AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY

AS OUTLINED IN

MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES

FROM 1790

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GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1922
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THE NAVAL POLICY OF AMERICA AS OUTLINED IN MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE PRESENT DAY.

The following references by Presidents of the United States to the urgent need of the United States possessing a proper Navy, corresponding to the Nation's position as a great power, and ready at any time for efficient service in war, could be multiplied a thousand-fold from the speeches and writings of almost all the statesmen who have striven disinterestedly and intelligently for the true honor and greatness of America. By no means all of the references made by the Presidents themselves have been taken. Many of them, such as President Taylor's urgent appeals for the establishment of a retiring list and pension list, and the improvement of the personnel of the Navy, or the recitals of the glory gained and conferred by the Navy in the War of 1812 and the Civil War, are omitted because they do not bear on the problem of the present day, which is, in my own opinion, to further strengthen the Navy, both in matériel and personnel, in battleships, in torpedo boats, in dry docks, in numbers of officers and men.

Fortunately the quality of the ships and guns and of the officers and men that we have is excellent.

The utterances of the Presidents here quoted tell in outline the growth of the Navy. Washington first advocated its formation for reasons which apply now as forcibly as they applied when he wrote, over a century ago. What he said shows well how, on this as on all other questions, the greatest of Americans approached every problem of vital interest to America in a spirit of the broadest patriotism and statesmanship, combined with clear appreciation of the needs of the present and keen insight into the greater needs which the future would develop.

Under the elder Adams the Navy which Washington advocated was actually begun, and even in its infancy it accomplished feats of note. The work of building it up was unwisely stopped, and the War of 1812 showed clearly the vital benefits conferred upon the

1 Where necessary they are slightly condensed.
Nation by the little Navy which it possessed, and the terrible loss and damage caused by the fact that in size this Navy was but a small fraction of what it should have been. The utterances of Monroe, the younger Adams, and Andrew Jackson show that the lesson was at least partially learned, and our Navy, though never brought up quite to the standard it should have been in point of size, was nevertheless maintained in a condition not wholly out of proportion to the needs and the honor of the Nation.

Especial attention should be paid to the third quotation from Andrew Jackson. The victor of New Orleans had that "instinct for the jugular" which is possessed by every great fighter. All that he says applies to the present day, for, as he points out so clearly, the only effective defensive is the offensive; the only way to defend our own seacoast properly is to attack our enemy instead of waiting for him to attack us. It is for this reason that we can not afford to rely purely upon torpedo boats or upon any kind of mere coast-defense vessels. Though it is, of course, absolutely necessary to have an abundance of torpedo boats, we must also possess a powerful fleet of ships able to hold the seas, able to make long voyages, to stand rough weather, and to meet and overcome in the shock of actual fight any enemy's fleet; for it is the enemy's fleet which should be the true objective in naval war. Fortifications are indispensable, but they in no sense equal, or supply the place of, a fighting Navy.

The effect of bringing the Navy up to something like a proper standard was shown in the inestimable services it rendered during the Civil War. It is characteristic of Lincoln's farseeing statesmanship and loving care for the welfare, ultimate as well as immediate, of the people for whom he was soon to lay down his life, that in the midst of the iron stress of the Civil War, when the problems of the present would have wholly absorbed any lesser man, he should yet have thought of the future in connection with our Navy, and should have advocated the building of those seagoing battleships which, though not needed in civil strife, would most assuredly be indispensable if the honor and renown of America were to be upheld against foreign powers.

After the close of the Civil War there came a period of reaction and decline. In spite of President Grant's repeated warning and protests, a spirit of economy prevailed, and our Navy was suffered to sink below the level of that of even the third-rate powers. Then, in the middle of President Arthur's administration, the turn came; the people and their representatives awoke to what was demanded by national self-respect, the foundations of our present Navy were laid, and ever since then under every administration the work of building it up has gone steadily on.
In point of efficiency our ships need fear comparison with those of no foreign nation, and though they are not as numerous as they should ultimately be, yet long strides in the right direction have been taken. If we continue to build up our Navy for a few years to come along the lines we have followed for the 15 years immediately past, we shall, within a comparatively short period, place the United States where she should be, among the naval powers of the world. Such a Navy would be, as all of our great leaders from the days of Washington and the elder Adams to our own have pointed out, the surest guarantee of peace; and if by any unlucky chance we were to have war it would not merely save us from material disasters, but what is of incalculably more moment, it would prevent that loss of national honor which would be felt as keenly in the farthest interior of the country as on the seaboard of the Atlantic or the Pacific.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
Assistant Secretary.

(Brought up-to-date, 1922.)

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

January 8, 1790.

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.

Annual Address.

December 7, 1796.

To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval force organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression. This may even prevent the necessity of going to war by discouraging belligerent powers from committing such violations of the rights of the neutral party as may, first or last, leave no other option.

These considerations invite the United States to look to the means and to set about the gradual creation of a Navy.

However pacific the general policy of a nation may be, it ought never to be without an adequate stock of military knowledge for emergencies. This lack would impair the energy of its character and hazard its safety or expose it to greater evils when war could not be avoided; besides that, war might often not depend upon its own choice. In proportion as the observance of pacific maxims might exempt a nation from the necessity of practicing the rules of the military art ought to be its care in preserving and transmitting, by proper establishments, the knowledge of that art. The art
of war is at once comprehensive and complicated. It demands much previous study, and the possession of it in its most improved and perfect state is always of great moment to the security of a nation.

JOHN ADAMS.

May 16, 1797.

Naval power is the natural defense of the United States.

December 8, 1798.

In demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear war for the necessary protection of our rights and honor, we shall give no room to infer that we abandon the desire of peace. Efficient preparation for war can alone insure peace.

The beneficial effects of the small naval armament provided under the acts of the last session are known and acknowledged. Perhaps no country ever experienced more sudden and remarkable advantages from any measure of policy than we have derived from the arming of our maritime protection and defense. We ought without loss of time to lay the foundation for an increase of our Navy to a size sufficient to guard our coast and protect our trade. Such a naval force would afford the best means of general defense.

December 3, 1799.

A steady perseverance in a system of national defense commensurate with our resources and the situation of our country is an obvious dictate of wisdom, for nothing short of the power of repelling aggression will secure to our country a rational prospect of escaping the calamities of war or national degradation.

November 27, 1800.

A Navy, well organized, must constitute the natural and efficient defense of this country against all foreign hostility.

JAMES MADISON.

May 25, 1813.

The brilliant achievements of our infant Navy claim the highest praise and the full recompense provided by Congress.
December 5, 1815.

The signal services which have been rendered by our Navy and the capacities it has developed for successful cooperation in the national defense will give to that portion of the public force its full value in the eyes of Congress. To preserve the ships we now have in a sound state, to complete those already contemplated, to provide amply for prompt augmentations, is dictated by the soundest policy.

JAMES MONROE.

January 30 1824.

In the late war our whole coast was either invaded or menaced with invasion. There was scarcely a harbor or city on any of our great inlets which could be considered secure. In whatever direction the enemy chose to move with their squadrons and to land their troops, our fortifications, where any existed, presented but little obstacle to them. Their squadrons, in fact, annoyed our whole coast, not of the sea only but every bay and great river throughout its whole extent. In entering these inlets and sailing up them with a small force the effect was disastrous, since it never failed to draw out the whole population on each side and to keep it in the field while the squadron remained there. The expense and exposure of the inhabitants and the waste of property may readily be conceived. These occurrences demonstrate clearly that in the wars of other powers we can rely only on force for the protection of our neutral rights, and that in any war in which we may be engaged hereafter with a strong naval power the expense, waste, and other calamities attending it, considering the vast extent of our maritime frontier, can not fail, unless it be defended by adequate fortifications and a suitable naval force, to correspond with those which were experienced in the late war. Two great objects are therefore to be regarded in the establishment of an adequate naval force: The first to prevent war so far as it may be practicable; the second to diminish its calamities when it may be inevitable. No government will be disposed to violate our rights if it knows we have the means and are prepared and resolved to defend them.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

December 6, 1825.

A military marine is the only arm by which our power can be estimated or felt by foreign nations, and the only standing military force which can never be dangerous to our own liberty. A perma-
nent naval peace establishment, adapted to our present condition and adaptable to that gigantic growth with which the Nation is advancing in its career is among the subjects which have already occupied the foresight of the last Congress. Our Navy, commenced upon a scale commensurate with the incipient energies, the scanty resources, and the comparative indigence of our infancy, was even then found adequate to cope with the powers of Barbary and with one of the principal maritime powers of Europe.

At a period of further advancement, but with little accession of strength, it has not only sustained with honor the most unequal of conflicts but covered itself and our country with unfading glory. But it is only since the close of the late war that by the numbers and force of the ships of which it was composed it could deserve the name of a Navy.

December 5, 1826.

We have 12 line-of-battle ships, 20 frigates, and sloops of war in proportion, which, with a few months of preparation, may present a line of floating fortifications along the whole range of our coast. Combined with a system of fortifications upon the shores themselves, it has placed in our possession the most effective sinews of war and has left us at once an example and a lesson from which our own duties may be inferred. The gradual increase of the Navy was the principle of which the act of 29th April, 1816 was the development. It was the introduction of a system to act upon the character and history of our own country for an indefinite series of ages. It was a declaration of that Congress to their constituents and to posterity that it was the destiny and the duty of the United States to become in regular process of time and by no petty advances a great naval power.

ANDREW JACKSON.

March 4, 1829.

The increase of our Navy, whose flag has displayed in distant climes our skill in navigation and our fame in arms; the preserva-
tion of our forts, arsenals, and dock yards; and the introduction of progressive improvements in the discipline and science of both branches of our military service, are so plainly prescribed by prudence that I should be excused for omitting their mention sooner than for enlarging on their importance.

December 3, 1829.

Constituting, as the Navy does, the best standing security of this country against foreign aggression, it claims the especial attention of Government, and should continue to be cherished as the offspring of our national experience.

March 4, 1837.

No nation, however desirous of peace, can hope to escape occasional collisions with other powers, and the soundest dictates of policy require that we should place ourselves in a position to assert our rights if a resort to force should ever become necessary. Our local situation, our long line of seacoast, indented by numerous bays, with deep rivers opening into the interior, as well as our extended and still increasing commerce, point to the Navy as our national means of defense. It will in the end be found to be the cheapest and most effectual, and now is the time, in a season of peace, that we can year after year add to its strength without increasing the burdens of the people. It is your true policy, for your Navy will not only protect your rich and flourishing commerce in distant seas, but will enable you to reach and annoy the enemy, and will give to defense its greatest efficiency by meeting danger at a distance from home. It is impossible by any line of fortification to guard every point from attack against a hostile force advancing from the ocean and selecting its object, but they are indispensable to protect cities from bombardment, dockyards and naval arsenals from destruction, to give shelter to merchant vessels in time of war and to single ships or weaker squadrons when pressed by superior force. Fortifications of this description can not be too soon completed and armed and placed in a condition of the most perfect preparation. The abundant means we now possess can not be applied in any manner more useful to the country, and when this is done and our naval force sufficiently strengthened we need not fear that any nation will wantonly insult us or needlessly provoke hostilities. We shall more certainly preserve peace when it is well understood that we are prepared for war.

*The stiles are my own.*
Every effort will be made to add to the efficiency of the Navy, and I can not too strongly urge upon you liberal appropriations to that branch of the public service. Our extended and otherwise exposed maritime frontier calls for protection, to the furnishing of which an efficient naval force is indispensable. We look to no foreign conquests, nor do we propose to enter into competition with any other nation for supremacy on the ocean; but it is due not only to the honor but to the security of the people of the United States that no nation should be permitted to invade our waters at pleasure. Parsimony alone would suggest the withholding of the necessary means for the protection of our domestic firesides from invasion and our national honor from disgrace. I would most earnestly recommend the increase and prompt equipment of that gallant Navy which has lighted up every sea with its victories and spread an imperishable glory over the country.

JAMES K. POLK.

December 2, 1845.

Our reliance for protection and defense on the land must be mainly on our citizen soldiers, who will be ever ready, as they ever have been ready in time past, to rush with alacrity, at the call of their country to her defense. This description of force, however, can not defend our coast, harbors, and inland seas, nor protect our commerce on the ocean or the lakes. These must be protected by our Navy.

Considering an increased naval force, and especially steam vessels, corresponding with our growth and importance as a nation, and proportioned to the increased and increasing naval power of other nations, of vast importance as regards our safety, and the great and growing interests to be protected by it, I recommend the subject to the favorable consideration of Congress.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

December 8, 1863.

The duties devolving on the naval branch of the service during the year, and throughout the whole of this unhappy contest, have been discharged with fidelity and eminent success.
The events of the war give an increased interest and importance to the Navy, which will probably extend beyond the war itself. The armored vessels in our Navy, completed and in service, or which are under contract and approaching completion, are believed to exceed in number those of any other power. But while these may be relied upon for harbor defense and coast service, others of greater strength and capacity will be necessary for cruising purposes and to maintain our rightful position on the ocean.

No inconsiderable embarrassment, delay, and public injury have been experienced from the want of governmental establishments (sufficient in number and adequate in character) for the construction and necessary repair of modern naval vessels. I think it my duty to invite your special attention to this subject. Satisfactory and important as have been the performances of the heroic men of the Navy, they are scarcely more wonderful than the success of our mechanics and artisans in the production of war vessels which have created a new form of naval power.

I commend to your consideration the policy of fostering and training seamen for the naval service.

U. S. GRANT.

December 5, 1870.

The appropriations made for the last and current years were evidently intended by Congress, and are sufficient only, to keep the Navy on its present footing by the repairing and refitting of our old ships. This policy must, of course, gradually but surely destroy the Navy. It can hardly be wise statesmanship in a Government which represents a country with over 5,000 miles of coast line on both oceans, exclusive of Alaska, and containing 40,000,000 of progressive people, with relations of every nature with almost every foreign country, to rest with such inadequate means of enforcing any foreign policy either of protection or redress. Separated by the ocean from the nations of the Eastern Continent, our Navy is our only means of direct protection to our citizens abroad, or for the enforcement of any foreign policy.

December 2, 1872.

Unless early steps are taken to preserve our Navy, in a very few years the United States will be the weakest nation, upon the ocean, of all great powers. With an energetic, progressive, business people like ours, penetrating and forming business relations with every part
of the known world, a Navy strong enough to command the respect of our flag abroad is necessary for the full protection of all their rights.

December 2, 1873.

The distressing occurrences which have taken place in the waters of the Caribbean Sea, almost on our very seaboard, illustrate most forcibly the necessity always existing that a Nation situated like ours should maintain in a state of possible efficiency a Navy adequate to its responsibilities. Congress should provide adequately not only for the present preparation but for the future maintenance of our naval force.

CHESTER A. ARTHUR.

December 6, 1881.

I can not too strongly urge upon you my conviction that every consideration of national safety, economy, and honor imperatively demands a thorough rehabilitation of our Navy.

With a full appreciation of the fact that this must involve a large expenditure of the public moneys, I earnestly recommend such appropriations as will accomplish an end which seems to me so desirable.

Nothing can be more inconsistent with true public economy than withholding the means necessary to accomplish the objects intrusted by the Constitution to the National Legislature. One of these objects, which is of paramount importance, is declared by our fundamental law to be the provision for the "common defense." Surely nothing is more essential to the defense of the United States and of all our people than the efficiency of our Navy.

If we heed the teachings of history we shall not forget that in the life of every nation emergencies may arise when a resort to arms can alone save it from dishonor.

December 4, 1883.

The work of strengthening our Navy by the construction of modern vessels has been auspiciously begun.

That our naval strength should be made adequate for the defense of our harbors, the protection of our commercial interests, and the maintenance of our national honor is a proposition from which no patriotic citizen can withhold his assent.
December 1, 1884.

I can not too strongly urge the duty of restoring our Navy as rapidly as possible to the high state of efficiency which formerly characterized it. As the long peace that has lulled us into a state of fancied security may at any time be disturbed, it is plain that the policy of strengthening this arm of the service is dictated by considerations of wise economy, of just regard for our future tranquility, and of true appreciation of the dignity and honor of the Republic.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

December 8, 1885.

All must admit the importance of an effective Navy to a Nation like ours. Yet we have not a single vessel of war that could keep the seas against a first-class vessel of any important power. Such a condition ought not longer to continue. The nation that can not resist aggression is constantly exposed to it. Its foreign policy is of necessity weak, and its negotiations are conducted with disadvantage because it is not in condition to enforce the terms dictated by its sense of right and justice.

BENJAMIN HARRISON.

December 9, 1891.

When it is recollected that the work of building a modern Navy was only initiated in the year 1883, that our naval constructors and shipbuilders were practically without experience in the construction of large iron and steel ships, that our engine shops were unfamiliar with great marine engines, and that the manufacture of steel forgings for guns and plates was almost wholly a foreign industry, the progress that has been made is not only highly satisfactory, but furnishes the assurance that the United States will before long attain, in the construction of such vessels, with their engines and armaments, the same preeminence which it attained when the best instrument of ocean commerce was the clipper ship, and the most impressive exhibit of naval power the old wooden three-decker man-of-war. The officers of the Navy and the proprietors and engineers of our great private shops have responded with wonderful intelligence and professional zeal to the confidence expressed by Congress in its liberal legislation.
There should be no hesitation in promptly completing a Navy of the best modern type, large enough to enable this country to display its flag in all seas for the protection of its citizens and its extending commerce. It is essential to the dignity of this Nation and to that peaceful influence which it should exercise on this hemisphere that its Navy should be adequate, both upon the shores of the Atlantic and of the Pacific.

December 6, 1892.

I earnestly express the hope that the work which has made such noble progress may not now be stayed. The wholesome influence for peace and the increased sense of security which our citizens domiciled in other lands feel when these magnificent ships under the American flag appear is already most gratefully apparent. The United States is again a naval power.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

December 3, 1894.

If we are to have a Navy for war-like operations, offensive and defensive, we certainly ought to increase both the number of battleships and torpedo boats.

December 3, 1894.

During the past fiscal year there has been an unusual and pressing demand in many quarters of the world for the presence of vessels to guard American interests.

December 7, 1896.

The War College has developed into an institution which it is believed will be of great value to the Navy in teaching the science of war, as well as in stimulating the professional zeal in the Navy, and it will be especially useful in the devising of plans for the utilization, in case of necessity, of all the naval resources of the United States.

Discipline among the officers and men of the Navy has been maintained to a high standard, and the percentage of American citizens enlisted has been very much increased.

The Naval Militia, which was authorized a few years ago as an experiment, has now developed into a body of enterprising young men, active and energetic in the discharge of their duties and promising
AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY.

great usefulness. This establishment has nearly the same relation to our Navy as the National Guard in the different States bears to our Army, and it constitutes a source of supply for our naval forces, the importance of which is immediately apparent.

WILLIAM McKinley.

December 6, 1897.

The great increase of the Navy which has taken place in recent years was justified by the requirements for national defense, and has received public approbation. The time has now arrived, however, when this increase, to which the country is committed, should for a time take the form of increased facilities commensurate with the increase of our naval vessels. It is an unfortunate fact that there is only one dock on the Pacific coast capable of docking our largest ships, and only one on the Atlantic coast, and that the latter has for the last six or seven months been under repair and, therefore, incapable of use. Immediate steps should be taken to provide three or four docks of this capacity on the Atlantic coast, at least one of the Pacific coast, and a floating dock in the Gulf. This is the recommendation of a very competent board, appointed to investigate the subject. There should also be ample provision made for powder and projectiles and other munitions of war, and for an increased number of officers and enlisted men. Some additions are also necessary to our navy yards, for the repair and care of our large number of vessels.

March 4, 1897.

Commendable progress has been made of late years in the upbuilding of the American Navy, but we must supplement these efforts by providing as a proper consort for it a merchant marine amply sufficient for our own carrying trade to foreign countries. The question is one that appeals both to our business necessities and the patriotic aspirations of a great people.

December 5, 1899.

The expense is as nothing compared to the advantage to be achieved. The reestablishment of our merchant marine involves in a large measure our continued industrial progress and the extension of our commercial triumphs. I am satisfied the judgment
of the country favors the policy of aid to our merchant marine, which will broaden our commerce and markets and upbuild our sea carrying capacity for the products of agriculture and manufacture; which, with the increase of our Navy, means more work and wages to our countrymen, as well as a safeguard to American interests in every part of the world.

The Navy has maintained the spirit and high efficiency which have always characterized that service, and has lost none of the gallantry in heroic action which has signalized its brilliant and glorious past. The Nation has equal pride in its early and later achievements. Its habitual readiness for every emergency has won the confidence and admiration of the country. The people are interested in the continued preparation and prestige of the Navy and will justify liberal appropriations for its maintenance and improvement. The officers have shown peculiar adaptation for the performance of new and delicate duties which our recent war has imposed.

December 3, 1900.

American vessels during the past three years have carried about 9 per cent of our exports and imports. Foreign ships should carry the least, not the greatest, part of American trade. The remarkable growth of our steel industries, the progress of shipbuilding for the domestic trade, and our steadily maintained expenditures for the Navy have created an opportunity to place the United States in the first rank of commercial maritime powers.

Besides realizing a proper national aspiration this will mean the establishment and healthy growth along all our coasts of a distinctive national industry, expanding the field for the profitable employment of labor and capital. It will increase the transportation facilities and reduce freight charges on the vast volume of products brought from the interior to the seaboard for export, and will strengthen an arm of the national defense upon which the founders of the Government and their successors have relied. In again urging immediate action by the Congress on measures to promote American shipping and foreign trade, I direct attention to the recommendations on the subject in previous messages, and particularly to the opinion expressed in the message of 1899:

I am satisfied the judgment of the country favors the policy of aid to our merchant marine, which will broaden our commerce and markets and upbuild our sea carrying capacity for the products of agriculture and manufacture, which, with the increase of our Navy, mean more work and wages to our countrymen as well as a safeguard to American interests in every part of the world.

I commend also the establishment of a national naval reserve. * * *
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

December 3, 1901.

The work of upbuilding the Navy must be steadily continued. No one point of our policy, foreign or domestic, is more important than this to the honor and material welfare, and, above all, to the peace of our Nation in the future. Whether we desire it or not, we must henceforth recognize that we have international duties no less than international rights. Even if our flag were hauled down in the Philippines and Puerto Rico, even if we decided not to build the Isthmian Canal, we should need a thoroughly trained Navy of adequate size, or else be prepared definitely and for all time to abandon the idea that our Nation is among those whose sons go down to the sea in ships. Unless our commerce is always to be carried in foreign bottoms, we must have war craft to protect it.

Inasmuch, however, as the American people have no thought of abandoning the path upon which they have entered, and especially in view of the fact that the building of the Isthmian Canal is fast becoming one of the matters which the whole people are united in demanding, it is imperative that our Navy should be put and kept in the highest state of efficiency, and should be made to answer to our growing needs. So far from being in any way a provocation to war, an adequate and highly trained Navy is the best guaranty against war, the cheapest and most effective peace insurance. The cost of building and maintaining such a navy represents the very lightest premium for insuring peace which this Nation can possibly pay.

Probably no other great nation in the world is so anxious for peace as we are. There is not a single civilized power which has anything whatever to fear from aggressiveness on our part. All we want is peace; and toward this end we wish to be able to secure the same respect for our rights from others which we are eager and anxious to extend to their rights in return, to insure fair treatment to us commercially, and to guarantee the safety of the American people.

Our people intend to abide by the Monroe doctrine and to insist upon it as the one sure means of securing the peace of the Western Hemisphere. The Navy offers us the only means of making our insistence upon the Monroe doctrine anything but a subject of derision to whatever nation chooses to disregard it. We desire the peace which comes as of right to the just man armed; not the peace granted on terms of ignominy to the craven and the weakling.

It is not possible to improvise a Navy after war breaks out. The ships must be built and the men trained long in advance. Some auxiliary vessels can be turned into makeshifts which will do in de-
fault of any better for the minor work, and a proportion of raw men can be mixed with the highly trained, their shortcomings being made good by the skill of their fellows; but the efficient fighting force of the Navy when pitted against an equal opponent will be found almost exclusively in the warships that have been regularly built and in the officers and men who through years of faithful performance of sea duty have been trained to handle their formidable but complex and delicate weapons with the highest efficiency. In the late War with Spain the ships that dealt the decisive blows at Manila and Santiago had been launched from 2 to 14 years, and they were able to do as they did because the men in the conning towers, the gun turrets, and the engine rooms had through long years of practice at sea learned how to do their duty.

While awarding the fullest honor to the men who actually commanded and manned the ships which destroyed the Spanish sea forces in the Philippines and in Cuba, we must not forget that an equal meed of praise belongs to those without whom neither blow could have been struck. The Congressmen who voted years in advance the money to lay down the ships, to build the guns, to buy the armor plate; the department officials and the business men and wageworkers who furnished what the Congress had authorized; the Secretaries of the Navy who asked for and expended the appropriations; and finally the officers who, in fair weather and foul, on actual sea service, trained and disciplined the crews of the ships when there was no war in sight—all are entitled to a full share in the glory of Manila and Santiago and the respect accorded by every true American to those who wrought such signal triumph for our country. It was forethought and preparation which secured us the overwhelming triumph of 1898. If we fail to show forethought and preparation now, there may come a time when disaster will befall us instead of triumph; and should this time come, the fault will rest primarily, not upon those whom the accident of events puts in supreme command at the moment, but upon those who have failed to prepare in advance.

There should be no cessation in the work of completing our Navy. So far ingenuity has been wholly unable to devise a substitute for the great war craft whose hammering guns beat out the mastery of the high seas. It is unsafe and unwise not to provide this year for several additional battleships and heavy armored cruisers, with auxiliary and lighter craft in proportion; for the exact numbers and character I refer you to the report of the Secretary of the Navy. But there is something we need even more than additional ships, and this is additional officers and men. To provide battleships and cruisers and then lay them up, with the expectation of leaving them
unmanned until they are needed in actual war, would be worse than folly; it would be a crime against the Nation.

To send any warship against a competent enemy unless those aboard it had been trained by years of actual sea service, including incessant gunnery practice, would be to invite not merely disaster but the bitterest shame and humiliation. Four thousand additional seamen and one thousand additional marines should be provided; and an increase in the officers should be provided by making a large addition to the classes at Annapolis. There is one small matter which should be mentioned in connection with Annapolis. The pretentious and unmeaning title of "naval cadet" should be abolished; the title of "mid-shipman," full of historic association, should be restored.

Even in time of peace a warship should be used until it wears out, for only so can it be kept fit to respond to any emergency. The officers and men alike should be kept as much as possible on blue water, for it is there only they can learn their duties as they should be learned. The big vessels should be maneuvered in squadrons containing not merely battleships, but the necessary proportion of cruisers and scouts. The torpedo boats should be handled by the younger officers in such manner as will best fit the latter to take responsibility and meet the emergencies of actual warfare.

Every detail ashore which can be performed by a civilian should be so performed, the officer being kept for his special duty in the sea service. Above all, gunnery practice should be unceasing. It is important to have our Navy of adequate size, but it is even more important that ship for ship it should equal in efficiency any navy in the world. This is possible only with highly drilled crews and officers, and this in turn imperatively demands continuous and progressive instruction in target practice, ship handling, squadron tactics, and general discipline. Our ships must be assembled in squadrons actively cruising away from harbors and never long at anchor. The resulting wear upon engines and hulls must be endured; a battleship worn out in long training of officers and men is well paid for by the results, while, on the other hand, no matter in how excellent condition, it is useless if the crew be not expert.

We now have 17 battleships appropriated for, of which 9 are completed and have been commissioned for actual service. The remaining 8 will be ready in from two to four years, but it will take at least that time to recruit and train the men to fight them. It is of vast concern that we have trained crews ready for the vessels by the time they are commissioned. Good ships and good guns are simply good weapons, and the best are useless save in the hands of men who know how to fight with them. The men must be trained and drilled under a thorough and well-planned system of progressive instruction, while
the recruiting must be carried on with still greater vigor. Every effort must be made to exalt the main function of the officer—the command of men. The leading graduates of the Naval Academy should be assigned to the combatant branches, the line and marines.

Many of the essentials of success are already recognized by the General Board, which, as the central office of a growing staff, is moving steadily toward a proper war efficiency and a proper efficiency of the whole Navy, under the Secretary. This General Board, by fostering the creation of a general staff, is providing for the official and then the general recognition of our altered conditions as a Nation and of the true meaning of a great war fleet, which meaning is, first, the best men, and, second, the best ships.

The Naval Militia forces are State organizations and are trained for coast service, and in event of war they will constitute the inner line of defense. They should receive hearty encouragement from the General Government.

But in addition we should at once provide for a National Naval Reserve, organized and trained under the direction of the Navy Department and subject to the call of the Chief Executive whenever war becomes imminent. It should be a real auxiliary to the naval seagoing peace establishment and offer material to be drawn on at once for manning our ships in time of war. It should be composed of graduates of the Naval Academy, graduates of the Naval Militia, officers and crews of coast-line steamers, longshore schooners, fishing vessels, and steam yachts, together with the coast population about such centers as life-saving stations and lighthouses.

The American people must either build and maintain an adequate Navy or else make up their minds definitely to accept a secondary position in international affairs, not merely in political but in commercial matters. It has been well said that there is no surer way of courting national disaster than to be "opulent, aggressive, and unarmed."

December 2, 1902.

There should be no halt in the work of building up the Navy, providing every year additional fighting craft. We are a very rich country, vast in extent of territory, and great in population; a country, moreover, which has an Army diminutive indeed when compared with that of any other first-class power. We have deliberately made our own certain foreign policies which demand the possession of a first-class Navy. The Isthmian Canal will greatly increase the efficiency of our Navy if the Navy is of sufficient size; but if we have an inadequate navy, then the building of the canal would be merely
AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY.

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giving a hostage to any power of superior strength. The Monroe doctrine should be treated as the cardinal feature of American foreign policy; but it would be worse than idle to assert it unless we intended to back it up, and it can be backed up only by a thoroughly good Navy. A good Navy is not a provocative of war. It is the surest guaranty of peace.

Each individual unit of our Navy should be the most efficient of its kind as regards both material and personnel that is to be found in the world. I call your special attention to the need of providing for the manning of the ships. Serious trouble threatens us if we can not do better than we are now doing as regards securing the services of a sufficient number of the highest type of sailormen, of sea mechanics. The veteran seamen of our warships are of as high a type as can be found in any navy which rides the waters of the world; they are unsurpassed in daring, in resolution, in readiness, in thorough knowledge of their profession. They deserve every consideration that can be shown them. But there are not enough of them. It is no more possible to improvise a crew than it is possible to improvise a warship. To build the finest ship, with the deadlest battery, and to send it afloat with a raw crew, no matter how brave they were individually, would be to insure disaster if a foe of average capacity were encountered. Neither ships nor men can be improvised when war has begun. We need a thousand additional officers in order to properly man the ships now provided for and under construction. The classes at the Naval School at Annapolis should be greatly enlarged. At the same time that we thus add the officers, where we need them, we should facilitate the retirement of those at the head of the list whose usefulness has become impaired. Promotion must be fostered if the service is to be kept efficient.

The lamentable scarcity of officers and the large number of recruits and of unskilled men necessarily put aboard the new vessels as they have been commissioned has thrown upon our officers, and especially on the lieutenants and junior grades, unusual labor and fatigue and has gravely strained their powers of endurance. Nor is there sign of any immediate let-up in this strain. It must continue for some time longer, until more officers are graduated from Annapolis and until the recruits become trained and skillful in their duties. In these difficulties incident upon the development of our war fleet the conduct of all our officers has been creditable to the service, and the lieutenants and junior grades in particular have displayed an ability and a steadfast cheerfulness which entitles them to the ungrudging thanks of all who realize the disheartening trials and fatigues to which they are of necessity subjected.

There is not a cloud on the horizon at present. There seems not the slightest chance of trouble with a foreign power. We most
earnestly hope that this state of things may continue; and the way to insure its continuance is to provide for a thoroughly efficient Navy. The refusal to maintain such a Navy would invite trouble, and if trouble came would insure disaster. Fatuous self-complacency or vanity, or shortsightedness in refusing to prepare for danger, is both foolish and wicked in such a Nation as ours; and past experience has shown that such fatuity in refusing to recognize or prepare for any crises in advance is usually succeeded by a mad panic of hysterical fear once the crisis has actually arrived.

December 7, 1903.

I heartily congratulate the Congress upon the steady progress in building up the American Navy. We can not afford a let-up in this great work. To stand still means to go back. There should be no cessation in adding to the effective units of the fighting strength of the fleet. Meanwhile the Navy Department and the officers of the Navy are doing well their part by providing constant service at sea under conditions akin to those of actual warfare. Our officers and enlisted men are learning to handle the battleships, cruisers, and torpedo boats with high efficiency in fleet and squadron formations, and the standard of marksmanship is being steadily raised. The best work ashore is indispensable, but the highest duty of a naval officer is to exercise command at sea.

The establishment of a naval base in the Philippines ought not to be longer postponed. Such a base is desirable in time of peace; in time of war it would be indispensable and its lack would be ruinous. Without it our fleet would be helpless. Our naval experts are agreed that Subig Bay is the proper place for the purpose. The national interests require that the work of fortification and development of a naval station at Subig Bay be begun at an early date, for under the best conditions it is a work which will consume much time.

December 4, 1904.

In treating of our foreign policy and of the attitude that this great Nation should assume in the world at large, it is absolutely necessary to consider the Army and the Navy, and the Congress, through which the thought of the Nation finds its expression, should keep ever vividly in mind the fundamental fact that it is impossible to treat our foreign policy, whether this policy takes shape in the effort to secure justice for others or justice for ourselves, save as conditioned upon the attitude we are willing to take toward our Army, and especially toward our Navy. It is not merely unwise, it is con-
temptible for a nation, as for an individual, to use high-sounding language to proclaim its purposes, or to take positions which are ridiculous if unsupported by potential force and then to refuse to provide this force. If there is no intention of providing and of keeping the force necessary to back up a strong attitude, then it is far better not to assume such an attitude.

The strong arm of the Government in enforcing respect for its just rights in international matters is the Navy of the United States. I most earnestly recommend that there be no halt in the work of upbuilding the American Navy. There is no more patriotic duty before us as a people than to keep the Navy adequate to the needs of this country's position. We have undertaken to build the Isthmian Canal. We have undertaken to secure for ourselves our just share in the trade of the Orient. We have undertaken to protect our citizens from improper treatment in foreign lands. We continue steadily to insist on the application of the Monroe doctrine to the Western Hemisphere. Unless our attitude in these and all similar matters is to be a mere boastful sham, we can not afford to abandon our naval programme. Our voice is now potent for peace, and is so potent because we are not afraid of war. But our protestations upon behalf of peace would neither receive nor deserve the slightest attention if we were impotent to make them good.

December 5, 1905.

We can not consider the question of our foreign policy without at the same time treating of the Army and the Navy.

But it is, of course, true that the man behind the gun, the man in the engine room, and the man in the conning tower, considered not only individually, but especially with regard to the way in which they work together, are even more important than the weapons with which they work. The most formidable battleship is, of course, helpless against even a light cruiser if the men aboard it are unable to hit anything with their guns; and thoroughly well-handled cruisers may count seriously in an engagement with much superior vessels if the men aboard the latter are ineffective, whether from lack of training or from any other cause. Modern warships are most formidable mechanisms when well handled, but they are utterly useless when not well handled, and they can not be handled at all without long and careful training. This training can under no circumstances be given when once war has broken out. No fighting ship of the first class should ever be laid up save for necessary repairs; and her crew should be kept constantly exercised on the high
seas, so that she may stand at the highest point of perfection. To put a new and untrained crew upon the most powerful battleship and send it out to meet a formidable enemy is not only to invite but to insure disaster and disgrace. To improvise crews at the outbreak of a war, so far as the serious fighting craft are concerned, is absolutely hopeless. If the officers and men are not thoroughly skilled in and have not been thoroughly trained to their duties, it would be far better to keep the ships in port during hostilities than to send them against a formidable opponent, for the result could only be that they would be either sunk or captured.

December 3, 1906.

The United States Navy is the surest guarantor of peace which this country possesses. It is earnestly to be wished that we would profit by the teachings of history in this matter. A strong and wise people will study its own failures no less than its triumphs, for there is wisdom to be learned from the study of both, of the mistake as well as of the success. For this purpose nothing could be more instructive than a rational study of the War of 1812, as it is told, for instance, by Capt. Mahan. There was only one way in which that war could have been avoided. If during the preceding 12 years a Navy relatively as strong as that which this country now has had been built up, and an Army provided relatively as good as that which the country now has, there never would have been the slightest necessity of fighting the war; and if the necessity had arisen the war would under such circumstances have ended with our speedy and overwhelming triumph. But our people during those 12 years refused to make any preparations whatever regarding either the Army or the Navy. They saved a million or two of dollars by so doing; and in mere money paid a hundredfold for each million thus saved during the three years of war which followed—a war which brought untold suffering upon our people, which at one time threatened the gravest national disaster, and which, in spite of the necessity of waging it, resulted merely in what was in effect a drawn battle, while the balance of defeat and triumph was almost even.

I do not ask that we continue to increase our Navy. I ask merely that it be maintained at its present strength; and this can be done only if we replace the obsolete and outworn ships by new and good ones, the equals of any afloat in any navy. To stop building ships for one year means that for that year the Navy goes back instead of forward. The old battleship Texas, for instance, would now be of little service in a stand-up fight with a powerful adversary. The old double-turret monitors have outworn their usefulness, while it
was a waste of money to build the modern single-turret monitors. All these ships should be replaced by others; and this can be done by a well-settled program of providing for the building each year of at least one first-class battleship, equal in size and speed to any that any nation is at the same time building; the armament presumably to consist of as large a number as possible of very heavy guns of one caliber, together with smaller guns to repel torpedo attack; while there should be heavy armor, turbine engines, and, in short, every modern device. Of course, from time to time, cruisers, colliers, torpedo-boat destroyers, or torpedo boats will have to be built also. All this, be it remembered, would not increase our Navy, but would merely keep it at its present strength. Equally of course the ships will be absolutely useless if the men aboard them are not so trained that they can get the best possible service out of the formidable but delicate and complicated mechanisms intrusted to their care. The marksmanship of our men has so improved during the last five years that I deem it within bounds to say that the Navy is more than twice as efficient, ship for ship, as half a decade ago. The Navy can only attain proper efficiency if enough officers and men are provided, and if these officers and men are given the chance (and required to take advantage of it) to stay continually at sea and to exercise the fleets singly and above all in squadron, the exercise to be of every kind and to include unceasing practice at the guns, conducted under conditions that will test marksmanship in time of war.

In both the Army and the Navy there is urgent need that everything possible should be done to maintain the highest standard for the personnel, alike as regards the officers and the enlisted men. I do not believe that in any service there is a finer body of enlisted men and of junior officers than we have in both the Army and the Navy, including the Marine Corps. All possible encouragement to the enlisted men should be given, in pay and otherwise, and everything practicable done to render the service attractive to men of the right type. They should be held to the strictest discharge of their duty, and in them a spirit should be encouraged which demands not the mere performance of duty, but the performance of far more than duty, if it conduces to the honor and the interests of the American Nation; and in return the amplest consideration should be theirs.

December 3, 1907.

I think it is only lack of foresight that troubles us, not any hostility to the Army. There are, of course, foolish people who denounce any care of the Army or Navy as "militarism," but I do not think that these people are numerous. This country has to contend
now, and has had to contend in the past, with many evils, and there is ample scope for all who would work for reform. But there is not one evil that now exists, or that ever has existed in this country, which is, or ever has been, owing in the smallest part to militarism. Declaration against militarism has no more serious place in an earnest and intelligent movement for righteousness in this country than declaration against the worship of Baal or Astaroth. It is declaration against a nonexistent evil, one which never has existed in this country, and which has not the slightest chance of appearing here. We are glad to help in any movement for international peace, but this is because we sincerely believe that it is our duty to help all such movements provided they are sane and rational, and not because there is any tendency toward militarism on our part which needs to be cured. The evils we have to fight are those in connection with industrialism, not militarism. Industry is always necessary, just as war is sometimes necessary.

It was hoped The Hague Conference might deal with the question of the limitation of armaments. But even before it had assembled informal inquiries had developed that as regards naval armaments, the only ones in which this country had any interest, it was hopeless to try to devise any plan for which there was the slightest possibility of securing the assent of the nations gathered at The Hague. No plan was even proposed which would have had the assent of more than one first-class power outside of the United States. The only plan that seemed at all feasible, that of limiting the size of battleships, met with no favor at all. It is evident, therefore, that it is folly for this Nation to base any hope of securing peace on any international agreement as to the limitation of armaments. Such being the fact it would be most unwise for us to stop the upbuilding of our Navy. To build one battleship of the best and most advanced type a year would barely keep our fleet up to its present force. This is not enough. In my judgment we should this year provide for four battleships. But it is idle to build battleships unless in addition to providing the men and the means for thorough training; we provide the auxiliaries for them, unless we provide docks, the coaling stations, the colliers, and supply ships that they need. We are extremely deficient in coaling stations and docks on the Pacific, and this deficiency should not longer be permitted to exist. Plenty of torpedo boats and destroyers should be built. Both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts fortifications of the best type should be provided for all our greatest harbors.

We need always to remember that in time of war the Navy is not to be used to defend harbors and seacoast cities; we should perfect our system of coast fortifications. The only efficient use for the Navy
is for offense. The only way in which it can efficiently protect our own coast against the possible action of a foreign navy is by destroying that foreign navy. For defense against a hostile fleet which actually attacks them, the coast cities must depend upon their forts, mines, torpedoes, submarines, and torpedo boats and destroyers. All of these together are efficient for defensive purposes, but they in no way supply the place of a thoroughly efficient navy capable of acting on the offensive; for parrying never yet won a fight. It can only be won by hard hitting, and an aggressive seagoing Navy alone can do this hard hitting of the offensive type. But the forts and the like are necessary so that the Navy may be foot-loose. In time of war there is sure to be demand, under pressure of fright, for the ships to be scattered so as to defend all kinds of ports. Under penalty of terrible disaster, this demand must be refused. The ships must be kept together, and their objective made the enemies' fleet. If fortifications are sufficiently strong, no modern navy will venture to attack them so long as the foe has in existence a hostile navy of anything like the same size or efficiency. But unless there exists such a navy then the fortifications are powerless by themselves to secure the victory. For, of course, the mere deficiency means that any resolute enemy can at his leisure combine all his forces upon one point with the certainty that he can take it.

Until our battle fleet is much larger than at present it should never be split into detachments so far apart that they could not in event of emergency be speedily united. Our coast line is on the Pacific just as much as on the Atlantic. The interests of California, Oregon, and Washington are as emphatically the interests of the whole Union as those of Maine and New York, of Louisiana and Texas. The battle fleet should now and then be moved to the Pacific, just as at other times it should be kept in the Atlantic. When the Isthmian Canal is built the transit of the battle fleet from one ocean to the other will be comparatively easy. Until it is built I earnestly hope that the battle fleet will be thus shifted between the two oceans every year or two. The marksmanship on all our ships has improved phenomenally during the last five years. Until within the last two or three years it was not possible to train a battle fleet in squadron maneuvers under service conditions, and it is only during these last two or three years that the training under these conditions has become really effective. Another and most necessary stride in advance is now being taken. The battle fleet is about starting by the Straits of Magellan to visit the Pacific coast. Sixteen battleships are going under the command of Rear Admiral Evans, while eight armored cruisers and two other battleships will meet him at San Francisco, whither certain torpedo destroyers are also going. No fleet of such size has ever made such a voyage, and it will be of very great edu-
ational use to all engaged in it. The only way by which to teach officers and men how to handle the fleet so as to meet every possible strain and emergency in time of war is to have them practice under similar conditions in time of peace. Moreover, the only way to find out our actual needs is to perform in time of peace whatever maneuvers might be necessary in time of war. After war is declared it is too late to find out the needs; that means to invite disaster.

It must be remembered that everything done in the Navy to fit it to do well in time of war must be done in time of peace. Modern wars are short; they do not last the length of time requisite to build a battleship; and it takes longer to train the officers and men to do well on a battleship than it takes to build it. Nothing effective can be done for the Navy once war has begun, and the result of the war, if the combatants are otherwise equally matched, will depend upon which power has prepared best in time of peace. The United States Navy is the best guaranty the Nation has that its honor and interest will not be neglected; and, in addition, it offers by far the best insurance for peace that can by human ingenuity be devised.

April 14, 1908.

I advocate that the United States build a Navy commensurate with its powers and its needs, because I feel that such a Navy will be the surest guaranty and safeguard of peace. We are not a military nation. Our Army is so small as to present an almost absurd contrast to our size, and is properly treated as little more than a nucleus for organization in case of serious war. Yet we are a rich Nation, and undefended wealth invites aggression. The very liberty of individual speech and action which we so prize and guard renders it possible that at times unexpected causes of friction with foreign powers may suddenly develop. At this moment we are negotiating arbitration treaties with all the other great powers that are willing to enter into them. These arbitration treaties have a special usefulness because in the event of some sudden disagreement they render it morally incumbent upon both nations to seek first to reach an agreement through arbitration, and at least secure a breathing space during which the cool judgment of the two nations involved may get the upper hand over any momentary burst of anger. These arbitration treaties are entered into not only with the hope of preventing wrongdoing by others against us, but also as a proof that we have no intention of doing wrong ourselves.

Yet it is idle to assume, and from the standpoint of national interest and honor it is mischievous folly for any statesman to assume, that this world has yet reached the stage, or has come within measurable distance of the stage, when a proud nation, jealous of its honor
and conscious of its great mission in the world, can be content to rely for peace upon the forbearance of other powers. It would be equally foolish to rely upon each of them possessing at all times and under all circumstances and provocations an altruistic regard for the rights of others. Those who hold this view are blind indeed to all that has gone on before their eyes in the world at large. They are blind to what has happened in China, in Turkey, in the Spanish possessions, in Central and South Africa during the last dozen years. For centuries China has cultivated the very spirit which our own peace-at-any-price men wish this country to adopt. For centuries China has refused to provide military forces and has treated the career of the soldier as inferior in honor and regard to the career of the merchant or of the man of letters. There never has been so large an empire which for so long a time has so resolutely proceeded on the theory of doing away with what is called "militarism." Whether the result has been happy in international affairs I need not discuss; all the advanced reformers and farsighted patriots in the Chinese Empire are at present seeking (I may add, with our hearty good will) for a radical and far-reaching reform in internal affairs. In external affairs the policy has resulted in various other nations now holding large portions of Chinese territory, while there is a very acute fear in China lest the Empire, because of its defenselessness, be exposed to absolute dismemberment, and its well-wishers are able to help it only in a small measure, because no nation can help any other unless that other can help itself.

The State Department is continually appealed to to interfere on behalf of peoples and nationalities who insist that they are suffering from oppression—now Jews in one country, now Christians in another; now black men said to be oppressed by white men in Africa. Armenians, Koreans, Finns, Poles, representatives of all, appeal at times to this Government. All of this oppression is alleged to exist in time of profound peace; and frequently, although by no means always, it is alleged to occur at the hands of people who are not very formidable in a military sense. In some cases the accusations of oppression and wrongdoing are doubtless ill founded. In others they are well founded; and in certain cases the most appalling loss of life is shown to have occurred, accompanied with frightful cruelty. It is not our province to decide which side has been right and which has been wrong in all or any of these controversies. I am merely referring to the loss of life. It is probably a conservative statement to say that within the last 12 years, at periods of profound peace and not as the result of war, massacres and butcheries have occurred in which more lives of men, women, and children have been lost than in any single great war since the close of the Napoleonic struggles. To any public man who knows of the com-
plaints continually made to the State Department there is an element of grim tragedy in the claim that the time has gone by when weak nations or peoples can be oppressed by those that are stronger without arousing effective protest from other strong interests. Events still fresh in the mind of every thinking man show that neither arbitration nor any other device can as yet be invoked to prevent the gravest and most terrible wrongdoing to peoples who are few in numbers or who, if numerous, have lost the first and most important of national virtues—the capacity for self-defense.

When a nation is so happily situated as is ours—that is, when it has no reason to fear or to be feared by its land neighbors—the fleet is all the more necessary for the preservation of peace. Great Britain has been saved by its fleet from the necessity of facing one of the two alternatives—of submission to conquest by a foreign power or of itself becoming a great military power. The United States can hope for a permanent career of peace on only one condition, and that is on condition of building and maintaining a first-class Navy; and the step to be taken toward this end at this time is to provide for the building of four additional battleships. I earnestly wish that the Congress would pass the measures for which I have asked for strengthening and rendering more efficient the Army as well as the Navy; all of these measures as affecting every branch and detail of both services are sorely needed, and it would be the part of far-sighted wisdom to enact them all into laws, but the most vital and immediate need is that of the four battleships.

To carry out this policy is but to act in the spirit of George Washington; is but to continue the policies which he outlined when he said, "Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. * * * Nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded and that in place of them just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated. * * *

"I can not recommend to your notice measures for the fulfillment of our duties to the rest of the world without again pressing upon you the necessity of placing ourselves in a condition of complete defense and of exacting from them the fulfillment of their duties toward us. The United States ought not to indulge in persuasion that, contrary to the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history of every other nation abounds. There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most
powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.”

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT.

March 4, 1909.

What has been said of the Army may be affirmed in even a more emphatic way of the Navy. A modern Navy can not be improvised. It must be built and in existence when the emergency arises which calls for its use and operation. My distinguished predecessor has in many speeches and messages set out with great force and striking language the necessity for maintaining a strong Navy commensurate with the coast line, the governmental resources, and the foreign trade of our Nation; and I wish to reiterate all the reasons which he has presented in favor of the policy of maintaining a strong Navy as the best conservator of our peace with other nations, and the best means of securing respect for the assertion of our rights, the defense of our interests, and the exercise of our influence in international matters.

December 7, 1909.

The return of the battleship fleet from its voyage around the world, in more efficient condition than when it started, was a noteworthy event of interest alike to our citizens and the naval authorities of the world. Besides the beneficial and far-reaching effect on our personal and diplomatic relations in the countries which the fleet visited, the marked success of the ships in steaming around the world in all weathers on schedule time has increased respect for our Navy and has added to our national prestige.

December 6, 1912.

In the past 15 years the Navy has expanded rapidly, yet far less rapidly than our country. From now on reduced expenditures in the Navy means reduced military strength. The world’s history has shown the importance of sea power both for adequate defense and for the support of important and definite policies.

WOODROW WILSON.

December 8, 1914.

A powerful Navy we have always regarded as our proper and natural means of defense; and it has always been of defense that
we have thought, never of aggression or of conquest. But who shall
tell us now what sort of a Navy to build? We shall take leave to
be strong upon the seas, in the future as in the past; and there will
be no thought of offense or of provocation in that. Our ships are
our natural bulwarks. When will the experts tell us just what kind
we should construct, and when will they be right for 10 years
together, if the relative efficiency of craft of different kinds and uses
continues to change as we have seen it change under our very eyes
in these last few months?

But I turn away from the subject. It is not new. There is no
new need to discuss it. We shall not alter our attitude toward it
because some amongst us are nervous and excited. We shall easily
and sensibly agree upon a policy of defense. The question has not
changed its aspect because the times are not normal. Our policy
will not be for an occasion. It will be conceived as a permanent
and settled thing, which we will pursue at all seasons, without haste
and after a fashion perfectly consistent with the peace of the world,
the abiding friendship of States, and the unhampered freedom of
all with whom we deal. Let there be no misconception. The coun-
try has been misinformed. We have not been negligent of national
defense. We are not unmindful of the great responsibility resting
upon us. We shall learn and profit by the lesson of every experi-
ence and every new circumstance; and what is needed will be ade-
quately done.

December 7, 1915.

But armies and instruments of war are only part of what has to
be considered if we are to provide for the supreme matter of national
self-sufficiency and security in all its aspects. There are other great
matters which will be thrust upon our attention whether we will or
not. There is, for example, a very pressing question of trade and
shipping involved in this great problem of national adequacy. It is
necessary for many weighty reasons of national efficiency and de-
velopment that we should have a great merchant marine. The great
merchant fleet we once used to make us rich, that great body of
sturdy sailors who used to carry our flag into every sea, and who
were the pride and often the bulwark of the Nation, we have almost
driven out of existence by inexcusable neglect and indifference and
by a hopelessly blind and provincial policy of so-called economic pro-
tection. It is high time we repaired our mistake and resumed our
commercial independence on the seas.
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