A HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES NAVY

VOLUME III
Ornament on turret of the Kearsarge.
A HISTORY OF THE
United States Navy
FROM 1775 TO 1902

BY
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REMINISCENCES OF THE OLD NAVY
EDITOR OF THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY
(U. S. Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789-1791)

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IN THREE VOLUMES
VOL. III

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April, 1902.
PREFACE TO NEW EDITION OF VOL. III.

In the first edition of this History of the United States Navy, published 1894, and in all subsequent editions, the author invited corrections and additional facts from any reliable source with the single purpose of insuring accuracy in his narrative. At the time Volume III was prepared, the commander of the Flying Squadron in the Spanish-American War had been resting for over two years under charges of neglect of duty and serious misconduct, and no action on his part had been taken toward a settlement, by an official inquiry, of the questions involved. The results of the writer's study of the subject showed certain failures on the part of the officer in question, particularly in regard to the retrograde movement from Santiago, which were characterized in severe terms. These terms were applied to the conduct of Commodore Schley as a commander because he failed to destroy an enemy's ship and withdrew his squadron from the blockade of an enemy's fleet. As to Commodore Schley's personal conduct in battle (while the loop of the *Brooklyn* must be regarded as unfortunate), the author does not question the commodore's physical courage. It is not worth while to discuss misconceptions of the author's language which have been prevalent. He regrets that any reason for this was afforded by the use of expressions which he has withdrawn.

As a whole, the results of the searching investigation made by the court of inquiry (a complete account of which will be found in an appendix) have justified the
historical position taken in the preceding edition of this volume regarding Commodore Schley's conduct in the Santiago campaign.

The author desires to say that no officer or person in any way connected with the navy has ever made the slightest effort to bias his mind against Rear-Admiral Schley. Furthermore, no person reading proof sheets of this work has ever "approved" of the writer's criticisms of that officer, nor has the author ever intimated that such "approval" was ever made.

In this new edition of Volume III, Admiral Dewey has favored the writer with additional details and corrections bearing on the battle in Manila Bay. Items of interest from Lieutenants Joseph Beale, William G. Mayer and Charles S. Braddock, all of the United States navy during the Spanish war, have been inserted.

In conclusion, the writer desires to say that any suggestions or items of interest bearing on the history of our navy will be gladly received and considered for insertion in future editions of this work.

E. S. M.

February, 1902.
PREFACE TO VOLUME III.

In the preparation of this work the writer—as in Volumes I and II—has based his narrative solidly on official reports, both Spanish and American, of the commanders participating. Any material conflicting with these reports has been rejected. As a further safeguard, nearly every commanding officer concerned has read and corrected proof sheets dealing with actions in which each figured. It was this effort to obtain accuracy that has delayed the publication of this volume full twelve months, but the writer feels more than compensated for his failure to produce a "timely" work in the satisfaction of securing accuracy. It is remarkable how many mistakes—and in some cases glaring errors—have crept into popular accounts of our navy’s doings in the Spanish war. It might be supposed that events of such moment, occurring under our very eyes, would be properly and truthfully recorded. Such is not the case. Unsparing exertions have been made to set aright these misconceptions. That this work may be as complete as possible, the writer has devoted much time in ascertaining the middle names of our officers engaged in the war. These have been given in full—so far as they could be learned—in the index, and will be found convenient for future reference.

In the collecting of material for this work the writer is especially indebted to Dr. Juan García Purón for official records and authoritative items from Spanish sources. Señor Purón forwarded from Madrid to the...
writer a complete set of the El Mundo Naval (ilustrado) —the best Spanish naval periodical—covering many weeks before and after the war, from which the author obtained a most comprehensive and technical view of Spain’s maritime strength in 1898. In this publication appears a series of articles by Captain Victor M. Concas, Cervera’s second in command during the battle of July 3d. These throw a flood of light on that memorable occasion from the Spanish point of view, and add substantially to the naval history of our country. Besides this, Dr. Purón supplied the writer with many pamphlets published in Spain soon after the war, which give the fullest versions of the “other side.” To be sure, the “other side” story was somewhat prejudiced, and was in a considerable degree devoted to “explaining away” the reverses Spain suffered; yet they are valuable from a historic point of view.

From Secretary Long the writer has received copies of every official report asked for. The hearty and invaluable co-operation of Rear-Admiral Crowninshield, who so ably filled the important position of chief of the Bureau of Navigation during the war, is acknowledged; also that of Commander Richardson Clover, chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and Captain Charles Dwight Sigsbee, who succeeded him. The mass of material, both domestic and foreign, bearing on the Spanish war, collected by Clover and Sigsbee, and the skillful manner in which it was treated, is beyond all praise. Like the management of our maritime power in that struggle, it sets a standard which world powers have not equaled.

Brigadier-General Fitzhugh Lee has greatly aided the writer by editing those portions of this volume dealing with incidents prior and subsequent to the destruction of the Maine in Havana harbor. Lieutenant-Commander William Walker Maclay, U. S. N. (resigned), also has favored the writer with items of value.

Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson has very kindly edited the chapter dealing with the sinking of
the *Merrimac* in the entrance to Santiago harbor, and has indicated the exact position of the wreck in the map prepared for this work.

To Captain John Russell Bartlett, U. S. N. (retired), the writer is indebted for highly interesting material relative to the important work done by our naval militia in manning the "mosquito fleet" and several auxiliary cruisers, and in performing coast-guard duty. This is a service of peculiar significance. It has not attracted much public attention, because no Spanish war ship approached our coasts, but it has established a precedence which will be studied in future wars.

To Captain Frank Wildes the writer is under great obligations for the corrections of several popular errors regarding the battle of May 1st. Valuable assistance has been received from Rear-Admirals John Francis Higginson, Frederick Rodgers, John Woodward Philip, Montgomery Sicard, William Thomas Sampson, Albert Smith Barker and Edwin Malcolm Shepard. From Captains Philip Henry Cooper, Francis Augustus Cook, Colby Mitchel Chester, Charles Edgar Clark, Benjamin P. Lamberton, Caspar Frederick Goodrich, Bowman Hendry McCalla, French Ensor Chadwick, Willard Herbert Brownson, Charles Hubert Stockton, Henry Ware Lyon; and from Commanders Chapman Coleman Todd, Frederick Martin Symonds, John Elliott Pillsbury, James Douglass Jerrold Kelley and Albert Gleaves Berry items of historical importance have been received. Correspondence dealing with minor actions of the war has been had with Lieutenant-Commanders Corwin Pottenger Rees, Nathan Sargent, William Banks Caperton, Albert Caldwell Dillingham, William Henry Hudson Southerland, Jesse Mims Roper, Cameron McRae Winslow and Alexander Sharp, Jr.; also with Lieutenants Charles Nelson Atwater, John Baptiste Bernadou, Spencer Shepard Wood, Edward Walter Eberle, Charles Lincoln Hussey, Henry Heber Ward and William Henry Buck. Acknowledgments of aid
received from other officers who have read over proof sheets of this work, dealing with actions in which they were concerned, and in other ways assisted the writer, have been made in footnotes.

Special efforts have been made in this volume to render justice to those officers and men who were engaged in the so-called "minor action of the war." The operations at Manila and Santiago were of such a stupendous character that there has been a pronounced tendency on the part of the public to overlook all other achievements. Many splendid actions were fought, many daring enterprises were undertaken, which, had they not been overshadowed by the most important operations of the war, would have raised the men participating to the pinnacle of fame. It is believed that full justice has been done to these "lesser heroes" of the war. Furthermore, the writer has conscientiously endeavored to give appropriate mention to our humbler heroes in these engagements. The officers, of course, are noticed first, but too frequently the heroes of the forecastle and fire rooms are passed in silence. It is a matter of deepest gratification to the great American people to know that worthy successors of Reuben James, John Andrews, Patrick Dougherty, John McFarland, Henry Shutes and Horatio Young are plentifully represented in the new navy of the United States.

In conclusion, the writer desires to say that he will gladly receive additional items of interest, corrections or suggestion, from any reliable source, for insertion in future editions. He desires to emphasize the fact that this is pre-eminently a "living history" of our navy, so that any material tending to perfect his work will be welcome. In the first edition of this work, issued in 1894, he said, "The study of the United States navy is far from being completed, and, impressed with this fact, I would gladly receive information from any reliable source in order that it may be incorporated in future editions." This invitation has been responded
to generously, with the result that Volumes I and II of this work, as presented in this third edition, have been substantially improved, and it is earnestly hoped that this hearty co-operation will continue, so that we may have a perfect record of our navy's doings, such as our gallant officers and men deserve.

E. S. M.

Navy Yard, New York, April, 1901.
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PART SIXTH.

AFTER THE CIVIL WAR.

1865–1898.
CHAPTER I.

MINOR SERVICES OF THE NAVY.

At the close of the civil war, or in April, 1865, the navy list contained the names of seven hundred and seventeen vessels. Many of these craft were chartered or purchased merchant vessels, hastily secured and fitted for the emergency, and soon after the cessation of hostilities were sold, broken up or returned to their first owners. Work on most of the Government war craft in course of construction was suspended, and in many cases the partially completed ships were broken up and the material sold. A large number of the war vessels that were hastily built during hostilities, especially those of the Kewaydin and Mosholu class, having been constructed with unseasoned timber, were found to be rapidly rotting, and these vessels also were condemned and disposed of. Many other vessels were permanently retired by the adoption of the rule that if the cost of repairs needed at any time should equal twenty per cent of the original price of a ship, she must be sent to "rotten row."

During this period of the disintegration of the navy a number of services were performed by the ships retained that merit attention. In May, 1867, the Lackawanna rescued the crew of the American whaler Daniel Wood, which had been wrecked on a reef in the Pacific Ocean near the Sandwich Islands. A valuable service was performed in the same year by Commander Ralph Chandler in the United States steamer Don. Chandler surveyed a dangerous shoal, not laid down in
the maps, twenty miles west of St. George's Shoals, directly in the track of trading vessels.

The services of the navy were again demanded in the Far East by the treatment the crew of the American trading schooner General Sherman received from the Coreans. While working her way up the Ping Yang River, Corea, September, 1866, the General Sherman was captured and destroyed, and her crew was reported to have been massacred by the natives. Several attempts were made to learn the fate of these sailors, and in January, 1867, the Wachusett, Commander Robert Wilson Shufeldt, in vain made inquiries for them. In April of the following year the Shenandoah, Commander John Carson Febiger, visited the coast with the same result. Meantime reports came to Rear-Admiral John Rodgers, from other sources, that some of the men were confined in Corea. In 1865 a French army attempted to invade Corea, but was driven back with great slaughter, which success had made the Coreans more than usually confident. In May, 1871, Rodgers appeared off the Corean coast with the Colorado, the Benicia, the Monocacy and the Palos, and, assuring the Coreans that his visit was peaceful, designed merely to gain knowledge of the General Sherman and her crew, he began his preparations for ascending the Ping Yang River. The natives affected to comply with his wishes, but on June 1st, while four launches from the squadron, under the command of Captain Blake, were taking soundings in advance of the vessels, they were fired upon by two forts. The Americans responded as well as they could, while the Palos and the Monocacy, hastening to the support of the launches, silenced the forts with their 8-inch shells. As the Corean flag was still flying and no attempt was made to apologize for the treacherous attack, six hundred and forty-four men were landed, and on June 11th carried the forts by storm, with a loss of three killed and seven wounded, Lieutenant Hugh W. McKee being
among the former. Finding it impossible to get further information regarding the fate of the General Sherman's crew, Rodgers sailed away on July 3d.

In 1870 a boat expedition from the Mohican, Commander Low, under the orders of Lieutenant Willard H. Brownson, on June 17th cut out the piratical steamer Forward, formerly a British gunboat, which had been operating on the coast of Mexico, manned by a crew of filibusters. The pirates' craft was anchored in a river about fifteen miles above San Blas.¹ The Americans gallantly pulled toward the Forward, and, despite a galling fire, routed the pirates and burned their ship. Master J. M. Wainright and one man were killed, while six were wounded.

On June 24, 1873, the Juniata, Commander Daniel Lawrence Braine, sailed from New York in search of the men who had been making arctic explorations in the Polaris. Proceeding as far northward as it was deemed prudent for a vessel of the Juniata's size, Commander Braine sent his steam launch, the Little Juniata, which had been equipped especially for the voyage, farther north in search of the missing explorers. She was in charge of Lieutenant George Washington De Long, Lieutenant Charles W. Chipp, an ice pilot and seven volunteers. Boldly pushing his way northward, De Long, after encountering a terrific storm on August 11th, met the steamer Tigress, Commander James Augustin Greer, U. S. N., which also had been sent out by the Government to assist in the search. After looking in vain for the missing explorers, the vessels returned, having learned that the people of the Polaris had been rescued by a whaler and taken to Scotland.

While off Montevideo, Uruguay, November 10, 1881, Commander Silas W. Terry, of the Marion, received orders to put to sea at once and search in the vicinity

¹ Commander Willard H. Brownson to the author.
of Heard Island, South Indian Ocean, for the crew of the American whaler *Trinity*, which had not been heard from in eighteen months. The *Marion* arrived off Heard Island, January 12, 1882, and found the missing men. The *Trinity* had been wrecked on this desert place, October 17, 1880, and for fifteen months her crew of thirty men had been eking out a bare existence amid the snows and piercing storms.

After the civil war a number of our war vessels that had engaged in that struggle were wrecked. Several of these were victims of the extraordinary physical convulsions in the West India Islands and on the western coast of South America in 1867 and 1868. While anchored off Frederickstadt, on the island of St. Croix, November 18, 1867, the *Monongahela* was lifted by a gigantic wave (caused by an earthquake) and carried over a number of warehouses and landed in one of the streets of the town. A receding wave carried her out of the town and placed her on a coral reef, without serious damage, and with only five of the crew lost. The ship was successfully launched from this reef soon afterward. The cruiser *De Soto* was torn from her moorings in the harbor of St. Thomas about the same time and thrown upon the piles of a new wharf. The receding sea carried her into deep water again, with little injury. The *Susquehanna* in the same harbor barely escaped similar unseamanlike treatment. An earthquake on the west coast of South America, in 1868, caused the water to recede from the harbor of Arica, six hundred miles north of Callao, where the war steamer *Wateree*, Commander James H. Gillis, and the storeship *Fredonia* were anchored. The returning wave broke the *Fredonia* into pieces, drowning twenty-seven officers and men, while the *Wateree* was carried half a mile inland, where she was left high and dry, with only one man lost. As the cost of getting her into the water would be more than the vessel was worth, she was sold.
On the evening of January 24, 1870, the Oneida while steaming out of the harbor of Yokohama, Japan, homeward bound after a three years' cruise, was run into by the British passenger steamer Bombay and a large portion of the stern was carried away. The Oneida sank in fifteen minutes, carrying down with her twenty-two of her twenty-four officers and ninety-five of her one hundred and fifty-two men.

By the terms of our treaty with New Grenada—now one of the Colombian states—made in 1848, the United States guaranteed the protection of traffic across the Isthmus of Panama. In March, 1885, a revolution broke out at Panama which not only interfered with traffic across the Isthmus, but endangered the lives and property of many Americans living there. Under order of Rear-Admiral James E. Jouett, then in the flagship Tennessee, at Aspinwall, Major Charles Heywood, with a battalion of marines, on the night of April 11, 1885, occupied the railroad company's buildings, which were outside the walls of the city. Heywood was a veteran of the civil war, and had been brevetted twice for distinguished gallantry in the presence of the enemy. By placing a guard (who had occasion to fire at times) on every train, the traffic was kept open in spite of the endeavors of a vicious and desperate mob. On April 15th Commander Bowman Hendry McCalla, with one hundred and fifty sailors and a detachment of marines under Captain John H. Higbee, arrived at Colon. McCalla, to whom the supreme command of our landed forces was intrusted, arranged his men so as to protect our interests at Matachin, Colon and at various other points. At 11.55 A. M. the American consul general informed McCalla that the insurgents were erecting two barricades in the streets of Panama which would cut off the Central and South American cable office. McCalla then ordered Heywood to occupy the city and keep communications open. This was done with great steadiness in the face of
trying circumstances. Although the necessity of a military occupation of Panama has been seriously questioned, yet it can not be denied that its execution was admirably carried out.

On March 15, 1889, the United States war vessels *Trenton*, Captain Norman H. Farquhar, the *Vandalia*, Captain C. M. Schoonmaker, and the *Nipsic*, Captain Dennis W. Mullan, were in the harbor of Apia, Samoa, under the orders of Rear-Admiral Lewis A. Kimberly, who was aboard the flagship *Trenton*. These vessels had been assembled here to protect American interests during German efforts to interfere in the affairs of the natives. In the harbor also were the German war ships *Adler*, *Olga* and *Eber*, and the British cruiser *Calliope*. A terrific hurricane came up on this day which lasted forty-eight hours, and carried all these vessels ashore excepting the *Calliope*, which managed to get to sea. The *Nipsic* was the first of the American vessels to ground. She struck a reef near the shore, and it was due to the great bravery and skill of her officers that nearly all her men were saved, only seven perishing, Captain Mullan and Lieutenant John A. Shearman being the last to leave her. Soon afterward the *Vandalia*, dragging her anchor, was carried ashore, F. M. Hammar, a seaman, perishing in a heroic attempt to reach land with a line. Captain Schoonmaker was injured early in the storm, and finally, with several other officers, was washed overboard and perished. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant James W. Carlin, who acted with conspicuous heroism, and it was largely through his skilful management that the loss of life was not greater. Many of the *Vandalia*'s people escaped to the stranded *Nipsic* and were saved. Besides her commander, the *Vandalia* lost Paymaster Frank H. Arms, Lieutenant F. E. Sutton, of the marines, Pay-Clerk John Roche, and thirty-nine men. The ship was a total loss. On the following day the *Trenton* was carried ashore alongside the
Vandalia. It was owing to an excellent suggestion of Lieutenant Robert M. C. Brown that she escaped running on a reef. Many of the Vandalia's people were taken aboard the Trenton. Only one man on the Trenton was killed. The Eber and Adler were complete wrecks, only one officer and four men escaping from the former. The Olga grounded, but lived through the storm. The Nipsic afterward was floated off and repaired.

The loss that was most felt by the people of the United States, however, was that of the Kearsarge. On February 2, 1894, while in charge of Commander Oscar F. Heyerman, on her way from Port au Prince, Hayti, to Bluefields, Nicaragua, she was wrecked on Roncador Reef. Her men were rescued eight days later by the City of Para. The colors of the Kearsarge were recovered, and on June 19, 1894, the thirtieth anniversary of the battle between the Kearsarge and the Alabama, they were presented to a representative of the Navy Department in the New York Stock Exchange, all business being suspended an hour for the ceremony.

On the 16th of October, 1891, a number of American sailors from the cruiser Baltimore, Captain Winfield Scott Schley, were attacked in a liquor store at Valparaiso, Chili. Believing that American naval officers had communicated military news to Balmaceda's army, the Chilians for some time had manifested hostility toward the Baltimore's men. Getting the better of the fight in the drinking resort, our sailors reached the street and boarded a car. An angry mob followed them, stopped the car and, dragging the sailors from it, set upon them with murderous intent. Boatswain's Mate Charles W. Riggin was shot and killed, William Turnbull, coal heaver, died of injuries received, while, in all, fifteen of our men were wounded. As the affair was clearly a national insult, our Government promptly ordered the Boston and the Yorktown to
Valparaiso, and demanded reparation, which was finally given; the Chilian Government giving seventy-five thousand dollars in gold for distribution among the families of the two seamen killed, and among those who were more or less injured.

In June, 1891, an Arctic exploring party was sent out by the Academy of Natural Sciences, of Philadelphia, under the command of Lieutenant Robert E. Peary, a civil engineer of the navy, in the *Kite*. Establishing a base for operations at McCormick Bay, the explorers made a thirteen-hundred-mile journey northward with good scientific results. They returned in September, 1892. A second expedition under Peary's command sailed north in the summer of 1893, returning in September, 1895. In this effort the northern limits of Greenland were established, an accurate chart of a thousand miles of the west coast of Greenland was made, eleven hitherto unknown islands were discovered and many valuable scientific data were secured. Peary undertook a third expedition in the summer of 1896 in the *Hope*. 
CHAPTER II.

GROWTH OF NAVAL ARCHITECTURE.

From the time the United States began building a navy our war ships have taken the lead in all-round efficiency and general excellence. When the first administrator of the navy reported on a new group of cruisers that "separately they would be superior to any European frigate," he gave a standard to American shipbuilders that has been well sustained. British naval constructors generally were content to follow the lead of the United States and France, and their most efficient war vessels were built on the lines of American and French vessels captured or wrecked on the coast of England. Before the close of the War of 1812 the admiralty was compelled to build cruisers exactly on the lines of the famous American 44-gun frigate. Our frigates were called "terrible nondescripts," and one of the English 74-gun line of battle ships actually sailed from Cadiz for the North American station disguised as a frigate. The London Courier of January 4, 1813, noted that some of the most famous British line of battle ships—several of them having been under Nelson's orders—were selected to be cut down as frigates to cope with our Constitution, President and United States. In 1820 the British Government sent a naval officer to inspect our navy. He reported that "the organization of the American Naval Department, either for administrative duties or for practical work, is the best system extant. Their ships are the best built, and their timber is unsurpassed. Their frigates are com-
petent to cope with ships of the line, and their ships of the line with three-deckers, and the whole administration of the navy is conducted with comparatively little expense.

In the introduction to a new edition of Mr. James' History of the British Navy, the editor says: "It is but justice, in regard to America, to mention that England has benefited by her [America's] example, and that the large classes of frigates now employed in the British service [1826] are modeled after those of the United States." An English naval expert, speaking of the Goliath (1898) as the latest and most powerful battle ship ever constructed in Great Britain, says: "It is of historic interest that the modern ironclad, with its turrets and massive plates, had its root idea in the famous monitors first designed for the United States Government by Ericsson, who sought to combine invulnerability with very heavy ordnance. . . . Ericsson gave the cue to naval designers all over the world, and his elementary principle has only been developed and modified during the years that have lapsed."

The policy of our naval administration has been to maintain the navy on a progressive footing, and each new group of vessels added to the list was fitted with every improvement that American ingenuity could devise. Our war ships, from the time that Congress, on December 13, 1775, decided to build thirteen cruisers, have been superior to the same class of European vessels in their day. Of the first thirteen cruisers, those that got to sea had remarkably successful careers. They were the Hancock, the Randolph, the Raleigh, the Trumbull and the Providence, while the Alliance and the Confederacy, built later in the war, even surpassed our first efforts in naval architecture. The cruisers of the Revolution were improved upon by that famous group of frigates—United States, Constitution, President, Constellation, Crescent, Chesapeake, Philadelphia, Congress and New York—launched in 1797-99.
These vessels were supplemented in 1814 by the Guerrière, the Columbia and the Java, all of the 44-gun rate. So successful was this class of war ships that the Government built the Potomac (1821), the Brandywine (1825), the Congress (1841), the Cumberland (1842), the Savannah (1842), the Raritan (1843) and the St. Lawrence (1847). These vessels were built on the general lines of the famous Constitution, and were armed with eight 8-inch guns and forty-two long 32-pounders. The Constitution was not formally put out of commission until December 15, 1881. Equally successful were the 18-gun sloops of war built just prior to and during the War of 1812, of which the Wasp, the Peacock, the Hornet and the Enterprise were conspicuous examples.

At the close of the War of 1812 a plan for a permanent and progressive peace establishment of the navy was adopted, which provided for the maintenance of twelve ships of the line, fourteen first-class frigates, three second-class frigates, six sloops of war and a proportionate number of smaller vessels. In pursuance of this plan, the Government, between 1814 and 1818, built the 74-gun ships of the line Washington, Franklin, Columbus, Ohio, North Carolina, Delaware and Vermont, which were armed with twelve 8-inch and seventy 32-pounder guns. In 1825 the appearance of the North Carolina in the Mediterranean, with her one hundred and two guns in three tiers, aroused great interest, and she was pronounced by European naval officers to be the most powerful war vessel afloat.

The United States not only built the finest war vessels, but also introduced steam in cruisers. The first war steamer was the Demologos, or Fulton, built under the direction of Robert Fulton in 1813-'14. This vessel, having her wheel in the center, was a far more ambitious step in naval architecture than is generally supposed. Besides the sufficiently radical innovation of steam, her battery of twenty long 32-pounders was
supplemented by a submarine gun designed to project a hundred-pound shot. She also had an engine for discharging an immense column of water through an enemy’s porthole, with the idea of sinking the vessel, and she was provided with a furnace for hot shot. It was undoubtedly from the submarine gun of the Demologos that General Rains got his idea of the submarine mortars that formed a part of the defenses of Mobile Bay in 1864. At the close of the War of 1812 the Demologos was stationed in the Brooklyn Navy Yard as a receiving ship, where in 1829 she was blown up and a large number of men were killed. Many believed that the disaster was caused by superstitious seamen, who objected to such “steam devils” supplanting the more comfortable sailing ships. Another steam battery, called Fulton the Second, designed for the defense of New York harbor, was built in 1837-38. She was constructed of the best live oak, had sloping bulwarks five feet thick, and had three masts and four smokestacks. She was a hundred and eighty feet long, but iron pipes connecting with her copper boilers caused galvanic action and occasioned serious leaks, by which she was three times disabled. The sloping sides of this craft evidently gave the cue to the Confederates when they built their formidable ironclads of the Merrimac type. In 1838 England was building several

1 “The Demologos, or Fulton, measured one hundred and forty-five feet over all, fifty-five feet beam and drew only eight feet of water. The superstructure was built on two hulls, separated from end to end by a channel fifteen feet wide and sixty-six feet long. One hull contained the boiler, which was made of copper, for generating steam. The machinery occupied the other boat. The water wheel revolved in the space between them. The main or gun deck supported the armament, and was protected by a parapet four feet ten inches thick, of solid timber, pierced by embrasures. Her upper or spar deck, upon which many hundred men might parade, was encompassed with a bulwark for safety. She was rigged with two stout masts, each of which supported a large lateen yard and sails. She had two bowsprits and jibs, and four rudders, one at each extremity of each boat, so that she might be steered with either end foremost.” (Colden’s Life of Robert Fulton.)
war steamers, the *Penelope*, *Terrible* and *Valorous* being her first paddle-wheel cruisers. France also had nine cruisers of this class.

It is difficult, in the light of to-day, to realize the prejudice that existed against the introduction of steam in war ships. When Captain Matthew Calbraith Perry, on February 17, 1838, seriously asserted that he believed seagoing war steamers, fourteen hundred to fifteen hundred tons, would be built to cruise twenty days and yet be safe from disaster, he was regarded by many of his brother officers as being exceedingly visionary and eccentric. The introduction of steam in war ships was strenuously opposed by James K. Paulding when he was Secretary of the Navy (1838). He said, "I never will consent to see our grand old ships supplanted by these new and ugly monsters," and when the project was pressed upon him he exclaimed, "I am steamed to death!" But the opposition of the Secretary did not prevent the construction, in 1841, of the twin side-wheel steamers *Mississippi* and *Missouri*, which at that time were the most efficient war vessels afloat. Two more ships of this class were built in 1847, the *Susquehanna* and the *Powhatan*.

The great advantage of having the machinery and the propelling power under the water line, where they would be safe from the enemy’s shot, introduced the propeller in war steamers. As early as 1823 Captain Delisle, of the French Engineers, proposed to the French Minister of the Marine a method of propelling a boat by means of a submerged screw, but his suggestion was not carried out and was soon forgotten. The first well-authenticated instance of the screw as a means of marine propulsion is that of Joseph Ressel, of Vienna, who experimented in 1826 with a barge driven by hand. In 1829 he applied steam power to his propeller, and at one time made six miles an hour; but a steam pipe burst, and the police interfered with further experiments in this line. In the
spring of 1837 the Francis B. Ogden (named after the American consul in London, who had been instrumental in introducing the screw) made a trip up the Thames at a speed of ten knots. But London engineers treated the new idea with neglect. In 1838 the first direct-acting propeller engine ever built was put in the Robert Field Stockton, which crossed the Atlantic in 1839, and was used as a tugboat. Upon the urgent solicitation of Captain Robert Field Stockton, who got his ideas largely from John Ericsson while in London, the first steam propeller in the United States navy was built and launched in 1844. She was named the Princeton, in honor of Stockton's home. The success of this vessel led the Government to build, in 1856–'59, the splendid screw vessels Niagara, Colorado, Merrimac, Wabash, Minnesota, Roanoke, Brooklyn, Lancaster, Hartford, Richmond, Pensacola, Pawnee, Mohican, Narragansett, Dacotah, Iroquois, Wyoming and Seminole. At the time these vessels were completed they had no superiors in the world.

But, as formidable as they seemed, they suddenly were found to be of little value, when, on March 8, 1862, the Merrimac made such short work of the wooden ships in Hampton Roads, while the appearance of the Miantonomoh in English waters and the trip of the Monadnock around Cape Horn showed that the wooden navies of the world were doomed. Ericsson, in his monitor, as we have just seen, "gave the cue to naval designers all over the world," the essential feature of his invention, the turret, being introduced in all first-class war ships to-day. In fact, strictly speaking, our heavy war vessels of 1900 are nothing more than highly developed monitors. The two turrets, one forward and one aft, and in ships of the Oregon class the auxiliary turrets containing 8-inch guns, classify them unmistakably with the improved monitor, the only essential difference being the greater free board, designed to secure better accommodation for the offi-
cers and crew. This free board, however, is in no way estimated in the main defensive scheme of our battle ships. The heavy armor belt is carried not much higher above the water line than in the original Monitor, while the heavily armored protected deck of the Oregon is in much the same position as that on Ericsson's invention. Stripped down to her real offensive and defensive conception, the Oregon would bear a remarkable proportional resemblance to the Monitor, the superstructure built above the real protective deck and belt being designed so that it could be riddled with shot without in any way affecting the vitality of the ship.

Scarcely less remarkable than the development of the war ship was that of naval ordnance. Our war vessels during the Revolution were armed with guns varying from 4- to 18-pounders, the 12-pounders being mostly used. The carronade, or short gun, having little penetrating but great smashing power, was introduced about the time of our French war, the calibers rapidly increasing from 12- to 32-, 42- and 68-pounders. The 44-gun frigates, like the Constitution, at first were armed with thirty long 24-pounders on the gun deck and with twenty 32-pounder carronades on the quarter-deck and forecastle. The new 44-gun frigates, from the Potomac to the St. Lawrence (1821-47), had even heavier armaments, carrying forty-two long 32-pounders and eight 8-inch guns.

As early as 1812 Lieutenant George Bomford invented the seacoast howitzer, or columbiad, for firing shells at long range. It was fired in 1815 at an English vessel with some success, but the close of that war delayed its development. The French general Paixhans, however, took up the idea, and in 1824 introduced the gun, with some changes, under his name in France. Bomford's gun gave place to the Dahlgren and the Rodman gun. The Paixhans chambered ordnance, capable of horizontal shell firing, gradually superseded
the carronades. In 1839 experiments were made in the United States with hollow, nonexplosive shot, the invention of Mr. Cochran. They were found to possess great smashing power with low velocity, and took less powder. In 1841 Congress appropriated fifty thousand dollars for experiments in ordnance, but the "new-fangled" guns did not meet with much favor from officers of the old school. Captain Parker, while in the *Columbus*, in 1842, wrote: "The shells were a great bother to us, as they were kept in a shell room and no one was ever allow to look at them. It seemed to be a question with the division officers whether the fuse went in first or the sabot, or whether the fuse should be ignited before putting the shell in the gun or not. However, we used to fire them off, though I can not say I ever saw them hit anything. . . . It took so long to get ready for the great event [target practice] that we seemed to require a resting spell of six months before we tried it again." With the idea of acquainting the men with gun practice, a school for gun firing was opened at Sandy Hook in the spring of 1840, and even to this day the place is the scene of gun testing for the Government.

In 1839 John Ericsson brought to this country a wrought-iron 12-inch gun of his own design. It was built of the best material, but had the usual defect of a forged gun, which was weak transversely and liable to crack in the rear of the trunnions. Ericsson remedied the defect by shrinking on the best American 3½-inch wrought-iron bands over the breech. This gun was fired about three hundred times with twenty-five pounds of powder, which in those days was considered an enormous charge. It threw a two-hundred-and-twelve-pound shot and pierced four and a half inches of wrought iron. Soon after Ericsson's arrival in the United States, Captain Robert Field Stockton had a gun built on Ericsson's principle, but it had a foot more diameter at the breech, and at that time was
the largest mass of wrought iron ever brought under the forge. It was called Peacemaker, and was fired with twenty-five to fifty pounds of powder. On February 23, 1844, the Princeton, aboard of which was mounted the Peacemaker, with a large number of distinguished guests, made a short cruise down the Potomac. The great gun had been fired several times, but it finally burst, killing Secretary of State Upshur, Secretary of the Navy Gilmer, Captain Beverley Kennon, Virgil Maxcy, Colonel Gardiner and a colored servant of the President, and wounding many others. Probably owing to this catastrophe the department was slow in introducing heavy guns in the navy, and when they were used at the beginning of the civil war the charges of powder were limited to fifteen pounds. In 1854 an 11-inch gun was considered too heavy for naval purposes, and it was not until just before the civil war that such were generally used in our navy.

In 1885 the armament of our war ships consisted principally of 9-inch smooth-bore guns, 8-inch muzzle-loading rifled guns and converted 80- and 60-pounders breech-loading rifled guns. The 8-inch guns were 11-inch cast-iron smooth-bore Dahlgrens, having a rifled wrought-iron tube inserted into the bore. The 100- and 60-pounder Parrott guns were converted into breech-loading 80- and 60-pounders. In 1885 there was no plant in the United States capable of making forgings for guns of more than 6-inch caliber, while steel shafting, torpedoes, armor and machine guns also had to be purchased abroad. With a view to remedying this serious defect, the Gun Foundry Board in 1883 visited the principal gun and steel establishments in the United States and abroad, and in the following year recommended that the Government maintain gun factories capable of turning out the largest calibers after the most approved patterns, and that private firms be encouraged in making steel forgings and material for guns. In January, 1886, the Board on For-
tifications, composed of civilians and navy and army officers, approved the report of the Gun Foundry Board, and in August of that year four millions were appropriated for a steel-armor plant and two million one hundred and twenty-eight thousand dollars for guns. In May, 1887, contracts were signed with the Bethlehem Iron Company for gun forgings and armor plates. This plant has been developed until it is one of the best establishments of its kind in the world, and can produce forgings for 16-inch guns. The naval-gun factory was begun at the Washington Navy Yard in 1887, and has been constantly enlarged until it is now a most complete establishment.

The superiority of the "built-up" gun over the cast-steel gun has been demonstrated on several occasions. The built-up gun is made in a number of separate parts, which are "assembled" and "machined" into one solid mass of steel. The tube or body of the gun is made from a solid steel ingot, forged and tempered in oil, annealed and bored to the required dimensions. Over the rear portion of the tube is shrunk a steel jacket covering about two fifths of the gun, and over this again are shrunk on a series of hoops forged on a mandrel, all interlocking so as to form an extremely strong mass. Over all this is screwed on the trunnion band, which gives the gun additional strength. The piece is then ready to be rifled. These guns can safely withstand a powder pressure of twenty-two tons to the square inch. One of the largest guns built by the United States on the improved plan was tested at Indian Head, June 23, 1894, with satisfactory results. It had a 13-inch bore and was called Peacemaker. It threw an eleven-hundred-pound shell, which pierced a 17-inch nickel-steel plate.

The United States also can claim the distinction of having designed the first war craft protected with iron plates. In March, 1814, Thomas Gregg, of Pennsylvania, secured a patent for an ironclad steam war vessel,
drawings of which are now in the Patent Office in Washington. The following specifications are given:

"The boat is framed on an angle of about eighteen degrees all round the vessel, when the top timbers elevate the balls and the lower ones direct them under her. The top deck, which glances the ball, may be hung on a mass of hinges near the ports. Said deck is supported by knees and cross timbers on the lower sides, so that it may be sprung with powder, if required (when boarded by the enemy), to a perpendicular, when the said deck will be checked by stays, while the power of powder will be exhausted in the open air, and then fall or spring to the center of the deck again. The aforesaid deck will run up and down with the angle, which may be coppered or laid with iron. The gun deck may be bored at pleasure, to give room, if required, as the men and guns are under said deck. The power is applied between her keels, where there is a concave formed to receive them from the bow to the stern, except a small distance in each end, forming an eddy. The power may be reversed to propel her either way. Said power is connected to upright levers to make horizontal strokes alternately. The elevation of her timbers and gearing will be proportioned by her keel and tonnage."

The development of armor plate in the United States has kept pace with that of building war ships and guns. In 1882 there was no establishment in this country that could manufacture plates over five inches thick. Now plates of the greatest thickness have been turned out by American plants. Tests showed that the nickel-steel plates, while not offering quite so much resistance as the all-steel plates, had a greater tenacity and resistance to rupture. A notable victory for American armor was scored when an 18-inch Harveyized plate for the Indiana was tested at Indian Head, July 20, 1894. A Carpenter shell weighing eight hundred and fifty pounds was fired at this plate from a 12-inch
rifled gun at point-blank range, and, although it was impelled by two hundred and fifty pounds of powder, having a striking velocity of one thousand four hundred and sixty-five feet a second, the shell did not penetrate over eight inches, and no cracks were found in the plate.

The attention of naval constructors had been directed to the use of the ancient trireme's beak, but its application to sailing vessels was deemed impracticable. The introduction of steam, however, gave the ram a new and terrible power. In 1827 Captain Samuel Barron made a model of a machine ram, which is now in the Naval Academy at Annapolis. In 1836 Captain James Barron exhibited the model of a "prow ship" in the rotunda of the Capitol at Washington, and this subject was again brought to the attention of the Government three years later. On August 28, 1839, the war steamer Fulton, Lieutenant W. F. Lynch, while steaming down the East River, rammed and nearly sank the Montevideo. Captain Matthew Calbraith Perry, who witnessed the accident from the shore, was impressed with the destructive powers of ramming, and suggested that the boilers and funnel of the Fulton be strengthened for a shock and an experiment be made on a hulk. War between the United States and Great Britain over the Northeastern boundary question at that time was imminent, but on the amicable adjustment of the difficulty Perry's suggestion was pigeonholed, the old objection that the vessel ramming would be exposed to a raking fire being offered as the reason for not making the test. On November 11, 1850, he again wrote to the department that with steam power a ship would be exposed to a raking fire for a very short time only. Meanwhile England and France were introducing the ram in their navies.

In 1881, when the matériel of the United States navy had reached the lowest state of efficiency since its regular establishment, Secretary William H. Hunt ap-
pointed an advisory board of fifteen officers, over whom Rear-Admiral John Rodgers presided, to determine the requirements of a new navy. This board reported in favor of twenty-one armored vessels, seventy unarmored cruisers, twenty torpedo boats, five torpedo gunboats and five rams, and that the material used in their construction be steel. On designs furnished by a second advisory board, the *Atlanta, Boston, Chicago* and *Dolphin* were built, the initial letters of these names causing this advance squadron to be called the *A B C D's* of the new fleet. This reconstruction of the navy was rapidly and ably carried on under the successive administrations of Secretaries William E. Chandler, William C. Whitney, Benjamin F. Tracy, Hilary A. Herbert and John D. Long.

On March 27, 1898, the Holland submarine boat *Plunger* made a successful trial near New York. The boat, under the management of her inventor, Mr. Holland, made several successful dives under the water and was in perfect control. She is armed with a two-barrel dynamite gun. This boat has been purchased by the Government, and the construction of six more of similar design has been ordered.

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1 For other attempts at submarine navigation, see vol. i, pp. 86-88, and vol. ii, pp. 473-474.
CHAPTER III.

DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL PERSONNEL.

Along with the remarkable development of the matériel of the navy we must note the equally gratifying progress made in the personnel. During the Revolution officers for the navy were selected from the merchant marine and from the privateer service. As a rule, these men were fairly well educated, and were remarkably proficient in seamanship. They had been brought up in the hard school of experience, and on many occasions proved themselves to be officers of extraordinary ability. On the reorganization of the navy at the close of the eighteenth century many of these officers were reinstated in the service, while midshipmen were appointed from year to year by the President, to begin at the lowest round of the ladder of promotion, and were advanced in regular order as vacancies occurred. Soon after the War of 1812 attention was given to the broader education of the younger officers. Courses of study were prescribed, examinations were held at stated times, and the "youngsters" were advanced according to their record. Before the establishment of the Annapolis Naval Academy, in 1845, a board of examiners met in the Naval Asylum and Hospital at Philadelphia and passed upon the attainments of officers before advancing them to a higher grade.

Several attempts had been made to establish training schools for officers and sailors of the navy. In 1838 Captain M. C. Perry suggested a school for engineers, but it was not until 1845 that a regular naval
academy was established. On June 24th of that year George Bancroft, Secretary of the Navy, convened a board of officers at Philadelphia for the purpose of establishing the Annapolis Naval Academy. This board consisted of Captains George A. Read, Thomas ap Catesby Jones, Matthew Calbraith Perry, E. A. F. Lavalette and Isaac Mayo. The academy was established on the grounds of Fort Severn, near Annapolis, and sessions were begun October 10, 1845, with Captain Franklin Buchanan as first superintendent. A postgraduate course of study for officers being desirable, the Naval War College was established on Coaster's Harbor Island, Newport, R. I., in 1884, having Commodore Stephen Bleecker Luce as its president, who with Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and Professor James Russell Soley constituted the faculty. Captain Charles H. Stockton is now president of the college. In 1869 a torpedo corps was established, under the direction of the Ordnance Bureau, to conduct experiments in submarine warfare.

A valuable auxiliary to the navy are the Naval Reserves. In March, 1891, Congress appropriated twenty-five thousand dollars for the establishment of these Reserves, and they are now in full operation in: California, Captain L. H. Turner; Connecticut, Lieutenant-Commander A. H. Day; District of Columbia, Commander R. P. Hains; Florida, Commander J. W. Fitzgerald; Illinois, Captain B. M. Shaffner; Louisiana, Commander J. W. Bostick; Maryland, Commander I. E. Emerson; Massachusetts, Captain J. W. Weeks; Michigan, Lieutenant-Commander G. Wilkes; New Jersey, Battalion of the East, Commander W. Irving; Battalion of the West, Commander C. B. Dahlgren; New York, Captain J. W. Miller; North Carolina, Commander G. L. Morton; Ohio, First Battalion, Lieutenant-Commander A. U. Betts; Second Battalion, Lieutenant-Commander G. R. McKay; Pennsylvania, Commander J. S. Muckle; Rhode Island, Commander
W. M. Little; South Carolina, Commander R. H. Pinckney; and Virginia, Commander C. W. Cake. Naval Reserves also have been established in Georgia, Missouri, Oregon and Texas. When Assistant Secretary Roosevelt called on the Naval Reserves after the Maine disaster their total available strength was found to be four thousand five hundred men, which could easily have been increased to nine thousand in an emergency. Lieutenant W. H. H. Southerland, U. S. N., had charge of the Naval Reserves during the Spanish war.

Speaking of the efficiency of the Naval Reserves that formed the crew of the Catskill during the Spanish war, Lieutenant-Commander Martin Ellsworth Hall, who commanded that monitor, said: "These were a well-drilled, intelligent and disciplined body of men. In infantry, field-gun and boat drills they were fully equal to the sailors of the regular service. The officers had their men well in hand, and all orders were promptly and intelligently executed. The chief deficiency of both officers and men was in seamanship and navigation, which they had not had an opportunity of learning, but rapid progress was made in both during the short cruise of the Catskill. Lieutenant Parker passed a very good examination before a board of naval officers in all naval branches, and after my detachment my successor, Lieutenant Porter, of the Naval Brigade, handled the Catskill with great skill. I consider the naval militia a very valuable auxiliary to the naval defense of the country. If some of the yachts purchased during the war were turned over to the States for the use of the naval militia, so that the various divisions could have frequent exercises under way, much greater progress could be made in seamanship, navigation and gunnery. Under its very efficient commander, Captain Weeks, the organization and equipment of the Massachusetts Naval Brigade was all that could be desired. The Catskill's crew was mustered (armed and equipped)
United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md.
six hours after the order was received for them to proceed to Philadelphia."

On November 10, 1775, Congress resolved that two battalions of marines be raised, consisting of "one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, two majors and other officers as usual in other regiments; that they consist of an equal number of privates with other battalions; that particular care be taken that no persons be appointed to offices or enlist into said battalions but such as are good seamen or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea when required." This was the beginning of an important department in the navy which has always served with honor and distinguished gallantry. In nearly all our naval operations, both on sea and land, the marine corps has added much to the glory of American naval prowess. The strength of the marine corps to-day is one hundred and twenty-five officers, having Charles Heywood as colonel commandant.

In the early days of the navy chaplains nominally were appointed by the President, and it was by no means the rule that the appointee was an ordained clergyman. In fact, the commander of every ship felt that it was one of the privileges of his office to appoint the chaplain himself, and generally the man was selected more from motives of personal friendship than because of any theological training or fitness. To-day the chaplains are necessarily ministers of some recognized religious body. The number allowed by law is twenty-four, Chaplain Wesley O. Holway heading the list.

The engineer corps came into existence with the introduction of steam in our war ships. It has always been a service of great exposure and little chance for glory. The magnificent services rendered by this corps in the Asiatic squadron and the home fleet during the

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1 Lieutenant-Commander Hall to the author.
Spanish war is sufficient commentary on the efficiency of the men engaged in it. A large percentage of the credit for our great naval victories and achievement is due them. Under the 1899 act this corps was merged in the line.

The first attempt to establish a naval hospital in the United States was made February 26, 1811, when Congress appropriated fifty thousand dollars for this purpose and created a board of navy hospital commissioners. Previous to this, July 16, 1798, Congress had provided for the disabled and sick sailors in civil and private hospitals and raised a fund for their support. "Immediately after the passage of the law of 1811," says Surgeon James D. Gatewood in his able report, "it became necessary for the navy to take charge of its sick on shore. . . . At the old navy yard on the Delaware, in the city of Philadelphia, a very small building was appropriated to this purpose. It was represented in 1813 as a wretched hovel, destitute of every necessary comfort for sick persons, and calculated to hold eight patients. At that time it was holding twenty-four, and the thought of each patient was simply to gather strength enough to desert." This was the first United States naval hospital. To-day we have splendid buildings and accommodations for our seamen on Widow's Island, Penobscot Bay, Me.; at Portsmouth, N. H.; at Chelsea, Mass.; at New York Navy Yard; at Philadelphia; at Washington; at Annapolis (sick quarters); at Norfolk, Va.; at Pensacola; at Mare Island, California; and at Yokohama, Japan. We have fifteen medical directors, with Medical Director Christopher J. Cleborne at their head, fifteen medical inspectors, fifty surgeons, fifty-one passed assistant surgeons, and eighteen assistant surgeons. During our preparations for war with Spain after the Maine disaster our Government purchased a comfortable, roomy ship, renamed Solace, which was fitted up with every appliance and convenience as a hospital ship, with the idea of cruising
in the vicinity of probable action and having all the
injured placed in her at the earliest possible moment.
At the same time the commodious steamer *Vulcan* was
equipped as a floating machine shop ready to make
repairs at sea. Fortunately the services of this "ship
doctor" were not greatly in demand.

The handling of the money and stores for naval
uses is in the hands of the pay corps. This consists of
thirteen pay directors, with Pay-Director Charles H.
Eldredge at their head, thirteen pay inspectors, forty-
one paymasters, thirty passed assistant paymasters,
and twenty-eight assistant paymasters.

During the war for independence the navy was man-
egaged by various committees appointed by Congress.
When the United States Constitution went into opera-
tion the navy was in charge of the War Department,
but on the appointment of a Secretary of the Navy
(1798) this arm of the service was turned over to the
Navy Department. Down to 1815 the Secretary of the
Navy had not always been a man experienced in naval
affairs, and to meet this difficulty a board of naval
commissioners, to act under the Secretary of the Navy,
was formed. It consisted of Captains John Rodgers,
Isaac Hull and David Porter. This system of adminis-
tering naval affairs was continued with but slight mo-
difications until 1842, when the management of the navy
was placed in the hands of five bureaus. In 1862 three
more bureaus were added, making eight in all: 1, Navi-
gation; 2, Ordnance; 3, Equipment; 4, Navy Yards;
5, Medicines; 6, Provisions; 7, Steam Engineering;
and 8, Construction. A naval officer appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, with the rank
of commodore, was placed at the head of each of these
bureaus.
CHAPTER IV.

OUR NEW FLEET.

Superiority of single ships over those of the same class in foreign navies, rather than a larger number of ships, has been the policy of our naval administrations from the time the United States began building a navy. How it has been followed out in our new fleet will be seen in a comparison of some of our newest war vessels with those of Great Britain and France. Our battle ships of the Indiana and Iowa class, although slightly inferior in speed to the Renown and the Jauréguiberry (which represent the finest battle ships of the same class in English and French navies), are in all other points their superiors. If, for instance, the Indiana and the Renown were engaged in an end-on battle, either bow to bow, stern to stern, or stern to bow, the aggregate amount of shot weight the Indiana could bring to bear would be nearly three times as much as that of the English ship; and it was shot weight that contributed so much to our naval victories in the War of 1812. Taking the broadsides of the two ships, the aggregate energy of the Indiana's fire would be more than double that of the Englishman. Aside from this, the quality of our armor and guns and the general arrangement of our war ships have been admitted by high English authority to be superior to those of the British navy.

An even more striking illustration of the superiority of our new war ships over those of other naval powers was had in the possible meeting of the Oregon with Cervera's squadron while making her famous run from
The Yorktown.

Type of our modern gunboats.
the Pacific coast to Key West. Captain Clark, of the *Oregon*, was by no means indisposed to give battle, single-handed, to the four heavy Spanish cruisers. In pursuance to the thoughtful encouragement cabled by Secretary Long to Clark at Bahia, "We believe that you will defeat it [Cervera's squadron] if met," this superb battle ship was prepared for immediate action. All unnecessary woodwork was removed, her sides were painted lead color, and even the boats were prepared to be thrown overboard at a moment's notice. Clark's plan of action was to lead the Spaniards a running fight, in which the two monstrous 13-inch guns of his ship, flanked by four 8-inch rifles, could have thrown a heavier weight of metal than all the single gun turrets of the Spanish vessels combined. Clark's announcement that he intended to fight Cervera's squadron if he fell in with it was received by the American crew with the heartiest cheers.

In the "cruiser" class of ships, also, the comparison is largely in favor of the Americans. As these vessels are designed primarily for chasing or escaping from an enemy, their bow and stern fire are especially important. Comparing the *New York* with the *Blenheim*—the latter being five hundred tons heavier than the former—we find that the American can bring to bear upon a point directly ahead sixteen guns with an aggregate muzzle energy of thirty-eight thousand one hundred and eighty-five foot tons, while the latter can bring only seven guns with a muzzle energy of sixteen thousand one hundred and forty-four foot tons; and about the same difference is in favor of the American's stern fire. As to the broadside fire of these two ships, we find that the American has nineteen guns with a muzzle energy of forty-six thousand two hundred and twenty-three foot tons, against the fifteen guns and thirty-four thousand seven hundred and forty-five foot tons of the Englishman. A similar comparison of all classes of war ships shows that those of the American
Our New Fleet. 1884-1900.

Navy are superior to the English by ten to thirty-five per cent.

On her trial trip, July 14, 1894, the Minneapolis steamed over twenty-three knots an hour, which makes her one of the fastest armored cruisers in the world. Her sister ship, the Columbia, which had her trial some months before, also made a magnificent record, and this places at the disposal of the United States the two most formidable commerce destroyers ever built. These peerless vessels already have been duplicated in the navies of Europe, but American ingenuity, under wise Government encouragement, has been at work, and by the time the Columbia and the Minneapolis have been fairly copied we shall undoubtedly be able to introduce improved cruisers.

The building of our new fleet has been marked by steady improvement in each succeeding ship. As we have seen, the advance squadron of our fleet consisted of the Atlanta, Boston, Chicago and Dolphin. Considering the somewhat primitive state of our steel manufactures at the time the first of these vessels, the Dolphin, was launched (1884), these war ships were highly creditable specimens of American naval architec-

The torpedo boat Cushing.
ture. Although designed merely as a dispatch boat, the \textit{Dolphin} has made a cruise of fifty-two thousand miles around the world, and carries an efficient armament. She was followed in 1885 by the \textit{Atlanta} and the \textit{Boston}, whose armaments of two 8-inch and six 6-inch guns, besides the secondary battery, and a speed of fifteen knots, make them highly efficient and formidable war ships. The \textit{Chicago} was designed for a flagship and generally has been used as such. She is preeminently the aristocrat of the new navy, and no one who sees her handsome lines will begrudge her the distinction. In 1888, the \textit{Baltimore}, the \textit{Charleston}, the \textit{Yorktown}, the \textit{Petrel} and the \textit{Vesuvius} were launched; in 1889, the \textit{Philadelphia}, the \textit{San Francisco}, the \textit{Concord} and the \textit{Bennington}; in 1890, the \textit{Newark}, the ill-fated \textit{Maine} and the \textit{Cushing}; in 1891, the \textit{Montgomery}, the \textit{Detroit}, the \textit{Machias} and the \textit{New York}; and in 1892, the \textit{Columbia}, the \textit{Minneapolis}, the \textit{Olympia}, the \textit{Cincinnati}, the \textit{Raleigh}, the \textit{Marblehead}, the \textit{Castine}, the \textit{Bancroft} and the \textit{Texas}. Following these were the \textit{Massachusetts}, the \textit{Indiana}, the \textit{Oregon}, the \textit{Iowa}, the \textit{Brooklyn}, the \textit{Texas}, the \textit{Wilmington}, the \textit{Helena}, the \textit{Nashville}, the \textit{Annapolis}, the \textit{Vicksburg}, the \textit{Wheeling}, the \textit{Marietta}, etc.; while the \textit{Kearsarge}, \textit{Kentucky}, \textit{Illinois}, \textit{Alabama}, \textit{Wisconsin}, \textit{Maine} (No. 2), \textit{Missouri}, \textit{Ohio}, \textit{Georgia}, \textit{New Jersey}, \textit{Pennsylvania}, \textit{California}, \textit{Nebraska} and \textit{West Virginia} (all of the \textit{Iowa} style) are completed or are in course of construction.

The \textit{Iowa} type of vessels is designed primarily as "coast-line battle ships," and in order to allow access to a larger number of harbors the mean draught has been kept down as nearly as possible to twenty-four feet, which is considerably less than that of vessels of similar tonnage abroad. The bunkers will hold eighteen hundred tons, which at ten knots an hour will enable these ships to cruise sixteen thousand miles without recoaling, so they are qualified for distant
service. The auxiliary battery of 8-inch guns in these ships had no counterpart in other navies. Their armor protection is seventeen to twenty inches thick over the heavy guns, ten inches thick over the 8-inch battery, seventeen inches on the redoubts under the 13-inch guns barbettes, five inches on the broadside between the redoubts, as a protection against high explosive shells, and eighteen inches on the water line.

The vessels of the New York class are designed as "cruiser destroyers." With her powerful armament, defensive armor and high speed the New York is able to make swift raids along the enemy's coast, easily overtaking ordinary battle ships and as easily outsailing them if they are too formidable for her to attack. The great length of the vessel gives her a decided superiority in rough weather, and it is doubtful if the swiftest vessels under such conditions could escape her. The hull is protected by a water-line belt five inches thick, extending from the protective deck to the berth deck abreast of the machinery, while a steel deck, six inches thick, is on the slope amidships.

Six efficient cruisers of three thousand one hundred tons displacement are also under construction. They are the Chattanooga, Cleveland, Denver, Des Moines, Galveston and Tacoma. These vessels have high speed and carry an armament of ten guns in their main batteries. The battle ships Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Georgia are described in the act authorizing them, as follows: "Three seagoing coast-line battle ships, carrying the heaviest armor and most powerful ordnance for vessels of their class upon a trial displacement of about thirteen thousand five hundred tons, to be sheathed and coppered, and to have the highest practicable speed and great radius of action, and to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not exceeding three million six hundred thousand dollars each." The armored cruisers are similarly described, except that they are to cost four million dollars each and are to
have a displacement of four thousand tons. The cruisers are described as "protected cruisers of about two thousand five hundred tons trial displacement, to be sheathed and coppered, and to have the highest speed compatible with good cruising qualities, great radius of action, and to carry the most powerful ordnance suited to vessels of their class, and to cost, exclusive of armament, not exceeding one million one hundred and forty-one thousand eight hundred dollars each." Besides these vessels, there are a number of monitors, most of which were begun during the civil war and have been remodeled for coast defense. As such they are highly efficient. They are the Monterey, the Puritan, the Miantonomoh, the Monadnock, the Amphitrite and the Terror. Four monitors of an improved type, the Ar-

A coast-defense monitor.

kansas, Connecticut, Florida and Wyoming, are being constructed, having three thousand two hundred and fourteen tons displacement and two thousand four hundred indicated horse power. The Bancroft, named after the historian who was once Secretary of the Navy, was designed as a practice ship for the Naval Academy, but afterward was drafted into the regular service. The sailing ship Chesapeake has been built as a training vessel. Twenty-two torpedo boats have been built or are in course of construction, and one purchased in Germany. By the close of 1899 the navy list showed eleven war ships of the first rate and fourteen in course of construc-
tion, eighteen of the second rate and seven building, fifty-one of the third rate and six under way, seventy-eight fourth rate; twenty torpedo boats completed and thirty-three in the hands of contractors, besides six old-fashioned sloops of war, forty-seven tugs, six receiving ships, and ten under the caption "unserviceable." When the vessels under construction are completed the navy of the United States, in view of the efficiency of the ships and the well-known skill and daring of our officers and crews, may justly be awarded fourth, if not third place among the naval powers.

Such is the condition of the "new" navy of the United States in the year 1900. As compared with the maritime strength of other nations it is much in the same proportion as in 1812. In point of numbers our ships are inferior to those of several naval powers, but, taking ship for ship in their several classes, those of the United States will be found to stand at the head of the list, and, as in the case of the Spanish war, they can give a good account of themselves, and every dependence may be placed upon them in any future trouble.¹

¹ For complete list of the navy, see Appendix.
PART SEVENTH.

WAR WITH SPAIN.

1898.
CHAPTER I.

CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES.

Spanish rule in the West Indies, and especially in the "Pearl of the Antilles," has been marked by a degree of injustice and inhumanity that has seldom been equaled in modern history. From the time Cuba was occupied by the Spaniards, four centuries ago, their sway has presented a series of broken promises and deeds of violence. It required only a century for the conquerors to obliterate the aborigines. The Indians, whose nature was as gentle as their climate, were compelled to work in mines and do other severe manual labor for which they were entirely unfitted. Under the merciless lash of their taskmasters they died by the thousands; Sir Arthur Helps, in his exhaustive history, *The Spaniards in America,* having computed that every full-blooded native was exterminated in three generations.

To supply the places of these unfortunate people the Spaniards imported negroes from Africa, and the fate of these men and women differed from that of the aborigines only in that, having stronger constitutions, they were better able to bear the heavy burdens imposed upon them. The complete record of these years of cruelties will never be known. Enough is given, however, to justify the statement that in the last few decades the world has witnessed no more unscrupulous disregard of human rights than that shown in the island of Cuba. It has been fashionable in America to abhor the massacre of the Armenians in far off Turkey,
but when we come to reverse the telescope of criticism we find the brutalities practiced at our very thresholds rapidly and conveniently gliding down the perspective to the vanishing point. Hundreds of men, women and children were slaughtered in Armenia, but thousands every year for four centuries have met a slower and more painful death at the hands of Spaniards within a few miles of our coast.

The *Virginius* affair, like the destruction of the *Maine*, served to bring American sentiment to a head. Sometime in the spring of 1870 an English shipyard turned out two small vessels (sister ships), which, three years later, met again in Cuban waters under circumstances which nearly resulted in war between two nations. These were the paddle-wheel steamers *Virginius* and *Tornado*. The former, though English built, had a questionable claim to American registry, and had made several filibustering voyages to Cuba in aid of the insurgents, who were then engaged in their Ten Years' War against Spanish rule. On October 31, 1873, the *Virginius*, while off the south coast of Cuba under the command of Captain Joseph Fry, an ex-officer of the United States navy, with one hundred and fifty-five men (Americans, Englishmen and Cubans) aboard, was sighted by the *Tornado*, then a Spanish gunboat, and chased. Captain Fry made every effort to reach Jamaican waters, lightening his craft by throwing overboard his cargo of horses and military supplies, but in spite of his utmost exertions he was captured and taken to Santiago de Cuba. There, on November 4th, four of the crew, three Cubans and one American, were shot by order of the Spanish commander, General Juan Burriel, and three days later thirty-seven of the prisoners, including Captain Fry, were taken ashore, lined up before a squad of marines, and shot. On November 8th twelve more suffered the same fate, in spite of the vehement protests of the British consul, F. W. Ramsden (who served in the same capacity in 1898), for
a large proportion of the men thus slaughtered were Americans and Englishmen.

It was when the news of this outrage—for whether or not these men were engaged in a filibustering expedition, the seizure of American and British citizens on the high seas was a clear violation of international laws—reached the United States that we first began to realize the atrocities that were being perpetrated in the island of Cuba. It was clearly a cause for war, but the navy of the United States at that time was in a shamefully deteriorated condition, the country apparently having forgotten Washington's admonition of December 7, 1796: "To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval force organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression." Here was a case of both "insult" and "aggression," and in point of fact the United States was powerless to vindicate herself. The remaining one hundred and two men of the Virginius were saved from a similar fate by the spirited action of the British sloop of war Niobe, Sir Lambton Loraine, which ran into Santiago harbor with decks cleared and guns shotted, ready to fight the five or six Spanish gunboats lying in the harbor if the butchery was continued.

If possible, the outcome of this affair was even more disgraceful to the United States than the outrage itself. After long correspondence the Spanish Government disclaimed all responsibility for the shooting, agreed to
pay an indemnity of eighty thousand dollars, "punish those who have offended," surrender the *Virginius* and salute the American flag. General Burriel, the really culpable official in the transaction, was "punished" by speedy promotion. The *Virginius* had been carried in triumph by the Spaniards to Havana, where she had been received with every demonstration of delight. But it was not at Havana that her flag was rehoisted and saluted. She was taken to the obscure port of Bahia Honda, where the only witnesses of the international ceremony were the hills of the bay and a few fishermen who knew nothing of its significance. When the Americans took possession of the *Virginius* they found that she had been purposely defiled and rendered filthy by the Spaniards, and had been left in such an unseaworthy condition that she sank on her way north. To give the insult a national significance, Don Carlos, who was then at war with his cousin Alfonso, lately placed upon the throne of the Bourbons, suggested that the contending sides suspend hostilities and unite in punishing the "arrogance" of the United States, after which the two claimants to the throne might renew their strife.

The affair of the *Virginius*, though arousing intense feeling in America, was allowed to pass over with this sham apology and reparation, and the insurrection in Cuba, started in 1868 by Carlos Cespedes, began to wane. In 1876 General Martinez Campos, who had done so much to re-establish the Bourbons on the throne, was sent to Cuba with twenty-five thousand of his best troops to crush out the remnants of the rebellion. Realizing the hopelessness of pacifying the natives by force of arms, Campos, on February 10, 1878, effected the famous compromise of Zanjon, in which he made large concessions to the Cubans, and so brought about the end of the Ten Years' War. But the compromise was ignored at Madrid, and, though affording some relief, the old intolerable conditions were soon found
to be prevailing again, and in February, 1895, Juan Gomez raised the flag of revolt near Matanzas, Bartolome Masso at Manzanillo, and Jesus Rabi, Guillermo Monçada and other natives in the province of Santiago de Cuba.

The situation became so grave that Don Emilio Calleja, the captain general, on March 27th resigned, and Campos was again sent out to "pacify" the island. Campos at first attempted to confine the insurrection to the province of Santiago de Cuba by placing a cordon of ten thousand troops along the western border of that province, a distance of about fifty miles. In attempting to break through this trocha José Martí, who had been placed at the head of the provisional government, was killed; but Maximo Gomez, who was recognized as the commander in chief of the "Army of Liberation," found little difficulty in entering Puerto Príncipe, and led his men almost within sight of Havana, burning bridges and destroying plantations and railroads as he went. Finding himself assailed by a storm of criticism for his want of success in the field, Campos resigned, and was succeeded, January 17, 1896, by General Valeriano Weyler, an officer who had served in the Ten Years' War and had gained an unenviable reputation for shocking cruelty. The appointment of Weyler was well understood to mean that the war was to be pushed with an iron hand.

Weyler arrived at Havana, February 10, 1896, and, quite in keeping with his reputation, he on February 17th issued a proclamation ordering a death penalty to be inflicted on all persons convicted of fourteen specified offenses. Among these were the furnishing of arms, horses, provisions or other assistance to the insurgents, the disclosure of telegraphic messages to any but designated officials, the circulation of reports, false or true, of any rebel successes, and the publication or even speaking of anything belittling Spain or the Spanish army. He further ordered that all country stores in
the provinces of Santiago and Puerto Príncipe be vacated, and that no person was to go abroad without a passport signed by the military authorities. As a further preventive of the natives carrying information of the movements of Spanish troops to the insurgents, Weyler, on October 21, 1896, issued his infamous re-concentration order. By this bando all the rural inhabitants were compelled to assemble in fortified towns, where little or no provision was made for their sustenance.

It would be unfair to Weyler to say that he was the originator of the vicious system of re-concentration. He merely aggravated a diseased condition. Re-concentration had been practiced before Weyler arrived in Cuba. In 1895 the people were flocking to military posts for protection both from the insurgents and detached bodies of Spanish troops, and in 1896 Secretary Olney reported to Congress: "There are in one provincial city alone some four thousand necessitous refugees from the surrounding country to whom the municipal authorities can afford little or no relief." There is no question, however, that Weyler's edict added greatly to the sufferings of the island. The result was a complete paralysis of rural industries in the island, which so affected the large towns that the commerce between the United States and Cuba declined from $95,804,000 in 1894 to $26,666,000 in 1897. Besides this, the sufferings of the pacíficos were indescribable, it having been estimated that some two hundred thousand of them perished.

It also would be unfair to say that the Spaniards made no attempt to relieve the condition of these unfortunate people. Relief societies were formed in many towns, and to a small extent aided the sufferers. Campos, before Weyler's arrival, endeavored to raise a fund, contributing two thousand dollars himself, besides which the soldiers subscribed a day's pay. In view of the fact that the Spanish Government frequently
was unable to pay its own soldiers, we can readily imagine that the "day's pay" was but another of those brutal mockeries which have long characterized Spanish dealings with this island. General Weyler was recalled October 6, 1897, and his successor, Captain-General Blanco, promptly revoked the reconcentration bando. Blanco also gave one hundred thousand dollars in Spanish silver to the relief of the sufferers, while the city of Havana, by a special tax, raised eighty thousand dollars for the same purpose. In March, 1898, the Cortes voted six hundred thousand dollars for the pacíficos, but the money was never sent; war with the United States serving as an excuse.

On Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee's report that some six to eight hundred American citizens were among the sufferers, President McKinley promptly called a special session of Congress, May 17, 1897, and fifty thousand dollars were voted to their relief. On December 24, 1897, the President issued a public appeal in behalf of the suffering Cubans, and about two hundred thousand dollars were subscribed. By the aid of the Red Cross Society, whose president, Miss Clara Barton, went to Havana, food was purchased with this money and distributed; Blanco graciously admitting the provisions free of duty. And it must be added that, although many of the Spanish residents in Cuba, and especially in Havana, expressed the bitterest opposition to this "impudent meddling" with their right to manage Cuba, Blanco exerted all his influence to further the object of the philanthropy.

Meanwhile the exasperation of the Spaniards against what they deemed the unwarranted interference of the Americans in their domestic affairs was further aroused by filibustering expeditions which were projected in the United States by Cubans and their sympathizers. It is not denied that many Cubans obtained American citizenship only to protect themselves from Spanish authority, and in many instances they needlessly flaunted
their naturalization papers in the face of Spanish officials in mere bravado. Doubtless many of the "six to eight hundred American citizens" reported by Consul-General Lee as being victims of the reconcentration were native Cubans of this class. Credit must be given, however, to the Government of the United States in using every legitimate means to prevent the fitting out and departure of filibustering expeditions from our shores. In fact, our Government acted far more conscientiously in this matter than did the British ministry in 1861-'65, else we would have seen Cuban Alabamas, Floridas, Rappahannocks, Shenandoahs and Sumters sailing from the United States, which in a short time would have annihilated Spanish commerce in every quarter of the globe.

As expressing the feelings of a large body of the American people at that time, the Senate, on May 20, 1897, passed a resolution according belligerent rights to the "government proclaimed, and for some time maintained by force of arms, by the people of Cuba." This recognition of the independence of Cuba got no further than the Senate. Intervention by the United States was delayed by the effort of Spain to give autonomy to Cuba. The "new constitution" proved to be only another to the long list of shams with which Spain had tantalized the wretched Cubans. It was spurned by the loyal Spaniards and Cubans alike. On the part of the Cubans, the only force that surrendered under the conditions of the new constitution was that of one hundred and ten men under Juan Masso in the province of Santiago de Cuba. Having reason to believe that the insurgent leader Aranguren would submit to the new order of things, Blanco sent Colonel Joaquín Ruiz, of the Spanish army, under a flag of truce to treat with him. Ruiz was seized by the insurgents, and, notwithstanding his flag of truce, was murdered in cold blood. On January 12, 1898, officers from the garrison at Havana led a mob in attacking the newspaper offices of the
three papers which had favored the new constitution, the Diario de la Marina, the Reconcentrado, and the Discusión. Troops that had been sent to suppress the disorders fraternized with the rioters, and threats were made not only against Cuban-Americans, but against Americans who were in no way connected with the insurrection.

It was in anticipation of just such a contingency as this that the battle ship *Maine* had been stationed at Key West with orders to be in readiness to steam to Havana, only ninety miles distant, at a moment's notice, to take on board any Americans who found their lives in danger. As the excitement resulting from the mob's attack on the newspaper offices seemed to justify the preparation of war ships for this service, Consul-General Lee, on January 13, 1898, cabled to Washington: "Uncertainty exists whether [Blanco] can control the situation. If demonstrated he can not maintain order, preserve life and keep the peace, or if Americans or their interests are in danger, ships must be sent, and to that end should be prepared to move promptly." In keeping with the great tact he had shown throughout these trying times, Lee did not immediately send for assistance, but, carefully watching events, stood ready to take decisive action at any crisis. On January 24th the Government at Washington, feeling that the situation was too grave to admit of further delay, informed Lee that the *Maine* had been ordered to Havana on a "friendly visit." Feeling that the arrival of this ship might arouse the Spaniards to further violence, Lee at once cabled: "[I] advise visit [to] be postponed six or seven days, to give last excitement more time to disappear." Captain Sigsbee, however, had received his sailing orders, and at eleven o'clock on the following morning, January 25th, the magnificent battle ship, resplendent in her dress of white, exchanged salutes with the Spanish batteries, and moved majestically into the harbor of her doom.
CHAPTER II.

DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE.

A careful review of the active operations of the United States navy in the past one hundred and twenty-five years will show that its brilliant record of successes has been owing largely to a high degree of preparedness in the ships individually. In the struggle for independence, in the French war, in the fights with the states of Barbary, and in the second war with Great Britain the commanders of American cruisers almost invariably far exceeded their instructions and the regulations of the service by devising, improving and perfecting, of their own volition, in times of peace, means of defense and offense in their several commands, so that when it came to actual hostilities our ships were found in the highest possible state of efficiency. It was this splendid system of navy management that gave commanding officers a personal interest in their vessels, many of our commanders having superintended the construction of the craft in which they achieved subsequent victories, from the laying of the keel to the mounting of their armaments.

This same "personal interest" was noticeable before the outbreak of the Spanish war. On May 1, 1897, Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard assumed command of the North Atlantic squadron—the main force of the United States navy then in active service—and it is not too much to say that it was largely owing to the careful and systematic drills and evolutions that our officers and crews went through in these new and almost
untried machines of naval warfare in the summer of 1897, under this thorough and conscientious officer, that the gratifying results of the following year were achieved. 1 After arduous drills along the New England coast, which ended August 31, 1897, this squadron pro-

1 Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard has been closely identified with the development of our new navy. Born September 30, 1836, he entered the Naval Academy in 1851, and served as executive officer in the Oneida when that vessel, as a part of Farragut's fleet, passed Forts Jackson and St. Philip, silenced the Chalmette battery and captured New Orleans. In the same vessel he participated in the two bombardments of Vicksburg, the one at Grand Gulf, and at Milliken's Bend, when the ram Arkansas ran the gauntlet of the National fleet. Afterward the Oneida was assigned to the blockade of Mobile. Promoted to the rank of lieutenant commander July 16, 1862, Sicard was placed in command of the Seneca, in which vessel he took part in the two attacks on Fort Fisher. He commanded the left wing of the second naval division in the famous land assault on Fort Fisher, January 15, 1865. Being advanced to the rank of commander March 2, 1870, Sicard served four years, 1871-1875, as inspector of ordnance at the Washington, D. C., Navy Yard, and designed the first steel rifled breech-loading guns for the navy. He also designed the carriages for these guns and for those of the long Gatling guns. He became a captain August 7, 1884. For eight years, 1880-1887, he was chief of the Ordnance Bureau and had charge of the reconstruction of our naval ordnance. It is to be noted that none of these guns has failed in service. He introduced the first rapid-fire guns in the service, directed and supervised the designs of carriages for them, caused the first torpedo search lights to be manufactured in this country, and made many efforts to introduce automobile Whitehead torpedoes. Captain Sicard purchased the first modern armor-piercing shells for the navy and introduced the manufacture of cast-steel common shell and shrapnel, and it was by his direction that brown powder for high-power guns was first successfully manufactured in America. In many other important details Rear-Admiral Sicard has identified himself with the rehabilitation of the navy. At the expiration of his second term as chief of the Ordnance Bureau he was appointed president of the Steel Inspection Board and contributed largely to the remarkable success of that body. Promoted to the rank of commodore July 10, 1894, Sicard became commandant of the New York Navy Yard and was made a rear admiral April 6, 1897, and assumed command of the North Atlantic squadron May 1st of the same year. Soon after his detachment from this command, Sicard became president of the Naval War Board, which made such a brilliant record in the Spanish war. He was retired September 30, 1898, and died September 13, 1900. In 1863 he married Elizabeth Floyd, great-granddaughter of Gen. William Floyd, a signer of the Declaration of Independence.
ceeded to the Southern drill ground, some twenty-five miles east of Cape Charles, and resumed its exercises. "The night of October 8th terminated a period of hard work of the kind that brought overwhelming victory later. . . . The days at sea had been spent in squadron evolutions and target practice, and the nights, at least in part, in night signaling, search-light drill, and in secondary practice, simulating the conditions of attack by torpedo boats. It was not mere routine; it was the business of warfare, pursued with stern official conscience under a commander in chief who throughout his whole career had been conspicuous for official conscience." This squadron consisted of ships which have become historic. They were the New York, Captain French Enson Chadwick (flagship); the Iowa, Captain William Thomas Sampson; the Massachusetts, Captain Francis John Higginson; the Indiana, Captain Henry Clay Taylor; the Brooklyn, Captain Francis Augustus Cook; and the Maine, Captain Charles Dwight Sigsbee.

On the night of October 8th orders reached the North Atlantic squadron, then on the aforementioned drill grounds, to have the Indiana go to Hampton Roads and the Maine to Port Royal, while the other vessels were to proceed north. Four days later the Maine arrived at Port Royal, where she remained until November 15th, when she repaired to Norfolk. Here her executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, was detached and his place was taken by Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright. From Norfolk the Maine proceeded to Key West, arriving at the latter port December 15th, with orders to hold herself in readiness to steam to Havana at a moment's notice, where she was to give an asylum to Americans in that city if occasion should require it. Realizing the delicacy and danger of the situation, Captain Sigsbee at

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1 Captain Sigsbee, Century Magazine, November, 1898.
once arranged a secret code of communication between Consul-General Lee at Havana, as it was well known that the Spaniards would not scruple to violate the sanctity of the post or telegraph offices if they desired to tamper with correspondence or messages which they believed affected them. On Sunday, January 23, 1898, the other large ships of the North Atlantic squadron arrived off Key West to continue drills. The Maine rejoined this force. The following day, Monday, the squadron got under way, and, steaming west, anchored on a bank some ten miles south of the southeastern entrance to Tortugas Roads.

That night Captain Sigsbee noticed the lights of a vessel rapidly approaching the squadron from the east, and surmising it to be a torpedo boat from Key West with instructions for the Maine, he at once caused his fires to be spread and preparations to be made for immediate departure, while his gig was held in readiness to go aboard the flagship. In a short time signal was made for the commanding officer of the Maine to repair on board the New York. Without delay Sigsbee was in his boat and making for the flagship. There was a rough sea on at the time, which, together with a strong tidal current and a very dark night, rendered the trip of the little boat perilous. Before reaching the New York the gig met the torpedo boat Dupont—which proved to be the craft that had brought the dispatches from Key West—and being taken aboard of her made for the flagship. On reaching the New York, Sigsbee was informed that the Maine was to proceed at once for Havana “on a friendly visit.” In pursuance of these instructions Captain Sigsbee, at eleven o’clock that night, got his ship under way and shaped her course for Havana.

In order that he might give his visit every appearance of being a “friendly one,” Captain Sigsbee made a landfall on the coast of Cuba, well to the westward of Havana, at daylight, Tuesday, January 25th. The early
hours of the morning were taken up with getting the battle ship in the best order. The officers put on their frock coats and the crew were dressed with exceptional neatness in blue. Having made these preliminary arrangements, Captain Sigsbee headed his ship eastward, and, when abreast of the city, sent her ahead at full speed with the national colors at the peak and the jack at the foremast head. In response to the signal, "We want a pilot," a pilot was sent off by the captain of the port, a navy man, and with great care and skill brought the battle ship into the harbor and moored her to a buoy of his own selecting. At that time there were in the harbor of Havana the Spanish cruiser Alfonso XII and the square-rigged German training steamer Gniesenau, the latter being some four hundred yards north of the Maine, in the man-of-war anchorage off the Machina. A day or so after the Maine's arrival the German training steamer Charlotte put into the port.

Wishing to maintain the most friendly relations with the Spanish officials, Captain Sigsbee attended to the courtesies of the port with unusual care. When the first Spanish officer, a lieutenant of the navy, visited the battle ship, Captain Sigsbee received him with every mark of attention. He seemed to the American commander to be "embarrassed and even humiliated in carrying out his duty." This officer was quickly followed by another Spanish lieutenant and a lieutenant from a German war ship. Captain Sigsbee promptly made all the necessary official calls, and was received with every expression of
The Maine entering Havana harbor. Destroyed there, February 15, 1898.
Anxious to test the effect of the Maine's arrival on the public before taking further steps, Captain Sigsbee kept all his officers and men aboard his ship, excepting Naval Cadet Jonas H. Holden, his aid, whom he sent ashore to Consul-General Lee with the announcement that the commander of the Maine would soon follow.

When Sigsbee landed he noted that "there was a crowd assembled, but only of moderate size. There was no demonstration of any kind; the crowd closed in on me slightly. I thought the people stolid and sullen so far as I could gather from an occasional glance, but I took very little notice of anybody. On my return, however, I noted carefully the bearing of the various groups of Spanish soldiers that I passed. They saluted me, as a rule, but with so much expression of apathy that the salute really went for nothing. They made no demonstration against me, however, not even by look. . . . All visits were made without friction and with courtesy on both sides, and apparently with all the freedom of conversation and action usually observed."²

It having been announced in the newspapers that a bullfight was to take place on the following Sunday, Captain Sigsbee determined to witness the performance with several of his officers. It is on such occasions that the Spanish nature reveals itself to full advantage, and on the day named the American commander, with four of the Maine's officers and Consul-General Lee, occupied a box courteously offered by General Parrado, who was acting as captain general in the absence of Blanco, then away on a tour of the island. There was a widely prevalent feeling among the Americans in Havana at that time that Captain Sigsbee was exposing himself to danger in making such a public appearance

¹ Captain Sigsbee to the author.
² Captain Sigsbee, in Century Magazine, November, 1898.
at a time when the masses were usually excited, and he was urged not to take any risks. But believing that he was only doing his duty, the intrepid officer persisted in his determination. On the way to the bull ring at Regla some one thrust into his hand a copy of a circular then widely circulated in Havana, a translation of which reads as follows:

SPANIARDS!

LONG LIVE SPAIN WITH HONOR!

What are you doing that you allow yourselves to be insulted in this way? Do you not see what they have done to us in withdrawing our brave and beloved Weyler, who at this very time would have finished with this unworthy, rebellious rabble who are trampling on our flag and on our honor?

Autonomy is imposed on us to cast us aside and give places of honor and authority to those who initiated this rebellion, these low-bred autonomists, ungrateful sons of our beloved country!

And finally these Yankee pigs who meddle in our affairs, humiliating us to the last degree, and for a still greater taunt order to us a man-of-war of their rotten squadron, after insulting us in their newspapers with articles sent from our own home!

Spaniards! the moment of action has arrived. Do not go to sleep! Let us teach these vile traitors that we have not yet lost our pride, and that we know how to protest with the energy befitting a nation worthy and strong, as our Spain is and always will be!

Death to the Americans! Death to autonomy!
Long live Spain! Long live Weyler!

Putting the copy of the above circular into his pocket, Sigsbee attended the bullfight. It was observable that an unusually strong military guard was in attendance, but, aside from the many scowling glances that were directed toward the box occupied by the Americans, the affair passed off without incident. When the American officers returned to their ship people from the bullfight passed near the Maine in ferryboats and saluted her with derisive calls, but made no further demonstrations of hostility. In short,
the behavior of the Spanish officials and that of the people, considering the abnormal conditions, could not have been complained of, excepting that native boatmen in the harbor, while giving prompt attention to calls from the Spanish cruisers and other vessels in port, manifested a reluctance, amounting to absolute insult, to answer signals from the Maine. The same hostility was shown by tradesfolk on shore in supplying the wants of the battle ship.

Notwithstanding the apparently orderly condition of Havana, Captain Sigsbee took every precaution a capable officer could devise in a friendly port to guard against any foul play. Etiquette prevented him from dragging the harbor in the vicinity of the Maine's moorings, and also prevented the establishing of picket boats or the search-light service. But every preparation that could be made within the ship was carefully attended to. Extra sentries were stationed on the forecastle, poop and bridge. The corporal of the guard was instructed to watch with unusual care the hundreds of people who visited the ship. Ammunition was kept on deck for instant use, and instead of fire under one boiler, two boilers were made ready for immediate service. "The purport of my own orders and instructions," said Captain Sigsbee, "was that we should consider the Maine in a position demanding extreme vigilance and requiring a well-sustained routine both by day and by night," though "until the night of the explosion nothing whatever was developed to show that there was any special need for extreme vigilance."

The bearing of the Maine's crew during these trying days is worthy of notice. Captain Sigsbee says: "During the whole visit the crew remained on board, with the exception of an occasional visit to the shore, on duty, by some well-trusted petty officer. I regretted very much to retain the crew on board, because it had been my custom to give liberty freely when in other
Journals. Even the bimboatmen did not seem to care especially for the custom of the men, doubtless because of the undercurrent of feeling against us. The crew never complained—not in a single instance, that I am aware of."^1

On the night of February 15, 1898—three weeks after the Maine’s arrival in Havana—the American battle ship was observed by several of her officers and many of the crew to be heading in a direction she had not taken since her arrival—namely, northwest. The day had been unusually hot and sultry, and night came on dark and overcast. In keeping with the rule of refusing shore leave to the men, adopted by Captain Sigsbee since his arrival in Havana, all of the three hundred and twenty-eight men in the battle ship were aboard, and of the twenty-six officers only Passed Assistant Engineer Frederic C. Bowers, Naval Cadet Pope Washington (of the Engineers), Paymaster’s Clerk Brent McCarthy and Gunner Joseph Hill were absent. The usual order and extra precautions to guard against treachery were observed. At ten minutes after nine o’clock the marine bugler Newton played the order to “turn in and keep quiet” in his most elaborate style, and as the musical echoes of the blast were resounded from the uttermost corners of the bay, the orderly preparations for retiring for the night were under way.

At 9.40 P. M. a terrific explosion took place at the forward end of the ship, quickly followed by a second report. Captain Sigsbee at the time was sitting in the admiral’s cabin—the Maine having been fitted as a flagship—writing. In an instant every electric light in the vessel was extinguished, leaving all in total darkness. Realizing the serious nature of the disaster, Sigsbee groped his way through the cabin, along a passage and thence to the superstructure. On his way some one

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1 Century Magazine, November, 1898.
violently ran against him. It proved to be William Anthony, the orderly at the cabin door. His training rendered him oblivious of his own danger, and, apologizing for the collision, he saluted and reported that the ship had been blown up and was sinking.

Reaching the main deck, Captain Sigsbee was promptly surrounded by his surviving officers, ready to carry out the first orders. In a moment it was realized that the Maine was hopelessly wrecked. Finding that the inrushing waters rendered it unnecessary to flood the magazines, Captain Sigsbee gave his attention to rescuing the survivors. An effort was made by Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, Lieutenant Hood, and Naval Cadets Boyd and Cluverius to man the fire mains with a view to extinguish the fire that was raging in the central part of the ship. These officers, at great risk, made their way over the poop awning, but found that the fire mains were disabled beyond repair. Only two of the ship's fifteen boats were available. These were manned by the surviving officers and men jointly, and in fifteen minutes rescued every man they could find. One wounded man was found pinned under a fallen ventilator, and was rescued by Lieutenants Hood and Blandin just as the water was rising over him. Rescuing boats had put out from the Alfonso XII and the American passenger steamer City of Washington.

Finding that the Maine was settling on the bottom of the harbor, with her poop deck awash,¹ and that there was nothing more to be done aboard, Captain Sigsbee gave the order to get into the boats, he being the last to leave. Captain Sigsbee then went aboard the City of Washington and there penned his famous dispatch announcing the loss of his ship: "Maine blown up in Havana harbor at nine-forty to-night and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed

¹ Captain Sigsbee to the author.
or drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line steamer. Send lighthouse tenders from Key West for crew and few pieces of equipment above water. No one has clothing other than that upon him. Public opinion should be suspended until further report. All officers believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, including representatives of General Blanco, now with me to express sympathy.—Sigsbee.” One sentence of this dispatch—“Public opinion should be suspended until further report”—alone is sufficient to mark Captain Sigsbee as a commander of remarkable coolness and ability. The loss of his ship is the most serious catastrophe a naval officer can face. The tendency on all such occasions is to lose no time in throwing the blame on anybody and everybody but the commander himself. Captain Sigsbee had every reason to believe at that moment—just as the American people believe to-day—that the Maine was fouly and treacherously destroyed through Spanish agencies. But instead of availing himself of this most plausible cover for the disaster, Captain Sigsbee gave every chance for the cause of the explosion to be traced—to his own negligence or that of his officers if such proved to be the case—in his efforts to avert war. Had Captain Sigsbee, in his first dispatch announcing the loss of the Maine, stated or even intimated that the explosion was due to Spanish treachery—as he would have been perfectly justified in doing—nothing could have restrained the infuriated Americans from declaring war at once.¹

¹ Captain Charles Dwight Sigsbee was born January 16, 1845, at Albany, N. Y., and entered the Naval Academy in 1859. In October, 1865, he was attached to the Monongahela, and several months later was ordered to the Brooklyn, in which vessel he participated in the battle of Mobile Bay under Farragut, and afterward in the bombardments of Fort Fisher as well as in the final attack on that fort by the squadron of Admiral Porter. On the close of the civil war he was attached to the Wyoming and made a cruise of four years to the East Indies, China and
Of the three hundred and fifty men and officers in the Maine at the time of the explosion, two hundred and sixty, including two officers, Lieutenant Friend

Japan, serving some time in the Ashuelot. During this cruise he was promoted successively from ensign to lieutenant and to lieutenant commander. In January, 1869, he was ordered to duty at the Naval Academy, and in 1871 to the Hydrographic Office. He was then attached to the Severn, and later to the Worcester as navigator; also to the Canandaigua as executive officer. In 1873 he was ordered to duty in the Coast Survey.

From 1874 to 1878 he commanded the Coast Survey steamer Blake engaged in deep-sea exploration, during which he sounded and explored virtually the whole of the Gulf of Mexico. "Sigsbee Deep" in the Gulf of Mexico was named in his honor. His inventions and methods relating to deep-sea exploration are explained in a work entitled "Deep-Sea Sounding and Dredging," etc., published by the Coast Survey in 1880, which is recognized in all maritime countries as a standard work. For his inventions the decoration of the Red Eagle of Prussia was given to him by William I of Germany. Sigsbee also received a gold medal and other honors from abroad. He became a commander in 1882. He has served as a member of the Naval Examining Board, of the Naval Retiring Board, and has had three tours of duty at the United States Naval Academy, where he has been twice head of academic departments and member of the academic board. He has also been attached to the United States Hydrographic Office as assistant hydrographer, and from 1893 to 1897 was head of that office. He became a captain March, 1897, and took command of the Maine on April 10th. Sigsbee's executive ability was well illustrated shortly after he assumed command of this ship. In order to avoid sinking an excursion steamer in East River, New York, he ran the Maine into a wharf, doing considerable injury and sinking a float loaded with cars, but doing no material damage to the battle ship. For this action he was highly commended by the Navy Department.

After the destruction of the Maine Sigsbee was, for a short time, an aid to the Secretary of the Navy, and when hostilities broke out he was placed in command of the auxiliary cruiser St. Paul. His career in that vessel will be noted in a following chapter. From September, 1898, to January, 1900, he was in command of the battle ship Texas. In December, 1899, the Texas was charged with the duty of transporting the Maine's dead from Havana to the United States. At the present time he is chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, a member of the Naval Construction Board and of the Naval General Board. Captain Sigsbee has commanded the following naval sailing ships: Dale (twice), Constellation and Portsmouth; and the following steam vessels: Blake, Kearsarge, Maine, St. Paul and Texas. He is a member of various scientific societies. In 1870 he married Eliza Rogers Lockwood, daughter of the late Prof. Henry H. Lockwood, United States navy.
W. Jenkins and Assistant Engineer Darwin R. Merritt, were killed or subsequently died of injuries received. Some months later Lieutenant Blandin died from causes attributed to the shock of the explosion. About one hundred of the bodies were not recovered from the wreck. Next to the blowing up of the United States frigate *Randolph*, in 1777—when three hundred and eleven men in a complement of three hundred and fifteen perished—this is the greatest disaster that has ever befallen a single ship of our navy. The Spanish authorities in Havana promptly made visits of condolence, and stoutly disclaimed all knowledge as to the cause of the disaster. Every assistance was given to Captain Sigsbee and other survivors of the *Maine*, and the burial of the dead at the Cristóbal Colon Cemetery, February 17th, was attended with every mark of respect and apparently sincere regret.

A court of inquiry was promptly convened by our Government. It consisted of Captain Sampson, president; Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, judge advocate; Captain Chadwick and Lieutenant-Commander Potter. The sessions were held in the lighthouse tender *Mangrove*, which brought them from Key West, February 21st. After a sitting at Havana and Key West, lasting several weeks, the disaster was thoroughly investigated, and a report was delivered to President McKinley March 21st. Divers had been sent down,

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1 The officers of the *Maine* at the time of the explosion were: Captain, Charles Dwight Sigsbee; Lieutenant Commander, Richard Wainwright; Lieutenants, George F. W. Holman, John Hood, Carl W. Jungen, George P. Blow, John J. Blandin and Friend W. Jenkins; Cadets, Jonas H. Holden, Wat T. Cluverius, Amon Bronson and David F. Boyd, Jr.; Surgeon, Lucien G. Heneberger; Paymaster, Charles M. Ray; Chief Engineer, Charles P. Howell; Passed Assistant Engineer, Frederic C. Bowers; Assistant Engineers, John R. Morris and Darwin R. Merritt; Cadets (Engineer Division), Pope Washington and Arthur Crenshaw; Chaplain. John P. Chidwick; First Lieutenant of Marines, Albertus W. Catlin; Boatswain, Francis E. Larkin; Gunner, Joseph Hill; Carpenter, George Helms; Pay Clerk, Brent McCarthy.
eyewitnesses of the explosion had been examined, the surviving members of the ship's company had been closely questioned, and after a most thorough consideration of every circumstance the court came to the conclusion that the first explosion was caused by a submarine mine, followed by a second explosion, which was attributed to the forward magazine of the battleship. The Spanish authorities made an independent investigation; but it has been conclusively shown that their search was purely perfunctory, and the charge that the findings of their board of inquiry were drawn up before the investigations were fairly started has not been satisfactorily refuted.

While the American court of inquiry was in session at Havana the Spanish cruiser Vizcaya entered that port. This vessel had called at New York to "return the friendly visit" of the Maine at Havana. Captain Eulate, her commander, did not know of the loss of the Maine until his arrival in the American port. So great was the excitement in the United States at this time that extraordinary precautions were taken both by the federal and municipal authorities to guard against any similar "accident" to the Spaniard. Shortly after the Vizcaya's arrival in Havana the United States gunboat Montgomery, Commander George A. Converse, put into the same port, March 9th, from Matanzas. About the same time the Vizcaya entered Havana harbor her sister ship, the Almirante Oquendo, entered the same port, March 5th, thus forming the nucleus for a formidable flying squadron, with a convenient base for operations against the coast of the United States.

Although President McKinley received the report of the court of inquiry into the loss of the Maine March 21st, he very prudently delayed sending it to Congress until March 28th, while other delays were purposely made in order to give the country much needed time in which to prepare for war. On March 9th Congress placed at the disposal of the President
fifty million dollars "for national defense," and Commander Willard H. Brownson was at once sent to Europe with authority to purchase war craft. Before his arrival in England, however, Lieutenant John C. Colwell, our naval attaché in London, had secured the Brazilian cruisers Amazonas and Almirante Abrowall, of the Cincinnati class, which were renamed New Orleans and Albany respectively, while a torpedo boat, rechristened Somers, was purchased in Germany. Another small cruiser, the Diogenes, renamed Topeka, was also purchased in England. The cruiser Nictheroy was purchased of Brazil at Rio de Janeiro. On April 11th the President sent to Congress a message reviewing the hopeless conditions in Cuba, and declaring that, at last, the hour for intervention had come. Two days later the House of Representatives voted for intervention. On April 20th the President sent an ultimatum to Spain, demanding that the Madrid Government "at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters." The President announced that he would wait for a "full and satisfactory response" until noon April 23d, and if such answer was not made by that time the United States would forcibly eject Spanish authorities from Cuba.

This ultimatum was never officially presented to the Spanish Government, for on April 21st our minister to Spain was informed by the Madrid Government that diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain were severed. On April 25th Congress declared that war had existed between the United States since April 21st, the day on which Spain summarily broke off all relations with this country.
CHAPTER III.

MOBILIZATION.

Not the least notable feature of the Hispano-American war was the energy and skill displayed by the Navy Department in mobilizing our maritime forces. When hostilities seemed probable the navy consisted of seventy-seven war craft—not including twenty-two torpedo boats, many of the latter being in course of construction. Of the seagoing vessels, thirteen were undergoing repairs, nine were in ordinary, and seven were in the service of our several militia organizations, leaving only forty-eight war ships at the immediate disposal of the Navy Department. Of these forty-eight craft, fourteen were on the North Atlantic station, seven were on the Pacific coast, three—the Cincinnati, Castine and Wilmington—were in the South Atlantic, two—the San Francisco and Bancroft—were in European waters, and six—the Olympia, Boston, Raleigh, Monocacy, Concord and Petrel—were on the Asiatic station. Eight vessels were in use as training schools, three were on special service, and the same number was held in reserve.

The rapidity and skill with which these ships, stationed in different parts of the world, and scattered at widely separated points of their several stations, were concentrated in a few strategic ports must arouse the admiration of all intelligent observers. At the outbreak of the American Revolution there was, of course, no navy to be mobilized. A maritime force was created. In view of the generally chaotic condition of the rebel-
ling colonies, it is not surprising that we find our sea power at that time managed with hesitancy. The little navy that sprang into existence rapidly diminished in force, so that by 1782 there were only seven Continental war craft displaying the Stars and Stripes, and had it not been for the astounding enterprise of our privateers-men the flag of the young republic would scarcely have appeared on the high seas.

In our second war with Great Britain the administration of the navy was marked with a degree of timidity amounting almost to cowardice. At first our commanders were forbidden to sail, the department regarding that step too hazardous, and decided to reserve our frigates for harbor defense. Captain David Porter undertook his memorable cruise in the Pacific without the consent of the department. It was in direct disobedience of orders that Captain Hull put to sea from Boston, August, 1812, and began that series of brilliant victories which raised the maritime prowess of the United States in the estimation of all nations. Had Hull been defeated in his action with the Guerrière, he undoubtedly would have been shot for disobeying orders. It was not until several of our highest naval officers waited on the Secretary of the Navy that the department finally consented to our men-of-war venturing freely on the high seas.

In our war with Mexico the management of the navy in the Gulf at first was characterized by inefficiency and failures, while our officers on the Pacific coast—where they were beyond the reach of departmental interference—took matters in their own hands and consummated one of the most brilliant naval programmes on record, the entire Pacific coast being wrested from the enemy by the almost unaided efforts of our seamen.

The same timidity and inefficiency were noticeable in the first two years of the civil war; the South, in spite of its well-known deficiency in shipyards, machine shops, and skilled mechanics, actually getting
First-class battle ship Oregon.
into commission a number of ironclads—the then improved type of war craft that was destined to turn the balance of sea power in the struggle—some time before a single iron-mailed craft in the North was completed. At the time this war broke out the navy of the United States consisted of ninety vessels, of which twenty-one were unserviceable, twenty-seven were out of commission, and forty-two were in commission. Of the forty-two in commission, six were in the East Indies, eight on the coast of Africa, seven were on the Pacific coast, twelve were at home ports, three were on the European station, and six were in South Atlantic waters. Thus it will be seen that on the eve of the Spanish war the navy of the United States was quite as widely scattered over the globe as when the civil war broke out.

In view of these facts the American people may well congratulate themselves on having had at the head of their naval administration during the Hispano-American war men who knew how to handle and appreciate sea power. Secretary John Davis Long and Assistant Secretary Theodore Roosevelt—the latter being succeeded, May 11, 1898, by Charles Herbert Allen—with their able corps of advisers, not only rapidly concentrated every available war ship at a few strategic points, but they created an auxiliary force which for efficiency in actual service has not been surpassed.

As we have seen, the European station, commanded by Rear-Admiral Thomas O. Selfridge, had two cruisers, the San Francisco (flagship), Captain Richard P. Leary, and the Bancroft, Lieutenant-Commander John V. B. Bleecker. As early as January 11, 1898, Secretary Long sent a warning note to Selfridge at Villefranche-sur-Mer, urging him to retain the men on that enlistment and to prepare his squadron for active service. At that time the Helena, Commander William T. Swinburne, was on her way to the Asiatic station, and on January 16th Long intercepted her at Funchal with
the following message: "Secret and confidential. In view of recent events it is considered advisable to delay departure from Funchal. Can you obtain good berth behind breakwater for a considerable time?" In this dispatch we have a good illustration of the thorough-

![Map of the Atlantic Fleet mobilization](image)

ness with which the department prepared for hostilities. Even the question of a safe anchorage at Funchal had been foreseen and considered. On the following day the Secretary ordered the Helena to Lisbon, which port he had selected as a rendezvous for our cruisers in
European waters. In pursuance with these instructions the San Francisco, Bancroft and Helena were swiftly collected at Lisbon under orders to keep a full supply of coal on hand and to be prepared to sail for any point at instant notice. On March 12th the Secretary ordered the Bancroft to Norfolk, Va., the Helena to Key West, and two days later Commodore John A. Howell—who had succeeded Selfridge, February 6th—was directed to sail in the San Francisco for Newcastle-on-Tyne, where he was to hoist the flag of the United States over the recently purchased cruisers New Orleans (Amazonas), and Albany (Abrouall). The command of the New Orleans devolved on Lieutenant-Commander Arthur P. Nazro, who was to proceed at once for New York under the convoy of the flagship. At this time the Spanish torpedo boat destroyer Audaz was in English waters, and it was feared that she might make an attack on the American cruisers. Howell sailed as instructed, but saw nothing of the Spaniard. Reaching the United States, Howell was placed in command of the northern patrol squadron, still having the San Francisco as his flagship. This squadron was organized for the protection of the Atlantic coast north of the Delaware capes. Besides the flagship San Francisco there were attached to this force the auxiliary cruisers Yankee, Commander Willard H. Brownson; Dixie, Commander Charles H. Davis; Prairie, Commander Charles J. Train; and Yosemite, Commander William H. Emory. In May the Columbia, Captain Theodore F. Jewell, and the Minneapolis, Captain James H. Sands, were detached from the flying squadron and placed under Howell's orders. The New Orleans was placed under the command of Captain William M. Folger and was assigned to the Eastern squadron; the Bancroft, now under Commander Richardson Clover, was detailed for special duty; while the Helena became a part of the mighty fleet assembling at Key West. In this manner every available
vessel on the European station was brought into American ports ready for instant service.

The South Atlantic squadron, under the command of Captain Colby M. Chester, consisted, as we have seen, of the \textit{Cincinnati} (flagship); \textit{Castine}, Commander Robert M. Berry; and the \textit{Wilmington}, Commander Chapman C. Todd. The day after intercepting the \textit{Helena} at Funchal, Secretary Long cabled, January 17th, to Captain Chester at Montevideo, Uruguay, the following cautious instructions: "Affairs are very disturbed at Cuba. It is considered advisable to change the disposition of ships. Announce unofficially your intention to proceed with the \textit{Cincinnati} and \textit{Castine} [on] a cruise northward for exercise and drill and to visit the most northern part of the South Atlantic station. As soon after as possible, without thereby causing comment, proceed to Pará, Brazil, at discretion, and there await further orders." The \textit{Wilmington} at that time was at Basseterre, Guadeloupe, under orders, dated December 9, 1897, to proceed to the South Atlantic station. To Commander Todd the Secretary, the same day he gave the above orders to Chester, cabled: "Delay execution of the orders of December 9th for the present. Cruise in the Windward Islands, not touching at Spanish ports. Will keep in telegraphic communication. About February 14th proceed to La Guayra and there await further orders. Do not detach Ensigns Bretherton and Dayton." In pursuance with these instructions the \textit{Cincinnati} and \textit{Castine} proceeded to Pará, and on February 17th the Secretary cabled them "to proceed to such port as you think best to the north of Pará. Keep in telegraphic communication with Washington." Nine days later Secretary Long cabled the \textit{Wilmington} at La Guayra to make for Barbadoes. Commander Todd obeyed this order, and at Barbadoes met the \textit{Cincinnati} and \textit{Castine}. Thus in forty days the entire South Atlantic squadron had been unostentatiously concentrated and made ready for any service.
At this time the *Annapolis*, Commander John J. Hunker, was in the West Indies with a number of apprentices aboard, on a practice cruise. The Secretary had not been able to communicate with her, so that her commander was not informed of the serious situation. On March 15th Long cabled Chester: “Order the squadron to proceed to Port Antonio. The *Annapolis* left yesterday from Curacao for a cruise northward, to arrive not later than March 31st at Key West. Try to intercept and direct her to proceed to Hampton Roads.” By means of these energetic measures the department in a few weeks had collected at Key West a magnificent fleet of war ships within instant communication of Washington, and ready for any emergency. Captain William Thomas Sampson, was made an acting rear admiral, and appointed April 21st to the command of this fleet in place of Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard, who was incapacitated by ill health.¹

The *Brooklyn*, Captain Francis A. Cook, was ordered from La Guayra, and with the *Massachusetts*, Captain Francis John Higginson; *Texas*, Captain John W. Philip; *Minneapolis*, Captain James H. Sands; Co-

¹ This fleet consisted of the *New York* (flagship), Captain French E. Chadwick; the *Iowa*, Captain Robley D. Evans; *Indiana*, Captain Henry C. Taylor; *Puritan*, Captain Purnell F. Harrington; *Terror*, Captain Nicoll Ludlow; *Cincinnati*, Captain Colby M. Chester; *Amphitrite*, Captain Charles J. Barclay; *Marblehead*, Commander Bowman Hendry McCalla; *Montgomery*, Commander George A. Converse; *Machias*, Commander John F. Merry; *Nashville*, Commander Washburn Maynard; *Dolphin*, Commander Henry W. Lyon; *Detroit*, Commander James H. Dayton; *Catskill*, Commander Robert M. Berry; *Wilmington*, Commander Chapman C. Todd; *Vicksburg*, Commander Abraham B. H. Lillie; *Helena*, Commander William T. Swinburne; *Newport*, Commander Benjamin F. Tilley; *Fern*, Lieutenant-Commander William S. Cowles; and *Vesuvius*, Lieutenant-Commander John E. Pillsbury. Attached to this fleet were the torpedo boats *Porter*, Lieutenant John C. Fremont; *Ericsson*, Lieutenant Nathaniel R. Usher; *Cushing*, Lieutenant Albert Gleaves; *Foote*, Lieutenant William L. Rodgers; *Winslow*, Lieutenant John B. Bernadou; and *Dupont*, Lieutenant Spencer S. Wood. The tugs *Samoset* and *Leyden* were commanded by Lieutenant York Noel and Ensign Frederick L. Sawyer respectively.
lumbia, Captain Theodore F. Jewell; and the ram Katahdin, Commander George F. F. White, formed a flying squadron under the command of Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, having its base of operations at Hampton Roads.

The same rapid concentration of naval forces was observable in the Asiatic squadron. The Olympia had been under orders to return home, but when war seemed possible Secretary Long, January 27, 1898, cabled Commodore George Dewey, at Yokohama, Japan: "Retain, until further orders, the crews of the squadron whose terms of enlistment have expired." Realizing the important part the Asiatic forces would play in the pending struggle, Dewey proceeded to Hong Kong, and there formed his base of operations against the Philippines. The third-rate cruiser Concord also was under orders to come home, but her instructions were countermanded in time to allow her to take part in the Manila campaign. On February 25th Assistant-Secretary Roosevelt cabled Dewey at Hong Kong: "Secret and confidential. Order the squadron, except the Monocacy, to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands."

The order "see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast" was in keeping with the department's comprehensive plan of sending every available war ship on the Pacific slope to the Atlantic. Had the Spanish naval forces in the Philippines been free to act, they would have been in a position to create incalculable damage on American commerce in the Pacific. The Pacific squadron consisted of the Oregon, Captain Albert Smith Barker; Baltimore (flagship), Captain Nehemiah Mayo Dyer; Monterey, Captain Charles

1 For map, see Chapter VIII.
Edgar Clark; *Monadnock*, Captain William H. Whiting; *Bennington*, Commander Henry E. Nichols; *Alert*, Commander Eugene H. C. Leutze; and *Marietta*, Commander Frederick M. Symonds. To Rear-Admiral Joseph N. Miller, at Honolulu, the Secretary also gave warning. On February 26th the *Baltimore*, then at the Hawaiian Islands, was sent with all possible dispatch to re-enforce the Asiatic squadron, while the revenue cutter *Hugh McCulloch*, then on her way round the world, was ordered to Hong Kong. By means of prompt measures Commodore Dewey soon had at Hong Kong, ready for any emergency, the flagship *Olympia*, *Baltimore*, *Boston*, *Raleigh*, *Concord*, *Petrel*, *Monocacy* and *Hugh McCulloch*.

Not satisfied with merely putting the regular war ships of the navy in the best possible condition for hostilities, the department organized an auxiliary naval force, in which additional vessels belonging to the merchant marine and private individuals were drafted. Officers of the navy were placed in command of these, and were assisted by the naval reserves. This was known as the mosquito fleet, and performed valuable service. A board, consisting of Captain Frederick Rodgers, Lieutenant-Commander James D. Jerrold Kelley, Chief Engineer Albert F. Dixon, Assistant Naval Constructor John D. Tawresey and Lieutenant Nathan Sargent, was formed for the purpose of purchasing a fleet of vessels from the merchant marine. By this means a valuable adjunct to the navy was created.¹ The steamer *Creole*, renamed *Solace*, was fitted up as a hospital ship, while the *Saturn*, Commander Benjamin S. Richards, was secured as a coal vessel. Other vessels were prepared for the same service. The large passenger steamer *China* was secured with the view of operating with the Asiatic squadron.

Thus was completed the ablest mobilization of sea

¹ For complete list of these vessels see Appendix.
power, under actual war conditions, the world has ever witnessed. One man in Washington, with able assistants, at the first alarm of real war came within touch of every ship forming the United States navy. Vessels proceeding on distant voyages were promptly checked, rapidly concentrated at a convenient rendezvous, and brought to a desirable base of operation. The great home fleet was quickly massed at a few naval ports, and in an incredibly short time was made ready for whatever might come. The distant Asiatic squadron was rallied at Hong Kong ready to strike the first great blow of the war. Everything that foresight, prudence and tireless energy could do to bring about the successful carrying out of these plans was done. When we remember that several European battle ships of the largest class have been sunk by collision during the ordinary practice maneuvers, that others have been damaged, and that many men have been killed through accidents in times of peace, we may well congratulate ourselves on the management that brought about the mobilization and maneuvers of the mighty fleet of war craft assembled at Key West, during the excitement and hurry of actual war, without a serious accident. Secretary Long very modestly refers to his management of the navy as follows: "I think I ought to say that I have always felt that the prompt mobilization and efficient work of our navy in the recent war, which deserves the hearty praise you give it, was due not to me but to the chiefs of bureaus and the officers in command at sea. I have never thought that bureau chiefs have received the credit which is theirs." 1 The chiefs of bureaus during the war were Civil Engineer Mordecai T. Endicott, Yards and Docks; Commander Royal B. Bradford, Equipment; Captain Arent Schuyler Crowninshield, assisted by Commander Francis W. Dickins, Navigation; Captain Charles O'Neil, assisted

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1 Secretary Long to the author.
by Lieutenant Frank F. Fletcher, Ordnance; Chief Constructor Philip Hichborn, Construction and Repair; Engineer-in-Chief George W. Melville, Steam Engineering; Paymaster-General Edwin Stewart, assisted by Paymaster Henry G. Colley, Supplies and Accounts; and Surgeon-General William K. Van Reypen, assisted by Surgeon John C. Boyd, Medicine and Surgery. At the head of the judge-advocate general's office was Captain Samuel C. Lemly.
CHAPTER IV.

VOYAGE OF THE OREGON.

Realizing that the scene of active operation in the Atlantic would be in the West Indies, the Navy Department deemed it desirable to re-enforce the fleet in those waters with the first-class battle ship Oregon, then on the Pacific coast. This magnificent craft had been constructed at San Francisco, and was designed primarily as a coast line battle ship. The great difficulties of sending her on the long voyage round South America were apparent at once and involved no little risk and responsibility. Should the ship be lost the blame would necessarily be attached to those ordering her on such a perilous mission. As the venture was successful, due credit should be awarded to the same source. Such an attempt never before had been made, and doubts were freely expressed as to her ability to perform the feat. The exigencies of the occasion, however, determined Secretary Long in ordering this superb example of naval architecture to the Atlantic, notwithstanding the fact that the loss of this important vessel, or even a serious accident to her, would be heralded abroad as a distinct advantage to the enemy. When the London Statesman, just before the War of 1812 broke out, said, "The Americans will be found attempting deeds that no other nation would attempt," it gave a prophecy which is seen to have held good down to 1898.

Fully conscious of the responsibility he was incurring, the Secretary telegraphed to the commander of the Oregon, then in Puget Sound, Washington, under
date of March 7th: "The situation is getting worse. You should go to San Francisco as soon as possible and get ammunition." Two days later the Oregon arrived at the port mentioned, and on March 12th the Secretary telegraphed: "When in all respects ready for sea, proceed with the vessel under your command to Callao, Peru, and await further orders. In view of the present critical condition of affairs the Oregon should leave San Francisco at the earliest possible date and arrive at Callao as soon as practicable. The crew is to be constantly drilled, the passage of the ship not to be delayed thereby."

In March, 1897, Captain Albert Smith Barker assumed command of the Oregon, and it was largely owing to his able management that this splendid vessel was found in the highest state of efficiency when she began her famous race against time. On the expiration of Barker's term of sea service, January, 1898, he was succeeded by Captain Alexander H. McCormick, who continued the work of preparing the ship for her unexpected ordeal. On March 17th Captain Charles Edgar Clark assumed command of this ship in place of Captain McCormick, the latter being incapacitated by ill health. Two days later, having filled with coal and in other respects having prepared herself for the hazardous undertaking, the Oregon sailed from the Golden Gate, and with an average speed of 10.7 knots an hour arrived at Callao, April 4th. At the time the Oregon

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1 Rear-Admiral Barker to the author. It is interesting in this connection to note that when Captain Clark gave up the command of the Oregon in August, 1898, Captain Barker was transferred from the Newark back to the favorite Oregon, and came to New York in her. In October he sailed for the Pacific, by way of Cape Horn, in command of the Special Service Squadron, which consisted of the battle ships Oregon and Iowa, the supply steamer Celtic, the distilling ship Iris and the colliers Aberenda, Cassius, Justin, Scindia and Sterling. On reaching the Pacific the Iowa with some of the auxiliaries were sent to San Francisco, while the Oregon and the Iris continued on their course for the Philippines via Honolulu, arriving at Manila in March, 1899.
left San Francisco the Marietta, Commander Frederick M. Symonds, was at Panama. On March 22d Secretary Long ordered this vessel to proceed to Callao and make arrangements to coal the Oregon upon the arrival of that battle ship. Commander Symonds immediately proceeded to carry out this order, and when he arrived at Callao he found that the untiring vigilance of the
department had anticipated every contingency and had foreseen every requirement necessary for the hastening of the voyage of the ships. At Callao Commander Symonds received a dispatch from Secretary Long under date March 29th: "Contract for the best coal to be delivered on board the Oregon immediately on arrival. Oregon to coal with utmost dispatch. You proceed at once to Valparaiso." Commander Symonds, immediately upon the receipt of this dispatch, contracted for one thousand tons of coal for the Oregon, and after making arrangements for having it placed in lighters ready for transportation aboard the Oregon when that ship should arrive, he sailed on the evening of March 31st for Valparaiso.

On his arrival at Callao Captain Clark made the usual repairs on his engines after a long run. "The engines and boilers of the Oregon were at no time in need of extensive repairs. The high state of efficiency in which the engineering department was kept should be fully credited to the untiring energies of the five zealous young engineer officers and the excellent men who composed the engineer force under the direction of that able chief engineer, Robert W. Milligan."1

Through the energy of Chief Engineer Milligan and his assistants, this work was rapidly completed, not having in any way interfered with the coaling of the vessel. Recognizing the urgency of the occasion, Captain Clark, on April 5th, cabled to the Secretary: "I can make Montevideo, perhaps Rio Janeiro, not stopping at Valparaiso, and if coal can be obtained at Sandy Point, Patagonia, I could make Bahia." On the following day Captain Clark supplemented this dispatch with the following: "On account of navigation of Magellan Straits and reported movements of Spanish torpedo vessel [the Temerario] near Monte-

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1 Lieutenant Edward Walter Eberle to the author. For the names of these officers, see page 89, footnote.
video, I should recommend Marietta to accompany this vessel." Acting on this suggestion, the department, April 6th, cabled to Clark: "Proceed at once to Montevideo or Rio Janeiro. The Spanish torpedo boat Temerario is in Montevideo. Marietta has been ordered to proceed to Sandy Point to arrange for coal. How many tons of coal will you require? The Marietta and Oregon to proceed together. Keep your destination and this message secret." In pursuance with this programme the Secretary cabled the Marietta at Valparaiso, April 7th, to proceed at once for Sandy Point, and there secure six hundred tons of coal for the Oregon, and then to accompany that battle ship to the United States.

Previously to the Marietta's arrival at Valparaiso a number of Spanish residents at that place had learned of the destination of that cruiser and announced their intention of destroying the ship, if she dared to anchor in the harbor, by means of torpedoes. Through the courtesy of the Chilian officials, Commander Symonds was advised of these threats and immediately upon his arrival he stationed patrol boats about his ship, besides making every preparation for a night attack. The local authorities supplemented these precautionary measures by not permitting shore boats to approach the cruiser at night nearer than three hundred yards, while detectives were stationed along the beach to watch suspicious characters. The Chilians further showed their good will toward the United States by removing the usual restrictions as to the observance of Holy Thursday and Good Friday—days receiving national recognition in Chili—so as to permit the delivery of coal and stores to the Marietta. Commander Symonds, in company with the United States minister (the Hon. Henry L. Wilson), called on the officials and thanked them for these courtesies.

In keeping with his promise to make the run to Rio Janeiro, if he could obtain coal at Sandy Point, Captain
Seas breaking over the deck of the Oregon during a gale off Patagonia. Photographed from the fighting-top.
Clark left Callao on the evening of April 7th with one boiler still under repair, having taken on board during his stay in that port eleven hundred tons of coal, one hundred tons being in bags placed on deck. "For some reason," writes Lieutenant Eberle, of the Oregon, "many people in Callao had anxiously inquired about our time of sailing and our port of destination; but we had courteously answered that we did not know. Strangely enough, just as we were ready to leave a dense fog shut down upon the harbor, and we silently hove up anchor and went to sea. When the fog had cleared away and the Oregon was not to be seen no doubt the people who were so curious to learn of our movements charged us with playing a 'Yankee trick' by stealing out of the harbor under cover of the fog, thus concealing our course."

"The weather was not good after leaving Callao, and continued to increase in severity until it developed a heavy gale when we entered Magellan Straits." At the straits the Oregon ran into the heavy swells usually found at that storm-bound point, which were now thrashed into dangerous cross seas by the violent gale, causing the ship to pitch heavily, "the jack staff sometimes disappearing altogether under the solid seas that swept all but the superstructure." The pitching soon became so pronounced that when the bow of the ship dipped into the waves the stern was raised high out of water, so that the propellers, being relieved of the resistance of water, suddenly whirled round with terrific speed, which caused the entire ship to vibrate and shake like an aspen leaf. As the bow of the ship gradually rose on the waves, the stern regained its proper level and again submerged the propellers, not to be

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1 Century Magazine, October, 1899.
2 Lieutenant Eberle to the author.
3 Official report of Captain Clark.
again raised above water until the next wave caused the vessel's head to sink in the seas. This seesaw movement, with engines of eleven thousand horse power going almost at full speed, was a fearful strain on both machinery and hull; but as the instructions of the department were to get the Oregon into home waters with the utmost dispatch, Captain Clark determined to take the risks.

About 3.30 P. M., April 16th, the Oregon entered the straits, and that evening anchored outside Port Tamar. It was then that the seagoing qualities of the great battle ship was put to the severest test. A gale had been blowing for some time, but when the ship entered the straits and got under the high mountains, one of those sudden "willy-waws," which for centuries have made this vicinity dreaded by navigators, broke over the straits, and, being accompanied with a flood of rain, rendered the situation of the Oregon critical in the extreme. So heavy was the rain that it was impossible to distinguish the shore even at a comparatively short distance, and, as no soundings could be obtained, "the Oregon was for a time awkwardly placed," as Captain Clark modestly expresses it. Shortly before dark the anchors were dropped on a rocky shelf fringed by islets and reefs, the soundings showing thirty-eight to fifty-two fathoms of water. Cables were run out to one hundred fathoms. Fortunately they held the ship through "one of the most violent gusts I have ever experienced."1 The tempest having exhausted itself, the Oregon on the following morning, April 17th, got under way, and on the same evening anchored off Sandy Point (Punta Arenas), having made the run from Callao at the extraordinary average of eleven and three fourth knots an hour, and the passage of the straits at fifteen and a half knots an hour. At the time of the gale the Marietta was anchored in thirty-five fathoms of water in

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1 Official report of Captain Clark.
Tuesday Bay, where she had arrived the evening before.

At Sandy Point Captain Clark found a hulk in which was the coal contracted for by Commander Symonds while at Valparaiso. Unfortunately, the coal was in the lower hold of the hulk, above which was a quantity of wool, and for "the next few days," wrote Captain Clark, "our men were constantly transferring it [the wool] to enable them to get at the coal." It was at this point that Captain Clark especially comments on the good conduct of his officers and men. He said: "It is gratifying to call the department's attention to the spirit existing on board this ship in both officers and men, which can best be described by referring to instances such as that of the engineer officers voluntarily doubling their watches when high speed was to be made; to the attempt of men to return to the fire room after being carried out of it insensible; and to the fact that most of the crew, who were working by watches day and night at Sandy Point, preferred to leave their hammocks in the netting until they could get the ship coaled and ready to sail."^2

It is only just to Captain Clark to add that such enthusiasm in a ship's company is largely due to the spirit and ability of the commander himself. Naval history has shown in numberless instances that the character of the commander is reflected in every man and boy who comes under his orders. A captain is not an automaton who merely wears the insignia of rank and gives orders. One commander may give an order that will be sullenly and inefficiently obeyed. The same order may be given by another, and it will be carried out in a far more effective manner. It is not sufficient for a commander to order his men; he must command their hearts and willing obedience as well.

1 Lieutenant Caperton to the author.  
2 Official report of Captain Clark.
Captain Clark is a type of naval officer that has done so much toward making the navy of the United States honored and respected the world over. He has that faculty so necessary to great naval success—of winning the unquestioning obedience, the respect, confidence—ay, and the love—of his men. "Captain Clark had the affection, confidence and admiration of his officers and men to a remarkable degree."¹ It was one of the Oregon's men who wrote: "We loved our captain, and had such faith in him as a gentleman and a 'scrapper' after our own hearts that we were ready for any kind of a fight with him as leader."²

Shortly before daylight, April 21st, the two war ships got under way from Sandy Point. While in the straits the Marietta kept about a mile in advance of the battle ship so as to give warning of any attempt of the Spanish torpedo vessel Temerario to rush at the Oregon from behind a point of land. Once fairly in the open sea the Oregon was not long in demonstrating her superior qualities by easily distancing her consort, the big battle ship being compelled to slow up in order that the Marietta might keep in her company. During the run to Rio Janeiro, hearing that the Temerario might sight them before dark and get near enough to dispatch a torpedo during the night, only the leading vessel showed lights, and these were screened at the sides. The 8-inch and 6-inch guns were loaded with shell, while ammunition for the rapid-fire guns was kept on deck, four crews in each watch being stationed at the guns. Orders for the maneuvering of the two ships in the event of falling in with a suspicious-looking vessel were issued.

At 4 P. M., April 30th, the Oregon (and the Marietta at 9 P. M.) arrived at Rio Janeiro, where Captain Clark received a dispatch from Washington stating that war

¹ Lieutenant Eberle to the author.
² See New York Semi-Weekly Tribune, April 4, 1899.
had existed between the United States and Spain since April 21st. "All hands were very anxious for news," writes Lieutenant Eberle, of the Oregon, "and memorable were the cheers that greeted the news that war had been declared. In a few moments our band was on deck, and between the rounds of cheers the strains of the Star-spangled Banner and of Hail Columbia floated over the Brazilian fleet and the crowds that lined the wharves. The crew uncovered and stood at attention during the playing of the national anthem, and then followed more cheers and the inspiring battle cry 'Remember the Maine,' a watchword often heard about the decks as the men turned to the coal barges and worked as they had never worked before. The intense heat and the long and trying working hours of those days and nights were borne without a murmur."¹

And now began the home run of this gallant sea charger's record-breaking race against time. The eyes of the world were fixed upon her. Could she do it? was the question uppermost in the minds of all. True, she had made an unprecedented run so far, and the battle ship had borne the ordeal magnificently. But the final and crucial test was yet to be made. The unparalleled voyage from Puget Sound (some ten thousand knots) had been made, the Marietta had foiled the attempts of the Spaniards to destroy her at Valparaiso, both the ships had weathered one of the heaviest storms in the experience of men at Sandy Point, the little squadron had safely passed the torpedo boat at Montevideo and had gained Rio Janeiro. Could the Oregon complete her marvelous performance?

While at Rio Janeiro Captain Clark received a dispatch from Secretary Long saying that the Temerario had left Montevideo, probably for Rio Janeiro. Evidently the Spaniard saw an opportunity to deliver an effective blow at the United States, and was stealing up

¹Century Magazine, October, 1899.
the coast to attack the battle ship at her anchorage in the Brazilian port. The dangers of the situation were increased by the fact that four Spanish armored cruisers, heavy and fast, and three torpedo boat destroyers had sailed, April 29th, from Cape Verde to the west. Secretary Long cabled to Captain Clark, May 1st: "Beware, and study carefully the situation. Must be left to your discretion entirely to avoid this fleet and to reach the United States by West Indies. You can go when and where you desire. Nictheroy and the Marietta subject to the orders of yourself." On the following day the Secretary cabled, "Do not sail from Rio Janeiro, Brazil, till further orders," but a few hours later the Secretary changed his mind and very prudently allowed Clark to follow his own discretion in the final run of the voyage.

Truly, the situation was becoming critical. A dangerous torpedo gunboat, manned by men who long had been famous for treachery, and who would not hesitate to attack the Oregon in the neutral port of Rio Janeiro if a favorable opportunity offered, and a powerful Spanish squadron, swifter even than the speedy battle ship, coming across the Atlantic, presumably with the initial object of intercepting the daring craft that had made such a wonderful run from the Pacific, and doubtless—the enemy supposed—exhausted by her exertions, would fall an easy prey. Well might the question be asked, Can she do it?

Captain Clark acted with that promptness and decision which characterized all his actions from the time he began his venturesome voyage. His first step was to guard against a possible attack from the Temerario, and for that purpose he sent an officer to the commander of the Brazilian flagship in port, saying that "a five-million-dollar battle ship might be disabled or even destroyed by the torpedo vessel of the nation that had blown up the Maine," and that he expected the Brazilian naval forces to prevent any act of hostilities in their
waters. Captain Clark further declared that if the Temerario approached the Oregon with hostile intent, he would destroy her. Meantime, in order that the torpedo craft could have no excuse in approaching the battle ship too closely, Captain Clark got under way, and moving from the usual men-of-war's anchorage, took a position farther up the bay, at the same time instructing the Marietta to send her steam launch to the Temerario, in case that boat entered the harbor, and to inform her commander that if he approached within half a mile of the Oregon, the battle ship would destroy her. Besides this, the Marietta was prepared to keep her search light upon her every night.

Just before anchoring in his new berth, Captain Clark received word that the Brazilian admiral had given orders to stop the Temerario at the entrance of the port, and if she entered, she was to be escorted by a Brazilian man-of-war to a safe anchorage well up the bay. So long as the American cruisers were in this port a war ship was stationed near the entrance, and at night kept her search lights playing on the offing, to which were added the lights of Fort Santa Cruz. “In this,” says Captain Clark, “as in all other respects during our stay, the Brazilian officials showed by their acts that their expressions of sympathy and hopes for our immediate success were genuine.”

Having thus taken every precaution for the safety of the vessels under his command, Captain Clark, on the morning of May 4th, again put to sea with the Marietta, the Nictheroy (the latter in compliance with the request of the Brazilian Minister of Marine) sailing a few hours afterward. Here was a new danger for the American commander. He had been informed that the Temerario had sailed from Montevideo and might now be lurking near the entrance to Rio Janeiro harbor, ready to pounce upon the Nictheroy as soon as she ventured out, and at a time when she would be beyond the support of her consorts. Furthermore, it
was known that the machinery of the *Nictheroy* was in a poor condition and was likely to break down at any time. "The Rio papers were filled with startling rumors about Admiral Cervera's fleet and the little *Temerario,*" records Lieutenant Eberle, "and each day reported the enemy's fleet awaiting us outside the harbor. . . . Many of the good people of Rio were confident that we were going to certain destruction, . . . and the Brazilian admiral even sent a cruiser out ahead of us in order to prevent an engagement in neutral waters." Late in the afternoon of May 5th the *Nictheroy* joined the *Oregon* and the *Marietta,* but a delay of several hours immediately followed.

Believing that the department was anxious to have the *Oregon* at the seat of war at the earliest possible moment, Captain Clark decided to leave his consorts, and, giving instructions for them to make the best of their way to Bahia, he went ahead at full speed. Every preparation was now made for battle. All woodwork was torn out, the battle ship was painted a dull lead color, the boats were made ready to be thrown overboard at a moment's notice and target practice was renewed. On the following day Captain Clark assembled his men aft and told them that they might meet the Spanish ships. This announcement was received with tremendous cheers. It seems that while in Rio Janeiro many of the men had purchased red ribbons, on which they had ingeniously inscribed letters cut out of brass, forming the legend, "*Remember the Maine.*" These ribbons were now worn by the men as cap bands.

Arriving at Bahia after dark, May 8th, Captain Clark communicated with the department, and in the middle of the following night again put to sea. It was now felt by those aboard the *Oregon* that they were entering upon the crucial period of this memorable voyage. Ammunition was placed on deck, the guns were made ready for any emergency and a sharp watch was kept for the first indication of the enemy's ships. More than once
on the run from Bahia to Barbadoes—the next stop marked out for the Oregon—the men aboard believed that they were in reach of Cervera's squadron. "We had an alarm early one morning in murky weather which did not permit a clear view far in any direction. A lookout reported a vessel in sight that showed no lights. Instantly there was a call to quarters. Every man asleep by the guns and elsewhere was on his feet in a moment, and every gun was ready. But the stranger turned out to be a peaceful sailing ship bound for Rio, and no prize for us. . . . One night [May 12th] the men on watch in the tops saw a red light out to starboard, and reported it to the officer on deck. A few minutes later another light was reported on the port bow. Then another was seen astern. At the first report the officer of the deck was inclined to believe that the men had seen a phosphorescent flash, but when the others were reported Captain Clark was called on deck, and a consultation was held. No change was made, however, either in our speed or course, and soon the lights vanished."¹

Having reason to believe that Cervera's squadron was lying in wait for him behind Cape St. Roque, Captain Clark made a wide sweep round that point, and then shaped his course for Barbadoes, arriving at Bridgetown at daylight, May 18th. Here the Americans were told that a Spanish squadron of "sixteen" vessels was at Martinique, only ninety miles away. Hurriedly getting enough coal aboard to carry her to a home port, the Oregon left Bridgetown at nine o'clock that night. Knowing that Spanish spies were watching every movement of the battle ship, Captain Clark kept all his lights burning brightly, and made a straight course for Key West. But when five miles out, he caused these lights to be suddenly extinguished and, changing his course, made a wide sweep round Barbadoes and steamed

¹ Account of one of the Oregon's men, New York Tribune, April 4, 1899.
eastward of all the islands. By this move he frustrated any possible night attack on his ship by Spanish torpedo boats.

Passing to the north of the Bahamas, the *Oregon* arrived off Jupiter Inlet on the night of May 24th. A boat was sent through the surf, and a telegram was dispatched to the department announcing the safe arrival of the ship. On the morning of May 26th the *Oregon* arrived at Key West, thus having made the remarkable run of fourteen thousand miles around a continent, under the most trying conditions, in sixty-eight days. In response to the department’s congratulatory telegrams, Captain Clark modestly reported from Key West, May 27th: “I have the honor to acknowledge the department’s telegram of yesterday, which was received and read to all hands at muster the same evening, causing great enthusiasm and spontaneous cheers. That the officers who have labored so faithfully and intelligently to bring the ship around in our efficient condition for fighting and steaming, and, especially, that the crew, who, individually and collectively, have made real sacrifices, and who for two months have asked for nothing but the privilege of doing extra work that might hasten the progress of the ship, should be mentioned and congratulated, affords me, as the commanding officer, special gratification.”

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1 Captain Charles Edgar Clark was born in Bradford, Vt., August 10, 1843, and was appointed to the Annapolis Naval Academy, September 29, 1860. His first sea voyage was in the historic *Constitution*, when that venerable frigate transferred the naval cadets from Annapolis to Newport, April, 1861. During the great battle in Mobile Bay, August 5, 1864, Clark was in the *Ossipee*, and was the first officer to exchange words with Captain Johnson when the Confederate commander appeared above the casemate of the *Tennessee*. Clark was in the *Suwanee* when that vessel was wrecked near the northern end of Vancouver Island, July 9, 1868, and though the fifth officer in rank he was left in command of thirty-three survivors on Hope Island. Before they were rescued their camp was surrounded by four hundred armed Indians. He commanded the patrol fleet sent to the Bering Sea, May 16, 1894, to enforce the terms of the Paris Arbitration Commission in reference to the Seal Fisheries Act. The
The Oregon saluting the flagship on arrival at Key West.
So much interest has been centered in the Oregon's wonderful race that it is not surprising that the creditable performance of the gunboat Marietta, made in her company, has been almost overlooked. Though not equaling the achievement of Captain Clark, Commander Symonds brought his vessel from San José, on the west Guatemalan coast, to Key West—a distance of twelve thousand miles—in a manner that called for unusual skill and tact. It must not be forgotten that it was largely owing to the prompt and skillful arrangements of Commander Symonds that the Oregon found coal waiting for her at Callao and Sandy Point, which contributed in no small degree to her speedy voyage.

After separating from the Oregon near Rio Janeiro, May 5th, Commander Symonds proceeded to Bahia with the Nictheroy. The machinery of the latter broke down many times, and greatly delayed the passage. At Bahia, Commander Symonds cabled to the department, under date of May 11th, advising that the Nictheroy be left at this port; but as this was not deemed advisable, both vessels put to sea and entered Pará River, where the Nictheroy remained some time making necessary repairs. Meantime, the Marietta reached Key West early in June. Speaking of his ship and men, Commander Symonds says: "Upon no occasion were we obliged to stop for even slight repairs,

officers of the Oregon on this voyage were: Captain, Charles Edgar Clark; Lieutenant Commander, James K. Cogswell; Lieutenants, Reginald F. Nicholson, William H. Allen, Horace W. Harrison, Albert A. Ackerman and Edward W. Eberle; Ensigns, Charles L. Hussey and Rufus Z. Johnston, Jr.; Naval Cadets, Harry E. Yarnell, Luther M. Overstreet, Cyrus R. Miller, William P. Giles, Samuel G. Magill and Clarence S. Kempf; Surgeon, Phillips A. Lovering; Assistant Surgeon, Washington B. Grove; Paymaster, Samuel R. Calhoun; Chief Engineer, Robert W. Milligan; Passed Assistant Engineer, Cleland N. Offley; Assistant Engineers, Joseph M. Reeves and Frank Lyon; Naval Cadets (Engineer Division), Henry N. Jensen and William D. Leahy; Chaplain, Joseph P. McIntyre; Captain of Marines, Randolph Dickins; Second Lieutenant of Marines, Austin R. Davis; Boatswain, John Costello; Gunner, Arthur S. Williams; Carpenter, Milton F. Roberts.
and when en route from Punta Arenas [Sandy Point] to Rio Janeiro, accompanied by the Oregon, no difficulty was experienced in maintaining the full contract horse power of the engines. Upon arrival here [Key West], had the immediate services of the vessel been desired, she could have proceeded to sea at once after coaling. This condition of the vessel is due in a great measure to the zeal of the officers and crew. The cheerfulness and efforts of all to prevent any unnecessary delay in our arrival at this place is deserving of mention, and was most forcibly illustrated at our last coaling place, the Pará River. The crew having worked all one night, engaged in coaling, in a temperature that was trying in the extreme, were the following forenoon, despite their zeal, unable to maintain their record for fast work; whereupon, to encourage them, two of the watch officers, neither of whom were on watch at the time, seized wheelbarrows and assisted in coaling until all was on board, and, in consequence, I was enabled to get to sea that day."  

Commander Symonds speaks in the highest terms of the "stanch little Marietta, a gunboat of but one thousand tons, a composite-built vessel with light engines and water-tubular boilers—the first of that kind ever used in our service."  

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1 Official report of Commander Symonds. The officers of the Marietta on this voyage were: Commander, Frederick Martin Symonds; Lieutenants, Alexander McCrackin, William Banks Caperton and James H. Hetherington; Ensigns, Henry K. Benham, Frederic B. Bassett and James J. Raby; Passed Assistant Surgeon, George Rothganger; Assistant Paymaster, Edmund W. Bonnaffon; Passed Assistant Engineer, William H. Chambers.  

2 Commander Symonds to the author.
CHAPTER V.

THE AUXILIARY NAVAL FORCE.

An important step taken by the Navy Department in its comprehensive scheme of mobilization of the maritime strength of the United States was that of calling out the recently organized Naval Militia.\(^1\) This was the first time the militia were mobilized under actual war conditions, and the results were highly gratifying. Under a joint resolution of Congress, approved by the President May 26, 1898, an auxiliary naval force was established. In anticipation of such a measure the department, with commendable foresight, as early as March 23d had directed Commander Horace Elmer to prepare a scheme for the formation of a “mosquito flotilla,” in accordance with the general ideas formulated by the Naval War College. This was “an entirely separate organization.”\(^2\) Commander Elmer at once entered upon his work, and soon perfected an organization by which the various divisions of this force corresponded with the districts of the lighthouse service on the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard.

In January, 1898, the Naval Militia had been organized in fifteen States, having thirty-seven hundred and three petty officers and enlisted men and about two hundred commissioned officers. Just before the war broke out two additional States had organized similar militia. Without waiting for Congress to authorize the employment of the Naval Militia, the Navy Depart-

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\(^1\) For the formation of this body of amateur navy men, see pp. 24, 25.
\(^2\) Assistant Secretary Roosevelt to Rear-Admiral Erben, April 28, 1898.
ment, on March 26th, called on the State of New York for men to man the monitor *Nahant*, then at League Island Navy Yard. A crew composed of volunteers left New York on April 12th, returning with the *Nahant* on April 17th. On this date the First Naval Battalion of New York was also called upon to furnish a crew for the *Yankee*. One hundred and fifty men were furnished. On April 22d this force was increased by fifty-four men for the engine room. The crews of the *Yankee* and *Nahant* were regularly mustered into the service April 28th and 29th. They were enlisted for one year. At the same time the States of Massachusetts, Michigan and Maryland were called upon to furnish officers and men for the *Prairie*, *Yosemite* and *Dixie*.

These orders taxed the resources of our militia to the utmost, as each of these vessels required about two hundred and fifty men. "As examples of the promptness with which the call was met, the contingent from the First Naval Battalion, New York, reported uniformed, armed, equipped and ready for duty in six hours after receiving notice; and the contingent from the Massachusetts Naval Brigade, which was notified at one o'clock on a Saturday afternoon, arrived at the New York Navy Yard, fully prepared for service on the *Prairie*, at nine o'clock the next morning. For the first time in the history of the navy, professional men, business men and men of leisure of the highest education were brought into the lower ratings, and from the reports which have come incidentally to my notice, it appears that they served with great intelligence and enthusiasm, and after a short experience made good man-of-warsmen, although they had had little or no training as seagoing sailors, and exhibited some lack of knowledge of the care of property and themselves that is common to all volunteers."¹

¹ Official report of Captain Bartlett to Assistant Secretary Allen, the Auxiliary Naval Force coming under the immediate direction of the Assistant Secretary.
On April 25th Rear-Admiral Henry Erben (retired) succeeded Commander Elmer—the latter having died, largely as the result of overwork—as the head of this important organization. Although war was not declared until this date, mines had been placed by the War Department in the harbors of the principal seaports. In May the duty of guarding these mines was placed under the management of the Naval Militia. In New York the Governor had chartered tugboats, which were placed at the disposal of the Naval Militia, who patrolled the mine fields, "acquitting themselves most creditably." 1 By May 26th the entire coast line had been divided into districts corresponding with those of the Lighthouse Board. Under an appropriation of three million dollars, fifteen tugs and yachts were purchased for the service, 2 an additional vessel, the yacht Free Lance, being presented by her owner, F. Augustus Schermerhorn, of New York. Speaking of the purchase and fitting of these vessels, Assistant Secretary Allen reported: "Numerous instances will

1 Official report of Captain Bartlett.

2 Class.

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<td>Tug</td>
<td>J. D. Jones</td>
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These vessels, together with the old monitors, receiving ships and other craft drafted from the revenue service, made a total of forty-eight vessels forming the Auxiliary Naval Force.
be found where the cost to the department was very much less than the original price asked—sometimes, indeed, less than the price at which the purchase was recommended by the board. . . . Of the $3,000,000 appropriated, but $720,639.05 was spent.”

Finding that some of the vessels of this force could be spared, Rear-Admiral Erben, on June 30th, detached the following craft, under the command of naval officers, as being best suited for service in Southern waters: The Gov. Russell, East Boston, Apache, Viking and Sylvia, and later the Potomac, Siren and Kanawha. On July 9th Rear-Admiral Erben was succeeded by Captain John Russell Bartlett. Captain Bartlett reported that “the department was overwhelmed with requests for active service. . . . A draft of men was sent from the Pensacola Navy Yard to the naval station at Key West, and other drafts were forwarded from receiving ships on the Atlantic coast to the Norfolk Navy Yard, for transportation by the first public conveyance. . . . Several hundred men enlisted from the Naval Militia were sent to Cuban waters from Key West, and distributed among the vessels of the North Atlantic fleet, where they saw actual warfare, at Santiago, in the battle which resulted in the destruction of Admiral Cervera’s squadron.”

On the Pacific coast the Auxiliary Naval Force had been placed under the orders of Rear-Admiral Joseph Miller; as a distinct command, but soon after Captain Bartlett assumed charge of the Auxiliary Force on the Atlantic station, the Pacific force was placed under his orders also, Lieutenant William E. Gunn, U. S. N., who entered the service from California, being made his assistant. The four revenue cutters Corwin, Grant, Perry and Rush patrolled the coast from San Francisco to Alaska, so as to give protection to

1 Official report of Assistant Secretary Allen.
2 Official report of Captain Bartlett.
the treasure vessels returning from the Klondike gold fields.¹

Pay Inspector John H. Stevenson (retired) was attached to the headquarters of the third district, and Assistant Paymaster Webb V. H. Rose to the seventh

¹ When at its maximum strength the Auxiliary Naval Force consisted of forty-one vessels, exclusive of the seven mentioned as having been detached for service in Southern waters. The yacht Shearwater, the torpedo boat Manly and the monitors Canonicus and Mahopac, although attached to this flotilla, were not put into commission. The complete organization of this important maritime force was as follows:

At headquarters, Navy Department, Washington: Captain John Russell Bartlett (retired), chief; Lieutenant Herbert L. Satterlee, Chief of Staff; Chief Engineer Henry W. Fitch (retired), fleet engineer; Assistant Paymaster Warren L. Sawyer.

First district, headquarters at Portland, Me: Lieutenant Robert J. Beach (afterward relieved by Lieutenant William H. Clifford), with the monitors Montauk and Wyandotte. The latter was not sent to her station at Bath, Me.

Second district, headquarters at Boston: Lieutenant John W. Weeks, with the receiving ship Minnesota, the monitors Catskill and Lehigh, the tug Seminole and the yacht Inca.

Third district, headquarters at New York city: Lieutenant-Commander Jacob W. Miller (afterward relieved by Lieutenant Edwin C. Weeks), with the receiving ship New Hampshire, the monitors Jason, Manhattan and Nahant, the yachts Aileen, Elfrida, Enquirer, Free Lance, Huntress, Restless and Shearwater, and the torpedo boat Manly. The monitor Manhattan was not sent to her station at Newport. The Jason was stationed at Fisher's Island, and the Nahant at Tompkinsville.

Fourth district, headquarters at Philadelphia: Lieutenant John S. Muckle, with the receiving ship St. Louis, the monitors Canonicus and Mahopac, and the side-wheel steamer Arctic.

Fifth district, headquarters at Baltimore: Lieutenant Isaac E. Emerson, with the receiving ship Dale, the monitor Ajax and the yacht Sylph.

Sixth district, headquarters at Port Royal (afterward removed to Wilmington, N. C.); Lieutenant George L. Morton, with the monitor Nantucket, and the tugs Cheyenne, Chickasaw and Waban.

Seventh district, headquarters at Pensacola: Lieutenant John C. South-erland, with the tug Tacoma. Attached to this district was the battalion of the Auxiliary Naval Force at the Pensacola Navy Yard.

Eighth district, headquarters at New Orleans: Lieutenant John W. Bostick, with the monitor Passaic, and the tugs Choctaw and Powhatan.

Ninth district, headquarters at San Francisco: Lieutenant William E. Gunn, with the revenue cutters Corwin, Grant, Perry and Rush and the tugs Active, Iroquois and Vigilant.—Captain Bartlett to the author.
district. Chief Engineer Alexander Henderson (retired) was attached to the headquarters of the third district, Chief Engineer Edward D. Robie (retired) to the second, and Chief Engineer William W. Dungan to the fifth district. There were commissioned in the navy from the Naval Militia one lieutenant commander, one hundred lieutenants and ninety-five ensigns, while thirty-eight hundred and thirty-two were enlisted. The last of the yachts in the service, the Aileen, Siren and Elfrieda, were put out of commission September 26th. The character of the work performed by this force was, first, guard duty, and, second, patrol duty. The first was limited to the old monitors. The monitors had been laid up thirty years, and, even after they had left the repair shops, the Naval Militia found much to be done before they could be placed in fighting trim. This arduous work was cheerfully undertaken and most creditably finished. The patrol duty was performed in yachts and tugs. This was the work of guarding the mine fields, patrolling the coast and giving warning on the approach of a hostile squadron. At unexpected times the efficiency of the Naval Militia was tested. A notable example was on July 16th, when it became necessary to take the Buffalo and Rainbow from Norfolk to the New York Navy Yard. At that time no officers of the regular navy were available for this service, and Captain Bartlett detailed officers and men from his department for the emergency, Lieutenant William H. Stayton and Lieutenant Eugene M. Harmon commanding the vessels respectively.

In 1888 Lieutenant John C. Colwell wrote: "The Naval Militia is placed first in importance, because it is upon the coast defenders that at first the brunt of a maritime war would fall, and the men to bear the weight of a foreign naval attack should have the best system of organization, drill and equipment that it is possible to give. The organization being local, the officers and
men would have an intimate knowledge of the capabilities of their immediate neighborhood for offense and defense, and would be much more valuable at such a place than would a body of entirely strange seafaring men suddenly ordered to that service."

The experiences of the Auxiliary Naval Force in the late war fully bear out the prediction of Lieutenant Colwell. Captain Bartlett gives, as the results of his observation of this branch of our sea power, the opinion that a National Naval Reserve should be established, in which the Life-Saving Service, the Lighthouse Establishment, the Weather Bureau, the Revenue Service, the Naval Militia and the merchant marine should co-operate. He says: "The Naval Militia has brought the navy in touch with the people in a way in which nothing else could have done in time of peace. It is a valued addition to the military establishment of the various States, and, when more fully developed, will be a stepping stone to the United States Naval Reserve. It should be to a large extent a school for officers of the latter, and from the United States Naval Reserves alone should accessions to the fighting strength of the navy be made in time of war."

The Naval Militia of the seaboard States were also called upon to furnish officers and men to man the coast signal stations, for which duty they had been drilled. On October 18, 1897, the Navy Department convened a board "for the purpose of considering the establishment of coast signal stations for naval defense." A general scheme was proposed for the establishment of signal stations along the coast, to be manned by the then existing Naval Militia, the whole to be under the direction of the Navy Department. It was also suggested that the co-operation of the Treasury Department be secured for the use of its life-saving stations,

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1 Lieutenant Colwell on Naval Reserve and Coast Defense.
2 Official report of Captain Bartlett.
particularly those that could be put in telegraphic communication with headquarters. Certain systems of signaling were considered, and the board subdivided the coast so that important centers, such as naval stations and strategic points, could be amply protected by the methods proposed.

Steps were taken by the Naval Militia along the seacoast to instruct a certain number of men in the use of all kinds of signals and to include in their organization a number of experienced telegraphers. It was also proposed by the board to utilize homing pigeons. No further action was taken by the Government until March 15, 1898, when Captain Caspar Frederick Goodrich was ordered "to make and report with all practicable dispatch a preliminary plan of arrangement for establishing a Coast Signal Service on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts." Arrangements were to be made for the construction of stations and their occupation by signal men whenever the department directed. Captain Goodrich visited the whole length of our coast, and gave directions to the officers in command of the Naval Militia in the several States as to what would be required as to outfit, etc., and selected the points where stations were to be established.

On April 9, 1898, orders were issued to Captain Goodrich to establish at once the coast-line system of signal stations for national defense according to plans indicated in his report to the department. Seventy-five thousand dollars from the appropriation for national defense was allotted by the President for this purpose. On April 22d Captain Goodrich asked the department in writing, "Shall I send out telegrams and establish the coast signal stations? All is ready—only the word is needed." This was answered at 2.25 P.M. with the words "Go ahead." Captain Goodrich at once wired from the Navy Department to the commanding officers of the Naval Militia from Massachusetts to Louisiana, and to J. H. Hanley, Esq., of Galveston, Texas: "Es-
tablish and man coast signal stations already determined by me. Lowest bids, greatest economy, most speed necessary. Let crews sign temporary agreement pending receipt of enlistment forms. . . . Send future communications to superintendent, New York."

The Naval Militia selected for this duty left at once, and within twenty-four hours had arrived at their stations ready to watch for the enemy. They took with them camp outfits, and as rapidly as possible houses, masts and signal towers were erected. Captain Goodrich was relieved April 23d by Captain Theodore F. Kane, and this officer was superseded May 9th as superintendent by Captain John Russell Bartlett, who established headquarters in one of the rooms of the Intelligence Office, Navy Department. He was assisted by two officers of the New York Naval Militia, Lieutenants Frank B. Anderson and Edwin C. Weeks. The organization, when completed, had eight districts, in which were thirty-six signal stations, officered and manned entirely from the State Naval Militias; a total of eighteen officers and two hundred and ten men. Photographs of all Spanish war craft were given to each station.1

The necessity of covering the stretches of coast be-

1 The officers were commissioned in the navy as lieutenants and ensigns, and the men enlisted for one year. At each station quarters were built for the crew, and a ninety-foot mast erected carrying a forty-foot yard. The equipment consisted of cooking utensils, etc., a powerful telescope, binoculars, flags, torches and signal lanterns. In some instances signal towers were built. Each station was provided with a telegraph outfit and many with telephone instruments. The crews of the stations consisted of one chief quartermaster, three quartermasters of the second class and one landsman; at the most important points an extra telegraph was allowed. The men were divided into watches and armed with Springfield rifles, and a daily and weekly routine of exercise and drill was maintained, also rules and regulations, as soon as the stations were established. Each was furnished with a log book, prepared for the special use of the Coast Signal Service, and with forms for weekly transcript from the log to be sent to headquarters. Everything that was seen that looked at all suspicious was telegraphed to Washington.
tween the isolated stations was at once apparent, and the value of the co-operation of the Life-Saving Service and the United States Lighthouse and Weather Bureau systems became self-evident. The crews of the life-saving stations patrol the beaches from Maine to Texas, and no vessel could approach within sight of the coast and escape their attention, while the lighthouse keepers and the observers of the Weather Bureau had exceptional facilities for noting the approach of ships. The stations of the Coast Signal Service were connected with the general telegraph and telephone systems of the country, and with the life-saving telephone lines that link their stations along the coast.

When these arrangements had been completed, May 15th, the observing capacity of the Naval Militia men at their thirty-six stations was increased by the fourteen hundred and forty-three men at the life-saving stations, the eight hundred and fifty lighthouse keepers (who were connected, as fast as possible, by wire), and by the thirty-three observers of the Weather Bureau. Thus an aggregate of twenty-five hundred and twenty-six men in two hundred and thirty-seven stations were on the lookout for the approach of an enemy's vessel, and all ready to report instantly to the office of the superintendent at Washington. Tests of wires were made every four hours to district headquarters, and daily to headquarters at Washington. Arrangements were made to send notice or news direct from each district headquarters to offices of the Auxiliary Naval Force and to the principal forts and batteries. The service was unique as well as most useful to the Government, although no enemy was sighted.

This duty was performed exclusively by the Naval Militia. "The Naval Militia have proved, in our recent experiment, well disciplined, trustworthy, competent and zealous; and I can speak in the highest terms of the officers and naval militia men who entered the
Coast Signal Service. The officers have been intelligent and painstaking, and their acquaintance with the men of their commands has resulted in a very high percentage of effective work."¹ The service was closed on July 31st. The total amount expended was $73,198.32, and about half of this expenditure was for gear that could be used again. The officers and men were paid $41,062.71, making the total cost of the service for the war $114,261.39.

Speaking of this novel Coast Signal Service, General D. T. Mertvago, the military and naval attaché to the Russian embassy at Washington, said: "It is a very remarkable work from all points of view, and must be taken as a standard."

¹ Official report of Captain Bartlett, Superintendent Coast Signal Service.
CHAPTER VI.
MATANZAS, CIENFUEGOS AND CARDENA8.

It was at six o'clock on the evening of April 21st when Rear-Admiral Sampson received a telegram from Secretary Long directing him to "Blockade coast of Cuba immediately from Cardenas to Bahia Honda. Blockade Cienfuegos if it is considered advisable." Week after week the mighty fleet of war craft had been lying at Key West anxiously awaiting the word to begin operations. At last it had come. All that night the masts and signal yards of the assembled fleet were twinkling and flashing in response to orders from the flagship. One by one the dark floating fortresses moved slowly from their anchorages, crept past the forts and felt their way through the tortuous channel to offing, and there awaited the next move. In the gray dawn of April 22d the armada again got under way—their bows ominously pointed toward Havana. The fighting monsters leisurely churned their way through a calm sea in double formation: the New York, Iowa, Indiana, Amphitrite, Cincinnati and Mayflower in column to port and the Wilmington, Castine, Newport, Nashville and Machias to starboard, while the perky torpedo boats Porter, Dupont, Foote and Winslow—all bearing names much too big for them—darted about the fleet after the most approved fashion of Indian scouts.

Scarcely had these sea warriors settled down to the regulation jog of "a march to Cuba," when, at 7.20 A. M., a steamer was sighted The Nashville, Commander Washburn Maynard, ran out, and in a few
minutes fired the first shot of the war, making a prize of the Spanish merchantman Buena Ventura. This omen of good luck was followed, at eight o'clock, by the display of Sampson's rear-admiral colors on the New York, which was saluted by thirteen guns. Three o'clock that afternoon the frowning coast of Cuba was sighted, and about the same time the flagship went in chase of the valuable Spanish merchant steamer Pedro, which, after a lively run, was captured.

Early on the following day the fleet was re-enforced by the arrival of the Detroit, Marblehead, Puritan, the torpedo boat Ericsson and the tug Algonquin. With a view of blockading Matanzas and Cardenas, Sampson sent the Puritan, Marblehead, Cincinnati, Wilmington, Foote and Winslow eastward, while the Nashville, Machias, Castine and Newport were ordered westward to patrol the coast from Havana to Bahía Honda, the rest of the fleet remaining off Havana.

At that time it was proposed to occupy the port of Matanzas, where a strong military force was to be landed with a view of opening communications with the insurgents, and, if the conditions were favorable, to make that point a base for military operations against Havana. It was deemed too hazardous for the fleet to immediately attempt a bombardment of the Havana fortifications, as “first, there may be no United States troops to occupy any captured stronghold or to protect it from riot and arson until after the dry season begins, about October 1st; and, second, the lack of docking facilities makes it particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled before the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable vessels.”

Rear-Admiral Sampson was anxious to make a direct attack on Havana. He said, “I regard it as very important to strike quickly and strike hard as soon as hostilities commence,” and he pointed out how the

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1 Secretary Long to Sampson, April 6th.
monitors, assisted by the quick-firing guns of some other ships, might silence the batteries west of Havana if placed close inshore. The department, however, was firm in its determination to delay direct operations against the capital of Cuba, and Sampson for a time confined his attentions to maintaining a rigorous blockade. On April 26th the Government moderated its instructions as follows: "While the department does not wish a bombardment of forts protected by heavy cannon, it is within your discretion to destroy light batteries which may protect vessels you desire to attack, if you can do so without exposure to heavy guns."

Acting on these instructions, Rear-Admiral Sampson, having learned through Captain Purnell F. Harrington of the Puritan that the enemy was working on new defenses at Matanzas, on April 27th appeared before that port with his flagship, the New York, Captain French E. Chadwick, and with the Puritan and the Cincinnati, Captain Colby M. Chester, began a bombardment. Shortly before noon, April 27th, these vessels stood in toward Matanzas, and at 12.50 P. M. the New York opened on the Morillo and Gorda earthworks, the Cincinnati and Puritan opening their batteries soon afterward. The Spaniards responded with an animated though ill-directed fire, several of their shells passing over the New York. A number of American missiles were seen to fall in the Gorda battery, occa-
From a photograph by E. Muller, Brooklyn, N. Y.

*Monitor Puritan.*
sioning considerable damage. Although the main object of the bombardment was to prevent the Spaniards from completing their defensive works on the western side of the harbor, the Americans found time to send a few shells into the batteries on the eastern side. After the flagship had fired fifteen 8-inch, sixty-one 4-inch, and twenty-eight 6-pounder shells, and the other war ships a proportionate number, the signal "Cease firing" was made at 1.19 P.M. and the vessels retired beyond range, no casualties of any kind having occurred on the American side. Notwithstanding the Spanish claim that not one of their number was injured by the bombardment, the object of the attack was accomplished. The Puritan was left off the port with orders to prevent any resumption of work on the Gorda batteries.

Having received word from Secretary Long that the Spanish steamers Montserrat and Alicante had sailed from St. Pierre, Martinique, for the south coast of Cuba, probably Cienfuegos, Rear-Admiral Sampson ordered the Marblehead, Commander Bowman Hendry McCalla, and the Eagle, Lieutenant William H. H. Southerland, to intercept them. Leaving the station off Havana about 10 A.M. April 25th, these two vessels proceeded toward the western end of Cuba. Falling in with the Nashville, Commander Washburn Maynard, McCalla, in accordance with instructions received from Sampson, ordered the Nashville to accompany him. The three cruisers were proceeding westward when, at 3.46 A.M. April 26th, the Marblehead and Eagle, in
consequence of an undetected half-point deflection of the standard compass, ran on the Colorado reefs. After a delay of twelve hours the vessels were floated off and the squadron resumed its course. Boarding the Russian bark Verandi and Norwegian steamer Condor on the following day, these cruisers, about 11 A.M. of the 28th, searched for the banks, and discovered the cable steamer Silvertown. Thinking that a shoal might be in that vicinity, Commander McCalla slowed down and spent two hours in a vain effort to find the reefs.

Not wishing to appear off Cienfuegos until the following morning, McCalla steamed northeast until about fifteen miles from Trinidad, and early on the morning of April 29th appeared off Cienfuegos.\(^1\) The enemy's war craft in the harbor at this time were the Diego Velázquez, Satélite, Lince, Galicia and Gaviota. At this moment the Galicia came out of the inner harbor and took a position abreast of Punta de la Cocos, and, believing that she might be endeavoring to escape eastward, the American cruisers were stationed so as to intercept her. But the gunboat soon disappeared within the harbor. At 10.55 A.M. the Nashville signaled that a steamer was in sight to the west, and, giving chase, Commander Maynard soon captured the Spanish steamer Argonauta, of Cienfuegos, having aboard eight Spanish officers, eight soldiers, four women and three children as passengers, besides a quantity of Mauser rifles, provisions and ammunition and twelve bags of mail. Ensign Henry C. Kuenzli with a prize crew was placed aboard, while the civilian passengers with their private effects were sent into Cienfuegos, the Spanish officers and soldiers being taken aboard the Nashville.

Anxious to determine the character of this prize, Commander McCalla, about 1 P.M., left the Eagle to guard the port, with instructions to run in as closely as

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\(^1\) For map of Cienfuegos, see page 121.
possible and discover what craft were in the harbor, while the *Marblehead* made for the scene of capture. Scarcely had the *Marblehead* proceeded two miles, however, when the *Eagle* signaled that a gunboat was again coming out. Lieutenant Southerland had promptly carried out his instructions, and on reaching the mouth of the harbor had discovered two torpedo boats and a torpedo gunboat. The Spaniards opened fire, their first missile coming on a direct line for the *Eagle*, but fell about a hundred yards short. This was followed by a second shot, also a little scant. The *Eagle* then opened with her port forward 6-pounder and, backing slowly, soon had her entire broadside in lively action. One 6-pounder shell pierced the Spaniard’s boiler, and another passed through her funnel.

In repelling this gunboat attack Lieutenant Southerland gained the distinction of bringing on the first naval action of the war. The plucky little yacht *Eagle*, armed with four 6-pounders and two small Colt guns, actually defeated the torpedo gunboat *Galicia*, armed with two 4.72-inch breech-loading rifles, four 6-pounders, one machine gun and two torpedo tubes, and two small gunboats. It was subsequently learned that it required five weeks for the Spaniards to repair the *Galicia*.\(^1\) Commander Jacobsen, of the German protected cruiser *Geier*, entered the port of Cienfuegos June 11th. Speaking of the *Galicia* he says: "An unlucky star seems to have been over this vessel. At first it was stated that she was to be docked in order to make repairs. Afterward she was again pronounced seaworthy, but the fact is that she never left the harbor [again] during the whole period of the war;"\(^2\) showing how severely she had been handled by the pugnacious little *Eagle*.

On making out the *Eagle*’s signal, Commander McCalla at once retraced his course at full speed, and,

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\(^1\) Lieutenant Southerland to the author.

\(^2\) Sketches from the Spanish-American War, by Commander Jacobsen, of the German navy.

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gaining a position near the *Eagle*, opened fire. The Spaniards soon retreated behind a headland. In endeavoring to get the exact range of the gunboat, the Americans sent two shells into a hamlet near Cienfuegos. In a short time the gunboat changed her position and moved to a point nearer the entrance of the harbor, where she was concealed behind a low point of land. Gauging her position by the smoke that was seen to be issuing from her funnel, the Americans fired two 5-inch shells. Our cruisers were now so close to the port that a shore battery—probably field artillery—opened on them, while the infantry guard at the lighthouse discharged their small arms at the *Eagle*. Commander McCalla reports that although the Spaniards did good line shooting, all their shots fell short excepting two, which passed over the *Marblehead*. Learning that the *Montserrat* and the *Alicante* had put into Cienfuegos on the morning of April 27th, and finding that he was running short of coal, Commander McCalla at 5 p. m., after having made a search for the cables leading into Cienfuegos, withdrew his vessels, the *Nashville* making full speed for the flagship off Havana, as it was thought that the captured mail bags might contain information of value.

Early in the blockade Commander John F. Merry of the *Machias* had been stationed off Cardenas, where he discovered three Spanish gunboats. The torpedo boat *Winslow*, Lieutenant John Baptiste Bernadou, had appeared off Cardenas May 7th, and had shelled the enemy's signal station on Romero Key. During the firing three Spanish gunboats—the *Antonio López*, the *Ligera* and the *Alerta*—steamed out of Cardenas at full speed, and when at a distance of three thousand yards responded to the *Winslow*. By a little maneuvering, Lieutenant Bernadou managed to draw the largest of these gunboats within range of the *Machias*' 4-inch guns. That vessel promptly opened on the gunboats and induced them to retire. On this occasion the enemy displayed fairly good marksmanship, several of their missiles fall-
ing near the torpedo boat. After this *rencontre* the *Winslow* returned to her station off Matanzas. At this period of the blockade many of our heavier war ships had been detached on other service, leaving only a few of the lighter gunboats, torpedo craft and yachts to guard the north Cuban ports. It was well known that a number of Spanish gunboats were in these harbors, and they might easily have attacked the few American craft singly with every chance of success. It was with a view of reducing this danger that Commander Merry determined to destroy the gunboats that had shown themselves in Cardenas harbor.

The harbor of Cardenas is a round basin with a diameter of ten miles, abounding in shoals, and even under the most favorable conditions difficult of navigation. Of the three channels leading to this port from the north, two were believed to have been mined, while the third, that between Romero and Blanco Keys, had not as yet been explored by the Americans. Commander Merry’s plan was to enter by the last channel and make an attack on the Spanish gunboats and either to destroy them or bring them out. He was deterred from making the attempt immediately for lack of light-draught vessels. With him was the revenue cutter *Hudson*, Lieutenant Frank H. Newcomb, but as the *Machias* drew too much water to enter the harbor by the desired channel, he deemed it imprudent to make the venture with the *Hudson* alone. On the arrival of the *Wilmington*, Commander Chapman Coleman Todd, on the morning of May 11th, which had been ordered to relieve the *Machias*, Commander Merry communicated his plan to Commander Todd, and found that enterprising officer willing to enter into it. A few hours after the *Wilmington’s* arrival the *Winslow* again appeared off Cardenas, which placed at Commander Merry’s disposal three vessels capable of entering the port. The *Winslow*, having only five tons of coal left, had run down to the *Machias* to replenish her supply.
The first step to be taken was to drag the Romero-Bianco channel, so as to clear it of torpedoes. This task was assigned to the *Winslow* and the *Hudson*. A careful study of the charts showed that the channel had a minimum depth of water of ten feet, and, as the rise of tide at this place was one and a half foot the *Wilmington*, drawing a scant ten feet, could barely make her way over. Taking aboard the Cuban pilot Santos, the *Winslow*, in company with the *Hudson*, began an exploration of the channel. It was not long before the revenue cutter grounded, but soon worked herself clear without injury, Lieutenant Bernadou meantime dragging the channel, and at noon reported to Commander Todd that it was possible for the three ships to enter.

At 12.30 p.m. May 11th, it then being high tide,
the three vessels began their perilous attempt, the *Hudson*, taking a position on the starboard side and the *Winslow* on the port side of the *Wilmington*, so as to assist her in steering clear of shoal water. The *Machias* then stationed herself about twenty-one hundred yards to the northeast of Diana Key, where she opened fire on the signal station erected by the Spaniards on that place. Commander Merry then ordered Ensign Arthur L. Willard to man the *Machias’* launch and take possession of the place and cut any wires he might find. Effecting a landing, Willard made a diligent search, both on shore and by dredging in the waters around, but could find no trace of wires. "Mr. Willard accomplished the work in a very excellent manner, destroying the station and all Government property, which had been abandoned in a very hurried manner, and as a signal of his success hoisted the American flag on the signal station and brought on board the Spanish flag, together with the signal station apparatus."  

As the *Wilmington*, *Winslow* and *Hudson* entered the harbor no Spanish vessels, excepting two square-rigged merchantmen with unbent sails anchored directly in front of the town, were in sight. Fearing that the Spanish gunboats might escape in the broad expanse of the bay, Commander Todd placed his little squadron so as to cut off any escaping craft. The *Hudson* at 1 p. m., when abreast of Cozojal Point, was signaled to "go out and look at small craft." Lieutenant Newcomb steamed toward Diana Key and skirted the western side of the bay; the *Winslow* meantime searched the eastern side, while the *Wilmington* stood down the middle of the harbor. The officers of the three vessels were instructed to keep a close watch as they passed along the shores in the hope of discovering the enemy's gunboats. In this way the little squadron proceeded up the harbor, making a circuit on each side, the *Wilmington* and

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1 Official report of Commander Merry.
Winslow coming together again about thirty-five hundred yards off Cardenas. Observing that his consorts were nearing the town in advance of his vessel, Lieutenant Newcomb, at 1.35 p.m., made for them under full steam. Before the Hudson could rejoin her consorts, the Winslow had been ordered to come within hailing distance of the Wilmington, when Commander Todd called out:

"Winslow, there! Go in and investigate that gunboat moored to the wharf, there on the right, painted gray."

"Ay, ay, sir!" was the gallant response, and the Winslow went.

The gunboat referred to, the Antonio López, had just been discovered by the Americans. She had a black funnel and was moored to the wharf, apparently not under steam. To the left of the gunboat was a compact mass of buildings, which, together with the shipping, rendered it impossible for the Americans to discover what preparations the enemy had made for defense. Adjusting his torpedoes for surface runs, with the fans upon the war noses set to provide for an explosion at short range, and with decks cleared for immediate action, Lieutenant Bernadou proceeded toward the town under full speed. The profound quiet prevailing on shore and the seemingly entire absence of any preparations for defense gave the Americans reason to hope for an easy capture of the gunboat and any other Government craft that might be lurking in these waters.

At 1.40 p.m., when at a distance of fifteen hundred yards from the town, the torpedo boat still being at her highest rate of speed in shoal water, a plainly distinguishable puff of white smoke darted from the bow of the Spanish gunboat, and an instant later a shell, with a piercing shriek, flew over the Winslow, splashing harmlessly in the bay some distance beyond. This shot was almost simultaneously followed by a number from batteries evidently concealed on shore behind the ship-
ping or from the guns of boats anchored in such a position to be invisible to the Americans. Nearly all of these later shots were fired with smokeless powder, so that it was difficult for our men to determine the exact position of the cannon.

This fire was promptly returned by the Wilmington and Winslow, the Hudson not yet having approached near enough to fire. As the Spaniards had placed a number of light wooden buoys in the harbor as range finders, they, on this occasion at least, fired with great accuracy. To add to the disadvantages under which the Americans were laboring, a light haze soon collected along the shore in the vicinity of the Spanish batteries, rendering it still more difficult to locate the position of the Spanish guns. Lieutenant Bernadou says: "When close [to the shore] I detected one or two gun flashes from among the buildings, but at no time could I detect the exact position of the guns. My uncertainty as to the position of the enemy was attested by the commanding officer of the Hudson and by officers commanding gun divisions of the Wilmington, who inquired of me shortly after the action what I made out to be the enemy's exact position."

The first shots that struck the Winslow practically threw her out of the action. A missile through the forward conning tower destroyed the steam steering gear and severed the piping. A second shot through the after tower jammed the rudder and cut both wheel ropes. For some time the craft was held with her head toward the enemy by the propellers, but she gradually swung round, her broadside presenting the best possible target for the enemy. Soon after this a shot penetrated the Winslow's engine room, completely disabling the starboard engine. Lieutenant Bernadou, who early in the engagement had received a painful flesh wound in the left thigh, now directed his efforts to

1 Lieutenant Bernadou to the author.
maintaining a rapid fire from his 1-pounders and to keeping his vessel in motion with her remaining engine, so as to prevent the enemy from obtaining too exact a range. He also was obliged to guard against getting in the line of fire between the shore batteries and the *Wilmington* and *Hudson*, the latter vessel now having united the fire of her two 6-pounders to that of the other vessels. The *Winslow*s single unhurt engine, however, had the effect of throwing her bow toward the Spaniards when backing, and while going ahead it brought her stern in the same direction. Fortunately, the Spanish gunboat had been thrown out of action early in the engagement under the heavy fire kept upon her by the Americans, while the fire from the shore batteries had perceptibly slackened. "After the *Winslow*s steering gear was disabled—but before the engines were—she had succeeded in getting out of range of the guns on shore, and the casualties ensuing occurred after Bernadou gallantly steamed back into action again."¹

In spite of the fact that the wind was blowing from the ships toward the shore, Lieutenant Bernadou, by rapid backing and steaming ahead alternately, had managed to work his vessel some three hundred yards from the place where she was first disabled. Finding that he could place his ship out of action in this way, Bernadou directed Ensign Worth Bagley to devote his entire attention upon the movement of the craft, taking special care to keep her out of the *Wilmington*s line of fire. He personally directed the movements of the man at the reversing gear, as the ordinary communications between the engine room and the deck had become impracticable. This extemporized method of maneuvering the boat compelled Ensign Bagley to make a number of short trips from the deck to the foot of the ladder leading into the engine room.

¹ Commander Todd to the author.
While making one of these trips, Bagley had reached a position abreast the starboard gun, close to a group of men who had been stationed below, but who had been sent on deck after the port engine had been disabled. At this instant a shell, striking a hose reel, exploded, instantly killing Ensign Bagley, John Varveres, oiler, and John Dneeef, fireman; mortally wounding J. V. Meek, fireman, and Josiah Tunnell, the cabin cook; and injuring William J. Patterson and Quartermaster Daniel McKeown. Previously to this, Lieutenant Ber
adou, finding that his boat was being riddled with shot, had signaled the Hudson to tow her out of range. Lieutenant Newcomb had anticipated this signal, for he ran close to the Wilmington and received permission to go to the Winslow's assistance. Notwithstanding the comparatively frail construction of his craft, Newcomb gallantly hurried to the rescue of the hard-pressed torpedo boat, and he was in the act of passing a cable to the crippled Winslow when the fatal shell exploded. It was fully thirty minutes before a line could be made fast to the Winslow. The difficult feat was finally accomplished by Lieutenants W. H. Scott and E. E. Mead. The terrific fire from the Wilmington by this time, 3 p.m., had almost silenced the enemy's guns, though they fired a few more shots as the Hudson towed the Winslow out of range. After seeing that the dead and wounded had been properly conveyed aboard the Wilmington (where they were attended by Passed Assistant Surgeon Frank Clarendon Cook) Lieutenant Bernadou turned over the command of his boat to Gunner's Mate G. P. Brady, as the lieutenant's wound was so serious as to prevent him from continuing in command. At 3.30 p.m. the little squadron started out of the harbor, the Winslow towed by the Hudson, and about dark joined the Machias outside.¹

¹ The chief injuries to the Winslow were: "(a) A 1-pounder shell through the forward conning tower, putting the steam steerer out of action and wounding the commanding officer [Bernadou]. This was, as far
What the losses of the Spaniards in this unfortunate though gallantly conducted affair were probably will never be known, though there is every reason to believe that they suffered much from the terrific storm of shell that the American vessels poured upon them. Captain Severo Gómez Núñez, of the Spanish artillery, who was at Havana at the time, denies that the Antonio López had the support of land batteries in this action. This statement, however, is contradicted on the best of authorities. "The firing that damaged us was not done by the gunboats but by guns on shore. The place, in anticipation of an attack as a landing point on the road to Havana, was better fortified than the other coast towns." 2 "Before the fight was over I was near enough to this vessel [the López] to remark several large holes in the deck house, just behind the gun, so that the López did not last long." 3 The Cardenas newspapers gave no details whatever of the action, but about a week later they gave an account of the funeral of the commander of the López. From this time till the close of the war the Spanish gunboats—

as I know, the first hit of the action. (b) A shot through the after conning tower. (c) A shot through the forward boiler, breaking up in the furnace and carrying away over one hundred 1-inch water tubes. (d) A shot through the first low-pressure cylinder of the forward engine, cracking the casing and denting the piston. (e) A shot wrecking the forward blower engine, used in maintaining forced draught on the forward boiler. (f) A shot piercing a ventilator. (g) A shot entering the bow compartment, igniting a small wooden shelf, burning the cork paint and charring the fragments of cork, the fragments of shell penetrating into the commanding officer's cabin. (h) A shell coming from the direction of the port quarter at a low angle, the point striking a fore and aft seam of the deck and exploding, killing Ensign Bagley and others. This shell, practically bursting among these men, had the effect of stunning those not immediately killed. After ranging the bodies I was about to cover them with the torpedo tube covers when I observed two of them moving slightly, and they subsequently revived for a short time. There were a good many minor hits and dents produced by small projectiles, and I figured up that she had been struck independently over twenty times. Two shots also went through the smokestack."—Lieutenant Bernadou to the author.

1 La Guerra Hispano-Americana, p. 123.
2 Lieutenant Bernadou to the author.
3 Ibid.
though having many opportunities of attacking our frail yacht-gunboats—made no further demonstrations from Cardenas Harbor.

Lieutenant Bernadou spoke in the highest terms of the bravery of his officers and men, making special mention of Gunner's Mates G. P. Brady and T. C. Cooney, Chief Machinist Hans Johnson, Seaman Cox and Water Tenders O'Hearn and Madden. Bernadou also acknowledged the spirited manner in which Lieutenant Newcomb came to the rescue of the disabled torpedo boat. The Winslow was found not to have been as seriously injured as was expected. Judging from the size of the shot holes found in her, the Spaniards must have used 2½-inch or 3-inch guns. The Winslow was taken to Key West, where she was repaired, and in a few weeks again reported for duty. The Wilmington was struck only twice, although many fragments of exploding shells flew over her. No one was injured in that ship or the Hudson. The Hudson was struck by a few small projectiles, and fired one hundred and thirty-five shells from her two 6-pounders. The Winslow seemed to have been the enemy's main target.

Lieutenant Newcomb commended the conduct of his men, especially mentioning Lieutenants Scott and Mead and Engineer N. E. Cutchin and his assistant, T. D. Lewton. "Each and every member of the crew," said Lieutenant Newcomb, "from the boatswain down to Moses Jones, the colored boy, who attached himself to the after gun and never failed to have a shell ready when it was needed, did his whole duty cheerfully and without the least hesitation." For conspicuous bravery in this action the following were promoted from the ranks to warrant grades: T. C. Cooney to be carpenter, Hans Johnson and G. P. Brady to be gunners. Besides, each one received a medal of honor and a hundred dollars. For the part he had played in this gallant affair Lieutenant Bernadou was advanced ten numbers in the list of lieutenants.
CHAPTER VII.

CABLE CUTTING.

One of the most significant features of the Hispano-American war was the prominence assumed by the submarine cables connecting Spanish dependencies with the outside world. The laying of transoceanic cables, bringing all parts of the globe into instant communication, has resulted in a species of submarine warfare hitherto unknown, and presents to administrators of sea power a problem which is destined to play an important part in naval maneuvers of the future. If there could possibly have been anything to detract from the completeness of Commodore Dewey's victory at Manila, it was the fact that Washington was dependent on Madrid for the first news of the battle. Had Dewey's squadron been supplied with an electric outfit, having men expert in submarine telegraphy, it would have been possible for the Americans to have retained the seaward end of the cable they severed in the harbor, and by dropping a ground line, such as a chain cable attached to an anchor, have been in speedy communication with Washington. It should be one of the first responsibilities of the American people to have their war craft equipped with apparatus for grappling and operating submarine cables in shoal waters.

It was the effort to sever telegraphic communication between Cuba and Porto Rico and Spain that engaged the earnest attention of our navy in the late war, and it was in this peculiarly dangerous work that some of the most daring and brilliant services were rendered by our
officers and seamen. Free exchange of intelligence between Havana and Madrid was of inestimable value to the enemy. The only cable touching Cuba from the north was that running to Key West, which, of course, was controlled by the United States. On the south side cables were looped along the coast from Batabano to Guantanamo Bay, from which place there was a cable running to Hayti. Santiago also was connected by cable with Jamaica. The first active operations on these southern cables were undertaken by Commander Bowman Hendry McCalla of the *Marblehead*. We

![Map of Cuba showing cable communications](Image)

have noted the work of this enterprising officer off Cienfuegos and his preliminary attempt to discover the cables running from the south side of the island at this point. After the American attempt to destroy the enemy’s gunboats off Cienfuegos (noted in Chapter VI), the Spaniards in this vicinity remained quiet, and, except for a few brushes with their gunboats, which from time to time appeared in the entrance of the harbor, nothing of importance occurred. The last appearance of the Spanish flotilla had been on May 10th, but it retreated as soon as fired upon.

On the day the *Winslow* was making her heroic attempt to extricate herself from the trap the enemy
had set for her at Cardenas Commander McCalla decided to send out a boat party to cut the cables of the Cuba Submarine Company leading south and west from the cable station near the lighthouse at the entrance of Cienfuegos harbor. The arrival of the revenue cutter Windom and the collier Saturn enabled Commander McCalla to proceed with the execution of his plan. On the night of May 10th Lieutenant William H. H. Southerland of the Eagle was directed to proceed westward and destroy the lightship off Diego Perez Rey, and to cut the cable known to be in the shallow water in that vicinity. Meantime Lieutenant Cameron McRae Winslow of the Nashville was placed in command of a boat party, consisting of a steam launch from the Marblehead, one from the Nashville, and a sailing launch from each of those war ships, with instructions to proceed close into Colorados Point and cut the cables leading there. The Marblehead and Nashville were to cover the boats with their guns. Lieutenant Edwin A. Anderson of the Marblehead was made second in command, while Ensign Thomas P. Magruder of the Nashville was to have charge of the steam launches. Each of the sailing launches was manned by twelve oarsmen, besides which there was a coxswain, a blacksmith and a carpenter's mate, who with the officers made sixteen men in each of these boats. Half of the men were armed with rifles and the other half with revolvers, though a few extra rifles were stowed away in case of emergency. Each steam cutter had a coxswain, two seamen, a fireman, a coal passer, a sergeant of marines and six marines as sharpshooters. In the Marblehead's steam cutter a 1-pounder Hotchkiss gun was mounted, while the Nashville's cutter had two Colt machine guns, one forward and one aft. The party was supplied with life preservers and tools for cutting the cables.

To Lieutenant Anderson was allotted the task of selecting men to man the Marblehead's boats. When it became known that some unusually dangerous en-
terprise was under way volunteers pressed forward eager to participate. One account says: "Three times the desired number of men offered to serve, and none backed down even after repeated warnings by Anderson

that the service was especially dangerous. 'I want you men to understand,' said Anderson, 'that you are not ordered to do this work, and do not have to go unless you want to.'"¹ Lieutenants Winslow and Dil-

lingham selected the men for the *Nashville*'s boats. "There was no lack of volunteers on either ship."¹

The beach near the point of attack was low and covered with a dense growth of high grass and reeds. The lighthouse stood on an elevation, behind which it was known that rifle pits had been dug by the Spaniards. "The rifle pits extended eastward, close to the shore line and in close proximity to the cable house."² The surrounding country formed an excellent cover for infantry, and rendered it an exceedingly hazardous place for a boat party to operate.

A little before 7 A. M. May 11th the *Marblehead* and *Nashville* ran close inshore, and at 7.07 the former, having secured a position westward of the harbor entrance with broadside on, opened fire on the cable house. The *Nashville* gained a position within twelve hundred yards of the shore to the east of her consort, and at 7.45 began shelling the *chaparral*. In a few minutes the cable house was destroyed and the Spanish infantry and cavalry forces were scattered. Soon after the bombardment began a soldier mounted on a white horse broke from cover, and, gallantly running the gantlet of fire along the beach, disappeared in the direction of Cienfuegos. He was carrying the news of the attack to headquarters, with an urgent request for re-enforcements.

Lieutenant Winslow with his boat party now made directly for the cable house, the *Marblehead*'s steam cutter towing her sailing launch and the *Nashville*'s steam cutter towing her launch to the starboard of the *Marblehead*'s boats. As the expedition came within

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¹ Lieutenant Winslow to the author.
² Ibid.

range a rapid fire was directed upon the chaparral from the automatic and 1-pounder guns, besides which the sharpshooters in both steam cutters and launches kept up a fusillade with their rifles. When about two hundred yards from the beach the steam cutters cast off their tow lines, Lieutenant Winslow being in the Nashville's sailing launch, Lieutenant Anderson in the Marblehead's, while Ensign Magruder was left in command of both steam cutters, with orders to proceed closer in and cover the sailing launches with an incessant fire. "The sailing launches pulled in under oars, and the steam launches remained seaward. The Nashville's sailing launch led in." As the Spaniards used smokeless powder it was difficult to determine their exact locality, but the steam cutters directed their fire the best they could, and at first succeeded in silencing the enemy.

When the sailing launches were about one hundred feet from the beach the cable running eastward was discovered. It was at once grappled, and with much difficulty the heavy iron rope, two inches in diameter, was raised to the surface and lifted over the two sailing launches. Even under the most favorable circumstances the underrunning of such heavy weights was an operation attended with great difficulties. On this occasion a strong sea tossed the boats about like cockleshells, thereby rendering the work more dangerous. Not being provided with the best implements for cutting cables, it took the men in the launches nearly half an hour to sever this line. Finally, by the aid of hack saws, a section about two hundred feet long was cut off and coiled in the Nashville's launch, the sea end being dragged out and dropped in seventy-eight feet of water, ranges being taken and sketches made, so that this end of the cable could be found and raised when needed. While dragging the cable seaward the Marble-

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1 Lieutenant Winslow to the author.
head's launch was struck by a heavy wave, and, being held down by the cable, the launch narrowly escaped swamping.

Having accomplished this task, both sailing launches proceeded westward of the demolished cable house, and when within ninety feet of the beach discovered the second cable. "We were now directly in front of the rifle pits," wrote Lieutenant Winslow, "and hardly a hundred feet from them. The ships, realizing the danger of our position, increased their fire until it became a furious cannonade, the shells passing so close over our heads that the crews instinctively ducked as they went by and burst against the rocks beyond. The Marblehead was directing her fire particularly close to us, and her excellent gun practice, due to months of hard work before the war, excited our admiration, though our situation was uncomfortable. The shells could hardly have come closer to us without hitting the boats. We realized that we had taken the chance of an accidental hit from our ships or receive the fire of the enemy at pistol range, and the men worked on in disregard of both." Much difficulty was experienced at this place by the grapplings becoming entangled in the coral formation at the bottom, but after half an hour of hard work the second cable was brought to the surface and lifted over the launches. Of this line some ninety feet were cut off and coiled down in the Marblehead's launch, and the sea end was cast overboard in forty feet of water. The main object of the expedition had now been accomplished, and had the insurgents severed the overland lines of telegraphic communication between Havana and Santiago, as they had assured the Americans they could do, Havana would have been isolated. The natives, however, failed to carry out their part of the programme, and it remained for the Americans to complete the work at a later day.

1 Century Magazine, March, 1899.
While engaged on the second cable the Americans discovered a third and smaller one, which ran, as they afterward learned, to Cienfuegos. Although no mention of a third cable had been made, Lieutenant Winslow determined to cut this line also. The wind had now increased, raising a dangerous sea and greatly enhancing the difficulties of grappling. Several times the boats crossed the place where the cable had been seen, but failed to hook it. Once the launches were carried by the force of the seas within a few feet of the shore. After many efforts the cable was grappled, the Nashville's launch at the time being not more than fifty feet from the beach.

Down to this time the Spaniards had maintained a straggling fire on the launches, but were prevented from making a serious demonstration by the tremendous broadsides the Marblehead and Nashville were hurling at them, and by the sputtering discharge of the Colts and the 1-pounder in the cutters. While no trace of the enemy could be found, owing to their use of smokeless powder, the American war ships were enveloped in clouds of smoke; but the Nashville's tall funnels appearing above the mass plainly indicated her position to the enemy. At the time Lieutenant Winslow was grappling for the third cable, about 9:25 A.M., the enemy—apparently heavily re-enforced and having machine guns—suddenly opened a galling fire, directed chiefly at the working party, though some of their missiles were aimed at the war ships and with effect. Realizing that it was impossible to work successfully under such a terrific fire in frail open boats, at a range of not over two hundred feet, Lieutenant Winslow, just as the third cable had been lifted near the surface of the sea, ordered his men to release the line, and gave instructions for the steam cutters to take the launches in tow, the men in the latter manning their oars to prevent the waves from carrying them on the beach. The men not engaged at the oars used rifles to answer the shore fire.
Soon after Lieutenant Winslow's launch had been taken in tow that officer, while reaching for a fresh rifle, received a painful wound from a Mauser bullet in his left hand; but the heroic man insisted on continuing in command. Shortly before this Robert Volz, a seaman in Winslow's boat, was shot through the head, and fell to the bottom of the boat. He had also received a shot in his shoulder and two through his body. He survived his injuries, and ten days later, while at Key West, he ran away from the hospital and reported for duty aboard the Nashville. Equal heroism was shown by other men in the launches. An eyewitness says: "One of the first men to be struck was at the oars. No one else in the boat knew it, however, till he fainted in his seat from loss of blood. Others took the cue from this, and there was not a groan or complaint from the two boats as the bullets, that were coming thicker and faster every minute, began to bite flesh every now and then. The men simply possessed themselves in patience, and went on with their work." At 10.13 A.M. the Marblehead's steam cutter and sailing launch reached their ship, the Nashville's boats returning to their ship about the same time. Had it not been for the handsome style in which the Marblehead and Nashville ran close inshore and poured in a heavy fire on the Spaniards the American losses would have been much greater. Lieutenant Winslow had strict orders not to land.

Lieutenant Anderson's party was not so fortunate. The enemy had taken a position within one hundred and fifty yards of his boats, and directed a terrific shower of bullets, badly wounding one man in the launch at the first fire. The coxswain was injured just as the launch got started, and in order to shield his men Lieutenant Anderson steered the boat off, and directed the men to keep concealed as much as possible. But, in spite of these precautions, several bullets penetrated the side of the boat and wounded several more.
Some of these shot holes were so near the water line as to cause the launch to leak, the men being compelled to bail in order to keep her afloat. Added to the leaks was the shipping of seas caused by the launch being heavily laden with the cable. In the *Marblehead's* cutter Patrick Regan and Herman W. Kuchneister, marines, were mortally wounded; while in her launch Harry Hendrickson, Ernest Suntzewich, John Davis, John J. Doran and William Levery were wounded. Hendrickson died of his wound. Lieutenant Anderson highly commended the conduct of his men, making special mention of John J. Doran, J. H. Bennett, A. Sundquist, F. Gill and L. Chadwick.

Lieutenant Winslow spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of Lieutenant Anderson and Ensign Magruder. Of his men he said, "They all behaved with the utmost coolness and courage," and made special mention of E. Krause, B. F. Baker, T. Hoban and R. Blume. No reliable estimate of the Spanish loss can be made. Many of them were seen to fall under the terrific fire that was rained upon them, and it is believed that our loss was avenged many times over. Captain Severo Gómez Núñez of the Spanish artillery, in his book *La Guerra Hispano-Americana*, merely says: "On May 11th the boats of the *Marblehead* and *Nashville*, under cover of the guns of said vessels and the *Windom*, attacked the mouth of the bay of Cienfuegos with a view to effecting a landing. They were received by the fire of the artillery and infantry, which compelled them to withdraw, with one dead and eleven wounded." ¹

"As the boats were coming out, the *Nashville*—then under the command of her executive officer, Lieutenant Albert C. Dillingham—steamed close in to the reefs, partially sheltering the *Nashville*’s boats, and drew the enemy’s fire."² Commander McCalla had given instruc-

¹ *La Guerra Hispano-Americana*, p. 123.
² Lieutenant Winslow to the author.
tions not to fire on the lighthouse, but, as it was seen that the Spaniards were using this building as a fort, permission was given to the Nashville to direct her guns on that structure. The Marblehead also opened on the same target. In a few minutes the lighthouse was riddled with shot, and soon a 4-inch shell from a gun in the Windom in charge of Lieutenant R. O. Crisp, exploded within it, toppling the tower over and driving the enemy into the woods beyond. Maynard kept up his fire in whatever direction the Spaniards showed themselves to be until 11 A. M., when the boats were seen to be out of danger, when he retired. The Nashville was repeatedly struck by bullets, which did some damage to the running gear and wounded several of her men, among them being Commander Maynard himself, who received a severe contusion over the heart from a spent bullet, and for a time was compelled to relinquish the command, the ship being turned over to Lieutenant Albert C. Dillingham. "Lieutenant Dillingham deserves great credit for his coolness and good judgment throughout the affair, and especially toward the close of the engagement." 1 Of Lieutenant Winslow, Dillingham says: "Too much credit can not be given to Lieutenant Winslow for his excellent judgment and consummate coolness under most trying conditions of heavy sea and destructive fire of the enemy. As soon as Lieutenant Winslow had seen his wounded cared for, though wounded himself, he came to the bridge for duty."

While this brilliant action had been taking place off Cienfuegos, Lieutenant Southerland in the Eagle had reached the lightship off Diego Perez Island, 7 A. M., May 11th, and began a search for the cable connecting Batabano with Cienfuegos. A boat was sent aboard the lightship, and the keeper's services were secured in searching for the cable. Boats were at once set to work

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1 Official report of Maynard.
with grapnels, and dragged in varying depths between the lightship and the point marked by a wreck. Although bottom was plainly seen, yet the men were unable to discover the cable, the strong wind and heavy sea rendering the task unusually difficult. At 4 p.m. the work was abandoned, and, after taking the keeper and his personal effects aboard the *Eagle* and setting fire to the lightship in accordance with orders, Lieutenant Southerland proceeded to Piedras Cay, where he arrived about sunset. At this place a boat was sent ashore and destroyed the light apparatus. The keeper of the lightship stated that he had received no pay for seven months, while the two men and a boy in charge of the light at Piedras Cay were found to be in a starving condition, they having been eight months without pay, three weeks without any communication from the outside world, and five days without food.

The cables from Santiago de Cuba to Jamaica and Hayti enabled Captain-General Blanco, by means of land wires and couriers, to maintain communication with Madrid, so that the next points of attack in cable cutting were these lines. This work was undertaken by Captain Caspar F. Goodrich of the *St. Louis* and Lieutenant Carl W. Jungen of the *Wompatuck* five days after the successful attempt to sever the cables at Cienfuegos. On the night of May 16th Captain Goodrich went aboard the *Wompatuck*, having with him Lieutenant Albertus F. Catlin and eight marines, Chief Engineer Thomas G. Segrave, Third Officer Smith, Second Engineer Preston and the following volunteers of the *St. Louis*: M. Koning, J. Lindsay, F. Albretch, J. B. Wickersham, John Donaldson, George Campbell and William Wynn; all the officers and men volunteering for this dangerous attempt. Unfortunately, before the *Wompatuck* had got sufficiently close inshore to begin the work, she was discovered by a Spanish patrol boat, and, not knowing what might be the resources of the enemy in search lights and guns, Goodrich deemed it
prudent to retire, intending to renew the attempt a day or so later.

At daylight, May 18th, the \textit{St. Louis} then being about seven miles off Santiago light, Captain Goodrich put his ship on various courses and gradually approached the fortifications. As the water at this place was very deep and the ships were meagerly supplied with grappling appliances, Captain Goodrich ran within a mile and a third of Morro Castle, where he had the good fortune to pick up the cable in over three thousand feet of water. Just as the Americans had made fast to the cable, fire was opened upon them from the Morro, from a new battery on the west side of the harbor, and from a mortar battery on Casper Point,\footnote{For map see chapter Operations off Santiago.} the last proving the most dangerous of all. When the firing began the \textit{Wompatuck} came up and added the fire of her single 3-pounder to the 6-pounders of the \textit{St. Louis}. Insignificant as was the metal carried in the two American vessels, as opposed to the monstrous guns in the shore batteries, they succeeded in silencing the one gun on the Morro that was placing its shot dangerously close—both over and short of—to the frail merchant craft, and Spanish gunners could be seen running to cover. In the same way the fire from the western battery was silenced. The aim of the gunners in the mortar battery was unusually good for the Spaniards, many of their shot falling close aboard the ships, some of them not one hundred feet away, which rendered the position of the \textit{St. Louis} and \textit{Wompatuck} critical. Realizing that one shell might completely disable the magnificent passenger steamer he commanded, Captain Goodrich now steamed seaward, dragging the cable with him, so that he could cut it at his leisure when safely out of range. Reaching a position out of gunshot the Americans cut the cable, having actually opposed their frail craft within twenty-five hundred to three thou-
sand yards to batteries which, a few weeks afterward, were strengthening so as to defy the bombardments of our heaviest war ships. Though the two vessels were under fire forty-one minutes neither of them was in any way injured, nor were any casualties reported.

In this truly handsome affair Captain Goodrich reports: "Lieutenant Jungen, in his little vessel the Wompatuck, added a most praiseworthy display of coolness and pluck in battle to his uniformly zealous and intelligent co-operation with me previously." Captain Goodrich also acknowledges the efficient services of Ensign Fred R. Payne, and Lieutenant Catlin, of the Marine Corps, and adds: "You are doubtless aware of the peculiar conditions under which the officers and crew of this vessel are serving their country. The officers are not appointed in the navy, nor are the men enlisted, yet greater bravery in action or more devotion to their flag than theirs could not have been shown. With shells whistling over their heads, the gang of men, who, under Chief Officer Segrave, were employed on the forecastle in the dangerous task of heaving up the telegraph cable, never flinched, but stuck to their posts to the end." Mr. Segrave was rewarded by a commission as lieutenant in the navy. The conduct of Lieutenant Jungen also was particularly commended by Captain Goodrich.

Early on the following morning Captain Goodrich, accompanied by the Wompatuck, attempted to cut the French cable at Guantanamo. A few hours after leaving Santiago, Cervera's squadron appeared off that port and entered. Guantanamo, besides having a battery of one gun, was guarded by a Spanish gunboat carrying heavier guns and in every way superior to the St. Louis and Wompatuck, and her commander, having learned of this disparity in forces, was prepared to give battle. Sending the little tug to the entrance of the harbor to drag for the cable, Captain Goodrich drew close in to protect her. Lieutenant Jungen soon caught the cable,
and was in the act of hauling it to the surface of the water when the Spanish gunboat and the battery opened fire. The Americans responded as well as they could, and for forty minutes a severe engagement ensued, in which both the St. Louis and the Wompatuck took part. Realizing the hopelessness of exposing his frail vessels to the heavy fire of the gunboat and battery, Captain Goodrich reluctantly gave the signal to retire before the cable could be severed. Captain Goodrich says: "Lieutenant Jungen obeyed my signal to withdraw with great reluctance after a very pretty fight. Also Chief Officer Segrave deserves the department's recognition for faithful work under the enemy's fire."

Notwithstanding his failure to destroy the French cable at Guantanamo, Captain Goodrich determined to accomplish the work at the other end, and with this object in view he proceeded with the Wompatuck to St. Nicholas Mole, arriving there on the morning of May 20th. The work of dragging outside the marine league for the cable was immediately begun, and in a remarkably short time the line was caught and severed. Then making his way to Ponce, Porto Rico, Captain Goodrich, while off Tortuga, spoke the St. Paul, giving valuable information concerning the defenses of Santiago which might prove useful to Commodore Schley, then bound for that port. At daylight, May 22d, the St. Louis began dragging for the cable west of Ponce, but the bottom proving very irregular and rocky, and not having proper apparatus for this work, Captain Goodrich was compelled to give up the work. The perils of this work in such a large ship as the St. Louis were greatly enhanced by imperfect charts, the numerous shoals rendering the veering of the great ship extremely perilous. Arriving at St. Thomas May 23d, Captain Goodrich, after warning the cable company officials not to make any attempt to repair the lines he had severed, sailed for New York to refit.¹ Reporting on the work

¹ Captain Goodrich to the author.
of Captain Goodrich, Rear-Admiral Sampson says:
"Captain Goodrich from the first has rendered valuable
assistance in severing telegraphic communication be-
tween Cuba and the outside world." On July 18th
Goodrich cut the other Santiago-Jamaica cable, so that
to him belongs the distinction of severing the last
foreign cable connecting Cuba with Spain.

Two months after the gallant affair off Cienfuegos
the cable connecting Trinidad with Manzanillo was cut
by a force under the command of Lieutenant Lucien
Young. This was made necessary, as Blanco was still
able to communicate with Santiago de Cuba by over-
land lines and couriers. This cable was part of the line
reaching to Cienfuegos, the eastern end being looped
along the coast, touching at Trinidad, Jucaro and Santa
Cruz del Sur. In obedience to verbal instructions from
Rear-Admiral Sampson, Lieutenant Young, at 1 p.m.,
July 10th, left Cape Cruz, where he had been stationed,
with the Hist, accompanied by the Hornet, Lieutenant
James M. Helm, and the Wompatuck, Lieutenant Carl
W. Jungen. Arriving off Santa Cruz that day, these
little vessels entered the Cuatros Reales Channel and
anchored for the night behind the keys just east of
Santa Cruz del Sur. Lieutenant Young had been in-
formed by a Cuban pilot that the cable was laid in the
San Juan Channel, and ran eastward between the Gui-
zaro and Calabara Keys.

Getting under way early on the morning of July
11th, the three vessels, at 7 a.m., began dragging along
the muddy bottom in sixty feet of water at points indi-
cated in the diagram.¹ After fifteen minutes of dili-
gent work Young succeeded in twice hooking the cable,
but being provided with light grappling the cable
slipped off both times, and when endeavoring to raise it
for the third time the dragging line parted. By lash-
ing two 15-pound grapnels together and bending on to

¹ See page 119.
them a 2½-inch line Lieutenant Jungen, after an hour and a half of hard work, succeeded in grappling the cable for the fourth time. Finding that it was impossible to weigh the cable with such a small line, Jungen signaled the Hornet for assistance. Lieutenant Helm promptly sent his 40-pound grapnel, and bending a 5-inch hawser to it, Jungen hove the cable up the Wompatuck's side, where it was secured and a section two hundred feet long was cut out, the seaward end being carried out to sea and dropped. While the Americans were endeavoring to grapple the cable a call was made for a diver to go down and attach a hawser to the cable. William Burgess promptly volunteered, and "although he made two fruitless plunges in fifty feet of water, I consider him worthy for his efforts and deserving of consideration."¹ Having accomplished the object of the expedition, Lieutenant Young returned with his three vessels to Cape Cruz.

On July 16th Commander Chapman Coleman Todd, in the Wilmington, grappled the cable running from Santa Cruz to Jucaro and cut it.

¹ Official report of Lieutenant Jungen.
CHAPTER VIII.

AMERICANS IN THE FAR EAST.

American interest in the far East dates from the earliest periods of our history. It was in 1669 that Nathaniel Higginson—a graduate of Harvard and Governor of Madras—wrote to his brother, Lieutenant-Colonel John Higginson, of Salem, Mass., and suggested making the Massachusetts colony the seat of Oriental trade by way of London. He gave a long list of articles, including china ware, lacquers, silks, musk, pearls, diamonds and spices, which, he declared, "will sell well." "Thus early," wrote Thomas Wentworth Higginson in 1897, "it seems, was the taste for Chinese and Japanese goods—germ of future aestheticism—implanted in the American colonies; but when it comes to pearls and diamonds, the quiet Salem burgher, descendant of three generations of devout clergymen, 'understands not their value.' Yet he believes that some of them will sell well, even in 1669!"

Shortly after the American Revolution, or in 1787, the frigate Alliance—then transformed into a trader—under the command of Thomas Read, an ex-captain of the United States navy, sailed for China. She was followed by several other enterprising Yankee merchantmen. As early as 1797 Robert Shaw displayed the Stars and Stripes in the harbor of Nagasaki, Japan, and in the same year Charles Stewart, afterward a distinguished commander in the War of 1812, stopped at Deshima, Japan; he was allowed to get water and provisions, but the natives would not permit him to land.
In December, 1799, the 32-gun frigate *Essex* sailed for the far East, and was the first regularly commissioned United States war ship to carry the flag round Cape of Good Hope. It was not until 1831 that an American agent was appointed “to open trade in the Indian Ocean,” Edmund Roberts being selected by President Jackson for that purpose. In 1845 Congress decided that it was desirable to enter into commercial relations with Japan and Corea, and the 90-gun ship *Columbus*, Captain James Biddle, with the *Vincennes* anchored off Uraga, Bay of Yedo, but the authorities refused to negotiate.

Probably the first instance of force being used in the far East by the United States was when Captain David Geisinger, commanding the East India squadron, as it was then known, sent Lieutenant James Glynn with the sloop of war *Preble* into Nagasaki harbor with a demand for the release of eighteen Americans who had been wrecked on the Japanese coast in the whaler *Lawrence*. Under threats of bombarding the town, Glynn accomplished his purpose and sailed away with the men. By 1850 the American flag had become familiar in the Eastern seas, and Captain Matthew Calbraith Perry’s splendid diplomacy in 1853–’54 brought Japan within the pale of civilization. Three years later, or in 1856, Commander Andrew Hull Foote added one of the most brilliant pages to our naval history by his daring and successful attacks on the Canton forts, while in 1859 Captain Josiah Tattnall gave an international significance to the adage “Blood is thicker than water” by his handsome exploit at the Peiho forts.

As we have seen, one of the most creditable naval actions in the civil war was that between the *Wyoming*, Captain David Stockton McDougal, and the Japanese batteries at Shimonoséki Straits, and in 1867 Com-

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1 See vol. ii, pp. 154, 155.  
2 Ibid., pp. 155, 156.  
3 Ibid., pp. 387–396.
mander George Eugene Belknap taught the savages of Formosa that Americans were not to be trifled with even in that remote corner of the earth, while in 1871 Rear-Admiral John Rodgers conducted his masterly expedition against the Coreans.

From this brief review of American operations in the far East, it will be seen that this quarter of the globe has been the scene of some of our most brilliant naval exploits. It would be difficult for an American who has not lived in some of these Eastern ports to realize the rivalry existing between the representatives of European nations. The situation is peculiar. In the great seaports of the United States and in those of European nations war ships frequently come together; but always under circumstances that give little occasion for exhibiting race prejudices or jealousies. In the far East various European squadrons meet on equal terms, it is true, but there has ever been a strong temptation on the part of the officers and crews, and among their respective countrymen ashore, to make unfriendly comparisons between the various nations as represented in their cruisers, while the natives themselves enter into the discussions with more or less avidity.

For more than a hundred years the far East has been the chessboard of European powers. It is here that the all-absorbing game of acquiring territory and extending trade has been unremittingly played, and it must be admitted that the United States, in spite of powerful opposition at home, has, through the able efforts of our representatives, kept well in the lead; and on more than one occasion—notably that of thwarting the schemes of Holland and Russia to monopolize the trade with Japan—checkmated well-planned moves of European powers. It was when England and France, in 1859, were endeavoring to extort a treaty from China at the cannon's mouth that our naval officers and diplomatic representatives secured trade privileges in ad-
SCENE OF AMERICAN OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EAST.

SCALE OF MILES

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vance of their rivals—and that, too, entirely by pacific means. "The calculating, long-backed diplomats of the United States," said an eminent English authority at the time, "sent their admiral and envoy to reap the advantages for which the Europeans were fighting."

The officers of the various war ships stationed in Eastern waters and their representatives ashore well knew that any failure on their part to obtain an advantage over a rival or to checkmate an unfavorable move would not be overlooked by their home governments, while if they won a decisive point high rewards awaited them. There has always been more or less jealousy exhibited by the representatives of European nations over the unquestionable advantages the United States have secured in the far East. The civil war in America was a signal for the expression of bitter enmity toward the United States, and it was regarded as a propitious time to remove a powerful factor in Eastern intrigue. This feeling was strikingly shown when Commander McDougal, in the Wyoming, entered the port of Singapore in 1862. English merchants at that place mistook the National cruiser for the long-expected Alabama, and promptly sent aboard flowers and "files of late papers," in order that Captain Semmes might be fully posted as to the whereabouts of Yankee merchantmen.

The rush of German, English and American war ships to Apia, in 1889, well illustrates the vigilance exercised by representatives of "foreign" powers in the far East, while the sinking of the United States cruiser Oneida by the British passenger ship Bombay in a night collision¹—in which the English made no effort to save the American officers and men, believing the Oneida to be a rival American passenger steamer, with the result that twenty-two of the twenty-four officers and ninety-five of the one hundred and fifty-

¹ See p. 7.
two men of the cruiser perished—showed too plainly the enmity existing between the American and English representatives in 1870.

The rivalry between foreign naval officers was reflected in their crews. In all the treaty ports at which these men-of-war came together the local papers frequently had accounts of street disorders in which these seamen were the principals. Many a mimic war was fought and many an international question was "settled" by these ambitious tars. When their home governments were at odds over some dispute their respective seamen in the far East were even more stirred up. The "Eastern question" was "settled" many times by the British and Russian sailors in the streets of these treaty ports, with the result that broken heads, bleeding noses, blackened eyes and bruised bodies figured largely in the list of casualties. When the United States, England and France were endeavoring to secure a treaty from China in 1859, one of the fiercest "unrecorded battles" took place in the streets of Hong Kong, in which several hundred American and English tars fought for many hours. The garrison was called out to restore order, but, like the outsider who interferes in a family broil, both the American and British tars joined forces in attacking their common foe, the soldiers; and after defeating them, the seamen retired to the suburbs, where they fought out their little grievance to their own satisfaction.

This "unrecorded battle" took place just before Tattnall made his memorable dash to the assistance of the English forces, when sorely pressed, in their attack on the Chinese forts at the mouth of the Peiho River. So appreciative were the British of the magnanimity of this act that a few months later, when the crews of the two squadrons again met in Hong Kong, they organized a Christmas dinner, where the several hundred tars who only a short time before had been punching one another's noses in their own peculiar way of
settling international disputes were found in loving embrace. These occasional exhibitions of brotherly love, however, were few and far between, the rule being that sailors of different nationalities were to regard each other as enemies, who were to be pounded and maltreated wherever opportunity offered.

Notwithstanding all the talk about "blood being thicker than water" and the "bond of amity" that has recently sprung up between the United States and Great Britain, it can not be denied that in the far East nearly as much unfriendliness was shown by our British cousins out there on the breaking out of the Hispano-American war as was exhibited by them at the time of our civil war. We have sufficient evidence of this in the remark of Mr. Graham—namely, that the gunners of our Manila squadron were largely Englishmen. Singularly enough, this is the same "accusation" made by Mr. James in his History of the British Navy when endeavoring to palliate the English naval disasters in the War of 1812. Of course, every one saw that the objective point in the far East was the Philippine Islands. The placing of such a valuable group of islands in the balance was, in itself, of enormous importance to the intrigues and diplomacies of the far East. For the moment it overshadowed all other considerations of international interest. The fact that the United States might get them aroused the united opposition of all European interests as represented in the East.

Even before war was actually declared—at the first intimation that hostilities were possible—these diplomats were bestirring themselves to devise means to preserve the Philippines to Spain or, in case of her losing them, to see that a good share came to the nations they represented. They endeavored to discourage the Americans from making an attack on Manila by exaggerating the defenses of the place. The fortifications, they declared, were impregnable, the many forts and batteries mounted guns of the newest and most formi-
dable character, the Spanish army ran up to thousands of well-seasoned veterans, who would fight with those guns to the last man, the harbor and its entrances were rendered impassable by "immense mine fields" skillfully laid and perfectly connected. The tides and currents were "fearfully strong," and were sure to carry the unwary mariner on to treacherous shoals and dangerous reefs, with which the waters of the Philippines abounded. Fever and other diseases awaited those Americans who had the temerity to land. Then, to cap this appalling climax of difficulties, they pointed to that "formidable" fleet of Admiral Montojo, which many of the diplomats declared was more than equal to the entire American force in the Pacific. Montojo himself was reported as being the "most dangerous kind of a foe." His exploits, real or imaginary, were recounted for the benefit of the Americans, and the only fear expressed for the outcome of the possible fight was that Montojo might be overconfident to the extent of engaging the American vessels without getting all his forces together.

In fact, not only the Hong Kong Times, but all the English newspapers in the Orient, were good enough to inform the Americans in prominent type that Manila was "impregnable"; that "forts, terrible forts" were on every point along the harbor entrance; that the bay shore "fairly bristled with Krupp guns"; and that, owing to the enormous range and power of these "monstrous" cannon, any approaching hostile craft would be riddled with shot long before her own ordnance could be brought to bear. Moreover, these newspapers declared that Manila Bay was completely mined, and that the passage of any channel would "result in every ship of the fleet being blown into eternity." These terror-inspiring descriptions of the Gibraltar-like defenses of Manila were repeated so many times and emphasized so much by the English press in the Orient as to lead a less cool-headed com-
mander than Commodore Dewey to believe that in attacking Manila he was leading his squadron to certain destruction.

It would be vain to deny that all these rumors of the formidable character of the defenses of Manila did not have some weight with the American commander. The capital of the Philippines was an out-of-the-way station for Americans, and was seldom visited; consequently our officers were not in a position to determine how many or to what extent these reports were true, exaggerated or totally unfounded. Many of these statements had been made by men high in authority, who declared that they had seen that of which they spoke, and knew that Manila was impregnable. The experiences of the war have taught the American people that the Spaniards, while brave in battle, are even more terrible in language. Their official reports were well calculated to strike terror to the most courageous heart. After the war had progressed we found that many of these boastings were merely diplomatic tricks intended to "scare off an attack." "Neither the number nor the location of the Spanish squadron was known until the vessels were actually sighted, nor did Dewey have any valid account of the shore batteries or submarine defenses of Manila when he steamed into the bay."¹

As a matter of fact, the defenses of Manila were of a formidable character. There were heavy guns; there were mines capable of sending every ship of Dewey's squadron to the bottom; there were skillful gunners among the Spaniards; there were strong currents and treacherous shoals and reefs. And, what is more, there was a formidable Spanish squadron officered and manned by as brave a set of men as ever set foot aboard a war craft. The entrance to Manila harbor was well suited for defensive works. Between the two arms of

¹ Lieutenant Carlos Gilman Calkins.
the mainland that formed its entrance were the islands of Corregidor and Caballo, admirably situated and distanced to render the passage of a hostile fleet hazardous. The former, towering six hundred and forty feet above the level of the sea, was only two miles from the north shore, while less than a mile to the south of it was Caballo Island, four hundred and twenty feet high. Between Caballo and the mainland to the south the channel is about three miles wide. Both of these islands and the mainland to the north and south were fortified, and as the winds of the entrance are frequently fresh and the tide generally strong, they formed a line of defense that might easily have been rendered impassable.

A few miles beyond the entrance was the tongue of land on which the Cavité batteries were placed, and in such a position as to be able to deliver a raking fire on any vessel that managed to pass the entrance forts.

Manila (or Manilla) Bay and environments.

The scene of Commodore Dewey's operations in the Philippines.
Cavité was the military post and marine arsenal of Manila. It had a population of five thousand, and a garrison of six hundred men—about the same force that manned Fort Morgan in Mobile Bay when Farragut forced an entrance into that harbor. Opposite the fort, on the mainland, was a mortar battery having a good range across the harbor and toward the entrance of the bay. Between Manila and Cavité were mine fields, while the city itself, though having its strongest defenses on the land side, had several batteries of Krupp guns; some of them being of larger caliber than any carried in the American squadron.

Besides these defenses the Spaniards had in or near the Philippines a fleet of twenty-three war ships. How many of these would be found at Manila the Americans had no means of knowing, but there was every reason to suppose that the bulk of this force would be mobilized to meet the Americans should they have the temerity to venture an attack. Subsequent events showed that twelve of the largest Spanish craft were collected to oppose the Americans, which, added to the defenses of the port, gave the enemy reasonable grounds for stating that Manila was well protected.

For many years our Government had maintained the poorest of our war ships on the Asiatic station. The old Monocacy, Ashuelot and other antiquated craft of the Saco and Lackawanna class had become the butt of ridicule for the wits in the far East, and were not inaptly described as the "ironmonger's hope." It is a fact that Eastern machine shops made more money in repairing United States war craft than in most other lines of their business. The writer vividly recalls the remark of a prominent English machinist in Yokohama, Japan, made in 1878, to the effect that "if it was not for your old Yankee wash boilers half of us fellows would be out of work." In striking contrast, European powers made it a point to keep some of their best modern war ships on this station. When our new
ships, like the *Olympia, Baltimore* and *Raleigh*, were sent to the far East, they came in for a good share of criticism. It was for English interests, of course, to have as many war ships of other nations—especially those of Japan and China—built in British shipyards as possible, and they lost no opportunity to disparage American shipbuilders and make every unfavorable—real or imaginary—comparison. The high free board of our new war ships was especially criticised, and while these new Yankee ships might be all well enough as "pleasure yachts," their "structural weakness" was thoroughly rubbed into the minds of all, and every effort was made to convey the idea that as practical builders of fighting craft the Americans were not to be trusted. As most of the ships of the Spanish fleet had been built in English, French and Austrian shipyards—two of them having been constructed at Hong Kong—we can easily discover the motives the foreigners had in underrating our vessels and in praising those of Spain.

Hostilities in the Philippines began with the capture of the American ship *Saranac* near Iloilo, April 26th, and the Spaniards confidently believed that Dewey's squadron was crippled by the loss of her cargo of Australian coal. Fortunately for the owners of the craft the *Saranac* was under British colors, and subsequently she was released, but not until the news of the capture—greatly exaggerated—had been wafted into every port in the China Sea.

In view of these facts it is not strange that Europeans living in the East came to firmly believe that Manila was impregnable, that the Spanish fleet was infinitely superior to that of the United States, and that Dewey's vessels would be mere toys in the hands of the valiant Spaniards and their terrible guns.
CHAPTER IX.

SAILING FOR MANILA.

With that sagacity and forethought which were so conspicuous in all his operations in the Philippines, Commodore George Dewey, while in Washington at the close of the year 1897, came to the conclusion that in the event of war between the United States and Spain, the far East would be the scene of important operations. He made application for the command of the Asiatic squadron, and received his appointment November 30, 1897, and at once proceeded to his station. Like many other distinguished commanders in our navy, Dewey knew little of the sea until his appointment as a naval cadet in 1854.¹

¹ George Dewey was born in Montpelier, Vt., December 26, 1837. He was educated in a public school and academy and in the Norwich University, and entered the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Md., September, 1854. Graduating fifth in his class, 1858, he was assigned to the steam frigate Wabash. He served as lieutenant in the Mississippi when that vessel, as part of Farragut’s fleet, ran past Forts Jackson and St. Philip (see vol. ii, pp. 306–349). He was in the same ship when the National naval forces ran the Confederate batteries at Port Hudson (see vol. ii, pp. 374–376). The Mississippi was destroyed, and Dewey, after spiking the guns, made his escape with Captain Smith in a small boat. In July, 1863, Dewey was with the gunboats that engaged the Confederate batteries below Donaldsonville (see vol. ii, p. 381), and in 1864 he was attached to the Agawam. Subsequently, he was transferred to the steam frigate Colorado, and took part in both attacks of Fort Fisher (see vol. ii, pp. 502–507). Commissioned as lieutenant commander March 3, 1865, he served as executive officer in the Kearsarge 1865–’67, as navigator in the Colorado 1867–’68, and in 1870 secured his first command, the Narragansett. He was commissioned as commander April 13, 1872, and was variously connected with the Pacific Survey and Lighthouse Boards until 1882, when he commanded the Juniata.
Immediately upon his arrival in the East, Dewey began to concentrate his forces at Hong Kong, as being the most advantageous base for operations against the Philippines. This was done rapidly, yet quietly and without ostentation. From this place he maintained frequent communications with Washington. On January 27, 1898, Commodore Arent Schuyler Crowninshield, as head of the Navigation Bureau, cabled Dewey, "Retain until further orders the crews of the squadron whose terms of enlistment have expired." About a month later Assistant Secretary Roosevelt ordered Dewey to keep his vessels full of coal, "the best that could be had," and in event of hostilities Dewey's first business was to keep the Spanish fleet in Asiatic waters, after which he was to begin offensive operations. The kindly watchfulness of the department is shown in the dispatch of Secretary Long when he cabled April 1st, "How much soap and tobacco shall I ship?" Evidently Dewey was expected to make "clean" work of it, and at the same time his men were to be made comfortable.

In pursuance of instructions, cabled April 4th, Dewey chartered the British steamer *Nanshan*, and two days later purchased the vessel, together with her cargo of three thousand tons of coal, most of the *Nanshan*'s crew temporarily entering the American service. On April 9th Dewey reported that he had purchased the British steamer *Zafiro* for eighteen thousand pounds sterling. April 6th Secretary Long cabled Dewey, "Condition very critical; war may be declared"; and on the following day he ordered Dewey

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on the Asiatic station. He commanded the *Dolphin* 1884-'85, the *Pensacola*, flagship of the European squadron, 1885-'88, was chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting 1888-'93, and for two years served on the Lighthouse Board. He was commissioned commodore February 28, 1896, and served as President of the Board of Inspection and Survey 1896-'97. He was assigned to the command of the Asiatic squadron November 30, 1897, and took charge January 1st of the following year.
to land all his woodwork and supplies not absolutely necessary for active operations.

Week after week the Americans waited for the final word. Dewey spent much of his time studying the charts of the Pacific, and it was noted by his officers that the maps of the Philippines soon became worn and marked by unwonted use. A more significant straw was the activity displayed in stripping the ships down to fighting condition. Bulkheads were knocked away and all superfluous woodwork was carefully laid aside and placed where shot and shell could not reach it. Early on the morning of April 19th the *Olympia*'s carpenter received orders to mix war paint, and in a short time painters' scaffolds were rigged over the side of the flagship and a gang of hearty jackies were busily engaged in spoiling her pretty white sides with a coat of ugly lead-color paint, which the Russians had found so valuable in eluding the vigilance of their enemies at sea. The work on the *Olympia* was imitated by the people in other vessels of the squadron, and by the evening of April 20th our ships presented a peculiarly ugly and vicious appearance. The *Baltimore*, which had hurried across the Pacific Ocean from Honolulu, did not join the squadron at Hong Kong until the 21st. Seeing that her sisters were fully dressed "for the ball," she, too, promptly donned her fighting costume, and in an incredibly short time was vying with them in ugliness.

Every one, from the commodore down to the mess boys, felt the stimulus of these warlike preparations. Putting on war paint with the aboriginal North Americans meant serious business, and these worthy successors of the Indians were in no way behind in this feeling. True, Hong Kong was the seaman's paradise on the Asiatic station. The attractions on shore were such as to make the sailor whose ship was stationed there the envied of all his brethren. But then, what Yankee tar would not prefer a chance to have a brush
with an enemy, be he black or white, to the tame pleasures of an attractive port? War talk was dominant, and since the news of the destruction of the Maine, with a loss of two hundred and sixty-six officers and men, some of the jackies declared that they could hear voices of lost brethren whispering in their ears, while some even went so far as to say that at night they saw the ghost of the wrecked battle ship sailing through the squadron, with colors flying, guns manned, and a full crew arrayed in ethereal garb, all pointing toward Manila, their blanched faces seeming to implore them to "Remember the Maine."

Among the officers much the same exhilaration was felt, but with more reserve in expression. They had experienced several war scares in their time, and on most occasions these had resulted in nothing. The present "scare," it is true, looked as if it might amount to something, but still other alarms within their recollection that were equally promising had been dispelled. Yet there was a certain craving for righteous vengeance in this particular case, and they went about their preparations with a peculiar earnestness and grimness that boded ill for whomsoever they met. Ensign Benjamin F. Hutchinson was sent over to take command of the Nanshan, while Ensign Henry A. Pearson was detailed to take charge of the Zafiro. Aboard the latter all the spare ammunition of the squadron had been placed. Both of these gallant young officers were much chagrined at their assignments aboard such noncombatant craft, as they thought that they would have little chance of taking part in the impending battle.

On April 17th the lookouts reported the little revenue cutter Hugh McCulloch, Captain Daniel D. Hodgson, and in a short time she was blowing her puny whistle and, with yachtlike waves dancing about her bow, came to the anchorage with as much fuss and bustle as if the fate of an empire depended on her
exertions. With a view to gratifying her sense of importance in a small way, Captain Gridley quaintly remarked, "Now the squadron is safe." The Hugh McCulloch had been making a tour round the world, having crossed the Atlantic, steamed up the Mediterranean, through the Suez Canal, across the Indian Ocean to Singapore, and, like most "globe trotters," had an "awful lot to say." At Singapore Captain Hodgson received orders to join Dewey's squadron and to take part in the possible operations against Manila. This, of course, raised the self-importance of the doughty revenue collectors several pegs higher, so that it was not strange when the little craft rushed panting and blowing into Hong Kong that her people were found ready for any service—from that of officiating as flagship "down" to engaging Montojo's fleet single-handed.

There was some thought at first of taking the old Monocacy into the squadron, but as it seemed to be an era of good feeling between the United States and Great Britain it was finally deemed good policy not to deprive British machine and repair shops in the far East of this very considerable source of revenue. Three of her officers and fifty men were taken from her, however, and distributed around the squadron.

Diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain were severed April 21st, and on the 25th the President declared that a state of war had existed from April 21st. For several weeks before this the American Asiatic squadron had been patiently waiting for the word to begin operations. To any one who has not lived under a tropical sun it is difficult to realize the enervating effects of the heat at this time of the year. Our ships had been simmering and stewing in Hong Kong harbor for days as if in an oven. The tar seemed to boil up from the seams in the deck, while the paint was ready to blister and burst in bubbles. At moments of breathless calm the flags, that in fresh
breezes fluttered out in the beautiful colors of the American ensign, or in storm expanded to their full length in sturdy maintenance of their dignity, hung limp and lifeless against the masts or halyards.

On Sunday, April 24th, Commodore Dewey received a note from the British officials in Hong Kong that as England had become a neutral in the impending conflict the American squadron must move out of English waters. This was the first official intimation the squadron had that war had been declared. Dewey promptly complied, and in a few hours the *Boston*, *Concord*, *Petrel*, *Hugh McCulloch*, *Nanshan* and *Zafiro* were anchored in Mirs Bay, a little Chinese roadstead thirty miles northward, where they were joined on the following day by the *Olympia*, *Baltimore* and *Raleigh*. The revenue cutter *Hugh McCulloch*, being a noncombatant—a designation her people sternly resented—was detailed to get news at Hong Kong. On Tuesday, April 26th, this little vessel was observed hastening toward the American squadron with a prodigious amount of puffing and snorting entirely unbecoming a sober, hard-fisted collector of revenues. She was bearing the following dispatch, which was soon laid before Dewey:

"War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy them. Use utmost endeavors.—Long."

This was one of the most important orders ever given to an American naval commander. "When the commodore read the dispatch he closed his lips with his characteristic snap. 'Thank the Lord,' he said, 'at last I've got the chance, and I'll wipe them off the Pacific Ocean!'" 

Reading the dispatch a second time, Dewey pondered over the words "You must

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1 Account of an eyewitness.
capture or destroy them.” These were serious orders to give to an American naval officer. It meant the sacrifice not merely of one life, but possibly hundreds, besides millions in treasure. “Capture or destroy them”? Where were they? Dewey had for weeks been carefully preparing for just such a message, but possibly a larger scope of action had been given to him than he expected. Spain’s sea forces in the far East were scattered far and wide. How many of her gunboats were at Manila or in other parts of the Philippines he had no means of knowing, but “capture or destroy them” he must. Thousands of tons of American shipping in the wide Pacific were in peril. One insignificant Spanish cruiser could inflict untold harm on our commerce, just as the Shenandoah had done thirty-three years before. Dewey only knew that some twenty-three Spanish war craft were in his “zone” of action. He had learned, however, one useful lesson from Farragut—namely, that “the closer you get to your enemy the harder you can strike,” and, acting on this principle, he determined to start at once for the Spaniard’s headquarters.

In spite of his utmost endeavors in the past few weeks, Dewey had succeeded only in getting contradictory and somewhat confused reports of the Spanish fleet and their preparations for defense. With a view of learning something more definite, he had requested our consul at Manila, Oscar F. Williams, to come to Hong Kong. Williams left Manila April 23d, and about 1 p.m. April 27th boarded the Olympia. He was at once engaged in consultation with Dewey and his commanding officers. An hour later, or at 2 p.m., the commodore’s sailing signal was shown from the flagship, and in a few minutes the squadron was moving in a southeasterly direction, to cover the six hundred and twenty-eight miles between it and the enemy’s richest possessions in the far East. The time of the American ships’ departure and the direction they
had taken were promptly cabled to Manila by Spanish agents in Hong Kong, who had been closely watching every move. Mr. Williams gallantly accompanied the ships, so as to give whatever information he could to the commodore.

Dewey's force at this time consisted of the flagship *Olympia*, Captain Charles V. Gridley; the *Boston*, Captain Frank Wildes; the *Raleigh*, Captain Joseph B. Coghlan; the *Baltimore*, Captain Nehemiah M. Dyer; the *Concord*, Commander Asa Walker; the *Petrel*, Commander Edward P. Wood; the *Hugh McCulloch*, Captain Daniel B. Hodgson (of the Revenue Service); the steamer *Nanshan*, Ensign Benjamin F. Hutchison; and the steamer *Zafiro*, Ensign Henry A. Pearson.

Realizing that he was many thousand miles from the nearest base of supplies, and that failure meant a national catastrophe, Dewey exercised great caution. The necessity for economy in the use of coal was of the utmost importance, and with this in mind he ordered the ships to proceed at the rate of only eight knots an hour. A heavy swell was on when the squadron left Mirs Bay, which caused the vessels to roll considerably, the *Petrel*, *Nanshan* and the *Zafiro* especially making a very wet run of it. Knowing that everything depended upon the men behind the guns, Dewey kept his crews constantly exercising during the entire voyage to the Philippines, and there was not a day in which some active preparations for battle were not going on.

Dewey's ability as a commander never was shown in better light than in the way he prepared his crews for the expected encounter. Borrowing a point from Captain Porter of the old *Essex*, who caused a fire to be kindled in the lower hold at night and then called on his crew to put it out, Dewey on the first night the squadron was at sea, when the flagship had settled down to the quiet of the night, caused the bugler to sound the call for action. In a wonderfully short time
each ship in the squadron had answering red and white lights flashing up and down the masts, and the decks were alive with men—who only a moment before had been sleeping—preparing for instant action. With startling distinctness rapid orders were heard from the bridge of the flagship, and, within seven minutes from the time the first call had been given, there followed a silence, as sudden as had been the alarm. Aboard the *Olympia* was distinctly heard the calm voice of Captain Gridley reporting to the commodore, "The ship is ready for action, sir," and, looking back at the long line of war ships behind, signals to the same effect were seen, while the condition of each ship's deck, with its groups of men around the guns at their fighting quarters, plainly discernible in the bright moonlight, showed how perfect was the discipline in the squadron.

When the ships left Mirs Bay no official announcement had been made of the destination of the vessels or that war had been declared. The officers and men, however, read the handwriting everywhere in the peculiar and unmistakable preparations that were under way, so that it did not need the confirmation of a few private dispatches which some of the men had received to tell them that they were on a mission of war. On the evening of the first day out—Wednesday, April 27th—when the crews were assembled at "quarters for inspection," it was formally announced that war existed between the United States and Spain. "And the rousing cheer that went up from every division showed that the men regarded the long-expected news with the keenest satisfaction." Soon afterward the men were crowding around the bulletin boards where public notices in each ship were posted. It was evident that the present bulletin was one of unusual interest, for the men jostled one another in their eagerness to read it, and, having deciphered the contents, burst out in peals

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1 Joseph L. Stickney, correspondent of the New York Herald.
of laughter. The notice was Captain-General Basilio Augustin's bombastic proclamation relative to the declaration of war. It is given here in full as a curiosity of historical worth:

The North American people, constituted of all the social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and provoked war with their perfidious machinations, with their acts of treachery, with their outrages against the law of nations and international conventions.

The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of Victories will give us one as brilliant as the justice of our cause demands. Spain, which counts upon the sympathies of all nations, will emerge triumphantly from this new test, humiliating and blasting the adventurers from those States which, without cohesion and without a history, offer to humanity only infamous traditions and the ungrateful spectacle of a Legislature in which appear united insolence and defamation, cowardice and cynicism.

A squadron manned by foreigners possessing neither instruction nor discipline is preparing to come to this archipelago with ruffianly intentions of robbing us of all that means life, honor and liberty.

Filipinos, prepare for the struggle, and, united under the glorious Spanish flag, which is ever covered with laurels, let us fight with the conviction that victory will crown our efforts, and to the challenge of our enemies let us oppose, with the decision of the Christian and the patriot, the cry of "Viva España!"

Your general,
BASILIO AUGUSTIN Y DAVILA.

On the second evening of the passage, Thursday, April 28th, Bandmaster Valifuoco selected a programme intended especially to arouse the enthusiasm of the men. That homely, time-honored tune Yankee Doodle elicited cheers from all the seamen. "When the concert closed with the Star-spangled Banner, the voices of at least fifty men took up the words of each verse, the young apprentices particularly being prominent in the lead, and the chorus spread through the ship from forecastle to cabin with an enthusiasm that carried the hearts of all on board."1 Search-light prac-

1 Stickney, correspondent of the New York Herald.
tice was then engaged in, and the menacing line of war ships, falling and rising on the rolling seas, standing out grimly and severe in the moonlight, with huge columns of smoke pouring out of their funnels and trailing leeward toward the horizon, presented a never-to-be-forgotten sight. On Friday the weather was very warm and sultry and the work of the coal passers, far down in the bunkers, was extremely debilitating; but in spite of this they stuck to their work with the determination of heroes.

Early Saturday morning, April 30th, land was sighted at Cape Bolinao. At this place the Spaniards had a telegraph station, and the arrival of the ships was quickly reported to Manila. As the squadron was now close to the enemy, redoubled exertions were made to discover the whereabouts of Spanish war craft. On this point the Americans were much in the dark, for although they had received many rumors while at Hong Kong our officers well knew that little reliance could be placed on them. It was a well-known Spanish trick to circulate erroneous reports so as to mislead and confuse their enemies. So Dewey approached the island of Luzon with no certainty as to where he would meet Montojo's fleet or in what force it might be found.

Believing that they would come upon the enemy at any moment, the Americans now prepared for immediate action. The sheet chain cables were coiled around the ammunition hoists to serve as an additional protection from shells, while nets of tough manila rope, about as thick as one's little finger, were rigged under and around the boats and across the wardroom bulkheads as a protection against flying splinters—a device so frequently employed in our vessels during the civil war. Woodwork, when struck by shells or solid shot, has proved even more disastrous than the missiles themselves. It was Sir Richard Hawkins who said, several centuries ago, "On shore it is only the bullet that hurteth, but in a ship I have seen the splinters kill and
hurt many at once." With a view to diminishing this source of danger, all furniture that could possibly be spared was thrown overboard. Chests, tables, boxes, chairs, bulkheads, were soon floating and bobbing in the sea along the wake of the ships to be washed ashore and picked up some future day by wondering natives of the south seas.

As Dewey had heard that Montojo intended to give battle off Cape Bolinao, he had shaped his course so as to make that point of land; but on arrival there a careful search revealed the fact that no Spanish ships were near that place, so the squadron moved leisurely down the coast toward Manila. "At 4 A.M. Saturday the Olympia signaled 'Boston and Concord reconnoiter Subig Bay.' The bay was entered about 1.30 P.M. The Baltimore came in sight about 3 P.M., but did not enter the bay."\(^1\) A careful search of this harbor was made, but no trace of Dewey's great objective—the enemy's squadron—could be found, and the scouting vessels returned with this report. Afterward it was learned that Montojo had left Subig Bay only a few hours before the American squadron appeared off that port.

"The natural sortie harbor for the strategic defense of Manila Bay was obviously to be found in Subig Bay. A fleet installed in this harbor would threaten an invader's lines of communication and compel him to keep his forces concentrated, thus limiting his activities. . . . We knew that the strategic advantages and nautical convenience of Subig had been recognized . . . and that a naval commission had been engaged for a dozen years in elaborating plans for the industrial and military equipment of this excellent harbor."\(^2\)

About 6 P.M. a signal was displayed from the Olympia summoning the commanders from all the vessels in the squadron to repair aboard the flagship. In

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\(^1\) Captain Frank Wildes to the author.

\(^2\) Lieutenant Carlos Gilman Calkins.
a few minutes captains’ gigs or larger boats were putting off from each vessel and speeding over the calm sea, and soon the council of war was in session. Dewey briefly told his commanders that, as the Spanish fleet had not been discovered in Subig Bay, he had determined to look for it in Manila harbor and that he would endeavor to force the entrance that night. The several commanders then put off to their respective vessels, and as each captain was carried back to his ship the regular splashing of the oars in the water and the rattling of the rowlocks, in the quiet of that calm tropical night, seemed loud enough to arouse the whole coast of Luzon. It was an ideal summer’s evening in the tropics. Scarcely a breath of air stirred the glassy sea. The sun gradually sank into the water like a dull, copper ball, but soon afterward a quickly vanishing twilight was succeeded by a great yellow moon which hung in the heaven like a beacon, as if to relieve her brother in standing guard over the universe. Occasional clouds obscured the beams of the queen of night, but still there was sufficient light to discover to any wary seaman the approach of hostile vessels. Orders were signaled to slow down to eight knots an hour, as at that rate the moon would disappear below the horizon before they came in sight of Manila.

A little after nine o’clock the bold headlands forming the entrance to Manila harbor gradually loomed up. The vessels formed in line headed by the Olympia. After her came, in the order mentioned, the Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord and Boston, the Hugh McCulloch, Nanshan and Zafiro being stationed on the starboard quarter of the Boston. Orders were then passed along the deck of each ship, not by the usual means of a blaring bugle, but in whispered commands, for it seemed in the painful stillness of the hour as if every sound would reach the foe whom the Americans well knew must now be within sight. Quietly the men, phantomlike, glided to their guns and in grim silence
awaited the signal for action. Long before this every man had made his final preparations for the coming struggle. Every light in the ships was extinguished save one at the stern, which served as a guide for the vessel immediately behind, and that luminant was carefully screened on both sides so as not to betray their presence to the Spaniards. What the strength of the enemy they were to oppose was or what the hidden means of defense he had adopted, they had little means of knowing. They only realized that they were six thousand miles from the nearest friendly port. The hand of every nation had been turned against them. They had elected to draw the sword, and must abide the consequence. Alone on the open ocean, they were, indeed, dependent on no one but themselves. Defeat meant the scornful raillery of the world. Victory meant immortality.

In this manner the ghostly squadron crept down the
coast, passing headland after headland in steady pace toward Manila. Finally they rounded the last point and came in full view of the sentinel-like tower on Corregidor Island, the lights on that island and Caballo having been extinguished. Orders were now given for every man to wash and take a cup of coffee—a most humane and touching manifestation of Dewey's magnanimity, and which serves as another evidence of his ability as a great commander. In the Petrel the hammocks were not piped down, but the men were allowed to sleep by the guns. This little ceremony having been completed, the column of ships made directly for Boca Grande channel, which, according to Captain Sostoa, was "full of torpedoes," while Colonel Garces, of the marine artillery, declared that the line of torpedoes were all in place on the night of April 27th.

On sped the ships in profound silence, each moment bringing them nearer and nearer to the danger point. Nothing served to break the oppressive silence of the hour except an occasional whispered order and the throbbing and churning of the engines. To those aboard it seemed as if even these subdued noises must be heard by those on land, but as yet not the slightest evidence had been given that their presence had been discovered. Officers and men stood at their stations in sepulchral silence and in momentary expectation of that outburst of action and pandemonium incident to battle. The suspense was becoming intolerable. Some of the men as they stood with open mouths—the better to endure the terrific concussion of the great guns which might be fired at any moment—could hear the beating of their hearts. To the Americans this was the most trying moment of the battle.

As the column came abreast of Corregidor Island every glass in the squadron was turned shoreward in a vain hope to detect some sign of a wakeful foe or to catch the first glimpse of those "terrible forts bristling with Krupp guns," about which they had heard so
much while at Hong Kong. The frowning island towered up about five or six hundred feet in the night like some gigantic sentinel, but in spite of every endeavor the Americans could discover no trace of an enemy. At 11.30 p.m. the spectral column swung broadly into Boca Grande channel, half a mile from El Fraile. Surely they must be discovered now. But, no—yes, there is the flash of a light in the center of the island. Was it a mere chance fire, or was it an alarm? There goes an answering light on the north shore of the mainland, followed soon afterward by a feeble zigzaggy flight of a rocket from the summit of Corregidor. Yes, we must have been discovered at last. That, in any event, was a relief to the fearful uncertainty that had oppressed every man in the squadron for the preceding half hour, and the gun crews instinctively nerved themselves for action. Now was the time to expect messengers of death hurtling around our ears. But, no! These signals could not have been seen. The Spaniards must be asleep.

Meantime the ships sped up the channel, every second adding to their safety in running these dangerous batteries. Not a challenge, not a hail, not a cry, not a shot, came from the silent forts. "I can scarcely believe it possible that the garrisons were at their posts and awake, for again it seemed to us that surely a fleet stealing into an enemy's harbor never made so much noise as we did," said an officer in the Olympia. Now the ships were almost past the batteries, and still the same inexplicable silence from the shore gunners. Possibly they had gone to sleep relying on Augustin's brave proclamation that the Yankees would never dare to approach Manila. Truly the proclamations of the Spaniards were very satisfying.

About this time, when all believed that the squadron had accomplished the extraordinary feat of running the batteries undiscovered, an energetic stoker aboard the Hugh McCulloch opened the furnace door and threw
on some "nice powdery coal," with the result that in an instant a brilliant shower of sparks from the cutter's smokestack flew high into the air like some gaudy "flowerpot" in a Fourth of July pyrotechnic display. "Well, if some one don't see that," said a lieutenant in the flagship, "the whole island must be asleep." Some one did see it, but he was tardy in proclaiming the fact, for it was several minutes, or about 12.15 A.M., before a bugle blast came out of the west, quickly followed by a flash from El Fraile Island and a boom of a great gun. Between the flash and the report a shell passed diagonally between the *Raleigh* and the *Petrel*. The boom of cannon was a welcome relief to the men, and they began to settle down to the natural condition of action. Two more shots were fired by this same gun or battery, and a splash was seen in the water a short distance astern of the *Hugh McCulloch*. This might have been caused by the breaking of swash caused by motion of the ships or by a fish, for since the wreck of the *Maine* the Spaniards had been persistent in associating fish with submarine disturbances. But whatever it was, the little *Concord* took the compliment for herself, and replied with a vicious snap of one of her 6-inch guns. Just where her shell struck is not known, but our officers distinctly heard a sullen plunk and a smash, followed by a cry. Then came the *Boston* with the louder roar of an 8-inch gun, and in the rear of them the pug-nacious *McCulloch*, who, having drawn the enemy's fire, seemed to think it good form to begin barking with her cannon. Fearing that the little "pug dog" of the squadron might suffer at such close range, Dewey signaled her to take a position off the flagship's port quarter. Before this order could be effected the cutter signaled back that Chief Engineer Randall had been prostrated by the heat, and twenty minutes later he died. About this time the *Raleigh*, being the third ship in line, opened with her 5-inch guns. The *Concord*'s 6-inch guns were banging away. Her first shell of
this caliber was observed to explode exactly over the spot where the Spanish had fired, and all felt that great execution had been done. The Americans afterward learned that this shell had taken effect among the Spanish gunners and had killed or wounded several men. After that the shore batteries were silent.

The entire squadron had now passed safely into the harbor. So far everything had progressed most satisfactorily, but there yet remained the formidable mines in the bay and those "dreadful batteries" at Cavité and at Manila about which the Americans had heard so much. Then, above all, there was the great Spanish fleet of twenty-three war ships to be located and annihilated. How many of them had been assembled in this harbor, if any were there, was now to be discovered, and having been found they were to be fought until utterly destroyed. This perhaps was the most trying period of the daring enterprise. True, the suspense of approaching the entrance of the harbor had been great, but the little spat with the shore batteries had served as a slight relief. If the men now could only plunge right into the enemy's fleet and begin a rough-and-tumble scrimmage, now that their nerves were tuned up to the fighting pitch, it would have suited every man in the squadron. But this was not to be. Another period of suspense, even more trying than the first, must be endured. It was the commodore's plan to wait for the light of day so as to discover the lay of the harbor into which he had forced such a bold entrance. Slowly and very quietly the ships reduced their speed until they were moving through the water with scarcely perceptible motion. On looking over the side of each ship it required the closest scrutiny to detect that the water was rippling along the dark hulls, while a glance behind could scarcely reveal the vessel next astern; the dull gray with which they had been painted rendering the outlines of each craft almost undistinguishable in the surrounding gloom. Small won-
der, then, that the Spaniards at the entrance of the harbor had failed to aim accurately.

The oppressive quiet of the hour was broken only by the regular throbbing of the engines and the subdued churning of the propellers as they steadily urged the ships onward. Instinctively all eyes were turned toward Manila in the vain hope of catching a glimpse of the enemy's fleet, or the approach of a scouting vessel. Surely the Spaniards at Manila and Cavité must have heard the firing at the entrance forts and were sending out spying craft. Perhaps a snakelike torpedo boat, at that moment, was creeping upon the squadron. The conditions were perfect for such knavish warfare. Who would be the first to detect its approach? Or if the enemy were not busy with such devilry, surely they must be getting up steam in their war craft and weighing anchors. That, at least, would be evidence that some of Montojo's ships were in port. Accordingly, all eyes were strained to catch the first spark of newly kindled fires that must speed out of the smokestacks, and heads were bent to catch the first clanking of chains hauling up muddy anchors from the foul bottom of the bay. But none of these indications of the enemy's presence rewarded the vigilance of the Americans. Surely there would be signals flashed out in the darkness and in a few minutes search lights would be throwing their long scintillating rays over the placid surface of the bay to spy out the approaching ships.

But, no. There was not the slightest indication that a Spanish war craft was in the bay. Had running of the gantlet at the entrance of the harbor been in vain? Were Montojo's ships elsewhere, and must the American squadron again run past those forts in their efforts to put to sea and resume their search for the great objective point of their mission? So far as indications went at this period of the daring venture these questions had to be answered in the affirmative. Commodore Dewey was observed consulting earnestly in an
undertone with the men who were acting as pilots. Their forms could be seen from many parts of the flagship, looming up in the gloom like gigantic phantoms. Near by was Lieutenant Calkins, the navigator of the *Olympia*. Everything depended on his judgment. He knew the channel to a nicety, and confidently following his lead the great column of war ships slowly pressed onward. Piloting a number of ships in a harbor well lighted and buoyed is not the easiest operation even in broad daylight. The difficulties in this case were greatly enhanced by the absence of guiding lights and range marks, so that Calkins' duty called for all the qualities that go to make up a first-class officer.

Up and down the deck could be discerned groups of men standing motionless at their various stations. The few necessary orders were given in whispers, and perhaps the intense strain of the situation could not be better evidenced than in the quavering voices of the men as they passed the word from mouth to mouth. The possibility that at any moment the ships might stumble upon a mine field and every man be blown to eternity did not tend to relieve this dreadful suspense. "We all came to the conclusion afterward," wrote an officer in the squadron, "that this leisurely advance through the quarter light of the dawn was the most trying period in the whole affair. This creeping, creeping, creeping, with invisible mines below us and an invisible fleet ahead was a test out of which no man came without a sigh of relief. We were all keyed up, but it was not long before the fighting string in every man's heart was twanging and singing like that of a taut bow."

Steadily the midnight visitors crept up the bay. As affording some relaxation to his men, Dewey at 4 A.M. ordered coffee served. The lights of the city were now plainly visible, twinkling and blinking in the distance like some many-eyed monster rousing itself out of a deep slumber, rubbing its optics in a sleepy effort to
distinguish an approaching foe. How much longer before this monster would be alive with action, thundering out his angry protests at the coming of an enemy into his lair? When would those batteries that lined the shore belch out their storm of iron hail? At what moment might those deadly mines be touched with an electric spark and vomit forth the bottom of the bay and tear those war craft into atoms? Were the Spaniards sleeping in the hope that their "to-morrow" would still give them time enough to prepare for defense? If so, their mañana had come.

At eleven o'clock on the night of April 25th, thirty-nine hours before Dewey sailed from Mirs Bay, Admiral Montojo steamed out of Manila harbor for Subig Bay with the following cruisers: \textit{Reina Cristina, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon and Castilla}, and the dispatch boat \textit{Marques del Duero}. On leaving Manila, Montojo addressed a characteristic note to the commandant of Cavité, Señor Sostoa, in which he said:

"It having been resolved to go out with the squadron for Subig, not only for the defense of that important port, but also as a strategic harbor for operations which may occur, the staff is placed in charge of the necessary orders from these headquarters. As commandant of the Cavité arsenal, I have nothing to say to your Excellency concerning its defense, as the chief commander and officers will know how to defend the interests of the nation, trusting in the valor, zeal and intelligence of all those who, with slight and feeble resources upon which we count, will do everything possible to guard the honor of the flag and navy.

"Go on, sir, in the ordering and equipping as much as you think necessary. You will use the telegraph to report to me all that you think important as well as the cable to communicate with the Government. As long as possible communicate by way of Paranaque and Malate, and also with the batteries of the coast by sig-
nals as well as by boats. If you need merchant vessels to equip with torpedo tubes, which may be effective in such vessels, you will equip them also.

"(Signed) MONTOJO,

"SIGUILLY, Secretary."

Early on the morning of the 26th Montojo's squadron entered Subig Bay, where extensive earthworks were under construction for the defense of that port. "I had a conference with Captain Del Rio," says Montojo, "who, though he did not relieve my anxiety respecting the completion of the defensive works, assured me that they would soon be finished." A few hours before Dewey tripped anchor in Mirs Bay, April 27th, Montojo made his dispositions for the defense of Subig Bay. The old San Quintin, being unseaworthy, together with two merchant vessels, was sunk so as to block the eastern entrance of the port, while the Castilla was stationed at the western entrance.

Speaking of the defenses of Subig, Montojo says: "With much disgust, I found that the guns which should have been mounted on that island [Grande] were delayed a month and a half. This surprised me, as the shore batteries that the navy had installed—with very little difficulty—at the entrance of Manila Bay, under the intelligent direction of Colonel of Naval Artillery Señor Garces and Lieutenant Beneavente, were ready to fight twenty-four days after commencement of the work. I was also no less disgusted that they confided in the efficacy of the few torpedoes which they had found feasible to put there. The entrance was not defended by torpedoes nor by the batteries of the island, so that the squadron would have had to bear the attack of the Americans with its own resources in deep water and with little security. Our vessels could not only be destroyed, but they could not save their crews."

Still clinging to the Spaniard's fateful trust in
"mañana," Montojo lingered in Subig Bay, believing that he might have time to complete his plans for the defense of that port, but on April 28th he received a cable dispatch from the Spanish consul at Hong Kong which read as follows: "Enemy's squadron sailed at 2 p.m. [April 27th] from the Bay of Mira, and, according to reliable accounts, they sailed for Subig to destroy our squadron, and then will go to Manila." This dispatch shows how closely and accurately Dewey's movements in Chinese waters had been watched by Spanish spies. On the receipt of this news, Montojo called a council of his officers and, with the exception of the stubborn Del Rio, they decided that the Spanish naval force must return to Cavité. Ordering Del Rio to make the best possible preparations for the defense of the new arsenal at Subig, Montojo at once dispatched the Don Juan de Austria to Manila to secure a large number of lighters, filled with sand, as a further defense for his proposed new line of battle. At 10 a.m. April 29th the Spanish squadron left Subig Bay, the Castilla towed by the transport Manila, and on the morning of the next day they arranged themselves in line in the shoal water off Sangley Point. On the afternoon of the same day, April 30th, as we have seen, the American squadron appeared off Subig Bay in a vain search for the enemy.

"At 7 p.m. April 30th," says Montojo, "I received a telegram from Subig announcing that the enemy's squadron had entered that port at 3 p.m., reconnoitering, doubtless seeking our ships, and from there they sailed with course for Manila. The mail steamer Isla Mindanao arrived in the bay. I advised her captain to save his vessel by going to Singapore, as the enemy could not get into the entrance [of Manila Bay] probably before midnight. As he was not authorized from the Trans-Atlantic Steamship Company, he did not do so, and then I told him that he could anchor in shallow water as near as possible to Bakor."
"At midnight gun fire was heard off Corregidor, and at two o'clock on the morning of May 1st I received telegraphic advices that the American vessels were throwing their search lights at the batteries of the entrance, with which they exchanged several shots. I notified the commanding general of the arsenal, Señor Sostoa, and the general governor of the plaza, Captain Señor Garcia Pana, that they should prepare themselves. I directed all the artillery to be loaded and all the sailors and soldiers to go to their stations for battle, soon to receive the enemy. The squadron being disposed for action, fires spread, and everything in proper place, we waited for the enemy's arrival."
CHAPTER X.

BATTLE OF MAY FIRST.

As the first blush of dawn began to be visible in the east, the American squadron reached a position about seventeen miles up the bay and seven from the city. One by one the twinkling lights of Manila paled before the rapid approach of the tropical day, but for some time it was impossible to distinguish surrounding objects. Every eye was strained to catch a glimpse of the much-boasted armada, and every ear was bent to hear the first boom of cannon that might betray the whereabouts of the enemy. Presently the shadowy outlines of a group of vessels gradually developed off to port and the squadron headed toward it, but before five o'clock they were seen to be merchantmen and our officers turned their glasses elsewhere. The sun now began to assert itself, but coming up behind the hills it threw long shadows over the edges of the bay, which for a time prevented the Americans from distinguishing their surroundings.

At 5 A. M. the signal "Prepare for action" was unfurled on the *Olympia*, but in the faint light it could scarcely be made out by the vessels in the rear of the column, so the *Baltimore* repeated it. The vessels of the American squadron were now in compact order of battle. The bugle sounded to quarters, the men took their stations for immediate action, and with colors flying at each masthead the ships, with barely steerageway, passed in a broad curve to the east side of the bay and to the north of Manila. Then heading southward, they
made for the water front of the city, so as to pass it at a distance of three miles. The storeships and the *Hugh McCulloch* were now sent some distance into the harbor, where they would be safe.

The bay was now rapidly being flooded with the rays of a tropical sunrise. Soon the shadows under the hills melted away, and in a few minutes another forest of masts began to assume shape near Cavité. Powerful glasses in the American squadron quickly made these out to be military tops of modern war craft, and it was not long before the entire Spanish fleet, prepared for action, was clearly outlined against the shore.

It was Dewey's plan to follow the tactics used so advantageously in the civil war by Stringham and Du- pont at Hatteras and Port Royal—namely, to keep his column in constant motion so long as the fighting lasted, thus depriving the enemy of the advantage of a stationary target. He proposed to hold the fire of his batteries until within effective range, then to pour in every available shot until the column had passed beyond range, when it was to sweep back, pass the enemy as before, but at closer quarters, pouring in their most effective broadsides until beyond range, again to turn back, and thus maintain a circuit of fire—drawing closer and closer at each pass—until one side or the other succumbed. The *Olympia*, besides having the usual preparations for battle, had heavy sheet chains "faked up and down, over a buffer of awnings against the sides in wake of the 5-inch ammunition hoist which afforded a stanch protection, while iron and canvas barricades were placed in various places to cover gun crews and strengthen moderate defenses."¹ The Americans in other vessels of the squadron also showed much ingenuity in devising additional means of defense.

At 5 a.m., while the squadron was yet north of the city, the two 5.9-inch guns on Sangley Point uttered

¹ Official report of Captain Gridley.
their protests, but the missiles fell far short and to the left of the *Olympia*. This was followed by a shot from the Spanish squadron, but with a similar want of effect. Observing that their shells were falling short of the mark, the Spaniards at Cavité and aboard their fleet soon desisted.

The Americans were now opposite the city. With their glasses our officers could distinctly make out the ramparts, church towers and other vantage points crowded with people eager to see the fight, while hundreds were hastening down the shore, fully believing in the bombastic proclamation of Augustin and prepared to see that "rotten squadron" blown to atoms. As the majestic column of war ships passed the water front the battery on the Luneta at 5.15 A.M. sent three shells hissing and screaming toward the ships. The missiles went high over the mark and fell into the bay several miles beyond. The *Concord* and *Boston* answered this with two shells each. These Spanish guns continued to fire throughout the battle, and the officer in command, on discovering that he had not destroyed our ships, committed suicide.

"The firing of these batteries deprived the city of any right to protest against immediate bombardment," wrote Calkins. Dewey was not waging war against a populous town, and he had no intention of wasting ammunition on women and children. His objective point was the Spanish fleet. As our ships slowly left Manila behind and made toward Cavité Dewey quietly remarked to one of his officers that the blue hills back of the city reminded him of those in Vermont. This is only one instance of the perfect self-control and coolness with which the Americans went into this deadly strife. Every officer and man in the squadron felt the influence of their "immaculate" commander, as one of the Irishmen expressed it. "From first to last," said an officer who was beside Dewey throughout the battle, "the commodore never for one instant
changed his demeanor, which was always that of a man who had a duty to do and who went about it with the plain every-day determination to do that duty."

The admirable bearing of the American commander in chief was handsomely supplemented by the officers in our other ships. Captain Wildes took a cup of coffee on the bridge of the Boston—while under the hottest fire—with as much nonchalance as if seated on the veranda of a bungalow. Up in the tops of the Petrel stood Lieutenant Bradley A. Fiske busily engaged measuring the slowly decreasing distance with a stadiometer.

At 5.15 A. M. a signal was displayed from the Spanish flagship, and in an instant all their ships opened a heavy fire, which was promptly followed by their shore batteries. The thunderous roar of their guns showed that they had some old-fashioned ordnance, but the sharper impact of many modern pieces could easily be distinguished, plainly indicating that they were amply supplied with the best rifled cannon. Montojo says, "We then slipped our cables and started the engines in order not to serve as a stationary target for the enemy."

The tremendous booming of these guns indicated plainly enough that heavy work was before the Americans, but Dewey, observing that the enemy's shot was falling short, reserved his fire, while onward went the silent line of war ships, straight for the storm of shot and shell that was whipping and tearing up the placid surface of the bay, like a squall approaching just in front of them.

Now the bow of the Olympia began to enter this dreadful rain of metal, and the gunners instinctively tightened their grip on the lanyards, for now they might expect the order to fire at any moment. When the column was about four miles from Cavité a dull explosion took place some distance off the bow of the

1 Official report of Montojo.
**Baltimore.** In an instant a great mass of water and mud, torn from the bottom of the bay, sprang into the air. A mine had been exploded. The Americans were in the mine fields of which they had heard so much. Now, if ever, they were to be blown into eternity. But there was not the slightest halt in the steady progress of that silent line of battle. The men stood calmly at their stations, ready to follow their brethren of the *Maine* if need be. Speaking of this trying period of the battle, an officer in the squadron said: "No change of course was ordered; no special word of command was given, and, though each man of us, I suppose, took a tooth grip of the lower lip and had no idea of how many seconds lay between him and the kingdom come, I can state it as a fact that the only remarks I heard made were such natural ones as 'Torpedoes at last,' or 'Now we'll get it!'

There could now be no question that the squadron was in the midst of those "terrible mine fields," and every one expected that the next moment would show some of those noble war craft thrown bodily into the air, torn and wrenched to pieces and her men blown to atoms. But no other explosions of this nature took place, though the Spaniards, evidently encouraged by this exhibition of their submarine prowess, redoubled their exertions at their guns until the bay resounded with a deafening crash of heavy artillery that might well appall the stoutest hearts. Still there was no answer from the dull gray line of war craft. On they glided, utterly unmindful of this terrific byplay, with eyes fixed on the enemy, and creeping forward toward the foe at a rapid pace.

All this time Commodore Dewey was calmly watching the advance of his ships from the forward bridge of the *Olympia*, at that juncture the most exposed position in the squadron. By him were his chief of staff, Commander Benjamin P. Lamberton, and the executive officer, Lieutenant Corwin P. Rees. In the
conning tower was Captain Gridley, eagerly awaiting the word to fire. Observing that many Spanish shots were flying high overhead—showing that the ships were now well within range—Dewey, with a glance at the shore as if to better gauge the distance, turned to Lieutenant Rees and said, by way of getting his opinion as to the distance, "About five thousand yards, I should say; eh, Rees?"

"Between that and six thousand, I should think, sir," responded the lieutenant. Commodore Dewey then leaned over the rail and, in a quiet voice, said to Gridley:

"When you are ready you may fire, Gridley."

How eagerly this order had been awaited may be judged by the fact that it was given exactly at 5 h. 41 m. 25 s. A. M., and in one second more the bridge upon which the commodore was standing gave a leap like a springboard under his feet and a terrific roar proclaimed that the starboard 8-inch gun of the Olympia had given the signal for the Americans to open fire. As a mark of international courtesy, this shell was aimed at Montojo's flagship. Scarcely had the Olympia's 8-inch shell left the muzzle when the roar of the Baltimore's heavy guns was heard, quickly followed by those of the Raleigh. Soon after the other vessels in the column got into range, and the thunder of their guns, added to that of the Spanish ships and batteries, made a terrific tumult. One shrieking shell came straight for the Olympia's forward bridge, but exploded about one hundred feet away, a fragment cutting the rigging just over the commodore's head, while another piece cut a long splinter from the deck under the bridge. Another fragment of a shell smashed the bridge gratings. Evidently the Spaniards had long before acquired the exact range, and they were getting in their best hits.

The Americans could not be too quick in returning some of the blows that were falling dangerously near
them. An unlucky shot might easily throw one of their ships out of the fight. The Americans had now opened with all their bow guns, and in a short time all the cannon on the port sides were booming out their messengers of death and destruction. Above all the noise could be heard the savage roar of the 8-inch guns pealing out like monarchs of the battle storm. These were supplemented by the rapid thunder of the 5-inch guns, and thickly interspersed between these was the sharp, rattling sputter of the smaller calibers.

It was at this period of the battle that the mythical "torpedo boat attacks" on the American squadron occurred, which, in the light of subsequent developments, glide from the sublime to the ridiculous with a celerity that is jarring. As the Olympia became fairly engaged with the enemy, a diminutive steam cutter, "with awnings spread and a big Spanish ensign streaming astern," innocently ventured out from Sangley Point, crossed the course the American squadron was steering, and then—after the most approved code of etiquette for torpedo boats—turned back as if to await the big Yankee. Of course the gunners in Dewey's squadron were notified of the "danger," and soon every available gun in the secondary batteries—ay, the heaviest guns in our main batteries, to say nothing of the animated fusillade from the marines with their Springfield rifles at a range of twelve hundred yards—was directed at the supposed torpedo boat. But the obstinate thing refused to sink or even to be seriously injured, and continued to drift about until she came within five hundred yards of the flagship.

Fortunately she did not carry out her supposed design of blowing up the Olympia, and finally drifted ashore, the American gunners occasionally giving her a shot for five hours afterward. Subsequently it was learned that this steam cutter belonged to an English

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1 Lieutenant Calkins.
gentleman living at Cavite who was expecting a trunk to arrive in Manila by a mail steamer and had sent his Filipino crew with the steam cutter to get it. They started out that peaceful Sabbath morning with minds far removed from hostile intent, and with a full supply of peanuts. So much has been said of "marvelous" American gunnery that it is cruel to record that these people escaped to the shore uninjured. A few days after the battle an American officer visited the stranded cutter and found it covered with "splashes of blood," while articles of clothing "saturated with gore" were scattered around promiscuously. Naturally he concluded that there had been slaughter in the craft. He soon learned, however, from the owner of the boat that the "gore" was nothing but red paint, three five-gallon cans of which were in the craft and were mortally hurt. This was the only torpedo boat attack that really occurred in the glorious battle of May 1st. This boat was not so badly wrecked as to prevent her being repaired in time to carry American generals about Manila Bay when our troops arrived on the scene.

Admiral Montojo's ships were riddled with a merciless shower of bursting shells. The first apparent result was a noticeable diminution of their fire. Not so many missiles of death now tore and rent the air and water around and over the American ships. The balance of shot weight was rapidly turning the tide in favor of the Americans. The roar of the enemy's guns was terrific, but that of the Americans was perceptibly gaining. Although the Spaniards were suffering heavily in killed and wounded, their ships withstood our fire surprisingly well. "The white bulwarks of the Castilla," said Lieutenant Calkins, "had been scarred and blackened by our fire, but even her wooden hull had not burst into flames after two hours of brisk bombardment." Yet it was observable that the Spanish crews were rapidly being decimated, while much confusion existed aboard all their ships.
On the other side the same silence among the men was observed, but the guns were belching away with frightful roars and with machinelike regularity. The even, swinging discharge of cannon after cannon was beginning to tell. Montojo reported: "The fire of the Americans was rapid, and we found our ship being riddled with countless projectiles, for the three cruisers which led the American line aimed particularly at the Reina Cristina, my flagship. Soon after the battle began a shell exploded in the turret, killed or wounded the entire crews of the four guns, and tore from the foremast a fragment which wounded the helmsmen who were steering on the deck. The first lieutenant, José Nuñez, took charge of the steering gear, and stuck to his task until the end of the battle, showing bravery which is beyond all praise. Another shell entered between the decks and set on fire the material belonging to the ship's carpenters. Fortunately, however, the crew succeeded in extinguishing the flames." The Reina Cristina's flag was carried away early in the fight, but was quickly rehoisted. She took fire at 7.25 A.M., and her people could be seen playing the fire hose aloft. Other vessels in the Spanish fleet fared in proportion to their importance.

Just as the Boston, the last vessel in the American line, was getting beyond the range of fire, the Olympia, at 6.20 A.M., had swung round and was now heading eastward so as to pass Montojo at closer quarters than before. The American crews were now shifted to the starboard guns, and again the Olympia began to draw into that storm of shot and shell. This time it was the batteries at Cavité that had the first chance at the moving column, and it was here that we suffered our heaviest injuries. One shot went entirely through the Baltimore, but, fortunately, hit no one. Another struck just outside the wardroom, "but did not even dent the ship's side." A shell carried the signal halyards out of Lieutenant Brumby's hands on the after bridge of
the *Olympia*. Ensign John S. Doddridge's stateroom in the *Boston* "was injured by a shell which entered the port quarter and started a fire. The same shell passed into the wardroom, where Paymaster Martin sat, and exploded, and although wrecking the room and scorching some clothing it left the officer unhurt."  

Another fire was started by a shell which burst in the port hammock netting, while a shell passed through the *Boston*'s foremast, close to the bridge, where Captain Wildes was standing. 

But to these attentions the American gunners were giving their return compliments with compound interest. In the turret of the *Olympia* were twelve of the "men behind the guns," six to each 8-inch rifle. On them was our main reliance for victory. They occupied all the available space in that confined quarter. Had one of them been wounded or killed he would have been promptly removed so as to make room for another. These men had been drilled and drilled to the performance of their duties until they moved with the regularity of machines. The six men to each gun were known as captain, plugman, loader, sponger, liftman and shellman. Each one knew to a nicety exactly what his duty was. They had been kept on deck, outside the turret, to the last moment, for to the high temperature of that place there was added the heat of burning powder and the natural oppressiveness of air in a confined space where twelve men in vigorous action were to be kept. At every pause or breathing spell of the action these men were ordered on deck, where they could get fresh air, and when the turret would have a chance of getting some ventilation. It was then that the object glasses of the telescope sight, which had become blurred with smoke and powder, were carefully wiped and prepared for further service.

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1 Captain Wildes to the author.
When all was ready, the twelve men, half naked, again entered the turret and stood like statues beside their machines of death. Above them, on top of the turret, were Captain Gridley or his assistants in the conning tower, through the slender sight-holes of which they watched and directed the working of the guns. As the flagship came into range for the second round of the engagement, these twelve men silently awaited the word. As the _Olympia_ again drew into the storm of shot and shell the order to fire was given, and the enormous guns sent their messengers of death toward the enemy. Then it was that the machinelike motions of the twelve men began again. "Commence firing" was the quiet order, and the twelve automatons sprang to their duties. They fully realized that on the rapidity and precision of their movements depended the issue of the battle. Should the enemy deliver a greater number of missiles, fired with greater accuracy than they did, the scales of victory would rapidly turn against them. On the other hand, should the Americans fire faster and truer the enemy could not long hold out, and there was consequently less danger of being hit. It was quite as much a race between the gunners of the opposing ships as to who could deliver the most rapid and telling blows as if it had been a boat race where each man, for the time being, bent all his energies and attention on his own particular oar.

With little or no thought of anything else, therefore, these men, at the order "Commence firing," jumped to their work. Should they work too rapidly, so as to clog or frustrate their own efforts, or should the aim be taken too quickly, so as to be inaccurate, they would be losing ground—ground never to be recovered. Should they work too slowly they would be losing equally valuable time. It was the happy mean between too rapid and too slow work that they must gauge. Care must be taken to detect and repair any injury to the guns or cartridges. "Many of the shells in the _Olympia_ be-
came detached from their cases on loading and had to be rammed out from the muzzle. Several cases jammed in loading and in extracting." \(^1\) In the *Baltimore* "the firing devices gave considerable trouble—extractors, sear springs and firing pins bending and breaking, and wedge blocks jamming; electric firing attachments gave trouble by the grease and dirt incident to firing insulating the connections—so much so that shortly after the engagement commenced they were abandoned for percussion; but coolness and steadiness replaced defective parts in the shortest possible time." \(^2\) "After an hour's fighting it was found that most of the breech plugs of the 6- and 8-inch guns [in the *Boston*] were expanded by the heat, so as to make it a somewhat difficult operation to close the breech. After firing the forward 8-inch gun for half an hour it was found necessary to put in a new gas-check pad. The wire breechings of No. 2 6-inch gun (starboard) were carried away near the end of the firing. The lock of No. 3 6-inch gun (port) was disabled and a spare one substituted. The vent of the after port 6-inch gun became choked up about the end of the first engagement and a spare mushroom was substituted." \(^3\) And much the same report was made from every fighting craft of Dewey's squadron, all tending to show how delicate modern guns are and how much coolness and skill are required to successfully operate them in the heat of action.

The breech of the enormous gun was now opened, the elevating gear and loading trays inspected, firing locks prepared, slides placed, priming wires correctly disposed, and everything connected with the intricate and delicate mechanism of the modern gun prepared. The order "Load!" was next given. Up from the magazine came the two shells, each weighing two hundred and fifty pounds, and were carefully placed on the

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1 Official report of Captain Gridley.
2 Official report of Captain Dyer.
3 Official report of Lieutenant Norris, of the *Boston.*
loading trays. The enormous mass of steel and gunpowder was pushed home. Gas checks and screw locks were adjusted, the breech was locked, primer inserted, the lanyard hooked and lock cocked. Then the monster rifle, some twenty-eight feet long, was carefully swept along the line of vision and aimed. The order "Fire!" was given, the turret was rocked as if shaken by an earthquake, and the thunderbolt sped on its mission of death. Then again came the quick order "Commence firing!" and the same machinelike operation was repeated. The turret soon became choked with smoke, the air was stifling, the faces and bodies of the men were black with burned powder, relieved only by the streams of perspiration furrowing through the soot and revealing streaks of white skin. The savage, vengeful crash of Spanish missiles was heard striking on the outside of the turret, making frantic efforts to get at those twelve machines who were causing such havoc to the enemy. But the machines seemed to be unconscious of this hell raging without. They have ears alone for the magic words "Sponge!" "Load!" "Point!" "Fire!" and with the pendulum swing of a clock they steadily proceeded with their work of death.

It was a shell fired by these men early in the engagement that exploded in the turret of Montojo's flagship and "killed or wounded the entire crews of the four guns." Had it not been for the steadiness of our gunners it might easily have been Dewey, instead of Montojo, who would have had to report "a shell exploded in the turret"—with a result we shudder to think of.

The same regularity was noticeable in the smaller guns of the squadron. "The firing of our broadsides," wrote an American officer, "was distinguished by a well-defined crash that came as regularly as clockwork, while the fire of the Spanish ships and forts produced a continuous roll and rattle." "Coolness, precision and

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1 Official report of Montojo.
rapidity“ was the motto constantly held before the panting, perspiring gun crews as they hastened their work of death around the smaller guns. Watchful officers were on the alert to foresee and forestall difficulties. Defects in the delicate mechanism were quickly discovered and remedied. There was no unnecessary shouting or blustering. Not an order was wasted. Commands were given in measured, distinct tones that meant instant obedience—and the men knew it.

Down in the engineers' department were the real “sailors” of Dewey’s war ships, the men who did the propelling. With these men there was little of the poetry or glory of the old-time sailor. The call for volunteers to ascend a toppling mast amid a shower of bullets and cannon balls and save the day by securing the spar before it went by the board was not heard. The “sailors” were now below the water line, safe from the reach of shot and shell, but exposed to the torture of heat and a possible horrible death from steam or fire. There were calls for volunteers, however, and men responded with all the heroism of old-time sailors. A boiler was leaking. Who would crawl under that intricate mass of machinery, pulsating and vibrating at its highest rate of speed, and stop the leak? A dozen men answer. This is only an “incident” of the engineers' department. All through the terrific heat of that day the men at the engines stuck to their duty of “navigating” Dewey's ships as only heroes knew how to do. “From 9.42 p. m. April 30th to 12.40 p. m. May 1st two divisions of the engineers’ force worked constantly on the boilers and engines notwithstanding the heat, while the third division worked at the powder division.”1

With merciless precision the American ships passed the enemy the second time, pouring a terrific fire of great and small shot, which could be plainly seen rip-

1 Official report of Captain Gridley.
ping and tearing the Spanish vessels. Some of the great rents that had been made in their sides in the first turn were now merged in one awful chasm through which the water poured. Smoke and flames were noticed rising from their hatchways and out through their sides. Passing beyond the line of fire, the column again turned and came down for the third passage at arms. It was on this round that the crucial fire of the American ships was delivered. Many of the enemy's guns had been disabled and thrown out of action, while the American cannon were still worked with unabated vigor.

Rapid and destructive as the American fire had been down to this stage of the action, Dewey felt that more effective firing could be attained if his ships remained stationary. Accordingly, when they were about to come down for the third passage at arms, he signaled his ships to prepare to anchor, while the Petrel was warned that she might be called upon to turn the eastern end of the Spanish line. The position that Dewey selected for his flagship in this change of the programme was inside of the five-fathom curve—as indicated on the charts—and was about eighteen hundred yards from the center of the enemy's line. An unexpected movement on the part of the Spanish admiral, however, suddenly changed this plan and the signal was annulled.

The "unexpected movement on the part of the Spanish admiral" is explained by Lieutenant Calkins as follows: "Animated by desperate counsels, Spanish vessels had made one or two attempts to advance to meet us in front of their line. Only one of these efforts was persistent or significant enough to be remembered. As we stood eastward on our third passage along the zone of fire, the Reina Cristina, bearing the flag of Admiral Montojo, was seen to detach herself from her consorts and to approach a gap in the line with the apparent purpose of coming to close quarters with the
Olympia, which had just changed her course sixty degrees to the south of her previous tracks toward the turning point. The two flagships seemed closing rapidly, but the Spaniard had only advanced a ship's length or so beyond his line before his progress was arrested by a hail of concentrated fire which produced immediate and visible results. His speed slackened, smoke puffed out forward and aft, a white plume of escaping steam showed that his motive power was crippled, and an awkward turn, exposing the unprotected stern, suggested that his steering gear had met the same fate. One shot struck the port bridge on which Montojo was standing. That brave man quietly moved over to the starboard side and continued to direct the fight as if nothing had occurred.

But human endurance could not withstand the terrific hail of shot hurled upon this unfortunate vessel. She was slowly turned, and made as rapidly as possible for the beach. In effecting this maneuver she exposed her stern to a full raking fire, an advantage the Americans pitilessly availed themselves of. Just as her stern was fairly pointed toward the Olympia an American gunner carefully aimed an 8-inch gun at her and fired. This has been considered one of the most beautiful shots of the engagement. The enormous gun, some twenty-eight feet long, had been aimed with the accuracy and ease of a rifle in the hands of a backwoodsman. The 250-pound projectile leaped from the muzzle and hissed through the air at the rate of two thousand feet a second, or with an energy of eight thousand one hundred and ten foot tons—sufficient to have pierced twenty-one and a half inches of Harveyized steel. In five seconds it had struck the stern of the Spanish flagship fair and square. That ship did not have twenty-one and a half

1 Captain Wildes explains this maneuver as follows: "The Reina Cristina had not, down to this time, been in her proper place. Now she steamed up very handsomely into the column."—Captain Wildes to the author.
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inches of Harveyized steel to protect her. The enormous projectile crashed through her stern, and, tearing its way through all bulkheads and partitions, flew screaming into the engine room and on reaching one of the boilers exploded, ripping up the protective deck above. The ship seemed to have given a lurch forward under the impact of that terrific blow. In all, the Reina Cristina had one hundred and fifty-three men killed and ninety wounded.

Observing that the Reina Cristina had been disabled, Captain Dyer gave his attention to the Castilla, and such was the effect of his fire that by the time the Baltimore had passed beyond the range the Spaniard was in a mass of flames from stem to stern. It was this fearful effect of American shells that led the enemy to report that we were using petroleum bombs. Twice again the American column of ships passed the doomed Spanish fleet, each time at closer quarters than before, and each time repeating those terrific broadsides that tore and rent the enemy's vessels with appalling effect. The few guns remaining intact aboard Montojo's fleet were still worked bravely, if not skillfully. Furiously seconding these were the land batteries, which had not as yet received the serious attention of the Americans, as Dewey was keeping steadily in mind his orders to first destroy Spain's naval power in the East. But with all the roaring of the enemy's guns not one of Dewey's ships was seen to stagger or draw off, and when near enough to be well in range of the Spaniards, the small guns in the fighting tops added their vicious sputtering.

By this time the fight had lasted fully two hours, and the smoke was so thick along the shore and over the water that it was not only difficult to distinguish the enemy's ships and forts except by a gray mass illuminated by occasional sputters of flame, but it was almost impossible to make out signals. At 7.35 A.M. it was erroneously reported to Dewey that only fifteen rounds per gun were left. It was then that Dewey coolly
turned to Lieutenant Rees, who was standing near by, and said, "What time is it, Rees?"

"Seven forty-five, sir."

"Breakfast time," said Dewey with an odd smile, just as if the men had been engaged in target practice instead of one of the most momentous naval battles on record. "Run up the signals for 'cease firing' and to 'follow me.'" "The batteries at Manila had wooden azimuth circles and telephones which should have enabled them to plot our tracks. They had nearly five hours' practice, but no amount of deliberation or persistence enabled them to score—even while we were drifting about, with crews at breakfast, within the radius of their fire." As the American column swung out of close range the Spaniards gave a cheer, not so lustily as they had indulged in at the beginning of the action, but still sufficiently animated to show that there was fight in them yet.

1 Lieutenant Calkins.
CHAPTER XI.

THE SECOND ROUND.

Profitting by the lesson Farragut had given navy officers at Mobile Bay, August 5, 1864, Commodore Dewey, after gaining the anchorage near the store-ships, signaled "Let the people go to breakfast," and at 8.40 A. M. ordered "Commanding officers repair on board flagship," so as to learn the casualties of the fight and to determine the exact amount of damage his vessels had sustained. This was a most humane as well as a prudent step, for the men had been fighting two hours in the intense heat of the tropics and the ships were thousands of miles from a base of supplies, so that it was well to learn of the resources of the squadron before entering upon another bout with the enemy. Captain Isaac Hull did the same thing in his action with the British frigate Guerrière in 1812, and the English press, like the Spanish eighty years later, attributed the maneuver to the discomfiture of the Americans. But in each case the enemy was woefully undeceived.

As the several commanders, in response to Dewey's signal, stepped aboard the Olympia they gave a series of reports unequaled in naval history. Not a man had been killed or seriously hurt, not a gun was out of working order, not a ship had been disabled! "All in good shape, sir, except that it was very hot," reported Captain Wildes of the Boston. "Men tired, and ship a little scratched," said Captain Dyer of the Baltimore. "Everything all right, and ready to resume business at a moment's notice," declared Commander Walker of
the *Concord*. "Poor Randall died from heart disease as we were passing Corregidor, but that is the extent of our casualties," remarked Captain Hodgson of the *McCulloch*; while the dashing Coghlan poetically sang, "Out of the jaws of death, out of the gates of hell, and only a little smoky from the trip." And of course Commander Wood was very modest about what did not happen to the *Petrel*. Captain Gridley, of the *Olympia*, supplemented these glad reports with the statement that the flagship, though exposed to the special aim of Spanish guns, had passed through the ordeal almost unscathed. Surgeon John E. Page had left his instruments spread out on the operating table in the *Olympia's* wardroom untouched, while Chaplain John B. Frazier left unsaid those sublime words of comfort to the wounded and dying men who came not. And here we have a good story at the expense of the worthy chaplain. Some time in the heat of the battle Frazier, feeling that he ought to take some part in the action, thrust his head out of a porthole and watched the fight in the true American spirit. He might have watched it "to the finish," only an irreverent Spanish shell hit the side of the ship only a few feet from this porthole and exploded. The chaplain's head "suddenly disappeared inside that porthole, and he is still counting himself in luck that he has a head left to tell the story."

Dewey now decided to give his squadron a rest of three hours. All hands had been piped to breakfast, after which there was a general clearing up. The guns were cooled off, the powder stains wiped out, the ammunition room was replenished, and everything was made ready for the renewal of the fight. Some apprehension at first was felt by the sailors that the commodore would not renew the battle, and the attitude of the men showed plainly enough that they were willing to forego breakfast and everything else if they only might have a chance to "finish it up right off." But
Dewey knew how to save the energies of his men as well as his ammunition, and, though it was far from his intention to postpone the final round of the battle, he announced that refreshments would first be served before again going for the enemy. He realized that the men had been actively engaged since daybreak on a single cup of coffee, and the heat of the day and battle had, unconsciously perhaps, diminished their vigor. At the announcement that the fight was shortly to be renewed, the jackies could be seen all over the deck slapping each other's backs, shaking hands, and executing impromptu hornpipes.

Dewey's determination to take a rest for two or three hours in the height of one of the most momentous battles in modern history forms a striking picture. True, other American naval commanders had become famous by taking this picturesque step in naval engagements. Hull, Decatur, Bainbridge, Stewart and Farragut, after giving the crucial blows in their several victories, had drawn just out of gunshot and calmly repaired damages before completing their work, but these actions, except in Farragut's case at Mobile, were between single ships. The picture presented by Dewey in Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, was of heroic size. There, off toward Cavité, enshrouded in the smoky haze of battle, that hung like a pall over them, were the wrecked Spanish ships; some of them sunk, others sinking, and those that remained afloat were but pitiful hulks of what a few, only a few; hours before, had been the graceful vessels that so proudly and arrogantly flew the gold and red colors of España. Under the placid waters of the bay were scores of bodies of men, torn and disfigured, who but a short time ago were fighting like demons for fatherland. The blood was still oozing from the scuppers of the Spanish ships that floated. Their decks were strewn with mangled bodies, while the survivors ran about in frantic confusion, bravely endeavoring to get some order out of chaos, so as to again meet the
terrible Americans. The shrieks and groans of the wounded and dying smote the ear from all sides; the guns, still hot and smoking with the heat of action, were clogged with wreckage and the bodies of human kind. One by one the magazines of the burning ships exploded with a sickening concussion, scattering the fragments of ship and human bodies on all sides. In the Spanish batteries much the same confusion was noticeable. Officers were frantically rushing about endeavoring to whip the soldiers into place and make further preparations for defense. Then, farther up the bay toward Manila, thousands of people could be seen lining the shores, the embankments and other vantage points, wildly discussing the event or hurrying from house to house in their efforts to escape from those "terrible guns."

Opposed to this spectacle of horror, consternation and pandemonium was the peaceful scene afforded by the American squadron riding quietly and seemingly unconcernedly adrift in the bay. So far as the spectators on shore or in the Spanish fleet could discover, there was no indication of the recent battle in those silent, massive ships as they drifted, unvexed by anchors, swinging gracefully and easily with current and breeze. True, a few boats were observed passing from one vessel to another, but they were pulled with the slow, even stroke of the man-of-warsman and without the slightest indication of frenzied haste, that was so much in evidence on shore. To the casual observer these boats might have been on some dress parade so far as their movements would show. Had the spectator managed to get close to these grim war ships he would have noticed that the guns were all cleared off and ready for instant action. He would have seen the officers languidly fanning themselves with as much nonchalance as if in a friendly harbor, while the seamen would have been seen calmly sipping their coffee, washing the powder stains from their bodies or serenely
puffing at their pipes as they gathered in groups to discuss the recent incidents of the battle. This was the picture exhibited by Dewey for two hours and more in the Bay of Manila on May 1, 1898. "Truly," might the artist exclaim, "the Americans have elevated naval warfare to a fine art."

While on board the flagship Dyer was ordered to intercept a steamer that was steaming up the bay, and the _Baltimore_ promptly made for her. On closer inspection Dyer discovered the steamer to be flying British colors, and so signaled the _Olympia_. This little excursion had carried the _Baltimore_ some two miles toward Cavité. Observing that his consorts were getting ready for the second round, the _Baltimore_ fairly rushed over the bay to take her place of honor at the head of the American line.

Having completed his arrangements for engaging the enemy again, Dewey turned to his chief of staff, Commander Lamberton, and asked, "Everything all right, Lamberton?" "Everything, I believe, sir," replied that officer. "Very well. Call to quarters and get under way." Every man now took his place, and at 10.45 the _Olympia_ headed toward the Spanish fleet at Cavité, with the other vessels in line behind her. When Captain Dyer had left the _Olympia_ after the conference of commanders it was learned that he had prevailed upon Dewey to permit the _Baltimore_ to lead the American line in the second round, and as the ships got under way the gallant _Baltimore_ forged ahead to the station of honor. "But," says Coghlan of the _Raleigh_, "when signal was made to re-engage, this vessel [the _Raleigh_] started ahead full speed, using reserve speed to keep up with the flagship, but it was found to be impossible, and, falling behind all the time, I cut across to gain a line abreast of Cavité battery just as the flagship passed the _Baltimore_ at that fort."\(^1\)

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\(^1\) Official report of Captain Coghlan.
The squadron again passed up the Manila channel, and as it drew near Cavité it was noticed that the Reina Cristina, the Castilla and the steamer Mindanao were burning, the last ship having been beached halfway between Cavité and Manila, and their crews were busy endeavoring to extinguish the flames. It was Dewey's programme to first complete the wreck of the enemy's fleet and then to give the united attention of his ships to the Spanish forts. When the Baltimore had come within twenty-eight hundred yards of Sangleys Point she opened with her starboard battery, Dyer gradually reducing his speed and stopping the engines as the range was obtained, delivering a rapid and accurate fire on the shore batteries and a gunboat just inside of Sangleys Point, practically silencing the batteries before the other vessels of the American line came up. Before coming within gunshot the Americans observed Admiral Montojo changing his flag from the Cristina to the Isla de Cuba.

Making for the Cristina and the Austria, the Baltimore received the concentrated fire of all the remaining guns in those ships. Apparently the enemy was now firing with greater deliberation and better aim, for one of their shells exploded on the Baltimore's deck, slightly wounding five men with splinters. Dyer restrained his impatient gunners, the numerous missiles of the Spaniards meantime splashing all round the head of the American line in a most unpleasant manner. When about three thousand yards from her first objective point, the Baltimore, at 11.16 A.M., swung round and poured a broadside into the Reina Cristina with terrific effect. For a moment or two after this blow the smoke concealed the view, but as it soon lifted the Americans saw that Montojo's recent flagship was literally torn to pieces and an instant later she blew up. It was by this broadside that Captain Don Luis Cardaso and most of his men were killed. The Cristina rapidly settled and sank, leaving her surviving officers...
and men struggling in the water or endeavoring to reach their nearest consorts.

At 11.45 Dewey ordered the *Concord* to destroy a large transport that was well inside the shoals. In making for this vessel Walker delivered an effective fire at the curtain of Cavite fort and at two vessels. When within twenty-five hundred yards of the transports the *Concord* opened with her main and secondary batteries, and after the first broadside ten boat loads of men were observed leaving the transport and making for the beach. Walker then ordered out his first cutter and whaleboat in charge of Ensigns Louis A. Kaiser and William C. Davidson, and, being provided with inflammables, started to complete the destruction of the transport. But before they had proceeded far it was seen that the transport was on fire and the boats were recalled.

Having made the first "count" in the programme laid out by Dewey for the second round of the battle, the *Baltimore* turned her formidable guns upon the *Austria*, while the *Olympia* and *Raleigh*, finding that their first target had disappeared under the *Baltimore*'s fire, steamed rapidly up to that ship and united their fire also on the *Austria*. Shot after shot were poured with merciless precision and accuracy into this unfortunate craft until the vessel actually swayed and rocked under the fearful castigation. Her gunners made a brave effort at resistance, but a zephyr might as well have opposed itself to a tornado. The *Austria* was literally riddled with shot. The death agony of this ship was soon ended by a shell from the *Raleigh*, which struck the Spaniards' magazine. By this time the head of the American line had passed on to other ships, and the *Petrel* was left to complete the destruction of the *Austria*.

During this fight the gunboat *General Lezo* had been very active in firing on the American ships, and Commander Walker directed the guns of the *Concord* toward
her, and in a few minutes his shells had set her on fire and she made for the beach, her men in the meantime taking to the water. The *Castilla* was still burning from the fires started in the first round of the battle, and now the *Baltimore* and *Concord* united in pouring in a terrific fire on the unfortunate craft. Finding that the flames were approaching their magazine, the Spaniards opened her sea valves to prevent the ammunition from exploding, and abandoned her.

With the destruction of the *Castilla* every fighting vessel of the Spaniards had been disposed of, with the single exception of the *Don Antonio de Ulloa*. The commander of this vessel, Captain Robion, fought his ship to the bitter end with a heroism that must call for the admiration of friend and foe. To the *Olympia* and *Boston* was given the work of completing the destruction of this gallant ship. Soon our shells were crashing through her with deadly precision, setting her on fire in a number of places. Yet her brave crew gave no signal of surrender. "We will go down with our colors flying" seemed to be the motto which animated them to deeds of extraordinary heroism. On came the merciless shot, one after the other, and soon the ship was a wreck.

While the main portion of the American squadron was devoting its attention to the larger Spanish ships, Dewey noticed three of the smaller Spanish gunboats making for the head of Cavité Bay, and he immediately signaled the *Petrel* to go after them. This was just the kind of an errand the plucky little gunboat *Petrel* relished, and Commander Wood was promptly in chase, the *Boston* and *Concord*, at 1.45 a.m., going to her support. The two cruisers soon found that the shoaling water would not allow them to reach the enemy, but the *Petrel*, being of lighter draught, boldly put into the bay. One of these Spanish gunboats was the *Marques del Duero*, and, getting within one thousand yards of her, Commander Wood opened a rapid and accurate fire, and in
a short time made a complete wreck of her. Having disposed of the Duero, the Petrel began a galling fire on the two gunboats, and in a few minutes they were scuttled, while their men took to the boats and made for the shore. In all, the Petrel destroyed eight vessels in this trip. Returning from this handsome affair, the Petrel came across the storeship Manila, which was discovered hiding behind a wharf, and captured her.

At 12.25 p.m. not a Spanish flag was flying in the harbor near Cavite except from the staff of the sunken Don Antonio de Ulloa. The Reina Cristina was a mass of flames and aground near the bastion at Cavite, and the Castilla was burning not far away. The remaining vessels had sought refuge behind the arsenal, several of them burning.

Montojo now found his boastful fleet a mass of wreckage and ruin, the Isla de Cuba alone remaining, and her guns were silent, while her decks had been swept clear of men. Realizing the uselessness of further resistance, he hauled down his flag, and, getting into boats with the surviving Spaniards, made for the shore and thence to Manila, accompanied by a crowd of sightseers who had come down from the city to witness the discomfiture of the Yankees. The total destruction of the Spanish fleet enabled Dewey to devote his undivided attention to the forts, which hitherto had not received the earnest fire of the American squadron, and were, in consequence, firing on our ships with comparatively impunity. Of these shore batteries, that at Sangley Point had been handled most skillfully. It mounted two Ordonez guns, and their gunners handled them with unusual skill. A shell from one of these guns had struck the Boston, and a 6-pounder shell pierced both sides of the Raleigh's whaleboat. This injury seems to have nettled Captain Coghlan, for he brought his ship within one thousand yards of the battery, and opened such an effective fire that six of the gunners
were soon killed, a larger number wounded, and the guns completely disabled, or at least silenced.

As the American ships gradually concentrated their fire on the remaining shore batteries, the Spanish guns were silenced in rapid succession. Whenever one of them "spoke again" it was the signal for every available American gunner to direct his fire at this unfortunate piece. The terrific pounding the Americans were administering on the bastions of the Cavité fort was plainly evidenced in the rapidly crumbling walls of that massive structure. The *Baltimore*, *Boston* and *Concord* gave their best attention to this fort, while the *Olympia*, *Raleigh* and *Petrel* opened fire on the arsenal. Presently, a white flag appeared over the Cavité citadel. Upon observing this flag, Dewey, at 12.30, gave the signal "Cease firing," quickly followed by the signal to sail back to the rendezvous near the *Nanshan* and *Zafiro*. The *Petrel* was left to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats which were behind the point at Cavité. "This duty," said Dewey, "was performed by Commander Wood in the most expeditious and complete manner possible." The *Raleigh* remained near Cavité till 1.30 p.m.

As the grim line of ships again passed Manila the great Krupp guns on the Luneta battery were silent. The lesson taught by the destruction of Montojo's fleet had been learned. When the ships reached the store vessels the *Olympia* stopped, while all the other war ships steamed slowly past her with every man at quarters cheering and saluting as if they could not sufficiently express their joy. Throughout both engagements the *Hugh McCulloch* hovered on the skirts of our fighting ships ready for any emergency. Captain Hodgson passed a 9-inch hawser along his decks in readiness to tow off any of our ships in case of grounding.

Proceeding with his usual businesslike rapidity, Dewey now called his commanding officers aboard the flagship to learn from them what had been the casual-
ties and damages of the engagement. The same reports were given. Not a vessel had been disabled, not a gun overthrown, not a man killed. Two shots had struck the Baltimore and wounded six men and two officers—Lieutenant Frank W. Kellogg and Ensign U. E. Erwin.¹ Six of the eight injured men were hurt by their own ammunition, as the first hostile shell that struck the Baltimore exploded a box of 3-pounder ammunition.

Having said so much about the formidable character of the defenses of Manila, before the Americans made their attack, it is with some surprise that we find these same critics—after the event—using every artifice known to figure juggling in an altogether “small” effort to minimize Dewey’s magnificent victory. With a sudden change of front, as startling as it is ludicrous, these wiseacres of European extraction suddenly came to the conclusion that, after all, the harbor of Manila was not “fairly bristling with Krupp guns of the largest calibers”; that Montojo was not such a “very terrible man”; that there were no submarine mines; that the difficulties of entering the port were not so “appalling”; and that the Spanish ships and sailors were not such concentrations of ferocity and nautical emaculation as they had pictured. Yet all these things had been said—before the battle. Now, after the action, we witness the pitiful “crawling” of these same wiseacres out of the maze and tangle of untruths in which they had enmeshed themselves.

Henry Cabot Lodge, in his brilliant work, The War with Spain, has ably summarized the situation as follows: “The rapidity, brilliancy and completeness of the American victory at Manila riveted the attention of the world. In Europe, where hostility to the United States was everywhere felt and expressed, the news was received either in silence—which is sometimes the sin-

¹ The wounded men were Barlow, Budinger, Covert, O’Keefe, Reclar-dilli and Snelgrove. Not one of these men would consent to go into the sick bay.
cerest flattery—or with surprised expressions of wonder and grudging admiration. England, which from the beginning manifested a genuine and cordial friendship, praised Dewey's work generously and freely. Yet both on the Continent and in England, after the first shock had passed, critics appeared who sneered at the battle, called it a butchery, exaggerated the American force and diminished that of Spain. One English critic called it marvelously easy, and a well-known English journal said Dewey had merely destroyed a few old wooden ships. The last allegation was, of course, merely a willful falsehood, for there was only one wooden ship, the Castilla, in the Spanish fleet, and the fact that the others also burned proved nothing, for all Cervera's ships—the very latest productions of European shipyards—took fire in the Santiago fight, just like the older types at Manila. As to 'its being so easy,' it certainly looked easy after it was all done, and so did setting an egg on end seem easy after Columbus had shown how to do it.”

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1 Senator Lodge is too generous in this statement. The average date for the launching of the vessels comprising Dewey's fleet, as will be shown on page 206, was July, 1888, while that of Montojo's ships was December, 1883; a difference of less than five years, and surely not sufficient to characterize the Spanish craft as antiquated and those of the United States as modern.—E. S. M.

2 Lodge's War with Spain, pp. 61, 62.
CHAPTER XII.

AFTER THE BATTLE.

The course taken by Commodore Dewey in giving his men a rest and in taking count of his ammunition and damages after the first bout of the battle of Manila, before completing the destruction of the Spanish fleet has, very justly, been considered one of the most striking features of that momentous struggle. But even more remarkable was Dewey's handling of his ships after the enemy had surrendered. Immediately after the Spanish ships had been burned, sunk and deserted, and the shore batteries at Cavite silenced, the American squadron, with the exception of the Petrel, took station off Manila. From this place a message was sent to the Governor General to the effect that if the shore batteries in front of Manila—which had participated in the firing during the forenoon and were now within easy range—should fire another shot, Dewey would at once shell the city. "This had the desired effect, and the squadron anchored and remained off Manila until the evening of the following day. During this time not a shot was fired from the shore batteries; the city having thus virtually surrendered."\(^1\) Napoleon showed how bloodshed could be "magnificent," but not "war." Dewey demonstrated that "war" could be carried on with a minimum amount of bloodshed and at the same time be "magnificent."

It was this astounding self-control of the man Dewey, at a moment when all the savagery of warfare was aroused in the breasts of the conquerors,

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\(^1\) Admiral Dewey to the author.
when the thirst for blood coincident with mortal combat and the heat of the greatest naval battle of modern times was at its height, that so woefully misled the Spaniards. "Had not the Americans failed to seize Cavité after a bloody contest?" "Had they not moved far out in the bay, safe from the few remaining guns of the shore batteries?" A victorious Spanish commander would have been only too eager to grasp the prize within his reach. Almost any victor would have done this. Yet there were the American ships—apparently in perfect fighting trim—making off to a safe position. Thus reasoned Augustin, and so he cabled to Madrid: "The Americans were compelled to take refuge behind the merchantmen in the harbor," and that "they had withdrawn to bury their dead."

Dewey knew full well that the Spaniards were crowding the cables with dispatches giving their version of the battle. He knew that his astonishing victory was being misrepresented, even to the extent that Cabinet officials in Madrid could "scarcely restrain their emotions." He knew that the worst possible accounts of his achievement were being spread broadcast to the world, and that it would be days before he could give his side of the story. Yet, notwithstanding the temptations and distractions surrounding him, Dewey contented himself with cleaning his decks, replenishing his ammunition, and in making everything ready for any contingency that might arise; leaving it to the future to make known to the world his glorious victory. Truly, Dewey, in this manifestation of self-control, has set a standard of naval excellence that will never be surpassed.

The work of repairing the inconsiderable injuries sustained by the American ships in the great battle was soon completed.¹ "Our crews," wrote Consul

¹ In the Olympia no one was killed or injured. The damages to the ship were: One plate, just forward of the second 5-inch sponson, indented one and a half inch; three planks in the wake of the forward turret on
Oscar F. Williams, “are all hoarse from cheering, and while we suffer for cough drops and throat doctors, we have no use for liniment or surgeons.” Williams had gallantly stood on the bridge of the Baltimore in the first round of the battle, and on the Olympia’s bridge in the second bout. All that Sunday afternoon and evening the American squadron lay quietly in the bay. Off toward Cavite were the smoldering ruins of the forts and arsenal, and close by were some of the Spanish ships burning fiercely, while the

the starboard side of the forecastle slightly torn up; the port after shrouds of the fore and main rigging cut through; the strong back of the gig’s davits hit and slightly damaged; a hole made by a 6-pound shot in the frame of the ship between frames Nos. 65 and 66 on the starboard side below the main-deck rail; lashings of the port whaleboat davit carried away by a shot; one of the rail stanchions, carried away outside of the port gangway; hull of the ship indented on the starboard side one foot below the main-deck rail and three feet abaft No. 4 coal port. Some difficulty was experienced in all the ships with the ammunition hoists, defective primers and shells and other mechanism of some of the guns, but these defects were speedily remedied as the battle progressed.

Five small projectiles struck the Baltimore, all of which, with one exception, exploded or broke up. The most serious blow was that from a 4.7-inch steel shot entering the side forward of the starboard gangway, about a foot above the line of the main deck. It passed through the hammock netting, downward through the deck planks and steel deck, bending and cracking the deck beam in wardroom stateroom No. 5, then glanced upward through the after engine room coaming against the after cylinder of No. 3 6-inch gun on the port side, carrying away the lug and starting several shield bolts and putting the gun out of action. It then deflected over to the starboard side, striking a ventilator ladder and dropping on deck. In its passage it struck a box of 3-pounder ammunition of the fourth division, exploding several charges and wounding Lieutenant Frank W. Kellogg, Ensign Noble E. Irwin, and six men of the gun’s crew—none very seriously. A second shot came in about a foot above the berth deck just forward of the blower, passed through the athwart-ship alleyway, hitting the exhaust pipe of the starboard blower, and caused a slight leak. A third shot struck about two feet above the water line on the port side, abreast bunker B-110, passed into the bunker, cutting blower drain and main air duct, and exploded in the bunker. A fourth shot came in about six feet above the berth deck, starboard side, abreast the forward end of the forward washroom, and broke up in a clothes locker. The fifth shot struck the Baltimore’s starboard forward ventilator, slightly bending it. The Baltimore received considerable injury from the shock of her own
sunken wrecks showed their tops or charred bulwarks—ghastly mementoes of American wrath over the das-tardly destruction of the *Maine*. Soon after Dewey's squadron came to anchor the British consul, Mr. Rawson Walker, boarded the flagship, and, in behalf of the foreign residents, requested that the city might be spared a bombardment. The magnanimous Dewey was only too willing to comply. Through Mr. Walker he notified Augustin that Manila was in a state of block-ade, that the Americans proposed to occupy Cavité, and that if a single hostile shot was fired they would at once destroy every battery in and around the city. In the hope that some arrangement might be made

guns. The upper cabin skylight, the after range finder and the two whaleboats hanging at the davits were all destroyed by the concussion of the 8-inch guns.

The *Raleigh* was struck only once, and that was by a 6-pounder shell which passed through both sides of the whaleboat—above the water line—and then glanced along the chase of the starboard 6-pounder on the poop. The gun was not injured, while the whaleboat was soon repaired and made ready for service.

Aboard the *Boston* there were no casualties. A 4-inch shell pierced the forecastle fifteen feet and seven inches above the upper deck, going from starboard to port, cutting one swifter of standing rigging on the port side. One 2-inch shell pierced the turtle back five feet forward of the port amid-ship 6-inch gun five feet from the gun deck. Another 2-inch shell entered the ship's side fourteen inches above the load line, passing through state-room No. 5 on the port side, wrecking the berth and furniture. A third 2-inch projectile struck the outside shell of the hammock netting on the port side abreast of the after end of the chart room, exploding inside among some clothing and setting it on fire. One shell grazed the after part of the main topmast just above the lower cap. The discharge of the *Boston's* after 8-inch gun, when it was pivoted and fired across the deck, caused some damage in the room below on the port side, the seams of the deck opening considerably. Some of the ship's boats also were injured by the shock of guns fired near them.

Although many shots passed over and near the *Concord* during the fight no injury was received from them. Much glass and several boats were damaged by the discharge of her own guns.

In the *Petrel* no casualties were reported. The vessel was not hit once except for a scratch on the stem, and no repairs were necessary. Like her consorts, she suffered considerably from the concussion of her own heavy guns.
Scene on board the wreck of the Reina Cristina.
by which he could send a dispatch to Washington, Dewey further declared that if the Spaniards would not permit the Americans to use the cable he would cause it to be cut. The cable officials readily complied with this request, but Augustin forbade them to receive or transmit any message from the squadron, and on Monday afternoon the line was grappled and severed.\footnote{Comparative Forces in the Battle of May 1st.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>American.</strong></th>
<th><strong>Spanish.</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baltimore</strong>. — Protected cruiser, steel, twin screws, speed of 20 knots, 327 feet long, 48 feet beam, 4,413 tonnage. Battery: four 8-inch, six 6-inch, four 6-pounder, two 3-pounder, two 1-pounder, two 47-mm., four 37-mm., four Gatling guns. Crew, 395. Launched at Philadelphia, 1888.</td>
<td><strong>Castilla</strong>. — Cruiser, iron, single screw, speed of 13 knots, 236 feet long, 44 feet beam, 3,360 tonnage. Battery: four 5.3-inch, two 4.7-inch, two 3.4-inch, two 2.9-inch, eight 4-pounder, four revolving guns. Crew, 349. Launched at Cadiz, Spain, 1881.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raleigh</strong>. — Protected cruiser, steel, twin screws, speed of 19 knots, 300 feet long, 42 feet beam, 3,213 tonnage. Battery: one 6-inch, ten 5-inch, eight 6-pounder, four 1-pounder, two Gatling guns. Crew, 298. Launched at Norfolk, 1892.</td>
<td><strong>Don Juan de Austria</strong>. — Protected cruiser, steel, single screw, speed of 14 knots, 210 feet long, 32 feet beam, 1,159 tonnage. Battery: four 4.7-inch, two 2.7-inch, two 3-pounder, four revolving, and one machine guns. Crew, 179. Launched at Trieste, Austria, 1887.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boston</strong>. — Protected cruiser, steel, single screw, speed of 16 knots, 270 feet long, 42 feet beam, 3,000 tonnage. Battery: two 8-inch, six 6-inch, two 6-pounder, two 3-pounder, two 1-pounder, two 47-mm., two 37-mm., two Gatling guns. Crew, 272. Launched at Philadelphia, 1884.</td>
<td><strong>Don Antonio de Ulloa</strong>. — Cruiser, iron, single screw, speed of 13 knots, 210 feet long, 32 feet beam, 1,160 tonnage. Battery: four 4.7-inch, two 2.7 inch, six rapid-fire, and one machine guns. Crew, 159. Launched at Carraca, Italy, 1887.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Concord</strong>. — Gunboat, steel, twin screws, speed of 17 knots, 230 feet long, 23 feet beam, 2,722 tonnage. Battery: one 4.7-inch, one 3.9-inch, three 4.7-inch, one 3-inch, two 2.7-inch, six 2.7-inch, two 2.7-inch, two 1-pounder, two 8-mm., two Gatling guns. Crew, 24. Launched at Washington, 1898.</td>
<td><strong>Velasco</strong>. — Gunboat, steel, single screw, speed of 14 knots, 210 feet long, 32 feet beam, 1,152 tonnage. Battery: three 6-inch, two 2.7-inch, one 3-inch, six 2.7-inch, three 3.9-inch, eight 2.7-inch, two 1-pounder, one 3-pounder, one 1-inch, one 4.7-inch, one 3.9-inch, one 3-inch, one 2.7-inch, one 1-pounder, one Gatling guns. Crew, 28. Launched at Washington, 1898.</td>
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Monday, May 2d, Dewey shifted his squadron and made a temporary anchorage off Cavité. Early that morning a tug came puffing up the bay from the direction of Corregidor under a flag of truce. It bore an offer from the commandant to surrender. On Tuesday,

**American.**

*Petrel.*—Gunboat, steel, single screw, speed 13 knots, 176 feet long, 31 feet beam, 892 tonnage. Battery: four 6-inch, two 3-pounder, one 1-pounder, two 37-mm., two Gatling guns. Crew, 100. Launched at Baltimore, 1887.

**Spanish.**


*Marques del Duero.*—Gunboat, iron, twin screws, speed of 10 knots, 157 feet long, 26 feet beam, 500 tonnage. Battery: one 6.3-inch, two 4.7-inch, one machine guns. Crew, 128. Launched at La Seyne, France, 1875.

*General Lezo.*—Gunboat, iron, twin screws, speed of 10 knots, 157 feet long, 26 feet beam, 520 tonnage. Battery: two 4.7-inch, one 3.5-inch, three machine guns. Crew, 106. Launched at Cartagena, Spain, 1885.

**Summary.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average date of Launches</th>
<th>No. ships</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Men.</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>July, 1888</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>19,098</td>
<td>1,681</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>Nov., 1883</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>110†</td>
<td>13,351</td>
<td>1,780†</td>
<td>618†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Not including the soldiers or guns on shore.
May 3d, the *Baltimore* and *Raleigh* accompanied the tug to that island, with orders to take possession, and if the least sign of treachery was manifested the forts were to be blown up. Arriving off Corregidor, the Americans found the place deserted by all save the commandant himself; and, quite in keeping with what seems to be the height of Spanish erudition in the science of war—namely, to leave nothing for the conquerors to seize—all the guns had been overturned. A force was landed and took possession of the island.

On the morning of May 2d Dewey sent his chief of staff, Commander Lamberton, in the *Petrel* to take possession of the arsenal at Cavité. The little gunboat ran within five hundred yards of the arsenal and then abruptly halted, for the white flag, which had been shown Sunday, had disappeared, and instead of finding the arsenal deserted, a large number of armed men was observed in and around the works and at the landing place. Well knowing that the Spaniards would not scruple to take advantage of any unguarded point that might in any way tend to relieve the fearful castigation they had received, Commander Wood trained the *Petrel's* guns so as to cover a landing party. "Lamberton, taking with him Lieutenant Albert N. Wood of the *Petrel* and Mr. Stickney, with an armed boat’s crew, pulled in for the landing, after leaving orders with Wood to open fire on the arsenal if the party did not return in an hour."¹ As the two American officers landed, Captain Sostoa, of the navy, the senior Spanish officer present, met them, armed Spanish sailors promptly closing around the Americans in a threatening manner, and the party marched to the arsenal.

"May I ask," inquired Lamberton, "why your men are under arms after the surrender?"

"There was no surrender," boldly replied the Spaniard.

¹ Captain Lamberton to the author.
Suspicion of treachery or some subterfuge at once flashed through the mind of the American officer, and he sharply answered, "The white flag was hoisted."

"Yes," said Sostoa, "but not as a surrender; only as a token of a truce, during which we might remove our women and children to a place of safety."

The quick-witted American officer saw through this clumsy ruse to gain time, and he explained—what the crafty Spaniard knew before—that an arsenal was not the place for women and children in time of war. Lamberton cut short Sostoa's evasive explanation that the "Americans came to visit us at such an extremely early hour that we had no time," etc., and "If you had begun the fight at a less unreasonable hour," etc., with the curt statement that the Spaniards had fired the first shots, which showed that they were ready for the fight, and that if they did not lay down their arms at once the battle would be renewed. Sostoa endeavored to evade this by saying that it would be necessary for him to communicate with his superiors in Manila. Lamberton looked at his watch. Forty of the sixty minutes given to the Petrel before opening fire had expired, and although Lamberton had no doubts as to the issue of a renewal of the fight—even with only the little Petrel opposed to the arsenal—he realized that his position and that of his comrades on shore would be critical in the extreme. They had exposed themselves (May 1st) to the full fire of the Spanish guns afloat and ashore, and had passed the ordeal unscathed, but they were quite sure that there would not be such a happy termination of a fight when in the line of American gunners. Lamberton then wrote down the terms of surrender: "Without further delay all Spanish officers and men must be withdrawn, and no buildings or stores must be injured. As Commodore Dewey does not wish further hostility with the Spanish naval forces, the Spanish officers will be paroled and the forces at the arsenal will deliver all their small arms."
The conversation between the Americans and Spaniards had been held in Spanish, but the above conditions of surrender were written in English, and Sostoa made a pretext of this for further delay, requesting that a translation might be made. Lamberton looked at his watch again, and saw that it lacked only five minutes of the time the Petrel was to open fire. He realized that there was no further time for parley and announced that he would return to his ship, and if the white flag was not raised on the arsenal by noon the Americans would renew the action. Returning to their boat, the Americans made for the Petrel. As they drew near that ship, her men could be seen moving about the guns, preparing to fire. The launch soon ran alongside and announced the further extension of time. At a quarter to twelve o'clock the white flag appeared on the arsenal, and Lamberton returned, to find that Sostoa had marched off with all his men; an extremely clever, soldierlike and praiseworthy trick—as viewed by the high-spirited grandees of Castile.

The evacuation of Cavite by the Spaniards was the signal for swarms of natives, who had been hovering on the outskirts in eager anticipation of pillage, to rush into the streets and houses and carry off everything of value. The Americans were astonished at the "carrying capacity" of these natives. A force of marines was promptly landed and placed the town under martial law. The wounded were taken to Manila under the Red Cross flag, and the Americans gave their attention to repairing the fortifications and to getting the guns in position for future operations.

On the morning of May 4th the transport Manila was towed off and made a prize.

Speaking of his officers and men, Dewey said: "I doubt if any commander in chief, under similar circumstances, was ever served by more loyal, efficient and gallant officers than those of the squadron now under my command. Captain Frank Wildes, commanding
the Boston, volunteered to remain in command of his vessel, although his relief arrived before leaving Hong Kong. Assistant Surgeon Charles P. Kindleberger, of the Olympia, and Gunner Joel C. Evans, of the Boston, also volunteered to remain after orders detaching them had arrived. The conduct of my personal staff was excellent. Commander Benjamin P. Lamberton, chief of staff, was a volunteer for that position, and gave me most efficient aid. Lieutenant Thomas M. Brumby, flag lieutenant, and Ensign William P. Scott, aid, performed their duties as signal officers in a highly creditable manner. The Olympia being short of officers for the battery, Ensign Harry H. Caldwell, flag secretary, volunteered for and was assigned to a subdivision of the 5-inch battery. Mr. J. L. Stickney, formerly an officer in the United States navy, and now correspondent for the New York Herald, volunteered for duty as my aid and rendered valuable service.

"I desire especially to mention the coolness of Lieutenant Carlos G. Calkins, the navigator of the Olympia, who came under my personal observation, being on the bridge with me throughout the entire action, and giving the ranges to the guns with an accuracy that was proved by the excellence of the firing." Pay Inspector Daniel A. Smith, Fleet Pay Clerk William J. Rightmire and Pay Clerk W. M. Long voluntarily performed active service.

Commander Walker, of the Concord, particularly commended his executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander George P. Colvocoresses, for the "cool, deliberate and efficient manner with which he met each phase of the action and for his hearty co-operation in my plans. Lieutenant Thomas B. Howard, the navigator, proved that, like his father, he was ready to offer his life to his country and flag. The officers of divisions—Lieutenant Patrick W. Hourigan, Lieutenant Charles M. McCormick, Ensign Louis A. Kaiser and Ensign William C. Davidson—performed every duty with zeal and
alacrity. Ensign Orlo S. Knepper, in charge of signals, performed the duty as though he were in the daily habit of being under fire. Passed Assistant Paymaster Eugene D. Ryan volunteered to take charge of the after powder division, and was most useful therein. The steam department, under Chief Engineer George B. Ransom and Passed Assistant Engineer Horace W. Jones, was in perfect condition, working as though on parade. Pay Clerk F. K. Hunt volunteered to assist the surgeon. The crew, one and all, worked with enthusiasm."

Other officers specially mentioned were: Lieutenants Bradley A. Fiske, Edward M. Hughes, Charles P. Plunkett and Albert N. Wood; Ensign George L. Fermier, Captain William P. Biddle, of the marines, Passed Assistant Engineer Reynold T. Hall, Passed Assistant Surgeon Carl D. Brownell, and Assistant Paymaster George G. Seibels. In short, all the commanders spoke in the highest terms of their officers and crews, and singled out names especially for commendation with evident reluctance.¹

¹ The officers of the six ships that took part in the battle of May 1st were: Commodore, George Dewey; Chief of Staff, Commander Benjamin P. Lamberton; Flag Lieutenant, Thomas M. Brumby; Ensign Harry H. Caldwell, clerk and secretary; Fleet Pay Clerk, William J. Rightmire.

**Olympia**: Captain, Charles V. Gridley; Lieutenants, Corwin P. Rees, Carlos G. Calkins, Valentine S. Nelson, Stokely Morgan; Lieutenant (junior grade), Samuel M. Strite; Ensigns, Montgomery M. Taylor, Frank B. Upham, William P. Scott, Arthur G. Kavanagh; Medical Inspector, Abel F. Price; Passed Assistant Surgeon, John E. Page; Assistant Surgeon, Charles P. Kindleberger; Pay Inspector, Daniel A. Smith; Chief Engineer, James Entwistle; Passed Assistant Engineer, Gustav Kaemmerling; Assistant Engineers, Edwin H. DeLany, John F. Marshall, Jr., Edward H. Dunn; Chaplain, John B. Frazier; Captain of Marines, William P. Biddle; Gunner, Leonard J. G. Kuhlwein; Pay Clerk, William M. Long.

**Baltimore**: Captain, Nehemiah Mayo Dyer; Lieutenant Commander, John B. Briggs; Lieutenants, Frank H. Holmes, Frank W. Kellogg; Lieutenants (junior grade), John M. Ellicott, Charles S. Stanworth; Ensigns, George N. Hayward, Noble E. Irwin, Michael J. McCormack; Medical Inspector, John C. Wise; Passed Assistant Surgeon Frederick A.
AFTER THE BATTLE.

1898.

Hesler; Assistant Surgeon, Reginald K. Smith; Pay Inspector, Edward Bellows; Chief Engineer, John D. Ford; Assistant Engineers, Henry B. Price, Huch I. Cone; Chaplain, Thaddeus S. K. Freeman; Captain of Marines, Otway C. Berryman; First Lieutenant of Marines, Dion Williams; Acting Boatswain, Harry R. Brayton; Gunner, Louis J. Connelly; Carpenter, Otto Barth; Pay Clerk, W. J. Corwin.

Raleigh: Captain, Joseph Bullock Coghlan; Lieutenant Commander, Frederic Singer; Lieutenants, William Winder, Benjamin Tappan, Hugh Rodman; Ensigns, Casey B. Morgan, Frank L. Chadwick, Provoost Babin; Surgeon, Emlyn H. Marsteller; Assistant Surgeon, Dudley N. Carpenter; Paymaster, William W. Galt; Chief Engineer, Frank H. Bailey; Passed Assistant Engineer, Alexander S. Halstead; Assistant Engineer, John R. Brady; First Lieutenant of Marines, Thomas C. Treadwell; Acting Gunner, Gaston D. Johnstone; Acting Carpenter, Timothy E. Kiley.

Boston: Captain, Frank Wildes; Lieutenant Commander, John A. Norris; Lieutenants, Bernard O. Scott, John Gibson; Lieutenant (junior grade), William L. Howard; Ensigns, Samuel S. Robinson, Lay H. Everhart, John S. Doddridge; Surgeon, Millard H. Crawford; Assistant Surgeon, Robert S. Blakeman; Paymaster, John R. Martin; Chief Engineer, Richard Inch; Assistant Engineer, Leland F. James; First Lieutenant of Marines, Robert McM. Dutton; Gunner, Joel C. Evans; Carpenter, Osgood H. Hilton.

Concord: Commander, Asa Walker; Lieutenant Commander, George P. Colvocoresses; Lieutenants, Thomas B. Howard, Patrick W. Hourigan; Ensigns, Louis A. Kaiser, William C. Davidson, Henry V. Butler, Jr., Orlo S. Knepper; Passed Assistant Surgeon, Richard G. Brodrick; Passed Assistant Paymaster, Eugene D. Ryan; Chief Engineer, George B. Ransom; Passed Assistant Engineer, Horace W. Jones.

Petrel: Commander, Edward P. Wood; Lieutenants, Edward M. Hughes, Bradley A. Fiske, Albert N. Wood; Lieutenant (junior grade), Charles P. Plunkett; Ensigns, George L. Fermier, William S. Montgomery; Passed Assistant Surgeon, Carl D. Brownell; Assistant Paymaster, George G. Seibels; Passed Assistant Engineer, Reynold T. Hall.
There is a tendency, when passing judgment on contemporary naval or military leaders, to run to extremes. The achievements of commanders on sea or land usually are pronounced superlatively excellent or their shortcomings execrably bad. The American people gave ample illustration of this in the Spanish war. Those officers who had the good fortune to win public approval were extravagantly praised, while those who fell under popular censure were unreasonably blamed. Not that this failing is peculiar to the American people, for it has been manifested by all nations and in all wars. During the South African struggle, 1899–1900, the English public, on the receipt of good or bad news, gave exhibitions of national hysterics which, when calmly viewed, seem almost puerile.

It is this danger of praising too highly or condemning too harshly that must be avoided in determining the historical status of our commanders in the Spanish war, and in no case is it more difficult to arrive at the true character and value of an officer's services than in that of Dewey's. The hero of Manila has been the recipient of such lavish praise, such extraordinary honors and such royal welcomes that we might almost suspect that the Americans, in pronouncing upon Dewey, had "run to extremes." In view of these facts it is well to carefully inquire just how Dewey's achievements compare with those of other great naval commanders of the century, and how the battle of May 1st stands
when placed side by side with the famous sea fights of modern history.

One of the most conservative biographers of England's greatest admiral has declared that Nelson's victory at Aboukir (Battle of the Nile) was his "masterpiece." It will be a fair test, then, to compare the engagement at Manila with that action. The two battles were fought under remarkably similar circumstances. In each case the enemy was anchored in a wide harbor, Nelson and Dewey both taking the initiative. The American, however, forced what was thought to be a dangerously mined port at night, while the Englishman entered a wide bay, free from all submarine obstructions and explosives, in broad daylight. Furthermore, Dewey's opponent had the support of formidable shore batteries, and was aided by mine fields, even when in the harbor, while Nelson had neither of these dangers to guard against. It is a coincidence worthy of note that these two great naval actions were fought just one hundred years apart, Aboukir in 1798 and Manila in 1898.

In the battle at Aboukir Nelson had thirteen ships of the line, with an aggregate of twenty thousand tons, carrying seventy-four hundred and one men and nine hundred and thirty-eight guns, with eleven thousand pounds of shot weight to a broadside. Brueys, the French commander, also had thirteen ships of the line, besides a few smaller craft, carrying nine thousand men, and having guns capable of throwing twelve thousand pounds of shot weight to a broadside. At Manila Dewey had only six fighting vessels, but they aggregated nineteen thousand and ninety-eight tons—or about equal to the thirteen ships of the line under Nelson's command—carrying sixteen hundred and sixty-eight men and fifty-three guns in the main batteries, while Montojo had nine ships mounting forty-two guns in their main batteries, manned by eighteen hundred and seventy-five men. From these figures it
will be seen that in point of tonnage—or in the bulk weight of the fighting ships engaged in the two battles—Dewey's squadron at Manila was about equal to Nelson's fleet at Aboukir.

In considering the number of men, guns and pounds of shot weight handled in these two actions we must remember that a great change has taken place since Nelson's time. During the present century every first-class maritime power has had five separate and distinct fleets. First, there was the sailing war craft of Nelson's time. About 1840 the sailing fleets of the world gave place to the steam side-wheeler, which had demonstrated its immense superiority over the sailing war craft. Ten years later the side-wheeler was compelled to give place to the obvious advantages of the propeller war ship. This class of militant craft did well enough until, on March 8, 1862, when the *Merrimac* demonstrated in Hampton Roads the terrible powers of iron-mailed casemates when opposed to wooden ships. This brought about the fourth revolution in the navies of the world, and forthwith all maritime powers built iron-clads. Rapid advance in the art of steel manufacture caused, about 1880, the introduction of steel in the fleets of the world, so that the close of the nineteenth century found each naval power with its fifth or steel fleet. Thus we see that from Nelson's to Dewey's time there were five distinct and most pronounced advances in the art of naval architecture, each one being a complete revolution and so vastly superior to its predecessor as to leave little room for comparison.

These leaps, these bounds in naval development, are strikingly illustrated in the fact that Dewey, with only six fighting vessels at Manila, having a total tonnage of nineteen thousand and ninety-eight tons, manned by only sixteen hundred and sixty-eight men, had an immeasurably greater power for offense and defense than Nelson had at Aboukir with his thirteen ships, mounting nine hundred and thirty-eight guns and
manned by seventy-four hundred and one men. Or, to give a broader illustration, Great Britain to-day, with fewer than seven hundred war craft, manned by one hundred thousand men, is a far greater power on the high seas than she was in 1810, when she had ten hundred and forty-eight vessels in her navy, manned by nearly one hundred and fifty-two thousand men.

As to the number of ships, men and guns engaged, therefore, it will be found that both Dewey and Montojo operated forces for offense and defense—aside from any consideration of steam power, ramming and torpedoes, which, of course, were untried agencies in Nelson's time—vastly superior in every respect to those of Nelson and Brueys in 1798, notwithstanding the number of ships and men engaged. In Nelson's day, ten men were allowed for handling each gun, and about eight minutes—under the most favorable circumstances—for each discharge, so that the French or English commander was doing well in delivering twelve thousand pounds of shot weight every eight minutes. Improved methods in breech loading enabled the Americans and Spaniards to discharge their heavy guns at Manila at the rate of at least five times every eight minutes, so that when the total shot weight of their broadsides was six thousand pounds, it was in reality five times that, or thirty thousand pounds, when we come to allow for the quick firing of modern ordnance as opposed to the cumbersome and tedious method of muzzle loading in 1798. It is not an unfair comparison, then, to place the broadside shot weight of the American and Spanish forces at Manila approximately at thirty thousand pounds, as compared to the eleven thousand and twelve thousand pounds of the English and French at Aboukir.

In this discussion no consideration has been given to the enormous advantages of rifled guns and pointed steel projectiles, torpedoes, submarine mines, protective armor, or of the fearful effects of exploding shells.
Elongated shot or shells were unknown to Nelson or Brueys, who used solid missiles, and the nearest they came to the disastrous effects of a shell was by heating a solid shot before inserting it in a gun. It is easy to get at the shot weight per broadside in Nelson’s generation, for the projectiles were uniformly round and of solid iron. The weight of the modern shot is not so easily determined, it being of different shapes, mostly elongated and more or less pointed, while there is a constantly changing variety and proportion of metals going into its composition. But when we consider that a 13-inch rifle throws a shell weighing eleven hundred pounds with sufficient velocity to pierce seventeen inches of composite steel, we can readily see that the destructive force at Nelson’s command sinks into insignificance when compared with modern ordnance, and that the number of men engaged is by no means an index of the strength of the fleets. A single 13-inch rifle, with modern appliances for loading and quick firing, would almost be equal to Nelson’s entire broadside at Aboukir.

The English losses at Aboukir were two hundred and eighteen killed and six hundred and seventy-eight wounded, while those of the French are placed at about two thousand, or fewer than one fifth of their entire number. At Manila the Americans had none killed and only six wounded, while the Spanish casualties were six hundred and eighteen, or almost half of their entire force. These figures seem the more remarkable when we remember that Nelson had no considerable land batteries, or torpedoes, or submarine mines to contend against. Dewey not only destroyed or captured every Spanish ship, but he silenced formidable land batteries as well. Nelson did not destroy or capture all the French ships, some of them—owing to the distressed condition of the British fleet after the action—escaping. Neither can it be said that the Spaniards fought with less heroism or skill than Nelson’s oppo-
ments, for, as seen in the results, Montojo's men held out to the last plank, many of them going down with their craft. Many of the Spaniards at Trafalgar preferred death at the hands of their own officers to the performance of their duties.

Aboukir, very properly, has been considered one of the decisive naval engagements of the world, for it resulted directly in the abandonment of Egypt by the French. In no less degree was the fight at Manila decisive in its effects, for it deprived Spain of a territory greater than Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Switzerland combined, and was nearly equal to England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland.

In the great fleet action between the English under Lord Howe and the French commanded by Admiral Villaret, May 28 to June 1, 1794, there was just double the force engaged at Aboukir. This action, being fought in the open sea, deprives us of a close comparison with Dewey's exploit at Manila, but none the less it reflects most creditably on the American commander. Even with their twenty-six ships of the line—both English and French having that number—seventeen thousand and twenty thousand complements and twenty-three thousand to twenty-eight thousand pounds of shot weight to the broadside, neither the French nor the English admirals handled the destructive forces Dewey or Montojo had with their six and nine ships and their sixteen hundred and eighty-one and seventeen hundred and eighty-one men. As has been shown, the sixteen hundred and eighty-one Americans at Manila handled a power for destruction that the seventeen thousand men under Lord Howe never dreamed of. The *Olympia* alone would have proved a formidable antagonist to the greater part of the French fleet. In this battle, extending over three days, the British had two hundred and ninety killed and eight hundred and fifty-eight wounded, while the French had about three thousand killed and four thousand.
wounded, or about two fifths of their entire number. Only six of the French vessels were captured.

Nearly the same figures pertain to the great battle of Trafalgar, fought in 1805. There the English had twenty-seven ships of the line as opposed to the thirty-three of the French and Spaniards, or twenty-one hundred and forty-eight guns against the twenty-six hundred and twenty-six of the allies. Here the English loss was four hundred and forty-nine killed and twelve hundred and forty-one wounded, and they captured or destroyed nineteen of the enemy's ships of the line. And so the comparison could be carried out in all the great naval battles early in the century, in each case it appearing that Dewey with his six ships and sixteen hundred and eighty-one men had quite as great a power for offense or defense as any of the old-time naval heroes.

In comparing the Manila triumph with the more recent operations of the civil war, however, we find the conditions materially altered. The two most inviting instances, of course, are Farragut's passage of the New Orleans defenses in 1862 and in Mobile Bay in 1864. At New Orleans the seventeen ships that forced their way up the river carried one hundred and fifty-four guns, as opposed to the one hundred and forty-six in Forts Jackson and St. Philip and in the Confederate flotilla. Most of these guns were of much larger caliber than any Dewey had, his heaviest guns being 8-inch rifles, while the National fleet carried as high as 11-inch calibers; but being muzzle loaders and using the old-fashioned powder, it is doubtful if they possessed the destructive force of Dewey's fifty-three guns. But aside from this, Farragut had fire ships, ironclads, a ram and a formidable barrier in a narrow channel where there was a swift current to contend against, which would more than counterbalance the probable superior effectiveness of Dewey's improved weapons. At New Orleans both sides possessed far
greater destructive forces than the ships at Trafalgar, for now we are dealing with rifled ordnance, shells, steam power, ironclads, rams and exceedingly difficult navigation. The National forces had thirty-seven killed and one hundred and forty-seven wounded, while that of the Confederates was slightly greater.

At Mobile Farragut's victory was even more brilliant. Here the enemy had the ironclad ram Tennessee, which, without the support of the forts, proved to be a formidable antagonist to the entire National fleet. Besides this, the narrow ship channel was obstructed by a double row of torpedoes, numbering in all one hundred and eighty. The total number of guns available for the defense was ninety-six, while in Farragut's ships there were one hundred and seventy-four guns. Dewey, to be sure, had torpedoes to contend with at Manila, but he had a wide bay in which to maneuver, while Farragut was compelled to pass a double line of torpedoes, one of his four ironclads being sunk by them and carrying down ninety-three men. The total loss in the National fleet on this occasion was fifty-two killed and one hundred and seventy wounded, while that of the Confederates was only twelve killed and twenty wounded.

Considering Dewey's achievement in the light of history, then, we find that he undoubtedly excelled Nelson's victory at Aboukir, fully equaled Lord Howe in 1794, and certainly handled a maritime force equal to Nelson at Trafalgar, and gained a more complete and brilliant victory than did the English on that occasion. But it can not be said that Dewey equaled Farragut's feat either at New Orleans or in Mobile Bay. The contending forces at Manila may have been as powerful and the victory as complete, but he certainly did not have the obstacles to contend with that Farragut had at both New Orleans and Mobile Bay. Dewey, however, has shown himself to be a worthy pupil of the great admiral, and had the opportunity offered,
he would have demonstrated that he possesses all the requirements that go to make up a great naval commander. It was no fault of his that he did not have under his command a much larger force, or that Montojo was not proportionately strong. He took what he had and handled his resources with all the dash—tempered with sound judgment—that is so necessary to great success in naval enterprises.

Persistent efforts have been made to give the impression that the Spaniards at Manila were totally unprepared for the attack Dewey made on May 1st. Some have even gone so far as to characterize the entry of the American squadron in that harbor as a "midnight surprise." Montojo's ships have been described as being "antiquated" craft, fit only to be anchored as targets and fired at, while the guns in the shore batteries have been depicted as "old-fashioned" ordnance, "venerable" relics of the middle ages. Nothing could be more unjust to the gallant officers and men of Dewey's squadron than such willful untruths.

The facts in the case are as follows: As has been shown, Montojo's ships were not "antiquated," their average date of launching being November, 1883, while that of the American vessels was July, 1888—a difference of fewer than five years. By May 1st the Spaniards at Manila had made far more elaborate preparations for defense than had their opponents. Only a short time before, war over the Caroline Islands had become imminent between Germany and Spain. With a view to defending the Philippines, elaborate plans were perfected for the protection of Manila. Vast quantities of ammunition and military supplies of every description, of the latest and best manufacture, had been sent out.

Dewey, as is well known, was dangerously handicapped in this respect—also in the matter of coal—even to the extent of exercising the greatest economy. With a view to further augmenting this large stock of mili-
tary stores, the Spanish Government loaded the ocean liner *Isla de Mindanao* with ammunition and guns, and—when war with the United States seemed inevitable—hurried her to the Philippines. She arrived at Manila the last week in April, 1898, only a few days before Dewey made his attack.

"In the fall of 1897," writes Lieutenant Ellicott, "there stood before the city of Manila four 9½-inch breech-loading rifles, nine 8½-inch muzzle-loading rifled mortars [all larger than any gun carried in the American ships], four 5½-inch converted breech-loading rifles, and fifteen 6.3-inch muzzle-loading bronze rifled guns of old design, all carefully emplaced behind heavy earthworks, fully equipped and superabundantly supplied with ammunition. All batteries were connected by telephone, and plane tables were arranged at the extremities of measured bases to give accurate ranges. Drills were carried on continually and with enthusiasm. . . . At Cavite and in the batteries commanding the entrance to the harbor were built bomb proofs in the ground, with covered galleries or trenches for approach, while in sheltered spots near at hand were roomy bamboo quarters for the gun crews."  

As to Dewey's entry into Manila harbor being a "midnight surprise," we know that both Augustin and Montojo, weeks in advance, were thoroughly advised as to the exact force and number of the American ships, and that they knew the precise moment they left Mirs Bay and the direction they headed. The arrival of Dewey's squadron off Cape Bolinao, Friday night (April 29th), was promptly telegraphed to Manila, as also was its reconnaissance of Subig Bay on the afternoon of April 30th. All this we have on the word of Montojo himself, besides the fact that the discovery of the invading squadron at the entrance of Manila harbor was made at midnight, and the news was flashed both to Montojo and Augustin.

1 Proceedings of the Naval Institute.
 Protected cruiser Raleigh.
Thus we see that Montojo had the incalculable advantage of knowing in advance the exact force and every move of his opponent, down to the very day of the battle. Dewey was not only in total ignorance of the whereabouts of the Spanish war craft, but he was completely in the dark as to their dispositions for defense and their force. "The Spaniards had guarded their work well. United States Consul Williams, who remained in Manila till one week before that date [April 30th], and who accompanied the American squadron back, could only learn that numerous new batteries were being erected at the entrance to the bay, and that the channels were being mined. No knowledge of the
relative strength of the defenses of the two channels could guide the Americans' choice,"¹ and the result was

that Dewey, in entering the bay, actually took a course that most exposed him to the enemy's fire.²

¹ Lieutenant Ellicott.
² A complete summary of the shore guns defending Manila at the time the Americans made their attack—not including ordnance really...
“In the face of all evidence,” says Lieutenant Ellicot, from whose exhaustive and painstaking researches the above figures have been compiled, "the existence of mines at the entrance to the bay can scarcely be doubted. A chart was captured at Cavité next morning [May 2d], with lines of torpedoes marked on it in Boca Chica and off San Nicola Shoal, and with marginal memoranda about the spacing and number of mines. In the articles of capitulation signed by the Governor of Corregidor it was stated that mines existed in Boca Grande. The testimony of nearly every Spanish officer interviewed by the writer after the fall of Manila was to the same effect."

obsolete—shows that in and around Manila, covering the water front, were four 9½-inch breech-loading rifles, nine 8½-inch muzzle-loading rifle mortars, four 5½-inch breech-loading rifles, two 5.9-inch breech-loading siege rifles, fifteen 6.3-inch muzzle-loading rifles, and two 4.7-inch breech-loading rifle siege guns. At Sangley Point were two 5.9-inch breech-loading rifle siege guns, and at the Cavité arsenal, three 6.3-inch muzzle-loading rifles. On the north shore of Corregidor Island were three 8-inch muzzle-loading rifles; at Punta Gorda three 7-inch muzzle-loading rifles; at Punta Bassissi, two 6.3-inch breech-loading rifles; on Caballo Island, three 6-inch breech-loading rifles; on El Fraile, three breech-loading rifles; and at Restinga, three 6.2-inch breech-loading rifles. Captain Sostoa, who had charge of the military defenses of Manila, was the grandson of the distinguished officer after whom the Ordoñez gun was named. He was one of the ablest artillery officers in Spain's service, and had been sent out to the Philippines expressly to superintend the defenses of Manila.
CHAPTER XIV.

ON THE SOUTH COAST OF CUBA.

After the sharp action between the Marblehead, Eagle, Nashville and Windom with the Spanish batteries and gunboats at Cienfuegos, and the brilliant exploit of the party under Lieutenant Winslow in cutting the cables off that place, Cienfuegos became the scene of several other creditable actions. At 1.15 p.m., June 13th, while the auxiliary cruiser Yankee, Commander Willard Herbert Brownson, was lying some eight miles southwest of San Juan River, a steamer was discovered close inshore to the east of Cienfuegos, heading eastward. Commander Brownson promptly cleared for action, and with crew at quarters endeavored to overhaul the stranger. Observing the maneuver, the commander of the steamer turned westward, and, after remaining stationary for some time off Colorados Point,1 advanced toward the American. She was now seen to be a low steamer, about two hundred feet long, with one smokestack and one mast between the pilot house and funnel, and showing Spanish colors. As her awnings were spread over the pilot house and the gangways abreast of it, it was thought that she was not prepared for immediate action.

When the Spaniard turned on the Americans the Yankee was under full speed for the entrance of the port, and when she had approached within twelve hundred yards2 of the steamer and was about five thousand from the harbor batteries, Commander Brownson

1 See map on page 121. 2 Commander Brownson to the author.

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hoisted his colors, and, putting his helm aport so as to bring that broadside to bear, opened with his forecastle 5-inch gun and all the guns in his port battery. The Spaniard at once returned the fire, but as the wind was very light the smoke rapidly collected, enveloping both vessels so as to greatly impair the accuracy of their firing. When the enemy observed the Yankee swinging to port she followed the maneuver and made for the harbor at a high rate of speed, the Americans following and using every gun that would bear. As soon as the chase got out of the line between her pursuer and the shore batteries the latter opened a lively fire—the Yankee at that time being some four thousand yards distant from them. By this time the chase had drawn too far abaft the Yankee's beam to permit the use of the American broadside, and Commander Brownson again put his helm hard aport, swinging round to the northwest, heading directly for the gunboat, which was then close to the harbor entrance and under the protection of a battery at Sabanilla Point. Early in the action a small gunboat had come out to assist in the fight, and now added her fire to that of the chase and the two land batteries.

Approaching within four thousand yards of the east battery, Commander Brownson again swung his ship, this time bringing his starboard guns into play, and soon compelled both the Spanish gunboats to retire. Had it not been for the dense volumes of smoke that obscured the view from the beginning of the battle, the Yankee undoubtedly would have destroyed or captured the first gunboat, notwithstanding the assistance she received from her consort and the land batteries. Scarcely at any time could the American gunners see the fall of their missiles, which circumstance greatly interfered with their getting the range. A number of shells fell near and over the Yankee. One piece entered the port of gun No. 8 on the port side and struck S. P. Kennedy, a landsman, in the shoulder, inflicting
a painful though not serious wound. This was the only casualty in the Yankee. The chase carried at least four guns to the broadside of about 4-inch caliber. Before turning seaward the Yankee fired a few parting shots at the Sabanilla battery, one of which landed directly in it. The loss of the enemy in this affair is unknown, but it is believed that several on shore were injured.

A week after this, or on the morning of June 20th, the Yankee, while lying to the southeast of Cienfuegos, discovered a steamer to the east, in the vicinity of Trinidad. Commander Brownson immediately gave chase, and soon made her out to be painted white, with one smokestack and two masts, and in other respects answering to the description of the Purissima Concepción had she not appeared much larger, the vessel in sight being at least one thousand tons. Standing within half a mile of Mulas Point, Commander Brownson fired a shot across her bow with a view of inducing her to show her colors, but, paying no attention to this, the stranger began to get under way, and when at four thousand yards—the nearest the Yankee could get—Commander Brownson opened a heavy fire. The enemy now stood eastward among the shoals and was quickly out of range, the Yankee following but failing to get within effective striking distance.

When the Americans began firing, a vessel—apparently a hulk—mounting guns lying at the Casilda
wharf, and a small gunboat, which had come to the assistance of the vessel first sighted, opened on the Yankee, but at such long range that Commander Brownson did not reply. The larger steamer put into Masio harbor. Returning off Cienfuegos, Commander Brownson consulted with a pilot as to the advisability of running into Masio harbor, near Casilda. He was advised not to make the attempt with a vessel of the Yankee's draught. On June 22d, however, this officer appeared off Blanco Key, which is just south of the harbor of Casilda, the port of Trinidad, and sent a boat in to take soundings and buoy the channel. The men in the boat only confirmed the pilot's opinion as to the impracticability of taking such a large vessel into that port. Commander Brownson was of the opinion that a considerable trade was carried on at Casilda and urged that light-draught vessels be provided to interrupt it.

Being in need of coal, Commander Brownson, on the evening of June 24th, started for Key West. While off Cape Frances, Isle of Pines, on the morning of the 25th he discovered a number of small vessels at anchor behind the cape. Standing close in he observed one of the boats to be getting under way. A shot across her bow induced her to return to the anchorage. Two boats in charge of Lieutenant William G. Cutler and acting Ensign William D. W. Dimock—who volunteered for the service—were sent in to bring the craft out while the Yankee stood in as close as possible to the shoals so as to cover them. No resistance was met, and the five vessels were brought out. They were fishing craft from Batabano engaged in supplying the Havana market. As this was one of the principal sources of provisions for the blockaded city, and the boats having no official registers, Commander Brownson destroyed them. They were the Nemesia, Luz, Jacinto, Massuelita and Amistad. While engaged in this work a small black steamer approaching the shoals about five miles away was discovered. She appeared to be a gun-
boat or a torpedo craft, and on making out the Yankee made her escape. Many more small craft were seen from the Yankee on the following day, but owing to shoals they could not be captured.

On the evening of June 19th the auxiliary cruiser Dixie, Commander Charles Henry Davis, appeared off Cape Cruz and remained at the entrance to Manzanillo harbor twenty-four hours. As it was impossible for a ship of the Dixie's size to pass safely inside of the Esperanza Bank, Commander Davis, after noting that the light at Cape Cruz had been discontinued, got under way June 20th after dark, and on the next day ran close inshore, off San Juan River, and drove the garrison from the blockhouse and the soldiers from another blockhouse at Guayximico River, as these rivers afforded safe entrances for boats. Both of these stations had many soldiers stationed at them, while the blockhouse at Guayximico River mounted a gun.

At 5 p.m. June 21st, the Dixie appeared off Cienfuegos, where Commander Davis noticed that the enemy had made a fortification out of the ruins of the lighthouse which had been destroyed in the preceding month by the Marblehead, Nashville, Eagle and Windom. He also noted that a new battery had been constructed on a hill above the Morro. Though the Dixie stood close inshore these fortifications did not open fire. Proceeding off Casilda, the port of Trinidad, the Dixie, on the 22d, was fired on by a gunboat lying inside the point. Commander Davis returned the compliment with a few shells, but, owing to the distance, was unable to judge of the effect. On the following day he ran as close to Maria Aguilar Point as the reefs would allow, about two miles from the harbor, where he discovered a gunboat behind a point of land. A few shots were exchanged with her, and one was seen to strike the Spaniard, but with what effect it was impossible to determine. After the war
it was learned that this gunboat had been sunk at her moorings by the Dixie's fire.\(^1\) Meantime another gunboat of some six hundred tons and carrying six guns, which proved to be very fast, came out of the harbor and fired at the Dixie across a line of reefs. When the enemy was clear of the point Commander Davis opened on him and compelled him to retreat. It was thought that several of our shot had taken effect, as the Spaniard showed no disposition to renew the action. The second gunboat had been under the Dixie's fire ten minutes, and one of the American shells struck her, heeling the vessel over so much as to present the whole flat of her deck to view.

On June 30th the Detroit, Commander James Henry Dayton, appeared off Cienfuegos and noted that work was progressing on the fortifications, but at such a great distance inland as to render an attack futile. On July 8th the German cruiser Geier received permission from Commander Dayton to enter Cienfuegos harbor to take aboard four German refugees.

At 8.45 A.M. on June 29th, while the Yankton, Lieutenant-Commander James Dexter Adams, was skirting the coast from Cienfuegos to Trinidad, she passed the Eagle, Lieutenant William Henry Hudson Sutherland, near Cape Muno, close inshore, and noticed that she was fired upon by a masked battery placed well back on the hills. The Eagle had arrived off the mouth of Rio Honda, some ten miles west of Trinidad, at 6 A.M. for the purpose of landing a captain and two privates of the Cuban army. While cruising back and forth, waiting for the Cubans to answer her steam-whistle signals, she was fired upon from the shore and several projectiles fell in the water near by. At first there were no signs of an enemy, but after a number of shots had struck the water within fifty yards of the Eagle, a large force of cavalry was detected on a high

\(^1\) Commander Davis to the author.
plateau back of the beach. Lieutenant Southerland opened with his 6-pounders, and the first shot was seen to fall in a group of Spaniards and must have done considerable execution. It was at this juncture that the Yankton appeared upon the scene.

Lieutenant-Commander Adams promptly stood in to her assistance, and at 8.50 a.m. opened at a distance of four thousand yards. The Spaniards were quickly silenced. The Yankton, at 9.15 a.m., ceased firing, Lieutenant Southerland reporting that one of the Yankton's 4-inch shells had fallen in the Spanish battery and apparently had done much damage. The only American injured was Charles Wilson, landsman, who was slightly burned in the face by an exploding cartridge. On the afternoon of the same day the Yankton, in company with the Dixie, shelled one or two gunboats lying behind the reef at Casilda. The fire was not returned nor could the Americans discover the effect of their shots. July 2d the Yankton gave chase to a steamer, the description of which corresponded to that of the Alfonso XII, excepting that she was not square rigged forward. Not being able to overtake her in time the Yankton resumed her blockading duties. The Eagle now proceeded to a point thirteen miles west of Cienfuegos, where the Cubans were landed, after which she resumed her station off the Isle of Pines.

Early in the morning of July 3d the Eagle, when ten miles west of Cape Pepe, Isle of Pines, gave chase to a large four-masted steamer, probably the one the Yankton had chased the day before. After pursuing the stranger fifty-nine miles and finding that he was losing ground, Southerland edged away and resumed his course.

At six o'clock on the morning of July 5th the Eagle discovered a schooner under sail to the south of the Isle of Pines. Chase was immediately given, and at 6.30 a.m., observing that the schooner's crew had anchored and deserted her at a point about half a mile
from the beach near a small settlement, Lieutenant Southerland sent a boat in charge of Ensign John Hol-ley Roys to investigate. As the ensign boarded the schooner, a sharp fire was opened from the shore, two shots passing through one of the schooner's sails and another going between two of the American seamen. The *Eagle* promptly responded and quickly silenced the enemy. The schooner, the *Gallito*, was found to be laden with mahogany, tobacco, lumber and honey. As no ship's papers could be found, the *Eagle* took her in tow and carried her to Key West.

Filling with coal, the active *Eagle* was proceeding to her station off the southwest coast of Cuba, when, at 11.5 a.m. July 12th, while near the mainland, several sailing craft were sighted dead ahead, with a large steamer apparently following them. Arriving within hail of the sailing craft, which proved to be the schooner *Three Bells* and two small sloops, all prizes of the *Dixie*, and in charge of Lieutenant Samuel M. Blount, it was learned that the steamer had been in chase of these vessels until the *Eagle* appeared in sight, when she altered her course and headed at good speed northward and westward. Lieutenant Southerland immediately gave chase so as to head the stranger off. In less than an hour it was observed that the chase had run aground on a shoal, two miles east of Piedras Point. A white side-wheel steamer, which had been lying off the point, now ran alongside the stranded vessel, probably to take off her cargo. The *Eagle* cautiously worked her way through the shoals—with boats ahead to take soundings—and, when about two thousand yards of the steamer, dropped anchor. The side-wheeler, which now had a large number of people aboard, left her consort and circled round, apparently hoping that the advancing American would run aground or be compelled to retire.

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1 Lieutenant Southerland to the author.
Lieutenant Southerland then fired a blank cartridge, and as no attention was paid to it—not even by a show of colors—he began a rapid discharge of shots on both vessels. The side-wheeler now steamed for the north channel and was soon out of range, notwithstanding the fact that a number of shot were seen to strike near her. As the larger steamer did not return the Eagle's fire and no persons being visible aboard, Southerland concluded that she had been abandoned, and getting under way he called for volunteers to board her. The whale-boat was quickly manned and armed with a Colt machine gun on an improvised platform, and under the command of Ensign Powers Symington pulled toward the steamer. At the same time the cutter, in charge of Ensign Thomas Tingey Craven, was sent out to sound ahead of the vessel.

In this manner the Eagle managed to work herself to a position within six hundred yards of the steamer, when Symington's party was observed to board without opposition, although it was noticed that the stranger had two guns mounted on her forecastle. Ensign Craven, with a force of men, at 3.25 p. m. was ordered to the assistance of the boarding party with instructions to make every possible attempt to secure the two guns—which proved to be 4.72-inch rifles—with their ammunition, and if the steamer could not be brought out, to destroy her.

When the Americans first boarded the Santo Domingo, as she proved to be (of Barcelona, Campagnia Transatlantica), they found her guns loaded and her fires going full blast under all the boilers, with the steam blowing off at one hundred and seventy pounds. Evidently the Spaniards had hoped to blow their ship and the Americans up at the same time. The midday meal in the forward saloon was found served and partly eaten. From her papers the Americans learned that the Spanish auxiliary steamer Montevideo was expected soon to arrive in the vicinity. This circumstance, to-
gather with the impossibility of getting the *Santo Domingo* afloat, determined Southerland to destroy his prize. This ship was literally packed with provisions, even the staterooms being utilized for storage. Two 12-inch guns were discovered in her hold but could not be reached. After shooting a number of live stock, the Americans, at 6.25 p.m., set fire to her. The 4.72-inch guns could not be removed and were destroyed. By the timely destruction of the *Santo Domingo* Lieutenant Southerland saved the *Three Bells* and her consorts from recapture. Afterward it was learned that the *Santo Domingo* had a complement of four officers and seventy-eight men, besides sixty-six passengers. All her people had been taken off by the white steamer, which made for Batabano.

The value of the services rendered by the small converted yachts like the *Eagle* is forcibly brought out in the experience of the *Alfonso XII*. This craft, laden with stores the enemy was most anxious to get, first endeavored to put into Cienfuegos, but was chased off by the *Yankton*. On the following day she made an effort to land her cargo near the Isle of Pines, but was driven away by the *Eagle*. Two days later she attempted to run into Mariel or Havana, but was prevented from doing so by the *Hawk*. Thus it appears that three converted yachts frustrated the efforts of this steamer to land her stores at any point between Cienfuegos and Havana, a distance of nearly six hundred miles.1 On the night of June 30th, the *Helena*, Commander William Thomas Swinburne, while cruising off the keys southeast of Trinidad, discovered a search light playing in the direction of Port Tunas. This harbor had been particularly mentioned by Consul Dent as a center of blockade running. On the following morning, July 1st, Commander Swinburne ran close in and discovered a steamer’s smoke, which soon proved

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1 Lieutenant Southerland to the author.
to be from the United States ship Peoria, Lieutenant Thomas William Ryan, with two steamers under convoy, close inshore, to the west of Tunas. Lieutenant Ryan reported that the transport Florida was aground. An attempt had been made the night before to land a small force of Americans and Cubans, but it had been frustrated by the enemy with some loss; the brother of General Nuñez, commanding the force, having been killed, and Mr. Winthrop Chanler, in charge of the American contingent, being among the wounded. Fortunately the landing party had been able to bring off its wounded. As the people in the Florida were greatly in need of assistance, Commander Swinburne at once ran close up to a large blockhouse which had intrenchments on either side, just west of the transport, and fired a few well-directed shots which deterred the enemy from carrying out their designs on the stranded vessel; then taking a position astern of the Florida and passing a line to her, he managed to drag her into deep water.

Commander Swinburne adds: "On June 30th the Helena had just been relieved from duty off Cienfuegos, and we were guarding the entrances to Casilda and Tunas and had no knowledge of the presence of the convoy. This convoy consisted of the steamers Fanita and Florida, carrying stores, munitions of war, some three hundred Cubans, a few Americans under Mr. Winthrop Chanler, of New York, and a troop, or portion of a troop, of the Tenth Cavalry, under Lieutenant Carter Johnson of the army. This expedition was trying to reach General Gomez. At the request of the War Department the Peoria, formerly a Philadelphia pilot boat steamer, mounting 3-pounder rapid-fire guns, had been furnished at Key West as an escort. During the night of the 30th a Cuban had pluckily made his way off to the Peoria in a canoe, at imminent risk of being shot for his pains, and informed Johnson that Gomez could be communicated with at Palo Alto,
about forty-seven miles eastward. On the night of July 2d, piloted by this man and convoyed by the *Peoria*, the ships sailed away, while the *Helena* kept her search light on the town to deceive the enemy.”¹ Lieutenant Johnson, of the Tenth Cavalry, then came aboard the *Helena*, and after consulting with Commander Swinburne, it was decided to make another attempt at landing at the point forty-seven miles eastward, while the *Helena*—with the *Peoria* in company, so as to

![Diagram of a portion of Tunas, prepared from the private journal of Commander Swinburne for the author.](image)

A, small earthwork mounting four or five guns, probably 3.2 inches caliber; B, intrenchments filled with infantry; C, two field pieces firing shrapnel; D, business houses, railroad depot, etc.; E, railroad wharf burned during night of July 2d. The *Florida* was aground about a thousand yards off Caney Point.

assist in case of grounding—was to deceive the enemy by making an attack on Tunas. Accordingly, at 7.30 A.M. July 2d, the *Helena* moved slowly in toward Tunas until she brought her broadside to bear, fifteen hundred yards from the town, when she and the *Peoria* opened fire on a small earthwork. The Spaniards promptly responded. Commander Swinburne had observed several flags planted in the channel, and as they evidently were range marks to guide the enemy’s gunners, he stood clear of them. Several of the enemy’s shells went over the *Helena*. One charge of shrapnel burst just under the cruiser’s starboard 4-inch gun,

¹ Commander Swinburne to the author.
splashing the water and scattering a number of balls over her. No damage, however, was occasioned in either ship or among the men.

After twenty-eight minutes of accurate firing the Americans silenced the Spanish guns. As the earthworks were now a shapeless mass and the enemy could be seen removing their dead and wounded, the ships slowly retired. To further deceive the Spaniards as to the real object of the expedition, the Helena and Peoria, at five o'clock that afternoon, made a demonstration against the blockhouse, and under cover of night the transports, convoyed by the Peoria, moved eastward. During the night an extensive conflagration was seen in the vicinity of the railroad wharf. Sunday, July 3d, Commander Swinburne again moved close inshore, and saw that the Spaniards had been greatly reinforced and had repaired their earthworks, remounted the guns and had planted new range flags. It was estimated that the number of troops in the town had now been swelled to quite four thousand. Satisfied that the object of his attack had been accomplished, Commander Swinburne backed his ship and was about to retire when the Spaniards again opened fire, this time with more accuracy than the day before, but occasioned no damage. The Americans responded, but having no end to gain by further attack, they steamed seaward. We can better appreciate the difficulties attending these operations when we remember that the coast of Cuba was poorly charted, and at the point where Swinburne made his attack the shore was abounding in treacherous shoals. "I had nothing but the chart of Cuba in two sheets (published by the Hydrographic Office) and the lead for a guide." That night the Helena remained at her station, six miles south of Tunas, and on the following morning returned to the blockade squadron off Cienfuegos.

1 Commander Swinburne to the author.
CHAPTER XV.

BLOCKADING THE NORTH SHORE.

There is no duty in naval warfare which involves so much hardship, exposure and liability to disaster as that of a prolonged blockade of an enemy's port. To remain broad off to sea day after day, week after week and month after month, in plain sight of frowning batteries, exposed to all the caprices of weather, with the serious problem of maintaining a coal supply sufficient to meet any emergency, and with the knowledge that a venturesome blockade runner might at any moment avail himself of thick weather or a tempestuous night to run in, is a task that might well tax the resources of the ablest officers. The difficulties of maintaining the blockade on the north coast of Cuba were greatly enhanced by the fact that this shore is abounding in perilous shoals, is imperfectly charted, and the only maps in the possession of our officers were so unreliable as to be worse than useless. At any moment one of those fierce wind storms, for which the West Indies are famous, might break upon the blockading ships and place them at the mercy of batteries that lined the shores, or drive them hopelessly wrecked on treacherous keys. Well might it have been said that our officers, seamen and ships engaged on this service were placed "'twixt the devil and the deep blue sea."

Commodore John Crittenden Watson, one of the distinguished officers in the civil war, had charge of the blockade in the first stages of the war. On June 25th Commodore John Adams Howell was detached from the command of the Northern Patrol Squadron and went
to Key West. From that place he proceeded off Havana, and early in July relieved Watson, the latter being ordered to command the squadron which was being prepared to threaten the Spanish coast in case Camara really sailed for the Philippines. Speaking of the difficulties of the blockade, Howell says: "There are now here [July 27th] two small revenue cutters, two tugs, one converted yacht and this ship [the San Francisco]. The powerful batteries [at Havana] compel the ships in the center to remain at least six miles away in the daytime, while those at the ends must keep at least ten miles from the Morro. The arc to be covered includes over seventeen points of the compass. Thus, in the present state, each ship has far more ground to cover than she should. There should never be less than ten ships here, and twelve would be far better. At one time the blockade here was reduced to only four small ships, and at another time the Mayflower [a converted yacht] was the largest ship here. Our best reports give at least four vessels of war inside Havana, among them the Conde de Venadito, one of the Pinzons, and another ship similar to her, and an armed merchantman. The risk run by reducing the number of ships on the blockade under these circumstances is manifest . . .

To properly shut all supplies out of Havana from the north side, the entire coast from Bahia Honda to Nuevitas, a coast line of nearly four hundred miles, must
be closely blockaded. To do this I have at my disposal to-day thirteen vessels, mostly tugs, etc."

One of the dangers to which blockading craft were constantly exposed was that of a chance shot from shore batteries. About five o'clock on the morning of August 12th, while Commodore Howell's flagship, the *San Francisco*, Captain Richard Phillips Leary, was on the inside blockade, the Spanish guns on the Morro and nearby batteries sent some twenty shells at the cruiser. One of the missiles struck the flagship's stern, shearing off the midship frame in two places, twisting the next starboard frame and injuring some woodwork—all the damage being confined to the spar deck.

Notwithstanding the fact that this blockade service gave the officers and men engaged in it little opportunity for distinguishing themselves, this tedious and inglorious duty was most faithfully and conscientiously performed, and on several occasions skirmishes with the enemy, which seem to have escaped public attention, took place and were highly creditable to those participating.

A few minutes before midnight July 4th, when the *Hawk*, Lieutenant John Hood, was cruising seven or eight miles west of Havana, a large steamer was discovered just astern, having crept upon the *Hawk*, under cover of night, unobserved. Evidently she was attempting to run the blockade. The stranger apparently discovered the *Hawk* at that moment, for she immediately put about and made off at high speed along the coast westward. Hood gave chase, but after ten minutes it was seen that the stranger was gaining. No attention was paid to the 6-pound shot the Americans fired at her. The *Hawk* persisted in the chase, however, and occasionally fired a gun.

About 1.30 p.m., when off Mariel, the chase suddenly became stationary, and it was believed that she

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1 Official report of Commodore Howell.
had run aground under a battery that was known to have been erected near there. Hood, not knowing the real strength of this battery, cautiously drew near until about a mile and a half of the harbor's mouth, when the chase could be seen, and various signal lights were observed on shore. Lieutenant Hood then caused four 6-pound shells to be fired at intervals, so as to induce her to come out, but received no response save a continuous blowing off of steam. After the fourth shot had been fired the stranger showed a white light over the side, which the Americans took to be an indication of surrender.

At 2 A. M. a boat with eight men, in charge of Ensign Frank Herman Schofield, was sent in with orders to investigate and take possession if possible, but if fired upon he was directed to return at once to the Hawk. "Knowing that there were batteries and a garrison on shore and that the expedition was somewhat hazardous, I called for volunteers, and the crew was promptly made up, with Ensign Schofield in command. Our only boat for such service was a dingey belonging to the Iowa. In the bow of this Mr. Schofield ingeniously rigged an improvised mount for an automatic Colt gun, and with the crew well armed with rifles the expedition left the ship, with orders to return at once if fired on, while the guns of the ship were got ready to support any attack."  

Ensign Schofield approached within a ship's length of the steamer, but could not discover that any one was aboard. He then called. By way of an answer a volley of musketry was fired at his boat from the ship, while another volley from the shore on the opposite side, some two hundred yards distant, was received. After this, a rapid discharge of small arms was directed at the unprotected boat both from shore and ship. Thus the little craft with its handful of men was placed in a perilous position. "Mr. Schofield and his crew, being

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1 Official report of Lieutenant Hood.
thus placed at close range between two fires, behaved in a manner beyond all praise. He promptly headed for the Hawk, and at the first volley opened fire with his Colt gun on the part of the ship from which the volleys came, the ship being the nearer, till they were temporarily silenced, and then turned it on the shore line, from whence the other volleys proceeded, with the same success." 1 As soon as Lieutenant Hood observed that the Spaniards had opened on the boat, he sent the Hawk ahead until about half a mile from the steamer, but was deterred from opening fire until Ensign Schofield returned, as the boat was directly in the line of fire. The inaccuracy of the enemy's marksmen is attested by the fact that no one in the boat—and not even the boat herself—was struck.

As Ensign Schofield reported that the steamer was aground, but might be floated off, Lieutenant Hood determined to withhold his fire and bring the prize out. She was now seen to be a four-masted steamer having two funnels, and of about six thousand tons burden. Accordingly the Hawk remained off the port until daylight, one gun from a shore battery being fired at her. At daylight it was seen that the steamer had run high up on a reef, evidently having took ground at full speed while she was endeavoring to make the harbor. Realizing that it was impossible to get the vessel off, and having only 6-pounders with which to effect her destruction, Lieutenant Hood ran toward Havana and signaled the Castine, Commander Robert Mallory Berry, for assistance. Berry promptly complied, and both vessels steamed back to Mariel, and about 7 A.M. opened fire on the shore batteries and the stranded vessel. After firing at the steamer an hour, Berry ordered the Hawk to report the affair to the senior officer of the Havana blockade, Commander Charles Jackson Train, while the Castine remained to complete the work of destruc-

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1 Official report of Lieutenant Hood.
tion, the crew and soldiers, known to have been aboard the steamer, having left her when the firing became serious. Learning of the affair, Train proceeded in the Prairie to Mariel and assisted the Castine in destroying the prize. While engaged in this work the Americans were fired upon by a gunboat in the port, but her guns were too small to do any damage. Commander Train commended Lieutenant Hood for his watchfulness in detecting the blockade runner, and for the plucky manner in which he ran her down. Speaking of the boat's crew that approached the steamer, Lieutenant Hood says: "This was the first time any of the men concerned had ever been under fire, and I consider their coolness and steadiness as worthy of special mention and commendation. With Mr. Schofield in the boat were L. C. Hull, gunner's mate; William Blasie and G. M. Eastad, quartermasters; John Rhoades, ship's clerk; A. Hanson, A. Riggan, and F. E. Chappell, ordinary seamen; and H. G. Parrent, coal passers.

On May 6th the torpedo boat Dupont, Lieutenant Spencer Shepard Wood, was fired on by a battery at the entrance to Matanzas harbor. Wood pluckily headed in, attacked the fortification near the lighthouse on the left of the entrance and after silencing it proceeded with the Hornet, Lieutenant James Meredith Helm, to a blockhouse seven miles eastward and drove the enemy to the woods. A number of the Spaniards were killed or wounded. "It was observed that many were carried away from the scene of action."

At daybreak June 9th, while the converted yacht Scorpion, Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, was on the north coast of Cuba convoying the ammunition ship Armeria and the provision ship Supply from Key West to Santiago de Cuba, the smoke of a steamer was sighted off the starboard quarter some twenty miles from Nuevitas. The Armeria signaled her consort to

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1 Lieutenant Wood to the author.
take a station astern, but Marix, deeming it advisable to meet a probable enemy as far away from his convoy as possible, headed directly for the stranger. In a short time she was made out to be a war craft, and general quarters was sounded and every preparation made for action. On approaching nearer it was seen that the stranger was a modern man-of-war of considerable size, and was painted like the Spanish men-of-war recently seen at Havana. To increase the perplexity of the Americans the flag of the stranger could not be distinguished, as it was calm at the time; but as the color red predominated there seemed to be no doubt of her being a Spaniard.

When about one thousand yards away both vessels stopped, and Marix brought his starboard battery to bear, at the same time giving strict orders not to fire until he passed the word. Soon afterward the stranger’s colors blew out, and it was seen that they were British, the supposed enemy proving to be the English war ship Talbot—the same that some months afterward carried the body of Lord Herschell to England. Marix concludes his report of this affair by saying: “Our crew looked disappointed, although I myself felt differently, for we would have had very slight chance against a vessel of that type and size, and it was only the necessity of giving the convoys under my charge a chance to escape that I decided to engage such an enemy.”

In pursuance of Rear-Admiral Sampson’s orders, given July 9th, Commodore John A. Howell, commanding the first squadron of the North Atlantic fleet, extended the Cuban blockade over the entire northern coast of the island, so far as the limited number of vessels under his control would permit. The Topeka, Lieutenant-Commander William Sheffield Cowles, and Maple, Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright Kellogg, patrolled the coast between Porto Tanamo and Matanzas; the Prairie, Commander Charles J. Train, off Gibara and vicinity; the Badger, Commander Albert
Sidney Snow, near Nuevitas; the *Pompey*, Commander James Madison Miller, *Uncas*, Lieutenant Frederick Roland Brainard, and *Hudson*, Lieutenant Frank H. Newcomb, off Cardenas and Matanzas; while Captain Nicoll Ludlow, of the *Terror*, with the remainder of the fleet, stood guard over Havana, Mariel and Bahia Honda. It was Howell's opinion that this force was insufficient to maintain a perfect blockade of the northern coast of Cuba, and he estimated that forty cruisers were required, besides twelve light-draught vessels for work inside the keys.

While off the port of Nipe, Howell communicated with the Cuban insurgents, and learned that a small gunboat and about one thousand Spanish soldiers were stationed at that place. There appeared also to be one battery, but though the *Topeka* stood close in, it did not venture to fire on her. In order to guard against the dangers of hurricanes, Commodore Howell endeavored to find some harbor where our vessels could have refuge in heavy weather. Port Banes was available, but only for smaller craft.

About twenty minutes to four o'clock on the afternoon of July 26th, while the *Badger*, Commander Albert S. Snow, was blockading the port of Nuevitas, a large seagoing tugboat towing a barge and a brigantine were discovered coming out of the port, with Spanish colors and the Geneva Red Cross flag, besides a quarantine flag flying, from each vessel. Commander Snow made for the vessels, and as they apparently intended to pass without stopping, he fired a blank cartridge which had the effect of bringing the vessels to. A boarding party was sent out. They were found to be the tugboat *Humberto Rodrigues*, the barge *San Fernando*, and the brigantine *Saif*. The vessels were full of soldiers, some sick, but many apparently well, and the surgeon in charge reported that General Salcedo, who commanded that district, had ordered them to Havana by water. But no written orders to that effect were found
in the vessels. Passed Assistant Surgeon Maxwell S. Simpson was sent aboard the tug, and reported that, besides the crew, six Spanish officers—captains, first and second lieutenants—and about thirty-five soldiers were aboard. These were represented by the Spanish medical officer in charge as being wounded or sick, but Mr. Simpson believed that three of the officers and many of the soldiers were well. The barge and brigantine were not boarded, as it was reported that six cases of yellow fever were in them. Dr. L. L. Williams, in charge of the quarantine station, afterward made a careful examination and reported that there were neither yellow fever nor cases of contagious diseases of any kind aboard any of the vessels, and even the Spanish surgeon afterward admitted that such were the facts.

As the conduct of these craft was clearly a violation of the blockade, Commander Snow accompanied the vessels to the blockading squadron off Havana, where Commodore Howell ordered them to Tortugas. In the tug were sixty-five persons, including a crew of twenty men, and in the San Fernando were two hundred and seven men, ten being the crew; while in the Safi were one hundred and twenty-seven men, ten comprising the crew. The entire party was in charge of Chief Surgeon Maximo Martinez Morales. On July 1st Commander Snow was instructed by the department to place the prisoners aboard the least valuable vessel, or two if necessary, and send them into Havana. All these people accordingly were placed in the San Fernando and Safi and were towed by the Humberto Rodrigues—in charge of Lieutenant Edward M. Peters, the prize officer—into Havana, where the prisoners were landed, after which the tug proceeded to New York.

On the night of July 24th-25th the Prairie, Commander Charles J. Train, left her station off Gibara, and early on the morning of the 26th the Nashville, Commander Washburn Maynard, took her place. Maynard found that the Spanish troops had been withdrawn
from the town to Holguin, leaving five hundred and thirty-six sick behind, and that the Cubans were in full possession. Maynard seized the schooners *Expreso de Gibara* and the *Gibara*, which the enemy had left in the port, sending the former, under Ensign James Er- ling Walker, and the latter, Ensign Carlton Farwell Snow, to Key West. On the 30th the French cruiser *D'Estaing* arrived at Gibara to inquire into the imprisonment of the French consul at that place, who had been confined twenty-four hours by the Spanish officials for sending a letter to French citizens at Banes. On August 6th a small sloop arrived from Nuevitas, aboard which was a Spaniard who had been sent by General Salcedo with a dispatch to General Luque, ordering him to evacuate Holguin and to retire to Puerto Prin- cipe. This Spaniard reported that two Spanish gun- boats, the *Pizarro* and the *Ligera*, had been sunk in the channel of Nuevitas preparatory to the evacuation of that place.

One of the most spirited actions of the war was that which took place on the morning of August 14th off the harbor of Caibarien between the lighthouse tender *Mangrove*, Lieutenant-Commander Daniel D. V. Stuart, and two Spanish gunboats. On August 8th Commodore George Collier Remey, commanding the naval base at Key West, ordered the *Mangrove* to go to Key Frances to assist a Cuban expedition under the lead of Colonel Bosa, which had sailed in the schooners *Dellie* and *Ellen F. Adams*. If the expedition was not found at this place the *Mangrove* was to proceed to Santa Maria Key, ten miles east of Key Frances. In carrying out these instructions Stuart arrived off Key Frances 7 p. m., August 12th, but finding no signs of the expedi- tion he anchored for the night. He got under way again at a quarter after eight o'clock on the following morning, and after steaming five miles eastward found the *Dellie* anchored inside of a key. From this vessel Stuart learned that Colonel Bosa had landed his party
from the *Ellen F. Adams* the day before and had marched inland. As the *Dellie’s* party was to land the following morning, Stuart decided to remain inside Key Frances so as to prevent the Spanish gunboats from interfering.

On the afternoon of the 13th the *Mangrove* made an attempt to reach Caibarien, but the tide being unfavorable she returned to her anchorage inside Key Frances. As the sun was going down that evening Stuart discovered one of the gunboats at Caibarien under way, the *Hernan Cortes*, and at 8.15 A.M. the following day he again made his way toward that port. Having no chart of these waters he was obliged to feel his way slowly, so that it was 10.55 A.M. before the *Mangrove* arrived at a point about two and a half miles east of the harbor. Here a large gunboat was observed moored close inshore, with a spring out from her stern so that her port broadside was presented to any approaching craft. The Americans opened from their port 6-pounder, to which the Spaniard responded, and at 11.10 A.M. the tender got within range and stood northwest for twenty minutes, keeping up a steady fire with the 6-pounder. Stuart then headed southeast and opened with his starboard guns, the enemy all the time maintaining a rapid fire from his heavy 4.7-inch gun, most of his shot, however, going over the lighthouse tender.

Hoping to induce the gunboat to come out where the action could be maintained on more equal terms, Stuart, at 11.45 A.M., stood away from the shore, upon which the Spaniard ceased firing, but a smaller gunboat kept up an ineffective cannonade until 12.30 P.M. At 1.45 P.M. the small gunboat approached the *Mangrove* under a flag of truce and announced that an armistice had been proclaimed between the United States and Spain. As there was every reason to believe that the report was correct, Lieutenant-Commander Stuart retired from the harbor. In his official report he especially commended Ensigns Charles Augustine Brand and
John Havens Dayton. He also spoke in high terms of the conduct of Mates John Peterson and Philip L. Cosgrove, of the lighthouse crew. On the afternoon of the 15th the Mangrove, while near Sagua la Grande, passed the Spanish gunboat Infanta Isabella, which also signaled that an armistice had been proclaimed.

On August 2d the yacht Siren, Lieutenant John Marshall Robinson, captured the steamer Franklin, and five days later, in company with the Viking, Lieutenant Edward G. Bucklank seized the steamer Bergen. On August 9th the Siren took the Alladin and, as all these vessels hailed from Bergen, Norway, it would seem to indicate that that port had become a center for blockade runners.

An officer in the Siren notes: "On August 2d we stood for Francis Key Light and discovered a Spanish gunboat. Everybody was delighted at the prospect of a brush with the Dons. We gave chase, but the Spaniard ran into shoal water, so we were compelled to give it up. We learned that there were three gunboats in Caibarien, that they had been down during the past night but had at once retreated on our coming in sight."

1 Diary of Lieut. William G. Mayer, of the Siren. These vessels, undoubtedly, were the gunboats that engaged the Mangrove on August 13th.
It is not to be denied that the fitting out of the Spanish squadron under Rear-Admiral Pasqual Cervera y Topete, for active operations on the western side of the Atlantic, caused the authorities in Washington keenest anxiety. It was, in fact, the crucial move of the war. Notwithstanding Spain’s naval inferiority, the sailing of this squadron was a step that, for the time being, placed the United States at a disadvantage. With several thousand miles of seacoast to defend, with a maritime force only slightly in excess of the enemy’s, and with that force scattered throughout the West Indies, our Government found itself suddenly thrown on the defensive. It most anxiously awaited the blow this Spanish fleet was capable of striking, not having the first idea as to where it would fall. It was in reference to this phase of the conflict that the London Times and many leading newspapers of the Continent solemnly declared that undoubtedly the United States at first would meet with disaster on the high seas.

Had the Spanish navy been handled with American energy, skill and daring, it could have delivered one of those crushing blows which a weaker nation, in beginning offensive operations against a stronger one, is always able to give. When our war for independence broke out, almost before the English realized that hostilities had begun in earnest, scores of American cruisers and privateers put to sea, and, making directly for British waters, inflicted an immense amount of damage on the enemy’s commerce. When we declared war
against Great Britain in 1812, a courier started from Washington and in three days arrived in New York. Two hours later Captain John Rodgers' squadron left that port, and in a cruise of six months captured twelve English vessels, valued at half a million dollars. Meanwhile the *Essex* had started on her famous cruise in the Pacific Ocean, and annihilated British commerce in that quarter of the globe. Even greater activity was displayed by our privateersmen. Niles, in his Register of July 15, 1812, says: "In sixty days, counting the day on which war was declared [June 18th], there will be afloat from the United States not less than one hundred and fifty privateers, carrying on an average seventy-five men and six guns. If they succeed pretty well, their number will be doubled in a short time. Sixty-five were at sea on the 15th inst. [less than a month after the declaration of war]. Many others are probably out that we have not heard of."¹ In our war with Mexico Captain John Drake Sloat immediately assumed the offensive, and appearing off the Pacific slope began that brilliant series of operations which resulted in the cession of an enormous tract of territory to the United States.

When the war with Spain broke out our naval administrators had no reason to believe that the same energy would not be displayed by this new enemy. Scattered as our fighting craft were at distant parts of the West Indies, it was only logical to conclude that the approaching Spanish squadron would strike at some exposed part of the Cuban coast, destroy in detail our light gunboats, and, eluding our heavier battle ships (as the swift Spanish cruisers should easily have done), gain Havana or some other convenient port. Recoaling and getting to sea again before a sufficient force could be collected against them, they could have raided the Atlantic coast, or again turned their energies to destroy-

¹ See Maclay's History of American Privateers, p. 226.
ing our war craft in detail. That is what a Dewey, a Sampson, or a Watson would have done with a similar command. That is what Raphael Semmes with one frail gunboat did in our civil war, and that is what our naval administrators might reasonably have expected of Spanish naval prowess, concerning which so much had been gravely predicted by European newspapers. The four cruisers composing the main body of Cervera's squadron are acknowledged to have been swifter than any of our battle ships, thus enabling the Spaniards to keep beyond gunshot of our heavier craft, and allowing them to overhaul and capture our lighter war craft. "It always seemed perfectly natural to me that Cervera, after his long trip across the ocean, should have put into some port for coal, repairs and information before attempting any depredations."¹

In the light of subsequent events, it is a singular fact that neither the United States nor Spain became a party to the Declaration of Paris, signed April 16, 1856, by which Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey renounced privateering. It is even more remarkable that neither the United States nor Spain resorted to this style of warfare in the war of 1898. The advantages Spain would have derived from a predatory war on our commerce are well set forth by Severo Gómez Núñez, Captain of Artillery, in his book, La Guerra Hispano-Americana. He says:

"All [United States] merchant vessels bound for Central America, passing through the straits between the West Indian islands, would be at the mercy of a couple of cruisers of the Alabama type [referring to the famous Confederate cruiser of that name]. . . . Another important point where the commerce with North America might be intercepted is about one thousand to twelve hundred miles east of New York, in a circle not exceeding three hundred miles in diameter. At this place pass

¹ Rear-Admiral Sampson to the author.
all the merchant vessels from Europe bound for the eastern ports of the United States."\(^1\) In another chapter Captain Núñez says: "In the chain of errors, the final link of which—for the present!—is the terrible defeat we suffered, not the least, perhaps, is the order for these two ships [the Vizcaya and the Almirante Oquendo, which were in Havana March 5th] to return to Cape Verde. . . . In co-operation with the small but by no means inefficient vessels which we had at Havana and other ports of the island, and auxiliary vessels in the shape of merchant steamers, they might have constituted a flying squadron which would have given the enemy something to do and something to fear. The reader will agree with us that if we had had such a naval force at Havana, the Americans—who had, moreover, to reckon with Cervera’s squadron, which could have gone out a little later if it chose, re-enforced by the Pelayo and one or two other ships—would have been compelled to divide their fleet considerably, especially if we had considered the possibility of using some privateer cruisers against their commerce."\(^2\)

At the time Cervera entered Santiago de Cuba our maritime forces were scattered along the north and south coast of Cuba. It is almost impossible to conceive of an American commander, with cruisers of equal force and speed, slinking into port without first having struck a crushing blow at our blockading forces, widely scattered and beyond supporting distance as they were on May 19, 1898. An American commander would have run swiftly along the coast, either westward or eastward, picking up and destroying all our detached blockading ships, and possibly recoaling from them, and, relying on superior speed to elude the enemy’s heavier war ships, reach Havana, Cienfuegos or San Juan to recoal before again putting to sea to repeat

\(^1\) La Guerra Hispano-Americana, p. 31.  
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 149.
the programme. We had colliers enough on the Cuban coast to have kept Cervera's squadron in coal for a month. Even had Cervera put to sea again after recoaling at Santiago de Cuba, as he might easily have done any time within two weeks after his arrival, he would still have been in a position to deliver effective blows at our blockading forces, and might have raised the blockade completely.

The extremely critical position in which all the United States maritime forces were placed by the approach of Cervera's cruisers—doubly dangerous on account of their high speed—is well brought out in Commodore Howell's dispatch quoted on page 240. Of course, the department was unable to supply the ships so urgently needed; the extract quoted being given merely to show how widely scattered were the forces engaged in the blockade on the north coast, and how easy it would have been for four swift cruisers—like those under Cervera's command—to have swept the coast, capturing these light craft in detail, and to have entered Havana, where the enemy could have recoaled and sailed again—re-enforced by the "small but by no means inefficient vessels which we had at Havana and other ports of the island, and auxiliary vessels in the shape of merchant steamers"\(^1\) with comparative impunity.

No one was more alive to the danger threatening our navy and coast at this crisis than the Naval Board of Strategy at Washington. Extraordinary preparations were made early in the struggle to guard against this very peril. All knew that this was the one great blow Spain was in a position to strike. It will be remembered that the Vizcaya, after her visit to New York, made for Cuba and then to Porto Rico. Even before war had been declared the Navy Department was closely following the movements of this vessel.

\(^1\) La Guerra Hispano-Americana, p. 149.
On April 13th Secretary Long telegraphed Sampson at Key West: "It is stated on the truth of the Herald that the Oquendo and Vizcaya have left San Juan" [Porto Rico]. A week later Secretary Long telegraphed Sampson that the Almirante Oquendo and Vizcaya had arrived at the Cape de Verdes, and on the following day word was received that the "Spanish fleet has left the Cape de Verdes. Destination unknown." The last dispatch was soon contradicted.

It was to guard against the uncertainties and dangers of contradictory reports that the department, when hostilities seemed inevitable, determined upon the extraordinary expedient of employing some of the line officers of the navy as spies in the enemy's country. "Early in April, 1898, the conflicting nature of the reports in regard to Spanish naval movements, received from various confidential sources, indicated to our Navy Department the desirability of having absolutely trustworthy secret agents abroad for the purpose of gaining prompt and thoroughly dependable information as to the more important details of Spanish naval mobilization. The Navy Department does not divulge either the class or method of employment of those secret agents who, for hire, engaged to obtain this or that item of information. It is to be safely assumed, however, that they were a class similar to that of Spanish agents in this country; and that is to say that, having accepted the pay of one country, they were also willing to sell themselves to the other. Indeed, it at once gave them a value in the market of paid spies which they were only too eager to realize upon. The spy sent out from Washington, and able to command but a few tens of dollars, could proceed to Madrid, reveal and prove his character by demonstrating his ability to communicate with Washington, and then demand and secure his original hire several times over upon engaging to remain at Madrid or to proceed to Cadiz, and send thence to Washington such information as it
might please the Spaniards to dictate. Our naval attachés abroad were marked men who were tracked and watched day by day; they could not have been used had the Navy Department wished."

The maze of conflicting dispatches received by the Secretary early in the war amply justifies the foregoing supposition of Ensign Ward. It was with a view of obtaining absolutely reliable information as to the movements of the Spanish naval forces that Captain Arent Schuyler Crowninshield, chief of the Bureau of Navigation and permanent member of the Board of Strategy, developed the idea of sending two young navy officers to Spain. "Carefully as the Spaniards had guarded every detail of their mobilization, and doubtful though it seemed whether there would be one or two Spanish squadrons in the Atlantic, Captain Crowninshield had a fixed opinion that there would be two, and on this opinion he based his plans. Cervera and Camara both flew their flags afloat, and Crowninshield foresaw that their forces could not be joined into one without running counter to the ambitions of the junior admiral in a manner of which Spanish administrative methods were incapable."  

It was on this shrewd calculation, then, that the Board of Strategy determined to send two officers to Spain—one to watch Cervera and the other to follow Camara. To the first duty Ensign Henry Heber Ward was assigned, and Ensign William Henry Buck was selected to watch Camara. The plan was approved by the Secretaries of the Navy and War and by the President. Lieutenant Humes Houston Whittelsey was detailed to receive all the dispatches sent by the young officers. The only other persons having any knowledge of this daring enterprise were an officer in the United States army and a foreign merchant. Fully alive to the fact that discovery, while in the enemy's

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1 Ensign Henry Heber Ward to the author.  
2 Ibid.
country, meant an ignominious death, these brave young men promptly undertook this most important service.

Sailing from America, April 31st, they heard on their arrival in England that Cervera had left the Cape de Verdes; but as this information was unconfirmed, they decided that Ward should go directly to Cadiz, and, if Cervera was not found there, to proceed across the Atlantic after him, while Buck was to follow Camara. Acting on this plan, the two officers, having dropped their identity as Americans when leaving Washington and assuming the character of traveling Englishmen, separated. Arriving at Cadiz, Ward found Camara there with the Carlos V, the Pelayo, two cruisers, three torpedo boats, and four transatlantic steamers; but no trace of Cervera. Remaining at this place thirty-six hours, in which time he succeeded in identifying each vessel of Camara's squadron, Ward proceeded to Gibraltar, where he communicated in cipher with Washington. It seems that only the day before the department had cabled Dewey that Camara had sailed for the Philippines, so that Ward's reliable report of Camara being at Cadiz was one of the most valuable points of information the department, so far, had received.

Buck joined Ward at Gibraltar, and when it was definitely known that Camara had left Cadiz and was proceeding eastward, Buck took passage in an English steamer and arrived at Port Said just as the Spanish squadron had gone through the canal. Being informed of the probable return of Camara, Buck remained at this place. Truly enough, Camara did return, and Buck promptly reported the fact to the department. When the Spanish admiral started westward, Buck cabled the fact to Washington, and "took a steamer sailing about the same time [Camara did], which continued in sight of the Spanish squadron till near Algiers, which was the port of the steamer's destination. Here Buck again reported Camara's last known posi-
tion. By this time the circumstances of the war rendered Mr. Buck's services in Europe no longer necessary, and he was ordered home.

Meantime Ward had taken steamer for the United States. Stopping at the Madeiras, he learned from the masters of two incoming English steamers that only three Spanish torpedo boats had been left at the Canaries. This important information he at once cabled to Washington. From the Madeiras Ward proceeded to St. Thomas in the West Indies. Here he became satisfied "from reports from Washington and by his own observations" that the port of San Juan (Porto Rico) might become the scene of further operations, and took passage to that place in a British steamer. His arrival there was anticipated by the Spanish authorities, who, having received information from their consul at St. Thomas in regard to Ward, sent four officials of the port, including a Spanish naval officer, to the steamer. The trend of the remarks and questions of these gentlemen showed Ward that no good was intended for him, and he refused to answer further questions unless in the presence of his [the British—Ward still assuming his character as a traveling Englishman] consul. After waiting two hours that gentleman came on board, and the examination was continued. At its conclusion Ward was informed that the officials would take no further action in the matter, but that he must not leave the ship.

Although being in the port, aboard a steamer, gave him opportunities for learning something of the condition of affairs there, Ward had come to San Juan to get detailed and accurate information, and for that reason he requested the British consul to see that his [Ward's] right, as a British subject, to go on shore was regarded. Upon the representations of the consul this permission was finally given, subject to the provision, however, that

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1 Ensign Ward to the author.
he should leave that night when the steamer sailed. He went on shore accompanied by the consul and a Spanish naval officer. A call upon the naval commandant was suggested by one or the other, and was agreed to. The commandant received them cordially, making his apologies to Ward for the trouble and inconvenience, and with true Castilian prodigality of courtesies placed himself and all his household goods at Ward's disposal. The only request the "American" had to make, however, was that the apparent espionage of the Spanish naval officer might be discontinued. This was promptly granted. After walking about the town, along the water front, and through part of the barracks, Ward returned on board the ship, and on reaching St. Thomas cabled to the department, reporting the presence in San Juan harbor of the *Isabel II*, the *General Concha*, and a number of smaller vessels and their armaments.

Ward's visit to San Juan occurred on June 13th. After that he made occasional trips to French and English ports. On July 10th he returned to St. Thomas, where he received a cable dispatch from the department inquiring about the reports that the Spaniards were accumulating supplies at Curaçao and other ports. Ward proceeded to those points and found that the reports were groundless. On July 19th he was ordered to New York. For these extremely hazardous and truly heroic exploits Ward and Buck were recommended for promotion, the former to be advanced ten and the latter eight numbers; the consideration being officially designated as "extraordinary heroism."

Many hundreds of cable dispatches were sent to the department, all of them more or less contradictory. In fact, the Spaniard displayed his skill in a war of words by managing to cable to our department information which was intended to be confusing and misleading. It was one of the most remarkable achievements of the war that the Navy Department managed
to get so promptly at the kernels of truth in these bushels of skillfully contrived falsehoods. On April 29th, the day Cervera left the Cape Verdes, Secretary Long, in his dispatch to Rear-Admiral Sampson, summed up the naval situation on this side of the Atlantic with marvelous accuracy: "Washington, April 29th. Sir: You are informed that we have telegrams from St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, stating in effect that the armored cruisers Infanta María Teresa, Cristóbal Colón, Oquendo and Vizcaya, also the three torpedo-boat destroyers Plutón, Terror and Furor, sailed, it is claimed, for Cuba this morning; that at the same time the transports Ciudad de Cádiz and San Francisco, and the three torpedo boats Rayo, Ariete and Azor, left for the Canaries. The transports and torpedo boats returned shortly after leaving port, owing to a slight collision between the Ariete and Rayo at sea. There are also reports that the Pelayo is in Cádiz, but this has not been confirmed by reliable telegrams, though it is thought to be true." The secretary could not have summed up the situation on the other side of the Atlantic more accurately on that day had he been there in person.

The crisis of the war was now approaching. The all-important point was to ascertain where this squadron would strike its first blow; if, indeed, it was bound westward at all. Secretary Long promptly took the most effective measures for gaining the first news of the enemy's whereabouts should he arrive on this side of the Atlantic. The swift ocean steamers Harvard, Captain Charles Stanhope Cotton, the St. Louis, Captain Caspar Frederick Goodrich, and the Yale, Captain William Clinton Wise, were stationed in various parts of the West Indies, so as to gain the first possible information of the approaching squadron. The Harvard was ordered eastward of the Windward Islands, her cruising grounds being the point 15° 38' north latitude, longitude 59° 40' west, and latitude 14° 25' and longitude 59°
30° west. The St. Louis was ordered to cruise from the northern point of the Harvard's patrol to 16° 55' north, while the Yale was to hover in the vicinity of Porto Rico. The general instructions to the commander of the Harvard were: "If you get no positive information by noon of May 10th, you will proceed to the chief ports of the island of Martinique and, if the enemy's squadron is sighted, to send word of that fact to the department at the earliest possible moment." The same instructions were given to the St. Louis and Yale, excepting that the former was to touch at the chief ports of Guadaloupe after meridian of May 10th, while the Yale was to continue on her patrol until the evening of May 13th, when she was to look into St. Thomas or any other port which Captain Wise might deem desirable.

Having followed the movements of the Spanish Cape Verde squadron with remarkable accuracy, the department, on April 29th, set forth the situation in a dispatch to Rear-Admiral Sampson as follows: "Though this Spanish squadron is reported in the telegrams above mentioned as being bound for Cuba, it seems very doubtful whether it would proceed immediately to your neighborhood [Havana], but it might possibly go to San Juan, Porto Rico, or some other part of that island, or to the eastern part of Cuba [just where it went, Santiago de Cuba—E. S. M.]. It is presumed that if they do take refuge in a port, as above mentioned, that movement would be favorable to your operations against them. It has been frequently suggested that this Spanish squadron, or part of it, might proceed to the vicinity of Cape St. Roque for the purpose of intercepting the Oregon and Marietta, now known to be on their way to re-enforce you, and which are expected to arrive about the end of this month [on April 30th the Oregon and Marietta reached Rio de Janeiro]. Of course the department need not remind you of the importance of confining the enemy in San
Juan, Porto Rico, in case they go in there for coal or other supplies.

"It was a matter of common rumor some time ago that the Spanish authorities were preparing an old hulk or hulks, loaded with stone, for the purpose of obstructing the entrance to the harbor. Whether they have been placed is not positively known. It has, of course, been suspected that the destination of the four Spanish armored cruisers and torpedo destroyers might be on the Atlantic coast of the United States, probably northward, for the purpose of inflicting what injury they could upon our coastwise cities and towns, and capturing such of our merchant ships and smaller men of war as they might fall in with. If this prove to be the case, it may be necessary to detach one of the battle ships of the squadron operating on the coast of Cuba to proceed northward and re-enforce the flying squadron and such other vessels as we might have in that region. Therefore, in reflecting upon the situation, you must be prepared to entertain the possibility of such detachment. It would seem that, after such a detachment had been made, the squadron on the coast of Cuba would still be strong enough to meet any other Spanish ships that might appear, or to meet the four armored cruisers and the destroyers above mentioned in case they should leave the northern coast and suddenly appear upon the Cuban coast. But if the four Spanish armored cruisers, after feinting upon the northern coast, proceed to the West Indies for the purpose of there joining the Pelayo, Alfonso XIII and Carlos V, it would be supposed that our northern squadron would follow them and re-enforce you in operating against them."

The foregoing is sufficient evidence of the great advantage the Spaniards held at this greatest crisis of the war. They had a compact squadron of four armored cruisers, superior in point of speed to any force we could hope to bring against them, and were approach-
ing to deliver a telling blow against the sea power of the United States. Above all, they had the incalculable advantage of selecting their own point for beginning the attack. As Secretary Long said, in the above instructions to Sampson, this force might strike its initial blow at the United States anywhere from Cape St. Roque, Brazil, to Machias, Me., a stretch of several thousand miles. Well might the nation have awaited with the keenest anxiety the coming of Cervera's ships!
CHAPTER XVII.

SEARCHING FOR THE ENEMY.

That there is a marked distinction between the Anglo-Saxon and Latin minds was forcibly demonstrated in the figuring of the American authorities as to the probable course Cervera would take in crossing the Atlantic. Truly, there was a wide scope of possibilities as to where the Spanish commander might strike. He had the choice of intercepting the Oregon and Marietta at Cape St. Roque, of running into the several available Spanish ports in the West Indies or, finally, striking at some of the many poorly defended seaports in the United States before making for a West Indian harbor. Having carefully canvassed all the contingencies in the case, the Americans came to the conclusion—very sensible to the Anglo-Saxon mind—that Cervera would make for Porto Rico—preferably San Juan—and, after recoaling there, strike at our blockading vessels scattered along the Cuban coast, where he had an admirable opportunity of inflicting great damage and of making important captures, which the superior speed of his vessels would enable him to do, before any considerable force of our comparatively slow-going war ships could be collected to oppose him. Indeed, with the numerous coaling stations within easy reach in the West Indies and the thousands of tons of American coal afloat in that vicinity, it is not improbable that the swift Spanish cruisers could for some time have eluded any considerable squadron we could have directed against them.
To the Anglo-Saxon mind this seemed the most probable course the Spanish squadron would take in approaching the western side of the Atlantic. On May 3d Secretary Long summed up the situation, in a cable dispatch to Rear-Admiral William Thomas Sampson at Key West, as follows: "No large army movement can take place for a fortnight, and no small one will be undertaken until we know the whereabouts of the four Spanish armored cruisers and destroyers. If their objective point is Porto Rico, they should arrive about May 8th, and immediate action against them and San Juan is then authorized. In such case the flying squadron will re-enforce you." Sampson learned of the departure of the Spanish squadron from Cape Verde while he was on the blockade off Havana, May 1st. "We thought the first point Cervera would touch at would be San Juan, Porto Rico, where there was a good harbor, plenty of water and a good coal supply. Furthermore, this was the most convenient Spanish port for renewing that supply."¹

Acting on the information received, Rear-Admiral Sampson, on May 4th, collected the following war ships at Padre Cruz Light in the St. Nicolas Channel: The *New York* (flagship), Captain French Ensor Chadwick; battle ships *Iowa*, Captain Robley Dunglison Evans, and *Indiana*, Captain Henry Clay Taylor; monitors *Amphitrite*, Captain Charles James Barclay, and *Terror*, Captain Nicoll Ludlow; cruisers *Detroit*, Commander James Henry Dayton, and *Montgomery*, Commander George Albert Converse; tug *Wompatuck*, Lieutenant Carl William Jungen; and torpedo boat *Porter*, Lieutenant John Charles Fremont. Formidable as this force might seem on paper, it will be found that, had the two commanders met in the open sea, Cervera's squadron would have had little difficulty in sailing around it at pleasure. Sampson said: "In one respect

¹ Rear-Admiral Sampson to the author.
we were at a great disadvantage. The monitors proved to be a grievous disappointment and a source of great anxiety. The Amphitrite and Terror were so slow that, in order to make even seven and a half knots an hour, both had to be taken in tow—one by the Iowa and the other by the New York. The machinery of the battle ship Indiana also was unreliable, which, added to the insufficient supply of coal carried by the monitors, rendered the squadron, as a whole, most inefficient in mobility. . . . On the other hand, the trial speed of all the four Spanish ships was about twenty-one knots, making them, as a squadron, the fastest in the world. Of course we did not expect these ships to maintain their trial speed; our own ships did not do that. . . . We had to assume in the enemy's squadron that the maximum speed which they could maintain would not be in excess of sixteen knots. . . . In what a plight we should have been had we met Cervera's ships at this time! For lack of speed, the monitors could not have come into action at all."¹

With strong hopes, then, of meeting Cervera's squadron off Porto Rico, Rear-Admiral Sampson, following the reasoning of a sound Anglo-Saxon mind, hurried eastward along the northern coast of Cuba. As he passed the harbor of Manati, Cuba, the squadron was sighted by a small boat containing Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew S. Rowan, son of Vice-Admiral Stephen Clegg Rowan. Young Rowan had been on a perilous mission to Cuba, where he had gained valuable information from the insurgents. He left Jamaica in a small boat manned by Cubans, and, landing in the district of Portillo, had traversed the eastern end of Cuba and reached the northern coast at Manati, where he again entered a native boat, in which he made his way to Nassau. The boat was not seen, or at least no attention was paid to it, by the American squadron.

¹ Sampson in Century Magazine, April, 1899.
Arriving at Cape Haytien, Sampson, on May 8th, cabled the department: "[I] have received no information of the Spanish armored vessels. I request, upon arrival, the three American line steamers [Harvard, Yale and St. Louis] be ordered to report by telegraph or otherwise at St. Thomas. Lacking the services of these vessels, I will have to return to the west immediately. I shall await answer to this request at Cape Haytien, and if granted, I will proceed to San Juan,

probably destroying fortifications, establishing a temporary base at Culebra Island to the east of Porto Rico, as entrance to San Juan is obstructed. Upon the arrival of the Spanish squadron in the West Indies, I request the Massachusetts and Texas."

Early on the morning of May 12th the American squadron approached San Juan, but a glance was sufficient to show that the Spanish war ships were not in port. Sampson had reckoned on the enemy arriving there May 8th. The question then was, Had they reached that port, recoaled and gone elsewhere? If so, the vital point was to discover where they had
gone. The *Yale*, Captain William Clinton Wise, in accordance with instructions from the department, had cruised round the island of Porto Rico, but failed to find any trace of the hostile vessels. In fact, no men-of-war were discovered in any of the harbors, excepting at San Juan, where two small gunboats and a large armed transport were at anchor.

On May 8th, while Sampson's force was at Cape Haytien, the *Yale* captured the Spanish merchant steamer *Rita*, from St. Thomas, laden with coal and a general cargo. She was placed in the hands of a prize crew, and was taken into Charleston, S. C. On May 9th, while Captain Wise was reconnoitering the harbor of San Juan, an armed transport came out and drove the American liner off. "Had this vessel," the *Yale*, said Wise, "been armed with one or two 5-inch rapid-fire guns, I would have captured her." On the following day, while still cruising near San Juan, the *Yale* was subjected to the fire of heavy guns, but the shots fell short. On May 12th she communicated with the *St. Louis*, Captain Caspar Frederick Goodrich, and learned that that vessel, also, had been unable to gain the slightest information as to the whereabouts of the hostile ships. The *Yale* continued her search for the Spanish squadron, so that she did not communicate with Sampson when the latter arrived off San Juan.

As Rear-Admiral Sampson drew near to San Juan he determined upon a bombardment of the fortifications of that place, with a view to developing their strength, and also to give his men some practice at target firing under the most trying circumstances. With his usual care and forethought, Sampson summoned his commanding officers to the flagship, and submitted his plan to them. The trade winds caused a heavy swell off the harbor of San Juan, which rendered the gun fire of monitors extremely unreliable, besides which the charts of the island were imperfect, causing an approach
to the city dangerous, excepting when in the regular track of commerce. To reduce these difficulties to a minimum, Sampson, on reaching San Juan, sent the light-draught gunboat *Detroit*, Commander Dayton, with the *Wompatuck*, Lieutenant Jungen, to station a small boat having a flag prominently displayed at a point where the American ships were to start on their round of fire. This brought the starboard batteries of the fighting ships to bear on the Spanish fortifications, while leadsmen were to be constantly engaged on the port side to take soundings.

In accordance with this programme, Commander Dayton, of the *Detroit*, forged ahead of the squadron until he was about half a mile from the reef, when he stood eastward until Fort Canuela and the western end of Cabras Island were in range. He then headed east by south. The *Wompatuck* now steamed in and dropped her flag boat at the point desired by Sampson. "Very few signs of life were observed on shore. Signals were being made at the semaphore station, and a few men were seen hurrying about the morro, apparently carrying rammers and sponges. With the light as it was, it was difficult to accurately determine the position of the guns." 1 Having transferred his flag to the *Iowa*, Sampson formed his line of battle, the light-draught *Detroit* leading and constantly taking soundings so as to give warning to the larger ships of dangerous shoals, followed by the *Iowa, Indiana, New York, Amphitrite* and *Terror*; the *Montgomery* being detailed to silence the little fort of Canuela.

At 5.15 A. M. the head of the American column entered the firing line some forty-five hundred yards from the morro, and at 5.17 A. M. two shots had been fired from the *Iowa's* 6-pounder on the starboard forward bridge and from the starboard 8-inch turret gun. This fire was quickly supplemented by the discharge of all

1 Commander Dayton's official report.
From a copyrighted photograph by E. Muller.

First-class battle ship Indiana.
the guns in the starboard battery. The other vessels also fired as soon as their batteries came within range. For nearly ten minutes the enemy made no response; but at 5.24 A. M. they began, most of their missiles falling wide of the mark. The Americans frequently were compelled to cease firing on account of the dense volumes of smoke which collected round them, rendering it impossible to aim with accuracy. As the squadron approached the eastern limit of the firing line Sampson had marked out, about fifteen hundred yards from the morro, the Iowa turned northward and swung round so as to retrace her course, the other vessels of the squadron following her.

“The Detroit took her station in accordance with orders. She was expected to run close in, so that the Spanish guns in the fortifications could not be depressed sufficiently to reach her. Her mission was to destroy any torpedo boat that might venture out of the harbor. When I found that she could be reached, I recalled her from a position which would have been hazardous in the extreme but for the fact that the fire from her 5-inch guns was so great that it drove the Spaniards from their guns and they could not reply effectually so long as it was maintained.”  

While this spirited episode was taking place the line of American ships had returned to the starting point. Before beginning the second round, Sampson, observing that the smoke from the guns had greatly interfered with the accuracy of aim, signaled, “Use only large guns,” by which means the additional smoke from the secondary batteries was avoided. The second turn developed the fact that the Spanish fortifications were armed with more cannon than the Americans had been led to believe. However, the enemy fired too hurriedly to occasion any considerable damage. When our column had reached the end of the firing line for the second

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1 Rear-Admiral Sampson to the author.
time the *Detroit* and *Montgomery* had been ordered not to engage at close quarters again.

After making three circuits—each closer to the fortifications than the preceding one—Sampson, at 7.45 A.M., withdrew his ships, and ordered his commanding officers to report casualties. The *Terror*, which had been lying close inshore, poured in a terrific fire on the enemy, and did not desist until 8.15 A.M.

The reports of the commanding officers in this engagement were as gratifying as the bombardment had been spirited. While returning from the end of the firing line to the starting point, a 6- or 8-inch shell exploded at the after port skid frames of the *Iowa*, beneath the boats, wounding three men and damaging the first whaleboat, sailing launch, the joiner work about the bridge, and inflicting other slight injuries.\(^1\) This shell probably came from the morro. Captain Evans reported that this shot, like nearly all the missiles falling near the American ships, was fired when our column was returning on the outward course from the end of the firing line to the starting point. The wounded in the *Iowa* were J. Mitchell, G. Merkle, and R. C. Hill. Not a single shot struck the *Iowa*'s hull, the Spanish projectiles taking effect only in her superstructure. Some damage was caused by the concussion of the battle ship's guns.

To the surprise of all who had witnessed the plucky fight of the *Detroit*, her commander reported that his ship had not been struck once, and no one aboard had been injured. Captain Ludlow of the *Terror*, after following the column formation on its three circuits, ran closer in and opened a heavy fire, which was especially directed against a "most vicious" battery situated a short distance south of the morro. When the *Terror* finally withdrew, the Spaniards pitched shell after shell at her, but not one struck her, though a few fragments

\(^1\) Official report of Captain Evans.
afterward were picked up on her deck. With the exception of the leadsman's apron on the port side being carried away by a shell, the monitor was uninjured and no one on board was hurt. The New York was struck only once, and that by a 6-inch shell, which came aboard about six feet above the after end of the superstructure, taking off the top of the after stanchion, and in exploding killed one seaman and wounded four. The man killed had disobeyed orders by unnecessarily exposing himself. This shot was received from the eastern battery in the third circuit, then about five thousand yards distant. Lieutenant-Commander Albert Gleaves Berry of the Amphitrite said that the "so-called ventilation system [in the monitor] is absolutely worthless. It has never worked satisfactorily at any time." This testimony is valuable, as showing the undesirability of this class of war ships in cruising.

Edwin Emerson, Jr., a war correspondent who visited San Juan shortly after this bombardment, says: "It did not take me long to discover that the effects of the American bombardment on the fortifications, as well as in the city, were more widespread than I had anticipated. In the outer breastworks facing the sea each of the older forts and towers had suffered severely, while some of the batteries lying under their shadow were all but dismantled. The havoc wrought in the city was plain to all. More than a score of houses had gaping holes and clefts in their walls. The fragments of one shell, after snapping the flagstaff of the Intendencia in twain, shattered the roof of the building, went through the so-called throne room, struck two officers and some soldiers who were chatting on its marble steps, and finally disfigured the front and rear walls of several adjoining buildings, injuring and wounding two other persons. Within the harbor, where the visiting for-

1 Official report of Captain Ludlow.
2 Official report of Captain Chadwick.
3 Lieutenant-Commander Berry to the author.
eign men-of-war rode at anchor, believing themselves to be beyond the range of our guns, many shots likewise took effect. Had the Spanish fleet been hiding inside, it would have been driven to seek the open sea. Even the neutral ships found themselves in uncomfortable quarters. One stray shot went clean through the forward smokestack of the French corvette, *L'Amiral Rigault de Genouilly*. Another tore into the rigging of the British merchant vessel *Albborough*, splintering one of her topmasts, while several shells exploded on the harbor front, in the immediate vicinity of the powder magazine of the Spanish navy yard, causing the colored stevedores and wharfmen on the water front to scatter in all directions.”

Having tempered the nerves of his men by this fire, Rear-Admiral Sampson, being satisfied that the enemy’s squadron was not at San Juan, steamed out of sight of land in a direction that gave the Spaniards the impression that the American squadron was to remain in the vicinity. At nightfall, however, Sampson detailed the *Montgomery* to proceed to St. Thomas for news, while the other vessels made for Cape Haytien. On the evening of the 14th the squadron fell in with the hospital ship *Solace*, which reported that after leaving Key West a press boat had hailed her and said that an Associated Press dispatch was in circulation to the effect that Cer-\textsuperscript{\textdegree}vera had returned to Cadiz. Determined, if this report was true, to return and complete the subjugation of San Juan, Sampson halted his ships off Porto Plata, and sent in the *Porter* to communicate with the department and with American consuls at various places.

\textsuperscript{1} Century Magazine, September, 1898.
CHAPTER XVIII.

ARRIVAL OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON.

In keeping with the department's comprehensive plans for detecting the first appearance of the Spanish squadron on this side of the Atlantic, the liners *St. Paul*, Captain Charles Dwight Sigsbee, and *Harvard*, Captain Charles Stanhope Cotton, had been patrolling their beats, some eighty miles east of the Windward Islands. At half-past nine o'clock on the morning of May 11th, the *Harvard*—after a vain search for the enemy—put into the harbor of St. Pierre, island of Martinique, in order to communicate with our consul at that place, George L. Darte. Owing to the long delay in obtaining pratique and in working the big liner to her anchorage, Captain Cotton was unable to make his report to the department until late in the afternoon. Meantime the consul and captain of the port boarded the *Harvard*, the latter tendering in behalf of the governor, whose official residence was at Fort de France, some fifteen miles distant, the usual courtesies of the port. After Captain Cotton had sent his cable dispatches to the department, to Rear-Admiral Sampson and to Captain Goodrich of the *St. Louis*, saying that the *Harvard* had neither seen nor heard anything of the enemy, he went ashore and called on the American consul.

A few minutes before six o'clock that evening a messenger hurried into the consulate with a telegram from a trusted agent at Fort de France, announcing that a Spanish torpedo boat destroyer had arrived at that place at 4 p.m. Upon the receipt of this startling news,
Captain Cotton hastened aboard the Harvard to prepare a cipher dispatch for Washington, requesting Mr. Darte in the mean time to gain any additional details he could. At 8 p.m. the captain of the port came aboard and officially informed Cotton that the Spanish torpedo boat destroyer Furor had arrived at Fort de France, and had departed, or would depart, about 7 p.m., and that, in accordance with custom, the Harvard was prohibited from putting to sea before 7 p.m. on the following day.

With a view to obtaining more explicit details of the Furor, Captain Cotton detailed Lieutenant Theodore P. Kane of the marines to proceed at once to Fort de France. As there was no regular mean of transportation at that hour—the night being exceptionally dark and squally—Kane took a small rowboat, and, after a most perilous trip through an exceedingly rough sea across the open roadstead, arrived at the fort at two o'clock the following morning, May 12th, returning to the Harvard at 9 a.m. by the small steamer that plded between Fort de France and St. Pierre. He reported that he had seen and counted five large steamers, hull down, in the offing; that the Spanish steamer Alicante, a hospital ship, was lying in the inner harbor, reported to have hospital stores and troops aboard; that as he was returning to St. Pierre in the local steamer he passed, about 8.15 a.m., within a quarter of a mile of a large Spanish torpedo boat destroyer [the Terror] standing into the harbor from the direction of, and evidently belonging to, the ships in the offing; and that the latter, being to the southwest, were standing off and on, apparently waiting for news from the shore.

At noon May 12th the French authorities informed Captain Cotton that the Terror had arrived at Fort de France at 8 a.m., and would probably leave about noon, and that the Harvard would not be permitted to leave without twenty-four hours' notice. From information received from various sources Captain Cotton was satisfied that his ship was blockaded by the Spanish squad-
ron, and on May 13th he cabled to the department that the Spanish consul had protested to the French officials against the presence of the American liner at St. Pierre, and requested that she be compelled to leave port at once; which, of course, meant that she would be captured by the enemy's squadron. Secretary Long immediately cabled back: "Vigorously protest against being forced to sea in the face of a superior blockading force, especially as you were detained previously in the port by the French authorities because Spanish men-of-war had sailed for another port. Also state that the United States authorities will bring the matter to the attention of the French Government. Urge the United States consul to protest vigorously."

There can be no doubt that the majority of the people at Martinique were strongly in sympathy with the Spanish, and would have done anything to further their interests. As Captain Cotton cabled to Washington: "Our friends are very few here or at Fort de France, while those whose sympathies are wholly and openly with Spain are many." However, Cotton admitted that "the French governor is courteous and shows no disposition to force us out of port." He further said: "I have seen in some New York papers references to alleged delay in the cable offices at St. Pierre in handling cablegrams to and from this ship. As to that, I can only say that I have no knowledge, personal or otherwise, of any delay, certainly not to the delivery of messages to this ship, and there seems to be good ground to believe that my messages were sent as soon as possible after their receipt at the cable office." It is a fact, however, that some of the dispatches received from Martinique at this time were mutilated so as to render portions of them unintelligible. Whether this was intentional or not probably never will be known. It certainly was unfortunate, and gave reason for suspicion.

Captain Cotton did have cause to complain, however, of the activity of the people in aiding the Spanish
at this critical juncture. He said: "Fishermen and men from the hills report that the Spanish cruisers and small steamers have been seen cruising at night near St. Pierre and in the straits north and south of the islands; that strange and unusual signals have been made at sea and on the hills back of the town; that a torpedo cruiser passed near the town going to the northward and southward on the night of May 11th, and that one lay off Pearl Island last night [May 12th], six and a half miles north of the town. As to the signals there is no doubt, for at frequent intervals last night we saw them on shore along the hills back and north and south of the town, and one colored signal some distance at sea. On the night of the 11th we saw rocket signals from a hill northeast of the town, and an English gentleman who owns a plantation in that vicinity told Mr. Davids [the former American vice-consul] that some men known to be Spanish sympathizers had been found on his place with rockets on the night of the 11th instant."

There is little question that Cervera, by means of these signals and by his friends on shore, learned of the disposition of the entire American fighting vessels at that time, and also of the presence of Rear-Admiral Sampson at San Juan and of his bombardment of that place on the morning of the 12th. The next news as to the whereabouts of Cervera's squadron was received from the American consul at Curaçao, Leonard B. Smith, who cabled that four armored cruisers and two torpedo boat destroyers had arrived off that place May 14th. "I never received Cotton's report, or, if I did, not until after I received the definite report from Curaçao which was brought off by the Porter at Porto Plata. This information was the first definite and reliable news that I had of Cervera since he left the Cape Verdes."¹

The knowledge that Cervera's squadron had arrived off Martinique, and later off Curaçao, was a great relief

¹ Rear-Admiral Sampson to the author.
to the department. It reduced by one half the serious problem of locating this formidable Spanish force. It was now known that the enemy was on the south side of Cuba, and not on the north side. Instantly the intricate machinery of the Government was put into operation to concentrate all our available naval power at such points as to enable the department to run down and corner the Spanish ships somewhere in the West Indies. Dispatches, telegrams, and cable messages at once were speeding from Washington to all corners of the now narrowed scene of operations, notifying all our commanders that the enemy's squadron had touched at Martinique and Curaçao, and might soon be expected at some point in Cuba or Porto Rico.

In accordance with the comprehensive scheme of the department to spread out a network of scouting boats which was to finally locate the enemy, the Minneapolis, Captain Theodore Frelinghuysen Jewell, was ordered to cruise near Monte Christi, Hayti; the St. Paul and the Yale, Captains Sigsbee and Wise, between Morant Point, Jamaica, and the west end of Hayti; the Har-
ARRIVAL OF THE SPANISH SQUADRON. 1898.

ward, to watch Mona Passage and the north side of Porto Rico; while the St. Louis, Captain Goodrich—then engaged in cutting cables off Santiago and Guantanamo—was to proceed at once to Ponce, then to St. Thomas, thus placing herself in a position to detect any attempt of the Spaniards to round the eastern end of Porto Rico. Commodore Schley, with the Flying Squadron at Hampton Roads, was ordered to Key West, arriving there May 18th and left the following day for Cienfuegos with the Brooklyn, Captain Francis Augustus Cook, Massachusetts, Captain Francis John Higginson, Texas, Captain John Woodward Philip, two cruisers, and two torpedo boats, so as to cover the western end of Cuba. The main squadron, under Sampson in person, proceeded in all haste to Key West to recoal and to be at a point where it could best cover the blockading squadron off Havana and anticipate further moves of the enemy.

In a communication to Sampson, dated May 16th, Secretary Long summed up the situation with remarkable accuracy, as follows: "It would seem probable that the enemy, after coaling, may haul up for Santiago de Cuba and the south side of the island, or pass through the Yucatan Channel and endeavor to operate in the Gulf of Mexico. It would seem doubtful whether he would pass through the Windward Passage and upon the north coast of Cuba or whether he would round Cape San Antonio and endeavor to appear off Havana or Key West, as in either case he would be advancing upon a superior force. Still, his passing to the north side of Cuba would appear to be within the possibilities, though if he feels it necessary to show himself on the coast of Cuba, it would seem more probable that he would select Santiago de Cuba or perhaps Cienfuegos. It would be difficult for him to justify a campaign in the Gulf of Mexico with an American fleet in his rear and free to act against him and with the only two passages of exit in all probability carefully guarded. How-
ever this may be, you are of course alive to the necessity of watching him vigilantly, and it is hoped that three fast vessels that the department has dispatched upon his track may afford you useful information in the premises. You are, of course, at liberty to recall them if you think their present services unnecessary, or you may use such ships of your fleet to co-operate with them as you may think desirable. The department, however, strongly hopes that you may be enabled soon to bring the Spanish squadron to an engagement with such force as may insure their capture."

The three fast vessels ordered to pursue and keep in touch with the Spanish squadron were the Harvard, St. Paul and Minneapolis. Rear-Admiral Sampson so far changed the plan of sending fast cruisers in search of the Spanish squadron as to order the Yale to assist the St. Paul in cruising between Morant Point and Nicolas Mole, Hayti; the Harvard to watch at Mona Passage and on the north side of Porto Rico; the St. Louis engaged in cutting cables at Santiago de Cuba and Guantanamo, after which she was to proceed to Ponce and then to St. Thomas; while Sampson with his squadron proceeded with all speed to Key West.

It was while the St. Paul was off San Juan, Porto Rico, June 22d, that one of the most satisfactory actions of the war took place. On June 19th the St. Paul left the blockading squadron off Santiago de Cuba, and, in the hope of intercepting Spanish vessels, proceeded at a moderate rate of speed through the Mona Passage, so that she did not arrive off San Juan until early June 22d. At 12.40 p. m. of that day Lieutenant Julius A. Pattson discovered a cruiser coming out of the harbor, and ordered the emergency signal for manning the guns. Captain Sigsbee at once proceeded to the bridge and observed a bark-rigged Spanish cruiser of the Infanta Isabel type coming out, but keeping under the protection of the shore batteries. Twenty minutes later the torpedo boat destroyer Terror, which
had formed part of Cervera’s squadron in crossing the Atlantic, but had put into San Juan for repairs, steamed into view and headed eastward. All this time a heavy fire had been opened on the *St. Paul* by the 8- and 10-inch guns of the Morro, some of the missiles going beyond the American liner. Unmindful of these shells, Sigsbee moved slowly eastward, taking care to keep the *Terror* on such a bearing that if she made a dash at the *St. Paul* the Spaniard would be compelled to rush through the trough of the sea, thus placing herself at a disadvantage. A further advantage the shrewd American commander obtained by this maneuver was that of throwing the *Infanta Isabel* completely out of range in case the *Terror* engaged the *St. Paul*.

At 1.20 p. m. the *Terror*, then nearly within reach of the liner’s heavy guns, made a dash for the *St. Paul* with the intention of blowing her up. It was a moment of supreme interest and of international significance. At last the much boasted torpedo boat was upon trial under battle conditions. The big American liner presented a broad target, and was worthy game. Sigsbee coolly reserved his fire until the on-rushing torpedo boat was fifty-four hundred yards distant, when he gave a most beautiful exhibition of American gunnery. Notwithstanding the great distance, it was seen that the *St. Paul’s* heavier shells were falling close to her dangerous foe. “Suddenly that vessel [the *Terror*] headed up into the wind, broadside to the *St. Paul*, as if injured, but kept up a fire from her battery, her shot falling short. I was looking at her from the upper bridge with binocular glasses of great power, and at this time I saw a shell explode, apparently against her hull abaft the after smokestack. She immediately turned with port helm and stood in for the harbor at considerable speed, her behavior giving evidence of damage. Instead of standing in through the channel close to the Morro, whence she had issued to begin her attack, she fell a long distance to leeward. When down...
toward Cabras Island she rounded to and stood south-eastward toward the harbor, apparently not under good management. The Spanish cruiser showed concern by standing in after her.”

Afterward it was learned that the Spaniards grounded the Terror to prevent her sinking, three shells having struck her, killing two of her men and wounding several others. After the disabling of the Terror another Spanish cruiser, in company with the Infanta Isabel, steamed out as if to give battle. Sigsbee calmly awaited their oncoming, but as they declined to pass beyond the protection of the land batteries no further engagement took place. The St. Paul remained off this port until the 26th, when she made for St. Nicolas Mole, Hayti. In this creditable affair Captain Sigsbee especially commended Lieutenant-Commander William H. Driggs; Lieutenants James C. Gilmore, Samuel Nicholson Kane, John M. Poyer, Robert H. Osborne, George Young; Ensigns Charles S. Bookwalter, Wilfrid V. Powelson, A. L. Colwell, Orton P. Jackson and Chief Engineer John Hunter.

Shortly after sending the above dispatch to Sampson the department learned that Cervera carried munitions of war “essential to the defense of Havana. Orders imperative to reach Havana, Cienfuegos or railroad port connected with Havana at all hazards.” This later information raised doubt in the minds of all as to whether Cervera was bound for Havana direct or Cienfuegos. It seemed impossible that he would make for the north coast of Cuba in view of the superior force he would meet off Havana, and, as Santiago was not connected by rail with the Cuban capital, Cienfuegos seemed to be the haven the Spanish squadron was bound for. Immediately upon the news that Cervera had reached Curacao swift dispatch boats were sent to give warning to all the commanders on the blockade.

1 Official report of Captain Sigsbee.
CHAPTER XIX.

SCHLEY'S PROGRESS TOWARD SANTIAGO.

Anxious to be at the base of naval operations as soon as possible, Sampson, about noon, May 18th, reached Key West in the New York—the remaining part of his force arriving on the following day—and found that the Flying Squadron had preceded him a few hours. At 8 a.m., May 19th, Schley, with the Brooklyn, Captain Francis Augustus Cook; the Massachusetts, Captain Francis John Higginson; the Texas, Captain John Woodward Philip; and the Scorpion, Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, sailed under orders from Sampson to "establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay."

At this time, neither Sampson nor Schley knew exactly where Cervera's ships were. They only knew that the enemy had touched at Martinique, again at Curaçao, and had sailed, probably, for some port on the south coast of Cuba. When Schley left Key West, both the rear admiral and the commodore believed that Cervera was bringing munitions of war for the defense of Havana, and that Cienfuegos, being the nearest deep-water port having railroad communication with the Cuban capital, was his destination.

But scarcely had the Flying Squadron left Key West when, on that evening (May 19th), a cable dispatch from Havana was received announcing that Cervera had arrived at Santiago. This dispatch was repeated "with great positiveness," said Sampson, "on the evening of the 20th"—the hostile ships actually

1 Official report of Commodore Schley.
making that port on the morning of the 19th. On that day (May 19th) Secretary Long telegraphed Sampson at Key West: "The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba might very well be correct; so the department advises you that you send word immediately to Schley to proceed at once off Santiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving only one small vessel off Cienfuegos."

Scene of Sampson's and Schley's advance on Santiago de Cuba.

With his usual care Sampson, on the morning of May 20th, sent this telegram in duplicate—one copy by the Iowa, Captain Robley Dunglison Evans, and the other in the torpedo boat Dupont, Lieutenant Spencer Shepard Wood—to Schley. Sampson, however, having received only the first dispatch announcing Cervera's arrival, thought the Spaniards might still be bound for Cienfuegos, and, acting on the discretion given him in the word "advise" in the secretary's dispatch, added this memorandum: "After duly considering this telegram, I have decided to make no change in the present plan—that is, that you should hold your position off Cienfuegos."

The Iowa and Dupont arrived off Cienfuegos May
22d, and, in accordance with his instructions, Schley established a line of blockade about four miles offshore. At night an inshore line, consisting of the Scorpion, Dupont and Castine, Commander Robert Mallory Berry—the last ship arriving on the scene May 23d, as convoy to the collier Merrimac, Commander James Madison Miller—was maintained.

A few hours after he had sent these dispatches to Schley, Sampson received further news from Havana which satisfied him that Cervera's squadron really was at Santiago de Cuba. The flagship New York left Key West early on the morning of May 21st. Before sailing Sampson sent word to Schley by the Hawk, Lieutenant John Hood: "Spanish squadron probably at Santiago. . . . If you are satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos proceed with all possible dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him in port."

As we have seen, the Flying Squadron left Key West at 8 a.m., May 19th, under orders to "establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay." These ships arrived off Cienfuegos on the morning of May 22d—seventy-two hours after starting—and it is here that the first charge of tardiness is made against Commodore Schley. It is pointed out that he was on the most important mission of the war—namely, the discovery of Cervera's whereabouts at the earliest possible moment; that he knew all our naval and military operations must be suspended until this vital question had been definitely settled; that he commanded the Flying Squadron, the vessels of which—as the name implies—had been selected especially for speed and celerity in movement; and that he started from Key West with ample coal supply, and was not encumbered with colliers, transports, or other slow-going craft. And yet it was not until the "morning of the 22d [that we] stood in for the entrance of Cienfuegos harbor."  

1 Official report of Commodore Schley.
In its statement of Facts the Schley court of inquiry declared that "Commodore Schley did not proceed with utmost dispatch off Cienfuegos and blockade that port as closely as possible." Admiral Dewey, however, gave it as his opinion that "the passage from Key West to Cienfuegos was made by the Flying Squadron with all possible dispatch, Commodore Schley having in view the importance of arriving off Cienfuegos with as much coal as possible in the ship's bunkers." Dewey also declared that "the blockade off Cienfuegos was effective."

It appears that for two and a half days after his arrival off Cienfuegos Schley made no serious attempt, of his own volition, to ascertain whether or not Cervera's squadron was in that port—the vital object of Schley's mission. This is most remarkable when we learn from the commodore himself that, on approaching the harbor, he heard the sound of cannon fire which he construed as a salute for Cervera's raiding force. He says: "On May 21st [about 6 p.m.], when about forty miles southwest of this port, I heard, from the bridge of this vessel [the Brooklyn], firing of guns toward Cienfuegos, which I interpreted as a welcome to the Spanish fleet; and the news this morning [May 23d] by the Adula convinced me that the fleet is there. Latest war bulletins from Jamaica, received this morning, asserts that the fleet has left Santiago. I think I have them here almost to a certainty."

Much has been said of a code of signals arranged by Commander McCalla with the insurgents. Signal lights were observed from the Flying Squadron on the nights of May 22d and 23d; but Commodore Schley has insisted that he was ignorant of their meaning, and that he had not been informed of the secret code. The episode of the signals, however, becomes of secondary importance when we learn that Schley, believing Cervera to be in Cienfuegos, made no serious effort to determine that point. Schley may not have known
anything about the code of signals, but he did know that he had been charged with the all-important duty of ascertaining at the earliest possible moment the whereabouts of Cervera's ships, and he did have special reasons for believing that they were in Cienfuegos at the exact time he was approaching that port. Yet, during the two and a half days he remained off that port, the commodore made no determined effort to satisfy himself on this question of vital importance.

At 8.15 A.M., May 23d, Commodore Schley received a memorandum stating that a good landing place had been found by Commander McCalla thirteen and a half miles west of Sabanilla Point; that the Cubans had perfect knowledge of what was going on within Cienfuegos; and that there were fair roads from the landing place to Cienfuegos. It was because Schley failed to avail himself of this important information that the court of inquiry unanimously declared that the commodore "should have endeavored, on May 23d, at Cienfuegos, to obtain information regarding the Spanish squadron by communicating with the insurgents at the place designated in the memorandum delivered to him at 8.15 A.M. of that date."

Commodore Schley offered as an excuse for not communicating with the shore the statement that the "surf would have prevented." It has been shown, however, that the surf off Cienfuegos all this time was no worse than normal, and that there were several available landing places in the vicinity. Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile this excuse with the well-known daring and enterprise of the officers and men in the Flying Squadron. Schley would have had no difficulty in getting any number of volunteers to brave any surf or any other danger in order to serve their country in an emergency. When volunteers were called for, ten days later, in the Texas, to face a much greater danger, the scene aboard that ship is described: "All hands, some three hundred, had been called on deck,
Armored cruiser Brooklyn.
and an officer addressed them: 'The admiral is anxious to give each ship an opportunity of sharing in the glory or misfortune. Before I say more, permit me to state that every man putting his foot on the deck of the *Merrimac* to-night will take his life right in his hand.' Here he paused, then calmly said, 'Who will represent the *Texas*?' Had he touched an electric button, every hand could not have gone up sooner, nor could every throat have yelled a quicker 'I'll go, sir; please let me do it, sir.'"¹ Equal patriotism was displayed aboard the other vessels of the American fleet.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that had Schley promptly sent volunteers ashore on the day or night of his arrival off Cienfuegos, May 22d, he would easily have ascertained that Cervera's ships were not there, so that, when he received Sampson's dispatch [May 23d]—"If you are satisfied that they [Cervera's ships] are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all possible dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba"—he would not have been compelled to admit before the Senate Naval Committee: "Not being satisfied at this time [May 23d] that the enemy's vessels were not there [Cienfuegos] I held my position"—thereby losing many hours of invaluable time.

At 7 A.M., May 24th, the *Marblehead*, Commander Bowman Hendry McCalla, the *Vixen*, Lieutenant Alexander Sharp, Jr., and the *Eagle*, Lieutenant William Henry Hudson Southerland, arrived off Cienfuegos. About 10 A.M. the *Marblehead* and *Eagle* proceeded to the landing place, thirteen and a half miles west of Sabanilla Point, communicated with the insurgents, landed stores for them, learned that the Spanish squadron was not in the harbor of Cienfuegos, rejoined the American force at 3.30 P.M., and reported to Commodore Schley the information obtained.

¹ Experiences of a Chaplain Ashore and Afloat, by Chaplain Jones, of the *Texas*, p. 180.
had now received this all-important information—namely, that Cervera was not in Cienfuegos—and was free to proceed to Santiago, it appears that he seriously contemplated further useless delays, for, under date of May 24th, he wrote to Sampson, "I shall move eastward to-morrow" [May 25th]; and in another dispatch to Rear-Admiral George Collier Remey at Key West, Schley said, "I shall proceed to-morrow [May 25th] off Santiago de Cuba." Fortunately, however, Commodore Schley changed his mind, and about 8 p.m., May 24th, leaving the Castine off Cienfuegos to watch that port, he stood eastward with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Iowa and Texas in column; the Marblehead, Vixen and Eagle on the outer flank; and with the Merrimac shoreward.

As there was a probability that the Flying Squadron, in sailing eastward, might pass Cervera's ships making for Cienfuegos, the court of inquiry criticised Schley's close-order formation, declaring that he should have disposed his vessels with a view of intercepting the enemy in any attempt to pass the Flying Squadron.

"The run to Santiago," reported Commodore Schley, "was marked by rain and rough weather to such an extent that the Eagle was unable to keep up a speed of 7.5 to 8.5 knots, and fell behind so much as to seriously delay the squadron, which was forced to slow to a speed of from four to five knots for her to regain and hold her position." The court of inquiry, in its statement of Facts, says: "Before midnight of May 24th, owing to heavy rolling, the forward compartment of the Eagle filled with water, which reduced her speed. On May 25th the wind was fresh from the eastward, the weather was bad and the sea was heavy for small vessels. The squadron reduced its speed to enable the Eagle to remain with it."

Commodore Schley has been criticised for permitting his squadron to "slow to a speed of from four to five knots" merely to retain under his command the con-
verted yacht *Eagle* at a time when he must have realized the great importance of determining the enemy's whereabouts at the earliest possible moment. In defense of this action the commodore said: "The *Eagle* was a part of the force which Admiral Sampson had thought proper to send to me, together with the *Iowa* and the collier *Merrimac*. I had no right to abandon her without a necessity, not then apparent to me." It has been shown, however, that Schley did have the right to "abandon" the *Eagle*, for he availed himself of that "right" on the following day, or May 26th, when he sent that yacht to Port Antonio, and thence to Key West. That the "necessity" for the utmost urgency in locating Cervera's ships at this crisis was not "then apparent" to the commodore is improbable.

"If I had known," he said, "that the Spanish fleet was in the latter port [Santiago] I trust that it is not necessary for me to assure this honorable committee that no consideration of the *Eagle*, or anything else, would have prevented me from getting there at the earliest possible moment with the larger vessels."  

After spending two and a half days in being assured that the enemy's raiding force was not at Cienfuegos, it was a conviction, amounting to a certainty, that Cervera was at Santiago.

In its verdict regarding the Flying Squadron's passage from Cienfuegos to Santiago the court of inquiry says: Schley "should have proceeded from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba with all dispatch," and he "should not have delayed the squadron for the *Eagle*." Admiral Dewey, however, dissented from this opinion to the extent of saying that "the passage from Cienfuegos to a point about twenty-two miles south of Santiago was made with as much dispatch as was possible while keeping the squadron a unit."

The Flying Squadron arrived at a point about twenty-two miles south of the port of Santiago—much too far

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1 Schley to the Senate Naval Committee.
to discover any of Cervera's ships in the entrance—at 5.30 p.m., May 26th, and then stopped. Shortly afterward the scouting vessels Yale, Captain William Clinton Wise, Minneapolis, Captain Theodore Frelinghuysen Jewell, and St. Paul, Captain Charles Dwight Sigsbee, joined the Flying Squadron. These vessels had been scouting in the vicinity of Santiago several days. In its statement of Facts the court of inquiry declared that "Commodore Schley had no conversation with the senior commanding officer of the scouts, and obtained no positive information from the scouts regarding the Spanish squadron."

In obedience to a signal from the Brooklyn, Captain Sigsbee boarded the flagship, taking with him the Cuban pilot Núñez. Schley says: "Captain Sigsbee stated verbally that he had been close into the port [Santiago] several times, and that there were no indications of any kind that the enemy was present, and, indeed, he doubted his [Cervera's] presence. Pilot Núñez, an experienced Santiago pilot, who was sent on board the Brooklyn by Sigsbee, was emphatic in his belief that the squadron [Cervera's] was not able to enter, on account of their size, without the assistance of tugs. He stated that owing to the narrowness of the channel such large ships could not enter the port. Sigsbee also confirms this."¹

In reference to this Sigsbee says: "Admiral Schley says that on the occasion of his [Schley's] first appearance off Santiago de Cuba, he [Schley] was assured by me that I did not believe that the Spanish fleet was in Santiago de Cuba. He also refers to the emphatic declaration of the pilot, Núñez, to the same effect. What I actually said to the admiral [Schley] was that Núñez had first expressed a belief that such large vessels as Cervera's cruisers could not get into Santiago because of their length, but he [Núñez] afterward admitted that they might get in with the aid of tugs. . . .

¹ Schley to the Senate Naval Committee.
Every officer on board the *St. Paul* knew that I believed Cervera to be at Santiago.”

In his letter to the Senate Naval Committee Rear-Admiral Schley said: “After having been informed by the ‘scouts,’ commanded by such officers as Sigsbee, Jewell and Wise, that, although they had all been off Santiago de Cuba for a week, they had seen nothing of it [Cervera’s squadron],” etc. Each of these officers—Sigsbee, Jewell and Wise—testified before the court of inquiry that he had given Commodore Schley no such information.¹

As we have seen, the Flying Squadron arrived at a point about twenty-two miles south of the morro at 5.30 p.m. May 26th. At 7.45 p.m.—two hours and fifteen minutes later—Schley hoisted this signal: “Destination Key West, via south side of Cuba and Yucatan Channel, as soon as collier is ready. Speed nine knots”; thus actually beginning a retreat from Santiago at a much higher rate of speed than he had approached it. It was indeed a pity that Commodore Schley, after his dilatory advance of eight hundred miles from Key West to a point about twenty-two miles south of Santiago’s morro, did not send at least one of his vessels the remaining fifteen or twenty miles and discover the Spanish ships in plain sight at the harbor’s mouth.

It was the unanimous verdict of the court of inquiry that Commodore Schley made “no effort to ascertain whether the Spanish squadron was in the harbor of Santiago; he left said harbor entirely unguarded from 6 p.m. of May 26th to 5 p.m. of May 27th, and guarded only by the scout *St. Paul* from 5 p.m., May 27th, until about 6 p.m., May 28th. The Flying Squadron arrived off the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, seven miles south of the morro, at 6 p.m., May 28th.”

Shortly before the commodore began his retrograde

¹ It was the unanimous verdict of the court of inquiry that Schley’s conduct in the Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, “was characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness and lack of enterprise.”
movement (or at 6 p. m.) the *Merrimac* broke her "intermediate pressure valve" and "cracked her stuffing box."¹ "This unfortunate accident to the *Merrimac*," said the commodore, "embarrassed the squadron's movements and, as she was the only collier on hand, it was necessary to have her taken in tow; and this proved to be very difficult on account of the wind and sea. . . . Indeed, it required some fifteen to twenty hours to get a line to her that would stand the great strain of towing, and no end of hard work all night and

![Diagram showing Schley's course off Santiago.](image)

part of the next day, the 27th, during which the squadron drifted with the wind and sea to westward of port."²

In its statement of Facts the court of inquiry says:

"The squadron proceeded westward eighteen miles; stopped at 11.15 p. m. [May 26th], the tow lines of the collier having parted; drifted until 3.40 p. m. May 27th; resumed its westward course for twenty-three miles; stopped again at 7.15 p. m. and drifted until 1 p. m. of May 28th."

At 9 A. M. May 27th the *Harvard*, Captain Charles

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¹ Commodore Schley's official report.  
² Ibid.
Stanhope Cotton, hastening from St. Nicolas Mole, arrived and delivered to Commodore Schley the following mandatory dispatch: "All department's information indicates the Spanish division is still at Santiago de Cuba. The department looks to you to ascertain the fact, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action," etc.

About noon of the same day Schley sent his well-known reply to this command: "Have been absolutely unable to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen and Brooklyn from collier owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since leaving Key West. Brooklyn is the only one in the squadron having more than sufficient coal to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santiago in present state of coal account of the squadron. It is to be regretted that the department's orders can not be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that end. I am forced to return to Key West via Yucatan Passage. Can ascertain nothing concerning the enemy." Lieutenant Joseph Beale of the Harvard gallantly volunteered to go ashore and ascertain if Cervera's ships were in the harbor, but Schley declined the offer.

As we have seen, Commodore Schley began his retreat from Santiago without making the slightest effort to ascertain whether or not the grand object of his search was in that port—indeed, without coming within sight of the harbor entrance at all. As to the squadron's coal supply, the court of inquiry in its statement of Facts found that at noon, May 27th, "the coal supply of the vessels of the Flying Squadron was sufficient to have enabled them to steam ten knots per hour: the Brooklyn for eleven and three quarter days, the Iowa for seven and one half days, the Massachusetts for ten days, the Texas for six and one quarter days, the Marblehead for three and one quarter days and the Vixen for eleven and one quarter days"—it requiring fewer than four days to reach Key West at this rate of
speed. All this without considering the coal in the collier. Had the Flying Squadron remained on blockade duty the court of inquiry found that the *Brooklyn* had coal enough aboard to have remained off Santiago twenty-six days, the *Iowa* sixteen days, the *Massachusetts* twenty days, the *Texas* ten days, the *Marblehead* five days and the *Vixen* twenty-three days; and still each ship would have had enough coal to have reached Gonaïves, Hayti, or Cape Cruz, Cuba; at either of which places it would have been possible to have coaled in smooth water. Besides this superabundance of coal in the ships' bunkers, there was the *Merrimac* with forty-three hundred and fifty tons of the best coal aboard, the amount of coal required to completely fill the bunkers of all the ships on that date being only twenty-seven hundred and fifty tons.

In its verdict relative to Commodore Schley's report about his coal supply and facilities for coaling the court of inquiry was unanimous in declaring that Schley's "official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling facilities of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading." The court also was unanimous in declaring that Schley "should not have made the retrograde turn westward with his squadron," and that "he should have promptly obeyed the Navy Department's order of May 25th," already partly quoted.

The receipt of the commodore's "can not obey orders" dispatch caused the Government at Washington deepest anxiety. In fact, this was not inaptly described as the "darkest hour of the war." On May 27th Long cabled Schley: "The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether the Spanish division is in Santiago de Cuba harbor; as, if so, immediate movement against it and the town will be made by the navy and a division of about ten thousand men of American troops which are ready to embark. You must surmount difficulties regarding coaling by your ingenuity and perseverance. This is
a crucial time, and the department relies upon you to give information quickly as to the presence of Cervera.”

Two days later the Secretary followed up this stringent dispatch with: “It is your duty to ascertain immediately the Spanish fleet, if they be at Santiago de Cuba, and report. Would be discreditable to the navy if that fact was not ascertained immediately. All naval and military movements depend on that point.”

After “some fifteen or twenty hours”¹ spent in getting a tow line to the *Merrimac*, “during which the squadron drifted with the wind and sea to the westward of port,”² the Flying Squadron, at 3.50 p.m. May 27th, formed in squadron and steamed westward—in spite of the department’s mandatory order, brought by the *Harvard*, to push on to Santiago—at a speed of seven knots. At 3.35 p.m. May 27th Schley signaled the *St. Paul*, “If Sampson comes here tell him half of squadron out of coal and collier engine broken down.” At 7.20 p.m. the ships halted, the *Texas* and *Marblehead* going alongside the *Merrimac* for coal. The engines were kept moving occasionally during the night so as to keep distance from the flagship.

May 28th dawned clear and pleasant and the forenoon was given up to coal ing the *Texas*, *Marblehead* and *Vixen*. Just before noon the *Brooklyn* signaled “Rendezvous in Gonaïves Bay” (Island of Hayti). “At 1.30 p.m. formed column, natural order, and stopped. At 2 p.m. went ahead... Stopped at 2.45 p.m. and went ahead at 3 p.m., standing eastward. At 4.05 p.m. the *Brooklyn* signaled, ‘While off Santiago the general meeting place will be twenty-five miles south of that place.’ Works at entrance to Santiago de Cuba harbor in plain sight at about 5.30 p.m. At 7.40 p.m. stopped, following motions of flagship. . . . Moving engines occasionally to maintain position. . . . At 7.40 a.m. [May 29th] sighted a man-of-war in entrance to harbor,”³ the singular arrangement of having her single mast be-

¹ Schley’s official report. ² Ibid. ³ Evans’ official report.
tween her two smokestacks rendering the Cristóbal Colon easily distinguishable. We know that this Spanish cruiser at least had taken this position at the harbor's mouth on May 26th and maintained it until the 31st. Shortly after discovering the Cristóbal Colon, two vessels of the Vizcaya class—and toward evening a torpedo boat destroyer—were descried. A blockade of the port was established, which Admiral Dewey declared to be effective.

That night, May 30th, the Marblehead and Vixen ran closer in to guard against a surprise. About nine o'clock the Vixen discovered a light moving rapidly close inshore, and from the speed at which it was going it was thought to be a torpedo boat. The signal "A torpedo boat is escaping" was promptly made. The Vixen started in chase, while the larger vessels of the squadron at once began playing their search lights and cleared for action, the Massachusetts firing several 6-pound shots. After running some eight or ten miles, the light suddenly disappeared. Afterward it was learned that the light was that of a locomotive on the Juricao Railroad, which runs close to the shore, near where the Vixen was stationed. On the 30th of May the New Orleans, Captain William Mayhew Folger, arrived off Santiago with the collier Sterling, Commander Robert E. Impey.

At 10.55 A. M. May 31st Commodore Schley—after having been in plain sight of the enemy's vessels two days without attacking—with his personal staff, consisting of Lieutenant James Hamilton Sears, Lieutenant Benjamin Warner Wells, and Ensign Edward McCauley, went aboard the Vixen and proceeded to the Massachusetts, where the commodore hoisted his flag. At 11.10 A. M. Schley caused this signal to be exhibited from the Massachusetts: "The Massachusetts, New Orleans and Iowa will go in after dinner to a distance

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1 The unanimous verdict of the court of inquiry on this point was that Schley "should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago harbor on May 29th and 30th."
of seven thousand yards and fire at the Cristóbal Colon with 8-, 12- and 13-inch guns. Speed about ten knots.” In accordance with this programme the Massachusetts, followed by the New Orleans and Iowa, at 1.30 p.m. got under way, and when “about eight thousand yards from the shore turned eastward, passed the entrance and opened fire with the port 8- and 13-inch guns, the range used increasing from seventy-five hundred to ninety-five hundred yards.” The New Orleans opened fire at 1.51 p.m., and the Iowa about the same time. Evans, of the Iowa, ceased firing at 2.01 p.m. because the course led by the commodore had taken the column far beyond the reach of harm. At 2.05 p.m. the ships headed south—not north—then swung westward at a much longer range than before, and at 2.10 p.m. resumed firing with their starboard guns. “Hauled off at 2.13 p.m., total time of firing being seven minutes thirty-five seconds,” reported Captain Higginson.

Before leaving the Vixen to board the Massachusetts Schley cautioned Lieutenant Sharp against exposing his vessel. As the range was eighty-five hundred yards and the maximum range of the Vixen’s guns was six thousand yards, Sharp found the “temptation was too strong to resist,” and followed the other ships as they steamed across the entrance of the harbor. Three shots came near this little craft, one about one hundred yards ahead, another some seventy-five yards on her port quarter, while the third went over her. “The range at which our guns were fired was eighty-five hundred yards, but the shots fell short. The range settings of the sights were gradually increased to nine thousand yards during this [first] run. . . . During the second passage the sights were set first at ninety-five hundred yards, gradually increased to eleven thousand yards. Nearly all shots fell slightly short; but as they all appeared to burst or graze, it is likely that the enemy

1 Official report of Captain Higginson.
was struck by many fragments, and possibly by some shells." ¹

Captain Higginson of the *Massachusetts* reported that the vessels "steamed in to about eight thousand yards, then turned eastward, passed the entrance and opened fire with the port 8-inch and the 13-inch guns, the range used increasing from seventy-five hundred to ninety-five hundred yards. . . . Hauled off at 2.13 p.m., total time of firing being seven minutes thirty-five seconds. Five 13-inch and nine 8-inch [shots] were fired from the *Massachusetts*, all being good line shots, but range generally short." In Dewey's attack on the Spanish forts and ships at Cavite, the range was from five thousand to five hundred yards. In Sampson's bombardment of San Juan the range varied from twenty-three hundred to eleven hundred yards. In no action in this war where the Americans made the slightest pretense of injuring the enemy was the range greater than four thousand yards. In Schley's *quasi* bombardment of Santiago the range seems at no time to have been less than seventy-five hundred yards—practically out of harm's way—and according to the reports of the captains engaged it was rapidly increased to eleven thousand yards. This "reconnoissance," said Schley, "was intended principally to injure and destroy the *Cristóbal Colon. . . .""

The unanimous verdict of the court of inquiry on the attack was that Schley "did not do his utmost with the force under his command to capture or destroy the *Cristóbal Colon* and other vessels of the enemy which he attacked on May 31st."

The *Cristóbal Colon* slipped her moorings and withdrew into the inner harbor on the arrival of the *New York* and *Oregon*, the day following Schley's attack. "We recognized the *Colon* at daybreak, and immediately started in to investigate the meaning of the remarkable circumstance of an enemy's vessel,

¹ Lieutenant Sharp to the author.
practically unsupported—lying in plain view of an American squadron of superior strength—which was stationed far to the southwestward of the harbor. Before we could get within range the Colon fired a 'defiance' gun and did not appear again until July 3d."

That the Americans had an excellent chance to destroy the Cristóbal Colon at this time is seen by referring to the log of that ship, which records: "An enemy's shell exploded near the stern, making dents in the side and cracking some bowls in the roundhouse." Had Schley come within the range set by Dewey and Sampson, he undoubtedly could have inflicted serious injury on this ship. Referring to her log again, we find that the action was fought out of gunshot, so far as the Spaniards were concerned, for the log says: "In a short time the other battle ships returned [on the second passage of the entrance] and then the action continued on both sides, but our shot falling short on account of the enemy keeping at too great a distance." Realizing that this ship was in danger if attacked by a resolute enemy, Cervera, on the following morning, moved the Cristóbal Colon with the rest of his squadron into the inner harbor, thus depriving the Americans of a splendid opportunity for delivering a crushing blow.

In defense of his ineffective attack on the Spaniards, Commodore Schley said to the Senate Naval Committee: "The result of the reconnaissance determined without question the presence of the Spanish fleet in the harbor. That question decided, it would have been unwise to risk, until re-enforced, any chance of serious disablement of the ships that would have rendered the squadron numerically inferior to the enemy. This, my judgment, was in line with the judgment of the Navy Department set out on page 171, Appendix of Bureau's Report in Secretary Long's instruction to Rear-Admiral Sampson in these words:—

1 Rear-Admiral Sampson to the author.
The department does not wish the vessels of your [Sampson's] squadron to be exposed to the fire of batteries at Havana, Santiago, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those harbors. Even in this case the department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish this, the destruction of the enemy's vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries.

The commodore neglects to mention that this dispatch was dated April 6, 1898, nearly three weeks before hostilities actually began, and when there was absolutely no knowledge of what the enemy's naval programme was to be. Schley's attack, which was "intended principally to injure and destroy the Cristóbal Colon," was made nearly two months after this dispatch was written and when the entire naval situation had been changed by the definite knowledge that Cervera's raiding force had crossed the Atlantic and was in Santiago harbor.

Schley also neglects to give Sampson's reply to this dispatch: "I sympathize with all you say about guarding our big ships against a possible serious loss while the enemy's fleet is still intact. At the same time I regard it as very important to strike quickly and strike hard as soon as hostilities commence"; and then the rear-admiral gave a detailed plan of his proposed attack on the formidable defenses of Havana.

Furthermore, the commodore knew that the department had acquiesced in Sampson's determination of exposing the ships of his squadron to the fire of formidable shore batteries as shown in the Secretary's approval of Sampson's bombardment of Matanzas and San Juan—the latter port being much more strongly fortified than Santiago. Schley also omits to mention the department's approval of Dewey's "exposure" of his ships to the batteries at the entrance of Manila, again to the formidable guns defending the water front of the city, and finally at Cavite, where Dewey discovered Montojo's ships. On that occasion Dewey did
not make a "reconnoissance" of "seven minutes and thirty-five seconds," at a range of seventy-five hundred to eleven thousand yards, but boldly ran into a range of two thousand to five hundred yards and hammered the Spanish vessels until they were utterly destroyed. Dewey "exposed" his ships to two separate land batteries (even before he knew positively that the enemy's ships were in Manila Bay—they having arrived there only forty-eight hours before he forced the entrance), while Schley, after having three of Cervera's largest cruisers in plain sight two days, made a reconnoissance

"intended principally to injure and destroy the Cristóbal Colon" of "seven minutes and thirty-five seconds" at an impotent range.

On June 1st Rear-Admiral Sampson arrived off Santiago with the New York, Oregon and Mayflower, Commander Morris R. S. Mackenzie, and took matters in his own hands. The next day Sampson took vigorous measures to insure, the detention of the enemy's ships in the harbor. The American vessels were arranged in a semicircle, as shown in the diagram, the radius of the arc being shortened from six miles by day to four and three miles at night. Soon afterward a search-light service was begun, in which one of the
battle ships was stationed within two miles of the for-
tifications—and even closer in thick weather—and
played her light on the entrance of the harbor all
night. This hazardous service was assigned to the
battle ships Massachusetts, Oregon and Iowa, and
(after her arrival) to the Indiana. Owing to the peculiar-
ly trying nature of this service, each ship took a
turn of two hours until daybreak.

While these battle ships were throwing a flood of
light on the entrance of the harbor, the little Gloucester,
Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright; Scorp-
ion, Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix; Suwanee,
Lieutenant-Commander Daniel Delehanty; and Vixen,
Lieutenant Alexander Sharp, ran closer in, ahead of
the search light—of course taking care to keep out of
its path—to watch for the egress of the enemy, while
two or three steam launches ventured close inshore,
neay the mouth of the harbor. This was a service of
great danger—not only from the enemy's missiles, but
from a mistaken shot sent by our own guns. It was
gallantly performed and too much praise can not be
awarded to the officers and men of these frail craft.
Each of our war ships kept her bow pointed toward the
morro, with her search lights in readiness in case the
enemy was sighted. This admirable arrangement was
kept up until after the destruction of Cervera's ships.
CHAPTER XX.

HOBSON'S GALLANT EXPLOIT.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON had left Key West in his flagship, the New York, early on the morning of May 21st for Havana, and arrived off the latter place at noon of the same day. Realizing that he must collect a sufficient force to meet Cervera, should that commander see fit to round the eastern end of Cuba and make a dash for Havana along the north coast, Sampson, on the 22d, left three of the smaller ships to maintain the blockade at Havana, and proceeded with the bulk of his squadron to a point northeast of Key Frances, Nicolas Channel, where the following vessels were collected: the New York (flagship), Captain French Ensor Chadwick; Montgomery (flying the broad pennant of Commodore John Crittenden Watson), Commander George Albert Converse; the Indiana, Captain Henry Clay Taylor; the Miantonomoh, Captain Mortimer Lawrence Johnson; the Puritan, Captain Purnell Frederick Harrington; the Terror, Captain Nicoll Ludlow; the Amphitrite, Captain Charles James Barclay; the New Orleans, Captain William Mayhew Folger; the Cincinnati, Captain Colby Mitchel Chester; the Detroit, Commander James Henry Dayton; the Wilmington, Commander Chapman Coleman Todd; the Mayflower, Commander Morris R. S. Mackenzie; the Machias, Commander John Fairfield Merry; the Vicksburg, Commander Abraham Bruyn Hasbrouck Lillie; the Newport, Commander Benjamin Franklin Tilley; and the Wasp, Lieutenant Aaron Ward.
Early on the morning of the 27th, in response to a signal from the admiral's flagship, Commodore Watson, Captain Folger and Captain Converse repaired on board the New York to consult with Sampson relative to a plan suggested by Captain Chadwick of the New York, looking to the obstruction of the narrow entrance to Santiago Bay by means of which it was thought that the Spanish vessels could be held permanently within that harbor, or at least until enough war ships could be collected off the port to insure the confinement of the hostile squadron at that place. The council was unanimously in favor of sinking a collier in the channel, which, if properly done, would leave our fleet, with the exception of one or two ships to prevent the enemy from removing the wreck, free for any other duty. Captain Converse suggested that the Merrimac, then known to be off the port, be used for this purpose, while Sampson himself was in favor of sinking two schooners laden with coal, brick or stone. As Converse's plan had the great advantage of immediate execution, it was adopted, and Sampson at once, without waiting to communicate with the department, sent instructions to Schley by Captain Folger in the New Orleans. This vessel, with the collier Sterling, got under way on the afternoon of May 27th, and arrived off Santiago May 30th.

On the afternoon of May 27th Sampson hastened to Key West, arriving at 2 A.M. May 28th, and communicated with the department. It was then that Sampson learned of Schley's failure to properly blockade Cervera's squadron at Santiago, and had actually announced his intention of returning to Key West for coal. From the tenor of Schley's dispatches Sampson was fearful that his instructions to Schley relative to sinking the Merrimac would not be carried out, so he, with the sanction of the department, determined to proceed off Santiago in person. While at Key West Sampson sent for Naval Constructor Richmond Pearson Hobson, and
Armored cruiser New York.
asked him for his opinion as to the best method of sinking the *Merrimac*.

It appears that Hobson, like many other officers in the navy, had been devising schemes for obstructing the entrance to Santiago harbor. Hobson was with the American squadron in the bombardment of San Juan, and believing that the fortifications of that place could not be reduced without heavy loss, he perfected a plan for sweeping the narrow channel clear of mines, so as to enable the squadron to run into the harbor. "The admiral," said Hobson, "had listened to the proposition kindly and apparently with approval, but had replied that until the enemy's fleet was met he could not risk even a single vessel." Hobson then proposed an "unsinkable craft," which was to run into Havana so as to take up the force of the mine explosions, and so enable the American vessels to follow. Sampson rejected this scheme also, and confided to Hobson that it was a "sinkable rather than an unsinkable" boat that was wanted to block Cervera's ships in Santiago.

Hastening back to his fleet, May 30th, Sampson passed along the north coast of Cuba, and going through the Windward Passage arrived off Santiago June 1st, when he promptly communicated to Schley his plan of blocking the entrance of Santiago harbor. By this time Hobson had completed all arrangements, the general plan of which was to fasten ten torpedoes on the port side of the collier, below the water line, which were to be exploded by electric wires from the bridge of the vessel when in the channel. "I was greatly impressed," said Sampson, "with the faith and absolute fearlessness which Mr. Hobson displayed. Not in the least particular did he show a particle of doubt of success. He had developed the whole plan to such a degree that no one else had, or probably could have, the matter so completely in mind. For this reason alone prudence demanded that he should be intrusted with the principal command."
The magnificent spirit of the officers in the American fleet is strikingly revealed in the protest Commander James Madison Miller, commanding the Merrimac, made at not being allowed to retain his place aboard the collier in this perilous attempt. "He came aboard the New York," said Sampson, "and entered a most urgent protest against being deprived of his command, even questioning my authority to remove him from a ship where he had been placed in command by the Navy Department. He positively refused to give up his command to any one under the circumstances. He had my sympathy, but I succeeded in convincing him that in the exceedingly short time at our disposal it would be most unwise to make a change in the plans."

Again the daring of the Americans was shown by the eagerness with which the call for volunteers was responded to. "To my surprise," said Sampson, "enough officers and men volunteered to man a hundred Merrimacs, there being hundreds of offers from a single ship. As only seven men were required, it was a difficult matter to decide who should be chosen to go." Ensigns Powell and Ernest F. Eggert were selected from the junior officers to accompany the daring leader of the expedition. Hobson says: "While I was on the Merrimac Assistant Engineer Crank had expressed a wish to go in with the ship, and had recommended a machinist and a water tender, Phillips and Kelly, who had shown themselves competent and reliable, and who wished to go. Captain Miller . . . had spoken in high terms of his quartermaster, young Deignan. There was advantage in having men for the wheel, the engines and the boilers from the Merrimac's crew, on account of their familiarity with that particular vessel, so I called the three men up, looked at them well, explained the nature of the mission and asked if they wished to go. All replied affirmatively, so I decided to take them."  

1 Lieutenant Hobson in Century Magazine.
Mullen, the boatswain, was allowed to go because of his experience with the anchors, the letting go of which at a critical time being attended with much danger. Charette pleaded to go, inasmuch as he had served under Hobson while the latter was a midshipman in the *Chicago*, and, having served in the dynamo room, was placed in charge of the torpedoes. Montague, the chief master at arms in the *New York*, was the last man chosen, and was detailed to cut the lashings of the stern anchor when the moment arrived.

All day, June 1st, men were busy stripping the collier of every superfluous article. Toward evening it was found that the *Merrimac* and other vessels in the fleet had drifted some twelve miles eastward. With a view to regaining his position off Santiago harbor Hobson, at 12.30 A.M. June 2d, got under way and ran westward at a nine-knot rate for a preliminary trial; the *New York* following, but having her steam launch towing astern, made only five or six knots and was soon left behind.

By 1 A.M. light fleecy clouds had obscured the moon, rendering the bold headlands around Santiago indistinct and visible only by the aid of powerful night glasses. The horizon was thickening in the south, and a dense black cloud in the southeast threatened to hide the moon in the hours in which the *Merrimac* was to make her final rush for the entrance of the harbor. At this time "Commander Miller was sitting on the bridge," says Hobson, "Deignan was at the wheel; the ship replied to the helm, and the gallant captain told about her steering and maneuvering qualities and other virtues, still expecting to go in with his ship. He had let me take complete charge, and I had not thought it necessary to tell him of the admiral's final decision."

About 2 A.M. the dark outlines of a craft was suddenly made out ahead, and shortly afterward another

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1 Lieutenant Hobson to the author.
on a southwesterly line with the first. Believing that they were guide craft placed by the admiral to keep the proper distance from shore, Hobson stood out. It was then noticed that one of the craft showed an intermittent light. These vessels proved to be press dispatch boats, which showed the lights in order that the approaching collier might not run them down. Shortly before 3 a.m. the New York came up and Sampson, repairing aboard the Merrimac, carefully inspected all the arrangements for the attempt. "Everything was in readiness for letting go—blocks under the lashings, with axes at hand. The wiring was complete and responded to the tests, the firing ends being on the starboard side of the bridge, ready to make contact. Montague and Charette had led off the signal cords and, with the boatswain, had got the lifeboat out and put in arms and equipment. The boatswain considered that the boat in question would tow better alongside than astern, a long line being got out from forward, another from abreast the boat. After the hogging lines had been hauled home, the New York's men were ordered into the boats. Before leaving, Cadet Boone asked earnestly to be allowed to remain, but he had to be refused like the others. The admiral went on the bridge to wait till all the men were off, and was the last to leave. On coming on board, the admiral had gone up on the bridge, and as he spoke to Captain Miller I heard an exclamation from the latter. Though bitterly disappointed, the generous captain came up to say a kind word and wish us success. Assistant Engineer Crank, who was still in the engine room, was to remain on board till the last stretch, when he was to be taken off by the torpedo boat that would accompany us to the point. The admiral said good-bye with a simple word of kindness. With us who knew him, such a word from Admiral Sampson would outweigh a volume."¹

¹ Lieutenant Hobson in Century Magazine.
Had the men in charge of this daring exploit been at all superstitious, they would have found an unlucky omen in the fact that the propeller of Sampson's steam launch, in shoving off from the Merrimac, became entangled in one of the lines hanging over the side of the collier; so that it was half an hour before it could be extricated. The Merrimac's people may have had a latent superstition lurking in their minds, but apparently it in no way influenced their determination of going in that night, for after all was again clear they started slowly toward the entrance of the harbor.

The moon had now gone behind the dark bank of clouds on the horizon, and, though it was about four o'clock, dawn had not begun to tinge the eastern sky. As the collier gathered headway the lifeboat at her side began to swing from the ship and threatened to capsize. This compelled Hobson to slow down and shorten the breast line. Again the Merrimac was sent ahead at full speed, and again the boat behaved badly; but Hobson realized that time was now pressing, so he maintained his speed with the lifeboat plunging and finally capsizing, so that she was cut adrift.

The men were now stripped to their underclothing. Revolvers, belts and life preservers were strapped on, and the prearranged stations were occupied by the men with signal cords tied to their wrists. In a few minutes the dark vessels of the American fleet performing blockade duty began to loom up in the darkness, then the somber outlines of Morro Castle assumed shape and the men knew that the crucial moment was at hand, for now a faint rose tint, foretelling the approach of day, began to diffuse itself over the eastern horizon.

At this moment, when the men in the collier were nerving themselves for the final dash into the mouth of the harbor, a hail was suddenly heard over the water off the port side, and in a short time the torpedo boat Porter came tearing through the sea within speaking distance and Lieutenant Fremont announced that the
admiral had ordered the *Merrimac* to return. Realizing that some light was necessary to surely effect an entrance to this difficult harbor, Hobson, without slackening the speed of the *Merrimac*, requested Fremont to return to the admiral and ask for permission to proceed with the programme. Fremont consented with the understanding that if a favorable reply was given, the *New York* was to show four red signal lights. The torpedo boat rushed back into the darkness with this message, while the *Merrimac* stood on, her men anxiously watching for the signal—which never appeared. "By the time the collier was under way for the entrance of the harbor," said Sampson, "I reluctantly made up my mind that it was already too light to make the attempt," and orders were given for her to come back.

As the signal lights did not appear, the *Merrimac* was obliged to return. The postponement of the attempt for one day was the severest trial the men had yet undergone. Indeed, it might well be termed the hardest ordeal they had to pass through in the entire undertaking. Hobson said: "When the torpedo boat *Porter* overtook the *Merrimac* and delivered the admiral's imperative order to return, one could see a cloud of gloom and disappointment pass over the men. No one spoke a word. Each man lingered near his post for some time, not wishing to make the effort necessary to get into a position of comfort. I knew how the men felt. A fearful reaction had set in. I remember catching hold of a stanchion on the bridge and leaning my head back against it as the ship swung around."

During the scorching heat of the following day the *Merrimac* 's people endeavored to get rest from the severe exertions of the preceding twenty-four hours, while Hobson made further preparations for the run into the harbor.¹ About 1.30 A. M. June 3d, after

¹ The men finally selected for the attempt were Naval Constructor Richmond Pearson Hobson, Daniel Montague, Randolph Clausen, Osborn
serving coffee and sandwiches, Hobson ordered his crew to quarters. He then placed his men as follows: Murphy on the forecastle, so as to cut the anchor lashings, after which he was to fire torpedo No. 1. His was a post of especial peril, for he was exposed to the danger of the rushing chain cable, besides which the narrow forecastle, having no bulwark or rail, rendered it likely that he would be thrown overboard by the shock of the torpedo explosion. Charette was placed at torpedoes Nos. 2 and 3, Deignan at No. 4, Phillips at No. 6, Clausen at No. 5, and Kelly at No. 8. Deignan, after leaving the wheel was to proceed to torpedo No. 4.\footnote{Lieutenant Hobson to the author.}

Everything being in readiness, Mr. Crank came on deck and reported that the engines were prepared for the run without further attention. The launch had already got some distance from the collier before Mr. Crank came on deck. He repeated his offer to go in, but Hobson firmly declined, and, after some difficulty, recalled the launch and Mr. Crank boarded it. By this time the Merrimac had swung heavily round, heading west-southwest, and, as she gathered headway, made for the harbor. The moon, being about an hour and a half high, threw a path of light directly ahead of the collier, seeming to guide her on the way to her grim mission of self-destruction. Anxious to avoid detection as long as possible, Hobson kept clear of this light, steering eastward, and crept along obliquely at the speed of four knots an hour. As the ship began her final run for the harbor, Hobson ordered Charette to see if all the men had been equipped, and had their revolvers and life preservers on. All were ready save the two men, Phillips and Kelly, in the engine room, who asked permission to put these accouterments on at the last moment, as they interfered with their work.

The blockading vessels were now some miles behind, and the dark outlines of morro began to loom up clear

Warren Deignan, Francis Kelly, George Charette, George F. Phillips and J. E. Murphy.
and ominous. The collier was now a little more than a mile from the castle, the bright moonlight rendering her perfectly distinct to the enemy; but still they gave no sign of watchfulness. Hobson then put the *Merri-mac* at full speed ahead. Charette was now sent into the engine room to inform Phillips and Kelly that the signal to stop would be the order to open the sea connections and to man the torpedoes.¹

Soon Morro Castle came on the starboard beam of the collier—and still no sign of the enemy. In a short

¹ Lieutenant Hobson to the author.
time that venerable fortress bore north; then north by east, and finally north-northeast—and yet no protest from the frowning battlements. Had the Spaniards gone to sleep? By the aid of night glasses Estrella Battery was sighted. "Can you make out the white spot to the left of the morro?" asked Hobson of Deignan. "Yes, sir," was the answer. "That is Estrella," calmly responded Hobson, "steer for Estrella," and in a few moments the huge collier was plunging along the swells of the channel at a nine-knot pace. The massive walls of the morro, like some reclining giant rising to view an approaching foe, now seemed to leap suddenly in their might, while the Merrimac, large as she appeared but a few moments before, sank into insignificance beside the towering wall of the fortress.

Even when the collier was within five ship's lengths of the morro, there was no protest against her approach. When she had proceeded another ship's length, or was within four hundred yards, a flash darted from the water's edge, at the left side of the entrance; but the shot flew wide of the mark. This was followed by another flash, and this time a projectile was heard splashing astern. Turning night glasses in the direction from which these missiles had come, the Americans detected a dark object—probably a picket boat—lying in the shadow of the cliff with a rapid-fire gun. Apparently this boat was endeavoring to disable the Merrimac's steering gear—the one weak point in the collier which gave Hobson most anxiety, for, without his rudder, he could not bring his ship to the desired position for sinking.

The adventurers were now under the steep cliff of Morro Castle, and the helm was slightly ported. Just then the western battery opened on the collier, but at such short range that it was impossible for the Spaniards to effect vital injury to the ship. "The western battery has opened on us," reported the faithful Charette. "Very well; pay no attention to it," replied
Hobson, and onward plunged the heavy *Merrimac* to her destruction. The ship was now within three lengths, or about three hundred yards, from Morro Castle. At that moment a large shot whizzed across the bridge, but did no serious damage. A few seconds later Hobson gave the order to stop the engines, and in a short time the machinery ceased its throbbing. By this time every available Spanish gun was splitting the air with vehement protests.

The decisive moment had now arrived. "You may lay down to your torpedoes, Charette," said Hobson. The firing from the batteries had become general, but, paying no heed to it, Hobson gave his entire attention to sinking the collier. A swell sent the *Merrimac's* stern to port, while the bow swung heavily toward the morro. Her bow was about thirty feet from Morro Rock, and only half a ship's length from the position selected for the maneuver. When the ship began to feel the starboard shift in the helm which had been ordered Hobson then gave the order to port the helm, but it was then discovered that the steering gear had been carried away, and, as the collier still had a momentum of six knots an hour, Hobson dropped his bow anchor.

This was the signal for the firing of the torpedoes. No. 1 went off promptly, and from the shock it was known that the first hole had been blown in the collier. But torpedoes Nos. 2 and 3 failed to ignite, upon which Hobson shouted out, "Fire all the torpedoes!" but his voice was drowned in the fearful roar of cannon and small arms. After some delay torpedo No. 5 exploded, Nos. 2 and 3 still hanging fire, the connections being broken and the cells shattered. Nos. 1 and 5 were the only torpedoes that ignited, all the others failing. A projectile had cut the lashings and had dropped the stern anchor, which soon brought the *Merrimac* in a position two thirds athwart the channel, just in front of Estrella Point, but unfortunately the chain parted,
allowing the heavy collier to swing into the channel where she would soon straighten out.¹

The collier now rapidly filled. Finding that he could do nothing further, Hobson assembled all his men (as he thought), preparatory to getting clear of the doomed craft when she gave her final plunge. "Kelly was absent from the muster though it was supposed that he was present."² While putting on his life preserver a large shell had exploded near by, throwing him unconscious to the deck. When partially recovered he crept toward the engine room hatch, and finding that the water had risen to the cylinders he made his way toward the rendezvous. The apparition of this man—when the others had supposed that all were present—occasioned some alarm, for it was thought that the Spaniards must have boarded. Hobson at once leveled his revolver at Kelly, and it was not until the latter had announced his identity that the mistake was discovered.

The Merrimac had been rapidly settling when a mine was exploded under her. For a moment it was thought that this would hasten her destruction, but, aside from slightly facilitating the sinking, it made no perceptible difference. Soon afterward the collier stuck her starboard quarter on Estrella Point, but there was nothing further for the men to do but to wait until the vessel sank. A terrific shower of missiles was heard pattering on the sides and all over the ship, and larger projectiles crashed through the sides, carrying destruction in every direction.

While the men laid flat on the deck Hobson put his head through a chock hole in the side of the ship to reconnoiter. He describes the situation at this crisis as follows: "The deck vibrated heavily, and we felt the full effect, lying, as we were, full length on our faces. At each instant it seemed that certainly the next would

¹ Lieutenant Hobson to the author.  
² Ibid.
bring a projectile among us. The impulse surged strongly to get away from a place where remaining seemed death, and the men suggested taking to the boat and jumping overboard; but I knew that any object leaving the ship would be seen, and to be seen was certain death, and therefore I directed all to remain motionless. The test of discipline was severe, but not a man moved, not even when a projectile plunged into the boiler and a rush of steam came up the deck not far from where we lay. The men expected a boiler explosion, but accepted my assurance that it would be only a steam escape.”

In this manner the adventurers waited some twenty-two minutes when the Merrimac swung off the bank and again was being carried by the tide farther into the channel, though her people realized that the fast sinking vessel must soon go to the bottom. Two mines were exploded from the Socapa Battery, but missed the collier. The ship now gave a heavy lurch to port, the stern rose, the bow sank and with a forward motion she quickly settled. Some of the men were fearful that she would roll completely over and carry all to the bottom, but Hobson assured them that she would right herself in going down.

The water now reached the deck on which Hobson and his men were concealed, and, swashing to and fro with great violence, threw them around like baggage. A number of oil cans and spars were floated in the wild vortex of raging water, and inflicted painful wounds. Hobson was lifted by the flood and thrown against the bulwarks, his waist striking the rail. He was pinned in this position for some time by some heavy objects pressing against his legs, and for a few moments it looked as if he would be dragged down with the ship. By a great effort he disentangled himself, and on looking around to see what was to be done next he discovered that the

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1 Lieutenant Hobson in Century Magazine.
2 Lieutenant Hobson to the author.
lifeboat had been carried away, so that the only means of support was the catamaran. The men were soon clinging to this float, but as the line with which it was made fast to the boom became taut it caused the float to turn over and kept it anchored to the wreck.¹

The firing of the enemy now suddenly ceased. The fast-running tide began to scatter the débris of the wreck, and the men clinging to the catamaran were plainly visible to the enemy. The shores were lined with troops, eager to catch the first glimpse of any survivors, while small boats filled with armed men were plying about with lanterns to pick up any American. With a view to escaping discovery Hobson ordered his men to keep as much of their bodies as possible under water, leaving only their heads above the surface, keeping close to the float.² Notwithstanding the season the water was found to be chilly, and soon the Americans were shivering with the cold. The moon had now declined so much as to throw the shadows of Socapa over the scene of the wreck. The enemy's search boats drew closer and closer to the catamaran, but did not discover the Americans.

Soon after sunrise a steam launch was observed approaching the Merrimac. It contained Admiral Cervera with a reconnoitering party. When about thirty yards away Hobson hailed. The launch suddenly stopped, the guard leveled their rifles at the catamaran, and for a moment the Americans believed that they were to be butchered in cold blood. The order "Fire!" however, was not given, and in a few moments the launch cautiously drew nearer. Hobson called out that his party were Americans and wished to surrender to a Spanish officer. Then swimming toward the boat, he was assisted in by the admiral and the officers, and soon afterward the other Americans were rescued from their chilly place of concealment. When it finally

¹ Lieutenant Hobson to the author. ² Ibid.
dawned on the Spaniards that these Americans had voluntarily carried the collier into the port for the purpose of obstructing the channel, Cervera's party could not repress murmurs of "Valiente!"

The Americans were now transferred to the Reina Mercedes, where they were hospitably entertained by the Spanish officers. It seems that even down to this time the Spaniards were under the impression that the Merrimac was one of the cruisers in the American fleet. After going aboard the Reina Mercedes the executive officer of that cruiser, Commander Emilio Acosta y Eyerman, told Hobson how he himself "had directed the fire of two heavy guns against the entering vessel, though a large part of his crew was absent, manning guns that had been placed ashore, and how he had finally sunk her by two Whitehead torpedoes from his bow tubes, remarking that the mines fired at us seemed to have missed, going astern. He added that, of course, it was an unequal fight; that, in fact, it seemed to him that we should have known from the natural formation of the entrance that it would be impossible for a vessel to force her way through. He then asked what battery we had. I had just referred to being on duty in the New York, and understood him to refer to her, and in reply enumerated her battery, mentioning that he would find it in any of the naval annals. This seemed to agree with what he had concluded was the battery, and he then asked how many men we had lost. I told him we had lost none. He asked where, then, were all the crew, and all those that were below in the engine and boiler rooms and magazines. I saw that he had been referring all the time to the vessel that came in, and told him that she was the Merrimac, a collier, and had no guns at all; that we had sunk her ourselves, and would have sunk her athwart near Estrella if the steering gear had not been shot away and nearly all our own torpedoes disabled; adding that, though one of their mines had struck us, it was doubt-
ful if it had assisted our sinking to any extent, and that
we had felt no shock from the automobile torpedoes
fired by the Mercedes. He seemed utterly incredulous.
The same experience was met with in the case of the
other Spanish officers."¹ Two days later, June 6th,
Acosta was killed by a shell from the American fleet.

Through the courtesy of the Spanish officers, Hobson
was permitted to send the following dispatch to Samp-
son: "I have the honor to report that the Merrimac is
sunk in the channel. No losses, only bruises. We are
prisoners of war, being well cared for." This report
was taken aboard the New York by Commander Joa-
quin de Bustamente in person, and afforded great relief
to the American commander in chief, who had been
most anxious for the welfare of the men who had car-
rried the collier into the channel. In the attack on El
Caney, July 1st, Bustamente—who commanded a divi-
sion of four hundred sailors, landed from Cervera's
ships—was mortally wounded. By order of Lieutenant-
General Linares, Hobson and his men were taken to the
morro, and placed in apartments most exposed to the
fire of the American fleet in the attack made on June
6th, a fragment of one of our shells actually entering
the cell occupied by Hobson. After a confinement of
several days in this place the Americans were taken to
a building in Santiago, where they were kept until their
exchange, on July 6th.

Too much can not be said in commendation of the
magnanimous conduct of Frederick W. Ramsden, the
British consul at Santiago de Cuba. The American
people have not forgotten his kindly services in the
Virginius affair, 1873, and his generous attentions to
the comfort of Hobson's gallant party only adds to the
obligation. Hobson and his men owed all their com-
forts and probably their lives to the unceasing efforts
of this gentleman.

¹ Lieutenant Hobson in Century Magazine.
CHAPTER XXI.

HOLDING CERVERA IN SANTIAGO.

It is commonly supposed that the battle of July 3d began and ended on that day. In the many popular accounts of the stirring events that resulted in the destruction of the Spanish fleet the impression is given that Cervera's sortie was unexpected, that his mad rush to destruction was somewhat of a surprise to the Americans, and that our commander in chief was to a considerable extent taken unawares. Nothing could be more erroneous and unjust to the brave men who, during long weeks of tedious watching and weary hours of ceaseless preparedness, awaited the game that had been so clumsily run down and cornered in its burrow. The "sun of Austerlitz" rose and set in one day; Santiago's sun rose when Cervera was finally caught in that harbor, and set only after long weeks of unremitting watchfulness and activity. Then it threw its flood of light on the smoldering wrecks of the proud and graceful Spanish craft, strewn with mangled bodies of heroic men and stained with the best blood of España. No one was more thoroughly conscious of the battle that must come than the quiet, painstaking, and unassuming man who, from the time he was assured that Cervera's squadron was securely locked in Santiago harbor, handled the American naval forces with marvelous skill, persistency and tireless activity. These are strong and sweeping statements, possibly more forcible than the writer has ever indulged in before. The facts in the case, however, amply justify them, and after they have been clearly set forth the reader may judge for himself.
With the true instincts of a strategist, Sampson realized, as soon as he had secured Cervera in the harbor of Santiago, that a naval engagement of decisive moment must occur off that port before the crucial blow of the war could be given. So long as the Spanish fleet, or even a part of it, existed there was hope for the enemy. From the time he arrived off this harbor, therefore, the American commander in chief bent his energies to holding the game in hand and in preparing his forces for the final and satisfying bout which he so clearly foresaw must ensue.

There was a thick haze hanging over the entrance of Santiago harbor when Rear-Admiral Sampson, at six o'clock on the morning of June 1st, with the *New York, Oregon, Mayflower* and *Porter*, arrived at the center of activity. Rendered uncertain by the conflicting reports of Commodore Schley as to the actual condition of affairs, Sampson, without stopping to communicate with his second in command, ran close to the harbor's mouth in order to satisfy himself as to the presence of the long-looked for enemy. A shot from a vessel lying in undisturbed possession of the harbor entrance at once dispelled all doubts on this point, for the military tops of a war craft were seen to pass into the inner bay, where she was soon lost to view. Sampson then knew that at least one of Cervera's ships was in that port, and the presumption was that the others were there too. The commodore's vessels were descried about six miles from the harbor entrance, where they were maintaining a blockade of the port.

Having satisfied himself as to the enemy's whereabouts, Sampson, in his usual businesslike manner, summoned his commanding officers, including Schley,¹

¹ It must not be supposed from the foregoing narrative that the relations between Sampson and Schley were in the least strained. Mr. Goode, who was with Sampson in the *New York* throughout these stirring times and is eminently fitted to speak authoritatively, says in his admirable work, With Sampson through the War: "During the month in front of
aboard the *New York* for consultation. It was then that he learned that the commodore had not found opportunity to put into execution the admiral's scheme of sinking a collier in the entrance of the harbor.

While preparations for sinking the *Merrimac* in the harbor entrance were under way Sampson was busily engaged in perfecting plans for a blockade. By an order issued June 2d Sampson divided his fleet into two squadrons: the first, under his immediate command, consisting of the *New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans,*

![Sampson's blockade formation.](image)

*Mayflower* and *Porter,* was to guard the eastern side of the harbor entrance, while the second, under the command of Schley, consisting of the *Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead* and *Vixen,* remained on the west side. The two squadrons formed a semi-circle to the south of Santiago (as indicated in the diagram), so as to completely blockade the entrance to that port. In daylight these ships maintained a distance of six miles from the morro, while at night

Santiago the relations between Sampson and Schley were of a cordial nature. Whenever a conference was held Schley came over to the *New York,* and once or twice visited the admiral when there was no conference; but he took no more active part in the councils than did the captains of the vessels."—Goode's *With Sampson through the War,* p. 185.
or in thick weather this distance was substantially decreased.

That the Spaniards at this time were fully alive to change in the style of blockade is shown in notes of Lieutenant José Müller y Tejeiro, who was second in command of the enemy’s naval force in that part of Cuba. Under date of June 1st, he says: “The enemy appeared before the morro with thirteen ships. . . . From that time on the hostile ships, which were afterward increased in number, established day and night a constant watch.”

Lieutenant Müller declared that the American blockading ships, prior to June 1st, “disappeared at dark instead of continuing to watch it [the entrance] during the night.” The court of inquiry, however, in its statement of Facts said that “the Flying Squadron did not withdraw at night from the entrance to Santiago harbor to a distance at sea. The blockade was maintained at an average distance of about six to seven miles from the harbor entrance during the day and probably somewhat nearer during the night. Two vessels performed picket duty at night, two miles inside the line of vessels.” Dewey also said: “The blockade of Santiago was effective.”

Lieutenant Müller’s testimony is interesting, however, as bearing on the much discussed weather conditions prevailing off Santiago at the time of the Flying Squadron’s arrival. He says: “The whole coast is accessible, and the ground so high that it can be distinguished perfectly, even in stormy weather; so that there was no danger in remaining there in calm weather such as we have had all this year (for even in that Providence favored them); and what I say is true, as shown by the fact that afterward they never left the mouth of the harbor for a single moment, day or night.”

On June 2d Sampson issued the battle order which, after tedious weeks of watching, finally resulted in the

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1 Account of Lieutenant José Müller y Tejeiro.
destruction of the Spanish fleet, July 3d. The order was: "If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his [Cervera's] vessels or force them to run ashore." That this order was carried out to the letter will soon be shown.

To further increase the certainty of Cervera's detention in this port, Sampson on June 5th organized the night-picket line, which consisted of three steam launches, each armed with a 1-pounder. These little craft, usually in charge of naval cadets, were directed to cruise about a mile off the morro, so as to detect the egress of any venturesome torpedo boat, and to announce the fact by means of colored lights to our larger ships. In thick weather these picket boats frequently ran much closer inshore, where at times they were exposed to the enemy's fire at the shortest range.

On June 7th Sampson supplemented these precautionary measures by creating a second picket line, consisting of the Vixen, Suwanee and Dolphin, which formed a semicircle, two miles from the morro, between the steam launches and the main line of blockading ships. These vessels also frequently ran in at night much nearer than their prescribed distance to the morro, in order to guard against any possible escape of Spanish craft. These precautions were supplemented by the famous search-light service already alluded to.

On June 12th Sampson again tightened his grip on the cornered squadron by ordering the distance of the day blockade to be reduced from six to four miles, besides which each of the American commanders was directed to keep his ship constantly pointed toward the harbor entrance, in order that there might be no loss of time in turning round when the enemy finally made his sortie. Occasionally some of our ships, carried by winds or currents, would fall away from this position, but a sharp reminder from the commander in chief showed plainly enough that when Cervera came out it was
Second-class battle ship Texas.
Sampson's idea to have all his ships make straight for the game, instead of turning away from it.

With a view to discouraging attempts toward increasing the defenses of the harbor, and also to giving his men further practice at the guns under actual battle conditions, Sampson, soon after his arrival on the scene of action, began a series of bombardments on the morro, which was kept up to the date of Cervera's sortie. The first of these attacks took place on the morning of June 6th, or about fifty hours after Hobson had made his memorable dash into the harbor entrance. On this, as on all other occasions, Sampson divided his ships into two columns, the first, or eastern column, consisting of the New York, Yankee, New Orleans, Oregon and Iowa, and the second, or western column, consisting of the Brooklyn, Marblehead, Texas and Massachusetts. The Dolphin was to steam toward the east side of the harbor and the Suwanee and Vixen to the west, in order to fire on any troops that might appear.

At 7.41 A.M. the New York, leading the eastern column, opened fire, and in a short time all the American ships were engaged. Sampson led his fighting craft inshore until within two thousand yards of the forts. The enemy's feeble protest was quickly overruled, and a storm of missiles, falling in and around the fortifications, tore up the earth, dismounted some of the guns, and entailed considerable loss on the enemy. At 10.15 A.M. Sampson ceased firing and led the attacking ships out of range, not one of our vessels having been struck and no casualties having occurred.

The enemy claimed that only three men were killed in the shore batteries and fifty-one, including five officers, injured. The Reina Mercedes, which was lying nearest to the harbor entrance, though not in sight of the Americans, was struck thirty-five times, one of the missiles setting the ship on fire in several places and causing the death of Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyerman, the second in command. Five of her sailors
also were killed and about twelve wounded. "Acosta was directing the extinguishing of the fire in the fore-
castle when a large shell cut off his right leg at the hip
and also his right hand, mutilating him horribly. But
he lived for half an hour, urging the men to extinguish
the fire." 1

That this bombardment gave the Spaniards a whole-
some dread of American gunnery is seen in the notes of
Lieutenant Müller, who says: "When the American fleet opened fire it was so intense and the shots followed
each other in such quick succession that it might have
seemed like a fusillade if the mighty thunder of guns
can be compared with the crackling of small arms. By
nine o'clock it became somewhat slower, shortly after
reaching again the same intensity, then decreasing once
more at 10.15, and again becoming terribly intense at
10.30. At 11.02 it ceased. Punta Gorda battery fired
only seven shots. . . . During the first moments the
firing was so intense that it resembled one prolonged
thunder. In fact, I had no idea that any firing could
be so terrific as that of those ten ships. Much has been
said of the bombardments of Sebastopol and Alexan-
dria, but I do not believe that they could have been as
terrible as the bombardment we suffered that 6th day
of June—a day which the inhabitants of Santiago will
never forget." 2 So apprehensive were the enemy of
further attacks from the Americans that on June 9th
they contrived a log boom, strung with a steel cable,
and swung it across the harbor entrance.

On the afternoon of June 6th, or only a few hours
after Sampson's bombardment of the harbor forts, an
engagement took place which may well be termed
unique. At the time mentioned the Dolphin, Com-
mander Henry Ware Lyon, was cruising eastward of
the morro, close inshore, when she discovered a train
of open flat cars loaded with troops coming from the

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1 Lieutenant José Müller.  
2 Account of Lieutenant Müller.
direction of Juricaco bound for Santiago. At this point the railroad hugs the beach, running through a series of open spaces, tunnels and deep cuts. It was when the train was passing one of the open spaces that the Americans discovered it. The *Dolphin* at the time was only six hundred yards from the shore, and Lyon at once brought his 4-inch guns and smaller arms into play. The range was ideal for marksmanship, and the little gunboat quickly proved her excellence by directing a shower of missiles at the exposed Spaniards, which instantaneously threw them into a panic.

It was quite a long stretch to the next tunnel—the only refuge the enemy had under the circumstances—and the engineer opened wide the throttle and hurried his precious load to the friendly cover, where he halted the train, afraid to venture into the next opening. The little *Dolphin*—like a full-blooded hunting canine digging at a rabbit's burrow—now commenced banging away at the side of the tunnel where the train was supposed to have stopped. Soon her 4-inch shells tore away the seaward side of the covering, so that it was only a question of a few minutes when the Spaniards would be buried alive or be compelled to make a dash through the next open space to a place of refuge. They decided on the latter course, and in a few minutes the engine, with its human freight, sped from cover and made for the next shelter, which was a deep cut. Lyon was prepared for this "sortie," and, training his 4-inch guns with rare skill, succeeded in planting a shell in the locomotive's boiler, completely wrecking it and bringing the train to a standstill. By this time Lyon had edged the *Dolphin* closer inshore, so that even the smallest arms could be fired at point-blank range. A murderous shower of missiles was poured into the helpless mass of troops, and, realizing that even Castile valor was of no avail against the storm of shot that was "arguing the point" against them, they very properly made a scramble for the chaparral.
In this singular affair the Spaniards had over a hundred killed or wounded, while their "excursions" on the Juricaco Railroad ceased abruptly. "We learned from Cuban insurgents shortly after this episode that the Spaniards had several hundred killed and wounded. I think this an exaggeration, though I am satisfied that the casualties on the occasion—that is, on the enemy's side, for, of course, we had nothing to do but to aim and fire—were heavy, and might easily amount to one hundred." 1

Late that afternoon Lyon, noticing some men working on a battery east of the morro, received permission from Sampson to go in and "discourage" the enterprise. Taking a position favorable for action, the little Dolphin sent a few shots at the men. This drew an unexpectedly hot response from the enemy. Shells began dropping near the frail gunboat with astonishing precision, threatening at each moment to "pin the Dolphin to the bottom of the sea." This was a little more than the gallant Lyon had bargained for. He knew all about the "structural weakness" of the Dolphin, and hastily retired. Afterward it was learned that the Dolphin had entered a circle which the Spaniards had carefully marked out and, long before, had trained all their old-fashioned mortars on. This accounted for the surprising accuracy of their fire. After that all the American gunboats gave that "charmed circle" a wide berth. Taking it all in all, June 6th proved to be an exceedingly busy day for the Dolphin.

Four days after Sampson's bombardment of the morro the St. Louis appeared off Santiago with her prize, the British ship Twickenham, which had on board a cargo of coal for Cervera's ships. The Twickenham had been chasing all over the Caribbean Sea in vain efforts to find the Spaniards. Not being in the least apprehensive about his coal supply or his ability to coal

1 Captain Lyon to the author.
at sea, Sampson ordered the prize with her cargo to Key West.

By this time Sampson had communicated with the insurgents on shore, and was satisfied that all of Cervera's ships were in Santiago harbor. There seems to have been, however, considerable doubt in the outside world on this point, the Government at Washington especially being anxious to have the matter settled positively. With a view to removing all question, Sampson asked Lieutenant-Commander Daniel Delehanty of the Suwanee to select an officer who would go through the enemy's lines and ascertain for himself just how many of the hostile ships were in that port. Lieutenant Victor Blue of the Suwanee was chosen. Going ashore at Aserradero, some fifteen miles west of Santiago, this gallant young officer, on the morning of June 11th, started from the camp of the Cuban general Rabi. Dressed in uniform, Blue, with the assistance of Cuban guides, made his way through the dense underbrush, passed through the Spanish lines, and on the morning of the following day gained a vantage point three miles from the harbor. Here he distinctly made out the Spanish craft and mapped their exact location. Having determined this all-important point, Blue retraced his course and regained his ship on the morning of June 13th. In this handsome exploit Blue traversed seventy miles of the enemy's territory under most trying conditions and at a time when capture meant a prompt and ignominious death. On June 25th Lieutenant Blue again went on this dangerous mission and gained additional details relative to the Spanish fleet. For this truly "extraordinary heroism" Blue was officially complimented and was recommended to be promoted.

The dynamite cruiser Vesuvius, Lieutenant Commander John Elliott Pillsbury, arrived off the blockade June 13th, and Sampson decided to give this new instrument of naval warfare a trial at the earliest opportunity. Accordingly, on the following night, Pillsbury passed
the several lines of blockade, and taking a position within a mile of the morro, discharged the cruiser's three guns. As each shell contained two hundred pounds of gun cotton, the explosions were terrific, opening great chasms in and around the fortifications and throwing the Spaniards into a panic. One officer and six men in the Socapa battery were injured. It does not appear that much permanent damage was done to the batteries by these shells, though the moral effect is unquestioned. Frederick W. Ramsden, the British consul at Santiago at the time of the blockade, notes: "An officer of the torpedo boat destroyer Plutón told me last night that a big shell, which looked like a comet as it came somewhat slowly through the air, fell near them between Key Smith, and then came traveling in the water by means of a screw, and burst just in front of their ship. He says that had theirs been a heavy ship it would have blown it up, but the little Plutón, which only draws seven and a half feet, was just lifted out of the water, and every one on board was thrown off his feet, but no one really hurt. The water round was strewn with dead fish, and the concussion was also felt by the Mercedes, which was behind the Plutón. He says it was a dynamite shell from the pneumatic gun of the Vesuvius." For several nights after this the Vesuvius ran close in and discharged her three guns, much to the annoyance, but little to the permanent injury, of the enemy.

In the true American spirit of giving a rival a fair chance, Sampson on the morning of June 15th detailed the New Orleans to attack the eastern batteries single-handed. The New Orleans was an English-built craft, and was generally regarded as one of the best specimens of British shipyards. After the Oregon's remarkable performance in steaming from Puget Sound to Jupiter Inlet and the generally creditable results obtained from the other American-built war craft in the Spanish war, naturally there was some desire to compare the New
Orleans with her sisters of American birth. Captain Folger handsomely ran close in to the eastern batteries, and for twenty minutes deliberately "slapped the earthworks in the face" without eliciting a reply, when he was recalled by signal, having demonstrated to the satisfaction of all that the New Orleans was a good boat, with a battery that compared favorably with those in the American craft.

Early on the following morning, June 16th, Sampson advanced to a second general attack on the harbor forts. On this occasion he directed that in all guns of 8-inch or larger caliber reduced charges should be used, so as to increase the angle of the missiles' fall. Having approached within three thousand yards of the shore, the Americans, at 5.24 A.M., opened fire, which they maintained with marked deliberation for an hour, when they retired, having sustained no casualties of any kind. The Spaniards at first responded with a weak fire, but it was quickly smothered. In this attack the New York and most of the other ships approached within two hundred yards of the shore and as close as fifteen hundred yards to the morro. This bombardment, like most of the others made by Sampson, was undertaken principally to discourage the enemy from extending or strengthening their fortifications.

Describing the effect of the attack, Lieutenant Müller says: "The greater part of the projectiles dropped close to the Spanish fleet. Afterward it was learned that a fragment of a shell had caused a slight injury to the María Teresa's starboard galley.... At the morro a gunner was killed, and an officer and five soldiers were injured. At Socapa two sailors were killed and four, with Ensign Broquetas, were wounded.... One of the Hontoria guns was put out of action by débris obstructing it, but not a single gun was dismounted." The Spaniards officially place their casualties in this affair at three men killed, with two officers and sixteen men wounded.
With a view to ascertaining the facilities for landing troops in a small bay to the west of Santiago, two steam cutters—one from the *New York* under the command of Naval Cadet Joseph Wright Powell, and the other from the *Massachusetts*, Naval Cadet Thomas Charles Hart—were sent out early on the morning of June 17th under the orders of Lieutenant Charles Henry Harlow. After entering the bay, and when not more than fifty yards from the shore, the cutters were suddenly fired upon from the cover of bushes and the fort by Spanish infantry. Harlow struck back at this invisible foe as well as he could with his 1-pounders and rifles, but having nothing to gain by remaining under fire—his mission being merely a reconnaissance—he withdrew just as the *Texas* and *Vixen* steamed up and drove the Spaniards to cover. Notwithstanding the fact that both cutters were riddled with bullets, not one of the Americans was seriously injured.
CHAPTER XXII.

LANDING THE ARMY.

To the navy, and more especially to its marine corps, belongs the credit of having effected the first permanent occupation of Cuban soil by a regular United States force in the Spanish war. At midnight, June 6th, only a few hours after Sampson's first bombardment of the morro, the Marblehead and Yankee were ordered to Guantanamo, and on the following day they took undisputed possession of the outer harbor, the gunboat Sandoval retiring to the shoal waters of the inner harbor, where she was beyond the reach of our heavy craft. As the object of this expedition was to select and occupy some point on this bay in anticipation of the army's arrival, Commander McCalla at once landed a detachment of forty marines from the New York, under Captain Mancil C. Goodrell, forty from the Oregon and twenty from the Marblehead. The cable station on the east side of the harbor entrance was selected, the Spanish troops holding that place being put to flight by a heavy fire from the ships.

On the morning of June 10th the transport Panther, having on board six hundred and forty-seven marines under Lieutenant-Colonel Robert W. Huntington, arrived in Guantanamo Bay from Key West. The marines were at once landed and the cable house site was occupied as Camp McCalla. The thick underbrush around the place was cut away as much as possible, and efforts were made to burn the rest, but with indifferent results. On the afternoon of June 11th Spanish troops crept up
on one of the marine outposts and killed Privates James McColgan and William Dunphy. All that night the enemy maintained a desultory fire on the camp. The *Marblehead* and *Dolphin* shelled the surrounding country, and the marines made frequent dashes in the direction of the invisible enemy, but were not able to dislodge the sharpshooters. During the night Assistant Surgeon John Blair Gibbs was mortally wounded while standing beside his tent, and on the following morning, June 12th, Sergeant C. H. Smith was killed and several marines were wounded. While making a sortie on the night of June 12th Sergeant-Major Henry Good was shot. Our casualties down to this time were five killed and twenty-two wounded, so that it soon became evident that the Americans must either retire from their exposed position or drive the Spaniards from cover.

The arrival of sixty Cubans under their commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Tomas, placed at Huntington's disposal much valuable information relative to Spanish tactics, and also gave him guides who could lead him through any of the tangled roads of that district. Learning that the Spanish headquarters was at Cusco, about six miles away, where the only fresh water for miles around could be obtained, Huntington organized an expedition for the purpose of driving the Spaniards off and destroying the well. The expedition, consisting of Company C (First Lieutenant Lewis C. Lucas), Company D (Captain William F. Spicer)—in all, one hundred and sixty men, under the command of Captain George F. Elliott—left Camp McCalla at 9 a.m. June 14th, accompanied by fifty Cuban scouts under their commander, Thomas. The party proceeded eastward close to the beach, while the *Dolphin*, Commander Henry Ware Lyon, ran close inshore so as to support them.

After an exhausting march under a tropical sun and over tangled paths the expedition arrived at a point two and a half miles from Cusco, when Elliott detailed
Lieutenant Lucas with fifty marines and all the Cubans to cross the hill on the left, so as to cut off the enemy's pickets. This detachment, however, was discovered by the Spaniards before it could accomplish its purpose, and the pickets, falling back, gave the alarm. Elliott now hurried all his men to the crest of the hill, which commanded the enemy's position. The Spaniards also had been racing for the same vantage point, and on finding it occupied by the Americans, they opened a spirited fusillade at a distance of eight hundred yards.

Lucas came into the fight at 11.15 A.M. Nine of his men, having been exhausted, had returned to Camp McCalla. The crest of this hill was in the shape of a horseshoe, almost inclosing Cusco Valley and the all-important well. Second Lieutenant Philip M. Bannon led the second platoon of Company C just below the crest of the hill, out of the enemy's sight, leaving the narrow path, and worked his way through the cacti. Behind this platoon and following in single file was Company D. About this time Second Lieutenant Louis J. Magill with fifty men of Company A, who had been stationed as an outpost to Camp McCalla, hearing the firing, came up with his men and joined forces.

For fifteen minutes the Americans pushed through the underbrush in an effort to gain a position more favorable for attacking the enemy. All this time they were subjected to a heavy fire from an invisible foe, as the Spaniards used smokeless powder, and, being stationary, were completely screened by the foliage. The marines, being on the move, presented conspicuous marks. "By the use of glasses and careful search by the men, individuals were discovered here and there, and fire was opened on them; they would break from cover to cover, and we were thus enabled to gain targets at which to fire, which had been heretofore impossible owing to the dense chaparral in which the enemy sought successful cover. Many of the men fired as coolly as at target practice, consulting with each other and their
officers as to range. Among these were Privates Carter, Faulkner and Boniface, all of whom did noticeable execution."

Availing himself of a shift in the enemy's position, Magill succeeded in pouring in a destructive cross fire, so that in a short time the enemy's resistance was reduced to a few straggling missiles. As the Cusco well was near the beach, the Dolphin, Commander Henry Ware Lyon, had cruised along the shore as a support to the marines. At this period of the battle signal was made for the Dolphin to shell the enemy's headquarters. This was promptly done and with such good effect that the Spaniards began to break from cover in all directions, thus exposing themselves to a destructive musketry fire which the marines at once opened upon them. Following up their advantage, the Americans, about 2 p.m., compelled the enemy to retreat, and at 3.15 p.m. forty marines under Lucas left the crest of the hill, burned the Spaniards' headquarters and de-

![Map of the Caribbean Sea](image-url)

*Scene of naval operations at Santiago and Guantanamo.*

1 Official report of Captain Elliott.
stroyed the well, while the Cubans pushed on and harassed the retreating Spaniards. Having accomplished the object of the expedition, Elliott began the return march at 5.30 p.m., arriving at Camp McCalla at 8 p.m. The wounded were taken aboard the *Dolphin*, where Commander Lyon gave them every possible attention. During the fighting Lyon sent ashore a quantity of fresh water—most welcome to our exhausted marines on that scorching day.

In this truly brilliant affair only one American was wounded, though ten or twelve were overcome by the intense heat. On the part of the Cubans, who, on this occasion at least, were of substantial assistance, two were killed and four wounded. Some sixty of the Spaniards were killed and a larger number were injured. Eighteen of them were made prisoners. A quantity of arms and ammunition was captured, and a complete heliograph outfit and signal station were destroyed. Captain Elliott spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of his men. "The fire of the force under my command was at all times deliberate and aimed, sights being adjusted and volleys fired when sufficiently large bodies of the enemy could be seen to justify it." Special mention was made of Lieutenants Lucas, Wendell C. Neville, Bannon, Melville J. Shaw and Magill, and Sergeant John H. Quick.

The dangerous work of clearing Guantanamo Bay of torpedoes was undertaken by Commander Lyon of the *Dolphin*. Under the direction of this officer two steam cutters, each towing a whaleboat some distance astern, were employed, which, steaming in parallel courses passed over every navigable part of the bay. Between the two whaleboats was stretched a light chain, some fifty feet long. As the whaleboats, drawn by the steam launches, moved along on parallel courses, the chain swept the water under the surface until it came in con-

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1 Official report of Captain Elliott.
tact with a torpedo anchor and cable. The obstacle at once retarded the progress of the boats; the torpedo was raised to the surface and removed. For several weeks these boats, under the immediate command of Ensigns William Carey Cole and Yates Stirling, Jr., continued at this exceedingly hazardous service. "It was as plucky an enterprise as ever I have witnessed. Day after day these young officers ventured close inshore, within pistol shot of dense chaparral, where Spaniards could have fired with certain aim upon them with impunity, yet they went about their work as unmindful of their peril as if demonstrating a problem in geometry in a class-room."  

On June 15th Sampson detailed the Texas and Suwanee to shell a small fort on the western arm of Guantanamo harbor, which had occasionally fired upon our ships. The Marblehead, which had remained in this port, joined in the attack. In passing through the narrow channel her propeller fouled a contact mine, while the Texas set one adrift. Each machine contained one hundred pounds of gun cotton, and it was remarkable that both ships were not destroyed. The fort was quickly subdued and the Spaniards driven well inland. The cable house was repaired, the cable mended, so that by June 21st Sampson was in telegraphic communication with Washington.

Lieutenant Müller, in his book Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, bitterly complains of the accuracy and precision with which the Americans were informed of all Spanish mines, making special comment on a "yacht" that was constantly plying between our fleet and the shore, where she communicated with the insurgents. This "yacht" was the Suwanee, Lieutenant-Commander Daniel Delehanty, who, as Müller says, was of great assistance in maintaining communication with the Cubans and landing arms and munitions of

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1 Captain Lyon to the author.
war for their use. On June 19th Sampson received a visit from the Cuban general, Calixto Garcia, who was in command of some four thousand insurgents at Aserradero.

The day before, Sampson had made an inspection tour along the coast, and at Guantanamo found everything ready for the army. Since their defeat at Cusco the Spaniards had left our marines in undisturbed possession of Camp McCalla. In the quiet bay were the Iowa and Yankee coaling from colliers as unconcernedly as if at Key West, while near by were the Marblehead, Dolphin, Panther, Armeria and the hospital ship Solace, forming a complete naval base close to the scene of operations, which had been rendered possible by the daring and pluck of the marines under Huntington. Sampson described these details to Garcia, and, while nothing definite was decided upon, the interview ended with the idea that the proposed attack on Santiago would be from the east.

The great fleet of transports which had left Tampa, Fla., June 14th, with sixteen thousand troops under the command of Major-General William R. Shafter, arrived off Santiago June 20th. The thirty-seven transports were convoyed by the Indiana, Detroit, Annapolis, Wilmington, Castine, Helena, Bancroft, Manning, Osceola, Wasp, Hornet, Eagle, Wompatuck and the torpedo boats Rodgers, Ericsson and Dupont—all under the supreme command of Captain Henry Clay Taylor of the Indiana. Taylor exhibited rare seamanship and judgment in bringing this monstrous fleet to its destination in good time and without a single mis- hap. As soon as the transports arrived Sampson, with Captain Chadwick and Lieutenant Staunton, repaired aboard the Segurança—Shafter's headquarters—and held an informal conference, after which the officers proceeded off Aserradero, where they landed and resumed the conference.

After freely discussing the situation it was decided
to land the army at Daiquiri, and Shafter positively announced his intention of occupying the forts at the entrance to the harbor, in order that Sampson might clear the channel of mines and thus be able to enter the port and destroy or capture Cervera's squadron—the great and only considerable object of the naval and military movements at Santiago. With this understanding clearly understood—namely, that the army's main objective was to be the harbor forts rather than the city itself—Sampson returned to his fleet and Shafter to his transports.

The disembarkation of sixteen thousand troops, with all their arms, munitions, horses and endless accouterments, on a hostile coast without delay or serious loss of life, was one of the most brilliant achievements of the war. "The army had neither lighters nor launches. They had been omitted, forgotten or lost, like an umbrella, no one knew exactly where; so the work of disembarking the troops fell upon the navy." The naval part of this stupendous task was intrusted to Captain Caspar Frederick Goodrich of the St. Louis. In spite of a heavy swell and high surf, six thousand troops were landed the first day, June 22d, and by the evening of June 26th the entire expedition, with a large quantity of ammunition and supplies, had been safely placed ashore. Goodrich especially commended Lieutenant Frank Kinsey Hill, who acted as beach master, Ensigns Charles Lincoln Hussey and Fred Rounsville Payne, and Naval Cadets Orin Gould Murfin and Thomas Charles Hart.

With a view to misleading the enemy as to what point the Americans would land, Sampson had directed several attacks to be made simultaneously at different points along the coast. Early on the morning of June 21st the Texas and Vixen bombarded the small fort west of Santiago called Cabanas, while several trans-

1 Lodge's War with Spain.
Loading 13-inch shells in a battle ship.
ports were to close in as if to land troops. As the So-
capa battery began a spirited discharge of its cannon, 
Captain Philip could not resist the temptation to engage, 
and, moving eastward, began one of the "prettiest ex-
hibitions of gunnery in this war." The only mark the 
Texas had was a faint, reddish line of earthwork, 
scarcely distinguishable in the distance, yet shell after 
shell from her 12-inch guns was pitched into this small 
area, throwing up clouds of dust, opening yawning 
chasms and completely spoiling the enemy's aim. At 
first the Spaniards responded with deliberation, one 
missile striking the Texas, killing one man and wound-
ing eight, but as the Americans acquired the range the 
Spaniards were soon put to flight.

While this spirited duel was taking place off San-
tiago the Gloucester and Eagle were making a lively 
demonstration at Aguadore's; the Annapolis, Hornet, 
Helena and Bancroft at Siboney; while the New Or-
leans, Detroit, Castine, Wasp, Scorpion, Suwanee and 
Wompatuck peppered the hills at Daiquiri, and cleared 
the vicinity of hostile troops.

General Shafter very generously acknowledged the 
assistance the navy rendered in landing the army, re-
ferring to it as "enthusiastic," and declaring that he 
"could not have effected the landing without the navy's 
aid in ten days, if at all." Sampson, in a report to 
Secretary Long dated June 27th, said, "General Shaf-
ter has been most kind in his recognition of the aid 
afforded by the fleet, all of our boats, with several hun-
dred officers and men, assisting."

While the army was engaged in its inland movement 
against Santiago the navy improved every opportunity 
to harass the enemy. A number of the gunboats and 
light craft were detached from the main fleet off Santiago 
to operate on the north or south coast of Cuba as the 
exigencies of the blockade required, leaving only a force 
sufficient to insure the retention of Cervera in Santiago 
and the protection of the transports.
In one of her attacks the *Vesuvius*, on the night of June 25th, landed a shell which did considerable damage to the morro, destroyed the lighthouse keeper's dwelling and wounded four men. Two nights after this the *Vesuvius* again dropped a shell in the fortifications which injured three men.

Under the impression that the army was advancing along the beach in its movement against the harbor forts, the *Gloucester* and *Scorpion* occasionally swept the hill lands near Aguadores so as to clear it of possible collections of Spanish troops.

On June 30th Sampson received a note from Shafter, in which the latter announced his intention of attacking Santiago on the following day, and asked the navy to make a demonstration before the harbor and also to bombard Aguadores preparatory to an attack on the latter place by a brigade of infantry. Slight as this hint was, it was the first intimation Sampson had received that Shafter had abandoned his plan of marching near the beach, where he would receive the powerful support of the fleet, to attack the morro and Socapa batteries, and that his march inland, away beyond the support of the navy, so far from being a feint, was the main purpose of his campaign.

In accordance with Shafter's wish, the *New York*, *Swayne* and *Gloucester*, early July 1st, opened a heavy fire on Aguadores while a brigade, proceeding by rail from Siboney, made a pretense of attempting to cross the inlet and then retired. Not really knowing whether or not this was a mere feint, Sampson poured in an animated fire on the Spaniards, and was somewhat disappointed on observing the retreat of our soldiers. Early July 2d our ships, at Shafter's request, began another bombardment of the Santiago harbor forts. The firing lasted from 5.48 to 7.45 A. M., the enemy's gunners speedily retiring to cover and our ships moving in closer than in previous attacks. From Spanish sources it was learned that two of their guns
had been dismounted, one man killed and thirty-two wounded.

On the same day Shafter wrote to Sampson: "Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly intrenched about three quarters of a mile from town. I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are already very heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life than I can."

This extraordinary note can only be explained on the hypothesis that Shafter's mind was so agitated by the difficulties into which he had plunged that he really did not know what he was saying. Had it been possible for our battle ships to "force the entrance" of Santiago harbor it would have been done long before, and there would not have been the slightest necessity for an army corps to be transported from Tampa. It would have been certain disaster for our ships to have attempted running such a narrow, tortuous channel, mined and fortified as was that of Santiago. The Government, as well as Sampson, had been satisfied on that point a month before, when Sampson wrote, "Beg troops move with all possible alacrity . . . paramount importance." The Secretary of the Navy had specifically forbidden Sampson to risk his armored ships in mine fields until the Spanish fleet was destroyed.

The main and only considerable object of the expedition was Cervera's fleet. On the fate of those ships hinged all the military and naval operations of the war. Shafter, from the time he landed, acted as though the capture of Santiago, instead of Cervera's ships, was the great motive of the expedition. Failing to notify the navy of his sudden change of plan, he struck inland, plunged into a wild and most difficult country for military operations, where he was far beyond the powerful and important support of the navy, and, after a series of bloody fights, discovered that he had completely divided the United States forces by placing the
enemy's main body of troops—strongly fortified in positions of their own selection—between our army and navy. This he had done in such a "masterful" way that the navy and army were absolutely beyond supporting distance of each other.

Sampson had asked for troops to capture the forts at the harbor entrance, so the navy could clear the channel of mines, enter the port and make short work of Cervera's ships and consequently of the city. Troops had been sent, but Shafter, instead of capturing the forts, had hurried his men far inland, behind the city, and was now imploring the navy to "force the entrance"! The astonishing facts are these: The troops Sampson had begged for had arrived—sixteen thousand of them—but had been handled with such incomprehensible notions of generalship that, so far from having furthered the grand object of their mission (the destruction or capture of the Spanish vessels), they were now imploring the navy to save them by a suicidal attempt to "force the entrance."

Victor M. Concas, commander of the *Infanta María Teresa*, says: "We regarded with anxiety the heights on which were located the defenses for the harbor entrance, against which General Shafter did not direct his forces, more regardful of his own interest—certainly than that of his country; for if he had done this, following the natural and sound councils of the admiral [Sampson] of the squadron, there would not have been so great a loss of life, nor would the outcome of his expedition have been so uncertain."¹

A further and possibly more serious result of Shafter's inland campaign was that Cervera, relieved of all fear of a land attack on the harbor forts, was able to spare one thousand seamen and marines, who formed an important re-enforcement to the Spanish troops. "As many as one thousand men were disembarked from the

¹ Squadron of Admiral Cervera, by Captain Concas.
squadron for the aid of the city under the command of
the chief of staff of the former, Captain Joaquín de Bus-
tamente. About four hundred of these men fought in
the battle of July 1st, in which El Caney was taken by
the enemy. . . . It was the naval column which, with
its valiant commander at its head, repelled the attack,
illustrating once more that what is needed for war are
sound and well-fed men, such as our robust sailors,
who, as yet unaffected by the climate, were in a condi-
tion to sustain the battle.”

Truly, the situation was appalling. It is no wonder
that Shafter found the difficulties confronting him so
great that he asked permission from Washington to
temporarily withdraw his forces; a request the Govern-
ment promptly refused. So far from being assisted by
Shafter, our navy suddenly found a new and most seri-
ous burden placed upon it. That the situation was
critical must be admitted. To capture Santiago while
seven hostile war ships—massive steel forts, impregna-
table to any attack of infantry, cavalry or field artillery—
were in the harbor was an impossibility in any reason-
able length of time. The storming of San Juan Hill
and El Caney would have been found mere child’s play
compared with an army’s attempt to capture armored
cruisers having the freedom of a wide expanse of bay
to operate in. It was when Shafter had thus thrust
his nose securely between the Spaniard’s teeth that he
gave expression to the following cry of pain in a note
to Sampson, July 2d: “I am at a loss to see why the
navy can not work as well under a destructive fire as
the army.”

That the army which Shafter, in his efforts at self-
aggrandizement, had injudiciously entangled in the
jungles in the rear of Santiago was rescued from anni-
hilation by the blunders of the Spaniards rather than
by the logic of events is clearly shown by the official

1 Captain Concas, in Squadron of Cervera.
dispatches of the enemy. As early as June 3d Correa, the Minister of War, cabled Blanco that it was the Government's intention to send a powerful naval and military force to the Philippines, and in order to do this it was necessary "to send all the ships of Cervera's squadron that can get out of Santiago." According to Spanish regulations, Cervera's force was under the absolute control of Captain-General Blanco, and by virtue of that authority Blanco, on July 1st—after many warnings of such a course—telegraphed Cervera: "In conformity with the opinion of the Government, you will re-embark those of your crews which were landed, taking advantage of the first opportunity to go out of the harbor with all your ships."

No one realized better than Cervera himself the disastrous consequences of obeying this mandate. He at once summoned a council of his officers, and after the situation was fully discussed it was the unanimous verdict of his officers that to put to sea in the face of the blockading fleet would be suicidal, not only for the Spanish squadron, but for the army as well. In the course of Shafter's inland advance on Santiago, Cervera had landed one thousand of his seamen, who proved to be a powerful re-enforcement for the defenders of the city. Acting on his own convictions, backed by the unanimous opinion of his officers, Cervera telegraphed Blanco, July 1st, that if the sailoís were re-embarked the city would surely be lost. About one o'clock on the morning of July 2d Cervera received the following imperative order from Blanco: "Re-embark landed troops of squadron as fast as possible and go out immediately."

At the first light of day, July 2d, the Spanish admiral again had his officers in consultation, and then announced his intention of going out at the earliest opportunity. He explained his plan of action, which was based on the supposition that the blockading fleet would occupy approximately the position it had held the pre-
ceding four weeks. Cervera had observed that there was a considerable gap in the western part of the semi-circle of American war ships. "Close inshore, toward the west, there was a yacht [the Vixen], which we supposed to be in constant communication with the insurgents, and supporting the yacht was the Brooklyn, in the center of the interval and far away from the other ships, consequently leaving a large space open to the southwest between the Texas and the coast. Supposing, therefore, that the Brooklyn was at her usual station when we came out, the Infanta María Teresa was to engage her in battle, endeavoring to ram her, and while the rest of the enemy's squadron was grappling with our flagship, the other ships, headed by the Vizcaya, without delaying to succor the Infanta María Teresa, were to pass in column between her and the coast and endeavor to escape. The destroyers were to place themselves under the protection of the larger ships as soon as possible under forced draught, endeavor to steam away, and to take no part in the battle except in case a good opportunity should present itself. Upon encountering any single ship, however, they were to improve the opportunity to attack her. Those of the ships which succeeded in escaping were to gain Havana or Cienfuegos." From the foregoing we discover that the noble Cervera deliberately prepared to sacrifice himself and his ship in order that the remaining portion of his squadron might escape.

After naming four o'clock that afternoon, July 2d, as the time for sailing, the admiral closed the council. Captain Concas then hastened ashore to withdraw the sailors for re-embarkation. All the men regained their ships by noon, excepting the two hundred from the Vizcaya. These had been fighting more to the front, and re-embarked at 4 p.m. As they were completely exhausted by long fighting and marching, Cervera decided

1 Captain Concas, Cervera's chief of staff.
to postpone his sortie until the following morning. At 2 A. M., July 3d, Concas visited the *Plutón* and *Furor*. "At two o'clock in the morning, by order of the admiral, I went ashore and for the last time communicated with Villaamil, who, with his destroyers, was below the piers of the iron mines, where the firing sounded so near that it seemed as if the enemy had surrounded that position. However, nothing extraordinary occurred, and all the captains saw that their crews were enjoying a refreshing rest to prepare them for the action of the following day." Concas informed Villaamil of Cervera's intention of sailing the next morning.

Such were the appalling difficulties besetting American arms at Santiago on the night of July 2d, when a startling move, made by the Spanish admiral, relieved the Americans of the gravest peril.

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1 Captain Concas, in Squadron of Admiral Cervera.
CHAPTER XXIII.

BATTLE OF JULY THIRD.

The third day of July, 1898, dawned with a heavy mist enveloping the harbor and city of Santiago and the near-by hills, though seaward the haze was not so pronounced. It was an ideal daybreak in the tropics. The powerful rays of the sun, breaking through and dispelling the mists of early dawn, were soon glaring upon the New World armada, as if angry at its temerity in presuming to withstand their scorching heat. A light breeze from the northwest ruffled the comparatively smooth sea, and gently rocked those modern leviathans of the deep, as if lulling them to slumber before the awful storm broke upon them. On this memorable day, as the sparkling breakers frolicked at the feet of the towering verdure-clad mountains that marched so bravely and grandly to the edge of the sea, Nature seemed to outdo herself in inviting man to keep holy the Sabbath day.

In general the cordon of war craft that for a month had tenaciously held its grip on the mouth of Santiago harbor occupied the same relative positions. Unfortunately for their gallant people, the Massachusetts and Suwanee, shortly before dawn, had left their stations for Guantanamo to coal, leaving on guard the New York, Brooklyn, Iowa, Indiana, Oregon, Texas, the torpedo boat Ericsson and the yachts Gloucester and Vixen. There was nothing in the appearance of this imposing naval force suggestive of war or its horrors. To be sure, the ships had an unbecoming dress of lead
color, but they had worn that full two months, and it had become so soiled and dirty as to be scarcely distinguishable from any misused apparel. The surly bulldog battle ships, the nimble greyhound cruisers, the pert spaniel yachts and the snaky torpedo boat rolled easily on the long, swinging waves, as if too languid to care whether war had been declared or not. The officers and men could be seen moving about the decks as unconcernedly in the performance of "Sunday inspection" as if they were in some good American harbor. Turning powerful glasses landward, our people could distinguish men strolling about the venerable ramparts of the mediaeval morro and the modern Socapa and Eastern Batteries, attending to what little they had to do with all the elaborate inertia of Castilian indolence. Well might the stranger knocking at Santiago's gate that beautiful Sunday morning have said: "Peace on earth, good will toward men"!

To the commander in chief of the American fleet, however, these were hours of gravest anxiety. He had asked for the co-operation of a land force to assist him in entering the harbor, so as to destroy the enemy's naval force. So far from the army being an "assistance" to him, Sampson now realized that the destruction of Cervera's squadron actually was of secondary importance, the prime and supreme need of the moment being the rescue of the army from a position into which it had been led by the desire of its commander to become the great and only figure in these operations.

A council of war between our navy and army commanders had become imperative. Shafter, ill with the fever, could not come to Sampson; so Sampson, with extreme reluctance, decided to leave his station off Santiago and have an interview with Shafter on land. Captain Chadwick, representing Sampson, had visited Shafter the day before, and had found the situation so grave that Sampson decided to consult with Shafter in person. The admiral had even resolved, and perhaps
perfected his plans, to force the entrance of Santiago harbor without the assistance of our land forces, if such a course proved necessary to save the army from disaster. The transport Resolute, Commander Joseph Giles Eaton, was on hand with a complete countermining outfit and twenty-four thousand pounds of gun cotton ready to assist in the forlorn attempt—another illustration of the tireless care and forethought of the Navy Department.

Accordingly, at ten minutes before nine o'clock on the morning of July 3d, Sampson caused the signal "Disregard movements commander in chief" to be displayed from the New York, and, with the Ericsson, Lieutenant Nathaniel Reilly Usher, moved leisurely toward Siboney, where he was to land and, after proceeding several miles inland, meet Shafter. As the New York steamed past the towering mountains that girded the south coast of Cuba her officers instinctively kept their glasses on the morro (which they had watched so patiently during the past four weeks) and on the fleet that remained on the station. The forms of men aboard the blockading war ships, arrayed in regulation white, could be distinctly made out as they stood at "Sunday inspection." This in itself was sufficient evidence for those in the flagship that all was well off Santiago. Just as the barren hills of Siboney, brown and rugged, were standing out distinctly off the port bow Sampson stood on the quarter-deck of the New York to take a parting look at the fleet. At this moment a man on the signal bridge cried out:

"Smoke in the harbor!"

An instant later he fairly yelled: "The fleet's coming out!"

Glasses were at once trained on the dull, yellow streak which faintly indicated the position of the morro.

"Yes, they are coming out," calmly replied Sampson. "Hoist two-fifty"—that signal meaning "Close in toward the harbor entrance and attack vessels." The
flagship's course eastward was promptly checked, and swinging round she retraced her course with the *Ericsson*, using her best speed to get into the fight. As yet it was by no means certain that the Spanish vessels would not head eastward (in Sampson's direction), in which case the *New York* would have had a grand opportunity to distinguish herself. Much to the chagrin of every man in the flagship, however, Cervera's ships were observed turning westward, and the *New York* used her best endeavors to reach the scene of action.

Describing the egress of their ships, Captain Concas, of the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, says: "The entrance to the harbor of Santiago is a narrow channel, about eleven hundred yards in length, which is made still narrower near its outlet by the location of Diamond Bank, which reduces its width to about seventy-six yards. These narrows take a slight turn, which makes it necessary in coming out to steam at a moderate speed, in order not to run upon the rocks on the opposite shore, and therefore it is impossible, when several ships are going out, for more than one to be in the channel at a time. Otherwise there is danger of collision, if by chance some damage should be done to the ship which goes out first, or if it should run aground, which would not be strange in view of the difficult character of the maneuver. . . . To this natural difficulty of the harbor must be added the obstruction near Key Smith caused by the sunken *Merrimac*, against which we would not only scrape, but the ships would have to turn before clearing it, for which reason the port screws would pass within three or four yards of the wreck with great risk of being entangled in it or its rigging. It was necessary, therefore, that the ships go out a considerable distance apart. . . . We had just finished making the turn at Diamond Bank amid deathlike silence, everybody awed by the magnificent spectacle of the ships issuing from the narrow passage, when
the enemy discovered us.”¹ The Spanish cruisers came out in the following order: *Infanta María Teresa* (flagship), Captain Víctor M. Concas; *Vizcaya*, Captain Antonio Eulate; *Cristóbal Colón*, Captain Emilio Díaz Moreu; and *Almirante Oquendo*, Captain Juan B. Lazago.

It was while Sampson was nearing Siboney that the head of the hostile squadron was discovered by the *Iowa*, at 9.31 a.m.,² and Evans promptly made the signal: “Enemy’s ships coming out!” and fired a gun to draw attention. At that moment the *Iowa* was between three and four miles due south of the morro and had steam up sufficient only for about five knots. “The *Iowa* had had trouble with her boilers and Evans had secured special permission from me to disable certain boilers for repairs. This fact probably accounts for her poor speed. The general practice was to keep under half boiler power. By sending one ship from the blockade to Guantanamo each day we were just enabled to keep sufficient coal aboard to permit the use of one half the boilers.”³ The enemy’s vessels came out at nine knots and with a full force of reserve speed. As soon as each ship cleared shoal water forced draughts were applied and the highest possible rate of speed was maintained.

Remembering the instructions Sampson had given, Evans at once impelled the *Iowa* straight for the enemy’s leading ship, the *Infanta María Teresa*, and at 9.40 a.m., or nine minutes after the alarm had been given, when at a range of six thousand yards, fired the first shot on the American side. Observing that the Spaniards were turning westward, Evans shifted his helm so as to head them off, the range meantime decreasing to twenty-five hundred yards. But he soon discovered that the *Infanta María Teresa* would pass

¹ Captain Concas, in El Mundo Naval, a Spanish naval periodical.
² Official report of Captain Evans.
³ Rear-Admiral Sampson to the author.
him, so he sent the Iowa westward, and opened a strong fire from his starboard battery. After maintaining this course for a few minutes the Iowa again veered northward so as to intercept the second cruiser, the Vizcaya. But that vessel also had too much steam on for the American, and Evans again swung westward—almost parallel to the enemy’s column—and poured in a destructive fire from his starboard battery, the distance having now been reduced to eighteen hundred yards.

Noticing that the Spanish cruiser Cristóbal Colón was now coming up, Evans for the third time edged northward in a further effort to check the Castilian’s flight. Again he was too late, demonstrating in a most forceful manner the vast advantage speedy cruisers have over a blockading force. In the light of these facts it seems almost certain that three at least of Cervera’s ships would have escaped had they even approximately attained the speed credited to them.

Determined to punish this craft to the utmost, Evans again swung westward and maintained a furious can-
nonade with his starboard guns. By this time the range was about fourteen hundred yards, so that the fire of the secondary battery was effective. Furthermore, the Iowa had accumulated more steam, so that she was enabled to keep within fighting distance of this cruiser longer than was the case with the first two. “The fire of the main battery of this ship, when the range was below two thousand five hundred yards, was most effective and destructive, and after a continuance of this fire for perhaps twenty minutes it was noticed that the Infanta María Teresa and Almirante Oquendo were in flames and were being headed for the beach.”

Soon after the close of the war the author endeavored to obtain a description of this action from Rear-Admiral Cervera. The admiral replied, “I much regret to say that naval regulations prevent me from saying anything on the subject until I have communicated with my Government.” After Cervera had officially reported to his Government, a copy of his report was courteously placed in the hands of the writer, and the following extracts are given:

Speaking of the effects of our fire, Cervera says: “There was no doubt in my mind as to the outcome, although I did not think that our destruction would be so sudden. One of the first projectiles burst an auxiliary steam pipe on board the Infanta María Teresa. A great deal of steam escaped, which made us lose the speed on which we had counted. About the same time another shell destroyed one of the fire mains. The ship made a valiant defense against the galling hostile fire. Among the first wounded was our gallant commander, Captain Concas, who had to withdraw, and as we could not afford to lose a single moment, I myself took direct command, waiting for the executive officer to appear. Fire broke out aft and spread

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1 Official report of Captain Evans.
2 Rear-Admiral Cervera to the author.
rapidly forward. Our machinery being disabled, we had no means of fighting it. It being impossible to flood the magazines, owing to the smoke and flames, I beached the ship and surrendered. Explosions were heard in the ammunition rooms and the fire gained so rapidly that we had scarcely time to be rescued by the United States boats that came to our assistance. We had lowered a boat, which immediately sank. The steam launch was then lowered, but after making one trip that sank also. During this time explosions followed each other in rapid succession."

Shortly after the Iowa's signal, "Enemy's ships coming out!" was deciphered aboard the Texas the head of the Spanish column was plainly visible, pushing out beyond the headland which had concealed it, and Captain Philip at once sent his ship ahead with all the steam he could command, giving orders to Chief Engineer Alexander Berry Bates to increase the speed to the utmost. At this moment the Texas was fifty-one hundred yards from the morro. The officer of the deck, Lieutenant Mark Lambert Bristol, promptly gave the general alarm, sent the crew to quarters, and, like Evans in the Iowa, put the helm to starboard, so as to run a course parallel, though converging, to that of the enemy. The Infanta Maria Teresa having opened fire shortly after being discovered, the Texas, at 9.40 A.M., began with her turret rifles at a range of forty-two hundred yards. This fire was maintained with admirable skill and vigor, the Texas all the time occasionally swinging round as each of the leading cruisers passed her, so as to bring her full starboard broadside into play. Observing the egress of the Plutón and Furor, Philip, like Captains Evans, Clark and Taylor, of the Iowa, Oregon and Indiana, operated his secondary battery on those torpedo boat destroyers. Some of the heavy shells from these battle

1 Official report of Rear-Admiral Cervera.
2 Official report of Captain Philip.
In the boiler room of the Oregon.
ships were seen to strike the destroyers and did serious damage.

So great was the advantage the Spaniards possessed in a full head of steam that the plucky little Texas—in spite of her best efforts to at once avenge the death of her sister, the Maine—soon fell behind the Infanta María Teresa and Vizcaya, though she had managed to place many telling missiles in those ships before they passed her zone of fire. By the time the Almirante Oquendo came up, however, the heroic engineers and firemen of the Texas had so far developed her speed that later in the chase she "was holding her own with the Colon."³ Philip maintained his position abreast of the Almirante Oquendo some time, pouring in a terrific fire—for at this juncture the Texas seemed to concentrate her anger on that craft—and undoubtedly would have compelled her to surrender or run ashore had not the magnificent Oregon just at this time begun her famous "burst of speed" and moved between the Texas and her antagonist, blanketing Philip's fire. The Oregon's chastisement of the Almirante Oquendo, however, added to that she had already received from the Texas, Iowa and other American vessels, had sealed her fate. She had been wounded to death, and, turning landward, ran ashore and displayed the white flag.

We get some idea of the horrible effects of the American fire in the official report of Lieutenant Adolfo Calandria of the Almirante Oquendo, who says: "When the third round was about to be fired in the forward turret, a projectile entered between the gun and gun port, tearing a piece from the upper edge of the latter and killing two men and wounding a third. In the after turret Lieutenant Polanco was killed. A shell entered the after torpedo room and put everybody there out of action. A few moments later another shell exploded in the central room aft, killing or

¹ Official report of Captain Philip.
wounding many men, among the latter being Ensign Pobil.\footnote{\textsuperscript{1} Official report of Lieutenant Calandria.}

By this time Philip's engineers were beginning to work the Texas up to her best speed, and so far from losing ground in the chase, she was actually gaining on the much-boasted Vizcaya. Observing that the Almirante Oquendo had been eliminated from the problem, Philip gave his attention to the ship next ahead—the Vizcaya—then about sixty-six hundred yards distant, and closely engaged with the Oregon. At 11.05 a.m. the Vizcaya was in flames, Captain Eulate had turned inshore, and fifteen minutes later beached and surrendered. Knowing that other American ships, which could be depended on to take care of the stranded cruiser, were coming up, Philip hastened after the Brooklyn and Oregon in the chase for the Cristóbal Colon, now the only cruiser left of Cervera's proud squadron.

At the time Cervera's ships were discovered, the Brooklyn was about sixty-three hundred yards from the morro, and was the westernmost of the American ships excepting the Vixen. Commodore Schley, in his official report to Sampson, said: "Signal was made from the Iowa that the enemy was coming out, but his movement had been discovered from this ship at the same moment. \ldots Signal was made to the western division, as prescribed in your general orders, and there was immediate and rapid movement inward by your squadron."

As the Spanish cruisers cleared Diamond Shoal, they turned westward, and were rapidly approaching the Brooklyn. The Iowa, Indiana, Oregon and Texas, as we have seen, came to close quarters at once, and in the first twenty minutes poured in the heaviest and most effective fire of the engagement. In fact, it was in this first twenty minutes that the Infanta María
Teresa and the Almirante Oquendo received their mortal blows. Commodore Schley said: "The concentration of the fire of the [American] squadron upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them."  

The Brooklyn headed for the Spanish ships at a speed of twelve knots, and, like the Iowa, Indiana, Oregon and Texas, obeyed Sampson's order: "If the enemy tries to escape, the [American] ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels, or force them to run ashore." There can be no doubt that, at first, two of the Spanish cruisers devoted the bulk of their fire at the Brooklyn. Cervera knew her contract speed, and believed that she was the most dangerous vessel. As a matter of fact, the Brooklyn had some of her boilers disconnected, so that the comparatively slow-going Oregon was fully as speedy—just as the events of the day proved. "But," said Schley, "the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly, soon diverted this fire [from the Brooklyn], and did magnificent work at close range. I have never before witnessed such deadly and fatally accurate shooting as was done by the ships of your command as they closed in on the Spanish squadron." Again, Schley says, in the same report, "All the ships of the [American] squadron advanced into close range, and opened an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the enemy's squadron as it was coming out of the harbor."

Describing the Brooklyn's entry into this battle, the court of inquiry, in its statement of Facts, says: "The Brooklyn stood toward the Spanish vessels with varying helm, fired one shot from her forward turret at thirty-five hundred yards' range, which proved short, and then engaged with her port battery. When about fourteen hundred yards distant from the leading Span-

1 Commodore Schley's official report.
ish ship, the *Infanta Maria Teresa*, the *Brooklyn* turned to starboard, with her helm hard aport, and continued so to turn until she headed westward, parallel to the course of the Spanish ships. The commanding officer of the *Brooklyn* [Captain Cook] put the helm hard aport, and at almost the same instant Commodore Schley gave the order, ‘Hard aport.’”

It was the unanimous verdict of the court of inquiry that: “By commencing the engagement on July 3d with the port battery, and turning the *Brooklyn* around with port helm, Commodore Schley caused her to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels, especially with the *Vizcaya* and *Cristóbal Colon*. The turn of the *Brooklyn* to starboard was made to avoid getting her into dangerous proximity to the Spanish vessels. The turn was made toward the *Texas*, and caused that vessel to stop and to back her engines, to avoid a possible collision.”

Speaking of this affair, the late Rear-Admiral Philip said to the writer: “The *Texas*, at this time, was doing her best to close on the Spaniards, when, to my surprise and consternation, I saw the *Brooklyn* swing round with port helm—when all the other American war ships had used the starboard—away from the Spaniards, and place herself directly in our course. I was compelled to stop and reverse our engines, and even then came nearer to a collision than I could wish. On account of this circumstance the *Texas* lost a splendid chance of closing with the enemy.”

In his testimony before the court of inquiry, Rear-Admiral Schley said, when speaking of the *Brooklyn’s* loop: “I had hoisted the signal of ‘Close up,’ and then ‘Follow the flag.’” During the entire Santiago campaign, while in command of the Flying Squadron, it seems that Schley had given the commanders of his vessels no specific instructions as to what they

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1 Rear-Admiral Philip to the author.
should do in case of meeting an enemy. It has been conclusively shown, however, that if Schley did hoist the signal, "Follow the flag," it was absolutely inoperative in directing the movements of the other vessels.\(^1\) Schley went into the action flying Sampson's prescribed signal, "Close up," but, instead of closing up (as all our other heavy vessels did), Schley abruptly stood away from the enemy, interfered with the Texas, and left a gap at the western end of our line through which the Spaniards escaped. It was fortunate, indeed, that Evans, Taylor, Clark and Philip did not "follow the flag."

"When the Brooklyn completed the turn [loop] and was heading westward, parallel to the course of the Vizcaya, the Vizcaya and the Cristóbal Colon were about twenty-four hundred yards northward and westward of the Brooklyn."\(^2\) The Brooklyn then joined the Oregon in her chase after the Vizcaya and Cristóbal Colon. Throughout the engagement the officers and men of the Brooklyn fought with conspicuous gallantry, fired with accuracy, and would have inflicted even more damage on the enemy than they did had they not lost time in changing batteries, and had been drawn off to long range at the crucial period of the battle. It was the unanimous verdict of the court of inquiry that "Schley's conduct during the battle of July 3d was self-possessed, and he encouraged, in his own person, his subordinates, officers and men, to fight courageously."

An interesting episode in this great battle was the part taken by the yacht Vixen, Lieutenant Alexander Sharp, Jr. Like the famous Gloucester, the Vixen was a mere pleasure craft—the Josephine—of about eight hundred tons, and mounting four 6- and four 1-pounder

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\(^1\) The signal, "Follow the flag," was not displayed from the Brooklyn during the battle, but three hours after the surrender of the Cristóbal Colon, or at 4:20 p.m., when the Brooklyn and Oregon were sent to meet an Austrian war ship.

\(^2\) Statement of Facts by court of inquiry.
The fighting-top of the Indiana during the battle.
guns. On May 14th she had sailed from Key West for Cienfuegos, and after performing valuable service as a dispatch boat in communicating with the insurrectos and on blockade duty, she proceeded to Santiago with Commodore Schley's force. On the morning of Cervera's sortie the Vixen was the westernmost of the blockading ships and close inshore, where the Spaniards would have caught her single-handed between their ships and the beach. Acting with decision, Sharp stood seaward, crossed the bow of the Infanta María Teresa at a distance of two miles, and was complimented with some ten large shell from the Spaniard, any one of which, had it struck, would have sent the yacht to the bottom.

By 10.10 A. M. the Vixen had gained her proper position, about a mile to the south and west of the Brooklyn. Many of the missiles intended for the Brooklyn passed high over her and landed dangerously near the Vixen, her flag at the mainmast being torn by a piece of shell. After the Brooklyn, Oregon and Texas had passed far ahead of the Vixen in their chase of the Cristóbal Colon, Sharp headed inshore, and at 11.06 A. M. opened fire on the Vizcaya, then making for the beach. Observing the hopeless condition of that cruiser, Sharp resumed his course westward, and about 2.30 P. M. reached the spot where the Cristóbal Colon was stranded.

On discovering the enemy, Captain Clark sent the Oregon ahead at full speed, and in ten minutes was in the thickest of the fight. "For a short time," said Clark, "there was an almost continuous flight of projectiles over this ship, but when our line was fairly engaged and the Iowa had made a swift advance, as if to ram or close, the enemy's fire became defective in train as well as range." At first the Oregon used only her main battery, but, discovering the Plutón and Furor, Clark directed an effective fire at them from his secondary battery so long as they were in range.

1 Official report of Captain Clark.
Observing that Cervera's object was to escape westward, Clark made after him, bent on "carrying out to the utmost Sampson's order—'If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore.'" In a short time the swift Oregon came abreast of the Infanta Maria Teresa, which had lost her position as the leading vessel in the Spanish column, and was now sternmost. She had been severely punished, nearly all of our war ships having fired at her; and as the Oregon drew near, Captain Concas headed for the beach. In executing this maneuver Concas exposed his ship to a raking fire, which the Oregon took advantage of by pouring in a shower of well-directed steel. Not stopping to annihilate the doomed Spanish flagship, Clark hastened after the next cruiser, the Almirante Oquendo, using his starboard guns as they bore, and before he gained a position abeam Clark observed her turning inshore and beach.

On hastening back from Siboney with the New York, Lieutenant Usher urged the Ericsson to the assistance of the Gloucester, but finding that the Spanish destroyers had surrendered, Usher hastened after the Vizcaya, so as to use his torpedoes. "At full speed we drew near the morro, and as we passed, and afterward, the fire of the shore batteries was directed at us. Several shells struck near us, short or beyond, and two burst overhead." The Brooklyn and Oregon had now drawn considerably ahead of their consorts, and were firing with accuracy on the Vizcaya, Schley still clinging to his position southward of the other American ships. The Oregon had attained the astonishing speed of sixteen knots an hour, which enabled her to keep within touch of the Brooklyn. The Vizcaya was soon compelled to head inshore also; at 11.10 A.M. she grounded and surrendered.

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1 Official report of Captain Clark.
2 Official report of Lieutenant Usher.
Finding that the *Vizcaya* was hopelessly wrecked, Usher was continuing after the *Cristóbal Colon* when Sampson ordered him back to rescue Spaniards. After fishing up one man, Usher gave his attention to those in the *Vizcaya*. "Ran close alongside the *Vizcaya* and sent small boat to her, boats from the *Iowa* pulling in also at the same time. Explosions from the ammunition began about this time, and her guns, which had been left loaded, were fired one after the other by the flames. The *Vizcaya* was on fire fore and aft, but the mass of fire was aft, and the position of the *Ericsson* was perilous in the extreme, and only the urgency of the occasion caused her to remain. [We] rescued eleven officers and about ninety sailors and marines from the vessel, many of them sorely wounded. The Spanish were no sooner taken on board than they urged immediate withdrawal of the *Ericsson*; but this vessel remained until all alive had been taken from the *Vizcaya*."

The only Spanish cruiser now remaining was the *Cristóbal Colon*, which was still eight or ten miles ahead of our leading ships. Speeding after her were the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*, while the *Texas*, with the *New York* farther behind, was rapidly coming up. These four ships now settled down to a determined chase. Their guns ceased "barking," though rifts of smoke still clung to them, while the stains of burned powder were visible here and there about the ships—silent, though eloquent, witnesses of the terrific cannonading they had just been engaged in. In a short time their batteries were put in order. The guns were carefully reloaded, the ammunition was rearranged, the men gave themselves a hasty brushing up, and then stood ready for the closing scenes of this memorable battle. Having nothing further to do with their batteries, the officers and men sought vantage points in their several vessels and watched the race.

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1 Official report of Lieutenant Usher.
Down in the engineer's department and in the fire rooms, where the center of activity now shifted, all was animation and exertion as the heroic men strove by every possible means to increase speed. The fate of Cervera's last cruiser now depended solely on them. For hours they had worked far down in the bowels of the ship in an atmosphere unendurable in ordinary circumstances. Added to the awful heat of that tropical July day were the blazing fires, in which tons upon tons of coal were throwing out heat that seemed to boil the blood in the veins. The mercury rose high above one hundred degrees. Dozens of men were prostrated, but only to revive on reaching the deck and to return to their posts like the heroes they were. "More steam!" "More speed!" were the cries that came from the deck, and more steam and more speed were the answers that came in the increased throbbing of the mammoth engines as they churned and whirled the propellers with mighty strokes, forcing the monstrous ships through the water with giant strength. It is a noble death to fall in the heat of battle for the defense of the flag. What shall we say about the men felled by the heat of the fire rooms in modern battle ships, whose return to life is only a signal to resume their posts and renew the fight?

The four American ships presented a magnificent spectacle as they raced through the sea along the coast of Cuba under a cloudless sky. The awful crash of ordnance had abruptly ceased. Silence reigned supreme over the scene. Far out on the horizon, scarcely discernible save for a few fleecy blurs of smoke, was the Cristóbal Colon, the one faint object on which the four great American war ships were now concentrating their best efforts. At the bows of each of our ships a snow-white wave rose high on the cutwater, at times spilling over and on to the forecastle. So great was the momentum that the forward part of these vessels rose a foot or two higher than their normal level, while their sterns sank correspondingly as they settled in the trough the
ships had dug in the sea. Mighty columns of black smoke rushed up to the tops of their funnels, and, as if frightened at the impressive spectacle presented, they abruptly tumbled over the smokestacks, and scurried off toward the horizon.

Notwithstanding the contract speed of the Cristóbal Colon, the four American war ships gradually overtook her. After this silent race had lasted about two hours, the Brooklyn and Oregon again opened fire with their forward turret guns, the latter’s 13-inch shells landing near and beyond the chase. Moreu had experienced the effect of these monstrous missiles earlier in the battle, and he realized the futility of further opposition, so, after a few more of the dreaded shot fell near him, he headed shoreward, beached and surrendered. That the Cristóbal Colon was brought to by the Oregon rather than by the Brooklyn is seen in the official report of Commodore José de Paredes, the second in command in Cervera’s squadron, who personally commanded the Cristóbal Colon during the battle. He says: “I saw that neither the Brooklyn nor the Oregon could overtake us, the former falling behind more than the latter. . . . At 1 p. m. the Oregon began to gain on us and soon after opened fire with her heavy bow guns, which I could answer only with one gun, while the distance between us grew constantly shorter. We had one man killed and twenty-five wounded.” 1 Captain Cook went aboard to receive the surrender. “The captain spoke English, and received me pleasantly, though naturally much depressed. He was polite, shook hands, and said that his case was hopeless. . . . I was on board about fifteen minutes. As we came from the Colon the flagship New York came in with the Texas.” 2 And so the last of the four proud Spanish cruisers—vessels which had caused unquestioned anxiety at Washington—was destroyed, after what will be

1 Official report of Commodore Paredes.
2 Official report of Captain Cook.
ever regarded as one of the most momentous, skillfully and patiently planned, and gallantly conducted battles in naval history.¹

The Cristóbal Colon had run ashore on a ledge of submerged rocks, so that part of the ship was supported while the stern was dependent on the sea. In this position she was in great danger, as an ebb tide might easily cause her to slide off the ledge and go, stern foremost

¹ The officers in the American fleet engaged in this brilliant action were:

In the flagship New York: Rear-Admiral, William Thomas Sampson; Captain and Chief of Staff, French Ensor Chadwick; Assistant Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Sidney Augustus Staunton; Flag Secretary, Lieutenant Charles Carlton Marsh; Flag Lieutenant, Ensign Ernest Linwood Bennett; Lieutenant Commander, William Parker Potter; Lieutenants, John Emil Rolfer, Frederick Wesley Coffin, Richard Thomas Mulligan, Edward E. Copehart, Frank Marble and Samuel Hughes; Ensigns, Edwin Taylor Pollock, Frank Hardeman Brumby, Leigh Carlyle Palmer and Joseph Wright Powell; Naval Cadets, Ernest Frederick Eggert, Needham Lee Jones, Oscar Dibble Duncan, Austin Kautz, Charles Boone, William Gunnell Du Bose, Louis Clark Richardson and John Sisson Graham; Medical Inspector, Charles Urquhart Gravatt; Passed Assistant Surgeon, Thomas Andrew Berryhill; Assistant Surgeon, Raymond Spear; Pay Inspector, Arthur Burtis; Chief Engineer, Charles Jenkins MacConnell; Passed Assistant Engineers, Frank Marion Bennett and Walter Ball; Assistant Engineers, Allen Merriam Cook and Henry Thomas Baker; Chaplain, Alfred Lee Royce; Major, Robert L. Meade; First Lieutenant of Marines, Rufus H. Lane; Acting Boatswain, Philip Mullen; Gunner, Charles Morgan; Acting Carpenter, James Irving Hale. By verbal order Ensign Henry Croskey Mustin served in the New York in the capacity of an aid to Sampson.

In the Brooklyn: Commodore, Winfield Scott Schley; Captain, Francis Augustus Cook; Lieutenant Commander, Newton Eliphalet Mason; Lieutenants, Albon Chase Hodgson, Thomas Dillard Griffin, William Rees Rush, Edward Simpson and James Gregory Doyle; Ensigns, Charles Webster and Edward McCauley, Jr.; Naval Cadets, John Halligan, Jr., Ralph Norris Marble, Jr., James Alexander Hand, Jr., William Pigott Cronan, Ulysses Samuel Macy, Clarence Arthur Abele, Fletcher Lamar Sheffield and William Benefiel Wells; Captain of Marines, Paul St. C. Murphy; Second Lieutenant of Marines, Thomas S. Borden; Boatswain, William Lowell Hill; Gunner, Franklin Tyler Applegate; Carpenter, George Hichborn Warford.

In the Iowa: Captain, Robley Dunglison Evans; Lieutenant Commander, Raymond Perry Rodgers; Lieutenants, William Henry Schuetze,
or upside down, to the bottom. To add to her peril, it was found that she was taking in water rapidly, the Spaniards having opened the sea valves in each of their cruisers after they realized that further resistance was hopeless. Captain Cook reported that the prize might be saved. A detachment of American officers and seamen was placed aboard, but in a few hours it was apparent that they were in danger of going down with the

Horace Mark Witzel, John Madison Orchard, Louis Sayre Van Duzer, Frank Kinsey Hill and Glennie Tarbox; Ensigns, Nathan Crook Twining, Horace Greeley Macfarland and Guy Norman; Naval Cadets, Arthur Japy Hepburn, Orin Gould Murfin, Joseph Wright Graeme, Victor Stuart Houston, Hillary Williams, William Christian Asserson, Alfred Crosby Owen, Henry Lafayette Collins and Andrew Thomas Graham; Surgeon, Manly Hale Simons; Passed Assistant Surgeon, Rand Percy Crandall; Paymaster, James Andrew Ring; Chief Engineer, Charles Whiteside Rae; Passed Assistant Engineer, Herman Osman Stickney; Assistant Engineer, Martin Edward Trench; Chaplain, Roswell Randall Hoes; Captain of Marines, Lincoln Karmany; Second Lieutenant of Marines, Theodore H. Low; Acting Boatswain, Allen Whipkey; Acting Gunner, Allan Scott Mackenzie; Acting Carpenter, Frank Johnson; Mate, Hjalmer Eugene Olsen.

In the Indiana: Captain, Henry Clay Taylor; Lieutenant Commander, John Augustus Rodgers; Lieutenants, Samuel Pancost Comly, Richard Henderson, Roy Campbell Smith, Frederick Lincoln Chapin, McDonough Craven, Benton Clark Decker and Thomas Washington; Ensigns, Percy Napier Olmsted and William Reynolds Cushman; Naval Cadets, Gilbert Chase, Walter Maxwell Falconer, Willis McDowell, Arthur St. Clair Smith, Jr., Charles Truesdale Owens and Ernest Clinton Keenan; Surgeon, Nelson Macpherson Ferebee; Assistant Surgeons, George Dayton Costigan and Middleton Stuart Elliott; Paymaster, Reah Frazer; Chief Engineer, George Cowie; Passed Assistant Engineer, Carl M. Green; Assistant Engineers, Walter Ball, Roscoe Charles Moody and Daniel Mer- shon Garrison; Chaplain, William Gilbert Cassard; Captain of Marines, Littleton W. T. Waller; First Lieutenant of Marines, William C. Dawson; Boatswain, James Dowling; Gunner, George Lincoln Mallery; Acting Carpenter, George W. A. Bailey.

ship. Acting with his usual decision and resourcefulness, Sampson resorted to a novel expedient for saving the ship. The exploit is described, at the request of the author, by Lieutenant Charles Lincoln Hussey, then an ensign, as follows:

"I was one of the officers sent from the Oregon with the prize crew ordered to take charge of the Colon. She was found to be making water aft very fast. Late in the afternoon, as her after compartments filled, her bow rose and she slid off the beach [into deep water]. An anchor was immediately let go, and she swung parallel to the beach. She continued to make water so rapidly that it became evident that she would sink. To prevent

Surgeon, Washington Berry Grove; Paymaster, Samuel Reed Calhoun; Chief Engineer, Robert Wiley Milligan; Passed Assistant Engineer, Cleland Nelson Offley; Assistant Engineers, Joseph Mason Reeves, Frank Lyon and Thad C. Dunlap; Chaplain, Joseph P. McIntyre; Captain of Marines, Randolph Dickins; Second Lieutenant of Marines, Austin R. Davis; Boatswain, John Costello; Gunner, Arthur Solomon Williams; Carpenter, Milton Fuller Roberts.

In the Texas: Captain, John Woodward Philip; Lieutenant Commander, Giles Bates Harber; Lieutenants, Lewis Cass Heilner, Harry Phelps, Francis J. Haeseler, Harrison Augustus Bispham and Mark Lambert Bristol; Ensign, William Kern Gise; Naval Cadets, Alfred Warren Pressey, William Herbert Reynolds, Frederic Ralph Holman. Robert William Henderson, Morris Hamilton Brown, Henry Tutwiller Wright and Guy Willian Faller; Surgeon, Clement Biddle; Assistant Surgeon, Harold Hamilton Haas; Paymaster, John Slaughter Carpenter; Chief Engineer, Alexander Berry Bates; Passed Assistant Engineer, Kenneth McAlpine; Assistant Engineers, Chester Wells and Alfred Watson Hinds; Chaplain, Harry William Jones; First Lieutenant of Marines, Cyrus S. Radford; Boatswain, John Francis Brooks; Gunner, Francis Martin; Carpenter, Ellis Washington Craig.


In the Ericsson: Lieutenant, Nathaniel Reilly Usher; Ensign, John Rufus Edie.

In the Hist: Lieutenants, Lucien Young (commanding), C. W. Hazeltine and Felix H. Hunicek; Ensign, Douglas C. McDougall; Assistant Paymaster, Charles Morris, Jr.; Assistant Engineer, Edward Stanley Kellogg.
her going down in deep water—about twelve fathoms [seventy-two feet]—Captain Chadwick, Admiral Sampson's chief of staff, who had been kept informed of the state of affairs on board the prize, ran the New York close up to the sinking ship, and with the ram of the New York against the quarter of the Colon pushed the stern of the latter, little by little, in toward the beach. Then taking a line from the bow of the Colon to the bow of the New York, he ran the stern of the sinking ship well up the beach, so that when she rolled over, less than three hours later, she was in comparatively shallow water.”

From his position west of the morro Captain Taylor of the Indiana was unable to join in the final chase of the Cristóbal Colon, but he managed to deliver some effective blows on each of the Spanish cruisers as they came out of the harbor, as, in turning westward, they exposed for a time their entire broadsides as a target to the Indiana's gunners. It was at 9.37 A. M., while the men were at quarters preliminary to general muster, that the Iowa's alarm was noted aboard Taylor's ship. "We at once cleared for action, and the men were at the guns in a remarkably short time, all the officers and men showing an alacrity that clearly indicated their pleasure at the opportunity offered them.”

Steaming ahead as fast as possible, the Indiana opened on Cervera's flagship. Taylor maintained a savage cannonade on this unfortunate craft until she drew beyond range, when he devoted his attention to the other Spanish cruisers as they came out of the harbor. "From the bridge I could see that our shooting was excellent and showed its effects. One of our 13-

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1 Lieutenant Hussey to the author.
2 "The discrepancies as to the time the enemy was sighted are probably due to the variations in the deck clocks aboard the several ships. The enemy was discovered coming out by each blockading ship practically at about the same moment."—Rear-Admiral Sampson to the author.
3 Official report of Captain Taylor.
inch shells was seen to enter the *Infanta Maria Teresa* under the quarter-deck and explode, and that ship was observed to be on fire very shortly afterward."

About 10.15 A.M. Taylor, observing that the Spanish flagship and the *Almirante Oquendo* were on fire and heading for the beach, devoted his attention to the torpedo boat destroyers *Plutón* and *Furor*, which, after an interval, followed the cruisers out of the harbor. As these vessels were quickly disposed of by the yacht *Gloucester*, as narrated in the next chapter, Taylor trained his 13-inch guns on the fleeing *Vizcaya*, then at long range. In a short time that vessel was seen to turn toward the beach. At this juncture the American flagship *New York* rushed past the *Indiana* and signaled, "Go back and guard entrance of harbor!" In obedience to this order, the *Indiana*, at noon, stood for the morro, and half an hour later the *Resolve* came within hail and reported by megaphone that a Spanish battle ship was coming *from the east*. Soon afterward the *Harvard* hurriedly passed and confirmed the report.

This was startling news indeed! The bulk of the American fighting ships was widely scattered along the coast to the west in chase of the *Cristóbal Colon*. A large fleet of transports at Guantanamo, to the east, had to be protected. For some time past there had been persistent rumors of a second Spanish naval force crossing the Atlantic with the object of aiding Cervera in an attempt to escape from Santiago harbor. That these rumors were well founded is seen in the statement of Lieutenant José Müller, the second in command of the naval forces at Santiago. No one was better informed of the situation on the Spanish side at this crisis than he.

And this is what he says in his diary under date of July 2d: "It occurred to me (and no one could have dissuaded me from it) that a fleet [Camara's] from the

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1 Official report of Captain Taylor.
Peninsula [Spain] was on its way to Porto Rico; that it would pass in sight of the semaphore of Porto Rico; that consequently Admiral Cervera would know when it would reach Santiago; and when fire was opened on the enemy it would leave the mouth [of Santiago harbor] free, and he [Cervera] would go out, and the two fleets combined would defeat the enemy. I remembered everything I had read in the newspapers about the purchase of ships and the date when those building had been launched. Everything was clear to me. We had ships, and they were coming. No doubt they were quite near, or perhaps only a few miles distant.”

Without question these well-grounded rumors had reached the American naval officers.

It is not remarkable, then, that when Commander Eaton descried a strange war ship approaching from the east—especially as her flag, in the distance, bore a strong resemblance to that of España—he concluded that it was a forerunner of the second hostile squadron. Captain Taylor, with guns loaded and crew at quarters, promptly bore down on the stranger, ready for instant action. The cause of this excitement proved to be the Austrian armored cruiser Kaiserin Maria Teresa. She sent a boat aboard the Indiana, asking permission to enter the harbor. Taylor referred the officer to the admiral, and the Austrian passed down the coast—disturbing the serenity of several of our gallant commanders in the hour of their great victory—and saw her namesake, the Infanta Maria Teresa, a mass of flame and wreckage on the beach.

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1 Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, by Lieutenant Müller.
2 The officers in the Resolute were: Commander Joseph Giles Eaton; Lieutenants Charles Custis Rogers, John Arthur Bell, Charles S. Braddock, Jr., John A. Gorgas, Jr. and Fred H. Pullen; Ensigns Frank H. Silvers, John F. Tatem and George H. Mather; Passed Assistant Surgeon Peter McGill; Passed Assistant Paymaster William H. Fulper; Passed Assistant Engineer Frank H. Conant; Passed Assistant Engineer Louis L. Bernier; Assistant Engineer George B. Massey.
CHAPTER XXIV.

WAINWRIGHT AND THE DESTROYERS.

With a sagacity deserving of special note, Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright of the Gloucester, who, it will be remembered, was the executive officer of the Maine when that battle ship was destroyed in Havana harbor, when he realized that the Spanish cruisers were escaping from Santiago, made up his mind that the Plutón, Lieutenant-Commander Pedro Vásquez, and Furor, Lieutenant-Commander Diego Carlier, would soon follow, and he determined to reserve his efforts for those craft. The Gloucester was nothing but a frail pleasure yacht—the Corsair—hastily fitted when the war broke out as a dispatch boat. Her length on the water line was two hundred and four feet, while her displacement was seven hundred and eighty-six tons. Being rigged as a two-masted schooner, her foremast was removed and a battery of four 6-pounders and four 3-pounders with two 6-millimetre machine guns was placed on her. Her complement was ninety-three officers and men. Both the Furor and the Plutón were the latest and best productions of the Clyde shipyards. They were considerably longer than the Gloucester, and, by being constructed for war purposes, were immeasurably superior to her in fighting qualities. Each was armed with two 14-pounders, two 6-pounders, two 1-pounders, and two 14-inch torpedo tubes, and had a complement of sixty-seven officers and men.

"It was the plain duty of the Gloucester," modestly reported Wainwright, "to look after the destroyers,
and she was held back, gaining steam until they appeared. The Indiana poured in a hot fire from all her secondary battery upon the destroyers, but Captain Taylor’s signal, ‘Gunboats close in!’ gave security that we would not be fired on by our own ships.”

With the true instincts of a sea fighter, Wainwright husbanded his strength, intently watching for an opportunity to attack.

It was 9.43 A.M. when the Gloucester’s people discovered Cervera’s squadron coming out. At that moment the yacht was about three thousand yards southeast of the morro. “General quarters” was sounded, and Wainwright proceeded to the bridge, the most exposed part of the little craft, and opened fire on the Infanta María Teresa at a range of three thousand five hundred yards. Believing that the Spanish torpedo boat destroyers would soon follow, Wainwright slowed his engines, but kept an animated fire on the cruisers so long as they were in gunshot. In a few minutes all the heavy fighting ships, both American and Spanish, were strung along the coast in a furious race, leaving the little Gloucester practically alone to face the destroyers and the land batteries, which all the time maintained a heavy though ill-directed cannonade.

It was when the last of Cervera’s cruisers had come out of the harbor, turned westward, and was about a mile up the coast, that the destroyers, under the immediate command of Captain Fernando Villaamil, made their appearance. They came out of the rat-hole entrance to the harbor of Santiago at their highest rate of speed, like cornered rodents making a dash for liberty. This was the Gloucester’s opportunity, and, with catlike agility, she headed north-northwest under full steam and opened a rapid and accurate fire at a range of two thousand five hundred yards. In a few minutes the Indiana signaled “Gunboats advance!” As the yacht

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1 Official report of Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright.

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was the only "gunboat" available at that crisis, Wainwright had the temerity to regard the order as directed to himself, and he at once proceeded to close on the apparently uninjured destroyers single-handed.

By this time the *Gloucester* was holding a course almost parallel, though slightly converging, to that taken by the *Plutón* and *Furor*. Her speed had been developed to seventeen knots, and it was noticed that she was steadily gaining.

Not satisfied with attacking one of the destroyers at a time, Wainwright divided his puny fire between the *Plutón* and *Furor*, the forward starboard two 6-pounders and one 3-pounder being trained on the leading Spaniard—the *Plutón*—while the after guns, the two 3-pounders, were directed at the *Furor*. The enemy opened a terrific though ill-directed fire on the yacht, hundreds of missiles falling in a few minutes near the *Gloucester* and whipping the sea into a froth. On this occasion the Spaniards operated a 1-pounder Maxim gun with terrifying, if not terrible, effect. The monotonous whirring of this machine could be clearly distinguished in that awful crash and thunder of ordnance, while a pronounced line of foam in the sea plainly indicated the path these countless missiles were making. Had that tornado of merciless steel been properly directed, the *Gloucester* would have been riddled like a sieve in five minutes, and probably not one of her people would have been left alive to tell the story. The Americans "continued to fire very rapidly, which made it extremely difficult for us to serve the guns."¹

By 10.15 A.M. Wainwright had reduced the *Plutón*'s lead to twelve hundred yards, at which range the *Gloucester* probably did her best firing, the two 6-millimetre guns now operating with effect. By this time the signs of distress were discovered aboard the *Plutón*. The furious pace she had set began to falter. In a few

¹ Account of Lieutenant Caballero of the *Plutón*.
minutes she gave a hesitating yaw to port, away from land, and then turned abruptly to starboard and made a mad rush for the shore, entangling herself in a shoal of rocks some distance from the beach.

Satisfied that the Plutón was out of the fight, Wainwright concentrated his fire on the Furor. Gradually he reduced her lead to six hundred yards, and fairly covered her with a shower of steel, the Spanish gun crews actually being swept away as fast as they could be formed. Presently the Furor began that sickening circling round—unerring signs to a sailor's mind that the ship's end is near—and Wainwright knew that he had won a second victory. "She was pointing off shore and in our direction, leading me to think she was about to close with us. She continued to turn, however, completing her circle to port at decreasing speed. Steam and smoke from her decks and her slackening fire showed her to be damaged, and it was evident she was disabled too seriously to continue the action."¹ A moment later some one in the forward part of the Furor waved a white cloth, and the Americans ceased firing.

Describing the loss of the Furor, one of her officers, Lieutenant Bustamente, says: "One of the projectiles struck one of the hatches of the boiler ventilators, thereby reducing the pressure and consequently the speed of the ship. By this time the projectiles were falling on board in large numbers. One of the shells struck Boatswain Dueñas, cutting him in two; one part of the body fell between the tiller ropes, clogging them momentarily, and it was necessary to take it out in pieces. Another projectile destroyed the engine and servo-motor, and another the after shell room, exploding and destroying it. Under the circumstances orders were given to abandon the ship, and I, with part of the crew, jumped into the water about three miles from the coast. One of the swimmers was struck in the head.

¹ Official report of Lieutenant Thomas C. Wood.
by a bullet, and was buried in the water forever. "The ship, after a series of horrible explosions, went down." 1 Twenty-five or thirty of the destroyer's people reached land, and, after an exhausting tramp through the woods under the leadership of Lieutenants Caballero and Bustamente, gained the Socapa battery that night. Lieutenants Thomas C. Wood and George H. Norman, with Assistant Engineer André Morton Proctor and a prize crew, were promptly sent aboard to assist the survivors and endeavor to save the ship. A horrible condition was found on board. "The vessel was a perfect shambles. As she was on fire and burning rapidly, they took off the living, and then rescued all they could find in the water and on the beach. . . . While this work was going on several explosions took place in the Furor [one of them nearly resulting disastrously for the Americans], and about 1.30 A. M. she threw her bow in the air and, turning to port, slowly sank in deep water. The Plutón was among the rocks in the surf and could not be boarded, but the crew had made their way ashore, or were adrift on life buoys and wreckage." 2

Of the Furor's sixty-seven officers and men, only nineteen, including her commander, Carlier, and Lieutenant Arderius, survived the ship, and many of those rescued were more or less injured, Arderius having been badly hurt. In the Plutón, Lieutenant-Commander Vásquez, Lieutenant Boado, with twenty-four petty officers and men, were saved, all the remaining forty-one men—including Captain Villaamil—perishing. In April of the following year the hull of the Furor was discovered by divers from the Yankton in fifty feet of water. A thorough investigation was made, but no trace of a shot larger than a 6-pounder was found. This, backed by a similar statement made by the several American officers who boarded her at the time of her surrender, seems to confirm the Gloucester's claim to

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1 Account of Lieutenant Bustamente.
2 Official report of Lieutenant Huse.
having been the principal agent in the destruction of that ship and the Plutón. This claim is further strengthened by the account of Lieutenant Caballero of the Plutón, who, after showing how the destroyer was hopelessly wrecked, says: "As we were making a great deal of water, we continued close to the shore to reach Punta Cabrera, and when we were close to the headland which it forms we received a 32-centimetre [a 12- or 13-inch shell, the first mention Caballero makes of a large shot], which exploded the forward group of boilers, blowing up the whole deck and cutting off communication between the two ends."\(^1\) The Furor's hull was found to be so riddled with shot that no attempt was made to raise her. The destruction of the destroyers, however, was facilitated by secondary batteries in the larger American war ships, the New York having used her 4-inch guns, while the Iowa, Indiana, Oregon and Texas also gave heavy blows to these craft.

Observing smoke behind a promontory just west of him, Wainwright, leaving a boat's crew with the destroyers, brushed his yacht up a bit, loaded his guns, and with all hands at quarters rounded the point ready for another fight. The smoke was found to be issuing from the stranded Infanta María Teresa and the Almirante Oquendo. These ships were burning principally aft, their surviving officers and men being huddled forward, evidently unable or unwilling to swim to the beach, which was about one hundred and fifty yards distant. The surf at this place was formidable, besides which a band of insurgents was collected on shore ready to seize and perhaps massacre the Spaniards. Wainwright at once got out his gig and cutter, and sent them with Lieutenant Norman and Acting Ensign John Ed- son to the rescue.

As Norman's boat (the gig) drew near the cruiser it was observed that about twelve of the crew had gained

\(^1\) Account of Lieutenant Caballero.
the beach, where they were surrounded by a half-naked band of Cubans. Edson's boat (the cutter) now approached. "As we neared her" [the Infanta María Teresa], said Edson, "I held up a rope's end to indicate my purpose. A line which they gave me I took to the beach, and called for a good swimmer to take it through the surf. Otto Brown [a seaman] responded manfully. With the line about his neck he fought against the breakers for twenty minutes. He returned once to the boat for rest. After another struggle, the cutter being closer in this time, he made the beach. I also sent Peter Keller [boatswain's mate] through the surf to secure the line ashore. The cutter was hauled to and from the ship [the seaward end being made fast to the cruiser] along this line, carrying each time eight or ten men from the burning wreck. As we neared the beach each time I found it necessary to throw one or more Spaniards into the water in order to expedite the work. These men were immediately grabbed by Keller and Brown and passed along the line to the beach. In this manner the cutter landed two hundred officers and men, and I believe that Admiral Cervera was among the number." 1 The Spanish admiral was "among the number," and we shudder to think that he might have been one of those the energetic young ensign "threw" into the water and was "grabbed" by the stalwart Keller or Brown "in order to expedite the work." Young America never was a respecter of persons, anyhow.

"All through the time we were rescuing the crew of the Teresa," said Lieutenant Norman, "small explosions were constantly occurring between her decks. The fire was steadily working forward, and those still left in the ship were urging us to hurry in our work of removing them, as they feared an explosion of the forward magazine. After the crew of the cruiser [some four hundred and eighty] had been placed

1 Official report of Acting Ensign Edson.
ashore, I backed my boat as near as possible to the surf and sent a man ashore with orders for the admiral, the fleet captain and five other officers next in rank, to come out to my boat. They promptly obeyed, two of our men dragging them out, one at a time, along the life line through the surf to our boat's side. I then returned with these as prisoners to the *Gloucester*. In the long pull out Admiral Cervera and his officers expressed much gratitude for our rescue of them and their crew and considerable anxiety for those we had left on the beach, who, though over four hundred strong, being unarmed and nearly naked, were at the mercy of the Cubans who had gathered around them.

"As we left the wreck for the *Gloucester*," said Edson, "the fire had reached the forward turret, so that the whole ship was nearly aflame. One of the 11-inch guns was discharged, sending a shot into the water close alongside us."

After placing his distinguished prisoners aboard the *Gloucester*, Lieutenant Norman hastened back to the scene of wreckage and found that the Spaniards, fearing an explosion of the cruiser's magazine, had retired behind a hill, though a few remained on the beach attending to the wounded, of whom six had expired. Norman, with a small guard, landed, marched to the place the Spaniards had retreated to and formally received their surrender. A touching illustration of the humanity of the American naval officer is had in the fact that Norman, on this trip, with some trouble and great risk, had loaded his boat with eatables and freely distributed them to the half-starved Spaniards. By this time a number of the *Almirante Oquendo's* men had straggled over the beach and joined the admiral's crew, so that the prisoners now numbered over five hundred.

1 Official report of Lieutenant Norman.
2 Official report of Acting Ensign Edson.
About this time the Harvard passed close inshore, and Captain Cotton sent out nine boats—eight of them large lifeboats—under the immediate command of Lieutenant Joseph Beale to rescue the unfortunate Spaniards. After much hard work and exposure to great danger these boats rescued six hundred and seventy-two officers and men from the enemy's ships. About the same time Captain Taylor of the Indiana sent his steam launch, having a "pull boat" in tow, with two surgeons and a quantity of medical supplies. The task of removing the prisoners was completed about ten o'clock that night, when the Harvard made for Siboney, where, at 8 A. M. the next morning, Lieutenant Norman and his men returned to the Gloucester.

While the heroic work of saving the people of the Infanta Maria Teresa was going on, Lieutenant Wood of the Gloucester was equally brave in assisting the men in the Almirante Oquendo. "After putting my prisoners [from the Furor] aboard the Gloucester, I was ordered to save what life I could from the Almirante Oquendo, hard and fast ashore and burning furiously. This vessel lay with her bow inshore about three hundred yards from the beach. On going alongside as near as practicable, owing to the surf and great heat from the burning vessel, I could see none of her officers or crew except some twenty or thirty crowded on the forecastle or hanging by ropes from her bow; and these I succeeded in rescuing and putting aboard our ship, together with some ten or twelve whom I found floating on fragments of wreck. The burning cruiser, her plates, many of them bursting outward and red hot, the roar of flames, the constant explosion of small-arm ammunition, varied by heavier explosions from the guns or boilers—this, with the cries of the wretches on her bow for help, made a scene which was indescribably impressive. The gratitude of those saved was touching, and from all Spanish survivors I saw only a devout appreciation of escape, and
from many of them a testimony of the terrible effectiveness of the fire from our fleet.\(^1\)

In his official report Sampson said: "The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the Gloucester excited the admiration of every one."\(^2\) Wainwright, in his official report, adds: "The efficiency of this fire, as well as that of the ship generally, was largely due to the intelligent and unremitting efforts of the executive officer, Lieutenant Huse. The result is more to his credit when it is remembered that a large proportion of the officers and men were untrained when the Gloucester was commissioned." The colors of the Almirante Oquendo and Furor were brought aboard the Gloucester by Lieutenant Wood, and the Pluton's by Mr. Proctor. Of the crew Wainwright also spoke in the highest terms, calling especial attention to Chief Boatswain's Mate John Bond and Chief Machinist Robert P. Jennings.\(^3\)

Speaking of the Gloucester's fire in this action, Lieutenant Huse says: "The action was a remarkable one. The matériel of the enemy was superior in every respect, and yet, having destroyed two vessels, either of which would have been a fair match for this ship [the Gloucester], and inflicted terrible losses to their personnel, I have to report not one casualty. This result I attribute wholly to the accuracy and rapidity of our fire, which made the proper service of the guns on board

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\(^1\) Official report of Lieutenant Wood.

\(^2\) The officers of the Gloucester were Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright, Lieutenants Harry McLaren Pinckney Huse, Thomas C. Wood and George H. Norman, Jr.; Ensign John T. Edson, Assistant Surgeon J. F. Bransford, Assistant Paymaster Alexander Brown, Passed Assistant Engineer George Washington McElroy, and Assistant Engineer André Morton Proctor.

the Spanish ships utterly impossible. In this opinion I am borne out by the statements of our prisoners, who commented on the awful destructiveness of our fire and spoke of their unsuccessful efforts to use their torpedoes, the crews being swept away repeatedly by bursting shell. They also referred to the deadly effect of the Colt automatic guns [6-millimetre], and said that the projectiles from these passed clean through the vessels.\(^1\)

Notwithstanding the terrific fire to which the American vessels were subjected on this day, both from the cruisers and land batteries, the extraordinary fact remains that while each and every one of the enemy’s boats was utterly destroyed, not one of our ships was seriously injured, and of the three or more thousand Americans exposed to danger, only one, Chief Yeoman George Henry Ellis, was killed, and only one man, J. Burns, fireman—both in the Brooklyn—was wounded.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Official report of Lieutenant Huse.

\(^2\) The Brooklyn “was struck twenty times by whole shot and many times by pieces of bursting shell and from small shot of machine guns. No serious injury was done to the ship. . . . The smokestacks were hit in several places, the signal halyards, rigging and flags were cut in many places. The flag at the main was destroyed, being much cut by shot and flying pieces of shell.”—Official report of Captain Cook.

The Iowa was struck about ten times. One 5.7-inch shell pierced her starboard side two or three feet above the actual water line, swept across the berth deck and perforated the cofferdam partition bulkhead, where it remained without exploding. Another 5.7-inch shell “pierced the side and the cofferdam A 105. . . . It broke off the hatch plate and coaming of the water-tank compartment, exploded and perforated the walls of the chain locker, creating a small fire, which was promptly extinguished. . . . Two or three other projectiles of small caliber struck about the upper bridge and smokestacks, inflicting trifling damage, and four other small projectiles struck the hammock nettings and the side aft.”—Official report of Captain Evans.

The Indiana “was struck only twice by fragments of shell or projectiles of very small caliber. No damage was done to the ship except the wreckage of the gig by the blast of our own gun.”—Official report of Lieutenant-Commander John Augustus Rodgers.

The Texas seems to have sustained the most serious injuries on the American side. A 5.7-inch shell penetrated the starboard side above the
According to the most reliable estimates the Spaniards had three hundred and fifty killed or drowned, one hundred and fifty-nine—including ninety-nine officers—wounded, and seventeen hundred and seventy-four made prisoners.

It has ever been a characteristic of United States naval officers to treat prisoners of war not only humanely, but generously. The history of our navy is replete with instances of magnanimity toward a fallen foe. We have noted the many occasions when our warm-hearted tars opened their scanty kits in order to clothe destitute prisoners, and how our officers treated recent antagonists of the quarter-deck so that they were compelled to admit "We cease to feel ourselves prisoners."

This noble trait was especially noticeable in the treatment of the Spaniards captured in the naval action of July 3d. Almost as soon as the Navy Department learned of the victory measures were set on foot to comfortably house and provide for prisoners. Suitable quarters were especially prepared on Seavey's Island, Portsmouth, N. H., under the immediate direction of Paymaster Joel Porter Loomis. In all, twenty officers and sixteen hundred and sixty-one men were quartered at this place. Charles Heywood, colonel commandant of the marine corps, twice inspected the camp, and reported that "when these prisoners were landed they were dirty, many with scarcely any clothing, some in feeble condition, and a number of them wounded. They

main deck, "exploded in the forward air shaft to forced draught blower, destroying doors of both air shafts and the adjacent bulkheads. Several pieces passed through the doorway of the after shaft and penetrated the after bulkhead of the shaft. . . . The ash-hoist machinery was badly damaged."—Official report of Lieutenant-Commander Giles Bates Harbor. This ship was injured in other places, the cost of repairs being nearly five thousand dollars.

The New York, Oregon, Gloucester, Vixen and Ericson practically were uninjured. The Hist, Lieutenant Charles W. Hazeltine, though incurring much danger by running close to the burning wrecks in her efforts to rescue the survivors, escaped uninjured.
were provided with an excellent meal that night, and the next day they were supplied with sufficient warm clothing and bedding through the earnest efforts of Pay-master Loomis. I inspected the grounds and barracks, and found them in a perfectly sanitary condition, showing that great care had been bestowed on the men and camp by Colonel James Forney and Lieutenant-Colonel Robert L. Meade.”

Those prisoners requiring constant medical attendance were sent to the naval hospital at Norfolk. Rear-Admiral Cervera with seventy-eight officers and fourteen enlisted men as servants were quartered at Annapolis, where they were treated by Captain Philip Henry Cooper and his assistants with the utmost consideration.

1 Official report of Colonel-Commandant Heywood.
CHAPTER XXV.

BARACOA AND PORT NIPE.

Not waiting for the final destruction of Cervera's squadron, Sampson, as soon as he felt that the enemy's ships were securely cornered in Santiago, at once began energetic operations against various points along Cuba where effective blows could be struck. Many of these actions have been noted in the chapters South Coast of Cuba and Blockade of the North Shore. For some time the gunboat Annapolis, Commander John Jacob Hunker, had been stationed off the important town of Baracoa, at the eastern end of Cuba. This was an unusually difficult point for naval operations on account of its exposure to ocean waves and winds, yet it was especially important, as a blockading force virtually controlled the Windward Passage, one of the main channels of commerce in the West Indies.

On the morning of July 15th Commander Hunker ran in and anchored on the east side of Miel Bay, about twelve hundred yards from the Matachin battery, for the purpose of communicating with a party of Cubans who were encamped on the shore of the bay. In a short time an insurgent officer came aboard and informed Hunker that some three hundred Spanish soldiers held the city, but were hemmed in by Cuban forces. About 11.25 A. M. Lieutenant George William Mentz, the executive officer of the Annapolis, reported that a Spanish flag had been hoisted on the battery, and a few minutes later a well-directed shot from the land whistled over the gunboat.
Hunker promptly got under way, sent his men to quarters and returned the fire with the after 4-inch gun. It was raining heavily at the time, and the ocean swells rendered it extremely difficult for the Americans to fire with accuracy. So heavy were the seas that the pitching of the ship frequently submerged the forward guns, and after three shots had been fired from them their ports were closed and their crews were sent to other guns. After the first few discharges a dense mass of smoke collected around the ship, which added materially to the difficulty of firing with accuracy. As the starboard battery gradually swung into full play the ship got clear of the smoke and the gunners were able to fire with greater precision. Two shots were seen to fall within the battery and set fire to some woodwork, but it was quickly extinguished. As the enemy's guns had been silenced, and not wishing to injure the town, Hunker, at 12.05 A.M., ceased firing and drew out of range. The ship had been struck several times by fragments of 3.5-inch shells, two spent pieces hitting, but not seriously injuring, two of the crew.

"These men were on the spar deck, one aft and one forward, and were struck at the same time, showing that if they were shot from shrapnel the explosion was such as to scatter some of its balls fore and aft the ship. Each of these pieces is of lead, flattened out, and about an inch in diameter. A piece of iron shell 2.5 inches long by 1.5 inch wide hit the sailing launch's strong back, struck the deck at the foot of the bridge ladder, making quite an indentation, struck the steam launch and fell to the deck. The shell from which this piece came was seen to explode about fifty feet from the ship, and most of its fragments passed over the ship."  

Commander Hunker spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of his officers, while Lieutenant Mentz said:

"Even the men on the sick list voluntarily rushed to

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1 Official report of Lieutenant Mentz.
their quarters. This is the first time the crew has been under fire at such close range, and there was no flinching, although the shot fell close to and passed over the ship. All were cool and eager to do their duty.”

A few days after this brush with the Matachin battery the Annapolis took part in one of the most daring affairs of the war. On July 18th Rear-Admiral Sampson ordered this vessel to join the Topeka, Lieutenant-Commander William Sheffield Cowles, the yacht Wasp, Lieutenant Aaron Ward, and the tug Leyden, Ensign Walter Selwyn Crosley, in an attack on Port Nipe. In this harbor was the Spanish cruiser Don Jorge Juan, of nine hundred and thirty-five tons, armed with three 6.3 Palliser rifles—one on the forecastle and one on each side on sponsons—two 3-inch Krupp guns—one on each quarter—and having a complement of one hundred and fifty-seven men and two revolving cannon. Besides this formidable cruiser, it was believed that there were two Spanish gunboats in that port. The narrow entrance to the harbor was protected by thirty electric and contact mines, which the enemy evidently relied upon to destroy or to deter an enemy from forcing an entrance. On each side of the harbor were batteries, manned by some eight hundred troops. Truly a formidable port for these four comparatively frail American vessels to attack.

Commander Hunker was fully advised as to the strength of Nipe's defenses and also of the dangers from mines; but he counted largely on taking the enemy unprepared, and on the morning of July 21st he appeared off the harbor with the Annapolis, Wasp and Leyden, where he found the Topeka on guard. It was his intention to first send in the Wasp and the Leyden, under cover of the Annapolis and Topeka, so as to develop the strength of the battery on the bluff at Roma Point; but this plan was somewhat disconcerted by the eagerness of the commanders of the Wasp and Leyden to "get at" the enemy. When the Wasp came along-
side the *Annapolis* on the morning of July 21st to receive her orders Commander Hunker called out: "I want you and the *Leyden* to go in and examine that bay. The *Topeka* and this vessel will cover the point." To this Lieutenant Ward replied, "Shall I lead?" A little puzzled by this strange answer, Hunker asked, "What's that?" Ward then explained: "I am the senior officer," meaning that he ranked Ensign Crosley of the *Leyden*; "may I lead?" This commendable rivalry of the two officers to assume the post of danger caused some confusion in Hunker's plans; "but," said that commander good naturedly, "each was so anxious to lead, although I had given Lieutenant Ward orders to do so, that they raced forward at full speed and drew ahead a mile or more, or farther than I had intended." Notwithstanding the fact that Ensign Crosley, in the slow-going *Leyden*, had a good start for the honor of "getting his head knocked off," the speedy *Wasp* soon overhauled her, and at 12.20 P.M. took the lead into the bay.

Ensign Crosley said: "The first indication of the presence of the enemy was from the high hill to the right of the first turn in the channel, where a blockhouse and signal station were seen. Several signals were made as follows: An American flag was hoisted and quickly run down; a black ball or shape surmounted by a red pennant was next run up. This was soon lowered, and the same shape, surmounting a square blue flag, replaced it. This was in turn replaced by a Spanish flag with the same ball under it. The *Wasp* fired some shots at this station, but my orders as received from you did not allow me to fire until fired upon. The *Leyden* was fired upon from this station by small arms, many shots falling in the immediate vicinity of the vessel, but none striking her.

"At the same time a bright lookout was maintained

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1 Official report of Commander Hunker.
for mines or torpedoes, but nothing to indicate the presence of anything of the kind was seen, except six floats such as are generally used for fishing pots. At the time the shots were fired from the shore I discovered a vessel at anchor within the bay, and was able to make out a man of war flying Spanish colors. Almost immediately I was able to communicate this discovery to the commanding officer of the Wasp, who in turn signaled to you. At the same time I found a stake in the water with '3,000' marked upon a white board secured thereto, and a puff of smoke was seen to issue from the Spanish vessel. The shot fell near the Leyden, and was immediately followed by two more which fell equally near."

Having approached within forty-five hundred yards of the Spanish cruiser, the enemy, at 12.44 p. m., opened on the Wasp with a bow gun, to which the yacht and the Leyden immediately responded. Continuing up the bay at a speed of eight knots, closely followed by the Annapolis, the leading American vessels gradually reduced the distance to sixteen hundred yards, sputtering away with their puny batteries at the Don Jorge Juan very much like pert spaniels barking at a chained mastiff. "For fully six minutes before the Annapolis and Topeka came within effective range the Wasp and Leyden sustained the fire of the heavy Spanish guns. I sincerely hope," said Commander Hunker, "that their [Ward's and Crosley's] dash and courage will be properly appreciated and well rewarded." When Commander Hunker made out the Wasp's signal, "Enemy's vessel in sight!" he pushed rapidly into the harbor, closely followed by the Topeka. At this moment a large steamer appeared in the offing, and the people in the Topeka drew Hunker's attention to it. But that officer was too intent on the battle ahead to investigate the stranger, which afterward proved to be the Panther.

1 Official report of Ensign Crosley.
2 Official report of Commander Hunker.
As the *Annapolis* and *Topeka* passed up the channel, shots were fired from their 6- and 1-pounder guns to clear the beaches and woods of sharpshooters, besides which ten 4-inch shells were directed at the battery on the bluff near the signal station. As these gunboats drew near, the *Wasp* and *Leyden* separated to starboard and port, so as to give the heavier vessels a good range at the *Don Jorge Juan*. By 12.51 p.m. the *Annapolis* had cleared the channel and opened at six thousand yards with the 4-inch gun on the forecastle, and, as the ship gradually drew nearer, all the guns in the port battery were brought into play. In a short time a 4-inch shell, fired by Boatswain's Mate Moran in the *Annapolis*, struck the *Don Jorge Juan* full on the bow, and, raking her fore and aft, caused her to take in such quantities of water that she rapidly settled at the head.

About ten minutes after the *Leyden* had begun firing, Ensign Crosley noticed two boats filled with men leaving the cruiser and pulling for the beach. After the Spaniards had fired three more shots another boat load of men was observed leaving the ship, while in a short time the steam launch, with the last load of men, pushed off from the sinking ship and headed up the Mayari River. About the time the enemy fired their last shot their flagstaff was cut away. The *Leyden*, at 1.15 p.m., signaled that the enemy had surrendered, and by promptly sending his whaleboat to the wreck, Ensign Crosley secured the *Don Jorge Juan*’s colors. The *Annapolis* had not discovered that the enemy had surrendered until the signal was made from the *Leyden*, for the smoke had collected around the gunboat so as to seriously obstruct the view. The last shot fired from the *Annapolis* was at 1.18 p.m., and at 1.45 p.m. the *Don Jorge Juan* went down, bow first, and settled easily on the bottom in thirty-six feet of water.

The *Topeka*, while following the *Annapolis* in, had
fired at the earthwork on Roma Point, and afterward at what appeared to be a fort at Port Tobacco. She was prevented from firing at the Don Jorge Juan, as the other American vessels were in her line of fire. As Commander Hunker expected, the Spaniards were not prepared for the dash of the Americans into the port. The Don Jorge Juan had been caught napping. No steam was up, and no special preparations for resistance had been made, the Spaniards evidently believing that the Americans would not dare to attempt the passage of the channel known to be guarded by thirty mines or torpedoes.

The Wasp and Leyden were now ordered to search other parts of the bay for the remaining gunboats. No trace of the enemy could be found, the Spaniards having taken their remaining gunboats up the Mayari River and sunk them. Although the American vessels had been under a severe fire some thirty minutes, none of the vessels was damaged and no one was hurt. The torpedo boat Dupont, Lieutenant Spencer Shepard Wood, shortly afterward entered the harbor, and her people found a contact mine floating in the channel. Two mines also were plainly seen by Lieutenant Ward and Ensign Crosley, while on their way out of the harbor after the fight, moored from eight to ten feet below the surface of the water. On leaving the port the Americans could plainly see the buoys with connections and the signal ranges on shore marking the positions of the torpedoes. Twelve of them were counted, arranged in a zigzag line in the narrowest part of the channel. As they were easily distinguished in the water, they were readily evaded by hugging the south side of the channel. The next morning the mayor of Nipe informed Commander Hunker that all the Spanish soldiers in that vicinity, together with the crews of the gunboats, had retreated to Holguín.

Speaking of the action, Commander Hunker said: "I can not too highly praise the spirit shown by the
commanding officers of the *Topeka, Wasp* and *Leyden* in taking their vessels through the mine fields into Nipe Bay, the courage exhibited by Lieutenant Ward and Ensign Crosley in engaging the more heavily armed Spanish cruiser, for a time unsupported, or the, eagerness with which the commanding officers of the *Wasp* and *Leyden* thanked me when I gave them the order to enter.” Of Lieutenant Mentz, Commander Hunker says: “He most coolly and effectively directed the gun fire, and Lieutenant Boush, who skillfully conned the ship through the channel, and into action, deserves special commendation.”¹ Lieutenant Mentz especially remarked the good conduct of Boatswain’s Mates Henry Moran and Albert Nitschke and Corporal Francis Ryan. One of the *Don Jorge Juan*’s 3-inch guns was transferred to the *Annapolis*. Lieutenant Ward commended the gallantry of Lieutenant Roger Welles, Jr., and said the firing of Chief Gunner’s Mate James Luvin and Boatswain’s Mate A. F. Weckstrom was “exceptionally good, hits being frequent.”²

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¹ Official report of Commander Hunker.
² Official report of Lieutenant Ward.
CHAPTER XXVI.

MANZANILLO.

The numerous and intricate approaches to the port of Manzanillo, on the south coast of Cuba, rendered it especially valuable to the enemy as a haven for blockade runners. Early in the war a force of American war ships was stationed off this place, and it was there that some of the most creditable actions of the war took place. With a view to beginning active operations against that city, Rear-Admiral Sampson, on June 29th, instructed Lieutenant Lucien Young of the Hist to cruise in that vicinity, and, if practicable, to destroy four Spanish gunboats reported to be in the harbor.

Arriving off Cape Cruz on the 30th, Young fell in with the Hornet, Lieutenant James Meredith Helm, and the Wompatuck, Lieutenant Carl William Jungen. He dispatched the Hornet after a schooner that was endeavoring to make the port. She proved to be the Nickerson under English colors, but she was loaded with provisions and had four Spaniards aboard. A prize crew under Ensign William Dugald MacDougall took possession. Meantime Lieutenant John Lewis Purcell, in the Osceola, was ordered to watch for any vessels attempting to run out or in the Quatros Reales Channel.

Having a Cuban pilot aboard, Young formed his three vessels in column at half distance, the Hist leading and the Hornet bringing up the rear, and at a rate of ten knots an hour entered the Azuraga Pass. On rounding the point that opened a bay, Lieutenant Young
discovered a gunboat under Spanish colors at anchor near a blockhouse on shore. As there was insufficient water for the Wompatuck to enter the bay, Lieutenant Jungen was directed to remain in the channel and prevent the enemy’s escape behind the key. Meantime the Hist and Hornet pushed into the harbor. As the Americans drew near, the gunboat endeavored to hide behind a point which was found to be swarming with soldiers, she evidently having been warned of her danger by the heliograph signal on West Key.

Cautiously making their way among the shoals, the Hist and Hornet gained a position where they were in range at fifteen hundred yards, and immediately opened with every gun that would bear. Both our vessels soon grounded, which for a time interfered with their range, but, getting afloat in a few minutes, they were again pounding away at the gunboat. The third shot from the Hist’s 3-pounder struck the Spaniard’s stern and silenced his aft machine gun. All this time a storm of musket shots from a wooded point not more than four hundred yards away was sweeping over the exposed decks of the frail American boats; but it was quickly silenced after the 37-millimetre and the 3- and 6-pounders had been trained upon this place.

The gunboat, finding that she could not escape in this direction, now deliberately steamed across the harbor, keeping up a rapid fire from her 3-pounder. Though repeatedly hit by the Americans, she, in a crippled condition, managed to get behind one of the smaller keys. But here her broadside was exposed to the Hist and Hornet, and in a few minutes a 3-pounder shell from the former struck her amidships and blew her up. Having completed the destruction of the gunboat, without a single casualty on the American side, Lieutenant Young, leading in the Hist and followed by the Wompatuck and Hornet, after passing through Balandras Channel, headed for Manzanillo, shelling the heliograph tower on the way.
As the Americans proceeded up the bay they discovered a sloop close inshore full of soldiers. A few shells induced the men to land and take to the bush. Passing to the left of Giva Keys, the Americans drew near to the city. It was then that Lieutenant Young discovered that, instead of four gunboats, there were nine armed vessels drawn up in the form of a crescent across the harbor, close inshore, where they were supported by artillery and large bodies of troops. On the right of the crescent formation of craft was a savage-looking torpedo boat, while a good-sized gunboat guarded the left flank. Between them were three smaller gunboats, all armed with machine guns, besides 3- and 6-pounders. The vessels were re-enforced on the right by a large smooth-bore gun on Caimanera Point, and on the left by four large pontoons armed with 6-inch smooth-bore guns. Behind the vessels on the water front was a heavy battery of field artillery, and several big guns were descried in a fort on the hill. Added to this formidable defense were the two miles of shore front swarming with soldiers, prepared to keep up a fusillade of Mauser bullets on the approaching Americans.

Such a formidable line of defense might well have appalled the boldest, but Lieutenant Young had started out with a definite object in view, and was animated by that grand American battle cry, "I'll try, sir!" Rounding Caimanera Point, Lieutenant Young headed directly for the enemy, and at 3.20 p.m., when within one thousand yards of the torpedo boat, opened fire with his forward 3-pounder. He then swung his ship round and brought all his broadside guns into play, his example being handsomely followed by the Hornet and Wompatuck; the American vessels slowly passing along the Spaniards' entire front. For an hour and twenty minutes these frail craft braved the entire fire of the enemy. Fortunately, most of the Spanish shot passed over our ships, while the American missiles had a tendency to fall short, which circumstance would in-
dicate that the Spanish guns were much heavier than those of the Americans.

The enemy, however, soon got an accurate range, striking the Hist eleven times, one of the missiles passing through the engine-room hatch, and another exploding inside the hatch, both taking effect within a few inches of the main steam pipe, and undoubtedly would have pierced it had it not been well protected by waste and cork fenders. One shot plowed up the deck of the bridge. The Hornet was struck a number of times, one shot—about ten minutes after the action began—cutting the main steam pipe and filling the vessel with steam.

Notwithstanding this serious injury, Jungen gallantly kept up his fire from every gun that bore, the men passing ammunition through the scalding steam. One of the Spanish gunboats was sunk. "While firing toward the shore with the starboard battery, a small sloop loaded with soldiers sailed up on our port side and opened fire on us with rifles. A shot from the port 6-pounder struck her fairly amidships and sent her to the bottom."1 Observing the escaping steam from the Hornet, Young signaled the Wompatuck to tow her out of action. "Seeing that she was disabled, I stopped, backed down to her, and handed her a towline which I had prepared on clearing for action. The towline was not well secured in the Hornet, and as soon as a strain was brought upon it it slipped round the capstan, and the Wompatuck was obliged to stop and back again. At the suggestion of Lieutenant Helm, the Wompatuck was placed alongside the Hornet, though this masked nearly all the guns on her engaged side. During this performance the Wompatuck fired her stern guns all the time, as did the Hornet."2

The Wompatuck was severely handled, being struck several times, one shot entering near the water line and passing out on the other side. The Hist now backed

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1 Official report of Lieutenant Helm.
2 Official report of Lieutenant Jungen.
down to the disabled *Hornet*, but was signaled, "No further aid needed!" upon which Young headed for the large pontoon, which had been doing serious work with her 6-inch smooth-bore guns. By taking careful aim the *Hist*’s gunners landed a shell in the float, which set her on fire and destroyed her. Having accomplished the object of his attack and observing that the torpedo boat was disabled and that several of the gunboats were seriously injured, Lieutenant Young slowly drew northward, when a gun that had been concealed on one of the Manzanillo keys opened fire upon him. A few well-directed shots silenced this gun. Though keeping up a continuous fire on the retiring Americans, the Spaniards made no attempt to follow, and the Americans leisurely proceeded to an anchorage for the night. Before retiring, Lieutenant Young made a careful reconnoissance of the harbor, and discovered the *Puríssima Concepción* and a steamer tied up to one of the two very large side-wheel transports, the *Gloria* and *José García*. The three vessels were behind the line of defense and showed no colors. Near them were a number of schooners and smaller craft.

In his official report Young spoke of "the brave, energetic, cool and efficient manner in which all the officers and men acted under fire," and especially commended Lieutenant Jungen "for the coolness and manner in which he handled his vessel under a galling fire as he came to the rescue." No losses were sustained by the Americans, though three men—E. Madsen, S. Bakke and P. Griffin—were scalded in the *Hornet* by escaping steam. The *Hornet* was struck a number of times, the most serious injuries, aside from the cutting of the steam pipe, being in the after-deck house, on the starboard and on the armor belt. One shell struck an ammunition box on which a gun captain was standing, but occasioned no further damage. Another shell passed through the bridge screen, between Lieutenant Helm and Ensign Ralph Earle,
who were not three feet apart. Ensigns Earle and Christopher Catron Fewel were specially commended by Lieutenant Helm. The Wompatuck was hit three times; one shell destroyed the pilot-house rail, another passed over the deck house within four feet of Lieutenant Jungen, while the third struck the starboard quarter above the guard and glanced off. While commending the conduct of all aboard, Lieutenant Jungen makes special mention of Boatswain's Mate Frederick Muller "for his coolness and for the prompt execution of all orders at a critical time."

On the following day, July 1st, the yacht Scorpion, Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, arrived off Manzanillo, and at 4 p. m., in company with the tug Osceola, Lieutenant Purcell, entered the harbor at full speed. At 4.32 p. m., when two thousand yards from the Spanish line of defense, they opened a spirited fire. As Marix grimly remarked, the Spaniards "seemed to have plenty of ammunition," and on this occasion used it with exceptional skill. At first they aimed too high, but improved their target practice with each discharge of their many pieces, and after the American vessels had been in range twenty minutes the enemy's shot began to fall unpleasantly near. The Scorpion and Osceola maintained an animated fire, and when within one thousand yards of the shore they silenced the musketry fire with their Gatling guns. Owing to shoal water and the fact that the Spanish kept their gunboats bow-on toward the Americans, our men found much difficulty in landing their shot; but by firing deliberately and carefully, some damage was inflicted. A shell was observed to strike one of the vessels—the Maria, used as a receiving ship—square on the bow; another shell killed thirteen men at one of the guns. Finding that it was impossible to destroy the gunboats, Marix, at 4.55 p. m., slowly retired to the entrance of the harbor, where he remained in the vain hope of the Spaniards coming out to attack him.
Although the *Scorpion* and *Osceola* had been struck a number of times, no one in either ship was hurt. Rear-Admiral Sampson highly commended the conduct of both Marix and Purcell in this spirited affair. The *Scorpion* and *Osceola* remained off Manzanillo until July 5th, keeping a close watch on the port. They captured, within sight of the city, a fishing schooner, a sloop with provisions aboard, and a large steel lighter, also laden with provisions. The first was released as being valueless, as also was the sloop after her freight had been thrown overboard. The lighter, being full of valuable provisions, was secured. After these several attacks a careful blockade of Manzanillo was maintained, one vessel being stationed off the various entrances of the harbor every night, and during the day they ran close in and effectually interrupted all water communication between that port and the outside world. July 15th Lieutenant-Commander Marix captured the schooners *Carmita* and *Farragut*.

On the evening of July 17th the blockading vessels off Manzanillo, being re-enforced by the *Wilmington*, Commander Chapman Coleman Todd, and the *Helena*, Commander Swinburne, met off Guayabal, and at 7 A. M., July 18th, moved into the harbor for a more determined attack. The *Wilmington* and *Helena* entered through the northern, the *Scorpion* and *Osceola* by the middle, and the *Hist*, *Hornet* and *Wompatuck* by the southern channel, the speed of the seven vessels being so gauged as to bring them in effective range of the Spanish gunboats about the same time. As the Americans passed into the harbor they fired into neighboring keys in order to scatter any troops that might be in concealment.

At 7.50 A. M. fire was opened on the gunboats at long range, which was gradually reduced as the Americans drew nearer. As it was Commander Todd's first object to destroy the gunboats, he directed our vessels to keep
as far from the range of the shore batteries as possible. As compared with their former defense, the Spanish gunboats made a weak resistance and were rapidly destroyed. The accuracy of our gun fire was noteworthy and was largely due to the system of "gun captains," which the commanding officers declared to be most excellent. In a short time the transports Gloria, José Garcia and Purissima Concepción were in flames and destroyed; the pontoon María and a storeship were burned and blew up, while the gunboats Estrella, Delgado Perrato and Cuba Española were injured. Another gunboat, the Guantanamo, was beached and riddled with shot, while the fifth gunboat, the Guardian, was driven ashore in a disabled condition.

Toward the close of the action the American ships came within close range of the shore batteries, and our sharpshooters endeavored to pick off the Spanish officers, who could be seen on horseback urging their men to the guns. Having accomplished the purpose of the attack—namely, the destruction of the Spanish floating defenses—Commander Todd, at 10.20 A.M., gave the signal to retire. This the American vessels did in good order, no casualties having occurred on the American side, nor were any of our vessels hit.

These attacks on Manzanillo and the rigorous blockade of that port had reduced the population and garrison to a deplorable condition, and Rear-Admiral Sampson determined on a direct bombardment of the place. In accordance with his orders, the Newark, Captain Caspar Frederick Goodrich, on the afternoon of August 9th, left Guantanamo, and, in company with the Resolute, Commander Joseph Giles Eaton—the latter having on board a battalion of five hundred marines under Colonel Huntington—proceeded to Cape Cruz, where, on the 10th, they fell in with the Hist, Lieutenant Lucien Young, and Suwanee, Lieutenant-Commander Daniel Delehanty. Learning from Lieu-
First-class battle ship Kentucky, stern view.
tenant Young that affairs at Manzanillo were favorable for an attack, and that a Cuban pilot was aboard the Hist who declared that he could take the Newark within two miles of Manzanillo, Captain Goodrich, on the morning of August 11th, started for Quatros Reales Channel, having been re-enforced the night before by the Osceola, Lieutenant John Lewis Purcell, and the Alvarado, Lieutenant Victor Blue.

In order to reduce the chances of grounding on the numerous and uncharted shoals, the Hist was sent ahead with the pilot, the Suwanee being on her starboard beam, followed by the Osceola and Resolute, while the Newark and Alvarado brought up the rear, each vessel keeping the lead going all the time. A signal was arranged by which the leading vessels warned the Newark and Resolute, the heaviest draught vessels in the squadron, of shoaling water. The passage of the channel was safely accomplished, and at dark the squadron anchored inside of the Great Barrier Reef in sixty feet of water, about forty miles from Manzanillo. At half-past four o'clock on the following morning, August 12th, the ships got under way again and steamed toward the city. The Hist now proceeded at full speed to a point about six miles south of Manzanillo, in order to communicate with the Cuban forces at that place, consisting of a squadron of cavalry. Several Cuban officers were brought aboard, who were instructed to at once report the arrival and object of the American squadron to Generals Rabi and Rios, the two Cuban generals encamped with about five hundred troops near by; and to further instruct them that should they hear our guns they were to at once assault the Spanish forces from the rear. This errand having been accomplished, the vessel returned to anchorage near the Suwanee, off the northern key of the harbor." ¹

When well outside of the northern entrance the

¹ Official report of Lieutenant Young.
Resolute, Suwanee, Hist and Osceola anchored, and, hoisting a flag of truce, Captain Goodrich proceeded to an anchorage about three miles from the city, and sent, at 12.35 p.m., the Alvarado under a flag of truce to demand the surrender of the place. The military commandant refusing to surrender, Captain Goodrich, at 3 p.m., signaled the outlying vessels to take their prescribed stations off the town. At 3.35 p.m. the Newark, having taken down her flag of truce, and displaying her battle flags, advanced toward Manzanillo until the shoaling water prevented her nearer approach. Five minutes later the flagship opened a destructive fire on the shore batteries, the division officers being instructed by Lieutenant Commander William Henry Turner to fire at discretion, shortly followed by the other vessels in the squadron.

This fire was maintained with great accuracy until 4.15 p.m., when white flags were observed on the gunboat Cuba Española and on the commandant's quarters. Captain Goodrich now signaled "Cease firing!" and sent Lieutenant Blue in under a flag of truce. At this time the Suwanee, Hist and Osceola, all under the immediate command of Lieutenant Delehanty, were approaching the town through the middle channel from the south, and when within one thousand yards of the shore batteries, 4.35 p.m., the enemy opened fire on them, the Spaniards afterward declaring that they failed to observe the truce flag on the Alvarado. Thereupon Lieutenant Blue promptly hauled down the flag of truce and, returning to his station, joined the American vessels in reopening fire on the shore batteries. About 4.50 p.m. the force of Cubans with which the Hist had communicated early in the morning was discovered attacking the northern part of the town. The Spanish artillery responded. With a view to aiding the insurgents, Goodrich ordered a few 6-inch shells to be thrown in the direction of the artillery. At 5.30 p.m. the American squadron anchored for the night, the Newark
every half hour sending a shell toward the artillerists until daylight.

On the following morning white flags were observed from the batteries and blockhouses, and soon a boat put off from the shore under a flag of truce. It contained the captain of the port, who handed Captain Goodrich a cipher dispatch from the Secretary of the Navy, which read: "Protocol of peace signed by the President; armistice proclaimed." This, of course, put an end to further hostilities.

In this affair not one American was injured, and, aside from three Mauser bullets through the Suwanee's ensign, none of the vessels was seriously damaged. Captain Goodrich commended the conduct of Commander Eaton, Lieutenant-Commander Delehanty, and Lieutenants Young, Purcell and Blue. In April of the following year (1899) some workmen were killed by the explosion of a shell they were digging up in the foundation of a house in Manzanillo. It had been fired by the Americans in their bombardment of the city.

It appears that late in the afternoon of the 12th the Spanish commandant called a board of his officers to determine the question of surrendering, and they recommended immediate capitulation. To this the commandant assented, and had withdrawn his troops from the batteries so as to facilitate the occupation. As the Americans did not land that night, the Spaniards drew up and signed papers accepting Captain Goodrich's terms of surrender, and had them in readiness to hand over when the announcement of peace put an end to hostilities. At one time during the fight the Suwanee, while running at full speed, grounded, but was soon worked into deeper water without injury.
CHAPTER XXVII.

OPERATIONS OFF PORTO RICO.

It might easily be supposed that Cervera's formidable squadron having been eliminated from the problem, the way was open for an immediate advance upon Porto Rico. "General Miles, from an early period of the war, was convinced that it would be an error to undertake a summer campaign on a large scale in Cuba. He thought, and very justly, that the correct objective, from a military point of view, was Porto Rico, which was the Spanish base for all operations in the West Indies, where the climate was much better for northern troops than was the case in Cuba." Sampson reasoned on the same lines when he made his attack on San Juan, Porto Rico, in the hope of anticipating Cervera's arrival off that port.

Had it not been for Shafter's overanxious desire to conduct an inland campaign against Santiago, it would have been possible for the United States to have begun operations against this real pearl of the Antilles immediately after the complete destruction of Cervera's ships. The only considerable object of the naval and military operations against Santiago was the destruction of these ships. Each of these vessels had been absolutely destroyed on July 3d, but Shafter had so entangled the army in the jungles of Cuba that it required some weeks of the combined efforts of the navy and army to extricate him from his position of extreme peril.

1 Lodge's War with Spain.
At ten o'clock Sunday morning, July 3d, Shafter demanded of General Toral the surrender of the city under threat of immediate bombardment, though he had no siege gun with which to back up his demand, and had just cabled to Washington that the defenses were "almost impregnable." The Spaniard curtly declined, well knowing that powerful allies in the form of climatic diseases were already at work decimating the American ranks. To further strengthen their position, the enemy, now deprived of Cervera's formidable guns, on July 4th, scuttled the cruiser Reina Mercedes near the Merrimac in the narrow channel, so as to prevent the advance of Sampson's ships into the harbor. Accompanying Toral's refusal to surrender, July 3d, he asked for a two days' truce so the noncombatants might leave the city. Shafter complied, the result being that on July 5th twenty thousand starving and fever-laden refugees, mostly women and children, relieved Toral of their presence and threw themselves on the American army—then in almost a starving condition—for support.

A succession of truces and skirmishes along the lines filled the interval from July 5th to July 9th, when Shafter made another ineffectual demand for surrender. Thereupon the American forces maintained a fire of small arms and field artillery until the evening of July 10th. On the afternoon of the last-mentioned day the Brooklyn, Indiana and Texas ran close inshore and fired over the hills, in the hope of landing a few shells in the city. On July 11th the New York, Brooklyn and Indiana stood within four hundred yards of the beach at Aguadores, where they were at a range of eighty-five hundred yards from the city of Santiago, and with great skill landed a number of shells among the houses, occasioning much damage. That the fire of these ships—the army at that time having no heavy guns—was largely instrumental in forcing the enemy to the ultimate surrender of Santiago is seen in the official dispatch of General Linares, who said, "The [Ameri-
can] fleet has a perfect knowledge of the place, and bombards by elevation with mathematical accuracy."

So appreciative was Shafter of the "persuasive" effects of this fire that he asked Sampson to continue it, and on the following day the admiral ordered the Oregon and Massachusetts to the work. But their services were not needed. "The Spaniards knew that the naval bombardment was effective, whatever doubts the officers of our own army have had in regard to it. The navy, despite the long range and the intervening hills, had managed to supply the place of the lacking siege guns." On July 12th a truce was agreed to, the ceremonies of surrender taking place five days later.

On July 21st the expedition against Porto Rico, consisting of thirty-three hundred troops under the command of Major-General Nelson Miles, sailed from Guantanamo in seven transports convoyed by the Massachusetts, Captain Francis John Higginson; the Yale, Captain William Clinton Wise; the Columbia, Captain James Hoban Sands; the Dixie, Commander Charles Henry Davis; and the Gloucester, Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright. The military part of this expedition was destitute of suitable means for landing troops and was dependent on the navy for disembarking. At the time of sailing it was intended to effect a landing at Fajardo, but soon afterward Miles wisely decided to make Guanica his objective point, as the first place had been widely advertised so the enemy would be enabled to concentrate there. Sending the Dixie to notify the New Orleans, Captain William Mayhew Folger, then off San Juan, Higginson shaped his course for Guanica, arriving there early on the morning of July 25th.

The draught of the Massachusetts would not permit her to approach as close to the harbor as was desired. Although no entrance batteries were visible, it was far

1 Lodge's War with Spain.
from a certainty that the Spaniards had not mined the channel or had not improvised batteries that might make it hazardous for a hostile ship to enter. It was with the full knowledge of these possibilities that the gallant Wainwright asked and obtained permission to run the doughty Gloucester into the port and effect a landing. With some anxiety the Americans watched the yacht's progress. Wainwright pushed steadily into the harbor, and finally reached a convenient place for sending a detachment ashore. Observing troops approaching from Yauco, he opened fire and put them to flight.

A detachment of twenty-eight men, under the command of Lieutenant Harry McLaren Pinckney Huse—Lieutenant Thomas C. Wood being second in command—put off in the cutter and landed, without opposition, at a wharf. Huse promptly deployed his men so as to cover the beach, and replaced the Spanish colors with the Stars and Stripes; so the navy must be credited with having been the first regular American force to land and hold Spanish territory (in this war) in Porto Rico as
well as in Cuba. At this moment a brisk fire was opened on the Americans from the chaparral, about three hundred yards up the main highway. Huse responded with deliberate and carefully aimed fire, while the cutter, taking a position at the foot of the road, opened with her 6-millimetre Colt gun. But this machine soon jammed and was put out of action. Sending Lieutenant Wood with eight men to the right, Huse placed four men under Chief Yeoman F. W. Lacy in the ruins of a stone house on the left, and awaited developments.

So far, Huse had no idea of the strength or character of his assailants. When he landed, the town seemed to be entirely deserted. The only man in sight—a countryman—had been captured, and from him Huse learned that some thirty Spanish regulars were near by, and that re-enforcements were momentarily expected from Yauco, four miles away. As we have seen, these re-enforcements were hastening to Guanica, but had been driven back by the Gloucester's fire. At that moment Huse did not know the results of the yacht's fire—or, indeed, what she was firing at. He only knew that there was an enemy in front of him and he pluckily advanced his center along the highway. "The enemy's fire was well sustained but high, and no casualties resulted from it."¹

Pushing his way to the northern limits of the town, Huse threw a barricade across the highway and emplaced there a Colt gun, which Wainwright had sent ashore to replace the one that had jammed. As a further defense, two barbed-wire fences, fifty and one hundred yards in advance of this barricade, were strung across the road. Soon after this the first contingent of Colonel Black's regiment of engineers landed and rapidly pushed beyond the lines established by the navy.

While these spirited operations were in course, Assistant Engineer André Morton Procter cut out

¹ Official report of Lieutenant Huse.
1898. OCCUPATION OF PORT OF PONCE. 415

a lighter which was used for the landing of troops. In obedience to Wainwright's orders, Huse, after the troops had been installed in their positions, returned to the Gloucester, leaving a detachment to operate the Colt gun. An hour later this party, with the machine gun, also returned to the yacht. Miles afterward boarded the Gloucester and "thanked us for the services rendered." 1 "The landing party," said Wainwright, "was well handled by Lieutenant Huse, and the men behaved extremely well, particularly when it is remembered that it was their first experience on shore." Huse specially commended the conduct of Lieutenant Wood and Chief Yeoman Lacy. "All the men under my command behaved splendidly." 2

Being re-enforced by the Annapolis, Commander John Jacob Hunker, and the Wasp, Lieutenant Aaron Ward, Higginson, on July 27th, sent the Dixie, Annapolis and Wasp to reconnoiter at Ponce. On the afternoon of the same day these vessels entered the harbor without opposition, and, stationing his vessels so as to command the shore, Davis sent Lieutenant Greenlief Augustus Merriam ashore, under a flag of truce, to demand the surrender of the place. Merriam found that the garrison had retired to Ponce, some miles inland, and returned to the Dixie. That night the British and German consuls, together with several other gentlemen representing the commercial interests of the port, boarded the Dixie and announced that they had authority to surrender Ponce and La Playa.

Early the next morning, July 28th, Merriam, accom-

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1 Official report of Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright.
panied by Naval Cadet George C. Lodge and Lieutenant Henry C. Haines of the marines, with two armed boats' crews, landed and took formal possession of the port, the American flag being hoisted over the captain of the port's office by Naval Cadet Lodge. "In the harbor were upward of twenty merchant vessels, some of which showed neutral flags. These were boarded by boats from the Dixie and Annapolis on the evening of July 27th and the forenoon of the 28th. While negotiations for the surrender were in progress, the Gloucester came into port, and Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright collected, during the night, all the lighters in the harbor—amounting to a total of about fifty—and had them ready to place alongside the transports upon their arrival in the morning, so there was no delay in landing the army."1 "I can not too highly commend," said Captain Higginson, "the very able and efficient manner in which Commander Davis executed his orders and cleared the way completely for an immediate and peaceful possession of Ponce by the army."2

Captain Higginson left Guanica in the Massachusetts, having Major-General Miles aboard, with the transports at daybreak, July 28th, for Ponce. On his way to that place he met the Cincinnati, Captain Colby Mitchel Chester, with two more transports, and the united force entered the harbor of Ponce before 7 A. M. The navy promptly landed the soldiers, who took possession, Captain Chester being appointed captain of the port, Lieutenant John Adrian Hoogewerff beach master, Lieutenant Charles Johnston Badger harbor master, and Surgeon James Carroll Byrnes quarantine officer.

On the evening of July 31st the St. Louis, Captain Caspar Frederick Goodrich, with the transport Cherokee, arrived at La Playa. Miles sent word to Higginson that he desired the soldiers in these vessels to be landed

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1 Official report of Commander Davis.
2 Official report of Captain Higginson.
at a point thirty miles east of Ponce, and the *St. Louis*, *Gloucester* and *Wasp* were ordered to reconnoiter and, if possible, take possession of the beach. These vessels proceeded to Arroyo, where Captain Goodrich went aboard the *Gloucester*. At 9.30 A.M., August 1st, when the yacht was anchored in the open roadstead, about three quarters of a mile from shore, Wainwright sent Lieutenant Wood with an armed party ashore.

"On approaching the shore and finding no landing, I beached our boat. Assembled on the beach were a large crowd of natives and a few police with side arms. In front, apart from these, stood a Spanish officer in uniform, to whom I addressed an inquiry for the commandant and town officials. He conducted us to the customhouse, fronting the water, and in a few moments were gathered himself, the captain of the port, the alcalde, the collector and his deputy, the justice of the peace, the padre and some of the leading citizens. Through Dr. Bransford I informed these gentlemen of the presence of the *Gloucester* and demanded the immediate surrender of the town and all Spanish property. A heated discussion followed, which I was obliged to cut short by a peremptory request for an affirmative answer under penalty of a prompt bombardment of the town. One by one the gentlemen yielded their surrender and gave their parole, with the exception of the captain of the port, a Spanish naval officer (retired), who refused to do either. All these gentlemen I then sent off to the ship in charge of Dr. Bransford, whom I requested to report to you the condition of affairs. I kept ashore with me Chief Quartermaster Bechtold, and then directed him to hoist the United States flag on the customhouse. This was done, and our colors were greeted with cheers from many of the natives."*

About 10.30 A.M. a landing party from the *Gloucester*, with a machine gun, under the command of Lieu-

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1 Official report of Lieutenant Wood.
tenant Norman, came ashore and took possession of the town. That night the landing party was withdrawn, and a few shots were fired at the *Gloucester*. The Spaniards were fully informed as to the weakness of the American force, and a troop of cavalry threatened to attack. On August 2d, however, two or three hundred troops were disembarked from the *St. Louis* and secured the place.

The auxiliary cruiser *Yosemite*, Commander William Hemsley Emory, had maintained the blockade of San Juan single-handed from June 26th, and two days later chased the Spanish transport *Antonio Lopez*, which was endeavoring to make San Juan harbor. "There was a thick rain squall at the time, and the stranger emerged from it only a short distance away from us. It was a mutual surprise."¹ Finding that the *Yosemite* was gaining, the commander of the transport beached near Punta Salinas, where he had the support of artillery on shore. The gunboats *Alfonso III* and *Isabella II* soon came out of the harbor to the transport's assistance, and together with the shore battery opened a heavy fire on the *Yosemite*. Emory responded gallantly, and did not retire from range until assured of the transport's complete destruction.

Probably the most picturesque action in this war was that at the lighthouse, Cape San Juan, Porto Rico, near Fajardo, the point first selected by Miles for landing the army. On the evening of August 6th Captain Charles James Barclay, of the monitor *Amphitrite*, detailed Lieutenant Charles Nelson Atwater, Ensign Kenneth Marratt Bennett, Assistant Engineer D. J. Jenkins, Surgeon A. H. Heppner, Naval Cadets W. H. Boardman and Paul Foley, Pay Clerk O. F. Cato and twenty-eight petty officers and men, in two boats, to land, take possession of the lighthouse and relight the light. It was very dark when the party reached the narrow

¹ Lieutenant Nathan Sargent of the *Yosemite* to the author.
channel through the reefs, and each boat grounded before getting through. On gaining a landing place, Ensign Bennett, with half the men, scrambled up the steep ascent, two hundred and sixty-five feet above sea level, rendered doubly perilous by the darkness and their ignorance of the locality, and approached the lighthouse.

The Spaniards had designed this building both as a lighthouse and a fort. It stood boldly out to sea on the top of a steep hill, and commanded four lower hills and the distant land approaches across a low neck half a mile south. The four lower hills form a small promontory on which it is difficult to land on account of coral reefs. The land drops abruptly away from the lighthouse on all sides. Fifty feet from the building was a barbed-wire fence. Around this and from fifty to two hundred yards from it was another wire fence and a low hedge. Beyond, all was rugged hillside, densely covered with high brush and creepers, and traversed by rough paths, except west, where there was a pasture that commanded the lighthouse. The grounds were cleared, except for a few low bushes and cactus hedges. "It may be worthy of note that every officer and man in the party volunteered for the duty, and that a large part of the ship’s company made themselves nuisances trying to get themselves selected to go."1

"The building itself is a brick structure one hundred by forty feet, inside measurement, with walls two feet thick, evidently built for military defense. There is little woodwork about it, except the doors and windows. These are furnished with heavy shutters, instead of frames for glass, and have ordinary slat blinds outside of them. The shutters, when closed, are secured with iron diagonal braces. The floor is marble tile, the roof beams and girders iron, and the roof floor brick. There is only one lofty story and no cellar. The front is com-

1 Lieutenant Atwater to the author.
manded by a slightly raised central portico, with loopholes in the parapet. Opposite the portico the lighthouse tower abuts against the rear wall, and a circular gallery, just under the light, is loopholed. The light tower is about twice as high from the ground as the roof, and can only be entered from the ground floor or the roof. Two-foot brick parapet walls, about two and a half feet high, subdivide the roof. The window sills are five or six feet above the ground.”

Approaching the massive lighthouse, Ensign Bennett, leading the advance, sent Naval Cadet Boardman with three men ahead. Boardman entered the dark, gloomy hall, and, having assured himself that the building was unoccupied, directed his men to lay aside their loaded weapons, preparatory to ascending the spiral stairway leading to the tower. The men took off their belts, but one of the revolvers slipped from a defective holster, and, falling on the marble floor, went off, the bullet inflicting a serious wound in Mr. Boardman's thigh, so he had to be taken back to the Amphitrite. The unexpected report of a pistol, loudly reverberating in the hollow building, at first led the four Americans to believe that they walked into a Spanish ambuscade.

Lieutenant Atwater and his party now entered and the light was relit. Atwater knew that Spanish regulars were in the vicinity, and, believing that he would be attacked, gave his first attention to fortifying his position. Loopholes were cut in the main doors, windows were barricaded, a two days' supply of food and plenty of ammunition were provided, and at night every receptacle was filled with drinking water. "Sentries were posted on the tower, on the east and west end of the roof, and at the entrance door. Part of the time it was necessary to post a sentry outside, at the end of a narrow lane that formed the only approach; but when the moon rose he was called in and the door barred.

1 Official report of Lieutenant Atwater.
By day a tower sentry and a post at the gate were maintained, the petty officer acting as corporal of the guard, having strict orders to allow no outside communication without my authority. The Colt gun was mounted on the roof to sweep the lane."\(^1\)

The natives were friendly to the Americans, but were in terror lest they might again fall into the power of Spanish troops. Fajardo had been occupied by our naval forces, but when Miles changed the point for debarkation to Ponce, our forces were withdrawn, and the town was raided by Spanish troops. On August 7th many of these people came to the lighthouse and reported that the Spanish regulars were coming. As the reports were confused and seemed to be wildly exaggerated, Atwater permitted Boatswain's Mate Ernest John Brown to dress in native costume, conceal a revolver in his clothing and proceed inland to obtain reliable information. "He set out on a very inferior nag, and I watched him over the hill, two miles away, with some misgivings. But five hours later he returned at full gallop, on a beautiful horse, and reported having counted a troop of mounted infantry, proceeding from Loquillo to Fajardo, numbering between ninety and one hundred men. We learned later there were one hundred and twenty of them. With reliable information of such a force, about four miles away, the men fully realized the necessity of precautions."\(^2\)

Soon after Brown's return with this important news, some six hundred natives—men, women and children—flocked to the lighthouse and begged for shelter. Atwater admitted fifty women and children, and told the others that they must return to their homes. The refugees, however, were in such dread of the enemy that they encamped for several nights and days in the open field near the lighthouse, sending in frequent false alarms of the Spaniards' approach. On August 7th and

\(^{1}\) Official report of Lieutenant Atwater.  
\(^{2}\) Ibid.
8th men kept dashing up to the lighthouse on horseback with the wildest reports, one having seen five hundred and another eight hundred Spaniards, etc. Lieutenant Atwater gave little heed to these reports, but maintained the greatest vigilance.

At eleven o'clock on the night of August 9th "I began to get indications of something going on, and, although it was too dark to be sure of anything, I thought I saw moving figures of men in white on the edge of the woods two hundred and fifty yards southwest. As the men greatly needed rest, I determined not to arouse them needlessly. Flashing of lights was reported, but since none could be shown me, I was uncertain. At about 11.45 p.m. it began to lighten a little as the moon rose behind clouds, and with my night glass I made out what I believed to be an officer at the corner of the woods referred to. He stood out in the open. Shortly after I saw the buttock of a man in white exposed behind a bush on one side, and then three or four men in white showed for an instant on the other side. I gave no noisy alarm, but cautioned the lookouts to watch carefully. I had the men on the roof awakened, went downstairs and called Mr. Hansard, and went out to Gunner Campbell, who had charge below. I met him on the step and ordered him to have the corporal of the guard bring in the sentry and close the door. I started with him for the gate, when the sentry and corporal came running up, having seen men in the road, and at that instant there came a volley from without. We retreated inside and closed the door. Certain as to my arrangements, and entirely confident of Gunner Campbell, I went up to the roof. There I found the men steady at their stations shooting over the parapet without unnecessary exposure. I made my rounds, and then fired ten shots from the southwest corner of the parapet at flashes from bushes with a 6-millimetre rifle. During the following hour I found time for another ten shots with a Lee .45 caliber.
Two rifles, one of each kind, failed us, although they were in order before dark that night. I gave one man a revolver, and the other, after a call from a man that he had emptied his belt, distributed cartridges in his hat. All were cool and steady, and it was soon observed and commented on that the Mauser bullets were singing high above us. Believing the attack to be entirely from the front and west faces, I had my men mainly along those lines. Those stationed on the other sides fired occasionally, but I question if they saw anything to shoot at.

"I had the light put out as a signal of attack, and the ships' search lights began to play and their secondary batteries to fire. They were eighteen hundred yards distant. I thought with search lights to direct the fire we should be in no danger from the ships, but I noticed the men were annoyed at the proximity of their shells, several of which passed nearly over us and exploded on a hill in line half a mile beyond, and one shrapnel exploded over us. About 12.30 a.m. a shell struck the parapet between two men, throwing one of them prone. It demolished the two-foot wall, gouged along the bricks of the roof, diverged a little to the right into the end of the inner wall, which it tore off, and did not explode. It was undeformed, but its base fuse had unscrewed and was not recovered. Large bricks were scattered all over the roof, and with the stiff easterly breeze the mortar dust was blinding until the roof was sprinkled. Although the shell must have traveled almost within touch of six men, not one was hurt. It was found at daybreak on the roof, and was one of our 6-pounders. I at once had the light lighted. About 12.30 a.m. the whistling of bullets overhead ceased, though flashes still came occasionally from the brush and were answered. Shortly after, I gave the order to cease firing. Immediately after, a man fired at a flash in the bushes, and these were the last shots fired. I signaled the ships we needed no help and that no one was hurt. At 2 a.m. two
Spanish soldiers crossed an open space, but I would not allow my men to fire on them, as they were going away, and I thought it unnecessary to arouse the ships again. It was now so light from the moon that there was no chance for a surprise. I kept the doors closed until after daylight, and the men kept ready of their own accord, though only half were required to do so.”

At daylight no Spaniards were to be seen. Evidently they had given up the attack and marched away, leaving large quantities of empty Mauser shells, some equipments and pools of blood on the ground. From the best information attainable, it is believed that a Spanish lieutenant and four privates were killed and that eight were injured. There were no casualties on the American side.

1 Official report of Lieutenant Atwater.
CHAPTER XXVIII.

DEWEY'S FINAL ACTS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

Perfect as Dewey's victory on May 1st had been, the American commander, on the close of that memorable day, found himself face to face with gravest dangers. Seven thousand miles from the nearest base of supplies, with a formidable Spanish army and swarms of treacherous insurgents to deal with, his stock of ammunition alarmingly reduced and having no prospect of replenishing it for many weeks, with a powerful group of foreign war ships—some presumably friendly and others openly hostile—in the bay to handle, the position of our forces was critical indeed. That Dewey, during the long anxious weeks before re-enforcements reached him, maintained his fleet in Manila Bay and handled the delicate machinery of international diplomacy without an error, is in itself a triumph fully equal to his superb victory on May 1st.

Dewey faced the situation with characteristic courage and energy. He established a blockade of the port, opened a naval base at Cavité, refitted and commissioned suitable Spanish gunboats that fell in his hands, and in every possible way endeavored to secure the fruits of his victory. On May 12th the gunboat Callao, while attempting to run the blockade, was captured. That many nations were watching Dewey's operations with jealous eyes is strikingly shown in the fact that thirteen days after the battle there were in Manila Bay one British, one French, one Japanese and two German war ships. The German squadron was rapidly increased.
to five ships, some of them being armored cruisers, making it superior to the American naval force at Manila—and this, too, notwithstanding the fact that Germany had fewer commercial interests in the Philippines than any of the governments represented by war ships.

The Germans and French soon gave expression to their sympathy for the Spaniards. Petty violations of the blockade were frequent, the Germans seeming to avail themselves of every opportunity to show their enmity toward the United States. The Kaiser's officers and men landed and paraded the streets of Manila arm in arm with Spaniards. German war ships persisted in moving about the bay at night, which was against blockade rules, and were annoyed because American search lights followed them. One of their cruisers extinguished her lights and attempted to enter port at night, and would have succeeded had not the vigilant Americans sent a shell across her bow.

When the first army division from San Francisco arrived it found three German war ships stationed off Corregidor Island as if blockading the port. The question naturally rose in the minds of the incoming Americans, Had the Germans captured Dewey's squadron and were lying in wait to seize the twenty-five hundred officers and men aboard these transports? The scene presented was highly suggestive of this, and when the Americans entered the port, the largest of the German ships—the Kaiserin Augusta—got under way and in a threatening manner followed close in the wake of the transports until they reached the Olympia, when the Germans broke out the Stars and Stripes and saluted—a thoroughly scholarly and gentlemanly insult according to the German university code.

Dewey was fully alive to this silly bravado, and that he possessed himself in patience is one of the best points he scored in this momentous campaign. Patience ceased to be a virtue, however, when it was learned that a German cruiser had landed provisions in
Manila. Dewey at once sent his flag lieutenant, Thomas M. Brumby, to Rear-Admiral von Diederich "with his compliments" and to call Diederich's attention to "an extraordinary disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse," and "to tell Admiral von Diederich that if he wants a fight, he can have it right now." Diederich did not want to fight. He professed to be "sorry" for what had happened and declared that he was ignorant of the misdoings of his officers—a sad commentary on the much-boasted German military training.

It was on May 19th that Aguinaldo and staff arrived at Manila, having been brought from Hong Kong in the Nanshan. From the first Dewey firmly refused to acknowledge the authority assumed by this leader. "I have had several conferences with him," wrote Dewey under date of July 27, 1898, "generally of a personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any way with the force under my command, and on several occasions I have declined requests, telling him that the squadron could not act until the arrival of United States troops. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron. . . . My relations with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. . . . I believe he expects to capture Manila without my assistance."

On July 2d the captured gunboat Callao was placed in commission under the command of Lieutenant Benjamin Tappan. Five days later, July 7th, Dewey learned that the insurgents had gained complete possession of Subig Bay with the exception of Isla Grande, which they were prevented from occupying by the German war ship Irene. For a naval base Subig Bay was of even greater strategic value than Manila, and Dewey promptly dispatched the Raleigh and Concord to the scene of trouble. Observing the approach of these vessels, the Irene hastily left the harbor.

1 Account of Mr. Stickney.
The first army division for Manila sailed from San Francisco in the chartered steamers *City of Peking, Australia* and *City of Sidney*, May 25th. It left Honolulu June 4th, and from that point was escorted by the *Charleston*, Captain Henry Glass. When clear of land, Captain Glass opened a sealed package and found orders directing him to so far change the course of the transports as to seize the island of Guam. The vessels arrived off the north end of that island at daybreak, June 20th. Stopping first at Agaña, and finding no vessels there, Glass proceeded to San Luis D'Apra, where he expected to find a gunboat and a military force.

Leaving the transports at a safe anchorage, Glass steamed boldly into the harbor and fired a few shells at Fort Santa Cruz. Receiving no response, the *Charleston* was anchored so as to command the harbor, shortly after which a boat was observed working its way through the reefs, flying a Spanish flag. It contained the captain of the port and the health officer, the former a lieutenant commander in the Spanish navy, and the latter an army surgeon. On gaining the *Charleston's* deck they made profuse apologies for not returning the cruiser's "salute," saying that they were quite out of powder, and begged to borrow a little so they could pass the international courtesy decently. We recall how a worthy British squire hurriedly put off to Captain John Paul Jones' flagship, the *Bonhomme Richard*, on the eve of her battle with the *Serapis*, September 23, 1779, and asked for the loan of a barrel of gunpowder in order to fight that "Pirate and Rebel Traitor Paul Jones." Jones good-naturedly gave the desired powder, but the more practical Glass informed the astonished Spaniards that war existed between the United States and Spain, that the "salute" contained hostile shots and that the American squadron had come to seize the islands.

At 8.30 A.M., June 21st, Lieutenant William Braunersreuther landed with a force of marines and two
companies of the Second Oregon and received the surrender of the governor, five officers and fifty-four noncommissioned officers and privates, comprising the total military force of the island. The prisoners were placed aboard the City of Sidney in charge of Lieutenant-Commander Thomas Stowell Phelps, Jr. Having concluded this business in a thoroughly seamanlike manner, Captain Glass got under way with his convoy, and reached Manila June 30th.

The arrival of the second army division justified the Americans in beginning active operations against the city. Troops were landed and began a steady advance toward the Pasig. In the series of actions that followed, Dewey's ships guarded the left flank of the army and shelled the country in advance of the troops.

On August 7th, and again on the 9th, Dewey and Major-General Merritt sent a joint demand for the surrender of Manila. But the Spaniards were unwilling to capitulate without a fight, and on August 13th a determined assault was made on the defenses. As the American fleet advanced to bombard the fortifications the German and French war ships moved to the northwest of the city, while the English and Japanese vessels joined Dewey's force at Cavite. Later in the day, while the bombardment was on, the British admiral placed his ship between the German flagship and our vessels.

At 9.28 A.M. the Olympia was thirty-six hundred yards from the fort. The Monterey advanced toward the central battery, the Boston, Charleston, Baltimore, Hugh McCulloch, Raleigh and Petrel were with the flagship, the Callao and Barcelo steamed close inshore to flank the army, while the Concord was north of the city so as to engage a battery at the mouth of the Pasig. While the troops were attacking the land defenses of Manila, Dewey's ships kept up a heavy fire on the shore batteries. At 5 P.M. the enemy surrendered, the Stars and Stripes being hoisted by Flag Lieutenant Brumby.
August 12, 1898, the United States and Spain agreed upon terms for the cessation of hostilities, and on November 28th a treaty of peace was signed by which Spain ceded the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico to the United States and relinquished all claims to Cuba.

Learning that the Germans were renewing their meddlesome tactics at Cebu, Dewey ordered Commander Charles Carpenter Cornwell in the Petrel to proceed at once to that island and take possession in the name of the United States. When Cornwell arrived at the main port of the island, February 21, 1899, he found the British gunboat Pigmy and von Diederich's flagship, the Kaiserin Augusta, in the harbor, while English and German flags were profusely displayed in the town. Through the British consul Cornwell communicated with the natives, and having allayed their fears as to a "general massacre," found that they were willing to surrender. On the following day a detachment of blue jackets, under the command of Lieutenant James Henry Bull, landed and took possession, Lieutenant Charles Peshall Plunkett being made captain of the port and Lieutenant James Phillips Parker collector of customs.

Early in the spring of 1899 word reached Manila that a Spanish garrison, consisting of three officers, eighty soldiers, and three priests, had been surrounded for nearly a year in the port at Baler, due north of Manila, but on the eastern or Pacific side of the island of Luzon, and could not hold out much longer. With a view to rescuing these people from massacre, Dewey ordered the Yorktown, Commander Charles Stillman Sperry, to bring the garrison to Manila. The Yorktown arrived off Baler April 12th, and Sperry detailed Lieutenant James Clarkson Gillmore with fourteen men to proceed in a boat and determine if it was practicable for the Yorktown to enter the river. Gillmore drew toward the shore to take soundings, but, exceeding his instructions, he pushed into the river, where his boat was lost to view and was beyond supporting distance.
Proceeding some distance up the stream, the Americans were suddenly fired upon by fifty insurgent soldiers—as was afterward learned—on one side of the stream and twenty on the other. These men were under the command of a Spanish renegade officer who had been conducting the siege against the Baler garrison. Four of the American seamen were killed outright and three were wounded, besides which their boat was shattered and riddled with shot, so that she rapidly filled and had settled down to her gunwales when Gillmore surrendered. The Americans were taken ashore, bound hand and foot, and were treated barbarously. The renegade Spaniard intimated that he would at once butcher them, and taking the prisoners some distance inland, where there was a clearing, blindfolded them, drew them up before a file of soldiers and with elaborate ceremony announced that they were about to be shot. The insurgents had actually shouldered their rifles when the Spaniard, with a dramatic gesture, suddenly stepped forward and declared that he would save the lives of the prisoners even at risk of drawing vengeance upon himself for disobeying orders—the entire performance being a mere sham devised especially to distress the Americans.

From this time on the unfortunate Americans were marched from place to place and subjected to indescribable hardships and cruelty. After being confined for some time at San Isidro, they were dragged to Vigan. The prisoners made several attempts to escape, but each time they were betrayed by an Englishman named Brown, who pretended to sympathize with the Americans and thus became acquainted with their plans. On the approach of our troops to Vigan the insurgents again retreated, Gillmore and his men being led into a wilderness and abandoned—without food, clothing or arms—to starvation or butchery at the hands of savages. The men subsisted for some time on berries, and finally reaching the banks of a river, they constructed
a raft and floated downstream. On the third day of this perilous voyage, December 18th, they were rescued, after eight months of captivity, by a detachment of American soldiers under Colonel L. H. Hare.

Iloilo was captured February 11th by General Miller and the Boston, Captain George Francis Faxon Wilde, and the Petrel, Commander Cornwell. Forty-eight marines, under the command of Lieutenant Albert Parker Niblack, were the first to land and take possession. Lieutenant Lay Hampton Everhart of the Boston was made captain of the port.

While gallantly covering a landing party with a Gatling gun in a steam launch at Malabon, in March, Assistant Engineer Emory Winship was severely wounded by the insurgents.

On May 20, 1899, Dewey left Manila in his flagship Olympia on his homeward voyage via Hong Kong and the Suez Canal. At every port in which he stopped the Hero of Manila was received with demonstrations of respect and enthusiasm. He arrived in New York September 26th, and was greeted as no American before him had been. September 29th and 30th were devoted to naval and military demonstrations in Dewey's honor. Honors from State and municipal governments were showered upon him.

March 1st, 1899, Congress unanimously passed a bill reviving the grade and rank of admiral so as "to provide prompt and adequate reward to Rear-Admiral George Dewey, the said grade and rank to exist only during the lifetime of this officer." President McKinley signed the bill and commission March 2d. Previously to this, May 10, 1898, the President had subscribed an act of Congress in which the "thanks of Congress and the American people" were extended to "Commodore Dewey and to the officers and men under his command for the gallantry and skill exhibited by them" in the "destruction of the Spanish fleet and batteries in the harbor of Manila."
CHAPTER XXIX.

RECENT OPERATIONS IN THE EAST.

At the time Captain Albert Smith Barker succeeded Admiral Dewey as commander in chief of our naval forces on the Asiatic station, May 20, 1899, American troops were engaged in active operations against the insurgents. In this work the navy rendered valuable assistance, interrupting communications between the Filipinos and the outside world, seizing one port after another, protecting the flanks of our armies when operating near the shore, and shelling the enemy on many important occasions.\(^1\) The energetic measures Dewey had been taking in prosecuting a naval campaign against the insurgents were ably continued by Captain Barker.

\(^1\) By the close of the year 1899 our fleet in Asiatic waters consisted of the *Brooklyn* (flagship), Captain Theodore Frelinghuysen Jewell; *Oregon*, Captain George Francis Faxon Wilde; *Newark*, Captain Bowman Hendry McCalla; *Monterey*, Captain George Wood Pigman; *Monadnock*, Captain John McGowan; *Baltimore*, Captain John McQueen Forsyth; *New Orleans*, Captain Edwin Longnecker; *Yorktown*, Commander Charles Stillman Sperry; *Wheeling*, Commander William Turnbull Burwell; *Castine*, Commander Samuel Williams Very; *Monocacy*, Commander George Augustus Bicknell; *Concord*, Commander Seth Mitchell Ackley; *Princeton*, Commander Harry Knox; *Seindia*, Commander James Madison Miller; *Marietta*, Commander Edward Hickman Gheen; *Bennington*, Commander Conway Hillyer Arnold; *Nashville*, Commander Raymond Perry Rodgers; *Helena*, Commander Edwin King Moore; *Culgoa*, Commander William Henry Everett; *Glacier*, Lieutenant-Commander John Bradford Biggs; *Manila*, Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Phillips Nazro; *Celtic*, Lieutenant-Commander Nathaniel Jordan Knight Patch; *Petrel*, Lieutenant-Commander Walter Cleveland Cowles; *Iris*, Lieutenant John Madison Orchard; *Callao*, Lieutenant George Brown Bradshaw; *Panay*, Lieutenant John McClane Luby; *Paragua*, Ensign Orlo Smith Knepper; *Albay*, Ensign
Near the city of Manila, May 20th, Barker found the Oregon, Baltimore, Monterey, Concord, Callao and Culgoa; the Monadnock was off Paranaque guarding the right flank of Brigadier-General Overshine's brigade and playing search lights on Filipino trenches; the Helena was proceeding to Jolo to represent the navy when our troops relieved the Spanish garrison; the Castine was on her way to Zamboanga to protect Spanish soldiers when they evacuated that place; while the Petrel was searching the east coast of Luzon for a steamer reported to be laden with arms for the insurgents. The Yorktown was at Iloilo, and the Boston at Cebu. Performing guard duty near Dagupan was the Wheeling, while similar work was done by the Callao and Manila at the narrow neck of land connecting Cavite with the mainland.

One dark night, while the Monadnock was on her station off Paranaque, as just described, some Bolo men put off in a canoe, stealthily crept up on the monitor, after the most approved wild-wood fashion, and let go a flight of arrows. They waited with Oriental patience for the ironclad to sink, but the stubborn thing refused to go down. The Americans quickly got their search lights and rapid-fire guns into play, and one of the witnesses declares that when our boats reached the spot where the Bolo men were last seen, the only trace of the party was three teeth on a piece of wreckage.

It was on May 20th that the Charleston sailed from Manila with Senator Beveridge aboard for Iloilo. The distinguished passenger was on a tour of observation, and from Iloilo proceeded in the Princeton to Cebu, Mindanao and Sulu, the gunboat afterward returning to her station off Iloilo. Captain Barker spoke highly

Daniel Wilbert Wurtzbaugh; Manileño, Ensign Ivan Cyrus Wettengel; Mariveles, Ensign Charles Edward Gilpin; Samar, Ensign Henry Croskey Mustin; Guardoqui, Ensign Gilbert Chase; Calamianes, Ensign Austin Kautz; Mindoro, Naval Cadet Ernest Augustus Weichert; Basco, Naval Cadet Charles Hermann Fischer.
of the services rendered by the little gunboats cruising among the islands to the south, the Albay and Samar having their base for operations at Iloilo and the Manila at Cebu.

On June 10th the army captured Las Pinas and Paranaque, our war ships, the Monadnock, Helena, Princeton, Wheeling and Callao, shelling the insurgent lines in advance of our troops. In the severe fighting that followed on land June 11th to 13th these war vessels shelled the insurgent lines with much effect. A detachment of men was landed and took active part in the land operations. General Lawton generously acknowledged the navy's assistance. It was on this day that Captain Henry E. Nichols of the Monadnock died from exposure to the sun while his vessel was in action.

On June 20th Captain Barker was succeeded by Rear-Admiral John Crittenden Watson. Active operations in the Philippines were generally suspended until the fall, though our war ships were constantly occupied in guard duty and in patrolling the coast. It was while engaged in this dangerous service that the Charleston was wrecked on an uncharted reef on the northwest coast of Luzon. Shortly before this, September 14th, the Charleston had shelled an insurgent fort on Subig Bay, and on the same day Ensign William Davidson, of the Paragua, dispersed three hundred Filipinos at San Fabian. Nine days after this, September 23d, the Charleston, with the Monterey, Concord and Zafiro, shelled Olangapo, on Subig Bay, for three hours, after which a detachment was landed, in spite of a galling fire from the shore, and destroyed cannon the insurgents had been using against our cruisers. In this spirited affair one American was killed and several were injured.

The navy again rendered conspicuous service in the determined effort to drive the Filipinos from the south of Manila. On this occasion, October 8th, marines were landed from the Wheeling, Petrel and Callao, and joined our soldiers in the successful attack. Marines
were landed from the *Oregon*, November 26th, and captured Vigan, and on December 11th the insurgents surrendered the entire northern end of Luzon to Captain McCalla of the *Newark*. On March 6, 1900, Watson was succeeded in the command of our Asiatic naval forces by Rear-Admiral George Collier Remey.

In the army operations in southwestern Luzon the navy assisted in the capture of Taal. While our troops were attacking the insurgent position on a narrow slip of land, separating Lake Taal from the bay, the *Marietta*, Commander Edward Hickman Gheen, moved close inshore and enfiladed the enemy's trenches. On January 18, 1900, Lieutenant Claude Bernard Price of the *Marietta* landed with a detachment of seamen and a Colt gun, and co-operated with the army.

While these operations were in course an incident occurred in the Samoan Islands which demands attention. With a view to settling the dispute between the followers of Malietoa and Mataaafa, the Government ordered Rear-Admiral Albert Kautz to proceed to Apia with the *Philadelphia*. That ship arrived on the scene of trouble March 6, 1899, where English and German war ships had preceded her. The Americans and English upheld the claims of Malietoa, while the Germans were suspected of having furnished arms to the followers of Mataaafa. A force of men was landed from the American and English war ships and Malietoa was formally enthroned. The allies then repelled attacks from the Mataaafa men and drove them inland. On March 23d villages held by the Mataaafa partisans were shelled by the *Philadelphia* and the English war ships *Porpoise* and *Royalist*.

While a detachment of two hundred and fourteen Americans and English seamen and marines accompanied by some one hundred and fifty natives were marching near Apia, April 1st, they fell into an ambuscade which had been carefully prepared for them on the plantation of a German who was openly hostile to
the Anglo-Saxons. A number of the white men were killed or wounded, and their Colt gun becoming jammed, they retreated to the beach. In this treacherous affair Lieutenant Philip V. Lansdale, Ensign John R. Monaghan and two seamen of the Philadelphia were killed and beheaded; as also were several of the English officers and seamen.

December 13, 1900, the Yosemite was wrecked at San Luis D’Apra, island of Guam, five of her crew perishing.

Massacre of native Christians, living in a village seventy miles from Peking, by Boxers, on May 19, 1900, caused the center of interest in the far East to shift from the Philippines to north China. The Boxers—so called in compliment to their athletic leader Prince Tuan—rapidly became more and more aggressive, and on their threatening the capital itself our Government ordered the Newark, Captain Bowman Hendry McCalla, with Rear-Admiral Louis Kempff aboard, to the mouth of the Peiho River. On her arrival at this place a hundred seamen and marines were landed from the Newark and reached Tientsin under the personal command of McCalla, May 29th, being the first of the allies to arrive there. By May 31st the rioting of the Boxers in Peking had become so alarming that a small international force, including seven American officers and fifty-six marines, entered that city and acted as guards for the several foreign legations.

With a view to isolating the capital, the Boxers destroyed the railroad between Tientsin and Peking. Alarmed for the safety of the foreigners in the imperial city and for the handful of men sent there to protect them, the allies, on June 10th, dispatched two thousand men under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hardy Seymour to the rescue. The American contingent of this force was the one hundred men under McCalla. Seymour’s party found that the railroad had been so thoroughly destroyed that they were two days
in advancing thirty-four miles. It was then that Seymour discovered that not only his communications with Tientsin had been severed, but that his force was surrounded by overwhelming numbers of well-armed Boxers. It was not until the allies had repelled numerous attacks of the fanatics and had fought their way step by step with a loss of three hundred men that they finally regained Tientsin, June 26th.

That the imperial troops were openly siding with the Boxers was shown when the forts at the mouth of the Peiho River fired on the allied fleet, June 17th. One English, one German, one French, one Japanese and three Russian war ships—the Americans not participating—promptly responded and finally landed a detachment, and the forts were carried by storm. The situation now became so serious that our Government ordered the Oregon, Yorktown, Nashville and Monocacy to the Peiho, while the Ninth Regiment—fourteen hundred strong—under Colonel Emerson H. Liscum, was sent from Manila. In entering the Gulf of Pechili the Oregon grounded on Pinnacle Rock, June 28th. For a week her position was critical, but she was finally floated off and was found not to be seriously injured.

On July 9th three hundred and fifty marines under Colonel Robert L. Meade were landed from the Brooklyn and Newark, and took active part in subsequent land operations. By this time our navy was represented on the scene of trouble by the Brooklyn (flagship), Captain Charles Mitchell Thomas; Newark, Captain Bowman Hendry McCalla; Nashville, Commander Raymond Perry Rodgers; Yorktown, Commander Edward Davis Taussig; Monocacy, Commander Frederick May Wise; Solace, Commander Herbert Winslow; Iris, Ensign Dudley Wright Knox; and Zafiro, Ensign Lyman Atkinson Cotten. A small addition to this force was made by commissioning a river steamer, which the Monocacy had captured, under the command of Lieutenant Henry Francis Bryan.
Early in July the Chinese began to close in on the foreigners and allies in Tientsin and on the 10th began a direct attack. For several days there was heavy fighting. In the unsuccessful assault made by the allies on the native city, July 13th, Colonel Liscum and Captain Austin R. Davis, of the marines, were killed. In the attack made on the 14th the Boxers were finally driven out of Tientsin, the allies having eight hundred and seventy-five men killed or wounded, of whom two hundred and fifteen were Americans. On June 24th Rear-Admiral George Collier Remey was ordered to the scene of trouble in the Brooklyn, arriving at the mouth of the Peiho July 9th. Remey took direct charge of our naval operations, Kempff being second in command.

In August the allies made a determined advance upon Peking and after a severe struggle entered the Forbidden City August 28th. The withdrawal of our troops from Peking began October 3d, but a strong naval force was maintained in north China waters for some time afterward. In the entire campaign in China our navy's total loss was one officer and twenty-one men killed and seventy-seven wounded. For special bravery at Tientsin Colonel Meade was brevetted brigadier-general and Lieutenant William G. Powell captain in the Marine Corps.

For gallant and meritorious service in the expedition with Admiral Seymour, Captain McCalla was advanced three numbers, Ensigns Daniel Wilbert Wurtzbaugh four, Charles Edward Gilpin three, Naval Cadets Joseph Kneffler Taussig four, Charles Edward Courtney six, Paymaster Henry Erhardt Jewett two, and Gunner Clifford Henry Sheldon three numbers. For similar conduct in defense of the legations at Peking, Major Littleton W. T. Waller was advanced two numbers and brevetted lieutenant-colonel of marines, Captain John T. Myers four numbers and brevetted major, Captain Smedley D. Butler two numbers and brevetted captain,
Captain Henry Leonard two numbers, Captain Charles G. Andresen brevetted captain, Assistant Surgeon Thomas McCormick Lippitt two numbers; First Lieutenants Arthur E. Harding and Wade L. Jolly brevetted captains.

For conspicuous service in connection with the Eighth Army Corps in the actions of March 25, 27, 29, and April 4, 1899, Lieutenant Cleland Davis was advanced five numbers, and for gallantry displayed at Noavaleta George C. Thorpe and David Dixon Porter were brevetted captains in the Marine Corps, the latter's commission to date from October 8, 1899.

In February, 1901, Consul-General Rounsville Wildman, who so ably assisted Dewey in many ways during his operations in the Philippines, was drowned with his wife and two children when the homeward-bound steamer Rio Janeiro sank off the harbor of San Francisco.

Soon afterward came the news of Lieutenant-Commander Jesse Mims Roper's heroic death. Early on the morning of March 31, 1901, fire broke out in the sail-room—adjoining the magazine—of the gunboat Petrel, then stationed at Manila. Roper, who commanded the Petrel, was the first to go below decks to extinguish the flames, but he was forced to regain the deck, being nearly prostrated by the heat and smoke. Learning that seaman Patrick Toner and others were below, the heroic Roper—against the earnest advice of his officers—ventured below again to the rescue—but this time never to return. His body was rescued by Lieutenant Josiah S. McKean and Naval Cadet John Earl Lewis, both of whom narrowly escaped death. Twenty-two of the crew were prostrated, but afterward recovered. The contents of the sail-room were destroyed, but in other respects the Petrel was not seriously injured.
APPENDIX I.

THE VARIOUS SQUADRONS, STATIONS AND DISTRIBUTION OF VESSELS DURING THE WAR.

The following table will show the dates upon which the vessels named joined the North Atlantic fleet, and the length of their service. It is not possible to state what vessels were under the direct command of the several squadron commanders, as the disposition of the vessels depended upon their location. Vessels within signal distance of Key West were under the command of the commandant of the naval base at that place; those on the western coast of Cuba were under the orders of the commanding officer of the blockading division or of the commander of the First North Atlantic Squadron; others on the east coast of Cuba, by reason of their presence there, received their orders from Sampson or Schley.

Northern Patrol Squadron.—April 20, 1898, Commodore John A. Howell assumed command. This squadron, consisting at first of the San Francisco (flagship), Prairie, Dixie, Yankee and Yosemite, was organized for the protection of the coast and coastwise trade between the capes of the Delaware and Bar Harbor, Me. May 29th the Yankee was detached from the squadron, and the services of the Yosemite and Dixie being required in Southern waters, the former was detached on May 30th, and the latter on June 13th. During May the squadron was strengthened by the addition of the Columbia, Badger and Southery. On June 9th the Minneapolis was ordered to duty in the squadron and was stationed at Newport News, Va., to guard the new battle ships being constructed there. The department considering it advisable to increase the efficiency of the blockade of Cuba, Howell, on June 25th, was ordered to assemble the vessels of his command, with the exception of the Minneapolis, at Key West. Upon his arrival there, July 1st, with the San Francisco, Columbia, Prairie, Badger and Southery, he was assigned to the command of the first division of the North Atlantic Fleet.
Flying Squadron.—The Flying Squadron was under the command of Commodore W. S. Schley, who, from the beginning of the war to May 24th, acted independently, and from May 24th until June 21, 1898, when the Flying Squadron ceased to exist, under the directions of Sampson.

Eastern Squadron (Commodore J. C. Watson, commanding).—During June and July the department issued orders for the formation of the Eastern Squadron, to which the following vessels were assigned: Oregon, on July 7th; Newark, on July 7th (detached August 3d); Yankee, on July 7th; Yosemite, on July 7th; Dixie, on July 7th; Massachusetts, on July 9th; Badger, on July 12th; New Orleans, on July 17th. The colliers Abarenda, Alexander, Cassius, Cæsar, Scindia and Justin, and the supply ship Glacier, were attached to this squadron on August 3d, with orders to hold themselves in readiness at Hampton Roads to join the squadron. At the time of formation of the Eastern Squadron, the department especially directed that the vessels assigned to it were to remain under the orders of the commander in chief of the North Atlantic Station until the departure of the Eastern Squadron for Europe, but as this squadron was never sent abroad, the vessels composing it always remained under the orders of Admiral Sampson.

NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET.

Rear-Admiral W. T. Sampson, commander in chief from beginning of war to close of hostilities.

Blockading Squadron.—Commodore J. C. Watson, commanding from May 6th to June 21st.

First North Atlantic Squadron.—Commodore Watson, commanding from June 21st to June 27th; Commodore J. A. Howell, commanding (rear-admiral, August 10th), from July 1st to close of hostilities.

Second North Atlantic Squadron.—Commodore W. S. Schley, commanding (rear admiral, August 10th), from June 21st to close of hostilities.

Eastern Squadron.—Commodore J. C. Watson, commanding, from July 7th to September 20th.

Flying Squadron.—Commodore W. S. Schley, commanding, from beginning of war to May 24th, independently; from May 24th to June 21st under orders of Admiral Sampson.

Naval Base, Key West, Fla.—Commodore George C. Remey, commanding, from May 7th to August 24th.
## United States Vessels Engaged in the War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Length of Service</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abarena</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. W. H. Buford</td>
<td>June 7th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander</td>
<td>Comdr. W. T. Burwell</td>
<td>June 19th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphitrite</td>
<td>Capt. C. J. Barclay</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annapolis</td>
<td>Comdr. J. J. Hunker</td>
<td>April 25th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apache</td>
<td>Lt. G. C. Hanus</td>
<td>August 4th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armeria</td>
<td>Comdr. L. C. Logan</td>
<td>June 4th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accomac</td>
<td>Ensign W. S. Crosley to May 6th, when Boatswain J. W. Angus assumed command.</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>Badger</td>
<td>Comdr. A. S. Snow</td>
<td>July 1st to end of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bancroft</td>
<td>Comdr. Richardson Clover</td>
<td>May 24th to end of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>Capt. F. A. Cook</td>
<td>June 7th to end of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caesar</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. A. B. Speyers, First Lt. W. H. Cushing, R. C. S.</td>
<td>July 21st to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calumet</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castine</td>
<td>Comdr. R. M. Berry</td>
<td>June 18th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celtic</td>
<td>Comdr. H. B. Mansfield</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>Capt. C. M. Chester</td>
<td>July 1st to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>Capt. J. H. Sands</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cushing</td>
<td>Lt. Albert Gleaves</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>Comdr. J. H. Dayton</td>
<td>June 18th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dixo</td>
<td>Comdr. C. H. Davis</td>
<td>Northern Patrol Squadron May 6th to June 18th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dolphin</td>
<td>Comdr. H. W. Lyon</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorothea</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. W. J. Barnette until August 9th; Lt.-Comdr. N. T. Houston on August 9th.</td>
<td>July 1st to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Du Pont</td>
<td>Lt. S. S. Wood</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle</td>
<td>Lt. W. H. H. Southerland</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eriesson</td>
<td>Lt. N. R. Usher</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fern</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. W. S. Cowles until April 27th; Lt.-Comdr. Herbert Winslow on April 27th.</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish Hawk</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. F. H. Delano</td>
<td>July 25th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foote</td>
<td>Lt. William L. Rodgers</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frolic</td>
<td>Comdr. E. H. Gheen</td>
<td>July 31st to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glacier</td>
<td>Comdr. J. P. Merrell</td>
<td>July 22d (Eastern Squadron) to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. Richard Wainwright</td>
<td>June 2d to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwin</td>
<td>Lt. C. S. Williams</td>
<td>July 8th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>Capt. W. D. Roath, R. C. S.</td>
<td>May 1st to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannibal</td>
<td>Comdr. H. G. O. Colby</td>
<td>July 1st to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasek</td>
<td>Lt. J. Hood</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helena</td>
<td>Comdr. W. T. Swinburne</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hest</td>
<td>Lt. Lucien Young</td>
<td>June 24th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hornet</td>
<td>Lt. J. M. Helm</td>
<td>April 22d to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudson</td>
<td>First Lt. F. H. Newcomb, R. C. S.</td>
<td>May 1st to end of war</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### United States Vessels—Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Length of service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Capt. H. C. Taylor.</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Capt. R. D. Evans.</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justin</td>
<td>Comdr. G. E. Ide until July 10th; Comdr. W. L. Field on July 10th.</td>
<td>June 2d to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. C. T. Forse.</td>
<td>May 26th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leyden</td>
<td>Boatswain J. W. Angus to May 6th; Ensign W. S. Crosley on May 6th.</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machias</td>
<td>Comdr. J. F. Merry to June 27th; Comdr. W. W. Mead on June 27th.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manning</td>
<td>Capt. F. M. Munger, R. C. S.</td>
<td>May 7th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangrove</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. W. H. Everett to June 7th; Lt.-Comdr. D. D. V. Stuart on June 7th.</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maple</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. W. Kellogg.</td>
<td>May 15th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marblehead</td>
<td>Comdr. B. H. McAlla. (Promoted to captain August 10th.)</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marietta</td>
<td>Comdr. F. M. Symonds.</td>
<td>June 4th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Capt. F. J. Higginson.</td>
<td>May 24th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McLane</td>
<td>First Lt. W. E. Reynolds, R. C. S.</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miantonomoh</td>
<td>Capt. M. L. Johnson.</td>
<td>May 5th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>Capt. T. F. Jewell.</td>
<td>May 24th to June 6th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris</td>
<td>Capt. H. D. Smith, R. C. S.</td>
<td>April 26th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashville</td>
<td>Lt. C. E. Fox.</td>
<td>July 12th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niagara</td>
<td>Comdr. Washburn Maynard to May 30th; Lt.-Comdr. E. S. Prime on May 30th.</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>Capt. A. S. Barker to August 6th; Capt. C. F. Goodrich on August 8th.</td>
<td>May 25th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newport</td>
<td>Comdr. B. F. Tilley.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Capt. F. E. Chadwick.</td>
<td>June 2d to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oneida</td>
<td>Lt. W. G. Miller.</td>
<td>May 26th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Capt. C. E. Clark to August 6th; Capt. A. S. Barker on August 6th.</td>
<td>April 27th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osceola</td>
<td>Lt. J. L. Purcell.</td>
<td>April 30th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piscataqua</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. N. E. Niles.</td>
<td></td>
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### United States Vessels—Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Length of service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pompey</td>
<td>Comdr. J. M. Miller</td>
<td>June 7th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter</td>
<td>Lt. J. C. Fremont</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prairie</td>
<td>Comdr. C. J. Train</td>
<td>July 1st to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton</td>
<td>Comdr. C. H. West</td>
<td>July 27th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potomac</td>
<td>Lt. G. P. Blow</td>
<td>July 13th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puritan</td>
<td>Capt. P. F. Harrington to June 18th; Capt. Fred Rodgers on June 18th</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolute</td>
<td>Comdr. J. G. Eaton</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodgers</td>
<td>Lt. J. L. Jayne</td>
<td>July 1st to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Capt. R. P. Leary</td>
<td>May 3d to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturn</td>
<td>Comdr. S. W. Very to June 4th; Comdr. G. A. Bicknell on June 4th</td>
<td>June 10th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seindia</td>
<td>Comdr. E. W. Watson</td>
<td>May 24th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scorpion</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. Adolph Marix</td>
<td>May 1st to May 11th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sioux</td>
<td>Ensign W. R. Gherardi</td>
<td>June 24th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siren</td>
<td>Lt. J. M. Robinson</td>
<td>May 11th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solace</td>
<td>Comdr. A. Dunlap</td>
<td>July 1st to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southery</td>
<td>Comdr. Walton Goodwin</td>
<td>May 24th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sterling</td>
<td>Comdr. R. E. Impey</td>
<td>July 21st to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stranger</td>
<td>Lt. G. L. Dyer</td>
<td>May 26th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. R. R. Ingersoll</td>
<td>May 15th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwanee</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. D. Delehanth</td>
<td>August 2d to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvia</td>
<td>Lt. G. H. Peters</td>
<td>April 23rd to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tecumseh</td>
<td>Lt. G. R. Evans</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror</td>
<td>Capt. Nicoll Ludlow</td>
<td>May 24th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Capt. J. W. Philip (Commodore from August 10th.)</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talbot</td>
<td>Lt. W. R. Shoemaker</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topeka</td>
<td>Comdr. W. S. Cowles</td>
<td>July 10th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncas</td>
<td>Lt. F. R. Brainard</td>
<td>July 6th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vesuvius</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. John E. Pillsbury</td>
<td>April 23rd to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicksburg</td>
<td>Comdr. A. B. H. Lillie</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viking</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. J. C. Wilson</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vizen</td>
<td>Lt. A. Sharp, Jr</td>
<td>July 22d to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulcan</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. I. Harris</td>
<td>May 12th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasp</td>
<td>Lt. A. Ward</td>
<td>July 1st to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windom</td>
<td>Capt. S. E. Maguire, R. C. S.</td>
<td>May 1st to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilmington</td>
<td>Comdr. C. C. Todd</td>
<td>May 5th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winstow</td>
<td>Lt. J. B. Bernadou</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wompatuck</td>
<td>Lt. C. W. Jungren</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodbury</td>
<td>Capt. H. B. Rogers, R. C. S.</td>
<td>April 26th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yankee</td>
<td>Comdr. W. H. Brownson</td>
<td>May 8th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yankton</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. J. D. Adams</td>
<td>June 3d to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yosemite</td>
<td>Comdr. W. H. Emory</td>
<td>(In Northern Patrol Squadron from May 6th to May 29th.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>June 25th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>June 4th to end of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(In Northern Patrol Squadron from May 6th to May 30th.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX I

### United States Vessels—Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Length of service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FLYING SQUADRON</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>Capt. F. A. Cook</td>
<td>Beginning of war to May 24th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katahdin</td>
<td>Capt. G. F. F. Wilde</td>
<td>Detached from squadron April 16th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Capt. F. J. Higginson</td>
<td>Beginning of war to May 24th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merrimac</td>
<td>Comdr. J. M. Miller</td>
<td>April 9th to April 29th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>Capt. T. F. Jewell</td>
<td>Beginning of war to May 24th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VESSELS ON SPECIAL SERVICE</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>Capt. W. M. Folger</td>
<td>May 9th to May 24th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scorpion</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. Adolph Marix</td>
<td>May 1st to May 24th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sterling</td>
<td>Comdr. R. E. Impey</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Capt. J. W. Philip</td>
<td>Beginning of war to May 24th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturn</td>
<td>Comdr. S. W. Very</td>
<td>April 21st to April 29th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>Capt. C. F. Goodrich</td>
<td>April 30th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Paul</td>
<td>Capt. C. D. Sigsbee</td>
<td>May 5th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard</td>
<td>Capt. C. S. Cotton</td>
<td>April 30th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale</td>
<td>Capt. W. C. Wise</td>
<td>May 2d to end of war.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Pacific Station.

[Rear-Admiral Joseph Nelson Miller.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Commander/Length of service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albatross</td>
<td>Lt.-Comdr. J. F. Moser to July 14th; Lt.-Comdr. C. K. Curtis from July 14th to August 1st; Lt.-Comdr. J. F. Moser on August 1st.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bennington</td>
<td>Comdr. H. E. Nichols to July 14th; Lt.-Comdr. J. F. Moser July 14th to August 1st; Comdr. E. D. Taussig on August 1st.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corwin</td>
<td>Capt. W. J. Herring, R. C. S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Capt. J. A. Slamm, R. C. S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry</td>
<td>Capt. W. J. Kilgore, R. C. S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rush</td>
<td>Capt. W. H. Roberts, R. C. S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohican</td>
<td>Comdr. G. M. Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monadnock</td>
<td>Capt. W. H. Whiting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monterey</td>
<td>Capt. C. E. Clark to May 24th; Comdr. E. H. C. Leutze on May 24th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>Capt. G. H. Wadleigh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeling</td>
<td>Comdr. Uriel Sebree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**United States Vessels—Continued.**

**Asiatic Squadron.**

[Commodore George Dewey.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Length of service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baltimore</strong></td>
<td>Capt. N. M. Dyer.</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boston</strong></td>
<td>Capt. Frank Wildes.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brutus</strong></td>
<td>Lt. V. L. Cottman.</td>
<td>August 4th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Charleston</strong></td>
<td>Capt. Henry Glass.</td>
<td>July 4th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concord</strong></td>
<td>Comdr. Asa Walker.</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monadnock</strong></td>
<td>Capt. W. H. Whiting.</td>
<td>August 16th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monocacy</strong></td>
<td>Comdr. O. W. Farenholt.</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monterey</strong></td>
<td>Comdr. E. H. C. Leutze.</td>
<td>August 4th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nanshan</strong></td>
<td>Lt. W. B. Hodges.</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nero</strong></td>
<td>Comdr. Charles Belknap.</td>
<td>August 16th to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Olympia</strong></td>
<td>Capt. C. V. Gridley to May 25th; Capt. B. P. Lambert on May 25th.</td>
<td>Beginning to end of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Petrel</strong></td>
<td>Comdr. E. P. Wood.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Raleigh</strong></td>
<td>Capt. J. B. Coghlan.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>McCulloch</strong></td>
<td>Capt. D. B. Hodgson, R. C. S.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zafiro</strong></td>
<td>Lt. W. McLean.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX II.

VESSELS CAPTURED BY THE AMERICANS IN THE WAR.

The * means the vessel was armed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Taken by</th>
<th>Steam or sail</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“</td>
<td>Quarto de Setiembre.</td>
<td>Machias.</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>“</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1.</td>
<td>Castilla.*</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>“</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“</td>
<td>Don Antonio de Ulloa.*</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>“</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“</td>
<td>Don Juan de Austria.*</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>“</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“</td>
<td>General Lesto.*</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>“</td>
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<tr>
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448
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<td>Cristobal Colon.*</td>
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<td>Furor.*</td>
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<td>Infanta Maria Teresa.*</td>
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<td>July 3</td>
<td>Pluton.*</td>
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<td>July 16</td>
<td>Sandoval.*</td>
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<td>Olinde Rodrigues.</td>
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<td>Delgado Parejo.*</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>July 18</td>
<td>Estrella.*</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 18</td>
<td>Gloria.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 18</td>
<td>Guantanamo.*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 18</td>
<td>Guardian.*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>July 18</td>
<td>José Garcia.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>July 18</td>
<td>Ponto Maria.*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 18</td>
<td>New Orleans.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 18</td>
<td>Amer. squad.</td>
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## Vessels captured by the Americans—Continued.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Taken by</th>
<th>Steam or sail</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 18</td>
<td><em>Purissima Concepción</em></td>
<td>Amer. squad</td>
<td>Steam.</td>
<td>Destroyed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 19</td>
<td><em>Newfoundland</em></td>
<td>Mayflower</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 21</td>
<td><em>Jorge Juan</em></td>
<td>Amer. squad</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 22</td>
<td><em>Regulus</em></td>
<td>Hawk.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 24</td>
<td><em>Dolores</em></td>
<td>Eagle.</td>
<td>Sail.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 25</td>
<td><em>One lighter</em></td>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>Sail.</td>
<td>Condemed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 26</td>
<td><em>Gíbara</em></td>
<td>Nashville</td>
<td>Sail.</td>
<td>Condemed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 26</td>
<td><em>Expreso de Gíbara</em></td>
<td>Badger.</td>
<td>Steam.</td>
<td>Sent in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 26</td>
<td><em>Humberto Rodrígues</em></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Barge.</td>
<td>Released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 26</td>
<td><em>San Fernando</em></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 26</td>
<td><em>Safi</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 27</td>
<td><em>Twelve lighters</em></td>
<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>Steam.</td>
<td>Condemed.</td>
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<td>&quot; 27</td>
<td><em>Sixty-seven lighters and twenty-two small craft</em></td>
<td>Amer. squad</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 29</td>
<td><em>Manati</em></td>
<td>Helena.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot; 29</td>
<td><em>Nipe</em></td>
<td>Bancroft.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 30</td>
<td><em>Tobasqueno</em></td>
<td>Hawk.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Aug. 1</td>
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<td>Gloucester</td>
<td>Steam.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 2</td>
<td><em>Franklin</em></td>
<td>Siren.</td>
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<td>&quot; 2</td>
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<td>Amer. squad</td>
<td>Sail.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 3</td>
<td><em>Marie</em></td>
<td>Yankee.</td>
<td>Steam.</td>
<td>Released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 4</td>
<td><em>Carnista</em></td>
<td>Bancroft.</td>
<td>Sail.</td>
<td>Abandoned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 4</td>
<td><em>Josephine</em></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 4</td>
<td><em>José Pilarí</em></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 4</td>
<td><em>Principe</em></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 6</td>
<td><em>Salve María</em></td>
<td>Hornet.</td>
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<td>Wrecked.</td>
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<td>&quot; 7</td>
<td><em>Ciudad de Sagua</em></td>
<td>Amer. squad</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Destroyed.</td>
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<td>&quot; 7</td>
<td><em>Freo Juanitas</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 7</td>
<td><em>Nabiero</em></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 7</td>
<td><em>Pensamiento</em></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 7</td>
<td><em>S. F. 22</em></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 8</td>
<td><em>Alladin</em></td>
<td>Hawk.</td>
<td>Steam.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 8</td>
<td><em>Blanco</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; 8</td>
<td><em>Vivero Lorenzo</em></td>
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<td>&quot; 11</td>
<td><em>Joven Genaro</em></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX III.

AS TO THE DEPARTMENT'S "PERSECUTION" OF SCHLEY.

In the following letter, dated July 3, 1899, from Secretary Long to President McKinley, the bearing of the Navy Department toward Rear-Admiral Schley is clearly set forth. The Secretary says:

Senator McComas advised me that some gentlemen in Baltimore have expressed to him by a telegram a desire for an interview with you with reference to what they term "the persecution of Admiral Schley." I understand this means his persecution by the Navy Department. If so, such complaint is so absolutely unfounded, and also so entirely contrary to the truth, that I should be glad to be present if any charge is made, so that the facts can be stated.

The Navy Department has from the first been especially considerate with regard to this officer. At the time the Flying Squadron was formed, although Commodore Schley was at the foot of the list of commodores, the department selected him for the command. You will remember that when I suggested his name you were yourself inclined to question the selection. It gave him a command which was especially desirable, and to which any one of his seniors might have felt entitled. He expressed great satisfaction when I announced this appointment to him, and very cordially accepted it, expressing his pleasure at this service in the Atlantic waters under the commander in chief.

When the Spanish fleet under Cervera threatened our shores, Commodore Schley was given a chance with the Flying Squadron to go in search of the enemy. And here, again, the department gave him one of the best opportunities of the war, and he had an independent command from that time until the 1st of June, when the commander in chief took command. You are aware, of course, that during this time of his independent command his administration of it was not satisfactory to you or to the department. There was delay in ascertaining whether Cervera's fleet was at Cienfuegos, this fact not having been ascertained during the several days when Commodore Schley had opportunity to ascertain it—indeed, not until Captain McCalla joined him and immediately and easily ascertained that the Spanish fleet was not there. Commodore Schley's later approach to Santiago, and his exceedingly unfortunate and unnecessary turning back when within twenty miles of that port; his acknowl-
edged and unwarranted disobedience of orders in so doing; his retreat for
a day or two back toward Key West; his claim of a lack of coal, when
the records show from six to twelve days' supply on board every ship, and
when, if there was coal enough to go hundreds of miles back to Key West,
there was certainly enough to go to Santiago, as was shown when he again
changed his mind, this time for the better, and went there—all these things
show what I think he would now acknowledge to have been a very great
mistake, and what, had the facts been fully known at the time, would
undoubtedly have been regarded as cause for relieving him from com-
mand, if not for further disciplinary proceedings. You will remember
that when word came to you of this backward step of his, which was the
only backward step on the part of the navy during the war, with what
anxiety and gloom you were oppressed. Inasmuch, however, as Commo-
dore Schley's independent command terminated at that time, and a month
later the battle of Santiago, in which he participated, was fought and a
glorious victory secured, the department felt that no action of a disci-
plinary character was necessary. The department, therefore, recommended
the promotion of, and you promoted, subject to future confirmation by
the Senate, all the commanding officers engaged in that combat, the com-
mmander in chief having the first promotion, and Commodore Schley, as
next in command, having the second, and so on. Thus far, certainly, it is
difficult to see how there has been any persecution by the Navy Depart-
ment, or anything but the most considerate action toward Admiral Schley.
Since that time the department has taken absolutely no action and
expressed no opinion with reference to this case, except in the following
instances:

First, in February last the Senate asked for the records in Admiral
Schley's case. These were prepared solely from the official reports and
given simply as required. In order that there might be no mistake or
omission, the department appointed a board of three officers to collate
them, and put upon this board Admiral Schley's own flag lieutenant,
who certified to their correctness.

Second, a controversy arose recently in the newspapers, and entirely
outside of the department, as to a colloquy said to have occurred at the
battle of Santiago between Commodore Schley and his navigator, Lieu-
tenant Hodgson. One newspaper repeatedly published this colloquy,
claiming it to have been given by Lieutenant Hodgson. Later, in another
paper, appeared a letter directed from Lieutenant Hodgson to Admiral
Schley denying that the colloquy published had occurred. It was then
published in the first paper, on the alleged evidence of another officer, that
Lieutenant Hodgson had stated that such a colloquy had occurred. Under
these circumstances there arose a case in which it appeared that either one
or the other of the two naval officers had publicly made a false statement
in a matter affecting the navy. As this, if unexplained, tended to dis-
credit and scandalize the service, it became necessary, as usual in such
cases, to call for an explanation. Both officers were, therefore, called
upon by the department to make explanations, the result of which was
that Lieutenant Hodgson stated that what he meant by his letter of denial was that no colloquy in the exact terms published had occurred, while, in fact, the substance of the colloquy was substantially true. The further fact was brought out that with his letter of absolute denial to Admiral Schley he also sent an explanatory letter to the effect that this denial was only a denial of the colloquy as published, but that the substance of the colloquy was correct. Lieutenant Hodgson had already, previously to this, sent a similar explanatory letter to Admiral Schley.

The action of the department with reference to Lieutenant Hodgson in this matter, as will therefore readily be seen, was the action which is ordinarily taken by the department to give an officer an opportunity to explain what, unexplained, might subject him to a charge of unbecoming statement or conduct. The question might arise whether the department should not have called upon Admiral Schley to explain why he should publish a letter giving an impression that no such colloquy had occurred and refrain from publishing an accompanying letter, and also a letter even previous to that, both of which show that while this colloquy had not occurred in the exact terms alleged, it had substantially occurred, and why he offers no explanation of apparently permitting two letters containing the whole case to be withheld and another, calculated to convey a different impression, to be published. Certainly the action of the department in not so calling upon the admiral can not be regarded as persecution.

The foregoing is all the action of the department in the matter of Admiral Schley, except that he has been detailed to the usual work given to officers of his and of higher rank in the ordinary discharge of naval duties, and has been accorded every facility for meeting the public. There has undoubtedly been a great deal of discussion entirely outside of the department, which has itself, however, as yet expressed no opinion with regard to the maneuvers of our naval vessels at the battle of Santiago. Nothing, therefore, could be further from the truth than the suggestion of persecution. Whatever has been done has been done with your approval and with a desire rather to allay than to stimulate the feeling which always attends a public discussion of personal merits. Admiral Schley neither has grounds for complaint nor has he suggested any complaint. Should he do so, the department would most cordially make any investigations he should desire, or submit to proper inquiry his record and his claims.

It is inconceivable that any self-respecting naval officer would for a moment rest under the criticism, much less the persecution, of a superior authority and not demand at once the hearing of a court of inquiry. Admiral Schley is an officer of long professional experience, and has had every consideration at the hands of this department; and the fact that he has accepted its action without the suggestion of an objection thereto is conclusive evidence that it has been entirely satisfactory to him, or, if not, that it has been so just and considerate that he has no cause of complaint.
APPENDIX IV.

UNITED STATES NAVY IN 1901.

Abbreviations.—r. f. = rapid-fire guns; H. R. C. = Hotchkiss revolving cannon; c. = composite hull; a. c. = armored cruiser; p. c. = protected cruiser; mm. = 39-1000th of an inch; d. b. = dispatch boat; t. s. = training ship; t. t. = torpedo tube; d. c. = dynamite cruiser; * = building or being contracted for; † = captured from Spain; § = plans being prepared. All the ships of the new navy are built of steel except when otherwise indicated.

**Seagoing Battle Ships.**

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<th>NAME</th>
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<th>Displacement, tons</th>
<th>Max. speed</th>
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<td>16</td>
<td>$2,650,000</td>
<td>IV 13-in.; XIV 6-in.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>Maine</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2,885,000</td>
<td>IV 12-in.; XVI 6-in.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1891</td>
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<td>3,063,000</td>
<td>IV 13-in.; VIII 8-in.; IV 6-in.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>2,885,000</td>
<td>IV 12-in.; XVI 6-in.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th>Main</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XVI 6-pdr. r. f.; VI 1-pdr. r. f.; IV Colts; II 3-in. r. f. field.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>XII 3-in. r. f.; XII 3-pdr. r. f.; VIII 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-in. field; II machine; VI automatic.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>XVI 6-pdr. r. f.; VI 1-pdr. r. f.; IV Colts; II 3-in. r. f. field.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX 6-pdr. r. f.; VII 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-in. r. f. field.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>XX 6-pdr. r. f.; IV 1-pdr. r. f.; IV Colts; II 3-in. r. f. field.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>XVI 6-pdr. Maxim-Nordenfelt; IV 1-pdr. automatic; II 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-in. r. f. field; II Colt automatic.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI 6-pdr. Maxim-Nordenfelt; IV 1-pdr. automatic; II 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-in. r. f. field; II Colt automatic.</td>
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UNITED STATES NAVY IN 1901.

Seagoing Battle Ships (Continued).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Keel laid</th>
<th>Displace-</th>
<th>Maxi-</th>
<th>Cost.</th>
<th>BATTERY.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ment, tons.</td>
<td>mum speed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Main.</td>
<td>Secondary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey *</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>§</td>
<td>IV 12-in.; VIII 8-in.; XII 6-in.</td>
<td>XII 3-in. r. f.;</td>
<td>XII 3-pr. r. f.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-pr. r. f.; VII</td>
<td>VIII 3-pr. r. f.;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in.</td>
<td>field; II machine;</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VI automatic.</td>
<td>VI automatic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ohio *</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>$2,899,000</td>
<td>IV 12-in.; XVI 6-in.</td>
<td>XVI 6-pr. Maxim-</td>
<td>Nordenfelt; IV 1-pr. automatic;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6-in.</td>
<td>II 1-pr. r. f.; II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
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<td>16.79</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,222,810</td>
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<td>XI 8-in. r. f.;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>II 1-pr. r. f.; II</td>
<td>Colt; I 3-in. r. f. field.</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>§</td>
<td>IV 12-in.; VIII 8-in.; XII 6-in.</td>
<td>XII 3-in. r. f.;</td>
<td>VII 3-pr. r. f.;</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3-pr. r. f.; VIII</td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in. field; II machine;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in.</td>
<td>VI automatic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island *</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>§</td>
<td>IV 12-in.; VIII 8-in.; XII 6-in.</td>
<td>XII 3-in. r. f.;</td>
<td>XII 3-pr. r. f.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-pr. r. f.; VIII</td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in. field; II machine;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in.</td>
<td>VI automatic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>6,315</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>II 12-in.; VI 6-in.</td>
<td>XII 6-pr. r. f.;</td>
<td>VI 1-pr. r. f.; IV 37-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VI 1-pr. r. f.; II</td>
<td>mm. H. R. C.; II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia *</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>§</td>
<td>IV 12-in.; VIII 8-in.; XII 6-in.</td>
<td>XII 3-in. r. f.;</td>
<td>XII 3-pr. r. f.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-pr. r. f.; VIII</td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in. field; II machine;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>VI automatic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>11,565</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,674,950</td>
<td>IV 13-in.; XIV 6-in.</td>
<td>XVI 6-pr. r. f.;</td>
<td>VI 1-pr. r. f.; IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XII 3-pr. r. f.;</td>
<td>Colt; II 3-in. r. f. field.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Armored Cruisers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Keel laid</th>
<th>Displace-</th>
<th>Maxi-</th>
<th>Cost.</th>
<th>BATTERY.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ment, tons.</td>
<td>mum speed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Main.</td>
<td>Secondary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>9,315</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>$2,986,000</td>
<td>VIII 8-in.; XII 5-in.</td>
<td>XII 6-pr. r. f.;</td>
<td>IV 1-pr. r. f.; IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Colts; II 3-in. r. f.</td>
<td>field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California *</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>§</td>
<td>IV 8-in.; XIV 6-in.</td>
<td>XVIII 8-in. r. f.;</td>
<td>XII 3-pr. r. f.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-pr. r. f.; VIII</td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in. field; II machine;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in.</td>
<td>VI automatic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado *</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>§</td>
<td>IV 8-in.; XIV 6-in.</td>
<td>XVIII 8-in. r. f.;</td>
<td>XII 3-pr. r. f.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-pr. r. f.; VIII</td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in. field; II machine; VI automatic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland *</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>§</td>
<td>IV 8-in.; XIV 6-in.</td>
<td>XVIII 8-in. r. f.;</td>
<td>XII 3-pr. r. f.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-pr. r. f.; VIII</td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in. field; II machine; VI automatic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska *</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>§</td>
<td>IV 8-in.; XIV 6-in.</td>
<td>XVIII 8-in. r. f.;</td>
<td>XII 3-pr. r. f.;</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-pr. r. f.; VIII</td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in. field; II machine; VI automatic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-pr. r. f.; II 3-in.</td>
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</table>
## APPENDIX IV.

### Armored Cruisers (Continued).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Keel laid.</th>
<th>Displacement, tons.</th>
<th>Maximum speed.</th>
<th>Cost.</th>
<th>BATTERY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>8,300</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>$2,982,000</td>
<td>VI 8-in.; XII 4-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Dakota</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VIII 6-pdr. r. f.; II 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-in. r. f. field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XVIII 3-in. r. f.; XII 3-pdr. r. f.; VIII 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-in. r. f. field; II machine; VI automatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia*</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IV 8-in.; XIV 6-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>XVIII 3-in. r. f.; XII 3-pdr. r. f.; VIII 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-in. r. f. field; II machine; VI automatic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ram.

| Katahdin              | 1891       | 2,155               | 17             | $930,000 | IV 6-pdr. |

### Double-Turret Monitors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Displacement, tons.</th>
<th>Maximum speed.</th>
<th>Cost.</th>
<th>BATTERY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amphitrite</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>3,990</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>IV 10-in.; II 4-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miantonomoh</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>3,990</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>IV 10-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monadnock</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>3,990</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>IV 10-in.; II 4-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monterey</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>4,064</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>$1,628,005</td>
<td>II 12-in.; II 10-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puritan</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>6,060</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>IV 12-in.; VI 4-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>3,990</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>IV 10-in.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Single-Turret Monitors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Displacement, tons.</th>
<th>Cost.</th>
<th>BATTERY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canonicus</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>$622,986</td>
<td>II 15-in. S. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catskill</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>427,766</td>
<td>II 15-in. S. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>427,766</td>
<td>II 15-in. S. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lehigh</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>427,766</td>
<td>II 15-in. S. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahopac</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>635,374</td>
<td>II 15-in. S. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>628,879</td>
<td>II 15-in. S. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montauk</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>423,027</td>
<td>II 15-in. S. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahant</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>413,515</td>
<td>II 15-in. S. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nantucket</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>408,089</td>
<td>II 15-in. S. B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas *</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>3,214</td>
<td>11½</td>
<td>960,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida *</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>3,214</td>
<td>11½</td>
<td>925,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada *</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>3,214</td>
<td>11½</td>
<td>960,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming *</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>3,214</td>
<td>11½</td>
<td>975,000</td>
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</table>
### Unarmored Vessels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Keel laid</th>
<th>Displacement, tons.</th>
<th>Maximum speed</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Battery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albany, p. c.</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>3,437</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>VI 6-in.; IV 4.7-in.; VIII 4.7-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta, p. c.</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>$617,000</td>
<td>III 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; IV 8-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore, p. c.</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>4,413</td>
<td>20.096</td>
<td>1,325,000</td>
<td>IV 8-in.; VIII 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston, p. c.</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>610,000</td>
<td>VI 6-in.; II 8-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charleston, p. c.</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,430,000</td>
<td>X 5-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chattanooga, p. c.</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>889,000</td>
<td>XI 5-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, p. c.</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>VIII 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 5-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati, p. c.</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>3,213</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,430,000</td>
<td>X 5-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland, p. c.</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,735,000</td>
<td>XII 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 3-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia, p. c.</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>7,375</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>1,420,000</td>
<td>VIII 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 5-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver, p. c.</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,430,000</td>
<td>IX 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 3-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Des Moines, p. c.</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,430,000</td>
<td>X 5-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit, c.</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>612,500</td>
<td>VIII 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 3-in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galveston, p. c.</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,420,000</td>
<td>VIII 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 3-in.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marblehead</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>674,000</td>
<td>X 5-in.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milwaukee, p. c.</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>23.073</td>
<td>2,680,000</td>
<td>XII 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 3-in.</td>
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<td>Minneapolis, p. c.</td>
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<td>7,375</td>
<td>23.073</td>
<td>1,430,000</td>
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<td>Montgomery</td>
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<td>2,089</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>612,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newark, p. c.</td>
<td>1888</td>
<td>4,098</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,248,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Orleans, p. c.</td>
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<td>3,457</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,796,000</td>
<td>XV 6-pdr. r. f.; VIII 6-pdr. r. f.; I 3-in.</td>
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<td>Olympia, p. c.</td>
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<td>5,870</td>
<td>21.686</td>
<td>1,350,000</td>
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<td>Philadelphia, p. c.</td>
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<td>4,324</td>
<td>19.678</td>
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### Unarmored Vessels (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Keel laid</th>
<th>Displacement, tons.</th>
<th>Maximum speed</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raleigh, p. c.</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>3,213</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>$1,100,000</td>
<td>XV 5-in.; I 6-in.</td>
<td>VIII 6-pdr. r. f.; I 6-pdr. r. f.; I Colt; I 3-in. r. f. field.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reina Mercedes, p. c.</td>
<td>1888</td>
<td>3,099</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1,428,000</td>
<td>XII 6-in.</td>
<td>XII 6-pdr. r. f.; I 6-pdr. r. f.; II Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>San Francisco, p. c.</td>
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<td>4,065</td>
<td>19.525</td>
<td>1,420,000</td>
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<td>VIII 6-pdr. r. f.; I 6-pdr. r. f.; II Colt. automatic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Louis, p. c.</td>
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<td>9,500</td>
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<td>1,420,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tacoma, p. c.</td>
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**Gunboats.**

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<th>Displacement, tons.</th>
<th>Maximum speed</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Bancroft</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
<td>IV 4-in.</td>
<td>VIII 3-pdr. r. f.; I 6-in.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; II 37-mm. H. R. C.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bennington</td>
<td>1888</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>490,000</td>
<td>VI 6-in.</td>
<td>II 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; II 37-mm. H. R. C.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; I Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Castine</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>318,500</td>
<td>VIII 4-in.</td>
<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; II 37-mm. H. R. C.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concord</td>
<td>1888</td>
<td>1,710</td>
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<td>490,000</td>
<td>VI 6-in.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don Juan de Austria‡</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>IV 5-in.</td>
<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; IV Colts; II 42-mm. Nordenfelts; IV 11-mm. Nordenfelts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Alava‡</td>
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<td>1,390</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>II 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; II 37-mm. H. R. C.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; II 37-mm. H. R. C.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helena</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>VIII 4-in.</td>
<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; II 37-mm. H. R. C.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iala de Cuba‡</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>VI 4.7-in.</td>
<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; II 37-mm. H. R. C.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iala de Luson‡</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>VI 4.7-in.</td>
<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; II 37-mm. H. R. C.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II Colt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machias</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>318,500</td>
<td>VIII 4-in.</td>
<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; II 37-mm. H. R. C.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nashville</td>
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<td>1,371</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>VIII 4-in.</td>
<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; II 37-mm. H. R. C.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II Colt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 10*</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>(Contract not yet awarded)</td>
<td>247,000</td>
<td>IV 6-in.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petrel</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>892</td>
<td></td>
<td>247,000</td>
<td>IV 6-in.</td>
<td>II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; II 37-mm. H. R. C.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; I Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Topeka</td>
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<td>1,700</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>170,287</td>
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<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; I Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wilmington</td>
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<td>1,392</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>VIII 4-in.</td>
<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; I Colt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorktown</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>455,000</td>
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<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; I Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annapolis</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>227,700</td>
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<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; I Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marietta</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>223,000</td>
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<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; I Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newport</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>229,400</td>
<td>VI 4-in.</td>
<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; I Colt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Princeton</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>VI 4-in.</td>
<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; I Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vicksburg</td>
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<td>1,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>229,400</td>
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<td>IV 6-pdr. r. f.; II 3-pdr. r. f.; I 1-pdr. r. f.; I Colt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheeling</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>219,000</td>
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Special Class.

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<tr>
<th>NAME.</th>
<th>Keel laid.</th>
<th>Displacement, tons.</th>
<th>Maximum speed.</th>
<th>Cost.</th>
<th>BATTERY.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chesapeake</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>$112,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dolphin</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>1,486</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>315,000</td>
<td>II 14-pdr. r. f.; II 6-pdr. r. f.; II Gatlings.</td>
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<td>Vestvius, d. c.</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>III 15-in.</td>
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Auxiliary Cruisers.

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<th>Keel laid.</th>
<th>Displacement, tons.</th>
<th>Maximum speed.</th>
<th>Cost.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Badger</td>
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<td>4,784</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>$367,000</td>
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<td>Buffalo</td>
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<td>6,888</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>575,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dixie</td>
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<td>6,145</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>575,000</td>
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<td>Panther</td>
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<td>4,200</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>375,000</td>
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<td>14.5</td>
<td>575,000</td>
<td>X 6-in.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yankee</td>
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<td>6,888</td>
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<td>575,000</td>
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Torpedo Boats.

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<th>Displacement, tons.</th>
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<td>Bagley</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>$161,000</td>
<td>III 3-pdr. r. f.; III 18-in. t. t.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>30</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>III 3-pdr. r. f.; III 18-in. t. t.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>Biddle</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>161,000</td>
<td>III 3-pdr. r. f.; III 18-in. t. t.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blakeley</td>
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<td>165</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>159,000</td>
<td>III 3-pdr. r. f.; III 18-in. t. t.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cushing</td>
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<td>105</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>82,750</td>
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<td>Davis</td>
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<td>154</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>81,546</td>
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<tr>
<td>De Long</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>159,400</td>
<td>III 3-pdr. r. f.; III 18-in. t. t.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Du Pont</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>147,000</td>
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<td>Ericsson</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>Farragut</td>
<td>1897</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foote</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>85,000</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>39,000</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>24,250</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>45,000</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>89,000</td>
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<td>26</td>
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### Torpedo Boats (Continued)

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<th>NAME</th>
<th>Keel laid</th>
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<th>Cost</th>
<th>BATTERY</th>
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<tr>
<td>Porter</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Rodgers</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Rowan</td>
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<td>182 27</td>
<td></td>
<td>160,000</td>
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<td>Shubrick*</td>
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<td>Somers</td>
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<td>Stiletto</td>
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<td>318 18</td>
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<td>25,000</td>
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<td>Stockton*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>129,750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stringham*</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>340 30</td>
<td></td>
<td>235,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. A. M. Craven</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>146 30</td>
<td></td>
<td>194,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talbot</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>46 21</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornton*</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>165 26</td>
<td></td>
<td>129,750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tingey*</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>165 26</td>
<td></td>
<td>168,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilkes*</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>165 26</td>
<td></td>
<td>146,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winslow</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>142 24</td>
<td></td>
<td>97,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Submarine.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Keel laid</th>
<th>Displacement tons</th>
<th>Maximum speed</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>BATTERY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adder*</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>120 8</td>
<td></td>
<td>$170,000</td>
<td>I torpedo tube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grampus*</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>120 8</td>
<td></td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>I torpedo tube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>73 45</td>
<td></td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>I torpedo tube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moccasin*</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>120 8</td>
<td></td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>I torpedo tube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pike*</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>120 8</td>
<td></td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>I torpedo tube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plunger*</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>168 8</td>
<td></td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>I torpedo tube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-poise*</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>120 8</td>
<td></td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>I torpedo tube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shark*</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>120 8</td>
<td></td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>I torpedo tube</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Torpedo-Boat Destroyers.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Keel laid</th>
<th>Displacement tons</th>
<th>Maximum speed</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>BATTERY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bainbridge*</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>420 29</td>
<td></td>
<td>$283,000</td>
<td>II 14-pdr. r. f.; V 6-pdr. r. f.; II 18-in. t. t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barry*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>420 29</td>
<td></td>
<td>283,000</td>
<td>II 14-pdr. r. f.; V 6-pdr. r. f.; II 18-in. t. t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chauncey*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>420 29</td>
<td></td>
<td>283,000</td>
<td>II 14-pdr. r. f.; V 6-pdr. r. f.; II 18-in. t. t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dale*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>420 28</td>
<td></td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>II 14-pdr. r. f.; V 6-pdr. r. f.; II 18-in. t. t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decatur*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>430 28</td>
<td></td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>II 14-pdr. r. f.; V 6-pdr. r. f.; II 18-in. t. t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopkins*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>408 29</td>
<td></td>
<td>291,000</td>
<td>II 14-pdr. r. f.; V 6-pdr. r. f.; II 18-in. t. t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hull*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>408 29</td>
<td></td>
<td>291,000</td>
<td>II 14-pdr. r. f.; V 6-pdr. r. f.; II 18-in. t. t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>400 30</td>
<td></td>
<td>281,000</td>
<td>II 14-pdr. r. f.; V 6-pdr. r. f.; II 18-in. t. t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macdonough*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>400 30</td>
<td></td>
<td>281,000</td>
<td>II 14-pdr. r. f.; V 6-pdr. r. f.; II 18-in. t. t.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Torpedo-Boat Destroyers (Continued).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Keel laid</th>
<th>Displacement, tons</th>
<th>Maximum speed</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>BATTERY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paul Jones*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>$285,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferry*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>285,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preble*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>285,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>282,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truxton*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>286,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whipple*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>286,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worden*</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>286,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unarmored Gunboats (in Order of Tonnage).

Yankton, Scorpion, Vixen, Gloucester, Wasp, Frolic, Dorothea, El Cavo,† Pinta, Stranger, Peoria, Hirt, Eagle, Hornet, Quiros,‡ Villalobos,‡ Siren, Sylvia, Callao,‡ Pampanga,‡ Paragua,‡ Samar,‡ Araya,‡ Belusan,‡ Aileen, Elfrida, Sylph, Caledonia,‡ Albay,‡ Leyte,‡ Oneida, Panay,‡ Manilen,‡ Mariveles,‡ Mindoro,‡ Restless, Shearwater, Inca, Alvarado,‡ Sandoval,‡ Huntress, Basin,‡ Guardoqui,‡ and Urda,‡. These vessels are built of steel and iron, and carry a battery of from two to ten guns, according to size. The largest vessel has a displacement of nine hundred and seventy-five tons and the smallest forty-two. They have a speed of eight to nineteen knots.

Old Naval Vessels.

Old iron vessels: Alert, Monocacy, Michigan and Ranger. These have a tonnage varying from five hundred and fifty to thirteen hundred and seventy; and speed, 8.5 to 11.2 knots. Old wooden vessels: Adams, Alliance, Enterprise, Essex, Hartford (recently rebuilt), Lancaster and Mohican. These have a tonnage varying from nine hundred to thirty-two hundred and fifty; and speed, 7.5 to 12 knots. They are now used for the training of apprentices and landsmen.

The above are steam vessels. In addition to the old navy vessels enumerated above are the following sailing vessels: Training-ship Constellation, eight guns, built 1854; training-ship Monongahela, built 1882, and school-ships St. Mary's and Saratoga.

Tugs.

There are thirty-nine tugs in the naval service, the largest of which, the Potomac, has a displacement of six hundred and seventy-seven tons, and the two smallest, the Chickasaw and Rapido, one hundred tons. These vessels are distributed among the various naval stations in the United States and the Philippine Islands.

The following wooden vessels are unfit for further sea service: Receiving-ships Franklin, Pensacola, Richmond, Vermont, Wabash, Independence, Nipica and Constitution. These vessels are being used by various State naval militia: Fern, Marion, Minnesota, Portsmouth, Yantic, Dale, New Hampshire and St. Louis. The James-town has been transferred to the Marine Hospital Service. The Michigan, an iron cruiser of six hundred and eighty-five tons, is employed on special duty in the Northwestern lakes.

The auxiliary fleet of the navy consists of sixteen colliers, three supply ships, two distilling ships, one refrigerator ship, one tank steamer and one hospital ship.
APPENDIX V.

AMERICAN NAVAL CASUALTIES IN THE SPANISH WAR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manila Bay (May 1st)</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cienfuegos (May 11th)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardenas (May 11th)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Juan, Porto Rico (May 12th)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guantanamo, Cuba (June 11th to 20th)</td>
<td>6*</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago (June 22d)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago (July 3d)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yankee (June 13th)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle (July 12th)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bancroft (August 2d)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphitrite (August 7th)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1†</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>68</strong></td>
<td><strong>84</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* One accidentally killed.  † Accidentally shot.

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### APPENDIX VI.

**ROLL OF HONOR—SEAMEN AND MARINES WHO HAVE WON MEDALS FOR BRAVERY IN ACTION.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Occasion</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Occasion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahearn, Michael</td>
<td><strong>Kearsarge-Alabama.</strong></td>
<td>Colbert, Patrick</td>
<td>Plymouth, N. C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, Aaron</td>
<td>Mattox Creek, 1865.</td>
<td>Coleman, John</td>
<td>Corean forts, 1871.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur, Matthew</td>
<td>Forts Henry and</td>
<td>Cooper, John</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asten, Charles</td>
<td>Red River.</td>
<td>Cotton, Peter</td>
<td><em>De Kalb</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atkinson, Thomas</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
<td>Crawford, Alexander</td>
<td>Attempt against the <strong>Albemarle</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avery, James</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
<td>Cripps, Thomas</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin, Charles</td>
<td>Destruction of the</td>
<td>Davis, John</td>
<td>Elizabeth, N. C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnum, James</td>
<td><em>Kearsarge-Alabama.</em>*</td>
<td>Davis, Samuel W.</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barton, Thomas C.</td>
<td>Frankin, Va.</td>
<td>Deakin, Charles</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bass, David L.</td>
<td>Fort Fisher.</td>
<td>Demning, Lorenzo</td>
<td>Destruction of the <strong>Albemarle</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bazaar, Philip</td>
<td>Fort Fisher.</td>
<td>Dempster, John</td>
<td>Fort Fisher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell, George</td>
<td>Royal Yacht.</td>
<td>Denig, J. Henry</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bickford, John F.</td>
<td><em>Kearsarge-Alabama.</em>*</td>
<td>Diggins, Bartholo</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binder, Richard</td>
<td>Fort Fisher.</td>
<td>—new—</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blagden, William</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
<td>Ditzenback, John</td>
<td><em>Neosho</em> in Cumberland River.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blake, Robert</td>
<td>Stono River.</td>
<td>Doolin, William</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bois, Frank</td>
<td>Vicksburg.</td>
<td>Dorman, John</td>
<td>Richdel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond, William</td>
<td><em>Kearsarge-Alabama.</em>*</td>
<td>Dougherty, James</td>
<td>Corean forts, 1871.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourne, Thomas</td>
<td>New Orleans.</td>
<td>Dougherty, Patrick</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradley, Amos</td>
<td>New Orleans.</td>
<td>Duncan, Adam</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradenley, Charles</td>
<td><em>Louisville.</em>*</td>
<td>Duncan, James K. L.</td>
<td>Harrisonburg, La.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breenhen, Christo-</td>
<td>New Orleans.</td>
<td>Edwards, John</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pher</td>
<td></td>
<td>English, Thomas</td>
<td>Fort Fisher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brinn, Andrew</td>
<td>Fort Hudson.</td>
<td>Erickson, John P.</td>
<td>Fort Fisher.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Brown, Robert</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
<td>Fitzpatrick, Thomas</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
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<td>Brownell, William P.</td>
<td>Kicksburg.</td>
<td>Franklin, Frederick</td>
<td>Corean forts, 1871.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brutsche, Henry</td>
<td>Plymouth, N. C.</td>
<td>Franks, William J.</td>
<td>Yazoo City.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buck, James</td>
<td>New Orleans.</td>
<td>Freeman, Martin</td>
<td>Mobile Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>N. C.</em></td>
<td>Grace, H. P.</td>
<td>Corean forts, 1871.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Graham, Robert</td>
<td>Plymouth, N. C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Greene, John</td>
<td>New Orleans.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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## APPENDIX VI

### Roll of Honor (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occasion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Griffiths, John</td>
<td>Fort Fisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griewold, Luke M.</td>
<td>Sinking of Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haffee, Edmund</td>
<td>Fort Fisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haley, James</td>
<td>Kearsarge-Alabama.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halstead, William</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ham, Mark G.</td>
<td>Kearsarge-Alabama.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton, Hugh</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton, Richard</td>
<td>Destruction of the Albermarle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton, Thomas W.</td>
<td>Vicksburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand, Alexander</td>
<td>Roanoke River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harcourt, Thomas</td>
<td>Fort Fisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harley, Bernard</td>
<td>Destruction of the Albermarle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrington, Daniel</td>
<td>Brunswick, Ga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris, John</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison, George H.</td>
<td>Kearsarge-Alabama.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hathaway, Edward</td>
<td>Vicksburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkins, Charles</td>
<td>Fort Fisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayden, Cyrus</td>
<td>Fort Fisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayden, Joseph B.</td>
<td>Fort Fisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayes, John</td>
<td>St. Mark's-Alabama.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayes, Thomas</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hickman, John</td>
<td>Fort Hudson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinunegar, William</td>
<td>Fort Fisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollat, George</td>
<td>New Orleans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horton, Lewis A</td>
<td>Sinking of the Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houghton, Edward J.</td>
<td>Destruction of the Albermarle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard, Martin</td>
<td>Plymouth, N. C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard, Peter</td>
<td>Fort Hudson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudson, Michael</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huskey, Michael</td>
<td>Carondelet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyland, John</td>
<td>Red River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irlam, Joseph</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irving, John</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irving, Thomas</td>
<td>Charleston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irwin, Nicholas</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, John</td>
<td>Stono Inlet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James, John H.</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenkins, Thomas</td>
<td>Vicksburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson, Henry</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Johnson, William P.</td>
<td>Harrisonburg, La</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, Andrew</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, John</td>
<td>Sinking of the Monitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, John E</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, Thomas</td>
<td>Fort Fisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, William</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan, Thomas</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jourdan, Robert</td>
<td>Nansemond River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Fort Fisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelley, John</td>
<td>Hamilton, N. C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kendrick, Thomas</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenna, Barnett</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyon, Charles</td>
<td>Drury's Bluff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King, R. H.</td>
<td>Destruction of the Albermarle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinnaird, Samuel W.</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laffey, Bartlett</td>
<td>Yazoo City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laklin, Daniel</td>
<td>Franklin, Va</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larn, John S.</td>
<td>Mark's, Fla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laverty, John</td>
<td>Roanoke River, 1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawson, John</td>
<td>Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lear, Nicholas</td>
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ROLL OF HONOR.

Roll of Honor (Continued).

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Clausen, Randolph Merrimac.
Cooney, T. C. Cardenas.

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Francklin, Joseph J. Cienfuegos.
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APPENDIX VII.

THE SCHLEY COURT OF INQUIRY.

Early in June, 1901, the third volume of this History of the United States Navy, dealing with the Hispano-American war, was published after more than three years of most exhaustive research and study on the part of the author. In his account of the Santiago campaign the writer—who, in other portions of his work, had spoken in appreciative terms of Rear-Admiral Schley's services in the arctic relief expedition and in the attack on the Baltimore's men at Valparaiso—following absolutely the official records as they then stood, made criticism on Schley's retrograde movement, his futile attack on the Cristóbal Colon, his "inaccurate and misleading" reports about his coal supply and his conduct during the first half-hour of the battle of July 3d.

These criticisms aroused great interest all over the world, with the result that on July 22, 1901, Rear-Admiral Schley demanded an official investigation of his conduct. The request was promptly granted, the Secretary of the Navy, John Davis Long, causing the following precept with ten specifications to be drawn up:—

1. His conduct in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign.
2. The circumstances attending, the reasons controlling and the propriety of the movements of the Flying Squadron off Cienfuegos in May, 1898.
3. The circumstances attending, the reasons controlling and the propriety of the movements of the said squadron in proceeding from Cienfuegos to Santiago.
4. The circumstances attending the arrival of the Flying Squadron off Santiago, the reasons for its retrograde turn westward and departure from off Santiago, and the propriety thereof.
5. The circumstances attending and the reasons for the disobedience by Commodore Schley of the orders of the department contained in its dispatch dated May 26, 1898, and the propriety of his conduct in the premises.
6. The condition of the coal supply of the Flying Squadron on and about May 27, 1898; its coaling facilities; the necessity, if any, for, or advisability of, the return of the squadron to Key West to coal; and the accuracy and propriety of the official reports made by Commodore Schley with respect to this matter.

7. Whether or not every effort incumbent upon the commanding officer of a fleet under such circumstances was made to capture or destroy the Spanish cruiser Cristóbal Colon as she lay at anchor in the entrance to Santiago harbor, May 27 to 31, inclusive, and the necessity for, or advisability of, engaging the batteries at the entrance to Santiago harbor, and the Spanish vessels at anchor within the entrance to said harbor, at the ranges used, and the propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the premises.

8. The necessity, if any, for, and advisability of, withdrawing at night the Flying Squadron from the entrance to Santiago harbor to a distance at sea, if such shall be found to have been the case; the extent and character of such withdrawal; and whether or not a close or adequate blockade of said harbor, to prevent the escape of the enemy's vessels therefrom, was established, and the propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the premises.

9. The position of the Brooklyn on the morning of July 3, 1898, at the time of the exit of the Spanish vessels from the harbor of Santiago. The circumstances attending, the reasons for and the incidents resulting from the turning of the Brooklyn in the direction in which she turned at or about the beginning of the action with said Spanish vessels, and the possibility of thereby colliding with or endangering any other of the vessels of the United States fleet, and the propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in the premises.

10. The circumstances leading to, and the incidents and results of, a controversy with Lieutenant Albon C. Hodgson, U. S. N., who, on July 3, 1898, during the battle of Santiago, was navigator of the Brooklyn, in relation to the turning of the Brooklyn; also the colloquy at that time between Commodore Schley and Lieutenant Hodgson and the ensuing correspondence between them on the subject thereof, and the propriety of the conduct of Admiral Schley in the premises.

The foregoing specific directions are given primarily for the information and guidance of the court, but do not limit or restrict the scope of its inquiry into the "entire matter," the investigation of which is asked by the officer concerned.

After various changes in the personnel of this court—made in accord with the wishes of the applicant so as to insure absolute fairness—it was finally constituted as follows: Admiral George Dewey (president) and Rear-Admirals Andrew Ellicott Kennedy Benham and Francis Munroe Ramsay. Captain Samuel Conrad Lemly was judge-advocate general, while Edwin P. Hanna acted as solicitor for the department. Rear-Admiral Schley engaged a
brilliant array of counsel, headed by the Hon. Jeremiah M. Wilson, assisted by Isidor Rayner and Captain James Parker, U. S. N. The sessions of the court were held on the second floor of building No. 105, the new gunner's workshop, in the Washington Navy Yard, the first session beginning at 1 P.M., September 12, 1901. Two sessions were held daily for forty days, the last being on November 7th.

In its inquiry the court heard the sworn testimony of five rear-admirals, eleven captains, eight commanders, fifteen lieutenant commanders, twenty-five lieutenants and thirty-one other officers and civilians, nearly all of whom (ninety-five in all) were participants in the Santiago campaign. It was conspicuous throughout the inquiry that the court was pre-eminently fair, impartial and distinctly generous in its rulings for and dealings with the applicant. At the close of the taking of testimony—all of which had been in open sessions—the court adjourned and held secret sessions in order to sift and weigh the great mass of testimony before it and to formulate its findings and opinions.

On December 13, 1901, thirty-seven days after the close of its public sessions, the court submitted the following:

THE COURT'S FINDINGS.

COURT OF INQUIRY, McLEAN BUILDING,
1517 H STREET, N. W.,
WASHINGTON, D. C., December 13, 1901.

The court having, by the authority of the Navy Department, occupied rooms Nos. 9 and 10, McLean Building, No. 1517 H street, N. W., Washington, D. C., while deliberating upon its proceedings, and the members thereof having assembled daily since Monday, November 11th, with the exception of Sundays and holidays, and having concluded the investigation, reports its proceedings and the testimony taken, with a full and detailed statement of all the pertinent facts which it deems to be established, together with its opinion and recommendation in the premises.

FACTS.

The Flying Squadron, consisting of the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas and Scorpion, under the command of Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, U. S. N., sailed from Key West about 8 A.M. of May 19, 1898, with orders from the Navy Department and from the commander in chief of the North Atlantic squadron to proceed with dispatch (utmost) off Cienfuegos to capture the enemy off that port, if possible, or to blockade him, and to maintain the blockade as close as possible.

The Flying Squadron arrived off Cienfuegos on the morning of May 22d, and established a blockade. During the day the ships lay off the port at various distances, in no particular order. At night they formed in column of vessels, headed offshore and moved at only sufficient speed for
keeping positions. The small vessels performed picket duty inshore of the large ships.

Commodore Schley did not proceed with utmost dispatch off Cienfuegos and blockade that port as close as possible.

At 10 A.M. May 22d the Dupont arrived at Cienfuegos with a dispatch from the commander in chief, dated Key West, May 20, 1898, which informed Commodore Schley of the probability of the Spanish squadron being in Santiago de Cuba, and ordered him to hold Cienfuegos until the receipt of more positive information.

At 10.30 P.M. May 22d the Iowa arrived at Cienfuegos, and at 7 P.M. of the same date the Scorpion left Cienfuegos for Santiago.

ORDERED TO PROCEED TO SANTIAGO.

At 8.15 A.M. of May 23d Commodore Schley received by the dispatch vessel Hawk the following dispatch and memorandum from the commander in chief: Dispatch No. 8, dated Key West, May 21, 1898, which stated that the Spanish squadron was probably at Santiago and ordered Commodore Schley, if he was satisfied that the Spanish squadron was not at Cienfuegos, to "proceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him in that port."

A memorandum, dated off Havana, May 21, 1898, which directed Commodore Schley to mask his movements in leaving Cienfuegos.

A memorandum which stated that a good landing place had been found by McCalla thirteen and a half miles west of Sabanilla Point; that the Cubans had perfect knowledge of what was going on within Cienfuegos; that the Cuban forces in the San Juan Mountains controlled the railway between Cienfuegos and Trinidad; and that there were fair roads from the landing place to Cienfuegos.

At 8.30 A.M. May 23d the Castine and the collier Merrimac arrived at Cienfuegos.

At noon on the same date the British steamer Adula was permitted to go into Cienfuegos.

At 7 A.M. May 24th the Marblehead, Vixen and Eagle arrived at Cienfuegos.

About 10 A.M. the Marblehead and Eagle proceeded to the landing place, thirteen and a half miles west of Sabanilla Point, communicated with the insurgents, landed stores for them, learned that the Spanish squadron was not in the harbor of Cienfuegos, rejoined the squadron at 3.30 P.M. and reported to Commodore Schley the information obtained.

After the receipt of this information, Commodore Schley wrote a dispatch to the commander in chief in which he stated: "I shall move eastward to-morrow [May 25th]." He also wrote a dispatch to the commandant of the naval base at Key West in which he stated: "As it is not found practicable to coal the Texas from the collier here, where there is so much swell, I shall proceed to-morrow [May 25th] off Santiago de Cuba, being embarrassed, however, by the Texas' short coal supply and her inability to coal in the open sea. I shall not be able to remain off that
THE SCHLEY COURT OF INQUIRY.

port on account of general short coal supply of squadron, so will proceed to the vicinity of Nicolas Mole, where the water is smooth and I can coal Texas and other ships with what may remain in collier."

No work was, apparently, in progress on the fortifications of Cienfuegos while Commodore Schley was off that port.

No efforts were made by Commodore Schley to communicate with the insurgents, to discover whether the Spanish squadron was in the harbor of Cienfuegos prior to the morning of May 24th.

Signal lights were displayed on shore at night, May 22d and May 23d, but Commodore Schley had no information which enabled him to interpret them.

Before sailing from Cienfuegos, Commodore Schley received reliable information that ships could be coaled in the vicinity of Cape Cruz and in Gonaives Channel.

THE START FOR SANTIAGO.

The Flying Squadron, with the exception of the Castine, sailed from Cienfuegos about 8 p.m. of May 24th, the heavy ships in column of vessels, the light ships on the right flank and the collier Merrimac on the left flank. At 10.10 a.m. of May 26th the light vessels were shifted to the port beam and the collier to the starboard beam.

Before midnight of May 24th, owing to heavy rolling, the forward compartment of the Eagle filled with water, which reduced her speed.

On May 25th the wind was fresh from the eastward, the weather was bad and the sea was heavy for small vessels. The squadron reduced its speed to enable the Eagle to remain with it. On May 26th the weather improved, the wind veered to the westward and became light and the sea moderated. At 1.30 a.m. Commodore Schley sent the Eagle to Port Antonio to coal, and then to return to Key West. On noon of May 26th the Eagle had sufficient coal to steam ten knots per hour for three days. At 5.30 p.m. the squadron stopped about twenty-two miles to the southward of the port of Santiago, and was joined by the scouts Minneapolis, Yale and St. Paul. At 6 p.m. May 26th the engines of the collier Merrimac were temporarily disabled. The engines were changed to work "compound," and at 4.20 p.m. of May 27th she was able to make six knots with her own steam. The broken parts of the engines were repaired on board the flagship, all repairs being completed at midnight of May 28th. The Yale towed the Merrimac while disabled.

The commanding officer of the St. Paul visited the flagship, in obedience to signal, took with him a Cuban pilot, and had a conversation with Commodore Schley. Commodore Schley had no conversation with the senior commanding officer of the scouts, and obtained no positive information from the scouts regarding the Spanish squadron.

THE RETROGRADE MOVEMENT.

At 7:45 p.m. May 26th Commodore Schley changed the course of the Flying Squadron to the westward, and signaled to his squadron: "Desti-
nation Key West via south side of Cuba and Yucatan Channel, as soon as
collier is ready; speed, nine knots."

The squadron proceeded westward eighteen miles; stopped at 11.15
p.m., the tow lines of the collier having parted; drifted until 3.40 p.m.
May 27th; resumed its westward course for twenty-three miles; stopped
again at 7.15 p.m. and drifted until 1 p.m. of May 28th.

At 9.30 a.m. May 27th the Harvard joined the Flying Squadron, and
her commanding officer delivered to Commodore Schley the following
dispatch, dated May 25th, addressed by the department to the Harvard at
St. Nicolas Mole, Hayti:

"Proceed at once, and inform Schley, and also the senior officer present,
off Santiago de Cuba, as follows: 'All department's information indicates
the Spanish division is still at Santiago de Cuba.' The department looks to
you to ascertain fact, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave with-
out a decisive action. Cubans familiar with Santiago de Cuba say that
there is landing place five nautical miles west, or six from mouth of har-
bor, and that there insurgents probably will be found, and not Spanish.
From the surrounding heights can see every vessel in the port. As soon as
ascertained, notify department whether enemy is there. Could not squad-
ron, and also the Harvard, coal from Merrimac leeward Cape Cruz, Cuba,
Gona'ives, Hayti Channel, or Mole, Hayti? The department will send [coal]
immediately to Mole, Hayti. Report without delay situation in Santiago
de Cuba."

"THE DEPARTMENT'S ORDERS CAN NOT BE OBEYED."

This dispatch was answered by Commodore Schley about noon May
27th, as follows:

"Received dispatch of May 26th, delivered by Harvard off Santiago
de Cuba. Merrimac engine is disabled and she is helpless; am obliged to
have her towed to Key West. Have been absolutely unable to coal the
Texas, Marblehead, Vixen and Brooklyn from collier, owing to very rough
seas and boisterous weather since leaving Key West. Brooklyn is the only
one in squadron having more than sufficient coal to reach Key West. Im-
possible to remain off Santiago in present state of coal account of the
squadron. Not possible to coal to leeward of Cape Cruz in summer, owing
to southwest winds. Harvard just reported to me she has only coal
enough to reach Jamaica, and she will proceed to Port Royal; also reports
only small vessels could coal at Gona'ives or Mole, Hayti. Minneapolis
has only coal enough to reach Key West; the same of Yale, which will
tow Merrimac. It is to be regretted that the department's orders can not
be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that end. I am forced to
return to Key West, via Yucatan Passage, for coal. Can ascertain nothing
certain concerning enemy. Was obliged to send Eagle to Port Antonio,
Jamaica, yesterday, as she had only twenty-seven tons of coal on board.
Will leave St. Paul here. Will require ninety-five hundred tons of coal
at Key West."
THE QUESTION OF THE COAL SUPPLY.

The coal supply of the vessels of the Flying Squadron at noon on May 27th was sufficient to have enabled them to steam ten knots per hour: The Brooklyn for eleven and three quarter days, the Iowa for seven and one half days, the Massachusetts for ten days, the Texas six and one quarter days, the Marblehead for three and one quarter days, the Vixen for eleven and one quarter days; or to have remained on blockade duty off Santiago de Cuba: The Brooklyn for twenty-six days, the Iowa for sixteen days, the Massachusetts for twenty days, the Texas for ten days, the Marblehead for five days, the Vixen for twenty-three days, and then steam to Gonâves, Hayti, or to Cape Cruz, Cuba, to coal. At that date the Flying Squadron was accompanied by the collier Merrimac, containing forty-three hundred and fifty tons of coal. The amount of coal required to completely fill the coal bunkers of all the vessels of the Flying Squadron on this same date was twenty-seven hundred and fifty tons.

CONDITIONS FAVORABLE FOR COALING.

The conditions of wind, sea and weather from noon on May 26th to June 1st were favorable for taking coal from a collier at sea off Santiago. The Iowa, Castine and Dupont coaled at Cienfuegos from the collier Merrimac on May 23d, and the Massachusetts and Castine on May 24th. The Texas asked permission to coal first on May 23d, and was refused by Commodore Schley, who ordered the Iowa to coal first and the Massachusetts second. The Texas was ordered to coal from the collier on May 24th, but the order was revoked, as the Massachusetts was alongside the collier, and the commanding officer of the collier deemed it unsafe to place his vessel between two battle ships. The Texas and Marblehead coaled at sea off Santiago, from colliers, May 27th and 28th; the Massachusetts and Vixen, on May 29th; the Brooklyn and Iowa, on May 30th; the Brooklyn, Texas and Marblehead, on May 31st.

At 3.35 P.M. May 27th Commodore Schley signaled to the St. Paul: “If Sampson comes here tell him half of squadron out of coal and collier engine broken down.”

At 10.45 P.M. May 27th Commodore Schley signaled to the Texas: “The more coal you take in this smooth weather the less you will have to take in Hayti.”

ARRIVAL OFF SANTIAGO.

Commodore Schley made no effort to ascertain whether the Spanish squadron was in the harbor of Santiago; he left said harbor entirely unguarded from 6 P.M. of May 26th to 5 P.M. of May 27th, and guarded only by the scout St. Paul from 5 P.M. May 27th until about 6 P.M. May 28th. The Flying Squadron arrived off the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, seven miles south of the morro, at 6 P.M. May 28th, and established a blockade.
The distance from Cienfuegos to Santiago is three hundred and fifteen miles. Commodore Schley did not proceed with all dispatch from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba.

**THE ATTACK ON THE CRISTÓBAL COLON.**

Early on the morning of May 29th the Cristóbal Colon and other vessels of the Spanish squadron were discovered at anchor in the harbor of Santiago, about twelve hundred yards from the entrance. No attempt was made by Commodore Schley on May 29th or May 30th to capture or destroy these Spanish vessels. At 1.30 p.m. May 30th the cruiser New Orleans and the collier Sterling joined the Flying Squadron.

At 10.55 a.m. May 31st Commodore Schley shifted his flag to the Massachusetts. At 11.10 a.m. the flagship Massachusetts signaled: "The Massachusetts, New Orleans and Iowa will go after dinner to a distance of seven thousand yards and fire at Cristóbal Colon with 8- and 12-inch guns. Speed about ten knots."

At 1.30 p.m. the three vessels designated steamed in column toward the entrance to the harbor of Santiago, heading to the eastward, at about ten knots speed. The ships passed the harbor entrance about seven thousand yards distant from the morro, firing at the Cristóbal Colon and the shore batteries with ranges varying from seven thousand yards to eighty-two hundred yards. All projectiles fell short.

When the ships had passed to the eastward of the entrance the flagship turned offshore, followed in succession by the other ships, repassed the entrance and fired as before, but with ranges varying from nine thousand yards to eleven thousand yards. Some of these projectiles fell near the Cristóbal Colon. The fire was returned by the ships in the harbor and by the land batteries, but no large guns were used by the batteries. Several projectiles passed over our vessels, but no injuries were sustained.

**THE SANTIAGO BLOCKADE.**

The Flying Squadron did not withdraw at night from the entrance to Santiago harbor to a distance at sea. The blockade was maintained at an average distance of about six to seven miles from the harbor entrance during the day and probably somewhat nearer during the night. Two vessels performed picket duty at night, two miles inside of the line of vessels.

**BATTLE OF JULY 3D.**

The Spanish squadron was discovered to be in the entrance to Santiago harbor steaming out at about 9.30 a.m. July 3, 1898. The Brooklyn at that time was heading to the westward of north, about sixty-three hundred yards southwest, three quarters south from the morro, which was practically her blockading position.

Large vessels coming out of the harbor of Santiago were obliged to head about southwest by south, and the Spanish vessels therefore, in com-
ing out, until clear of the shoal to the westward, were obliged to head directly for the position of the *Brooklyn*. When clear of this shoal the Spanish vessels turned, in succession, to the westward and took a course nearly parallel to the land.

**THE BROOKLYN'S LOOP.**

The *Brooklyn* stood toward the Spanish vessels with varying helm, fired one shot from her forward turret at thirty-five hundred yards' range, which proved short, and then engaged with her port battery. When about fourteen hundred yards distant from the leading Spanish ship, the *Infanta María Teresa*, the *Brooklyn* turned to starboard, with her helm hard aport, and continued so to turn until she headed to the westward parallel to the course of the Spanish ships. The commanding officer of the *Brooklyn* put the helm hard aport, and at almost the same instant Commodore Schley gave the order, "Hard aport."

When the *Brooklyn*’s helm was put hard aport, the *Infanta María Teresa* was about fourteen hundred yards to the eastward of north from the *Brooklyn*, the *Vizcaya* was to the eastward of the *Infanta María Teresa*, and the *Cristóbal Colón* was to the eastward of the *Vizcaya*. When the *Brooklyn* completed the turn and was heading to the westward, parallel to the course of the *Vizcaya*, the *Vizcaya* and the *Cristóbal Colón* were about twenty-four hundred yards to the northward and westward of the *Brooklyn*. The turn of the *Brooklyn* was toward the *Texas*. The *Texas* stopped and backed her engines.

**THE HODGSON COLLOQUY.**

On July 3, 1898, about the time the *Brooklyn* began her turn to starboard, a conversation regarding the proximity of the *Texas* took place between Commodore Schley and Lieutenant Albon Chase Hodgson.

Rear-Admiral Schley caused to be published in a daily newspaper (the New York Sun) a letter addressed to him by Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson, dated June 11, 1899, in which Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson said: "The colloquy published in the New York Sun and alleged to have taken place between you and me on the day of the battle of Santiago, July 3, 1898, never occurred." Rear-Admiral Schley did not have published the other letters of Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson in regard to this matter.

**OPINION.**

Commodore Schley, in command of the Flying Squadron, should have proceeded with utmost dispatch off Cienfuegos and should have maintained a close blockade of that port.

He should have endeavored on May 23d, at Cienfuegos, to obtain information regarding the Spanish squadron by communicating with the insurgents at the place designated in the memorandum delivered to him at 8.15 A.M. of that date.
He should have proceeded from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba with all dispatch, and should have disposed his vessels with a view of intercepting the enemy in any attempt to pass the Flying Squadron.

He should not have delayed the squadron for the Eagle.

He should not have made the retrograde turn westward with his squadron.

He should have promptly obeyed the Navy Department's order of May 25th.

He should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago harbor on May 29th and 30th.

He did not do his utmost with the force under his command to capture or destroy the Cristóbal Colon and other vessels of the enemy which he attacked on May 31st.

By commencing the engagement on July 3d with the port battery and turning the Brooklyn around with port helm, Commodore Schley caused her to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels, especially with the Vizcaya and Cristóbal Colon.

The turn of the Brooklyn to starboard was made to avoid getting her into dangerous proximity to the Spanish vessels. The turn was made toward the Texas and caused that vessel to stop and to back her engines to avoid possible collision.

Rear-Admiral Schley did injustice to Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson in publishing only a portion of the correspondence which passed between them.

Commodore Schley's conduct in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign prior to June 1, 1898, was characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness and lack of enterprise.

His official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling facilities of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading.

His conduct during the battle of July 3d was self-possessed, and he encouraged, in his own person, his subordinates, officers and men, to fight courageously.

George Dewey,
Admiral U. S. N., President.
Samuel C. Lemly,
Judge-Advocate General, U. S. N., Judge Advocate.

Admiral Dewey's Opinion.

In the opinion of the undersigned the passage from Key West to Cienfuegos was made by the Flying Squadron with all possible dispatch, Commodore Schley having in view the importance of arriving off Cienfuegos with as much coal as possible in the ships' bunkers.

The blockade of Cienfuegos was effective.

Commodore Schley, in permitting the steamer Adula to enter the port of Cienfuegos, expected to obtain information concerning the Spanish squadron from her when she came out.

The passage from Cienfuegos to a point about twenty-two miles south
of Santiago was made with as much dispatch as was possible while keeping the squadron a unit.

The blockade of Santiago was effective.

Commodore Schley was the senior officer of our squadron off Santiago when the Spanish squadron attempted to escape on the morning of July 3, 1898. He was in absolute command and is entitled to the credit due to such commanding officer for the glorious victory which resulted in the total destruction of the Spanish ships.

George Dewey,
Admiral U. S. N., President.

Samuel C. Lemly,
Judge-Advocate General U. S. N., Judge Advocate.

RECOMMENDATION.

In view of the length of time which has elapsed since the occurrence of the events of the Santiago campaign, the court recommends no further proceedings be had in the premises.

George Dewey,
Admiral U. S. N., President.

Samuel C. Lemly,
Judge-Advocate General U. S. N., Judge Advocate.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the court of inquiry was unanimous in its opinions on the following points:

POINTS ON WHICH THE COURT WAS UNANIMOUS.

I. Schley failed to avail himself of important information given to him at 8.15 A.M., May 23, 1898.

II. Schley should not have made the retrograde movement from Santiago, May 26th to 28th.

III. He should have obeyed the Navy Department's order of May 25th.

IV. He should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels near the entrance of Santiago harbor, May 29th and 30th.

V. He did not do his utmost to destroy the Cristóbal Colón, May 31st.

VI. By making the loop in the battle of July 3d, Schley lost distance and position with the Spanish vessels.

VII. This loop was made to avoid getting into dangerous proximity to the Spanish vessels, and it caused the Texas to stop and back her engines to avoid a possible collision.

VIII. He did injustice to Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson in publishing only a portion of the correspondence which passed between them.

IX. Schley's conduct in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign, prior to June 1, 1898, was characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness and lack of enterprise.

X. His official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling facilities of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading.

XI. His conduct during the battle of July 3d was self-possessed, and he encouraged, in his own person, his subordinates, officers and men, to fight courageously.
DEWEY'S INDIVIDUAL OPINION.

I. The passage of the Flying Squadron from Key West to Cienfuegos was made with all possible dispatch.

II. The blockade of Cienfuegos was effective.

II. The passage from Cienfuegos to a point about twenty-two miles south of Santiago was made with as much dispatch as possible while keeping the squadron a unit.

IV. The blockade of Santiago was effective.

At the conclusion of his individual opinion Admiral Dewey added that, in his opinion, Commodore Schley was in "absolute command" during the naval battle of July 3, 1893, and that he is "entitled to the credit due to such a commanding officer." This is a point that was beyond the scope of the court of inquiry (as determined by its own rulings), Admiral Dewey himself having been conspicuously instrumental in ruling out all testimony on that point. His individual opinion, therefore, can not be taken as contradictory to that of his confrères, inasmuch as that phase of the inquiry was never properly recognized.

SCHLEY'S BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

Five days after the court of inquiry made its report in the Schley application, Rear-Admiral Schley filed the following bill of exceptions:—

THE RICHMOND,
WASHINGTON, December 13, 1901.

To the Honorable, the Secretary of the Navy:

Winfield Scott Schley, Rear-Admiral, U. S. N. (retired), the applicant before a court of inquiry of which Admiral George Dewey, U. S. N., is president, and Rear-Admirals Andrew E. K. Benham and Francis M. Ramsay, U. S. N., members, and Captain Samuel C. Lemly, U. S. N., Judge-Advocate General, judge advocate, objects to the approval of the findings of the court upon the ground that the opinion rendered and the report of facts made by the majority of the court are in conflict with the overwhelming weight of evidence, and that the majority of the court in their said opinion have ignored the testimony of the applicant and of the whole of applicant's witnesses and all that portion of the evidence given by witnesses for the Government which was favorable to the applicant, and have thus deprived him of rights guaranteed to him by the laws of the land and the Constitution of the United States; and the applicant now assigns the following grounds in support of his said objection:—

1. The majority of the court have given their opinion that Commodore Schley should have proceeded with the utmost dispatch off Cienfuegos when there was no specification covering this subject, and when the applicant did not have sufficient opportunity to bring in proper and convincing evidence in reference thereto, and when the only evidence taken by the court on this subject was directly contrary to the opinion rendered.
2. The majority of the court have held that the applicant should have
endeavored to open communication with the insurgents at the place design-
nated in the memorandum by Commander McCalla, delivered to him on
the morning of the 23d of May, 1898, when, in fact, there was no place
mentioned in said memorandum as being a place at which a camp of insur-
gents was located.

3. The majority of the court have arrived at the opinion stated in the
foregoing paragraph without regard to the fact, which was proved by an
overwhelming weight of testimony, that the said McCalla memorandum
was sent to Commodore Schley only for use in connection with the infor-
mation it contained relative to certain batteries at or being constructed in
the vicinity of the entrance to the harbor of Cienfuegos, as is attested by
the order No. 6, dated May 19, 1898, and sent to Commodore Schley by
Admiral Sampson.

4. The majority of the court in the opinion rendered hold that Com-
modore Schley should have maintained a close blockade of Cienfuegos,
when by overwhelming testimony it was proved that a close and effective
blockade of that port was maintained, the judge advocate having substan-
tially abandoned any charge to the contrary.

5. The majority of the court, in the opinion rendered, have entirely
ignored the uncontradicted testimony proving that the British steamer
Adula was permitted to go into the harbor of Cienfuegos in order that
information might be obtained through her as to whether the Spanish fleet
was then in that port, it having been clearly established that the captain
of the said British steamer Adula promised and agreed, before permission
was given him to enter the port, that he would bring his ship out in fewer
than twenty-four hours and furnish the information desired.

6. The majority of the court, in the opinion rendered, have entirely
failed to refer to dispatch No. 7, admitted to have been sent by Admiral
Sampson to Commodore Schley, the construction of which was agreed
upon in the argument of the case, to wit: That it was an imperative order
for Commodore Schley to hold his squadron off Cienfuegos whether the
Spanish fleet was or not in that port.

7. The majority of the court, in the opinion rendered, have entirely
ignored the admitted fact that the commander of the Eagle failed to com-
unicate the situation at Cienfuegos to Commodore Schley.

8. The majority of the court, in the opinion rendered, have entirely
ignored the uncontradicted evidence in the case that Captain Robley D.
Evans, knowing the meaning of the signal lights on shore at Cienfuegos,
failed to communicate his information concerning them to Commodore
Schley.

9. The majority of the court, in the report of Facts submitted, declare
that the signal lights on shore near Cienfuegos were seen by Commodore
Schley on the night of May 22, 1898, when, in fact, the overwhelming
weight of both oral and documentary evidence proved that Commodore
Schley saw and had knowledge of these lights only on the night of May 23d
and at no other time.
10. The majority of the court, in the opinion rendered, are silent on the subject of the following charges preferred by the judge advocate against Commodore Schley during the progress of the investigation, namely, that he did not mask his movements in departing from in front of the port of Cienfuegos, but by using Ardois signals he revealed the destination of his squadron to the enemy on shore, despite the fact that by overwhelming weight of testimony this charge was entirely disproved.

11. The majority of the court have based their opinion in reference to the retrograde movement upon a statement made in their report of facts that Commodore Schley, before sailing from Cienfuegos, received reliable information that ships could be coaled in the vicinity of Cape Cruz and Gonaíves Channel, and it is now respectfully denied that there was any such positive testimony in this case; every witness, with one exception, who was examined on the subject disavowed all knowledge in reference thereto, and the uncontradicted testimony of Captain F. A. Cook establishes the fact that the official charts with which the flagship Brooklyn was supplied, and upon which Commodore Schley was compelled to rely for information, showed coaling at Cape Cruz to be neither feasible nor practicable, and the records clearly show that not until the 27th of May, three days after leaving Cienfuegos, when Captain Charles S. Cotton visited the flagship Brooklyn, did Commodore Schley receive any definite information concerning the feasibility or practicability of coaling his ships from a collier in Gonaíves Channel; all of which facts have been wholly ignored by the majority of the court in formulating their said report of Facts.

12. The majority of the court, in stating in its report of Facts that Commodore Schley received no positive information from the scout ships as to the presence of the enemy's fleet in the harbor of Santiago, utterly ignore the overwhelming testimony in proof of the fact that Captain C. D. Sigsbee did actually report to Commodore Schley and to others that the Spanish fleet was not in the harbor of Santiago.

13. The opinion of the majority of the court and the report of Facts are entirely silent on the subject of the proved and admitted failure of Captains Wise and Jewell to communicate the information they had received in reference to the presence of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Santiago to Commodore Schley.

14. That the report of Facts submitted by the court states that the conditions of wind, sea and weather, from noon on May 26th to June 1st, were favorable for taking coal from a collier at sea off Santiago, when this statement has been directly controverted by the evidence of the witnesses for the Government.

15. The tables prepared by Government experts and admitted in evidence before the court, showing the coal supply of the vessels of the Flying Squadron, with reference to their chasing capacity, proceeding at full speed, with forced draught, have not even been adverted to in the report of Facts.

16. There has not been the slightest reference made by the majority of the court to the orders of the Honorable Secretary of the Navy, offered and
proved in evidence, forbidding the hazarding of American ships against shore batteries, and the court has decided against the applicant upon the seventh specification of the precept without, in the slightest degree, referring to this important evidence.

17. The majority of the court have entirely failed to give any opinion as to the character of the blockade of Santiago, although the same was included in the eighth specification of the precept, and by specific direction the court was obligated to give an opinion thereupon.

18. The majority opinion of the court that Commodore Schley should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the entrance of Santiago harbor on May 29th and 30th, and that he did not do his utmost with the force under his command to capture or destroy the Colon and other vessels of the enemy on May 31st, is wholly at variance with the order under which Commodore Schley was acting before Santiago, said orders, as is attested by No. 8, dated May 21, 1898, and sent by Admiral Sampson to Commodore Schley, restricting his operation to the establishment and maintenance of a blockade of the port of Santiago, if the enemy should be found therein; and also said opinion is utterly and absolutely at variance with the overwhelming weight of testimony which clearly established the fact that the affair of May 31st was predetermined upon and executed as a reconnoissance and not as a formal attack upon the Spanish vessels, nor upon the land batteries at the entrance to the harbor of Santiago.

19. The majority opinion of the court is ambiguous and indeterminate in that the court holds the turn of the Brooklyn to starboard was made to avoid getting her into dangerous proximity to the Spanish vessels, without stating whether evasion of such dangerous proximity was due to the personal fears of Commodore Schley or to a desire on his part to preserve the ship intact, and ready for further work in the effort to win a victory from the enemy.

20. The majority of the court have entirely ignored the overwhelming testimony submitted in the case in arriving at the opinion that Commodore Schley erred in commencing the engagement on July 3d with the port battery, the evidence in the case clearly establishing the fact that in the execution of the standing order to "close in and attack in harbor entrance," it was impossible for the Brooklyn, without turning away from the enemy, to open the engagement except with her port battery; and the evidence also clearly establishes the fact that the turning of the Brooklyn in the manner and direction in which she did turn did not cause her to lose either distance or position with the Spanish vessels, the contrary opinion of the court upon this subject being arrived at only by disregarding all the evidence offered in behalf of Commodore Schley.

21. The majority opinion of the court is ambiguous and indeterminate in that, while stating that the Brooklyn's turning caused the Texas to stop and "to back her engines to avoid possible collision," said opinion does not state whether the danger of such collision, as comprehended by the ninth specification of the precept, was real or imaginary, whereas the over-
whelming weight of testimony clearly established the fact that at no time was there danger of collision between the Brooklyn and the Texas.

22. The testimony of Captain F. A. Cook, a witness called by the judge advocate, in reference to the proximity of the Brooklyn to the Texas at the time of the Brooklyn's turning, has been ignored and not even adverted to in the statement of pertinent facts.

23. The majority of the court have assumed that the testimony of Lieutenant-Commander A. C. Hodgson, notwithstanding its repeated contradiction, in reference to the alleged conversation regarding the proximity of the Texas at the time of the Brooklyn's turning, is true, and have entirely ignored the testimony of Commodore Schley and Captain F. A. Cook to the contrary, without even referring to it in their statement of pertinent facts.

24. The majority opinion of the court that Commodore Schley's conduct in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign, prior to June 1, 1898; was characterized by "vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise," is in no wise justified by the evidence submitted in the case, and could only have been arrived at by the action of the court in wholly ignoring all of the evidence of Commodore Schley, all of the evidence of witnesses summoned in his behalf, and all that portion of the evidence of witnesses called by the judge advocate, which was favorable to the said Commodore Schley.

25. The majority opinion of the court is inconclusive in that it is entirely silent upon a charge preferred by the judge advocate during the course of the public investigation and claimed by him to come within the purview of the first specification, to wit: That the said Commodore Schley was derelict in the discharge of his duty, unmindful of the regulations for the government of the navy of the United States, in that he did not prescribe and promulgate anticipatory orders of battle.

26. The majority of the court have entirely failed to determine as to who was in command of the American naval forces engaged in the battle of Santiago, the finding of which fact was absolutely necessary in order to determine properly the first specification of the precept as to the conduct of Commodore Schley in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign.

27. The majority of the court have rejected the whole of the testimony offered on behalf of the applicant, and have not adverted to such testimony, and have entirely ignored the testimony of the applicant himself, who was on the stand for many hours and subjected to the most searching examination, and by so doing they have perverted the ends of justice. That if this testimony was all false they should have so announced, and if all or any part of it was true the said applicant was entitled to the benefit of it and by declining to consider or pass upon it they have deprived him of his common-law and constitutional rights.

28. That the majority of the court have found the applicant guilty upon specifications which were substantially abandoned by the judge advocate, as will appear in the argument in the case.
29. That the whole proceedings show that the majority of the court, in the opinion and report of Facts rendered, have selected the testimony of a few hostile witnesses, and upon their testimony have based the said opinion and report of Facts, discarding all the other testimony in the case, without making the slightest reference to it, as they were directed by the precedent to do.

30. The applicant, besides the reasons herein given, hopes to be able during the further investigation of this inquiry to adduce other serious and important reasons why the majority opinion of the court should not be approved.

31. The applicant is prepared to show that the whole proceedings upon the part of the majority of the court have been entirely irregular; that his rights have been prejudiced and ignored; that his testimony in many more particulars than have been herein cited has not been considered, and that the evidence is absolutely insufficient to sustain the opinion which has been rendered by the majority of the court; that a grave injustice has been committed which would become irreparable and be perpetuated unless this opinion of the majority of the court should be disapproved.

Wherefore, the said applicant most respectfully prays that approval of the opinion of the majority of said court of inquiry be withheld and that said opinion be disapproved, and that he may be afforded the opportunity to have the testimony of his record of himself and his witnesses properly considered and passed upon, and that the said proceedings be remitted to the court for that purpose, and that he be given such other and further relief as he is entitled to in the premises.

W. S. SCHLEY, Rear Admiral U. S. N. (retired).
ISIDOR RAYNER, Counsel for the Applicant.

ANSWER OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE.

This bill of exceptions was sent to the office of the judge advocate, and on December 20th the following answer was made:—

December 20, 1901.

Sir: A communication dated the 18th inst., signed by Rear-Admiral W. S. Schley and by Isidor Rayner and James Parker, his counsel, objecting to the approval of the findings of the court of inquiry in the case of Rear-Admiral Schley and asking particularly that what the signers are pleased to term "the opinion of the majority of the court" be remitted to the court for further consideration, has been received by the department's reference and is returned with the following statement:—

It is somewhat difficult to deal with this paper on account of its general and non-specific character and sweeping, though unsupported, assertion of opinion by the applicant and his counsel, that in their judgment the adverse finding of the court is not justified by the evidence. The paper might be discussed as simply a not unexpected expression of dissatisfaction with an adverse judgment, but for the fact that it contains a number of...
misstatements, and, particularly, has woven throughout its entire structure an "inaccurate and misleading" use of the words "majority of the court."

The findings of Fact and the opinion of the court of inquiry in the case of Admiral Schley upon the more important and material points before it were not reached by a majority of the members only, but by the entire court. The points of the precept upon which all the members of the court unite, appear to be incontrovertibly established by the evidence; it is not understood how any other conclusions could have been reached upon them, and they constitute the essential features of the entire matter under inquiry. The evidence adduced before the court conclusively shows:—

Under the fourth clause of the precept: That on the 26th of May, 1898, when within a few miles of Santiago, to which point he was under orders to proceed with the utmost dispatch, and where he was advised that the enemy's fleet was reported to be, and where in fact it actually was, Commodore Schley turned about with the fleet under his command, consisting of some of the best vessels of the American navy, and headed for a home port more than seven hundred miles distant, without sufficient reason or excuse for such action, taking with him at the same time the scouting vessels the department had sent there to watch the entrance, and leaving the port of Santiago, with the enemy's fleet inside, unguarded. Upon this point the court says in its opinion: "He should not have made the retrograde turn westward with his squadron." In the face of the facts the court could not have found otherwise.

Under the fifth clause of the precept: That while thus abandoning the field of action with his fleet, Commodore Schley was overtaken by a dispatch vessel bearing an urgent order, dated May 25th, from the department, in substance directing him to proceed to Santiago, ascertain facts, report, and not suffer the enemy to escape; that, nevertheless, he continued to retreat with his squadron, telegraphing to the Secretary of the Navy, "It is to be regretted that the department's orders can not be obeyed." The court found that he "should have promptly obeyed the Navy Department's orders of May 25th." Disobedience of an important order in time of war having been thus virtually confessed, no other finding by the court was possible.

Under the sixth clause of the precept: Commodore Schley's explanation of the retrograde movement and of his disobedience of orders as made at the time in a full telegram to the department on the subject was, in substance, shortage of coal and inability to coal the ships of his squadron from the collier. Evidence developed before the court shows that the squadron was at the time well equipped with coal and that coal had been and could be readily taken from the collier. There was nothing for the court to find but to find as it did, that Commodore Schley's official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling facilities of the Flying Squadron were "inaccurate and misleading." An attempt to justify by inaccurate and misleading official reports the turning homeward of a powerful squadron at a critical period of war, in disobedience of orders, is a very serious matter.
Under the seventh clause of the precept: The evidence adduced before the court shows that during the whole of the 29th and 30th of May the Cristóbal Colon and other vessels of the Spanish squadron lay in the entrance to Santiago harbor, the Colon moored in plain sight, broadside to the entrance; that this harbor was defended by weak batteries, and that there was nothing to prevent the Flying Squadron from destroying the Colon and perhaps other of the enemy's vessels as they lay at anchor; that no effort whatever was made to do so on the 29th or on the 30th of May, and that the attempt made on the 31st was brief and abortive. It is complained in paragraph 16 of the paper above mentioned that certain cautionary orders issued by the department were not "in the slightest degree" referred to by the court. These cautionary orders were introduced in evidence and fully discussed in argument. We contended that, quite obviously, they had no application to the conditions existing at Santiago on the 29th, 30th and 31st of May, and the finding of the court that Commodore Schley "should have endeavored to capture or destroy the Spanish vessels at or near the entrance of Santiago harbor on May 29th and 30th," and that "he did not do his utmost with the force under his command to capture or destroy the Colon and other vessels of the enemy which he attacked on May 31st," show that the court reached such conclusion.

It may very properly be added that the claim of the applicant and counsel that the affair of May 31st was intended merely as a reconnaissance is not borne out by the evidence, for while testimony was introduced to show that it was so designated by Commodore Schley in conversation with a naval cadet and with a newspaper correspondent prior to entering upon it, none of the commanding officers of the vessels engaged was so advised, and no instructions were given relative to the taking of notes of the engagement. The commanding officers were, on the contrary, informed in effect that the purpose was to destroy the Colon, and the officers in charge of the turrets of the Massachusetts were instructed accordingly by the commodore in person.

Under the ninth clause of the precept the evidence adduced before the court, from the bridge and from the engine room, showing that the Texas was stopped and backed "to avoid possible collision" with the Brooklyn, is indisputable. That danger and delay to the Texas and loss of distance and position by the Brooklyn were the immediate results of the loop executed by the latter vessel is too clearly shown to admit of doubt; and the finding of the court upon the point is fully sustained by the evidence.

Under the tenth clause of the precept it was established by the introduction before the court of original letters themselves that Rear-Admiral Schley obtained from Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson, a junior officer who had served under him, a categorical statement that a certain "colloquy," reported in the public press to have taken place on the bridge of the Brooklyn, July 3d, between himself and Commodore Schley, "never occurred," although Mr. Hodgson had assured the admiral that the facts as published were "substantially correct," that the admiral gave out for publication the categorical denial thus obtained, but did not publish an ac-
companying explanatory and qualifying letter; and that, subsequently, although repeatedly appealed to by Mr. Hodgson, Admiral Schley failed to do justice in the matter.

All members of the court agree in finding that Admiral Schley "did injustice to Lieutenant-Commander A. C. Hodgson in publishing only a portion of the correspondence which passed between them." The mere perusal of the correspondence in this case is sufficient to show the correctness of this finding, and to convince any impartial reader that it could not be and ought not to be modified.

Upon the points above set forth, which appear to embrace substantially the important matters covered by the inquiry, the court is united, and its findings are unanimous; they are sustained by the unimpeached and unimpeachable testimony of Commodore Schley's brother officers, who served with and under him, by official telegrains, letters and reports, and by the logs of the several vessels of his squadron, and it would accordingly be idle to remit these matters to the same body for reconsideration upon the same evidence.

It is not by any means intended here to say that the foregoing principal points covered by the inquiry are the only points upon which the findings of the court are in all respects or substantially unanimous; because the truth is that the court is a unit upon all material points, with respect to which the admiral expresses individual, but not in all cases contradictory, views. It does not appear that any good purpose would be served by asking the court to reconsider these.

Aside from the "inaccurate and misleading" use of the term "the majority of the court," the next prominent feature of the paper before us is the broad and sweeping fashion in which the applicant and his counsel declare that the court has "ignored" or "not considered" evidence. A sample sentence is the following from paragraph 27, although the paper is largely made up of such remarkable statements:

"The majority of the court have rejected the whole of the testimony offered on behalf of the applicant, and have not adverted to such testimony, and have entirely ignored the testimony of the applicant himself."

The court adjourned on the 7th of November last. Since that date its members have been, with rare exceptions, in daily session, morning and afternoon, examining the evidence before them. It was their sworn duty to consider and weigh that evidence, and the applicant and his counsel have no right to say that they have disregarded it.

But it is particularly urged in paragraphs 24 to 27, and elsewhere in the objection, that the testimony of the applicant himself has been ignored. This is merely stated, not shown. We contend that the testimony of the applicant alone, upon direct and cross-examination, establishes the important facts generally of "dilatoriness, vacillation and want of energy" at Cienfuegos, and throughout the entire campaign from Key West to Santiago; the particulars of the retrograde movements; the disobedience of orders; of the inaccurate and misleading official reports; neglect and failure to destroy the Colon; injustice to Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson;
and some minor matters. The facts of these points were all substantially confirmed by the applicant's own testimony; so that, far from ignoring such testimony, the court may have based its most important findings thereupon.

But the court has a perfect right, after weighing it, to ignore any testimony. Neither the applicant, his counsel, nor the judge advocate is to say what testimony it shall accept and what it shall reject. These matters may be argued, but their final determination is the province of the court.

It happened in the present inquiry that the applicant, while on the stand, contradicted in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, testimony given by a majority of the witnesses. By way of particular illustration, Commodore Schley gave testimony at variance with that of the following witnesses: Rear-Admirals Cotton, Evans and Taylor, Captains Sigsbee, McCalla, Cook, Folger and Chadwick, Commanders Rodgers, Wainwright, Schroeder and Heilner, Lieutenant-Commanders Hodgson, Southerland, Sharp, Marsh and Wood, Major Wood, U. S. M. C.; Lieutenants Hood, Roys and others. In most cases these witnesses swore affirmatively to incidents of which Commodore Schley had no recollection. Where the matters thus in dispute were of importance—and they generally were—it was not only the right, but the duty of the court to accept the one and reject the other, and to report in harmony with such decision. Every court must do this when occasion arises, and such action constitutes no ground for remanding the case for reconsideration.

Some of the minor misstatements of fact above referred to as appearing in the paper under consideration are the statement in paragraph 1 that there was no "specification" covering the voyage from Key West to Cienfuegos, when this point is in fact covered by the first, and in part by the second clause of the precept; the complaint in paragraph 2 of the paper, that there was no place mentioned in the McCalla memorandum at which a camp of insurgents was located, when the fact is that the court does not say that there was such a place, but correctly paraphrases the memorandum; the statement that the McCalla memorandum was sent to Commodore Schley only for use in connection with the matter of batteries at Cienfuegos; and the statements in paragraph 4 and elsewhere that the judge advocate had substantially made certain admissions, whereas the fact is that the judge advocate made no admissions respecting matters under inquiry, excepting the feature under the first part of clause eight of the precept that the Flying Squadron did not withdraw at night from the entrance to Santiago to a distance at sea, and that no personal cowardice on the part of applicant has been established.

Paragraph 26 of the paper under consideration reads:—

"The majority of the court have entirely failed to determine as to who was in command of the American naval forces engaged in the battle of Santiago, the finding of which fact was absolutely necessary in order to determine properly the first specification of the precept as to the conduct of Commodore Schley in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign."
If it is true that a finding by the court upon this question was absolutely necessary in order to determine properly the first specification of the precept, then it must be stated that counsel for the applicant failed of their duty during the inquiry. Several times in the course of the proceedings they brought this question into court and took it out again, without giving the court opportunity to rule upon it; once even withdrawing it so hastily as to interrupt the president of the court in a sentence that promised to be an adverse ruling. If they seriously believed, as they now state to be the case, that the matter of command on July 3d was essential to the applicant's interest, it was their plain duty not only to bring the matter before the court, but to insist upon a hearing there, and others interested should have been heard. To request that the court now rule upon it is to ask that another officer's interests be passed upon, to his possible prejudice, in his absence and without a hearing—a thing intolerable, whosoever may be concerned.

In conclusion, we are satisfied that no good purpose would be served by remitting the proceedings or any of the features of this inquiry to the court. A more patient, exhaustive and painstaking hearing was never given; greater consideration was never extended to any officer before a military court of inquiry. No expense was spared, no convenience or facility denied, no courtesy refused. The applicant has had his day in court, and the judgment is against him. It is accordingly recommended that the proceedings be not returned, but that the matter be concluded by the department's approval of the unanimous findings of the court.

We have the honor to be,

Samuel C. Lemly,
Judge Advocate, Court of Inquiry.

E. P. Hanna,
Assistant to Judge Advocate.

To the Secretary of the Navy.

On December 21st the counsel for Rear-Admiral Sampson filed the following protest against the individual opinion of Admiral Dewey that Commodore Schley was in supreme command at the battle of July 3d:

To the Honorable Secretary of the Navy:

Sir: As counsel for Rear-Admiral Sampson, we have the honor to request that the department, for the reasons below stated, strike out or specifically disapprove that portion of Admiral Dewey's opinion filed in connection with the proceedings of the Schley court of inquiry in which he states his views to be that Commodore Schley was in absolute command at the naval battle of Santiago:

1. Commodore Schley was not in command at the battle.

II. The President of the United States and the Navy Department had decided that Admiral Sampson was in command at that battle and Commodore Schley second in command.
III. The question as to who commanded at Santiago was not referred to the court for consideration, and evidence bearing on the point was excluded.

I. Commodore Schley was not in command at that battle:—

(a) The disposition of the forces at the beginning of the battle, according to Commodore Schley's own statement, placed Admiral Sampson in command. The Brooklyn and the Vixen were the westernmost ships of the fleet; the Indiana and Gloucester were the easternmost. The New York was nearer both of the latter than was the Brooklyn, and notably at the time when the Indiana was heavily engaged at the beginning of the action and when the Gloucester was engaged with the Furor and Pluton. Commodore Schley says, "The Indiana and the Gloucester . . . were closer to your flagship than to the Brooklyn." We have, then, the case of a fleet in a regular formation, with the commander in chief within signal distance and closer to a larger number of ships than is the second in command. It is true that the commander in chief could not have reached the most distant vessels by signals, excepting by causing them to be repeated by an intermediate vessel—an entirely usual course—but it is equally true that the second in command could not have reached the remote vessels of the fleet (namely, the Indiana and the Gloucester) without likewise repeating signals. In this state of affairs the regulations of the navy and the customs of the sea place the absolute command and the full responsibility on the senior officer.

(b) The Brooklyn's maneuver during the action destroys any claim that Commodore Schley might have had to the command. The facts as to the loop are found by the court. The finding and opinions show that to avoid danger to his own ship he maneuvered without warning to the rest of the squadron, and in disregard of the fleet formation.

II. The President of the United States and the Navy Department had decided that Admiral Sampson was in command at that battle and Commodore Schley second in command.

This fact was before the court, for the secretary's letter to the Senate (dated February 6, 1899) states that the Spanish squadron was destroyed "by our fleet under his (Sampson's) command," and "the advancement of Commodore Schley was proposed in recognition of his services as next in rank at the victory of Santiago."

III. The question as to who commanded at Santiago was not referred to the court for consideration. Evidence bearing on the point was excluded:—

(a) If Commodore Schley was in command, Admiral Sampson was not, and if the question as to which was in command was to be considered by the court, surely Admiral Sampson became an interested party and under the precept was entitled to the hearing which was repeatedly refused him.

(b) The language of the precept excludes the question as to who commanded at that battle. It directs the court to inquire into the conduct of Admiral Schley—not into his status or as to whether or not he was in com-
mand, and to report its conclusions upon his "conduct in connection with the events of the Santiago campaign."

(c) The judicial officers of the court maintained that this matter was outside the scope of the inquiry. They expressed willingness to go into it if their views should be overruled, but were in every instance sustained by the court. Thus, at page 157, the assistant to the judge advocate said: "One further word as to a suggestion just made, as to the intention to show that Admiral Sampson was not in this battle. I wish to say that we don't understand that the question whether Admiral Sampson was or was not in the battle of Santiago is before the court. If it is, we shall be happy to investigate it. . . . Until the case takes that attitude it is improper to spread upon the record arguments and questions which proceed upon the theory that he is in the case." Counsel for the applicant withdrew the question.

At page 490 of the record, the same matter being under discussion, Mr. Hanna said: "If it is the desire of the court to go into these things, it would, of course, be proper that we should also go into them. It would not only be proper, but it would be necessary. . . . We are thoroughly prepared to go into any discussion of them, provided the court desires to so enlarge and extend the scope of this inquiry." Counsel for the applicant again failed to press the point and the court made no objection to Mr. Hanna's view.

At pages 153 and 1080 there were similar rulings by the judge advocate. In the case of all these declarations there was acquiescence on the part of the court.

(d) The court uniformly rejected evidence as to who commanded. On all the pages herein cited from the record, the court rejected such evidence, and nowhere was it admitted against objection.

(e) The court more than once specifically ruled that this question was not before it. For example, at page 1586, where the question was as to the position of the commander in chief and of the New York and as to the part they took in the battle, Admiral Dewey said: "We do not want that. We have ruled that out." The judge advocate then asked if the court had so ruled, and Admiral Dewey replied: "We have. We have kept the New York out of it." See also page 481.

(f) The court went so far as to rule at page 1421 that Admiral Schley was not in command during the battle. The matter then before the court related to the periods during which Admiral Schley had been in absolute command, and the judge advocate said: "Mr. Rayner, you are confining yourself to July 3d, are you?" Mr. Rayner in reply acquiesced in this view, and the court ruled that "all questions . . . shall be confined to between the 19th of May and the 1st of June, relating to the organization, management and control of that squadron when he was actually commander in chief." Matters relating to his alleged command on July 3d were excluded. On page 1433 the court confirms this decision.

(g) All proposed questions on this subject were either rejected by the court or withdrawn by the applicant, who finally acquiesced in the deci-
sions of the court and gave up his efforts in this behalf, saying: "I bow respectfully to the decision of the court and I know exactly what it means." Instances of the withdrawal of such questions and their rejections by the court will be found in the record on pages 138, 157, 484, 485, and 1080.

(h) The minority opinion expressed by Admiral Dewey in this matter is at variance with all the rulings of the court in this regard and directly contradicts the letters wherein Admiral Dewey, for the court, defines Admiral Sampson's status.

The Navy Department in its precept had justly provided that any person "interested" might be given an opportunity of appearing before the court in person or by counsel and protecting his rights.

As counsel for the applicant ignored at times the court's rulings and spread upon the record arguments reflecting upon Admiral Sampson, we, as his counsel, three separate times appealed to the court asking for protection or for permission to appear and defend Admiral Sampson's rights. Each time our request was denied and we were assured that Admiral Sampson was not involved, and finally Admiral Dewey, acknowledging the receipt of one of our letters, in which we had appealed to him on the ground of this very question as to who commanded at Santiago, said:

"I have to state that while the precept convening this court gives it authority to permit any person whom it may regard as concerned in the investigation to be present, . . . the court considers that Admiral Sampson is not an interested party; . . . and you are further informed that if circumstances arise which in the opinion of the court render it necessary for Admiral Sampson to be represented, due notice will be sent him."

Upon that promise Admiral Sampson relied. The notice came only in the form of a minority opinion by Admiral Dewey discussing matters beyond the scope of the precept and now here included in the Facts found by the court.

Very respectfully,

STAYTON & CAMPBELL,
E. S. THEALL,
Counsel for Rear-Admiral W. T. Sampson.

BROAD STREET, NEW YORK, December 19, 1901.

Secretary Long replied that the question of command having been ruled out by the court of inquiry, further action in the premises was unnecessary.

On December 20, 1901, Secretary Long approved the findings of the court (by which act the individual opinion of Admiral Dewey was officially eliminated) in the following document:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON,
December 20, 1901.

The department has read the testimony in this case, the arguments of counsel at the trial, the court's findings of Fact, opinion and recommendation, the individual memorandum of the presiding member, the statement of exceptions to the said findings and opinion by the applicant, the reply to said statement by the judge advocate of the court and his assistant, and
the brief this day submitted by counsel for Rear-Admiral Sampson traversing the presiding member’s view as to who was in command at the battle of Santiago.

And, after careful consideration, the findings of Fact and the opinion of the full court are approved.

As to the points on which the presiding member differs from the opinion of the majority of the court, the opinion of the majority is approved.

As to the further expression of his views by the same member with regard to the questions of command on the morning of July 3, 1898, and of the title to credit for the ensuing victory, the conduct of the court in making no finding and rendering no opinion on those questions is approved—indeed, it could with propriety take no other course, evidence on those questions, during the inquiry, having been excluded by the court.

The department approves the recommendation of the court that no further proceedings be had in the premises.

The department records its appreciation of the arduous labors of the whole court.

John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy.

SCHLEY’S APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT.

On January 22, 1902, Rear-Admiral Schley, through his lawyers, appealed to President Roosevelt—not from the points on which the court of inquiry was unanimous in its opinions—to secure Executive approval of the individual opinion expressed by Admiral Dewey. Eighty-eight pages of this appeal are devoted to the question of command at Santiago, and only sixteen to the minor points in Dewey’s individual opinion. In the petition proper Rear-Admiral Schley bases his appeal for relief on three grounds:

I. He contends that the Secretary of the Navy was not justified in holding, and was vested with authority to hold, that the court of inquiry could not with propriety have passed upon the question of command in the battle of July 3d; and that Secretary Long was in error in stating that evidence concerning the question of command, upon which Admiral Dewey submitted an opinion, was excluded by the court during the inquiry. It is also contended that Rear-Admirals Benham and Ramsay “failed in the discharge of the most important duty devolving upon them under the precept, in that they did not report their opinion upon the said question.”

II. Rear-Admiral Schley argues that the “concurring members” of the court failed of their duty in not reporting their opinion as to whether or not a close blockade of Santiago harbor was established.

III. The third ground deals with the passage of the Flying Squadron from Key West to Cienfuegos, the blockade of the latter port, the attempt to ascertain if Cervera’s ships were in that port, and the passage of that squadron to a point about twenty-two miles south of Santiago harbor.
In support of the first point, which involves the main object of the appeal, Rear-Admiral Schley's counsel maintains:

(a) The court of inquiry did actually entertain and consider the question of commandership in the naval battle of July 3, 1898.

(b) That Schley was actually in command in this battle, a statement of excerpts being cited in support of this, including the testimony of Mr. Dieuailde, a newspaper correspondent aboard the Texas, who wrote a report of the battle, over which a "copy-reader" placed the caption "The victory was Schley's."

(c) That the official reports of the battle, made by commanders of vessels, were admitted in evidence and that some of these were wholly silent as to the participancy in the battle of any officer senior to Schley.

(d) That, on the morning of July 3d, Sampson left the blockading line and sent up the signal: "Disregard movements of commander in chief," and that this signal was formal, notice that Sampson was about to absent himself from his command.

(e) That, at the opening of the battle, Sampson was too far away to communicate with the other ships, except one.

(f) That Sampson, being under orders of the Navy Department to go to Siboney, could not resume command of the fleet until he had complied with those orders.

This question of commandership, as will be seen by referring to Judge-Advocate Lemly's answer to Rear-Admiral Schley's Bill of Exceptions (page 491) and to the Messrs. Stayton and Campbell's "protest against the individual opinion of Admiral Dewey" (pages 491–494), was repeatedly ruled out by the court of inquiry. A digest of the Judge Advocate's answer to Schley's appeal, handed to President Roosevelt on January 27, 1902, is given herewith.

LEMLY'S REPLY.

After showing that "questions affecting Rear-Admiral Sampson's interests were brought before the court by counsel for the applicant [Schley] as many as seven times and each time ruled out by the court or withdrawn before an opportunity to rule upon them was given," the Judge Advocate goes into the question of commandership in detail.

1. Rear-Admiral Schley claimed, in the court of inquiry, that Sampson's plan of intercepting the Spanish ships, when they came out, failed. This plan was: "If the enemy tries to escape, the [American] ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore." When Cervera's vessels appeared, all the large American war ships closed up excepting the Brooklyn, which ship, though displaying Sampson's prearranged signal "Close up," did not close up, but turned seaward—away from the advancing foe—and interfering with the Texas, compelled that ship to back her engines and lose valuable time and
distance at the critical period of the battle. The *Brooklyn* guarded the westermost point of the blockade, and this point being deserted by the *Brooklyn* (by her turn seaward), the enemy was enabled to escape through the gap thus made.

II. Nobody has ever disputed Grant's title to the victory at Appomattox, though then lying sick some miles from the place of surrender—so far that it was feared he could not be reached within the period of armistice. Though Howard was senior officer present at the capture of Savannah and Sherman absent on one of Admiral Dahlgren's gunboats, nobody has questioned Sherman's famous report to Lincoln: "I beg to present you, as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah."

III. Rear-Admiral Sampson was present and actively engaged in this battle. He gave orders to the vessels of the American fleet, notably sending the *Indiana* back to guard the entrance of the harbor and to prevent any of the Spanish gunboats (known to be there) from escaping.

IV. In a dispatch to the Secretary of the Navy dated July 10, 1898 (seven days after the battle), Schley says: "Victory was secured by the force under the command of Commander in Chief, North Atlantic station [Sampson], and to him the honor is due."

V. Commodore Schley did not exercise command on that day [July 3, 1898] over any ship except, to some extent, his own flagship, the *Brooklyn*.

VI. Commodore Schley did not have anything to do with the disposition of the forces of the American squadron made before the fight began, or with the standing battle orders issued. It has never anywhere been claimed that he is entitled to credit for that.

VII. No orders, except these two signals [Clear for action, at 9.30 a.m.; and Close up, at 9.45 a.m.], were given by Commodore Schley to the fleet from 9.35 a.m., when the enemy's ships were discovered escaping, until after 1.15 p.m., when the Cristóbal Colon "fired a lee gun and hauled down her flag," and the battle was over.

VIII. Efforts were made by Rear-Admiral Schley's attorneys in the course of the inquiry to show that unrecorded orders were signaled from the *Brooklyn* to the fleet. ... It was subsequently shown that the supposed signals were not actually made.

IX. If Commodore Schley was in "absolute command" during the battle of Santiago, and if he made any use of his authority, he must have exercised some control over some of the vessels participating. ... The following American ships were very actively and effectively engaged in the battle of Santiago: Gloucester, Indiana, Iowa, Texas, Oregon and *Brooklyn*. ... The plain truth is that Admiral Schley did not, during the battle, in any way direct or control the splendid performances of the *Gloucester* and the three battle ships *Indiana*, *Iowa* and *Texas*. The officers in command of these ships neither received nor obeyed a solitary order from him [Schley].

X. The contention that the magnificent work of the *Oregon*, or any part of it, was done under orders from the *Brooklyn*, or that the *Oregon* received and obeyed even a single order from Commodore Schley from the time the
Spanish ships were sighted to the time of the surrender of the Cristóbal Colon (which surrender may fairly be taken as the close of the battle), must be abandoned, and with it goes the last peg upon which to hang the pretense of a claim that during the battle of Santiago Commodore Schley effectively exercised any of the functions of a commander in chief.

XI. The weight of the testimony is to the effect that the commodore controlled the movements of his flagship, the Brooklyn, well, with the exception of the loop. But it also shows, not negatively, but affirmatively and beyond question, that he did not control the operations of the fleet in general on that day.

XII. All this is established not by theoretical deduction or expert or inexpert opinion, but by direct, positive, unimpeached and unimpeachable testimony, given under oath by the admiral's "brothers in arms."

XIII. The plain truth of the matter, therefore, developed for the first time under the search light of this inquiry, although quite incidentally, is that so far as the Gloucester, I oca, Indiana, Texas and Oregon are concerned, not the stroke of a propeller blade, not the touch of a helm, not the firing of a shot, was done under the direction or by the orders of Rear-Admiral Schley during this memorable battle.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S ANSWER TO SCHLEY'S APPEAL.

On February 18, 1902, President Roosevelt made the following answer to Rear-Admiral Schley's appeal:—

I have received the appeal of Rear-Admiral Schley and the answer thereto from the Navy Department. I have examined both with the utmost care, as well as the preceding appeal to the Secretary of the Navy. I have read through all the testimony taken before the court and the statements of the counsel for Rear-Admirals Sampson and Schley; have examined all the official reports of every kind in reference to the Santiago naval campaign, copies of the log books and signal books, and the testimony before the court of claims, and have also personally had before me the four surviving captains of the five ships, aside from those of the two rear-admirals, which were actively engaged at Santiago.

It appears that the court of inquiry was unanimous in its findings of Fact and unanimous in its expressions of Opinion on most of its findings of Fact. No appeal is made to me from the verdict of the court on these points, where it was unanimous. I have, however, gone carefully over the evidence on these points also. I am satisfied that on the whole the court did substantial justice. It should have specifically condemned the failure to enforce an efficient night blockade at Santiago while Rear-Admiral Schley was in command. On the other hand, I feel that there is a reasonable doubt whether he did not move his squadron with sufficient expedition from port to port. The court is a unit in condemning Rear-Admiral Schley's action on the point where it seems to me he most gravely erred; his "retrograde movement" when he abandoned the blockade, and his disobedience of orders and misstatement of facts in relation thereto. It
should be remembered, however, that the majority of these actions which the court censures occurred five weeks or more before the fight itself; and it certainly seems that if Rear-Admiral Schley's actions were censurable he should not have been left as second in command under Rear-Admiral Sampson. His offenses were in effect condoned when he was not called to account for them. Rear-Admiral Sampson, after the fight, in an official letter to the department alluded for the first time to Rear-Admiral Schley's "reprehensible conduct" six weeks previously. If Rear-Admiral Schley was guilty of reprehensible conduct of a kind which called for such notice from Rear-Admiral Sampson, then Rear-Admiral Sampson ought not to have left him as senior officer of the blockading squadron on the 3d of July, when he [Sampson] steamed away on his proper errand of communication with General Shafter.

AS TO THE COMMAND AT SANTIAGO.

We can therefore, for our present purposes, dismiss consideration of so much of the appeal as relates to anything except the battle. As regards this, the point raised in the appeal is between Rear-Admiral Sampson and Rear-Admiral Schley as to which was in command, and as to which was entitled to the credit, if either of them was really entitled to any unusual and pre-eminent credit by any special exhibition of genius, skill and courage. The court could have considered both of these questions, but as a matter of fact it unanimously excluded evidence offered upon them, and through its president announced its refusal to hear Rear-Admiral Sampson's side at all; and in view of such exclusion the majority of the court acted with entire propriety in not expressing any opinion on these points. The matter has, however, been raised by the president of the court. Moreover, it is the point upon which Rear-Admiral Schley in his appeal lays most stress, and which he especially asks me to consider. I have therefore carefully investigated this matter also, and have informed myself upon it from the best sources of information at my command.

The appeal of Rear-Admiral Schley to me is not, as to this, the chief point he raises, really an appeal from the decision of the court of inquiry. Five sixths of the appeal is devoted to this question of command and credit—that is, to matter which the court of inquiry did not consider. It is in effect an appeal from the action of President McKinley three years ago when he sent in the recommendations for promotion for the various officers connected with the Santiago squadron, basing these recommendations upon his estimate of the credit to which the officers were respectively entitled. What I have to decide, therefore, is whether or not President McKinley did injustice in the matter. This necessarily involves a comparison of the actions of the different commanders engaged. The exhaustive official reports of the action leave little to be brought out anew; but as the question of Rear-Admiral Sampson's right to be considered in chief command which was determined in his favor by President McKinley, and later by the court of claims, has never hitherto been officially raised, I deemed it best to secure statements of the commanders of the five ships
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(other than the Brooklyn and New York, the flagships of the two rear-admirals) which were actively engaged in the fight.

REAR-ADmiral PHILIP’S TESTIMONY.

Rear-Admiral Philip is dead. I quote extracts from his magazine article on the fight, written immediately after it occurred, closing with an extract from his letter to the Secretary of the Navy of February 27, 1899:

It was the blockade that made the battle possible. The battle was a direct consequence of the blockade, and upon the method and effectiveness of the blockade was very largely dependent the issue of the battle. Under the orders of Rear-Admiral Sampson the blockade was conducted with a success exemplified by the result. When the Spanish admiral at last made his dash to escape, we were ready—ready with our men, with our guns and with our engines. It was only a few minutes after we had seen the leader of the advancing squadron that it became apparent that Cervera’s plan was to run his ships in column westward in an effort to escape. Before he had fairly found himself outside the morro the entire blockading squadron—Indiana, Oregon, Iowa, Brooklyn and Texas—was pumping shell into him at such a rate as virtually to decide the issue of the battle in the first few moments. All our ships had closed in simultaneously. Then occurred the incident which caused me for a moment more alarm than anything Cervera did that day. Suddenly a whiff of breeze and a lull in the firing lifted the pall, and there, bearing toward us and across our bows, turning on her port helm, with big waves curling over her bows and great clouds of black smoke pouring from her funnels, was the Brooklyn. She looked as big as half a dozen Great East- erns, and seemed so near that it took our breath away. “Back both engines hard!” went down the tube to the astonished engineers, and in a twinkling the old ship was racing against herself. The collision which seemed imminent, even if it was not, was averted, and as the big cruiser glided past, all of us on the bridge gave a sigh of relief. Had the Brooklyn struck us then it probably would have been the end of the Texas and her half thousand men. At ten minutes to ten [the Spanish ships had appeared at about 9.30] the Iowa, Oregon and Texas were pretty well bunched, holding a parallel course westward with the Spaniards. The Indiana was also coming up, well inside of all the others of our squadron, but a little in the rear, owing to her far eastward position at starting. About a quarter past ten the Maria Teresa, which had been in difficulties from the moment she left the shelter of the morro, turned to seek a beaching place. She was on fire, and we knew that she was no longer a quantity to be reckoned with. Five minutes later, our special enemy, the Almirante Oquendo, also turned inshore. The Viscoya kept blazing away viciously, but the pounding she got from our four ships, more particularly the Oregon, was too much for her, and in half an hour she, too, headed for the beach. I determined to push on with the Texas. It gives me pleasure to be able to write that, old ship as she is and not built for speed, the Texas held her own and even gained on the Cristobal Colon in that chase. Rear-Admiral Sampson was commander in chief before, during and after the action.

CAPTAIN CLARK’S STATEMENT.

The credit for the blockade which led up to the fight is, of course, Rear-Admiral Sampson’s. The position of the ships on the morning of the fight—in a semicircle, head-on to the harbor—in consequence of which we were able to close in at once, was his. In closing in—that is, in-

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making the first movements—we were obeying his instructions; though, as a matter of fact, we would all have closed in any way, instructions or no instructions. When the Spanish ships came out of the harbor the navigator of my ship saw the New York to the eastward, but I received no signal of any kind from the New York during the action, nor was she near enough to signal directly to me until after the Cristóbal Colon surrendered.

The engagement may be said to have been divided into three parts: First, the fight proper, while the Spanish squadron was coming out of the harbor and until it was clear of the Diamond Shoals and definitely headed westward; second, the running fight with the already damaged vessels as they fled westward, until the María Teresa, Almirante Oquendo and Vizcaya ran ashore; and, third, the chase of the Cristóbal Colon, during which there was practically no fighting. During the first stage I did not see the Brooklyn or receive any signals from her. At the close of this stage the Oregon had passed the Iowa and Texas, and when we burst out of the smoke I saw the four Spanish ships going west apparently uninjured, and followed hard after, at the same time observing the Brooklyn a little ahead and offshore. She was broadside to the Spanish vessels and was receiving the weight of their fire, and was returning it. The Brooklyn and the Oregon thereafter occupied substantially these positions as regards each other, being about equidistant from the Spanish ships as we successively overtook them, except when the Oregon attempted to close with the Almirante Oquendo. The heaviest fighting was at the harbor mouth and while the enemy was breaking through or passing our line. Not long after the running fight began the María Teresa and then the Almirante Oquendo turned and went ashore, the Vizcaya continuing for some distance farther before she also was beached. Throughout this running fight the Brooklyn and Oregon were both hotly engaged, being ahead of any of our other ships; and we then constituted the western and what I regard as the then fighting division of our fleet. I considered Commodore Schley in responsible command during this running fight and chase, so far as I was concerned, and acknowledged and repeated a signal he had flying, for close action or something of the kind. As, however, the problem was perfectly simple, namely, to pursue the Spanish ships as I had been doing before I saw the Brooklyn, he did not, as a matter of fact, exercise any control over any movement or action of the Oregon, nor did I perform any action of any kind whatever in obedience to any order from the Brooklyn, neither as to my course nor as to my speed, nor as to my gun-fire, during the fight or chase.

The Oregon always had fires under all boilers. In spite of the speed shown by the Oregon in this fight she had not been and is not classed as the fastest ship; but during all her service, in order that no scale should form in them, not one of our boilers was used for condensing, though the resulting discomfort for all hands was an additional hardship for her commanding officer.

REAR-ADmiral EVANS’S STATEMENT.

The following is Rear-Admiral Evans’s statement:—

The credit for the blockade, for the arrangement of the ships at the opening of the fight, and for the first movements forward into the fight, must of course belong to Rear-Admiral Sampson, whose orders we were putting into effect. When the fight began Rear-Admiral Sampson’s ship, the New York, was in plain sight. I saw her turning to overtake us. Throughout the fight I considered myself as under his command, but I received no orders from him until the Vizcaya was aground. Nor did I receive any orders whatever from the Brooklyn, nor should I have needed
them if I had received them, inasmuch as I considered Rear-Admiral Sampson to be present and in command.

The heavy fighting was during the time when the Spanish vessels were coming out of the harbor and before they had stretched fairly to the westward. When they thus stretched to the westward we all went after them without orders—of course we could do nothing else. Until the Maria Teresa and Almirante Oquendo ran ashore the Iowa was close behind the Oregon and ahead of the Texas, and all of us were firing steadily at the Spanish ships. The Texas then recovered her speed—for she was dead in the water after having backed to avoid the Brooklyn when the Brooklyn turned—and she went ahead of the Iowa. Both of us continued to fire at the Vizcaya until she went ashore. Then I stopped, but the Texas followed the Brooklyn and the Oregon after the Cristóbal Colon.

When the battle began the New York was not much farther to the eastward of me than the Brooklyn was to the westward. After the Vizcaya had grounded the New York overtook me and signaled me to return to the mouth of the harbor to prevent any other Spanish ship from coming out and attacking the transports. I received no signals of any kind from the Brooklyn. All we had to do was to close in on the Spanish squadron as it came out of the harbor, in obedience to the orders of Rear-Admiral Sampson, and then, when the heaviest fighting was over and the Spanish ships were trying to escape to the west, to follow them—and of course there was no signal necessary to tell us to follow a fleeing enemy.

The machinery of the Iowa was not in condition to get the best speed, though every effort had been made to make it so. Her cylinder heads had not been off for more than six months, owing to the service she was performing. Her bottom was very foul, as she had not been docked for a period of seventeen months. The Indiana was unavoidably in even worse shape.

The New York had left the blockading line flying the signal "Disregard the movements of the commander in chief," a signal frequently made, and well understood by the entire fleet. It did not transfer the command. No signal was made for the second in command to assume command of the fleet, which was usually done by the commander in chief before reaching the limit of signal distance when he proposed for any reason temporarily to relinquish his command to the next ranking officer.

REAR-ADmiral TAYLOR'S STATEMENT.

The following is Rear-Admiral Taylor's statement:

At the beginning of the fight the New York was about as far to the eastward of me as the Brooklyn was to the westward. The only signal I received from the New York was at the very close of the fight, when she signaled to me to return and guard the mouth of the harbor so that nothing should come out to attack our transports. I received no signal whatever from the Brooklyn, and should not have heeded any if one had been made, as I considered Rear-Admiral Sampson present and in command. From her position the Indiana took full part in the actual fight as the Spanish ships came out of the harbor. When they ran to the westward the Indiana fell behind, but continued firing at them and at the torpedo boats until all but the Cristóbal Colon were sunk or beached. I saw the Brooklyn turn and run out seaward, seemingly over a mile, about the time the rear one of the Spanish ships turned to the west; if, instead of making this loop, the Brooklyn had stood straight in toward the Spaniards, as the other American ships did, it seemed to me that the fight would have been settled then, without need of the long chase.
COMMANDER WAINWRIGHT'S STATEMENT.

The following is Commander Wainwright’s statement:

At the outset of the fight the New York was not much farther away from me in one direction than the Brooklyn was in the other, and was in plain sight. A signal from Rear-Admiral Taylor in connection with my moving forward to attack the torpedo boats was the only signal I received. I made one to the New York just before the last torpedo boat sank. The New York at that time was coming up under the fire of the batteries, and herself fired a couple of shots at the torpedo boat. Of course Rear-Admiral Sampson was present and in command. I received no signals from the Brooklyn, and would not have noticed her at all had it not been for the fact that when the other vessels closed in she made what has been since called “the loop,” so that my attention was attracted by not seeing the Texas because she stopped, and by not seeing the Brooklyn because she went to seaward, away from the Spanish vessels. In other words, the left or westward part of our line was refused, and this attracted my attention, because it seemed to me from where I was that this permitted the Spanish vessels to try to escape to westward.

SHOT THAT STRUCK SPANISH SHIPS.

The survey of the damages of the four Spanish war vessels shows that in addition to several score hits by the 6-pounder and 1-pounder guns of the American fleet, they were struck forty-three times by the larger guns of four inches caliber and over. The Cristóbal Colon, which came out inside the others and did comparatively little fighting, received but three of these hits. The other three ships, which bore the brunt of the action, received forty among them. Of these forty, eleven, according to the report of the board which examined into them, were by 4-inch guns, ten by 5-inch guns, four by either 4- or 5-inch (the board could not determine which), while one was by either a 5- or 6-inch, twelve were by 8-inch, and two by 12-inch guns. All of our big ships except the Texas had 8-inch guns. Only the Texas and Iowa had 13-inch guns. The Oregon and Indiana had 13-inch guns, and they and the Texas had 6-inch guns. The only 4-inch guns were on the Iowa, the only 5-inch guns on the Brooklyn. Therefore, on the three Spanish ships which did the bulk of the fighting, out of the forty large-caliber shots that struck them eleven certainly came from the Iowa, ten certainly came from the Brooklyn, four from either the Iowa or the Brooklyn, and two from either the Iowa or the Texas. Of the three which struck the Cristóbal Colon two were 5-inch and must have come from the Brooklyn; one was either a 5-inch or a 6-inch. It must be remembered that the 4- and 5-inch guns were the only quick firers above 6-pounders in our fleet, and that they were not only much more rapidly but much more surely handled than were the larger and slower-firing guns.

THE IOWA SUFFERED MOST DAMAGE.

The damage and loss of the American vessels were trivial. The only loss suffered was aboard the Brooklyn, where one man was killed and one wounded. In damage, the cost of the repairs shows that the Iowa suffered
most and the *Oregon* least. The American ships engaged possessed a more
than twofold material superiority over the Spanish ships, and the differ-
ence in the handling of their guns and their engines was even greater.
We have just cause to be proud of the vigilance and instant readiness our
ships displayed, and the workmanlike efficiency with which they were
handled. The most striking act was that of the *Gloucester*, a converted
yacht, which her commander, Wainwright, pushed into the fight through
a hail of projectiles, any one of which would have sunk her, in order that
he might do his part in destroying the two torpedo boats, each possessing
far more than his own offensive power.

**BEGINNING OF THE FIGHT.**

From the statements of the captains above, from the official reports,
and from the testimony before the court of inquiry, the fight can be plotted
with absolute certainty in its important outlines, though there is conflict
as to minor points. When the four Spanish cruisers came out of the har-
bor the *New York* had left her position in the blockading line forty or
forty-five minutes before. She had hoisted the signal "Disregard the
movements of the commander in chief," but had not hoisted the signal to
the second in command to take charge, which, as appears by the signal-
book, was sometimes but not always used when the command was trans-
ferred. As soon as the engagement began the *New York* turned and
steamed back, hoisting a signal to close in, which, however, none of the
squadron saw. She was in plain sight, and not very much farther from
the easternmost blockading ships than the latter were from the *Brooklyn*,
which was the westernmost of the line.

**THE BROOKLYN’S LOOP.**

As soon as the Spanish ships appeared the five big American block-
aders started toward them in accordance with the standing orders of Rear-
Admiral Sampson. After this first move each acted purely on his own
initiative. For some minutes the Spanish and American vessels steadily
approached one another, and the fighting was at its hottest. Then the
already damaged Spanish ships turned to the westward, while at the same
time the westernmost American vessel, the *Brooklyn*, which was nearest
the Spanish line, turned to the eastward, making a loop or three-quarter
circle, at the end of which she again headed westward, farther off from
and farther behind the Spanish vessels than before the loop had begun,
but still ahead of any of the American vessels, although farther outside.
The *Texas*, the next ship to the *Brooklyn*, either was or conceived herself
to be put in such jeopardy by the *Brooklyn*’s turn toward her that she
backed her engines, coming almost or quite to a standstill: so that both
the *Oregon* and the *Iowa*, which were originally to the eastward of her,
passed her, and it was some time after she had again started before she
regained her former position relatively to the Spanish vessels. The Span-
ish vessels had straightened out in column for the west, the *Cristóbal Colon*
going inside of the others and gradually forging ahead of them, without suffering much damage. The two torpedo boats, which had followed them out of the harbor, were now destroyed by the fire of the rearmost of the American big vessels and of the Gloucester, which headed straight in for them, paying no more heed to their quick-fire guns than to the heavy artillery of the forts, to which she was also exposed.

THE RUNNING FIGHT.

In the running fight which followed, until the Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo and Vizcaya were destroyed, the Indiana gradually dropped behind, although she continued to fire until the last of the three vessels went ashore. The Brooklyn was ahead of any of the other American vessels on a course outside theirs; she was nearly broadside on to the Spaniards. The Oregon, Iowa and Texas were all close together and actively engaged throughout this running fight. The Brooklyn and Oregon, followed at some distance by the Texas, then continued in chase of the Cristóbal Colon, which went nearly thirty miles farther before she also went ashore. During this chase of the Cristóbal Colon there was practically no fighting.

These are the facts as set forth above in the statements of the captains, and elsewhere in their official reports and testimony. They leave no room for doubt on any important point.

QUESTION OF COMMAND.

The question of command is in this case nominal and technical. Rear-Admiral Sampson’s ship, the New York, was seen at the outset of the fight from all the other ships except the Brooklyn. Four of these five ship captains have testified that they regarded him as present and in command. He signaled “Close in” to the fleet as soon as the first Spanish ship appeared, but his signal was not seen by any American vessel. He was actually under fire from the forts, and himself fired a couple of shots, at the close of the action with the torpedo boats, in addition to signaling the Indiana just at the close of the action. But during the action not a single order from him was received by any of the ships that were actively engaged.

Rear-Admiral Schley at the outset of the action hoisted the two signals of “Clear ship” and “Close in,” which was simply carrying out the standing orders of Rear-Admiral Sampson as to what should be done if the enemy’s ships attempted to break out of the harbor. Until after the close of the first portion of the fight at the mouth of the harbor, and until after he had made his loop and the Spanish ships were fleeing to the westward, not another American ship noticed a signal from him. When the western pursuit had begun, the Oregon, and the Oregon only, noticed and repeated one of his signals of command. The captain of the Oregon then regarded him as in command, but did not in any shape or way execute any move-
ment or any action of any kind whatsoever in accordance with any order from him.

In short, the question as to which of the two men, Rear-Admiral Sampson or Rear-Admiral Schley, was at the time in command is of merely nominal character. Technically Sampson commanded the fleet, and Schley, as usual, the western division. The actual fact, the important fact, is that after the battle was joined not a helm was shifted, not a gun was fired, not a pound of steam was put on in the engine room aboard any ship actively engaged, in obedience to the order of either Sampson or Schley, save on their own two vessels. It was a captain's fight.

Therefore the credit to which each of the two is entitled rests on matters apart from the claim of nominal command over the squadron; for so far as the actual fight was concerned neither one nor the other in fact exercised any command. Sampson was hardly more than technically in the fight. His real claim for credit rests upon his work as commander in chief; upon the excellence of the blockade; upon the preparedness of the squadron; upon the arrangement of the ships head-on in a semicircle around the harbor; and the standing orders in accordance with which they instantly moved to the attack of the Spaniards when the latter appeared. For all these things the credit is his.

**THE BROOKLYN'S LOOP.**

Rear-Admiral Schley is rightly entitled—as is Captain Cook—to the credit of what the *Brooklyn* did in the fight. On the whole she did well; but I agree with the unanimous finding of the three admirals who composed the court of inquiry as to the "loop." It has seriously marred the *Brooklyn's* otherwise excellent record, being in fact the one grave mistake made by any American ship that day. Had the *Brooklyn* turned to the westward, that is, in the same direction that the Spanish ships were going, instead of in the contrary direction, she would undoubtedly have been in more "dangerous proximity" to them. But it would have been more dangerous for them as well as for her! This kind of danger must not be too nicely weighed by those whose trade it is to dare greatly for the honor of the flag. Moreover, the danger was certainly not as great as that which, in the selfsame moment, menaced Wainwright's fragile craft as he drove forward against the foe. It was not, in my judgment, as great as the danger to which the *Texas* was exposed by the turn as actually made. It certainly caused both the *Brooklyn* and the *Texas* materially to lose position compared to the fleeing Spanish vessels. But after the loop had once been taken Rear-Admiral Schley handled the *Brooklyn* manfully and well. She and the *Oregon* were thenceforth the headmost of the American vessels—though the *Iowa* certainly, and seemingly the *Texas* also, did as much in hammering to a standstill the *Vizcaya*, Almirante *Oquendo* and *María Teresa*; while the *Indiana* did all her eastward position and crippled machinery permitted. In the chase of the Cristóbal Colon the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* share the credit between them.
Under such circumstances it seems to me that the recommendations of President McKinley were eminently proper, and that so far as Rear-Admirals Sampson and Schley were concerned, it would have been unjust for him to have made other recommendations. Personally, I feel that in view of Captain Clark’s long voyage in the Oregon and the condition in which he brought her to the scene of service, as well as the way in which he actually managed her before and during the fight, it would have been well to have given him the same advancement that was given Wainwright. But waiving this, it is evident that Wainwright was entitled to receive more than any of the other commanders; and that it was just to Rear-Admiral Sampson that he should receive a greater advance in numbers than Rear-Admiral Schley—there was nothing done in the battle that warranted any unusual reward for either. In short, as regards Rear-Admirals Sampson and Schley, I find that President McKinley did substantial justice, and that there would be no warrant for reversing his action.

Both Rear-Admiral Sampson and Rear-Admiral Schley are now on the retired list. In concluding their report the members of the court of inquiry, Admiral Dewey and Rear-Admirals Benham and Ramsay unite in stating that they recommend that no further action be had in the matter. With this recommendation I most heartily concur. There is no excuse whatever from either side for any further agitation of this unhappy controversy. To keep it alive would merely do damage to the navy and to the country.

Theodore Roosevelt.
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