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16th Congress.]  

No. 198. 

[2d Session.

REDUCTION OF THE NUMBER OF SEAMEN IN THE NAVY.

COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 29, 1821.

Mr. Philip P. Barbour, from the Committee on Naval Affairs, to whom was referred a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 11th of January, 1821, instructing them to inquire into the expediency of limiting by law the number of seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, to be annually employed in the service of the United States, and, also, into the expediency of reducing the number now in actual service," reported:

That by an act of Congress, approved the 3d of March, 1801, a naval peace establishment was fixed by law, providing the number of ships which should be kept in constant service, in time of peace, and that the residue should be laid up in ordinary, with a sailing-master, certain petty officers, seamen, and marines, attached to each

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vessel thus laid up; authorizing the President to officer and man the vessels to be retained in actual service, as he might direct, limiting him, however, to two-thirds of the then present complement of seamen and ordinary seamen, (by which the committee understand the two-thirds of the then full crews of the ships retained,) limiting the number of captains, lieutenants, and midshipmen, to be retained in the navy service in time of peace, and authorizing the President to discharge all the other officers in the navy service of the United States. That, by another act of Congress, approved April 31st, 1806, the President was authorized to keep in actual service, in time of peace, as many of the frigates and other armed vessels of the United States, as, in his judgment, the nature of the service might require, and to cause the residue to be laid up in ordinary in convenient ports; and the President was authorized to officer and man the public armed vessels, in actual service in time of peace, as he might direct; but the act just referred to limited the number of captains, masters commandant, lieutenants, and midshipmen; it limited, too, the number of able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, to nine hundred and twenty-five, and authorized the President to appoint, for the vessels in actual service, as many officers of the grades therein mentioned as might, in his opinion, be necessary and proper; that, by another act, approved March 3d, 1807, the President was authorized, in addition to the then present naval peace establishment, to employ a number of able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, not exceeding five hundred, should the exigency of the public service require it; that, by another act, approved Jan. 31st, 1809, it was provided that; in addition to the frigates then employed in actual service, there should be fitted out, officered, and manned, four other frigates by name; and that the President might equip, man, and employ, in actual service, as many of the public armed vessels, then laid up in ordinary, and gunboats, as, in his judgment, the public service might require; and, for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the said act into effect, the President was authorized, in addition to the number of petty officers, able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, then authorized by law, to appoint, and cause to be employed, three hundred midshipmen, three thousand six hundred able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, to be engaged to serve for a period not exceeding two years; but subject to be sooner discharged. That, by another act, passed June 28th, 1809, the President was authorized, in the event of a favorable change in the foreign relations of the country, to cause to be discharged from actual service, and laid up in ordinary, such of the frigates and public armed vessels as, in his judgment, a due regard to the public security and interest would permit. That, by another act of Congress, passed March 30th, 1812, the President was authorized to cause to be immediately repaired, equipped, and put into actual service, three frigates by name; and it was provided that the officers and seamen of the navy might be increased so far as was necessary to officer, man, and equip the vessels so to be put into service. That, by another act of Congress, passed January 2d, 1813, it was provided that the President should cause to be built, equipped, and, employed, four ships to rate not less than seventy-four guns, and six to rate forty-four guns each; and the number of commissioned and warrant officers, petty officers, able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, to be employed on board each of the said ships of seventy-four guns, was fixed by that act; the crew, so far as it consisted of seamen and boys, was limited to two hundred able seamen, and three hundred ordinary seamen and boys. That, by another act, passed March 3d, 1813, the President was authorized to have built, manned, equipped, and commissioned, for service, six sloops of war, and also to have built, or procured, as many sloops, to be employed on the lakes, as the public service might require; and, by the second section of the last mentioned act, the President was authorized to appoint such officers, and to employ such number of seamen, as might be necessary for such vessels as were authorized by law to be put in commission, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.

The committee have thought it proper to give to the House a brief view of the progress of legislation in relation to this subject, and they believe the foregoing sketch substantially to present it. Upon a reference to the various acts of Congress before referred to, it will be found that, both in the years 1801 and 1806, there was a naval peace establishment fixed by law, limiting not only the number of seamen and boys, but of officers also. It will be found, too, as your committee believe, by reference to dates, compared with the history of the country, and, indeed, to the language of some of the acts of Congress themselves, that the subsequent provisions, in relation to the naval establishment of the United States, had reference directly to what either then was, or probably soon would be, the relation of the country to foreign governments; in short, that they looked directly to a state either of actual or probable war.

Your committee understand the resolution referred to them to relate to the number of seamen and boys necessary to be employed in time of peace, and whether that shall be fixed by law. In the present state of things the only limitation upon the number of seamen is to be found in the appropriation bill, which, in effect, annually limits the number to be employed by the amount of the appropriation annually made for that object. Your committee believe that the proper office of the appropriation bill is, as far as practicable, to provide means for objects authorized by existing laws; there are, indeed, cases which, on account of the contingent or uncertain character of the expenditure, constitute exceptions to this rule; but, in general, the rule is considered as a sound one. Your committee would further remark that, in investigating this subject, they have extended their inquiries, beyond the mere scope of the resolution, into the propriety of fixing a naval peace establishment, embracing as well the number of officers as ships to be kept in the service of the United States in time of peace; and they beg leave shortly to submit some of their reasons for thinking that there should be a peace establishment in the navy as well as the army. Although, by the constitution of the United States, the President is commander-in-chief of the army and navy, yet it belongs to Congress to "raise and support" the one, and "to provide and maintain" the other; the power to provide and maintain implies that of determining the quantum; a question the decision of which ought not to be left, in the opinion of your committee, to the Executive Department; and yet, in practice, it is in effect left to Executive decision: for, as has been before remarked, there being no permanent law in force limiting the number of officers, ships, or men, to be kept in service, the only limitation is in the amount of appropriation; and your committee believe that, in practice, the amount of the estimates has generally been appropriated without any discussion in Congress as to the necessity of them. Whatever confidence we may have in the Executive it seems not to be right, in principle, to leave to its discretion, in effect, the decision of a question which belongs to the Legislature. Your committee believe that in Great Britain, though the number of seamen is not fixed by a permanent law, yet it is settled by the annual vote of Parliament. If there were probable danger of war, or difficulty in our foreign relations, it might not be expedient to fix the number of seamen by a permanent law, but, in the present circumstances of the country, it seems to your committee it may be done; it will be remembered it is a peace establishment which is contemplated; when war shall come, or even upon its probable approach, both the army and navy will doubtless be placed upon a footing suited to the then altered state of the country.

Your committee would further remark that an additional reason with them for inclining to a peace establishment is to fix the number of officers, who, they believe, in many grades, are too numerous, and yet for all whom, unless their number shall be reduced by law, an appropriation must be made. Your committee are aware that this is a difficult and delicate subject; the officers of the navy in the recent war not only distinguished themselves, but, by breaking the charm of invincibility belonging to the British navy, contributed much both to our glory, and our solid strength as a nation. The committee are also aware that many of them have devoted some of their best years to their profession; yet, if the interest of the country requires a reduction, painful as the duty is, it is one which ought to be performed. In relation to the number of ships to be retained in service, the reasons which would prove the propriety of fixing the number of seamen, would apply with full force to them; indeed, it is another state of the same question in substance, since, if the number of seamen be fixed, no more vessels will be employed than they can man; and the fixing a certain maximum of seamen is considered a more judicious course than to fix the number of ships, inasmuch as the President will then be left at liberty to use such classes of vessels as may, in his opinion, be best adapted to the nature of the service; the aggregate of the guns, however, being limited by the number of men allowed to man them. Your committee have said that they consider the officers of many of the grades as too numerous; they will now proceed to state the grounds of their opinion. They have not for a moment entertained the idea, of paring down the officers of the navy to any thing like a mere sufficiency to officer the ships to be actually retained in service in time of peace; it is obviously impossible upon this subject to select any given number, and show that it is precisely the right one: some reasonable rule must be adopted. Your committee have acted upon

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the principle that, whilst, on the one hand, the mere number of officers necessary for the vessels in actual service is not sufficient with a view to the future progress and prosperity of the navy, on the other, it would be entirely out of the question to employ, in time of peace, as many as would officer our whole navy, built and to be built, in time of war. They have, therefore, selected what they consider a medium between these extremes; it appears, by the Naval Register of 1821, that the total number of guns of our ships, which are built, equipped, and launched, (which description excludes the three line-of-battle ships Ohio, North Carolina, and Delaware , which are believed not to be equipped,) amounts to seven hundred and ninety-seven, of all classes of vessels, gunboats included. Your committee have thought that if we retained in service, in time of peace, a sufficient number of commissioned and warrant officers to officer all these upon the war establishment, it would afford a liberal peace establishment. Bringing the number of officers to this standard, the committee find that there are various ranks in which the present number considerably exceeds that which would be required by the rule just stated: they will descend to particulars in a few grades, in which the excess is relatively most considerable; thus, upon this scale, there is an excess of fifteen post captains; of twenty masters commandant; of seventy lieutenants; of twenty-seven surgeons; of more than forty sailing-masters. There, are, perhaps, two or three grades in which an allowance of a few more than even this scale would produce, might be judicious; amongst them, probably, might be placed the midshipmen, who may be considered as constituting the nursery of the future commanders of our ships; this, however, would only vary the result in an inconsiderable degree. The committee forbear to go into further detail upon this subject, because, if the House should adopt the principle, the detail could be presented in a bill.

As to the seamen, if it should be decided to fix the number by law, the resolution then directs the committee to inquire into the expediency of reducing the number now in actual service. Upon this subject the committee would remark, that it will be seen, by adverting to a letter from the Navy Department, under date of the 11th of December, 1820, amongst the printed documents, that the whole force of the vessels of war in the actual service of the United States amounts to about three hundred and thirty-five guns, distributed as is mentioned in the same letter. Your committee incline to the opinion that the following diminution of that force may be made without injury to the public service, viz: instead of two corvettes and a sloop on the coast of Africa, whose object is the suppression of piracy and the slave trade, three of the schooners authorized by an act of the last session would be sufficient, making a deduction of thirty-four guns; instead of a thirty-six-gun frigate in the Indian seas, the corvette Cyane of twenty-eight would be sufficient, makings deduction of eight; if to these deductions be added the force of the Macedonian and Ontario, of which the one is returning after being replaced by the Constellation, and the other is proceeding to take the place of the Peacock , amounting together to fifty-four guns, the whole force which would remain after these deductions, from that now in service, would be two hundred and thirty-nine guns; but suppose an additional number of thirty-six guns to be included for any contingent service, such, for example, as the replacing of a vessel returning from a cruise, then the whole force which, according to the views before presented, would be necessary, would be two hundred and seventy-five guns: to man this force upon a war establishment, if the committee have not erred in calculation, would require eight hundred and fifty-six able seamen, eight hundred and two ordinary seamen, and one hundred and ninety-five boys; to this add, according to a document of the last session, for the ships in ordinary, navy yards, and navy stations, two hundred and eighty-seven able seamen, three hundred and fourteen ordinary seamen, and sixty-seven boys, and the aggregate is, of able seamen one thousand one hundred and forty-three, of ordinary seamen one thousand one hundred and sixteen, and of boys two hundred and sixty-two; total of able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, two thousand five hundred and twenty-one. The estimate from the Navy Department for the service of the year 1821, embraces one thousand three hundred and thirty-two able seamen, one thousand three hundred and seven ordinary seamen, and two hundred and ninety-three boys, making an aggregate of two thousand nine hundred and thirty-two; from which it would seem that if the force suggested by the committee be retained in service, there might be a reduction of about four hundred and eleven, viz: one hundred and eighty-seven able seamen, one hundred and ninety-one ordinary seamen, and thirty-one boys.

Upon the whole view of the subject, the committee beg leave to recommend to the House the following resolution:

Resolved, That a naval peace establishment ought to be fixed by law.

Navy Department, January 22, 1821.

Sir:

Your letter of the 15th instant has been submitted to the Board of Navy Commissioners, and I transmit to you, herewith, their answer to some of the inquiries.

With respect to the resolution which proposes a reduction of the number of seamen now in service, I would beg leave to add to the observations made by the Commissioners on that subject, that I am persuaded it would be unwise and impolitic to reduce the number of men on board our public vessels now in service. And the propriety of diminishing the aggregate number for the service must depend entirely on the question, whether a less naval force is to be employed? It has already been particularly communicated to Congress, the number and service in which our public vessels are employed; and whether the great and permanent interest of the country will be promoted by withdrawing any of them, is submitted to the wisdom and discretion of Congress, by granting, or withholding the means of employment. If the object is to reduce the naval force which is to be kept in service, I should incline to think limiting the aggregate number of seamen is the most advisable course to be adopted, leaving it to the President to employ vessels of such class as he shall think best calculated to promote the public good, within the means placed at his disposal.

With respect to the number of officers in our public vessels I would observe, that I have always put on board as many as could be accommodated. This occasioned no additional expense to the Government, and was deemed highly important to the officers themselves, both for the purpose of improving them in their profession, and keeping them out of idleness.

The report of the Fourth Auditor, of the balances due from so many officers of the navy, excited in my mind, as it has in yours, a little surprise, which induced me to make some inquiry on the subject, as I knew, according to the present course of the Department, money was put into the hands of so many officers of inferior grade for disbursement. On examination I find that most of the balances which appear on the list arise from transactions during the late war. At that time it was found necessary to put money into the hands of officers of inferior grades for the recruiting service, and to pay the expenses of transporting recruits, stores, and public property. Our gunboats, and other small vessels, being commanded by officers of this class, it became necessary to make advances to them for the pay and subsistence of the crews. Few, if any, of these balances from inferior officers, have arisen since the year 1816; and measures are daily taking to procure the settlement of these accounts, and to put in suit those where a prosecution shall become necessary.

I have the honor to be, with very great respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

SMITH THOMPSON.

Hon. Philip P. Barbour,

Chairman Naval Committee, Home of Representatives.

Navy Commissioners' Office, January 18, 1821.

Sir:

In reply to the letter of the honorable the chairman of the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives to you, of the 15th instant, which you were pleased to refer to this Board; the Commissioners of the Navy have now the honor of submitting their report.

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As to the "expediency of fixing by law the number of able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, and of reducing the number below what it is at present," the Commissioners, with great deference, observe, that the number of able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys necessary for the service, depends essentially upon the number and class of the ships intended to be kept in commission; that the number heretofore attached to our ships in service has not, in their opinion, been greater than the safety and proper government of the ships required.

It appears, on referring to the statute books, that the subject of limiting the number of seamen for the navy service has, at various periods, employed the deliberations of Congress; In the year 1806 a special act was passed on the subject; the following year, however, the number was greatly increased by another law, and, in the year 1809, the number was still further increased, till in the year 1812, when every restriction was removed. It is understood that the principle was found to be very inconvenient in practice, with respect to the number of which the crews of the different ships shall consist; we find acts of Congress passed upon the subject, 27(h March, 1794, 1st July, 1797, and 2d January, 1813, the two first acts were, however, virtually repealed by the act of 27th April, 1798, which commits the number of the crews of the ships then authorized to be employed to the decision of the President of the United States; and since that period, the number of officers and men employed on board of frigates, and smaller vessels, has, from time to time, been decided by the Executive.

The act of the 2d January, 1813, above referred to, declares the number of which the crew of a ship of the line shall consist; but the number estimated was for a size far inferior to the actual force and dimensions of the ships when built, their force amounting to eighty-six instead of seventy-four guns; and the law for the gradual increase of the navy not limiting the size of the ships of the line, and only requiring that they should not be less than seventy-four guns, the commissioners believed that, if in their construction they confined themselves within the limits of the sum appropriated, they should best effect the wishes of the country by extending their force and dimensions to the size of this class of ships most approved in older maritime nations; and, although they are built on the usual plan of two deck ships, their force and dimensions exceed even those of 1813. Hence, if will readily be perceived that no existing law, which limits the numbers of the crews of seventy-four gun ships, is applicable to the ships of the line recently launched, and now building.

Our ships might, undoubtedly, be navigated with fewer men; but their effective force would be reduced in full proportion to the reduction of the number of men. Reduce the number of the crew, and you in effect reduce in an equal, if not greater degree, the power of the ship.

The crew of a forty-four would be sufficient to navigate in safety a ship of the line; but, if the crew was not to exceed the number allowed to a forty-four, a ship of the line would not be able to fight as many guns as a forty-four, because she requires more men to manage her sails, &c. Under such circumstances a frigate might capture a ship of the line; and the same principle might place a frigate in the power of a sloop of war, or a sloop of war in the power of a gunboat.

The commissioners forbear, sir, to present to your view a picture of the situation of an officer nominally commanding a ship of the line, but in fact a force not equal to a frigate. No officer having a due regard to his own reputation, or to that of the service, ought to consent to be placed in such a situation.

Independently of other considerations in favor of keeping our ships full manned in time of peace, it may be remarked, that no nation is in the habit of informing its enemies of its intentions to declare war; that it is a custom universally observed, on meeting with any vessel of war at sea, to beat to quarters and prepare the ship for action. Such a state of preparation has, in many instances, saved our national flag from dishonor; and a contrary condition, on another occasion, put it out of the power of the commander to prevent the impressment of several of our seamen from on board one of our men-of-war. Our, own experience has confirmed the necessity of keeping our ships of war, whenever in service, in a state of constant preparation to repel aggression, or any attempt, from any quarter, to dishonor our flag.

It is. the invariable custom of the nations of Europe, when they reduce the number of officers and men on board of a ship, to make a correspondent reduction in the number of her guns. A ship in that state is said to be armed en flute, and is not considered in the light of a vessel of war; being always commanded by an officer of inferior grade, and generally employed as a transport, store-ship, the conveyance of ambassadors, and such like service. We have ourselves occasionally employed ships of this character in this way.

Ships are rated by the number of guns they mount, and the number of men must be in proportion to the number of guns; a ship of war should never carry guns, without being prepared, at all times, in peace or in war, to fight them with effect. If there are not men enough to work all the guns, or, in other words, to sustain the character of the ship, it would, as alike respects individual and national honor, be better to reduce the number of guns; for the number that cannot be fought with full effect, for want of men, is surely worse than useless on board of ship.

With respect to the machine for hauling up ships, it is believed to possess many advantages over dry docks, both for repairing and for building of ships, and for preserving them after they are built. Dry docks, however well constructed, are always damp, and it is necessary to keep a number of men constantly employed for the special purpose of removing the water that unavoidably finds its way through the gates and other parts. The machine is calculated to admit of a vessel, however large, being hauled up and placed under cover, where she will be perfectly dry; where the artificers can work to the greatest possible advantage, and where a ship, when completed, may, if not required for service, be kept in a state of perfect safety and preservation for a long period of time, at a very inconsiderable expense.

Its original cost will bear no comparison with that of a dry dock. It would certainly not require more than one-fifth, probably not more than one-sixth of the Sum necessary to build a dry dock.

The Commissioners have been informed by one of the gentlemen now employed in the investigation, that the chief engineer associated with him has said that it would take the most expert civil engineer six months to calculate the cost of a dry dock. The Commissioners cannot, of themselves, form a satisfactory judgment upon this point; but they are already in possession of information which justifies the inference that a dock, suitable for the present state of the service, and calculated only for a single ship, could not be constructed, even on the cheapest plan, for less than $250,000. The cost of the machine for hauling up ships, including the house and every necessary apparatus, would not, it is believed, exceed $45,000. The estimates heretofore made, place it at about $40,000.

Hence it would appear that the first cost and the annual expense of the proposed machine, would be greatly less than that of a dry dock, while it is confidently believed that it possesses all the facilities and conveniences of a dry dock, and the special and very important advantage of being at all times perfectly dry. The situation it provides for the frame and other materials of a ship, while building, is, of all others, the best calculated to season and preserve them. It seems almost superfluous to remark that building ships in such situations would add greatly to their durability.

The principle of building ships under shelter is recognized by all the maritime nations of Europe; and universal experience, both in public and private yards, approves its correctness and confirms its advantages, both as respects workmanship and the durability of the materials.

Docks can be used for repairing and building only, whereas the proposed plan, at infinitely less expense, is calculated, it is confidently believed, not only for repairing and for building, but, if necessary, preserving ships after they are built. Indeed, in every view which can be taken of it, it appears to claim a decided preference over docks.

The Commissioners avail themselves of this occasion to express to you, sir, their opinion that the present state of the service calls imperiously, either for the erection of docks, or some other means by which our ships of the line and frigates may be repaired without incurring the enormous expense, the serious risks and injuries attendant on careening ships for the purpose of repairing.

It is believed that there is none of the maritime nations of Europe, having a navy of equal extent with ours, who are compelled to resort to this tedious, hazardous, and expensive method of repairing their ships.

The paper herewith, marked A, shows the number of commission, warrant, and petty officers, able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, required for each class of our public vessels now in commission. I have the honor to be, with great respect, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN RODGERS.

Hon. Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy.

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A.

Exhibit showing the commission, warrant, and petty officers, able seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys, required for each class of public vessels of war now in commission.

Captains.

Masters commandant.

Lieutenants commanding.

Lieutenants.

Midshipmen.

Surgeons.

Surgeons' mates.

Pursers.

Chaplains.

Schoolmasters.

Sailingmasters.

Captains' clerks.

Masters' mates.

Boatswains.

Gunners.

Carpenters.

Sailmakers.

Boatswains' mates.

Gunners' mates.

Carpenters' mates.

Sailmakers' mates.

Quarter gunners.

Quartermasters.

Yeomen.

Coxswains.

Stewards.

Coopers.

Armorers.

Masters-at-arms.

Ship's corporal.

Cooks.

Able seamen.

Ordinary seamen.

Boys

Columbus, seventy-four,

1

1

9

28

1

3

1

1

1

2

1

3

1

1

1

1

6

3

3

2

13

10

3

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

280

300

48

Constitution, forty-four,

1

6

20

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

3

2

2

1

10

8

3

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

160

170

27

Congress, thirty-six,

1

5

16

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

8

6

3

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

130

140

25

Cyane, twenty-eight,

1

4

12

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

6

4

3

1

1

1

1

1

1

75

33

15

John Adams , corvette,

1

3

8

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

I

2

1

1

1

6

4

3

1

1

1

1

1

1

60

49

11

Peacock, sloop,

1

3

6

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

5

4

3

1

1

1

1

1

45

45

10

Spark, brig,

1

2

4

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

4

4

2

1

1

1

1

1

30

16

9

Alligator, schooner,

1

2

4

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

20

16

8

Lynx, schooner,

1

4

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

16

8

6

Gunboat,

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

8

8

3