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24th Congress.] |
No. 671. |
[1st Session. |
ON THE MEANS AND MEASURES NECESSARY FOR THE MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES OF THE COUNTRY.
COMMUNICATED TO THE SENATE, APRIL 8, 1836.
To the Senate:
I transmit herewith reports from the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments, to whom were referred the resolutions adopted by the Senate on the 18th of February last, requesting information of the probable amount of appropriations that would be necessary to place the land and naval defences of the country upon a proper footing of strength and respectability.
In respect to that branch of the subject which falls more particularly under the notice of the Secretary of War, and in the consideration of which he has arrived at conclusions differing from those contained in the report from the Engineer bureau, I think it proper to add my concurrence in the views expressed by the Secretary.
ANDREW JACKSON.
Washington, April 8, 1836.
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Department of War, April 7, 1836.
Sir:
In conformity with your instructions, I have the honor to transmit reports from the Engineer and Ordnance departments, furnishing so much of the information required by the resolution of the Senate of February 18, 1836, as relates to the fortifications of the country, and to a supply of the munitions of "war. The former branch of this subject has required laborious investigations on the part of the officers charged with this duty, and their report has therefore been longer delayed than, under other circumstances, would have been proper; but the whole matter was too important to have the interests involved in it sacrificed to undue precipitancy.
The Engineer report was received at the department on Friday last, and I have embraced such portions of the intervening time as other official calls and a slight indisposition would allow me to devote to its examination. I did not consider that any suggestions I could make would justify a further delay at this advanced stage of the session, while, at the same time, I am aware that this letter will need all the allowance which these circumstances can claim for it.
It is obvious that, in the consideration of any general and permanent system of national defence, comprehensive views are not only necessary, but professional experience and a knowledge of practical details; such information, in fact, as must be obtained by long and careful attention to the various subjects which form the elements of this inquiry. Although, therefore, I do not concur in all the suggestions contained in these reports, and more particularly in those which relate to the nature and extent of some of our preparations, still, I have thought it proper to lay them before you, rather than to substitute any peculiar views of my own for them. Both furnish facts highly interesting to the community, and if they anticipate dangers which it may be thought are not likely to happen, and suggest preparations which future exigencies will not probably require, they are still valuable documents, presenting the necessary materials for the action of the legislature. The report from the Engineer department, in particular, evinces an accurate knowledge of the whole subject, while, at the same time, its general views are sound and comprehensive. I consider it a very able document.
Under these circumstances, I have thought it proper to submit some general remarks, explanatory of my own views, concerning a practical system of defence, and which will show how far the plans and details are in conformity with my opinion. I feel that this course is due to myself.
I shall confine my observations to the maritime frontier. Our inland border rests, in the southwest and northeast, upon the possessions of civilized nations, and requires defensive preparations to meet those contingencies only which, in the present state of society, we may reasonably anticipate. In the existing intercourse of nations, hostilities can scarcely overtake us so suddenly as not to leave time to move the necessary force to any point upon these frontiers threatened with attack. I am not aware of any peculiar position upon either of these lines of separation which commands the approaches to the country, or whose possession would give much superiority to an invading or defensive force. In fact, the division is in both cases an artificial line through much of its extent, and a portion of the natural boundary offers scarcely any impediment to military operations. Under such circumstances, it seems altogether inexpedient to construct expensive fortifications, which would do little more than protect the space under cover of their guns; which are not required as places of depot; which guard no avenue of communication, and which would leave the surrounding country penetrable in all directions. Without indulging in any improper speculations concerning the ultimate destiny of any portion of the country in juxtaposition with us, or looking for security to any political change, we may safely anticipate that our own advance in all the elements of power will be at least equal to that of the people who adjoin us; nor does the most prudent forecast dictate any precautions founded upon the opinion that our relative strength will decrease and theirs increase. The lake frontier, indeed, presents some peculiar considerations; and I think the views submitted by the Engineer department respecting Lake Champlain are entitled to much weight. This long, narrow sheet of navigable water opens a direct communication into the States of New York and Vermont, while its outlet is in a foreign country, and is commanded by a position of great natural strength. It is also within a few miles of the most powerful and populous portion of Canada, and open to all its resources and energies. With a view, perhaps, to possible rather than probable events, it may be deemed expedient to construct a work at some proper site within our boundary, which shall close the entrance of the lake to all vessels ascending its outlet. As such a work, however, would be an advanced post, and, from circumstances, peculiarly liable to attack, its extent and defences should be in proportion to its exposure.
There is already a considerable commercial marine upon the four great lakes, Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Michigan, which are opened to the enterprise of our citizens. And this will increase with the augmenting population which is flowing in upon the regions washed by these internal seas It is obvious that, from natural causes, the physical superiority will be found upon the southern shores of these lakes. The resolution of the Senate embraces the inquiry into the expediency of constructing permanent fortifications in this quarter. And this inquiry properly divides itself into two branches:
1st. The policy of fortifying the harbors upon the lakes; and
2d. The policy of commanding, by permanent works, the communications between them.
Both of these measures presuppose that the naval superiority upon these waters may be doubtful. But it is difficult to foresee the probable existence of any circumstances which would give this ascendency to the other party. It is unnecessary to investigate the considerations which bear upon this subject, as they are too obvious to require examination. They are to be seen and felt in all those wonderful evidences of increase and improvement which are now in such active operation. A victorious fleet upon these lakes could disembark an army at almost any point. If a harbor were closed by fortifications, they would only have to seek the nearest beach and land their men from boats, so that no defences we could construct would secure us against invasion; and temporary block-houses and batteries would probably be found sufficiently powerful to repel the attacks of any vessels seeking to enter the narrow harbors upon the lakes, if we could foresee the existence of any circumstances which would induce an enemy to endeavor to force an entrance into them.
As to the communication between the lakes, the inquiry, from geographical causes, is necessarily restricted to that from Lake Erie to Lake Huron, and to the straits of Michilimackinac. Of the former, almost sixty miles consist of two rivers, completely commanded from their opposite banks, while the entrance into one of these, the river St. Clair, is impeded by a bar, over which there are but about eight feet of water. No armed vessels could force their way up these rivers while the shores were in an enemy's possession, who might construct batteries at every projecting point, and who, in fact, might in many places sweep the decks with musketry. As to the straits of Michilimackinac, they are too broad to be
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commanded by stationary fortifications, even if any circumstances should lead to the construction and equipment of a hostile fleet upon the bleak and remote shores of Matchedask bay, in the northeastern extremity of Lake Huron.
I am therefore of opinion that our lake frontier requires no permanent defences, and that we may safely rely for its security upon those resources, both in the personnel and materiel, which the extent and other advantages our country insure to us, and which must give us the superiority in that quarter.
It may, perhaps, be deemed expedient to establish a depot for the reception of munitions of war in some part of the peninsula of Michigan, and to strengthen it by such defences as will enable it to resist any coup de main which may be attempted. From the geographical features of the country our possessions here recede from their natural points of support, and are placed in immediate contact with a fertile and populous part of the neighboring colony. In the event of disturbances, the ordinary communications might be interrupted, and it would probably be advisable to have in deposit a supply of all the necessary means for offensive or defensive operations, and to place these beyond the reach of any enterprising officer who might be disposed by a sudden movement to gain possession of them. The expenditure for such an object would be comparatively unimportant, even should the contingency be judged sufficiently probable to justify precautionary measures.
I had the honor, in a communication to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate, dated February 19, 1836, a copy of which was sent to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, to suggest the mode best adapted, in my opinion, to secure our frontier against the depredations of the Indians. The basis of the plan was the establishment of a road from some point upon the Upper Mississippi to Red river, passing west of Missouri and Arkansas, and the construction of posts in proper situations along it. I think the ordinary mode of construction ought not to be departed from. Stockaded forts with log block-houses have been found fully sufficient for all the purposes of defence against Indians. They may be built speedily, with little expense, and when necessary by the labor of the troops. Our Indian boundary has heretofore been a receding, not a stationary one, and much of it is yet of this character. And even where we have planted the Indians who have been removed, and guaranteed their permanent occupation of the possessions assigned to them, we may find it necessary, in the redemption of the pledge we have given to protect them, to establish posts upon their exterior boundary, and thus prevent collisions between them and the ruder indigenous tribes of that region. I think, therefore, that no works of a more permanent character than these should be constructed upon our Indian frontier. A cordon established at proper distances upon such a road, with the requisite means of operation deposited in the posts, and with competent garrisons to occupy them, would probably afford greater security to the advanced settlements than any other measures in our power. The dragoons should be kept in motion along it during the open season of the year, when Indian disturbances are most to be apprehended, and their presence and facility of movement would tend powerfully to restrain the predatory disposition of the Indians; and if any sudden impulse should operate to drive them into hostilities, the means of assembling a strong force, with all necessary supplies, would be at hand. And as circumstances permit, the posts in the Indian country now in the rear of this proposed line of operations should be abandoned, and the garrisons transferred to it.
But it is upon our maritime frontier that we are most exposed. Our coast for three thousand miles is washed by the ocean, which separates us from those nations who have made the highest advances in all the arts, and particularly in those which minister to the operations of war, and with whom, from our intercourse and political relations, we are most liable to be drawn into collision. If this great medium of communication—the element at the same time of separation and of union—interposes peculiar obstacles to the progress of hostile demonstrations, it also offers advantages which are not less obvious, and which to be successfully resisted require corresponding arrangements and exertions. These advantages depend on the economy and facility of transportation, on the celerity of movement, and on the power of an enemy to threaten the whole shore spread out before him and to select his point of attack at pleasure. A powerful hostile fleet upon the coast of the United States presents some of the features of a war where a heavy mass is brought to act against detachments which may be cut up in detail, although their combined force would exceed the assailing foe. Our points of exposure are so numerous and distant, that it would be impracticable to keep at each of them a force competent to resist the attack of an enemy prepared by his naval ascendency and his other arrangements to make a sudden and vigorous inroad upon our shores. It becomes us, therefore, to inquire how the consequences of this state of things are to be best met and averted.
The first and most obvious, and in every point of view the most proper method of defence, is an augmentation of our naval means to an extent proportioned to the resources and the necessities of the nation. I do not mean the actual construction and equipment of vessels only. The number of those in service must depend on the state of the country at a given period. But I mean the collection of all such materials as may be preserved without injury, and a due encouragement of those branches of interest essential to the growth of a navy, and which may be properly nurtured by the government, so that on the approach of danger a fleet may be put to sea without delay sufficiently powerful to meet any force which will probably be sent to our coast.
Our great battle upon the ocean is yet to be fought; and we shall gain nothing by shutting our eyes to the nature of the struggle, or to the exertions we shall find it necessary to make. All our institutions are essentially pacific, and every citizen feels that his share of the common interest is affected by the derangement of business, by the enormous expense, and by the uncertain result of a war. This feeling presses upon the community and the government, and is a sure guarantee that we shall never be precipitated into a contest, nor embark in one, unless imperiously required by those considerations which leave no alternative between resistance and dishonor. Accordingly, all our history shows that we are more disposed to bear while evils ought to be borne, than to seek redress by appeals to arms. Still, however, a contest must come; and it behooves us, while we have the means and the opportunity, to look forward to its attendant circumstances, and to prepare for the consequences.
It is no part of my object to enter into the details of a naval establishment. That duty will be much more appropriately and ably performed by the proper department. But as some of the views I shall present on the subject of our system of fortifications must be materially affected by any general plan of naval operations which, in the event of hostilities, might be adopted, I am necessarily led to submit a few remarks, not professional, but general, upon the extent and employment of our military marine.
There is as little need of inquiry now into our moral as into our physical capacity to maintain a navy, and to meet upon equal terms the ships and seamen of any other nation. Our extended commerce, creating and created by those resources which are essential to the building and equipment of fleets, removes all
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doubt upon the one point, and the history of our naval enterprise, from the moment when the colors were first hoisted upon the hastily-prepared vessels at the commencement of our revolutionary struggle to the last contest in which any of our ships have been engaged, is equally satisfactory upon the other. The achievements of our navy have stamped its character with the country and the world. The simple recital of its exploits is the highest eulogium which can be pronounced upon it.
With ample means, therefore, to meet upon the ocean, by which they must approach us, any armaments that may be destined for our shores, we are called upon by every prudential consideration to do so. In the first place, though all wars in which we may be engaged will probably be defensive in their character, undertaken to repel or resent some injury or to assert some right, and rendered necessary by the conduct of other nations, still the objects of the war can be best attained by its vigorous prosecution. Defensive in its causes, it should be offensive in its character. The greater injury we can inflict upon our opponent, the sooner and the more satisfactory will be the redress we seek. Our principal belligerent measures should have for their aim, to attack our antagonist where he is most vulnerable. If we are to receive his assaults, we abandon the vantage ground, and endeavor, in effect, to compel him to do us justice by inviting his descent upon our shores, and by all those consequences which mark the progress of an invading force, whether for depredation or for conquest. By the ocean only can we be seriously assailed, and by the ocean only can we seriously assail any power with which we are likely to be brought into collision.
But independently of the policy of making an adversary feel the calamities of war, it is obvious that, even in a defensive point of view alone, the ocean should be our great field of operations. No one would advocate the project of endeavoring to make our coast impervious to attack. Such a scheme would be utterly impracticable. A superior fleet, conveying the necessary troops, could effect a landing at numerous points upon our shores even if the best devised plan of fortifying them were consummated. And, from the nature of maritime operations, such a fleet could bring its whole strength to bear upon any particular position, and by threatening or assailing various portions of the coast, either anticipate the tardy movements of troops upon land, and effect the object before their concentration, or render it necessary to keep in service a force far superior to that of the enemy, but so divided as to be inferior to it upon any given point. These dangers and difficulties would be averted or avoided by the maintenance of a fleet competent to meet any hostile squadrons which might be detached to our seas. Our coast would thus be defended on the ocean, and the calamities of war would be as little felt as the circumstances of such a conflict would permit.
As to the other advantages of a navy in the protection of commerce, they do not come within the scope of my inquiries, and are not therefore adverted to. Nor is it necessary or indeed proper that I should present those considerations of distance, of exposure, and of station, which would render a fleet numerically inferior in the aggregate to that of the enemy, yet still sufficiently powerful upon our own coasts to meet and overcome any armament which could probably be sent here.
It seems to me, therefore, that our first and best fortification is the navy. Nor do I see any limit to our naval preparations, except that imposed by a due regard to the public revenues from time to time, and by the probable condition of other maritime nations. Much of the materiel employed in the construction and equipment of vessels is almost indestructible, or at any rate may be preserved for a long series of years; and if ships can be thus kept without injury upon the stocks by being built under cover, I do not see what should restrain us from proceeding to build as many as may be deemed necessary, and as fast as a due regard to their economical and substantial construction will permit; and to collect and prepare for immediate use all the munitions of war, and other articles of equipment not liable to injury or decay by the lapse of time. Nor do I see that these preparations should be strictly graduated by the number of seamen who would probably enter the service at this time or within any short period. To build and equip vessels properly requires much time, as well with reference to the execution of the work as to the proper condition of the materials employed. And the costly experiment made by England, when she too hastily increased her fleet about thirty years ago by building ships with improper materials and bad workmanship, ought to furnish us with a profitable lesson. These vessels soon decayed, after rendering very little service. Naval means should therefore be provided at a period of leisure, to be ready for immediate employment in a period of exigency; and a due regard to prudence dictates that these means should so far exceed the estimated demands of the service as to supply in the shortest time any loss occasioned by the hazards of the ocean and the accidents of war. We may safely calculate that the number of seamen in the United States will increase in proportion to that rapid augmentation which is going on in all the other branches of national interest. If we assume that at a given period we may expect to embark in war, our capacity to man a fleet will exceed our present means by a ratio not difficult to ascertain. And even then, by greater exertions and perhaps higher wages, a larger portion may be induced to enter the naval service, while no exertions can make a corresponding addition to the navy itself but at a loss of time and expense and a sacrifice of its permanent interest.
But whatever arrangements we may make to overcome any naval armaments sent out to assail us, we are liable to be defeated and to be exposed to all the consequences resulting from the ascendency of an enemy. And the practical question is, what shall be done with a view to such a state of things? As I have already remarked, any attempt by fortifications to shut up our coast so that an enterprising foe with a victorious fleet conveying a competent force, and disposed to encounter all the risk of such an expedition, could not make his descent upon the shore, would be useless in itself, and would expose to just censure those who should project such a scheme. And, on the other hand, the government would, if possible, be still more censurable were our important maritime places left without any defensive works. Between these extremes is a practical medium, and to ascertain where it lies we must briefly look at the various considerations affecting the subject.
What have we to apprehend in the event of a war? Is it within the limits of a reasonable calculation that any enemy will be able and disposed to debark upon our coast an army sufficiently powerful to lay siege to our fortifications, and to endeavor by this slow and uncertain process to obtain possession of them? I put out of view the enormous expense attending such a plan; the distance of the scene of operations from the points of supply and support, with the consequent difficulties and dangers, and the possibility that the convoying fleet might be overpowered by a superior force, and the whole expedition captured or destroyed All these are considerations which no prudent statesman directing such an enterprise will overlook. But beyond these is a question bearing still more directly upon the point under examination. Is there any object to be obtained sufficiently important to justify the risk of placing a body of land troops before one of these works, too strong to be carried by a coup de main, and endeavoring to destroy its defences by a regular investment? I think there can be none.
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I take it for granted that no nation would embark in the Quixotic enterprise of conquering this country. Any army, therefore, thrown upon our coast would push forward with some definite object to be attained by a prompt movement and by vigorous exertions. Our experience, more than half a century ago, demonstrated that an invading force could command little more than the position it actually occupied. The system of fortifications adopted in Europe is not applicable to our condition. There military movements must be made upon great avenues of communication, natural or artificial, and these are closed or defended by fortresses constructed with all the skill that science and experience can supply, and with all the means that wealth and power can command. An invading army must carry these positions by escalade or by siege, or leave sufficient detachments to blockade them, or must turn them and move on with all the difficulties attending the interruption of their communication, and with the dangers which such a force in their rear must necessarily occasion. Works of this character are keys to many of the European states, whose political safety depends upon their preservation. Their possession enables their governments to meet the first shock of war, and to prepare their arrangements, political or military, to resist or avert the coming storm. And, although during some of the wars which arose out of the French revolution, when, from causes which history is now developing, the armies of France set at defiance the received maxims of military experience, and justifying their apparent rashness by success, reduced with unexampled facility, or carried on their operations almost in contempt of the strongest fortifications, the subjugation of each of which had been till then the work of a campaign, still the opinion is yet entertained by many that this system of defence is best adapted to the condition of the European community.
There is also a striking difference between the political situation of those countries and that of ours which gives to these defensive preparations a character of importance which can never apply to the United States The possession of a capital in the eastern hemisphere is too often the possession of the kingdom. Habits of feeling and opinion, political associations, and other causes, combine to give to the metropolis an undue ascendency. Internal parties contending for superiority, and external enemies aiming at conquest, equally seek to gain possession of the seat of government. And the most careless observer of the events of the last half century must be struck with the fact that the fate of the capitals and the kingdoms of modern Europe are closely connected together. Under such circumstances, it may be prudent, by powerful fortresses, to bar the approaches to these favored places, and frequently to construct works to defend them from external attack, or to maintain their occupation against internal violence.
But there is nothing like this in our country, nor can there be till there is a total change in our institutions. Our seats of government are merely the places where the business of the proper departments is conducted, and have not themselves the slightest influence upon any course of measures, except what is due to public opinion and to their just share of it. If the machine itself were itinerant, the result would be precisely the same. Or if, by any of the accidents of war or pestilence, the proper authorities were compelled to change their place of convocation, the change would be wholly unobserved, except by the few whose personal convenience would be affected by the measure. Nor have our commercial capitals any more preponderating influence than our political ones. And although their capture by an enemy, and the probable loss of property and derangement of business which would be the result, might seriously affect the community, yet it would not produce the slightest effect upon the social or political systems of the country. The power belongs to all, and is exercised by all.
It follows, therefore, that an enemy could have no inducement to hazard an expedition against any of our cities under the expectation that their capture and possession would lead to political results favorable to them. Washington may indeed be taken again, and its fall would produce the same emotion which was everywhere felt when its former capture was known. But an enemy would retire from it with as few advantages as marked its first abandonment, and if his course were the same, with as few laurels as he won by its possession. I make these remarks because it seems to me that some of the principles of the European system of fortifications may possibly be transferred to this country without sufficient attention having been given to those circumstances, both geographical and political, which require a plan exclusively adapted to our own condition.
I consider some of the existing and projected works larger than are now necessary, and calculated for exigencies we ought not, with the prospects before us, to anticipate. If such is the fact, the objection is not only to the expense of their construction and preservation, but also to the greater difficulty of defending them, and the increased garrisons which must be provided and maintained. The hypothesis upon which their extent has been determined is that they may be exposed to investment both seaward and landward, and that they ought to be capable of resisting a combined attack, or, in other words, that their water batteries should be sufficient to repel an assailing squadron, and that their land defences should be sufficient to resist a besieging army.
It is certain that whatever works we erect should be so constructed as to be beyond the reach of any coup de main that would probably be attempted against them. And this capacity must depend upon their exposure and upon the facility with which they can be relieved. But this proposition is far different from one to construct them upon a scale of magnitude which presupposes they are to be formally invested by a powerful land force, and which provides for their ability to make a successful resistance. A dashing military or naval officer may be willing to risk something to get possession of an insulated post by a prompt movement, expecting to accomplish his enterprise before his adversary can be prepared or succor obtained; and this, even when he looks to no other advantage than the capture of the garrison, and the effect which a brilliant exploit is calculated to produce, and when he is aware that he must abandon his conquest with as much celerity as he attained it. But formal investments of fortified places, with all their difficulties, and expense, and uncertainty, are only undertaken when there is some object of corresponding importance to be expected. We have works constructed which it would require armies to reduce. Have we any reason to anticipate that they will be assailed by a force proportioned to their magnitude?
I have already remarked that a European power cannot expect to retain permanent possession of any part of this country. If, therefore, he succeed in overcoming or eluding our fleets, and is prepared with a respectable land force, and ready to risk its employment upon our territory, he can land at many points which we cannot close against him. His debarkation is not a question of practicability but of expediency. If a safe harbor or roadstead offers itself, and there is no defensive work to prevent his approach, he will, of course, land at the nearest point to the object of his marauding enterprise. If there is such a work, it will be a question of calculation whether it is better to attack and carry it, or to seek another, though more distant point of debarkation. I think there can be little doubt but there are few, if any, positions in our country which an enemy would not under such circumstances avoid. He would be aware of the facility of communication which our rivers, canals, and railroads afford, of the powerful use we should be
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prepared to make of steam in its various forms of application, and of the immense force which in a short time could be concentrated upon a given point, and it is scarcely within the limits of possibility that he would venture formally to besiege one of our forts, or, if he did, that he would not repent his rashness. Neither the co-operation of his fleet nor the nearer proximity of the place of landing to the object of attack would induce him to seek these advantages at the cost which must attend the slow process of besieging a fort, when, by removing to another position, he would land in safety, and save in time, in promptness of movement, and in his escape from the perils of a doubtful contest, more than he would lose by the difference in distance.
I am aware it may be objected that the weakness of a work might tempt an enemy to attack it, and that it may be supposed the power of some of our fortifications to resist a siege may hereafter furnish the true reason why they may not be compelled to encounter one. Certainly the stronger a work is the less will it be exposed to danger; but this would not furnish a sufficient reason for making its defences out of reasonable proportion to its exposure. The true inquiry is, what circumstances will probably induce and enable an enemy to assail a given point, and with what force; and how can we best meet and repel him? And I believe a just consideration of this proposition will lead to the conclusion that there are scarcely any positions in our country where an enemy would venture to set down before a work too strong to resist a coup de main. In the view, therefore, which I take of this whole subject, it will be perceived that I do not merely suppose an enemy will not invest our larger works, but that they would not do so were these works much inferior to what they are, both in their dimensions and construction.
What object would justify an enemy in attempting to land an army upon our coast? He would not expect to lay waste the country, for such a mode of warfare is not to be anticipated in the present state of society. All that, under the most favorable circumstances, he could accomplish, would be to gain sudden possession of a town and levy contributions, or to destroy a naval establishment, commercial or military, and precipitately retire to his ships before his operations could be prevented, or his retreat intercepted. I cannot therefore concur in the suggestion made in the Engineer report, that the first of the three great objects to be attained by the fortifications of the first class should be to "prevent an enemy from forming a permanent or even a momentary establishment in the country." It is not suited to the present and prospective situation of the United States. I understand the establishments herein contemplated are not the temporary occupation of naval arsenals and cities for the purpose of destruction or plunder, because these objects are specially enumerated, but are lodgements where armies may be stationed, and whence they may issue to commit inroads into the country.
I refer in these remarks to our maritime coast generally. There are, no doubt, certain points less equal to self-defence than others, and where the preparation must be greater. Of this class is the delta of the Mississippi, not only in consequence of its many avenues of approach, but because its great natural highway does not, at present, allow those lateral supplies of the personnel, which, from geographical formation and from the state of the settlements, can be speedily thrown upon most other points of the country. This region, however, is admirably adapted to the use of steam batteries, and they will form its principal means of defence.
To apply these remarks to the plan of fortifications partly completed and partly projected. Fort Monroe, at Old Point Comfort, covers about sixty-three acres of ground, and requires, by the estimates of the Engineer department, two thousand seven hundred men to garrison it in time of war. Its full armament consists of 412 pieces of different descriptions and calibre. I have been desirous of comparing its superficial extent with some of the European fortresses, but the necessary information could not be obtained within the short time that could be allowed for the inquiry. I understand from General Gratiot, however, that it is probably larger than almost any of the single works in Europe which do not enclose towns within their circuit. Drinkwater, in his History of the Siege of Gibraltar, states that 572 guns were mounted upon that fortress.
The object to be attained by Fort Monroe, in conjunction with Fort Calhoun, intended to mount 232 guns, is to prevent an enemy from entering Hampton Roads, a safe and convenient roadstead. This object is important because this bay is perfectly landlocked, and has sufficient depth of water for the largest vessels, and is withal so near the capes of the Chesapeake that it furnishes the best station which an enemy could occupy for annoying our commerce, and for committing depredations upon the shores of that extensive estuary; but these works do not command the entrance into the Chesapeake, nor is Hampton Roads the only safe anchorage for a hostile fleet. Their possession, therefore, does not exclude an enemy from these waters, though they will compel him to resort to less convenient positions from whence to carry on his enterprises. A hostile squadron reaching the Chesapeake and finding the entrance into Hampton Roads guarded by sufficient works, though much less extensive than those at Fort Monroe, would necessarily consider whether the possession of that roadstead is so important as to justify the debarkation of a large body of land troops, and to attempt to carry the works by regular approaches, and this in the face of the strenuous efforts which would be made to relieve it by all the aids afforded by the most improved facilities of communication, and by the light and heavy steam batteries which, upon the approach of war, would be launched upon the Chesapeake, and which, during periods of calm or in certain winds, could approach the hostile ships and drive them from their anchorage, or compel them to surrender, and most of which, from their draught of water, could take refuge in the inlets that other armed vessels could not enter. And even if the works were carried, they could not be maintained without the most enormous expense, nor, in fact, without efforts which no government three thousand miles off could well make; and all this while Lynnhaven bay, York bay, the Rappahannock, Tangier island, the mouth of the Potomac, and many other places, furnish secure anchorage, and are positions from which an enemy having the superiority could not be excluded, and while, in fact, a great part of the Chesapeake may be considered as affording good anchorage ground for large ships. Neither of them is equal to Hampton Roads, but most or all of them furnish stations for occupation and observation which would render it unnecessary to purchase the superior advantages of Hampton Roads by the sacrifice and hazard which would attend the effort. The occlusion of this roadstead does not secure Norfolk, important as it is from its commerce and navy yard. It only prevents the access of ships-of-war to it; and against these there is an interior line of defence, which may be considered as accessory to, and if necessary, independent of, the other. And a land force, deeming the destruction of the navy yard at Norfolk a sufficient object to justify such an expedition, would not sit down before Fort Monroe, if its scale of defence were far inferior to what it now is, but would debark at Lynnhaven bay, where there is no impediment, and march in five or six hours through an open country to Norfolk.
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New York is, in every point of view, our most important harbor, and its defences should provide for every reasonable contingency. The Engineer report recommends three classes of works: an exterior one for the protection of the harbor; an interior one to shut up Raritan bay; and a third to prevent a hostile fleet from approaching the city through the sound nearer than the vicinity of Throg's Point. The importance of the first class cannot be doubted. That of the second depends on the value of Raritan bay to an enemy as an anchorage ground, and on the utility of excluding him from a landing at Grave-send bay, upon Long Island, whence an army could march, without obstruction, to Brooklyn and New York. The third is proposed to be erected in order to bar his access to the lower part of the sound, or, more accurately speaking, to prevent his reaching Hell Gate, a natural barrier which no fleet could pass, and which is within ten miles of the city. Here, if his aim were New York, he would land, and would find no works to prevent his approach. The two forts proposed to be erected at Throg's Neck and Wilkins's Point, eight miles further up the sound, would compel him to debark beyond the reach of their guns, and would thus add that distance to his march, while, on the north shore, Harlem river would bo interposed between him and the city. On the Long Island side there would be no difference but that occasioned by the distance.
It is obvious, then, that, in the consideration of this plan, involving an estimated expenditure, in the aggregate, of $5,807,969, and efficient garrisons in time of war of 9,000 men, a close investigation should be made into all the circumstances likely to influence the operations of an enemy. Is the anchorage ground between the Narrows and Sandy Hook of sufficient value to an enemy, looking to the risk of his occupation of the coast, and to the doubts that may be reasonably entertained of the result of so great an experiment, to be carried on, in fact, in the sea, to authorize the commencement of these works without a new examination? Or is the probability of the disembarkation of an army at Gravesend bay, in preference to some other point upon the coast of Long Island, if a convenient one exists, so great as to require these preparations? The same questions may be asked respecting Wilkins's Point. The work at Throg's Point is in the process of construction; and as the river is only about three-fourths of a mile wide at this place, I think its completion will be sufficient for this line of defence till the proposed general examination can take place.
The situation of New York affords a fine theatre for the operation of floating batteries; and whether a sufficient number of them would secure it from the designs of an enemy better than the full completion of the extensive system of permanent fortifications recommended, is a question deserving investigation. Such an investigation I recommend; and after all the necessary facts and considerations are presented, the government should proceed to place this commercial metropolis of the country in a state of security.
The works at Newport cover about twenty acres, and will mount 468 guns, and will* need for their defence about 2,400 men. I cannot myself foresee the existence of any circumstances which now call for a fortress of this magnitude in the very heart of New England, constructed, not merely to command the harbor of Newport, but to resist a siege which would probably require nearly 20,000 men to carry it on. I am at a loss to conjecture what adequate motive could induce a foreign government to detach a fleet and army upon this enterprise. The expense would be enormous. The French army that invaded Egypt was less than 40,000 men, and required for its protection and transportation between 500 and 600 vessels. The army that conquered Algiers was about equal in force, and required, it is said, about 400 transports besides the ships-of-war. This scale of preparation for enterprises against the shores of the Mediterranean may enable us to form some conception of the arrangements that would be necessary to send across the ocean to this country, in the present day of its power, an expedition strong enough to form an establishment upon our shores, and to furnish it with supplies necessary to its subsistence and operations.
It has been supposed, indeed, by the board of engineers, that an army would find sufficient reason for the occupation of Rhode Island in the consideration that it would afford a secure lodgement whence expeditions could be sent to every part of our coast. But it is to be observed that no part of Narraganset bay is necessary for the safety of a hostile fleet watching that part of our coast. Gardiner's bay, in that vicinity, is a most safe and convenient station, which was occupied by the British during almost the whole of the late war; and it is pretty clear that it cannot be defended by any stationary fortifications that can be constructed. If it can by floating batteries, so may Narraganset bay, and the enemy thus prevented from occupying the latter also, without these extensive arrangements, requiring, after Fort Adams shall have been completed at an expense of $1,312,000, four other forts and a sea wall to be constructed, and $1,157,000 to be expended.
I do not think that the most prudent forecast ought to lead to the apprehension that a force competent to seize such a position would be sent to our country, or that any circumstances could enable them to maintain it in the face of the vigorous efforts that would be made to recover it, and in the midst of a country abounding in all the means to give effect to their exertions. But perhaps the most striking objection to the completion of this extensive plan is, that under no possible circumstance can it effect the desired object. That object, if I understand it, is not the mere exclusion of an enemy from Rhode Island, but it is to prevent him from taking possession of a safe and convenient position whence he could detach his forces, by means of his naval superiority, to any other part of the coast which would thus be exposed to his depredations.
The value of Gardiner's bay as a place of naval rendezvous I have already described. Block island, in its neighborhood, could be occupied by troops desiring only a lodgement; and so could Nantucket island and Martha's Vineyard; and these are only a few hours' sail from Narraganset bay. Buzzard's bay is also a safe and capacious harbor which cannot be defended, and Martha's Vineyard sound affords commodious places of anchorage A fleet riding in these moorings would have under its command all the islands in this group, and could secure its communications with its land forces encamped upon them, which would thus be enabled at any proper time to throw itself upon other parts of the coast. It may be doubted, if there were not a cannon mounted upon Rhode Island, whether an enemy acquainted with the topography and resources of this country would select it as his place of arms, if I may so term it, when there are islands in the neighborhood which would answer this purpose nearly as well, and where he would be in perfect safety as long as he could maintain his naval ascendency; and longer than that he could not, under any circumstances, occupy Rhode Island. And if I rightly appreciate the strength and spirit of that part of the country, his tenure in any event would be short and difficult. I do not mean to convey the idea that Rhode Island should not be defended. I think it should be; but I do not think that precautions should be taken against events which are not likely to happen. As there is no naval
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establishment here, it is not necessary to enter into any question concerning defensive arrangements exclusively connected with that object.
It will be perceived, also, that it is proposed to fortify Mount Desert island, on the coast of Maine, and that the expense is estimated at five hundred thousand dollars, and the number of the garrison competent to maintain it at one thousand men. This proposition is founded not on the value of this harbor to us, for it possesses little, and is, in effect, unoccupied; but on account of its importance to the enemy. Were there no other secure position they could occupy in that quarter, and which could not be defended, I should think the views submitted upon this branch of the subject entitled to great weight; but there are many indentations upon this coast affording safe anchorage, and which are either not capable of being defended, or from their great number would involve an enormous expense which no sound views of the subject could justify. An enemy, therefore, cannot be deprived of the means of stationing himself upon this coast; and before this expenditure at Mount Desert island is encountered, it ought to be clearly ascertained that the difference, in its practical advantages to an enemy, between the occupation of Mount Desert island and that of some of the other roadsteads in this quarter incapable of defence, would be sufficiently great to warrant this measure. My present impression is that it would not.
And on the subject of roadsteads generally, with a few exceptions depending on their local positions, I am inclined to the opinion that any attempt to fortify them would be injudicious. I do not speak of harbors and inlets which are occupied by cities and towns, but of mere anchorage grounds, deriving their value from the shelter they afford. If all could be defended, and an enemy excluded from them, the advantages would justify any reasonable expenditure. But this is impracticable; and I doubt whether the circumstances in which most of them differ give such marked superiority to those we can defend over those we cannot as to lead to any attempt to fortify them, in the first instance, and to maintain garrisons in them during a war.
I have adverted to these particular cases in order to present my views more distinctly than I could do by mere general observations; certainly not from the remotest design of criticising the reports and the labors of the able professional men to whom the subject has been referred, nor of pursuing the investigation into any further detail.
I consider the duty of the government to afford adequate protection to the sea-coast a subject of paramount obligation; and I believe we are called upon by every consideration of policy to push the necessary arrangements as rapidly as the circumstances of the country and the proper execution of the work will allow. I think every town large enough to tempt the cupidity of an enemy should be defended by works fixed or floating, suited to its local position and sufficiently extensive to resist such attempts as would probably be made against it. There will, of course, after laying down such a general rule, be much latitude of discretion in its application. Upon this branch of the subject, I would give to the opinion of the engineer officers great and almost controlling weight, after the proper limitations are established. These relate principally to the magnitude of the works; and if I am correct in the views I have taken of this branch of the subject, a change in the system proposed is necessary. Works should not be projected upon the presumption that they are to be exposed to, and must be capable of resisting, the attacks of a European army with its battering train and all its preparations for a regular siege. Neither our relative circumstances, nor those of any nation with which we shall probably be brought into conflict, can justify us in such an anticipation. All the defences should be projected upon a scale proportioned to the importance of the place, and should be calculated to resist any naval attack and any sudden assault that a body of land troops might make upon them; but further than this it appears to me we ought not to go. The results at Stonington, at Mobile Point, at Fort Jackson, and at Baltimore, during the late war, show that formidable armaments may be successfully resisted with apparently inferior means. These, indeed, do not furnish examples to be followed as to the scale of our preparations, but they show what stationary batteries have done in our country against ships-of-war.
It is to be observed that the great object of our fortifications is to exclude a naval force from our harbors. This end they ought fully to answer; and in this problem there are two conditions to be fulfilled:
1. That they be able to resist any naval batteries that will probably be placed against them; and
2. That they be also able to resist any coup de main or escalade which might be attempted by land. An open battery, under many circumstances, might fulfil the first condition, but not the second; and
therefore these works should be closed and regularly constructed. It is not to be denied that the proper boundary between the magnitude and nature of the works necessary to attain the objects indicated and those required to resist successfully a formal investment will sometimes become a matter of doubt, nor that circumstances may not be stated which might induce an enemy to open his trenches against one of these works because its capacity for defence was not greater. That capacity, however, with relation to the question under consideration, has a far more intimate connexion with the magnitude than with the form of the works, because, if unnecessarily large, they entail upon the country a serious evil in the increased means for their defence, independently of the additional expense in their construction. It is principally, therefore, in the latter point of view that I have presented the doubts which I have expressed upon this point.
Among the hypothetical cases heretofore stated by the board of engineers was one which supposed that an army of twenty thousand men might be assembled upon one of the flanks of our coast, and that we ought to be prepared, at every important point, to resist the first shock of such a force. I have already glanced at the reasons, geographical, political, financial, and prudential, which, in my opinion, leave little room to expect that any enemy will, hereafter, project an enterprise of this magnitude, so certain in its expense, so uncertain in its result, and so disproportioned to any object which could probably be attained. And the suggestion which was made by the board of defending the city of Washington by works erected near the mouth of the Patuxent proceeds upon similar views. Our navy, our floating batteries, our means of communication and concentration, seem to me far better adapted to the defence of this city than forts at the distance of nearly fifty miles, whose principal effect, if an enemy were resolved upon the enterprise, would be to compel him to make a detour in his expedition, or which would send him to some part of the coast of the bay between the Patuxent and Annapolis, or into the Potomac, where his descent would be uninterrupted, and where he would be but little, if any, further from Washington than at the head of navigation of the Patuxent.
Even during the last war, when the navy of Great Britain rode triumphant upon the ocean, but one serious attempt was made to force an entrance into a fortified harbor, and that was unsuccessful. The greatest possible force which can be brought, and the greatest possible resistance which can be applied, do not constitute a practical rule for the construction of our fixed defences. Moral considerations must also
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have weight. Probabilities must be examined. The power of the permanent batteries is one of the elements of security. So are the dangers of dispersion, and shipwreck, and all the hazards of a distant expedition, as these must operate on the councils of any country meditating such an enterprise, the efforts of our navy, the co-operation of the floating defences, and the troops which may be ready to meet the enemy upon his debarkation or march.
In submitting these reflections, I am desirous only of discharging the duty confided to me. I am gratified that the whole subject will be presented for the consideration of Congress in a systematic form, and that the principles of its future prosecution can now be settled. The plan originally devised was recommended upon great consideration, and, at the time its initiatory measures were adopted, was calculated for the state of the country. We had just come out of a severe struggle, and had felt the want of adequate preparation, and, above all, we had seen and deplored the circumstances which gave the enemy undisturbed possession of the Chesapeake, and its disastrous consequences. And it was to be expected that our arrangements for future defence should be planned upon the then existing state of things. I imagine there were few who did not concur in this sentiment. Because, therefore, some of our works, from the wonderful advancement of the country in all the elements of power, and from the development of new means of annoyance, are larger than are found necessary at this time, still this does not bring into question the wisdom of the original measure. And, as it is, they are most valuable and useful; but the experience we have acquired may be profitably employed in re-examining the plans proposed for the prosecution of the system, and in inquiring whether the change which has taken place in the condition of the country will not justify a corresponding change in the nature of our preparations, and whether we may not depend more upon floating, and less upon stationary defences.
During the period which has intervened since the last war we have nearly doubled in our population, and all our other resources have probably increased in a still greater ratio. Certainly some of the facilities and means of defence are augmented beyond any rational expectations. The power of transporting troops and munitions of war has already opened new views upon this subject; and such is the progress and probable extent of the new system of intercommunication, that the time will soon come when almost any amount of physical force may be thrown, in a few hours, upon any point threatened by an enemy. Nashville may succor New Orleans in sixty hours; Cincinnati may aid Charleston in about the same time; Pittsburg will require but twenty-four hours to relieve Baltimore; and troops from that city and from Boston may leave each place in the morning and meet in New York in the evening. This wonderful capacity for movement increases, in effect, some of the most important elements of national power. It neutralizes one of the great advantages of an assailing force, choosing its point of attack, and possessing the necessary means of reaching it. Detachments liable, under former circumstances, to be cut off in detail, may now be concentrated without delay, and most of the garrisons upon the seaboard may be brought together, and, after accomplishing the object of their concentration, be returned to their stations in time to repel any attack meditated against them.
The improvements which are making in the application of steam have furnished another most important agent in the work of national protection. There can be but little doubt that floating batteries, propelled by this agent, will be among the most efficient means of coast defence. In our large estuaries, such as the bays of New York, of the Delaware, and of the Chesapeake, they will be found indispensable; and of the most important advantages to be anticipated from the works at Old Point Comfort is the security they will afford to the floating batteries co-operating with them, and which will find a secure shelter in Hampton Roads. A hostile fleet, about to enter the Chesapeake, would certainly calculate the means of annoyance to which it would be exposed by these formidable vessels. During a calm they would take a distant position, insuring their own safety, while, with their heavy guns, they might cripple and destroy the enemy; and their power of motion would enable them, under almost all circumstances, to approach the fleet, and to retire, when necessary, where they could not be pursued. I think it doubtful whether a squadron would anchor in the Chesapeake, or proceed up it, if a competent number of these batteries were maintained and placed in proper positions.
These considerations may well lead us to doubt the necessity of such extensive permanent works, while their non-existence at the time the system was adopted justifies the views which then prevailed; and, without advancing any rash conjecture, we may anticipate such improvements in this branch of the public service as will make it the most efficient means of coast defence. These vessels, properly constructed, may become floating forts almost equal to permanent fortifications in their power of annoyance and defence, and in other advantages far superior to them. Being transferable defences, they can be united upon any point, and a few of them be thus enabled to protect various places. We have been brought by circumstances to a more rigid investigation of our means of defence, and to a re-examination of the whole subject. After an interval of twenty years of tranquillity, public sentiment and the attention of the government were, by unexpected circumstances, more forcibly directed to this matter. The result cannot fail to be advantageous. The whole subject can be now re-examined by Congress, with all the benefits which much experience has brought, and with the advantage of adapting the system to the advanced state of the country.
There are two bills for fortifications now pending before Congress. One before the House, amounting to $2,180,000, and intended to prosecute works already actually commenced. The estimates for this bill may, therefore, be considered necessary in themselves, under any view of the general subject, and not unreasonable in amount for the present year, because they include the operations of two years. The incidental expenses, however, may be safely reduced one-half, as it will not be necessary to make such extensive repairs as were considered requisite when the estimates were prepared.
The bill pending before the Senate contains appropriations for nineteen new works, and for the sum of $600,000, to be expended for steam batteries. The estimates on which this bill was founded were prepared at a time when prudence required that arrangements should be made for a different state of things from that which now exists. An examination of the general system of defence was not then expedient; and the means of protecting the most exposed points, agreeably to information previously collected, were asked of Congress. It was no time then to stop, and, instead of prosecuting established plans vigorously, to lose the period of action by surveys, and examinations* and discussions. But the opportunity is now afforded, without danger to the public interest, of applying the principles suggested to the works under consideration.
It cannot be doubted but that fortifications at the following places, enumerated in this bill, will be necessary:
At Penobscot bay, for the protection of Bangor, &c.; at Kennebec river; at Portland; at Portsmouth;
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at Salem; at New Bedford; at New London; upon Staten Island; at Sollers's flats; a redoubt on Federal Point; for the Barrancas; for Fort St. Philip.
These proposed works all command the approach to places sufficiently important to justify their construction under any circumstances that will probably exist. I think, therefore, that the public interest would be promoted by the passage of the necessary appropriations for them. As soon as these are made, such of these positions as may appear to require it can be examined, and the form and extent of the works adapted to existing circumstances if any change be desirable. The construction of those not needing examination can commence immediately, and that of the others as soon as the plans are determined upon. By this proceeding, therefore, a season may be saved in the operations.
The other works contained in this bill are:
For Provincetown.—And this proposition may be safely submitted to another inquiry, as the practicability of excluding an enemy from any shelter in Massachusetts bay, a matter of deep interest, and as a work at Provincetown are closely connected.
For Rhode Island, Narraganset bay.—This work may await the result of the views that may be eventually taken on the subject of fortifying this bay.
For a work at the Delaware outlet of the Chesapeake and Delaware canal.—This may be postponed without injury till next season; and in the meantime a project for the floating defences of the Delaware considered, and perhaps the size of the proposed work reduced.
For a work at the breakwater.—Until the effect of the deposits which are going on in this important artificial harbor are fully ascertained, I consider it injudicious to erect a permanent work for its defence. Another year will, perhaps, settle the question, and if the result is favorable an adequate fortification should be constructed here without delay.
For forts on the Patuxent river and at Cedar Point.—Both of these works are liable to some of the objections stated, and I think they had better be postponed for more mature consideration.
For fortifications at the mouth of the St. Mary's, Georgia.—This proposition may also be safely submitted to examination.
The estimate for steam batteries may be reduced to $100,000 That sum can be profitably employed.
If these appropriations are early made, most if not all these works can be put in operation this season, and the money usefully applied as fast as their progress will justify; and I think the measure would be expedient. But it is to be remembered that the power of the department to push them during the present year will depend on the reorganization of the corps of engineers. If that corps is not increased it will be unnecessary to make the appropriations in the bill before the Senate, as the objects contained in the other bill will be sufficient to occupy the time of the present officers of the corps.
Should it be deemed proper to re-examine the subject of the proposed fortifications generally, I would then recommend that an appropriation of $30,000 be made to defray the expenses of a board, including surveyors, &c.
My reflections upon the whole subject lead to the following practical suggestions on the great subject of the measures for the defence of the country:
1. An augmentation of the navy upon the principles before stated.
2. The adoption of an efficient plan for the organization of the militia.
Having already, in two of the annual reports I have had the honor to make to you, expressed my sentiments upon this subject, I have nothing new to lay before you, either with relation to its general importance or to the necessary practical details. I consider it one of the most momentous topics that can engage the attention of Congress; and the day that sees a plan of organization adopted suited to the habits of our people and the nature of our institutions, and fitted to bring into action the physical strength of the country, with a competent knowledge of their duty, and just ideas of discipline and subordination, will see us the strongest nation, for the purposes of self-defence, on the face of the globe. Certainly such an object is worthy the attention of the legislature.
3. The cultivation of military science, that we may keep pace with the improvements which are made in Europe, and not be compelled to enter into a contest with an adversary whose superior knowledge would give him pre-eminent advantages. War is an advancing science. Many an original genius and many an acute intellect are at all times at work upon it; and the European communities have such a relation to one another that the profession of arms is peculiarly encouraged, and every effort made to place their military establishments, not at the highest numerical point, but in the best condition for efficient service, both with respect to its morale and materiel. It is not by the mere reading of professional authors that the necessary instruction in this branch of knowledge can be obtained; there must be study and practice; a union of principles and details, which can best be obtained by a course of education directed to this object. This, I think, is one of the greatest advantages of the Military Academy. It cannot have escaped the recollection of those who were upon the theatre of action at the commencement of the last war that the first year was almost spent in a series of disasters, which, however, brought their advantages. We were comparatively ignorant of the state of military science, and we did not fully recover our true position till we had received many severe lessons; at what an expense of life and treasure need not be stated.
4. The skeleton of a regular establishment, to which any necessary additions may be made, securing, at the same time, economy, with a due power of expansion, and the means of meeting a war with all the benefit of a regularly organized force. This object is attained by our present army.
5. The preparation and proper distribution of all the munitions of war agreeably to the views hereinafter submitted.
6. I think all the defensive works now in the process of construction should be finished agreeably to the plans upon which they have been projected.
7. All the harbors and inlets upon the coast where there are cities or towns whose situation and importance create just apprehension of attack, and particularly where we have public naval establishments, should be defended by works proportioned to any exigency that may probably arise.
Having already presented my general views upon this branch of the inquiry, I need not repeat the practical limitations which I propose for adoption. But before any expenditure is incurred for new works, I think an examination should be made in every case, in order to apply these principles to the proposed plan of operations, and thus reduce the expense of construction where this can properly be done, and also the eventual expense of maintaining garrisons required to defend works disproportioned to the objects sought to be attained. I would organize a board for this object, with special instructions for its government.
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8. Provision should be made for the necessary experiments to test the superiority of the various plans that may be offered for the construction and use of steam batteries; I mean batteries to be employed as accessories in the defence of the harbors and inlets and in aid of the permanent fortifications.
The progressive improvement in the application of the power of steam renders it inexpedient, at any given time, to make extensive arrangements, connected with this class of works, with a view to their future employment. The improvement of to-day may be superseded by the experience of to-morrow; and modes of application may be discovered, before any exigency arises, rendering a resort to these defences necessary, which may introduce an entire revolution into this department of art and industry. Still, however, experiments should be made, and a small number of these vessels constructed. Their proper draught of water, their form and equipment, the situation and security of their machinery, the number, calibre, and management of their guns, and the best form of the engines to be used, are questions requiring much consideration, and which can only be determined by experience. And there can be little doubt that suitable rewards would soon put in operation the inventive faculties of some of our countrymen, and lead to the tender of plans practically suited to the circumstances. As we acquire confidence by our experience, arrangements could be made for collecting and preparing the indestructible materials for the construction and equipment of these vessels, as far as such a measure may not interfere with any probable change which at the time may be anticipated in the application of the power of steam.
9. I recommend a reconsideration of the project for fortifying the roadsteads or open anchorage grounds, and its better adaptation to the probable future circumstances of the country.
And I would suggest that the works which are determined on be pushed with all reasonable vigor, that our whole coast may be placed beyond the reach of injury or insult, as soon as a just regard to circumstances will permit. No objections can arise to this procedure on the ground of expense, because, whatever system may be approved by the legislature, nothing will be gained by delaying its completion beyond the time necessary to the proper execution of the work. In fact, the cost will be greater the longer we are employed in it, not only for obvious reasons arising out of general superintendence and other contingencies, but because accidents are liable to happen to unfinished works, and the business upon them is deranged by the winter, when they must be properly secured; and the season for resuming labor always finds some preparations necessary, which would not have been required had no interruption happened.
But the political considerations which urge forward this great object are entitled to much more weight. When once completed we should feel secure. There is probably not a man in the country who did not look with some solicitude during the past season at our comparatively defenceless condition when the issue of our discussions with France was uncertain, and who did not regret that our preparations during the long interval of peace we had enjoyed had not kept pace with our growth and importance. We have now this lesson to add to our other experience. Adequate security is not only due from the government to the country, and the conviction of it is not only satisfactory, but the knowledge of its existence cannot fail to produce an influence upon other nations, as well in the advent of war itself as in the mode of conducting it. If we are prepared to attack and resist, the chances of being compelled to embark in hostilities will be diminished much in proportion to our preparation. An unprotected commerce, a defenceless coast, and a military marine, wholly inadequate to the wants of our service, would indeed hold out strong inducements to other nations to convert trifling pretexts into serious causes of quarrel.
There are two suggestions connected with the prosecution of our works which I venture to make:
First. That the corps of engineers should be increased. The reasons for this measure have been heretofore submitted, and the proposition has been recommended by you to Congress. I will merely add, upon the present occasion, that the officers of this corps are not sufficiently numerous for the performance of the duties committed to them, and that, if an augmentation does not take place, the public interest will suffer in a degree far beyond the value of any pecuniary consideration connected with this increase; and
Secondly. I think that when the plan of a work has been approved by Congress, and its construction authorized, the whole appropriation should be made at once, to be drawn from the treasury in annual instalments to be fixed by the law. This mode of appropriation would remedy much of the inconvenience which has been felt for years in this branch of the public service. The uncertainty respecting the appropriations annually deranges the business, and the delay which biennially takes place in the passage of the necessary law reduces the alternate season of operations to a comparatively short period. An exact inquiry into the effect which the present system of making the appropriations has had upon the expense of the works would probably exhibit an amount far greater than is generally anticipated.
The report from the Ordnance department shows the quantity and nature of the munitions of war estimated to be eventually necessary, and their probable cost, including new establishments necessary for their fabrication and preservation. The conjectural amount is $29,955,537.
Believing it not expedient at present to make any preparations upon a scale of this magnitude, I have deemed it proper to accompany this report with a brief statement of my own views, where I depart from the suggestions that are presented in this document.
As our fortifications are constructed, their armaments should be provided; and the amount in depot should at all times exceed the anticipated demand, to meet the casualties of the service. We have now on hand 1,818 new cannon for sea-coast defence, and about 1,000 others, most of which are either useless or of doubtful character. The works actually finished, or so far completed as to admit of a part of their armament being placed in them, require about 2,000 guns. They are calculated ultimately to mount about 600 more. Others in the process of construction will require about 1,400. So far we have certain data for our estimates, unless, indeed, which I am inclined to believe, it should not he found necessary ever to provide the full complement destined for the largest of these works. Beyond this, the subject is conjectural, and the quantity needed must depend upon the principles that may be adopted in the further progress of the system of fortifications. There are four private founderies at which the public cannon are cast. These, if their whole attention were devoted to the object, could manufacture from 1,200 to 1,500 annually. As to carriages and other supplies, the amount that could be procured within a reasonable period is almost indefinite. Iron carriages are now made for all the casemate batteries, and they have not only the advantage of indestructibility from the atmosphere, but, requiring no seasoned materials, they may be supplied by the founderies through the country to almost any extent.
We have two armories for the manufacture of small arms, and there are seven private establishments which fabricate arms for the government. All these supplies are of the best description, and are submitted to a rigid inspection, which prevents imposition. The armories can at present turn out about
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27,000 arms annually, and probably 11,000 or 12,000 could be made at existing private establishments. Should any exigency require larger supplies, the quantity can be much increased. We have now on hand about 700,000 small arms, and there have been issued to the States about 180,000 muskets, 25,000 rifles, 30,000 pistols, and 378 field cannon and carriages, under the act for arming the militia If 100,000 of these muskets and rifles are preserved, there are in the country 800,000 of those species of arms belonging to the general or State governments.
What may be considered a proper supply is a question admitting much difference of opinion. It will be seen that the Ordnance department fixes the amount at about 600,000, in addition to what are now on hand, and including the number necessary to arm the militia. We had, at the commencement of the last war, 240,000 muskets, and during its progress 60,000 more were made and purchased. At its termination there were but 20,000 at the various arsenals. The residue were in the hands of the troops, or had been lost in the service. This consumption was greater, I think, than was necessary, or than would probably again take place. A plan of accountability has been introduced by which the men are charged with the arms they receive, and. if these are improperly lost or injured, the value is deducted from their pay. The paymasters cannot settle with them till this matter is adjusted.
The stock of small arms in Great Britain in depot, in 1817, was |
818,282 |
In the public service |
200,974 |
Total |
1. 019. 256 |
The number in depot in France, in 1811, was 600,000, not including the great number in service.
My own impression is, that 1,000,000 small arms may be considered a competent supply for the United States; and if so, a large deduction may be made from the estimate of the Ordnance department under this head of expenditure. Although the component materials of these arms are almost imperishable, still it is not expedient to keep a stock unnecessarily large on hand, because there is not only some risk and expense in their preservation, but because, like every other article manufactured by man, they are no doubt susceptible of great improvement; and it may be that those now made may be superseded by an improved model, which, once introduced, must be adopted, at whatever expense or inconvenience, by all nations. And the ingenious invention lately exhibited in this city, by which a series of balls in separate charges are brought by a rotary motion to a common place of discharge, suggests the possibility of a revolution in the form of our fire-arms.
On the subject of depots for these arms, I accord with the general suggestions made by the colonel of ordnance. I think the number should be increased, and arms placed in every part of the country ready to be used as circumstances may require.
It will be observed that in the estimate I have made I confine myself to the armament for the public service connected with the actual defence of the country, whether to be used by the army or militia in time of war; but I do not extend my views to a supply for arming the militia, in order to discipline them in time of peace. The extent of this policy is a question not necessary in the consideration of the subject before me.
As the arms in depot approach whatever number may be assumed as the proper maximum, the necessity for additional armories becomes less. When our stock is once completed, the present armories, without any aid from the private establishments, will be able to supply the annual consumption. I think, therefore, that two additional armories, as suggested by the Ordnance department, are not wanted; and, indeed, although there are considerations attending the transportation of the rude and the manufactured article, and other circumstances which would justify the establishment of a new armory upon the western waters at present, yet, if the measure is not carried into effect soon, its importance will annually diminish.
But a national foundery for cannon, both for the military and naval service, and, perhaps, two in different sections of the country, should be erected without delay. The best interests of the public require it. But I have nothing to add to the suggestions made upon this subject in my last annual report.
As to field artillery, the extent to which it shall be provided must depend upon the views of the legislature concerning the expediency of issuing it to the militia. If a more efficient organization does not take place, I think the expenditure on this account may well be saved to the public treasury. I consider all attempts to improve the condition of the militia, upon the present plan, as so nearly useless, that the whole system has become a burden upon the public, without any corresponding advantage. The principal benefit which results from the existing state of things is the power to call into service such portions of the population as may be wanted. But this may be attained by a simple classification, without the cumbrous machinery which at present creates expense and trouble, and which, while it promises little, performs still less.
Very respectfully, sir, I have the honor to be, &c.,
LEWIS CASS.
The President of the United States.
Engineer Department, Washington, March 30, 1836. Sir: In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to submit herewith the copy of a report prepared in fulfilment of the requirement of the first inquiry contained in the resolution of the Senate of the 18th of February last. The views presented by Colonel Totten on the subject are full and explicit, and are consonant with the principles heretofore advocated by this department. The report is therefore respectfully submitted, without any further comments.
Very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,
C. GRATIOT, Chief Engineer.
Hon. Lewis Cass, Secretary of War.
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Washington, March 29, 1836.
Sir: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to hand in some remarks on the fortification of the frontier of the United States.
And am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient,
JOS. G. TOTTEN, Lt. Col. Eng., Brevet Colonel. Brig. Gen. Ch. Gratiot, Chief Engineer, Washington.
In presenting a summary statement of the general system of the defence of the country by fortifications, as proposed and in part executed, it is proper to refer for much information as to localities, as to particular projects, and for statements and arguments somewhat elaborate, to communications made at different times by the board of engineers for fortifications.
These communications, of a nature forbidding too great publicity, are to be found in the records of the War Department, in the shape of reports of the board of engineers of 1817, 1819, 1820, 1821, 1822, 1823, 1824, and 1825. Reference may also be made with advantage to the revised report of the board of engineers presented in 1826, and published as document No. 153, of the state papers of the first session of the 19th Congress. The report of 1826, just referred to, was drawn up by the undersigned, and was the work of much research and of mature deliberation; and in giving it now a careful perusal, he thinks that the information now called for by the Senate cannot be better afforded, at least by him, than by again presenting that report, occasionally condensing, curtailing, or omitting portions of the argument and certain descriptions, and adding such new facts as may have been developed by further research, or made more prominent and interesting by the progress of improvement in the country.
The elements going to make up the general system of maritime defence are a navy, fortifications, interior communications by land and water, and a regular army and well-organized militia.
The navy must be provided with suitable establishments for construction and repair; stations, harbors of rendezvous, and ports of refuge. All these must be covered by fortifications having garrisons of regular troops and militia, and being supplied with men and materials through the lines of interior communication. Not being required to remain in the harbors for their defence, the navy, preeminent as an offensive arm, will be prepared to transfer the war to distant oceans, and to the shores of the enemy, and to act the great part which its early achievements have foretold, and to which its high destiny will lead.
Fortifications should—1st. Close all important harbors against an enemy, and secure them to our military and commercial marine.
2d. Should deprive an enemy of all strong positions, where, protected by naval superiority, he might maintain himself during the war, keeping the whole frontier in constant alarm.
3d. Must cover the great naval establishments from attack.
4th. Must protect the great cities.
5th. Must prevent, as far as possible, the great avenues of interior navigation from being blockaded at their entrances to the ocean.
6th. Must cover the coastwise and interior navigation by closing the harbors and the several inlets which intersect the lines of interior communication, thereby further aiding the navy in protecting the navigation of the country; and
7th. Must shelter the smaller towns along the coast, and also all their commercial and manufacturing establishments which are of a nature to invite the enterprise or cupidity of an enemy.
Interior communications will conduct with certainty the necessary supplies of all sorts to the stations, harbors of rendezvous and refuge, and the establishments of construction and repair for the use both of the fortifications and of the navy; will greatly facilitate and expedite the concentration of military force, and the transfer of troops from one point to another; will insure to these troops supplies of every description, and will preserve unimpaired the interchange of domestic commerce, even during periods of the most active external warfare.
The army and militia, together with the personnel of the marine, constitute the vital principle of the system.
It is important to notice the reciprocal relation of these elements of national defence; one element is scarcely more dependent on another than the whole system is on each one. Withdraw the navy, and the defence becomes merely passive. We expose ourselves the more to suffer the evils of war, at the same time that we deprive ourselves of all means of inflicting them. Withdraw interior communication, and the navy will often be greatly embarrassed for want of supplies, while the fortifications will be unable to offer full resistance for want of timely reinforcements. Withdraw fortifications, and the interior communications are broken up, and the navy is left entirely without collateral aid.
That element in the system of defence which is now to be attended to is the fortification of the frontier. It may not be unprofitable here to go somewhat more into detail, as to the relation of this with the other members of the system; the rather, as the reasons for some conclusions hereafter to be announced will be the more apparent.
In considering the relation of fortifications and of the navy to the defence of the country, it will appear that the functions of the latter are not less appropriately offensive than those of the former are necessarily defensive; that the latter loses much of its efficiency as a member of the system the moment it becomes passive, and should in no case (referring now to the navy proper) be relied on as a substitute for fortifications.
This position, it is thought, may be easily established.
If our navy be inferior to that of the enemy, it can offer, of course, without collateral aids, but a feeble resistance—single ships being assailed by fleets or squadrons. Having numerous points along our extended frontier to protect, all of which must be simultaneously guarded, because ignorant of the selected points of attack, the separate squadrons or vessels may be captured in detail, although the naval force be in the aggregate equal or superior to the enemy's. Should we in such a case venture to concentrate, under the idea that the particular object of the adversary was foreseen, he could not fail to push his forces upon the places thus left without protection. This mode of defence is liable to the
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further objection of being exposed to fatal disasters, independent of assaults of an enemy, and of leaving the issue of conflicts to be determined sometimes by accident, in spite of all the efforts of courage and skill. If it were attempted to improve upon this mode by combining with it temporary batteries and field-works, it would be found that, besides being weak and inadequate from their nature, the most suitable positions for these works must often be neglected, under the unavoidable condition of security to the ships themselves. If the ships take no part in the contest, the defence is, of course, relinquished to the temporary batteries; if the ships unite in the defence, the batteries must be at hand to sustain them, or the ships must strike to the superior adversary. Placing these batteries in better position, and giving them greater strength, is at once resorting to defence by fortifications; and the resort will be the more effectual as the positions are better chosen, and the works better adapted to the circumstances.
On the great comparative expense of such a mode of defence, which will be quite apparent after a little reflection, only one or two very brief remarks will be made, viz: The expense incurred by the nation defending itself on this plan will, from the first, greatly exceed that incurred by the attacking party, because, to resist a single fleet threatening the coast, there must be provided as many equal fleets as there are important objects inviting the attack of the enemy, and even with this costly preparation all lesser objects are thrown upon his forbearance. These defences, moreover, being perishable in their nature, will need frequent removal and repair.
On the other hand, the proper fortification of the coast preventing the possibility of a blockade so strict as not to afford frequent opportunities for our navy to leave the harbors, our ships, no longer needed for passive defence, will move out upon their proper theatre of action, though inferior to the enemy, with confidence, knowing that, whether victorious, whether suffering from the violence of tempests, or whether endangered by the vicinity or the pursuit of a superior force, they can strike the extended coast of their country (avoiding the more important outlets, where alone a considerable blockading force may be supposed to lie) at numerous points where shelter and relief await them; hovering around the flanks and in the rear of blockading fleets, and recapturing their prizes; falling upon portions of these fleets, separated for minor objects or by stress of weather; watching the movements of convoys, in order to pick up straggling vessels; breaking up or restraining the enemy's commerce in distant seas; meeting by concert at remote points and falling in mass upon his smaller squadrons, or upon his colonial possessions, and even levying contributions in his unprotected ports; blockading for a time the narrow seas, and harassing the coasting commerce of the enemy's own shores. These are objects which our own history shows may be accomplished, although contending, by means of a navy as to numbers apparently insignificant, against a marine whose force and efficiency have never been paralleled. Our own history shows, besides, that the reason why our infant navy did not accomplish still more was, that the enemy, possessing himself of unfortified harbors, was enabled to enforce a blockade so strict as to confine a portion of it within our waters. That this portion, however, indeed, that all was not captured, can be attributed only to respect (so misplaced that it could be the result of ignorance only) for the then existing fortifications—a result amply compensating the nation for the cost of those imperfect works. It would be difficult, nay, impossible, to estimate the full value of the results following the career of our navy when it shall have attained its state of manhood under the favorable conditions heretofore indicated. The blockade of many and distant parts of our coast will then be impossible, or rather can then be effected only at enormous cost, and under the risk of the several squadrons being successively captured or dispersed; the commerce of our adversary must be nearly withdrawn from the ocean, or it must be convoyed not by a few vessels, but by powerful fleets. In fine, the war, instead of resulting in the pillage and conflagration of our cities and towns; in the destruction of our scattered and embayed navy, and of the expensive establishments pertaining to it; in the interruption of all commercial intercourse between the several portions of the maritime frontier; in the frequent, harassing, and expensive assemblage of militia forces, thereby greatly lessening the products of industry, and infusing among this most valuable portion of our population the fatal diseases and the demoralizing habits of a camp life; instead of these and innumerable other evils attendant upon a conflict along and within our borders, we should find the war and all its more serious evils shut out from our territory by our fortresses, and transferred by our navy to the bosom of the ocean, or even to the country of the enemy, should he, relying on a different system, have neglected to defend the avenues by which he is assailable.
Our wars, thus becoming maritime, will be less costly in men and money, and at the same time more in unison with our institutions—forging no weapon for defence capable of being turned, under other circumstances, against the life of the State, and keeping our domestic industry and relations, under our internal financial resources, beyond the reach of assault from without.
It is an incontestable principle in military science, and one fully illustrated by military history, that the worst mode of waging war, although strictly a defensive one in its origin and its object, is to permit its field of action to lie within our own borders; and that the best mode is that which longest sustains an offensive attitude. In our own case, war can be excluded from our territory only by fortifications; and we can assume the offensive with the greatest portion of mankind only through our navy. The construction of the former secures the means of creating, equipping, and repairing the latter, and leaves it unencumbered with duties which it imperfectly performs, to the full exercise of its great and * appropriate functions. In accordance with these principles, what, in general terms, is the extent to which the government may be called on to prepare itself in fortifying the coast and in building up the navy?
It is not in human forecast to decide upon the station of the latter a generation hence. Political events may force the nation to place herself more nearly on a level with some of the greatest of maritime powers, or the prevalence of peaceful relations may restrict the growth of the navy to that demanded by the increase (rapid and extensive) of our commercial interests. But whatever may be the amount of enlargement of the naval force, whether greater or less, or whatever the mode, whether progressive and regular, or by sudden expansion, its increase will involve no corresponding extension in the number or strength of the fortifications, because these must be adequate to their object, of themselves, and must consequently be, with some exceptions, as numerous and as strong, while the navy is small, as when the navy shall have attained its maximum. A considerable enlargement of the naval force might build up new naval establishments, thereby, in raising the importance of certain positions, calling for stronger defences.
The growth of the country in wealth and numbers will convert certain places now presenting no inducements to the enterprise of an enemy into rich and populous cities. But with the exception of
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these cases, and such as these, it may be assumed that a good system of fortifications applied now to the maritime frontier will be equal to its object in all future times.
Conceiving it unnecessary to enlarge further on this part of the subject, a few remarks will be offered on the correlative influence of fortifications and interior communications.
The most important of these communications in reference to a system of defence, are: first, such as serve to sustain in all its activity that portion of domestic commerce which, without their aid, would be interrupted by a state of war; and, second, such as serve, besides their great original purposes, to conduct from the interior to the theatre of war necessary supplies and timely relief. The first, which are among the most important national concerns of this nature, lie parallel to, and not far from, the coast; the second, which, when they cross the great natural partition-wall between the east and the west, are equally important, lie more remote from the coast, and sometimes nearly or quite parallel to it, but generally fall, nearly at right angles to the line of the seaboard, into the great estuaries, where, in some cases, their products are arrested, or whence, in others, they flow or mingle with those of the first. To fulfil the object of the first-mentioned lines of communication, it is obviously necessary to prevent an enemy from reaching them through any of the numerous inlets from the sea which they traverse, including, of course, the great inlets wherein these unite with the communications coming from the interior The security of the coastwise line, therefore, involves the security of the other, and is in a great measure indispensable to it. From such considerations as have been already presented, it is inferred that for the security here required we must, as in the case of cities, harbors, naval establishments, &c., look to fortifications. But it fortunately happens, as will appear in the sequel, that wherever both objects exist, the works necessary for the one may often, if not always, be made to accomplish both. In reference to a system of defence for the protection of these lines of communication, it must be observed that, from the facility with which they may be broken up, and the serious evils consequent thereon, they offer to the enemy great inducements to enterprises of that nature. An aqueduct, an inclined plane, a tide-lock, a dam, an embankment blown up, is the work of an hour, and yet would interrupt the navigation perhaps for months.
The necessity of a regular army, even in time of peace, is a principle well established by our legislation. The importance of a well-organized militia is incident to the nature of our institutions, well understood by the people, duly appreciated by the government, and finely illustrated in our history. Nothing, therefore, need be said on these subjects, considered as general principles. It may, however, in a succeeding part of this communication, be deemed proper to hazard a conjecture or two touching the expediency of a peculiar organization of the latter.
Before going further, it is proper to be more explicit as to the sense in which the terms "navy" and "fortifications" have been employed.
By the term navy, only that portion of our military marine which is capable of moving in safety upon the ocean, and transferring itself speedily to distant points, is meant. Floating batteries, gunboats, steam batteries, &c.; these, and indeed all other modes of defence which are restricted in their sphere of action, tied down to local defence, and are produced chiefly in cases where the localities deny to fortifications their best action, are regarded as auxiliary to fortifications, and as falling within the same category. Under the term "fortifications," used as expressive of security afforded thereby to the seaboard, have been included permanent and temporary fortifications, the auxiliaries just mentioned, and both fixed and floating obstructions to channels.
The circumstances which must govern in framing a system of fortifications are—
1st. The importance of the objects to be defended. Great naval establishments, great cities, &c., invite to greater preparation on the part of an enemy, and demand corresponding means of resistance.
2d. The natural advantages or disadvantages of the position to be fortified. It will often happen that the defence of a position of great consequence can be effected with smaller works and at less expense than a place of much less value. It will not follow, therefore, that the expense of fortifications will be proportionate to the importance of the object, though it is indispensable that the strength should be.
3d. The species of attack to which the place is liable. Some places will be exposed only to capture by assault; others by siege; others to reductions by cannonade, bombardment, or blockade; and some to a combination of any or all these modes. If the enemy against which we fortify be unprovided with artillery, the mode of fortifying becomes peculiar.
4th. Whatever may be the circumstances, it is of vital importance that all the work should be fully adequate to the object, and that they should, even with a small garrison, be perfectly safe from a coup de main.
Proceeding now to a concise description of the maritime frontier, considered as a whole, the several sections will be afterwards separately examined, applying, as we go, to the several positions, the works already projected, and pointing out as far as practicable such as remain to be planned. The sea-coast of the United States is comprised within the 24th and 46th degrees of north latitude, and spreads over 27 degrees of longitude. The general direction of that part which lies on the Atlantic, north of the peninsula of Florida, is N.NE. and S.SW. This peninsula stretches out from the continent in a direction a little east of south, while that part which lies on the Gulf of Mexico corresponds nearly with the 30th parallel of north latitude.
Without estimating any of its indentations not properly belonging to its outline, and carrying our measure from point to point wherever the breaks are at all abrupt, the line of coast may be stated to be 3,300 miles in length.
Nearly parallel with the Atlantic coast extends a chain of mountains separating the sources of rivers flowing, on the one hand, directly into the ocean, from those which run into the Gulf of St. Lawrence or Gulf of Mexico. Even in the most lofty portions of this chain numerous gaps afford facilities for crossing by roads or railways.
Occasional expansions at high elevations presents sufficient surface to afford the water required for crossing by canals; and in other places the rivers themselves have severed the chain, leaving no impediments to communications of either kind. On both sides of these mountains the country offers numerous natural means of intercommunication, and facilities and inducements for the creation of artificial ones in endless combination.
From this general description it may be deduced that, notwithstanding the great extent of our seaboard, the safety of each section of it is a matter not devoid of interest to every portion of the people, however remote, geographically, at least so long as the nation shall continue her commercial relations with the rest of the world; and, indeed, until she shall find it her interest to interdict the circulation
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of domestic commerce through the avenues which nature or art may have created: a commerce of inestimable value at all times, becoming more necessary as well as more valuable on every interruption of foreign traffic.
As lying closely connected with the coast, it will be convenient to describe briefly in this place that line of interior communication on which, in time of war, reliance must be placed as a substitute in part for the exterior coasting navigation of peace.
Beginning in the great bay to the north of Cape Cod, it passes over land either into Narraganset Roads or Buzzard's bay; thence through Long Island sound to the harbor of New York; thence up the Raritan, over land, to the Delaware; down this river some distance, over land, to the Chesapeake; down the Chesapeake, up Hampton Roads and Elizabeth river, through the Dismal Swamp, to Albemarle sound; thence through the low lands, swamps, or sounds of the Carolinas and Georgia, to the head of the peninsula of Florida; thence over land to the Gulf of Mexico; thence through the interior sounds and bays to New Orleans, and thence through lowlands, swamps, and bayous, to the western boundary. Some of the few and brief natural interruptions of this extensive line have already been removed; some are rapidly disappearing before the energy of local or State enterprise, and to the residue the public attention is directed with an earnestness that leaves no reason to fear that they will not in due time be overcome. In all cases where this line becomes much exposed to an enemy from the difficulty of fortifying broad waters, communications more inland are even now afforded, or are in progress, by canals or railroads, which will be perfectly safe.
Proceeding now to a more minute examination of the coast, it will be convenient to divide it into four distinct parts, namely: the northeastern, extending from the English province of New Brunswick to Cape Cod; the middle, from Cape Cod to Cape Hatteras; the southern, from Cape Hatteras to Cape Sable; and the Gulf of Mexico frontier, from Cape Sable to the Mexican borders. They will be taken up in the order in which they stand above.
THE NORTHEASTERN SECTION OF THE COAST.
The northeastern section is characterized by its serrated outline and its numerous harbors; and, though differing in these respects entirely from the other sections, is not less distinguished in its climate than by the prevalence, at certain seasons, of dense and lasting fogs. The extent of this section, measuring from point to point, wherever the breaks of the coast are abrupt, is about 500 miles, while a straight line from Gape Cod to Quoddy Head is hardly half that distance. The eastern half of this coast is singularly indented by deep bays, the shores being universally rocky, and having numerous islands, surrounded by deep water, which not only add to the number of harbors, but afford, besides, an interior navigation, well understood by the hardy coasters of this section, and measurably secured by its intricacies, and the other dangers of this foggy and boisterous region, from interruption by an enemy. The western half, though it has two very prominent capes and a few deep bays, is much less broken in its outline than the eastern. It is covered by few islands, in comparison, but contains, nevertheless, several excellent harbors.
The eastern harbors of Maine are exposed in a peculiar manner. They are not only on the flank of our line, but they are also quite near to public establishments of the greatest maritime powers; they are, moreover, as yet, backed by a sparse population only, and are consequently both weak and exposed. The time cannot be very distant, however, when, becoming wealthy and populous, they will be the objects of a full portion of the public solicitude. Works designed for these harbors must therefore be calculated for the future—must be founded on the principle that they are to defend places much more important than any now existing there; that, being very near the possessions of a foreign power, they will be, in a particular manner, liable to sudden and to repeated attacks; and that, lying at the extremity of the coast, they can be only tardily succored. The works erected on this part of the coast should be so strong as to resist escalade, and to hold out long enough for the arrival of relief. Feebler works than these might be more injurious than beneficial; their weakness would, in the first place, invite attack, and it being a great advantage to occupy fortified places in an adversary's territory, the enemy would prepare himself to remedy the military deficiencies of these forts by adding temporary works, by the force of his garrisons, and the aid of his vessels.
No surveys have been made of these harbors, and no plans formed for their defence. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that much confidence is not asked for the mere conjectures presented below as to the number and cost of the works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been surveyed. In some cases there will be mistakes as to the number of forts needed, and in others the errors will be in the estimated cost; but the errors will probably as often lie on one side as on the other, so that the sum total may be a sufficient approximation to the truth.
This is the place to state, also, that the early estimates furnished for the projected works require considerable augmentation. The explanation of this is easy. In preparing those estimates, the board of engineers obtained lists of prices from different sections of the country and adopted them as accurate. Whether the lists thus furnished referred to materials and workmanship of inferior quality, or because they were drawn up at a period of unusually low prices, it has been found by experience that these prices were almost all too low. The board calculated with great care and labor, and with perfect honesty of purpose, applying the prices just mentioned to all the quantities susceptible of measurement and calculation; and they applied themselves with no less diligence and good faith to the estimate of expenses of a contingent nature, and, for the greater part, not to be foreseen with accuracy, either as to amount or kind. Having no experience in large constructions, these last were at least but conjectures'; and, as the history of constructions on several parts of the coast has since shown, they were much too small. In consideration of these deficiencies, of the present great elevation of prices, and of the liability to great increase of cost from occasional interruptions of progress and breaking up of systems of operations, it is thought that about fifty per cent. should be added to the amounts given in the estimates.
Eastport and Machias may be brought forward as places that will unquestionably be thought to need defensive works by the time; in the order of relative importance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There are several small towns eastward of Mount Desert island that may, at that period, deserve equal attention; at present, however, the places named above will be the only ones estimated for, and $100,000 will be assumed as the cost of each.
Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot bay, and centrally as regards the Kennebec and St. Croix rivers, having a capacious and safe roadstead, affording anchorage for the highest class of vessels, and easily accessible from sea, offers a station for the navy of an enemy superior to any other on
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this portion of the coast. From this point his cruisers might act with great effect against the navigation of the eastern coast, especially that of Maine, and his enterprises of every kind could be conducted with great rapidity against any point he might select. These considerations, added to the advantages which would result, in certain political events, from our occupying so advanced a station, whence we might act offensively, together with the propriety of providing places of succor on a part of the coast where vessels are so frequently perplexed in their navigation by the prevailing fogs, lead to the conclusion that the fortification, in a strong manner, of this roadstead, is highly necessary. A survey of this island was begun many years ago, but the party being called off to other duties, it was never completed; the project of defensive works has not been formed. The entire cost may be, as assumed by the Engineer department, $500,000.
Castine.—It would seem to be impossible, on this coast, to deprive an enemy, enjoying naval superiority, of harbors, or to prevent his using them as stations during the war—insular situations which his vessels would render unapproachable being so numerous; but it seems proper that those positions of this nature, which are at the same time the sites of towns, should be secured against his visitations. During the last war the English held the position of Castine for some time, and left it at their pleasure. It is probable that a work costing about $50,000 would deter an enemy from again making choice of this position.
Penobscot bay.—Upon this bay, and upon the river of the same name flowing into it, are several flourishing towns and villages. Of the many bays which intersect this coast, the Penobscot is the one which presents the greatest number of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed, a large portion of these harbors must, for the present, be left without defences; but the valuable commerce of the bay and river must be covered, and to afford a secure retreat for such vessels as may be unable to place themselves under protection of the works to the east or west of the bay, the passage of the river must be defended. The lowest point at which this can be done, without great expense, is at the narrows opposite Bucksport. A project has been given in for a fort at that position, now estimated at $150,000.
West of the Penobscot comes St. George's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta, and Sheepscot, all deep indentations and leading to towns, villages, and various establishments of industry and enterprise of greater or less present value and future promise. These have not been surveyed, and of course no plans have been formed for their defence. $400,000 are assigned to the fortification of these waters. The Sheepscot is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels of every class.
Kennebec river.—This river is one of the largest in the eastern States, enters the sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Croix. It rises near the source of the Chaudiere, a tributary of the St. Lawrence, and has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and extent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of several very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excellence of the harbor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. Surveys incomplete; estimated cost of defences, as formed by the Engineer department, $300,000.
Portland harbor.—A little to the northwest of Cape Elizabeth is the harbor of Portland. The protection of the town, of the merchantmen, and of the ships-of-war that may be stationed there to guard the coast, or that may enter for shelter, (all of them important objects,) may be secured, as an inspection of the map of the town and harbor will show, by occupying Fort Preble Point, House island, Hog Island ledge, and Fish Point. At the same time, if the two channels to the west and east of Hog Island ledge can be obstructed at small expense, which is hardly a matter of doubt, although some final surveys are necessary to decide this point, there will be no necessity for a battery on the ledge; and Fish Point need be occupied only by such works as may be thrown up in time of war. The expense, as now estimated, of the works planned for this defence—not including the defence of Hog Island channel, of which the mode has not been settled—will be $155,000 for Fort Preble, and $48,000 for House island. For Hog Island channel, say $135,000.
The mouths of the Saco, Kennebunk, and York.—Comparatively small works will, it is thought, adequately cover these places, and $75,000 is assumed as their aggregate cost.
Portsmouth harbor.—The only good roadstead or good harbor between Cape Elizabeth and Cape Ann is Portsmouth harbor, within the mouth of Piscataqua river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend this river as high as Fox Point, seven miles above the town of Portsmouth Between this point and Shooting Point is a branch of the river communicating with Great bay. This branch, which is one-third of a mile wide, presents for two miles in length an excellent cover for all sorts of vessels. This situation, sufficiently commodious for a secondary depot, designed to repair vessels-of-war seeking an asylum in this river, is too near the sea for a great naval depot; and in other respects does not possess the advantages of Boston, as was shown in the report of the board of engineers, 1820. Still, as Portsmouth is an excellent harbor and station, and as it is indispensable that some at least of these stations be provided with the necessary establishments for repairs, the depot in this river should be maintained. It is to be regretted that the bay to the south of Fox Point was not chosen as the site of the navy yard instead of Fernal's island. Being where it is, it will be necessary, in time of war, to make some particular dispositions for the protection of the yard from an attack from the north shore of the river.
The position of Fort Constitution must certainly, and that of Fort McCleary may possibly, be occupied by these defences, though the works themselves, especially the first named, must give place to such as will better fulfil the object. The other positions for forts are Garrish's Point, ---- island, and Clark's island; some if not all of which must be occupied. Some final surveys must be made before the necessary works can be accurately determined on, and before estimates can be made; but there is reason for believing that the entire expense of fortifying this harbor will not fall short of $500,000.
Newburyport harbor.—This is the next port south of Portsmouth. The Merrimack river, the mouth of which forms this harbor, is obstructed at its junction with the sea by a bar, on which there was formerly but six or seven feet water at low tide. This entrance has since, however, been thought to be essentially important, and, at any rate, it leads to a beautiful, prosperous, and wealthy city. The points forming the mouth of the river are continually changing their form and position; near the middle of the present channel is said to be the spot once occupied by a fort. Under such circumstances, it seems advisable to rely, for the defence of this harbor, on forts to be thrown up on the approach of war, unless the works of harbor improvement now in progress shall be found to give stability to the points in question. It is thought that $100,000 would defend this entrance adequately.
Gloucester harbor.—The position of this harbor, near the extremity of Cape Ann, places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachusetts bay, and gives it an importance beyond what would be
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assigned to it on account of its local interests. No surveys have yet been made, but it is believed that sufficient defences may be provided for $200,000.
Beverly harbor.—This harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of the works designed for Salem; $50,000 in addition will secure it.
Salem harbor.—The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two miles, being separated therefrom by a peninsula. The occupation of the extremity of Winter island (where are the ruins of Fort Pickering) on one side, and of Naugus Head on the other, will effectually secure this harbor. Projects have been presented for this defence, now estimated at $225,000.
Marblehead harbor —Besides covering, in some measure, the establishment at Boston, the harbors of Marblehead and Salem possess an important commerce of their own, and also afford shelter for vessels prevented by certain winds from entering Boston or pursuing their course eastward. The mode of defending Marblehead harbor proposed by the board of engineers consists in occupying on the north side the hillock which commands the present Fort Sewall, (which will be superseded by the new work,) and on the south, the position of Jack's Point. The two works will cost $318,000.
Boston harbor.—We come now to the most important harbor in the eastern section of the coast, and, considering its relation to general commerce and the interests of the navy, one of the most important in the Union. After a careful examination of all the necessary conditions of such a problem, the board of naval officers and engineers, in their joint report of 1820, gave this harbor a preference over all other positions to the east, and inclusive of New York bay and the Hudson, as the seat of the great northern naval depot. For reasons at large, for this selection, reference is made to the report of 1820. But, even should the recommendation therein contained remain unsanctioned, still Boston is a city of great wealth, possesses an extensive and active commerce, and contains already within its harbor an establishment on which great reliance is placed to give growth and energy to our navy. The present forts in Boston harbor defend merely the interior basin from attacks by water, but as it often happens that vessels enter Nantasket Roads with a wind too scant to pass the Narrows, or are detained in President Roads by light winds or an adverse tide; as the former especially is a very convenient anchorage, from whence to proceed to sea; and, above all, as Nantasket Roads afford the best possible station for a blockading squadron, it was deemed indispensable to place permanent defences at the mouth of the harbor. The project of defence regards the existing works, with the necessary repairs and modifications, as constituting a second barrier, contemplates placing a permanent fort on George's island; another at Nantasket Head, having two advanced works on the Head, and one on Hog island; reducing the altitude of Gallop island, in order to destroy its command over George's island; and filling up the Broad Sound channel, so as to leave no passage in that direction for ships-of-war. These are estimated to cost $2,337,000. Besides the works of a permanent character, it will be necessary, in the beginning of a war, to erect several temporary works in the lower part of the harbor, in order to make that defence more perfect, and also on certain lateral approaches to the navy yard.
Plymouth and Provincetown harbors.—These are the only harbors on the northeastern section of the coast south of Boston. They have a commerce of some consequence of their own, but they are particularly interesting in reference to the port of Boston, and to the transition from the middle to the eastern section of the coast, in which respect they would become still more important should the proposed canal from Buzzard's to Barnstable bay ever be executed. While these harbors are undefended, an enemy's squadron blockading Massachusetts bay will have ports of refuge under his lee, of which he would not fail to avail himself to maintain his blockade, even throughout the most stormy seasons, knowing that the wind which would compel him to seek shelter would be adverse to outward-bound, and fatal, should they venture near the cape, to inward-bound vessels. While in possession of these harbors, an enemy would have constantly under his eye the harbor of Boston, the passage round Cape Cod, and that through the canal. To these considerations, going to establish the necessity of securing these harbors by proper defences, it must be added that, being thus deprived of the shelter afforded by these ports, an enemy would be unable to enforce a rigorous investment. In the first place, he would often be deterred from taking a station near the land lest he should be caught embayed by the violent easterly winds prevailing at certain seasons; in the next place, he would always take a good offing, on every distinct indication of these winds, thereby leaving a clear coast to be profited of by our own vessels at the first instant of a change of weather. Our own vessels coming in from sea, and finding an enemy interposed between them and Boston, or being turned from their course by adverse winds, would, in case of the defence of these harbors, find to the south of Boston a shelter equivalent to that provided to the north by the fortifications at Marblehead, Salem, Gloucester, and Portsmouth.
The surveys of these harbors have not been handed in, and no plans have been formed for their defence. Plymouth harbor may be suitably defended, it is thought, by the occupation of Gurnet Point, and at no great expense, while it is thought that, to fortify Provincetown harbor in such a way as to cover vessels taking shelter therein, and at the same time to deprive an enemy of all safe anchorages, will involve considerable expense; probably no nearer estimate can be formed at present than that offered by the Engineer department, which gave $100,000 to Plymouth and $600,000 to Provincetown.
Should the canal above mentioned be executed, it will be necessary to place a small work at each of its outlets to prevent the destruction of the means by which the transit of vessels in and out of the canal must be accomplished.
MIDDLE SECTION OF THE COAST.
The coast between Gape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern section in possessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great portion of sandy shore, wherein it resembles the southern section in its milder climate and its clearer atmosphere, and it differs from all the other portions in the depth and magnitude of its interior seas and sounds, and in the distance to which deep tide navigation extends up its numerous large rivers.
The circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the great bays, measures 650 miles, while a straight line from one of the above-named capes to the other measures about 520 miles.
Martha's Vineyard sound.—To the south of Cape Cod lie the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, which, with several smaller islands on the south, and the projection of Cape Malabar on the east, enclose Martha's Vineyard sound. The channels through this sound being sufficient for merchant vessels, and one of them allowing the passage even of small frigates, are not only the constant track of coasting vessels, but owing to the relative situation of Long Island sound and Narraganset Roads, and to the existence of two tolerably safe harbors at convenient distances east of Gay Head, namely, Tarpaulin
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sound and Holmes's Hole, the sound is generally aimed at by all eastern vessels arriving from foreign voyages in the tempestuous months. There are certain difficulties, however, attending the navigation of this sound, arising from the want of a harbor near the eastern extremity, which have suggested the project of an artificial harbor at the northeast point of Nantucket island. Besides these harbors on the direct route through the sound, there are the harbors of Nantucket, Edgartown, and Falmouth.
In addition to the many thousand vessels which pass this water annually, of which there are sometimes forty or fifty, a portion containing the most valuable cargoes to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed to be at least 40,000 tons of shipping owned in the towns of this sound and employed in the whale fishery. If this portion of the coast is to be defended at all, it must be by fortifications, for there is no population scarcely except that of the towns, and this is believed to be entirely without military organization. A privateer might run into either of these harbors and capture, destroy, or levy contributions at pleasure. $250,000 may perhaps suffice for the defence of all these places against the kind of enterprises to which they are exposed.
Buzzard's bay.—Interposed between the island of Martha's Vineyard and the main are the Elizabeth islands bounding Buzzard's bay on the south. This bay, although of importance as leading to the proposed canal to Barnstable bay, as covering the flourishing town of New Bedford, and as being one of the natural harbors to be used by an enemy in forcing the blockade of Narraganset Roads, cannot be defended by fortifications, owing to its great breadth.
New Bedford and Fairhaven harbor.—No survey has been made of this harbor, which covers two of the most flourishing towns. It is certainly defensible, and probably for the amount assumed by the Engineer department, namely, $300,000.
Narraganset bay.—The properties of this great roadstead will be here adverted to very briefly. More minute information may be obtained by reference to reports of 1820 and 1821.
It is the only harbor on the coast accessible with a northwest wind, which is the most common and violent of the most inclement season, and as winds from NNW. to SSW. round by the east serve for entering both Boston and New York harbors, while this harbor can be entered with all winds from northwest to east round by the west, it follows that, while we possess this harbor, vessels may be certain of making shelter on this part of the coast with any wind that can blow, excepting only between N.NW. and NW. From this station the navigation inland of Long Island sound and especially the communication between that sound and Buzzard's bay or Martha's Vineyard sound, may be well protected. The blockade of the excellent harbor and naval station of New London will be rendered difficult. From this station the navy will command southwardly as from Hampton Roads; northwardly, the great inward curve of the coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras; the influence of which command over the blockading operations of an enemy will be apparent when it is considered that the only harbors of refuge he can have will be the Delaware, Gardiner's and Buzzard's bays, and that it is far from certain that improvements in the auxiliaries of fortifications may not deprive him of these also.
If Narraganset bay were without defence, an enemy would occupy it without difficulty, and, by the aid of naval superiority, form a lodgement in Rhode Island for the war. Occupying the island alone, or connecting therewith the position of Tiverton heights, opposite the northern extremity of the island—a position which is of narrow front, easy to secure, and impossible to turn—he might defy all the forces of the eastern States, drive the United States to vast expense of blood and treasure, and while this position of his troops would keep in alarm and motion all the population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York, through Long Island sound, or against more southern cities, would equally alarm the country in that direction; and thus, although he might do no more than menace, it is difficult to estimate the embarrassment and expense into which he would drive the government.
Of old forts, some of which were never finished, Fort Wolcott and Fort Green are the only ones retained in the projected system of defence.
The project of defence proposed by the board of engineers contemplates for the middle channel on Brenton's Point a strong fort, (now well advanced,) with out-works; another strong fort and out-works on the Dumplings; a smaller fort on Rose island, and the repair and modification of Fort Wolcott and Fort Green. The eastern passage is already shut by the permanent bridge at Howland's Ferry. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves: first, reducing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as, while the passage shall be as free as now for merchant vessels, to prevent the passage of ships-of-war; second, relying on fortifications alone to close the channel; or third, resorting in part to one and in part to the other mode just mentioned. Being the least expensive and most certain, the estimate was founded on the first.
The total cost of the Narraganset defences are estimated at $2,050,000.
Gardiner's bay.—This most valuable harbor to an enemy investing this part of the coast is probably not defensible by fortifications alone. It has not been surveyed, however; and at no distant day it will be an interesting question whether, by steam batteries or some similar means, under the protection of and aided by fortifications, its defence may not be accomplished. The necessity for fortifying this bay will be more evident should the railroad through Long Island, in contemplation, (perhaps in progress,) be constructed.
The Engineer department has assumed the probable cost of the works at $400,000.
Sag Harbor, New York, and Stonington, Connecticut.—Neither of these have been surveyed with reference to defence. The first is possessed of a considerable tonnage, and the second, besides being largely engaged in commerce, is about to be the termination of a railroad from Boston. To the first may be assigned $100,000, and $200,000 to the other.
New London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sound, and, as a port of easy access, having great depth of water, very rarely freezing, and being easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. It is also valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a blockading squadron off Sandy Hook. In the plan of defence the present Forts Trumbull and Griswold give place to more efficient works, whereof the expense is estimated at $314,515.
Mouth of Connecticut river.—This river has been shown to be subject to the expeditions of an enemy. It has not been surveyed in order to determine on the mode of defending it; and $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural cost.
New Haven harbor.—It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected during the last war, called Fort Wooster. The expense of both may be stated at $90,000.
There are several towns between New Haven and New York on both sides of the sound; none of them
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are very large as yet, though most, if not all, are prosperous and rapidly increasing. Although, in their present condition, considering their local situation, it might not be deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent defences, yet, as part of the present object is to ascertain, as near as may be, the ultimate cost of completely fortifying the coast, it seems proper to look forward to the time, perhaps not remote, when some of these towns may become objects of considerable predatory enterprise. Bearing in mind the increase of population in the mean time, and the manner in which the places generally are situated, it is thought that $200,000 will be enough to defend them all.
New York harbor.—The objects of the projected works for the vicinity of New York are to cover the city against an attack by land or sea; to protect its numerous shipping; to prevent, as much as possible, the blockade of this great port, which will have progressively added to the immense wealth of its own rivers greater and greater amounts of the productions of the boundless regions on the lakes, and to cover the interior communication uniting the Raritan with the Delaware. In the present condition of the defences of this harbor an enemy would encounter no great opposition, whether his attack were made by land or water. Coming by the sound, he might land within ten miles of the city, upon the main, upon Long Island, or upon both; and coming into the lower harbor, he might, while the works on Staten Island are in their present condition, risk forcing the passage of the Narrows, as well as the upper works, anchoring in the Hudson or in the East river; or he might land in Gravesend bay, eight miles from the city, and march directly to Brooklyn, where he would find the navy yard lying at his mercy, and whence he might levy a contribution or destroy half the city. The only mode of resistance would be the expensive, harassing, and uncertain one, of arraying a large body of militia upon Harlem and Brooklyn heights; and this could be resorted to only in the event, by no means certain, of receiving timely intelligence of his design.
If we fortify Throg's Neck and Wilkins's Point, on the East river, and if we complete the works at the Narrows, making them all too strong to be carried by a coup de main, we shall secure the means of transferring the neighboring militia upon the flanks and rear of an enemy should he march upon Brooklyn, while we shall secure the same advantage should he pursue the route by Harlem, besides increasing the length of his march to twenty miles through an intersected country.
This arrangement of defensive works, necessary as it is, still leaves the lower harbor open to an enemy's vessels; in which harbor, safe at all seasons, he could enforce the strictest blockade, cut off the lines of interior communication by the Raritan, and avail himself at any moment of a lauding place in dangerous proximity to the city and navy yard. In view of these considerations, the board of engineers projected additional works, one for the East Bank, and another for the Middle Ground, which would perfect the defences of the harbor, compelling an enemy attacking on this side to land upon a dangerous coast, near thirty miles from his object, and to enforce his blockade by riding on the open sea, with a dangerous coast on either hand. Before determining on the works last mentioned, the board went into much research in order to ascertain whether the sand-banks mentioned were unchangeable, and it was thought to have been very fully proved that there had been no material change in more than sixty years. This apparent stability of the shoals encouraged them to devise the projects referred to.
Recent surveys, it has been said, have discovered a new channel. If this be so, it may not be prudent to resort to the project, and it may become necessary to devise other means; but whatever they may be, they must, from the nature of the case, be very expensive; and there will be no great error, probably, in taking the estimated cost of the projected batteries as the cost of such mode of defence as may be finally resolved on. The cost of the complete defence of New York, remaining to be incurred, is, according to the estimates, $5,369,824.
Delaware bay and city of Philadelphia.—The coast from the mouth of the Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the south side of Long Island, is low, sandy, covered by numerous sandy islands, lying near and parallel to the coast, and having, besides the Delaware, many inlets and interior basins, but none, excepting the one named, affording water enough for sea-going vessels. The Delaware bay itself, being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel, and being much obstructed by ice at certain seasons, affords no very good natural harbor within a reasonable distance of the sea. The artificial harbor now in course of construction near Cape Henlopen will, it is hoped, fully realize the expectations of its projectors; in which event, it must be securely fortified. No plans have, however, as yet been made with that object; and as to the probable cost, nothing better can now be done than to assume the conjectural estimate of the Engineer department, namely $600,000.
The lowest point at which Philadelphia is defensible is at Pea Patch island, about forty-five miles below that city. A fort on that island, to replace the one destroyed by fire; a fort opposite the Pea Patch, on the Delaware shore; a temporary work on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement of war, and floating- obstructions placed in the channel, under the fire of these works, will effectually cover Philadelphia, the other important places on the river, and the outlet of the canal connecting the Delaware and Chesapeake bays. The plans and estimates for a fort to replace Fort Delaware are not completed. Taking the expense thereof at $600,000, the expense of the system, inclusive of temporary works, will be $1,121,000.
Chesapeake bay.—The board of naval officers and engineers intrusted with the selection of sites for great northern and southern naval depots recommended, in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820, Burwell's bay, on James river, for the one, and Charlestown, near Boston, for the other. They also recommended Boston harbor and Narraganset bay at the north, and Hampton Roads at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In those reports the commission entered at large into the consideration of all the matters relating to these important objects; and reference is now made to those reports for many very interesting details.
Hampton Roads, James river, and Norfolk.—The works projected for the defence of these are: 1st, a fort and advanced lunette at Old Point Comfort; 2d, a casemated battery on the Rip Rap shoals;, and 3d, a line of floating obstructions extending across the channel between these works. In the event of a great naval depot being fixed on James river, it might ultimately be desirable to provide additional strength, by adding works on the positions of Newport News, Naseway shoals, and Craney Island flats. Exclusive of these, the cost of completing the works is estimated at $723,188.
The existing fort, viz: Fort Norfolk, will aid in the defence of the city of Norfolk and of the navy yard. It is a small and inefficient work, but may be made useful as an accessory to the general defensive operations.
Harbor of St. Mary's.—The central situation, as regards the Chesapeake, of this fine basin, its relation to the Potomac, its depth of water, and the facility with which it may be defended, indicate its fitness as a harbor of refuge for the commerce of the bay, and as an occasional, if not constant, station
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during the war for a portion of the naval force. A survey has been made, but no projects have been formed. The Engineer department has conjectured that the cost may be $300,000.
Patuxent river.—The more effectually to protect the city of Washington from a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation of the Patuxent, and to provide an additional shelter for vessels, a fort has been planned to occupy Point Patience, and another to occupy Thomas's Point, both about six miles from the Chesapeake. Their expense will be $505,000.
Annapolis harbor.—No surveys or plans of defence have been made. The existing works are very inefficient. The estimate made by the Engineer department, viz: $250,000, is adopted.
Harbor of Baltimore.—The proximity of Baltimore to the bay places that city in a dangerous situation. In the present state of things, an enemy, in a few hours' march, after an easy landing, without being exposed to a separation from his fleet, can make himself master of that great commercial emporium.
Baltimore requires for its security two forts in the Patapsco: one at Hawkins's Point, and the other at the extreme end of the flat off Sollers's Point. Besides the advantages which will result of obliging the enemy to land at a greater distance, thereby delaying his march, gaining time for the arrival of the militia, and preventing his turning the defensive positions our troops might occupy, it will be impossible for him to endanger the city or its shipping by a direct attack by water. The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt Wood, and Covington battery, should be retained as a second barrier. Allowing $150,000 for putting these in a more efficient state, the expense will be $1,517,000.
Mouth of Elk river.—The completion of the line of communication from the Delaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it necessary to place a fort somewhere near the mouth of the Elk, in order to prevent an enemy from destroying by a sudden enterprise the works connecting these communications with the river. There have been no surveys made with a view to establish such protection; but the Engineer department estimates the cost of a suitable fort at $300,000.
Cities of Washington, Georgetown, and Alexandria.—Fort Washington covers these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land at some fifteen or eighteen miles from Alexandria, should that city be his object. It will also serve the very important purpose of covering the troops crossing from Virginia, with a view to fall on the flanks of an enemy moving against the capital. All these objects would have been better fulfilled had the work been placed at Lower Cedar Point; as it is, however, the forts in the Patuxent being constructed, and the militia of the surrounding country in a due state of preparation, an enterprise against these cities would be one of great hazard. Still, a work on Cedar Point should on no account be omitted. The department estimates its cost at $300,000.
From the mouth of the Chesapeake to Cape Hatteras there occurs no inlet navigable by sea-going vessels.
SOUTHERN SECTION OF THE ATLANTIC COAST.
This coast is invariably low and for the greater part sandy, much resembling the coast from Cape Hatteras to Montaug Point. A ridge of sand, here and there interrupted by the alluvion of the rivers, extends through its whole length; this ridge, in certain portions, lies on the main land, while in others it is divided therefrom by basins or sounds of various width and depth, and is cut up into islands by numerous channels of greater or less depth, connecting these interior waters with the sea. Wherever this sand ridge is broken, its place is occupied by low and marshy grounds, bordering the principal and the many lesser outlets of the rivers.
The nature of the country through which the rivers of this coast flow, after leaving the mountains, is such that the banks being easily abraded by the current, the waters are always turbid, and are continually transporting new supplies for the" formation of alluvion and the maintenance of extensive submarine banks, shoals, and bars; that these do not rapidly increase is owing to the force of the current, the action of the sea, and the mobility of the particles of matter. It is to the same cause, namely, the wearing away of the shores of the rivers, that is to be attributed the want, on this coast, of harbors unobstructed by bars, and which, as a coast, particularly distinguish this and the Gulf of Mexico frontier (where similar operations have been going on) from the more northern and eastern portions.
Ocracoke inlet.—The shallowness of the water on the bars at Ocracoke effectually excludes all vessels of war from the harbor within. But as this is now an outlet of an extensive commerce, and through this opening attempts might be made in small vessels or in boats to interrupt the line of interior communication, whereon so much might depend in time of war, timely preparation must be made of temporary works equal to defence of it against all such minor enterprises.
Beaufort harbor, North Carolina.—Work completed.
Mouths of Cape Fear river.—The defence of the main channel of Cape Fear requires, in addition to the work nearly completed on Oak island, another fort on Bald Head, and the defence of the smaller channel will require a redoubt on Federal Point. The battery, magazine, block-house, quarters, &c., at Smithville, should remain as accessories. The cost is set down at $258,000.
Georgetown harbor.—The first inlet of any consequence south of Cape Fear river is at the united mouths of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers, forming Georgetown harbor, which is a commodious and capacious bay, having sufficient water within and upon the bar, near the mouth, for merchant vessels and small vessels-of-war. A survey of this harbor, begun many years ago, has never been completed, and no projects of defence have been made. It is probable that a work placed near Moscheto creek, or on Winyaw Point, would give adequate strength, at the cost of about $250,000.
Santee river and Bull's bay.—About ten miles south from Georgetown entrance are the mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Carolina. It is not known whether the bars at the mouths of this river have sufficient water for sea-going vessels; the same uncertainty exists as to the depth into Bull's bay. It may be well, however, to consider them, and the other inlets between Georgetown and Charleston, as calling for small works, capable of resisting boat enterprises, and to assign to them $100,000. Should they prove to be navigable for privateers they will need a larger expenditure.
Charleston, South Carolina.—The city, situated at the junction of Ashley and Cooper rivers, is about five miles in a direct line from the sea. Between it and the ocean is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. Upon the bar, lying three or four miles outside of the harbor, there is, however, only water enough for the smaller frigates and for large sloops-of-war. On the southwest side of the harbor is James's island, through which are several serpentine passages, more or less navigable for boats and barges; some of them communicate directly with the sea and Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly passage from Stono to Charleston harbor, enters Ashley river, opposite the middle of the city.
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Interior natural water communications exist also to the southwest of Stono river, connecting this with North Edisto river, the latter with South Edisto and St. Helena sound; this again with Broad river, and, finally, this last with Savannah river. On the north side of the harbor of Charleston lies Sullivan's island, separated from the main by a channel navigable to small craft To the northeast of Sullivan's island an interior water communication extends to Bull's bay, and even beyond, to the harbor of Georgetown.
From this sketch it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defences to the principal entrance of the harbor. The lateral avenues must also be shut. And it is probable that accurate surveys of all these avenues will show that the best mode of defending the latter will be by works at or near the mouths of the inlets, as the enemy will be kept thereby at a greater distance from the city; the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be secured, and the line of interior communication will be inaccessible from the sea.
No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor can be found nearer the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's island. This is at present occupied by Fort Moultrie, a work of some strength but by no means adequate to its object, its battery being weak, and the scarp so low as to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by modification of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a better defence of the harbor, cannot now be determined.
On a shoal nearly opposite Fort Moultrie the foundation of a fort has been begun, which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort Moultrie. It is presumed that about $800,000 would put these works in a complete state.
Stono, North Edisto, and South Edisto.—All these must be fortified, at least in such a manner as to secure them from enterprise in boats or small vessels. To that end $50,000 may be assigned to each.
St. Helena sound.—The proper defences cannot be pointed out till this sound shall have been surveyed.
Although there is supposed to be no great depth of water on the bar, it is known to be navigable by the smaller class of merchantmen, and to have a navigable communication with the head of Broad river or Port Royal, intersecting the interior navigation between Charleston and Savannah. This sound will require defence, even should it not be of much use as a harbor of refuge for exterior commerce. $150,000 may be the cost of the defences.
Broad river or Port Royal Roads.—The value of this capacious roadstead as a harbor of refuge depends on the depth which can be carried over the bar, on the distance of this bar outside of the line of coast, and on the means which may be applicable of lessening the danger of crossing it. This is supposed to be the deepest bar of the southern coast. Should there prove to be water enough for frigates, and, by lighthouses on the shore and lights or other distinct guides on the bar, should it be practicable to make the passage of the bar safe and easy, this road, situated within sixty miles of Charleston and twenty of Savannah river, intersecting the interior navigation between these great cities, thereby securing the arrival of supplies of every kind, would possess a very high degree of importance, not only as a harbor of refuge, but as a naval station also.
The survey of the exterior shoals constituting the bar should be made with the greatest care and all possible minuteness. It is only when this shall have been done that the true relation of this inlet to the rest of the coast can be known, and on this relation the position and magnitude of the required defences will depend. For the present, the estimate made by the Engineer department is adopted, namely, $300,000.
Savannah and mouth of Savannah river.—Mention has been made of the natural interior water communication along the coast of South Carolina. A similar communication extends south from the Savannah river, as far as St. John's, in East Florida. Owing to these passages, the city of Savannah, like Charleston, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the harbor or river, and its defences must consequently have relation to these lesser as well as to the principal channels.
The distance from the mouth of Wassaw sound, or even Ossabaw sound, (both the southwest of Savannah river,) to the city is not much greater than from the mouth of the river, and an enterprise may be conducted the whole distance by water, or part of the way by water and part by land, from either or both. As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of Charleston, it cannot now be determined where they can be defended most advantageously. It is to be hoped, however, that the localities will permit the defences to be placed near the outlets of the sounds, because the defences thus placed will serve the double purpose of guarding the city of Savannah and covering these harbors, which in time of war cannot but be very useful.
The defence of Savannah river is by no means difficult. A fort on Cockspur island, lying just within the mouth, and, perhaps, for additional security, another on Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the junction of the river with the ocean, would effectually prevent the passage of vessels up the channel, and cover the anchorage lying between Tybee and Cockspur. The existing Fort Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, should be maintained as a second barrier, both as respects the main channel and the passages which come into the river from the south, which last would not be at all controlled by works on Cockspur or Tybee. A fort projected for Cockspur island is estimated at $470,000. To defend Tybee island may require $150,000, and $50,000 would put Fort Jackson in an efficient state, making a total of $670,000. South of the Savannah are Wassaw sound, Ossabaw sound, St. Catharine's sound, at the mouth of the Medway river; Sapelo sound, Doboy inlet, Altamaha sound, at the mouth of the great river of the same name; St. Simon's sound, at the mouth of Buffalo creek; St. Andrew's sound, at the united mouths of the Scilla and Santilla rivers, and Cumberland sound, at the mouth of the St. Mary's river. All these communications with the ocean are highly important as regards the line of interior navigation, and several of them as affording access to excellent harbors. The last especially is known to be navigable by the largest sloops-of-war and merchantmen, and two or three of the others are believed to be but little if at all inferior, either as regards depth of bar or safety of anchorage.
All these inlets are yet to be surveyed. Some of them are probably easily defensible by forts, and others may require the aid of floating defences. An important principle in relation to the defensive system of the whole southern coast, namely, that on a coast possessing few harbors, it is at the same time the more necessary to preserve them all for our own use, and the more easy to deprive an enemy of that shelter which is nearly indispensable to a continuous and close blockade. This principle is enforced as touching this particular part of the southern coast by the two following weighty considerations: its remoteness from the nearest naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is on a mean six hundred miles distant and to leeward, both as to wind and current, and its being close upon the larboard hand as they enter the Atlantic of the great concourse of vessels passing at all seasons through the Florida channel. While, therefore, this part of the coast, from the concentration of vessels here, is in great need of
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protection of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off from all retreat by a superior enemy.
Accurate and minute surveys, which will enable our vessels, whether driven by an enemy or by stress of weather to shun the dangers which beset the navigation of these harbors, and properly arranged defences to cover them when arrived, seem to be indispensable. It is worthy of remark, besides, that when these harbors shall be fortified the operation of investing the coast and watching the great outlet of commerce through Florida passage will be a difficult and hazardous one to an enemy on whose part no perseverance or skill can avail to maintain an uninterrupted blockade, or to avoid the occasional shipwreck of his cruisers; while on the part of our small vessels-of-war and privateers, the same sort of supervision will at all times be easy and safe.
Nothing better can be now done than to assume $200,000 as the average cost of defending each of the nine entrances, giving a total of $1,800,000.
The board of engineers have not examined the coast from the mouth of the St. Mary's to Pensacola; but in order that the chain of defence for the coast may be here exhibited unbroken, the estimates of the Engineer department of the places and positions intermediate between Cumberland sound and Pensacola will be inserted. St. Augustine, $50,000; Key West and Tortugas, $3,000,000; Charlotte harbor, Espiritu Santa bay, Apalachicola, Apalache bay, St. Joseph's bay, St. Rosa bay, together, $1,000,000.
GULF OF MEXICO FRONTIER.
The resemblance of this part of the coast to that which we have denominated the southern section is striking. We may, indeed, refer to the description herein given of the principal features of the latter as a true delineation of this. In respect to the relation of the coast to the interior, there is, however, the greatest difference between these two portions of the maritime frontier: for, while about eight-tenths of the whole territory of the United States is, in one sense, tributary to a part only of the Gulf of Mexico portion, in the southern section of the coast not more than one-tenth is connected with the seaboard by any natural ties. This fact, which shows the very deep interest which a large portion of the people and the government have in the security of this portion, is related to other facts which hardly leave an alternative as to the mode of attaining that security.
From the relative geographical position of this part of the coast and the country interested in its safety—from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature of the adjacent country, mixed character of the inhabitants—it will be some time before that portion within supporting distance, whose welfare may be endangered by an enemy, will, from peculiar circumstances, be competent, of itself, Jo sustain the assaults of an exterior foe. Upon the Atlantic seaboard, the Alleghanies crowd the people upon the coast and surround every alarm-post of the frontier with a more and more dense population, and the ocean and the interior parallel communication transmit rapid aid to the right and left; while the coast of the Gulf, weak in itself and remote from succor from behind, is almost inaccessible to lateral assistance.
Those reasons, therefore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized, a permanent, and a timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the United States (some of which were advanced in the commencement of this communication) will apply to this part of it with a peculiar force so long as any portion of its system of defence is incomplete
It has already been observed that the board of engineers have made no examination between Cumberland sound, in Georgia, and Pensacola. There are, however, along that shore and in the Florida reef, several very important harbors, which must be accurately surveyed.
Pensacola bay.—The upper arms of this considerable bay receive the Yellow-water or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river; and, while the tributaries of the last, interlocking with branches of the Alabama and the Chattahoochee, seem to mark the courses whereby, at some future day, canals will convey a part of the products of these rivers to Pensacola, the face of the whole region is remarkably adapted to the application of railroads.
Santa Rosa sound extends eastward from the lower part of this bay into Santa Rosa bay. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola, Perdido, and Mobile bays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to require but a few miles of cutting to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last-named bay, and thence, through an existing interior water communication, to the city of New Orleans.
Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is accessible to the largest class of sloops-of-war and to small frigates, and, under favorable circumstances, will admit even large frigates; and there is reason to hope that the bar may be permanently deepened.
The bar is near the coast, and the channel through it is straight and easily hit.
The harbor is perfectly landlocked, and the roadstead very capacious. There are excellent positions within it for repairing, building, and launching vessels, and for docks and dock-yards, in healthy situations. The supply of good water is abundant. It is perfectly defensible. These properties, in connexion with the position of the harbor as regards the coast, have induced the government to fix upon it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repairs.
An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficing to form the scheme of defence, while no other objects were sought than the security of the town and harbor. Regarded, however, as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repairs, further surveys, extending a greater distance from the shores, delineating accurately the face of the country, and showing the several avenues by land and water, are found to be necessary.
The defences of the water passage, as projected, are nearly completed, $210,000 being asked to finish them. A further water defence at the position of the Barrancas, and the works that are indispensable to cover the navy yard from a lateral attack through the western bays, the latter requiring the further surveys above mentioned, are not yet planned. The Barrancas work may be taken at $100,000 and the others at $300,000, making a total for Pensacola of $610,000.
Perdido bay.—This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and to Mobile bays, both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be carefully surveyed with a view to these objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may be $200,000.
Mobile bay.—The plan of defence for this bay comprised a fort at Mobile Point, which has been finished; another on Dauphin island, and a tower at the Pass au Heron. The estimates for the two last-named amount to $905,000.
New Orleans and the delta of the Mississippi.—The most northern water communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage called the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pont-
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chartrain. The next is by the Pass of Chef Menteur, also connecting these lakes. Through these passages an enemy entering Lake Pontchartrain would, at the same time that he intercepted all water communication with Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach New Orleans from the southern shore of the lake; or might continue onward through Lake Maurepas, Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching the Mississippi at the head of the delta; or, landing within the mouths of Chef Menteur, he might move against the city along the ridge of the Gentilly road.
To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and at the head of Lake Borgne, is Bayou Bienvenue, a navigable channel, (the one pursued by the English army in the last war,) not running into the Mississippi, but possessing shores of such a nature as to enable troops to march from the point of debarkation to the city. A little to the south of this is Bayou Dupré', also affording easy access to the city. The avenues just named are defended by a fort at the Rigolets; another at Chef Menteur; another at Bayou Bienvenue, and a tower at Bayou Dupré
The defences of the river are placed at the Plaquemine turn, the lowest position which can be occupied. Fort Jackson is on the right shore, and Fort St. Philip a little lower down on the left. This last work must be repaired or renewed. The expense is estimated at $117,000.
The only permanent work required at present west of the Mississippi is a fort to occupy Grand Terre island, for the purpose of defending the entrance to Barrataria bay, an excellent harbor for a floating force guarding the coasting trade on that side, and whence there are several passages leading to the Mississippi, near New Orleans. The estimate for this work is $400,000.
Before leaving this part of the subject, it is necessary to advert to the important uses which may be made of movable floating defences in aid of fortifications.
The applications of this auxiliary force along the coast of the United States may be very numerous, and, as has been before remarked, would, in certain cases, be requisite to attain full security for all the objects needing protection. In the case we have just been considering, for example, fortifications will enable us to protect New Orleans, even from the most serious and determined efforts of an enemy; but, owing to the great width of the passages, we cannot, by fortifications alone, deprive an enemy of good exterior anchorages, especially the very excellent one west of Chandeleur island, nor entirely cover the interior water communications between the Rigolets and Mobile. We must, therefore, either quietly submit to all the annoyance and injury which an enemy in possession of these passages may inflict, or avert them by the timely preparation of a floating force adapted to their peculiar navigation, and capable, under the favorable shelter of the forts, of being always on the alert, and of assuming an offensive or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of the enemy. As these means of defence are, however, secondary to fortifications, in every sense; as the extent to which they may be needed must depend on the relation of our naval force to that of other powers—a relation continually varying, as the shapes which these auxiliaries are to assume—the materials of which they are to be formed, the weapons they are to use, the agent which is to give them power, are points on which every ten years of this age of rapid improvement in the arts may effect complete revolutions, it is considered premature to go into details, and premature to go into expense.
From the preceding sketch of the system projected for the defence of the seaboard of the United States, it appears that all the fortifications proposed are not of the same pressing necessity, nor of like importance. Some are required immediately, while the commencement of others may be postponed. In proceeding to class them, it must be observed that the works of the first class are those destined to prevent an enemy from forming a permanent or even a momentary establishment in the country, those which will defend the great naval arsenals, and those which will cover the chief cities and towns.
In the second class will be placed the works which are to defend those naval stations and those cities of a secondary rank which, either from natural or artificial defences, existing works, &c., are not entirely without protection, and may, therefore, wait until the more important points are secured against a first attack; and in the third class will be arrayed the works which complete the defensive system in all its parts, but of which the construction may, without great danger, be deferred until the frontier shall have received all the successive degrees of strength resulting from a gradual erection of the forts of the first and second classes. A fourth class is added, containing such works as will be necessary only conditionally.
Table A, joined to this report, contains the first class, and shows that the works of this class will cost $11,609,444; will require 2,585 men to garrison them in time of peace, and 30,966 in case of siege.
Table B contains the works of the second class, showing that they will cost $5,873,000; will require 975 men to garrison them in time of peace, and 10,680 in case of siege.
Table C contains works belonging to the third class, showing that their cost will be $14,078,824; that their garrisons in time of peace will amount to 2,380 men, and in time of siege to 21,745 men; showing, also, that the total future expense of fortifying the maritime frontier will amount to $31,561,268; the troops necessary to guard these fortifications in time of peace to 5,940 men, and 63,391 men in time of war, supposing them all (which cannot happen) besieged at once.
The time required to construct the whole system must depend upon the annual appropriation which the nation may grant to this branch of the public service. All that need be said on the subject is, that in an undertaking necessarily involving so much time, and of such vital importance to the safety, prosperity, and greatness of the Union, there should be no relaxation of effort and perseverance. An undertaking of such magnitude must, with every effort, be the work of years. But it may be too much hurried as well as too much delayed. There is a rate of progress at which it will be executed in the best manner, and at the minimum cost. If more hurried, it will be defective in quality, and more costly if delayed.
France was at least fifty years completing her maritime and interior defences.
Some remarks will now be offered on the subject of the expense of erecting a system of defensive works, and garrisoning them for war, comparing it with the expense of defending the coast without fortifications. To simplify the proposition, the defence of Portsmouth, Boston, Narraganset Roads, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans, only will be taken.
Supposing an enemy had concentrated 20,000 men at Halifax or Bermuda, the government must, on hearing of this force, at once prepare to resist it at all the points mentioned above. As it will be impossible to foresee on which the first blow will be struck, it will be necessary to have troops encamped at each, and to meet the attack with a force not less numerically than that of the assailant; the troops, kept constantly under arms, must at least equal one-half of the hostile expedition; while as many more, ready for instant service, must be within call. These points are so immediately accessible in some cases,
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and so remote from succor in others, that, after the point of attack is announced by the appearance of the enemy before it, there will be no time for reinforcements to come from the interior.
By manoeuvring in front of any of these places, the enemy would induce us to concentrate forces there; when, suddenly profiting of a favorable breeze, he would sail to another, which he would reach in a few hours, and would not fail to seized if a force were not stationed there likewise, at least equal to his own. No reinforcement can, in this case, arrive from the interior in time, for all the troops under march would have taken up a point he has just quitted.
Our whole coast, from Maine to Louisiana, would thus be kept in alarm by a single expedition; and such is the extent and exposure of the seaboard, that an enemy might ruin us by a war of mere threatening. If the cities and other great establishments are not garrisoned, they will become a prey at once; and if they are garrisoned, the treasury will be gradually emptied; the credit of the government exhausted; the weary and starving militia will desert to their homes; nor will it be easy to avert the consummation of tribute, pillage, and conflagration
The table E, joined to this report, shows that, to be in readiness on each of these vulnerable points, it will be requisite to maintain 107,000 men, encamped and under arms, at the ten places mentioned, and 93,000 men ready to march and within call.
This number is, in fact, below that which would be required; for these points being, according to our hypothesis, exposed to an attack from 20,000 regular and disciplined troops, 20,000 militia would not be able to repel them, unless aided by intrenchments, requiring a time to construct them which might not be allowed, and involving expenses which are not included in the estimate. Besides, to have 20,000 men, especially new levies, under arms, it will be necessary, considering the epidemics that always assail such troops, to carry the formation of these corps to at least 25,000 men.
The State of Louisiana, being remote from succor, requires a larger force under arms than the other points. This force is fixed at 17,000, supposing that the State may supply 3,000 within call.
All expenses being reckoned, 1,000 regular troops, including officers, cost $300,000 per annum, or $150 per man, for a campaign of six months. 1,000 militia, including officers, cost $400,000 per annum, or $200 per man, for a six months' campaign. But, taking into consideration the diseases which invariably attack men unaccustomed to military life, and the consequent expense of hospital establishments; the frequent movement of detachments from the camp to their homes, and from the interior to the camp; and the cost of camping furniture, utensils, accoutrements, &c., which is the same for a short campaign as for a year; regarding all these things, the cost of a militiaman cannot be reckoned at less than $250 per man for six months.
The 107,000 militiamen necessary to guard the above-mentioned points, the maritime frontier being without defence, will therefore cost, in a campaign of six months, $26,750,000. In strict justice, there should be added to this expense, which is believed to be much understated, amongst other things, the loss of time, and the diminution of valuable products, resulting from drawing off so considerable a portion of efficient labor from its most profitable pursuits. This, besides being a heavy tax on individuals, is real loss to the nation.
It would be utterly vain to attempt an estimate of the loss to the nation, from the dreadful mortality which rages in the camps of men suddenly exposed to the fatigues and privations of a military life.
The total expense of constructing the fortifications at the ten places before mentioned will amount to $21,767.—(See table E.)
The garrisons of these fortifications may consist of the same number of regular troops in time of war as in time of peace: the remainder being furnished by the militia held in readiness to throw themselves into the forts on the first appearance of an enemy. By this arrangement 3,010 regulars, and 32,076 militia, either within the works or in small corps, on advantageous positions, making in all 35,086 men, would suffice, 64,914 men being kept in readiness to march when called upon.
We should, therefore, have only 35,086 to pay and support instead of 107,000, and the expense would be $8,430,500, instead of $26,750,000. The difference, namely, $18,319,500, being only $3,448,156 less than the whole cost of these defences. It follows that the expense of their erection would be nearly compensated by the saving they would cause in a single campaign of six months.
It is proper to add that, although the expense of these works will be great, that expense is never to be renewed; while with troops, on the contrary, the expense is annually repeated, if not increased, until the end of the war. Besides, the disbursements for fortifications are made in time of peace slowly, and to an extent exactly correspondent with the financial resources of the country. Armies are most wanted, and must be paid, in periods of the greatest emergency, when the ordinary sources of revenue are dried up, and when the treasury can only be supplied by a resort to means the most burdensome and disagreeable to the people.
The defence of the maritime frontier by permanent fortifications, and the disbursements for their construction, will thus tend to a real and positive economy.
The vulnerable points being reduced to a small number, instead of awaiting an attack on every point, and holding ourselves everywhere in readiness to repel it, we shall force an enemy to direct his assaults against those few which, being well understood by us, will, of course, have received timely preparation. There can be no doubt that such a state of things will make an adversary more reluctant to risk his expeditions; and, therefore, that we shall not only be better able to resist, but also less frequently called on to do so.
Some prominent military writers have opposed the principle of fortifying an extensive land frontier, but none have ever disputed the necessity of fortifying a maritime border; the practice of every nation, ancient and modern, has been the same in this respect. On a land frontier, a good, experienced, and numerous infantry, may, in some cases, dispense with fortifications; but though disciplined troops may cover a frontier without the aid of fortifications, undisciplined troops cannot. On a maritime frontier, however, no description of troops can supply the place of strong batteries, disposed upon the vulnerable points. The uncertainty of the point on which an enemy may direct his attack; the suddenness with which he may reach it, and the powerful masses which he can concentrate at a distance, out of our reach and knowledge, or suddenly, and at the very moment of attack, require that every important point be prepared to repel his attempt or retard it until reinforcements can arrive, and adequate means of resistance be organized. By land, we are acquainted with the motions of an enemy; but the ocean is a vast plain, without obstacle, where his movements are made out of our sight; where no trace is left of his path, and where we know nothing of his approach until he is within reach of the eye. In a word, unless the vulnerable points of a seaboard are covered by permanent fortifications, their only chance of safety
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must depend on the issue of a battle, always uncertain, even when the best disciplined, most experienced, and best appointed troops have made all possible preparation for the combat.
As for the garrisons which these forts will require in time of war, a small portion, about equal in number to the peace garrisons, should be of regular troops; the remainder of militia practiced in the manoeuvres and drill of great guns; it being indispensable that the greatest part of the troops required for the defence and service of the sea-coast fortifications should be of artillery.
This brings us to a suggestion or two in relation to the organization of the militia forces. Instead of the present small proportion of artillery allowed in the militia organization, the States might, with great advantage, increase the proportion of that force, in the vicinity of each of the exposed parts of the coast, so as to be equivalent to the exigencies and armament of the works, substituting for the usual field exercises as infantry actual drill and practice in the batteries. The number of militia artillery in each case would be determined by the number of guns applied to the defence of that particular place. As soon as a movement on the part of the enemy should threaten the frontier of the State, this force should throw itself into the forts, and there remain, so long as the precise point of attack should be undetermined. In most parts of the seaboard it would be advisable to have, also, a considerable body of militia horse artillery, as being a very useful arm in all cases, and as affording a defence always applicable against minor and predatory enterprises. This force might, in part, be drawn from the ordinary proportion of cavalry.
If, with our general system of permanent fortifications and naval establishments, we connect a system of interior communication by land and water, adapted both to the defence and to the commercial relations of the country; if to these we add a well-constituted regular army, and a militia, perfect in its organization, the nation will not only completely secure its territory from invasion and insult, but will preserve its institutions from those violent shocks and revolutions which have so frequently, in every age and in every country, been incident to a state of war.
Tables A, B, C, and D, following, contain the works constituting the proposed defensive system for the maritime frontier, arranged in four classes.
Table E exhibits a comparison of the cost of defending certain parts of the coast, without fortifications, and with the aid of the projected works.
Table F shows a possible concentration of militia forces in eleven days at Boston, Newport, Rhode Island, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, South Carolina, Savannah, Georgia, and New Orleans.
NORTHERN FRONTIER.
Not having been the subject of particular care and study, it is with diffidence that a few words are thrown out on the subject of the defence of the frontier which separates the United States from the English possessions.
The first questions that arise are these: is the political condition of the country lying on the other side of the country in question, viz: the condition of colonies of a transatlantic power, to remain unaltered? Or are these colonies to become independent nations? Or is any other important change to be wrought in their political relations? These questions bear directly upon the matter in hand. A generation hence, and there may be no more room for jealousy and watchfulness along that line than there now is along the imaginary lines which separate our contiguous States Within the same period the Canadas may have assumed the attitude of independent and separate States; and although the United States may recognize in these northern neighbors a youth of much promise and vigor, the period when the relative increase shall have been such as to make their proximity a source of much precaution and solicitude will not, probably, be near at hand. But though it may be possible that the colonial relations may be thrown off within the period for which it is our duty now to provide; and although, in any other relation, the United States might rely for security, at any moment, on the greater power which she might at any moment develop, can it be distinctly foreseen that the existing political connexion is to be soon dissolved? If not, if there be uncertainty on this point, does it become the duty of the United States to proceed at once to the task of securing herself on this frontier, regarding it as separating her from one of the most powerful empires of the earth; or, finally, may she wait and watch, relying on her sagacity to give due notice of impending danger, and on her resources to supply her, in time, with appropriate armor? If it be, indeed, possible to apply, within a brief state of time, all the defences that can be needed on this frontier, the course last suggested would appear to be the best.
What, therefore, is like to be the nature of the danger, and what the nature of the defence?
Along the St. Croix river only local establishments could require to be covered, as there are no objects of consequence to be reached by an enemy penetrating our interior from that border. Then comes the disputed territory, and the great unsettled regions along the northern margins of New Hampshire and Vermont.
Upon all this extent of frontier the exact location of future establishments, of consequence, cannot be foreseen with the certainty warranting their being now provided for by permanent defensive works. This region is to become populous and wealthy, the natural means of communication are to be improved, and numerous artificial means of communication are to be opened by roads, canals, and railways; but while this growth in wealth may invite aggression, the growth in numbers and the increased facilities of intercommunication, the increased power of rendering mutual succor, and of drawing aid from the interior, would, in a still greater degree, make aggression difficult and improbable.
Lake Champlain penetrates the territory in such a way that an enemy, having the naval mastery, might make a deep inroad and greatly harass the country along the shores, although no enterprise, even in the present state of population, could be carried far into the interior. Were it only to relieve a long line of frontier from predatory incursions, access to this lake from the north should be denied. But there are other very strong reasons for this exclusion. By closing the lake at its northern extremity, an expensive and uncertain strife for naval superiority on this lake would be avoided, and the whole lake would remain in our possession, serving as the best possible military line of communication in case the United States should assume offensive operations against the weakest point of the Canadian frontier.
From the northern end of this lake the forces of the United States should march into Canada and intercept the communication by the St. Lawrence, either at or near the mouth of the Richelieu river, at Montreal island, at some point where the ship channel of the river could be commanded, intermediate between these places, or at any two or at all these places, according to circumstances. Maintaining any or all these positions would limit the defence in the province above to the consumption of the means then
--391--
in store, and would completely paralyze its offensive power. Although no other object were in view than the defence of the frontier upon the upper lakes, no effort necessary to secure and maintain this position should be spared, because it is only thus that the contest for naval superiority on the lakes (which, if once suffered to begin, is both exhausting and interminable) can be avoided. Without aid from abroad Canada cannot contest such a question with the United States, and, so long as the United States possess that superiority, the defence of the upper portion of the frontier will be complete.
From being the most expensive of all modes of defence, naval superiority, in our hands, may thus become the cheapest; two or three small armed vessels on each lake, employed as convoys to the ordinary navigation and to the transports bearing troops and munitions, being all that would be needed.
Military enterprises would in this way be warded off from the numerous rich and populous cities and towns now embellishing our border, which it would not be easy to protect from the calamities of war by mere military works, without running into great expense, were the enemy's naval means to allow his approaching them at his pleasure.
In the case of the offensive movement supposed above, the fortified position of Isle aux Noix, and any other upon the Richelieu, should be at first left in rear, being reached or mastered by suitable bodies of troops, and should be subjected to immediate investment and vigorous attack, so as to be speedily reduced, and to open the navigable water communication within twenty miles of Montreal.
If the preceding remarks be well founded, it would appear that the peace and safety of the parts of the frontier extending along the river St. Lawrence, Lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior might be made to flow from military operations carried on against Canada by the line of Lake Champlain and the river Richelieu; and in order to this military operation being always practicable, and to be taken up at pleasure, nothing more is necessary than the fortification of the outlet of Lake Champlain. It might have been before remarked that the offensive movement in question is not deemed to be difficult or hazardous, nor would it be necessarily restricted to holding positions on the St. Lawrence, active operations against Quebec (to which this is the most convenient road) following, as a matter of course, upon these first successes.
The security, therefore, that may be obtained for the upper frontier by military operations on the lower, may at least justify these upper portions in waiting the progress of events.
The unexampled increase of population upon these very borders, the hundred new ways, already finished or in hand, of connecting these borders with the heart of the country, may so elevate the military resources of the region that, in the event of war, it will matter little in which of the political conditions first supposed the opposite territory may be found—a resistless torrent sweeping it from end to end; and although it might not be prudent to rely, in such a matter, on the mere spread of wealth and numbers, we may be certain that there will exist ample resources to create all such artificial military aids as the circumstances may call for, and we may infer that the application of these aids would now be premature.
The military consequences of the occupation of the outlet of Lake Champlain are so obvious, that it must not be supposed they are not perfectly understood by our neighbor across the border. As it would, consequently, be a great object with him to avert the consequences alluded to, he would, in the event of war, (often breaking out suddenly,) be first, if possible, in taking such a position as would prevent our commanding the issue of the lake; and hence it is that, in the preparation of the only permanent military work now recommended for the northern frontier, it seems advisable to admit no unnecessary delay.
A position for closing the lake, selected during the last war, and of which the fortification was begun soon after the peace, was found, after some progress bad been made, not to lie within our territory, and was abandoned. There is, however, a position equally good close at hand, and in all respects admirably adapted to the object in view.
The fortification of this outlet will probably cost about $600,000.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
--392--
A.
First class, comprising works first to be executed, as covering, partially or entirely, great cities and important towns; naval establishments; roads of rendezvous; places and harbors that an enemy might occupy; outlets of valuable commerce, Sc., arranged in geographical order.
Designation of works. |
Garrison. |
Guns, &c. |
Cost to complete |
|
Peace. |
Siege. |
|||
These works are in progress: |
|
|
|
|
Fort Independence, Boston harbor |
50 |
395 |
79 |
$202,852 |
Fort Warren, Boston harbor |
100 |
1,500 |
300? |
695, 414 |
Fort Adams, Narraganset Roads |
100 |
2,440 |
468 |
350,000 |
Fort Schuyler, New York harbor |
100 |
1,250 |
250? |
510,178 |
Fort Columbus, New York harbor |
100 |
535 |
207 |
20,000 |
Fort Delaware, Delaware bay |
100? |
1,250? |
250? |
? 600,000 |
Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads |
500 |
2,450 |
350 |
210.000 |
Fort Calhoun, Hampton Roads |
50 |
1,160 |
232 |
531,000 |
Fort Caswell, Cape Fear river |
50 |
450 |
90 |
60,000 |
Fort in Charleston harbor, South Carolina |
100 |
1,500 |
300 |
500,000 |
Fort Pulaski, Savannah river |
50 |
860 |
172 |
246,000 |
Fort Pickens, Pensacola harbor |
100 |
1,260 |
252 |
50,000 |
Fort on Foster's bank, Pensacola harbor |
50 |
720 |
144 |
160,000 |
MAINE. |
|
|
|
|
Fort at the narrows of the Penobscot |
50 |
500 |
145 |
150,000 |
Fort at the mouth of the Kennebec, not projected |
50? |
500? |
150? |
? 300,000 |
Fort Preble, Portland harbor |
50 |
300 |
82 |
155,000 |
NEW HAMPSHIRE. |
|
|
|
|
Works in Portsmouth harbor, not projected |
150? |
1,500? |
30[]? |
? 500,000 |
MASSACHUSETTS. |
|
|
|
|
Fort Pickering, Salem harbor |
50 |
250 |
50 |
174,000 |
Fort Winthrop, repairs, &c., Boston harbor |
10 |
250 |
50 |
50,000 |
Works at Provincetown, not projected |
50? |
1,500? |
300? |
? 600,000 |
Works at New Bedford, not projected |
50? |
750? |
150? |
? 300,000 |
RHODE ISLAND. |
|
|
|
|
Fort on Bose island, Narraganset Roads |
25 |
580 |
96 |
123,000 |
CONNECTICUT. |
|
|
|
|
Fort Griswold, New London harbor |
50 |
830 |
106 |
198,000 |
NEW YORK. |
|
|
|
|
Fort on Wilkins's Point, New York harbor |
50 |
1,336 |
184 |
686,000 |
Fort Tompkins and dependencies, New York harbor |
50 |
970 |
114 |
654,000 |
DELAWARE. |
|
|
|
|
Works to cover the Delaware Breakwater harbor, not projected |
100? |
1,125? |
225? |
? 600,000 |
Fort opposite Fort Delaware, on right bank |
50 |
760 |
112 |
521,000 |
MARYLAND. |
|
|
|
|
Fort on Elk river, to cover the debouche of the Chesapeake and |
|
|
|
|
Delaware canal and railroad |
50 |
760 |
112 |
300,000 |
Fort on Sollers's Point flats, below Baltimore |
100 |
835 |
159 |
1,000,000 |
Fort on Point Patience, Patuxent river |
50 |
400 |
80 |
246,000 |
WEST FLORIDA. |
|
|
|
|
Works to protect the navy yard at Pensacola from lateral attack |
|
|
|
|
through the bays, not projected |
50? |
1,000? |
50? |
? 300,000 |
Fort at Barrancas, Pensacola, not projected |
50 |
250? |
50? |
? 100,000 |
LOUISIANA. |
|
|
|
|
Fort St. Philip, Mississippi river |
50 |
400 |
60 |
117,000 |
Fort at Grand Terre, Barrataria island |
50 |
400 |
60 |
400,000 |
Total |
2,585 |
30,966 |
5,729 |
11,609,444 |
--393--
B.
Second class, comprising works to be constructed next after those of the first, the works having similar objects to defend as those of the first class, and being generally such as are necessary to complete the defence begun by the works of the first class; arranged in geographical order.
Designation of works. |
Garrison |
Guns, &c. |
Cost to complete. |
|
Peace. |
Siege. |
|||
MAINE. |
||||
Fort on House island, Portland harbor |
25 |
260 |
53 |
$48,000 |
MASSACHUSETTS. |
||||
Fort at Gloucester, not projected |
50? |
500? |
100? |
? 200,000 |
Fort at Naugus Head, Salem harbor |
25 |
180 |
38 |
51,000 |
Fort Sewall, Marblehead harbor |
50 |
280 |
55 |
174,000 |
Fort on Jack's Point, Marblehead harbor |
25 |
280 |
60 |
144,000 |
Fort and outworks on Nastasket Head, Boston harbor |
100 |
1,550 |
297 |
975,000 |
Fort on Gurnet Point, Plymouth, not projected |
25? |
250? |
50? |
? 100,000 |
RHODE ISLAND. |
||||
Works on Conanicut island, Narraganset Roads |
100 |
1,800 |
386 |
1,200,000 |
CONNECTICUT. |
||||
Fort at Stonington harbor, not projected |
50? |
375? |
75? |
? 200,000 |
Fort Trumbull, New London harbor |
50 |
460 |
62 |
116,000 |
MARYLAND. |
||||
Fort, Hawkins's Point, below Baltimore |
100 |
845 |
121 |
376,000 |
Fort McHenry, Covington battery, Redoubt Wood, repairs, &c., |
50 |
500 |
100 |
? 150,000 |
Fort on Thomas's Point, Patuxent river |
25 |
350 |
70 |
259,000 |
Fort on Cedar Point, Potomac river, not projected |
50? |
550? |
110? |
? 300,000 |
SOUTH CAROLINA. |
||||
Works in Port Royal Roads, not projected |
50? |
550? |
110? |
? 300,000 |
GEORGIA. |
||||
Fort on Tybee island, not projected |
25? |
300? |
75? |
? 150,000 |
Repairs of Fort Jackson, Savannah river, not planned |
25? |
200? |
30? |
? 50,000 |
Works to command entrance to Cumberland sound, mouth of St. Mary's river, Georgia, not projected |
50? |
550? |
110? |
? 200,000 |
ALABAMA. |
||||
Fort on Dauphin island, Mobile bay |
100 |
900 |
128 |
880,000 |
Total |
975 |
10, 680 |
2,030 |
5,873,000 |
--394--
C.
Third class, comprising the defence of all towns, harbors, inlets, &c., not included in the first two classes; arranged in geographical order.
Designation of works. |
Garrison. |
Guns, &c. |
Cost to complete. |
|
Peace. |
Siege. |
|||
MAINE. |
||||
Works at Eastport, mouth of St Croix |
25? |
250 |
50 |
$100,000 |
Works at Machias harbor |
25? |
250 |
50 |
100,000 |
Works at Mount Desert island |
50? |
1,000 |
200 |
500,000 |
Works at Castine |
10? |
125 |
25 |
50,000 |
Works at St. George's bay |
100 |
1,000 |
200 |
400,000 |
Works at Broad bay |
||||
Works at Damariscotta bay |
||||
Works at Sheepscot bay |
||||
Works in Hog Island channel, Portland harbor |
?135,000 |
|||
Works at the mouth of the Saco |
25? |
100 |
30 |
75,000 |
Works at the mouth of the Kennebunk |
||||
Works at York |
||||
MASSACHUSETTS. |
25? |
250 |
50 |
100,000 |
Works at Newburyport |
10? |
125 |
25 |
50,000 |
Works at Beverly |
25 |
150 |
21 |
43,000 |
Redoubt on Hog island, Boston harbor, projected |
210,000 |
|||
Reducing depth of water in Broad Sound passage |
3,000 |
|||
Reducing altitude of Gallop's island |
||||
Works at Nantucket harbor |
50 |
625 |
125 |
250,000 |
Works at Edgartown harbor |
||||
Works at Falmouth harbor |
||||
Works at Holmes's Hole |
||||
Works at Tarpaulin cove |
||||
RHODE ISLAND. |
50? |
250 |
45 |
80,000 |
Repairs and modification of old Fort Wolcott, Newport harbor |
? |
50 |
8 |
20,000 |
Repairs and modification of old Fort Green, Newport harbor |
307,000 |
|||
Closing west passage of Narraganset Roads |
||||
NEW YORK. |
50? |
750 |
150 |
400,000 |
Works at Gardiner's bay |
25? |
250 |
50 |
100,000 |
Works at Sag Harbor |
||||
CONNECTICUT. |
25? |
250 |
50 |
100,000 |
Works at the mouth of the Connecticut river |
10 |
220 |
30 |
48,000 |
Fort Hale, New Haven harbor, projected |
10 |
155 |
16 |
42,000 |
Fort Wooster, New Haven harbor, projected |
50? |
500 |
100 |
200,000 |
Works for defence of several harbors and towns between New Haven and New York, on both sides of the sound |
||||
NEW YORK. |
25? |
225 |
45 |
80,000 |
Fort Wood, New York harbor, repairs |
25? |
100 |
14 |
50,000 |
Fort Gibson, New York harbor, repairs |
100 |
1,760 |
342 |
1,681,412 |
Fort on Middle Ground shoal, New York harbor, projected |
100 |
1,760 |
332 |
1,681,412 |
Fort on East Bank shoal, New York harbor, projected |
||||
MARYLAND. |
50? |
550 |
110 |
300,000 |
Works at St. Mary's river |
50? |
500 |
100 |
250,000 |
Works at Annapolis harbor |
||||
NORTH CAROLINA. |
50 |
450 |
90 |
180,000 |
Fort on Baldhead island, Cape Fear river, projected |
25 |
200 |
43 |
18,000 |
Redoubt on Federal Point, Cape Fear river, projected |
||||
SOUTH CAROLINA. |
50? |
500 |
100 |
250,000 |
Works at Georgetown harbor |
25? |
250 |
50 |
100,000 |
Works at the mouth of the Santee, at Bull's bay, and other inlets between Georgetown and Charleston |
10? |
125 |
25 |
50,000 |
Works at Stono inlet |
10? |
125 |
25 |
50,000 |
Works at North Edisto inlet |
10? |
125 |
25 |
50,000 |
Works at South Edisto inlet |
50? |
375 |
75 |
150,000 |
Works at St. Helena sound |
60? |
500 |
100 |
200,000 |
GEORGIA. |
50? |
500 |
100 |
200,000 |
Works at Wassaw sound |
50? |
500 |
100 |
200,000 |
Works at Ossabaw sound |
50? |
500 |
100 |
200,000 |
Works at St. Catharine's sound |
50? |
500 |
100 |
200,000 |
Works at Sapelo sound |
50? |
500 |
100 |
200,000 |
Works at Doboy inlet |
50? |
500 |
100 |
200,000 |
Works at Altamaha sound |
50? |
500 |
100 |
200,000 |
Works at St. Simon's sound |
|
|
|
|
--395--
Garrison |
Designation of works. |
Guns, &c. |
Cost to complete. |
|
Peace. |
Siege. |
|||
EAST AND WEST FLORIDA —Estimate of Engineer department. |
||||
Works at St Augustine |
25? |
100 |
20 |
$50,000 |
Works at Key West and Tortugas |
500? |
2,500 |
500 |
3,000,000 |
Works at Charlotte harbor |
250? |
1,250 |
250 |
1,000,000 |
Works at Espiritu Santa bay |
||||
Works at Apalachicola |
||||
Works at Apalache bay |
||||
Works at St. Joseph's bay |
||||
Works at St. Rosa bay |
||||
ALABAMA. |
||||
Works at Perdido bay |
50? |
500 |
100 |
200,000 |
Tower at Pass au Heron, projected |
10 |
60 |
12 |
25,000 |
Total |
2,380 |
21,745 |
4,283 |
14,078,824 |
RECAPITULATION. |
||||
First class, from table A |
2,585 |
30,966 |
5,729 |
$11,609,444 |
Second class, from table B |
975 |
10,680 |
2,030 |
5,873,000 |
Third class, as above |
2,380 |
21,745 |
4,283 |
14,078,824 |
Total |
5,940 |
63,391 |
12,042 |
31,561,268 |
D.
Fourth class, comprising conditional works, the necessity for which will depend on the creation of artificial harbors, canals, great naval depots, &c.; arranged in geographical order.
Works on Barnstable bay, to cover Cape Cod canal.
Works on Buzzard's bay, to cover Cape Cod canal.
Works to cover artificial harbor in Martha's Vineyard sound.
Works on Newport News, to cover naval depot in Burwell's bay.
Works on Craney island, to cover naval depot in Burwell's bay.
Works on Naseway shoals, to cover naval depot in Burwell's bay.
Works to cover proposed new inlet of Albemarle sound.
E.
Statement exhibiting the cost of certain projected fortifications for the sea-coast defence, the forces necessary to protect them on the supposition, that there were no fortifications, the forces necessary for perfect security with the aid of the projected defences, and the expense of the troops in both cases.
Places. |
Aggregate cost of the proposed works. |
Comparison of the forces necessary to defend the places with and without the projected works. |
Expense |
Expenses |
|||||||
No. of troops necessary without fortifications. |
No. of troops required with the projected works. |
||||||||||
Under pay. |
Within call. |
||||||||||
Under pay. |
Within call. |
Regulars. |
Militia. |
Total. |
Militia. |
Expense of
the |
Expense of
the |
Expense of |
|||
Portsmouth |
?$500,000 |
10,000 |
10,000 |
150 |
1,500 |
1,650 |
8,350 |
$2,500,000 |
$22,500 |
$375,000 |
$397,500 |
Boston |
2,123,575 |
10,000 |
10,000 |
285 |
3,845 |
4,130 |
5,870 |
2,500,000 |
42,750 |
961,250 |
1,004,000 |
Narraganset Roads |
3,042,369 |
10,000 |
10,000 |
275 |
5,125 |
5,400 |
4,600 |
2,500,000 |
41,250 |
1,281,250 |
1,322,500 |
New York |
6,077,365 |
10,000 |
10,000 |
500 |
8,206 |
8,706 |
1,294 |
2,500,000 |
75,000 |
2,051,500 |
2,126,500 |
Philadelphia |
1,121,000 |
10,000 |
10,000 |
150 |
2,010 |
2,160 |
7,840 |
2,500,000 |
22,500 |
502,500 |
525,000 |
Baltimore |
1,516,000 |
10,000 |
10,000 |
250 |
2,180 |
2,430 |
7,570 |
2,500,000 |
37,500 |
505,000 |
542,500 |
Norfolk |
3,889,025 |
10,000 |
16,000 |
550 |
3,610 |
4,160 |
5,840 |
2,500,000 |
82,500 |
902,500 |
985,000 |
Charleston |
824,426 |
10,000 |
10,000 |
300 |
1,500 |
1,800 |
8,200 |
2,500,000 |
45,000 |
375,000 |
420,000 |
Savannah |
732,367 |
10,000 |
10,000 |
200 |
1,360 |
1,560 |
8,440 |
2,500,000 |
30,000 |
340,000 |
370,000 |
New Orleans |
961,529 |
17,000 |
3,000 |
350 |
2,740 |
3,090 |
6,910 |
4,250,000 |
52,500 |
685,000 |
737,500 |
|
21,767,656 |
107,000 |
93,000 |
3,010 |
32,076 |
35,086 |
64,914 |
26,750,000 |
451,500 |
7,979,000 |
8,430,500 |
|
Total |
200,000 |
Total |
100,000 |
* Supposing all to be militia, serving six months, and costing in the average $250 per man.
--397--
Some additions may be required from time to time at the arsenals already established, which, with the cost of the fourteen above mentioned, are estimated at $1,746,000.
This estimate is founded on the supposition that the new arsenals are to be, on an average, of a medium extent, when considered in relation to those already established, which are divided into four classes, as may be seen by reference to a tabular exhibit presented herewith. It would be proper to arrange every new depot in such manner as to admit of its increase or extension in case the public service should require it. It could then be passed from one class to a higher by the addition of such buildings, tools, or machinery, as the case might demand.
3. In relation to field artillery.
It is estimated that an adequate supply of field artillery for arming the militia and for troops in service, to be provided within ten years, will amount to 926 pieces, which, with their carriages, implements, and equipments, will cost about $576,175.
This estimate is based on the principle stated in the report before mentioned, and contemplates a supply proportionate to the ratio of the increase of the militia, one piece of artillery being allotted to every 2,000 men.
4. In relation to ordnance and ordnance stores required for arming the fortifications.
Agreeably to data derived from two statements received from the Engineer department on the 11th of January and 27th of February last, it is estimated that the expense of procuring the necessary ordnance and ordnance stores for the full and entire armament of the forts which are erected, together with those now building, and others which are contemplated to be built hereafter, embracing cannon, carriages, implements, and equipments complete, and ammunition, after deducting therefrom the quantity of similar munitions now on hand, will amount to about $17,840,249.
This estimate is founded on the supposition that 12,116 pieces of cannon, with 200 rounds of ammunition for each gun, will be ultimately required when all the forts projected shall have been completed.
It should be stated, however, that this sum may be considered partly conjectural, the plans for the defence of many of the harbors being not yet matured by the board of engineers, as it appears by a letter from the chief of that department dated February 27 last. There are likewise many other points along the coast which may require defences, the cost of the armament for which has not been embraced in this estimate; nor does it contain any item for the defence of the Mexican frontier.
5. In relation to small arms.
To progress with the arming of the militia to a reasonable extent, in accordance with the settled policy of the country and its civil institutions, a considerable addition should be made to the number of arms on hand. Having reference to the annual increase of citizens who may be called to bear arms, there will be required for the next ten years an expenditure of $7,721,233 for muskets, rifles, and pistols; and $321,880 for swords, making $8,043,113.
This last sum is found by allotting five swords to every 100 muskets, or their equivalent in other firearms.
6. In relation to accoutrements for small arms. Fifty thousand sets of accoutrements would cost $200,000.
This number distributed among the several arsenals would afford an adequate supply for any emergency, and being in some degree perishable, it is not considered advisable to provide a greater quantity, as they can be made at short notice, or as occasion may require.
7. In relation to field ammunition of all kinds.
The expense of providing a supply of gunpowder, cartridge paper, and other materials for field service, is estimated at $200,000.
This amount would afford at all times a supply of ammunition for 30,000 men in each of the principal divisions of the country.
The foregoing statements comprise all the estimates for the Ordnance department, except for a national foundery. The amount required for such an establishment will not exceed $300,000, which sum includes the cost of materials to be consumed in casting guns during the first year after commencing operations. The period of ten years is taken as a suitable time within which the foregoing expenditures may be completed.
The disbursements for the various objects embraced in the resolution which pertain to the Ordnance department are now, annually, little short of $1,000,000. If a period of fifteen years is assumed for the accomplishment of these purposes, the annual expenditure will be only double what it is at present, and it is believed that such an increase could be made with much advantage to the service. Indeed, that portion of expense which pertains to the manufacture of cannon and projectiles could annually be more than quadrupled, with safety and a due regard to economy.
RECAPITULATION.
2 national armories |
$1,050, 000 |
14 arsenals |
1,746,000 |
926 pieces of field artillery, with carriages, &c. |
576, 175 |
Ordnance and ordnance stores and ammunition for fortifications |
17, 840, 249 |
Small arms and accoutrements |
8,243,113 |
Ammunition for field service |
200,000 |
A national foundery |
300, 000 |
|
29, 955, 537 |
The resolution of the Senate is returned herewith.
I have the honor to be, sir, &c.,
GEO. BOMFORD, Colonel of Ordnance.
Hon. Lewis Cass, Secretary of War.
--398--
Statement of the cost of four classes of arsenals, exclusive of exterior walls, fences, gales, roads, tools, machinery, wharves, &c.
FIRST CLASS.—Depot simply. |
||||
Names. |
No. of buildings. |
Size. |
Cost of each. |
Total. |
Arsenals |
2 |
120 by 40 feet, and 47 feet high |
$20,000 |
$40,000 |
Great magazine |
1 |
To contain from 2,500 to 3,000 barrels of powder |
12,000 |
12,000 |
Officers' quarters |
1 |
43 by 40 feet, and 40 feet high |
8,000 |
8,000 |
Barracks |
1 |
100 by 36 feet, and 35 feet high |
13,000 |
13,000 |
Gun-carriage shed |
1 |
105 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high |
3,050 |
3,050 |
Office |
1 |
40 by 20 feet, and 29 feet high |
2,430 |
2,430 |
Small magazine for fixed ammunition |
1 |
30 by 20 feet, and 14 feet high |
756 |
756 |
Connecting walls |
|
|
|
1,000 |
Land, 25 acres at least, (see note 1,) estimated at $40 per acre |
|
|
|
1,000 |
Graduating and levelling the site proper, making drains, culverts, &c. |
|
|
|
1,000 |
|
|
|
|
82,236 |
SECOND CLASS.—Depot and place of repair. |
||||
Arsenal |
2 |
120 by 40 feet," and 47 feet high |
$20,000 |
$40,000 |
Great magazine |
1 |
To contain from 2,500 to 3,000 barrels of powder |
12,000 |
12,000 |
Officers' quarters |
1 |
43 by 40 feet, and 40 feet high |
8,000 |
8,000 |
Barracks |
1 |
100 by 36 feet, and 35 feet high |
13,000 |
13,000 |
Gun carriage shed |
1 |
105 by So feet, and 10 feet high |
3,050 |
3, 050 |
Smiths' shop |
1 |
25 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high |
945 |
945 |
Office |
1 |
40 by 20 feet, and 29 feet high |
2,430 |
2,430 |
Carriage-makers' shop |
1 |
25 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high |
945 |
945 |
Armorers' and turners' shop |
1 |
50 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high |
1,890 |
1,890 |
Painters' shop |
1 |
20 by 14 feet, and 14 feet high 352 |
352 |
|
Laboratory, viz: |
|
|
|
|
Driving and filling shop |
1 |
25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
787 |
787 |
Finishing room |
1 |
25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
787 |
787 |
Small magazine for fixed ammunition |
1 |
30 by 20 feet, and 14 feet high |
756 |
756 |
Connecting wall |
|
|
|
1,200 |
Land, 25 acres at least, (see note,) estimated at $40 per acre |
|
|
|
1,000 |
Graduating and levelling the site proper, making drains, culverts, &c. |
|
|
|
1,200 |
|
|
|
|
88,342 |
THIRD CLASS.—Depot and place of construction and repair, without water or steam power. |
||||
Arsenal |
2 |
120 by 40 feet, and 47 feet high |
$20,000 |
$40,000 |
Great magazine |
1 |
To contain from 2,500 to 3,000 barrels of powder |
12,000 |
12,000 |
Officers' quarters |
3 |
43 by 40 feet, and 40 feet high |
8, 000 |
24,000 |
Barracks |
1 |
100 by 36 feet, and 35 feet high |
13,000 |
13,000 |
Gun-carriage sheds |
2 |
100 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high |
3,050 |
6,100 |
Smiths' shop |
1 |
80 by 35 feet, and 14 feet high |
3,528 |
3,528 |
Timber sheds |
2 |
105 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high |
2,250 |
4,500 |
Office |
1 |
40 by 20 feet, and 29 feet high |
2,430 |
2,430 |
Carpenters' and carriage-makers' shop |
1 |
80 by 35 feet, and 14 feet high |
3,528 |
3,528 |
Armorers' and turners' shop |
1 |
50 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high |
1,890 |
1,890 |
Tinners' and casting shop |
1 |
40 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
1,260 |
1,260 |
Painters' shop |
1 |
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
945 |
945 |
Saddlers' shop |
1 |
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
945 |
945 |
Laboratory, viz: |
|
|
|
|
Driving and filling shop |
1 |
25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
787 |
787 |
Finishing room |
1 |
25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
787 |
787 |
Small magazine for fixed ammunition |
1 |
30 by 20 feet, and 14 feet high |
756 |
756 |
Guardroom |
1 |
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
945 |
945 |
Connecting walls |
|
|
|
1,350 |
Land, 25 acres at least, (see note,) estimated at $40 per acre |
|
|
|
1,000 |
Graduating and levelling the site proper, making drains, culverts, &c. |
|
|
|
1,350 |
Coal-houses |
|
|
|
1,000 |
|
|
|
|
122,101 |
--399--
Statement of the cost of four classes of arsenals, &c.—Continued.
FOURTH CLASS.—Depot and place of construction and repair, with water or steam power. |
||||
Names. |
No. of buildings. |
Size. |
Cost of each. |
Total. |
Arsenal |
2 |
120 by 40 feet, and 47 feet high |
$20,000 |
$40,000 |
Great magazine |
1 |
To contain from 2,500 to 3,000 barrels |
12,000 |
12,000 |
Officers' quarters |
3 |
43 by 40 feet, and 40 feet high |
8,000 |
24,000 |
Barracks |
1 |
100 by 36 feet, and 35 feet high |
13,000 |
13,000 |
Gun-carriage sheds |
3 |
100 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high |
3,050 |
9,150 |
Smiths' shop |
1 |
80 by 35 feet, and 14 feet high |
3,528 |
3,528 |
Timber sheds |
3 |
105 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high |
2,250 |
6,750 |
Office |
1 |
40 by 20 feet, and 29 feet high |
2,430 |
2,430 |
Carpenters' and carriage-makers' shop |
1 |
80 by 35 feet, and 14 feet high |
3,528 |
3,528 |
Steam-engine, or house for water power |
1 |
100 by 40 feet, and 18 feet high |
6,480 |
6,480 |
Armorers' shop |
1 |
50 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high |
1,890 |
1,890 |
Tinners' and casting shop |
1 |
40 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
1,260 |
1,260 |
Painters' shop |
1 |
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
945 |
945 |
Saddlers' shop |
1 |
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
945 |
945 |
Laboratory, viz: |
||||
Driving and filling shop |
1 |
25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
787 |
787 |
Finishing room |
1 |
25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
787 |
787 |
Small magazine for fixed ammunition |
1 |
756 |
756 |
|
Guard room |
1 |
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high |
945 |
945 |
Connecting walls |
1,450 |
|||
Land, 25 acres at least, (see note,) estimated at $40 per acre |
1, 000 |
|||
Graduating and levelling the site proper, making drains, culverts, &c. |
1,450 |
|||
Coal-houses |
1,500 |
|||
|
134,581 |
Note 1.—Twenty-five acres of land at least are necessary at each class of the arsenals, in order to be enabled to prove powder, which operation requires a space of 350 to 400 yards.
2. It is perceived that the expense of the first class may be reduced $20,000 if only one arsenal building be required in that class. The same remark applies to the other classes.
3. There are times when several companies of troops may be required, temporarily at least, at each class of the arsenals. The barracks are therefore made of the same size at each of the classes, and large enough to accommodate the companies as well as the troops of the ordnance proper. There has always been a deficiency at the arsenals in barracks when they have been occupied by troops.
4. The above includes everything connected with the buildings and site proper, nothing more. The expenses of the apparatus and tools, utensils, engines, &c., which may be necessary to put the several classes auto operation are not included.
5. The extent of the site occupied by each of the classes may be the same; and thus any one class may be enlarged into its next adjacent class without other expense than is required by the additional buildings.
6. The estimated expenditures in these statements are founded on the prices paid in the vicinity of Philadelphia, and are sufficiently near the truth, it is believed, for all positions which are not in Florida, Louisiana, or Alabama.
Ordnance Office, Washington, March 8, 1836.
REPORT FROM THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.
Navy Department, March 31, 1836.
Sir: In answer to so much of the resolutions of the Senate of the United States of the 18th ultimo as required information as to the probable amount of appropriations that may be necessary to supply the United States with ordnance, arms, and munitions of war, which a proper regard to self-defence would require to be always on hand, and the probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defences of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare of the Union, 1 have the honor to lay before you a report of the board of navy commissioners of the second instant, which contains the best information upon the subjects referred to in possession of this department; which is respectfully submitted.
MAHLON DICKERSON.
The President of the United States.
In Senate of the United States, January 21, 1836.
The following resolutions were ordered to be postponed to Monday next:
Resolved, That so much of the revenue of the United States, and the dividends of stock receivable from the bank of the United States, as may be necessary for the purpose, ought to be set apart and applied to the general defence and permanent security of the country.
Resolved, That the President be requested to cause the Senate to be informed—
1. The probable amount that would be necessary for fortifying the lake, maritime, and gulf frontier of the United States, and such points of the land frontier as may require permanent fortifications.
--400--
2. The probable amount that would be necessary to construct an adequate number of armories and arsenals in the United States, and to supply the States with field artillery (especially brass field-pieces) for their militia, and with side-arms and pistols for their cavalry.
3. The probable amount that would be necessary to supply the United States with the ordnance, arms, and munitions of war, which a proper regard to self-defence would require to be always on hand.
4. The probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defences of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and to the welfare of the Union.
Passed February 18, 1836.
Navy Commissioners' Office, March 2, 1836.
Sir:
The board of navy commissioners have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo, requesting a report on the probable amount that would be necessary to supply the United States with the ordnance, arms, and munitions of war (so far as may be wanted for the purposes of the navy) which a proper regard to self-defence would require to be always on hand; and on the probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defences of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare of the Union.
In conformity to these instructions, the board respectfully state, with respect to the ordnance for the navy, that after a careful examination of the subject, taking into consideration the ordnance and ordnance stores now on hand, and the extent of force for which it may be expedient to make early provision, they are of opinion that the sum of one million eight hundred thousand two hundred and fifty dollars will be required to supply the ordnance, arms, and munitions of war which may be wanted for the use of the navy, and which a proper regard to self-defence would require to have prepared ready for use.—(See paper A, annexed, for the detail.)
The board beg leave respectfully to observe that, for the vessels which are now built, or have been specially authorized, armaments may be provided, with some partial exceptions, from the cannon and carronades already provided; and the deficient ordnance, arms, and other ordnance stores, will be principally required for the vessels which are yet to be authorized or built. It is, therefore, respectfully recommended that any appropriation for this purpose, instead of being special or separate, should be included in an appropriation for "building and repairing vessels, and for the purchase of materials and stores for the navy."
The second object of inquiry, as to "the probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defences of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare of the Union," embraces a wide range, requires an examination of several subjects of great importance, and the expression of opinions upon which differences of opinion may and probably will exist. Before any estimate can be formed of the probable amount that would be necessary for the purposes proposed, an examination must be had, and an opinion formed of the nature and extent of the naval force which is "necessary to place the naval defences of the United States upon the footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare of the Union," and the time within which it ought to be or might be advantageously prepared.
Taking into view the geographical position of the United States with reference to other nations with whom we are most likely to be brought into future collision; the great extent of our maritime frontier, and the extreme importance of securing the communications of the whole valley of the Mississippi through the Gulf of Mexico, and the intercourse between all parts of the coast; the efficient protection of our widely-extended and extremely valuable commerce under all circumstances; and the great naval and fiscal resources of the country, the board consider the proper limit for the extent of the naval force to be that which can be properly manned when the country may be involved in a maritime war.
In estimating this extent, it is assumed that about ninety thousand seamen are employed in the foreign and coasting trade and fisheries. As the navigation has been generally increasing, there is little reason to apprehend any immediate diminution during peace. In any war which would require the employment of all our naval force, it is believed that such interruptions would occur to our commerce as would enable the navy to obtain without difficulty at least thirty thousand seamen and ordinary seamen; and if it should continue long, it is probable that a larger number might be engaged. The number of 30, 000, with the landsmen who may be safely combined with them, will therefore be assumed as the number for which vessels ought to be prepared for the commencement of a state of hostilities.
With respect to the nature of the force which it would be most advantageous to prepare, there will undoubtedly be differences of opinion. The materials for the larger vessels, as ships-of-the-line and frigates, would be obtained with great difficulty, under circumstances which should interfere with our coasting trade, whilst sloops-of-war and smaller vessels could be built with greater comparative facility under such circumstances.
The preparation of a considerable number of steam vessels, ready to defend our great estuaries, to aid the operations of our other naval force, and in the concentration or movements of the military force, as circumstances might require, is believed to demand serious and early attention.
Having due regard to these and other considerations, the board propose that the force to be prepared, ready for use when circumstances may require it, shall consist of 15 ships-of-the-line, 25 frigates, 25 sloops-of-war, 25 steamers, and 25 smaller vessels; and that the frames and other timber, the copper, ordnance, tanks, and chain cables, shall also be prepared for 10 ships-of-the-line and 10 frigates.
The force proposed to be prepared, ready for use, will employ and can be manned by the 30,000 seamen and others which have been considered available in a state of war. The materials for the ten ships-of-the-line and ten frigates will constitute a necessary reserve for increasing the number of those vessels, should they be required, or for supplying losses from decay or casualties.
To estimate the amount necessary to prepare this force, it is proposed to ascertain the whole probable cost, including ordnance, by the average cost of similar vessels already built, (steam vessels excepted,) and of materials already procured, and then to deduct the value of the present force, and all other present available means.
--402--
For the nature and distribution of this force the following is proposed:
|
Line. |
Frigates. |
Sloops. |
Steamers. |
Smaller. |
Total. |
Mediterranean |
1 |
2 |
2 |
|
2 |
7 |
Indian ocean |
|
1 |
2 |
|
1 |
4 |
Pacific |
|
2 |
3 |
|
2 |
7 |
Brazil |
1 |
1 |
2 |
|
2 |
6 |
West Indies |
|
1 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
Home |
3* |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
10 |
Total |
5 |
8 |
15 |
4 |
10 |
42 |
Considering this force with reference to its power of giving experience to the officers and qualifying them for the management of the force proposed for war, it appears that, for the force proposed to be actually employed at sea in peace and in war, the peace force will require and employ about two-thirds the number of commanders of squadrons, about one-third the captains, and forty one-hundredths of the commanders and lieutenants and masters which the proposed war, force would demand, and midshipmen sufficient to supply the additional number of these last classes which a change to a state of war would require.
Supposing the foregoing force to be that which is to be kept in commission, the next question is, what force will be necessary to keep afloat to provide the necessary reliefs? The board believe that this force should be the least which will answer the object proposed, as every vessel when launched is exposed to a decay which is much more rapid than when left under the cover of a tight ship-house.
We have already six ships-of-the-line afloat, which will be fully equal to our present wants when they are repaired. A reserve of three frigates may be required, but only to be launched when the necessity for it shall arise; for the sloops-of-war and smaller vessels it will probably be sufficient to merely keep up the cruising force as proposed, except some extraordinary demand should arise. The force of steam vessels proposed, when distributed at Boston, New York, Norfolk, and Pensacola, would probably meet all the demands of a state of peace, and furnish useful schools for officers, to prepare them for the proper management of others when they are required. The force to be kept afloat, then, will be assumed at six ships-of-the-line, eleven frigates, fifteen sloops-of-war, four steamers, and ten smaller vessels. The annual amount necessary to keep this force in a state of repair, and to supply the wear and tear of stores of cruising vessels, is estimated at $950,000.
The estimated expense of the force which is proposed to be kept in commission, exclusive of the repairs as above stated, and for the pay of officers at navy yards, rendezvous, receiving vessels, of superintendents and civil officers at all the shore establishments, and at the present cost of those establishments, is—
For pay of officers and seamen in commission, superintendents and civil officers, and all others at all the establishments, about |
$2, 500, 000 |
For provisions |
750, 000 |
For medicines and hospital stores |
60, 000 |
For ordnance stores, powder, &c. |
120, 000 |
For contingencies of all kinds |
390, 000 |
Total for the navy branch |
3, 850, 000 |
If the marines are continued as a part of the naval establishment, instead of substituting ordinary seamen and landsmen for them in vessels and watchmen in navy yards, and transferring the marines to the army as artillery, as has sometimes been suggested, the sum of about $400,000 annually will be required for that corps.
To determine the annual amount which it may be necessary to appropriate to prepare the vessels and reserve frames and other materials which have been proposed, some time must be assumed within which they shall be prepared. Believing that reference to the ability of the treasury to meet the probable demands upon it for all the purposes of the government must necessarily be considered in determining what amount may be allotted to the navy, the board have examined the reports of the Secretary of the Treasury, and respectfully propose to establish the ordinary annual appropriation for the navy, including the ordnance, at seven millions of dollars.
The operation of such annual appropriations may be seen by the following recapitulation of the proposed heads of expenditure:
For the force in commission and its dependencies, as before stated |
$3, 850, 000 |
The average appropriation for navy yards |
500, 000 |
For the repairs and wear and tear of vessels |
950, 000 |
For building vessels and purchase of materials |
1, 300, 000 |
Total for the navy proper |
6, 600, 000 |
For the marine corps |
400, 000 |
|
7, 000, 000 |
By the adoption of this gross sum for the navy and its dependencies, and the other items as proposed, $1,300,000 would be annually applied to increasing the number of our vessels and the purchase of materials; and with this annual expenditure the deficiency of $17,760,000 would not be supplied sooner than between thirteen and fourteen years, or at about the year 1850. The board consider this as the most remote period
* As receiving ships.
--403--
at which the proposed force ought to be ready, and are of opinion that it might be prepared much sooner, should Congress deem it necessary or advisable to make larger appropriations than have been suggested.
The board have expressed the opinion that no more vessels should be launched than are absolutely necessary to meet the demands for the force to be kept in commission; but, as a necessary consequence, they recommend that the other additional force should be in such a state of readiness that it may be launched and equipped by the time that men could be obtained for it. This arrangement renders an early attention to the completion of all the building-slips, ship-houses, and launching-ways at the different yards, so that the ships may be built, and that our docks, wharves, workshops, and storehouses should be finished; that our ships may be equipped with the greatest economy and despatch whenever they may be required.
Before concluding this report, the board would respectfully offer some remarks upon the form of the appropriations, and suggest some attention to existing acts of Congress.
By the separate acts for the gradual increase of the navy, for the gradual improvement of the navy, for building and rebuilding different vessels, altogether seven in number, each appropriation is rendered separate and distinct, although the general object is the same, and requires the use of the same kinds of materials. It is necessary, in conformity to the law of the 3d of March, 1809, that the vouchers, receipts, expenditures and accounts of each should be kept separately; and, in strictness, no article purchased for one can be applied to the use of another, however desirable or economical such use may be.
It is suggested, therefore, for consideration, whether it might not be very advantageous for Congress to determine, by some general act or resolution, the number and classes of vessels which the President might be authorized to have built, or for which materials might be procured; and then appropriate specially the amounts which might be devoted to those objects, and for keeping the force afloat in repair, under the general head of "For building and repairing vessels, and for purchase of materials and stores."
The adoption of some such plan, and removing the special restrictions which now exist, and requiring, as at present, detailed estimates for the current repairs, and reports of proceedings in building vessels, and for purchase of materials, would, it is believed, greatly simplify and diminish the number of accounts at the Treasury Department and in all the navy yards, without infringing in any degree the principle of special appropriations; would furnish to Congress all the information they now receive, and would enable us at all times to use those materials which are best prepared and most appropriate for the different objects for which they might be wanted.
The board beg leave, also, respectfully to state their opinion of the necessity for the services of a competent civil engineer for the navy, to furnish plans and estimates for all hydraulic and civil objects, and to have a general superintendence of their construction under the direction of the department. The particular character of these works requires the supervision of such a person, not less from motives of economy in the ordinary expenditures, than from the more important consideration of their proper arrangement, solidity of construction and durability.
All which is respectfully submitted.
JOHN RODGERS.
Hon. M. Dickerson, Secretary of the Navy.
A.
Upon the supposition that the naval force, to be so prepared that it might be equipped for sea at short notice, shall consist of 15 ships-of-the-line, 25 frigates, 25 sloops-of-war, 25 steamers, 25 smaller vessels, and that the frames and other durable materials shall be provided for 10 ships-of-the-line, and 10 frigates as a reserve, the following statement shows the total number and character of the armaments which the whole force will require; the number which can be furnished from the ordnance on hand; and the number which will be still required:
|
For ships-of-the-line. |
Frigates. |
Sloops. |
Steamers. |
S. V. |
Total number required |
25 |
35 |
25 |
25 |
25 |
On hand, for. |
11 |
22 |
16 |
0 |
12 |
Deficient |
14 |
13 |
9 |
25 |
13 |
Besides the bomb-cannon, guns, and carronades, for these armaments, there would be required shot, shells, small arms, pistols, and cutlasses, and a supply of powder sufficient for equipping a strong force in case of a sudden emergency.
The cost of these objects may be estimated as follows:
Armaments for 14 ships-of-the-line, |
at $45,000 each |
$630, 000 |
Armaments for 13 frigates |
16,500 each |
214, 000 |
Armaments for 9 sloops |
6,000 each |
54, 000 |
Armaments for 25 steamers |
3,000 each |
75, 000 |
Armaments for 13 smaller vessels |
1,500 each |
19,500 |
For guns, bomb-cannon, and carronades |
993, 000 |
|
100 shot to each gun, and 200 shells to each bomb-cannon, and shells for guns |
427, 000 |
|
8,000 muskets |
100, 000 |
|
3,500 pairs of pistols |
43, 750 |
|
8,000 cutlasses |
34, 000 |
|
9,000 barrels of powder |
202, 500 |
|
|
1, 800, 250 |