China-Burma relations
Websites/Multiple Documents
| Title: | | BURMA-CHINA CHRONOLOGY: 2nd Century BC to 1999 |
| Date of publication: | | 1999 |
| Description/subject: | | This chronology was compiled in 1999 by David Arnott as part of the research for his chapter on Burma-China relations in “Challenges to democratization in Burma: Perspectives on multilateral and bilateral responses. Chapter 3 - China–Burma relations” published by International IDEA in 2001.
Most of the extracts are from news sources, notably the official Burmese daily The Working People’s Daily (WPD), re-named The New Light of Myanmar (NLM) in April 1993. Most extracts from 1987-1996 are taken from The Burma Press Summary compiled by Hugh MacDougall. Other sources include the US Govt’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and the Internet version of NLM.
A lighter China-Burma chronology updated to end 2001 exists on The Irrawaddy research pages at http://www.irrawaddy.org/research_show.php?art_id=446 |
| Author/creator: | | David Arnott |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | WPD, NLM, FBIS ETC. |
| Format/size: | | pdf (1.8MB) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 22 February 2008 |
|
| Title: | | China Daily |
| Description/subject: | | Search for Myanmar |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | China Daily |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 03 June 2003 |
|
| Title: | | Google search in "The Irrawaddy" for "China" |
| Description/subject: | | Searched on Google for China site:irrawaddy.org |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" via Google |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 30 May 2011 |
|
| Title: | | Inside China Today |
| Language: | | English |
| Format/size: | | Search for Myanmar, Yangon etc. |
| Date of entry/update: | | 03 June 2003 |
|
| Title: | | People's Daily Online |
| Description/subject: | | 337 hits for "Myanmar" (February 2005)...3191 hits (January 2009)...3944 hits (October 2009) |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "People's Daily" |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 03 June 2003 |
|
| Title: | | Website of Renaud Egreteau |
| Description/subject: | | "Welcome to my Site !
Let me introduce myself. As a French researcher in International Relations, I have been working for the last 7 years on geopolitics in Asia, with a special focus on India and Burma (Myanmar).
In December 2006, I successfully defended my Ph.D Dissertation (Political Science, Asian Studies) at the Institute of Political Science, Paris, France : "India, China and the Burmese Issue : Sino-Indian Rivalry through Burma/Myanmar and its Limits since 1988" (with distinction).
You will find in this website a glimpse of the works I have done so far on those issues (articles, publications, fieldworks) as well as some links and contacts which could be of interest on these matters. Enjoy the visit "...
Dr. Renaud EGRETEAU |
| Language: | | Francais, French, English |
| Source/publisher: | | Renaud Egreteau |
| Format/size: | | html, pdf |
| Date of entry/update: | | 27 June 2007 |
|
Individual Documents
| Title: | | War trumps peace in Myanmar |
| Date of publication: | | 19 March 2013 |
| Description/subject: | | "Things are seldom as they seem in Myanmar, a country still little understood by the outside world. On a visit to Europe in early March, Myanmar President Thein Sein - an ex-general turned civilian politician - claimed that ''There's no more fighting in the country, we have been able to end this kind of armed conflict'' between government forces and various ethnic resistance armies.
Back at home, the Myanmar army continues its fierce offensive against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in the country's far northern region. As KIA representatives and government officials met for yet another round of peace talks in the Chinese border town of Ruili on March 11, more than a hundred trucks carrying
reinforcements and heavy equipment were seen entering Kachin State from garrisons in central Myanmar. In Shan State, almost daily skirmishes are reported with the Shan State Army, which has a shaky ceasefire agreement with the authorities. In Karen State, more government troops are taking up new positions in the hills bordering Thailand.
The Myanmar government's doublespeak has not dissuaded Western nongovernmental organizations and think tanks from launching various peacemaking initiatives at a time an entirely different foreign power has taken charge of the process: China..." |
| Author/creator: | | Bertil Lintner |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "Asia Times Online" |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 09 April 2013 |
|
| Title: | | Powers Seek Influence in Burma’s Conflict |
| Date of publication: | | 18 March 2013 |
| Description/subject: | | "Burma’s President Thein Sein, while visiting Europe, announced that the government’s fighting against ethnic resistance forces has ended – even as the government moves more troops into the troubled areas. Meanwhile, the United States and China are scrambling for influence by brokering peace to end the ethnic conflicts. Dozens of think tanks and NGOs from the West are attracting donor funds and pouring into the country. “The outcome has been overlapping initiatives, rivalry among organizations – and, more often than not, a lack of understanding by inexperienced ‘peacemakers’ of the conflicts’ root causes,” explains journalist and author Bertil Lintner. China, unhappy with Burma’s embrace of the West, has been actively leading peace talks since January. Lintner points out that China’s Yunnan Province has more than 130,000 ethnic Kachin who sympathize with their fellow Burmese Kachin. Motivations may differ, but China and the US both want the conflicts to end. Burma’s leaders may find it difficult to pursue military solutions, continuing sending troops north, while playing China and the United States off each other..." |
| Author/creator: | | Bertil Lintner |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Yale Global Online -Yale Center for the Study of Globalization |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 23 March 2013 |
|
| Title: | | China's Intervention in the Myanmar-Kachin Peace Talks |
| Date of publication: | | 20 February 2013 |
| Description/subject: | | "Peace talks between Myanmar's government and the rebel Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in Ruili, China, on February 4, finally rendered a glimpse of hope after 17 months of bloody conflict. Although the two sides still need more time and further dialogue to reach a peace agreement, major breakthroughs were achieved on key issues such as strengthening communications, easing tensions and holding further talks before the end of February.
Peace talks are not unusual for the KIO and the Myanmar government. Since the most recent outbreak of the conflict in 2011, the two sides have engaged in multiple rounds of informal talks, including at least three rounds in Ruili. However, these latest talks set a new precedent because of the central role that China played in the process and signify a major intervention by Beijing that is unique.
China was instrumental in arranging the latest round of dialogue between the two parties. Due to the lack of trust between the KIO and the Myanmar government, both preferred a third party location rather than Laiza--headquarters of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)--or Naypyidaw. During the talks, China not only provided the venue, but also explicitly guaranteed the security of all participants..." |
| Author/creator: | | Yun Sun |
| Source/publisher: | | Brookings |
| Format/size: | | English |
| Date of entry/update: | | 09 April 2013 |
|
| Title: | | China and the Changing Myanmar |
| Date of publication: | | 15 January 2013 |
| Description/subject: | | Abstract:
"The author argues that the democratic reform in Myanmar is
rooted in profound internal and external factors. Since the beginning of the
reform, the changes in Myanmar have taken tolls in a series of China’s exist-
ing interests inside the country. Economically, Chinese investments have
come under increasing scrutiny, criticism, and even oppositions, threatening
the viability of strategic projects such as the oil and gas pipelines. Politically,
the initial success of the democratic reform in Myanmar raises questions
about Beijing’s continuous resistance to reform. Strategically, the changes in
Myanmar undercut China’s original blueprint about the strategic utilities of
Myanmar for China at ASEAN, in the Indian Ocean and more broadly in
the region. In light of the changes, China has adjusted its policy toward
Myanmar. Not only has Beijing dramatically reduced its economic invest-
ments in Myanmar, it also cooled down the political ties while established
relations with the democratic oppositions. At the same time, China also
launched massive public relations campaigns inside Myanmar aimed at im-
proving its image and relations with the local communities."
Manuscript received 14 January 2013; accepted 23 February 2013
Keywords
: PR China, Myanmar, Myitsone dam, bilateral relation |
| Author/creator: | | Yun Sun |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 4/2012: 51–77 |
| Format/size: | | pdf |
| Date of entry/update: | | 09 April 2013 |
|
| Title: | | Danger Zone - Giant Chinese industrial zone threatens Burma’s Arakan coast (English and Burmese) |
| Date of publication: | | 17 December 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | "China’s plans to build a giant industrial
zone at the terminal of its Shwe gas
and oil pipelines on the Arakan coast
will damage the livelihoods of tens of
thousands of islanders and spell doom
for Burma’s second largest mangrove
forest.
The 120 sq km “Kyauk Phyu Special
Economic Zone” (SEZ) will be managed
by Chinese state-owned CITIC group
on Ramree island, where China is
constructing a deep sea port for
ships bringing oil from the Middle
East and Africa. An 800-km railway
is also being built from Kyauk Phyu
to Yunnan, under a 50 year BOT
(Build-Operate-Transfer) agreement,
forging a Chinese-managed trade
corridor from the Indian Ocean across
Burma. Investment in the railway
and SEZ, China’s largest in Southeast
Asia, is estimated at US $109 billion
over 35 years.
Construction of the pipelines and
deep-sea port has already caused
large-scale land confiscation. Now 40
villages could face direct eviction from
the SEZ, while many more fear the
impacts of toxic waste and pollution
from planned petrochemical and metal
industries. No information has been
provided to local residents about the
projects.
It is urgently needed to have stringent
regulations in place to protect
the people and environment before
projects such as these are implemented
in Burma." |
| Language: | | English, Burmese/ ျမန္မာဘာသာ |
| Source/publisher: | | Arakan Oil Watch |
| Format/size: | | pdf (810K-English; 1MB-Burmese) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Danger-Zone-bu-red.pdf |
| Date of entry/update: | | 16 December 2012 |
|
| Title: | | APPETITE FOR DESTRUCTION - China’s trade in illegal timber (text, video and Burmese press release) |
| Date of publication: | | 29 November 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | This report covers several countries in Asia and Africa....."Myanmar contains some of the most significant
natural forests left in the Asia Pacific region,
host to an array of biodiversity and vital to the
livelihoods of local communities. Forests are
estimated to cover 48 per cent of the country’s
land. Yet other recent estimates put forest
cover at just 24 per cent.
These vital forests are disappearing rapidly. Myanmar has one
of the worst rates of deforestation on the planet, with 18 per
cent of its forests lost between 1990 and 2005. Myanmar’s
forest sector is rife with corruption and illegality, leading to
over-harvesting and smuggling. Natural teak from Myanmar is
especially sought after on the international market for its
unique characteristics and availability.
Since the late 1990s, neighbouring China has imported large
volumes of timber from Myanmar, the bulk of which have been
logged and traded illegally. In 1997, China imported 300,000
cubic metres of timber from Myanmar; by 2005 this had risen
to 1.6 million cubic metres....In April 2012, EIA investigators travelled to the southern
Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Yunnan to examine current
dynamics of the illicit cross-border trade in logs from Myanmar,
especially Kachin State. The investigation involved monitoring
crossing points on the Yunnan-Kachin border, surveying
wholesale timber markets to assess the origin of wood supplies,
and undercover meetings with Chinese firms trading and
processing timber from Myanmar.
The investigation revealed continuing transport of logs across
the border, despite the 2006 agreements between the two
countries to halt such trade. Chinese traders confirmed that as
long as taxes are paid at the point of import, logs are allowed in
despite a commitment from the Yunnan provincial government
to allow in only timber accompanied by documents from the
Myanmar authorities attesting to its legal origin. As the
authorities dictate that all wood exports must be handled
by the Myanmar Timber Enterprise and shipped via Rangoon,
logs moving across the land border to Yunnan cannot possibly
be legal.
Field visits uncovered movement of temperate hardwood timber
species from the mountains of Kachin State into central Yunnan via several crossing points, with trade in teak and rosewood
centred around the border town of Ruili further south. The
contrast in the condition of the forests along the border was
striking; while forests in the mountainous region on the
Chinese side of the border are relatively intact, with large areas
protected in the Gaoligong Nature Reserve, across the border in
Kachin the devastation wreaked by logging is clearly visible.
Chinese wood traders confirmed that supplies were coming
from further inside Kachin, as timber within a hundred kilometres
of the border has been logged out, and told how deals are done
with insurgent groups to buy up entire mountains for logging.
One local community elder in Kachin interviewed by EIA
summed up the situation: “Myanmar is China’s supermarket
and Kachin State is their 7-11.”..." |
| Language: | | English; (Burmese press release) |
| Source/publisher: | | Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) |
| Format/size: | | pdf (1.42MB), 142K-Burmese press release; Adobe Flash (- 16 minutes, video) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/EIA-Appetite_for_Destruction-PR-bu.pdf (Press release, Burmese)
http://vimeo.com/54229395 (video)
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/EIA-Appetite_for_Destruction.pdf |
| Date of entry/update: | | 29 November 2012 |
|
| Title: | | Pipeline Nightmare (English and Burmese) |
| Date of publication: | | 07 November 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | "Shwe Pipeline Brings Land Confiscation, Militarization and Human Rights Violations to the Ta’ang People.
The Ta’ang Students and Youth Organization (TSYO) released a report today called “Pipeline Nightmare” that illustrates how the Shwe Gas and Oil Pipeline project, which will transport oil and gas across Burma to China, has resulted in the confiscation of people’s lands, forced labor, and increased military presence along the pipeline, affecting thousands of people.
Moreover, the report documents cases in 6 target cities and 51 villages of human rights violations committed by the Burmese Army, police and people’s militia, who take responsibility for security of the pipeline.
The government has deployed additional soldiers and extended 26 military camps in order to increase pressure on the ethnic armed groups and to provide security for the pipeline project and its Chinese workers. Along the pipeline, there is fighting on a daily basis between the Burmese Army and the Kachin Independence Army, Shan State Army – North and Ta’ang National Liberation Army in Namtu, Mantong and Namkham, where there are over one thousand Ta’ang (Palaung) refugees.
“Even though the international community believes that the government has implemented political reforms, it doesn’t mean those reforms have reached ethnic areas, especially not where there is increased militarization along the Shwe Pipeline, increased fighting between the Burmese Army and ethnic armed groups, and negative consequences for the people living in these areas,” said Mai Amm Ngeal, a member of TSYO.
The China National Petroleum Corporation and Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise have signed agreements for the Shwe Pipeline, however the companies have not conducted any Environmental Impact Assessments or Social Impact Assessments. While the people living along the pipeline bear the brunt of the effects, the government will earn an estimated USD$29 billion over the next 30 years.
“The government and companies involved must be held accountable for the project and its effects on the local people, such as increasing military presence and Chinese workers along the pipeline, both of which cause insecurity for the local communities and especially women. The project has no benefit for the public, so it must be postponed,” said Lway Phoo Reang, Joint Secretary (1) of TSYO.
TSYO urges the government to postpone the Shwe Gas and Oil Pipeline project, to withdraw the military from Shan State, reach a ceasefire with all ethnic armed groups in the state, and address the root causes of the armed conflict by engaging in political dialogue." |
| Language: | | English, Burmese/ ျမန္မာဘာသာ |
| Source/publisher: | | Ta’ang Students and Youth Organization (TSYO) |
| Format/size: | | pdf (English, 2MB-OBL version; 6.77-original; 1.45-Burmese-OBL version) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://www.palaungland.org/wp-content/uploads/Report/S%20P%20N%20Report/Pipeline%20Nightmare%20report%20in%20English%20version%20(Final).pdf (original)
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Pipeline_Nightmare-bu-op--red.pdf (full report in Burmese)
http://www.palaungland.org/wp-content/uploads/Report/S%20P%20N%20Report/Immediate%20Release%207%20N... (Summary in Burmese)
http://www.palaungland.org/wp-content/uploads/Report/S%20P%20N%20Report/For%20Immediate%20Release%2... (Summary in Thai)
http://www.palaungland.org/wp-content/uploads/Report/S%20P%20N%20Report/2012-11%20Shwe%20Pipeline%2... (Summary in Chinese) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 07 November 2012 |
|
| Title: | | |
| Date of publication: | | 05 November 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | Burma’s government is trying to win over the Burmese people and the West, and one way has been to suspend unpopular deals with China. In September 2011, the government suspended construction of the controversial Myitsone hydroelectric dam. Now protests are underway against a Chinese firm, Wanbao Mining, which signed an agreement in June to mine copper in Monywa. Burma’s reactions could serve as a model for other countries with similar deals with China. The public outcry against projects that dislocate small communities, destroy fields or pollute waterways could force China to repackage its policies towards smaller countries in the region, explains Burmese-speaking journalist and author Bertil Lintner, reporting from Monywa after being barred from Burma for more than two decades. Two women who sell vegetables in Monywa started the campaign, taking advantage of Burma’s government allowing more freedom of expression, particularly when other nations are the target. Lintner reports that Burma’s new political winds are no accident – in in 2004 a master plan was drafted, aiming to diversify foreign relations and promote a new “era of globalization.” |
| Author/creator: | | Burma: Trouble Brewing for China |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | YaleGlobal Online |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 09 November 2012 |
|
| Title: | | Burma: Trouble Brewing for China |
| Date of publication: | | 05 November 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | Burma’s government is trying to win over the Burmese people and the West, and one way has been to suspend unpopular deals with China. In September 2011, the government suspended construction of the controversial Myitsone hydroelectric dam. Now protests are underway against a Chinese firm, Wanbao Mining, which signed an agreement in June to mine copper in Monywa. Burma’s reactions could serve as a model for other countries with similar deals with China. The public outcry against projects that dislocate small communities, destroy fields or pollute waterways could force China to repackage its policies towards smaller countries in the region, explains Burmese-speaking journalist and author Bertil Lintner, reporting from Monywa after being barred from Burma for more than two decades. Two women who sell vegetables in Monywa started the campaign, taking advantage of Burma’s government allowing more freedom of expression, particularly when other nations are the target. Lintner reports that Burma’s new political winds are no accident – in in 2004 a master plan was drafted, aiming to diversify foreign relations and promote a new “era of globalization.” |
| Author/creator: | | Bertil Lintner |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | YaleGlobal Online |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 09 November 2012 |
|
| Title: | | China-Burma Relations (Special issue of the "Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs") |
| Date of publication: | | May 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | Editorial: On China–Myanmar Relations,
David I. Steinberg...
China–Burma Geopolitical Relations in the Cold War,
Hongwei FAN...
Myanmar in Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy – Strengthening Common Ground, Managing Differences,
Robert Sutter...
China–Myanmar Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership: A Regional Threat?
Chenyang LI...
China’s Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmar,
Yun SUN...
The Vexing Strategic Tug-of-War over Naypyidaw: ASEAN’s View of the Sino–Burmese Ties,
Pavin Chachavalpongpun...
Burmese Attitude toward Chinese: Portrayal of the Chinese in Contemporary Cultural and Media Works,
Min Zin...
Conference Report: China–Myanmar Relations: The Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence,
Maxwell Harrington...
Chronology of the Myitsone Dam at the Confluence of Rivers above Myitkyina,
Editor's Appendix...These items are also online separately in OBL |
| Source/publisher: | | Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs Vol. 31, No. 1 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 02 October 2012 |
|
| Title: | | Burmese Attitude toward Chinese: Portrayal of the Chinese in Contemporary Cultural and Media Works |
| Date of publication: | | February 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | Abstract: "This paper argues that since at least the mid 1980s, there has been
an observable negative attitude among the people of Burma against the
Chinese. Such sentiment is not just transient public opinion, but an attitude.
The author measures it by studying contemporary cultural and media works
as found in legally published expressions, so as to exclude any material rejected
by the regime’s censors. The causes of such sentiment are various:
massive Chinese migration and purchases of real estate (especially in Upper
Burma), Chinese money that is inflating the cost of everything, and cultural
“intrusion.” The sentiment extends to the military, as well: the article examines
a dozen memoirs of former military generals and finds that Burma’s
generals do not trust the Chinese, a legacy of China’s interference in Burma’s
civil war until the 1980s. The public outcry over the Myitsone dam
issue, however, was the most significant expression of such sentiment since
1969, when anti-Chinese riots broke out in Burma. The relaxation of media
restrictions under the new government has allowed this expression to gather
steam and spread throughout the country, especially in private weekly journals
that are becoming more outspoken and daring in pushing the boundaries
of the state’s restrictions."...
Manuscript received 2 February 2012; accepted 7 May 2012...
Keywords: PR China, Burma, culture, media, migration |
| Author/creator: | | Min Zin |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs Vol. 31, No. 1 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (260K) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 02 October 2012 |
|
| Title: | | China’s Strategic Misjudgement on Myanmar |
| Date of publication: | | February 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | Abstract: "Yun Sun argues that China’s policy failures on Myanmar in 2011
are rooted in several strategic post-election misjudgements. Following President
Thein Sein’s inauguration in March 2011, the Sino–Myanmar relationship
was initially boosted by the establishment of a “comprehensive strategic
cooperative partnership,” and China sought reciprocation for its long-time
diplomatic support in the form of Myanmar’s endorsement of China’s positions
on regional multilateral forums. A series of events since August have
frustrated China’s aspirations, however, including Myanmar’s suspension of
the Myitsone dam and the rapid improvement of its relationship with the
West. Several strategic misjudgements contributed to China’s miscalculations,
including on the democratic momentum of the Myanmar government,
on the U.S. –Myanmar engagement and on China’s political and economic
influence in the country. China’s previous definition of Myanmar as one of
China’s “few loyal friends” and the foundation of its strategic blueprint has
been fundamentally shaken, and China is recalibrating its expectations regarding
future policies."...
Manuscript received 18 February 2012; accepted 23 April 2012...
Keywords: PR China, Myanmar, Myitsone dam |
| Author/creator: | | Yun SUN |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs Vol. 31, No. 1 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (264K) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 02 October 2012 |
|
| Title: | | China–Burma Geopolitical Relations in the Cold War |
| Date of publication: | | January 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | Abstract: "This paper explores the historical role of geography in the Sino–
Burmese relationship in the context of the Cold War, both before and after
the Chinese–American détente and rapprochement in the 1970s. It describes
Burma’s fear and distrust of China throughout the Cold War, during which
it maintained a policy of neutrality and non-alignment. Burma’s geographic
location, sandwiched between its giant neighbours India and China, led it to
adopt a realist paradigm and pursue an independent foreign policy. Characterizing
China’s threat to Burmese national security as “grave” during its
period of revolutionary export, the article notes that Burma was cowed into
deference and that it deliberately avoided antagonizing China. It also looks
at the history of China’s attempts to break out of U.S. encirclement after the
Korean War and its successful establishment of Burma as an important
buffer state. After the U.S.–China rapprochement in 1972, however, Burma’s
geographical significance for Beijing declined. In this context, Burma’s
closed-door policy of isolation further lessened its strategic importance for
China. Since 1988, however, Burma’s strategic importance to China has
been on the rise once again, as it plays a greater role as China’s land bridge
to the Indian Ocean and in its energy security and expansion of trade and
exports." |
| Author/creator: | | FAN Hongwei |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs Vol. 31, No. 1 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (284K) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/issue/view/77 |
| Date of entry/update: | | 02 October 2012 |
|
| Title: | | China–Myanmar Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership: A Regional Threat? |
| Date of publication: | | January 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | Abstract: "This paper analyses the China-Myanmar ‘comprehensive strategic
cooperative partnership’ in the framework of China’s diplomacy in the post-
Cold War era and concludes that the partnership has no ‘significant negative
impact’ on regional relations. China pursues its partnerships with Myanmar
and other states to create a ‘stable’ and ‘harmonious’ surrounding environment,
itself a ‘major’ prerequisite for China’s peaceful development. The
author argues that China has not focused its diplomacy on Myanmar at the
expense of other states; rather, he notes that in fact China established a
‘comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership’ with three other ASEAN
states (Vietnam in 2008, Laos in 2009, and Cambodia in 2010) before it did
so with Myanmar in May 2011. The article argues that the scope and depth
of China’s partnerships with states such as Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
are actually above that of its partnership with Myanmar. It also argues that
Myanmar’s strong nationalism will prevent China from, for example, building
a base on Myanmar’s soil. The author also asserts that China does not
seek to use Myanmar as an ally to weaken or dilute ASEAN or its unity on
the South China Sea issue."...
Manuscript received 4 January 2012; accepted 16 May 2012
Keywords: PR China, Myanmar, comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership,
Cold War |
| Author/creator: | | LI Chenyang |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs Vol. 31, No. 1 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (281K) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/512/510 |
| Date of entry/update: | | 02 October 2012 |
|
| Title: | | Conference Report China–Myanmar Relations: The Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence Georgetown University, November 4, 2011 |
| Date of publication: | | January 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | Introduction"
"Georgetown University’s Asian Studies program hosted a conference on
November 4, 2011 entitled “China–Myanmar Relations: The Dilemmas of
Mutual Dependence.” The conference included panel discussions by scholars
and government officials from China, Myanmar, Thailand, India, Japan,
the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and the United States. With an attendance
of over 150 people, it proved that discussions regarding the Sino–
Myanmar relationship are able to attract interest in Washington.
The conference was bookended by two critical events that have focused
Washington’s attention on Myanmar’s relationship with its giant
neighbour. On September 30, Naypyidaw unexpectedly suspended the construction
of a major Chinese-backed infrastructure project, the Myitsone
dam, a decision that was received with applause in Washington but consternation
in Beijing. Then, only weeks after the conference finished, U.S. Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton made a historic visit to Myanmar from November
30 to December 2, the first by a Secretary of State since John Foster
Dulles in 1955. “Clinton in Myanmar: All about China?” blared one headline.
1 While the truth is certainly not so simple, the role of China in America’s
policy-making cannot be discounted. As Myanmar has accelerated its
political and economic reforms, international interest in the Myanmar–China
connection has only grown. While the Sino–Burmese relationship is complex,
involving a number of layers of sometimes antithetical interests both in
China and Myanmar, the conference discussions pointed to the emergence
of several broad themes..." |
| Author/creator: | | Maxwell Harrington |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs Vol. 31, No. 1 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (171K) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 02 October 2012 |
|
| Title: | | Myanmar in Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy – Strengthening Common Ground, Managing Differences |
| Date of publication: | | January 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | Abstract: "This assessment first briefly examines recent features of China’s
approach to foreign affairs, and then examines in greater detail features in
China’s approach to relations with its neighbours, especially in Southeast
Asia. It does so in order to discern prevailing patterns in Chinese foreign
relations and to determine in the review of salient recent China–Myanmar
developments in the concluding section how China’s approach to Myanmar
compares with Chinese relations with other regional countries and more
broadly. The assessment shows that the strengths and weaknesses of China’s
recent relations with Myanmar are more or less consistent with the strengths
and weaknesses of China’s broader approach to Southeast Asia and international
affairs more generally. On the one hand, China’s approach to Myanmar,
like its approach to most of the states around its periphery, has witnessed
significant advances and growing interdependence in the post-Cold
War period. On the other hand, mutual suspicions stemming from negative
historical experiences and salient differences require attentive management
by Chinese officials and appear unlikely to fade soon."
Manuscript received 25 January 2012; accepted 26 April 2012
Keywords: PR China, Myanmar, Southeast Asia, ASEAN, foreign policy |
| Author/creator: | | Robert Sutter |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs Vol. 31, No. 1 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (290K) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/511/509 |
| Date of entry/update: | | 02 October 2012 |
|
| Title: | | The Vexing Strategic Tug-of-War over Naypyidaw: ASEAN’s View of the Sino– Burmese Ties |
| Date of publication: | | January 2012 |
| Description/subject: | | Abstract: "This article argues that ASEAN’s policy toward Myanmar has
been predominantly responsive, dictated by China’s activism in the region. It
posits three arguments: First, that the release of political prisoners, including
Aung San Suu Kyi, may have been a tactical move to convince ASEAN to
award it the 2014 chairmanship and thereby consolidate the legitimacy of
the current regime; second, that Thein Sein’s suspension of the Myitsone
Dam was a strategic move intended to please both domestic and ASEAN
constituencies; and third, that Myanmar’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014
will help justify the organisation’s past approach to Burma as well as accelerate
the process of community-building. The paper argues that in spite of the
growing interconnectedness between ASEAN and China, ASEAN is locked
in a strategic tug-of-war with China over Myanmar. Myanmar has, on multiple
occasions, played upon ASEAN’s suspicion of China by playing the
“China card,” as I term it, forcing ASEAN to continually legitimise it
through public statements."...
Manuscript received 13 January 2012; accepted 5 April 2012...
Keywords: PR China, Burma, ASEAN, community-building |
| Author/creator: | | Pavin Chachavalpongpun |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs Vol. 31, No. 1 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (264K) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/514/512 |
| Date of entry/update: | | 02 October 2012 |
|
| Title: | | Burma's Big Brother |
| Date of publication: | | 02 December 2011 |
| Description/subject: | | China is emerging as the leading economic force in Burma, and the Burmese are starting to get uncomfortable...
"With Western sanctions and endemic levels of corruption, Burma’s economy has typically been of little interest to international investors, except for those with significant strategic interests. Desperate and unstable, the country has been left wide open for exploitation by Chinese state actors seeking energy and access to the Indian Ocean. Referring to the growth of India and China at the 2011 Myanmar/Burma Update, historian Thant Myint U stated that it “will change Burma's prospects for better or worse, more [than] anything else that is happening at the moment.”
Burma is definitely in a state of rapid transition. During the last 18-month period, the country has received 20-percent more official foreign direct investment (FDI) than in all of the previous 20 years put together. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of people in ethnic minority regions have suffered from a severe escalation of conflict and displacement. For the first time in 50 years, popularly elected politicians have been able to raise genuine topics of concern in parliament. However, the new constitution gives greater power and impunity to the military than any of those introduced previously..." |
| Author/creator: | | Dan Beaker |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Institute for Policy Studies/Foreign Policy in Focus |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 23 January 2012 |
|
| Title: | | The Nature and Management of Myanmar’s Alignment with China: The SLORC/SPDC Years |
| Date of publication: | | 02 November 2011 |
| Description/subject: | | Abstract: "Recent research has focused increasingly on the strategies that Southeast Asian countries have adopted vis-à-vis a rising China. This article aims to contribute to the literature by discussing Myanmar’s alignment posture towards China under the post-September 1988 military regime. In particular, the purpose is to specify and explain the nature and management of this alignment. The argument is as follows: first, during the two decades of SLORC/SPDC (State Law and Order Restoration Council/State Peace and Development Council) rule, Myanmar sought only limited alignment with China, focused primarily on diplomatic support and protection, with only a moderate record of bilateral defence and security cooperation. Second, Myanmar’s alignment with China after 1988 was shaped by at least three important factors: the core principles of the country’s previous foreign policy after colonial rule, a deeply embedded sense of nationalism among the military elite, and Burma’s Cold War interaction with China. Third, in managing its alignment with China over the last decade, the SPDC avoided compromises perceived as unpalatable in return for the promise of diplomatic protection and instead ‘rewarded’ Beijing by consenting to economic and infrastructure projects that were considered to advance the regime’s interest in either generating state revenue or contributing to the consolidation and expansion of control over state territory. The SPDC also pushed Beijing into reconsidering its position on the sensitive issue of armed ethnic groups in the Sino-Myanmar border region. The Myanmar case thus shows that lesser powers can obtain security benefits from a major power without this necessarily requiring more than limited alignment or entailing a serious erosion of political autonomy, particularly when the former possesses valuable natural resources and enjoys considerable geo-strategic significance for the latter." |
| Author/creator: | | Jürgen Haacke |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 2/2011: 105-140 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (338K) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/article/view/447
http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jsaa/rt/metadata/447/0 |
| Date of entry/update: | | 04 March 2012 |
|
| Title: | | Between China And India Lies Myanmar's Future - Interview by Host Scott Simon with Thant Myint U (audio and transcript) |
| Date of publication: | | 24 September 2011 |
| Description/subject: | | "Myanmar mostly makes news in the West these days with blood and iron, when the brutal military regime cracks down on monks and others protesting for democracy. Host Scott Simon chats with Thant Myint-U, author of "Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia", who says the country may have a bright and bold future as a bridge between China and India's growing economies." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | National Public Radio (NPR) |
| Format/size: | | MP3 (audio - 6 min 23 sec ) and html (transcript) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 25 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | Beijing wary of Myanmar elections |
| Date of publication: | | 03 October 2010 |
| Description/subject: | | "While the West would like Myanmar’s November elections to lead toward democracy, China is seeking something far more straightforward: stability.
When the leader of Myanmar’s military government, Than Shwe, visited Beijing earlier this month, he sought to reassure Chinese leaders that elections would not produce any negative fallout along their 2,192-kilometer shared border.
Conflict along the border has been an enduring characteristic of post-independence Myanmar, where a handful of ethnic groups maintain their own territory, militias and political representation.
But Beijing has just cause for concern after the Myanmar military’s August 2009 offensive into the Kokang region shattered a 20-year cease-fire and sent more than 30,000 refugees into China’s Yunnan province..." |
| Author/creator: | | Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Global Post |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 08 October 2010 |
|
| Title: | | China’s Myanmar Strategy: Elections, Ethnic Politics and Economics |
| Date of publication: | | 21 September 2010 |
| Description/subject: | | OVERVIEW:
Myanmar’s 2010 elections present challenges and opportunities
for China’s relationship with its south-western
neighbour. Despite widespread international opinion that
elections will be neither free nor fair, China is likely to
accept any poll result that does not involve major instability.
Beijing was caught off-guard by the Myanmar
military’s offensive into Kokang in August 2009 that sent
more than 30,000 refugees into Yunnan province. Since
then it has used pressure and mediation to push Naypyidaw
and the ethnic groups that live close to China’s
border to the negotiating table. Beyond border stability,
Beijing feels its interests in Myanmar are being challenged
by a changing bilateral balance of power due
to the Obama administration’s engagement policy and
China’s increasing energy stakes in the country. Beijing
is seeking to consolidate political and economic ties by
stepping up visits from top leaders, investment, loans and
trade. But China faces limits to its influence, including
growing popular opposition to the exploitation of Myanmar’s
natural resources by Chinese firms, and divergent
interests and policy implementation between Beijing and
local governments in Yunnan.
The Kokang conflict and the rise in tensions along the
border have prompted Beijing to increasingly view Myanmar’s
ethnic groups as a liability rather than strategic
leverage. Naypyidaw’s unsuccessful attempt to convert
the main ceasefire groups into border guard forces under
central military command raised worries for Beijing that
the two sides would enter into conflict. China’s Myanmar
diplomacy has concentrated on pressing both the main
border groups and Naypyidaw to negotiate. While most
ethnic groups appreciate Beijing’s role in pressuring the
Myanmar government not to launch military offensives,
some also believe that China’s support is provisional and
driven by its own economic and security interests.
The upcoming 7 November elections are Naypyidaw’s
foremost priority. With the aim to institutionalise the
army’s political role, the regime launched the seven-step
roadmap to “disciplined democracy” in August 2003.
The elections for national and regional parliaments are the
fifth step in this plan. China sees neither the roadmap nor
the national elections as a challenge to its interests.
Rather, Beijing hopes they will serve its strategic and economic
interests by producing a government perceived both
domestically and internationally as more legitimate.
Two other factors impact Beijing’s calculations. China
sees Myanmar as having an increasingly important role
in its energy security. China is building major oil and gas
pipelines to tap Myanmar’s rich gas reserves and shorten
the transport time of its crude imports from the Middle
East and Africa. Chinese companies are expanding rapidly
into Myanmar’s hydropower sector to meet Chinese
demand. Another factor impacting Beijing’s strategy towards
Myanmar is the U.S. administration’s engagement
policy, which Beijing sees as a potential challenge to its
influence in Myanmar and part of U.S. strategic encirclement
of China.
Beijing is increasing its political and economic presence
to solidify its position in Myanmar. Three members of
the Politburo Standing Committee have visited Myanmar
since March 2009 – in contrast to the absence of any
such visits the previous eight years – boosting commercial
ties by signing major hydropower, mining and construction
deals. In practice China is already Myanmar’s
top provider of foreign direct investment and through
recent economic agreements is seeking to extend its lead.
Yet China faces dual hurdles in achieving its political and
economic goals in Myanmar. Internally Beijing and local
Yunnan governments have differing perceptions of and
approaches to border management and the ethnic groups.
Beijing prioritises border stability and is willing to sacrifice
certain local commercial interests, while Yunnan values
border trade and profits from its special relationships
with ethnic groups. In Myanmar, some Chinese companies’
resource extraction activities are fostering strong
popular resentment because of their lack of transparency
and unequal benefit distribution, as well as environmental
damage and forced displacement of communities. Many
believe such resentment was behind the April 2010
bombing of the Myitsone hydropower project. Activists
see some large-scale investment projects in ceasefire areas
as China playing into Naypyidaw’s strategy to gain
control over ethnic group territories, especially in resource-
rich Kachin State..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | International Crisis Group (Asia Briefing N° 112) |
| Format/size: | | pdf (1.06MB) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 21 September 2010 |
|
| Title: | | China and Myanmar Strategic Interests, Strategies and the Road Ahead |
| Date of publication: | | September 2010 |
| Description/subject: | | Conclusion: "Since the end of the bipolar system and the
rise of globalization, the world has become
interconnected and interdependent through
culture, economy, and the polity. In order to
provide an accurate strategic foresight of
Sino-Myanmar relations, it is necessary to
understand the historical and present
context, national ambitions, and the current
means available to achieve these goals. At
the same time, to offer a precise forecast,
there is a need to hypothesize the possible
obstacles to these ambitions.
The paper concludes that the period of the
next 5-10 years, from a Chinese standpoint,
will be one of balancing between securing its
economic investment through bilateral
relations between China and ethnic groups,
China and the Junta, and its wish for
stronger involvement in the political arena.
In this quest, China will outbid all other
players; provide economic assistance;
infrastructure building; and a political
umbrella to the international community.
Nonetheless, China will have to face certain
obstacles to achieve these goals, mainly the
growing resentment of local Chinese
presence in Myanmar; border instability;
weak Myanmar governance; and stronger
international sanctions.
Alternatively, from a Myanmarese
standpoint, due to the Junta’s controversial
history, it wants to prove to the regional and
international community that it is a
legitimate government. Through the Seven
Step Roadmap to Democracy and the
election later this year, the Junta wants to
show its credibility as the government of
Myanmar. The Junta has been successful at
making regional actors compete for its
natural resources and its strategic
importance works in its favor. When China,
India, and ASEAN compete for access to
Myanmar, they are supporting the Junta
with financially, which gets translated into
political support. Also, the Junta does not
want foreign involvement in its national
affairs. Therefore, it purposely keeps a low
profile in the international arena. The
obstacles to the achievement of Myanmar’s
goals would be an increase in international
criticism that would pressure China to
further influence the Junta, and ethnic
groups uniting against the government,
which would weaken furthermore the
credibility of the Junta.
In conclusion, in the near future, China’s
economic thirst will be challenged by its
wish to become a regional and international
superpower on the one hand, and on the
other, Myanmar’s Junta will try to convince
its neighbors and the world that its
government is legitimate..." |
| Author/creator: | | Billy Tea |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies - Delhi (IPCS Research Paper 26) |
| Format/size: | | pdf (281K) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 16 November 2010 |
|
| Title: | | Peace, Conflict, and Development on the Sino-Burmese Border |
| Date of publication: | | 02 December 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | "On August 27-30, 2009, fighting broke out between the Kokang ceasefire group (MNDAA) and the Myanmar/
Burma government army, sending 30,000 refugees across the border into Yunnan province in southwest
China. To some observers, the timing of the conflict -- less than a fortnight after a visit to Myanmar/Burma by
U.S. Senator Jim Webb -- seemed to indicate a calculated maneuver on the part of the ruling generals in Nay
Pyi Taw to test international reactions as well as responses from its neighbors with regards to its exercise of power
in the country's borderlands. The actuality is that the event itself was part of a political process that the military
government embarked upon already twenty years ago. What is special about this summer's conflict itself, though,
is where it occurred and the ethnicity of the population involved, which has implications for peace on the border
and ultimately for bilateral relations between China and Myanmar/Burma." |
| Author/creator: | | Xiaolin Guo |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Institute for Security and Development Policy (Sweden) |
| Format/size: | | pdf (116K) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 19 February 2010 |
|
| Title: | | Playing with Superpowers |
| Date of publication: | | November 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | Burma’s generals have a history of juggling relations with Washington and Beijing...
"If ever the Burmese regime made it clear it preferred “Made in America” to “Made in China,” it would be no surprise to see relations between China and Burma suffer a severe hiccup.
China is now keenly observing Washington’s new policy toward the Burmese regime and Burma’s opposition movement. At the same time, Beijing is observing the unpredictable Naypyidaw regime’s paukphaw (kinship) commitment to China.
Burma’s former dictator, Ne Win, (left) met then US President Lyndon Johnson in 1966.
Burmese military officers used Western weapons to counter Chinese-backed insurgents in the past. They have long memories of Chinese chauvinism and Beijing’s efforts to export communism to Burma and install a government sympathetic to Mao Zedong’s communist ideology.
Those days are long gone. China became Burma’s staunchest ally after the regime brutally crushed the pro-democracy uprising in 1988. For the past 21 years, China has adopted its paukphaw policy toward Burma and played an influential role there..." |
| Author/creator: | | Aung Zaw |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 17, No. 8 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://www2.irrawaddy.org/print_article.php?art_id=17143 |
| Date of entry/update: | | 28 February 2010 |
|
| Title: | | PRC/BURMA: A/S CAMPBELL'S MEETING WITH ASIAN AFFAIRS DG YANG YANYI |
| Date of publication: | | 14 October 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | SUMMARY: In an October 13 meeting with EAP A/S Kurt
Campbell, MFA Asian Affairs Department Director General Yang
Yanyi said that China saw many positive aspects in the U.S.
review of its Burma policy and suggested proceeding based on
its conclusion, despite PRC concern over continuing
sanctions. Yang asserted that the junta was committed to
building a peaceful, modern, democratic Burma, but stability
remained paramount to them "for now." She claimed the regime
was committed to a fair election in 2010 and was renewing
efforts on developing the economy. DG Yang cautioned that
the regime could not be replaced, and counseled patience on
development and democratization efforts given the complexity
of Burmese society. Chinese officials had told the Burmese
to consider China's legitimate interests in dealing with the
situation in Kokang, but also stressed that China would not
interfere in the internal affairs of Burma. A/S Campbell
cautioned that steps by the regime toward progress on nuclear
technology would make dialogue more difficult and the U.S.
and China had a shared interest in partnering to prevent such
progress. END SUMMARY. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 24 December 2010 |
|
| Title: | | Peace in Name only |
| Date of publication: | | October 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | War and refugees will remain a fact of life in Burma as long as the root causes of conflict in the country’s borderlands remain unaddressed...
"The rout of the ethnic Kokang militia, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, in northern Burma in late August has brought into stark relief what millions of people live with in Burma every day: conflict between the central state and non-state armed militias. For decades, clashes between the Burmese regime’s army and its myriad enemies have been forcing people into hiding or across borders. What is different about the recent fighting is that it involved China—not usually a country that tolerates refugees from Burma or instability along its borders..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 17, No. 7 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 27 February 2010 |
|
| Title: | | SEPTEMBER 29 MFA PRESS BRIEFING: IRAN, NORTH KOREA, BURMA, TIBET, SCO |
| Date of publication: | | 29 September 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | "...Reports that Burma had begun expelling Chinese citizens from its
territory were "not in line with the facts."..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 07 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | CHINESE MFA SAYS ONGOING CRISIS IN BURMA STILL NOT THREAT TO REGIONAL PEACE |
| Date of publication: | | 28 September 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "In a meeting with Western Embassy officials
on September 28, MFA Asia Department Deputy Director General
Yang Yanyi delivered now familiar points on China's position
on the crisis in Burma: China is concerned and supports UN
efforts; the Burmese government should "properly handle" the
situation; sanctions are not the solution; and the UN
Security Council is not the appropriate venue to address the
Burma situation. Yang said criticism of China's role in
solving the crisis is unfair and "slanderous." Discussing
whether the ongoing crisis affects regional peace and
security, Yang reiterated that the situation is still only a
"yellow light" and that China still believes the situation
does not merit UN Security Council attention." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 07 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | CHINA'S MYANMAR DILEMMA |
| Date of publication: | | 14 September 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY"
"Each time global attention is focused on events in Myanmar,
concerned stakeholders turn to China to influence
the military government to undertake reforms. Yet simply
calling on Beijing to apply more pressure is unlikely
to result in change. While China has substantial political,
economic and strategic stakes in Myanmar, its influence
is overstated. The insular and nationalistic leaders in the
military government do not take orders from anyone,
including Beijing. China also diverges from the West in
the goals for which it is prepared to use its influence.
By continuing to simply expect China to take the lead
in solving the problem, a workable international approach
will remain elusive as Myanmar continues to play China
and the West against each other. After two decades of
failed international approaches to Myanmar, Western
countries and Beijing must find better ways to work together
to pursue a wide array of issues that reflect the
concerns of both sides.
The relationship between China and Myanmar is best
characterised as a marriage of convenience rather than
a love match. The dependence is asymmetric -- Myanmar
has more to lose should the relationship sour: a
protector in the Security Council, support from a large
neighbour amid international isolation, a key economic
partner and a source of investment. While China sees
major problems with the status quo, particularly with regards
to Myanmar's economic policy and ethnic relations,
its preferred solution is gradual adjustment of policy by
a strong central government, not federalism or liberal
democracy and certainly not regime change. In this way,
it can continue to protect its economic and strategic interests
in the country. In addition to energy and other investments,
Myanmar's strategic location allows China access
to the Indian Ocean and South East Asia.
But Beijing's policy might ultimately have an adverse
effect on Myanmar's stability and on China's ability to
leverage the advantages it holds. Political instability
and uncertainty have resulted in a lack of confidence in
Myanmar's investment environment, and weak governance
and widespread corruption have made it difficult
for even strong Chinese companies to operate there.
Myanmar's borders continue to leak all sorts of problems
-- not just insurgency, but also drugs, HIV/AIDS
and, recently, tens of thousands of refugees. Chinese
companies have been cited for environmental and ecological
destruction as well as forced relocation and human
rights abuses carried out by the Myanmar military. These
problems are aggravated by differences in approach between
Beijing and the provincial government in Yunnan's
capital Kunming, which implements policies towards
the ethnic ceasefire groups.
At the same time, resentment towards China, rooted in
past invasions and prior Chinese support to the Communist
Party of Burma, is growing. Myanmar's leaders fear
domination by their larger neighbour, and have traditionally
pursued policies of non-alignment and multilateralism
to balance Chinese influence. Increasing competition
among regional actors for access to resources and
economic relationships has allowed Myanmar to counterbalance
China by strengthening cooperation with other
countries such as India, Russia, Thailand, Singapore,
North Korea and Malaysia. The military government is
intensely nationalistic, unpredictable and resistant to external
criticism, making it often impervious to outside
influence.
While China shares the aspiration for a stable and prosperous
Myanmar, it differs from the West on how to
achieve such goals. China will not engage with Myanmar
on terms dictated by the West. To bring Beijing on
board, the wider international community will need to
pursue a plausible strategy that takes advantage of areas
of common interest. This strategy must be based on a
realistic assessment of China's engagement with Myanmar,
its actual influence, and its economic and strategic
interests. The West could better engage China to encourage
Myanmar's government to commit to a truly inclusive
dialogue with the opposition and ethnic groups. In
addition to talks on national reconciliation, dialogue
should also address the economic and humanitarian crisis
that hampers reconciliation at all levels of society.
At the same time, China should act both directly and in
close cooperation with ASEAN member countries to
continue support for the good offices of the United Nations
as well as to persuade the military to open up." |
| Language: | | English, Chinese |
| Source/publisher: | | International Crisis Group (Asia Report No. 177) |
| Format/size: | | pdf (1.2MB) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/177_chinas_myanmar_dilemma.ashx (English)
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/Chinese/177_chinas_myanmar_dilemma_ch... (Chinese) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 16 September 2009 |
|
| Title: | | BURMA/PRC BORDER SITUATION UPDATE |
| Date of publication: | | 01 September 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "As cross-border refugees from Burma's Kokang
region continue to return to Burma, local residents and
remaining refugees in China's Nansan border region told
ConGenOff September 1 that refugee flows had moved to border
crossings in Yunnan province adjacent to ethnic Wa-controlled
territory. Many refugees expressed discontent with the PRC
government's perceived weak response to the outbreak of
violence in Kokang that resulted in the destruction of PRC
citizens' property. China's official reaction praised Yunnan
province's response to the refugee flows and called on Burma
to maintain stability. PRC netizens' response to violence in
the Kokang region appeared to have been tightly controlled,
with very few dissenting postings remaining online." End
summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 07 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | SEPTEMBER 1 MFA PRESS BRIEFING: BURMA BORDER, NORTH KOREA, JAPAN ELECTION, INDIA BORDER, AFGHAN ELECTION |
| Date of publication: | | 01 September 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | "...-- China hoped that the Burmese Government would properly handle its
domestic issue and guarantee the safety of Chinese citizens and
their property in that country.
-- The Burmese Government had apologized to China for Chinese
casualties, thanked China for accepting those who escaped the
fighting, promised to protect Chinese citizens and their property
and restore peace and stability along the border..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 07 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | China's Troublesome Little Brother |
| Date of publication: | | September 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | Behind displays of friendship, Beijing is showing signs that it is losing patience with Burma's politically inept ruling generals...
"When Vice Snr-Gen Maung Aye, the second most powerful figure in Burma's ruling junta, led a high-level delegation to Beijing in mid-June, China's state-run Xinhua news agency dutifully reported that the visit's third in six yearsâ”was aimed at strengthening friendly and cooperative ties between the two neighboring countries.
Behind the scenes of the outwardly amicable visit, however, the story was not so simple. According to businessmen close to the regime in Naypyidaw, before departing for Beijing, Maung Aye complained that China was meddling in Burma's affairs. A former commander of the Burmese army's northern region who once fought several fierce battles against the Chinese-backed Communist Party of Burma in the 1970s and 1980s, Maung Aye has never really trusted Beijing. Now, he grumbled, Chinese leaders were trying to tell Naypyidaw how it should deal with Aung San Suu Kyi, who was facing imprisonment on charges of violating the terms of her house arrest..." |
| Author/creator: | | Aung Zaw |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 17, No. 6 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 26 December 2009 |
|
| Title: | | Is China Two-timing the Generals? |
| Date of publication: | | September 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | Burma's military junta has to compete with ethnic groups such as the Wa, the Kokang and the Shan to win Beijing's favor...
"China is the Burmese military junta's most influential partner” economically, politically and militarily. But despite the close relationship, Beijing has long enjoyed a discreet affair -- a private relationship with the ethnic groups along Burma's northeastern frontier..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 17, No. 6 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 26 December 2009 |
|
| Title: | | PRC DOWNPLAYS CONFLICT IN BURMA'S KOKANG REGION |
| Date of publication: | | 31 August 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary. "China's Nansan border region adjacent to the
Kokang region of Burma is calm, and refugees have already
begun to return to Burma, ConGenOff observed August 30 and
¶31. PRC government statements and Chinese media accounts
downplayed the seriousness of the conflict between ethnic
Kokang fighters and Burmese military forces and disputed
UNHCR claims that 10,000-30,000 refugees had fled to China.
Chinese scholars did not anticipate that recent events would
impact China-Burma relations and suggested that current
instability could create an opportunity for increased
U.S.-China cooperation on Burma." End summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 07 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | MEDIA REACTION: U.S-JAPAN-CHINA, U.S. BURMA POLICY, CHINA TRADE RELATIONS |
| Date of publication: | | 17 August 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | The China Radio International sponsored newspaper World News Journal
(Shijie Xinwenbao) (08/17): "U.S. Senator Jim Webb's visit to Burma
has political implications. It demonstrates that the U.S.
government's policy of sanctioning Burma has changed into one of
'contact and dialogue.' The improvement in U.S.-Burma relations is
not only helpful for the U.S. to obtain Burmese oil resources, but
also to strengthen the U.S.'s presence in Southeast Asia to counter
China's influence in the region. The U.S. policy change with regard
to Burma is another example of Secretary Clinton's 'smart power.'
Obama is using 'smart power' to deal with hostile countries,
including Cuba, Venezuela, and North Korea. The U.S. government has
realized that suppressing Burma will not help win that country over..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 07 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG’S MAY 30, 2009 CONVERSATION WITH SINGAPORE MINISTER MENTOR LEE KUAN YEW |
| Date of publication: | | 04 June 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | "...China is active in Latin America, Africa, and in the Gulf. Within hours, everything that is discussed in ASEAN meetings is known in Beijing, given China’s close ties with Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, he stated..."...."...Beijing is worried about its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and is moving to ease the dependence by means like a pipeline through Burma..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Singapore, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 28 December 2010 |
|
| Title: | | BURMA: MFA DG QUESTIONS EFFECTIVENESS OF A NEW UNSC STATEMENT |
| Date of publication: | | 19 May 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | "The Charge delivered ref A points on May 18 urging PRC
support for UN Security Council action in response to the
trial of Aung San Suu Kyi to MFA North American and Oceanian
Affairs Department Director General Zheng Zeguang. In
response, DG Zheng suggested that a statement from the UN
Security Council would not be the most effective way to
address the issue and expressed hope that the United States
was open to "other options" to deal with the situation.
Zheng said China's "clear and consistent" position on the
issue had been to encourage the regime in Burma to promote
reconciliation and cooperate with UN Secretary General
Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 07 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | China-Burma Ties in 1954: The Beginning of the “Pauk Phaw” Era |
| Date of publication: | | May 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | "Although Burma was the first non-socialist country to recognize new China, the
favorable beginning failed to facilitate development of China-Burma relations in the
early period (1949-1953). On the contrary, their relations were “noncommittal and
very cold”.1 Both sides were suspicious and mistrustful to each other. China
regarded Burma as an underling of imperialist countries. Burma feared that China
would invade it and threaten its national security. The cold condition began to alter
when two countries’ Premiers visited each other in 1954. After 1954, Beijing and
Rangoon began to contact closely and frequently, and China-Burma relations entered
the friendly “Pauk Phaw” (fraternal) era during the Cold War. Some have been
written about general China-Burma relations in the Cold War, but little as yet has
been done in the detail of their ties, particularly the shift in 1954. This study focuses
on the manifestation, the causes and impact of the relations change. The turn of 1954
basically consisted of two dimensions: political and economic relations..." |
| Author/creator: | | Fan Hongwei |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Institute of China Studies University of Malaya - ICS Working Paper No. 2009-21 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (352K) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 25 March 2010 |
|
| Title: | | UNSYG SPECIAL ADVISER GAMBARI DISCUSSES BURMA VISIT AND BEIJING MEETINGS |
| Date of publication: | | 11 February 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "The Burmese military regime's objective is
to organize elections in 2010 that will be won by a
military-based political party, UN Special Adviser on Burma
Ibrahim Gambari told the Charge and four other Beijing-based
Western mission representatives February 10. Gambari added
that the military will then take control of the three most
important ministries (Defense, Internal Affairs, and
Territorial Affairs). Gambari reported that PRC Vice Foreign
Minister He Yafei had earlier reiterated to him China's
position that the situation in Burma does not constitute a
threat to international peace or security and therefore
should not be discussed in the UN Security Council. Gambari
suggested that pointing out to China the possibility that the
non-participation in the 2010 elections of the Burmese
opposition party National League of Democracy would cause
instability in Burma might convince China to bring pressure
on the Burmese regime." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 07 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | Regional Political Economy of China Ascendant:- Pivotal Issues and Critical Perspectives. Chapter 4: China Engages Myanmar as a Chinese Client State? |
| Date of publication: | | 2009 |
| Description/subject: | | Introduction: The Role of Energy in Sino-Myanmar Relations; Myanmar Plays the China Card; China Engages Myanmar in the ASEAN Way; Conclusion: Norms, Energy and Beyond: "Conclusion: Norms, Energy and Beyond
This chapter has demonstrated two points. First, although ASEAN, China,
India, and Japan form partnership with Myanmar for different reasons,
interactions among the regional stakeholders with regard to Myanmar have
reinforced the regional norm of non-intervention into other states’ internal
affairs. Both India and Japan, the two democratic countries in the region,
have been socialized, though in varying degrees, into the norm when they
engage Myanmar as well as ASEAN.67 The regional normative environment
or structure in which all stakeholders find themselves defines or constitutes
their Asian identities, national interests, and more importantly, what counts
as rightful action. At the same time, regional actors create and reproduce
the dominant norms when they interact with each other. This lends support
to the constructivist argument that both agent and structure are mutually
constitutive.68 This ideational approach prompts us to look beyond such
material forces and concerns as the quest for energy resources as well as
military prowess to explain China’s international behaviour. Both rationalchoice
logic of consequences and constructivist logic of appropriateness are
at work in China’s relations with Myanmar and ASEAN. But pundits grossly
overstate the former at the expense of the latter. To redress this imbalance, this
chapter asserts that China adopts a “business as usual” approach to Myanmar
largely because this approach is regarded as appropriate and legitimate
by Myanmar and ASEAN and practised by India and Japan as well, and
because China wants to strengthen the moral legitimacy of an international
society based on the state-centric principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention.
As a corollary, we argue that regional politics at play have debunked
the common, simplistic belief that Myanmar is a client state of China and
that China’s thirst for Myanmar’s energy resources is a major determinant
of China’s policy towards the regime. A close examination of the oil and
gas assets in Myanmar reveals that it is less likely to be able to become a
significant player in international oil politics. Whereas Myanmar may offer
limited material benefits to China, it and ASEAN at large are of significant
normative value to the latter. Ostensibly China adopts a realpolitik approach
to Myanmar; however, the approach also reflects China’s recognition of
the presence and prominence of a regional normative structure and its firm
support for it.".....11 pages of notes and bibliographic references |
| Author/creator: | | Pak K. Lee, Gerald Chan and Lai-Ha Chan |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya |
| Format/size: | | pdf (892K - OBL version; 1.2MB - original) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs12/China_engages_Myanmar_as_client_state.pdf-red.pdf |
| Date of entry/update: | | 17 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | China Builds Fence on Part of Burma’s Kachin Border |
| Date of publication: | | 23 December 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | Chinese authorities are building a fence along the Burmese border near Laiza in Kachin State, reportedly to deter drug traffickers.
Awng Wa, of the Kachin Development Networking Group, based on the Sino-Burmese border, told The Irrawaddy on Tuesday that work began on the fence last month. He said it is expected to be at least 10 km long. |
| Author/creator: | | WAI MOE |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 30 September 2010 |
|
| Title: | | CHINA ON UNGA THIRD COMMITTEE IRAN, BURMA AND DPRK RESOLUTIONS |
| Date of publication: | | 07 November 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | "PolOff on November 7 delivered to MFA International
Organizations and Conferences Department Human Rights
Division Deputy Director Yao Shaojun ref A points urging
China to support or at least to abstain on UNGA Third
Committee resolutions on Iran, Burma and the DPRK. PolOff
stressed that even if China is unable to support the
resolutions, the United States strongly urges China to oppose
or at least abstain on no action motions, which stifle even
discussion of these important human rights issues. Yao said
he took note of our concerns and would pass them on to his
superiors. However, because of "China's own experience with
human rights resolutions," the Chinese Government disagrees
with the U.S. view. China, Yao said, will oppose all the
resolutions and support the no action motions." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 07 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | Burma’s Coco Islands: rumours and realities in the Indian Ocean |
| Date of publication: | | November 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | Conclusion:
"Over the past 20 years, a number of myths have arisen about the Coco Islands.
Despite repeated warnings from some Burma-watchers, and attempts by a few
scholars to set the record straight in academic publications, these myths have
proven remarkably resilient. There are a number of reasons for this. One is
simply the lack of verifiable information about the islands, a problem
exacerbated by the unreliability of official statements issued by both the Burmese and Chinese governments. The issue has been greatly complicated,
however, by credulous reporting in the news media and the efforts of activists
and others to pursue their own policy agendas. There are several groups of
different nationalities which stand to benefit from continuing international
concerns about perceived Chinese military expansion into Burma and the
Indian Ocean.
The historical record is sketchy, and reliable data is still scarce, but an accurate
and balanced assessment of developments in the region is critical for an
understanding of Burma’s security, and its influence on the strategic
environment. Serious consideration of these issues demands careful research
and objective analysis, not a reliance on rumours and other marvellous tales’." |
| Author/creator: | | Andrew Selth |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | City University of Hong Kong, SEARC Working Paper Series No. 101 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (104K) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://www.cityu.edu.hk/searc/WP101_08_ASelth.pdf |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 January 2009 |
|
| Title: | | Sino-Burmese Relations 1949-1953: Suspicions and Equivocations |
| Date of publication: | | October 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | "During the cold war, the relations between China and its peripheries were critical
in China’s foreign relations. Thereinto, China-Burma relations were one of highlights
in Beijing’s peripheral diplomacy. Nevertheless, this issue, rich in significance, has
been not enough understood, particularly the Sino-Burma bonds in the early period
(1949-1953) after the establishment of diplomatic relations. Until now, detailed and
in-depth research on 1949-1953 Sino-Burma relations has not come forth. Although
the early days of the relations were not long, from a small clue one can see that was
coming , and it revealed some impetus and restrictive factors for the relations, such as
ideology, geo-politics, history, and the Cold War setting..." |
| Author/creator: | | Fan Hongwei |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Institute of China Studies University of Malaya - ICS Working Paper No. 2008-19 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (317K) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 25 March 2010 |
|
| Title: | | PRC: MFA OFFICIAL CALLS FOR PATIENCE ON BURMA |
| Date of publication: | | 18 September 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "China supports UN Special Advisor Gambari's
mission to Burma and the United States is "too impatient"
with Gambari's mission and the political transition process
in Burma, according to MFA Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
Division Deputy Director Chen Chen. Acknowledging that the
planned 2010 elections in Burma will leave the military
holding power, Chen said the elections will serve as "a soft
landing" for the regime. Continuing economic woes in Burma
are a result of U.S. sanctions, and as a "neighbor," China
opposes sanctions on Burma. Chen said the Burmese regime is
interested in improving relations with the United States."
End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 07 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | CHINA IN BURMA: THE INCREASING INVESTMENT OF CHINESE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN BURMA’S HYDROPOWER, OIL AND NATURAL GAS, AND MINING SECTORS |
| Date of publication: | | September 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | Updated September 2008...INTRODUCTION:
Amidst recent international interest in China’s moves to secure resources throughout the world
and recent events in Burma1, the international community has turned its attention to China’s role
in Burma. In September 2007, the violent suppression of a peaceful movement led by Buddhist
monks in Burma following the military junta’s decision to drastically raise fuel prices put the
global spotlight on the political and economic relationships between China and neighboring
resource-rich Burma.
EarthRights International (ERI) has identified at least 69 Chinese multinational corporations
(MNCs) involved in at least 90 hydropower, oil and natural gas, and mining projects in Burma.
These recent findings build upon previous ERI research collected between May and August 2007
that identified 26 Chinese MNCs involved in 62 projects. These projects vary from small dams
completed in the last two decades to planned oil and natural gas pipelines across Burma to
southwest China. With no comprehensive information about these projects available in the
public domain, the information included here has been pieced together from government
statements, English and Chinese language news reports, and company press releases available on
the internet. While concerned that details of the projects and their potential impacts have not
been disclosed to affected communities of the general public, we hope that this information will
stimulate additional discussion, research, and investigation into the involvement of Chinese
MNCs in Burma.
Concerns over political repression in Burma have led many western governments to prohibit new
trade with and investment in Burma, and have resulted in the departure of many western
corporations from Burma; notable exceptions include Total of France and Chevron3 of the United
States. Meanwhile, as demand for energy pushes many Asian countries to look abroad for
natural resources, Burma has been an attractive destination. India, Thailand, Korea, Singapore,
and China are among the Asian countries with the largest investments in Burma’s hydropower,
oil and natural gas, and mining sectors. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Burma’s oil and
natural gas sectors, for example, more than tripled from 2006 to 2007, reaching US$ 474.
million, representing approximately 90% of all FDI in 2007. While China has embraced a foreign policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
states, the line between business and politics in a country like Burma is blurred at best. In pursuit
of Burma’s natural resources, China has provided Burma with political support, 6 military
armaments,7 and financial support in the form of conditions-free loans.8 Investments in Burma’s
energy sectors provide billions of US dollars in financial support to the military junta, which
devotes at least 40% of its budget to military spending, 9 only slightly more than 1% on
healthcare, and around 5% on public education.10 These kinds of economic and political support
for the current military regime constitute a concrete involvement in Burma’s internal affairs.
The following is a brief introduction to and summary of the major completed, current and
planned hydropower, oil and natural gas, and mining projects in Burma with Chinese
involvement. All information is based on Chinese and English language media available on the
internet and likely represents only a fraction of China’s actual investment. |
| Language: | | English, Burmese, Chinese, Spanish |
| Source/publisher: | | EarthRights International |
| Format/size: | | pdf (825K; 3.22MB- original, Alternate URL; 1.85MB - Burmese; 1.3MB - Chinese; 3.52MB - Spanish) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://www.earthrights.org/publication/china-burma-increasing-investment-chinese-multinational-corp...
http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/publications/China-in-Burma-update-2008-English.pdf (English)
http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/publications/China-in-Burma-update-2008-Burmese.pdf (Burmese)
http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/publications/China-in-Burma-update-2008-Chinese.pdf (Chinese)
http://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/publications/China-in-Burma-update-2008-Spanish.pdf (Spanish) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 03 September 2010 |
|
| Title: | | CHINESE MFA VIEWS POSITIVELY GAMBARI VISIT TO BURMA |
| Date of publication: | | 27 August 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | "In an August 27 meeting also devoted to Georgia
(septel), MFA International Organizations and Conferences
Department UN Division Acting Director Sun Xiaobo told PolOff
(and accompanying UK and French Embassy PolOffs) that during
the recent visit of UN Special Advisor Gambari the Burmese
Government "had shown flexibility" and "made some efforts" to
be accommodating. Though Gambari did not meet Burmese Senior
General Than Shwe, he did meet Prime Minister Thein Sein and
other senior officials. Though opposition leader Aung San
Suu Kyi refused to meet Gambari, Gambari succeeded in meeting
other senior National League for Democracy (NLD) figures.
Moreover, the Burmese Government offered responses on each of
Gambari's five substantive proposals. In sum, China believes
that during his visit Gambari "made some achievements."..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | SHAPING POST-CYCLONE ASSISTANCE IN BURMA |
| Date of publication: | | 26 June 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | PolOff on June 26 delivered to MFA reftel points
seeking China's help in shaping the international responses
to a revised UN appeal and the imminent UN report on needs in
Burma after Cyclone Nargis. Drawing on reftel points, PolOff
emphasized that China should join the international community
in making clear to Burmese authorities that further
assistance will depend on full access, transparency and
accountability. PolOff added that donors should provide
assistance according to proven international models that rely
on community input, that assistance should not reinforce
Burmese Government abuses and that underlying problems in
Burma are political.
¶2. (C) MFA International Organizations and Conferences
Department UN Division Deputy Director Sun Xiaobo said he
would convey U.S. views to senior MFA officials. He said his
initial reaction was that China's views on the situation in
Burma are somewhat different. China believes it is
imperative that the international community continue
assistance to the Burmese Government and the Burmese people.
An ASEAN-led mechanism is in place to act as a bridge between
the Burmese Government and donors. Donors should make full
use of this mechanism to sort out differences but assistance
should not be delayed. Finally, Sun said, the international
community should not link humanitarian assistance to human
rights issues. "There are appropriate fora to discuss human
rights issues," but such discussions should not be related to
humanitarian assistance, Sun said. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | MAY 15 MFA PRESS BRIEFING: SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE RELIEF, BURMA DISASTER RELIEF |
| Date of publication: | | 15 May 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | "...Asked to comment on reports that Burma was diverting aid from
cyclone victims, Qin said the international community should
"respect the will of the Burmese." Describing Burma as a friendly
neighbor of China, Qin expressed China's empathy for the victims of
the cyclone disaster and said he hopes the international community
and Burma can agree "through friendly consultations" on the aid
Burma needs..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | PRC REPORTS BURMA WILL ACCEPT RELIEF TEAMS FROM FOUR NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES; CHINA STILL OPPOSED TO UNSC ACTION ON BURMA |
| Date of publication: | | 14 May 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei
told the Ambassador May 14 that Burma is inviting rescue
teams from Bangladesh, China, India and Thailand to assist
with relief efforts following Cyclone Nargis. Stressing the
"positive change" in the attitude of the Burmese Government
toward accepting assistance, AFM He noted that
representatives of the EU and UAE and Thai PM Samak
Sundaravej will also discuss disaster relief with Burmese
authorities in Rangoon. AFM He said that the situation in
Burma does not warrant consideration by the UN Security
Council. The Ambassador countered that UN Security Council
action is needed, because the Burmese Government is not doing
enough to provide assistance, thereby needlessly endangering
the lives of its citizens." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | MFA PRESS BRIEFING: SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE, BURMA DISASTER ASSISTANCE, SIX-PARTY TALKS |
| Date of publication: | | 13 May 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | "Qin said that China has expressed "its solicitude with Burma"
following the May 3 cyclone and is monitoring developments there.
He noted that China has sent two shipments of assistance and
provided money for disaster relief. Asked if the Sichuan earthquake
would impact China's assistance with disaster relief in Burma, Qin
said that China will continue to help "according to our
capabilities."
¶8. Asked for his views on actions by the Burmese government to
limit the arrival of foreign assistance into Burma, Qin said that
Burma has recently welcomed assistance from the international
community. He said that China provides assistance on the basis of
the principles of equality and mutual respect, respecting the will
of the receiving party and based on its "receiving capability." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | MAY 8 MFA PRESS BRIEFING: BURMA, ZIMBABWE, HU JAPAN VISIT, DALAI TALKS, CHINESE IN KOREA, VATICAN, GRAIN PRICES |
| Date of publication: | | 08 May 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | "...At the May 8, 2008 regular MFA press briefing, MFA Spokesman Qin
Gang urged the Burmese Government to "cooperate" and "consult" with
the international community on disaster relief efforts.
International assistance should "follow the principle of equality
and mutual respect" and should "respect Burma's sovereignty." Qin
also urged patience and communication when dealing with Burma.
China is prepared to send rescue and medical teams provided the
Burmese Government agrees..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | MFA PRESS BRIEFING: IRAN, TIBET, VISAS, BURMA, XINJIANG, HU VISIT TO JAPAN, CHINESE SUBMARINE BASE, MORE |
| Date of publication: | | 06 May 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | "...To assist in Burma's reconstruction efforts in the wake of a
disastrous cyclone, China has decided to send a "first batch" of USD
1 million in aid, including "cash and materials," said the spokesman
in a prepared announcement. The Chinese Government is in close
contact with the Chinese Embassy in Burma and is very concerned
about Chinese people working and studying in Burma. President Hu,
PM Wen and FM Yang have all sent messages to Burma expressing
condolences to the victims of the cyclone...." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | REFERENDUM IN BURMA DEMARCHE |
| Date of publication: | | 14 March 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | "PolOff on March 14 conveyed to MFA reftel points
urging China to make clear to the Burmese regime that the
planned May referendum on the regime's draft constitution
should adhere to internationally accepted standards for free
and fair elections and referenda. MFA International
Organizations and Conferences Department UN Division Deputy
Director Sun Xiaobo said China has not received a briefing
from UN Special Advisor Gambari on the results of his trip to
Burma and does not want to jump to conclusions. However,
China's preliminary view is that Gambari "achieved some
progress," though China does not deny there remain
"reasonable concerns." Sun said Gambari has emphasized that
his work is "a process," and China believes engagement with
Burma will require "patience and persistence" and problems
"cannot be resolved by one or two visits." On the prospect
of UN Security Council action, Sun said China's view is that
the Security Council is not an appropriate forum to discuss
Burma. Other fora, like the UN
Secretary General's "Friends of Burma" group, are more
appropriate and useful." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | DEMARCHE ON GAMBARI VISIT TO BURMA |
| Date of publication: | | 07 March 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | "...PolOffs on March 7 discussed with MFA International
Organizations and Conferences Department UN Division Deputy
Director Yao Shaojun and Asian Affairs Department Counselor
Yang Jian reftel points (delivered to MFA March 6) urging
China to press the Burmese regime to cooperate with UN
Special Advisor Gambari and to adhere to international
standards in the conduct of the planned May referendum. Yao
said that China "does not need the United States to tell it
to press Burma to cooperate with Gambari." "China has been
doing, is doing, and will do its job" on Burma. China has
been conveying its opinions to the Burmese government "in a
constructive manner," Yao said, and Burma "clearly
understands China's signals.".." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | Beijing Needs to Stop Playing Games |
| Date of publication: | | March 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | China has come a long way since the days of ping-pong diplomacy. As host of this year’s Olympic Games, Beijing will finally have a chance to demonstrate the emerging economic powerhouse’s status as one of the world’s great nations. But before that can happen, China must show that it knows how to wield its growing global influence responsibly...It would be unrealistic to expect China to relinquish its strategic interests in Burma. But it is possible that China, along with India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, could reach an understanding that would diminish the need of each of these parties to curry favor with the Burmese generals.
Although other considerations come into play—chiefly, a desire for a share of Burma’s natural riches and, in the case of India, security concerns along its northeastern frontier—China is frequently cited as the key reason Burma’s closest neighbors have chosen to engage the junta. There is genuine concern that a resurgent China will use Burma as a base to project its power at the expense of other regional players..." |
| Author/creator: | | Editorial |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 16, No. 3 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 27 April 2008 |
|
| Title: | | GAMBARI CONFIRMS MARCH VISIT TO BURMA; ASKS USG FOR "SPACE" TO CARRY OUT MISSION |
| Date of publication: | | 20 February 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "Drawing from Ref A talking points, the
Ambassador encouraged UN Special Envoy Gambari February 19 to
push for more concrete progress in Burma. Gambari confirmed
that he will return to Burma "in the first week of March,"
though the Burmese Government has not yet confirmed the date
nor issued him a visa. Echoing his comments in his October
2007 meeting with the Ambassador (Ref B), Gambari affirmed
continuing Chinese support for his mission and asked for the
United States to limit its public pressure on him in order to
create "space" to carry out his good offices mission." End
Summary |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy - Is Beijing Parting With Pariahs? |
| Date of publication: | | February 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: Beijing has recently stepped back from its unconditional support for pariah states, such as Burma, North Korea,
and Sudan. This means China may now be more likely to help the West manage the problems such states pose -- but only up to
a point, because at heart China still favors nonintervention as a general policy....."...China's patience with the Burmese junta has been wearing thin recently. For several years, Beijing encouraged it
to undertake Chinese-style economic and political reforms in order to help the regime consolidate its rule, ensure stability,
and regain international acceptability. It supported former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, whom it considered a Deng-style
reformist -- only to see him ousted in 2004. As the Burmese regime hardened further, China's confidence in the junta's
capacity or willingness to reform faded. But Beijing moved from providing encouragement to exerting pressure on the regime
only after its support for the regime was exposed in the UN Security Council. In mid-2006, the United States circulated a
resolution in the Security Council demanding the release of political prisoners, condemning Burma's human rights practices,
and calling for the establishment of a political process that would lead to a genuine democratic transition. China twice
managed to prevent the measure from being considered, and when the United States and the United Kingdom finally brought
it to a vote, last January, China vetoed it (as did Russia) -- the first time since 1973 that Beijing vetoed any matter unrelated to
Taiwan. At the same time, however, Beijing called on the regime to "listen to the call of its own people . . . and speed up the
process of dialogues and reforms...
Shifts in China's policy toward pariah states have been experimental, tentative, and incremental -- and are likely to remain so
in the near future. But the strength of China's position with respect to many pariah states is a reality -- and an opportunity.
Although there is little reason to believe that China is moving toward full alignment with Western policy, it may be prepared to
distance itself from the worst autocracies and rogue states. Even if Beijing's list of such states is likely to remain short, it is
bound to include a number of states that pose important security and humanitarian problems to the United States. In just two
years, China has moved from outright obstructionism and a defensive insistence on solidarity with the developing world to an
attempt to balance its material needs with its acknowledged responsibilities as a major power. And so when Washington and
its allies formulate their policies toward pariah states, they should assume that China, although in some respects an obstacle,
is now also a critical partner." |
| Author/creator: | | Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "Foreign Affairs", January/February 2008 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (113K) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 17 August 2008 |
|
| Title: | | MFA SAYS BURMA MAKING PROGRESS ON DEMOCRACY; REGIME RELUCTANT TO RECEIVE GAMBARI |
| Date of publication: | | 31 January 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "In China's view, the Burmese Government is
progressing on the democratic process and in dialogue with
Aung San Suu Kyi, MFA Asia Department Deputy Director General
Yang Yanyi told PolMinCouns January 30 during an official
readout of the January 20-21 visit to China of Burmese
Special Envoy U Maung Myint. However, Burma "has a problem"
with another visit by UN Special Advisor Gambari, Yang said.
Welcoming China's efforts to hasten Gambari's visit to Burma,
PolMinCouns countered Yang's positive assessment on Burma.
PolMinCouns pointed out the lack of progress in the dialogue
between the Burmese Government and Aung San Suu Kyi and cited
the recent charging of democracy activists for peaceful
activities as evidence of the worsening political situation
in Burma." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | CHINA SUGGESTS BURMA RECONSIDER GAMBARI VISIT DATE; ENCOURAGES CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH ASSK |
| Date of publication: | | 25 January 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "Chinese officials suggested to Burmese
Special Envoy and Deputy Foreign Minister U Maung Myint
during his January 21 visit to Beijing that the Burmese
regime reconsider UN Special Advisor Gambari's request to
visit Burma prior to the April timeframe offered by Burma,
MFA Asia Department Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
Division Deputy Director Chen Chen told PolOff January 25.
Chen said Chinese officials encouraged continuation of the
dialogue between the regime and democratic opposition leader
Aung San Suu Kyi. PolOff delivered ref B points on banning
imports of Burmese gems and hardwood. Chen promised to
convey the points to his superiors." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | CHINESE LOSING PATIENCE WITH BURMA |
| Date of publication: | | 18 January 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | "...The Chinese Ambassador no longer tried to defend the regime, and acknowledged that the generals had made a bad situation worse. The Chinese have used their access to the generals to push for change, without much observable result, but remain interested in working with us to promote change. The Ambassador indicated that fear of losing power and economic interests may be the key obstacles keeping the generals away from the negotiating table..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Rangoon via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 23 December 2010 |
|
| Title: | | MFA AND SCHOLARS DESCRIBE CHINA’S EFFORTS ON BURMA |
| Date of publication: | | 11 January 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "China has made great efforts to improve the situation in Burma, stretching the boundaries of its policy of non-interference, MFA and Chinese think tank interlocutors told HFAC and SFRC staff members January 10-11. MFA says China is contemplating next steps to address the current “standstill” in Burma, but Chinese scholars said domestic events and other international issues will draw China’s attention away from Burma. MFA officials and the scholars continue to encourage direct talks between the United States and the Burmese regime." End summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 24 December 2010 |
|
| Title: | | MFA AND SCHOLARS DESCRIBE CHINA’S EFFORTS ON BURMA |
| Date of publication: | | 11 January 2008 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "China has made great efforts to improve the situation in Burma,
stretching the boundaries of its policy of non-interference, MFA and Chinese think
tank interlocutors told HFAC and SFRC staff members January 10-11. MFA says China
is contemplating next steps to address the current “standstill” in Burma, but
Chinese scholars said domestic events and other international issues will draw
China’s attention away from Burma. MFA officials and the scholars continue to
encourage direct talks between the United States and the Burmese regime." End
summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | EAP DAS CHRISTENSEN PRESSES CHINA ON IRAN, BURMA, SUDAN, DPRK, HUMAN RIGHTS |
| Date of publication: | | 14 December 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | "...China should encourage the regime to reach out to the
opposition and engage in genuine dialogue, DAS Christensen
said. He expressed appreciation for China's previous efforts
on behalf of dialogue in, and Special Advisor Gambari's
visits to, Burma, but stressed U.S. unhappiness with the lack
of results. We want Gambari's January visit to achieve real
results. Gambari should be allowed unfettered access to
truly engage with all sides. Aung Sang Suu Kyi (ASSK) should
be allowed full access to opposition and ethnic minority
representatives. Pursuit of a new constitution under the
regime's "road map" without the input of the opposition would
lead to instability, not stability. Likewise, the status quo
does not constitute stability..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | AMBASSADOR URGES CHINESE ACTION ON BURMA |
| Date of publication: | | 06 December 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | "...Drawing upon Ref A talking points, the Ambassador in a
December 6 meeting with Assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei
urged China to press the Burmese regime to engage in an
authentic dialogue with the opposition and include the
opposition in efforts to draft a constitution. Drawing upon
Ref B talking points, the Ambassador conveyed the U.S.
request that China, as we are requesting of other purveyors
of arms to the regime, stop conventional arms sales to Burma... |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | Ein Freund und Helfer - China unterstützt aus strategischen und wirtschaftlichen Gründen das Militärregime in Myanmar |
| Date of publication: | | December 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Staaten wie Russland, Indien, Serbien und die Ukraine liefern bedenkenlos militärische Güter in das Land, dessen Bevölkerung seit Jahrzehnten brutal unterdrückt wird. Insbesondere China verkauft der Junta Waffen in großem Stil: Die Volksrepublik hat sich in den letzten Jahren zu einem der weltweit größten Rüstungsexporteure entwickelt, und auch Myanmar steht auf der Empfängerliste. Waffenlieferungen aus China; Interessen Chinas in Burma; Rolle der UN; Rolle der EU; Military support from China; chinese ambitions in Burma; role of UN; role of EU; |
| Author/creator: | | Verena Harpe |
| Language: | | German, Deutsch |
| Source/publisher: | | Amnesty International |
| Format/size: | | Html (21kb) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 27 May 2008 |
|
| Title: | | CHINA SUPPORTS BURMA GROUP OF FRIENDS IF BURMA SUPPORTS AND PARTICIPATES |
| Date of publication: | | 29 November 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | "...MFA International Organizations and Conferences
Department UN Affairs Division Deputy Director Sun Xiaobo on
November 29 told PolOff that China is willing to consider
various proposals in the UN conducive to helping Burma solve
its current problems. Specifically, China can support a
Burma "Group of Friends" or "Core Group" in the UN (reftel),
but only if the Government of Burma supports the proposal and
participates in the group. China's experience in the
Six-Party Talks (on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula)
has shown that it is very important that the "concerned
government" participate in any mechanism to solve an
international problem, Sun said..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | VFM WANG YI BRIEFS AMBASSADOR ON BURMA VISIT; NATIONAL RECONCILIATION EFFORT IS "DOMESTIC AFFAIR" |
| Date of publication: | | 21 November 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "Briefing the Ambassador on his recent trip
to Burma, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the ongoing
"political reconciliation and democratic process" are the
domestic affairs of Burma and should therefore be addressed
by the Burmese Government and people themselves. The
international community could be of assistance, but otherwise
should not interfere. VFM Wang said Burmese leaders
described the ongoing dialogue with opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi as "still in the confidence-building period,
clarifying misunderstandings and misgivings." ASSK, the
Burmese leaders complained, is "stubborn," "feels she is
always right and everyone else is always wrong," and is "hard
to talk to." VFM Wang also reported that Burmese leaders
expressed eagerness to resume bilateral dialogue with the
United States; Wang asked pointedly about U.S. willingness.
Drawing upon ref email points, the Ambassador urged China to
use its influence with the regime to promote genuine
dialogue, which would require the rel
ease of opposition leaders from arrest and detention." End
Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | S/P GORDON BILAT WITH VFM WANG YI: IRAN, BURMA, NORTHEAST ASIA SECURITY, AFRICA, ENERGY |
| Date of publication: | | 14 November 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | "...Director Gordon said an "historic opportunity"
exists to achieve political reconciliation in Burma.
Aung San Su Kyi and the military regime are both
showing some flexibility. The unity of the
international community, Gordon emphasized, is crucial
if we hope to make a difference in the behavior of the
Burmese regime. VFM Wang acknowledged that events in
Burma were a problem, but described the unrest in
Burma as an "internal affair" that does not impact
regional stability. Ultimately, VFM Wang said, it is
up to the parties in Burma to reach a solution. China
welcomes the role played by the international
community so long as those efforts are consistent with
encouraging a Burmese solution..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | NOVEMBER 1 MFA PRESS BRIEFING: DALAI LAMA, BURMA, SIX-PARTY TALKS, IRAN, TIBETAN REFUGEES, GATES VISIT |
| Date of publication: | | 01 November 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | "...Asked about Chinese pressure on Burma and the upcoming
Burma trip of UN Special Envoy to Burma Ibrahim Gambari, Liu
said China has normal relations with Burma and hopes that the
relevant parties exercise restraint and hold dialogue to
solve problems and realize national reconciliation. Gambari
will go to Burma on November 3. China supports Gambari's
mediation efforts and hopes they produce positive result..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | MFA SAYS GAMBARI TO PUSH FOR DIALOGUE IN BURMA; CHINA TO CONTINUE SUPPORT FOR "ROADMAP" |
| Date of publication: | | 30 October 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "The Burmese Government has agreed to a
November 5 visit by UN Special Envoy Gambari, and during that
visit Gambari hopes to push for dialogue between the regime
and Aung San Suu Kyi, a more inclusive constitutional process
and measures to improve economic development, an MFA
International Organizations Department official briefed us
October 30. Sun said China hopes Burma will "speed up" the
democratic process but, as Assistant Foreign Minister told
the Ambassador October 25 (reftel), continues to support the
Burmese government's seven-step "roadmap." China remains
open to the Gambari's Burma core group concept, but only with
Burmese government agreement." End summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | PRC LIMITS COVERAGE OF BURMA "DISTURBANCE," FORBIDS DISCUSSION OF CHINA'S ROLE |
| Date of publication: | | 26 October 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
Despite having taken a largely hands off
approach to managing coverage of Burma by relying on
editors to engage in "self-censorship," Chinese
authorities nevertheless have required reporters to
restrict their description of events in Burma to words
like "disturbance," so as not to legitimize the
actions of anti-junta demonstrators. Discussion of
China's role in Burma is forbidden. While Burma is a
sensitive story given China's experience during the
1989 democracy movement, some journalists tell us that
Burma is also just one of many international stories
and is not particularly newsworthy to Chinese readers.
End summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | GAMBARI TO PUSH DIALOGUE IN BURMA; CHINA STILL SUPPORTS "ROADMAP" |
| Date of publication: | | 25 October 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "Drawing from Ref A talking points, the
Ambassador encouraged UN Special Envoy Gambari October 25 to
push for more concrete progress in Burma. Gambari confirmed
that he will return to Burma "in the first week of November."
In addition to praising Chinese efforts on his behalf,
Gambari asked for the United States and the UK to limit their
public pressure on him in order to create "space" to carry
out his good offices mission, and he suggested the formation
of a core group on Burma, including the P5, India, Japan,
Norway and ASEAN. Gambari confirmed that he passed Aung San
Suu Kyi's message regarding the Beijing Olympics to Chinese
officials and that he will continue to push for dialogue
between Aung San Suu Kyi and Burmese military leaders.
Gambari stressed that he provided his briefing to the
Ambassador "early" because the United States had provided
exceptional assistance. He urged the Ambassador to keep the
fact of the briefing confidential.
¶2. (C) Summary continued: In an earlier meeting on October
25 with Assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei (other subjects
reported septels), AFM He affirmed Chinese Government support
for Gambari's mission and reiterated PRC opposition to
sanctions. AFM He expressed support for the Burmese "roadmap
to democracy" and said China would be amenable to forming a
core group, contingent on GOB agreement. The Ambassador
noted that while the United States is open to initiatives
that will show results on the ground in Burma, the "roadmap"
has been around a long time and has yielded little progress
to date." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | BURMA POINTS DELIVERED TO MFA |
| Date of publication: | | 23 October 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | "...Poloff conveyed ref A points on Burma and ref B
information regarding latest USG sanctions October 23 to MFA
Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam Division Deputy Director
Liang Jianjun and United Nations Affairs Division Deputy
Director Yao Shaojun. Liang had no substantive comment.
Yao, while not formally responding to the demarche points,
commented "personally" that the United States is adding too
many conditions to the dialogue process. Both interlocutors
promised to convey the points and information to their
superiors..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | BEIJING-BASED G-5 CHIEFS OF MISSION ON BURMA, THE EAST CHINA SEA AND UPCOMING HIGH-LEVEL FRENCH VISITORS. |
| Date of publication: | | 12 October 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
"At the October 12 bi-weekly G-5 Chiefs of Mission
gathering, UK Ambassador William Ehrman said that China's
concerns in Burma are driven by the long common border, the
2.5 million ethnic Chinese in Burma, the 150,000 PRC citizens
living there and the 3,000 Chinese companies active in the
country. French DCM Nicholas Chapuis argued that PRC support
for a UN Security Council Presidential Statement on Burma
marks a major policy shift for the Chinese. Japanese DCM
Umeda reported no progress on Sino-Japanese resource
cooperation in the East China Sea, citing the median line,
China's prior investment in the area and territorial concerns
as stumbling blocks. The French DCM reported that
preparations for French President Nicolas Sarkozy's November
25-27 visit to China are not yet finalized." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | OCTOBER 11 MFA PRESS BRIEFING: BURMA, ARREST OF DPRK ASYLUM SEEKERS, DALAI LAMA AND MORE |
| Date of publication: | | 11 October 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | "...The situation in Burma is "relaxing" and is
"turning in a good direction." The international
community should offer "constructive" help to allow
Burma to realize stability, reconciliation, democracy
and development..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | OCTOBER 9 MFA PRESS BRIEFING: BURMA UNREST, SIX-PARTY TALKS, IAEA INDIA VISIT, CURRENCY EXCHANGE |
| Date of publication: | | 09 October 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | "...Burma has "become calmer" through the efforts of both the
Burmese government and the international community. Any
action by the UN Security Council should be "cautious and
prudent" and calculated to promote "stability" within Burma.
The "pressure of sanctions" will not help. China has adopted
a "constructive" policy on Burma, and critics of China's
policy should not attempt "to reach ulterior motives" by
linking it to the 2008 Olympics..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | SEPTEMBER 27 MFA PRESS BRIEFING: BURMA, SIX PARTY TALKS, MISSING RUSSIANS |
| Date of publication: | | 27 September 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | "...At the September 27 regular MFA press briefing,
spokeswoman Jiang Yu said China has been closely following
the situation in Burma and hopes that all parties exercise
restraint so as to avoid escalation or a negative effect on
regional stability. She also expressed hope that the press
would report on the situation in Myanmar truthfully with no
"exaggerated hype." Some in the press had attacked China out
of "ulterior motives," she said. Asked to clarify, Jiang
said everyone had read the reports and seen examples. Asked
if China would support a UN Security Council Resolution on
Burma, she said the Security Council had discussed this topic
and the Chair had spoken to the press. She said the
international community should provide "constructive
assistance" to relax the situation in Myanmar and China
supports the mediation of the UN Secretary General. Asked if
any high-level visits had taken place between China and
Burma, she said she had no information but had already made
China's position clear. Asked specifically if China
condemned the violence in Myanmar, Jiang refused to answer
because the journalist asking "had come late to the press
conference."..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | SEPTEMBER 25 MFA PRESS BRIEFING: BURMA DEMONSTRATIONS, NEW JAPAN PM, SIX-PARTY TALKS, MERKEL-DALAI LAMA MEETING, LIMATE CHANGE, RUSSIA |
| Date of publication: | | 25 September 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | "...At the September 25 regular MFA press briefing,
spokeswoman Jiang Yu said stability in Burma serves the
interests of Burma and the international community and that
China sticks to a policy of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other countries, in response to several questions
on China's reaction to demonstrations in Burma. China hopes
and believes Burma's Government and people can handle the
current situation and achieve stability and economic
development..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | CHINA TO CONSIDER FORMAL UNSC BRIEFING ON BURMA, OPPOSES "TOO MUCH" PRESSURE ON RANGOON |
| Date of publication: | | 10 September 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "China will consider supporting a formal
briefing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by
Special Envoy Gambari (reftel), MFA Burma, Laos, Cambodia and
Vietnam Division Deputy Director Liang Jianjun told us
September 10. Liang said the MFA had conveyed to the Burmese
government Gambari's request to travel twice to Burma and
that the Burmese were receptive to a possible trip after
September 20. China's Ambassador in Burma has conveyed to
senior Burmese officials China's desire that Rangoon resolve
the ongoing crisis "in the proper way." Liang described
Burma's National Convention as a positive political
development. In any case, Liang said, encouragement and
engagement, not pressure and sanctions, are the best way to
move Burma toward political and economic reform." End
Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | CHINA TELLS BURMA TO RECEIVE GAMBARI QUICKLY, SUGGESTS UNITED STATES CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH BURMA |
| Date of publication: | | 27 July 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "In response to the Ambassador per ref A
urging China to press the Burmese regime to exercise
restraint, begin an inclusive dialogue on democracy, and
accept a visit of UN Special Envoy Gambari immediately,
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei stressed in a
meeting on September 27 that China has repeatedly
communicated its concerns to Burmese authorities over the
current situation. China views unrest in Burma as an
internal matter and not appropriate for UN Security Council
consideration. However, consistent with its support for the
UN Secretary-General, China has told Burmese officials that
UN Special Envoy Gambari should visit Burma as soon as
possible. AFM He complained that international media
unfairly assigned China responsibility for resolving the
current turmoil in Burma. He suggested the United States
continue its recent dialogue with Burma. The Ambassador
responded that, as Burma's primary business partner and a
neighboring state, China has both influence and
responsibility." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | APRIL 26 MFA PRESS BRIEFING: BDA, DPRK-BURMA... |
| Date of publication: | | 26 April 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | "...DPRK-Burma Resume Relations..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | DAS JOHN DISCUSSES BURMA, VIETNAM AND JOINT INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH CHINESE ACADEMICS |
| Date of publication: | | 08 March 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
"Chinese scholars of Southeast Asian affairs told EAP
DAS Eric John that Burma presents a major challenge and
opportunity for United States-China relations following
China's veto blocking a Burma resolution in the UN Security
Council (UNSC). The academics said China wants to cooperate
with the United States and continues to pressure Burma to
reform, but may emphasize economic reform and resolving
ethnic conflicts more than the political inclusiveness that
the United States stresses. Zhai said China thinks Burma's
plans for a new constitution are "better than nothing" and
that America's criticism of procedural and other flaws in the
regime's roadmap toward national reunification might be lost
on Beijing. DAS John countered that a bad constitution is
worse than nothing if it permanently excludes from the
political process any legitimate opposition. Elsewhere in
Southeast Asia, the United States and China share many
interests, including promoting economic growth, increasing
cooperation on nontraditional security issues and fighting
terrorism. The weakness and indecisiveness of ASEAN creates
problems for building regional architecture. China sees
Southeast Asia as a growing market, especially for exports
from China's border provinces. Vietnam is rapidly growing
more powerful and this causes China some concern, according
to the scholars." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | DAS JOHN DISCUSSES BURMA, SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH AFM CUI TIANKAI AND DG HU ZHENGYUE |
| Date of publication: | | 05 March 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary: "If the United States wants to make a difference on
Burma, it should engage directly with General Than Shwe,
Assistant Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai told EAP DAS Eric John
on March 5. In a separate meeting, MFA Director General for
Asian Affairs Hu Zhengyue stressed that State Councilor Tang
"really worked on" the Burmese during his recent visit to
Burma, delivering the message that Burma needs to respond to
the concerns of the international community. DAS John
underlined that the United States is worried that Burma is
headed at high speed in the wrong direction. If it adopts a
constitution excluding certain parties from the political
process, the United States and China could be locked into a
cycle of confrontation over Burma at the United Nations. DAS
John and AFM Cui also discussed the United States' and
China's overlapping interests in Southeast Asia. With DG Hu,
DAS John emphasized the importance of Indonesia and discussed
instability in East Timor, positive progress in the
Philippines and the situation in post-coup Thailand. EAP DAS
Thomas Christensen joined DAS John at the meetings." End
Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 24 December 2010 |
|
| Title: | | DAS JOHN DISCUSSES BURMA, SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH AFM CUI TIANKAI AND DG HU ZHENGYUE |
| Date of publication: | | 05 March 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
"If the United States wants to make a difference on
Burma, it should engage directly with General Than Shwe,
Assistant Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai told EAP DAS Eric John
on March 5. In a separate meeting, MFA Director General for
Asian Affairs Hu Zhengyue stressed that State Councilor Tang
"really worked on" the Burmese during his recent visit to
Burma, delivering the message that Burma needs to respond to
the concerns of the international community. DAS John
underlined that the United States is worried that Burma is
headed at high speed in the wrong direction. If it adopts a
constitution excluding certain parties from the political
process, the United States and China could be locked into a
cycle of confrontation over Burma at the United Nations. DAS
John and AFM Cui also discussed the United States' and
China's overlapping interests in Southeast Asia. With DG Hu,
DAS John emphasized the importance of Indonesia and discussed
instability in East Timor, positive progress in the
Philippines and the situation in post-coup Thailand. EAP DAS
Thomas Christensen joined DAS John at the meetings." End
Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | Towards Resolution: China in the Myanmar Issue |
| Date of publication: | | March 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Executive Summary:
The issue of Myanmar has been in the limelight of international affairs for
almost two decades now. Economic sanctions and political isolation have
consistently been the principal policies of the international community in
dealing with the incumbent government in Myanmar. Despite the mounting
pressure, the country’s military rulers have so far chosen to defy the
international outcry, and as a result, a political stalemate has persisted, while
the population of the country continues to struggle to make ends meet.
Twenty years after 1987, Myanmar remains on the UN list of the world’s
Least Developed Countries. Yet, the government that stole the country’s
election is still in power. The impasse itself now becomes a problem, and the
practice, if not the concept, of intervention is open to scrutiny.
Whatever problems Myanmar has today and however severe they may be,
they did not just spring up overnight after the military took power — the
country’s history, beleaguered by violence and turmoil in the past two
centuries, tells us that. Recounting the country’s struggle for independence
and the political upheavals in the decades that followed allows us to gain
insights into the nature of the problems with which the country is grappling
today. Accountable for the problems that presently hinder the democratic
process in Myanmar is a combination of colonial legacy, multi-ethnicity, a
wide range of political interests across communities and, above all, a lack of
national identity that bonds the country together. Without the necessary step
of state building and a process of national reconciliation from within, a host
of political, economic, and ethnic problems cannot be solved.
In regard to the issue of Myanmar, China has all along spoken with a
different voice. The difference is rooted in regional identity and shared views
of history and development. Like many Asian countries, China has had
peaceful as well as troubled relations with Myanmar. The export of Mao’s
revolution and fervent support for a people’s war’ to bring about regime
change in neighboring countries and beyond during the most radical period
of China’s modern history bears a striking resemblance to international
10
developments unfolding on the Indo-China Peninsula and elsewhere in the
world today. China’s current foreign policy and, in particular, China’s stance
on the issue of Myanmar, reflects lessons that China has drawn from its own
experience in the past. Economic reform that prospered and served to
stabilize China in the post-Mao era is now making its way to neighboring
Myanmar. This cross-border development (in part joined by ASEAN) has
brought significant changes to the war-torn country of Myanmar; and more
coordinated efforts from the international community along the same lines
would certainly benefit the country and its people in a meaningful way.
Intention and sincerity are crucial in the search for solutions, as indeed the
Six-Party Talks on North Korea demonstrate. |
| Author/creator: | | Xiaolin Guo |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program - Silk Road Paper, March 2007 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (2.23 MB) - 92 pages |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/ |
| Date of entry/update: | | 12 October 2010 |
|
| Title: | | CHINESE STATE COUNCILOR TANG'S VISIT TO BURMA |
| Date of publication: | | 27 February 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
"China encouraged Burma to accelerate its democratic
and national reconciliation processes, develop its economy
and improve the lives of the Burmese people, State Councilor
Tang Jiaxuan told Burmese generals on his February 25-27
visit to Burma. According to a readout provided to the DCM
by MFA Director General for North American Affairs Liu Jieyi,
Tang said Burma's internal affairs should be settled through
consultation between the government and the people and noted
that the international community can provide "constructive
help" in this regard. Burmese officials told Tang they are
prepared to have formal written communication with Aung San
Suu Kyi, to engage with the international community and to
continue progress in their roadmap toward eventual elections.
The generals' priorities remain domestic stability, economic
development and training of personnel. DG Liu's readout was
notable for its promptness, provided on the same day that
Tang and his delegation departed Burma. The Chinese provided
the same prompt readout to our Russian, Japanese and ASEAN
colleagues." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | PRC-BURMA: MFA ON NEXT STEPS FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND SPECIAL ENVOY |
| Date of publication: | | 27 February 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
"An MFA International Organizations Department
official told us that State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan
discussed Beijing's ideas about Burma's political
situation during his visit to Burma that ended
February 27. Responding to reftel demarche on next
steps for the international community regarding Burma,
the official said China believes that U/SYG Gambari
has been a useful Special Envoy whose term might merit
extension. Beijing is willing to cooperate with other
stakeholders to address the situation in Burma in
relevant international fora but stands by its view
that the UN Security Council "should not interfere" in
Burma's affairs, the official said." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | DAS CHRISTENSEN DISCUSSES BURMA WITH MFA ASIAN AFFAIRS DG HU ZHENGYUE |
| Date of publication: | | 06 February 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
"EAP DAS Thomas Christensen underscored the
need for continued international attention to Burma in
a meeting with MFA Asian Affairs Director General Hu
Zhengyue on February 6. The United States was
disappointed by China's veto of the Security Council
resolution on Burma. China should find ways to
promote reform in Burma. The United States is ready
to discuss these issues with China, he noted. DG Hu
said cooperation on Burma should be an important part
of closer coordination between the United States and
China on Asian affairs. China continues to urge
Burmese leaders to seek national reconciliation and
believes that ASEAN and the United Nations, but not
the Security Council, can play a constructive role on
Burma. DAS Christensen asked whether China pressed
Burmese General Thura Shwe Mann on reform last week
when he visited China. DG Hu said General Thura Shwe
Mann met with Premier Wen and Chinese military leaders
and Chinese officials urged the regime to respond to
international concerns, but also repeated China's
standard positions about not interfering in Burma's
internal affairs. DAS Christensen asked Hu about his
perceptions of the Burmese regime's relations with
Aung San Suu Kyi. DG Hu responded that the regime
does not see her as a threat. Even if she were in
power she would not be able to lead the country
effectively, given the complexity of the problems
Burma faces, DG Hu said. DAS Christensen said it is
the current Burmese regime, not Aung San Suu Kyi, that
has demonstrated a lack of capacity to handle the
complexities of the challenges that face Burma." End
Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | A/S SILVERBERG AND AFM CUI DISCUSS BURMA, HAITI, IRAN, UNSC REFORM, SUDAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS |
| Date of publication: | | 26 January 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
"United Nations successes in 2006 benefited from P-5
cooperation, especially between the United States and China,
Assistant Secretary for International Organizations (IO)
Affairs Kristen Silverberg told Assistant Foreign Minister
Cui Tiankai. U.S.-China cooperation resulted in the
selection of an exceptionally qualified new UNSYG and a new
WHO head, A/S Silverberg noted. AFM Cui said that U.S.-China
cooperation also made it possible to pass resolutions on the
DPRK and Iran nuclear issues. A/S Silverberg said Burma and
Haiti still require attention. Cui said China is open to
bilateral talks on Burma, will "stand on principle" on the
renewal of the MINUSTAH mandate in Haiti and believes further
sanctions on Iran will strengthen the hand of hardliners.
China considers India, as a representative of the developing
world, more deserving of a permanent UNSC seat than Japan,
Cui said. A/S Silverberg urged China not to allow the Human
Rights Council to be a forum for Israel-bashing, asked
Beijing to support the Ugandan candidate for the Global Fund
and reiterated invitations to Cui and IO Director General Wu
Hailong to visit Washington." End Summary. |
| Language: | | Engish |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | CHINESE OPPOSITION TO BURMA RESOLUTION UNCHANGED; BEIJING WILL VETO; FEARS COSTS OF CONFRONTATION |
| Date of publication: | | 11 January 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
"Calling the Charge to a 9:00 pm "urgent meeting,"
Assistant Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai said China has
"clearly" told the United States that Burma is a matter of
national security for China, that there is no present threat
from Burma to regional peace and security, that none of
Burma's neighbors support a UNSC resolution and that China
will "vote against" a Burma resolution if it is brought to a
vote. The PRC will inform other UNSC members and make a
public announcement of its opposition unless a solution is
reached imminently, but, in any case, China will vote against
a resolution. CDA stressed the need for a resolution,
highlighted that we have kept the PRC informed of our views
and said we planned for a vote on January 12. Cui said China
and the United States have recently worked well together on
tough issues such as Iran and North Korea at the UNSC. He
feared that by forcing a confrontation, the United States
will endanger that cooperation. Asked about whether the
revisions to the draft text would have an impact on Beijing's
position, a working-level official said that the PRC
opposition is to a resolution and not specific text." End
Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | BURMA NEEDS A GOVERNMENT THAT REPRESENTS ITS PEOPLE, CHINESE MFA OFFICIAL TELLS VISITING EAP DAS CHRISTENSEN |
| Date of publication: | | 05 January 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
"Burma needs a government that represents the Burmese
people and that provides more freedom to its citizens, MFA
Asian Affairs Department Director General Hu Zhengyue told
visiting EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas Christensen on
December 21. Hu said that China has been "working on" Burma
by urging the regime to begin ethnic and political
reconciliation, encouraging UN U/SYG Gambari to visit the
country, and urging the Burmese regime to become a country
that ASEAN could accept as a responsible member. Hu claimed
that China had achieved "significant progress" in replacing
opium as a key agricultural product in certain areas of
Burma. DAS Christensen stressed that Burma,s domestic
problems remain a serious threat to regional stability and
that the regime continues to eschew reform. Hu asserted that
the United States and China share a common goal in a stable
Burma and should coordinate our Burma policy." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | PRC/BURMA: MESSAGE ON UNSC RESOLUTION DELIVERED; BEIJING STILL OPPOSED |
| Date of publication: | | 05 January 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
"The PRC is prepared to block a UN Security Council
resolution on Burma but appears confident there will not be
enough support to bring such a resolution to a vote,
according to MFA IO Department UN Division Deputy Director
Cong Jun. MFA Director General for International
Organizations told CDA that China agrees with many of the
U.S. points about the bad behavior of the Burmese regime,
commenting that he and other MFA officials had raised PRC
concerns with the Burmese Ambassador in Beijing. Wu claimed
that Beijing has also pushed ASEAN countries to take a
stronger stance toward Burma and expressed a desire for
better cooperation with the United States. China does not
believe that a UNSCR will be effective and worries that it
could open the door to further resolutions that will lead to
a deterioration of the situation in Burma, he stressed. MFA
IO Department UN Division Deputy Director Cong Jun later told
us that Beijing remains strongly opposed to a Burma
resolution and, noting previous discussions about the
possible use of the PRC veto, said China "will not permit
passage of the resolution." Commenting that vote-counting is
best done in New York, Cong expressed confidence that fewer
than nine countries would be willing to vote in favor of the
resolution." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | Chinese Whispers: The Great Coco Island Mystery |
| Date of publication: | | January 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | How a single news agency report led to the accepted belief that China has a sophisticated intelligence post in Burmese waters
For almost 15 years, there has been a steady stream of newspaper stories, scholarly monographs and books that have referred inter alia to a large Chinese signals intelligence (SIGINT) station on Burma’s Great Coco Island, in the Andaman Sea. Yet it would now appear that there is no such base on this island, nor ever has been. The explosion of this myth highlights the dearth of reliable information about strategic developments in Burma since the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in 1988. |
| Author/creator: | | Andrew Selth |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 15, No. 1 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 30 December 2006 |
|
| Title: | | Chinese Military Bases in Burma: The Explosion of a Myth |
| Date of publication: | | 2007 |
| Description/subject: | | Executive Summary:
For 15 years, there has been a steady stream of newspaper stories, scholarly monographs and books that have referred inter alia to the existence of Chinese military bases in Burma. This apparent intrusion by China into the northern Indian Ocean has strongly influenced the strategic perceptions and policies of Burma’s regional neighbours, notably India. Reports of a large signals intelligence collection station on Great Coco Island in the Andaman Sea, for example, and a naval base on Hainggyi Island in the Irrawaddy River delta, have been cited as evidence that Burma has become a client state of China. Other observers have seen the existence of such bases as proof of China’s expansionist designs in the Indian Ocean region and its global ambitions. Few of these reports drew on hard evidence or gave verifiable sources to support their claims, but repeated denials of a Chinese military presence in Burma by Rangoon and Beijing were brushed aside.
As these reports proliferated, they were picked up by respected commentators and academics and given fresh life in serious studies of the regional strategic environment. Each time they were cited in books and reputable journals they gained credibility, and it was not long before the existence of Chinese bases in Burma was widely accepted as an established fact. In 2005, however, the Chairman of the Indian Defence Force’s Chiefs of Staff Committee conceded that reports of a Chinese intelligence facility on one of Burma’s offshore islands were incorrect. At the same time, he announced that there were no Chinese naval bases in Burma. There are a number of possible explanations for these statements, but this remarkable about-face, on two issues that have preoccupied Indian defence planners for more than a decade, must throw doubt on the claims of other “Chinese bases” in Burma. It also raises a number of serious questions about current analyses of China’s relations with Burma, and of China’s strategic interests in the northern Indian Ocean region.
It is possible to identify three schools of thought regarding China’s relations with Burma. The “domination” school believes that Burma has become a pawn in China’s strategic designs in the Asia–Pacific region, and is host to several Chinese military facilities. The “partnership” school sees a more balanced relationship developing between Beijing and Rangoon, but accepts that China has acquired bases in Burma as part of a long term strategy to establish a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean. The “rejectionist” school, however, emphasises Burma’s strong tradition of independence and Rangoon’s continuing suspicions of Beijing. This school claims that, despite the conventional wisdom, Burma has been able to resist the enormous strategic weight of its larger, more powerful neighbour. Some members of this school argue that Burma has the whip hand in its relations with China, and has been able successfully to manipulate Burma’s sensitive geostrategic position to considerable advantage. While acknowledging the close bilateral ties that have developed since 1988, they are sceptical of claims that China has any military bases in Burma. |
| Author/creator: | | Andrew Selth |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Griffith Asia Institute |
| Format/size: | | pdf (210K) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://www.griffith.edu.au/search/cache.cgi?collection=Internet&doc=http%2Fwww.griffith.edu.au%... |
| Date of entry/update: | | 31 May 2007 |
|
| Title: | | PRC/BURMA: BEIJING'S OPPOSITION TO UNSC RESOLUTION UNCHANGED |
| Date of publication: | | 27 December 2006 |
| Description/subject: | | The PRC continues to "strongly oppose" a UN Security
Council Resolution on Burma and though ready for a "political
confrontation" with the United States in order to block a
resolution, prefers to work with Washington to find "more
effective" ways to communicate dissatisfaction to the Burmese
regime, according to MFA International Organizations
Department UN Affairs Division Director Yang Tao. Yang told
Poloff December 27 that Beijing was surprised that the United
States backed off from pushing for an early vote on a Burma
resolution so quickly and with so little warning, adding that
the PRC was also surprised that the United States had not
suggested the possibility of a Presidential Statement (PRST).
Arguing that, as a neighbor, China has a much greater
interest than in Burma than does the United States, Yang
repeated his previous statement that Beijing will not accept
any linkage of a possible UNSC veto of a Burma resolution to
overall U.S.-China relations. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | PRC/BURMA: BEIJING'S OPPOSITION TO UNSC RESOLUTION UNCHANGED |
| Date of publication: | | 27 December 2006 |
| Description/subject: | | The PRC continues to "strongly oppose" a UN Security
Council Resolution on Burma and though ready for a "political
confrontation" with the United States in order to block a
resolution, prefers to work with Washington to find "more
effective" ways to communicate dissatisfaction to the Burmese
regime, according to MFA International Organizations
Department UN Affairs Division Director Yang Tao. Yang told
Poloff December 27 that Beijing was surprised that the United
States backed off from pushing for an early vote on a Burma
resolution so quickly and with so little warning, adding that
the PRC was also surprised that the United States had not
suggested the possibility of a Presidential Statement (PRST).
Arguing that, as a neighbor, China has a much greater
interest than in Burma than does the United States, Yang
repeated his previous statement that Beijing will not accept
any linkage of a possible UNSC veto of a Burma resolution to
overall U.S.-China relations. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | CHINA SEEKS ACCOMMODATION ON UNSC BURMA RESOLUTION; WARNS CONFLICT COULD DAMAGE COOPERATION IN OTHER AREAS |
| Date of publication: | | 19 December 2006 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
"The United States and China share many common
interests in the United Nations Security Council and with
regard to Burma, none of which would be served by conflict
over a Burma resolution in the UNSC, MFA Director General for
International Organizations Wu Hailong told the DCM. Wu
urged the United States to drop the resolution or seek
another way forward. China will oppose a UNSC Resolution on
Burma because Burma's political situation is showing
progress, the country's problems involve internal affairs and
are outside the UNSC's area of responsibility. The United
States has tabled a resolution on Burma because we seek real
progress and want to support Undersecretary Gambari's efforts
under the Secretary General's Good Offices mission, the DCM
said. Problems such as drugs, unrest, human trafficking and
infectious disease caused by Burma's government threaten
stability in the region. China should back the Burma
resolution, he emphasized." End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | URGING CHINA TO ACCEPT UNSC RESOLUTION ON BURMA |
| Date of publication: | | 14 December 2006 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
China should reconsider its opposition to a UN
Security Council Resolution on Burma, Polmincouns
stressed to MFA Deputy Director General for Southeast
Asia Tong Xiaoling on December 14. The situation in
Burma is harming the peace and security of the region.
Tong said China remains opposed to a resolution.
Separately, the Chinese warned the French Charge that
China has used its veto rarely but might do so on a
Burma resolution. A lower-ranking MFA official told
the French that China remains open to a "strong"
Presidential Statement. End Summary. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | PRC/BURMA: BEIJING STRONGLY OPPOSES UNSC RESOLUTION |
| Date of publication: | | 13 December 2006 |
| Description/subject: | | Summary:
The PRC "strongly opposes" a UN Security Council
Resolution on Burma and would consider using its veto, MFA
International Organizations Department UN Affairs Division
Director Yang Tao told Poloffs December 13 in response to
reftel message. Though the PRC shares many of the U.S.
concerns about the worsening problems in Burma, Beijing
rejects the idea that they pose a threat to international
peace and security warranting action by the Security Council.
Highlighting our desire to work with the PRC on Burma,
Poloffs urged China not to block the resolution from moving
forward and cautioned against casting a veto. End Summary |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
| Title: | | Economic and Military Cooperation between China and Burma |
| Date of publication: | | September 2006 |
| Description/subject: | | (A brief report on China’s support of economic and military development in Burma)
Contents: Introduction, Contract and Memoranda of Understanding, Aids and Loans, Trade, Seaports and Highways Projects, Gas Pipeline and Water Dam Projects, Military Supplies and Navy Ports , Conclusion, References. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Burma Western News |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 12 October 2010 |
|
| Title: | | A/S HILL'S MAY 25 WORKING LUNCH WITH VFM WU DAWEI |
| Date of publication: | | 02 June 2006 |
| Description/subject: | | "...Visiting EAP Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill
urged VFM Wu Dawei to improve relations with Japan and use
PRC influence to push the Burmese regime to release Aung San
Suu Kyi (ASSK) during a May 25 working lunch. A/S Hill also
noted the negative impact of PRC/Taiwan competition on
Pacific Island states. Wu stressed that Beijing seeks
improvement of relations with Tokyo but has no choice in its
response if Japan does not handle history issues properly.
He expressed satisfaction with the meeting between Foreign
Ministers Li and Aso. Wu complained about the Burmese
regime, noting that the PRC has raised ASSK but that the
senior military leadership views her as a threat and is
unlikely to release her. Wu closed by urging U.S.
participation in the East Asia Summit and saying that China
will not challenge the U.S. role and our interests in East
Asia. End Summary..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 26 December 2010 |
|
| Title: | | Defending Burma, Protecting Myanmar |
| Date of publication: | | May 2006 |
| Description/subject: | | "Over half a century has wrought profound changes in Burmese strategic perspectives that should be understood by those concerned about stability in the region..." |
| Author/creator: | | David I Steinberg |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 14, No. 5 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 28 December 2006 |
|
| Title: | | Strategic Memory Lane |
| Date of publication: | | November 2005 |
| Description/subject: | | It is known as the “Road to Nowhere” or “Ghost Road,” but there are hopes that political and strategic problems can be sidetracked to resurrect the World War II-era Ledo Road, running between India and China through Burma..."...India and China have sometimes made calls to reopen the Ledo Road. They have come from a visiting delegation from the Yunnan Provincial Chamber of Commerce at an international trade fair in Guwahati, the capital of Assam; from the Federation of Indian Export Organizations in Calcutta; and increasingly from a number of individual politicians and members of state governments in India’s northeast, especially from Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Academics have also raised the issue. A handful of people are upbeat about the tourism prospects—of driving air-con jeeps across the mountains and through jungles and exotic places from India to China.
China appears to be the most prepared. It has already greatly upgraded its section of the Burma Road, built in 1937-38, into a modern, partly six-lane mountain highway..." |
| Author/creator: | | Karin Dean |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 13, No. 11 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 01 May 2006 |
|
| Title: | | Living Under the Eye of the Dragon |
| Date of publication: | | July 2005 |
| Description/subject: | | "Members of the Communist Party of Burma who have lived in southern China since the party was fractured by a mutiny in 1989 have to be careful not to talk about Beijing’s warm relations with their former enemies in Rangoon
China is watched with awe worldwide as its economy grows at an alarming rate; and with its military might expanding apace, it is already regarded by the US and the West as a superpower. This and the fact that it is the Burmese military regime’s closest ally concerns not just western countries but also many Burmese at home and abroad.
Except for one group of Burmese, who both admire China’s swift rise and act as apologists for Beijing over its relations with Rangoon. They are members of the Communist Party of Burma, long regarded previously as a Chinese-supported threat to Rangoon; now, the less-than 500 CPB members live in the southern Chinese city of Kunming, where they are no longer a threat to anyone..." Describes the situation of former CPB leaders living in China, including Brig. Gen. Kyaw Zaw. |
| Author/creator: | | Aung Zaw |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 13, No. 7 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 30 April 2006 |
|
| Title: | | Rangoon the Economic Spoiler |
| Date of publication: | | July 2005 |
| Description/subject: | | Burma’s narrow-minded generals are a barrier to Asian development...
The Burmese junta doubtless believes it is clever in the way it plays its close relationship with China to gain leverage with India and even with fellow Asean members. The play is well recognized internationally, not least in India where realpolitik is adjudged to override commitment to democratic government. But what is less often realized is the damage that Burma’s combination of incompetent and thuggish government is doing to Asian development as a whole...Burma is not just an economic disaster in its own right, it is a major barrier to closer cooperation between South and Southeast Asia. The damage this does becomes clearer as the economies of India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh open up to the outside world, more aware of the benefits of trade and investment flows. South Asia as a whole may finally be about to make some progress towards a trade grouping and India is talking about a deal with Asean. But, as ever, Burma remains a physical obstacle to interaction between South and Southeast Asia as well as casting a shadow over the whole Asean process..." |
| Author/creator: | | Philip Bowring |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 13, No. 7 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 30 April 2006 |
|
| Title: | | GATEWAY TO THE EAST |
| Date of publication: | | June 2005 |
| Description/subject: | | a symposium on Northeast India
and the look east policy...
The Problem:
Posed by Sanjib Baruah, Visiting Professor, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi...
NORTHEAST INDIA IN A NEW ASIA:
Jairam Ramesh, Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha)...
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES OR CONTINUING STAGNATION:
Sushil Khanna, Professor of Economics and Strategic Management, Indian Institute of Management, Kolkata...
WATERS OF DESPAIR, WATERS OF HOPE:
Sanjoy Hazarika, Managing Trustee, Centre for Northeast Studies and Policy Research, New Delhi and Guwahati...
PROSPECTS FOR TOURISM:
M.P. Bezbaruah, Former Secretary, Ministry of Tourism, Government of India...
OPERATION HORNBILL FESTIVAL 2004:
Dolly Kikon, Member, Working Group, Northeast Peoples' Initiative, Guwahati...
GUNS, DRUGS AND REBELS:
Subir Bhaumik, East India Correspondent, BBC, Kolkata...
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:
Jayeeta Sharma, Assistant Professor of History, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA...
TERRITORIALITIES YET UNACCOUNTED:
Karin Dean, Asia Correspondent, 'Postimees', Bangkok...
COMMUNITY, CULTURE, NATION:
Mrinal Miri, Vice Chancellor, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong...
THE TAI-AHOM CONNECTION:
Yasmin Saikia, Assistant Professor of History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA...
THE ETHNIC DIMENSION:
Samir Kumar Das, Reader, Department of Political Science, Calcutta University...
BOOKS:
Reviewed by Nandana Datta, Dulali Nag, Bodhisattva Kar, Nimmi Kurian and M.S. Prabhakara...
FURTHER READING:
Compiled by Sukanya Sharma, Fellow, Centre for Northeast India, South and Southeast Asia Studies, Guwahati...
COMMUNICATION:
Received from C.P. Bhambhri and B.K. Banerji. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Seminar magazine |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 01 May 2006 |
|
| Title: | | A Prosperous Burma Would Benefit China |
| Date of publication: | | July 2004 |
| Description/subject: | | "China's stability would be strengthened if Burma were economically stable and prosperous. Thus it should increase efforts to work for the economic and political changes in Burma that would allow the country to receive international assistance.
The modernization of China initiated by Deng Xiaoping involved a shift in the conception of national power from a narrow military perspective to Comprehensive National Power, or CNP, currently seen as consisting of the "eight capabilities" of domestic economic activities, science and technology, foreign economic activities, social development, military, government regulation and control, foreign affairs and natural resources..." |
| Author/creator: | | David Arnott |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 12, No. 7 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 10 October 2004 |
|
| Title: | | Ming China and Southeast Asia in the 15th Century: A Reappraisal |
| Date of publication: | | July 2004 |
| Description/subject: | | Abstract / Description:
"The 15th century was a period of intense interaction between Ming China and Southeast Asia. The period saw the Ming invade Ðại Việt, expand the scope of the Chinese polity by exploiting and then incorporating Tai polities of upland Southeast Asia, and launch a succession of hugely influential maritime armadas which travelled through Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. It is argued that these three aspects of Ming policy can be seen as differing types of Ming colonialism greatly affecting Southeast Asia during the 15th century and beyond.
A chronological study of the policies relating to Southeast Asia of the successive Ming rulers is followed by a thematic overview of how the Ming policies actually affected Southeast Asia in the 15th century. This includes reference to effects in the political, economic and cultural topography of Southeast Asia The beginnings of a non-state-sponsored maritime trade between China and Southeast Asia is also investigated."...Keywords: Ming, Southeast Asia, 15th century, Zheng He, Dai Viet, Tai, Malacca.....20 references to Burma |
| Author/creator: | | Geoffrey Wade |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Asia Research Institute National University of Singapore Working Paper 28 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (2.42MB) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 12 March 2010 |
|
| Title: | | The Chinese Conundrum |
| Date of publication: | | July 2004 |
| Description/subject: | | "What role does Burma really play in Beijing’s policy plans?
Eleven bilateral agreements. A commitment to cooperate in the war on drugs and cross-frontier crime. And a large measure of mutual praise. Those were the official and much-publicized results of the week-long visit to China in mid-July by Burmese Prime Minister Gen Khin Nyunt.
...
Central to China’s regional concerns is its very real interest in seeing a stable and economically viable Burmese state on its western frontiers. Some Chinese officials have openly linked stability to "democracy", and Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue is on record as urging a "good internal and external environment for Myanmar’s [Burma’s] democratization"..." |
| Author/creator: | | Aung Zaw |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy" Vol. 12, No. 7 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 11 November 2004 |
|
| Title: | | BURMA’S CHINA CONNECTION AND THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION |
| Date of publication: | | September 2003 |
| Description/subject: | | Abstract:
Since abandoning its neutral foreign policy in 1988, Burma’s close
relationship with China has caused considerable unease in the Asia-
Pacific region. While some reporting on the defence and intelligence
links between Rangoon and Beijing has been inaccurate and
misleading, it has helped create the perception of an expansionist
China and led in turn to significant policy changes on the part of
regional countries, particularly India. The future of China’s
relationship with Burma has been interpreted in three ways. The
domination school’ sees Burma overwhelmed by China and becoming
a client state. The partnership school’ predicts a close and mutually
supportive strategic relationship. The rejectionist school’ believes
that Burma can resist China’s enormous strategic weight and remain
independent. All three schools seem to agree, however, that the
Rangoon regime will do whatever is necessary to survive in the face
of increasing international pressure. |
| Author/creator: | | Andrew Selth |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | SDSC Working Paper 377 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (73K) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 27 February 2009 |
|
| Title: | | Chinese gaze at the Indian Ocean: Recent development of bilateral relationship between China and Burma |
| Date of publication: | | 31 January 2003 |
| Description/subject: | | What lies beneath: Recent closer cooperation between China and Burma...
Chemical warfare: Chinese military connection...
India's irritation: Chinese dream of direct access to the Indian Ocean...
Pave the way southward: China's fungible usage of Japanese ODA...
Imminent political crisis? |
| Author/creator: | | Schu Sugawara |
| Language: | | Japanese |
| Source/publisher: | | BurmaInfo (Japan) |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://www.burmainfo.org (home page of publisher) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 03 June 2003 |
|
| Title: | | Sowing disorder: Support for the Burmese junta backfires on China |
| Date of publication: | | November 2002 |
| Description/subject: | | "In the early 1990s China’s sale of arms to Burma played a crucial role in keeping the Burmese military in power. But this support for the generals in Rangoon is now backfiring, as many of the negative consequences spill over the border into China, writes Andrew Bosson. While China has generally taken a passive stance towards international efforts to pressure Burma to improve its rights record, it would be in Beijing’s best interests to push Rangoon towards economic and political reform, he argues.
The relationship between Burma and China has been harmful to both countries, especially following the Chinese arms deals which preserved the junta in power and locked Burmese political and economic life into a stasis from which it has yet to emerge. The generals seem to have very little idea of how a modern economy functions and are essentially running the country as they would an army. Military expenditures continue to take up about 60 percent of the national budget. Thus it comes as no surprise that the economy is in an advanced state of failure. China also has been damaged economically: Burma’s lack of access to economic development assistance and its collapsed economy leave a gaping hole in the regional development projects the impoverished provinces of southwest China so badly need. China also suffers from the massive spread of HIV/AIDS, drug addiction and crime that have accompanied the massive quantities of heroin being trafficked from Burma into Yunnan Province. The growth of the drug economy in Burma may be traced directly to the lack of the necessary economic and political remedies, which is an indirect result of China’s intervention..." |
| Author/creator: | | Andrew Bosson |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | China Rights Forum Journal 2002-03 |
| Format/size: | | pdf (140K) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://iso.hrichina.org/public/contents/article?revision%5fid=3346&item%5fid=3345 |
| Date of entry/update: | | May 2003 |
|
| Title: | | Burma and superpower rivalries in the Asia-Pacific |
| Date of publication: | | April 2002 |
| Description/subject: | | "The Western democracies have declared that their strong stances against the current military regime in Burma reflect principled stands against the 1988 massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators, the failure of the regime to recognize the results of the 1990 general elections (which resulted in a landslide victory for the main opposition parties), and the regime?s continuing human rights abuses. Yet it can be argued that such a strong and sustained position would have been less likely had the Cold War not ended and Burma?s importance in the global competition between the superpowers not significantly waned. Lacking any pressing strategic or military reason to cultivate Burma, and with few direct political or economic interests at stake, countries like the United States and the United Kingdom can afford to isolate the Rangoon regime and impose upon it pariah status. If this was indeed the calculation made in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is possible that the changes that have occurred in the strategic environment since then may prompt a reconsideration of these policies.
Burma lies where South, Southeast, and East Asia meet; there the dominant cultures of these three subregions compete for influence. It lies also across the ?fault lines? between three major civilisations?Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucian.1 At critical times in the past, Burma has been a cockpit for rivalry between superpowers. Today, in the fluid strategic environment of the early twenty-first century, its important position is once again attracting attention from analysts, officials, and military planners. Already, Burma?s close relationship with China and the development of the Burmese armed forces have reminded South and Southeast Asian countries, at least, of Burma?s geostrategic importance and prompted a markedly different approach from that of the West..." The PDF version (222K) has a map and a 4-page presentation of Burma's geostrategic position not contained in the html version. |
| Author/creator: | | Andrew Selth |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | Naval War College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2 |
| Format/size: | | html (Google cache), pdf (226K) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_2_55/ai_88174228 |
| Date of entry/update: | | 03 June 2003 |
|
| Title: | | The Political Economy of China - Myanmar Relations: Strategic and Economic Dimensions |
| Date of publication: | | 2002 |
| Description/subject: | | The main thesis of this paper is to argue that Myanmar is neither a strategic
pawn nor an economic pivot of China in the short and immediate term. Since
1988, Sino-Myanmar entente is uneven, asymmetrical, but nevertheless
reciprocal and mutually beneficial. The strategic entente and economic relations
are a marriage of convenience. However, Myanmar’s strategic location on a
trijunction between South Asia, Southeast Asia and China is nevertheless
economically and strategically significant. Economically, Myanmar is important
for China as a trading outlet to the Indian Ocean for its landlocked inland
provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan. Strategically, Myanmar is potentially
important for China to achieve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and its
long-term two-ocean objective. Furthermore, a China-Myanmar nexus is
strategically useful for China to contain India’s influence in Southeast Asia.
Finally, Myanmar is part and parcel of China’s grand strategic design to achieve
its goal of becoming a great power in the 21st century. Despite the more extensive
growing Chinese influence over Myanmar, it is unlikely that Rangoon will
become a strategic satellite base for China. Myanmar’s strong sense of
nationalism, its past ability to successfully deal with foreign powers to preserve
its independence and cultural identity, will likely make Myanmar withstand
most odds. |
| Author/creator: | | Poon Kim Shee |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | The International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University |
| Format/size: | | pdf (59 KB) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 15 June 2006 |
|
| Title: | | Challenges to democratization in Burma: Perspectives on multilateral and bilateral responses. Chapter 3 - China–Burma relations |
| Date of publication: | | 14 December 2001 |
| Description/subject: | | I Historical preface;
II Strategic relations;
III Drugs in the China–Burma relationship;
IV China-Burma border: the HIV/AIDS nexus;
V Chinese immigration: cultural and economic impact;
VI Opening up southwest China;
VII Gains and losses for various parties where Burma is (a) democratizing or (b) under Chinese
“suzereinty”;
VIII Possible future focus;
IX Conclusions.
"
This paper has argued that China’s support for the military regime in Burma has had negative
consequences for both Burma and China. The negative impact on Burma of its relationship with China
is that it preserves an incompetent and repressive order and locks the country into economic and
political stagnation. The negative impact on China is that Burma has become a block to regional
development and an exporter of HIV/AIDS and drugs.
China’s comprehensive national interests would be best served by an economically stable and
prosperous Burma. China could help the development of such an entity by encouraging a political
process in Burma that would lead to an opening up of the country to international assistance and a
more competent and publicly acceptable administration..." |
| Author/creator: | | David Arnott |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | International IDEA |
| Format/size: | | pdf (274K) |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://www.idea.int/asia_pacific/burma/upload/challenges_to_democratization_in_burma.pdf |
| Date of entry/update: | | 12 July 2003 |
|
| Title: | | China Cutting Through to Bengal |
| Date of publication: | | June 2001 |
| Description/subject: | | Three Chinese-made dredgers worth US$ 8.9 million have been delivered to Burma as part of an effort to develop the Irrawaddy River waterway as a new trade route for China. "The neighbouring country expects to expand trade operations for its products, via the [Irrawaddy] river as a gateway to the Bay (of Bengal)", said a Rangoon-based shipping manager. The dredgers are being used to improve river transport from Bhamo, newr the Chinese border, to Minbe, which is to be connected to the Arakan coast by a new highway. |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy", Vol 9. No. 5 |
| Format/size: | | This is the whole of the item, which has disappeared from the Irrawaddy website. |
| Alternate URLs: | | http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ihMo_FzJljYJ:www.irrawaddy.org/print_article.p... |
| Date of entry/update: | | 02 September 2010 |
|
| Title: | | The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations: Strategic and Economic Dimensions |
| Date of publication: | | 2001 |
| Description/subject: | | The main thesis of this paper is to argue that Myanmar is neither a strategic
pawn nor an economic pivot of China in the short and immediate term. Since
1988, Sino-Myanmar entente is uneven, asymmetrical, but nevertheless
reciprocal and mutually beneficial. The strategic entente and economic relations
are a marriage of convenience. However, Myanmar’s strategic location on a
trijunction between South Asia, Southeast Asia and China is nevertheless
economically and strategically significant. Economically, Myanmar is important
for China as a trading outlet to the Indian Ocean for its landlocked inland
provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan. Strategically, Myanmar is potentially
important for China to achieve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and its
long-term two-ocean objective. Furthermore, a China-Myanmar nexus is
strategically useful for China to contain India’s influence in Southeast Asia.
Finally, Myanmar is part and parcel of China’s grand strategic design to achieve
its goal of becoming a great power in the 21st century. Despite the more extensive
growing Chinese influence over Myanmar, it is unlikely that Rangoon will
become a strategic satellite base for China. Myanmar’s strong sense of
nationalism, its past ability to successfully deal with foreign powers to preserve
its independence and cultural identity, will likely make Myanmar withstand
most odds. |
| Author/creator: | | Poon Kim SHEE |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | China Statistical Yearbook 2001, No. 20, National Bureau of Statistics, Source: China Statistics Press |
| Format/size: | | pdf (48.24 K) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 13 October 2010 |
|
| Title: | | Imagining a New Role for China |
| Date of publication: | | June 2000 |
| Description/subject: | | Even the current regime in Beijing must recognize that military rule in Burma is damaging to its own interests as well as those of the Burmese people. |
| Author/creator: | | Editorial |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy", Vol. 8. No. 6 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 03 June 2003 |
|
| Title: | | Beijing's New Flexibility |
| Date of publication: | | May 1997 |
| Description/subject: | | China's relationship with Burma |
| Author/creator: | | Editorial |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | "The Irrawaddy", Vol. 5. No. 2 |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 03 June 2003 |
|
| Title: | | PEKING AND THE BURMESE COMMUNISTS: THE PERILS AND PROFITS OF INSURGENCY - MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS |
| Date of publication: | | July 1971 |
| Description/subject: | | "This study documents a case where Peking's
policy towards a client Communist movement has been
guided throughout by primary regard for China's
national interest.This is illustrated in the
study's examination of Peking's facility in conducting
a two-level policy, state-to-state and support
of 'insurrection of Peking's readiness to subordinate
Burmese Communist interests to those of China where
necessary; of China's present direction of a "Burmese
Communist" insurgency whose basis is for the most
part neither Burman nor Communist; and of the apparent insistence of Peking that
resolution of continuing
state-to-state differences shall occur only on
its own terms . The study also illustrates that
Chinese material support of Communist insurrection
was in fact significantly less than seemed to be the
case prior to the rupture of Sino-Burmese relations
in 1967, and has been significantly greater since
that time than has come to light...".....The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers --
Cold War Era Hard Target Analysis of Soviet and Chinese Policy and Decision Making, 1953-1973 -- were made public in May 2007 under the US Freedom of Information Act |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | UN Govt. (The CAESAR, POLO and ESAU Papers) |
| Format/size: | | pdf (7MB) |
| Date of entry/update: | | 17 August 2009 |
|
| Title: | | CHINA ADVISES BURMA TO RECONSIDER GAMBARI |
| Description/subject: | | "Responding to reftel points delivered by PolOff, MFA
Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam Division Deputy Director
Chen Chen on April 30 said that the Chinese Government has
"advised" the Burmese Government to "positively reconsider"
previous suggestions offered by UN Special Adviser Gambari to
help ensure that the May 10 referendum is free and fair.
China specifically suggested that Burma allow international
observers to monitor the referendum, Chen said. Chen
mentioned that within the last ten days, high-level Foreign
Ministry officials from China and Burma had discussed the
referendum process on the sidelines of an international
meeting. (Note: Chen did not specify which officials or
what meeting.)..." |
| Language: | | English |
| Source/publisher: | | US Embassy, Beijing, via Wikileaks |
| Format/size: | | html |
| Date of entry/update: | | 06 September 2011 |
|
|