith, "Burma:
     Insurgency and Politics of Ethnicity ", 1991.
[64] A Breif History of National Democratic Front(Burma),(Private
[65] The complexity of ethnic armed insrugency issue in Burma has long been
     recognised. The evolvement of ideals and actions of the insurgents
     are also dictated by the necessity to survive in revolution. These
     facts are further complicated by the presense of private militias,
     which take advantage of lawlessness in remote areas, formed solely for
     production and trafficking of illicit drugs.
[66] Bertil Lintner,"The Politics of the Drug Trade in Burma", Indian
     Ocean Centre for Peace Studies occasional paper Mo 33. the University
     of Western Australia, May 1993.
[67] ( C -3) Australia Council For Oversea Aid, seminor on Burma, May 27,
[68] Burma Information Group, October 1993;The New Light Of Myanmar,
     16/9/94 stated,"...Others include the creation of a federal union and
     a multi-party democracy system with freedom of expression and worship
     as well as seven ethnic minority states with equal status, authority
     and their own parliaments, judicial systems and administrations in a
     power sharing system. Mo part of the territory of the state of region
     shall be allowed to secede from the union."
[69] Burma Action Group UK, "Burma and the United Nations: a proposal for
     constructive involvement", November 1992.
[70] UNGA draft resolution, UN Document A/C.3/48/L.70, 29 November 1993.
     (adopted by consensus in December 6, 1993.)
     Noting that the human rights situation in Myanmar has consequently
     resulted in flows of refugees to neighbouring countries, thus creating
     problem for the country concerned,
     Noting the ceasefire that has been reached between the Government of
     Myanmar and several groups of ethnic and religious minorities in
[71] Gareth Evans, "Cooperating for Peace: The global agenda for 1990s and
     beyond.", 1993.
[72] This author wrote a suggestion paper,"An Operational Guideline
     Proposal for the United Nations Agencies in Myanmar", last April. It
     outlines a guideline on how the UN AGencies may promote the human
     rights at the same time improving humanitarian situation; and how ti
     bypass SLORC in providing humanitarian assistance to the populace. The
     paper will be made available at your request.
[73] United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifteith Session, Agenda
     item 12, E/CN.4/1994/57, 16 February 1994.
[74] "An Operational Guideline Proposal for United Nations Agencies in
     Myanmar", 26 April 1994.
[75] Sources reports 600 such students in Kachin State and 300 in Karenni
[76] UNHCR,"The State of the World's Refugees", 1993; pp-84.
[77] ( D -1) Burma Issues, July 1994.
[78] Amnesty International, "Peace-keeping and Human Rights",
     ASA 40/01/94.
[79] Opinions on this point will certainly be varied. It often been charged
     to those tends to forgive oppressors as betraying from the course.
     Amongst Burmese people, there has been a profound sadness for those
     who made sacrifices in 1988 and the period that followed. Eventually,
     it is the sadness that compel this author to participate in the

Part 2 of  6.

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