12th Congress.]

No. 87

[1st Session.

INCREASE OF THE NAVY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 17, 1811.

Mr. Cheves, from the committee to whom was referred so much of the President's message of the 5th of November, 1811,* as relates to the naval establishment, reported, in part:

That the subject referred to your committee, in its several relations, presents a question of the highest importance to the interests of the people of this country, inasmuch as it embraces one of the great and leading objects of their government—that which, above all others, laid the foundation of the happy union of these States—your committee need hardly say they mean the protection of maritime commerce—an interest which, though when superficially viewed, seems to affect only the Atlantic portions of the country, yet really extends as far as the utmost limits of its agriculture, and can only be separated from it, in the opinion of your committee, by a total blindness to the just policy of Government. The important engine of national strength and national security which is formed by a naval force, has hitherto, in the opinion of the committee, been treated with a neglect highly impolitic, or supported by a spirit so languid, as, while it has preserved the existence of the establishment, has had the effect of loading it with the imputations of wasteful expense, and comparative inefficiency.

No system has hitherto been adopted, which, though limited by the dispensing security of the times, and the just economy of our republican institutions, was yet calculated to enlarge itself gradually with the progress of the nation's growth in population, in wealth, and in commerce, or expand with an energy proportioned to a crisis of particular danger.

Such a course, impolitic under any circumstances, is the more so when it is demonstrably clear that this nation is inevitably destined to be a naval power, and that the virtue of economy, if no other motive could be found, would recommend a plan by which this force must be gradually increased, the necessary expenses diminished, and durability and permanency given to the strength which they may purchase.

That a naval protection is particularly secured to the interest of commerce, by our great political compact, is proved by that part of the constitution which expressly gave to Congress the power "to provide and maintain a navy," and is confirmed by the history of the times, and the particular circumstances which led to its institution; but it is alike secured by the fundamental nature of all government, which extends to every interest under its authority, a protection (if within the nation's means) which is adequate to its preservation; nor is this protection called for only by the partial interests of a particular description of men, or of a particular tract of country. A navy is as necessary to protect the mouth of the Mississippi, the channel through which the produce of the agriculture of the Western States must pass to become valuable, as the bays of the Chesapeake and Delaware, and more necessary than on the shores of the Eastern or the Southern States. It has, indeed, been urged, your committee are aware, that a naval establishment is forbidden by the great and burthensome expenditures of public money which, it is said, will be required to support it, and by the inability of the country, by any expenditure, to maintain a navy which can protect its maritime rights against the power of Great Britain. The first objection appears to your committee to be founded on a mistaken assumption of the fact: for, in their opinion, a naval force, within due limits, and under proper regulations, will constitute the cheapest defence of the nation.

The permanent fortifications necessary to the defence of the ports and harbors of the Union will cost, in the opinion of your committee, as much in their erection, and as much annually, if properly provided and garrisoned, as the naval force which, it is confidently believed, on the testimony of persons competent to decide, would be amply sufficient to prevent all attacks from reaching our shores. It will thus furnish the most appropriate, adequate, and cheap protection against a foreign enemy, and will, at the same time, be perfectly innoxious to the public liberty, and the private morals of the country; dispense almost entirely with a standing army, so hostile to the genius of our free constitutions, and remove the standing vices and evils of camps and garrisons from the cities on our sea coast; cherish a noble body of mariners, who, in honorable peace, will spread the sails of a prosperous and vivifying commerce on every sea, and, in necessary war, terribly avenge their country's wrongs.

The other objection your committee suppose to be founded on an imperfect examination of the subject: for those who are best able to form opinions on this matter, from congenial professional pursuits, as well as a particular knowledge of the marine of Great Britain, declare that she cannot, at any time, spare more than a very limited force for the American station; one which can be effectually resisted by an establishment which may be supported by this Government without a direct expense, while, in its effects, it will greatly more than reimburse to the national wealth, the sums which may be drawn from it for this object; protect our harbors from insult, our coasting trade from spoliations, and give us the dominion of a sea on our borders which we ought to call our own, and defend with our cannon.

To detail all the reasons on which this opinion is founded would, perhaps, not be in the power of your committee, who are, in part, governed by the opinions of men of experience and professional skill, (often among the best grounds of human faith, but not always equally communicable.) But the leading facts and principles on which it is founded are too plain and obvious to labor under this difficulty. The history of all times proves the inability of Great Britain, or any other Power, to station a large force in remote seas: for, independent of the necessity that always exists for its presence in more proximate quarters, could the former nation place the whole of her thousand ships on our coast, she would be unable, in a state of hostility with the United States, competently to supply even a considerable

* See Foreign Relations, No. 32, page 79.

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squadron of them, for any duration of time, with the least regard to the efficiency of the service, and without a wasteful and ruinous expense. Let those who hold a different opinion declare how, and from whence.

To the defence of your ports and harbors, and the protection of your coasting trade, should be confined, in the opinion of your committee, the present objects and operations of any navy which the United States can, or ought to have. In this view our advantages are great and manifest. Looking along our extended line of coast, from the northeastern to the southern extreme of our territory, we discover, in quick succession, ports and harbors furnishing in abundance every supply for active and constant service in which to concentrate, by mutual advice and information, which can be transmitted with greatest certainty and speed, the forces of different stations, to attack the enemy in detail when his vessels may be scattered; and in which our ships may find refuge and security when approached by a force so much superior as to forbid a combat. To enter no further into details, it is obvious that, from these advantages, the power and efficiency of an American navy must be double its nominal proportion to that of an assailing enemy. But your committee beg leave to observe, that it would be unworthy the magnanimity of the nation to look only at one Power, and forget that it stands in the relation of an independent sovereignty to other nations, against whom, unless man change his nature, and cease to be violent and unjust, it may be necessary to array the national force on that element where the injury may be suffered, and where alone it can be avenged or redressed. With this view, your committee have not considered this subject with regard only to the practicable and advisable preparation for the present momentous crisis, which, whatever it may be, must be greatly inadequate, for the reasons already stated: but the object of the committee is to recommend a system which shall look to futurity, and though limited by the present situation and means of the country, have a capacity to be enlarged in proportion to the growing wealth, commerce, and population, the nation. Your committee are, at the same time, not unaware that some of those who are unfriendly to a navy, ground their opposition rather upon its future permanent establishment than on its present expense. But your committee will only observe, that the wisdom of that policy seems to reach as far beyond reasonable practicable views, as it will probably fall short of the attainment of its object. To restrain the great energies of such a number, as this country possesses, of the best seamen the world ever beheld, and such, a mass of tonnage as Great Britain herself has not boasted more than twenty years, will as much transcend the feeble efforts of the politician, as it would be beyond his power to create them: they are formed by the high behest of beneficent nature, nurtured by our wise, free, and happy public institutions, and can only perish with the latter.

Your committee, however, admit, that it will neither be politic nor practicable to swell the naval establishment of this country to the size of our desires or of our necessities; but a gradual increase of it is, in their opinion, within the most limited means, and within the obvious policy of the Government; and in attempting this, some present addition will be made (too little—much too little, they lament) to the best strength of the nation, as a measure of preparation for this crisis of danger.

With these observations, and with a full, detailed, and useful report of the Secretary of the Navy, in reply to questions propounded by your committee, they beg leave to recommend that all the vessels of war of the United States, not now in service, which are worthy of repair, be immediately repaired, fitted out, and put into actual service.

That ten additional frigates, averaging 38 gun's, be built; that a competent sum of money be appropriated for the purchase of a stock of timber; and that a dock, for repairing the vessels of war of the United States, be established in some central and convenient place.

They also beg leave to report a bill, entitled "A bill concerning the naval establishment."

Washington, November 19, 1811.

Sir:

I am directed, by the committee to whom was referred so, much of the President's message of the 5th instant as relates to the naval force of the United States, to request a reply from you to the several questions which follow; and they have also directed me to ask as early an answer as may be conveniently practicable:

1st, What number of the vessels of war of the United States is now in actual service; and what are their names, rates, and stations?

2d. What number of vessels is laid up in ordinary; what are their names and rates; what will be the expense of repairing and equipping them for actual service; within what time can the same be accomplished; and what will be their aggregate annual expense in service, with that of those now employed?

3d. What will be the expense of building, manning, and completely equipping for actual service, a vessel of each rate of those most useful and most usually employed in modern naval war; and what will be the annual expense of maintaining such vessels, respectively, in actual service?

4th. Will any, and, if any, what, force of vessels, not exceeding the rate of frigates, afford a reasonable protection to the coasting trade and the mouths of the harbors of the United States? If such be deemed incompetent, what other force is deemed requisite?

5th. What materials, for ship building and naval equipment, are deemed imperishable; and to what extent in quantity, and what amount in value, would it be practicable and advisable to provide the same? 6th. What is the number of gunboats belonging to the United States; what is their state of repair; what number is in actual service; and where are they stationed or laid up?

7th. In the event of putting in commission the ships now laid up in ordinary, could the necessary seamen, to man them, be speedily procured, without an increase of pay or bounty?

I am further directed to request, that you will communicate in your reply any other information which, in your opinion, may be important or material on this subject.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant.

LANGDON CHEVES.

Honorable Paul Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy.

Navy Department, December 3, 1811.

Sir:

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th instant. The several questions which you have been pleased to propound to me, involve a scope of information difficult correctly to state, and comprehend points upon which I am compelled to submit conjecture in some instances instead of fact. The subject is, however, so deeply interesting as to have commanded my most deliberate and anxious investigation.

The papers herewith submitted, and marked A, B, and C, will, I hope, afford satisfactory answers to your three first queries.

In reply to the fourth, I have to state, that, as to the force necessary to afford a reasonable protection to the coasting trade, and the mouths of the harbors of the United States, it appears to me impossible to form a satisfactory opinion, unless we knew the extent of the force by which our coasting trade and the mouths of our harbors may be assailed; The naval nations of Europe employ line of battle ships. The heaviest rate of our vessels of war does not exceed a large 44 gun frigate, which is inferior in number of guns, and men, and weight of metal, to a ship of the line. If, then, while we have only frigates, an enemy should send against us ships of the line, the protection which, in such case, we should be able to afford to our coasting trade, would obviously be very imperfect. With a force equal in number and rate to that of an enemy, or to that which, an enemy at a distance could send against us, neither our commerce on our coast nor our harbors would have any danger to apprehend: for, considering the numerous dangers of our coast, the heavy gales and fogs to which it is peculiarly subjected, our superior knowledge of the shoals with which it abounds, and the numerous ports to which we have access for victualling, repairing, and equipping ships, so decided would be our advantage, that it is believed an enemy, only our equal in number and rate of vessels, would not, under such circumstances, approach our shores with any intention of remaining for the

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purpose of molesting our trade. Such, indeed, are the advantages which we possess, in these particulars, that I incline to the opinion that, with half the number of vessels of the same rate which might be sent against us, a reasonable protection might generally be afforded to our coasting trade. I do not wish to be considered as giving the opinion, that, with such a force, our coasting trade could be effectually protected; that no capture of our merchant vessels would be made under such circumstances: for, even if our force were equal to an enemy, we might expect occasionally to have vessels captured. An enterprising enemy would watch opportunities, and avail himself of them; but, in our operations against the enemy, we should not, it is presumed, be found deficient in enterprise or vigilance, competent to retort his aggressions, and to secure an equivalent for all our losses.

Supposing, then, a continuance of the present state of things in Europe, and that the United States should come into collision with either of the present great belligerent Powers, a naval force of twelve sail of the line, (74's) and twenty well constructed frigates, including those we now have, and rating generally not less than thirty-eight guns, with the addition of our smaller vessels now in service, judiciously directed, it is believed would be ample to the protection of our coasting trade; would be competent to annoy extensively the commerce of an enemy; and, uniting occasionally in operations with the gunboats already built, if equipped and brought into, service, and our fortifications, also, afford complete protection to our harbors.

The imperishable materials for ship building and naval equipment, consist of timber, plank, staves, masts and spars, iron, copper in sheets, bolts and nails, anchors, kentledge, canvass, hempen yarns, &c. In timber of every description, required for navy purposes, our country abounds; and it would at this time be practicable to procure any quantity, on terms that are reasonable. It would unquestionably be sound economy to keep always on hand an adequate supply of this all-important article, which ought to be well seasoned before it is used. The deplorable effects of being compelled, as the Navy Department has frequently been, to use green timber in the repair of our ships, our experience too fully demonstrates. This, indeed, is one of the principal reasons of the great expense generally, and very justly, complained of by the guardians of the public purse; happily, however, ft is perfectly within the reach of our power to remedy this evil, and I do most earnestly recommend to your serious consideration, the propriety of an extra annual appropriation for three years, for the purpose of enabling the Department to provide an extensive stock of every description of timber required for navy purposes. The other articles of an imperishable nature may be procured as required, or as opportunities offer to obtain them on reasonable terms, out of the general appropriation for repairs made annually, for the support of the navy, to which purposes it will partly be devoted; and to the encouragement of the manufacture of sail cloth, manufactured within ourselves, of hemp of our own growth, by giving it a preference to that made of foreign hemp.

The, paper marked D affords an answer to your sixth query, as full as the information in possession of the Department will enable me to give it.

If it should be determined to commission the ships now in ordinary, the necessary seamen to man them can, it is confidently believed, be procured without any increase of pay or of bounty, and in time to man them as they maybe prepared for service.

In my answer to your fifth query, I have stated one of the causes of the great expense of the navy, so generally, and it is admitted justly, complained of, and I have suggested a remedy for that particular cause. Other causes of expense exists which may be obviated; and, under the latitude you have allowed me, I will, at this time, state one which immediately presents itself.

The United States do not own a dock. To repair our vessels we are compelled to heave them down-a process attended with great labor, considerable risk, and loss of time; and upon a ship thus hove down, the carpenters can-not work without much inconvenience. Hence the Department is subjected to much expense, which might be. avoided by the construction of one or more suitable docks. Such a provision, even in the present state of our navy, would be valuable for the reasons above stated; but if Congress determine to have built vessels of a rate superior to those we now have, it will certainly be found to be indispensable. The accuracy of this remark will be admitted, when we consider the force requisite to heave down a ship of the size of even a frigate, and the straining of her frame when this is done on the principle of the lever.

I have now, sir, according to my best judgment, offered replies t6 your queries; and, assuring you of my readiness to obey the further commands of the committee,

I have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, yours,

PAUL HAMILTON.

Honorable Langdon Cheves, Chairman of the Naval Committee.

A.

Exhibit showing the number of vessels of war of the United States
now in actual service, their names, rates, and
stations, for the winter.

Names of vessels.

Rate.

Station for the Winter.

Remarks.

Frigate President,

44

Newport, Rhode Island,

Under command of Com. Rodgers.

Frigate Essex,

32

Ship John Adams,

20

Brig Argus,

16

Frigate United States,

44

Hampton Roads,

Under command of Com. Decatur.

Frigate Congress,

36

Ship Wasp,

16

Brig Nautilus,

14

Frigate Constitution,

44

Foreign service.

Ship Hornet,

16

Brig Vixen,

14

Charleston, South Carolina,

Under command of Capt. Campbell.

Brig Enterprise,

14

Brig Siren,

16

New Orleans,

Lake Ontario,

Under command of Captain Shaw.

Lieutenant Woolsey.

Brig Viper,

10

Brig Oneida,

16

--250--

B.

Exhibit showing the number of vessels laid up in ordinary; their names and rates; the original cost of each, including every expense; the probable expense of repairing and equipping each for actual service; the period it will probably take to repair each; and the annual expense of each in actual service.

Names of vessels.

Rate.

Original cost.

Probable expense of repairing, &c.

Time necessary to repair, &c.

Annual expense.

Chesapeake,

36

$220,677 80

$120,000

Six months,

$102,253

Constellation,

36

314,212 15

120,000

Six months,

102,253

New York ,

36

159,639 60

120,000

Six months,

102,253

Adams,

32

76,622 27

60,000

Six months,

81,607

Boston,

32

119,570 04

60,000

Six months,

81,607

$469,973

Note.—The sums and periods of time, estimated for repairing and equipping the vessels of war comprehended in the above statement, are in a great degree conjectural; though it is presumed that the sums stated would be sufficient, and that, in the time stated, the vessels could be repaired.

Until these vessels shall be opened and thoroughly examined, it is obviously impossible to ascertain, with any degree of precision, what would be the expense of repairing them, or what time it would take to repair them: for, until then, their actual state and condition cannot be ascertained. By some it is at this time thought that neither the New York nor the Boston are worthy of being repaired; but I hope that, on opening them, we shall find them otherwise; and, under this impression, I have returned them in this exhibit. Should they be found to be too rotten to repair, I shall consider it as a serious misfortune, for they have been constructed upon the most approved models for vessels of their rates.

In the estimate of the expense of the navy for the year 1812, the employment of all our frigates, excepting those above stated, and of all our other vessels of war, and of sixty-two gunboats, is contemplated: these objects, together with the corps of marines, navy yards, and ordnance, &c: are estimated to cost two millions five hundred and two thousand and three dollars ninety cents, which is the aggregate amount of the estimate for the year 1812. Of this sum—

The expense of the corps of marines is estimated at

$228,905 90

The expense of navy yards, &c.

60,000 00

The expense of ordnance, &c.

60,000 00

The expense of the vessels of war in commission, and of those and the gunboats in ordinary,

1,403,098 00

The expense of the sixty-two gunboats in commission,

750,000 00

Whole amount of the navy estimate, year 1812,

$2,502,003 90

If, then, the frigates now in ordinary were put in commission, "their aggregate annual expense in service'
with that of those now employed," and including every other object of navy expense, upon the scale
contemplated in the estimate for the year 1812, would be the sum stated under the head "annual expense"
in this exhibit, viz:

$469,973 00

Added to the whole amount of the navy estimate, as stated above,

2,502,003 90

Which makes

$2,971,976 90

But, excluding the expense of the corps of marines, navy yards, and ordnance, above stated, the annual expense in service of the frigates now in ordinary, with that of those now employed, and of sixty-two gunboats in commission, and of ail the other gunboats in ordinary, would be two millions six hundred and twenty-three thousand and seventy-one dollars.

The aggregate annual expense, if the frigates now in ordinary were put in commission, and added to the expense of the vessels of war now in commission, and of the ordinary, but excluding the expense of the corps of marines, navy yards, ordnance, and of the sixty-two gunboats in commission; that is, the annual expense of all our vessels of war in service, and the expense of gunboats in ordinary, would be one million eight hundred and seventy-three thousand and seventy-one dollars.

But, as stated in, this paper, it would probably take six months to repair the frigates in ordinary: hence, their expense, if put in commission, would, for the year 1812, not exceed half their annual expense, viz: four hundred and sixty-nine thousand nine hundred and seventy-three dollars; half of which is two hundred and thirty-four thousand nine hundred and eighty-six dollars fifty cents: say two hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars.

If, then, the frigates in ordinary were put in commission, the whole expense of the navy, for the year 1812, including every expense whatsoever, (excepting the sum stated as necessary to put the frigates in ordinary in repair) would be two millions seven hundred and thirty-seven thousand and three dollars and ninety cents.

And, excluding the expense of the marine corps, navy yards, and ordnance, it would be two millions three hundred and eighty-eight thousand and ninety-eight dollars.

And, excluding the expense of the marine corps, navy yards, ordnance, and the sixty-two gunboats in commission, the expense for the year 1812 would be one million six hundred and thirty-eight thousand and ninety-eight dollars.

If, then, we had all our vessels of war in commission, their annual expense would be one million eight hundred and severity-three thousand and seventy-one dollars; but, for the year 1812, as five of them could not be brought into actual service for six months, their expense would be one million six hundred and thirty-eight thousand and ninety-eight dollars.

The estimate for the repair of the frigates in ordinary is a distinct consideration, and is not comprehended in any of the views taken of the subject. That estimate, as will be seen by reference to the table, amounts to four hundred and eighty thousand dollars: If, then, it should be determined to put the frigates now in ordinary in commission, an appropriation of four hundred and eighty thousand dollars for their repairs and equipment, and of two hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars for their support in actual service, during the year 1812, would be necessary. These items, added to the aggregate of the navy estimate for the year 1812, would make the whole expense for that year, three millions two hundred and seventeen thousand and three dollars and ninety cents.

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C.

Estimate of the expense of building, and completely equipping for actual service, vessels:of war of various rates;and the annual expense of each.

Rate.

Expense of Building.

Annual expense of each.

REMARKS.

Per Gun.

Dollars.

Dollars.

74

$4,500

333,000

211,784

The Frigate President cost,

$220,910 08

60

4,500

270,000

140,000

Philadelphia,

179,349 00

50

4,500

225,000

115,214

New York,

159,639 60

44

4,500

198,000

110,000

Essex,

139,362 50

36

4,500

162,000.

102,000

John Adams,

113,505 72

32

4,000

128,000

82,000

Maryland,

70,249 83

20

3,500

70,000

50,202

Note.—An estimate of the annual expense of a seventy-four, in detail, is subjoined, for the satisfaction of the committee. The annual expense of all the rates under sixty guns is given from past experience, and in neither case, it is believed, does this statement vary materially from what would be the actual annual expense.

The estimate of the expense of building ships of war of different rates, is believed to be ample. The cases referred, to under sixty guns, are considered as appropriate; they show the actual cost of vessels of war some years since, and it has been attempted to fix the expense per gun by this standard of experience. It is stated that a fifty gun ship may be built and equipped for two hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars, because the frigate President cost only two hundred and twenty-thousand nine hundred and ten dollars and eight cents; and this is believed to be correct: for the frigate President, although she rates less than a fifty gun ship, yet she is so nearly equal in her hull, armament, sails, rigging, &c. that such a frigate would certainly cost within five thousand dollars as much as a fifty gun ship would cost. To invalidate the effect of this reference in this case, it might be said, that, although the frigate President cost only two hundred and twenty thousand dollars, yet that other frigates, for instance the United States, the Constitution, and the Constellation, the two first equal, the last inferior in rate to her, cost considerably more; the fact indeed is so, for the United States cost two hundred and ninety-nine thousand three hundred and thirty-six dollars and fifty-six cents; the Constitution cost three hundred and two thousand seven hundred and eighteen dollars and eighty-four cents; and the Constellation, of inferior rate to either, cost three hundred and fourteen thousand dollars and upwards. But it must be remembered that these vessels were built at a time when we had but very little experience on the subject of building and equipping vessels of war; and the fact that the frigate Constellation, a thirty-six, did cost nearly one hundred thousand dollars more than the frigate President, a forty-four, is evidence of the disadvantages of inexperience in the one case, and of the advantages of experience in the other—advantages which it is to be hoped would be rather improved, in any future attempts to build and equip vessels of war.

The number of men required for the frigate President, or for either of our largest forty-four's, would be sufficient to man a fifty gun ship; hence the annual expense of a fifty gun ship would be about the same as the annual expense of the President, viz. one hundred and fifteen thousand two hundred and fourteen dollars, and it is so stated accordingly in the appropriate column.

It may not be amiss to state, for the information of the committee, that cannon, and a considerable proportion of the requisite timber for six seventy-four gun ships, are at this time provided, and deposited in the different navy yards. -

Estimate of the pay and rations of the officers and crew of a ship of war of seventy-four gns for twelve months-six hundred and fifty men.

OFFICERS.

Pay per month.

Amount of pay
per annum.

Rations per day.

Commander,

$100

$1,200

8

5 Lieutenants,

40

2,400

15

1 Master,

40

480

2

1 Surgeon,

50

600

2

16 Midshipmen,

19

3648

16

1 Purser,

40

480

2

3 Surgeon's males,

30

1,080

6

1 Boatswain,

20

240

2

1 Gunner,

20

240

2

1 Sailmaker,

20

240

2

1 Carpenter,

20

240

2

3 Master's mates,

20

720

6

1 Captain's clerk,

25

300

1

4 Boatswain's mates,

19

912

4

4 Carpenter's mates,

19

912

4

2 Boatswain's yeomen,

19

156

2

2 Gunner's yeomen,

19

456

2

2 Carpenter's yeomen,

19

456

2

2 Sailmaker's mates,

19

456

2

18 Quarter gunners,

18

3,888

18

1 Chaplain,

40

480

2

13 Quartermasters,

18

2,592

12

2 Yeomen of gun room,

18

432

2

1 Coxswain,

18

216

1

1 Cooper,

18

216

1

1 Steward,

18

216

1

1 Armorer,

18

216

1

2 Masters-at-arms,

18

432

2

1 Cook,

18

216

1

92

$24,420

123

280 Able seamen,

12

40,320

233 Ordinary seamen and boys,

10

27,960

$92,700

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Recapitulation of the foregoing statement.

Amount of pay,

$92,700

123 Rations.

92 Estimated in provisions.

31 Rations per day, eleven thousand three
hundred and fifteen per annum, at twenty cents,

2,263

Amount of pay and rations,

$94,963

Provisions
for six hundred
and fifty men.

207,594 pounds of bread, , at

$ 05,

$10,370 70

592 barrels of beef,

14 50,

8,584 00

507 do. of pork,

18 00,

9,126 00

170 do. of flour,

10 00,

1,700 00

16,900 pounds of suet,

20,

3,380 00

14,828 gallons of spirits,

90,

13,345 00

528 bushels of peas,

1 00,

528 00

12,675 pounds of cheese,

18

2,281 50

33,800 do. of rice,

05,

1,690 00

4,225 do. of butter,

20

845 00

2,113 gallons of molasses,

75,

1,584 75

2,113 do. of vinegar,

25,

528 25

$53,972 20

Pay of a detachment of marines,

$5,675

$8,175 00

Clothing, &c

2,500

Recapitulation
and
General Estimate.

Pay and subsistence of navy officers and seamen,

$94,963

Pay and clothing of a detachment of marines,

8,175

Provisions ,

35,972

Medicines and hospital stores,

5,000

Repairs arid contingencies,

40,000

Whole annual expense of a seventy-four gun ship,

$202,110

 

Exhibit showing the number of Gunboats
in commission, and in ordinary; their station, &
c.

Number of
Gunboats.

Where stationed.

Number in
commission.

Number
in
ordinary.

Under repair.

REMARKS.

54

New York,

20

34

7

By the last reports the gunboats in
ordinary generally were in a state of
preservation: all those in commission
are in good condition.

26

New Orleans,

19

6

14

Norfolk,

8

2

2

Charleston, S. C.

4

Wilmington, N.C.

4

11

St. Mary's,

11

9

10

Washington,

1

8

8

Portland,

2

Boston,

2

4

Conn. and R. Island,

4

20

Philadelphia,

20

10

Baltimore,

10

165

62

86

7