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/* Written 14 Dec 6:00am 1996 by DRUNOO@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* ---------" 1993: BA(SA) Report for refugees in Thailand "--------- */

6 October 1993


RE: The United Nations protection for the Burma's displaced people in Thailand.}\\
Concerned  with  the  lack of progress towards the transfer of power to the
elected National League for Democracy (NLD)  and  continuing  human  rights
abuses  on  un-armed  civilian population in Burma, the Burma Action (South
Australia) call  upon  the  international  community  to  (1)  address  the
humanitarian  needs of the internally displaced people in Burma and, (2) to
join in calling for the United Nations and The Government  of  Thailand  to
give protection for Burmese refugees in Thailand.

Despite  the international community's demands to respect the result of the
election in 27-May-1990, Burma's first multi-party  election in  26  years,
the  State  Law  and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the military junta,
who staged a military coup in 1988, shows no sign of transferring power  to
the elected civilian government.

SLORC's  repression  on the un-armed civilian population continues in spite
of condemnations by United Nations  Commission  on  Human  Rights  and  the
international  community.  Unlawful  detention  of  hundreds  of  political
prisoners, including 1991 Nobel  Peace  Prize  winner  Aung  San  Suu  Kyi,
continues this year despite a release of 2000.

The  Military  Government  of  Burma(SLORC)  clearly  continues to show its
intention to keep the strangle-hold on  state  power.  SLORC's   strategies
which  weaken  the strength of the opposition, enables it to stay in power.
SLORC used modest concessions as a buffer  for  the international criticism
and, at the same time, trys to find ways to establish its legitimacy.

As the political conflict in Burma has dragged into its 5th year,  the  the
situation   for   Burmese   refugees   in   Bangladesh  and  Thailand   has
deteriorated. Within the country, the number of internally displaced people
has increased due to  SLORCs   counter  insurgency   campaign.  The  muslim
refugees  in Bangladesh are living in an egregious conditions while Burmese
dissidents and ethnic Karen/Mon refugees in Thailand live in constant  fear
of arrest, detention and deportation. A new influx of refugees have crossed
the  Thai  border  because of the humanitarian situation for the internally
displaced people worsens.

While the political settlement  of the  conflicts  in  Burma   still  seems
remote,   we   call   upon  the  international  community  to  address  the
humanitarian needs and protection of Human Rights for the displaced  people
of Burma. We also urge the Government of Thailand and the United Nations to
provide protection for the Burmese refugees in Thailand.

I. Introduction
Following   the   brutal   crackdown   on   the   nationwide  pro-democracy
demonstrations in 1988, Burma's military assumed state power and  continues
ruling  in  the  name  of  State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).
SLORC promised  to  hold  a  multi-party  election   in  order  to  form  a
democratic government. It also promised to carry out economic liberalizations
to  revitalize  the  economy. The promised election was held in 27-May-1990
and the opposition party, the National League for Democracy  (NLD),  won  a
majority of seats. The military then refused to transfer the state power to
NLD  and  rephrased  that  elected  parliamentarians  are  to  draw  a  new
Constitution [1].

SLORC's move on the Constitutional restructure was found to be  an  attempt
to legalize the military's role on the state power [2]. The guideline for a
new  Constitution  was  set by SLORC to secure a leading role for the armed
forces in future politics. Furthermore, the constitution framed  under  the
control  of  SLORC  is  illegitimate  and  will  not  guarantee to meet the
democratic aspirations of the people of Burma [3].

The SLORC also fails to liberalize the economy  [4].  In  addition  to  the
obvious  political  instability  within  the country, the Burma military is
simply incompetent to enact a genuine economic reform.  SLORCs  invitations
for  free  trade  and  investments  only  attract  those who try to exploit
Burma's natural resources  for  a  quick  and  easy  profit.  Most  of  the
multinational oil companies which joined in search for Burma's possible oil
reserve in 1989 have abandoned the military, further weakening the SLORC's
financial position.

The people of Burma bear all the sufferings that are caused by the economic
mis-managements  of the previous military regime(BSPP) and SLORC. There are
signs of moral decline in a traditionally conservative Burmese  family  due
to destitution and poverty . The unemployment situation, combined with high
inflation,  make impossible for many families to feed their children. There
is  increase  in  trafficking  of  children,  especially  young girls, into
Thailand as sex-slaves [5,6]. The humanitarian situation within the country,
especially of women and children, is said to have been in a state of silent
emergency [7].

Despite SLORC having made a few changes in its conduct with the international
community, the actual transfer of power to NLD still seems remote.

We therefore call upon the international community to give attention to the
displaced Burmese people  in  Thailand.  We  also  urge  the  international
community  to  join  in  calling  for  SLORC  to  rectify  its human rights
violations against internally displaced people.

II. Armed Conflict in Burma: the Karen State.
There have been armed conflicts between the Rangoon central government and
the ethnic minorities since  Burma's independence in 1948.  The  underlying
reasons of ethnic armed revolts has been  the most complex issue in Burmese
politics.  A  common  objective among various ethnic insurgent groups is to
establish Burma as a state of federation in order to allow  greater freedom
for the ethnics nationalities. When General Ne Win took over power in 1962,
there were nationwide armed insurgency from the political groups as well as
ethnic minorities including the Communist Party of Burma (CPB),  the  Karen
and Kachin ethnic groups.  The nationwide armed insurgency which threatened
the  security  of  Burma  was,  according  to  Burma military, an emergency
situation that justified the military to seize state power.

By mid-1970, the armed insurgency within the country had been eliminated by
the government forces [8]. The ethnic rebels and CPB only  operate  in  the
mountainous  and  unaccessible border areas. The renewed offensive on Karen
guerrillas in the eastern part of Burma  was launched in 1984 and the first
influx of Karen refugees crossed the Thai border at  that  time.  Following
the government crackdown on  pro-democracy demonstrations in August/September
1988, Burmese refugees, mainly student activists, arrived at the Thai-Burma
border.  Throughout  1988-1992,  SLORC  intensified  its counter insurgency
campaign on Karen  guerrillas,  forcing  students  and  ethnics  population
further into Thailand.

The  struggle  for  ethnic  freedom  reached  a new phase when a group of 8
parliamentarians, who were elected in May-1990 election, fled to Thai-Burma
border and formed a parallel  government  in  December-1990  [9,10].  These
parliamentarians, who claimed to have support of other 250 parliamentarians
under  SLORC,  joined the ethnic freedom fighters, formed the government in
exile and work towards the establishment of  the  federal  union  of  Burma
[11].  This government in exile, known as the National Coalition Government
of the Union of  Burma,  certainly  meet  the  aspirations  of  all  ethnic
minority  groups.  The  parallel  government in exile enjoy the sympathetic
support from various countries and  expatriate Burmese abroad.

To establish Burma as a federation of states has been a sensitive political
issue even since the time that Gen. Ne Win took over power in  1962.  There
is  a  perception  among  older Burmese leaders that the establishment of a
federal union may leads to a secession. The Burmese military always claimed
itself as the saviour of Burma from disintegration  and  ethnic  rebels  as
separatists.  Following  the  1989  collapse of CPB [12], there has been no
ethnic insurgency left to challenge the military  and  no  external  forces
threatening   Burma.  To  date,  the issue of the non-disintegration of the
union, in fact, is the only issue that is left to  justify  the  military's
role in Burmese politics.

The  Burma  Army under Gen. Ne Win  therefore discourages the federalism in
Burma and suppresses any movement towards establishment of a federal union.
In dealing with the ethnic insurgency issue,  the  Burma  Army  prefers  to
solve  it  by  military means rather than making political concessions. The
emergence of NCGUB/DAB  as  a  political  alliance,  therefore,  becomes  a
concern to SLORC.

As  noted  by observers [13], SLORC changed its tactics in dealing with its
opponents after the leadership changes in April 1992. For the emergence  of
the NCGUB/DAB political alliance, SLORC used dividing and conquering tactics.
The  rebel  groups within DAB are coerced to sign separate peace agreements
with SLORC leaving the NCGUB/DAB  alliance  weakened  [14].  It  is  widely
believed that SLORC is responsible for the death and disappearances of some
members of parliament of NCGUB.

In dealing with the Karen insurgents, SLORC uses a special counter insurgency
strategy   known   as``{\em   four-cuts  strategy}''[15]  which   has  been
successful in eliminating communist rebels in Burma since the early  1970s.
This  four-cuts  strategy  is responsible for the increase in the number of
internally displaced people and consequently the increase  of  refugees  in

III. SLORC's four-cuts strategy and forced relocations[16]
After  the  1992 changes in  leadership, SLORC  also changed its tactics in
dealing with the Karen insurgency. To avoid  the  international  criticism,
SLORC  refrained  from making a direct offensive on the Karen rebels. In an
attempt to isolate rebels from the Karen ethnic population, villages within
the rebel operated  area  are  ordered  to  relocate.  The  area   is  then
declared  as  the  free-fire zones in which anyone seen is considered rebel
and shot on sight. Crops and villages within the area are destroyed [17].
Relocation sights are guarded concentration camps which villagers  are  not
allow to leave except to do slave labour, as  witnesses have reported [18].

Such  incidences  were  reported  on  the  49th  section  of  Human  Rights
Commission as follows [19]:

     74.  [T]he  Special Rapporteur was informed that if military suspected
     villagers were insurgents or were providing  aid  to  insurgents,  the
     entire village was given order to relocate by township level  Law  and
     Order  Restoration Council(LORC). In a number of cases reported to the
     Special  Rapporteur,  civilians  were  executed  when either refuse to
     relocate upon order or when they attempted to avoid relocation.

The villagers have to leave food, land and all possessions in relocations.
The Burmese army gave no compensation to the the  villagers.  All  villages
are reported to have a shortage of food [20]. As a result,  those villagers
cross the Thai border  looking for food, at a reported rate of 1000 per day
[21] to escape starvation and forced conscription by the army [22].

IV. The Royal Thai Government's response to the refugee problem.
It appears that the Royal Thai Government acknowledged the conflict between
Karen  guerrillas  and  the  Burmese army as Burma's internal problem. When
first influx of Karen refugees arrived in 1984, the Royal  Thai  Government
call  on  the non-government organizations to care for the welfare of Karen
refugees [23]. The Royal Thai  Government  appears  to  have  a  policy  of
non-interference towards Burma's internal politics prior to 1988.

The  Royal  Thai Governments policy on Burma  became more complex after the
SLORC seized state power in September  1988.  Outraged  by  the  military's
brutal  treatment  of  pro-democracy  demonstrators,  Burma's  major  donor
countries: Japan, Germany  and  other  Western  countries-  withdrew  their
financial support. SLORC at that time was reported to have foreign reserve
of  less  than  US$ 20 million. In December 1988, the Thai army chief, Gen.
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (now  Minister of the Interior),  visited  Burma  and
signed trade agreements with SLORC on fishing and logging  in  Burma  [24].
The Thai logging companies, mainly owned by the Thai Generals, trades at an
estimated $100 million each year. The investments of oil companies are also
substantial.  By  mid  1990,  Burma's foreign reserve rose to $550 million,
facilitating SLORC to buy $ 1.2 billion worth of arms from China [26].

The Royal Thai Government has always been in favour  of  the  policy  of  a
constructive   engagement  for  Burma.  By  which  it  means  the  economic
liberalization and support of  foreign  capital  would  induce  social  and
political changes. This policy of constructive engagement fell through when
the  government  responsible   lacked the will to implement change. Such is
the case of Burma, SLORC spends most of its foreign exchange solely to  buy
arms and are used in oppressing  the unarmed civilian  population.

The  Royal  Thai  Government's  treatment of Burmese refugees and displaced
people is also controversial [27]. The Royal Thai Government  is  unwilling
to  acknowledge the events developing in Burma. It also trys to prevent the
conflict between  the  Burmese  military  and  the  ethnic  minority  being
addressed  at  the  international  level.  The  displaced  people along the
Thai-Burma border are considered a result of violence in  Burma  and  their
existence on Thai territory has been informally tolerated. The international
observers,  UNHCR  and  ICRC,  are  not allowed permanent presence on these
refugee camps, leaving the refugees to negotiate their own safety with local
authorities. The shortcomings of such a  policy  are  evident  due  to  the
persistent   abuse  on  refugees  having  been   reported.  The  abuse  and
mis-treatment to Burma's ethnic refugees  by  Local  Thai  Authorities  for
commercial interests was reported in Asia Watch as:

     [I]n  April  1991,  Sangklaburi officials cut all delivery of food and
     medicines to the more than 10,000 Mon refugees residing in five  camps
     in  their district. The cut was at a crucial time when stockpiling was
     a imperative, prior to the May-August rains which prohibits access  to
     the camps. The threat of starvation that this posed forced Mon leaders
     to agree to a fine of 800,000 Baht, in logs from the Mon State, to the
     Phathumthani  logging   company.  The  fine  was  compensation for the
     destruction of a logging truck and death of  its  driver  in  February
     1991 which the Mon claimed had illegally entered their territory. Once
     the  agreement  between  Phathumthani  and  the  Mon  was reached, the
     District authorities allowed  food and medicine to be  transported  to
     the refugee camps.

The  collusion  of the Thais and Burmese army to capture the rebel outposts
has also been reported.

     ... The reported use of Thai soil by Burmese troops  in  their  recent
     attack  on Nai Et Thaung, once captured the uncontested replacement of
     a Thai border flag with a Burmese and a new  road  under  construction
     for  the  past  10  months  from  Thai side leading directly to Nai Et
     Thaung, leaves no illusions at the collaboration and vested  interests
     of Thai and Burmese officials.

Burmese  dissidents within Thailand  are also  subject to arrest, detention
and deportation. For example, after  General  Chavalit  visited  Burma  for
trade  talks  in  December  1988,  Burmese  students  were  deported as was
reported in Asia Watch [28]:

     [F]ollowing  these  events,  8-10,000  Burmese  dissidents fled to the
     Thai-Burmese border seeking shelter and support from the ethnic minorities
     and the international community. In a meeting on November 22, 1988, the
     cabinet of Royal Thai Government decided to offer  asylum  to  Burmese
     student  dissidents.  On December 22, however, the government reversed
     its policy and announced the establishment  of  the  Tak  Repatriation
     Center. From this Center, located in Tak province on the Thai  Burmese
     border  where  the  large  number  of  dissidents  had  fled, the Thal
     military with the cooperation of the provincial office of Thai Red Cross
     (but with the concern raised by  the  national  office)  began  flying
     these  asylum  seekers  back to Rangoon and into hand of SLORC. During
     the  months  between December 1988 and February 1989, some 328 Burmese
     dissidents were repatriated. There  were  no  international  observers
     involved and claims of forced repatriation were frequent....}

Since Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees or to its 1967 Protocol, the UNHCR in Bangkok is unable to give
protection  to the Burmese students dissidents. There were incidences where
Burmese students who registered with UNHCR (persons of  concern  to  UNHCR)
are treated inhumanely  by Thai police:

     [T]hat vulnerability was illustrated when, in the latter half of 1991,
     two  Burmese  ``persons  of concern to UNHCR'' were shot and killed by
     Thai police upon arrest. Min Thein was fatally shot  in  the  back  on
     July  31, while attempting to run away from Thai immigration officers.
     Ye Soe Aung was brutally beaten, stabbed and then shot twice  by  Thai
     police  on  November  4,  1991.  His body was recovered on November 10
     approximately 10 km from the place  of  arrest.  Both  incidences  had
     numerous witnesses and yet to date no officer have been indicted.UNHCR
     has reportedly pressed for such an incident.}

As of June 1992, the Royal Thai Government has set up  a  refugee  camp  in
Ratchaburi  province  known  as  'Safe  Area'.  Under this arrangement, the
Burmese dissidents who registered with the Ministry of  Interior(MOI)  will
be  permitted  to go to the `Safe Area'. In early 1993, Asia Watch reported
that  Burmese students in Bangkok are persuaded by UNHCR to go to the `Safe
Area' [29].

V. Illegal entrants and Prostitutes
There are  people  whose  homes  are  deep  inside  Burma  and  have  enter
neighbouring  Thai  provinces and worked illegally [30]. These new arrivals
are not absorbed by minority groups at the Thai-Burma border camps and Thai
authorities designate them as 'Burmese illegal immigrants'.  Their  numbers
significantly  increase  after  the 1990 election crackdown. The reason for
their flight has been:  opposition party support, unreasonable taxation and
price fixing, bribery, and forced conscriptions. In fact, as the authors of
Asia Watch noted and can be seen in (III),  there is no  clear  distinction
that can be drawn  between  these  groups,   but  all  are  suffering  from
persistent and gross violations of Human Rights in Burma.

The  deteriorating economy is also mounting pressure on the  Burmese people
as  their social and moral life declines. Under SLORC, the economy in Burma
is deteriorated to a point where many will do anything  to  survive.  There
have  been  reports  of  an increase in prostitution inside Burma [31]. The
trafficking of Burmese woman, especially  young  girls,  into  Thailand  as
sex-slaves has also increased [32,33].

The  Royal  Thai Government responds to this influx of illegal entrants and
prostitutes  by  rounding   them   up,   detaining   and   deporting   them
immediately  [34].  There  are  frequent  reports of inhumane detention and
mistreatment of Burmese prostitutes. There is  no  screening  procedure  to
check whether those deportees have well founded fears of persecution.

VI. Recent developments
Thailand  presently accommodates an estimated 80,000 Burmese dissidents and
ethnic refugees[35], in addition to 500,000 illegal immigrants[36]. Despite
the presence of such a high number  of  Burmese  refugees,  the  people  of
Thailand  -  Thai  students  in  particular  -  appear to have sympathy and
tolerance towards Burmese refugees.

The Royal Thai Government, on the other hand, continues  with  its  dubious
policy   on  Burmese  refugees  and  Burma.  The  Royal  Thai  Government's
unwillingness to address Burma's ethnic refugee problem could  be seen as a
gesture that reflects the Thais neutral  policy  towards  Burma's  internal
politics.  However,  it  must  be  stressed  that  such  neutral  policy is
responsible for Burma's displaced people's vulnerability and abuse  by  the
Royal  Thai  Government's  own members. Therefore, Thailand must change its
Burmese Refugee Policy and give the UNHCR and ICRC  access to  the  refugee
camps along Thai-Burma border.

With  regards  to Burmese dissidents in Thailand, the UNHCR in Bangkok have
no mandate to protect refugees, even if they  are  registered  with  UNHCR,
since  the  Royal Thai Government has not prepared any special legislation.
The Royal Thai Government's arrangement of a Safe Area  is  an  attempt  to
give  justification of its generosity and sympathy towards Burmese students
[37].  At  the same time, however, the Royal Thai Government  continues its
practice of rounding up ``Burmese illegal immigrants''  and  deported  them
immediately [38]. There have been no independent observers present at those
deportations.  In  fact,  all Burmese Refugees in Thailand are  technically
illegal and there are no screening processes for the deportations.  Burmese
dissidents are therefore concerned of arbitrary detention and deportations.
As  a  consequence,  some Burmese students choose not to report to the MOI,
and do not  register with UNHCR. There were  recent  reports  of  conflicts
between  the Burmese students and the Thai Authorities [39]. Therefore, the
Royal Thai Government would need to enact  a  legislation  similar  to  the
Comprehensive  Plan  of Action  for Indochinese Refugees to prevent further

In July 1993, SLORC announced that the logging deals  with  Thailand  would
not be renewed [40]. This was interpreted by expatriate Burmese and NGOs as
SLORC    applying   pressure  on  the  Royal  Thai  Government  for  better
cooperation in eliminating ethnic rebels along Thai-Burma border [41].There
have also been fear that refugee villages  in the vicinity of the  proposed
natural  gas  pipeline  between  Thailand  and  Burma  being attacked in an
attempt to clear the area [42].

VII. Conclusion.
Clearly, the constructive engagement policy doesn't work for a better Burma
as the Burmese Military Government have no will to enact genuine social and
economic reform. In past 5-years, SLORC used most of its resources to built
up military power. Unless there is a change in this attitude, the Royal Thai
Governments  constructive  engagements  with  Burma   simply   amounts   to
collusions  with  an  evil  power.  The  Royal  Thai Government's policy of
constructive engagement as well as policy on Burmese refugees  need  to  be

Presently,  there  is  not  enough  political will among the members of the
international community to impose an  effective  trade  embargo  on  Burma.
However,  the  international  community  and Thailand must not overlook the
implications of doing trade with Burma. The  international  community  must
ensure that the Burmese unarmed civilian population is protected from Human
Rights abuses. The measure must be taken to ensure the economic development
and establishment of a democratic government with a just constitution being
fulfilled.  The  United  Nations and international community must therefore
actively seek for the implementation of an international arms embargo.

As trading between Thailand and Burma  continues, the Royal Thai Government
must ensure  the safety of Burmese dissidents and ethnic refugees and  that
they  are   protected.  The  Royal  Thai  Government must consider granting
political asylum to the Burmese refugees and also give full access  to  the
UNHCR to protect ethnic refugee camps.

The  attention  must  be  drawn  on  the plight of the internally displaced
people in Burma, which is the root cause of the  influx  of  refugees  into
Thailand.  The  plight  of  internally  displaced  people  can  be  seen as
consequences of SLORC's four-cuts strategy. Sadly, SLORC will continue  its
counter  insurgency  campaign  unless  rebels  surrender to the government-
which is a most unlikely scenario. Therefore, the  international  community
must  actively  seek to implement an effective cease-fire between SLORC and
ethnic rebel forces.

As the military governments effort to eliminate rebels  sets  to  continue,
the  international  community  need  to give attention to the protection of
basic Human Rights to the unarmed  civilian  population.  In  the  case  of
forced  relocations,  we must address the arbitrary deprivation of property
from the villagers. SLORC's insensitivity for the basic humanitarian  needs
of villagers must also be condemned. We must ensure that SLORC  compensates
the  villagers  for their property and deliver the basic humanitarian needs
of the villagers.

PROPOSED ACTION: Write to Ms Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, and Prime Minister  Chuan  Leekpai,  The  Prime  Minister  of
Thailand,  for   protection  for displaced Burmese people in Thailand. Also
write to Professor Yozo Yokota, The United Nations Special  Rapporteur  for
Human Rights in Myanmar, for the compensation and welfare of the internally
displaced people.

 Ms Sadako Ogata, UNHCR, CASE POSTALE 2500,
                  CH-1211 GENEVA 2-DEPOT, SWITZERLAND

Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, Office of the Prime Minister,
               Government House, Nakorn Pathom Road, Dusit,
               Bangkok 10300, THAILAND. Fax:001-66-280-1443

Professor Y. Yokota, The Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Myanmar,
             Palias des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, SWITZERLAND.

 Attached with this letter are collected news items concerning situation of
 Burmese  refugees in Thailand. Please contact the secretary regarding your
 action and also further information. This report is written by Dr.U Ne Oo,
 a member of Burma Action(SA).

[1] SLORC Declaration 1/90, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 July 1992.

[2]  Janelle  M.  Diller,  Constitutional Reform in a Repressive State: The
Case of Burma, ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4 pp 393-407.

[3] The author concluded in his paper as,  "In  sum,  the  control  of  the
constitution  making  process  defeats  any  attempt  to  create  a genuine
constitution reflecting the will of the people. SLORC rules in violation of
former constitutional provisions, has proclaimed itself above the  rule  of
law,  and  imposed  its  form  of constitution-making process on the people
without their free consent. Only when SLORC cedes its  governing  power  to
the elected People's Assembly can truly genuine constitution-making process
begin." ibid, pp 407.

[4] Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1991, pp 56-60.

[5] Bangkok Post, 16 July 1993 [B-1.3]

[6] Burma Information Group reports, January 1993, 14 July 1993 [B-1.1,1.2]

[7]  Russell  Rollason  et.  al, International Council of Voluntary Agency,
Mission to Burma Report, 28 May 1993.

[8] Bertil Lintner, "Outrage: Burma's struggle for  democracy", White Lotus
UK (1990)

[9] Asiaweek, 4 january 1991

[10]  Amnesty  International,  Myanmar,"No  Law  at  all",   Human   rights
violations under military rule. , AI Index ASA: 16/11/92.

[11] The Government in exile, National Coalition Government of the Union of
Burma  (NCGUB)  signed  an  agreement to establish a Federal Union of Burma
with the umbrella organization of  ethnic  rebel  and  underground  Burmese
groups, Democratic Alliance of Burma(DAB).

[12]  Bertil  Lintner,  "The  rise  and  fall of Communist Party of Burma",
Ithaca New York,(1990).

[13] Russell Rollason, etal, ICVA Mission to Burma Report, 28 May 1993.

[14] Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 April 1993 [A-1.5]

[15]  The  four-cut  strategy:  the  military  attempts  to  cut  links  of
intelligence,  food,  money and recruit between armed opposition groups and
local civilians (AI Index ASA: 16/11/92)

[16] These events are not only occured in the Daren State.  As  Burma  have
various  ethnic insurgency groups fighting with Rangoon central Government,
an estimated 12 million people  suffers  a  result  of  counter  insurgency
throughout Burma.

[17] The military make the area totally un-inhabitable for the rebels.

[18]  U  Saw  BA  Thin  and  Jack  Dunford, ACFOA seminor on Burma, Sydney,
Australia, 28 May 1993.

[19] Professor Yozo Yokota, The Special Rapporteur  of  the  Commission  on
Human Rights. Document E/CN.4/1993/37, 17 February 1993.

[20] Bangkok Post, 27 June 1993 [A-1.4]

[21] FAr Eastern Economic Review, 29 July 1993, pp-9

[22] These are not an unprecedented events only occured in the Karen State.
Amnesty  International  in  1992,  for  example, reported similar events in
Dayah State. "... Some villagers went to Pruso town but thousands of  other
were  confined in poor conditions in the camps at Dorawkhu, Hoya and Delaco
villages. MOre than 40 people - particularly children  and  elderly  -  had
reportedly died from malnutrition in these camps by the end of July (1992).
Others,  who  were  forced  to  do  construction  work  for  the army, were
reportedly beaten and shot by soldiers. During March and  April  1992  over
1200 Karenni refugees from Kayah State fled into Thailand mostly from Pruso
township." (AI Index ASA: 16/11/92)

[23]  The Burmese Border Consortium under the auspices of the Committee for
Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand. ICVA Mission  to
Burma report, 28 May 1993.

[24] Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 February 1989 (see Appendix: A-1.1)

[25]  South  East  Asian  Information  Network  report,  28 April 1993; Far
Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1992 Year Book.

[26] Far EAstern Economic review, 8 August 1991, pp 56-60.

[27] Asia Watch, Abuses Against Burmese Refugees in  Thailand,  Vol.  No  4
Issue No 7., 20 March 1992.

[28]  See  also  Appendix:  A-1.1, Far EAstern Economic Review, 23 February

[29] Asia Watch, 28 January 1993 [C-1.1]

[30] Asia Watch, Vol No 4 Issue No 7, 20 March 1992; Bangkok Post, 27  June
1993 [A-1.4]

[31] Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 February 1992, pp 31 [B-1.4]

[32] Bangkok Post, 16 July 1993 [B-1.3]

[33]   Burma   INformation  Group  Reports,  January  1993,  14  July  1993

[34] Bangkok Post, 7 July 1993.

[35] See the map of refugee camps in Appendix: A-1.2

[36] Generally, people who fled from the fear of government persecution and
armed conflict are referred as refugees. Illegal immigrants are  those  who
try  to  escape  from  poverty  in Burma and may not have fear of political
persecution. As the author of Asia Watch noted and as explained in III, the
distinction between these two groups are only arbitrary.

[37] Burma Action(SA) was recently informed by UN refugee orricers that the
Safe Area meets  accepted  international  standards  for  the  welfare  and
protection of refugees.

[38] Bangkok Post, 7 July 1993.

[39] Burma Information Group report, 31 May 1993 [C-1.2]

[40] Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 July 1993 [C-1.3]

[41] B.U.R.M.A. Burma Rights Movement for Action, JUly 1993.

[42] Project Maje's Edith MIrante publication, August 1993 [C-1.5]

(Appendices are marked in here as [A/B/C- *.*], to be posted separately)

/* Endreport */