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FIRST REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Covering our Peacetime Navy and our Wartime Navy and including combat
operations up to 1 March 1944.
by
ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations
(Issued 23 April 1944)
Table of Contents
FIRST REPORT
Page
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL .......................................... 2
INTRODUCTION ................................................... 3
I THE PEACETIME NAVY ......................................... 4
Prior to the War in Europe ................................. 4
As Affected by the War in Europe ........................... 7
II THE WARTIME NAVY ........................................... 12
Fighting Strength .......................................... 12
Personnel .................................................. 20
The Marine Corps ........................................... 26
The Coast Guard ............................................ 27
The Seabees ................................................ 29
The WAVES .................................................. 29
III COMBAT OPERATIONS .......................................... 31
General .................................................... 31
Strategy ................................................... 37
The Pacific Theater ........................................ 39
The Defensive .......................................... 39
The Defensive-Offensive ................................ 47
The Offensive-Defensive ................................ 49
The Offensive .......................................... 70
Supporting Operation ................................... 74
The Atlantic Theater ....................................... 77
The Mediterranean Theater .................................. 82
Landings in North Africa ............................... 82
Landings in Sicily ..................................... 86
Landings in Italy ...................................... 88
IV TEAMWORK ................................................... 89
The Navy Team .............................................. 89
The Army and Navy Team ..................................... 89
The Allied Team ............................................ 90
V CONCLUSION ................................................. 92
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UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
27 March 1944
The Honorable Frank Knox Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
In view of the importance and complexity of our naval operations and the
tremendous expansion of our naval establishment since we entered the:
war, I present to you at this time a report of progress.
It is of interest to note that the date of this report happens to be on
the 150th anniversary of the passage by Congress of a bill providing for
the first major ships of the United States Navy-the 44-gun frigates
CONSTITUTION, UNITED STATES PRESIDENT and CHESAPEAKE and the 36-gun
frigates CONSTELLATION and CONGRESS.
This report includes combat operations up to 1 March 1944. I know of no
reason why it should not be made public.
ERNEST J. KING
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations
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Introduction
FOR more than two years, the United States has been engaged in world-
wide war. Our geographical position, our wealth, resources and
industrial development, combined with an unfaltering will to victory
have established and enhanced our position as one of the dominant powers
among the United Nations. As such we have been closely and deeply
involved with our Allies in all the political, economic and military
problems and undertakings which constitute modern war. Historically, the
conduct of war by allies has rarely been effective or harmonious. The
record of the United Nations in this regard, during the past two years,
has been unprecedented, not only in the extent of its success but in the
smooth working and effective cooperation by which it has been
accomplished. As one of the United Nations, the United States has reason
to be proud of the inter-Allied aspects of its conduct of the war,
during the past two years.
As a national effort, the war has shown the complete dependence of all
military undertakings on the full support of the nation in the fields of
organization, production, finance, and morale. Our military services
have had that support in a full degree.
The Navy has also had full support from the nation with respect to
manpower. Personnel of our regular Navy, who, in time of peace, serve as
a nucleus for expansion in time of war, now represent a small portion of
the total number of officers and men. About ninety per cent of our
commissioned personnel and about eighty per cent of our enlisted
personnel are Naval Reserves, who have successfully adapted themselves
to active service in a comparatively short time. Thanks to their hard
work, their training, and their will to become assets their performance
of duty has been uniformly as excellent as it has been indispensable to
our success.
As to the purely military side of the war, there is one lesson which
stands out above all others. This is that modern warfare can be
effectively conducted only by the close and effective integration of the
three military arms, which make their primary contribution to the
military power of the Nation on the ground, at sea, and from the air.
This report deals primarily with the Navy's part in the war, but it
would be an unwarranted, though an unintended, distortion of
perspective, did not the Navy record here its full appreciation of the
efficient, whole-hearted and gallant support of the Navy's efforts by
the ground, air and service forces of the Army, without which much of
this story of the Navy's accomplishments would never have been written.
During the period of this report, the Navy, like the full military power
of the Nation, has been a team of mutually supporting elements. The
Fleet, the shore establishment, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the
WAVES the Seabees, have all nobly done their parts. Each has earned an
individual "well done"-but hereafter are all included in the term, "The
Navy."
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PRIOR TO THE WAR IN EUROPE
THE fundamental United States naval policy is "To maintain the Navy in
strength and readiness to uphold national policies and interests, and to
guard the United States and its continental and overseas possessions."
In time of peace, when the threats to our national security change with
the strength and attitude of other nations in the world who have a
motive for making war upon us and who are-or think they are-strong
enough to do so, it is frequently difficult to evaluate those threats
and translate our requirements into terms of ships and planes and
trained men. It is one thing to say that we must have and maintain a
Navy adequate to uphold national policies and interests and to protect
us against potential enemies, but it is another thing to decide what is
and what is not the naval strength adequate for that purpose.
In the years following World War I, our course was clear enough-to make
every reasonable effort to preserve world peace by eliminating the
causes of war and failing in that effort, to do our best to stay clear
of war, while recognizing that we might fail in doing so. For a number
of years, the likelihood of our becoming involved in a war in the
foreseeable future appeared remote, and our fortunate geographical
position gave us an added sense of security. Under those circumstances,
and in the interest of national economy, public opinion favored the
belief that we could get along with a comparatively small Navy. Stated
in terms of personnel this meant an average of about 7,900 commissioned
officers, all of whom had chosen the Navy as a career, and 100,000
enlisted men more or less.
This modest concept of an adequate Navy carried with it an increased
responsibility on the part of the Navy to maintain itself at the peak of
operational and material efficiency, with a nucleus of highly trained
personnel as a basis for war time expansion.
For twenty years in its program of readiness, our Navy has worked under
schedules of operation, competitive training and inspection,
unparalleled in any other Navy of the world. Fleet problems, tactical
exercises, amphibious operations with the Marines and Army, aviation,
gunnery, engineering, communications were all integrated in a closely
packed annual operation schedule. This in turn was supplemented by
special activities ashore and afloat calculated to train individuals in
the fundamentals of their duties and at the same time give them the
background of experience so necessary for sound advances in the various
techniques of naval warfare. Ship competitions established for the
purpose of stimulating and maintaining interest were
(Plate 1 here)
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officers in the higher commands experience and training in strategy and
tactics approximating these responsibilities in time of war.
Our peacetime training operations, which involved hard work and many
long hours of constructive thinking, were later to pay us dividends. For
example, it would be an understatement to say merely that the Navy
recognized the growing importance of air power. By one development after
another, not only in the field of design and equipment, but also in
carrier and other operational techniques-such as dive bombing-and in
strategic and tactical employment, the United States Navy has made its
aviation the standard by which all other naval aviation is judged and
has contributed its full share to the advances which were to make
aviation the sine qua non of modern warfare. It may be stated here, with
particular reference to naval aviation, that the uniform success which
has characterized our naval air operations is unmistakably the result of
an organization which was based on the conviction that air operations
should be planned, directed and executed by naval officers who are naval
aviators, and that in mixed forces naval aviation should be adequately
represented in the command and staff organization.
Size and Composition
The effects of treaty limitations on our Navy are too well known to
require more than a brief review. In 1922, under the terms of the
Washington Arms Conference, limitations upon capital ships and aircraft
carriers were agreed upon, the ratio established being five for the
United States, five for Great Britain, and three for Japan. Pursuant to
that treaty, the United States scrapped a number of battleships, but was
permitted to convert LEXINGTON and SARATOGA, then under construction as
battle cruisers, to aircraft carriers. Whatever the other effects of the
treaty, that particular provision has worked to our advantage because
those two ships, as battle cruisers, would now be obsolescent, and as
aircraft carriers they were-and SARATOGA still is-effective units of our
fleet.
In 1930, at London, the parties to the 1922 treaty agreed upon further
limitations, this time with respect to cruisers, destroyers and
submarines. As a result of these two treaties, which reflected world
conditions at the time, and also because of our decision to maintain our
Navy at considerably less strength than that allowed by the treaties, we
experienced a partial building holiday that threw our small construction
program out of balance. Except for cruisers, hardly any combatant ships
(no battleships or destroyers) were added to our fleet during that
period, and few were under construction. In size, therefore, our Navy
remained static, with certain types approaching obsolescence. Moreover,
advances in the science of naval construction were hampered by the lack
of opportunity to prove new designs. As the accompanying chart (Plate 1)
indicates, our naval strength was at low ebb during the year 1927.
Our failure to build progressively was a mistake which it is to be hoped
will never be repeated. When a total building holiday in any type of
ship is prolonged, and there is no opportunity to proceed on a trial and
error basis, our designers are placed under handicaps taking years to
overcome.
In 1924, and again in 1929, in response to representations to the effect
that we were dangerously deficient in cruisers even in a world at peace,
the Congress author-
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ized the construction of a number of cruisers. These were appropriated
for from time to time, as were ships of certain other types (except
battleships), usually one or two at a time.
In 1933 our building program was stepped up materially by the
authorization for the construction of two new aircraft carriers, four
more cruisers, 20 destroyers and four submarines. The two carriers were
considerably different in design from those previously built. The other
types were more evolutionary as to new features, with the possible
exception of the BROOKLYN class of cruisers, which were to a degree a
departure from former light cruisers, both as to ship design and
armament. These cruisers were notable for their six-inch guns which
combined light but strong construction with rapid loading, giving them a
volume of fire far greater than any other light cruisers then-or now-in
existence.
In the previous year, eight destroyers of the FARRAGUT class had been
laid down. These were the first of a long series of new designs which
had been improved in each succeeding class up to the latest type laid
down in 1943. The 1933 program, which was considered large at the time,
used the FARRAGUT type of armament, not only for destroyers but for the
broadside batteries of the larger ships, because of the five-inch 38
caliber dual purpose gun which, because of its power, reliability and
extremely rapid loading, proved to be the best naval antiaircraft gun of
comparable caliber.
In March 1934, the Congress authorized but did not appropriate for a
Navy of treaty strength.
In 1935, in anticipation of making replacements under the terms of the
treaties, work was begun on the design of battleships of the NORTH
CAROLINA class. Original designs (completed in 1937) included many
features which have proved to be of great importance in the war; namely,
increased armor protection against bombs and gunfire, heavy fragment
protection around important control stations, modern five inch
antiaircraft weapons, good torpedo protection, and excellent speed and
steering qualities for rapid maneuvering. Contract designs for the
SOUTH DAKOTA and IOWA classes were completed in 1938 and 1939,
respectively. Most of these ships did not come into service until after
the war had been declared.
The 6000-ton ATLANTA class cruisers, featuring powerful antiaircraft
batteries, were designed in 1937.
In 1938, foreseeing the submarine menace, an experimental program for
patrol vessels was started. At the same time the motor torpedo boat was
started through a series of developmental stages.
In 1938, it had become apparent that in spite of all efforts on the part
of the United States to reach an agreement covering limitation of
armaments, and thus to establish at least the probability of world
peace, other nations were increasing their navies at an accelerating
rate. At that time, in spite of the fact that there was a general desire
on the part of most people everywhere in all countries of the world to
remain at peace, about one-fourth of the world's population was engaged
in war, and civilians were being driven from their homes and subjected
to bombing attacks. In view of the situation, the President, in his
message to the Congress, recommended an increase of 20 per cent in our
naval strength, exclusive of replacements permitted under the Vinson-
Trammel Act of 1934. In May 1938, the Congress authorized the recom-
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mended program, giving us, on paper, what appeared to be reasonably
adequate naval strength.
The so-called agreement at Munich was such as to require an upward
revision of the defense requirements of this country. Subsequent events
in 1939 resulting in the outbreak of the war in Europe not only
confirmed those estimates, but made our building up to them a matter of
urgency. A great increase in design activity, in preparation for later
building programs, began at this time. War had become a distinct
possibility.
AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR IN EUROPE
As a result of Germany's policy of expansion by political, economic and
military aggression, culminating in the invasion of Poland, the European
war began on 3 September 1939. While our position was for the time being
not clearly established, it was nevertheless apparent that this war
would affect the United States in a degree which might extend to our
becoming involved in a war for our national existence.
The Limited Emergency
The first step taken by the United States was the declaration of the
limited emergency by the President on 8 September 1939. The immediate
effect of this, so far as the Navy was concerned, was to fix the
authorized enlisted personnel strength of the Navy at l91,000 instead of
l31,485, and to authorize the recall to active duty of officers and men
and nurses on the retired and reserve lists of the Navy and Marine
Corps. Other direct effects were that the procurement of materials and
equipment, and the taking over of land needed for military purposes,
could be accomplished more readily. Also, the Coast Guard could be made
a part of the Navy if it appeared desirable, by Presidential order.
Indirectly, the limited emergency was responsible for changes in
contracting authority which eliminated competitive bidding, and for the
suspension of certain labor provisions relating to hours of work on
government contracts.
Neutrality
On 2 October 1939, the Congress of American Republics assembled at
Panama agreed upon a resolution which established a neutral zone
surrounding the Americas, with the exception of Canada, at an average
distance of 300 miles. By the terms of the resolution, belligerent
raiders and submarines were to be prevented from operating close to the
Western Hemisphere, as they had done in World War I, the thought
responsible for the resolution being that if belligerent operations took
place in that area, the United States and her Latin American neighbors
might well become involved in the war. The United States Navy being the
only armed force equal to the task of maintaining patrol in this
extensive area, the primary responsibility for the implementation of the
proclamation was obvious. The patrol was in fact taken by the United
States Navy, and at that time a portion of the 111 decommissioned
destroyers were recommissioned for the purpose of making it effective.
Preceded by heated debates, during which it was argued that, for
insufficient reason, we would be abandoning our traditional policy of
freedom of the seas, the Neutrality Act of 1939 became law on 4 November
1939, and American vessels and
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citizens were thereby prohibited from entering combat zones. The Act
also established a so-called cash and carry policy, under which all
belligerents were required to do their own transporting of goods
purchased in the United States, and pay for them before being granted
clearance. In addition, it authorized the President to place
restrictions on the use of ports and territorial waters of the United
States by submarines or merchant vessels of foreign states (pursuant to
which he prohibited their use by foreign submarines of belligerent
states, except when there by force majeure) and prohibited the use of
United States ports as bases for furnishing men and supplies to ships of
belligerent states lying off those ports. Other consequences of the
Neutrality Act were to make effective certain laws previously enacted,
having for their purpose the maintenance of neutrality. These included
prohibitions against sending our armed vessels for delivery to
belligerents, and contained provisions for detaining armed vessels or
vessels manifestly built for warlike purposes or conversion thereto.
Included, also, insofar as detention and permissible length of stay were
concerned, were laws covering the use of our ports by foreign vessels.
Naval Expansion
In view of the situation, our requirements as to naval strength were
again presented to the Congress, in January 1940. At that time, the part
the United States was to play in the war was still not clear, but with
due regard for our national safety and with aggressor nations
disregarding treaties and pacts without hesitation-the immediate result
being rapid changes in the international situation-Congress recognized
that our security would be measured by our ability to defend ourselves.
Coupled with this uncertainty was the knowledge that the international
situation had been very difficult to predict. Many keen observers were
certain that no European war would break out in 1939, and there were
others who felt that we would be able to stay out of the war.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Navy Department, and following a
careful examination of world conditions, the Congress authorized an
expansion of 11 per cent in our combatant ships, and the President
signed the bill on 14 June 1940.
Meanwhile, the aggressor nations had succeeded in imposing their will
upon numerous European countries. Germany had disposed of France and had
overrun the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Denmark and Poland, and stood
on the Channel coast, poised for an all out attack on Britain. In view
of that alarming situation, the Congress passed the so-called Two-Ocean
Navy Bill, which was signed by the President on 19 July 1940. The
increase in our naval strength authorized by this Act was 1,325,000 tons
of combatant ships-by far the largest naval expansion ever authorized.
This authorization was followed by the necessary appropriations in due
course, and, in the making, we had a Navy commensurate with our needs.
The Destroyer-Naval Base Exchange
During the summer of 1940, the Battle of Britain was in its initial
stages and the German submarine campaign had been prosecuted with
telling effect. At the beginning of the war Great Britain had suffered
severely from the general attrition of operations at sea, particularly
in destroyers in the Norwegian campaign and during the
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retreat from Dunkirk. Faced with this situation, Great Britain entered
into an agreement with the United States, under the terms of which 50 of
our older destroyers no longer suited for the type of fleet service for
which they had been designed, but still adequately suited for
antisubmarine duty, were exchanged for certain rights in various
localities suitable for the establishment of naval bases in the Atlantic
area, and essential to the national defense. In addition to the bases
acquired in return for the 50 destroyers, we were granted "freely and
without consideration" similar rights with respect to the leasing of
bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda.
This acquisition of bases operated to advance our sea frontier several
hundred miles in the direction of our potential enemies in the Atlantic,
and as the bases were leased for a term of 99 years, we could profit by
their strategic importance to the United States not only immediately,
but long after the crisis responsible for the exchange.
The bases thus obtained by the United States were briefly as follows:
Location Facility Established
Antigua, B.W.I. Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
British Guiana, S.A. Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
Jamaica, B.W.I. Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
St. Lucia, B.W.I. Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
Bermuda, B.W.I. Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
Great Exuma, Bahamas Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
Newfoundland Naval Operating Base
Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base, Air Field)
Trinidad Naval Operating Base
Naval Air Station (Sea Plane Base)
Lighter-than-Air Base
Radio Station
Lend-Lease and its Implementation
On 11 March 1941, the so-called "Lend-Lease" Act was signed by the
President. The provisions and effects of that Act are too well known to
require comment in this report. Naturally, we were unwilling to see a
large part of the material built with our labor and money lost in
transit, and our only recourse was to give the British assistance in
escorting the convoys carrying that material within North American
waters.
Incident to our decision, the United States entered into an agreement
with Denmark on 9 April 1941 relative to the defense of Greenland, and
on that day our Marines were landed there to prevent its being used by
Axis raiders. The Coast Guard cutter CAYUGA had already landed a party
there to conduct a survey with respect to airfields, seaplane bases,
radio stations, meteorological stations and additions to navigation, and
on 1 June, the first of the Greenland patrols was organized, consisting
chiefly of Coast Guard vessels and personnel.
On 27 May 1941, an unlimited national emergency was proclaimed by the
President.
On 7 July 1941, United States Marines were landed in Iceland and
relieved some of the British forces stationed there.
On 11 August 1941, on board the United States cruiser AUGUSTA, the
President and Prime Minister of Great Britain agreed upon a joint
declaration covering the principles of mutual interest to the two
countries.
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For some months, for the purpose of ensuring safe passage of goods
shipped under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act, our naval forces had
been patrolling waters in the vicinity of the convoy routes, and had
been broadcasting information relative to the presence of raiders. On 4
September 1941, GREER, a four-stack United States destroyer was enroute
to Iceland, with mail, passengers and freight. When about 175 miles
south of Iceland, she detected a submarine ahead. The submarine fired a
torpedo at her and missed, whereupon GREER counterattacked with depth
charges. Another torpedo was fired at GREER but it also missed, and
GREER continued to Iceland. As a result of this incident, our naval
forces were ordered by the President to shoot on sight any vessel
attempting to interfere with American shipping, or with any shipping
under American escort.
On 15 October, KEARNY a new destroyer, one of a number of vessels
escorting a convoy from Iceland to North America, was torpedoed
amidships. Eleven of her crew were killed and seven were wounded, and
the ship was badly damaged but able to make port.
On 30 October, the naval tanker SALINAS was hit by two torpedoes about
700 miles east of Newfoundland. There were no casualties to personnel,
and SALINAS reached port safely.
On 31 October in the same vicinity REUBEN JAMES, another old destroyer,
was struck amidships by a torpedo. The ship was broken in two; the
forward part sank at once, but the after part stayed afloat long enough
to enable 45 men to reach the deck and launch life rafts from which they
were rescued. About 100 men were lost in this sinking.
Whatever the situation technically, the Navy in the Atlantic was taking
a realistic viewpoint of the situation. During the month of November,
further steps were taken to enable our naval forces to meet the steadily
growing emergency. On 1 November the Coast Guard was made a part of the
Navy. Prior to that time ten Coast Guard cutters were transferred to the
British. On 17 November sections 2, 3 and 6 of the Neutrality Act of
1939 were repealed by an act of Congress, thereby permitting the arming
of Un
ted States merchant vessels and their passage to belligerent ports
anywhere.
Another effect of the European war, of major importance to the United
States, was the alliance by which on 27 September 1940 Japan became one
of the Axis powers.
For many years it had been predicted and expected that eventually
Japan's policy of expansion would conflict with our interests in the
Pacific. Recognition of that possibility, plus Japan's growing naval
strength, were indicated by her being a party to the 1922 treaty on
limitation of armaments, and to subsequent treaties dealing with that
subject.
At the time of the 1922 treaty Pearl Harbor and Manila were fortified
bases, and Guam was being fortified. None of our other Pacific
territories and possessions was fortified. When, therefore, the parties
to that treaty agreed to maintain the fortification of certain Pacific
islands in status quo, the fortification of Guam was halted.
Subsequently conforming to the treaty provisions, we maintained the
status quo at Guam and Corregidor, and confined our precautionary
measures in the Pacific to the strengthening of Pearl Harbor and our
west coast bases.
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Our foresight in developing Pearl Harbor and our west coast bases has
increased, immeasurably, our ability to carry on the war in the Pacific.
Whether or not Guam could have been made sufficiently strong to
withstand the full force of enemy attack is of course problematical, but
we appear to have had an object lesson to the effect that if we are to
have outlying possessions we must be prepared to defend them.
When, in the winter of 1935-1936, the Japanese declared themselves no
longer willing to abide by existing treaty provisions or be a party to
further negotiations, it gave rise to a feeling of uneasiness concerning
the trend of Japanese policy and activities. Unfortunately, the full
import of that move did not become apparent until later.
In 1931, Japan had embarked on a policy of aggression by the seizure of
Manchuria. This was followed by other conquests in China, and as we have
since learned, was accompanied by the fortifying of certain islands
mandated to Japan by the League of Nations, in direct violation of the
treaty provisions. A complete history of our relations with Japan during
the period 1931-1941 was issued by the State Department in the so-called
"White Paper" dated 2 January 1943.
Continuing her aggression, Japan moved into French-Indo China in 1940.
In 1941, the United States was engaged in protesting these and other
moves, and while conversations with the Japanese were being held, the
German offensive in Russia was being successfully pressed. It seems
likely that this influenced the Japanese decision to attack Pearl
Harbor.
Whatever the reasons, Japan, while her representatives in Washington
were still engaged in discussions, presumably with a view to finding a
means of preventing war, on the morning of 7 December 1941 attacked our
ships at Pearl Harbor. The attack was essentially an air raid, although
there were some 45-ton submarines which participated. The primary
objectives of the Japanese were clearly the heavy ships in the harbor
and our grounded Army and Navy planes were destroyed in order to prevent
them from impeding the attack. Damage done to the light surface forces
and the industrial plant was incidental. Of the eight battleships in the
harbor, ARIZONA was wrecked, OKLAHOMA capsized and three other
battleships were so badly damaged that they were resting on bottom. The
damages to the other three were comparatively minor in character. A
total of 19 ships was hit, including three light cruisers which were not
seriously damaged. Three destroyers were hit and badly damaged. (All
three were later restored to service.) Of the 202 Navy planes ready for
use on that morning only 52 were able to take the air after the raid.
Personnel casualties were in proportion to the material damage. The Navy
and Marine Corps suffered a loss of 2,117 officers and men killed and
960 missing.
The Japanese losses were about 60 planes, attributable mainly to
antiaircraft fire, and it is probable that others were unable, on
account of lack of fuel, to return to the carriers which composed the
striking force.
A few hours later a similar but less damaging attack was made on the
Philippines. (The situation in the Far East is described elsewhere in
this report.)
On the following day we declared " . . . that a state of war which has
thus been thrust upon the United States by the Imperial Government of
Japan is hereby formally declared. On 11 December a similar declaration
was made concerning Germany and Italy.
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FIGHTING STRENGTH
Armaments
THE world diplomatic situation had been deteriorating for some years,
and Europe had been at war since September 1939. For those reasons, we
had been adding to our fleet from time to time, beginning in 1933, but
our decision to prepare ourselves fully for the inevitable conflict may
be considered to have been made when the so-called Two-Ocean Navy Bill
became law on 19 July 1940. At that time, we had to consider the
possible disappearance of British sea power. England itself was
threatened and its capture by the Germans would have meant the loss of
the Royal Navy's home bases and the industrial establishments. These, we
could readily see, would become very tangible assets indeed, in the
event that we were drawn into the war.
In round numbers, provision for a "two-ocean Navy" meant an expansion of
about 70 per cent in our combat tonnage-the largest single building
program ever undertaken by the United States or any other country.
Upon the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, the Navy
Department initiated expansion of naval shipbuilding facilities in
private yards and in Navy yards. In many instances, particularly in Navy
yards, the expansion provided facilities which were to be available for
repairs as well as new construction.
By 19 July 1940, when the two-ocean Navy was authorized, the program for
expanding facilities was well started, and it continued thereafter at an
accelerating rate until the early part of 1943. Early in the period of
the shipyard expansion, it was apparent that as the new programs for
cargo ships, tanks, planes, and Army and Navy equipment of all kinds
started to pyramid, the country's latent manufacturing capacity would
soon be overloaded. Thus the problem became not merely one of expanding
shipyards, but of expanding the manufacturing capacity of industry as a
whole to meet the needs of the Navy shipbuilding program.
Expansion of general industry to meet the requirements of this
shipbuilding program began with plants producing basic raw materials.
Next to be enlarged were plants capable of manufacturing the component
parts of a modern man-of-war ranging all the way from jewel bearings to
huge turbines. So comprehensive was the building program that nearly
every branch of American industry was affected either directly or
indirectly. Manufacturers were encouraged to let out their work to
subcontractors, particularly to plants which had been producing
nonessential materials. An automobile manufacturer, for example, was
given the job of producing extremely intricate gyroscopic compasses and
a stone finishing concern undertook the manu-
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facture of towing machines and deck winches. Early in the building
program an acute situation in the construction of turbo-electric
propulsion machinery was solved by the construction of an enormous new
plant in a 50-acre corn field. As an illustration of the speed with
which the whole program was undertaken, the construction of that
particular plant was not begun until May 1942, and by the end of the
year the first unit had been produced, completed and shipped.
The rapidity of this naval expansion has had a profound effect upon our
military strategy. As a result of it, we were enabled to seize and hold
the initiative sooner than
(Plate 2 here)
we had originally anticipated, and to deal successfully with the
submarine situation in the Atlantic. The former has, of course, meant a
vast improvement in our military Situation everywhere and the latter was
of great benefit to the shipping situation, which was very serious in
the early months of the war and threatened to become more so with the
prospective increases in overseas troop movements and their support.
(See Plate 2.)
Immediately after the passage of the Two-Ocean Navy Bill, corresponding
contracts for new construction were let and there were soon more
warships and auxiliaries on the ways than had ever been under
construction anywhere in the world at any one time simultaneously with
this new construction, the conversion of merchant ships being
accomplished one of the most important of these being the escort
carriers later proved so effective in combating the German submarine
campaign in the
Page 14
Atlantic. It is interesting to note that the conversion of these ships
was superimposed upon the shipbuilding effort following enactment of the
Two-Ocean Navy Bill, it having been long appreciated that sea-borne
aircraft would play a dominant role in overseas campaigns if and when
war came.
With a construction program well under way, it was most important to
keep alterations in design at a minimum in order to avoid delays.
Nevertheless, changes which would increase military effectiveness or
give greater protection to crews were not sacrificed for the sake of
speeding up construction. Another consideration which industry had to
take in its stride was the evolution of strategic plans and changes in
the type of operations which made it necessary, from time to time, to
shift the emphasis in construction from one type of ship to another. For
example, when the war began our carrier strength was such that we could
not stand much attrition. When, therefore, we suffered the loss of four
of our largest aircraft carriers in the Coral Sea engagement, at Midway,
and in the South Pacific, it was imperative that the construction of
vessels of this category be pushed ahead at all possible speed. Shortly
after we suffered the heavy loss in battleship strength at Pearl Harbor
our battleships under construction at the time were given top priority.
At another stage of the war, when the submarine situation in the
Atlantic was a matter of great concern, emphasis was placed upon escort
carriers and destroyer escort vessels. At the moment, major emphasis
rests with the construction of landing craft, because we intend to use
them in large numbers in future operations.
The production of aircraft quite naturally assumed proportions
commensurate with the building program. Thanks to the research and
experimentation that had been done in improving and perfecting the
various types of airplanes, and thanks also to the genius of United
States industry in the field of mass production, our air power increased
with almost incredible rapidity as soon as our airplane factories were
expanded and retooled for the various models of planes we needed. In
view of the delays to be expected from changes in design when on a mass
production basis, it was apparent that a nice timing in changes of
design would be necessary, so that the performance of our aircraft would
always be more than a match for anything produced by the enemy. A
notable example is the change-over from the Grumman Wildcat to the
Grumman Hellcat.
In order to obtain a properly balanced navy, the construction of
combatant ships was supplemented by building patrol vessels, mine craft,
landing craft and auxiliary vessels of all types. Some 55 building yards
and yacht basins, located in practically all areas of the United States
served by navigable waters, have participated in the patrol craft
construction program.
No maritime nation has ever been able to fight a war successfully
without an adequate merchant marine-something we did not have when the
two-ocean Navy was authorized. The Maritime Commission therefore began a
vast program of merchant ship construction at the same time we were
expanding the Navy, and the merchant shipbuilding industry, too, faced
an enormous expansion. Furthermore, the supply of materials necessary to
complete the huge program had to be carefully allocated, in view of the
country's other needs that had to be met. The Navy needed material to
build ships and manufacture Planes and equipment, the Army required
Page 15
the material for military purposes, and civilian needs could not be
neglected. In order to control the allocation of material, the War
Production Board was established by the President and decisions as to
priorities have since been made by that agency.
Naturally, such a great undertaking involved thousands of business
transactions on the part of the Navy Department, with the contracting
builders and manufacturers. These transactions have been continuous, and
have been entered into on the basis of statutes which limit the profits
permissible, and provide for the negotiation and renegotiation of all
contracts. This part of the program has, in itself, been a colossal job.
Battleships
At the beginning of the program ten battleships were under construction.
By the time Pearl Harbor was attacked only two, NORTH CAROLINA and
WASHINGTON, were in service, but since that time, six more have joined
the fleet. These include SOUTH DAKOTA and three sister ships, INDIANA
MASSACHUSETTS and ALABAMA, and two of a larger class, IOWA and NEW
JERSEY. A third ship in the latter class, WISCONSIN, was launched 7
December 1943, appropriately enough, two years to the day after Pearl
Harbor was attacked. In speed, in fire power, particularly antiaircraft
fire, in maneuverability, and in protection, these ships represent a
great advance over previous design.
Aircraft Carriers
Construction of aircraft carriers represents one of the most spectacular
phases of the naval shipbuilding program. The carrier strength of the
Navy on 7 December 1941 was seven first-line vessels and one escort
carrier, a converted merchant ship. Contracts had been placed for
several large carriers of the new ESSEX class, and some of these had
been laid down. Conversion of a number of merchant vessels was under
way. The pressing need to add to our striking power in the air and to
replace losses suffered in the Pacific during 1942 led to a great
expansion of the construction program for first-line carriers.
Concurrently, an even larger expansion of the escort carrier program was
undertaken. By the end of 1943, more than 50 carriers of all types had
been put into service in our Navy, and in addition a large number of
escort carriers had been transferred to Great Britain.
This remarkable record in construction enabled us in a single year to
build up our carrier strength from the low point reached in the autumn
of 1942, when SARATOGA, ENTERPRISE and RANGER were the only ships of our
fleet carrier forces remaining afloat, to a position of clear
superiority in this category. The rapidity with which new carriers of
various types were put into service in 1943 influenced naval operations
in many important respects. Availability of several ships of the ESSEX
class and of a considerable number of smaller carriers, completed months
ahead of schedule, contributed to the success of our operations in the
Southwest Pacific, aided materially in checking the submarine menace in
the Atlantic, and enabled us to launch an offensive in the Central
Pacific before the end of the year.
A large proportion of the ESSEX class carriers have joined the fleet.
Excellent progress is being made on construction of the remaining ships
in the original pro-
Page 16
gram and of the additional vessels in this class authorized after the
Pearl Harbor attack. Nearly all of the carriers of the INDEPENDENCE
class, converted from light cruisers, have been completed. These ships,
though smaller than the ESSEX class vessels, are first-line carriers. It
is planned to supplement these two basic types of carriers with a third,
substantially larger than any of our present classes, which will
displace 45,000 tons, and will be capable of handling bombing planes
larger than any which heretofore have operated from the decks of
aircraft carriers. They will be far more heavily armed than smaller
carriers and will be much less vulnerable to bomb and torpedo attack.
The Navy's first escort carrier was the LONG ISLAND, converted early in
1941, from the merchant vessel MORMACMAIL. When experiments with this
ship proved successful, a sizeable conversion program was initiated,
using Maritime Commission C-3 hulls, and a number of oilers. In 1942,
because of pressing need, this program was greatly expanded.
The "baby flat-tops" have three principal uses. They serve as
antisubmarine escorts for convoys; as aircraft transports, delivering
assembled aircraft to strategic areas; as combatant carriers to
supplement the main air striking force of the fleet. Although their
cruising speeds are lower than those of our first-line carriers, these
auxiliary carriers can be turned out more rapidly and at a fraction of
the cost of conventional carriers. These ships have proved invaluable in
performing convoy escort and other duties for which larger and faster
carriers are not needed.
Cruisers
The BALTIMORE class heavy cruisers, a number of which are now in
service, were designed during the period from 19 July 1940 to 7 December
1941. These cruisers are considered as powerful as any heavy cruisers
afloat, particularly as recent technical developments have made it
possible to improve their fighting characteristics. The CLEVELAND type
of light cruiser (a development of the BROOKLYN class) was approved for
a large part of the cruiser program, its design having been completed
just before the expansion was authorized. The design of the large ALASKA
class was the result of a series of studies commenced when treaty
limitations went by the board and we were no longer bound by any
limitations on the size of ships.
Destroyers end Destroyer Escorts
The FLETCHER class of destroyers designed just after the outbreak of the
war in Europe, formed a large part of the new destroyer building
program. As compared with earlier destroyers, they are larger and have
greatly increased fighting power, made possible by the same technical
developments that permitted similar improvements in our cruisers.
Destroyer production has been highly satisfactory, and it has been
possible to expand and accelerate this part of the program in an orderly
manner. Although some new yards were engaged in building destroyers the
increases were made possible by expanding facilities in yards which had
had experience in destroyer construction. An idea of the acceleration in
the rate of delivery of destroyers may be had by comparison
Page 17
with the figures for 1941 and 1943. In 1943, the rate was approximately
eight times that of 1941. (See Plate 3.)
Contracts for the first destroyer escorts were let in November 1941. In
January 1942, the program was increased, and as Germany stepped up the
construction of
(Plate 3 here)
U-boats several more increases were found necessary. Because of
priorities the commencement of a large building program was delayed, but
after delivery of the first vessel of the class, in February 1943, mass
production methods became effective in the 17 building yards concerned
The result was a phenomenal output of those very useful vessels.
Submarines
As a result of the orderly progress which had been made in the
construction of submarines, involving continuous trial under service
conditions, the main problem to
Page 18
be solved in building more submarines was the expansion of facilities.
For a period of 15 years or more, there were only three yards in the
United States with the equipment and the know-how to build submarines.
These were the Navy yards at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Mare Island,
California, and the Electric Boat Company at Groton, Connecticut.
In addition to the expansion that took place at these yards, two other
yards went into the production of submarines. One of these was the Cramp
Shipbuilding Corporation of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the other
was the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company at Manitowoc, Wisconsin. The
building at the latter yard is a further testimonial to the ingenuity
displayed throughout the entire program, in that submarines are built at
Manitowoc, tested in the Great Lakes, then taken through the Chicago
drainage canal, and down the Mississippi River to New Orleans, where
they are made ready for sea.
Landing Craft
One of the most important achievements has been the landing craft
construction program. Although the Navy had begun to experiment with
small landing craft in 1936, we had only a few thousand tons in this
category when we entered the war. In 1942, a billion dollar program for
the construction of landing craft was superimposed on the already heavy
building schedule, and the work was given top priority until the desired
quota was filled. The facilities of existing public and private
shipyards were given part of the burden. New yards were constructed,
many of them in the Mississippi Valley, where bridge-building and steel-
working companies which had had no previous experience in shipbuilding
put up new plants and swung into production. In the second half of 1942,
almost a quarter of a million tons of landing craft were produced, and
the figure increased to well over a third of a million tons for the
first half of 1943.
This production included a tremendous variety of vessels from small
rubber boats to tank landing ships more than 300 feet in length. Within
this range are small craft designed to carry only a few men, and ships
with a capacity of 200, tracked craft capable of crawling over coral
reefs or up beaches, craft for landing tanks or vehicles, craft for
landing guns, craft for giving close fire support-in fact, all types
necessary for success in that most difficult of military operations,
landing on a hostile shore.
Airplanes
As a natural consequence of the importance of aviation in war, there has
been a tremendous growth in the number of aircraft in the Navy.
Lessons learned in battle have been incorporated in the design of combat
planes. New naval aircraft have larger engines and more power, increased
protection for both crew and plane, and greater firepower than the
models in service at the time of Pearl Harbor. The Grumman Wildcat,
which served with distinction through the first year of the war, has
been largely replaced by two new fighters-the Chance-Vought Corsair and
the Grumman Hellcat. These two fighters were born of the war. While the
Corsair existed as an experimental model before Pearl Harbor, it was so
modified before going into production as to represent virtually a new
plane. Offering greatly in-
Page 19
creased speed and firepower, the Corsair went into production in June
1942, and large numbers were being sent to the war fronts by the end of
the year. The Corsair was followed but in no sense succeeded by the
Hellcat, which carries more armament and has greatly increased climbing
ability. In production since November 1942, and in service with the
fleet since September 1943, the Hellcat rounds out a powerful striking
force for naval aviation. These two planes are superior to anything the
Japanese have.
The Douglas Dauntless scout and dive bomber, in service when this
country entered the war, has undergone successive modifications but is
still in use. A new plane in this category-the Curtiss Helldiver-is now
ready for the fighting front. This plane can carry a greatly increased
bomb load, has more firepower, and is speedier than the Dauntless.
Twelve days after the attack on Pearl Harbor the Navy approved the final
experimental model of a new torpedo bomber, the Grumman Avenger. Six
weeks later, this plane began coming off the production line. Undergoing
its baptism of fire at the Battle of Midway, it gradually replaced the
Douglas Devastator and has now become almost an all-purpose plane for
the fleet. The Avenger is a speedy, strongly protected, rugged aircraft
capable of delivering a torpedo attack at sea or a heavy bomb load on
land targets. Since it was first put into service, its defensive
armament and auxiliary equipment have been improved, and a new model
introducing other improvements is almost ready for volume production.
No field of aviation has been more important to the Navy than that of
long range reconnaissance and patrol. After two years of war, the
Consolidated Catalina flying boat remains in active service, having
proved its usefulness in performing such varied tasks as night bombing
patrol, rescues, antisubmarine warfare, and even dive bombing. Since
Pearl Harbor, the Catalina has been supplemented by the Martin Mariner,
a larger plane, which has likewise proved to be versatile in this field.
The Navy has made increasing use of land-based patrol airplanes because
of the greater speed and range of newly developed models of this type
and their greater defensive ability as compared with seaplanes. With
more land bases becoming available, it has been possible to utilize them
effectively for long over-water operations. Their superior offensive and
defensive power makes them more valuable in antisubmarine warfare and
for combat reconnaissance photography and patrol.
Two principal types of land-based patrol planes are now in service with
the Navy-the four-engine Consolidated Liberator and the two-engine Vega
Ventura. The Navys version of the Liberator is an extremely useful
plane for fast, long range reconnaissance, search and tracking. A new
version, with more powerful defensive armament and greater offensive
strength, soon will be available. The Ventura is a strongly armed
aircraft which carries a heavy bomb load. It has proved a powerful
weapon particularly in the war against the submarine. Two other land-
based bombers-the Lockheed Hudson and the Douglas Havoc-have seen
limited service with the Navy and a third-the North American Mitchell-is
in use by Marine air squadrons.
The principal plane used by the Navy for scout observation work during
the war has been the Vought-Sikorsky Kingfisher. A newer plane in this
field, now in service is the Curtiss Seagull.
The field of air transport has been enormously expanded since the
beginning of
Page 20
the war. The Naval Air Transport Service now operates, either directly
or through contract with private airlines, more than 70,000 miles of
scheduled flights to all parts of the globe, helping to maintain the
Navy's long supply lines. Thus far, standard type transport planes have
been used. In December 1943, however, the Martin Mars, world's largest
flying boat, was accepted by the Navy after exhaustive tests which
proved its ability to carry heavy loads at long range. Manufacture of
the Mars, under a prime contract with the Navy, is now under way, and
the first production planes of this type recently entered actual service
as cargo carriers.
Auxiliaries
The tremendous increase in the number of fighting ships and the global
nature of the war required the acquisition of a commensurately large
fleet of auxiliaries. These ships were obtained by construction, by
conversion of standard Maritime Commission commercial hulls and by
acquisition and conversion of commercial vessels. A considerable number
of conversions of standard Maritime Commission types have been
accomplished under the supervision of the Maritime Commission. Probably
the most important vessels produced under the auxiliary program during
1943 were those which take part in actual landing operations, consisting
of attack transports, attack cargo vessels and general headquarters
ships. The demand for repair ships of standard and special types, which
increased many-fold during 1943, was met by new construction and
conversion.
Patrol Craft
As previously stated, patrol vessels were necessary to a properly
balanced Navy. The first group of patrol craft, whose design was
developed before the war, was completed in the spring of 1942, and more
than 600 vessels of this type were completed in 1943. Motor torpedo
boats (which have been employed to good advantage in several different
theaters) were produced at intervals in accordance with military
requirements. The classification "Patrol Craft" includes the 110-foot
sub-chaser and the 136- 173- and 184-foot steel vessels. The greatest
emphasis on this type of ship prevailed prior to and during the German
submarine offensive off our Atlantic Coast and in the Caribbean.
PERSONNEL
The expansion program and the additional requirements following the
outbreak of war resulted in increases in personnel as follows. The
figures given include officers and men and the Women's Reserve, but not
officer candidates or nurses:
8 September 1939 7 December 1941 31 December 1943
Navy 126,418 325,095 2,252,606
Marine Corps 19,701 70,425 391,620
Coast Guard 10,079 25,002 171,518
Taking the number of men indicated into an organization was in itself an
enormous undertaking. Training them was an even greater undertaking, in
spite of their high intelligence and the other characteristics which
make the American fighting man
Page 21
Procurement of Officers
In time of peace the Navy is manned almost entirely by officers of the
regular Navy, most of whom are graduates of the Naval Academy. Several
years before the war, knowing that the Naval Academy would not be able
to supply officers in sufficient quantities for wartime needs, the Navy
established Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps units at various
colleges throughout the country. Under the system set up, students were
given the opportunity to take courses in naval science (which included
training at sea during the summer months) and, upon successfully
completing them, were commissioned in the Naval Reserve. When the
limited emergency was declared, these officers were ordered to active
duty, but when the war broke out it became apparent that the combined
supply of commissioned officers from the Naval Academy and from ROTC
units would not be sufficient to meet our needs for the rapidly
expanding Navy.
In February 1942, therefore, offices of naval officer procurement were
established in key cities throughout the country. Hundreds of thousands
of officer candidates went to these offices and there presented their
qualifications. With the requirements of health, character, personality
and education duly considered, the applications of those who appeared
qualified were forwarded to the Navy Department for final consideration.
Under this procedure some 72,000 officers were commissioned in the Navy
directly from civil life, to meet immediate needs.
Meanwhile, educational programs designed to produce commissioned
officers had been established in numerous colleges throughout the
country. Included were the aviation cadet program (v-5) principally for
physically qualified high school graduates and college students, and
later the Navy college program (v-12) which absorbed undergraduate
students of the accredited college program (v-1) and of the reserve
midshipman program (v-7). At the present time there are 66,815 members
of the v-12 program in some 241 different colleges.
From the foregoing, it will be seen that high school graduates are now
the Navy's principal source of young officers. Their training is
described elsewhere in this report, but the various programs for Naval
Reserve officers have supplied the fleet with large numbers many of whom
have already demonstrated their ability and the wisdom of the policy
calling for their indoctrination and training before being sent to sea.
Officers of the regular Navy are universally enthusiastic over the
caliber of young reserve officers on duty in the fleet.
In general, procurement of officers has kept up with the needs of the
service, With the exception of officers in the medical, dental, and
chaplain corps and in certain highly specialized fields of engineering.
As graduates of professional schools are the chief source of
commissioned officers in the various staff corps and as there must be a
balance between military and civilian needs, we are at present somewhat
short of our commissioned requirements in certain branches of the
service.
By comparison with the increase in size of the Naval Reserve, the
increases in the regular Navy have been small. The output of the Naval
Academy is at its peak, however having been stepped up by shortening the
course to three years and by increasing the number of appointments. In
addition, during 1943, 20,652 officers have been made by the advancement
of outstanding enlisted personnel.
Page 22
Recruiting of Enlisted Personnel
When the President declared the existence of a limited emergency on 8
September 1939, the personnel strength of the Navy had been increased by
calling retired officers and men to active duty and by giving active
duty status to members of the Naval Reserve who volunteered for it. At
the time the large naval expansion was authorized in July 1940, however,
there were still only slightly more than 160,000 men in the Navy and by
the end of that year only 215,000. As late as June 1941, the total was
still well below 300,000, and it was apparent that a radical increase
over and above the existing figure was an immediate necessity. Various
measures were therefore taken to stimulate recruiting, by virtue of
which the Navy strength stood at 290,000 on 7 December 1941. In other
words, we doubled our personnel in two years.
Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor there was a large increase
in enlistments, and by the end of that month some 40,000 additional men
had been accepted for naval service. This heavy enlistment rate,
however, experienced in December 1941 and January 1942, subsequently
fell off at a time when the requirements were still mounting. In order
to meet the situation and to provide an adequate method of recruiting
the large numbers of men needed, our recruiting system, which had
already been expanded, was fortified by a field force of officers
commissioned directly from civil life, and by the fall of 1942, we were
accepting each month a total equivalent to peacetime Navy strength.
On 5 December 1942, the voluntary enlistment of men between the ages of
18 and 37, inclusive, was ordered terminated as of 1 February 1943, on
which latter date the manpower requirements of the Navy were supplied by
operation of the machinery of the Selective Service system. During the
period of active recruiting about 900,000 volunteers were accepted.
Since 1 February 1943, 779,713 men have entered the Navy through
Selective Service. During the same period voluntary enlistments within
the age limits prescribed totaled 205,669.
On 1 June 1943 the Army and Navy agreed on joint physical standards
which were somewhat lower than those previously followed by the Navy,
but still sufficiently rigid to permit all inductees to be assigned to
any type of duty afloat or ashore.
Training
Strictly speaking, it is probably true that training is a continuous
process, which begins when an individual enters the Navy and ends when
he leaves it. In time of peace the number of trained men in the Navy is
relatively high. In time of war, however, particularly when we
experience a personnel expansion such as has been described, trained men
are at a premium. It is not an exaggeration to state that our success in
this war will be in direct proportion to the state of training of our
own forces.
When we entered the war we experienced a dilution in trained men in new
ships because of the urgency of keeping trained men where fighting was
in progress, and initial delays in getting underway with the huge
expansion and training program had to be accepted. As the war
progressed, and as the enemy offensive was checked, we were able to
assign larger numbers of our trained men to train other men. Our ability
to expand and train during active operations reflects the soundness of
our
Page 23
peacetime training and organization. With that as a foundation on which
to build, and with the tempo of all training stepped up, adequate
facilities, standardized curricula, proper channeling of aptitude, full
use of previous related knowledge, lucid instructions and top physical
condition became the criteria for wartime training.
Generally speaking, the first stage in the training of any new member of
the Navy is to teach him what every member of the Navy must know, such
as his relationship with others, the wearing of the uniform, the customs
of the service, and how to take care of himself on board ship. The
second stage involves his being taught a specialty and being thoroughly
grounded in the fundamentals of that specialty. The third stage is to
fit him into the organization and teach him to use his ability to the
best advantage.
Commissioned Personnel
The over-all problem of training officers involves a great deal more
than the education of the individual in the ways of the Navy. The first
step is classification according to ability, which must be followed by
appropriate assignment to duty. This is particularly true in the case of
Reserve officers, who must be essentially specialists, because there is
insufficient time to devote to the necessary education and training to
make them qualified for detail to more than one type of duty.
As previously stated, ROTC units, which were part of the v-1 training
program, had been established in various colleges, and courses in naval
science, which included drills and summer cruises, were worked into the
academic careers of the individuals enrolled. With the approach of war,
the training of these students was shortened in most colleges to two and
one-half years, and eventually they became part of the Navy college
training program (v-12).
In 1935, the Congress authorized the training of naval aviation cadets,
and that statutory authority was implemented by a program for their
training, known as the v-5 program, which was open to physically
qualified high school graduates and college students. Under the methods
adopted, a decision as to whether or not a candidate would be accepted
for the v-5 program was made by Naval Aviation Cadet Selection Boards,
who were guided by high standards covering the educational, moral,
physical and psychological qualifications of each individual. The period
of training normally requires from 12 to 15 months, exclusive of
additional college training required for 17-year-old students. Of this
time, six to eight months are spent in preliminary training in physical
education and ground school subjects at pre-flight schools. The
remainder of the training consists of primary, intermediate and advanced
flight training. Upon successful completion of the full flight training
course, an aviation cadet is commissioned ensign in the Naval Reserve or
second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve and is then ordered to
active duty as a pilot.
The v-12 (Navy college training) program was established on 1 July 1943.
It consisted initially of students who were on inactive duty in the
Naval Reserve, new students from civilian life, and young enlisted men
especially selected. The new students from civilian life consist of
selected high school graduates or others with satisfactory educational
qualifications who can establish by appropriate examination their
mental, physical and potential officer qualifications. These students
are then inducted
Page 24
into the Navy as apprentice seamen or as privates, United States Marine
Corps, placed on active duty, and assigned to designated colleges and
universities to follow courses of study specified by the Navy
Department.
v-12 training embodies most of the features of preceding Naval Reserve
programs. Depending on training requirements, and with the exception of
medical and dental officers, engineering specialists, and chaplains,
length of courses vary from two to six semesters. The courses of study
include fundamental college work in mathematics, science, English,
history, naval organization and general naval indoctrination for the
first two terms for all students. This is followed by specialized
training in a particular field, assignment of a student to special
training being based upon his choice and upon his demonstrated
competence in the field chosen, subject to available quotas. Upon
satisfactory completion of college training, students are assigned to
further training in the Navy, Marine Corps or Coast Guard, and if found
qualified after completion of that training they are commissioned in the
appropriate reserve.
So far, the v-12 program has worked well. It permits the selection of
the country's best qualified young men on a broad democratic basis
without regard for financial resources, and the induction and training
of those young men who show the greatest promise of having superior
ability and the other qualities likely to make a good officer.
The link between the College Training Program and the fleets is the
Naval Reserve Midshipman Program. The Navy college graduates who are
going to deck and engineering duties with the forces afloat are sent to
one of the six reserve midshipman schools for a four months' course.
Upon the successful completion of the first month's study, they are
appointed reserve midshipmen, and after the remaining three months'
intensive training, they are appointed ensigns in the Naval Reserve.
Originally four Reserve midshipmen schools were established, located at
Columbia University, Northwestern University, Notre Dame, and the Naval
Academy. The program has been such an outstanding success, and the
demand for its graduates has so increased, that two additional schools
recently have been put into commission, at Cornell and at Plattsburg,
New York, with the result that there are nearly 9,000 men in this
training program at any one time. The combined result of the College
Training Program and the Reserve Midshipman Program is to meet the need
of the fleets for thoroughly trained young deck and engineering
officers.
Enlisted Personnel
Recruit training, in addition to the instruction given the individual in
the ways of the Navy, consists of his being fully informed of the
training opportunities open to him. This is followed by a series of
tests designed to determine the ability of each recruit. These tests are
based on the type of duty to be performed in the Navy, and in addition
to such tests as the general classification test, consists of a
systematic determination of aptitudes in reading and mechanical ability
and any knowledge of specific work. Through a system of personal
interviews these tests are supplemented by considering the background
and experience of the individual, so that the special qualifications of
each recruit may be evaluated. This information is then indexed and
recorded and used in establishing quotas for the detail of men to
special service schools or to any other duty for which they seem best
qualified.
Page 25
While the recruit is learning about the Navy, therefore, the Navy is
learning about him. A practical application of this system was the
assembly of the crew for NEW JERSEY, a new battleship. While the ship
was fitting out, a series of tests and a thorough study of the
requirements of each job on board were conducted. For example, special
tests determined those best fitted to be telephone talkers or night
lookouts or gun captains, and as a result, when the crew went aboard
each man was assigned to a billet in keeping with his aptitude for it.
As permanent establishments, we had four training stations-Newport,
Rhode Island; Norfolk, Virginia; Great Lakes, Illinois, and San Diego,
California. As soon as we entered the war it became apparent that it
would be necessary to expand these four stations radically and to
establish others. By November 1942, we had expanded the four permanent
training stations and established new ones at Bainbridge, Maryland;
Sampson, New York, and Farragut, Idaho.
The training in the fundamentals of the specialty to be followed by a
newcomer to the Navy is carried on ashore and afloat. Recruits showing
the most aptitude for a particular duty are sent to special service
schools designed to give the individual a thorough grounding in his
specialty before assuming duties on board ship. If he hopes to become an
electrician's mate he may be assigned to the electrical school; if a
machinist's mate, to the machinist's mate school; if a commissary
steward, to the cook's and baker's school, and so forth. Approximately
32 per cent of those who receive recruit training are assigned to
special service schools.
An advanced type of training is given men who are already skilled in a
specialty by assembling them and training them to work as a unit. This
is known as operational training, and in addition to the special meaning
of the term as applied to aviation training, it encompasses such special
activities as bomb disposal units as well as the training of ship's
crews before the ship is commissioned.
When the individual goes on board ship, he discovers that his training
has only begun, because he must learn how to apply the knowledge he has
already gained and how his performance of duty fits into the
organization of the ship. This is another form of operational training-
conducted, of course, by the forces afloat-which is a preliminary to the
assignment of that ship as a unit of the fleet. This does not mean that
the ship is fully trained, but it means that the training is
sufficiently advanced to fit the crew for the additional training and
seasoning that comes only with wartime operations at sea. With the
proper background of training, the most efficient ship is very likely to
be the one which has been in action. In other words, actual combat is
probably the best training of all, provided the ship is ready for it.
Health
The health of the personnel in our naval forces has been uniformly
excellent. In addition, the treatment and prevention of battle
casualties has become progressively
The Medical Corps of the Navy has not only kept up with scientific
developments everywhere, but it has taken the lead in many fields. The
use of sulfa drugs, blood plasma and penicillin plus the treatment of
war neuroses, probably represent
Page 26
the outstanding medical accomplishments of the war, but all activities
requiring medical attention have been under continuous study.
For example, the conditions under which submarines must operate have
been found to require special diet, air conditioning, sun lamps, special
attention to heat fatigue, and careful selection of personnel.
Similarly, in the field of aviation medicine, such matters as supply of
oxygen, decompression treatment, acceleration stresses, air sickness,
and fatigue, require the closest attention. In the case of aviation
medicine, flight surgeons, who are themselves qualified naval aviators
and therefore familiar with all aviation problems, have been
instrumental in keeping our aviation personnel at the peak of their
efficiency.
Naval mobile hospitals were developed shortly before the war. These are
complete units, capable of handling any situation requiring medical
attention. Each unit contains officers of the Medical Corps, the Dental
Corps, the Hospital Corps, the Nurse Corps, the Supply Corps, the Civil
Engineer Corps and the Chaplain Corps, and in addition, enlisted
personnel of a wide variety of non-medical ratings such as electricians,
cooks, and bakers. Mobile hospitals are organized and commissioned, and
being mobile as the name implies, are placed under the orders of the
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, for such duty as may be deemed
desirable, the same as a ship. These mobile hospitals have proved
invaluable in all theaters.
While it is hardly possible to single out any one activity as
outstanding, the practice of evacuating sick and wounded personnel from
forward areas by plane to be treated elsewhere has been estimated to
have increased the efficiency of treatment by about one-third. The
beneficial effects of this practice on our ability to carry on a
prolonged campaign, such as in the Solomon Islands, are obvious.
There have been many more contributions to our military efficiency
having to do with not only medicine, but health in general. The question
of malaria control in the Solomon Islands, protective clothing, the
survival of personnel in lifeboats, the purification of drinking water,
the treatment of flash burns, the recording by tag of first aid
treatment received in the field, and periodic thorough physical
examinations are a few of the progressive measures which, collectively,
have been responsible for marked increases in our military efficiency.
THE MARINE CORPS
Statistics previously given indicate the personnel expansion of the
Marine Corps. In terms of combat units those figures represent a ground
combat strength of two half-strength divisions and seven defense
battalions expanded to four divisions, 19 defense battalions and
numerous force and Corps troop organizations and service units; 12
aviation squadrons expanded to 85; and increases in ships detachments to
keep pace with the ship construction program. Under the leadership of
Lieutenant General (now General, Retired) T. H. Holcomb, USMC, the
Marine Corps successfully met the greatest test in its history by
forging a huge mass of untrained officers and men into efficient
tactical units especially organized, equipped, and trained for the
complicated amphibious operations which have characterized the war in
the Pacific.
Training of the expanding Marine Corps personnel had to be conducted by
stages because existing bases were inadeauate in housing, space, and
facilities. Basic
Page 27
training for all Marines was continued at the established recruit depots
at Parris Island South Carolina, and San Diego, California. Specialized
advanced training for ground and aviation personnel before being
assigned to combat units was conducted chiefly at Camp Lejeune, New
River, North Carolina; at Camp Elliott, near San Diego, California; and
at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California. Improvised facilities were
used at those three bases until they had been developed into centers
capable of affording training in all the basic and special techniques
required in amphibious warfare. The final stage of training began with
assignment of personnel to combat unitS and ended with the movement of
those units to combat areas. (The effectiveness of individual and unit
training of the Marine Corps was first demonstrated at Guadalcanal and
Tulagi, eight months after the beginning of the war. That first test
showed Marine Corps training methods to be sound and capable of
producing combat units in a minimum of time.)
The commissioned personnel of the expanding Marine Corps were initially
obtained from reservists and graduates of the Marine Corps Schools at
Quantico. Later, commissioned personnel were obtained by including the
Marine Corps in the Navy v-12 program, by selecting candidates from
graduates of designated colleges and universities, and by increasing the
number of enlisted men promoted to commissioned rank.
Marine Corps aviation, while expanding to a greater degree than the
Corps as a whole, has continued to specialize in the providing of air
support to troops in landing or subsequent ground operations. Training
and organization in the United States and excellent equipment have made
it possible to operate planes from hastily constructed airfields with
limited facilities. The generally excellent performance of Marine
aviation squadrons operating from forward bases in the Central and South
Pacific areas in successful attacks against enemy aircraft, men-of-war,
and shipping attests the soundness of the organization.
In November 1942, the Marine Corps Women's Reserve was established, the
authorized strength being 1000 commissioned and 18,000 enlisted women,
to be reached by 30 June 1944. By 31 December 1943 there were 609
officers and 12,592 enlisted women in the organization, all of whom have
released male Marines for service in combat areas. The remarks relating
to the performance of duty of the WAVES contained in that part of this
report covering their organization and training, are equally applicable
to women in the Marine Corps.
Participation of Marines in combat is covered in Part III of this
report.
THE COAST GUARD
The duties of the Coast Guard under naval administration consist of the
civil functions normally performed by the Coast Guard in time of peace
which become military functions in time of war, and the performance of
naval duties for which the personnel of the Coast Guard are particularly
fitted by reason of their peacetime employment. The organization
operates separately with respect to appropriations required for Coast
Guard vessels, shore stations, and personnel.
The increase in the size of the Coast Guard was necessitated chiefly by
additional duties in connection with captain-of-the-port activities in
the regulation of merchant
Page 28
shipping, the supervision of the loading of explosives, and the
protection of shipping, harbors, and waterfront facilities. In addition,
the complements of Coast Guard vessels and shore establishments were
brought up to wartime strength; certain transports and other naval
craft, including landing barges, were manned by Coast Guard personnel;
and a beach patrol (both mounted and afoot) and coastal lookout stations
were established. The Coast Guard also undertook the manning and
operating of Navy section bases and certain inshore patrol activities
formerly manned by naval personnel, and furnished sentries and sentry
dogs for guard duty at various naval shore establishments.
Coast Guard aviation, which is about three times its previous size, has
been under the operational control of sea frontier commanders for convoy
coverage and for antisubmarine patrol and rescue duties. Other squadrons
outside of the United States are employed in ice observation and air-sea
rescue duty. Miscellaneous duties assigned to Coast Guard aviation
include aerial mapping and checking for the Coast and Geodetic Survey
and ice observation assistance on the Great Lakes.
The assignment of certain Coast Guard personnel to duties radically
different from those they normally perform required numerous changes in
ratings. This resulted in extensive classification and retraining
programs designed to prepare men for their new duties. The replacement
of men on shore jobs by SPARS, both officer and enlisted, has been
undertaken as a part of this retraining program. Approximately 10,000
SPARS-whose performance of duty and value to the service is on a par
with that of the WAVES and the women of the Marine Corps-will be
commissioned and enlisted when the contemplated strength of that
organization is reached.
The present strength of the Coast Guard was attained by the
establishment of the Coast Guard Reserve and by commissioning warrant
officers and enlisted men for temporary service. Other increases in the
commissioned personnel of the Coast Guard have been accomplished by
appointments made direct from civil life in the case of individuals with
particular qualifications, such as special knowledge in the prevention
and control of fires, police protection and merchant marine inspection.
A feature peculiar to the Coast Guard is the Temporary Reserve, which
consists of officers and enlisted men enrolled to serve without pay.
Members of the Temporary Reserve have full military status while engaged
in the performance of such duties as pilotage, port security, the
guarding of industrial plants, either on a full or part-time basis. At
the present time there are about 70,000 members of the Temporary
Reserve, but it is anticipated that it will eventually be reduced to
about 50,000. The Coast Guard Auxiliary, which is a civilian
organization, has contributed much of its manpower to the Temporary
Reserve, the result being a substantial saving in manpower to the
military services.
Under the general direction of Vice Admiral (now Admiral) R. R. Waesche,
USCG, Commandant, the Coast Guard has done an excellent job in all
respects, and as a component part of the Navy in time of war, has
demonstrated an efficiency and flexibility which has been invaluable in
the solution of the multiplicity of problems assigned. The organization
and handling of local defense in the early days of the war were
particularly noteworthy.
Page 29
THE SEABEES
For some months before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor we had been
strengthening our insular outposts in the Pacific by construction of
various fortifications. When these islands were attacked by the
Japanese, the construction was only partially completed, and the
civilians who were employed there by various construction companies were
subjected to attack, along with our garrisons of Marines.
In that situation, the civilians were powerless to aid the military
forces present because they lacked the weapons and the knowledge of how
to use them. Furthermore, they lacked what little protection a military
uniform might have given them. As a consequence, the Navy Department
decided to establish and organize naval construction battalions whose
members would be not only skilled construction workers but trained
fighters as well.
On 28 December 1941 authorization was obtained for the first contingent
of "Seabees" (the name taken from the words "Construction Battalions")
and a recruiting campaign was begun. The response was immediate, and
experienced men representing about 60 different trades were enlisted in
the Navy and given ratings appropriate to the degree and type of their
civilian training.
After being enlisted these men were sent to training centers where they
were given an intensive course in military training, toughened
physically, and in general educated in the ways of the service.
Particular attention was paid to their possible employment in amphibious
operations. Following their initial training, the Seabees were formed
into battalions, so organized that each could operate as a self-
sustained unit and undertake any kind of base building assignment. They
were sent to advance base depots for outfitting and for additional
training before being sent overseas.
The accomplishments of the Seabees have been one of the outstanding
features of the war. In the Pacific, where the distances are great and
the expeditious construction of bases is frequently of vital importance,
the construction accomplished by the Seabees has been of invaluable
assistance. Furthermore, the Seabees have participated in practically
every amphibious operation undertaken thus far, landing with the first
waves of assault troops to bring equipment ashore and set up temporary
bases of operation.
In the Solomon Islands campaign, the Seabees demonstrated their ability
to outbuild the Japs and to repair airfields and build new bases,
regardless of conditions of weather. Other specialized services
performed by the Seabees include the handling of pontoon gear, the
repair of motor vehicles, loading and unloading of cargo vessels, and in
fact every kind of construction job that has to be done.
At present the Seabees number slightly more than 240,000, nearly half of
whom are serving overseas at various outposts. Fleet commanders have
been and are generous in their praise and appreciation of the work done
by construction battalions everywhere. There can be no doubt that the
Seabees constitute an invaluable component of our Navy.
THE WAVES
Early in 1942, when the need for expansion of naval personnel became
acute, Navy Department proposed to the Congress that there be
established, as an
Page 30
integral part of the Navy, a Women's Reserve. The stated purpose of the
proposal was to employ women in shore billets, so that men could be
released for sea duty. Acting on that recommendation, the Women's
Reserve was established on 30 July 1942, and the organization became
known as the WAVES the name being derived from the expression "Women
Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service." In November 1943, certain
statutory changes were made which provided for women becoming eligible
for all allowances or benefits to which men are entitled, and made
certain alterations in the composition of the organization, chiefly with
respect to promotions.
Initial plans called for 1000 officers and 10,000 enlisted women, and
immediately upon obtaining the necessary statutory authority for the
organization, officer training schools were established, at Northampton
and South Hadley, Massachusetts, utilizing the facilities of Smith and
Mount Holyoke Colleges. At the same time, a training school for yeomen
was established at Stillwater, Oklahoma, one for radio personnel at
Madison, Wisconsin, and one for storekeepers at Bloomington, Indiana.
Under the procedure followed at that time all WAVES went to one of these
schools immediately after joining the Navy, and upon the successful
completion of their training, to duty somewhere in the continental
United States where they could take the place of men.
All officer candidates now go to Northampton for their indoctrinational
training and may then receive further training elsewhere-there are 16
schools for special training-in communications, supply, aerological
engineering, Japanese language, radio and electronics, chemical warfare,
general ordnance and photographic interpretation, and many others,
including air navigation, air gunnery, and ship and aircraft
recognition.
All enlisted WAVES now go to a general indoctrination school at Hunter
College in New York City, and there receive their basic training.
Further training at some other school-there are now 19 of them-designed
to train them in their chosen specialty, is now standard practice.
Enlisted personnel are trained as radio operators, yeomen, storekeepers,
for various aviation ratings, and for many others, including
pharmacist's mate. Approximately one-fourth of all enlisted women are
now on duty with naval aviation activities.
On 31 December 1943 there were 6,459 commissioned WAVES and 40,391
enlisted WAVES serving in various capacities. Present plans call for
nearly 100,000 WAVES by the end of 1944.
The organization has been a success from the beginning, partly because
of the high standards WAVES had to meet to be accepted, partly because
no effort has been spared to see that they are properly looked out for,
and partly because of their overpowering desire to make good. As a
result of their competence, their hard work, and their enthusiasm, the
release of men for sea duty has been accompanied in many cases,
particularly in offices, by increases in efficiency. The natural
consequence is an esprit de corps which enhances their value to the
Navy, and it is a pleasure to report that in addition to their having
earned an excellent reputation as a part of the Navy, they have become
an inspiration to all hands in naval uniform.
Page 31
III
General
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES FLEET
ON 1 February 1941, command afloat in the high echelons was vested in
three Commanders in Chief, one of whom commanded the Asiatic Fleet, one
the Pacific Fleet, and one the Atlantic Fleet, provision being made
whereby one of these three, depending on the circumstances, would act as
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, chiefly for purposes of
standardization. In case two or more fleets operated together, he would
coordinate their operations. At the time Pearl Harbor was attacked, the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet was also Commander in Chief of
the United States Fleet.
Almost immediately after our entry in the war it became apparent that
for the purpose of exercising command all oceans must be regarded as one
area, to the end that effective coordinated control and the proper
distribution of our naval power might be realized. On 18 December 1941,
therefore, the President changed this organization by making the
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, separate and distinct and in
addition to the other three Commanders in Chief, and ordered the
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, established
in the Navy Department in Washington.
As of 1 January 1942, Admiral H. R. Stark was Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral (now Fleet Admiral) E. J. King was Commander in Chief of the
United States Fleet, Admiral T. C. Hart was Commander in Chief of the
Asiatic Fleet, Admiral (now Fleet Admiral) C. W. Nimitz, who relieved
Admiral H. E. Kimmel late in December 1941, was Commander in Chief of
the Pacific Fleet, and Vice Admiral (now Admiral) R. E. Ingersoll was
Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet.
In March 1942, (coincident with my appointment as such) the duties of
the Chief of Naval Operations were combined with the duties of the
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Admiral Stark, who had so ably
performed the duties of Chief of Naval Operations during the vital
period preceding the war, became commander of United States Naval Forces
in Europe. This move was accompanied by a number of adjustments in the
Navy Department organization, calculated, among other things, to
facilitate the logistic support of the forces afloat by providing for
its coordination. Except for the fact that the Asiatic Fleet ceased to
exist as such in June 1942, that basic organization of the United States
Fleet and supporting activities is still in effect. In the spring of
1942, however, and from time to time thereafter, independent commands
were established directly under the Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet.
Page 32
Organization Within Each Fleet
In time of peace, for purposes of standardization, and to facilitate
training and administration, our forces afloat operate under what is
known as a type organization. Each fleet is subdivided according to
types of ships in that fleet (this includes shore-based naval aircraft),
and in general, the officers assigned to command each subdivision are
the next echelon below the Commander in Chief of a fleet. The "type
commands" are primarily for administrative purposes. For operations,
vessels and aircraft of appropriate types are formed into operating
commands known as "task forces."
Sea Frontiers
As of 1 February 1941, Naval Coastal Frontiers consisted of one or more
Naval Districts, depending on their geographical location, and Naval
Coastal Frontier forces were administrative and task organizations.
Commanders of those forces were responsible to the Navy Department for
administrative purposes and to the Chief of Naval Operations for task
purposes.
On 20 December 1941 the operating forces of Naval Coastal Frontiers were
placed under the command of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
On 6 February 1942 Naval Coastal Frontiers became Sea Frontiers, and
Commanders of Sea Frontiers were made responsible to the Commander in
Chief, United States Fleet, for that portion of their commands
comprising ships and aircraft duly allocated as Sea Frontier forces. For
the portion comprising ships and aircraft allocated by the Chief of
Naval Operations as local defense forces, they were made responsible to
the Chief of Naval Operations.
The foregoing change in designation of Naval Coastal Frontiers is not to
be confused with the designation "Coastal Frontier." The latter, of
which Sea Frontiers form a part, are coastal divisions with
geographically coterminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a
naval officer exercise command over their respective forces and
activities.
In continental United States there are four sea frontiers: the Eastern,
covering the Atlantic seaboard; the Gulf, covering the Gulf of Mexico;
the Western, which takes in the southern part of the Pacific Coast; and
the North West, which covers the northern part of the Pacific Coast.
Advance Base Units
Early in the war the Navy undertook a large expansion of its system of
advance bases, many of which represented the consolidation of gains made
by combat units. Depending on the circumstances, that is to say, whether
they were gained as a result of a raid or as a result of an advance, the
permanency of their construction was varied to meet the situation. In
the south and central Pacific, the entire campaign thus far has been a
battle for advance bases where we can establish supply ports, ship
repair facilities and landing fields to act as a backstop for a
continuing offensive.
Advance bases range in size from small units for the maintenance and
repair of PT boats, manned by a handful of officers and men to major
bases comprising floating
Page 33
drydocks, pattern ships, foundries, fully equipped machine shops, and
electrical shops, staffed by thousands of specialists. Some of these
bases are general purpose bases; others are established for special
purposes. Convoy escort bases, located at terminals of the convoy
routes, provide fuel, stores, ammunition, and repair facilities for
merchant ships and their escort vessels. Rest and recuperation centers
afford naval personnel facilities for relaxation and recreation after
they return from combat zones. Air stations provide the facilities of an
aircraft carrier on an expanded scale.
Once bases are built, they must be maintained. The problem of supplying
the Navy's worldwide system of advance bases is one of great complexity,
requiring a high degree of administrative coordination and attention to
the most minute detail. Food, clothing, fuel, ammunition, spare parts,
tools, and many types of special equipment must be made available in
sufficient quantities and at the proper times to maintain the fighting
efficiency of the fleet.
In view of the difficulties involved, the arrangements made for the
procurement and distribution of supplies to advance bases have been
extremely effective. New methods have been improvised and shortcuts
devised to simplify procedures and expedite deliveries. Among other
devices adopted is the mail order catalogue system. Through use of the
Navy's "functional component catalogue," it is possible to order all the
parts and equipment needed to set up any type of base from a small
weather observation post to a fully equipped airfield or Navy yard.
As our forces advance, new bases must be established and economy of
personnel and material demands that this be accomplished largely by
stripping the old bases that have been left behind as the front is
extended. This process is known as "rolling up the back areas."
FIGHTING EFFICIENCY
When Pearl Harbor was attacked, the forces comprising the Atlantic Fleet
had been engaged with Axis submarines, but the forces comprising the
Asiatic and Pacific Fleets had not been previously engaged in combat. In
the case of all ships everywhere, the transition from a state of peace
to a state of war involved a great number of immediate changes, some of
which could not possibly be made until our ships had been in action. For
example, we profited from experiences gained after the war started with
respect to the use of certain of our weapons in actual combat. Such
things as depth charges and explosive charges in torpedoes and shells
were put to the real test by our forces, and all personnel have become
accordingly familiar with their handling and use. We also learned from
experience the best practice in such matters as the painting and
preservation of the interior of ships, camouflage, deficiencies and
improvement of equipment, and from time to time what new contributions
were of value. The most valuable of all experience has been that gained
with respect to the operational technique in such fields as air combat,
amphibious operations, and escort Of convoys.
The war was also the real test of the training methods we had followed
in time of peace particularly the exercise of initiative by officers. As
used in connection with the exercise of command, initiative means
freedom to act, but it does not mean freedom to act in an off-hand or
casual manner. It does not mean freedom to disregard or
Page 34
depart unnecessarily from standard procedures or practices or
instructions. There is no degree of being "independent" of the other
component parts of the whole-the fleet. It means freedom to act only
after all of one's resources in education, training, experience, skill
and understanding have been brought to bear on the work in hand. This
requires intense application in order that what is to be done shall be
done as a correlated part of a connected whole-much as a link of a chain
or the gear within a machine.
In other words, our officers had been indoctrinated and were now in
larger measure on their own. Most of those officers understood perfectly
the transition that becomes automatic when we passed from the peacetime
to the wartime status, but it was thought desirable to define and
emphasize the standards expected in time of war, not only to confirm
their understanding, but for the benefit of newcomers. Without correct
exercise of the principle calling for initiative on the part of the
subordinate, decentralization, which is so essential, and which is
premised on division of labor, will not work.
CALCULATED RISK
The ability of a naval commander to make consistently sound military
decisions is the result of a combination of attributes. The natural
talent of the individual, his temperament, his reactions in emergencies,
his courage, and his professional knowledge all contribute to his
proficiency and to the accuracy of his judgment. We have spent years
training our officers to think clearly and for themselves, to the end
that when entrusted with the responsibility of making decisions in time
of war they would be fully qualified.
One of the mental processes that has become almost a daily
responsibility for all those in command is that of calculating the risk
involved in a given course of action. That may mean the risks attendant
upon disposition of forces, such as had to be taken before the Battle of
Midway, when an erroneous evaluation might have left us in a most
unfavorable strategic position; the risks of losses in contemplated
engagements, such as the Battle of Guadalcanal on 13-14-15 November
1942; the risks of success or failure dependent upon correct evaluation
of political conditions, of which the North African landings are an
example, and a host of others.
Calculating risks does not mean taking a gamble. It is more than
figuring the odds. It is not reducible to a formula. It is the analysis
of all factors which collectively indicate whether or not the
consequences to ourselves will be more than compensated for by the
damage to the enemy or interference with his plans. Correct calculation
of risks, by orderly reasoning, is the responsibility of every naval
officer who participates in combat, and many who do not. It is a
pleasure to report that almost universally that responsibility is not
only accepted, but sought, and that there have been few cases where it
has not been properly discharged.
LOGISTICS
The war has been variously termed a war of production and a war of
machines. Whatever else it is, so far as the United States is concerned,
it is a war of logistics. The
Page 35
(Plate 4 here.)
Page 36
the Army-of course-have presented problems nothing short of colossal,
and have required the most careful and intricate planning. The profound
effect of logistic problems on our strategic decisions is described
elsewhere in this report, but to all who do not have to traverse them,
the tremendous distances, particularly those in the Pacific, are not
likely to have full significance. It is no easy matter in a global war
to have the right materials in the right places at the right times in
the right quantities.
Superimposed on the shipping requirements for the overhead of logistic
needs has been the transportation of Army troops and the demands of
lend-lease. The combination of circumstances has made shipping a
question of primary importance which has been reflected in the
shipbuilding industry and the merchant marine.
When war was declared, an immediate estimate of the situation with
respect to material was made, as a result of which we could see that, no
matter how much material was produced within the next year, it would not
be enough. Therefore, with the idea of doing the first thing first,
every effort was made to produce as much material as possible of all
kinds, with the idea that as the war progressed our estimates could be
revised to fit our needs. Stock piles of spare parts and materials
needed for routine maintenance and repair of ships and aircraft were
therefore established at advance bases, additional supplies being
delivered under regular schedule.
Plate 4 is an over-generalization of the situation which existed in
April 1942 with respect to the relationships involving munitions,
manpower, and the eight fronts. From an examination of the diagram it
will be seen that in order to keep our operating forces balanced in such
a way as to conform to our planned operations, we had to maintain a
continuous flow of munitions and manpower from sources of supply. The
quantities involved, of course, had to be varied in accordance with the
importance of any particular front, that is to say, the urgency of a
particular campaign or operation. It is interesting to note that the
United States was, and is, the only nation represented as having a full
supply of both munitions and manpower.
It became possible to anticipate the needs for material much more
accurately after we had been in the war a little over a year, and
numerous changes were made in the methods of controlling the flow to the
operating forces.
In supplying the forces afloat with the material they need, different
methods are required. For example, spare parts and materials can be put
on a regular schedule, but in distributing battle damage spares, which
consist of complete units of pumps, turbines, boilers, turbo generators,
steering gear and other assemblies, it has been found advantageous to
keep them in stock at depots in the United States, and to effect
immediate delivery to points where they are needed. For example, on one
occasion a damaged submarine put into a distant base for extensive
replacement of her main drive controls and power cables. Within thirty-
six hours after receiving the information covering her needs a transport
plane loaded with nine tons of parts took off for the advance base.
CHARACTER
While every kind of naval warfare has been experienced, with naval air
power more often than not predominating, the war to date has to a degree
become charac-
Page 37
terized by numerous amphibious operations-a method of warfare with which
the Japanese had had considerable experience. Our previous conclusions
that this type of warfare required a technique of its own involving the
closest coordination of all forces engaged-land, sea and air-have been
confirmed. The very exigencies of such operations have done much to
promote effective cooperation between those forces, and they have also
made all hands realize that the uniform they wear signifies first that
they are members of United States forces, and second that they are
members of a particular unit of those forces. The inevitable solution to
successful amphibious warfare is unified command, under which system all
those participating are under the command of the individual best
qualified to conduct the operation regardless of his status in our armed
forces.
Strategy
The trend of events during the two years following the outbreak of war
in Europe indicated that the war would eventually engulf the United
States and become global in all its aspects. In keeping with that trend,
the growing truculence of Japan and the continuous clash of Japan's
policies with the policies of the United States made it likely that that
country would enter the war at the most propitious moment. Because of
that attitude, we were forced to retain the major part of our naval
strength in the Pacific, in spite of the unfavorable situation in Europe
reflecting the possibility of the need of our naval strength in the
Atlantic. We were therefore placed in an unfavorable strategic position,
in that our naval forces at that time were not adequate to meet the
demands in both oceans should we be forced into the war.
The sudden treacherous attack by Japan, which resulted in heavy losses
to us, made our unfavorable strategic position at the outbreak of war
even worse than we had anticipated. Had we not suffered those losses,
however, our fleet could not have proceeded to Manila as many people
supposed and there relieved our hard pressed forces. Such an undertaking
at that time, with the means at hand to carry it out and Support it,
would have been disastrous.
Although we had made some progress, and had for some months been
increasing our defenses in the Western Hemisphere, our armed forces and
our production were not adequately expanded and developed to permit our
taking the overall offensive in any theater. The Army ground and air
forces and our shipping were not yet prepared to move overseas in
sufficient strength for an offensive, and the Navy, even without the
losses sustained at Pearl Harbor, could not alone carry the war to the
enemy. We were therefore forced to assume the defensive in both oceans,
while preparations for an amphibious war were intensified.
Our strategy in the Atlantic involved maintaining our lines of
communications to Great Britain and to future bases of operations
against our enemies in Europe, in addition to insuring the security of
the Western Hemisphere. The control of the Atlantic was being vigorously
contested by German submarine and air forces, while the Axis face forces
constituted a threat of no mean proportions. To meet the situation we
trained men and manned ships and aircraft as soon as we could in order
to assume the
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offensive. By the end of 1942, we were ready and moved overseas in force
with the Army.
By the spring of 1943, the war against German submarines in the Atlantic
had turned in our favor and we were fully on the offensive in that area.
Furthermore, we had built up to our strategic requirements for the
transportation and support of our Army ground and air forces overseas
and the reinforcement of British naval forces guarding against the
outbreak of the German surface forces. Coincident with this expansion
and general increase in our strength, there was a rapid buildup in the
forces employed in the Pacific.
At the outbreak of the war with Japan, we were initially placed on the
defensive, but while we were so engaged we made all preparations to
seize the initiative as soon as possible and embark on our own offensive
operations. To that end, our fleet supported the operations of the
Allied forces throughout the Pacific in retaining key positions and
preventing further encroachments by the enemy.
In view of the absence of any well developed bases in Australia and in
the South Pacific Islands between Australia and the United States one of
our first problems was to build bases which would serve as links in the
line of communications. Early in 1942, therefore, after surveying the
situation, Efate, Espiritu Santo, and certain islands in the Fijis and
New Caledonia were selected for advance bases, and developed in varying
degree to suit our purposes. The establishment of those bases, which
have been in constant use as fuel and troop staging stations and as
distribution points for material and supplies, was in large measure
responsible for our ability to stand off the Japanese in their advance
toward Australia and New Zealand. Without them we should have been at
such a disadvantage that it is doubtful if the enemy could have been
checked.
While essential sea and air communications to Alaska, Hawaii, New
Zealand, Australia, and other intermediate positions were being
established and protected, our submarines immediately took the offensive
in enemy waters. Also during this period, our naval air task forces were
instrumental in attacking enemy positions and in turning back enemy
seaborne forces, particularly in the Coral Sea and off Midway. The enemy
succeeded in making an incursion into the western Aleutians.
The actions in the Coral Sea and at Midway did much to wrest the
initiative from the enemy and slow down further advance. Our first
really offensive operation was the seizure of Guadalcanal in August
1942. This campaign was followed by a general offensive made possible by
increases in our amphibious forces and in our naval forces in general,
which has continued to gain momentum on the entire Pacific front. At the
end of February 1944, the enemy had been cleared from the Aleutians, had
been pushed well out of the Solomons, had been ejected from the Gilberts
and western Marshalls, was being attacked elsewhere, and was forced to
adopt a defensive delaying strategy. Meanwhile, our own positions in the
Pacific had been strengthened.
At the end of February 1944, therefore, we were in a position to support
our submarines, which had been on the offensive from the beginning of
the war, with strong naval forces, some of which were ground and air
forces not needed on the European front. A similar situation exists in
the Atlantic, in that the sea lanes are under our control and we are
definitely on the offensive in that area.
Page 39
The Pacific Theater
The war in the Pacific may be regarded as having four stages:
(a) The defensive, when we were engaged almost exclusively in protecting
our shores and our lines of communication from the encroachments of the
enemy.
(b) The defensive-offensive, during which, although our operations were
chiefly defensive in character, we were able nevertheless to take
certain offensive measures.
(c) The offensive-defensive, covering the period immediately following
our seizure of the initiative, but during which we still had to use a
large part of our forces to defend our recent gains.
(d) The offensive, which began when our advance bases were no longer
seriously threatened and we became able to attack the enemy at places of
our own choosing.
The Defensive
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese withdrew from the central
Pacific and for the time being, except for the capture of the islands of
Guam and Wake, confined their major attacks to the Philippine Islands
and Netherlands East Indies. Our own operations were of necessity
limited to that line of enemy advance. Guam was easily taken. Our forces
on Wake, after gallant resistance which took a large toll of enemy
attacking forces, far superior in strength, were overcome at the end of
December.
Except for the forces in the Philippine Islands under General (now
General of the Army) Douglas MacArthur, our strength in the western
Pacific area consisted chiefly of the Asiatic Fleet, a few aviation
units, and the garrisons of marines at Guam and Wake already referred
to. The small Asiatic Fleet commanded by Admiral Thomas C. Hart included
the heavy cruiser HOUSTON, the light cruiser MARBLEHEAD, 13 overage
destroyers, some 29 submarines, two squadrons of Catalinas comprising
Patrol Wing Ten, and a few gunboats and auxiliaries which could not be
counted on for combat. With this force (plus the light cruiser BOISE,
which happened to be in Asiatic waters when the war warning was
received) we undertook to delay the enemy's advance until such time as
we could muster sufficient strength to put up any real resistance. In so
far as completely stopping the advance was concerned, the campaign was
foredoomed, but it nevertheless contributed materially to the ultimate
check of the Japanese advance, and the energy and gallantry of the
officers and men participating constitute a remarkable chapter in the
history of naval warfare.
During the latter part of November, when the Japanese advances along the
coast of Indo-china indicated the approach of a crisis, Admiral Hart had
sent MARBLEHEAD and eight destroyers to Borneo. Likewise, HOUSTON,
BOISE, and the destroyer tender BLACK HAWK, had been dispatched to
operate in southern waters. On the evening of 8 December therefore,
after the Japanese had bombed our airfields and destroyed many of
General MacArthur's planes, our submarines and motor torpedo boats,
which were still in Philippine waters, were left with the task of
impeding the enemy's advance. On 10 December the navy yard at Cavite,
which had long been recognized as inse-
Page 40
PLATE 5-THE DEFENSIVE PHASE IN THE PACIFIC
1. BATTLE OF MAKASSAR STRAIT, 24 JANUARY 1942: Japanese forces moving
southward are attacked by U. S. destroyers.
2. RAID ON THE MARSHALLS AND GILBERTS, 1 FEBRUARY 1942: U. S. carriers
and cruisers attack enemy bases.
3. BADOENG STRAIT, 19-20 FEBRUARY 1942: Combined forces under Rear
Admiral Doorman, R.N.N. engage Japanese force moving on Bali.
4. ACTION OFF RABAUL, 20 FEBRUARY 1942: Aerial engagement near the
enemy's major base in New Britain.
5. RAID ON WAKE ISLAND, 24 FEBRUARY 1942: A U.S. Task Force bombards a
former American outpost.
6. JAVA SEA ACTION, 27 FEBRUARY 1942: Combined forces attempt to
intercept Japanese convoys. The end of organized Allied naval resistance
in this phase of the war.
7. HOUSTON AND PERTH LOST, 1 MARCH 1942: The surviving cruisers of the
combined force are lost in an action near Soenda Strait.
8. RAID ON SALAMAUA AND LAE, 10 MARCH 1942: Carriers attack enemy ships
in recently occupied New Guinea bases.
9. RAID ON TULAGI, 4 May 1942: The opening blow of the Coral Sea
actions. U.S. carrier-based aircraft attack Japanese ships in the newly
occupied Solomons.
10. BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA, 7-8 MAY 1942: Carriers exchange blows.
Severe damage inflicted on the Japanese carrier force. LEXINGTON is
lost, but the Japanese advance is checked.
Page 41
(Plate 5 here.)
Page 42
cure, was practically wiped out by an air attack which also damaged the
submarine SEALION and the destroyer PEARY; SEALION being destroyed by
our own forces to prevent its capture. On the same day the Japanese
effected landings on the islands, and thereafter all attempts to bring
in effective quantities of supplies by sea proved unsuccessful. It
should be noted, however, that on 10 December there were some 200,000
tons of Allied shipping in Manila Bay; most of it good, and some of it
with valuable cargoes. All but one of these ships got clear, to the
southward, under what amounted to cover by our surface forces, and
escaped via the Sulu Sea and Makassar Strait. This was an important
"save."
The holding of the Army's positions on Bataan and Corregidor became only
a question of time, and Rear Admiral F. W. Rockwell, who was in command
of the local naval defense forces, moved with them to Corregidor on 26
December.
Admiral Hart set up his headquarters in the Netherlands East Indies.
Shortly thereafter General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, of the British Army,
arrived and assumed supreme command in that theater, whereupon Admiral
Hart became the Commander of the Allied naval forces. Until Admiral
Hart's arrival in Java, Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) William A.
Glassford commanded the surface ships in southern waters, assisted by
Rear Admiral William R. Purnell and other members of the Fleet Staff. Up
to this point (in so far as the Asiatic Fleet was concerned) the
campaign was conducted in accordance with plans worked out in the Navy
Department prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
The method adopted by the Japanese in making their advances through the
Philippine Islands and the Netherlands East Indies was built around
their air power. After building up their strength at a given base they
would overcome the consistently inferior Allied air opposition at the
next point of attack and then send along heavily screened amphibious
forces to make landings. As a rule, the distances were too short to
permit attack by our naval forces while the enemy was en route. As soon
as the enemy were in control of a new area they would repair the
airfields and gather forces for the next attack. These tactics were well
adapted to the geography of the Philippine Islands and the Netherlands
East Indies, particularly as there was almost a total absence of
interior communications in the islands occupied.
In January 1942, therefore, the Japanese had overrun the Philippine
Islands, and the greatest part of our strength was in the Netherlands
East Indies, for which the Japanese were obviously headed. Our
submarines and motor torpedo boats were engaged in slowing down the
enemy advance to give us as much time as possible to get organized for
the surface actions that were in prospect in the Java Sea.
THE JAVA SEA CAMPAIGN
In that situation, Admiral Hart had to plan all our operations without
air sup port except for a few Army bombers and a few fighters based on
Java. Our PBY4s of Patrol Wing Ten were not suited for the type of
operations in prospect, and as a matter of fact it was only the superb
work of their pilots in the face of enemy fighters coupled with the
mobility of our tenders that made their use possible.
By the end of December, the Japanese were preparing bases at Davao on
Mindanao, and at Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago. From these points they
moved south to
Page 43
attack Menado on the northern tip of Celebes, Tarakan in northeastern
Borneo, and shortly afterward Kema, with the obvious intention of moving
down Molucca Strait toward Ambon, Kendari, and Makassar Strait. By 20
January they appeared to be ready to move against Balikpapan, on the
east coast of Borneo.
Collecting the few ships at his disposal (until early February all
British and Netherlands surface ships had to be used to escort troop
convoys into Malaya) Admiral Hart decided upon a night torpedo attack.
This was delivered off Balikpapan (the action became known officially as
the Battle of Makassar Strait) early in the morning of 24 January by the
destroyers JOHN D. FORD, PARROTT, PAUL JONES and POPE under the command
of Commander (now Captain) P. H. Talbot. Whatever the losses sustained
by the enemy, the attack (one of four attempts by our cruisers and
destroyers to come to grips with the enemy at sea) was brilliantly
executed, and was responsible for the stalling of that particular force
for some time at Balikpapan. Other amphibious forces, however, continued
to advance eastward, and landed at Rabaul in New Britain and at
Bougainville in the Solomons. New positions on the coast of Borneo were
also seized by the enemy, and in the first few days of February they
captured Ambon and began bombing Soerabaja and several other Javanese
points.
In furtherance of the effort to delay the enemy drive, a striking force
consisting of four cruisers and seven destroyers, about half of which
were Netherlands and the other half American, was formed under the
command of Rear Admiral Doorman of the Netherlands Navy. A large enemy
convoy having gathered at Balikpapan, Admiral Doorman undertook to run
up Madoera Strait into the Java Sea and deliver an attack, but our
forces were discovered by Japanese planes and subjected to a prolonged
bombing attack which prevented the carrying out of the plan. During this
attack HOUSTON suffered one direct hit which destroyed her number three
turret and MARBLEHEAD was forced to retire to the south coast of Java to
effect temporary repairs.
Continuing their advance, the Japanese attacked Palembang in southeast
Sumatra and entered Banka Strait. Admiral Doorman's force, in a second
effort to interfere with the enemy operation, was again forced to
withdraw by enemy planes. By 14 February the Japanese in Borneo and
Celebes were in a position to advance on Bali and eastern Java, and
Japanese forces in Sumatra were also threatening Java.
At this point in the campaign, in accordance with previous agreements
providing that it would be conducted by the Netherlands, Admiral Hart
relinquished operational command of Allied naval forces to Vice Admiral
Helfrich of the Netherlands Navy, and a few days later General Wavell
turned over his command and left the area.
Having been subjected to daily bombing at Soerabaja, our headquarters
were transferred from Soerabaja to Tjilatjap on the south coast of Java.
On 19 February Darwin (most of our forces basing there had been
transferred to Tjilatjap because Darwin not entirely suitable from the
beginning, was becoming untenable), on the north coast of Australia, was
subjected to a heavy air raid which destroyed the airport, warehouse
docks, and virtually every ship in the harbor, including our destroyer
PEARY.
Enemy forces having landed on the southeast coast of Bali, and seized
the airfield
Page 44
there, Admiral Doorman, with his composite force, attacked enemy vessels
in Badoeng Strait on the night of 19-20 February. This action resulted
in the sinking of the Netherlands destroyer PIET HEIN and damage to the
Netherlands cruisers JAVA and TROMP and to our destroyer STEWART. Damage
to the enemy in this action was impossible to assess but was believed to
be considerable.
The action in Badoeng Strait was encouraging but it did little to impede
the Japanese, who now controlled all the northern approaches to the
Netherlands East Indies, and seemed about to move on Java. In an effort
to bolster up our strength with fighter planes, LANGLEY with planes and
crew on board, and SEAWITCH, with more planes, were diverted to Java. On
26 February LANGLEY was sunk by enemy bombers. PECOS, a tanker, was sunk
about the same time in the same area. SEAWITCH arrived safely at
Tjilatj