support would be their inability to supply their air units with the food in its present condition. With respect to the road I made clear that the mission was prepared to offer technical assistance in improving the conditions but that the political complications would have to be cleared by the Chinese themselves.

Part 6. The generalization informed me that he had taken up the question of aviation support with the British Ambassador on several occasions. Madame Chiang interjected that the Chinese had given assurances of support of large scale forces if Singapore were attacked, but that Britain refused to give assurances of air support if Kunming were attacked, unless British territory were invaded. I told the generalization that I could transmit his request to the Secretary of War.

[41] Previous to the interview I had drafted a radio on the subject of the probability of an attack on Kunming. Present indications point strongly that way. If successful, there is little doubt that China's resistance would end. Also it is doubtful whether without effective air support the Japanese might succeed in this decisive effort.

Part seven. It may not be an exaggeration to say that Kunming momentarily has become the key to the Pacific. There is no combat value in the Chinese air force. The American volunteers alone at present strength and as presently equipped are ineffective and will not be ready for combat for several months. Meetings of lend-lease aviation materiel contemplated will be too late and too late. Only British forces at Singapore, or perhaps organized units from the Philippines would be available in time to afford effective support to China.

I have discussed the interview with our Ambassador and he has read this radio.

MACEDON.

EXHIBIT NO. 48

WPD 2917-32

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
WAR PLANS DIVISION,
Washington, November '17, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers.

1. The attached Joint Board case has been before the Joint Planning Committee since last February. At a recent meeting of the Joint Board, Admiral Stark suggested that the Army take action on the Navy proposal.

2. The case is divisible into two main subjects—Changes in Coastal Frontiers and the assignment of Command in the Caribbean, Panama, Hawaii and Philippine Coastal Frontiers. The Army and Navy sections of the Joint Planning Committee have reached an agreement with regard to changes in Coastal Frontiers. They disagree, however, as to the service that should exercise Unity of Command in the Coastal Frontiers.

3. The proposals of the Army and Navy Sections on command are outlined in the attached Memorandum to you. The Memorandum also embodies my views on the question of unity command in the Caribbean Area, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

4. If the Joint Board desires definite action on this case, I recommend that you approve the attached Memorandum. I believe the Navy will agree with the solution proposed, which simply means that we will continue to operate by mutual cooperation. If you do not wish to raise the question of command at this time I can hold the case in suspense for the time being.

/s/ L. T. Gerow,
L. T. Gerow,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

2 Incls:
Memo. to C/S, fr.
Actg. A. C. of S., WPD.
JB No. 350 (Ser. 678)
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers.

I. Discussion.

1. Joint Board case (J. B. No. 350, Serial 678) prescribing coordination of command is now before the Joint Planning Committee.

2. The Navy section proposes changes in command relations in the following coastal frontiers:
   a. Caribbean.
      Coordination by the method of unity of command, command being vested in the Commandant of the 16th Naval District.
   b. Panama.
      Coordination by unit of command, command being vested in the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department except when major naval forces are based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations in either the Caribbean Sea or the Pacific Ocean. In this contingency command would be vested in the Commandant of the 15th Naval District.
   c. Hawaii.
      Coordination by unity of command as follows:
      (1) Command vested in Commanding General, Hawaiian Department when the most important strategic problem is one of territorial defense of the Hawaiian Islands and when major naval forces have been withdrawn and not based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations either in the vicinity or at a distance.
      (2) Command vested in the Commandant of the 14th Naval District when major naval forces are based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations either in the vicinity or at a distance.
      3. The Army section proposes the following, applicable to all coastal frontiers:
         a. Unity of command over forces assigned to the defense of a coastal frontier is vested in the Army, except when the United States Atlantic or Pacific Fleet or the major portion thereof is operating against comparable hostile forces within the radius of possible support by Army aviation operating from bases within the coastal frontier. In the excepted case, unity of command is vested in the Navy.

[2] b. In a specific operation, unity of command in coastal frontiers may be transferred from the Army to the Navy and vice versa, when the senior Army and Navy commanders concerned agree that such change is necessary and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.

c. Unity of command does not authorize the service in which it is vested to assign missions that will require the forces of the other service to operate from bases outside the coastal frontier.

4. The Army and Navy sections of the Joint Planning Committee have been unable to reach an agreement on a compromise solution of the problem of unity of command. The Army section does not believe that unity of command in coastal frontiers is essential. It is believed that the Navy section will agree to a continuation of coordination by mutual cooperation.

5. The vesting in a single individual of full responsibility for a military operation is a generally accepted principle for the accomplishment of effective military action. In theory at least, no amount of personal willingness to cooperate can eliminate the objections inherent in the committee system of control of military forces. The most frequently cited recent example of the effect of such divided responsibility is that of failure of the defense of Crete as contrasted with the successful attack on that island in which the attacking force presumably was commanded by a single individual.

6. Unity of command is the accepted method of coordination within the Army and within the Navy, themselves. However, the many practical difficulties encountered in the application of that principle as applied to joint operations of the Army and Navy have usually led to the adoption of the method of coordination by mutual cooperation except when specific tasks are planned.
7. The difficulty of determining the service in which unity of command should vest in the defense of a coastal frontier lies in the inability to determine in advance when hostilities will begin and the nature and the extent of the operations. For that reason it is difficult to foresee which service will play the major part in the defense and will have primary interest. The major responsibility may well pass from one service to the other during defensive operations. On the other hand, overseas landing expeditions or land operations requiring support from Naval forces, such as those in Libya, present problems in which the service having preponderance of responsibility can readily be determined. The time such an operation should begin, as well as terminate, and its nature and extent can be forecast and the service having the preponderance of responsibility definitely agreed upon between the two services, thereby indicating the service in which unity of command should vest. In such operations the preponderance of responsibility will not fluctuate from one service to the other as might be the case in defense of coastal frontiers.

8. A fact frequently lost sight of in consideration of the method of coordination under the principle of mutual cooperation is that, although the major operation is being conducted under that principle, joint operations subordinate thereto may still be conducted under the principle of unity of command if so agreed to by the Army and Navy commanders concerned. This method is particularly applicable to joint operations by forces having similar combat characteristics, such as the air forces of the two services.

II. Action recommended.

That coordination of joint operations in the Caribbean, Panama and Hawaiian Coastal Frontiers continue to be effected by mutual cooperation. If this recommendation is approved, such a proposal will be discussed with the Navy section of the Joint Planning Committee.

/s/ L. T. Gerow
L. T. Gerow,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

[1] OCS 21278-10

GCM
DECEMBER 20, 1941.

Personal and Confidential

My dear Emmons: Instructions to the Army and Navy were issued a few days ago assigning unity of command to the Navy in Hawai. At the same time unity of command was assigned to the Army in Panama.

For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion as to responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a year to secure unity of command in various critical regions had been unavailing. All sorts of Naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives, and similar matters had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I must say at the same time that some of the Army staff brought up somewhat similar objections to Naval control. Both Stark and I were struggling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed, at least under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two decisions I have just referred to have been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involved in our relations with Allies.

I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate the problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work with Nimitz in complete understanding.

Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought to our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. These days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency. This is a very hasty note, but I want General McCoy to take it off with him this morning.
You have my complete confidence and I will do everything possible to support you.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd.) G. C. Marshall.

General DeLos C. Emmons,
Commanding Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, T. H.

MY

EXHIBIT NO. 48A

Confidential

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Staff,
Washington, December 5, 1941.

OCS 21228-5

Memorandum for General Gruver:

I would like this matter of Coordination of Command discussed with the Naval Section of the Joint Planning Committee. However, I think it is important that a general policy, or what might be called an explanation, should first be decided on, expressed in carefully considered sentences, as to the application of unity command.

A discussion of this runs through a series of paragraphs on your memorandum and you have covered it subtly to me, but no where is it presented in a concise form.

[handwritten] G. C. M.
Chief of Staff.