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THIRD AND FINAL REPORT
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Covering the period 1 March 1945 to 1 October 1945
by
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King,
Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations
(Issued 8 December 1945)
THIRD REPORT
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL .......................................... 166
I INTRODUCTION ............................................... 167
II COMBAT OPERATIONS: PACIFIC ................................. 173
The Capture of Iwo Jima .................................... 173
Assault on Okinawa and its Capture ......................... 175
Fast Carrier Force Operation in Support of
Okinawa Invasion ....................................... 180
Joint Operations in the Philippines and Borneo ............. 183
Fast Carrier Force Pre-Invasion Operations
against Japan .......................................... 188
Contributory Operations .................................... 190
The Surrender and Occupation of Japan ...................... 192
III LOGISTICS AND BASES-PACIFIC ................................ 196
IV SUBMARINE OPERATIONS ....................................... 201
Attacks on Merchant Shipping ............................... 201
Attack on Naval Vessels .................................... 202
Special Missions ........................................... 203
V ATLANTIC OPERATIONS ........................................ 205
Antisubmarine Operations ................................... 205
Tenth Fleet ................................................ 206
U. S. Naval Forces in Europe ............................... 207
U. S. Atlantic Fleet ....................................... 211
VI SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL .............................. 213
Shipbuilding Program ....................................... 213
Aircraft ................................................... 214
Personnel .................................................. 216
Health ..................................................... 219
The Marine Corps ........................................... 221
The Coast Guard ............................................ 222
VII NAVAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DURING WORLD WAR II ......... 225
VIII CONCLUSION ................................................ 231
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UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, DC
TO: The Honorable James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
On 1 March of this year I presented to you my second annual report of
the progress of our naval operations and the expansion of our naval
establishment during the preceding year.
Since the terminal date of my second report major hostilities on all
fronts have terminated victoriously for the nations allied against the
Axis powers, and I transmit to you herewith my third and final report of
operations of the United States Navy in World War II. This report covers
the period 1 March 1945 to 1 October 1945.
The Navy built and manned by the united efforts of this country
continued to carry the action to the enemy, engaged him by sea and air,
maintained control of the essential lanes of sea communication and
transported men and supplies over all oceans to all theaters. The
significant role of amphibious operations in this war was strikingly
portrayed in the capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which were the
outstanding operations of this type during the last months of the war.
They exemplify the teamwork of all services which brought victory on
both the European and Pacific fronts.
For the officers and men of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, I
am happy to report, at the end of the war, that the missions and tasks
assigned all of them, singly and collectively, have been successfully
accomplished.
Ernest J. King
Fleet Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations
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Chapter I
Introduction
MY two previous reports carried to 1 March 1945 the account of the
development of our naval strength and the participation of the United
States Navy in combat operations. The present report is intended
primarily to cover the period of the succeeding seen months, during
which Germany surrendered and the war with Japan came to an end. This
being my last report, however, I am including herein my considered
general comment and observations on the war as a whole.
The major strategic decision of the war provided first for the defeat of
Germany and then for the defeat of Japan. Both of these tasks have now
been accomplished and we can view in clearer perspective the two major
campaigns which led to victory. The contrast between them is at once
apparent. The war in Europe was primarily a ground and air war with
naval support, while the war in the Pacific was primarily a naval war
with ground and air support.
In the European war, sea power was an essential factor because of the
necessity of transmitting our entire military effort across the Atlantic
and supporting it there. Without command of the sea, this could not have
been done. Nevertheless, the surrender of the land, sea and air forces
of the German Reich on 8 May 1945 was the direct result of the
application of air power over land and the power of the Allied ground
forces.
In the Pacific war, the power of our ground and strategic air forces,
like sea power in the Atlantic, was an essential factor. By contrast
with Germany, however, Japan's armies were intact and undefeated and her
air forces only weakened when she surrendered, but her navy had been
destroyed and her merchant fleet had been fatally crippled. Dependent
upon imported food and raw materials and relying upon sea transport to
supply her armies at home and overseas, Japan lost the war because she
lost command of the sea, and in doing so lost-to us-the island bases
from which her factories and cities could be destroyed by air.
From the earliest days of the war our submarines, operating offensively
in the farthest reaches of the Pacific, exacted a heavy toll of Japanese
shipping. At a conservative estimate, they sank, in addition to many
combatant ships, nearly two thirds of the merchant shipping which Japan
lost during the war.
Our surface forces-fast task forces composed of aircraft carriers, fast
battleships, cruisers and destroyers-carried the war to the enemy
homeland and destroyed impressive numbers of naval vessels and merchant
ships. Our amphibious forces, operating initially behind air offensives
and under air cover launched from carriers, seized the island bases
which made possible the achievements of land-based aircraft in cutting
enemy lines of communications and in carrying devastation to the
Japanese home islands.
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(Plate 14 here.)
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Thus our sea power separated the enemy from vital resources on the
Asiatic mainland and in the islands which he had seized early in the
war, and furnished us the bases essential to the operations of shore-
based aircraft from which the atomic bombs finally were dispatched, and
on which troops and supplies were being massed for the invasion of
Kyushu and of Honshu. The defeat of Japan was directly due to our
overwhelming power at sea.
The destruction of the Japanese Navy followed the Nelsonian doctrine
that naval victory should be followed up until the enemy fleet is
annihilated. Of 12 battleships, 11 were sunk; of 26 carriers, 20 were
sunk; of 43 cruisers, 38 were destroyed; and so on throughout the
various types of ships, which collectively constituted a fleet
considerably larger than ours was before the war began. The few ships
that remained afloat were for the most part so heavily damaged as to be
of no military value.
In striking contrast is the record of our ships. (See Plate 14.)
Although 2 old battleships were lost at Pearl Harbor, 8 new battleships
have since joined the fleet. Against 5 aircraft carriers and 6 escort
carriers lost, we completed 27 carriers and 110 escort carriers. While
we lost 10 cruisers, 48 new cruisers have been commissioned. We lost 52
submarines and built 203. The capacity of the United States to build
warships, auxiliary ships and merchant ships, while supporting our
forces and our allies all over the world, exceeded all former records
and surpassed our most sanguine hopes. It proved to be a vital component
of that sea power which Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz has well defined
in the following words:
"Sea power is not a limited term. It includes many weapons and many
techniques. Sea power means more than the combatant ships and aircraft,
the amphibious forces and the merchant marine. It includes also the port
facilities of New York and California; the bases in Guam and in Kansas;
the factories which are the capital plant of war; and the farms which
are the producers of supplies. All these are elements of sea power.
Furthermore, sea power is not limited to materials and equipment. It
includes the functioning organization which has directed its use in the
war. In the Pacific we have been able to use our naval power effectively
because we have been organized along sound lines. The present
organization of our Navy Department has permitted decisions to be made
effectively. It has allowed great flexibility. In each operation we were
able to apply our force at the time and place where it would be most
damaging to the enemy."
In the successful application of our sea power, a prime factor has been
the flexibility and balanced character of our naval forces. In the
Atlantic the German Navy was virtually limited to the use of submarines,
without surface and naval air support. In the Pacific, Japanese sea
power was hampered by army control, and Japanese naval officers lacked
the freedom of initiative so necessary to gain and exercise command of
the seas. On the other hand, while ours was a vast fleet, it was also a
highly flexible and well balanced fleet, in which ships, planes,
amphibious forces and service forces in due proportion were available
for unified action whenever and wherever called upon.
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It is of interest to note, in connection with formulation of plans for
the future strength of our Navy, that our fleet in World War II was not
solely engaged in fighting enemy fleets. On numerous occasions a large
part of the fleet effort was devoted to operations against land
objectives. A striking example is the capture of Okinawa. During the
three months that this operation was in progress our Pacific Fleet-the
greatest naval force ever assembled in the history of the world-was
engaged in a continuous battle which for sustained intensity has never
been equaled in naval history; yet at this time the Japanese Navy had
virtually ceased to exist-we were fighting an island, not an enemy
fleet.
With the possible exception of amphibious warfare, which covers a field
of considerably broader scope, the outstanding development of the war in
the field of naval strategy and tactics has been the convincing proof
and general acceptance of the fact that, in accord with the basic
concept of the United States Navy, a concept established some 25 years
ago, naval aviation is and must always be an integral and primary
component of the fleet. Naval aviation has proved its worth not only in
its basic purpose of destroying hostile air and naval forces, but also
in amphibious warfare involving attacks in support of landing
operations, in reconnaissance over the sea and in challenging and
defeating hostile land-based planes over positions held in force by the
enemy. In these fields our naval aviation has won both success and
distinction. Because of its mobility and the striking power and long
range of its weapons, the aircraft carrier has proved itself a major and
vital element of naval strength, whose only weakness-its vulnerability-
demands the support of all other types, and thereby places an additional
premium on the flexibility and balance of our fleet. The balanced fleet
is the effective fleet.
In a balanced fleet the several components must be welded together
rather than simply coordinated. For example, submarines normally operate
"on their own" and hasty consideration might lead to the false
conclusion that it would be advantageous for submarines to constitute a
separate independent service. However, careful consideration will
disclose the fallacy inherent in reasoning from this premise. Actually,
the commanding officer of a submarine, to fight his ship most
effectively, must be familiar with all phases of naval tactics and
strategy. It is also essential that officers in surface ships understand
the capabilities and limitations of submarines. This is accomplished in
time of peace by requiring that submarine officers alternate periods of
submarine duty with duty in vessels of other types. By this means, the
point of view of the officer corps as a whole is broadened and in the
higher echelons of command there are always included officers who have
had submarine experience.
Aviation, though a specialty, is much more closely interwoven with the
rest of the fleet than is the submarine branch of the Navy. It is, in
fact, impossible to imagine an efficient modern fleet in which there is
not a complete welding of aviation and surface elements. This is
accomplished by requiring aviators to rotate in other duties in the same
manner as do submarine officers, and by requiring non-aviators to
familiarize themselves with aircraft operations-not a difficult matter
since not only carriers but also battleships and cruisers are equipped
with aircraft. Aviation is part of the ordinary daily life of the
officer at sea.
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Of course, it is not possible to effect rotation of duties of all
submarine and air officers during war. As a matter of fact, this is true
of duty in all classes of ships. It is necessary during wartime to train
certain officers-especially the Reserves-for one particular type of duty
and to keep them at it. However, the long periods of peacetime training,
in which an officer obtains the rounded experience to fit him for higher
command, have been utilized in the past to give officers experience in
varied duties and the practice will be continued in the future. The
wisdom of that system was proved during the war by the efficiency of
aircraft carriers, commanded by qualified aviators who also were
experienced in handling ships, and, particularly, by the efficiency of
the high combat commands of the Pacific Fleet. Many of the major units
of the Pacific Fleet, composed of carriers and vessels of all other
types, were commanded by aviators. The strength of the Navy lies in the
complete integration of its submarine, surface and air elements.
The epic advance of our united forces across the vast Pacific, westward
from Hawaii and northward from New Guinea, to the Philippines and to the
shores of Japan, was spearheaded by naval aviation and closely supported
by the power of our fleets. In these advances, some of the steps
exceeded 2000 miles and the assaulting troops often had to be
transported for much greater distances. The Navy moved them over water,
landed them and supported them in great force at the beaches, kept them
supplied and, particularly at Okinawa, furnished air cover during weeks
of the critical fighting ashore.
The outstanding development of this war, in the field of joint
undertakings, was the perfection of amphibious operations, the most
difficult of all operations in modern warfare. Our success in all such
operations, from Normandy to Okinawa, involved huge quantities of
specialized equipment, exhaustive study and planning, and thorough
training, as well as complete integration of all forces, under unified
command.
Integration and unification characterized every amphibious operation of
the war and all were successful. Command was determined chiefly by
application of the principle of paramount capability. A naval officer
was in over-all command of an amphibious operation while troops were
embarked and until they had been landed and were firmly established in
their first main objectives ashore. Beyond that point, an officer of the
ground forces was in command and directed whatever naval support was
considered necessary.
Unity of command at the highest military level, in Washington (as an
extension of the principle of unity of command), was never attempted
nor, in fact, seriously considered. It is a matter of record that the
strategic direction of the war, as conducted collectively by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, was fully as successful as were the operations which
they directed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff system proved its worth. There
is no over-all "paramount capability" among the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
warrant elevating one of their members to a position of military
commander of all the armed forces-nor, in my opinion, is there any known
system or experience which can be counted upon to produce the man
qualified for such a position. This war has produced no such man-for the
records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will show that the proposals or the
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convictions of no one member were as sound, or as promising of success,
as the united judgment and agreed decisions of all of the members.
In connection with the matter of command in the field, there is perhaps
a popular misconception that the Army and the Navy were intermingled in
a standard form of joint operational organization in every theater
throughout the world. Actually, the situation was never the same in any
two areas. For example, after General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower
had completed his landing in Normandy, his operation became purely a
land campaign. The Navy was responsible for maintaining the line of
communications across the ocean and for certain supply operations in the
ports of Europe, and small naval groups became part of the land army for
certain special purposes, such as the boat groups which helped in the
crossing of the Rhine. But the strategy and tactics of the great battles
leading up to the surrender of Germany were primarily army affairs and
no naval officer had anything directly to do with the command of this
land campaign.
A different situation existed in the Pacific, where, in the process of
capturing small atolls, the fighting was almost entirely within range of
naval gunfire; that is to say, the whole operation of capturing an atoll
was amphibious in nature, with artillery and air support primarily
naval. This situation called for a mixed Army-Navy organization which
was entrusted to the command of Fleet Admiral Nimitz. A still different
situation existed in the early days of the war during the Solomon
Islands campaign where Army and Navy became, of necessity, so thoroughly
intermingled that they were, to all practical purposes, a single service
directed by Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. Under General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur, Army, Army Aviation, and the naval components of his
command were separate entities tied together only at the top in the
person of General MacArthur himself. In the Mediterranean the scheme of
command differed somewhat from all the others.
All these systems of command were successful largely because each was
placed in effect to meet a specific condition imposed by the
characteristics of the current situation in the theater of operations. I
emphasize this fact because it is important to realize that there can be
no hard and fast rule for setting up commands in the field. Neither is
it possible to anticipate with accuracy the nature of coming wars.
Methods adopted in one may require radical alteration for the next, as
was true of World Wars I and II. It was fortunate that the War
Department and the Navy Department, working together for many years-
definitely since World War I-before the war began, had correctly
diagnosed what was likely to occur and had instituted, not rigid rules,
but a set of principles for joint action in the field which proved
sufficiently flexible to meet the varying conditions that were
encountered during the war.
We now have before us the essential lessons of the war. It is my earnest
conviction that whatever else may have been learned as to the most
effective relationship of the ground, naval and air forces, the most
definite and most important lesson is that to attempt unity of command
in Washington is ill-advised in concept and would be impracticable of
realization.
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Chapter II
Combat Operations: Pacific
THE final phase of the Pacific naval war commenced with the assault on
Iwo Jima in February 1945, closely followed by that on Okinawa in April.
These two positions were inner defenses of Japan itself; their capture
by United States forces meant that the heart of the Empire would from
then on be exposed to the full fury of attack, not only by our carrier
aircraft but also by land-based planes, the latter in a strength
comparable to that which wreaked such devastation against the better
protected and less vulnerable cities of Germany. After Okinawa was in
our hands, the Japanese were in a desperate situation, which could be
alleviated only if they could strike a counterblow, either by damaging
our fleet or by driving us from our advanced island positions. The
inability of the Japanese to do either was strong evidence of their
increasing impotence and indicated that the end could not be long
delayed.
THE CAPTURE OF IWO JIMA
The strategic situation prior to the assault on Iwo Jima, the command
organization for that operation and the forces involved, the landing on
19 February, and the first ten days of ground fighting, have been
included in my previous report and will not be repeated herein. As March
opened, fierce ground fighting on Iwo Jima was still in progress. The
front line ran roughly parallel to the short axis of the island, the
northeastern third of which was still held by the enemy. Our right flank
(4th Marine Division) extended inland from the beach just beyond the
East Boat Basin and faced the enemy's skillfully prepared defense
positions in steep and rough terrain, which made progress difficult; our
left flank (5th Marine Division) rested on Hiraiwa Bay directly across
the island; in the center the 3rd Marine Division had pushed a salient
along the central Motoyama Plateau to occupy Motoyama village and the
near end of Airfield No. 3. By nightfall of 2 March this last airfield
and the whole of the Motoyama tableland were under our control, leaving
the enemy in possession of a diminishing horseshoe-shaped area fringing
the northeastern end of the island.
Airfield No. 1 had for some days been in use by light artillery spotting
planes, but on 3 March it came into its own when a B-29, after a strike
against the Japanese mainland made a successful forced landing at Iwo
Jima. More of such landings followed as the tempo of air strikes against
Japan was stepped up. On 6 March the first land-based fighter planes
came in, made patrol flights the following day, and relieved carrier
aircraft in close support of troops on the third day after arrival.
Airfield No. 2 was operational on 16 March.
Progress during the first week of March was slow despite daily artillery
preparation, supplemented by naval gunfire and air strikes before each
ground attack. On
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the night of 7-8 March the 4th Marine Division killed about 1000 enemy
troops who had organized a major infiltration. Subsequently the
resistance to our attacks diminished somewhat, and during the next three
days control was secured of all the eastern coastline to a distance of
approximately 4000 yards south of Kitano Point at the northeastern
extremity of the island. On 16 March the northwest shore had been
reached and Kitano Point isolated. Much mopping up remained to be done,
particularly of a small stubborn pocket of resistance in one of the
rugged gulches running southwest to the beaches from Kitano Point; but
on 16 March all organized resistance was declared ended as of 1800, and
the 4th Marine Division started re-embarking.
On 14 March the flag was raised officially and the establishment of
military government was proclaimed. On 18 March the 5th Marine Division
re-embarked. On 20 March the United States Army 147th Infantry Regiment
of the garrison force arrived. At 0800 on 26 March, responsibility for
the defense and development of Iwo Jima passed to the garrison force and
the Commander Forward Area, Central Pacific. The capture of the island
had taken 26 days of actual combat; over 20,000 enemy troops were
destroyed; and our casualties ashore, as reported on 17 March, were
20,196, of whom 4,305 were killed in action.
The diminutive size of Iwo Jima and its general barrenness, lack of
natural facilities and resources should lead no one either to minimize
the importance of capturing it or to deprecate as unreasonable and
unnecessary our heavy losses in doing so. It was important solely as an
air base, but as such its importance was great. Not only was the
pressure of air attack by our Marianas-based B-29's materially
intensified by the availability of Iwo for topping them off with fuel
and for supplying them with fighter cover from there on, but also there
was an increase in combat effectiveness of the B-29's due to the
heightened morale of personnel, heavier bomb loads, and decrease in
abortive flights. There was, moreover, a substantial saving in valuable
life in the number of B-29's which would have been shot down over Japan
had there been no fighter cover, and in the number which would have been
lost at sea had Iwo Jima not been available for emergency landings. It
is estimated that the lives saved through this latter factor alone,
subsequent to the capture of Iwo Jima, exceeded the lives lost in the
capture itself.
This loss of life during the capture resulted inevitably from the
strength of Iwo Jima as a defensive position and from the readiness of
the enemy. Neither strategic nor tactical surprise was possible in our
landing since, with Luzon and the Marianas in our hands, the seizure of
some point in the Nanpo Shoto chain was obviously our next move, and Iwo
Jima was by its location and the character of its terrain the most
profitable objective.
It had no extensive coast line to afford invading troops a choice of
landing points where they would meet little opposition, either on the
beaches or in subsequent deployments for advance against enemy
positions. Landing was feasible on only two beaches of limited extent,
and they were so situated that a single defensive organization could
oppose an assault against either separately or both simultaneously. The
Japanese were, therefore, well prepared to meet us.
The defensive organization of Iwo Jima was the most complete and
effective yet encountered. The beaches were flanked by high terrain
favorable to the defenders.
Page 175
Artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers were well concealed, yet could
register on both beaches-in fact, on any point on the island.
Observation was possible, both from Mount Suribachi at the south end and
from a number of commanding hills rising above the northern plateau. The
rugged volcanic crags, severe escarpments and steep defiles sloping to
the sea from all sides of the central Motoyama tableland afforded
excellent natural cover and concealment, and lent themselves readily to
the construction of subterranean positions to which the Japanese are
addicted.
Knowing the superiority of the firepower that would be brought against
them by air, sea, and land, they had gone underground most effectively,
while remaining ready to man their positions with mortars, machine guns,
and other portable weapons the instant our troops started to attack. The
defenders were dedicated to expending themselves-but expending
skillfully and protractedly in order to exact the uttermost toll from
the attackers. Small wonder then that every step had to be won slowly by
men inching forward with hand weapons, and at heavy costs. There was no
other way of doing it.
The skill and gallantry of our Marines in this exceptionally difficult
enterprise was worthy of their best traditions and deserving of the
highest commendation. This was equally true of the naval units acting in
their support, especially those engaged at the hazardous beaches.
American history offers no finer example of courage, ardor and
efficiency.
As a whole the operation affords a striking illustration of the
inherently close relation between land, sea and air power. The fleet
with its ships and planes delivered and supported the land forces. The
Marines took an air base from which our land-based planes could operate
with effectiveness far beyond that possible from our other bases in the
rear. The same general pattern marked our long progress all the way
across the vast central and western Pacific.
ASSAULT ON OKINAWA AND ITS CAPTURE
Our capture of the Marianas and Philippines had placed us on a strategic
line some 1300 miles from the Japanese homeland and across its direct
routes of communication to the south. The occupation of Iwo Jima had
advanced this line to within 640 miles of Tokyo at the eastern end. The
next step directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to secure a position
in the Nansei Shoto chain, which extends in a shallow loop from Kyushu,
the southernmost of the main Japanese islands, down to Japanese held
Formosa Okinawa, the largest and most populous island in this chain,
offered numerous sites for airfields from which almost any type of plane
could reach industrial Kyushu only 350 miles distant, and attack the
enemy's communications to Korea, to the Chinese mainland, and to the
Indo-China and Singapore areas. Since Okinawa also contained several
excellent naval anchorages, it was chosen as the objective; the
Operations against it followed immediately on those for the capture of
Iwo Jima.
From many standpoints the Okinawa operation was the most difficult ever
undertaken by our forces in the Pacific. It was defended by about
120,000 men (including native Okinawans serving with the combat forces)
with tanks and artillery. As possible reinforcements there were some
60,000 troops in various other positions in the Nansei Shoto chain, plus
much larger forces in nearby Formosa, Kyushu, and the
Page 176
Shanghai area. Also of great importance was the large native population,
which afforded the enemy an unlimited supply of labor, and which might
easily become a serious problem to us by clogging roads and imposing a
burden of relief.
The most serious threat to us, however, lay in the very factor for which
we had initiated the operation, namely the short distance from Okinawa
to the Japanese homeland, where lay the main reserves of air and naval
power. Just as we would be able to strike Japan to better effect after
securing Okinawa, the Japanese could strike us while we were attacking
that island. Japan's naval strength had been so reduced that it could
not hope for success against our own in a decisive action; but hit-and-
run raids, or perhaps forlorn-hope, honor-saving attempts, were a
possibility. Air attack, particularly of the suicide variety, was the
greatest menace, since the Japanese airfields within easy range of
Okinawa were too numerous to permit more than their partial and
temporary interdiction by our own air strikes against them. Severe
damage and losses, therefore, had to be expected and accepted as the
price of our success.
The operations for the capture of Okinawa were under the command of
Admiral R. A. Spruance, Commander Fifth Fleet. Major forces
participating under him were: the Joint Expeditionary Force (all
elements engaged directly in the landings), Vice Admiral (now Admiral)
R. K. Turner; the Expeditionary Troops (all ground forces engaged), the
late Lieutenant General S. B. Buckner, USA; the Fast Carrier Force, Vice
Admiral M. A. Mitscher, (including the battleships and other fire
support vessels of the late Vice Admiral W. A. Lee's Striking Force);
the British Carrier Force, Vice Admiral H. B. Rawlings; the Logistic
Supply Group (tankers and cargo vessels which serviced the fleet under
way close to the combat areas), Rear Admiral D. B. Beary; Service
Squadron Ten (the repair, supply and service vessels of all kinds, based
on Leyte Gulf, the Marianas, etc.), Commodore W. R. Carter; the
Amphibious Support Force (comprising escort carriers, minesweepers,
underwater demolition teams, gun-boats, and the gunnery ships assigned
to bombardment missions), Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) W. H. P.
Blandy; and the Gunfire and Covering Force (the battleships and other
gunnery vessels not with the fast carriers), Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo.
Numerous other participating task groups and units and their commanders
are not mentioned herein. About 548,000 men of the Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps took part, with 318 combatant vessels and 1139 auxiliary
vessels, exclusive of personnel landing craft of all types.
The greater part of the intelligence information required for the
operation was obtained from photographic coverage. Adequate small scale
coverage for mapping purposes was first obtained on 29 September 1944 by
B-29's of the XXI Bomber Command; from then on until the conclusion of
the operation, additional photographing was done at frequent intervals
by Army planes and planes of the Fast Carrier Force. The prompt
developing, printing, and interpreting of these photos, and the early
and wide distribution of the prints and of the information gleaned from
them, was an important feature of the operation.
The island of Okinawa, which is about 65 miles long, is roughly divided
into almost equal northern and southern parts. The northern area is
generally rugged, mountainous, wooded and undeveloped. The southern
area, which is generally rolling
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(Plate 15 here.)
Page 178
but frequently broken by deep scarps and ravines, is the developed part
of the island, containing the greater number of towns, roads, and
cultivated areas, the capital city of Naha, all five of the island's
airfields, and the strongest defenses. (See Plate 15.)
The preferred plan called for our ground forces to land on six miles of
beach on the southwest shore, protected from the prevailing northeast
trade winds and closely bordering the island's Yontan and Kadena
airfields. Four divisions were to be landed abreast on these beaches.
With the two center divisions advancing directly across the island to
the east coast, and with the left and right flank divisions pivoting
toward the north and south respectively, the Japanese forces in the
southern part of the island would be isolated by these maneuvers, and
were then to be overcome by attack from the north. Coincident with the
main troop attack, there was planned for the southeast coast a
demonstration, and an actual landing, if necessary.
Planned operations preliminary to and in support of the main landings
included the following: the seizure of the islands of the Kerama Retto
group, 20 miles to the southwest, in order to establish therein a
logistics supply and naval repair base and a seaplane base; the seizure
of the small island of Keise Shima, about 20,000 yards from the landing
beaches and 11,000 yards from Naha city, and landing army artillery
there to command the lower end of Okinawa; mine sweeping on a scale
greater than in any previous operation; the usual work by underwater
demolition teams; and the intensive bombardments by air and naval
forces.
Cargo and troops were loaded and embarked on the United States west
coast, in the Hawaiian Islands, in the southwestern Pacific, the
Marshalls, the Carolines, and Leyte. The various elements proceeded to
assemble afloat at Ulithi, Guadalcanal, Saipan, and Leyte. Following
rehearsals the several forces departed for the objective in the more
than 1200 ships of all kinds which the Joint Expeditionary Force
contained. Movement of all forces to the objective was carried out
without enemy interference. Operational breakdowns en route were
insignificant, a fact which speaks well for the efficiency of our
material and our personnel in operation, maintenance, and repair. An
indispensable element in the campaign as a whole was the covering
operations of the Fast Carrier Force, which are given in some detail in
the next section of this report.
The mine sweepers were in the van, and on L-minus-8 day, 24 March,
commenced sweeping under cover of gunfire from battleships of the Fast
Carrier Force, and continued this work up to L-day, 1 April. There were
75 sweepers; and the entire coastal perimeter of southern Okinawa was
cleared of mines during this pre-assault phase, in addition to the
sweeping necessary for the capture of Kerama Retto and Ie Shima.
Including re-sweeping, over 3000 square miles were swept and declared
safe prior to L-day. Some 177 mines were swept and about 80 floaters
destroyed. The thoroughness of this task is evidenced by the safety with
which bombardment and assault ships in great numbers closed the assault
beaches without significant loss from mines.
On L-minus-6 day the assault on Kerama Retto was commenced, and by L-
minus-1, 31 March, these islands and also Keise Shima had been occupied
against minor resistance. Nets were immediately laid to protect the
anchorages, and the seaplane base was established. Tankers, ammunition
ships and repair vessels were
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brought directly to this anchorage, which assumed a progressively more
important role as the principal haven for ships damaged by "kamikaze"
attacks of suicide planes.
Since L-minus-7, 25 March, Okinawa itself had been under intermittent
bombing and gunfire, and on L-day, 1 April, preceded by intense naval
and air bombardment, the Tenth Army landed according to schedule over
the Hagushi beaches on Okinawa against light enemy resistance. The
assault waves, embarked in amphibious vehicles, hit the beach at 0830,
moved rapidly inland, and by 1230 had captured both Yontan and Kadena
airfields with light losses. Prior to dark the Tenth Army, with
approximately 50,000 troops ashore, had gained a beachhead 4000 to 5000
yards in depth. Proceeding rapidly against initially weak resistance,
our troops crossed the island to the east shore, and on 4 April the
Yontan-Kadena segment of the island was in our hands.
The Japanese had made no serious attempt to stop us at the beaches where
we had landed; as the attack progressed from day to day, it was evident
that they had withdrawn most of their forces into the southernmost part
of the island, and had established their defenses in depth on terrain
admirably suited for defense and delaying action tactics. The enemy
defenses consisted of blockhouses, pillboxes, and caves, protected by
double apron barbed wire and minefields. Here the enemy used his
artillery unstintingly, and his defensive tactics were described as
"artful and fantastic."
In the north progress was rapid against scattered opposition; on 22
April all organized resistance in the northern two thirds of the island
had ceased, though patrolling and mopping up continued. In the south our
advance was stubbornly contested. From 4 April to 26 May our lines had
advanced only about four miles, and it took from 26 May to 21 June to
cover the remaining ten miles to the southern tip of the island. On 21
June, after eighty-two days of bitter fighting, organized resistance was
declared to have ended, although mopping up of two small enemy pockets
remained to be done.
On 18 June, while observing the attack of the Marine 8th Regimental
Combat Team, Lieutenant General Buckner, Commanding General of the Tenth
Army and the Ryukyus Forces, was instantly killed by a shell burst.
Command of the ground forces was then assumed by Major General Roy S.
Geiger, USMC, until after the capture of the island, when he was
relieved by General Joseph W. Stillwell, USA on 23 June.
The general pattern of the operation for the capture of Okinawa was
similar to those for the capture of Iwo Jima, the Marianas, the
Marshalls, etc.; it differed mainly in the size of the air, naval, and
ground forces employed, the length of time required to secure it after
the initial landing, and the number of naval vessels damaged or sunk at
the scene of operations by air attack, mainly of the suicide variety.
Having been experienced in previous operations, this form of attack was
not new, but the shorter distance from numerous air bases in Japan, and
the desperate situation which would threaten the Japanese if our assault
on Okinawa were successful, stimulated them to their greatest and most
fanatical effort.
The time element was closely connected with the extent of our ship
losses. By its very nature an amphibious invasion implies advancing a
huge number of vessels, both combatant and noncombatant, from a zone
dominated by one’s own land-
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based air forces into one hitherto dominated by the enemy's. Our vessels
are localized by the landing so that the enemy has not the problem of
finding them, but only of hitting them. Thus exposed, their protection
depends wholly on their own antiaircraft fire, smoke, and on cover from
our own carrier-based air forces, which are to that extent diverted from
offensive missions. This precarious situation for shipping continues
until progress ashore at the objective results in relief: first, by the
establishment of our own air forces, air facilities, antiaircraft
radars, and fighter-directors ashore in strength sufficient to dominate
the area; secondly, and more important, by releasing most of the
shipping so that there are fewer vulnerable targets presented to any
enemy that gets through. The longer this relief is delayed by the
continuance of ground fighting, the higher our shipping casualties
mount. The longer the Navy must remain in support of assault troop
operations, the more vulnerable it is to attack, and the higher is the
proportion of personnel and ship casualties. Slow progress on the ground
is directly reflected, therefore, in naval losses.
The first enemy air attack at Okinawa occurred on 24 March when the mine
sweepers arrived; the first damage was done on 26 March; and by 21 June,
when organized resistance had ceased, about 250 vessels of all classes,
from battleships and carriers down to destroyers and landing ships, had
been hit by air attack, by far the greatest proportion of them in
suicide crashes. Some 34 destroyers or smaller craft were sunk. Early
warning of impending attacks proved to be the best countermeasure and
for this purpose destroyers and other small vessels were stationed as
pickets at appropriate distances from the concentrations of heavier
shipping. These pickets took the heaviest losses themselves, but in so
doing they undoubtedly saved many bigger and more valuable vessels
during a critical three months.
FAST CARRIER FORCE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF OKINAWA INVASION
After the supporting operations for the Iwo Jima campaign were
completed, Vice Admiral Mitscher proceeded with his fast carrier task
force in support of the forth-coming Okinawa campaign. First he went
toward the Nansei Shoto in order to obtain photographic coverage of that
area. Planes were launched on 1 March, and excellent photo
reconnaissance was obtained for use in planning the Okinawa campaign.
While in this area, cruisers of the force bombarded Okino Daito Shima on
2 March, starting numerous fires and providing valuable training for the
ships participating. The force then proceeded to Ulithi for a ten-day
period of regrouping and logistic replenishment.
On 14 March the task force departed from Ulithi and proceeded toward
Japan t6 carry out its part in the invasion of Okinawa. On 18-19 March,
from a position 100 miles southeast of Kyushu, air strikes were launched
against airfields on that island in order to eliminate future airborne
resistance to our Okinawa invasion forces. Fleet units at Kure and Kobe
were also attacked with considerable success.
On the morning of the 19th the carrier FRANKLIN was badly damaged by
fires started when she was hit by two bombs from an enemy plane.
Outstanding rescue operations saved 850 men from the water, but the dead
and missing totaled 772.
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sweeps against enemy airfields to forestall an organized attack on the
slowly moving damaged ships and escorts. On 21 March 48 enemy planes
were intercepted 60 miles from the force by 24 carrier-based planes. In
the ensuing battle all the Japanese planes were shot down with a loss of
only two of our fighters.
In a four-day period Vice Admiral Mitscher's forces destroyed 528 enemy
planes, damaged 16 enemy surface craft, and either destroyed or damaged
scores of hangars, factories, and warehouses. Our own plane losses were
116. As a result of this operation, the enemy was unable to mount any
strong air attack against our forces on Okinawa for a week after the
initial landing.
On 24 March, under the command of Vice Admiral Lee, battleships of the
task force bombarded the southeastern coast of Okinawa. This was part of
a diversionary move to cover up the actual location of our landing
beaches; apparently the ruse was successful.
When the invasion of Okinawa began on 1 April, planes from the fast
carriers began a series of almost continuous strikes and combat air
patrols in direct support of the operation. For a few days enemy air
opposition was almost nonexistent, but on 6 April the Japanese finally
struck with fury against our ground and supporting forces. All units of
the carrier force performed admirably during the day's attack, knocking
down 248 planes, while losing only 2.
The carrier task force then proceeded northward, and on 7 April attacked
strong Japanese fleet units which had been located in the East China Sea
off Kyushu. Heavy weather handicapped our airmen, but in spite of this
they sank the battleship YAMATO, the cruiser YAHAGI and 4 destroyers.
Fires were started on 2 other destroyers, and only 3 destroyers in the
entire force escaped without damage.
While our planes were otherwise occupied in striking YAMATO and those
ships, the enemy resumed the heavy assaults of the previous day against
the carrier force. Combat air patrols destroyed 15 planes over the
force, and ships' gunfire knocked down 3 more. One suicide plane
penetrated the antiaircraft fire, however, and dropped a bomb on the
carrier HANCOCK; it then crashed on her flight deck, killing 28 men, and
badly damaging the carrier.
On 11 April the enemy resumed the air attacks on the fast carrier task
force. The number of Japanese planes participating was not large, but
their pilots were determined to destroy themselves by diving their
planes directly on the chosen target. Fortunately there were no direct
hits, but 8 near misses caused some damage. During the day our carrier-
based planes shot down 17 of these suicide planes, and ships' gunfire
destroyed 12 more, but they still constituted a serious threat to our
forces.
The next day the enemy shifted the weight of his suicide attacks to the
ships anchored at Okinawa, and the combat air patrols from both fast and
escort carriers had little difficulty in shooting down 151 enemy planes
over the islands.
On 15 April the carriers launched a surprise attack against southern
Kyushu airfields, destroying 51 enemy planes on the ground and setting
numerous ground installations afire. The Japanese managed to launch some
planes in opposition, and 29 of these were shot down before our aircraft
returned to the carriers.
Fighter sweeps were again launched against Kyushu on 16 April in an
effort to
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and destroyed 54 on the ground. In spite of this success, however, the
enemy launched heavy air attacks during the day against our Okinawa
forces and the fast carrier task force. All ground support was canceled,
and every effort was concentrated on a successful defense of the task
force. The final score for the day was 210 enemy aircraft shot down,
against a loss of 9 of our planes. Heavy damage was caused to the
carrier INTREPID when a suicide plane crashed on her flight deck at the
height of the battle.
On 19 April Vice Admiral Lee commanded a division of fast battleships in
the bombardment of the southeastern coast of Okinawa. This action
coincided with the beginning of the Tenth Army's all-out offensive. The
bombardment not only destroyed important military installations, but it
assisted in making a feint landing at that point appear authentic.
On 29 April suicide planes again attacked the task force in strength,
hitting and badly damaging two destroyers. The enemy paid for them,
however, with 25 aircraft knocked out of the air by planes and guns of
the task force.
After several days of relative calm, enemy aircraft returned in large
numbers on 4 May to attack our land and amphibious forces in the Okinawa
area. This attack was apparently part of a counter-landing operation to
aid their own ground forces. The fast carrier task force was not
attacked, however, and its fighters were free to defend the Okinawa
area, shooting down 98 enemy aircraft, while losing only 5 planes.
On 11 May another major air battle was fought over Okinawa and the ships
of the task force. Carrier-based planes shot down 69 enemy aircraft,
ships' gunfire accounted for 3 more, while 2 were destroyed in suicide
dives on the carrier BUNKER HILL. This ship was badly damaged, and 373
of her personnel were killed, with 19 missing.
The fast carriers moved northward on 12 May and launched additional air
strikes against Kyushu airfields on 13-14 May. Few planes were found and
virtually no air opposition was encountered over the fields. On the
morning of the 14th, however, the enemy managed to launch a force of 26
planes against the ships of the task force. Of these 6 were shot down by
ships' gunfire and 19 by combat air patrol; the remaining plane was
destroyed in a damaging suicide crash on ENTERPRISE.
On 24 May the fast carriers launched a clean-up sweep by 98 planes
against airfields in southern Kyushu. Except on Kanoya airfield little
activity was found, and it was evident that the previous strikes against
this area had been very effective. The score for the day was 84 enemy
planes destroyed, while our losses were confined to 3 planes lost to
antiaircraft fire off Kanoya.
On 28 May the late Vice Admiral J. S. McCain relieved Vice Admiral
Mitscher as commander of the fast carrier task forces.
On 2-3 June further long-range sweeps were launched against Kyushu, but
bad weather impaired their effectiveness. Only 30 enemy planes were
destroyed, while our losses were 16. By 4 June the bad weather had
developed into a typhoon, and the ships of the task force spent the next
24 hours in attempting to avoid the storm's center. Serious damage to 3
cruisers, 2 carriers, and 1 destroyer resulted.
Operations were resumed on 8 June when a final attack was made on
southern Kyushu. It was well executed, but previous raids had so reduced
Japanese air strength in this area that only 29 planes could be
destroyed. Only 4 of our carrier planes were
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lost. On 8 and 9 June, cruisers and battleships from Vice Admiral
McCain's task force bombarded Okino Daito and Minami Daito to the east
of Okinawa. These attacks terminated the supporting action of the fast
carrier task force, and on 10 June course was set for Leyte Gulf, where
they anchored on 13 June for a period of replenishment and repair.
For a period of nearly three months, the fast carriers and their escorts
had operated in and near the Okinawa area, giving invaluable support to
our occupation forces. During this time the task force had destroyed
2336 enemy planes, while losing 557 of its own aircraft. In addition,
widespread damage had been inflicted upon shore installations in Japan,
the Nansei Shoto, and upon important units of the Japanese fleet. This
remarkable record detracted considerably from the ability of the enemy
to oppose our landing forces on Okinawa, thereby contributing notably to
our final success.
British Carrier Operations
A fast British carrier task force, under the command of Vice Admiral
Rawlings, was assigned to Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet to assist in
the air support operations for the Okinawa assault. From 26 March to 20
April, and again from 4 May to 25 May, planes from this force rendered
valuable service in neutralizing the enemy air installations on
Sakishima Gunto, southwest of Okinawa. Carriers of the force were
subjected to frequent attacks by suicide planes, but none of them was
put out of action. Battleships and cruisers of the force bombarded
Miyako Jima on 4 May with satisfactory results.
JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES AND BORNEO
The situation in the Philippines on 1 March 1945 found United States
forces controlling all of Leyte and Mindoro, most of Samar except a
small area in the north, the central part of Luzon from Lingayen Gulf to
Manila and certain areas to the south. Isolated resistance was still
encountered within a few buildings in Manila and islands in the bay.
Guerrillas controlled substantial areas of the Visayan Islands and
Mindanao. Landings had been made on 28 February at Puerto Princesa on
the east coast of Palawan with practically no opposition. Control was
quickly extended over adjacent territory, providing airfields from which
enemy sea traffic in waters to the westward and southward could be
observed and attacked. Japanese concentrations still existed in many key
cities of the Philippines and along certain of the routes which our
ships had to travel to bring up vitally needed supplies and munitions.
In addition, though their general air strength in the area had greatly
diminished, the Japanese still controlled a number of airfields which
permitted harassing attacks.
A series of operations was undertaken to gain control of the important
straits leading into central Philippine waters in order to cut off enemy
reinforcements and to set the stage for the ultimate reduction of
remaining Japanese strongholds in the Philippines. The capture of
Palawan provided an effective barrier on the west and gave us a base for
naval and air operations which controlled the Balabac Strait entrance
from the South China Sea to the Sulu Sea. At the same time we secured
the most direct sea lane to Manila with an amphibious assault on Lubang
Island, con-
Page 184
trolling the Verde Island Passage just south of the capital. The islands
of Burias and Ticao were seized on 4 March and Romblon and Simara on 12
March. Possession of these islands afforded protection to our shipping
through San Bernardino Strait and obviated the need for the roundabout
route through Surigao Strait which was still subject to air attacks from
the Visayas.
The campaign to complete the reoccupation of the Philippines resolved
itself naturally into a series of amphibious landings to seize control
of coastal cities and other strongly held Japanese positions. In March
three such landings were made by forces of Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's
Seventh Fleet. (See Plate 9.)
The first of these landings was made on 10 March at Zamboanga, at the
southwest tip of Mindanao, in order to obtain control of the passage
from the Sulu to the Celebes Sea, secure naval and air facilities with
which to compress the Japanese remaining in the central Philippines, and
provide a further steppingstone down the Sulu Archipelago for future
operations towards Borneo. The attack group was under command of the
late Rear Admiral F. B. Royal. Light cruisers and destroyers bombarded
enemy positions there for two days while mine sweepers made sure the
approaches were clear. On 10 March the 41st Division was put ashore
under moderate enemy artillery and mortar fire. The troops quickly
overran Zamboanga City and the two airfields nearby, driving the
Japanese back into the hills. A further landing was made on Basilan
Island on 16 March without enemy opposition.
On 18 March a similar assault force landed at Iloilo on the island of
Panay. To clear this island and establish radar and air facilities as
well as motor torpedo boat bases, the 40th Division was staged from
Lingayen Gulf. Only token opposition to the landings was offered, and
naval gunfire preparation was withheld to save the lives of natives. The
assault group was commanded by Rear Admiral A. D. Struble. Iloilo City
was secured on the 20th; the docks and harbor area were found
practically undamaged. Subsequent minor operations had by the end of
March virtually cleared Panay and nearby smaller islands.
Troops of the Americal Division were used for the landing at Cebu on 26
March. Captain A. T. Sprague, Jr., commanded the attack group, which was
supported by a covering group of cruisers and destroyers under the
command of Rear Admiral R. S. Berkey. Although the beaches were well
organized for defense, the enemy positions there were found abandoned.
Cebu City was captured on the next day, but considerable opposition to
the advance of the troops inland developed, requiring extensive ground
operations to clear the island.
On 17 April, after naval bombardment and air strikes, the X Corps with
two divisions landed at Malabang (on Moro Gulf in southern Mindanao) and
moved overland toward Davao Gulf against light opposition. Rear Admiral
A. G. Noble commanded the naval task group and Rear Admiral R. S. Riggs
the cruiser force which covered the landing. Cotobato and its airfield
were secured on the next day. A novel feature of this campaign was the
successful use of light landing craft on rivers leading inland. Davao
Gulf was reached late in April and Davao City was captured on 4 May,
followed by further extension of control along the shores of the Gulf.
In the meantime, troops also advanced northward and effected a junction
on 23 May with a regimental combat team which had been landed at
Macajalar on the north
Page 185
(Plate 16 here.)
coast on 9 May. These operations effectively sealed off enemy garrisons
in the interior of the island where they could be mopped up at leisure.
The landing at Malabang was the last large amphibious assault necessary
for the reoccupation of the Philippines, but a number of minor landings
on the small islands were required in order to eliminate their
garrisons. The most important of
Page 186
these were: the crossing of a regimental combat team from Iloilo to
Pulupandan Point on northern Negros on 29 March, to assist in clearing
that island of the enemy; the landing of another at Legaspi, Luzon, on 1
April to facilitate the clearing of the Bicol Peninsula; and landings by
a third such unit at Sanga Sanga in the Tawi Tawi group on 2 April and
at Jolo on 8 April. Such landings were generally supported by naval
gunfire, as well as by air strikes. Landings were also made at Masbate
on 3 April; on Busuanga Island, lying between Mindoro and Palawan, on 9
April; and at Tagbiliran, Bohol Island, on 11 April. Bohol was the only
major island in the Philippines on which we had not yet established a
firm hold. From this time until the close of hostilities, most naval
operations in the Philippines involved small groups transporting and
covering American troops and guerrillas in shore-to-shore movements. The
major units of the Seventh Fleet were occupied with the invasion of
Borneo to the south.
The operations against Borneo, which began in May, were designed to deny
the enemy the fruits of his conquests in the Netherlands East Indies and
his use of the approaches to those areas. These included the capture of
Tarakan to obtain its petroleum resources and to provide an airfield for
support of the Balikpapan operation; the seizure of Brunei Bay to
establish an advance fleet base and protect resources in that area; and
the occupation of Balikpapan to establish naval air and logistic
facilities and to conserve petroleum installations there. (See Plate
16.) Vice Admiral D. E. Barbey was designated the commander of the
Borneo attack force.
The first Borneo operation was directed against the island of Tarakan,
approximately 185 miles southwest of Tawi Tawi, to overcome some 3000
Japanese that were estimated to be on the island, and to develop
facilities for future operations. Australian and American cruisers and
destroyers began shelling the island on 27 April and continued through 1
May. At the same time the mine-sweeping group cleared the necessary
approaches. Numerous neutralizing air raids had been made on airfields
in the area. On 1 May the attack group under Rear Admiral Royal moved
in. Units of the 9th Australian Division were landed on schedule with
only small arms opposition.
In the second Borneo operation the 9th Australian Division, reinforced,
was transported from Morotai to the Brunei Bay area of northern Borneo.
Three separate landings were made at Labuan Island and on the mainland
at Bintang and Cape Polompong. Air support was furnished by the United
States Thirteenth Air Force and the Australian First Tactical Air Force.
For ten days preceding the target date air strikes neutralized enemy
airfields and harassed troop movements and shipping in Borneo, with
emphasis on Brunei Bay targets the last three days. Mine sweeping began
on 7 June under the protection of Rear Admiral Berkey's covering force
of cruisers and destroyers. The mine sweeper SALUTE struck a mine and
sank with many casualties.
Beginning on 9 June a distant covering group of cruisers and destroyers
under Rear Admiral Riggs patrolled 50 miles west of Brunei Bay to
prevent enemy surface interference.
The attack group commander was again Rear Admiral Royal. On 10 June,
after an hour of heavy bombardment which caused the enemy to retreat
from the beaches, the assault waves landed without opposition and moved
inland against slight resistance.
When the landings had been successfully executed and one of the two
Japanese
Page 187
cruisers in the area had been sunk off the Malay coast by a British
submarine, the distant cover group was withdrawn on 11 June. Throughout
the operation motor torpedo boats rendered valuable assistance strafing
shore targets and patrolling the area. One hundred twenty miles to the
south at Miri-Lutong a supplementary landing was made by combined forces
after a week of mine sweeping in which 458 mines were swept.
The operations against Balikpapan were carried out under Rear Admiral
Noble as commander of the attack group, and Rear Admiral Riggs as
commander of the cruiser covering group. In preparation for the attack
heavy air strikes had been made for a month using the Army, Navy and
Australian air forces with as many as 100 sorties a day. The target date
was set for 1 July. Sixteen days prior to this, mine sweeping and
underwater demolition activities began with covering fire from cruisers
and destroyers. This was met with intense reaction from enemy coastal
guns. Three mine sweepers were damaged by enemy fire and three were sunk
and one damaged by exploding mines. There was some doubt as to whether
the target date could be met, but finally on 24 June destroyers were
able to get close enough inshore to smother the enemy guns before the
landing. An escort carrier group under the late Rear Admiral W. D.
Sample provided day and night air cover, since land planes were based
too far distant to assure their presence in the case of bad weather.
The attack force consisted of the largest number of ships used in the
Southwest Pacific area since the Lingayen landings. In the cover and
carrier groups were 9 cruisers (including 2 Australian and 1 Dutch), 3
escort carriers and destroyer escorts. The attack group was of
comparable scale. After an intense two-hour bombardment on 1 July, the
assault waves moved ashore. In spite of enemy artillery, mortar and
small arms fire, seventeen assault waves landed without a single
casualty. Stiffening resistance was met as the troops progressed inland
and fire support was rendered by cruisers both day and night. This
support continued through 7 July. A further landing at Cape Penajam was
made without casualties on 5 July. There was no surface or subsurface
interference with the attacking forces, and only four light harassing
attacks were made by enemy planes with no damage to our ships or
personnel.
While the period covered by this report witnessed no single naval
operation of the size and scope of the Leyte or Lingayen landings, the
numerous amphibious operations in which the Seventh Fleet participated
contributed materially to the consolidation of our positions in the
Philippines and the wresting of vital resources from the enemy in
Borneo.
These numerous amphibious landings were conducted on short notice and in
many instances were so closely spaced that for all practical purposes
they were concurrent operations. Their successful completion on schedule
reflects great credit on the commanders responsible for their planning
and execution. In addition to the landing operations, unremitting and
constantly mounting pressure was maintained on the enemy by Seventh
Fleet submarines, aircraft, and motor torpedo boats, which by June had
brought to a virtual standstill all enemy sea-borne and coastal
transport in the Southwest Pacific area.
Of equal importance with the offensive operations mentioned above were
the large movements of men and supplies into the Philippines, and the
extensive rede-
Page 188
ployment of men and equipment within the area in preparation for the
staging of the projected landings on the Japanese home islands. The
control and protection of the large number of ships employed for this
task were successfully accomplished without loss from enemy action,
although a considerable strain was placed on the available facilities
and forces.
With the cessation of hostilities, the Commander Seventh Fleet was
relieved of all responsibilities as senior naval officer in the
Southwest Pacific area and with a reconstituted Seventh Fleet assigned
the tasks of occupying and controlling the waters of the Yellow Sea,
Gulf of Pohai, the coastal waters of China south to twenty degrees north
and the navigable portion of the Yangtze River; the landing and
establishing of United States Army troops in Korea, and United States
Marines in North China; the evacuation of ex-prisoners of war and
internees; the support of operations of United States forces in the
China Theater; the clearance of mine fields and opening of ports in the
Seventh Fleet area; and the routing and protection of friendly shipping.
The planning for and execution of these tasks in the initial stages were
necessarily accomplished in great haste and with certain improvisations.
However, the new organization has been perfected rapidly with attendant
uniformly satisfactory progress.
FAST CARRIER FORCE PRE-INVASION OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN
After nearly three weeks of replenishment in Leyte Gulf, subsequent to
their support of the Okinawa operation, the fast carrier forces of
Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet, comprising the greatest mass of sea power
ever assembled, proceeded northward on 1 July toward Japan. This huge
armada was to complete the destruction of the Japanese fleet, conduct a
preinvasion campaign of destruction against every industry and resource
contributing to Japan's ability to wage war, and maintain maximum
pressure on the Japanese in order to lower their will to fight.
On 10 July the force arrived in the launching area, 170 miles southeast
of Tokyo. On that day strikes were made against airfields and industrial
plants in the Tokyo area; 72 planes were destroyed on the ground and
extensive damage inflicted on other targets. No attempt was made to
conceal the location of the fleet but, in spite of this, little enemy
air opposition was encountered.
Admiral Halsey then moved north to attack northern Honshu and southern
Hokkaido on 14-15 July. Aerial strikes dealt a severe blow to critical
water transportation facilities between Hokkaido and Honshu, when 5
railroad ferries were sunk and 4 others damaged. Again, little air
opposition was encountered by our planes. Simultaneously with these air
strikes heavy units of the force shelled Kamaishi and Muroran, causing
damage to the steel mills and oil installations in those cities.
On 17 July the Third Fleet moved south and was joined by units of the
British Pacific Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Rawlings.
Admiral Halsey was in over-all command and, on that day, ordered the
first combined American-British bombardment of the Japanese homeland.
Battleships fired 2000 tons of shells into the coastal area northeast of
Tokyo and encountered no enemy opposition during the operation.
On the following day American and British carrier-based planes struck at
enemy
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fleet units concealed at the Yokosuka naval base in Tokyo Bay. NAGATO,
one of two remaining Japanese battleships, was badly damaged. Numerous
shore installations and transportation facilities were also hit.
On 24 and 25 July the combined British and American naval forces
launched extensive air strikes against targets in the Inland Sea area.
The planes concentrated on the major fleet units still afloat at the
Kure naval base. Six major ships were badly damaged and, in all, 22
naval units totaling 258,000 tons were either sunk or put out of action,
sounding the death knell of Japanese sea power. Intensive antiaircraft
fire was met, and for the first time the enemy mounted aggressive, air-
borne opposition. A total of 113 enemy aircraft were destroyed during
the two-day attack, while only 12 British and American planes were lost.
A follow-up attack was made on Kure and the Inland Sea area by the
carrier-based planes on 28 July. Reconnaissance indicated that the enemy
fleet units had been effectively reduced by the previous strikes, but
additional bombs were dropped for good measure. Extensive damage was
also done to merchant shipping and to vital shore installations,
particularly railroad facilities. Strong air opposition was encountered
once more, but our aircraft knocked down 21 Japanese planes air-borne
and destroyed 123 on the ground for a total of 144 for the day, while
our forces lost 36.
On 30 July the Tokyo area was harassed for the third time in three weeks
by aircraft from the fast carriers, our airmen destroying 121 enemy
planes during the day and inflicting severe damage on lighter enemy
fleet units found in the region. Meanwhile, the fast battleships were
shelling the port of Hamamatsu on the east coast of central Honshu,
spreading havoc in that area.
For the first eight days of August the harassed Japanese homeland was
given a temporary respite while Admiral Halsey's fleet was riding out a
heavy typhoon. On 9 and 10 August, however, the offensive was renewed
with another air attack on northern Honshu. It was known that the enemy
had withdrawn a large part of his air force to fields in this area, and
the strikes were designed to destroy as many of them as possible. The
plan was partially successful, for during the two days 397 enemy planes
were destroyed and 320 others damaged. Almost no air-borne opposition
was encountered, and all but 10 of the destroyed planes were caught on
the ground. The British and Americans lost only 34 planes. While these
air strikes were in progress, battleships from the Third Fleet bombarded
the coastal city of Kamaishi for a second time, inflicting further heavy
damage on the steel mills in the area.
Admiral Halsey's final blow was delivered against Tokyo on 13 August.
Airfields and other military installations were the primary targets,
with 46 planes being destroyed on the ground. The Japanese tried to get
through to the surface ships, but 21 planes were shot down in the futile
attempt. The strong protective screen around the fleet was too much for
the fading enemy air strength.
On 15 August the order of Fleet Admiral Nimitz to "cease fire" was
received too late to stop the first of the day's air strikes planned for
Tokyo. It knocked 30 enemy planes out of the air and destroyed 10 more
on the ground. The second strike had also been launched, but it was
recalled in time; its pilots were ordered to jettison their bombs and
return to their carriers.
Since 10 July the forces under Admiral Halsey's command had destroyed or
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damaged 2804 enemy planes, sunk or damaged 148 Japanese combat ships,
sunk or damaged 1598 enemy merchant ships, destroyed 195 locomotives,
and damaged 109 more. In addition, heavy blows had been struck at
industrial targets and war industries, effectively supplementing the
bombing by B-29's. This impressive record speaks for itself and helps to
explain the sudden collapse of Japan's will to resist. Naval air power,
acting in close conjunction with naval surface power and Army bombers,
had beaten enemy land-based air power besides inflicting critical losses
on naval ships and seriously damaging many shore targets.
CONTRIBUTORY OPERATIONS
Although somewhat obscured by the more spectacular amphibious assaults
and carrier force operations which marked our major advances toward the
Japanese homeland, there were many other vital and necessary activities
which by their nature had more the form of a continuous pressure than of
major individual operations against the enemy. Outstanding parts were
played by the submarines (whose achievements are summarized in a later
chapter), by the land-based air forces, and, to a lesser extent, by the
Northern Pacific forces.
Northern Pacific Forces
Although usually hampered by foul weather, which ran the gamut of fogs,
rain, gales, snow, and floating ice fields, naval and air forces of the
Northern Pacific continued to exert pressure against the Japanese-held
northern Kurile Islands, posing a constant threat to the enemy's
northern flank.
Army and Navy aircraft flew such searches as weather permitted, bombed
and rocketed Japanese shipping and bases in the Kuriles several times
each month, and maintained photographic coverage to detect any increase
in enemy installations. Light naval task forces, usually consisting of 3
of the older cruisers and from 5 to 7 destroyers, bombarded coastal
positions in the Kuriles once in March, once in May, twice in June, and
once in July, and even penetrated the Okhotsk Sea in search of enemy
shipping. On 11-12 August cruisers and destroyers commanded by Rear
Admiral J. H. Brown, Jr., combining a high-speed antishipping sweep on
both sides of the central and northern Kuriles with bombardments of
enemy shore installations, intercepted two enemy convoys and destroyed
10 trawlers and a subchaser.
Land-Based Air Forces
With the exception of the B-29's of the Twentieth Air Force, the
principal missions of land-based air forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas
were support of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations, attacks on Japanese
shipping, and continued neutralization of by-passed enemy bases.
During the period of this report, the greatest expansion of land-based
air forces took place in the Army's Twentieth Air Force. Airfields in
the Marianas were constantly increased to accommodate greater numbers of
B-29's. When Iwo Jima became available for emergency landings, greater
bomb loads were carried safely, and fighter support became possible.
From that time until the end of hostilities, strategic bombing against
vital Japanese industries and cities was constantly stepped up,
coordinating
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with bombing by fleet planes, and many thousands of mines were dropped
in Japan's harbors and sea lanes. Destruction resulting from these
raids, and the final blows dealt with two powerful atomic bombs,
undoubtedly were a major factor in forcing Japanese capitulation.
Of less spectacular nature, yet also important in their effect on the
war, were the operations of other land-based air forces against enemy
shipping and by-passed islands in the Pacific. With the capture and
development of airfields on Okinawa, Army and Marine Corps bombers and
fighters of the Tactical Air Force and Fleet Air Wings One and Eighteen
were brought within easy range of the China coast, Korea, Shikoku,
Kyushu, and even Honshu, and were enabled to bring Japanese shipping in
these waters to a virtual standstill. Okinawa, as did Iwo Jima, returned
rich dividends for the investment involved in its capture by hastening
the war's end.
Support of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa campaigns, routine searches, and
constant neutralizing attacks against the many islands of the Pacific
still in the hands of enemy garrisons, were tasks which absorbed much of
the time and effort of Army, Navy, and Marine land-based aviators
throughout the Pacific, and were well coordinated with the air
operations of the fast carrier task forces in the advance toward Japan.
The last night of the war saw the first and only offensive mission
carried out from Okinawa against Japan by the B-29's of the recently
deployed Eighth Air Force, with their target the industrial city of
Kumagaya in northern Honshu.
Antisubmarine Warfare in the Pacific
By 1 March Japanese submarines had been nearly driven out of the central
Pacific by our countermeasures. Only an occasional supply or
reconnaissance submarine ventured into this area. Near the beginning of
March Japanese submarines were encountered near Iwo Jima, and during the
Okinawa campaign the Japanese made their main submarine effort around
that island. After the fall of Okinawa, most of the Japanese submarines
were drawn back to the homeland to aid in the defense against our
expected invasion. In addition to these anti-invasion employments, the
enemy was building and using a number of cargo submarines in an attempt
to supply by-passed positions. A considerable number of his submarines
were also employed for antisubmarine work. Our submarines made many
reports of sighting hostile periscopes and torpedo wakes. A number of
German U-boats continued to operate out of Penang, even after the
surrender of Germany.
In the main the Japanese submarines were ineffective, and our
antisubmarine measures bolstered by the advanced techniques used in the
Atlantic, took heavy toll. In return we suffered very light losses, with
the exception of the sinking-with heavy loss of life-of the heavy
cruiser INDIANAPOLIS probably by an enemy submarine, on 30 July. In
March and April antisubmarine measures executed by screening vessels by
planes from land bases and carriers, and by regular hunter-killer
groups, effectively checked the Japanese submarines and accounted for
several kills. It is interesting to note that several of these kills
were made by our own submarines. Through May, June, July, and August the
Japanese put an increased underwater fleet around Okinawa and managed to
cause some damage. including the sinking of
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a destroyer escort in July. For these operations the Japanese were
building and operating large numbers of midget submarines and human
torpedoes. It is believed that the destroyer escort mentioned above was
sunk by ramming a human torpedo. The Japanese submarine effort was
rapidly descending to the suicide level; but by the end of the war it
was well under control, as the Japanese shipyards were taking heavy
damage from the air and more escorts were being released from the
Atlantic after the surrender of Germany.
THE SURRENDER AND OCCUPATION OF JAPAN
With the reduction of Okinawa in June 1945, the campaign against the
Japanese Empire was concentrated on the home islands, with intensified
bombing by the Army Strategic Air Force from the Marianas, a rapid
acceleration of attacks by the Okinawa-based Tactical Air Force, and
far-ranging air attacks and bombardments by the Third Fleet. These
operations were climaxed by the employment of the atomic bomb against
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and, almost simultaneously, Russia's entry into
the war to open a strong three-pronged attack on Japanese forces in
Manchuria and Korea.
On 14 August Japan declared her acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam
Proclamation, which involved complete disarmament and surrender of all
military forces and equipment as set forth by the heads of the states of
Great Britain, the United States, and China. The instrument of surrender
was presented to Japanese representatives by General of the Army
MacArthur at Manila on 19 August 1945. This instrument provided that
Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific should receive the surrender of
the Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all
ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan,
minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38-00 North latitude, and
the Philippines; whereas the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet was
designated to receive the surrender of the senior Japanese commanders
and of all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese
mandated islands, Ryukyus, Bonins, and other Pacific islands.
For this purpose the Third and Fifth Fleets, which had heretofore been
alternative organizational titles for much the same assemblage of ships,
were now each assigned approximately equal forces and became separate
entities. Correlating the fleet assignments with the various zones of
responsibility assigned the various Army commands, Commander in Chief,
U.S. Pacific Fleet assigned naval responsibility to the Third Fleet for
the zone of the Eighth Army (to the northward and eastward of a line
crossing Honshu west of Yokohama and Tokyo); to the Fifth Fleet for the
zone of the Sixth Army (the remainder of the Japanese home islands to
the southward and westward of that line); to the Seventh Fleet for that
of the XXIV Corps (Korea south of 38 North latitude), as well as any
operations which might be carried out in Chinese waters; and to the
Commander, North Pacific, local responsibility for northern Honshu and
for Hokkaido.
Similarly, the three amphibious forces were coordinated with the
respective fleets and armies; the Third Amphibious Force under the
Commander Third Fleet for operations of the Eighth Army; the Fifth under
the Commander Fifth Fleet for operations of the Sixth Army: and the
Seventh under the Commander Seventh Fleet
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(Plate 17 here.)
for operations of the XXIV Corps and of any troops which might require
transportation to China. B-day (the date designated by Commander in
Chief, Army Forces, Pacific for the initiation of operations) was
proclaimed as 15 August 1945. At that time orders were issued to the
U.S. Pacific Fleet and to other forces under the command of Fleet
Admiral Nimitz to cease offensive operations against the Japanese. On 28
August a small force of our Army Air Force technicians landed at Atsugi
Airfield, 14 miles southwest of Tokyo, to prepare the way for a
subsequent
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air-borne landing and for the landing at the Yokosuka naval base of
Marine and Navy units. Originally it had been planned that this
preliminary air-borne force should land at Atsugi on the 26th, and that
General of the Army MacArthur should land there personally on the 28th
to discuss occupation arrangements with members of the Imperial General
Staff; simultaneously, Marine and Navy units should land at the Yokosuka
naval base below Tokyo, as well as at points in Sagami Bay.
The beginning of the occupation, however, was delayed 48 hours by a
typhoon, which also caused postponement from 31 August until 2 September
of signing of the formal instrument of surrender, a copy of which
Japanese emissaries had brought back from Manila. Nevertheless, on the
morning of 27 August an advanced unit of the Third Fleet, guided by a
group of Japanese naval officers, harbor pilots, and interpreters, and
provided with maps and charts, moved into Sagami Bay, which is just
southwest of Tokyo Bay.
On 29 August Fleet Admiral Nimitz arrived from Guam to break his flag in
the battleship SOUTH DAKOTA. Aboard MISSOURI Admiral Halsey, Commander
Third Fleet, entered Tokyo Bay and anchored off Yokosuka naval base. The
following day General of the Army MacArthur arrived at Atsugi Airfield
to set up General Headquarters at Yokohama. With him came an aerial
armada of troop-carrying planes. At the same time about 10,000 Marines
and naval personnel landed and took possession of the Yokosuka base and
neighboring fortress islands. Working toward a junction, the two forces
deployed. The last day of August many American prisoners of war were
freed and the area of occupation was expanded; new forces came ashore
from transports, some groups reaching the outskirts of Tokyo.
The Japanese naval base of Tateyama, across the bay from Yokosuka, was
occupied by Marines on 1 September, as American control spread smoothly
and swiftly throughout the whole area south of the capital.
The formal surrender of the Japanese Imperial Government, the Japanese
Imperial General Headquarters, and all Japanese and Japanese-controlled
armed forces wherever located, was signed on board the battleship
MISSOURI in Tokyo Bay at 0908 on 2 September 1945. General of the Army
MacArthur signed as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and Fleet
Admiral Nimitz signed as representative for the United States.
Even before the formal surrender of the Japanese government, the
Japanese commander of Mille Atoll in the Marshall Islands had
surrendered on 22 August aboard the destroyer escort LEVY, Mille being
the first of the many Japanese island possessions to capitulate as a
result of the Emperor's acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation. Nine
days later, on 31 August, on board the destroyer BAGLEY, Rear Admiral F.
E. M. Whiting received the surrender of Marcus Island.
The largest-scale island surrender, however, came shortly after the
senior Japanese Army and Navy officers at Truk Atoll had received word
of the capitulation of the Imperial government. By the act of signing
the terms of the surrender, the Commander of the 31st Imperial Japanese
Army committed the following islands under his control to laying down
their arms and awaiting United States occupation: Truk, Wake, the
Palaus, Mortlock, Mille, Ponape, Kusaie, Jaluit, Maloelap, Wotje,
Enderby, Mereyton, Rota and Pagan. The affixing of the signature of the
Commander of
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the Imperial Japanese Fourth Fleet further entailed the surrender of the
Japanese Navy-controlled bases of Namorik, Nauru, and Ocean. In the case
of both Army and Navy surrenders, the actual capitulation by individual
islands was effected over a period of several days following; however,
their submission became only a matter of time after the Truk ceremony.
It was estimated that a total of 130,000 Japanese military personnel
were involved in the Truk surrender-on Truk itself a total of 49,000
military and 9,000 civilians; on Babelthuap in the Palaus, 27,000
military and 12,000 civilians; on Ponape 8,900; and additional large
groups on Rota and Yap, with the remainder spread thinly throughout the
Caroline and Marianas Islands. On 3 September the surrender of the Bonin
Islands was received, and four days later the capitulation of 105,000
Japanese Army and Navy forces in some 60 islands of the Ryukyu group was
signed at General Stilwell's Tenth Army Headquarters on Okinawa.
Five days after the formal Japanese surrender, General of the Army
MacArthur entered Tokyo, and his troops raised the United States flag
over the American Embassy. It was the same flag which had flown over
Washington, D.C., on 7 December 1941; which had been hoisted over Rome
and Berlin; and which had been flown on the battleship MISSOURI while
the Japanese signed their surrender there.
Our access to the Japanese homeland gave opportunity at last for
securing reliable information as to conditions there, both by our own
observation and by conversation with Japanese officials who no longer
had the incentive or the ability to deceive either their enemies or
their own people. It was at once apparent that while the damage to their
cities and production centers by strategic bombing was fully as great as
photographic reconnaissance had indicated, the strangulation from our
less obvious but relentlessly effective surface and submarine blockade
and from our carrier-based air attacks had been a decisive factor in the
enemy's collapse. Their merchant marine had been reduced to a fraction
of its former size; of the few remaining ships, mostly small ones, only
half were still operable. Their food situation was critical, and their
remaining resources in fuel and all strategic materials were not less
so. It had been known that their few remaining carriers and heavy naval
vessels had been damaged, but it appeared that the fury of our carrier
strikes had forced them to withdraw all but a handful of men from these
ships, practically abandoning them.
Never before in the history of war had there been a more convincing
example of the effectiveness of sea power than when a well-armed, highly
efficient and undefeated army of over a million men surrendered their
homeland unconditionally to the invader without even token resistance.
True, the devastation already wrought by past bombings, as well as the
terrible demonstration of power by the first atomic bombs, augured
nothing less for the Japanese than total extinction; yet without sea
power there would have been no possession of Saipan, Iwo Jima and
Okinawa from which to launch these bombings. True, the Japanese homeland
might have been taken by assault in one final amphibious operation of
tremendous magnitude, yet without sea power such an assault could not
have been attempted.
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Chapter III
Logistics and Bases-Pacific
BEFORE the conclusion of the war, plans were maturing for the invasion
and occupation of the main Japanese islands. Two major operations were
projected: the first, with the code name of "Olympic," against southern
Kyushu; after consolidation there, the next-"Coronet"-into the Tokyo
plain area which is the industrial heart of Japan. The amphibious parts
of these operations-involving the preparation of landing beaches by mine
sweeping, underwater demolition teams, bombardment and bombing; the
transportation of the assault troops; and the initial landing for the
establishment of firmly held beachheads-were to have been the
responsibility of Fleet Admiral Nimitz.
The large-scale bombardments and bombings of the Third Fleet that began
on 10 July were actually in preparation for operation "Olympic." In mid-
August, as the war ended, the United States Navy had in the Pacific 90
per cent of its combatant vessels of submarine size or larger and 42 per
cent of its combatant aircraft. These ships, aircraft, support
auxiliaries and landing craft included:
Battleships 23
Aircraft Carriers 26
Escort Carriers 64
Cruisers 52
Destroyers 323
Escort Vessels 298
Submarines 181
Mine Craft 160
Auxiliary Vessels 1,060
Large Landing Craft 2,783
Combat Aircraft 14,847
Transport, training and utility aircraft 1,286
All six Marine divisions, or 100 per cent of the Marine Corps combat
strength, were also available for Pacific operations. The "Olympic" and
"Coronet" operations as planned would have been the largest amphibious
operations in history. While the Third Fleet provided strategic cover
and support for the amphibious forces making the invasion, the Fifth
Fleet was to have executed the amphibious phases of the invasions of
Kyushu and Honshu by transporting their troops and equipment to the
attack position on shore. By the application of naval force they would
have established the necessary ground troops in positions favorable for
further maneuvers to complete the destruction of Japanese ground forces.
In discharging its responsibilities for the amphibious phase of the
Kyushu or "Olympic" operation the United States Navy would have employed
3033 combatant
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and noncombatant vessels of a size larger than personnel landing boats.
Although the application of our sea power in its various forms proved
sufficient to bring Japan to terms without the necessity of invading her
home islands, the possibility of invasion on the scale contemplated
indicates the amazing progress in matters of supply and support that had
been made in less than four years of war.
In this evolution advance bases have played a vital role. The 1940 Navy
had no properly equipped advance bases other than Pearl Harbor. More
than 400 have since been established in the Atlantic and Pacific areas
in order to maintain the fleet and air forces in the forward areas where
there was fighting to be done. As we progressed across the Pacific,
islands captured in one amphibious operation were converted into bases
which became spring boards for the next advance. These bases were set up
for various purposes depending upon the next operation. At first they
were mainly air bases for the support of bombers and for the use of
protective fighters. This gradually changed to the establishment of
staging bases for the anchoring, fueling and refitting of armadas of
transports and cargo ships, and for replenishing mobile support
squadrons which actually accompanied the combat forces and serviced them
at sea. Further advances made necessary the development of repair and
refitting bases for large amphibious forces. As we progressed further
and further across the Pacific, it became necessary to set up main
repair bases for the maintenance, repair and servicing of larger fleet
units. The first of such large bases was set up at Espiritu Santo in the
New Hebrides and was followed by a main repair base at Manus in the
Admiralty Islands. It was then determined that so long as ships were in
condition to function in the battle line, minor battle damage and
derangements should be rectified in the forward area, thus eliminating
the necessity of returning ships to continental bases or even to the
Hawaiian Islands.
These conditions were recognized and steps were taken to support the
entire fleet in the Marianas, Philippines and Okinawa areas. A very
large base, capable of supporting one third of the Pacific Fleet, was
set up at Guam; another large base was established at Leyte-Samar; a
third was in process of construction at Okinawa when the war ended. Each
of these bases was designed to dock ships of various sizes, some being
able to take ships of the heaviest tonnage. All of the bases could
repair major battle damage to hull and equipment. Facilities were
established ashore with piers, roads and machine shops, in large measure
duplicating the type of facilities found at any of our navy yards. There
was also provided the replenishment storage necessary to restock every
type of vessel with fuel, ammunition and consumable supplies as well as
food. The stocks currently on hand at Guam would have filled a train 120
miles long. The magnitude of the fuel supply alone is indicated by the
total of 25,026,000 barrels of bulk fuel which was shipped to the
Pacific in June 1945 for military purposes. At Guam alone one million
gallons of aviation gas were used daily. As these bases were gradually
pushed forward, assault forces were brought two to five days steaming
nearer the enemy. By proper selection of the strategic points necessary
to accomplish the advance, we were able to by-pass and ignore many bases
established by the Japanese which they could no longer use because
their loss of command of the sea.
But for this chain of advance bases the fleet could not have operated in
the
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western reaches of the Pacific without the necessity for many more ships
and planes than it actually had. A base to supply or repair a fleet 5000
miles closer to the enemy multiplies the power which can be maintained
constantly against him and greatly lessens the problems of supply and
repair. The scope of the advance base program is indicated by the fact
that the personnel assigned directly to it aggregated almost one fifth
of the entire personnel of the Navy-over half a million men, including
almost 200,000 Seabees. In the concluding months of the war 82 per cent
of the Seabees were in the Pacific, the vast majority of them at work on
bases. In the Naval Supply Depot at Guam there were 93 miles of road. At
Okinawa alone there were more than fifty naval construction battalions
building roads, supply areas, airfields and fleet facilities for what
would have been one of the gigantic staging areas for the final invasion
of Japan
In the period covered by this report almost two million measurement tons
of materiel were shipped in connection with the advance base program.
An essential element in the facilities of our advance bases were
floating drydocks, which were capable of receiving vessels ranging from
small craft to the battleship MISSOURI. One hundred fifty two of these
docks were produced. They proved their special value in the speed with
which damaged ships could be returned to combat.
As our advance came nearer to the Japanese islands, the rear areas which
had been the scene of combat operations in earlier months were utilized
for logistic support. In the South Pacific, for example, more than 400
ships were staged for the Okinawa operation. They received varied
replenishment services, including routine and emergency overhaul as
required. Approximately 100,000 officers and men were staged from this
area alone for the Okinawa campaign, including four Army and Marine
combat divisions plus certain headquarters and corps troops and various
Army and Navy service units. Concurrently with the movement of troops
large quantities of combat equipment and necessary material were
transferred forward, thus contributing automatically to the roll-up of
the South Pacific area. Similarly in the Southwest Pacific area Army
service troops were moved with their equipment from the New Guinea area
to the Philippines in order to prepare staging facilities for troops
deployed from the European Theater. The roll-up was similarly continued
and progress made in reducing our installations in Australia and New
Guinea.
This vast deployment of our forces throughout the Pacific required
careful planning not only at the front but also in the United States.
During the last six months of the war the problem of materiel
distribution became of primary importance, and throughout this period
our system of logistic support had to be constantly modified to meet the
rapidly changing tactical conditions. War production had shifted the
emphasis from procurement to distribution; that is, while production was
still of high importance, a still greater problem was that of getting
well balanced materiel support to designated positions at certain fixed
times. Put another way, motion, not size, had become the important
factor. It was, nevertheless, essential in insuring the uninterrupted
flow of material through the pipe-line of supply to our forces overseas
that the reservoir within the United States which kept these pipe-lines
full did not become too large. On 1 June 1945 a set of standards for
Navy inventory control was promulgated which stressed a balance between
procurement
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and inventory. The attainment of these standards was of primary
importance to efficient distribution of materiel within the United
States, and particularly on the west coast, which was our major base for
the logistic support of the Pacific Fleet.
It has always been a cardinal principle of our Pacific logistic support
policy that the west coast be utilized to its maximum capacity. There
are two reasons for this: the source of supply must be as close to the
point of requirement as possible so that inventories at advance bases
may be kept to a minimum; secondly, greater utilization of shipping can
be achieved by the shortest haul possible. The integration of these two
elements, supply and shipping, was a major task in 1945.
When the collapse of Germany was imminent, a review in conjunction with
the Army of our policy of maximum west coast utilization was necessary.
It was concluded that approximately 68 per cent of the Navy's predicted
logistic requirements would have to be moved from the west coast to
bases in the Marianas, Philippines and Okinawa, as well as to the mobile
logistic support forces-Service Squadrons Six and Ten. Bases in the
Admiralties, New Guinea, and the Hawaiian Sea Frontier, since they were
in nonoperational areas, could be supported from the east and Gulf
coasts. In May, after a joint Army-Navy study, a ceiling was set on the
amount of materiel which could be shipped to the Pacific from the west
coast by the Army and Navy; this ceiling was based on the estimated
capacity of the six major west coast ports. By detailed study of the
capacities of port facilities and supply activities, as well as a
complete analysis of the types of commodities shipped by the Navy since
the first of the year, Commander, Western Sea Frontier (who coordinated
naval logistic matters on the west coast) reallocated the Navy's share
of west coast capacity among the various ports. Estimated tonnages were
set for each port, both by types of commodity and by overseas
destination to be served.
In the establishment and execution of this planned employment of west
coast facilities, Commander, Western Sea Frontier provided one of the
major links between the distribution systems of the continental United
States and Pacific Theater. Since the flow of materiel and the ships to
carry it are immobilized when more ships have sailed to a destination
than that destination can receive, the planned employment of west coast
ports was a matter of vital concern.
This was facilitated by the expansion of the functions of the Western
Sea Frontier which had taken place in November 1944 when the necessity
for coastal defense had assumed relatively minor proportions. The
expansion of function included placing every major activity of the three
west coast naval districts under a single command, with a view to
coordinating all essential matters of materiel and personnel and to
eliminating activities within the Western Sea Frontier which did not
contribute to the major effort.
While defensive operations became secondary, the responsibility of the
Western Sea Frontier to regulate the movement of ships and aircraft
through frontier waters was greatly increased. The eastern Pacific had
become a network of channels for the passage of traffic to the forward
areas. These channels were the most heavily traveled military highways
on and above the sea. In the period covered by this report there were
over 17,000 sailings of vessels large and small through the six million
square miles of Western Sea Frontier waters. In the same period an
average of one aircraft
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arrived on or departed from the west coast each fifteen minutes on the
longest over-water flight lane in the world.
The substantial increase in the level of Navy materiel movement which
occurred between March and July 1945 fully justified the planning for an
increased west coast load which had been undertaken. Total exports,
excluding aircraft, from May through July showed a 25 per cent increase
over March and April shipments. Items used in the construction of new
bases doubled during May and July as compared with March and April.
Ammunition shipments doubled, because of the considerable expenditures
during the Okinawa campaign (where 50,000 tons of 5-inch to 16-inch
projectiles were fired by surface ships) and the necessity for building
up a reserve for the assault upon Japan.
By the vast system thus developed the great concluding operations in the
Pacific were supported. Each month in the immediate past we shipped out
600,000 long tons a month into the Pacific Ocean areas. The momentum
generated by this materiel operation can be imagined. The problem
presented by the deceleration of this great tide of supply after V-J day
can also be imagined.
The following steps taken in the days immediately after the surrender of
Japan indicate the effort the Navy has made to reduce its logistic
energy as rapidly as possible without damage either to the domestic
economy or to the support of fleet elements still at sea. All shipments
of ammunition and of advance base components were stopped except those
required for occupational purposes and those specifically requested by
the fleet commanders as necessary for further operations. Maintenance
materiel movements overseas were subjected to careful review and
reduction. Stock levels at overseas bases of provisions, clothing,
equipment, medical needs, aviation requirements and spare parts items
were reduced to a thirty-day minimum and a sixty-day maximum. Orders
prepared in advance canceling procurement of materials were mailed in
tremendous volume from the Navy Department on the night of 14 August.
All continental public works construction projects, including those
actually under construction and those on which it was possible to begin
construction, were carefully reviewed-projects which were not required
for demobilization purposes or postwar purposes were canceled.
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Chapter IV
Submarine Operations
SUBMARINE warfare was an important factor in the defeat of the Japanese.
With the end of hostilities, it is now possible to reveal in greater
detail the splendid accomplishments of the submarines of the Pacific
Fleet and the Seventh Fleet. Our submarines are credited with almost two
thirds of the total tonnage of Japanese merchant marine losses, or a
greater part than all other forces, surface and air, Army and Navy
combined. (See Plate 18.) Of the total number of Japanese naval vessels
sunk, our submarines are credited with almost one third.
ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPPING
Our submarines, operating thousands of miles from their bases and deep
within enemy-controlled waters, began their campaign of attrition on
Japanese shipping immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, and
continued to fight with telling effectiveness until the Japanese
capitulated. During the early part of 1942, while our surface forces
were still weakened by the Japanese initial attack of 7 December 1941,
submarines were virtually the only United States naval forces which
could be risked in offensive operations. Although the number of
submarines available at the start was so small that the 1500 ton fleet-
type class was augmented by older types, submarine attacks produced
immediate and damaging results, which were greatly needed at the time.
They made it more difficult for the enemy to consolidate his forward
positions, to reinforce his threatened areas, and to pile up in Japan an
adequate reserve of fuel oil, rubber, and other loot from his newly
conquered territory. Their operations thus hastened our ultimate victory
and resulted in the saving of American lives.
Sinking of enemy merchant ships rose from 134 ships totaling 580,390
tons in 1942 to 284 ships totaling 1,341,968 tons in 1943. Then in 1944,
when submarine coordinated attack groups reached the peak of their
effectiveness, the merchant fleet of Japan suffered its worst and most
crippling blow-492 ships of 2,387,780 tons were sunk or destroyed in
submarine torpedo and gun attacks. The figures given above, which are
based on evaluated estimates, include only ships of 1000 tons and
larger. It should be borne in mind that our submarines sank or
destroyed, chiefly by gunfire, large numbers of smaller vessels,
particularly during the latter part of the war, when few large enemy
ships still remained afloat.
In 1945, because of the tremendous attrition on Japanese shipping by our
earlier submarine operations and the destructive sweeps by our fleets
and carrier air forces, enemy merchantmen sunk by submarines dropped to
132 ships totaling 469,872 tons. The advance of our forces had further
driven Japanese ships back to the coast lines and shallow waters of
Japan and the Asiatic mainland. Our submarines followed the
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enemy shipping into these dangerous waters and made many skillful and
daring attacks, such as the one in April when TIRANTE entered a
patrolled anchorage in Quelpart Island to blow up a 10,000 ton tanker
and two 1,500 ton escort vessels, which were peacefully lying at anchor.
Further south, persistent submarine patrolling plus air sweeps had, by
the end of March, stopped almost all enemy traffic along the sea lanes
of the East Indies and the coast of Indo-China.
(Plate 18 here.)
For a time, Japanese shipping continued to ply in the East China and
Yellow Seas, but the invasion of Okinawa in April soon made the East
China Sea untenable to the Japanese. Causing heavy damage, our
submarines were very active during April and May in the Yellow Sea and
along the east and south coasts of the main Japanese islands. In June
the landlocked Sea of Japan was penetrated in force. The submarines had
excellent hunting, and in a series of coordinated attacks did tremendous
damage to the remnants of the Japanese merchant fleet. One of the
intruders, BARB even landed a party on the coast of Honshu, and
successfully blew up a bridge and the speeding train that was crossing
it. By the end of the war, the Japanese merchant fleet was virtually
nonexistent.
ATTACKS ON NAVAL VESSELS
While United States submarines were effectively eliminating the Japanese
merchant fleet, they were also carrying out damaging attacks on Japanese
naval units. During the course of the war, the following principal
Japanese combatant types were sent to the bottom as a result of these
attacks:
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Battleship 1
Carriers 4
Escort Carriers 4
Heavy Cruisers 3
Light Cruisers 9
Destroyers 43
Submarines 23
Minor combatant vessels and
naval auxiliaries
(including 60 escort vessels) 189
Details of these sinkings will be found in Appendix A. While the loss of
the heavier naval units was critical to the Japanese, especially as the
strength of our surface fleet increased, the surprisingly high losses of
enemy destroyers and escort vessels to submarine attack are particularly
noteworthy. Our submarines, refusing to accept the role of the hunted,
even after their presence was known, frequently attacked their
archenemies under circumstances of such great risk that the failure of
their attack on the enemy antisubmarine vessel placed the submarine in
extreme danger of loss. So successful, however, were these attacks that
the Japanese developed a dangerous deficiency of destroyer screening
units in their naval task forces, and their merchant shipping was often
inadequately escorted.
SPECIAL MISSIONS
Among the special missions performed by submarines were reconnaissance,
rescue, supply and lifeguard duties. An outstanding result of effective
submarine reconnaissance was the vital advance information furnished our
surface and air forces prior to the Battle for Leyte Gulf, information
which contributed materially to that victory. Our submarines in a number
of instances rescued stranded personnel and performed personnel
evacuation duties, notably from Corregidor. The supplies and equipment
delivered by submarines to friendly guerrilla forces in the Philippines
did much to keep alive the spirit of resistance in those islands.
When our air forces came into positions from which they could intensify
their attacks on Japanese-held territory, United States submarines were
called upon to carry out lifeguard operations to rescue aviators forced
down at sea in enemy waters. Sometimes assisted by friendly aircraft,
which provided fighter cover and assisted in locating survivors, and
sometimes operating alone, our submarines rescued more than 500 aviators
during the course of the war.
Fifty-two United States submarines were lost from all causes during the
war, forty-six due to enemy action, six due to accidents and stranding.
These losses were due to continued penetration deep within the enemy
zone of defense, far from our bases, and, until the last phase of the
war, far beyond the areas where our surface ships and aircraft could
operate. Because of the nature of submarine operations and the general
necessity of submarines operating alone, the personnel loss in most
instances was the entire ship's company. As heavy as were the losses in
submarine personnel and equipment, submarine training and building
programs supplied replacements so effectively that our submarine force
at the end of the war far exceeded its pre-Pearl Harbor strength-and was
the most powerful and effective in the world. The Japanese capitulation
found our submarines on station searching for the rem-
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nants of the Japanese Navy and merchant marine, and on the alert to
rescue downed aviators off the coast of Japan.
Submarines of the Pacific Fleet have been commanded by Vice Admiral C.
A. Lockwood, Jr., since February 1943. Rear Admiral James Fife, Jr., has
commanded the Seventh Fleet submarines, including a number of British
and Dutch submarines, since December 1944.
No account of submarine warfare in the Pacific would be complete without
mention of the splendid contribution of the submarines of our Allies.
These craft, operating in the southwest Pacific, contributed materially
to the destruction of Japanese naval and merchant shipping, and
inflicted losses over and above those previously listed.
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Chapter V
Atlantic Operations
THE operations of the United States Navy in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean Theaters culminated in the victory of the Allied nations
in Europe. The success of the joint antisubmarine campaign and the
tremendous achievements in shipbuilding were essential preludes to the
landings in Normandy and southern France and the great land offensive,
which in three months carried the Allied Expeditionary Forces to the
German frontier and brought total victory on German soil six months
later. This victory was possible because ships were available and their
protection by the Navy effective.
ANTISUBMARINE OPERATIONS
In the antisubmarine campaign our Atlantic Fleet had responsibility for
Atlantic areas under United States operational command, and the British
Admiralty was responsible for North Atlantic and European operations in
which United States naval task forces participated. In the British
control areas Commander U.S. Naval Forces in Europe assured proper
liaison between the Admiralty and the Tenth Fleet organization in my
Headquarters, which was responsible for convoy and routing of United
States shipping and the development of plans, weapons, and tactics to be
employed in antisubmarine operations.
In the final month of the European war, German submarines made a last
determined effort, in great strength, to reach the eastern coast of the
United States. That attempt was thwarted by a powerful task force of the
U.S. Atlantic Fleet, which, during an engagement lasting several days,
destroyed five U-Boats. The United States Navy's final successful action
against German submarines occurred on 6 May, only two days before V-E
day, when a U-boat was sunk off Block Island by the destroyer escort
ATHERTON with the frigate MOBERLY assisting. The development of new
techniques, the intensive training of antisubmarine crews, and the
persistence with which the U-Boats were hunted offensively all played
vital parts in the surrender campaign. German submarines began to
surface and surrender shortly after V-E day, and U.S. Atlantic Fleet
escort vessels brought several of them to the United States east coast
ports.
A review of antisubmarine and convoy operations since 1939 illustrates
clearly these major naval contributions to victory in Europe. The
summarized statistics on the Battle of the Atlantic are as follows:
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German Allied
Submarines Shipping New Construction Net Gains
Sunk Sunk | U.S. | British | Total | Or Losses
(Number) (In thousands of tons)
1939 (4 months) 9 810 101 231 332 -478
1940 22 4,407 439 780 1,219 -3,188
1941 35 4,398 1,169 815 1,984 -2,414
1942 85 8,245 5,339 1,843 7,182 -1,063
1943 237 3,611 12,384 2,201 14,585 +10,974
1944 241 1,422 11,639 1,710 13,349 +11,927
1945 (4 months) 153 458 3,551 283 3,834 +3,376
--- ------ ------ ----- ------ -------
Totals 782 23,351 34,622 7,863 42,485 +19,134
From the foregoing statistical summary the chief features of the Battle
of the Atlantic are clear:
(a) Until the closing months of 1942 the German submarines were
continuing to reduce the available total of Allied tonnage;
(b) Antisubmarine operations resulted in the sinking of an average of 12
German submarines per month after 1 January 1943, or a total of 480 in
the two years 1943-44;
(c) American shipyards alone produced an average of a million tons per
month of new merchant ships after 1 January 1943, or a total of
24,000,000 tons in two years.
In the 12 months from 1 June 1944, 135 convoys arrived in United Kingdom
ports from overseas with a total of 7157 merchant ships totaling more
than 50,000,000 gross tonnage. The escort of this shipping and the
provision of trained naval armed guard crews aboard the merchant vessels
were among the primary tasks performed by the United States Navy in the
prosecution of the war in Europe. The Navy's antisubmarine campaign with
the British-United States integrated convoy system was in great part
responsible for the vital shipping necessary for the Allied land
offensive which broke into the Fortress of Europe in 1944 and
overwhelmed the Germans ashore in 1945.
TENTH FLEET
On 15 June 1945 the Tenth Fleet was dissolved. This effective
organization was established 20 May 1943 under my direct command, with
Headquarters in the Navy Department, to exercise unity of control over
United States antisubmarine operations in that part of the Atlantic
Ocean under United States strategic control. The first Chief of Staff of
the Tenth Fleet was Rear Admiral Francis S. Low, who was relieved in
January 1945 by Rear Admiral A. R. McCann.
To the Tenth Fleet were assigned the following tasks:
(a) Destruction of enemy submarines.
(b) Protection of Allied shipping in the Eastern, Gulf, and Caribbean
Sea Frontiers.
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(c) Support of other antisubmarine forces of our own and of the other
Allied nations operating in the Atlantic areas.
(d) Exercise of control of convoys and shipping that were United States
responsibilities.
(e) Correlation of United States antisubmarine training and materiel
development.
To accomplish these tasks the Tenth Fleet was organized into four
principal divisions: Operations; Antisubmarine Measures (materiel,
training, analysis and statistics, and operational research); Convoy and
Routing; and a Scientific Council composed of distinguished civilian
scientists.
The Tenth was a fleet without a ship. However, this highly specialized
command coordinated and directed our naval forces in the Battle of the
Atlantic, making available the latest intelligence to the Commander in
Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and to other fleet and sea frontier
commanders who directed the actual operations at sea, and supplying
antisubmarine training and operating procedures to our forces afloat.
The Tenth Fleet correlated the antisubmarine developments of the various
technical bureaus of the Navy Department and the fleet training schools
concerned with antisubmarine activities. In addition, it worked closely
with the General Staff of the United States Army and with the British
Admiralty and Canadian Naval Headquarters to avoid duplication and
confusion, and to insure that maximum effort would be directed against
the German underseas fleet. The effective work of the Tenth Fleet
contributed outstandingly to the success of the United States naval
operations in the Battle of the Atlantic.
U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE
During the spring and summer of 1945 the United States Naval Forces in
Europe were faced with a series of varied responsibilities. Until the
surrender of Germany the Navy was actively engaged in coastal offensive
operations and in supporting afloat the United States Army's build-up of
men and supplies, which included assistance in areas as far inland as
the Rhine; with the capitulation of the enemy came the establishment of
United States naval commands in Germany to aid in the military
occupation and government of that country and in the enforcement of the
surrender terms. United States naval components also assumed duties with
the Allied Military Missions to Denmark and Norway similar to those
already established in France, Belgium and Holland. With the end of the
war in Europe, the Navy speeded up the process of closing out the
multitude of bases and other facilities which had been established
earlier in the war in the United Kingdom, on the Continent, and in the
Mediterranean Theater of Operations.
Rhine River Crossing
The crossing of the Rhine River in March 1945 will be remembered as one
of the spectacular achievements of the American forces during the
closing months of the European war. In this operation the United States
Navy had the honor of taking part as a floating segment of General of
the Army Eisenhower's forces. LCVP’s and
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LCM’s, which had been used with great success in the coastal Normandy
invasion, were again employed to carry our troops on rivers. The naval
crews assigned to the operation began training in England in October
1944 and held their final practice maneuvers on the Continent later in
the winter. Considerable ingenuity and improvisation were necessary to
overcome technical difficulties, the craft employed having been
constructed for salt water use and not as river craft in the fresh water
of the swift-flowing Rhine. Five LCVP units of 24 craft each were formed
in England and later moved to the Continent and placed under the
operational control of United States Army commanders and administrative
control of Vice Admiral Alan G. Kirk, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces
France; of these, three actually participated in the crossings.
The first LCVP unit went into action with the United States First Army
at the Remagen bridgehead on 11 March 1945, assisting, under heavy
gunfire, in the erection of treadway and heavy pontoon bridges, in
ferrying troops, and in patrolling the river. At Oppenheim on 23 March
another LCVP unit carried portions of General Patton's Third Army across
the Rhine, and the following day made a second crossing under heavy
enemy fire at Boppard. Another crossing had been planned at St. Goar,
but because of enemy resistance the operation was staged instead at
Oberwesel, where, on 26 March, other units of the Third Army were
ferried across. Still another crossing was made at Mainz. The LCVP units
also served with the United States Ninth Army in its crossing of the
Rhine south of Wesel, which occurred almost simultaneously with the
Third Army's advance.
U.S. Naval Forces France
A second major operation in which the United States Navy played an
important part during the last days of Nazi resistance was that directed
against the German-held pockets in western France. Vice Admiral Kirk was
placed in operational command of the French naval task force which was
assembled for the attack. The United States Navy supplied fuel, training
facilities, a repair unit, aircraft, and 24 LCVP’s. The operation, which
was directed against the enemy forces in the Ile d'Oleron and at the
mouth of the Gironde River, began with a general naval bombardment at
0750 on 15 April. For five days the naval task force assisted the French
ground forces with naval bombardment and aerial reconnaissance in the
assault on Royan and the Point de Grave area at the mouth of the
Gironde. By 20 April this section was cleared of the enemy and the
assault on the Ile d'Oleron began the following day. Twenty-four United
States LCVP’s manned by French crews were used and supported by
extensive naval bombardment. The actual landings on Ile d'Oleron took
place on 30 April and all enemy resistance ceased there on 2 May. With
the general capitulation of the enemy on 8 May, the remaining German
pockets at La Rochelle, Lorient, St. Nazaire, etc., were occupied by
French forces accompanied by American naval observers.
While the Rhine crossings and the attacks on the German pockets were
going on, the Navy was continuing its less publicized but equally
important task of assisting the Army's build-up of troops and materiel
through its port operations, both along the English Channel and in the
southern French ports. Men and munitions poured
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onto the Continent through Marseilles, Toulon, Cherbourg, Le Havre and
Rouen. At the great port of Antwerp alone almost 20,000 tons of supplies
were unloaded daily.
From the United States Navy's airfield at Dunkeswell in Devon, patrol
planes of Fleet Air Wing Seven maintained a constant search of shipping
lanes for enemy submarines. When the surrender of Germany came on 8 May,
the German High Command was ordered to instruct its U-Boats at sea to
surface, radio their position, jettison their ammunition, fly a black
flag and proceed by fixed routes to prescribed ports. The first U-boat
to comply with this order surrendered on 9 May to a PB4Y-1 plane of
Fleet Air Wing Seven on patrol off Lands End, England.
U.S. N