

**NARRATIVE STATEMENT**  
*of*  
**EVIDENCE**  
*at*  
**NAVY PEARL HARBOR**  
**INVESTIGATIONS**

**Vol. I**

NARRATIVE STATEMENT

of

EVIDENCE

at

NAVY PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS

before

Admiral T. C. Hart, U.S.N.,

The Navy Court of Inquiry, and

Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U.S.N.

BUREAU OF SHIPS LIBRARY

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
Washington, D.C.



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON

10 December 1945

Hon. David I. Walsh,  
Chairman Naval Affairs Committee,  
U. S. Senate,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Walsh:

In compliance with your request made on 10 September 1945, when there was delivered to you the lengthy records of the several Navy investigations of the Pearl Harbor disaster I have had prepared, as I then had you advised I would, a composite narrative statement of the pertinent evidence that had been adduced, and am forwarding you a copy herewith. The statement also includes occasional references to official documents that came to hand while it was being written, and a recital of the official action taken by the Navy. I think this statement will supply a desirable and needful guide to much of the relevant evidence pertaining to Pearl Harbor.

Since the current Joint Congressional investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has caused the removal of the classified character of the material adverted to in this statement, there is no reason why you should not carry out your expressed desire to release this statement and to have it printed as a Senate Document for more extensive distribution if such procedure is still desired. Additional copies of the statement will be promptly supplied upon request.

Sincerely yours,

*James Forrestal*

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

27 November 1945

From: Lieutenant Commander John Ford Baecher, USNR.  
To : The Secretary of the Navy.  
Subject: The Navy Story of Pearl Harbor.

1. In pursuance of your direction, I have written and submit herewith a statement in narrative form of pertinent evidence developed in the several Navy investigations of the Pearl Harbor disaster, together with a recital of the official action of the Navy. In addition to the evidence adduced during the inquiries conducted by Admiral T. C. Hart, the Navy Court of Inquiry, and Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, occasional references have been made to some official documents assembled in connection with, or that came to notice during, the writing of this statement. The material used is presented with appropriate references to sources, documentary and testimonial.

*John Ford Baecher*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PART ONE

- COMMAND AND PLANS -

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THE NAVY HIGH COMMAND

During the times pertinent to any inquiry concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the Navy chain of command, in the higher echelons, was, beginning at the top: The President, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Sea Frontier, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.

The President was Franklin D. Roosevelt, who served from 4 March 1933 until his death on 12 April 1945. The Secretary of the Navy was Frank Knox, who served from 11 July 1940 until his death on 28 April 1944. The Chief of Naval Operations was Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, now retired, who occupied that position from 1 August 1939 until 25 March 1942 (N.C.I. page 2).<sup>1/</sup> Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN, now Rear Admiral, retired, was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and also Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet; he held those positions from 1 February until 17 December 1941 (N.C.I. Pages 3, 273). Admiral Claude C. Bloch, USN, then Rear Admiral, now retired but on active duty, was Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Sea Frontier and Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District from 10 April 1940 through the year 1941. (Har. page 3; N.C.I. page 385A).

A. The Command in Washington: Staff and Duties.

1. Chief of Naval Operations -- Duties

Prior to assuming the position of Chief of Naval Operations,

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 ✓ The references in parentheses are to pages in the Records of the several Navy investigations, viz: Har. - that by Admiral T.C. Hart; N.C.I. - that by the Naval Court of Inquiry; Hew. - that by Admiral H. K. Hewitt. Occasional references to any other sources are spelled out.



Admiral Stark held the following flag positions of major importance:

Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, Commander of Division of Cruisers, Battle Force, and Commander Cruisers, Battle Force (N.C.I. page 2). The duties of Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations, were prescribed by Navy Regulations (N.C.I., pages 75-6-7) of which the Naval Court of Inquiry took judicial notice (N.C.I., page 75) as follows:

(a) "Article 392.

"(1) The Chief of Naval Operations is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate from among officers of the Line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years. He is charged, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the operations of the fleet, with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, and with the coordination of the functions of the Naval Establishment afloat, together with the determination of priorities relating to repair and overhaul of ships in commission or about to be commissioned. (Act of 3 Mar. 1915.)

"(2) The Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving, has the rank and title of admiral, takes rank next after the Admiral of the Navy, and receives pay and allowances as specifically provided in the Act of 10 June 1922. All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him are performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders are considered as emanating from the Secretary and have full force and effect as such. To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties of his office there are authorized by law for this exclusive duty not less than fifteen officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps. Should an officer, while serving as Chief of Naval Operations, be retired from active service, he may, in the discretion of the President, be retired with the rank, pay, and allowances authorized by law for the highest grade or rank held by him as such Chief of Naval Operations.

"(3) During the temporary absence of the Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary when serving, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations is next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy."

(b) "Article 433.

"1. The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged

with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. (Act of 3 Mar. 1915.)

"2. The duties of the Chief of Naval Operations shall include the direction of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Division of Fleet Training; the operation of the Communication Service, of naval districts, of vessels assigned to the Naval Reserve, and of mines and mining; the operations of the Marine Corps, except when operating with the Army or on other detached duty by order of the President; and the operations of Coast Guard vessels when operating with the Navy; and the direction of all strategic and tactical matters, organization of the fleet, maneuvers, gunnery exercises, drills and exercises, and the training of the fleet for war; ocean and lake surveys; with the collection of foreign surveys; with the publication and supply of charts, sailing directions, and nautical rules; dissemination of all nautical, hydrographic, and meteorological information to ships and aircraft, and with the upkeep, repair, and operation of the Naval Observatory and Hydrographic Office.

"3. He shall so coordinate all repairs and alterations to vessels and the supply of personnel and material thereto as to insure at all times the maximum readiness of the fleet for war.

"4. He shall keep all bureaus and offices of the Navy Department informed in regard to action within their cognizance that is at any time necessary or desirable to improve the war efficiency of the fleet, and shall arrange for the coordination of effort of his office and of the bureaus and other offices of the Navy Department in relation thereto.

"5. He shall under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy direct the movements and operations of vessels of the Navy, including the time of their assignment for docking, repairs, and alterations, and shall prepare schedules and issue orders in regard thereto.

He shall keep records of service of fleets, squadrons, and ships.

"6. He shall advise the Secretary in regard to the military features and design of all new ships and as to any alterations of a ship which may affect her military value; as to the location, capacity, and protection of navy yards and naval stations,



including all features which affect their military value; also, as to matters pertaining to fuel reservations and depots, the location of radio stations, visual signal stations, reserves of ordnance and ammunition, fuel, stores, and other supplies of whatsoever nature, with a view to meeting effectively the demands of the fleet.

"7. He shall advise the Secretary of the Navy on all business of the department in regard to insular governments and foreign relations, and all correspondence in regard to these matters shall be presented for the Secretary's action through his office.

"8. He is charged with the preparation, revision, and record of regulations for the government of the Navy, general orders, tactical instructions, drill books (except such as are issued by the Bureau of Naval Personnel for the individual instruction of officers and enlisted men), signal codes, and cipher codes.

"9. In preparing and maintaining in readiness plans for the use of the fleet in war, he shall freely consult with and have the advice and assistance of the various bureaus, boards, and offices of the Department and the Marine Corps Headquarters, in matters coming under their cognizance. After the approval of any given war plans by the Secretary it shall be the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to assign to the bureaus, boards, and offices, such parts thereof as may be needed for the intelligent carrying out of their respective duties in regard to such plans and their maintenance in constant readiness.

"10. In carrying out his duties he shall utilize the facilities of the appropriate bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.

"11. The Chief of Naval Operations shall from time to time witness the operations of the fleet as an observer."

## 2. Staff of Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral Stark had a staff to assist him, the members of which included: Admiral (then Rear Admiral) Royal E. Ingersol, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (N.C.I. page 816); Vice Admiral (then Rear Admiral) Richmond K. Turner, Director of War Plans Division (N.C.I. page 988); Rear Admiral (then Captain) R. E. Schuirmann, Director

of Central Division (N.C.I. page 194); Vice Admiral (then Rear Admiral) Theodore S. Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence (Hew. page 389); Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, Director of Naval Communications (N.C.I. page 1026); Vice Admiral Roland Munroe Brainard, Director of Ship Movements Division (Har. page 399); Captain Charles Wallborn, jr., Administrative Aide and Flag Secretary of the Chief of Naval Operations (Har. page 383; N.C.I. page 967); and Captain John L. McCrea, Aide to Admiral Stark (Har. page 273). In addition, there was a Director of Ship Maintenance Division, and a Director of Fleet Training Division.

Important subordinates, holding major positions with large responsibilities on the Staff included: Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman, Assistant Director, Division of Naval Intelligence (Har. page 335); Rear Admiral (then Captain) Joseph R. Redmond, Assistant Director, Division of Naval Communications (N.C.I. page 1091); and Rear Admiral F. T. Leighton (now deceased), Chief of War Information Room of Ships Movements Division (Har. page 399).

In lower echelons, the following had duties connected with matters of importance or of interest that occurred prior to the Japanese attack:

Captain Robert O. Glover, War Plans Division, who was charged with special cognizance of parts of the War Plans as they related to the Pacific Ocean and Asia (Har. page 171).

Captain William A. Heard, Officer in charge of Foreign Branch (N.C.I. page 461; Hew page 390), and Captain Arthur H. McCollum, Officer in charge of Far Eastern Section (Hew pages 10, 390),

of the Division of Naval Intelligence.

Captain L. F. Safford, Officer-in-Charge, Communications Security (Intelligence) Section (Har. page 355; N.C.I. page 744; Hew. page 97); Captain (then Lieutenant Commander) A. D. Kramer, Head of Translation Section, Communication Security (Intelligence) Section (N.C.I. page 950; Hew. page 128); Lieutenant Commander (then Lieutenant (jg)) George W. Lynn, Senior Watch Officer, and Lieutenant Commanders (then Lieutenants (jg)) Alfred V. Pering, F. M. Brotherton and A. A. Murray, Watch Officers, Cryptographic (Decrypting) Section Communications Security (Intelligence) Section (N.C.I. pages 734, 81919A; Hew. pages 140-41, 143, 148, 433); and Lieutenant Frederick L. Freeman, assigned to Correlating and Dissemination Section, Communications Security (Intelligence) Section (Hew. page 149); all of the Division of Naval Communications.

3. Duties of Staff:

(a) Assistant Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral Ingersol held the post of Assistant Chief of Naval Operations through the year 1941 and until the last two or three days of that year (N.C.I. page 816). As such his duties, as described by him, were:

(1) "There were no duties assigned to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations by law or by regulation. The duties of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations were prescribed in Office Orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. They were also described in a general order which established the Joint Board, of which the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations was a member. The duties prescribed in the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations I have not seen for some time, so I

cannot quote them exactly, but in general they required the heads of the different divisions of Operations to take up matters of policy with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, before presenting them to the Chief of Naval Operations. He had general charge of the administration of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. In carrying out those duties, during the time that I was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, I endeavored to relieve the Chief of all of the details and onerous part of his duties that I could. Once he had established a policy, I endeavored to carry out the details, to sign correspondence in regard to it, to release dispatches in regard to it. However, if anything came in of which I thought he should have knowledge, I told him about it." \*\*\*

\*\*\*\*the Chief of Naval Operations often asked my advice, and on many occasions I considered it necessary to offer advice.\*\*\*\* (N.C.I. pages 816-17)

(2) "As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, I had no duties that pertained solely to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; that is, I did not have original cognizance of any matters. All matters for the consideration of Chief of Naval Operations were taken up with me before presenting to the Chief of Naval Operations. All matters of policy, of course, were referred to the Chief of Naval Operations. Once he had decided upon a policy, I then endeavored to carry out the details without further reference to him unless it was a question of which I thought he should know. I signed most of the correspondence except letters going to heads of other government departments or letters to Commanders-in-Chief which embodied orders to them. I frequently released many dispatches that had previously been considered by the Chief of Naval Operations after I knew they were in the form in which he wished them sent." \*\*\* (Har. page 417)

(3) "Generally speaking, I now feel that Admiral Stark kept me fully informed of all matters of which I should have had knowledge. I was usually present when conferences were held with other officers of the Navy Department or officers of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I was not always present when Admiral Stark conferred with officials of the State Department or with officials of the War Department. Frequently these conferences took place in the State Department or in the War Department and I usually did not accompany Admiral Stark for such conferences. I felt, however, that



when these were over that Admiral Stark told me everything that I should know. I do not recall now anything that transpired of which I was not told and of which I thought I should have been told. There may have been conferences between Admiral Stark and the President and the Secretary of State of which he did not tell me all the details." (Har. page 417)

(b) Director of Central Division

Rear Admiral Schuirmann, who held this position during the calendar year 1941 (Har. page 405; N.C.I. page 194), stated that he had a variety of duties, the principal one of which was liaison with the State Department, which he performed directly with the Chief of Naval Operations (Har. page 405; N.C.I. pages 194-5).

Rear Admiral Schuirmann testified that though there was no set system whereby he was advised of information within the Navy yet he obtained information within the Department over the phone or on personal visits from or to various persons in the Office of Naval Intelligence (N.C.I. page 196) and at the 0900 daily meetings ("daily round up") which were held by the Secretary of the Navy for some time preceding Pearl Harbor (N.C.I. page 196). His contact with the War Plans Division consisted of keeping them informed of and obtaining their reactions as to what was going on in the State Department (N.C.I. pages 196-97); there was no regular system whereby he was kept informed of the current situation estimates by the War Plans Division, and his knowledge in that respect was obtained when he attended meetings held occasionally in Admiral Stark's office, at which members of War Plans would express their views (N.C.I. page 198).

In his liaison with the State Department, Admiral Schuirmann generally dealt with Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Mr. Maxwell Hamilton, Mr. Joseph Ballentine, and others, including Under Secretary Welles. On occasions he dealt with Secretary Hull (N.C.I. page 195). He described this liaison as follows:

(1) "The liaison duties with the State Department were conducted by personal visits with those handling matters of mutual concern in both departments, by telephone and through a so-called liaison committee which was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations, which consisted of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army; Chief of Naval Operations; and Under Secretary of State. I accompanied the Chief of Naval Operations to these meetings in order to make notes so that on my return I could implement any action decided upon."  
(N.C.I. page 195).

(2) "A 'Liaison Committee' consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was mainly occupied with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally questions relating to the Far East were discussed. About the middle of May, 1941, the practice of having a stenographer present to record the discussion was commenced; prior to that time I would make notes of the meetings in order to be able to follow up such matters as required action, and I believe one of Mr. Welles' assistants made a precis of the meetings. At times there were 'off the record' discussions at these liaison committee meetings. I made notes of some of these 'off the record' discussions. Aside from the meetings of the Liaison Committee, Secretary Hull held meetings with various officials of the Navy Department, and I maintained liaison with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department by visit and by telephone. I know of no official record of these meetings and discussions. Fragmentary notes of some are in the files of the Central Division as are such records of the Liaison Committee as are in the possession of the Navy Department. It is possible that the State Department representatives may have

made notes of some of these meetings and discussions with Secretary Hull and other State Department officials." (Har. page 405).

(3) "In regard to the liaison meetings, prior to about the middle of May, 1941, I kept a resume of the meetings which was, I believe, kept by the Liaison Division of the State Department, and after the middle of May a stenographer was present to record these meetings. In addition to the matters on the record, there were certain matters discussed off the record, and on occasions I did make a memorandum of the proceedings after returning from the State Department. However, I do not believe that there was a complete record of these meetings and I do not know of any complete record of the meetings which were held from time to time with Secretary Hull or a record of the conversations with Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, and others. All records that I know of are in the Central Division of the Navy Department. I have none in my own possession." (N.C.I. page 195).

(4) "The liaison with the State Department was conducted partially by me as questions arose which were of mutual interest to the War and Navy Department. So far as I was able and directed, I acted as go-between between the Navy Department and the State Department on matters which were of mutual concern. There were, necessarily, high level liaison and meetings held at which I was not present." (Har. page 405).

(c) Director of War Plans Division and Subordinates

Vice Admiral Turner, who held this position from 23 or 25 October 1940 through the calendar year 1941 (Har. page 250; see N.C.I. pages 988, 1010), described his duties, generally, as follows:

(1) "I was one of the five or six major assistants below the Assistant Chief, and my official and personal relations with Admiral Stark were very close. A great many of the

projects which the Department had in mind were referred to the War Plans Division for comment and recommendations so that the War Plans Division was cognizant of most of the things that went on in the Department." (N.C.I. pages 988-89)

He stated further that his duties included being a sort of professional adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations in matters pertaining to military operations, particularly with regard to preparation for war, to future operations, and also in respect of relationships with the War and State Departments (N.C.I. page 989). His association with Admiral Stark during 1941, he said, extended beyond the mere preparation of formal war plans. "I considered myself one of Admiral Stark's principal advisers. We were close personal friends, as well as closely associated officially."

(Har. pages 250-51)

Captain Robert O. Glover, who was assigned to the War Plans Division during the calendar year 1941, and who after August, 1941 had special cognizance of parts of the War Plans as they related to the Pacific Ocean and Asia (Har. page 171), stated in respect of his duties:

(1) "Up to about August, 1941, my duties were in connection with all the color plans, with my principal attention being given on the Pacific and Asiatic areas. In August, 1941, the planning problem was concentrated by what is known as 'WPL-46', or 'Rainbow 5'." \*\*\*\*

"After August, I was given special cognizance of certain parts of WPL-46. These parts are: Part 3, Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2; Chapter III, Chapter V, Sections 2 and 3; Part 5, Appendix 2; Chapters II and IV and V. These sections generally dealt with the Pacific, Asiatic, and the Naval Transportation Service." (Har. page 171)



He stated that the plan was completed in May, 1941, and that it became effective about August, 1941 (Har. page 171). With reference to the preparation of plans, he said:

(2) "My initial impression, when I first joined the office in January, was that the preparation of our war plans was a very laborious and slow process. WPL-46 was based on Staff conversations between the British, Canadians, and the United States. I, personally, did not take part in those conversations and my only connection with the plan was after it had been issued. I considered WPL-46 was prepared reasonably expeditiously, and issued to interested officers expeditiously. It represented a realistic appreciation of the situation existing at that time, and a calculated risk in the Pacific." (Har. page 173).

Captain Glover explained the manner in which the Plan was to be kept up to date, as follows:

(3) "On 21 August 1941, a memorandum from the Head of the Plans Section of the War Plans Division, was issued which states the following pertinent to the question: 'Plan Section, War Plans Division, is charged with (a) Preparation of changes in the plan made necessary by changes in the assumptions or in the strategic situation, or which may be required to keep the plan current with administrative action; (b) The preparation of directives placing the whole or any part of the plan in effect; and (c) The continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice may be given in regard to the composition and distribution of forces, operations, and other matters in relation to the execution of the plan.' " (Har. page 174).

With reference to the preparation of current estimates of the situation, Captain Glover stated:

(4) "Referring again to the order of August 21, 1941, signed by the head of the Plans Section, War Plans Division, one paragraph of this order

designated Commander Ansel, in collaboration with Captain Wright, to draft daily and submit to the Director (Admiral Turner) a short strategic summary of the international military and political situation. Commander Ansel, in preparing these summaries, had made available to him dispatches of Military Intelligence Division, Naval Intelligence Division, the State Department, and the press." (Har. page 176).

(d) Director of Naval Intelligence and Subordinates

Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, who held this position from 15 October 1941 through 7 December 1941, (Hew. page 389), described generally the structure of his office:

(1) "The Office of Naval Intelligence was composed of two main branches, foreign intelligence and domestic. The domestic had to do with internal subversion, espionage, and other activities of foreign nationals or organizations inimical to national, and particularly naval, welfare. It included several branch offices in principal cities of the United States, one of which was Honolulu. The foreign intelligence was organized under a number, approximately eight, of regional groups of which the Far Eastern was one. Under the administration of ONI and directly of foreign intelligence were the Naval Attaches and Naval Observers stationed throughout the world." (Hew. pages 389-90).

(2) "The responsibility of the Far Eastern section derived from the responsibility of the office as a whole. In general, the duties of any of the foreign sections were to receive, collate, and analyze information obtained either by the agencies of ONI or received from other sources and to disseminate that in one of several ways. The usual means of dissemination of technical information was transmission by mail of copies or abstracts of the pertinent reports. There was a periodical publication, bi-weekly, as I remember, to all flag officers, containing political and operational intelligence, which contained a Far Eastern section, and in which latter the Far Eastern Division of ONI would incorporate any information of value. A third

means of dissemination, although not strictly dissemination, was the limited distribution within the Navy Department of highly confidential radio intelligence and all urgent or important operational information. The radio intelligence was incorporated in a secret book, which was passed by hand by a responsible officer to approximately four of the Navy Department's heads and to the President and the Secretary of State. The urgent operational information was reported to me and either by myself in company with Commander McCollum or by himself directly to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. There was also, as the situation got hot, a daily one or two paragraph summary of the Japanese picture which was given to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Director of War Plans. The immediate report I have mentioned above was also made to the Director of War Plans. These reports or analyses usually contained some deduction as to future moves to be expected, which we offered for such value as they might have to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Director of War Plans." (Hew. page 390-91)

(3) "Reverting now to the Foreign Intelligence activities; at the time of my taking over or shortly thereafter, the Japanese-American conversations which had been held intermittently since the preceding Spring, were reopened. A book of radio intelligence was shown to the State Department, the White House, Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Naval Intelligence, Director of War Plans, and the Secretary of Navy, daily or skipping a day if nothing pertinent was at hand." (Har. page 280)

With reference to the dissemination of information outside the Navy Department, and to the Fleets, Admiral Wilkinson pointed out a difference in procedures in respect of two types of information, Basic or Static Information, and Combat Intelligence. As to the former, he said:

(4) "Such information as we obtained, beyond that radio intelligence distribution I have just mentioned, of the nature of basic or static information, was compiled by Naval Intelligence and issued to a wide circulation, including Commanders-in-Chief of Fleets, and in general Flag Officers, as well as to the offices in the

Department interested. This information was contained in the monograph on Japan, which was revised from time to time, in papers describing the organization of the Japanese Fleet and Air Force as discovered by observers, notes which were all too inadequate, however, in view of the strict secrecy maintained by the Japanese general O.N.I. reports from Naval Attaches with respect to fortifications, trade connections, and so on, and the characteristics of principal naval officers, as information of their appointment was received and insofar as we had data on them. This basic information was circulated by means of a mechanism set up and functioning for some years." (Har. page 280)

But as to Combat Intelligence, and the responsibility for dissemination of information of Japanese ship movements,

Admiral Wilkinson said:

(5) "That point was never fully determined. We issued the reports and the bi-weekly summary of the situation, but I was told that the deductions of future movements were the function of War Plans rather than of Intelligence, and this understanding was confirmed by the Assistant Chief of Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, when at one time I said that I thought it was our responsibility. He told me at that time that the Army system was for Intelligence to prepare the analyses of enemy prospective movements, but in the Navy system War Plans did that. I told him then that I would prepare that analysis myself in my office in order that War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations might use it as they saw fit, and in consequence such analyses as I made weren't transmitted to the fleet, but were given to the Chief of Operations and to War Plans. The same with respect to spot news of the enemy movements. My understanding at the time was, and still is, that I would report to War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations the latest operational information deduced from all sources and that they would forward to the fleet such items as they felt should be so forwarded." (Hew. page 392)

(6) "\*\*\*\* There was not, however, any mechanism established nor effective for the dissemination of information of the type of combat intelligence, which is to say, the immediate movement of enemy ships, fleets, and forces." (Hart. page 280)



"Such combat intelligence as we received, by means of flash reports and direction finder and otherwise, was compiled and analyzed, but it was not a function of the organization of Naval Intelligence to disseminate this information to the Fleet, but rather to report it to the departmental agencies for such analyses as they cared to make, and for dissemination by them." (Har. pages 280-81)

\* \* \* \*

"I had found that there was a policy in the Department extending, I understood, from War College practices, that Intelligence was responsible only for the collection of information and the supplying of data to the operational agencies and was not required to develop, as I believe is the Army practice, the estimate of the situation from the enemy point of view. I felt that the Naval Intelligence, with its experienced personnel in the various fields, could clearly contribute something in an analysis of the enemy or of prospective enemy intentions; and I consulted Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Operations, who confirmed the Navy practice that intelligence would supply the data but that the Operational side, and particularly war plans, should make the analysis of enemy intentions. I said, however, that with his permission I would have such an analysis prepared from day to day and periodically summed up, say weekly, and submit it along with our daily situation for such value as might be ascribed to it or derived from it by the Operational agencies." (Har. page 281)

\* \* \* \*

"In pursuance of this, for some months prior to December 7, and, in fact, I think, prior to my arrival, the Japanese Section had prepared, daily, an analysis of the situation of Japanese-American relations and of the movement of Japanese forces insofar as we were aware of them. These daily situation reports were held very secret and their circulation was limited to Chief of Naval Operations and Director of War Plans, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the head of the Foreign Branch." 1/ (Har. page 281)

1/ The memoranda are now on file in the Far Eastern Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department. The series of memoranda, titled "Japanese Fleet Locations", are classified "Secret" and the file presently available indicates that said memoranda were issued approximately once a week, rather than daily. The series of memoranda titled "United States-Japanese Negotiations" are classified "Secret", are addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, and were issued almost every date. The last of this series bears date of 24 October 1941. (Har. page 281) (Footnote continued on next page)

In respect of his contacts with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Wilkinson stated:

(7) "With respect to the relationship of the Director of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, contact was usually through the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, but there was every access to the Chief of Operations himself, and, on occasions, when news of importance appeared, particularly toward the end of the period prior to December 7, Captain McCollum would go direct with me, if I were at hand, or alone if not, to Admiral Stark and tell him what news he had and what conclusions he had reached. There was no scheduled conference with the Chief of Naval Operations in which I, as Director of Naval Intelligence, sat, but I had every access to him. I recall at least two occasions, presumably at the end of November and early December, when the information that I brought down as described, along with Captain McCollum, interested the Chief of Operations to the extent of calling in some of his principal subordinates, such as Rear Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, and perhaps the Director of Communications, to hear the news, and, in brief, to discuss its implications, but I do not recall that at those or any other meetings which I attended, there was discussion of measures to be taken or information to be sent out." (Har. pages 281-82)

Rear Admiral Kingman, who was Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence from early in October, 1941 and through that year, and who had been head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch of that office since May, 1941, outlined the relationship between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Intelligence officers in the several Naval districts, as follows:

(Footnote 1 of preceding page cont'd.)

The officers on duty in the Far Eastern Section advised that the written memoranda on this subject were discontinued on 24 October 1941, and that between that date and 7 December 1941, this subject was covered by an oral report each morning by Captain McCollum, the Chief of the Section, to Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval Intelligence, who, in turn, reported the information orally to the Chief of Naval Operations. (Har. page 281)

(1) "The officer in charge of Domestic Intelligence Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, sometimes referred to as Branch 'B', has direct control and supervision over the activities of the several Naval Districts' intelligence organizations within the continental limits of the United States. In this capacity, the head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch does have a general good over-all knowledge of what is being done in the intelligence field in the several Districts. The Office of Naval Intelligence did not, however, during the period in question, attempt to issue detailed instructions or control the details of operation within each Naval District. The policy of O.N.I., at that time, was very definitely set forth to the effect that each District Commandant would execute the general policies established by O.N.I. and carry out the broad directives in such manner as the Commandant felt best suited the organization within his District." (Har. page 336)

However, the District Intelligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District (Honolulu) had more autonomy. Admiral Kingman stated, in that respect:

(2) "The Intelligence organization in the Fourteenth Naval District, being far removed from Washington, had a somewhat different status from those District intelligence organizations within the continental limits of the United States which could be more easily controlled and directed from Washington. Consequently, the details of administration with regard to 'investigate activities' within the Fourteenth Naval District were left more to the direct control and supervision of the District Commandant than was done in those Districts which were closely connected to Washington." (Har. page 336)

1. Foreign Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence.

Captain William A. Heard, who was head of the Foreign Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, from 9 October 1941 until 30 June 1942, and who had previously been in charge of the British Empire Desk, stated that the organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence was revised 11 August 1941. There were, he said, a director, an assistant director, and three principal

branches - Domestic, Foreign, and Administrative. In addition, there was a field organization of the Naval District Intelligence Offices, and the foreign posts (N.C.I. page 461). He described the collecting and dissemination of intelligence, as follows:

(1) "Intelligence was passed from the Office of Naval Intelligence in the following specific forms: First, when we received items of urgent interest, by oral report. Daily, Japanese summary to the Director of Naval Intelligence by the head of the Far East Section, relayed by the Director of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations. (Not invariably a daily report.) Daily, summary of State Department dispatches. Whenever appropriate, printed serials presenting related items of information. Weekly, known or estimated dispositions of all foreign fleets. When required by the Chief of Naval Operations, comparative strength tables by types of all fleets. A daily bulletin for the President's naval aide. Fortnightly, summaries of current national situation. When occurring, special summaries. Dispatches to foreign ports and the naval attaches. I have undertaken to answer specifically as to whether the information was evaluated. There were varying degrees of evaluation, naturally, in that scope of forms of reporting. Generally, all information was evaluated as to its credibility, as to its implication, and to a greater or less degree as to the conclusions which might be drawn from it. It had been established that the final evaluation in the form of enemy intentions was more properly the responsibility of the War Plans Division." (N.C.I. page 462)

Captain Heard stated he believed that, without exception, copies of all reports, including political information, were directed, and that oral reports were made, to the Chief of Naval Operations (N.C.I. page 462). The Director of Naval Intelligence enjoyed ready access to both Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll (N.C.I. page 463).

2. Far Eastern Section, Office of Naval Intelligence.

Captain Arthur H. McCollum, who was Officer in Charge



of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, stated as to his duties:

(1) "My duties consisted of evaluating all forms of intelligence received concerning the Far East, correlating it, and advising the Director of Naval Intelligence and through him the Chief of Naval Operations on political developments in the Far East and all forms of information concerning the Japanese Navy and other countries in the Far East and their defenses and state of preparation for war." (Hew. page 10)

Radio Intelligence, he explained, consists of three distinct procedures: (a) Actual translation of an enemy's code dispatches; (b) Traffic analysis, which is the drawing of deductions or inferences from the volume of enemy radio traffic, and the divergence of that traffic from the normal or standard of enemy traffic; and (c) Deductions drawn from a study of the enemy's ships' radio call signs (Hew. page 12).

With reference to the relationship of his Section with the Communications Intelligence Section of the Office of Naval Communications, Captain McCollum stated:

(2) "Captain Safford's unit produced a source of intelligence. Intelligence from that source was shown to me and was one of our most valued sources of intelligence concerning the Far East. Briefly, the intelligence received from that source consisted of decryptations of secret Japanese code despatches, inferences drawn from the analyses of Japanese radio traffic, and inferences drawn from changes in procedure of Japanese radio traffic. There was from time to time intelligence of this same general nature received from non-Japanese sources, but the bulk of it was from Japanese sources." (Hew. pages 10-11)

The three major command centers or radio intelligence centers, he said, were Washington, the Pacific (Pearl Harbor), and Asiatic (Cavite, P.I.). (Hew. page 11). In respect of the

diplomatic intercept traffic, Captain McCollum stated:

(3) "I am not certain whether items concerning the Japanese diplomatic traffic, that is, traffic in diplomatic cyphers, was invariably available to all three or not. The volume of that was very great, and, if I remember correctly, the principal headquarters for that type of traffic was here in Washington and, to my mind, it is doubtful that all decodes of Japanese diplomatic traffic were ever sent back out again. I don't think it was. I don't think it could have been with the existing radio facilities." (Hew. pages 11-12)

The system for serving radio intelligence, he said:

(4) "\*\*\*\*consisted of a three-point system, one serving the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; one serving the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; one serving the Chief of Naval Operations at the Navy Department in Washington. All intelligence derived from radio intelligence means except diplomatic intercepts as explained above in either one of these three centers was passed through and back to these three centers. In other words, information from radio intelligence sources available in Manila were also available at Pearl and also available at Washington, and vice versa. That was passed as a matter of routine back and forth among the three radio intelligence centers serving between the three major command centers, Asiatic, Pacific, and Washington." (Hew. page 11)

With respect to information concerning the location, composition and movements of the Japanese forces, Captain McCollum explained:

(5) "By the end of November we were almost wholly dependent upon radio intelligence for information concerning the location of Japanese naval forces, except those that were sighted by our observation posts along the China coast." (Hew. page 11)

The reason for this was, he said:

(6) "With the disappearance of means which we had devised for keeping Japanese naval vessels and naval movements under observation, such as reports by merchant ships, reports by agents located in various ports in Japan and on the

Asiatic continent, reports by our consular authorities, which all had been set up and was functioning -- these sources whereby our radio intelligence could be confirmed from time to time by actual visual sighting had disappeared by early November due to a number of natural causes. One was the enforcement of our embargoes against Japan, which in a very short period of time swept normal merchant traffic out of the North Pacific so that by mid-November it is hardly too much to say that there were no ship movements of any nature to and from Japan in the North Pacific. One other point that we watched and carefully checked, had a world-wide system for observing, was the world-wide movement of Japanese merchant shipping in all the ports of the world. Due again to the operation of our embargoes, the Japanese merchant shipping in the Americas was gone. Due to the war in Europe, the Japanese merchant shipping lines had been disrupted; so that source of intelligence had disappeared. One other point, the Japanese progressive closing in of security measures made it almost impossible for agents in Japan to get information out of Japan that would be timely in a tactical situation. So that by the middle of November it was apparent that so far as observing and locating the Japanese fleet were concerned, our major dependence was perforce based on radio intelligence without the benefit of check by visual observations from time to time. "

(Hew. pages 12-13)

(e) Director of Naval Communications and Subordinates

Rear Admiral Noyes, who was Director of Naval Communications from 15 October 1941 to 7 December 1941 (N.C.I. PAGE 1026), described, in general, the organization of his office at that time in respect of the function of handling intelligence information, as follows:

(1) "The handling of communication intelligence was a joint affair between the Office of Naval Communications and the Office of Naval Intelligence, which of course are both divisions of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. In

general, the Director of Naval Communications was responsible for the mechanics of crypto-analysis, including interception which could be done by naval means, which amounts to intercepting radio transmissions. Crypto-analysis was carried on by the Director of Naval Communications with assistance from the Office of Naval Intelligence, and when such intelligence as developed was turned over to the Office of Naval Intelligence to handle according to their usual procedure. Not the usual procedure, because this particular form of intelligence was considered most secret—a much higher degree of secrecy than the ordinary designation, "Secret", due to the fact that it is useless if any inkling reaches the enemy of the fact that we are able in any way to read his communications. (N.C.I. page 1026)

With reference to the release of communication intelligence to other officers or to higher authority when he was absent from his office, Admiral Noyes explained:

(2) "Under normal conditions, the Director of Naval Intelligence and I worked together. If one of us wasn't immediately available, the other one acted for him to see that action was taken; and if there was anything that was really hot, you might say, when either one of us was temporarily away, the next acting officer took over, and we had a 24-hour watch, both of us, which handled these matters continuously." \*\*\*\*

"There was a 24-hour watch of officers in my own especial watch, aside from the ordinary communications watch. Anything that came up that was considered important, during the night, the officer would call me and come up in an automobile to my house and bring me whatever the paper was, and if I considered it important enough I'd go with him to Admiral Stark's quarter's or to Anderson or whoever it happened to be. In other words, we covered twenty-four hours a day according to the circumstances. It didn't often happen that things turned out that required that quick action, but that did develop several times." (N.C.I. page 1027)

In respect of the manner in which the communications intelligence was handled up to higher authority, he stated:

(3) "\*\*\* the Director of Naval Intelligence, as I mentioned, was responsible for the finished information. It was turned over to him. I was responsible for the mechanics of obtaining it, and after that it was turned over to the Director of Naval Intelligence, who handled it personally and we only had one book--one copy in a book--and he took that book to the people that he was directed to show it to." (N.C.I. page 1028) \* \* \* \*

"The system was for him to take the book. Lieutenant Commander Kramer was his representative in my office, and he may have carried the book for him some times when he wasn't available--something like that, but generally, the Director of Naval Intelligence handled the matter very much himself." (N.C.I. page 1028)

Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, who was Assistant Director of Naval Communications during the latter half of 1941 (N.C.I. page 1091), referred to the functions of the Office of Naval Communications, as follows:

(1) "\*\*\* I would like to indicate the method in which this/communications intelligence/information was handled. It was the function of the Director of the Naval Communications organization to procure it. It was then passed to the Office of Naval Intelligence, whose function it was to evaluate and disseminate." (N.C.I. pages 1101-02)

1. Communications Security (Intelligence) Section,  
Office of Naval Communications

Captain L. F. Safford, Officer in Charge, Communications Security Section (N.C.I. page 744; Har. page 355; Hew. page 97), stated that the words "Communications Security" were employed to mask the true function of Communications Intelligence (Har. page 355). The functions of his section were (a) the obtaining of intelligence through Japanese communications, and (b) to design and prepare, and supervise the use, of our own naval codes and ciphers (N.C.I. page 744; Har. page 355; Hew. page 97). He stated that he was in charge of the intercept stations, the



direction finder exchanges, and the decrypting units. (N.C.I. page 744).

There were three main radio intelligence units located from Washington to the Philippines, he explained:

(1) "One in the Navy Department with subsidiary direction finder stations and intercept stations along the Atlantic Seaboard and in the Atlantic Ocean. The second in size was located at Pearl Harbor with subsidiary intercept stations and direction finder stations in Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor. The third was located on the Island of Corregidor in the Philippines with intercept and direction finder station there and a small intercept and finder station on the Island of Guam. There had been an intercept and direction finder station at Shanghai, but it was evacuated to Corregidor in December, 1940. There were also intercept and direction finder stations on the West Coast of the United States. The West Coast intercept stations fed their traffic directly into Washington; the direction finder stations were coordinated and controlled by the Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District." (Har. page 355.)

The Unit in Washington directed its activities to "naval activities in the Atlantic Ocean and to the plans and intentions of foreign governments;" (Har. page 356 and

(2) "In addition to the foregoing duties, the Washington unit had another important function: Training personnel for the other units so that they would be able to 'pull their weight in the boat' when transferred to duty overseas. For this reason, the Washington unit had, at this time, the most experienced personnel (some with over ten years of C.I. duty) and the least experienced (ninety per cent with less than one year of C.I. duty). The Washington unit had been standing continuous watches since February, 1941." (Har. page 356)

The unit at Pearl Harbor confined its attention to "the dispositions and plans of naval forces in the Pacific Ocean and to surveillance over Japanese naval communications."

(Har. page 356)

(3) "We expected that this would prevent the Fleet being surprised as the Russians had been at Port Arthur. These duties were prescribed in the current War Plans (WFDNC-8; Appendix IV; Art. 4-25) approved March, 1940, and by dispatches and letters of instruction issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. These duties did not include surveillance over Diplomatic communications of any sort. The personnel of this Unit had about four or five years of C.I. experience on the average. The officers included our best, and six or seven had had previous C.I. duty in the Asiatic C.I. Unit." (Har. page 356)

(4) "Pearl Harbor's main mission was in [an] attack on the Japanese flag officers system. This particular code and cipher had been in effect since about 1 December 1940 and remained in effect for some time after Pearl Harbor. We were also attacking this code with another group in the Navy Department and, I believe, the British were working on it. We never succeeded in a solution." (Hew. page 99)

While the Asiatic unit at Cavite, P.I., "was at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet to use as he saw fit." (Har. page 356)

(5) "During 1940 and early 1941, this Unit was mostly concerned with Japanese Diplomatic communications, but in October or November, 1941, it shifted its main attention to Japanese Naval Communications. The personnel of this Unit had about two or three years of C.I. experience on the average, and the officers were young, enthusiastic, and capable." (Har. page 356)

At another hearing, Captain Safford testified that the unit at Corregidor was also handling diplomatic traffic. He said:

(6) "The unit at Corregidor had been intercepting messages in the Japanese 'purple' code and other diplomatic systems for several years and continued to do that up to and including December 7, 1941. Their main attention was on the local Asiatic circuits for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, but very late in November, 1941, they were given the additional

duty of covering the Berlin-Tokyo circuit because we couldn't get adequate coverage from all other stations combined. These were forwarded to Washington and weren't touched locally." (Hew. pages 98-99)

With reference to the arrangements for the exchange of information between the three units (Corregidor, Pearl Harbor, and Washington), 1/ he stated:

(7) "If Corregidor translated a message which they thought important, they would encipher the translation and forward it to Washington. Everything they intercepted on the Tokyo-Berlin circuit was enciphered; that is, the intercept was enciphered and forwarded to Washington by radio. Corregidor also had liaison with the British unit at Singapore and anything of interest or importance received from Singapore was forwarded to Washington. In like manner, any translations of particular importance to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, were sent out from Washington. We also had a very free and continuous exchange of technical information between the two units, by which I mean the keys for the 'purple' machine and keys for another system which we called Jig-19, and any other information which would help either unit in its performance of duty." (Hew. page 99)

"Corregidor and the Navy Department exchanged by radio information on the 'purple' machine and on what we called the Jig-19 system and other diplomatic systems, but Pearl Harbor was not addressed in these messages." (Hew. page 100)

"With regard to communications between the Navy Department and our unit at Pearl Harbor, there were comparatively few." (Hew. page 99)

But previously Captain Safford had stated:

(8) "The C.I. Unit in Washington had no authority to forward to the C.I. Units in Pearl Harbor or Corregidor, or to the Commanders-in-Chief direct, any information other than technical information pertaining to direction finding, interception, and so forth. The dissemination of intelligence was the duty, responsibility, and privilege of the Office of Naval Intelligence as prescribed in Communication War Plans approved by the Chief of Naval Operations in March, 1940." (Har. page 360)

1/ Captain A. D. Kramer explained that the "Kopek Channel" was a code designator for material in a crypt channel "having to do with technical aspects of this decryption;" and that exchange was made in that channel only between three stations - Washington, Pearl Harbor, and the Asiatic Station. He explained further: "The purpose of having those stations set up where they were, more specifically at Pearl and in the Asiatic Station, was to service Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, Pacific, and Commander-in- (Footnote continued next page)

Captain Safford described the relationship between his unit and the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, headed by Captain McCollum, as follows:

(9) "We were furnishing intelligence or information to Op-16-PE, who evaluated the information and combined it with other intelligence and were responsible for its dissemination. My section had no authority or responsibility for the dissemination of anything except what we called technical information; that is, the codes and ciphers, Japanese frequencies, and so forth, which would aid us in our work, which would aid the organization in its work, rather." (Hew. page 97)

(10) "The information gained from breaking enemy messages, dissemination was a function and responsibility of Naval Intelligence. We were bending over backwards not to try to take over the functions of Naval Intelligence in this respect, and at the same time we were insisting that Naval Intelligence keep out of the communications field of activity and disband the amateur intercept stations which various ambitious District Intelligence Officers had set up without authority from the Navy Department. We insisted that both parties adhere strictly to approved war plans." (Hew. page 100)

(11) "My unit transmitted information directly to Signal Intelligence in the War Department and to Naval Intelligence representative (that is, Commander A.H. McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section, or Lieutenant Commander A. D. Kramer, attached to the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence but actually working in the Communication Intelligence Unit)." (Har. page 358)

2. Translation Section of Communications Security (Intelligence) Section.

Captain A. D. Kramer, who was attached to the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, was, from 1 October 1941 through 7 December 1941, and until June, 1943, on loan to the Office of Naval Communications, where he headed the Translation Section of the Communications Security (Intelligence) Section (N.C.I. pages 950, 986; Hew. page 128). He had somewhat of a dual responsibility, to Captain Safford, head of the Communications

(Footnote 1/ continued from preceding page.)

Chief, Asiatic Fleet. Consequently, delivery to those stations in that channel involved the presumption that the officers handling that material at those stations would supplement it with any local material they may have picked up by intercept and comparable decrypting activities there and furnish it to the flag officers concerned." (N.C.I. page 971)



Security unit of Naval Communications (Hew. page 128), but his primary responsibility was to Captain McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence (Hew. page 129). "That arrangement," he said:

(1) "\*\*\*\*may seem a little unusual, but it was one that had been in effect since the early 20's for several reasons. One was since all the language talent available in the Navy at that time were language officers who had been to Tokyo in that three year language course and as a result were well known to the Japanese and were normally in social contact with the Japanese in town here, naval attaches and assistants and the embassy people, it was felt preferable to have them attached to the Office of Naval Intelligence than to a section of Naval Communications. That was one reason. There were a number of others."  
(Hew. page 129)

The duties of the Translation Section consisted of "translating all decrypted traffic obtained from intercepts and delivering it to the Office of Naval Intelligence," and to others, inside and out of the Navy Department, to whom delivery was directed by either the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Secretary of the Navy (N.C.I. page 950). The work of translating was performed by a staff of civilian translators who were "professional Civil Service employees in the Navy Department" (N.C.I. page 952). Captain Kramer translated only occasionally, but, he glanced over and edited messages of high importance before they were typed up (N.C.I. page 953). His review of messages depended on their importance and who had done the translation (Hew. page 583).

All decryptions made by the Decrypting Section of Naval Communications were passed to the Translation Section. Captain Kramer said:

(2) "Every bit of traffic that was broken down into Japanese plain language, or partly broken down from those systems and not completely recovered, was passed to my section for translation or further code recovery and for translation and distribution and writing up. The filtering process to which you



referred might be interpreted as applying to the partially recovered systems which came in in considerable volume, some of which, however, could not be adequately broken down to get much intelligence out of it." (N.C.I. Page 951)

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However, there often occurred delays before traffic that had been recovered and decrypted reached the Translation Section:

(3) "I will have to repeat again a reference to the filtering process. When you use the statement 'all information' there were many other messages which my section did not get which were in various states of recovery in the G.Y. section, in the decryption or cipher recovery section of Op-20-G, which I did not get or oftentimes got several weeks later. In other words, with the large volume of traffic coming in on a new system, it might be weeks before I would get material from that system. I would not get it until it was sufficiently broken down to start pulling intelligible information out of it." \*\*\*\*

"In other words, a sketchily recovered message, you might be able to translate to the extent of a phrase here and a word there, but it would not make sense enough or would not warrant writing up for distribution to the senior officers in the Navy Department, so a message would have to be in a system that was sufficiently recovered to pull intelligible information out of it before I would get it for translation and distribution." (N.C.I. page 952)

And everything received was not translated either because there were insufficient translators to handle the large volume of material or because the material recovered belonged to a system that had not been sufficiently broken to enable the items in question to be intelligible (N.C.I. page 952). As Captain Kramer stated:

(4) "Because of the high volume that we got and the small number of translators we had -- there were three at that time -- it was not feasible or possible to translate everything that came to us. Consequently, we concentrated on the more secure systems which, in general, had the more important information in them. All the others were looked over and a brief summary made by the translators. Every one of those messages, before

going into the file -- in other words, before being finally disposed of -- was looked at by me as a final check to see whether the information warranted being translated. Everything that was translated in full that warranted distribution was written up and distributed."

(N.C.I. page 952)

The decisions as to which of the material that had been translated should be passed to higher authority was the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence

(N.C.I. page 953). Captain Kramer said:

(5) "In making decisions on most points myself, I was simply acting for the head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and more directly for the head of the Far East section. That discretion was left to me but I made a point, on occasion, of taking those things up for final confirmation of my decision to Captain McCollum, as a rule. The occasions were rather rare, however." (N.C.I. page 953)

The manner in which translations were prepared for dissemination was described by Captain Kramer as follows:

(6) "We prepared 14 copies of every decrypted translation. Seven copies went to Army. The other 7 were for delivery to senior officers in the Navy Department and also to either the White House or State Department, the responsibility of which rotated between the War Department and the Navy Department." (N.C.I. page 950)

There were six specific addressees, and the seventh copy was a file copy (N.C.I. page 951). A complete version of every message went into each of six separate folders, bound as a book, and delivery was made several times a day, depending

on urgency (N.C.I. page 951).

The volume of the material was considerable, running as high as 130 messages in one day (N.C.I. page 951).

Because of this, early in 1941, Captain Kramer pursued the custom of preparing a summary of all of the traffic, in which he briefed the subject of the messages and in which he indicated to senior addressees with asterisks urgent or important messages. The summaries were included with the material placed in the folders (N.C.I. page 951). They were intended to weed out the important messages in material that covered the entire world (N.C.I. page 954).

The practice of making the summaries was discontinued about the middle of 1941, even though the volume of material had increased. About that time the traffic had channelled, by reason of world events, into two main types: (1) Japanese-U. S. negotiations, and (2) the Berlin-Tokyo circuit, covering German information to the Japanese on the war in Europe and other matters of interest to Berlin and Tokyo. Both of these types had been closely followed by all senior addressees and no weeding out was required (N.C.I. pages 951, 954).

Furthermore, he said:

(8) "The volume was not only high, but individual messages often went to four or five or more, sometimes 15 typewritten pages. It was impracticable to summarize for that reason alone, but also because of the fact that those messages frequently had reference to half a dozen or more earlier messages, diplomatic notes, and so forth. Consequently, in preparing these books my principal objective was to get a brief reference foot-note for each one of those references or break out the originals of those earlier translations, attaching to those current messages, so that the book itself would be as complete as possible, as self-contained as possible, when these senior officers were looking at them." (N.C.I. page 954)

Captain Kramer explained the significance of certain markings, including a rubber stamp mark, appearing on some of the documents in evidence (N.C.I. Exhibit 63), as follows:

(9) "That stamp was made up by my office at the time we stopped making summaries of the day's book around the middle of 1941. The first two items in the upper left-hand corner are intended to mean a single or double asterisk. In other words, a single asterisk, as I earlier used, indicated an item of interest. A double asterisk indicated items of the highest interest or immediate urgency. 'One' referred to Secretary Knox, 'Ten' to Admiral Stark, 'Twelve' to Admiral Turner of War Plans. I normally used that stamp when we were not too pressed for time. In the fall of 1941, however, there were many occasions when the urgency of delivery was greater than taking time to stamp the half-dozen copies to indicate interest. In other words, I had made a point in such cases of verbally indicating interest. As a rule, those items would be only a few in a special, single folder." (N.C.I. page 968)

The pencilled circle around the numbers on the documents, he said, indicated that the message was delivered to the person whose number was so encircled (N.C.I. page 968). As to the purpose of the circling, he stated:

(10) "It was a matter of special interest or otherwise to those individuals. In other words, one message might be of much interest to Secretary Knox, who was following the negotiations with Japan very closely. Another message having to do with the change of the Japanese system might be of much interest to Admiral Noyes -- the technical aspects of it. Another message might be of much interest to



London, not only technical but those directly affecting London. It was purely a matter of interest." (N.C.I. page 968)

The manner in which the material was handled up to higher authority was described by Captain Kramer. Between 1 October 1941 and 7 December 1941, he said:

(11) "At the time referred to in your earlier question I had responsibility for delivery to the White House; Army to the State Department. The addressees in the Navy Department that normally got copies which I delivered were the aide to the Secretary of the Navy, Captain Beatty, or to the Secretary of the Navy directly; Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark; the head of Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson; the head of the Far East section, then Commander McCollum; Admiral Noyes as Director of Naval Communications; Admiral Turner, the head of War Plans. Occasionally there were certain other individuals I was directed to show it to." (N.C.I. page 950)

However, it was not strictly correct to say that he passed the material along to higher authority, to the six senior addressees, without any prior reference of the material to Captain Kramer's immediate superiors (N.C.I. page 953):

(12) "As a rule, an attempt was made to bring the whole book to Captain McCollum as head of the Far East section, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence first because the director oftentimes made a point of taking that into the C.N.O. himself. It occasionally happened during 1941 that the Director would take an item into the C.N.O. himself, but because of the large volume of that stuff through '41 it was left more and more to me." (N.C.I. page 953).

But when the book or volume of material was intermediately presented to Captain (then Commander) McCollum, or to the Director of Naval Intelligence:

(13) "There was no eliminating of anything from this volume of traffic since each of the books were made up in the same way. Occasionally, however, the Director would indicate something as being of greater or lesser interest to the C.N.O. or the Secretary." (N.C.I. page 953)



Concerning the actual placing of the material in the hands of senior addressees, and their reading of it, Captain Kramer said, as to the Secretary of the Navy:

(14) "I made a point of seeing that the more important ones [messages in the volumes that he passed around] were seen and read by the senior addressees that I delivered personally to. In some cases, of course, such as the Secretary of the Navy, Captain Beatty would make actual delivery and consequently I do not know just what ones he read." (N.C.I. page 951)

And, as to the Chief of Naval Operations, it was also the custom to leave the material with the Admirals' aide (N.C.I. pages 955-56):

(15) "The majority of times the folder was left with his aide. Just how much of that he read, I don't know, but in such cases I made a point of pointing out to his aide, his flag secretary, which were the things of most immediate importance or interest to the Admiral. Occasionally I would indicate that the Admiral should see them at once, or as soon as possible." (N.C.I. page 955)

But:

(16) "At other times when a particular hot item — if I may use that term — came in, I would request permission to see the Admiral directly and would take it in. That happened quite frequently during the fall of '41. By 'frequently' I would say two or three or four times a week." (N.C.I. p.955)

On these occasions he arranged with the aide to take the messages in directly and waited while the Admiral read them (N.C.I. p.955).

When the Admiral was not in, and the message was important, it would not only be left with the aide, but:

(17) "\*\*\*in the meantime, of course, I would have gotten it to the Director of Naval Intelligence and as a rule would indicate whether Admiral Stark or Secretary Knox had seen it yet, or not. Admiral Wilkinson would oftentimes then make a point of following it up to see that the Admiral got the word." (N.C.I. page 956)

3. Cryptographic Research Section of Communications Security (Intelligence) Section.

Lieutenant Commander George W. Lynn was the Senior Watch Officer in the Cryptographic Research Section of Naval Communications, which was in Captain Safford's Section, between 1 October and 7 December 1941 (N.C.I. page 734; Hew. page 140). Other watch officers sharing with him the same duty were Lt. Comdr. Alfred V. Pering (N.C.I. pages 738, 812; Hew. pages 141, 148). Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood (N.C.I. page 919A; Hew. pages 140, 143), and Lt. Comdr. A. A. Murray (Hew. pages 141, 143). <sup>1/</sup>

The primary duty of this watch was the decrypting of Japanese diplomatic cryptographs (N.C.I. page 734). Lt. Comdr. Lynn explained that the work of this group was based on intercepts:

(1) "I think possibly in order to give the story on that I should go back to the interception of traffic, because it is all more or less linked from that point on. The Army maintained a series of interception stations. The Navy had the same. The Army intercepts were cleared through the War Department, and the Navy intercepts were cleared through the Navy Department. The division was made on the basis of cryptographic dates. It was necessary to do some checking for that. The Army was responsible for the even dates. The Navy was responsible for the odd dates. The cryptographic date was merely the date it was intercepted; the filing time in the dispatch was something that had to be established. Each service would then translate its own traffic. That is, the Navy would translate the traffic of odd cryptographic dates, and the Army would do the same thing with the even dates, so translation was based--was divided--upon the cryptographic date of the material." (N.C.I. page 734-35)

This Section, Lt. Comdr. Lynn stated, received the "raw material" as it was recovered, which it processed or decrypted by comparing it with the discovered systems or keys to which it belonged (N.C.I. page 734). After decrypting, Lt. Comdr. Pering testified,

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<sup>1/</sup> Another member of this watch was one Lt. Comdr. Brown (N.C.I. page 924), but he was away on leave during the first part of December, 1941, and his watch was taken by Lt. Comdr. Lynn (Hew. pages 147, 1434).

the messages (decryption translations, which at that point were in Japanese) were, in pursuance of a general order, delivered to Commander (then Lieutenant Commander) Kramer (N.C.I. page 813) for translation by his Translation Section from Japanese into English (N.C.I. page 814). No provision was made for delivery of decryptions to any one higher up when Captain Kramer or other authorized officers were absent even when the message was urgent (N.C.I. page 814); but Lt. Comdr. Pering explained that as the decryption at that point was in Japanese his unit could not know if the message was in fact an urgent one (N.C.I. page 814).

There was also a Correlating and Disseminating Section or watch, adjoining the Cryptographic Research Section, to which were assigned Lieutenant Frederick L. Freeman, Lieutenant M. W. Lyon, Ensign (then Chief Yeoman) Nine, and Chief Yeoman Stalter. This Section was identified as Section GI of Intelligence. It disseminated to the Office of Naval Intelligence intelligence received by it from field radio intelligence units (Rev. pages 149, 150).

B. The Command in Hawaii: Staff and Duties

1. Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and U. S. Pacific Fleet - Duties:

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, as has been noted, was Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and also of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, from 1 February 1941 until 17 December 1941 (N.C.I. pages 3, 273). Admiral Kimmel stated that his duties were set forth in the General Orders and in the War Plans (N.C.I. page 275). He referred particularly to General Order No. 143 (N.C.I. page 275).

(a) General Order No. 143, issued by the Secretary of the Navy on 3 February 1941, effective 1 February 1941, organized the Naval Forces of the United States into: (a) The United States Fleet, consisting of (i) The United States Atlantic Fleet, (ii) The United States Pacific Fleet, and (iii) The United States Asiatic Fleet; (b) The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, (c) Special Task Forces, (d) Special Duty Ships, (e) The Naval Transportation Service, and (f) Naval District Craft.

The order further provided:

\*3. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the United States Asiatic Fleet are administrative and task organizations, and normally operate under the instructions or orders of the Navy Department. Each is under the command of a flag officer having the title 'Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic (or Pacific, or Asiatic) Fleet.' The geographical limits of command of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, shall include the Western Pacific and the Indian Oceans and tributary waters. The eastern limit shall be the 180th meridian south of latitude 50° north and the 160th meridian east of Greenwich, north of latitude 50° north. The western limit shall be Asia, Africa, and, south of Africa, the 20th meridian east of Greenwich.

\*4. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the United States Asiatic Fleet together comprise the United States Fleet, whose commander-in-chief is appointed from among the commanders-in-chief of the component fleets. The United States Fleet is an administrative organization for training purposes only, and is a task organization only when two or more fleets are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other.

\*5. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, will, through Type Commanders, prescribe standards and methods of training for all of the seagoing forces and aircraft of the Navy. Type Commanders will be designated in the 'Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy', and customarily, so far as possible, the type commander will be in the same fleet as the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

\*6. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, is senior to the other Commanders-in-Chief. When two or more



fleets are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other, the senior Commander-in-Chief is responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations for joint operations." (N.C.I. Exhibit 2(1)).

(b) The general duties of a Commander in Chief, such as Admiral Kimmel, are set forth in Articles 679 to 746, inclusive, Navy Regulations. Among others, the following general duties, applicable in peace times, are prescribed:

(1) "(1) The commander in chief shall take all practicable steps to keep the ships of his command ready for battle." (Navy Regs. Article 687).

(2) "(2) He is responsible for the indoctrination, drill, training, and efficient administration and operation of the fleet and the coordination of its various units in strategic and tactical employment.

"(3) He shall make recommendations to the Navy Department as to the composition and organization of the fleet and as to all matters pertaining to its military efficiency and control. He shall submit schedules of employment and cruising itineraries to the department in accordance with its instructions."

(3) "The Commander in Chief shall carry out all drills and exercises in accordance with the customs of the service, the instructions of the department, and the drill books and other publications of a similar nature. This shall be done in such manner as will most conduce to maintaining the fleet in constant readiness for war in all its phases." (Navy Regs. Article 692).

(4) "(3) He shall also be governed by the following rules:

"(a) He has the sole right to correspond directly with the Navy Department concerning any official matter connected with the fleet.

"(b) He shall keep the Secretary of the Navy fully informed of the movements of the fleet. These general reports shall not be considered as taking the place of separate letters on separate subjects." (Navy Regs. Article 699).

(5) "The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal.

"The right to self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of



the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined." (Navy Regs. Article 723).

(6) "The Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet is vested with authority to exercise control of the operations of fleet aircraft units from naval air stations, to allocate among units of the fleet the services, facilities, equipment, and spaces made available to the fleet, and to establish priorities with respect to repair and overhaul of aircraft of the fleet." (Navy Regs. Article 1554).

(c) The duties of Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet, were also prescribed by and/or included in the tasks and missions assigned in the War and Defense Plans, some of which were issued by Admiral Kimmel or by his subordinates under his direction, and some, or parts of some of which, especially as respects the employment by subordinates of aircraft for searching operations, could not be put into operation unless and until Admiral Kimmel made the aircraft available (N.C.I. pages 398-400). The War and Defense Plans included: 1/

(1) Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), 26 May 1941 (N.C.I. pages 9, 19; N.C.I. Exhibit 4).

(2) United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46), promulgated by Admiral Kimmel 21 July 1941 (N.C.I. pages 9-10; Exhibit 5; Hew. Exhibit 35).

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1/ The War and Defense Plans are summarized briefly here, and stated at greater length in Chapter II, Infra, pages 80-148.

Basic War Plan (WPL-46) and the Pacific Fleet

Operating Plan (WPPac-46) prescribed the following Phase I

Tasks (Japan not in the war) for the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

(i) The maintaining of fleet security at bases and anchorages; (ii) the protecting of the communications and territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French," and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the western hemisphere, by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary; (iii) continuing training operations as practicable; and (iv) guarding against surprise attack by Japan (N.C.I. Exhibits 4 and 5; N.C.I. pages 25-26; Hew. Exhibit 35; Hew. pages 25-26).

(3) Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935 (FTP 155) (N.C.I. page 27; N.C.I. Exhibit 6). This document provided that operations of the Army and Navy would be coordinated either by the method of (i) mutual cooperations, which would be the normal method, or by (ii) the exercise of unity of command, when ordered by the President, or provided in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, or when the commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires unity of command and agree further as to the service that shall exercise that command (N.C.I. pages 27-28).

(4) Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange (LAND-JCD-42), issued by Lt. General Short and Rear Admiral Bloch, dated 11 April 1941 (N.C.I. page 11;

N.C.I. Exhibit 7; Hew. Exhibit 80).<sup>1/</sup> This plan was based in part on Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, and stated it would constitute the basis of all subsidiary peace and war projects and joint operating plans. It provided that the method of coordination between the Army and Navy in Hawaii would be by mutual cooperation until and if the method of unity of command would be invoked as prescribed by the basic document (Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935) (Hew. Exhibit 80; Hew. page 5). Among other things, this plan provided that the Army, acting through the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, should ("shall") provide for an "Anti-aircraft Warning Service" (Hew. Exhibit 80; Hew. page 5), and that the Navy, acting through the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District,<sup>2/</sup> should ("shall") provide for "Distant Reconnaissance" and for "Attacking enemy naval forces" (Hew. Exhibit 80; Hew. page 10).

(5) Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District (1939), dated 28 March 1941, approved by General Short and Admiral Bloch 2 April 1941 (Hew. Exhibit 47). This document

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<sup>1/</sup> This and the other Joint Defense Plans (Infra, pages 42-44, 119-141) were made and executed by Rear Admiral Bloch in pursuance of his duties as Commandant Fourteenth Naval District under Article 1484 (4) of Navy Regulations, and also in pursuance of his duties as Naval Base Defense Officer, as prescribed by Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief (See Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41; N.C.I. Exhibit 8; N.C.I. page 4, see infra, page 146).

<sup>2/</sup> Though the tasks to be performed by aircraft that were assigned the Navy were stated in this Plan, and in the other Plans (infra, pages 42-44), to be performed by the Commandant, 14th Naval District, yet the Commandant was in these matters under the superior command and control of Admiral Kimmel, who controlled the use of the aircraft. (See infra, pages 45, 52, 53-55, 65, 106).

embraced joint agreements to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war. It was provided that the Army would expedite the completion of an Aircraft Warning Service, and that during the period prior to such completion the Navy, through the use of Radar, and other appropriate measures, would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as might be practicable (Hew. Exhibit 47; Hew. pages 4-5). It was also agreed that when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, those craft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations (Hew. Ex. 47; Hew. page 2).

(6) Operation Plan No. 1-41, issued 27 February 1941 by Admiral Bloch as Naval Base Defense Officer, effective 7 March 1941, together with: (i) Annex A, a detailed Inshore Patrol Plan; (ii) Annex Baker, a detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41; (iii) Addendum I, to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41, the Bellinger-Martin Joint Estimate covering joint air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu, dated 31 March 1941; (iv) Annex C, a detailed Anti-Aircraft-Defense Plan; (v) Annex D, a detailed Harbor Control Post Plan; and (vi) Annex Easy, a detailed Communications Plan (N.C.I. page 382; N.C.I. Exhibit 53).

This Operation Plan provided that the Commander of Patrol Wing Two, in consultation with the Army, would prepare a detailed naval participation air defense plan to be known as



Annex B (N.C.I. Exhibit 53; N.C.I. page 2). Addendum I, dated 31 March 1941, being a joint estimate of then Rear (now Vice) Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, Commander of Naval Base Defense Air Force and of Patrol Wing Two, and Major General F. L. Martin, Commander Hawaiian Air Force, stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor launched at dawn by Orange (Japanese) carriers within 300 miles of Oahu, and that task forces (Search unit, Attack unit, and Air Combat unit) should be "organized now" for action when one of the visualized emergencies arose (N.C.I. Exhibit 53; Doc. 3). Accordingly, Rear Admiral Bellinger drafted, and Rear Admiral Bloch approved, Annex Baker, the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41, dated 9 April 1941, which assigned to the Air Search and Attack Group the mission of locating and tracking all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action (N.C.I. Exhibit 53, Doc. 6).

(7) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised), issued by Admiral Kimmel, dated 14 October 1941, On Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas (N.C.I. page 11; N.C.I. Exhibit 8). This Letter was predicated on the assumption, among others, that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. It assigned tasks in event of an air attack and prescribed three conditions of readiness - Condition I, the highest; Condition II, an intermediate; Condition III, the lowest. (N.C.I. Exhibit 8)



Rear Admiral Kimmel testified that he was familiar with and recognized copies of the War and Defense Plans, namely "U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five)" (WPPac-46) (N.C.I. Exhibit 5), "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935" (N.C.I. Exhibit 6), and the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theatre, Orange (14 ND-JCD-42)" (N.C.I. Exhibit 7). Concerning his duties, he stated, repetitiously in part of other testimony by him:

"As Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, the duties as set forth in Navy Regulations, General Orders, and War Plans, were assigned to me when I was detailed to these duties."  
(N.C.I. page 276)

Admiral Kimmel defined the command relationships in respect of control over aircraft that existed between himself, Rear Admiral Bloch, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, and Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander Patrol Wing Two, as follows:

"Briefly, Patrol Wing Two was responsible to Commander-in-Chief for the training and operation of PatWing Two when acting as a part of the Fleet, and was responsible to the Commandant, 14th Naval District for the training and operation of PatWing Two when acting as a part of the Naval Base Defense Forces, at which time, of course, the Commandant, 14th Naval District, was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief." (N.C.I. page 277)

## 2. Admiral Kimmel's Staff - Duties

Admiral Kimmel, as Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, had a staff to advise and aid him. The more important members of the Staff and their designations and duties were:

(a) Vice Admiral (then Captain) W. W. Smith, was Chief of Staff and Personal Aide (Ol) (Har. page 32; N.C.I. page 528; Hew. page 335). Prior to assuming that position, he served under Admiral Kimmel for a year and a half as Captain of a cruiser, when Admiral Kimmel was Commander Cruisers, Pacific Fleet (Har. page 32). As Chief of Staff and Personal Aide, then Captain Smith's duties were:

"112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation, but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay."  
(Hew. Exhibit 34; Hew. page 1)

"200. CHIEF OF STAFF -- Ol-- Personal Aide.  
(See Navy Regulations Arts. 785-786.)

- (a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.
- (b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the Staff.
- (c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readiness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.
- (d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.
- (e) Signs correspondence as follows:
  - (1) Routine Matters.
  - (2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same, to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a policy has been established.

- (3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.
- (4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.
- (5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information, or guidance.
- (6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval of previous recommendations; action on legal papers.\*  
(Hew. Ex. 34, pages 3-4; Hew. pages 336-37)

(b) Rear Admiral (then Captain) W. S. DeLary was Operations Officer (11) and Assistant Chief of Staff (02) (N.C.I. page 496). Previously he had been Chief of Staff of Group 4 Pacific Fleet (N.C.I. page 496). As Operations Officer and Assistant Chief of Staff, then Captain DeLary's duties were:

\*203. OPERATIONS OFFICER -- 11 - (Assistant Chief of Staff 02).

- (a) Assists the Chief of Staff, as required, signing Correspondence in his absence as 'Assistant Chief of Staff'.
- (b) As head of Operations Section coordinates operations and employment activities.
- (c) Develops Fleet tactics and doctrine, and originates recommendations for revision of same.
- (d) Prepares problems and exercises.
- (e) Assignments of vessels to special duties.
- (f) Prepares estimates of the situation, campaign orders, operations orders, and plans and movement orders.
- (g) Assisted by other members of Staff reviews and analyzes Fleet exercises.
- (h) Acts as head of the Schedule Board for preparing the Fleet operation plans.
- (i) Navy Relief Force.
- (j) Fleet anchorages, bases, and operating areas.\*  
(Hew. Exhibit 34, pages 4-5)

(c) Vice Admiral (then Captain) Charles H. McKorris, was War Plans Officer (16) (N.C.I. page 886; Hew. page 293). As such, his duties were:

"207. War Plans Officer -- 16.

- (a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining thereto.
- (b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.
- (c) Member of Schedule Board.
- (d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Commanders.
- (e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters,-- District Commandant if appropriate.
- (f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships -- general features -- and on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.
- (g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material, particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and their distribution.
- (h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans matters.
- (i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these Plans may affect the Fleet." (Hew. Exhibit 34, pages 5-6; Hew. page 294).

(d) Captain (then Lieutenant Commander) E. T. Layton, was Intelligence Officer (25), having served in that capacity since 7 December 1940 (N.C.I. page 904; Hew. page 182). He was assisted by Commander (then Lieutenant) R. E. Hudson, Assistant Intelligence Officer (26). The duties of these officers were:

\*214. Intelligence Officer -- 25.

- (a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.
- (b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for current estimates (Monograph material).
- (c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g), of Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.
- (d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.
- (e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual).
- (f) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.
- (g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of other navies and prepares definite recommendation as to any action to be taken within own Fleet.
- (h) In charge of censorship.
- (i) Internal Security of ships.
- (j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

\*215. Assistant Intelligence Officer -- 26.

In addition to assisting '25' in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs the following additional assignments:

- (a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.
- (b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to Fleet.
- (c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.
- (d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and location plot of fleets of possible enemy or allies.\* (Hew. Exhibit 34, pages 7-8; Hew. page 183).

(e) Lieutenant Commander P. C. Crosley was Flag Secretary and Personal Aide (05), having the following duties:



202. Flag Secretary -- 05 -- Personal Aide.

- (a) Responsible for the receipt, dispatch, recording, routing, and filing of all official written correspondence. He shall be assisted by an officer (Assistant Communication Officer) designated to handle the SECRET mail.
- (b) Authenticates and checks the distribution of operation plans, orders, movement orders and multiple address correspondence requiring authentication.
- (c) In charge of the Flag Office organization and personnel connected therewith.
- (d) Ascertains that outgoing correspondence is in agreement with current instructions and properly distributed.
- (e) Brings to the attention of the officers concerned all conflicting, inconsistent or overdue communications.
- (f) Responsible for the general dissemination of administrative information.
- (g) Supervises the handling of U.S. and Guard Mail within the Fleet.
- (h) Printing.
- (i) Legal and disciplinary matters.
- (j) Signs correspondence 'by direction' for:
  - (1) Papers forwarded or returned without comment.
  - (2) Correspondence consisting of information or appropriate minor action only.
  - (3) Receipts and tracers.
  - (4) Transmission of registered mail, or publications.
  - (5) Transfers and orders for enlisted personnel.
- (k) Controls Flag Office Allotment.
- (l) War Diary.<sup>W</sup> (Hew. Exhibit 34, page 4;)

(f) The Operations and War Plans Officers had Assistants, as follows: (i) Then Commander R. F. Good, First Assistant Operations Officer (12); (ii) Then Lieutenant Commander H. L. Collins, Second Assistant Operations Officer (13); (iii) Rear Admiral (then Commander) V. R. Murphy, Assistant War Plans Officer (17); (iv) then Commander L. D. McCormick, Assistant War Plans (18); (v) then Lieutenant F.R. DuBorg, Assistant War Plans (19).

These officers had, generally, the duties of assisting their superior officers in all matters pertaining to the particular staff function (see Hew. Exhibit 34, pages 5-6). Some had specific duties: The First Assistant Operations Officer (12) had the duty of coordinating the duties of the Operations Officer with those of the War Plans Section, and was a member of the Schedule Board; the Second Assistant (13), the duties of maintaining a location plot and movement report system for vessels of the Fleet (Hew. Exhibit 34, page 5); the Assistant War Plans (17), of making Fleet estimates and plans, collaborating with Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of Naval Districts, and liaison with the Army on War Plans matters (Hew. Exhibit 34, page 6).

(g) In addition, there were on the staff the following officers: Then Colonel O. T. Pfeifer, USMC, Assistant War Plans and Marine Officer (86); Captain (then Commander) M. E. Curts, Communications Officer (20); then Lieutenant (jg) W. J. East, Jr., Assistant Communications Officer (30); then Lieutenant Allan Reed, Security Officer (21); then Lt. Comdr. D. C. Beard, Radio Officer (22); then Lt. Comdr. W. W. Drake, Public Relations Officer (27); then Lieut.(jg) J. E. Bassett, Assistant Public Relations Officer (28); then Commander H. D. Clark, Maintenance Officer (50); then Captain E. A. M. Gendreau, USMC, Fleet Medical Officer (75); then Commander W. A. Kitts, III, Gunnery Officer (90); then Commander A. C. Davis, Aviation Officer (95); then Lt. Comdr. R. B. Black, Aerologist and Personnel (96)

3. Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Sea Frontier - Duties:

As has been noted, Admiral (then Rear Admiral) Claude C.

Bloch was, during the year 1941, Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and Commander of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Sea Frontier (N.C.I. page 385A). He was also Commandant of the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Commander of Local Defense Forces, and, as an officer of the United States Pacific Fleet, the Naval Base Defense Officer (under Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41)(N.C.I. Exhibit 8, page 4), and the Commander of Task Force FOUR, U. S. Pacific Fleet. (N.C.I. pages 276, 385A).

Admiral Bloch stated that his duties were prescribed by Navy Regulations; Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935; the Rainbow War Plans; Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41; and directives from the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet (N.C.I. page 385A).

(a) The dual status of Rear Admiral Bloch, as Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, and as an officer of the Fleet, was defined in General Order No. 142, issued by the Secretary of the Navy on 10 January 1941. By this Order, the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District (along with others similarly situated) (a) was to operate under orders of the Navy Department as Commandant of the District, and (b) as a Fleet officer, he was to operate under orders of the Commander in Chief thereof (i) with duties corresponding to Senior Officer Present Afloat when his relative rank made him such, and (ii) as commander of task groups of the Fleet when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof (N.C.I. page 9; N.C.I. Exhibit 1).

(b) The general duties of a Commandant of a Naval District, such as was Rear Admiral Bloch, are set forth in Articles 1481 to 1486, inclusive, Navy Regulations. Among others, the following general duties are prescribed.

(1) "Each naval district shall be commanded by a designated commandant, who is the direct representative of the Navy Department including its bureaus and offices, in all matters affecting district activity." (Navy Regs. Article 1481)

(2) "(1) In the administration of affairs in the district the commandant shall not personally supervise the details of work or administration of the several groups or units, but will transact necessary business with the officer commanding the group or unit." \*\*\*\*

"(4)(a) The responsibility for the organization and efficient operation of all administrative units within naval districts, such as navy yards, torpedo stations, training stations, recruiting stations, submarine bases, schools, etc., rests with the officer in direct command of such units." \*\*\*\*  
(Navy Regs. Article 1482)

(3) "(1) The commandant of a naval district shall be guided by these regulations and by such other orders and instructions as may be issued to him by the Navy Department.

"(2) He shall supervise and be responsible for all matters affecting the dispositions and operations of the district naval coast defense forces, or other forces under his command, having for their object the repulse of hostile attacks upon any part of the naval district, or upon naval vessels or merchant shipping in or off the harbors or in the coastwise sea lanes of the district.

"(3) He shall cooperate with the Army commanders and commanders of the fleet forces within the district, in the preparation of defense plans in time of peace, as well as in their execution in time of war." \*\*\*\*

"(5) He shall be charged with the maintenance of an efficient information and communication service within the district in accordance with instructions, issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of Naval Communications." \*\*\*\* (Navy Regs. Article 1484)

(4) "(1) The mission of the commandant of a naval district in Coast Defense is to control the sea communications within the district, repulsing hostile attacks on the seacoast, or upon naval vessels or merchant shipping in or off harbors or in the coastwise sea lanes. The limits of the naval districts extend to seaward so far as to include the coastwise sea lanes.

"(2) When an enemy attack is made, the senior naval officer within the limits of the naval district or districts in which the attack is being made, whether commanding a district or a detachment of the fleet, will assume the strategical direction of all naval forces within the district or districts.

"(3) The senior naval officer afloat in the area in which the attack is being made, whether attached to the fleet or a district, will assume the tactical direction of all naval forces in contact with the enemy.

"(4) Cooperation between Army and Naval officers directing operations against enemy attacks shall be governed by such instructions as may be promulgated by the War and Navy Departments.

"(5) The commandants of naval districts will cooperate with the Army officers commanding corps areas in the preparation of plans in time of peace, determining the more probable situations likely to arise and entering into advance agreements upon plans of joint action for each such situation. (Navy Regs. Art. 1486).

(c) As Naval Base Defense Officer, Rear Admiral Bloch had, among other duties: (1) the duty, under Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter ZOL-41 (N.C.I., Ex. 8, page 4), of exercising jointly with the Army supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and, (ii) the duty, under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, 14ND-JCFD-42, (N.C.I., Ex. 7; Hew. Ex. 80, page 10), to provide distant air search or reconnaissance. However, as Naval Base Defense Officer, Rear Admiral Bloch was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (N.C.I., page 388). His duties as such were assigned by Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I., page 276; see N.C.I., Ex. 8, page 4), to whom he was responsible. (N.C.I., page 277).



This subordination embraced Rear Admiral Bloch's duties in respect of aircraft assigned for the defense of the naval base (N.C.I. page 277). Though Rear Admiral Bloch had the duty under Navy Regulations to cooperate with the Army Commanders and the Fleet Commanders in the preparation of defense plans, and the duty to supervise the disposition of district naval coast defense forces, or other defense forces under his command (Navy Regs. Article 1484(2)(3)), and though he had made the Joint Agreement with the Commanding General (J.C.F.D.P.; 14ND-JCD-42; N.C.I. Exhibit 7; Hew. Exhibit 80), as well as the subsidiary Annex VII, Section VI, (Hew. Exhibit 47), placing on the Navy the obligation to conduct distant reconnaissance, and stating it would be done by him as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, yet he did not control the aircraft that would have had to have been used if search operations were to be conducted (N.C.I. page 398). The aircraft were under the immediate command of Vice (then Rear) Admiral P.N.L. Bellinger, the Commander of the Naval Base Air Defense Force, who, as a Fleet officer, and as the Commander of Patrol Wing Two (under the Commander of Air Scouting Force), and Commander of Task Force Nine, was under the immediate and overall command of Admiral Kimme. (N.C.I. page 398). The command relationships worked thusly:

In event of an air raid alarm, the aircraft under Rear Admiral Bellinger, together with all other available aircraft, such as Marine units at Ewa and carrier planes on Ford Island, would begin to function (in the manner of a "volunteer fire department") as the Naval Base Air Defense Force under the direct command of Rear Admiral Bellinger, who would then function as Commander Naval Base Air Defense Force, and, who,

in that capacity was responsible to Rear Admiral Bloch as Naval Base Defense Officer (N.C.I. pages 398-99). But, prior to such an alarm, any use of aircraft for any such task as long range search or reconnaissance could not have been ordered by Rear Admiral Bloch; in that respect the planes were under the command of Rear Admiral Bellinger, as Commander of Patrol Wing Two and as Commander of Task Force Nine, and, who in turn, as such Fleet Officer, was under the command and control of Admiral Kimmel, as Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet (N.C.I. pages 398-400).

(d) As Commander of Task Force Four of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Bloch was a Fleet officer under the command of Admiral Kimmel. Task Force Four was defined by Admiral Kimmel, as Commander in Chief, to embrace "that part of Fourteenth Naval District activities which involve the Island Bases," with the "Primary mission [and having the duty]: To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases in order to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations." (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 2).

4. Rear Admiral Bloch's Staff - Duties

The staff of Rear Admiral Bloch, as Commandant Fourteenth Naval District included Captain J. B. Earle, Chief of Staff (Har. pages 368,377; Hew. page 451), who served as such from 9 June 1941 until May, 1942, and Rear Admiral (then Captain) Irving H. Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer (Hew. page 558). Under the latter, Lieutenant William B. Stephensen was head of the counter-espionage desk of the Fourteenth Naval District Intelligence Office (Har. page 323).

The Naval District Plans Officer was Captain Gill (Hew. page 473).

(a) Captain Earle was Chief of Staff to ComFOURTEEN and to Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and also Assistant Commandant of the Naval District (Har. page 377). He was ex-officio a member of the Joint War Planning Committee, though he stated he never formally served on the Committee. The practice was for the Chiefs of Staff to act informally as members, and the bulk of the work was done by subcommittees (Har. page 368). He was familiar with the relationship between the Navy and Army planners, and stated that it was easy to prepare the preliminary plans, but it always took considerable time to have them approved by the Army. This condition changed, however, as the international situation became more tense, and joint agreements were made and joint action was undertaken more rapidly (Har. page 369). He stated he was also familiar with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, 114ND-JCD-42 (Hew. Exhibit 80), and with Annex VII thereto (Har. page 369; see Hew. page 457). He was also familiar with Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41 (N.C.I. Exhibit 8; Hew. page 454).

(b) The mission of then Captain Mayfield, as District Intelligence Officer, was confined to general intelligence matters; cooperation with other federal and local intelligence organizations, particularly with respect to espionage and counter-espionage; and any other matters specifically directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or the District Commandant (Hew. page 558)

(c) Included in the Naval activities under Rear Admiral

Bloch as Commandant, was the Communication Intelligence Unit, referred to, in order to mask its true function, as the Combat Intelligence Unit, of which Captain (then Commander) Joseph J. Rochefort was the Officer in Charge. This was the Pearl Harbor Communications Security (Intelligence) Unit, previously referred to in connection with the other two main units that were located in Washington and Cavite. (Har. page 207; N.C.I. page 470; Hew. page 43).

This unit consisted generally of an Interceptor Group, Cryptographic or Research Group, and a Direction Finder Group, and it subsequently was enlarged to provide for the preparation and plotting of charts and maps (N.C.I. page 470). With reference to the direction finder group, Captain Rochefort stated that the Pearl Harbor unit was charged by the Navy Department with operating the Mid-Pacific radio direction finder net, which was located at Pearl Harbor. This net was, he said, not particularly productive of results owing to the type of equipment used, the lack of trained personnel, and the long distances involved. As a consequence, during the summer of 1941, the Commandant personally, after failing to obtain additional material from Washington, ordered the erection of additional radio direction finder sets at Midway and Palmyra Islands, using material from the Pearl Harbor pool. (Har. page 213)

The general mission of the three main units (Washington, Pearl Harbor and Cavite), Captain Rochefort testified, was to exploit all cryptographic systems employed by foreign powers

by Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was:

"(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with the execution of the expansion program, to continue the development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient long range Air Scouting and Air Striking Force for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces;" and  
"(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases." (N.C.I.

Exhibit 52, page 3).

(b) Commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings. This included Patrol Wings One and Two, based at Kaneohe, Oahu, and the aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings One and Two. In this capacity, his senior or commanding officers were  
(i) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet, based at San Diego, who was the type commander for Patrol Wings, and who, in turn, was directly under the command of Admiral Kimmel, as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (Har. page 133), and, (ii) Commander Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet, who was in the Force Commander of the Force of which Patrol Wings One and Two were a part, and who, in turn, was also under Admiral Kimmel (Har. page 115; N.C.I. pages 600-61; Hew. page 471A).



(c) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Ford Island, Pearl Harbor. This command responsibility of Rear Admiral Bellinger included administrative authority in local matters over all aircraft actually based on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor (Har. page 115; N.C.I. page 661; Hew. page 471A). In this position he also functioned, at times, under the superior command of the Commanders of Task Forces One, Two and Three, for the operation of such patrol planes as might be assigned those officers by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, for specific operations (N.C.I. page 661; Hew. page 471B).

(d) Liaison Officer for the Pacific Fleet with the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, for aviation development and facilities within the Naval District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands. (Har. page 115; N.C.I. page 661; Hew. page 471A).

(e) Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. When acting in this capacity, Rear Admiral Bellinger was under the command of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who was the Naval Base Defense Officer (Rear Admiral Bloch) and who, in that capacity, in turn, was under Admiral Kimmel as Commander in Chief (Har. page 133; N.C.I. page 661; Hew. pages 471A-471B).

Rear Admiral Bellinger stated that the most complicated of his duties consisted of those in connection with the Air Defense of Pearl Harbor. He explained that he became connected with the preparation of the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan and subsidiary plans when, about 1 March 1941, he was directed by Admiral Kimmel, as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to report to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare

an Air Defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. In pursuing this task, Rear Admiral Bellinger worked directly with Major General F. L. Martin, the Army Air Force Commander in Hawaii (Hew. page 471B). The principal plan which was drawn up, he stated, was the Operation Plan for the Naval Base Defense Air Force, which, in turn, was based on the Joint Estimate of the situation dated 31 March 1941, signed by Rear Admiral Bellinger and Major General Martin. (Hew. pages 471B-471C; see N.C.I. Exhibit 53 - Op. Plan No. 1-41, plus Addendum I and Annex Baker; see also Hew. Exhibit 47.)

Admiral Bellinger explained that his title, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, was actually a misnomer for several reasons: (i) because of the limited composition of the air forces under his operational control, which included only aircraft for scouting to locate enemy surface units and to attack them when located, and which did not include fighter aircraft, radar direction devices or anti-aircraft guns; and, (ii) because it implied that he had authority, which did not exist and which came into existence only when an emergency was apparent that placed the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a functioning status; and (iii) because, when his authority was called into existence it was limited in the respect that his operational control of those Army units which might be assigned by the Army commander was based upon the functioning of mutual cooperation, since there was no unity of command; and, (iv) because the authority over Army pursuit aviation and Navy fighter aviation was, under the Joint Defense Plan, lodged in the Army acting under Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, under the system of mutual cooperation (Hew. pages 471D-471E).

Rear Admiral Bellinger stated that the share of responsibility for the air defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base assumed by the Army under the Joint Defense Plan, was "to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy," and that the contribution that was to be made by the Army Air Force in carrying out that mission was (i) "to search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation" and (ii) "to detect, intercept and destroy enemy craft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation (Hew. pages 471C, 471E, 479-80). In the pursuance of this mission, the Joint Defense Plan and supplements, in dividing the responsibility for the air defense of Pearl Harbor, provided that the Army pursuit aviation and the Navy fighter aviation were to function under the command of Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, while the Search and Attack planes of both services were to function under Navy command (Hew. page 471E).

Rear Admiral Bellinger stated that the composition of the Naval Base Defense Air Force varied from day to day with the number of aircraft made "available" to it from the various Army and Navy air commands, and that the determining factor of availability was the employment schedule of the aircraft belonging to the various units (Hew. page 471C). The limitations of the number of planes made available, he stated, arose not only by reason of the limited number of planes under command of the various Army and Navy units, but also because those Navy planes actually present on Oahu, which chiefly belonged to Patrol Wings One and Two, could not be concentrated on activities in connection with the Naval Base Air Defense, since such would have

necessitated a substantial cessation of the expansion training activities (Hew. pages 471C, 471F, 471G). Expansion training, which had been the major activity and effort of Patrol Wings One and Two during 1941, prior to 7 December 1941, had the objective of training personnel who could form the nuclei of the new air squadrons that were being commissioned on the Mainland (Hew. pages 471F, 471G).

With reference to carrying out a long range search or reconnaissance, which was the obligation of the Navy acting through the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, under the Joint Defense Plan, Rear Admiral Bellinger, whose patrol planes would have had to be used for such an operation, testified that he looked to Admiral Kimmel, as Commander in Chief, rather than to Rear Admiral Bloch, who was Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District as well as Naval Base Defense Officer, for directives as to whether such a search would be made, because (i) normally speaking the reasons for long distance reconnaissance would have been known to the Commander in Chief prior to its being known to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and (ii) the planes were units of the Fleet, and their deployment was required to be known by the Commander in Chief so that he would know what he still had available for other uses (Har. page 133)

If the Commandant started action, he would have been acting for the Commander in Chief, and, Rear Admiral Bellinger said, presumably he would receive word from the Commander in Chief at the same time that it was received by Rear Admiral Bloch, as ComFOURTEEN, though the latter did have authority to start action in an emergency (Har. page 133).



Rear Admiral Bellinger further stated that he did not have authority to place the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a functioning status except in an actual emergency, such as occurred on 7 December 1941. At that time the forces did immediately assume a functioning status without orders from higher authority, when there was broadcast at 0758 the message:

"Air raid Pearl Harbor X This is no drill." (Hew. pages 741C, 741H)

Rear Admiral Bellinger stated that the normal procedure for vitalizing the Naval Base Air Defense Force for drills, was for the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to send a dispatch reading:

"Drill, Danger of an air raid on Pearl Harbor exists,  
Drill."

On receipt of this dispatch, Rear Admiral Bellinger, in turn, as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, sent a dispatch to all air units that made planes available to the Force, except Army pursuit units, ordering all available aircraft into the highest degree of readiness. In this way, the Navy Search and Attack Groups under Rear Admiral Bellinger were put into a functioning status. The planes initially in the highest degree of readiness would commence searches, and their efforts would be supplemental by others as they were made ready (Hew. page 471D).

Rear Admiral Bellinger testified that it was foolish to think that such a "skeletonized" organization, which remained practically non-existent, except during periodic drills, and which was to be put in motion only on the occurrence of emergency or by special orders, and was then to function on the basis of mutual



cooperation between the Army and Navy Air Forces rather than in accordance with the principal of unity of command, could go into action and function effectively at the occurrence of an actual emergency (Har. page 134).

Rear Admiral Bellinger's next senior in command, who acted for him in event of absence or illness, was Captain Logan Ramsey (Har. page 122).

6. The Fleet Command - Missions

At and for some time prior to 7 December 1941, the Pacific Fleet was organized by Admiral Kimmel into seven major task forces, the primary missions and commanders of which, and requirements concerning employment schedules, as prescribed by Admiral Kimmel on 31 October 1941, in Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41 (N.C.I. Exhibit 52), were as follows:

(a) Task Force One, under Commander Battle Force, Vice Admiral W.S. Pye, who was Admiral Kimmel's next senior in command in the Pacific Fleet (N.C.I. pages 274-275).

This Force consisted of Batdivs TWO, FOUR (6 BB),<sup>1/</sup> Cardiv ONE less LEXINGTON (1 CV), Crudiv NINE (5 CL), Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE (1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD), OGHALA, Mindiv ONE (1 CM, 4 DM).

Task Force One had as its "Primary Mission:"

"To organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient Covering Force available for supporting operations of other forces; or for engagement, with or without support in fleet action." (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 1)

<sup>1/</sup> See infra, page 99 for explanation of symbols on pages 67-69.

(b) Task Force Two, under Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, Vice Admiral William F. Halsey (N.C.I. page 274).

This Force consisted of Batdiv ONE (3 BB), Cardiv TWO (1 CV), Crudiv FIVE (4 CA), Desflot TWO (1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD), Mindiv TWO (4 DM) (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 1).

Task Force Two had as its "Primary Mission:"

"To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient Reconnoitering and Raiding Force for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces." (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 1)

(c) Task Force Three, under Commander Scouting Force, Vice Admiral Wilson Brown (N.C.I. page 274).

This Force consisted of Crudivs FOUR, SIX (8 CA), LEXINGTON plus Marine Air Group 21 (1 CV), Desron FIVE (1 DL, 8 DD), Minron TWO (13 DMS), Trainron FOUR (6 AP), 2nd Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 2).

Task Force Three had as its "Primary Mission:"

"To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient Amphibious Force for attack, with or without support of other forces, on outlying positions of the enemy." (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 2).

(d) Task Force Four, under Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, Rear Admiral Bloch. The composition and mission of this Force has been set forth, supra, page 56.

(e) Task Force Seven, under Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, Rear Admiral Thomas Withers (N.C.I. page 275).

This Force consisted of Subron FOUR less Subdiv FORTY-ONE (1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR, 1 DD), Subron SIX (12 SS, 1 AS), \*Subron EIGHT (6 SS, 1 AS), \*Subron TEN (4 SS, 1 AS) (\*Upon reporting). (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 2)

Task Force Seven had as its "Primary Mission:"

"(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient Submarine Observation and Attack Force for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces.

"(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases." (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 2)

(f) Task Force Nine, under Commander Patrol Wing Two, Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger. The composition and mission of this Force has been set forth, supra, pages 60-61.

(g) Task Force Fifteen, under Commander Base Force, Rear Admiral W. E. Calhoun (N.C.I. page 275).

This Force consisted of Units assigned (4 CA or CL). (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 3)

Task Force Fifteen had as its "Primary Mission:"

"To escort trans-pacific shipping in order to protect trans-pacific shipping against possible attack." (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 3)

(h) Admiral Kimmel issued, in the same letter, a directive to the several task forces concerning employment schedules, requiring in some cases current schedules to be adhered to, and, in the cases of Task Forces Seven and Nine, that revised schedules be prepared covering the period 15 November to

31 December 1941. The directive read:

"11. Schedules. Current employment schedules for Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE, and units not assigned to Task Forces, remain in effect except for units transferred to Task Forces SEVEN and NINE by this letter. Assignments to Task Force FIFTEEN will be indicated in the Task Force ONE, TWO and THREE schedules. Commanders Task Force SEVEN and NINE submit revised schedules for the period 15 November to 31 December 1941, at the earliest practicable date. For the present, required inter-type training of submarines and patrol planes with surface types will be limited to the Fleet Tactical periods listed in reference (b). Commanders Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will, if practicable, have at least two divisions of submarines and two squadrons of patrol planes available for each of these Fleet Tactical periods. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will include in their schedules joint arrangements for exercises between patrol planes and submarines in recognition signals, visual and radio communications, and coordinated tactics. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will also arrange for intertype training in addition to that required during Fleet Tactical periods by mutual agreement with Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE during the regular at sea operating periods of the surface Task Forces." (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 4).

Admiral Kimmel stated that the task force organization outlined and referred to, supra, pages 67-69, was, with minor changes, in effect during all the time he commanded the Pacific Fleet (N.C.I. page 274).



C. Relations with the War Department.

The testimony given in the several investigations established that there existed cordial relations between the Navy and Army Commands in Washington and in Hawaii.

(1) General Marshall testified that he had frequent conversations with Admiral Stark, and that their relations were excellent (N.C.I. page 856), and Admiral Stark wrote that General Marshall was a "tower of strength" to the Navy in its efforts to obtain more material. (N.C.I. Exhibit 29; infra page 179).

Admirals Pye (N.C.I. page 441), Delany (N.C.I. page 507; Har. page 78), Smith (N.C.I. page 536), Calhoun (id., pages 936, 937), and Kitts (N.C.I. page 523) testified to the existence of cordial relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in Hawaii. Similar testimony was given by Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. pages 367, 368) and by General Short (id., pages 220, 221). This was also the understanding of General Marshall (N.C.I. page 856). The testimony of Admiral Bloch (N.C.I. page 408) and General Short (N.C.I. pages 220, 221) was also that their relations were good.

(2) Vice Admiral (then Captain) McMorris said that the relations of Admiral Kimmel and General Short were cordial and cooperative as to the development of plans for local defense and for utilization of fleet units in port for local defense; that there may, from time to time, have been differences of opinion, but relations were habitually pleasant. (N.C.I. page 901).



Vice Admiral McMorris also testified that there was much interchange of information on a habitual informal basis between himself and members of General Short's staff, and that he himself not infrequently saw members of General Short's staff. He stated that prior to joining Admiral Kimmel's staff, he was Operations Officer for Admiral Andrews, who was Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment and Senior Officer Present in Hawaii until the Fleet came out some time during 1940; that during that period he frequently visited Fort Shafter and discussed defensive plans with the Army officers, and that after joining Admiral Kimmel's staff, his association at Fort Shafter with the Army continued. He said he felt he was not exceptional in that respect. (Hew. pages 332-333).

(3) Admiral Smith stated:

"Admiral Kimmel assumed command only a week or two before General Short arrived. Before General Short had taken over as Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel went around to see him both were in civilian clothing, and discussed all the problems of the Pacific as Kimmel saw them. The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were better than those I had ever seen between a commanding general and an admiral, either there or in other places. They were together, I should say, at least twice a week, very frequently with their Staffs, and sometimes more frequently than that. We always invited the Army to take part in our exercises, and then developed a relation such that Army planes would use Navy fields and Navy planes would use Army fields. It was found that the bombs of one would not fit the racks of the other, and that was remedied. The relations between the Army and the Navy out there were excellent." (Har. page 35).

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel never felt that Admiral Bloch was General Short's opposite number, rather Admiral Kimmel felt that he was General Short's opposite; he felt that when he was present he was the man who should deal with the Army and with everything himself.

he took that responsibility although that might not have been indicated on the official documents. However, Admiral Smith did not recall that this left Admiral Bloch in any state of uncertainty; Admiral Kimmel had a great deal of respect for Admiral Bloch. (Har. page 36).

Admiral Smith also said:

"Kimmel's attitude was that Bloch was under his command and that when he was in port, he had the responsibility and he dealt directly with Short. Probably one reason was that he had a force that Admiral Bloch did not have, but he felt that Bloch was his subordinate while in port, and he dealt directly with the Army. Usually, however, he would call in Admiral Bloch if he had anything important to say." (Har. page 36).

Admiral Smith said the primary reason why the Army and Navy business was conducted by Admiral Kimmel and not by Admiral Bloch was that after Admiral Kimmel moved ashore in the summer of 1941, he was there practically all the time and just assumed that responsibility of a permanent nature; and that responsibility included the responsibility for the safety of the Fleet for it was realized that the only defense would be by the Fleet and that there was no defense ashore except the net or the gate. (Har. page 37).

(4) Admiral Wilkinson testified that the Office of Naval Intelligence and G-2 were in constant communication with each other and that in fact General Miles, Head of Military Intelligence was dining with him on the night of 6 December. He stated that through his steady and effective liaison, all the information the Navy had regarding movements of the Japanese fleet was furnished the Army. (Hew. pages 408-409).

(5) Captain McCollum said that there was close cooperation between the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence and the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division (Army). He stated:

"The Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division had full information of the situation. We were in daily consultation. I saw Colonel Bratton or one of his assistants daily. They usually came to my office in the afternoon. They had full access to my charts showing the location and movements of ships, and they had full access to all of the radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department. That was given by me personally and verbally and the situation discussed from day to day with officers of the Far Eastern Section MIS in the War Department, and that had been true for some months past. We made no major move, for instance, such as withdrawing our naval language officers from Japan or sending a dispatch out to destroy all codes and ciphers - - - without notifying my opposite number in the War Department what we intended to do." (Hew. pages 20-21).

Captain McCollum said that so far as he knew all Army information was made available to his section. He said, however, that the Army radio intelligence organizations did not furnish information of value regarding the Jap Fleet, since "they didn't touch the Jap Navy systems." Army radio intelligence organizations were working on Jap diplomatic ciphers and on certain minor Japanese Army systems. He said that the cooperation between the Far Eastern Sections of Navy and Army Intelligence was "unofficial," but had the sanction and approval of both the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Military Intelligence Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. (Hew. pages 22-23).

(6) Admiral Smith said that the method of command in effect in Hawaii as between the Army and Navy was the method of mutual cooperation;

but the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, had the predominate interest which General Short recognized. He said the Navy was not very much impressed with the Army's provision for defense of Pearl Harbor, and realized that any defense of Pearl Harbor would have to be by the Fleet itself, "which it was." (Har. page 36).

(7) Admiral Bellinger stated that unity of command is essential to the preparation for meeting such an air attack as that on Pearl Harbor; the organization, operating twenty-four hours a day, must be fully manned and functioning. Reconnaissance, radar nets, complete information regarding shipping, and control of all aircraft in the zone of operations are essential. Such an organization must be in effect and functioning smoothly before the attack. Not much can be expected from a mutual cooperative organization existing only on paper, developed only through intermittent drills. (Hew. page 510).

D. Relations with the State Department.

The testimony at the several investigations established that cordial dealings and close cooperation marked the relations between the Navy Department and the State Department.

(1) The liaison between the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark) and the State Department was summarized by Admiral Turner as follows: 1/

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1/ See also the statement of Admiral Schuirman, Supra, pages 9-10.

"The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. He consulted them frequently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making any particular diplomatic move. In the Office of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the State Department. He visited the State Department and discussed problems with them practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State Department conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, usually attended by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War Plans of the Navy, the Chief of the Central Division of the Office of Naval Operations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two or three representatives of the State Department. The matters discussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western Hemisphere countries. The Army was building a lot of air fields in the Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had sent missions to those countries, and at the meetings with the Under Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occasionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a conference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to time, the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Navy Department to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were other unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy Departments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time to time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the State and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval Operations. I would say that relations between the State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and were characterized by good feeling." (Har. page 257).

Admiral Turner summarized the situation in regard to the State Department by stating that on the whole, he was satisfied and had no complaint or criticism on the attitude of the State Department. (Har. page 258).

(2) Maxwell M. Hamilton, who was Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department during the latter part of 1941, stated that there was close cooperation between the State Department and the Navy in exchanging information as to United States-Japanese relations. He stated that he had frequent contact with Admiral Schuirmann on questions



which came up for decision involving foreign and naval policy. The methods employed by the State Department of furnishing information to the Navy on matters of United States - Japanese relations were, he said: (i) the liaison office forwarded copies of paraphrases of telegrams or mail reports of interest to the Navy; (ii) the Division of Far Eastern Affairs transmitted paraphrases of telegrams and mail reports from the Far East, and, (iii) conferences were had between Navy and State Department officials, and meetings of the war council and Cabinet were held. (N.C.I. pages 1070-1072).

(3) Captain Smith-Hutton, who in 1941, was Naval Attache in Tokyo, obtained when possible information of Japanese military and naval activities. He said that Ambassador Grew expected him to keep advised as to the Japanese Navy and that they exchanged information. (N.C.I. page 1079). He said he had great difficulty in obtaining Japanese military and naval information, and had informed the Navy Department by implication in a report that they could not depend on him to keep them informed concerning the Japanese Navy. He was required to report to the Japanese Navy whenever he left Tokyo, and his movements were restricted. (N.C.I. pages 1077, 1080). He transmitted information by Japanese cable to the 4th Marine Radio in Shanghai, from whence it was sent to the United States. He also made reports to Ambassador Grew and to the Navy Department by diplomatic pouch. (N.C.I. page 1078).

(4) Admiral Schuirmann said (referring to "Peace and War" by Ambassador Grew, page 113) that a low evaluation had been given to Ambassador Grew's report that in case of trouble the Japanese planned a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. He could not recall any discussion of that report with the State Department, and said that he did not think a particularly high evaluation had been placed upon that report by the Ambassador or by his staff. He said he could not explain the prominence given to this report in "Peace and War." (Har. page 411).

(5) Admiral Schuirmann could not recall the extent to which the office of the Chief of Naval Operations had participated in the decisions to establish "moral embargoes" to prevent the export to Japan of various strategic commodities. But he did remember that there was a discussion of the question of Japanese reaction, particularly to the oil embargo, and that Admiral Stark expressed the view that a total embargo on oil would of necessity force the Japanese to move south or to collapse. (Har. pages 406, 407).

(6) Admiral Stark testified that the Navy Department knew of the proposal to freeze Japanese assets but was not consulted prior to the issuance of the Executive Order. He stated that he advised the State Department that if the United States embargoed oil shipments to Japan, Japan would go to war but "not necessarily with the United States," and that such an embargo should not be made effective unless this country were prepared to accept the risk of war. (N.C.I. pages 43-45).

Admiral Schuirmann said he believed that the Executive Order freezing Japanese credits was taken up by the State Department with the Navy Department; he did not recall any reports by the Navy to the State Department concerning the Navy's readiness for war in the Pacific balanced against the risks of the freezing order. He said that his own state of mind was that the Japanese would go their own way in China, Indo-China and put the onus of using force to stop them on the United States in hope that the division of opinion in the United States would delay effective measures. (Har. page 408).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall whether the State Department consulted the Navy Department before issuing the order in July freezing Japanese credits. (Har. page 422).

Admiral Turner said that he did not participate in any discussion prior to the freezing order, but was informed of it after the decision was made. (Har. page 258). At another time, Admiral Turner said that the freezing order was issued without any particular advance knowledge on his part, although he had heard it mentioned previously. He said he thought this meant a war between Japan and the United States. (N.C.I. page 989).

THE WAR AND DEFENSE PLANS

The evidence established that, except for the defense planning reflected in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935 (FTP155), the war planning of the Navy lagged until in May 1941 there was issued the Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5 (WPL - 46). <sup>1/</sup> The planning prior to the issuing of Rainbow 5 was the cause of some critical comment within the Naval establishment. After that time, there is no evidence of such criticism.

1. War Planning Prior to May 1941

(a) Admiral Stark testified that he received (N.C.I. pages 92 and 93) a letter from Admiral Richardson, then Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, dated 22 October 1940 (N.C.I. Exhibit 27), in which Admiral Richardson, among other things, stated:

"1. Since the return of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, from his recent conference in Washington

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1/ There intervened "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Orange (1938)." and "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 1".

The latter was approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy Departments on 14 August 1939, and was revised by the Joint Board on 10 April 1940. The provisions of the Joint Plan "Orange" included the assumption: "Active hostilities against the United States by Orange will be precipitated without a formal declaration of war" and prescribed the Navy Mission as including: "To patrol the coastal zone (of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier) and to control and protect shipping therein." This Navy Mission was restated in the Joint Plan "Rainbow No. 1." (See excerpts "Defense Plans", Joint Cong. Inv. Comm. investigating Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, November 1945.)

and in view of the conversations that took place there, additional thought and study have been given to the status and readiness of the U. S. Fleet for war operations. As a result of this study, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, feels it to be his solemn duty to present, for the consideration of the Chief of Naval Operations, certain facts and conclusions in order that there may be no doubt in the minds of higher authority as to his convictions in regard to the present situation, especially in the Pacific.

- "2. In order to bring out more clearly all the aspects of this situation, it is necessary to review certain factors affecting it and to discuss them in the light of present events.
- "3. On the occasion of his first visit to Washington, in July, and in personal letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief stressed his firm conviction that neither the Navy nor the country was prepared for war with Japan. He pointed out that such an eventuality could only result in a long drawn out, costly war, with doubtful prospects of ultimate success. He left Washington with three distinct impressions:

First. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action:

Second. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan:



Third. That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaiian area.

"4. On the occasion of his second visit to Washington, in October, 1940, an entirely different impression was obtained. It is true that the international situation, between the two visits, had materially changed, principally in that the danger of invasion of the British Isles was considerably less imminent, with consequent reduced chances of the loss or compromise of the British Fleet; in that the United States had more closely identified itself with Great Britain; in that Japanese aggression had progressed to the domination of Indo-China and gave signs of further progress toward the Dutch East Indies; and, in the open alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan, reportedly aimed at the United States.

"5. As a result of these changes, it now appears that more active, open steps aimed at Japan are in serious contemplation and that these steps, if taken now, may lead to active hostilities. It is in connection with this eventuality that the Commander-in-Chief is constrained to present his present views.

"6. The present O-1 Plan (ORANGE), WPUSF 44 and WPUSF 45, in the light of the present international situation, is believed beyond the present strength of the U.S. Fleet and beyond the present resources of the U.S. Navy. This is believed true for the following reasons:

- (a) The present strength of the U.S. Fleet is not sufficient "to establish, at the earliest practicable date, the United States Joint Asiatic Force in the Marshall-Caroline Islands area in strength superior to that of ORANGE and ready for further advance to the Western Pacific in condition to operate offensively in that area." \* \* \* \* \*
- (b) The Army is not now prepared and will not, in the immediate future, be prepared to support our western advance. The Fleet Marine Force is not sufficient to support the necessary operations alone. \* \* \* \* \*
- (c) I know of no flag officer who wholeheartedly endorses the present ORANGE Plan. It is the general conception that the Plan had its in-

ception primarily in the desirability of having a guiding directive for the development of the Naval Establishment to meet any international situation that might be thrust upon it. It is my belief that the impracticabilities of the ORANGE Plan, in the absence of a better one, have been periodically overlooked in order that the Department might have for budget purposes and presentation to Congress the maximum justification for the necessary enlargement of the Navy. In my opinion, the development of the Naval Establishment has not yet proceeded to the point essential to the successful prosecution of the Plan."\* \* \* \*

"10. The foregoing is briefly summarized as follows:

- (a) Unsuitability of ORANGE Plan in present situation and present development of Naval Establishment;
- (b) Inapplicability of other Plans available to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet (Rainbow Nos. I and II);
- (c) Vital necessity for (1) new directive (possibly Rainbow No. III) based on present realities, national objectives and commitments as far as these are known or can be predicted at the present time; (2) coordination of plans developed with National Policy and steps to be taken to implement that policy;
- (d) In the light of information now available to him, the Commander-in-Chief is of the conviction that the elements of a realistic plan should embody:
  - (1) Security and defense measures of the Western Hemisphere;
  - (2) Long-range interdiction of enemy commerce;
  - (3) Threats and raids against the enemy;

- (4) Extension of operations as the relative strength of the Naval Establishment (may be influenced by allied strength and freedom of action) is built up to support them." \* \* \* \* \* (N.C.I. Exhibit 27).

Admiral Stark stated that he was delighted to receive this letter from Admiral Richardson and that he was in accord with most of what Admiral Richardson had to say, particularly in regard to the War Plans. Admiral Stark also said the very reasons given by Admiral Richardson in his criticisms of the situation at that time were some of the causes for the subsequent development of Rainbow War Plan, No. 5, WPL-46. (N.C.I. page 93).

(b) Vice Admiral Turner, who became head of the War Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations on 23 October 1940, (N.C.I. page 1010), testified that, on that date, "the only War Plan in existence was the Orange War Plan, which was most unrealistic" (N.C.I. page 1011). Vice Admiral Turner referred to the letter written by Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark and stated that, after its receipt, he immediately started the preparation of the War Plan which was known as Rainbow Three, and which was issued in January 1941. This, he stated, was not a joint Army and Navy Plan, but,

"was purely a naval plan, based on the concept of Japan attacking the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies and Hawaii, and it involved sending a detachment of the Pacific Fleet out to join the Asiatic Fleet. That plan was thoroughly discussed by the principal officers in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and with one or two members of the General Board, and agreed on and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations." (N.C.I. page 1011).

(c) Admiral Stark wrote Admiral Kimmel on 25 February 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 31) concerning the Joint (ABC) staff conversations, as follows:

"I know little of further interest to bring up for the moment. Our staff conversations (and thank the Good Lord there has been no public leak that they are taking place) are nearing their conclusion and we hope will be finished in about ten days. Of course we will make you acquainted with all decisions reached just as soon as we can." (N.C.I. Exhibit 31).

(d) On 3 April 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific, Atlantic and Asiatic Fleets, including Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 73), subject "Observations on the present international situation", in which he discussed the drafting of the Rainbow 5 War Plan in conjunction with the British. He said:

"1. Staff conversations with the British have been completed and a joint United States - British war plan drawn up. Two copies of the Report (Short title ABC-1) of these conversations are being supplied each addressee by officer messenger. Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, founded on the United States - British plan, is in preparation and will be distributed at an early date. The general nature of Rainbow No. 5 will become evident to you upon perusal of the joint Report. This Report has been approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army and by myself, and, at an appropriate time, is expected to receive the approval of the President. You are authorized to discuss matter pertaining to Rainbow No. 5 with other officers of the Army and the Navy, as may be appropriate." (N.C.I. Exhibit 73). \* \* \* \* \*

"11. Your Operating Plans for Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 3 will, with little change, be equally effective for Rainbow No. 5. I advise you to study the Report of the staff conversations in order that you will be in a position to issue your new plans as soon as practicable after receipt of the new Basic Plan, and, if war comes before you receive it, so that you can promptly modify your present orders." (N.C.I. Exhibit 73, page 3).



## 2. The Plans

The several War and Defense Plans, which have been referred to briefly (supra, page 40 - 44), were prepared, and contained provisions pertinent to an inquiry into the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, stated in more detail as follows:

(a) Joint Action of the Army and Navy 1935 (FTP 155)

(NCI page 27; N.C.I. Exhibit 6).

This document, issued 11 September 1935 by George H. Dern, Secretary of War, and Claude A. Swanson, Secretary of the Navy, superceded one similarly entitled, dated 27 April 1927, and enunciated agreements concerning policies and procedure for the coordination of action by the Army and Navy in order to promote harmonious joint action, as vital to success in war (N.C.I. Exhibit 6, prefatory page 3).

(1) The document stated as its preface:

"1. PURPOSE OF STATEMENT OF POLICY. — The purpose of this statement of policy is to distinguish between the functions of the Army and the Navy in such a manner as to establish an authoritative and adequate basis for development, planning, procurement, and training of each service; and for their guidance in joint operations." (ibid, page 1)

(2) The general functions of the Army in peace and war were stated to include:

"(2) To defend the continental United States and its overseas possession, to include the defense of all permanent naval bases." (ibid, page 2)



"b. Additional general functions of the Army in war." \*\*\*\*

"(2) To conduct operations in support of the Navy for the establishment and defense of naval bases." (ibid, page 3)

(3) The general functions of the Navy in peace and war were stated to include:

"(2) To guard the continental and overseas possessions of the United States." (ibid, page 3)

(4) It was agreed that the methods of coordination of the operations of the Army and the Navy would be either by

"a. Mutual cooperation;

"b. The exercise of unity of command."

and determination of the method of coordination was stated to be:

"9. DETERMINATION OF THE METHOD OF COORDINATION.

"a. Operations of Army and Navy forces will normally be coordinated by mutual cooperation.

"b. Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of unity of command in the following cases:

(1) When ordered by the President; or

(2) When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; or

(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command." (ibid, page 5).

(5) It was stated that the activities requiring coordination or joint operations included coastal frontier defense (ibid, page 11), against attacks, which were classified as follows:

"(1) Major operations, i.e., those executed for the purpose of invasion; and

"(2) Minor operations, i.e., raids against shipping or shore objectives." (ibid, page 13)

(6) The specific functions of the Army in coastal frontier defense were stated to be the providing and operating of mobile land and air forces required for the direct defense of the coast and "essential harbor defense" (ibid, page 14).

"(2) Aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general coastal frontier defense; in support of or in lieu of naval forces. \*\*\*\*

"(6) Beach defense, together with vessels necessary for its installation, maintenance, and patrol." (ibid, page 14)

(7) The general functions of the Navy in coastal frontier were stated to include the protection of "the sea lanes vital to the United States, thereby contributing to the defense of the coastal frontiers," and, specifically, conducting "naval operations directed toward the defeat of any enemy force in the vicinity of the coast" and supporting the "Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives." (ibid, page 14) In carrying out these functions it was stated that "the Navy will:

"(1) Provide and operate—

(a) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of an attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast.

(b) A communication and intelligence system among the elements of the sea defense, with provisions for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Army.

(c) Contact mines, nets, and booms, including the vessels necessary for their installation and maintenance.

(d) Inshore patrols for the protection of mine fields and underwater obstructions other than beach defenses; for the control and protection of shipping in passage through defensive sea areas; for the control of shipping in defensive coastal areas, and for the prevention of enemy mining and submarine operations.

(e) Underwater listening posts for naval use where this service cannot be obtained from Army listening posts.

(f) Through the Lighthouse Service, when turned over to the Navy, coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation, and to change them as necessary.

(g) An information system through the Coast Guard stations when turned over to the Navy, and through lighthouses and light vessels.

(h) Necessary mine-sweeping vessels.

(2) Provide and maintain such fixed underwater obstructions as are component parts of Navy barrages; including the vessels necessary for their installation and maintenance.

(3) Operate gates through nets.

(4) Conduct shipping through channels in mine fields or obstructions." (ibid, page 15)

(8) The general functions of the Army and Navy air components were stated to be governed by the following policy:

"(1) The air component of the Army conducts air operations over the land and such air operations over the sea as are incident to the accomplishment of Army functions.

"(2) The air component of the Navy conducts air operations over the sea and such air operations over the land as are incident to the accomplishment of Navy functions." (ibid, page 17)

(9) The primary and secondary functions of the Army and Navy air components were outlined as follows:

"21. PRIMARY FUNCTIONS.

"a. The air component of each service has a primary function to which its principal efforts are to be directed, both in peace and in war.

"b. These primary functions are:

(1) The Army air component to operate as an arm of the mobile Army, both in the conduct of air operations over the land in support of land operations and in the conduct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast.

(2) The Navy air component to operate as an arm of the Fleet.

"22. SECONDARY FUNCTIONS.

"a. Secondary functions of the air component of the Army are:

(1) Reconnaissance and observation of fire for harbor defenses.

(2) Air operations in connection with the defense of important industrial centers and military and naval installations.

(3) Air operations in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

"b. Secondary functions of the air component of the Navy are:

(1) Air operations, by aircraft forming part of naval local defense forces, for the patrol of the coastal zones and for the protection of shipping therein.

(2) Air operations in support of or in lieu of Army forces." (ibid, pages 17-18.)

(10) The purpose of a joint organization and of joint measures for coastal frontier defense was stated to include:

"(1) Protecting shipping in the coastal zones;

"(2) Protecting our military and civil installations and facilities;

"(3) Preventing invasion of United States territory from overseas;

"(4) Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to military, industrial, and commercial operations." (ibid, page 27)

(11) In connection with coastal frontier defense, the agreements defined the geographical divisions known as a coastal frontier, a naval district, and other defensive

areas (ibid, pages 28-30). There were also defined inshore and offshore patrols as follows:

"r. An inshore patrol is a part of the naval local defense forces operating generally within a defensive coastal area and controlling shipping within a defensive sea area.

"s. An offshore patrol is a part of the naval local defense forces operating and patrolling the coastal zone outside of those areas assigned to the inshore patrol." (ibid, page 31)

(12) Possible enemy operations were considered (ibid, pages 32-38), and were stated to include:

"(1) Attacks on shipping in the coastal zone or in approaches to harbors.

"(2) Attacks on naval forces of the Defender, either off the coast, entering a harbor, while inside the harbor, or while debouching therefrom.

"(3) Air bombardments of the seacoast and contiguous areas from forces well out to sea." (ibid, page 36) \* \* \* \*

"(14) Torpedo fire into harbors.

"(15) Blocking action against harbor entrances.

"(16) Penetration by naval vessels into a harbor or water area.

"(17) Major landing operations supported by rapid-fire guns on ships and by aviation." (ibid, page 37)

(13) The possible enemy forces that might be employed to carry out the above operations were considered to be:

"(1) B y surface craft.-- Information and reconnaissance; seizure or destruction of shipping; combat with naval vessels; mining or countermining; mine sweeping; launching air operations; blockade; closing harbors or channels; clearing underwater obstacles; attacking nets; cutting cables; torpedo attacks on ships outside or inside harbors; laying smoke screens; gun bombardment; making feints; forcing a passage; and making and covering landings either for demolition purposes or for minor raids or raids in force. \* \* \* \*



"(3) By aircraft. -- Information and reconnaissance; attacking ships and shore objectives with machine-gun fire and/or high-explosive bombs; destroying obstacles; landing observers or spies; gaining superiority in the air; spotting gunfire; and laying smoke screens." (ibid, pages 37-38)

(14) The joint agreements contain definitions of "Categories of Defense," which were indications to the Army and to the Navy of the degree of preparation that should be taken for defending coastal frontiers (ibid, page 38).

These included:

"a. CATEGORY A.-- Coastal frontiers that probably will be free from attack, but for which a nominal defense must be provided for political reasons. \* \* \* \*

"b. CATEGORY B.-- Coastal frontiers that may be subject to minor attacks. \* \* \* \*

"c. CATEGORY C.-- Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to minor attack. \* \* \* \*

"d. CATEGORY D.-- Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. Under this category, the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol, inshore and offshore, than for Category C, will be required. Under this category certain defensive sea areas will be established. In addition, an anti-aircraft gun and machine-gun defense of important areas outside of harbor defenses should be organized; general reserves should be strategically located so as to facilitate prompt reinforcement of the frontiers; and plans should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become theaters of operations. Long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of the GHQ air force." (ibid, pages 38-39)

"e. CATEGORY E.-- Coastal frontiers that in all probability will be subject to major attack.  
\* \* \* \*

"f. CATEGORY F.-- Possessions beyond the continental limits of the United States which may be subject to either minor or major attack for the purpose of occupation, but which cannot be provided with adequate defense forces.\* \* \* \*

"g. GENERAL.

(1) Where Categories D and E are applicable initially, local defense plans should provide for the initial employment of such forces of the Army and the Navy as may be required in addition to those forces which are ordinarily available for the initial defense of the coastal frontier in question, and which can be diverted from the mobilization and concentration of the Army forces, from the United States Fleet, and from other naval forces, during the period of mobilization and concentration, without materially interfering with or seriously delaying the operations to be undertaken in the principal theater of operations."  
(ibid, page 40)

(15) The defensive operations required in order to meet possible enemy operations were stated to include the following:

"(1) The observation of the coastal frontier and the sea beyond as far as circumstances permit or seem to demand.

"(2) The protection of shipping in waters adjacent to the seacoast.

"(3) The attack on enemy vessels in waters adjacent to the seacoast.

"(4) The resistance to enemy approach to the seacoast.

"(5) The protection of the seacoast, and especially strategic harbors, against raids."

(ibid, pages 41-42)

The means available in time of war for meeting the above requirements of defense were stated to include the Fleet and Naval local defense forces, and the Army mobile and harbor defense forces (ibid, page 42).

(16) The relation of the Fleet to coastal frontier defense was stated to be as follows:

"The strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. This requires that coastal frontier defense be so effectively conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of its bases. In the case of hostile major overseas movements directed against our coasts, the Fleet, if present and free to act, will be a powerful factor for ensuring the security of its bases and our coasts, and, if it engages the enemy, should be supported by all the land-based aircraft available." (ibid, page 42)

(17) The relation of the Army mobile forces to coastal frontier defense was stated:

"The Army, in its responsibility for the direct defense of the coast, must be prepared to meet successfully any attack directed against any part of our coastal frontiers. This responsibility and the possibility that naval strategy may demand the presence of the Fleet in another theater of operations make it necessary for the Army to provide mobile forces, not only those to be used as covering or outpost forces in the initial coastal frontier defense organization, but also the additional forces required to defeat enemy landing or air attacks directed against any part of the coast. When any part of a coastal frontier is threatened, these additional mobile forces will be concentrated with a view to defeating the enemy in the affected area." (ibid, page 43)

(18) The relation of Army air forces to coastal frontier defense was outlined in part as follows:

"In operations against enemy attacks along our coast and in the waters adjacent thereto, the operations of Army and Navy aviation will overlap to a certain extent. That is, Army aircraft will necessarily have to operate over the sea and Navy aircraft may at times have to operate over the land. In any case, no restrictions will

be placed upon the complete freedom of either service to utilize against the enemy the full power of all aircraft available and any and all facilities that may be necessary to make that power effective. Army air forces are a part of the mobile Army forces engaged in the direct defense of the coast." (ibid, page 43)

The functions and operations of the Army air force were stated to be governed by principles which included the following:

"(e) In the absence of the Fleet, the primary responsibility of securing information of hostile fleet movements rests with naval district forces supplemented by Army Air Corps units. However, regardless of the presence or absence of the Fleet, the GHQ air force retains the responsibility for such reconnaissance as is essential to its combat efficiency.

"(f) In the absence of sufficient naval forces to engage the enemy at sea, a major attack upon the coast may develop so as to require the utilization of the GHQ air force in three phases as follows:

1st phase--The conduct of reconnaissance over the sea approaches to the coast and (when favorable opportunity presents itself) the attack of enemy elements." (ibid, page 44)

The agreements provided for the making of coastal frontier defense plans (ibid, pages 44-45). The responsibility of the Army air force was stated to be subject to the provision of each coastal frontier plan that was required to be made (ibid, pages 44-45).

(19) Included in the Naval local defense forces (ibid, page 45) referred to in this joint plan of action was the offshore patrol which, it was stated, might be composed, among other things, of aircraft, with the following duties:

"1. To patrol systematically the coastal zone outside of those parts assigned to the inshore patrol.

"2. To develop information of, report, and attack enemy forces sighted, in accordance with the doctrine of the patrol." (ibid, page 47)

(20) With reference to defensive coastal areas, it was provided that they would be delimited by the Army and the Navy (ibid, page 48), and that the Army "is responsible for the defense against aerial attack of all military and naval facilities ashore within a harbor area" (ibid, page 49).

(21) In respect of the defense against landing attacks some of the steps pointed out as necessary (ibid, page 52) were:

"(d) Distant reconnaissance by available air elements and naval vessels of enemy approach in the coastal zone.

"(e) An air offensive by all available Army and Navy aircraft in order to secure superiority in the air and to destroy at sea the approaching hostile elements that are vital to the enemy in making a successful landing.

"(f) Employment of the available naval forces to seaward to keep contact with and attack the enemy; patrol of the beach defenses and beach obstacles by the Army with outpost detachments, aircraft, and vessels to give warning of actual landing operations; maintenance of these beach obstacles by vessels of the Army." (ibid, page 53)

(22) This joint plan of action established a procedure for, and required the preparation locally of, joint frontier defense plans (N.C.I. Exhibit 6, pages 61-69).



(b) Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5, U. S. Navy  
(WPL-46) (N.C.I. Exhibit 4).

This basic plan, as has been pointed out (supra, pages 11,12), was prepared by the War Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., as a result of staff conversations between the British, Canadians, and the United States, and was completed in May, 1941 (Har. pages 171, 173). It is dated and was promulgated 26 May 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 1).

(1) The Plan states, with reference to its basis:

"0102. It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations (Short Title ABC-1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow 5." (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 5)

(2) There were included provisions for the execution of the entire Plan on "M-day," and for partial execution, as follows:

"Section 1. EXECUTION OF THE ENTIRE PLAN

"0211. a. Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV despatch, the Naval Establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, including acts of war:

'EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW No.5'.

b. The date of the above despatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise designated." (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 6).

"Section 2. EXECUTION OF A PART OF THIS PLAN

"0221. A preliminary period of strained relations of uncertain duration is anticipated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

"0222. Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war.

"0223. This plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nations to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or additional tasks thereof." (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 7)

(3) The task organizations by which the Plan was to be executed were prescribed, including the United States Pacific Fleet, under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 9).

The initial composition of the U. S. Pacific Fleet was stated to be: (i) Batdivs 1, 2, 4 (9 BB's), <sup>1/</sup> (ii) Crudivs 4, 6, 9 (8 CA's and 5 CL's), (iii) Desflots 1 and 2 (2 CL's, 4 AD's, 41 DD's, 40 DD's), (iv) Minecraft (1 CM, 8 DM), (v) Aircraft (a) (Cardiv 1, Cardiv 2 less CV5) (3 CV's), (b) Patwings 1 and 2 (83 VPB's, 2 AV's, 4 AVD's, 2 AVP's), (c) Patwing 4 ("to be formed about 1 Oct. 1941" and to consist of 24 VPB's, 2 AVD's, 2 AVP's), (vi) Submarines, (Subrons. 2, 4, 6, plus 1 CL) (1 CL, 1 AS, 2 ASR's, 1 DD, 1 AM, 60 SS's, 27 SS's), (vii) Base Force (43 Train vessels, 8 transports, 13 DM's), (viii) Marine Corps Forces (2nd Marine Division, 2nd Marine Aircraft Group,

I/ See note page 99 for explanation of symbols.

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2nd Defense Battalion, Sixth Defense Battalion), (ix) Naval Stations at Guam and Samoa (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, Appendix II, Table PAF-1, Sheets 1-3).<sup>1/</sup> There were also included in the Pacific Fleet "The Atlantic Reenforcement," which was initially comprised of Crudiv 5 (4 CA's) (ibid, Table PAF-2, Sheet 1).<sup>2/</sup>

(4) The Plan stated as the or its "General Assumptions," that the United States and the British Commonwealth, and their allies, referred to as the "Associated Powers," "are at war against the Axis Powers," and that they would conduct the war in accord with "ABC-1 and ABC-22" (Report of United States-British Staff conversations, and, Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan) (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, pages 5, 12, and Appendix I thereto, pages 3, 4).

In this assumption, the Axis Powers were defined as comprising either:

"7. \*\*\*\* a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

1/ The key to the symbols that refer to the ships of the Navy is: Batdiv - Battleship Division; Crudiv - Cruiser Division; Desflots - Destroyer Flotilla; Desron - Destroyer Squadron, Mindiv - Minron - Trainron; Cardiv - Carrier Division; Patwing - Patrol Wing; Subron - Submarine Squadron; BB - Battleship; CA - Heavy Cruiser; CL - Light Cruiser; OCL - Old light cruisers, DL - ; DD - Destroyers; CV - Aircraft Carrier; SS - Submarine; AD - Destroyer Tender; CM - Minelayer DM - Minelayer (light); AV - Seaplane Tender (large); AS - Submarine Tender; ASR - Sub-Rescue Tender; AM - Minesweeper (large); AVP - Seaplane Tender (small); AVD - Seaplane tender destroyer; VPB - Patrol Bomber.

2/ It was provided in WPL-46 that the units assigned to the Atlantic Reenforcement were to be transferred from the U. S. Pacific Fleet to the U. S. Atlantic Fleet when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 29).

"b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand." (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 4 of Appendix I)

And, it was further stated, with reference to Japan:

"9. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account." (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 4, Appendix I)

(5) The Concept of the War had, as stated, (i) the broad strategic objective of defeating Germany and her allies (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 13, and Appendix I thereto, page 5), and, accordingly, (ii) plans for military operations would be governed by considerations that concentrated attention on and proposed major efforts in the Atlantic and the continent of Europe, as follows: (ibid page 6)

"12. (Cont'd)

'13. (Cont'd)

(a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of the United States effort being concentrated in the Northwestern Approaches to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary importance.

(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basins, and to prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa." (ibid, page 7)

And, with reference to the Pacific and Japan, the Concepts continued:

"(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East."  
(ibid, page 7)

The principal defensive roles were conceived to be:

"(f) The principal defensive roles of the land forces of the Associated Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the Western Hemisphere; and to protect outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack." (N.C.I. page 8 of Appendix I)

And, some of the effort of the Army Air Forces was:

"(i) United States Army Air Forces will support the United States land and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, they will undertake the air defense of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States forces are located, and subsequently, of such other areas as may be agreed upon." (ibid, pages 8, 9)



(6) The Joint General Task of the Army and Navy was stated to include, in cooperation with the other Associated Powers, to "defeat the Axis Powers, and guard the United States national interests" by "Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power," and by "Protecting outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack" (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 14, and Appendix I thereto, page 19).

(7) The Navy General Task, in cooperation with the Army and the forces of the other Associated Powers, was defined:

"1. Destroy Axis sea communications in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, in the PACIFIC AREA east of 180°, and through the MALAY BARRIER in the FAR EAST AREA;

"2. Raid Axis forces and sea communications in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST AREAS, and in the EASTERN ATLANTIC and the WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN;

"3. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers in United States Areas, and support the defense of sea communications in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, in the FAR EAST AREA, and to the eastward of AUSTRALIA.

"4. Prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power, and support the defense of the territory of the Associated Powers in the FAR EAST AREA; and

"5. Prepare to capture the AZORES, CAPE VERDE, MARSHALL, and CAROLINE ISLANDS." (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 14)

(8) Various tasks were assigned the several task organizations (Fleets and Forces) (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, pages 15-60), including to the U. S. Pacific Fleet the following:

"3212. The U.S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the PACIFIC AREA:

a. TASK

Support the Forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

b. TASK

Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island Area, and to establish an advanced Fleet base in Truk;" \*\*\*\*

"g. TASK

Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces\*\*\*\*

h. TASK

Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;

i. TASK

Cover the operations of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces;" (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, pages 27, 28)

(9) The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, was directed in "WPL-46" to require that there be prepared the following plans:

"3215. a. \*\*\*\* The Commander in Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, will require the following plans to be prepared:

1. THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN - RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow No. 5);

2. A plan for the execution of TASK b. of paragraph 3212, assuming the availability of approximately 30,000 Army troops in addition to forces of the U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, and assuming that the task will be executed on 180M; \*\*\*\*

b. 1. Plans listed under a.1. and 2, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations." (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 30)

(10) It was recited in WPL-46 that the organization and boundaries of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces had been prescribed and defined in General Order No. 143 (N.C.I. Exhibit 2(i)) and in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935" (N.C.I. Exhibit 6), as modified by Annex I of Appendix I of WPL-46. It was also provided that there was included in the Naval Coastal Frontiers in the Pacific Area the "Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier" (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 33).<sup>1/</sup>

The composition of the Forces assigned to the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier were stated to be: (i) ODD Desdiv 80 (40 DD's), PG 19 (1 PG), 1 XPC (Daphne), 26 XYP's, 6 XAM's, 4 XAMc's, 2 XAOB's, 5 XYF's; (ii) units assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District and not otherwise assigned by WPL-46, to be assigned the Defense Forces by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in accordance with stipulated general rules; (iii) units of the Coast Guard located in the Fourteenth Naval District at the time the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy and not otherwise assigned by WPL-46. (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 33, and Appendix II thereto, pages 8, 9, and Table HCF, Sheet 1)

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<sup>1/</sup> The boundaries of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and the commander, were:

"a. Boundaries.

The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef. The Island of Wake, although outside the coastal zone, is included in the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier."

(Footnote continued on next page).

This Force was assigned the tasks of defending the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in "Category D"<sup>1/</sup> and of supporting the U.S. Pacific Fleet (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, pages 33,34).

It was provided in WPL-46 that there be prepared by the Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers (i) Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 34, and Appendix I thereto, page 28) and, by Commandants of Naval Districts, (ii) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans - Rainbow No. 5 (Naval District Plans O-5, Rainbow No. 5) (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 34). The former were to be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations, and the latter by the respective Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 34). It was also provided that the Naval Local Defense Operating Plans for Hawaii should be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for comment, prior to the review by the Chief of Naval Operations, so that they might be coordinated with the Operating Plans of the Pacific Fleet (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 35); and that

"(b) Such portions of the Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and Naval District Contributory Plans as relate to the protection of fleet anchorages and to services to the U.S. PACIFIC FLEET will be referred to the Commander in Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, if he so requests." (N.C.I. Ex.4, page 35)

(Footnote cont'd. from preceding page.)

<sup>1/</sup> b. Commanders.

Army. - The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Navy. - The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District,

who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army." (N.C.I. Ex.4, Appendix I thereto, pages 50-51).

<sup>1/</sup> Category D is defined, supra, page 92.



(11) The Command relationships between the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, was defined by WPL-46 to be that of subordination of the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, not only as respects "the execution of tasks requiring mutual support" but as applying "in all circumstances" (N.C.I. Exhibit 4, page 37).

(c) United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) (N.C.I. Exhibit 5; Hew. Exhibit 35).

This Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, as pointed out (supra, page 40), was promulgated by Admiral Kimmel 21 July 1941. It was prepared in pursuance of the directive of the Basic Plan, WPL-46 (N.C.I. Exhibit 5, page 3; Hew. Exhibit 35, page 3), as has been noted (supra, page 103). It was accepted and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations on 9 September 1941 (Hew. Exhibit 36).

The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan provided: 1/

#### "INTRODUCTION

#### CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

"O401: At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day

1/ The normal task organization for the plan was prescribed (N.C.I. Exhibit 5, pages 11-13; Hew. Exhibit 35, pages 11-13). The initial task organization for the execution of the Plan was also prescribed (Hew. Exhibit 35, pages 61-62). They were substantially the same (with minor changes) as the Task Force Organization prescribed by Admiral Kimmel on 31 October 1941 in Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41 (N.C.I. Exhibit 52) (see supra, pages 67,68,69,70).



being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day." (Hew. Exhibit 35, page 8)

#### "CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

"1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

NOTE: As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.".... (Hew. Exhibit 35, page 15)

#### "CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

##### "Section 1. General Information

"1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean:

1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American Coast and Longitude 74° West.
4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military forces." \*\*\*\*

"g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef." (Hew. Exhibit 35, pages 17-18)

"Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action

"1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser." (Hew. Exhibit 35, page 21)

"1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

- a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
- b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.
- c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
- d. The principal defensive efforts to be:
  1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
  2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.
  3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches. (ibid).

"1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

- a. Capture of Guam.
- b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
- c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
- d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
- e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.
- f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions. (Hew. Exhibit 35, pages 21-22)

"1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

- a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
- b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.
- c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main base in Halmahera).
- d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.
- e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.
- f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area.".... (Hew. Exhibit 35, page 22).

## "PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

### CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN - MISSION

"2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

- a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;
- b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
- c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;
- d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155° East;

- e. Defend Samoa in category 'D';
- f. Defend Guam in category 'F';
- g. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;
- h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;".... (Hew. Exhibit 35, page 24).

CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE  
ASSIGNED MISSIONS

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\*2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

- a. PHASE I - Initial tasks - Japan not in the war.
- b. PHASE IA - Initial tasks - Japan in the war.
- c. PHASE II, etc., - Succeeding tasks (Hew. Ex.35, page 25).

\*2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

- a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
- b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
- c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
- d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
- e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-Day.
- f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M-Day.

- g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155° East.
- h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
- i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
- j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
- k. Continue training operations as practicable.
- l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.
- m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan." (Hew. Ex. 35, pages 25-26)

"PHASE IA

- "2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:
- a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202, a,b,g,h.
  - b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c,d,e,f, and j as have not been completed.
  - c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the Northern Pacific.
  - d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, and of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, chiefly by covering operations.
  - e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.  
2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
  - f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
  - g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.



h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian area and the West Coast.

i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.

j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.

k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.

l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island area." (Hew. Exhibit 35, pages 26-27)

"PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

"Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE. \*\*\*\*\*

"3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I)." (Hew. Exhibit 35, page 28)

"Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO.

"3121. Task Force Two will:

Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I)." (Hew. Exhibit 35, page 29)

"Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE. \*\*\*\*\*

"3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I)." \* \* \* \*

"3133. b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan for capture of Eniwetok." (Hew. Exhibit 35, page 30) \* \* \* \*

"3133. c. 2. Task

Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-in-Chief." (Hew. Exhibit 35, page 31)

"Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)

"3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

"3142. On W-Day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

"3143. Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I)." \* \* \* \* (Hew. Exhibit 35, page 32)

"Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force)" \* \* \* \* \*

"3152. \* \* \* \* b. Task

Maintain patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I)." (Hew. Ex. 35, page 33)

"Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force)

"3161. Task Force Eight will:

Continue operations and training under Commanders Task Forces ONE and TWO." (Hew. Ex. 35, page 34)

"Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic & Control Force)"  
\* \* \* \*

"3173. Perform tasks required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). \* \* \* \*

"3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander Task Force NINE." (Hew. Exhibit 35, page 35)

"Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers

Task Force FOUR (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)

"3181. Special Information.

The Basic Plan assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier:

a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in Category 'D'. (Category 'D' - May be subject to major attack). (N.B. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category 'D' will apply during Phase I).

b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet.

d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.

"3182. By this Fleet Plan, Task Force Four is assigned the tasks below.

a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned. (As of the date of issue of this plan, the security plan of the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in effect).

b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV).

d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton.

"Task Force Five (Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier)"

"3183. Commanders Task Forces Five and Ten perform tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I)." (Hew. Exhibit 35, pages 36-37)

"Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable" \* \* \* \* \*

"3191. c. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating with Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of those frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces.

d. Continue such training activities of the Fleet as the Commander-in-Chief may direct.

e. Reenforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.

f. Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, the operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other operations as directed by the Commander-in-Chief." (Hew. Ex. 35, page 38)

"CHAPTER II. PHASE IA" \* \* \* \* \*

"Section 4. Task Force NINE (Patrol Plane Force)"

"3241. Task Force Nine will perform tasks as required in the following paragraphs of this section.

"3242. a. Special Information. \* \* \* \*

"2. No aircraft are assigned at present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. \* \* \* \*

"5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane search will comprise:

- (a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along our lines of communication.
- (b) Surface raids on our lines of communications.
- (c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against Midway, Johnston, Palmyra and Canton.
- (d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu." (Hew. Exhibit 35, pages 42-43)

"CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN

"3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution.

a. If action against European Axis Powers only is to be taken the despatch will be 'Execute Navy Plan Option Dash One Rainbow Five Phase One'.

b. When action against Japan is to be taken the despatch for execution will be 'Execute Navy Plan Option Dash One Rainbow Five Phase One Affirm'.

"3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and the national interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior authority at once." (Hew. page 53, Exhibit 35)

"PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

"CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS - PHASES I and IA

"5401. Tentative Operation Plans Nos. 1-R5 and 1A-R5 as formulated below are designed to facilitate the promulgation and execution of the tasks assigned for Phases I and IA of this U.S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). It is expected that they will be modified and executed by despatch when the corresponding Phase of this O-1 Plan is placed in effect as prescribed in paragraph 3401." (Hew. Exhibit 35, page 60)

"Section 1. Phase I.

United States Pacific Fleet  
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship  
Place  
Date



Operation Plan

No. 1-R5<sup>a</sup> \* \* \* \*

- "1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.
2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan." \* \* \* \* (Hew. Exhibit 35, pages 61, 63)
- "3. \* \* \* \* (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I). \* \* \* \*

(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.

(2) Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton is authorized. Assist as practicable in the development of Samoa and Guam.

(3) Make the facilities of the outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordinating the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV).

(4) Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and Canton." \* \* \* \*

"

Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Commander-in-Chief  
United States Pacific Fleet<sup>a</sup>

(Hew. Exhibit 35, pages 63,64,65,67)

"ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet  
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship  
Place  
Date

Patrol and Sweeping Plan." \* \* \* \* (Hew. Ex. 35, page I-1)



"1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution. (Hew. Exhibit 35, page I-1)

"2. Phase I.

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

- (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway, and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
- (b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
- (c) Covering.
- (d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
- (e) Routing shipping." \* \* \* \* (Hew. Exhibit 35, page I-1-2)

"Phase IA

"This Fleet will:

- (a) continue the operations of Phase I, except as to patrols which will be modified or discontinued as necessary in order to carry out prescribed offensive operations;
- (b) attack enemy communications by making initial sweep for enemy merchant ships and raiders, and by raiding Japanese sea communications westward of Nanpo Shoto;
- (c) reconnoiter and raid the Marshall Islands.

Subsequent Phases.

"This Fleet will:

- (a) continue operations of Phase I except as to patrols, for which further directives will be issued later." (Hew. Exhibit 35, page I-2)

"3. (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).

- (1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1).<sup>"</sup> (Hew. Ex. 35, pages I-6, I-7)

<sup>"</sup>(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of command relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan O-1.<sup>"</sup> (Hew. Ex. 35, page I-7)  
\* \* \* \*

"(g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).

(1) Coordinate, as practicable, patrol in coastal zone with patrols by other Fleet forces.

(2) Through liaison with Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Coastal Force) and Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) coordinate routing and escort of shipping in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier with that in the Fleet Control Zone, when and if established, and in the general Pacific Area. \* \* \* \*

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Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander-in-Chief,  
United States Pacific Fleet.<sup>"</sup>

(Hew. Exhibit 35, pages I-8, I-11)

(d) Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theatre,  
Orange (14 ND-JCD-42). 1/

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This Coastal Defense Plan, as has been pointed out (supra, pages 41-42), was issued by Lieutenant General Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and Rear Admiral Bloch, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, on 11 April 1941 (Hew. Exhibit 80, page 5). The Plan recited that it was based on "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 1, and Section V, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935," and that it "will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans are based." It provided, as stated above (supra, page 42), that the method of coordination between the Army and Navy in Hawaii would be by mutual cooperation until and if the method of unity of command "is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9b" (ibid).

The Plan provided descriptions of the various areas involved, including (i) the "Hawaiian Coastal Frontier," (ii) the "Hawaiian Coastal Zone," (iii) the "Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier," (iv) the "Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone," (v) the "Hawaiian Defensive Sea Areas" consisting of the (1) "Defensive Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier," the (2) "Pearl Harbor-Defensive Sea Area," the (3) "Kaneohe-Bay-Defensive Sea Area," the (4) "Palmyra, Kingman Reef, Johnston, Midway, and Wake-Defensive Sea Areas," and (vi) the "Oahu Defensive Coastal Areas" (Hew. Exhibit 80, pages 6-7).

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1/ See supra, page 41 for reference to and pages 86-96, supra for summary of some of provisions of "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935 (FTP 155)."

The Plan provided also that the category of defense was "Category 'D', as defined in Section III, Chapter V, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935" (Hew. Exhibit 80, page 7), and, in substance, that:

"\*\*\*the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the Naval forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and protect shipping therein; and to support the Army forces; and, that the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance."

The Plan provided:

"14. TASKS.

a. JOINT TASK. To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. ARMY TASK. To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces." (Hew. Exhibit 80, page 7)

"SECTION IV.

DECISIONS

"16. GENERAL.

a. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to provide for the needs of the defense of OAHU in accordance with the tasks, paragraph 14 above, and submit these plans to the War and Navy Departments, respectively.

b. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the execution of the tasks given in paragraph 14 above, these plans to include initial deployment and assignment of reinforcements when received.

c. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in consultation and accord with the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the mobilization of man-power and material resources in the TERRITORY OF HAWAII



and their allocation to the Army and Navy forces in the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER in accordance with the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.

d. Army and Navy subordinate tasks are assigned in accordance with Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, listed respectively, in paragraphs 17 and 19." (Hew. Exhibit 80, pages 8-9)

"17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

b. An anti-aircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D.C.A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.g.), and an aerial observation system on outlying Islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18.g.

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by 'Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940.'



j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population." (Hew. Exhibit 80, pages 9-10)

"18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, shall provide for:

- a. An inshore patrol.
- b. An offshore patrol.
- c. An escort force.
- d. An attack force.
- e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.
- f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)
- g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D.C.A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D.C.A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.
- h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.
- i. Distant reconnaissance.
- j. Attacking enemy naval forces.
- k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.
- l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17<sup>i</sup>, a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.
- m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto." (Hew. Exhibit 80, pages 10-11)

(e) Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District (1939).

Section VI to Annex VII, entitled "Joint Agreements," was dated 28 March 1941,<sup>1/</sup> and was approved by Lieutenant General Short and Rear Admiral Bloch on 2 April 1941. It was distributed by Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, on 20 June 1941, by letter to the Commandants of all Naval Districts and to the Commanders in Chief of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets (Hew. Exhibit 47).

The full title of Section VI to Annex VII of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was "Joint Security Measures, Protection of Fleet and Pearl Harbor Naval Base." This Army and Navy Joint Agreement, as pointed out above (supra, page 42), made provisions for joint defensive measures against hostile air raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.

The agreements made included the following:

"I. GENERAL.

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered

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<sup>1/</sup> It is pointed out, infra, page 173, that when HCF, JCD-42(N.C.I. Exhibits 7, 23; Hew. Exhibit 80) was adopted and supplanted HCF-39, JCB-13, Annexes Nos. 1 to VII of the latter remained effective and constituted Annexes Nos. 1 to VII of the new Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (see N.C.I. pages 221-222).

prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of HCF-39 (14NC-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary." (Hew. Exhibit 47, page 1)

Though the agreements were to be effective "at once," as stated above, the taking of joint action was made to depend on the reaching of what might be called an executing of plan agreement by the Army Commanding General and the Navy Commandant that the threat of a hostile air raid was sufficiently imminent to warrant action. In this respect the Joint Agreement provided:

"II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS.

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans." (ibid)

Provisions were made for the tactical control and for the composition of the defensive air forces as follows:

"II. 2.a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army Bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With

due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of this mission, when it will revert to Army control.

b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation; it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission." (ibid., pages 1-2)

With reference to an Aircraft Warning Service, the following agreements were entered into:

"5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, the Army will operate an Anti-aircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broadcasts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be transmitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or move-



ments of hostile aircraft off-shore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Provisional Anti-aircraft Brigade.

"6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

"7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, the Anti-aircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service (after establishment) will be manned and operated during combat, alert periods, joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer. The temporary loan of surplus communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages in joint communication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps will be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels." (ibid, pages 3-4)

\* \* \* \* \*

"11. Aircraft Warning Service.

The Army will expedite the installation and placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable." (ibid, pages 4-5).



(f) Operation Plan No. 1-41, Naval Base Defense Force, Fourteenth Naval District, dated 27 February 1941, together with: (i) Annex A thereto, Operation Plan I.S.P. No. A-1-41 (a detailed Inshore Patrol Plan); (ii) Annex Baker thereto, Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41 (a detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan); (iii) Addendum I to the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41, the Bellinger-Martin Joint Estimate covering joint air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu, dated 31 March 1941; (iv) Addendum II to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41, prescribing conditions of readiness and readiness reports for aircraft assigned to the Naval Base Defense Air Force; (v) Annex C thereto (a detailed anti-aircraft defense plan); (vi) Annex D thereto (a detailed Harbor Control Post Plan); (vii) Annex Easy (a detailed communications plan (N.C.I. Exhibit 53)).

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This Plan, with Annexes, has been referred to briefly (supra, pages 43-44). More fully considered, it is seen to contain the following provisions:

(1) The basic Operation Plan No. 1-41:

(i) Prescribed the task organization for the defenses of the Naval Base:

"TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Inshore Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol)  
Destroyer Patrol (2 DD)  
    Outer - 1 DD  
    Inner - 1 DD  
    Boom Patrol (1 Power Boat)  
    Harbor Patrol (4 Power Boats)  
    A/B Boom  
    Mine Sweepers - Magnetic (KEOSANQUA, YS-86)  
    Anchored (Mine Force and Base Force Detail)
- (b) Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two)  
    In conjunction with Army.
- (c) Anti-Aircraft Defense (District Marine Officer)  
    In conjunction with Army.

(d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer)  
In conjunction with Army." (N.C.I. Exhibit 53)

(ii) Directed attention to, among other documents,

14ND-JCD-13, the Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier

Defense Plan, stating:

"1. Information. Attention is directed to Pacific Fleet Confidential letter No. CL-41 of 15 February 1941, to Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1 CM-41 of 25 February 1941, and to 14ND-JCD-13 (Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan).

By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to coordinate joint effort, to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make 'alarm' and 'all clear' signals.

Assumptions.

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

- (1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.
- (2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.
- (3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

- (1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area - probable.
- (2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR - possible.
- (3) A combination of these two - possible.

2. This force, in cooperation with and in support of the Army, will establish security measures including air defense and surface ship patrol to enforce Presidential Proclamation No. 2375 of 4 November 1939, and General Order one hundred eighteen in order to protect PEARL HARBOR and to safeguard the Fleet." (N.C.I. Exhibit 53, pages 1-2)

(iii) Assigned general tasks to the Inshore Patrol, the

Base Defense Air Force, and the Anti-aircraft Defense

units, as follows:

- "3. (a) Inshore Patrol. Maintain a continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the PEARL HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; operate and patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships. Detailed Inshore Patrol Plan - Annex 'A'.
- (b) Base Defense Air Force. Maintain readiness of shore based Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units against air attack on PEARL HARBOR area. Commander Patrol Wing TWO in consultation with the Army will prepare detailed naval participation air defense plan - Annex 'B'.
- (c) Anti-Aircraft Defense. Defense Battalions of the Fleet Marine Force present in PEARL HARBOR in conjunction with Army and Fleet units in PEARL HARBOR, provide anti-aircraft defense. The District Marine Officer will, in consultation with Army and Fleet Officers concerned, prepare the detailed naval participation anti-aircraft defense plan - Annex 'C'." (N.C.I. Exhibit 53, page 2)

(2) Annex A, the Inshore Patrol Operation Plan No. A-1-41:

- (i) Provided the following task organization:
- "(a) Outer Harbor Patrol: Senior Unit Commander or C.O. Desdiv Eighty, TANEY, and Fleet Vessels Detailed.
- (1) Picket line: Unit Commander or Senior C.O. Not to be stationed at present.
- (2) Channel Entrance Patrol: C.O. DD detailed. 1 DD, detailed by Comdesdiv Eighty, or TANEY.
- (3) Ready Duty Destroyer: C.O. DD Detailed. 1 DD detailed by Comdesbatfor.
- (b) Harbor Channel Patrol: Senior Boat Officer.
- (1) Entrance Channel Patrol: Boat Officer 1 Power Boat. Not to be stationed at present.
- (2) Boom Patrol: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat detailed by Combatfor.
- (c) Inner Harbor Patrol: Senior Boat Officer. 4 Power Boats detailed by Combatfor and administered by Combbase: \* \* \* \*
- (d) A/B Boom: Lieut. Spear. Maintenance and Operating crews furnished by Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, and boom operated as at present.

(e) Minecraft:

- (1) XAMc Division: Lieut. Comdr. C.D. Hine, D-C, USNR  
REEDBIRD, CONDOR, COCKATOO, CROSSBILL
- (2) YS-86: C.O. Towing Vessel.  
KEOSANQUA and YT-142 towing vessels detailed by  
Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor, Navy Yard."  
(N.C.I. Exhibit 53, Annex "A"-page 1)

(ii) Stated the mission of the Inshore Patrol, as follows:

"2. This force will maintain a continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto, sweep the PEARL HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines; patrol the A/B boom; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any unauthorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and report movement of foreign registry ships." (ibid, page 3)

(iii) Prescribed the duties of the several task organizations (patrols), as follows:

"3. (a) Outer Harbor Patrol maintain a continuous patrol of the water approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:

- (1) Picket Line patrol the outer limits of the Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D.C.A.) Report all surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft sighted or contacted, and subsequent development and identification reports direct to Army Harbor Defense Command Posts and to Commander Inshore Patrol by voice radio on Patrol Group Inshore Patrol frequency 2690 kcs.  
Escort vessels through Outer Harbor Area (OAHU D.C.A.) as ordered.  
(details in Addendum I)

- (2) Channel Entrance Patrol patrol the seaward area within one and one half miles radius of entrance buoys.  
Enforce General Order one hundred eighteen.  
Prevent approach to the entrance channel of the harbor by any unauthorized vessel. If necessary to seize a vessel, report to Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) for instructions. See District Order 17-41 (Revised).  
Report movements of foreign registry ships.

- (3) Ready Duty Destroyer moor at normal berth in PEARL HARBOR or at discretion remain under way in vicinity of harbor entrance, ready to proceed immediately to re-enforce the Channel Entrance Patrol in repelling hostile run-in attempts, submarine attacks, or mining operations; to act as screening vessel in the area between PEARL HARBOR channel entrance buoys and outer limits of Outer Harbor Area for Gunnery School Vessels and others when ordered. Maintain the following condition of readiness:  
Boiler Power for twenty-five (25) knots.  
(If moored in port, steaming and sea watches posted, engines ready to answer all bells, and ship ready to get underway).
- (b) Harbor Channel Patrol maintain continuous patrol of Harbor Channel waters as follows:
- (1) Boom Patrol patrol the seaward side of the A/B Boom in order to safeguard the boom and prevent damage thereto by sabotage attempts from small craft or from shore. (Details in Addendum I).
- (2) Entrance Channel Patrol patrol the entrance channel from the A/B boom to the entrance buoys and the waters of the Defensive Sea Area of PEARL HARBOR inshore of the entrance buoys. (Details in Addendum I).
- (c) Inner Harbor Patrol maintain continuous patrol of the interior waters of PEARL HARBOR in order to control small boat traffic, guard against laying of mines in the harbor, and prevent damage to ships of the Fleet at anchor and to Navy Yard waterfront property, from sabotage attempts. (Details in Addendum I).
- (d) A/B Boom to be maintained and operated as present under the Captain of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.
- (e) Minecraft conduct sweeping operations in the seaward approaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows:
- (1) XAMc Division daily, commencing at 0200, sweep a channel one mile wide on either side of buoyed channel axis extended) from entrance buoys to the one hundred fathom curve. Carry out daily operations with two vessels each making single ship sweep, one for moored mines and one for magnetic mines. Immediately upon completion of sweeping operations, the senior commanding officer of the



sweeping group will send the following despatch 'priority' in plain language, addressed to the Commandant, Navy Yard, PEARL HARBOR and Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District, 'Clear' to mean 'The sweeping operation at the PEARL HARBOR channel entrance is completed'.

(2) YS-86 conduct magnetic sweeping as ordered." (ibid, pages 3-5, incl.)

(3) Annex Baker, the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41, dated 9 April 1941:

(i) Set up task organizations, as follows:

"(a) Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO))

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol Squadrons.  
Shore-based VO -- VS units.  
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.  
Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.  
Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.  
Army bombardment squadrons.  
Army reconnaissance squadrons.  
Navy Utility squadrons.

(b) Air Combat Group (Senior VF Squadron Commander)

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.  
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.  
One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes." (N.C.I. Exhibit 53, Annex Baker, page 1)

(ii) Stated under the heading "Information," that:

"An air combat group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will: Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group; and as a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request." (ibid)

and that "Assumptions" were:

"As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control in the PEARL HARBOR area will be coordinated with operations under this plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found necessary." (ibid, page 2)

(iii) Stated the mission of the two components of the Naval Base Defense Air Force to be:

"2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Operating Areas.

3. (a) Search and Attack Group. (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

(b) Air Combat Group. (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force." (ibid)

(iv) Provided that the plan was to be "effective upon receipt," and that it would be:

"\*\*\*operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on OAHU. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile conditions of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units." (ibid)

(v) Stated that "Operation orders for the search and attack group will be separately distributed" and that attached were the following:

"Addendum I - Joint Estimate"  
and  
"Addendum II - Aircraft Readiness"  
(N.C.I. Exhibit 53, Annex Baker, page 3)

(4) Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41, dated 31 March 1941, and signed by Rear Admiral

P. N. L. Bellinger, Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force and of Patrol Wing TWO, and by Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding, Hawaiian Air Force:

This was the joint estimate of Bellinger and Martin covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian Area. It contained the following:

(i) A Summary of the Situation:

- "(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.
- (b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.
- (c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.
- (d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.
- (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service." (N.C.I. Exhibit 53, Addendum I, page 1)

(ii) A survey of "Opposing Strength" including consideration of Japanese carrier strength, as follows:

- "(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However, the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least

12 eight inch gun and least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area." (ibid, pages 1-2)

(iii) The difficulties confronting the Defense Air

Force were stated:

"(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in general, can perform functions that accord with their type." (ibid, pages 2-3)

(iv) "Possible Enemy Action" was appraised as follows:

- "(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
  2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
  3. A combination of these two.

- (b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.
- (c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.
- (d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.
- (e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack." (ibid, pages 3-4)
- (v) The "Action Open to Us" was said to include the following:
- "(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that



a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.
2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available." (ibid, page 4) \* \* \* \*

"(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required:

1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander." (ibid, page 5)

(vi) The "Primary Decision," as stated, was that the Naval Base Defense Air Force would "locate and attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack." (N.C.I.Ex.53, Addendum I to Annex Baker, page 5 )

In order to provide for accomplishing that result, it was further decided that the Naval Base Defense Air Force should be established and composed of the two general units referred to in Annex Baker, that is, the Search and Attack Group, to operate under Navy command, and the Air Combat Group, to operate under Army command (ibid, page 6).<sup>1/</sup>

(5) Annex C to Operation Plan No. 1-41 prescribed the Anti-Aircraft Defense for the Naval Base, as follows:

(i) The task organizations were:

"(a) Group One: All ships in PEARL HARBOR assigned by Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 to Sector I.

(b) Group Two: Those so assigned to Sector II.

(c) Group Three: Those so assigned to Sector III.

(d) Group Four: Those so assigned to Sector IV.

(e) Group Five: All antiaircraft units of Defense Battalions of the Marine Corps present."

(N.C.I. Exhibit 53, Annex "C", page 1)

(ii) The missions of the several groups were referred to generally as follows:

"2. All naval forces of the Fourteenth Naval District and those of the U. S. Fleet in insular waters will support the Army antiaircraft defense of OAHU: (1) by gun fire, (2) by antiaircraft watches, and (3) by furnishing RADAR service when available.

3. (a) Groups One to Four, inclusive: Assume defense missions and defense conditions in accordance with the provisions of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.

(b) Group Five: Report to Commanding General, Provisional Antiaircraft Brigade for tactical assignment. Conform to conditions of readiness prescribed for that brigade." (ibid)

1/ In this same connection, conditions of readiness for aircraft were prescribed (ibid, pages 7, 8; Addendum II to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41).

(6) Annex D to Operation Plan No. 1-41, concerning the Harbor Control Post (under the District Operations Officer), contained the following statements and provisions:

(i) "1. Information. As in basic plan No. 1-41. The Harbor Control Post has been established in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District, in a modified form. The Army has provided telephone connections to the various Army circuits listed herein, and will maintain a suitable watch at their various stations; the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will endeavor to provide the Harbor Control Post with a teletype connecting into the HSCAB loop, and operator for same. Army officer personnel and secretaries for the Harbor Control Post will be provided from available personnel from HSCAB as needed. Army observation (lookout) stations around the island of OAHU will be manned as required and Army defense units will be placed in the condition of 'alert' considered necessary. The water area under the cognizance of the Harbor Control Post embraces the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area, with particular interest in the area south of OAHU, and will be known as the Control Post Area.

"2. This Harbor Control post will train personnel and operate in a modified form in accordance with OpNav serial 041230 in the establishment of security measures as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet."

(N.C.I. Exhibit 53, Annex D, page 1)

(ii) The duties of the Harbor Control Post were stated

to be:

"(1) In conjunction and cooperation with the Army and Navy units listed below, man as necessary and operate the following direct telephone connections:

Harbor Control Post to

Hqtrs. Haw'n Dept., Ft. SHAFTER

Hqtrs. HSCAB, FT. DERUSSY

Command Post, FT. KAMEHAMEHA

Command Post, HICKAM FIELD

Commander Patrol Wing TWO

SOPE (if at dock)

Navy Yard Signal Tower

Navy Yard Power House

"(2) In conjunction with Army and Navy reporting, communication, and intelligence agencies be prepared to 'alert' Army and Navy forces against aircraft, or other surprise attack, and assist in coordinating their defense measures. Direct Yard Power House when to sound air raid and blackout alarms and the secure signal.

"(3) Report promptly any action taken to immediate Superiors in Command, Army and Navy, and keep them advised of all known developments.

"(4) In conjunction with Commander Inshore Patrol, Captain of the Yard, and District Public Works Officer keep the Army Harbor Defenses informed of authorized ship movements within the Control Post Area." (ibid, pages 1-2)

- (7) Annex Easy to Operation Plan No. 1-41 was a detailed Communications Plan. This plan contained the following provisions:
- 

(1)

"1111 The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade maintains an Army Anti-aircraft Information Service centered at A.A.A. Brigade Headquarters, Fort Shafter, which broadcasts information of enemy aircraft by voice on 900 kc. This information is also vital to all activities including Fleet units present in Pearl Harbor. In order to simplify communications and avoid multiplicity of circuits, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO), will establish a Fox series on 900 kc. using radio telegraph with a modulated CW Transmitter. These transmissions can be copied on an ordinary broadcast receiver which even small vessels should be able to provide. For the present only the SOPE and Sector commanders are required to guard this frequency. All other vessels should guard this frequency is practicable, especially those having anti-aircraft batteries.

"1112 The destroyer patrol will use the Joint Army and Navy Inshore Patrol frequency of 2550 kc. The commander of the Pearl Harbor Groupment probably will have a radio station on this circuit which will normally receive only.

"1113 Information of hostile or potentially hostile forces acquired by Fleet forces in operating areas must be reported to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (NBDO), promptly. This can most easily be done on the Ship-Shore frequency (355 kc)." (N.C.I. Exhibit 53, Annex Easy, page 1)

(ii) Other provisions included those for the making of Contact Reports, Visual Signalling by day and Blinker Tube by night, Radio Call Signs for the several patrols, the establishing of special alarm and air raid signals and drill signals, and of a verification code. (N.C.I. Exhibit 53, Annex Easy, pages 3-5, and information sheets attached.)

(8) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised), dated 14 October 1941:

This letter was issued by Admiral Kimmel, as Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the "Pacific Fleet." It had as its subject, and made provision for, the "Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas." (N.C.I. Exhibit 8.) This letter, which has been referred to briefly (supra, page 44), included "Measures to be effective until further orders," and contained the following statements and provisions:

(1) The Security of the Fleet while operating and while based in the Hawaiian Area was predicated, it stated, on two assumptions:

"(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

- (1) To sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
- (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.
- (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

"(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

- (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
- (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
- (3) a combination of these two." (N.C.I. Exhibit 8, page 1)



(2) As security measures the letter prescribed two types of patrols, Continuous Patrols and Intermittent Patrols. The

**Continuous Patrols were:**

- (i) Inshore Patrol administered and furnished by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District;
- (ii) Boom Patrols; and
- (iii) Harbor Patrols.

**The Intermittent Patrols were:**

(iv) Destroyer Offshore Patrol, having the following duties:

"(a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.

"(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.

"(c) One destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice." (ibid, page 2)

(v) Air patrols, having the following duties:

"(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.

"(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21° - 21' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.

"(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein." (ibid, page 2)

(vi) "Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points 'A' and 'X' as defined in subparagraph (C)(3), below." (ibid)

(3) Provisions were made for the sortie and entry of units of the Fleet from and into Pearl Harbor. The movement of ships within Pearl Harbor, in the entrance channel, and in the swept channel was placed under the control of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. Fleet and Task Force Commanders were required, among other things to issue sortie and entry plans (ibid, pages 2-3).

(4) With reference to the Operating Areas, it was provided:

(i) "Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages," and that "Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo, Kahului are considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor" (ibid, page 3).

(ii) And,

"(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force that may be concerned." (ibid)

(iii) The security provisions for ships at sea included:

"(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following:

Priority 1	-- BBs
Priority 2	-- CVs
Priority 3	-- CAs
Priority 4	-- CLs

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander so directs.

(f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness THREE on torpedo, defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

(h) Maintenance of material condition XRAY, or equivalent in all ships.

(i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(l) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit. (ibid, pages 3-4)

(5) The provisions for "Defense Against Air Attack" included the following with reference to anti-aircraft gun fire:

"(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

"(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

"(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

"(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

"(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (C)(3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector." (ibid, page 4)

(6) The prescription of measures to be taken against an air attack included the following, embraced in duties of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as the Naval Base Defense Officer:

"(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N.B.D.O.). As such he shall:

- (a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.
- (b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.
- (c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.
- (d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:
  - (1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.
  - (2) Holding necessary drills.
  - (3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.
  - (4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.
  - (5) Arranging communication plan.
  - (6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed." (ibid)

(7) There were prescribed the following Naval Base Conditions of Readiness:

"(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:  
Condition I - General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.  
Condition II - One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.  
Condition III - Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one-ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."

(ibid, page 5)

(8) In the event of an air attack the procedures to be followed by the various task forces were prescribed as follows:



"(a) Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3) and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance.)

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

"(b) Task Force Commander operating at sea.

(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c), above).

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

"(c) Naval Base Defense Officer.

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available."

(ibid)

(9) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following was stated:

"Ship Attacked.

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F.T.P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S.O.P.A., Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use."

(ibid)

\*\*\*\*\* (2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack.

"(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

"4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make these measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL:"

(ibid, pages 6-7)

### III

#### THE BASING OF THE FLEET IN HAWAII - REGULAR AIR PATROL FROM HAWAII IN 1940 - WAR SCARE IN JUNE 1940 AND AIR PATROL ESTABLISHED AT THAT TIME

While the Pacific Fleet was under the command of Admiral Kimmel's predecessor, Admiral J. O. Richardson, it was ordered to change its base from the West Coast to Hawaii. Admiral Richardson objected to this change chiefly because of logistics and because of personnel problems raised by absences from families on the mainland. In addition, Admiral Richardson, according to his correspondence, was not enthusiastic about the foreign policies of the United States Government, which he said constituted an attempt to force the "will" of the United States on Japan. He considered that a part of this policy was manifested by the basing of the Fleet in Hawaii, and he thought such basing would be the cause of a war with Japan.

While in command of the Fleet, Admiral Richardson ordered a regular air patrol or air search from Oahu. These patrols were subsequently discontinued except as to the Fleet operating areas. In June 1940 there was a war scare or alert from Washington to the Army Commander in Hawaii, which resulted in the establishing by Admiral Richardson of an additional air patrol, which, as appears later, was in contrast with the failure of Admiral Kimmel to order any long distance reconnaissance after he received the "war warning" message of 27 November 1941.

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PART TWO

- BACKGROUND TO ACTION -

May 1940 - October 15, 1941.

(a) The Basing of the Fleet in Hawaii

(1) The immediate predecessor of Admiral Kimmel as Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, was Admiral James O. Richardson, U. S. Navy, who served in that capacity from 6 January 1940 to 1 February 1941. Admiral Richardson's immediate predecessor in that position was Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy. (N.C.I. page 1052).

(2) Admiral Richardson testified that as of the spring of 1940 a portion of the Fleet, known as the Hawaiian Detachment, was stationed in Hawaii. (N.C.I. page 1054). He stated that he took the main Fleet, which normally had been based in West Coast ports, principally southern California, (N.C.I. page 22), to Hawaii in the latter part of April 1940 (N.C.I. page 1054) as a part of the Fleet exercises, which were concluded in May 1940. (N.C.I. page 1053).

At the conclusion of the Fleet exercises Admiral Richardson said he received a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations directing him to announce to the press that "at his" own "request" the Fleet would remain in Hawaiian waters in order to carry out further exercises

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1/ Admiral Stark testified that the Hawaiian Detachment of the Pacific Fleet was established in pursuance of his order in 1939, shortly after he became Chief of Naval Operations, and that it consisted of a Cruiser Force. (N.C.I. page 22).

2/ Admiral Richardson wrote Admiral Stark from San Pedro on 16 February 1940, urging that restrictions be lifted on his publishing that the ships of the Hawaiian Detachment had been assigned to Hawaii. He desired by such publicity to encourage Honolulu owners of houses to prepare them for Navy occupancy. (Ex. 9 Joint Con. Inv. Pearl Harbor, Nov. 1945)



that he had in mind. (N.C.I. page 1053). The Fleet was based in Hawaiian areas, he said, in order to act as a restraining influence on the Japanese nation. (N.C.I. page 1059).

In this connection, Admiral Richardson received a letter from Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations, dated 27 May 1940 (N.C.I. page 89; N.C.I. Exhibit 26), which explained the reasons why the Fleet was ordered to base in the Hawaiian Area. In this letter Admiral Stark said:

"Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph. First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against, and to tell you, that here in the Department we are up against the same thing.

"Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

"Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action. We believe both the Germans and the Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

"Your natural question may follow -- well, how about Italy and the war? I can state that we have had Italy going into the war on 24 hours notice on several different occasions during the last two weeks from sources of information which looked authentic. Others have stated that it would occur within the next ten days. I have stated personally that cold logic would dictate her not going in for some time. It is anybody's guess. It may be decided by the time this reaches you. Events are moving fast in Northern France.

1/ This was an answer to Admiral Richardson's letter of 22 May 1940, in which he inquired why the Fleet was being kept in Hawaii in a manner indicating he preferred to be based in the West Coast. (Ex. 9 Joint Con. Inv. Pearl Harbor, Nov. 1945)

"The above in itself shows you how indefinite the situation is.

"Along the same line as the first question presented, you would naturally ask - suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer to that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thoughts contained in your recent letter.

"I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have kept very secret here.

"The above I think will answer the question "why you are there". It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question, and also - like you - I have been unable to get the answer. \*\*\*\*\*

"You ask whether you are there as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? Answer: Obviously it might become so under certain conditions but a definite answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.

"I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did return it might nullify the principle reasons for your being in Hawaii. This very question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have authority for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores, etc., and this should help in any case. \*\*\*\*\*

"I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or incidental results regardless of anything else, such as -

"(a) Solving the logistic problems involved, including not only supplies from the U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.

"(b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.

"(c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable.

"(d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy.

"(e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between Army and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.

"(f) Security of the Fleet at anchor.

"(g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of considerably more than just Oahu.

"You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating base but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up against." (N.C.I. Exhibit 26).

(3) Admiral Stark testified that at the time the Fleet sailed from the West Coast to Hawaii in the Spring of 1940, no conclusion had been reached to base it there indefinitely. He stated that early in May the decision was made to retain the Fleet in Hawaii for the time being. This he defined as a short period that would elapse in a few weeks. (N.C.I. page 87).

Admiral Stark also testified that Admiral Richardson made one or two trips to Washington during the late summer or fall of 1940,

during which the question of continuing to base the Fleet in Hawaii was discussed, (N.C.I. page 88), and Admiral Richardson expressed his desire to bring the Fleet back to the West Coast. (N.C.I. page 88). Some of the reasons given by Admiral Richardson in this connection, Admiral Stark testified, were that the morale of the personnel of the Fleet would be better if they were based on the West Coast, where they would have better opportunities for recreation and visits with their families. Admiral Stark could not recall that Admiral Richardson had rested his desire to return the Fleet to the West Coast upon any consideration by him that the Fleet was not secure at Pearl Harbor, though he did recall that included in the discussion of the matter was the question of the inadequacy of the supply train. (N.C.I. page 89). 1/

Admiral Stark further stated that no immediate decision was made in the spring of 1940 to base the Fleet in Hawaii continuously but that the question arose from time to time, on each of which it was decided to keep the Fleet there. (N.C.I. page 88). The final decision to base the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area was made, he stated, by the President of the United States (N.C.I. pages 90 - 91.) Admiral Stark, however, did not state when this final decision was made by the President.

1/ Admiral Richardson also wrote letters on 13 May 1940 and 12 September 1940, to Admiral Stark, stating his opposition to moving the Fleet west, saying it "means hostilities" which he thought could be conducted better from the West Coast, voicing opposition to the international policies of the Government as expressed by State Dept. actions in trying to force ("forcing") "our will upon another Pacific Nation", and listing many "disadvantages" of using Pearl Harbor as a base none of which involved insecurity resulting from an air attack. Previously on 26 Jan. 1940, Adm. Richardson wrote Adm. Stark his views of apprehension that "our leaders" might take steps involving us in a war with Japan. (Ex. 9 Joint Con. Inv. Pearl Harbor, Nov. 1945)



On 3 April 1941 Admiral Stark, in a letter to the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific, Atlantic and Asiatic Fleets, said:

"9. Unquestionably the concentration of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii has had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. I am more and more of the opinion that Japan will hesitate to take further steps, perhaps even against Indo-China, so long as affairs do not go too badly for Britain. What the effect on her would be were the United States to transfer a large part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic can, as yet, be only surmised. In any case, we shall rigidly avoid making any indication that we contemplate such a transfer until the last possible moment." (N.C.I. Exhibit 73, pages 2, 3).

(4) Vice Admiral Turner also stated that the question of shifting the Fleet back to the West Coast of the United States was discussed almost continuously from the time the Fleet was left there after the spring maneuvers in 1940. He stated that there were reasons unconnected with the war that made it desirable to have the Fleet back on the West Coast, some of which were better logistics, better contentment of personnel, and the troublesome question of whether the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii would cause an unfavorable reaction by the Japanese that would lend to war rather than prevent it. He said that some of the people in the Navy Department and in the Government believed that Japan could be bluffed and others did not think so. He stated further:

"The matter of moving the Fleet back to the Coast was put up to the President several times after I went to the Department and each time the decision was made to retain it out there, except that a scheme was worked out so I think a fourth or a third of the Fleet would come back to the States for repairs and for liberty and leave for the personnel." (N.C.I. page 992; also, see Har. page 261).



(5) Vice Admiral Turner also stated that as of 16 October 1941, he believed "everyone in authority in Washington was convinced that the Fleet ought to remain based on Pearl Harbor; war was too imminent." (N.C.I. pages 992, 993).

(6) According to Joseph Clark Drew, Ambassador to Japan during 1941 (N.C.I. page 1062), no formal official representations were made to him by the Japanese Government objecting to the basing of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area. (N.C.I. page 1065).

(7) Admiral Kimmel testified that he had never protested the basing of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, nor ever recommended that it be returned to the West Coast (infra, page 217).

(b) Regular Air Patrol from Hawaii in 1940

(1) Admiral Richardson stated that since the duration of the stay of the Fleet in Hawaii following the conclusion of the Fleet exercises in May 1940 was uncertain, as well as was the purpose for which it was retained, and, in view of the repeated warnings that were received of the outbreak of war in the immediate future, he continued in effect, after May 1940 practically the same patrols which had been established in connection with the Fleet exercises. Sometimes, he said, these patrols were carried out in a modified form, depending upon the number of aircraft available. (N.C.I. page 1053). Admiral Richardson stated that this air patrol was not used "primarily" for training, but only had that purpose in part. He stated that, from a twenty year study

of the Japanese, as well as from the repeated warnings received, that he concluded we might be involved in a war and that "war would come as a surprise, and therefore I felt that I had to maintain some semblance of a patrol consistent with the means available to do it." (N.C.I. page 1060).

He said that the patrol which he had carried out was designed to cover adequately, and with respect to spacing, a given sector of the circle, and that there was a daily rotation so that over a short period of time the whole circle was covered. However, he pointed out, the whole circle, particularly the part toward the eastward, was not covered (N.C.I. page 1053), and that the patrol was therefore not complete and was not adequate. (N.C.I. page 1060). He said that he by no means had enough patrol planes to carry out a 700 mile distance reconnaissance over the entire 360° circle. (N.C.I. page 1061).

Admiral Richardson explained further that the sector covered by his air patrol was from "about 170° to the westward to about 350°" which was the sector that he considered to be the more dangerous. He said that, to the best of his recollection, his patrol extended a distance of 300 miles at sea. (N.C.I. page 1055).

(2) Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger stated that under special conditions and orders, while he was on duty in Hawaii, there had been a daily air patrol of between six and twelve planes to a distance of 300 miles, (N.C.I. page 682), which covered a constantly changing sector (N.C.I. page 683). Admiral Bellinger thought, but was not positive, that the daily searches inaugurated by Admiral Richardson were discontinued after Admiral Kimmel took command of the Fleet. (N.C.I. page 682). <sup>1/</sup>

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1/ It is to be noted that Admiral Richardson testified before the Joint Congressional Committee that he had these patrols discontinued before turning over the command to Admiral Kimmel.

(c) War Scare June 1940 - Air Patrol Established

(1) Admiral Bloch testified that in June 1940, he was told by General Herron, then Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, that the latter had received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to be on the alert against an overseas raid from the West by a hostile nation (N.C.I. page 1139; Har. page 13). At this time, Admiral Richardson, then Commander in Chief, was at sea. Admiral Bloch told General Herron that he had received no such dispatch from the Navy Department, and he suggested that they report the matter to Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, then Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment, U. S. Fleet, who was the Senior Officer Present. Admiral Bloch's subsequent letter to Admiral Richardson, explaining the matter, was dated 20 June 1940, and said, in part:

"General Herron received a dispatch from the War Department the other day which stated in substance: 'Alert your forces against hostile oversea raid. This must be done in such a way as to prevent newspaper publicity or notice of foreign intelligence agents. Department suggests that you do this on a maneuver basis in order to accomplish the above.' General Herron brought this dispatch down to me and told me he was taking the necessary action and hoped that the Navy could see its way clear to have an off-shore patrol each day and do anything else in its power. I consulted Andrews and an off-shore and in-shore patrol around Pearl Harbor has been arranged concerning which you have been advised by Calhoun."

Accordingly, Admiral Bloch and General Herron visited Vice Admiral Andrews aboard his Flagship. The latter sent Admiral Richardson a dispatch advising him of the matter, and also decided to institute a dawn to dusk reconnaissance patrol. According to Admiral Bloch's

recollection, a long distance reconnaissance established by Vice Admiral Andrews was carried out for about three days and then discontinued by Admiral Richardson (N.C.I. page 1149).

(2) Admiral Andrews' memorandum to Admiral Richardson, of 18 June 1940, concerning the matter, said, in part:

"Rear Admiral Bloch visited me yesterday stating that he had just been informed by General Herron, in secret, that he (Herron) had just received orders from the War Department placing Army in this area on the 'Alert'. This was done with special emphasis on possible carrier and plane attacks. He asked Bloch for a distant air patrol and inner air patrol.

"I explained to Bloch your present patrol plan and informed him that I would establish immediately an inner patrol which I did at 1300 yesterday and am continuing same. General Herron desires that a VP patrol be established covering western semi-circle with Oahu as center instead of present VP patrol from Lahaina which as you know covers from 220 to 335 distance 180 miles.

"I agree with Herron and I have VP to establish such a patrol which must begin at dawn each day.

"I have discussed this matter with Fitch who is ready to start when you give the order."\*\*\*\*\*

"If you desire this patrol established in lieu of present patrol I suggest that you send Combase for a message 'Affirm patrol' and this new patrol will be started tomorrow. Such a patrol is pictured as below:



Sector to be searched daily - Western semi-circle. The Army will cover night patrol, leaving us day patrol only." (Exhibit 9, Joint Cong. Inv. Pearl Harbor, Nov. 1945).



(3) Admiral Richardson stated that he was in Lahaina when, on 19 June 1940, he received the message advising of the War Department's warning and that the dawn to dusk patrol had been established. He stated that he reported the receipt of this warning to the Chief of Naval Operations, and requested information regarding it, but stated that he received no reply. The dispatch from Admiral Richardson (CinCUS) to the Chief of Naval Operations (220603) was dated 22 June 1940, and read as follows:

"COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT RECEIVED ORDERS WAR DEPARTMENT PLACING FORCES ON ALERT AGAINST HOSTILE TRANSPACIFIC RAID X SINCE NO INFORMATION RECEIVED NAVY DEPARTMENT HAVE ASSUMED THIS IS EXERCISE X NAVY PATROL PLANES ARE PARTICIPATING" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 113.)

It appears that the testimony of Admiral Richardson that he received no reply from the Chief of Naval Operations to his dispatch was in error. The record (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 114) shows a copy of the reply by the Chief of Naval Operations, (222210), which was dated 22 June 1940, and which stated:

"WAR DEPARTMENT DIRECTIVE CONCERNING ALERT ISSUED AS PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE AFTER CONSULTATION WITH NAVY AND STATE DEPARTMENTS X REQUEST YOU CONTINUE COOPERATION" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 114.)



Admiral Richardson said he asked the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department whether the dispatch was an honest-to-goodness warning or a drill, and the Commanding General stated he had no idea but was acting as though it were a real warning of an impending attack. (N.C.I. page 1056).

Admiral Richardson, the records show, noted on the memorandum of Admiral Andrews, "I sent 'Affirm patrol' to Andrews on receipt of this." He also wrote to Admiral Stark about the matter, on 22 June 1940. In this letter he referred to his dispatch (220603), and, in part, said:

"To clarify the situation, I flew to Pearl yesterday and held a conference with Andrews, Bloch, and General Herron, commanding the Hawaiian Department. Briefly, on 17 June, due to the 'Alert' from the War Department, the Army issued live ammunition to all posts including A. A. batteries, etc., and established a patrol and guard over all critical areas, which are considered by them to be, all landing beaches, land areas (bridges, roads, etc.) and Pearl Harbor (Marines). Their directive included a proviso that all despatches were to be sent in code via cable to the Chief of Staff and that the public in Honolulu were not to be excited, hence the Army was stationed at waterworks, electric light plant, gas or telephone companies, but extra precautions were taken by these latter.

"The navy increased their distant plane patrol from 180 miles to 300 miles and enlarged the sector being covered to include from 180° to 360°, as well as establishing a 30 mile inner patrol.

"Two days later, the Army received word to 'ease up on the Alert', but to maintain guard on all critical areas on a semi-permanent basis. We did not know about this, until General Herron mentioned it at the conference in reply to my query as to how long the Alert would continue. General Herron stated that he might, on the 24th, further modify his present interpretation of the 'modified alert'."

IV

ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S REMOVAL OF HIS HEADQUARTERS FROM SHIP TO SHORE -- THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR FURNISHING HIM SECRET INFORMATION -- DETACHMENT OF PACIFIC FLEET UNITS TO THE ATLANTIC FLEET

When Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the Pacific Fleet on 1 February 1941, it had been based in Hawaii for approximately nine months. Almost immediately after taking over the command Admiral Kimmel removed his headquarters from ship to shore. When this occurred he became Senior Officer Present ashore, supplanting Admiral Bloch.

Soon after he assumed command, Admiral Kimmel raised a question with Admiral Stark as to the agency in the Navy Department responsible for furnishing him with secret information, which Admiral Stark answered.

In May 1941, in pursuance of the War Plans, and in order to provide for the transportation of troops to Iceland, some Pacific Fleet Units were detached and sent to the Atlantic Fleet.

(a). Admiral Kimmel's Removal of his Headquarters from Ship to Shore at Pearl Harbor

(1). In a postscript to his letter to Admiral Kimmel of 10 February 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 29), Admiral Stark referred to the question of shore-basing Admiral Kimmel's headquarters, and to quarters ashore for Admiral Kimmel as follows:

"Regarding your setting up a place on shore where your staff can do planning work; anything that you can arrange with Admiral Bloch will be perfectly satisfactory to me. I don't know just what the Submarine Base facilities are but you may be able to put up some additions which would eventually be needed because of the expected increase in the number of submarines. I will have Morrell go into these additions if you will forward to me a sketch lay-out in case you need our help. No one could say

just what the public or political reaction might be to your shore arrangements, because it might be misrepresented and might be misunderstood. That is the reason I suggest any additional facilities to be labelled additional facilities for the Submarine Base. It would not actually be a misnomer because undoubtedly they will be when the Fleet some day bases back on the West Coast.

"I also take it that you can arrange satisfactory communications with Admiral Bloch.

"Regarding a set of quarters for yourself, it would seem that the best solution and perhaps the only one would be for Admiral Bloch to divert one of the new sets of five houses now building to your use. Will you please communicate this to Admiral Bloch?" (N.C.I. Exhibit 29).

(2). On 18 February 1941 Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark (NCI Exhibit 30), saying:

"After a thorough investigation, we are proceeding to fit existing facilities at the Submarine Base to permit shore basing my staff and myself. Just when I will move ashore depends upon the supply of essential equipment. I have only one object, that is to so place myself and my staff that we can best accomplish the task before us." (N.C.I. Exhibit 30)

(3). On 25 February 1941, Admiral Stark, in a letter to Admiral Kimmel, (N.C.I. Exhibit 31) said:

"I suppose by this time your staff is working smoothly on the beach." (N.C.I. Exhibit 31)

(4). Admiral Bloch testified that Admiral Kimmel moved his offices ashore in February 1941, almost immediately after he assumed command of the Fleet and with the exception of possibly a couple of trips at sea and one trip to Washington, he was there the entire time although his intention, in the event of hostilities, was that he would go to sea. (Har. page 71).

Admiral Bloch also said that Admiral Kimmel's presence ashore did not make him either unhappy or embarrassed. Their relations were, he said, extremely good, and his own relations with the Commanding

General were cordial and their cooperation, he thought, was good. But; he said, the Commanding General had a right to go to Admiral Kimmel directly and also had a right to discuss matters with Admiral Kimmel directly and also had a right to discuss matters with Admiral Bloch. On one or two occasions Admiral Bloch did not know whether General Short had discussed particular matters with Admiral Kimmel or whether he had come to him in the first instance. This, however, did not cause any disagreement, because he talked everything over fully with Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Bloch did not think that there had been any doubt in his mind as to where he stood in the picture. (Har. page 7)

(b). The Question of Responsibility for Furnishing Secret Information to Admiral Kimmel

(1). In a post script (p.s.) to his letter to Admiral Stark of 18 February 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 30), Admiral Kimmel discussed the question of the responsibility in the Navy Department for furnishing him with information of a secret nature, adverting to the fact that it had been reported that the Office of Naval Intelligence had considered it a function of Operations, whereas Operations considered it to be the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence. In this connection, Admiral Kimmel said:

"P.S.

"I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI, do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?" (N.C.I. Exhibit 30)



(2). On 22 March 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 32), in response to the latter's letter of 18 February, saying:

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to GINJUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels if forwarded by airmail weekly to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent by dispatch. As you know, ONI 49 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of shipping which moves over each route." (N.C.I. Exhibit 32)

(c). Detachment of Pacific Fleet Units to the Atlantic Fleet

(1). Admiral Stark testified that Naval Units were detached from the Pacific Fleet and sent to the Atlantic during 1941, and that this movement conformed in general to dispositions required by the Rainbow Five War Plan (WPL-46) <sup>1/</sup> (N.C.I. page 24). He stated that he had ordered this movement "because I was given an order for an amphibious operation in the Atlantic which, in my opinion, and in that of my advisors, required this force to be in the Atlantic to insure its success." (N.C.I. page 25)

(2). Vice Admiral Turner testified that some of the vessels that had been sent to the Atlantic were sent back to the Pacific Ocean and that on 7 December 1941, "the deployment was substantially in accordance with Rainbow Five, (WPL-46)". (N.C.I. page 1011).

1/ See provisions of WPL-46 and of U.S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan - Rainbow 5, (supra pages 99, 110), concerning the "Atlantic reinforcements."



(3). On 3 April 1941, in a letter to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Pacific, Atlantic and Asiatic Fleets, including Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 73), Admiral Stark, in connection with his explanation of the drafting of WPL-46 (Rainbow Five War Plan) in conjunction with the British, stated as to the matter of the Atlantic Reenforcement from the Pacific Fleet:

"3. The basic idea of the United States - British plan is that the United States will draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reenforce the Atlantic Fleet, and that the British will, if necessary, transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier. The U.S. Asiatic Fleet would not be reenforced, but would be supported by offensive operations by the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

"4. From the viewpoint of the defense of the United States national position, the proposed naval deployment gives adequate security in case the British Isles should fall. From the viewpoint of bringing immediate heavy pressure in the Atlantic, which we consider the decisive theater, the plan leaves something to be desired in the initial stages of the war." (N.C.I. Exhibit 73, page 1).

(4). On 15 April 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch (152153) to CinCPac, concerning the Atlantic Reenforcement from the Pacific Fleet. The dispatch stated that the transfers previously indicated would be held in abeyance until the international situation cleared. The dispatch read:

"TRANSFERS INDICATED MY SERIAL 06538 OF 7 APRIL WILL BE HELD IN ABEYANCE UNTIL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION CLEARS AND

YOU ARE FURTHER ADVISED EXCEPT FOR THE FOLLOWING X EITHER ENTERPRISE OR YORKTOWN WILL BE SUBSTITUTED AND LEXINGTON

WILL NOT BE SENT X IF FORMER SHE IS TO CARRY OUT TRANSFER OF ARMY PLANES TO HAWAII SCHEDULED FOR 21 APRIL X WHEN

CARRIER IS READY DESIRE HER PROCEED ACCOMPANIED BY MCDUGAL AND DESDIV 18 DIRECT TO CANAL ZONE X DESIRE UTMOST SECRECY

REGARDING FACT VESSELS ARE LEAVING HAWAIIAN AREA X  
DESIRE GROUP MAKE NIGHT CANAL TRANSIT X AS EARLY AS

PRACTICABLE ADVISE PROPOSED DATE DEPARTURE AND  
PROSPECTIVE DATE ARRIVAL CANAL ZONE SO THAT DEPART-

MENT MAY NOTIFY COM 15 AND MAKE APPROPRIATE ARRANGE-  
MENTS FOR TRANSIT." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 122).

(5). On 16 April 1941, CinCPac sent a dispatch (162346) to OpNav replying to the latter's dispatch (152153) concerning the Atlantic Reenforcement, and suggesting 21 April 1941 as the day for departure. The dispatch read:

"YORKTOWN AND DDS READY YOUR 152153 X PROPOSED DATE  
DEPARTURE 21 APRIL X ARRIVAL EVENING FIFTEENTH DAY X

CARRIER SITUATION HAWAIIAN AREA UNSATISFACTORY UNTIL  
AFTER FOURTEEN MAY INCIDENT SHUTTLE TRIP ENTERPRISE

SEE MYSTER Ø552 NOW IN AIR MAIL AND MATERIAL DIFFICUL-  
TIES LEXINGTON SQUADRONS." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document  
123).

(6). On 13 May 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch (132Ø19) to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, which modified previous instructions concerning the Atlantic Reenforcement, and gave directions that there be organized, as the Atlantic Reenforcement, three groups each consisting of one battleship one light cruiser and three destroyers, which were to depart at intervals of one or two days, and that a fourth group, consisting of one light cruiser and DesDiv 3, was to form at sea. Utmost secrecy was urged with respect to the detachment of these units to the Atlantic. The dispatch read:

"INSTRUCTIONS MYSER Ø6538 MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS X  
ORGANIZE THREE GROUPS EACH CONSISTING ONE BATTLESHIP  
ONE LIGHT CRUISER AND THREE DESTROYERS FROM UNITS LISTED

THAT SERIAL X DESIRE THESE GROUPS TO DEPART AT INTERVALS  
ONE OR TWO DAYS X FOURTH GROUP TO CONSIST ONE LIGHT  
CRUISER AND DESDIV THREE LATTER DESTROYERS TO JOIN

CRUISER AT SEA BEFORE ARRIVAL PANAMA THIS GROUP FOLLOW  
THIRD GROUP THROUGH CANAL AT ONE OR TWO DAYS INTERVAL  
X DESIRE UTMOST SECRECY REGARDING FACT VESSELS ARE

DEPARTING HAWAIIAN AREA OR WEST COAST FOR ATLANTIC X  
DESIRE VESSELS LEAVING HAWAII PROCEED DIRECT CANAL ZONE  
AND ALL GROUPS MAKE NIGHT TRANSIT X AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

ADVISE COMPOSITION OF GROUPS PROPOSED DATES DEPARTURE  
AND CONTEMPLATED DATES ARRIVAL CANAL ZONE SO THAT OPNAV  
CAN MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRANSIT X SMALL GROUPS LIKE

YORKTOWN GROUP CAN MAKE TRANSIT APPARENTLY WITHOUT  
PUBLICITY X INITIATE THESE MOVEMENTS AS SOON AS  
PRACTICABLE." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 125).

(7). On 24 May 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (242155) to  
CinCPac directing the detachment of two tankers of the Cimmaron  
class which were to transit the Panama Canal and report to CinCLant  
for duty at the earliest practicable date. The dispatch read:

"DIRECT TWO TANKERS CIMMARON CLASS PROCEED SAN PEDRO  
EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE LOAD BUNKER AND THREE GRADES  
CARGO FUEL TO CAPACITY PROCEED CANAL ZONE TRANSIT AND

ON ARRIVAL CRISTOBAL REPORT CINCLANT FOR DUTY X EARLIEST  
PRACTICABLE ARRIVAL ATLANTIC DESIRED." (Hew. Exhibit 70,  
Document 127).

(8). In his Annual Report dated 15 August 1941, to the  
Secretary of the Navy covering the period 1 July 1940 to 30 June  
1941, (N.C.I. Exhib' . 44), Admiral Kimmel referred to changes that  
had occurred in the organization of the Pacific Fleet, including the  
Atlantic Reenforcement. In this connection, he said:

"(B) CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION:

"(a) Executed

"Subsequent to organization of the U.S. Pacific Fleet on 1 February, 1941, the following changes have been executed:

"(1) Battleship Division THREE, YORKTOWN, Destroyer Squadrons EIGHT and NINE, Cruiser Division EIGHT, CINCINNATI, Patrol Squadron SIXTY-ONE, CIMARRON, SANGAMON, SANTEE, RELIEF, WILLIAM P. BIDDLE, FULLER, HEYWOOD, LITTLE, MANLEY, STRINGHAM, MCKEAN, BRANT, BARTRIDGE, ALGORMA, and KALMIA, WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE Atlantic Fleet." (N.C.I. Exhibit 44, page 2).

V

THE ARMY COMMAND IN HAWAII - MISSION - EQUIPMENT

(a) The Army Command

During the pertinent times in question, the Secretary of War was Henry L. Stimson, who served from 10 July 1940 to 21 September 1945. The Army Chief of Staff was General George C. Marshall, who has been serving in that capacity since 1 July 1939. (N.C.I. page 853). The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was Major General W. C. Short, with headquarters at Fort Shafter, Oahu, who served as such from 7 February 1941 until 16 December 1941 (N.C.I. page 220). The Chief of Staff to Major General Short was Colonel Walter C. Phillips, who served as such from 5 November 1941 to 18 December 1941. He had previously worked through the various Staff Sections of the Hawaiian Department (N.C.I. pages 477-78).

(b) The Army Mission in Hawaii

(1) General Marshall testified, among other things, concerning the joint plans for the defense of Hawaii, the tasks assigned respectively to the Army and the Navy, the method of command being pursued, and the defensive forces and equipment available to and provided by the Army. He also referred to and quoted from a letter written by him to Major General Short in respect of the Army's mission in Hawaii. (N.C.I. pages 825-868).



General Marshall stated that the paramount mission of the Army Air Force in the Hawaiian Department was:

"To defend the island of Oahu against attacks by enemy aircraft, in cooperation with the Fleet aircraft, and to attack hostile vessels. That is set forth in Field Orders No. 41, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, on the subject of Army Operating Defense Plans as of April, 1941." (N.C.I. page 863).

General Marshall stated that under the Joint Agreement for the defense of Hawaii, the Army

"was to hold the land, seacoast, and air against attack. The Joint Coastal Frontier Plan of April, 1941, stated the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, should provide for beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defense of Pearl Harbor and the Navy and Army installations of Oahu, as well as for anti-sabotage measures and air-craft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands." (N.C.I. page 855).

while the Navy

"was charged with certain security measures which included the maintenance of long-distance plane patrol and searching operations, establishment of inshore patrol, destroyer patrol, boom patrol; the organization of minesweeping patrol; the organization of an air striking force to search for and attack hostile surface ships; the organization of air defense groups for the control and distribution of anti-aircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor." (N.C.I. page 855)

With reference to Section III of Article 31, subparagraph d of "Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935," (N.C.I. Exhibit 6), the last sentence of which reads: "Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for the use of the General Headquarters Air Force." <sup>1/</sup> General Marshall explained that the General Headquarters was established in March, 1935. It was, he said:

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<sup>1/</sup> See supra page 92.

"\*\*\*the air force in the continental United States. In June, 1941, when the Army Air Force was created, the G.H.Q. Air Force became the Air Force Combat Command, under the Commanding General of Army Air Forces. It was comparable to the present Army Air Force organization in the United States. I was not here at the time it was created, but the purpose was to bring here all the combat air forces together under one control in the continental United States in order to develop efficiency in operations, in maintenance, bombing, and everything of that sort. General Andrews was made the head of it, and created as a beginning, really, the technique of handling large air forces." (N.C.I. page 859).

General Marshall explained further that as soon as the Army started its program of expansion and of sending airplanes here and there, the General Headquarters Air Force was "largely wrecked," because it was not then an organization large enough to conveniently absorb the loss of personnel and material that were being taken from it. (N.C.I. page 859)

(2) Major General Short testified (N.C.I. pages 220-21, 234, 236, 259) that he was familiar with the several Joint Defense Plans, namely the "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935" (N.C.I. Exhibit 6, supra, pages 86-96), the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, JCD-42" (N.C.I. Exhibit 7, 23) and supplements thereto. 1/

Major General Short said that the system of command that prevailed was that of mutual cooperation, not unity of command (N.C.I. pages 220, 231, 235). He read into the record the provisions

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1/ See supra pages 119-141.

of Article 14 of the Joint Plan whereby the Army had the task of holding "Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces" (N.C.I. page 222).<sup>1/</sup> In connection with the Army mission, Major General Short, however, pointed out that the responsibility of the Army for the defense of Pearl Harbor was shared by the naval forces (N.C.I. pages 227, 251), and, in particular, that one of the most important items was the Navy task of conducting long range reconnaissance (N.C.I. pages 228, 251), and of meeting the enemy at sea (N.C.I. page 251).

Major General Short said that the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, JCD-42 (N.C.I. Exhibits 7, 23; Hew. Exhibit 80), by its terms, superceded HCF-39 (JCD-13) (Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, JCD-13) except "that the Annex Nos. 1 to VII of the latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this Plan" (N.C.I. pages 221-222), and was based or predicated on the Rainbow War Plans (N.C.I. page 260). He stated that the Joint Defense Plan was to go into execution upon the execution of the Rainbow War Plans, or on M-day (N.C.I. page 260).

(c) The Army Equipment in Hawaii

(1) General Marshall testified that he was familiar with the letter written on 24 January 1941 by the Secretary of the Navy

<sup>1/</sup> See supra, page 120.

to the Secretary of War <sup>1/</sup> concerning problems affecting the security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base Defense (N.C.I. page 853).

General Marshall stated that the letter of the Secretary of the Navy came over his desk one morning when he had just returned from an inspection trip, and that with it was a proposed reply to be submitted to the Secretary of War, <sup>2/</sup> which, he said, was not satisfactory to him "for the reason that it offered no help for some time to come; and I felt, speaking very frankly, that the letter from the Secretary of the Navy, in view of our tremendous shortages, was putting the Secretary of War in a very embarrassing position, and that under the circumstances we had to do something drastic to meet the situation." (ibid)

General Marshall testified that the letter of the Secretary of the Navy was a difficult one for the Secretary of War to answer because it related only to one place (Hawaii) of the many required attention throughout the Western Hemisphere and as

far west as the Philippines. And, he said, that that place (Hawaii)  
1/ The letter (N.C.I. Ex.9; Hew. Ex.64) is stated in full, infra, page 208. Copies of the letter were sent to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. The former was received on 5 February 1941 and was seen by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Ex.64).

2/ The answer of the Secretary of War to the letter of the Secretary of the Navy was dated 7 February 1941, and is stated in full, infra, page 212. A copy of the answer was forwarded on 11 February 1941 by Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. This copy was received on 26 February 1941, and Admiral Kimmel noted with his initials on the CincPac Routing Sheet that he had seen it. (Hew. Exhibit 64).

"was the one spot where we had done more during the preceding years that any other place." (N.C.I. page 855; see also N.C.I. pages 853-855) He stated that as a result of the above interchange of correspondence between the Secretaries of War and Navy, he talked with General Arnold concerning the air portion of the defense requirements in Hawaii. He stated that at that time the Army had in Hawaii 50 obsolete fighter planes and about 10 P-36's. Arrangements were made, he said, to take from squadrons in the United States 36 of the P-36's, which reduced the fighter squadrons left in the United States to two or three planes. The additional P-36's were sent to Hawaii on board a Navy airplane carrier about the first part of February 1941, and the shipment brought the air equipment of the Hawaiian Department up to 50 P-36's (N.C.I. pages 853-853A). General Marshall also said that, according to his recollection, on or about 15 March 1941, the Army sent 50 P-40's, the then most modern fighter planes, to Hawaii on board another Navy airplane carrier (N.C.I. page 853A).

(2) General Marshall read into the record a letter written by him on 7 February 1941 to Lieutenant General Short concerning the primary mission of the Army in Hawaii and touching on questions which had been raised by the Navy concerning deficiencies of Army material there, as follows:



"My dear Short: I believe you take over command today, however, the reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.

"Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army material for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to anti-aircraft guns. Of course, the facts are as he represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber .50 machine guns. The 3-inch anti-aircraft gun is on a better basis. What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.

"The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration for us; there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday - He had been pressing me heavily to get some modern anti-aircraft guns in the Philippines for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet - at the present time we have no anti-aircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and very little for Corregidor. By unobtrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active training, we have obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines. However, before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until quantity production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.

"I have not mentioned Panama, but the Naval requirements of defense there are of immense importance and we have not been able to provide all the guns that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. However, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day, some of it in four hours.

" You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of the P-36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days. This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the Japanese carrier based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it gives you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50 P-40-B pursuit planes about March 15th by Naval carrier from San Diego. These planes just came into production this week and should be on a quantity basis of about 8 a day by the first week in March.

" The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in China, according to our information has a speed of 322 miles an hour, a very rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20 mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak-proof tanks and armor. Our P-40-B will have a speed of 360 miles an hour with two .50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to climb of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and armor.

" We have an earlier model of this plane, the P-40 delivered between August and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights over water. Up to the present time we have not had available a modern medium bomber or a light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into production, if not quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 miles, carries 2,000 pounds, and has a speed of 320 miles an hour - a tremendous improvement on the old B-18 which you now have. It can operate with bombs 640 miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give you first priority on these planes. I am looking into the question of providing at least a squadron of Flying Fortress planes for Hawaii.

" I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-up, but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regarding barrage balloons. We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manufacture, and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our estimates. However, this provides nothing against the next

few months. I am looking into the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking us and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries in June will probably be made in Hawaii.

" You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited material we have, for Alaska, for Panama, not to mention the new leased bases. However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

" My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage any enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

" Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. Fortunately, and happily I might say, Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties." (N.C.I. pages 866-868, incl.)

(3) On 10 February 1941, Admiral Stark wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 29) in which, among other things, he discussed his relationship with General G. C. Marshall:

"I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. You now know that he is sending out 81 fighters to Oahu, which will give that place 50 fairly good ones and 50 of the latest type. I jumped to give him the transportation for them in carriers when he requested it. I hope too, you will get the Marines to Midway, Johnson and Palmyra, as soon as you can. They may have to rough it for a time until barracks are built, and the water supply, if inadequate, will have to be provided somehow just like it would be if they had captured an enemy atoll." (N.C.I. Exhibit 29) \* \* \* \* \*

"Speaking of Marshall, he is a tower of strength to us all, and I couldn't conceive of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He will go to almost any length possible to help us out and sometimes contrary to his own advisors." (N.C.I. Exhibit 29)

(4) On 18 February 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark, (N.C.I. Exhibit 30), concerning, among other things, a reinforcement by the Army of its fighters and of the cooperative attitude of General Short. He said:

"I was delighted to learn about the Army fighters. The first contingent is now on its way, together with certain equipment for the outlying islands. In addition to the fighters I believe it of the highest importance to send just as many Army bombers and adequate supplies of bombs to Oahu as the Army establishment can support with the greatest effort. The need for Army anti-aircraft guns should also be stressed. Active and immediate steps are being taken to coordinate the Army and Navy air effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl Harbor. I had a couple of interviews with Short and find him fully alive to the situation and highly cooperative. I recommend that you keep continuous pressure on this question of Army reinforcement of Oahu." (N.C.I. Exhibit 30).

(5) On 25 February 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 31), in part as follows:

"I am perfectly delighted over getting some modern Army airplanes in the Hawaiian area and jumped at the opportunity to transport them. I wish they would make me a similar offer for the Philippines, in which case I would also make available a carrier, properly escorted, for the duty." (N.C.I. Exhibit 31)

(6) General Marshall stated that on 5 March 1941 he wrote to Major General Short stating that he "would appreciate your early view of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with reference to the defense from air attack" and stating that it was highly important that representatives from Hawaii be present to observe the air defense exercises planned for the West Coast for the spring of 1941 (N.C.I. page 857).

In response to this letter General Short, on 15 March 1941, replied in some detail concerning the situation in his department in regard to air defense, and stated that he proposed to send General Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Forces, and General Gardner, Commanding the Hawaiian Coastal Defense, to the West Coast air exercises, which, it afterwards turned out, were postponed until the fall of 1941 (N.C.I. pages 857-858).

General Marshall replied on 28 March 1941 to General Short's letter of March 15th stating:

"Anti-aircraft and aircraft warning service materiel to meet your project requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows: 16 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, December 1941; 115 37-millimeter anti-aircraft guns, February 1942, and a blank number of 50-caliber guns." (The



number is missing from the record here.)" '4 SCR No. 268 radar, in April of 1941; 5 SCR No. 270; and 3 SCR No. 271, in April and May 1941. I am hopeful arrangements for materially augmenting your anti-aircraft artillery to provide for full strength of units of armament available to you can be made. Coastal artillery reinforcements will be held in the United States unless the situation in the Pacific becomes more acute.'" (N.C.I. page 858).

(7) On 4 June 1941, Admiral Kimmel forwarded a memorandum to Admiral Stark (N.C.I. Exhibit 10), concerning joint air defense exercises of the Navy and Army, reading in part as follows:

"The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

- (a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.
- (b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

"The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in its use." (N.C.I. Exhibit 10).

In his memorandum of 4 June 1941 to Admiral Stark

(N.C.I. Exhibit 10), Admiral Kimmel also discussed the number of Army fighter and light bomber planes and pilots, in Hawaii, saying:

"There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so.

"There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands."  
(N.C.I. Exhibit 10).

(8) General Marshall stated, generally, that Hawaii was "far and away the most heavily provided installation of ours in and out of the country, for defense." He said that Hawaii had first priority in the Army for years as to the number of troops and equipment; that, in 1941, the Army had nothing in Alaska and that it was trying "to provide something for Anchorage vicinity and Kodiak Island." In addition, he said, "the Panama defenses were very seriously deficient." He pointed out in substance that the sending away of materiel and personnel was a matter of serious concern because when such was done, "nobody could train." In this connection he said:

"Along with that, a matter that pertains to this and was one of the personnel factors, was the fact that if we took this materiel away nobody could train; therefore, there was no expansion. Therefore we couldn't create units. Our great dilemma at that time was taking away the fighter planes, we couldn't have combat fighter training adequate to the needs. When we put additional aircraft into Hawaii, we denied ourselves a very large training base for the tremendous expansion of some, I

think, about 5000 % that we were confronted with, so it was not only the ordinary consideration of availability of equipment, but it was the fact that we couldn't create an Army if we had nothing to train with. Of course, we had the same difficulties with ammunition, and again there we gave to the Navy the priority on the anti-aircraft, because they had to be prepared to go to sea on a moment's notice, which resulted in our own availability being so seriously reduced that we sent our anti-aircraft and some of our other units -- particularly anti-aircraft -- in the Tunisian campaign, deplorably deficient in their ability to shoot, because they had no ammunition with which to conduct practice in this country, because the priority had to go to the Navy, and those proportions to Great Britain and others to save the various crises throughout the world." (N. C. I. pages 853A-854).

(9) With reference to the Aircraft Warning System of the Army in Hawaii during the three or four months prior to 7 December 1941, General Marshall testified:

"In August of 1940 the War Department approved a plan for complete air warning service for Hawaii, for five mobile and three fixed stations, which was later increased to six mobile and six fixed stations, the increase being agreed to on May, 1941. Preliminary arrangements in 1940, looking toward installation of the detector stations, were going forward when General Short took command on February 7, 1941. On March 6, General Short, in a personal letter, emphasized the need for expedition in setting up the aircraft warning service and stated that, "in the present international situation, it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all, the need for it is now here." He went on to say that difficulty had arisen with the Interior Department in obtaining the authority to set up the detector station in the national park of Halekulai. That particular difficulty was settled in May, 1941, but only after I had personally taken it up with the Interior Department." (N.C.I. page 857)

(d) The Question of Unity of Command in Hawaii.

(1) General Marshall stated that prior to 7 December 1941 consideration was almost constantly given to the matter of effecting unity of command in the Hawaiian area, and that he had discussed the matter with Admiral Stark on a great many occasions. These discussions, he said, "usually developed a multiplicity of complications."

"I recall that I first proposed a unity of command under the Navy in Alaska and the Aleutians, as a first step toward getting straightened out in Hawaii and the Panama Canal. In each case, there were always so many minor objections or complications that we failed to arrive at a decision. I might say always that under unity of command, you can get immediate agreement if the other fellow exercises the command, and that refers to the British and ourselves also; and that is something I have become somewhat of an expert in dealing with all over the world. But it is the minor objections that create the great difficulty, because there are a multiplicity of those. However, in my opinion they were always exceedingly minor, and the great practical factors are hidden behind this screen of complications, suspicions by one service of the other. Stark and I were pretty much in agreement all the time, but in great departments like the War and Navy Department, you don't do things like that by ukase." (ibid)

(e) Army Equipment in the Philippines.

(1) General Marshall further testified that additional aircraft was sent to Hawaii as soon as quantity production came into being, and, with respect to the Philippines, he said:



"We didn't push the Philippines at all. We denied the Commander in the Philippines increases because we couldn't jeopardize things here at home and Hawaii for something at that distance, and we were also considering the Atlantic side and considering the threat of all the fifth column movement in Latin America, and the approaches of the Germans through Casablanca and Dakar, with ominous forebodings that we had in regard to that region; so we came to a time between this February period I spoke of and December 1941, when we turned to shipment to the Philippines to try to give them some adequate defense. I think the first material shipments of any kind went -- were actually started -- in about April, and those were some pursuit planes that we got out there, and then we began to send a few other things. It was not until the latter part of August that we started the big planes through to the Philippines -- the four-engine bombers -- and then we were accumulating supplies to try to put them in a state of defense that would deter Japanese action to the south of the Philippine Archipelago. I might add that it had been the desire -- it was pressed by Admiral Stark on several occasions, on numerous occasions -- to have us increase the garrison, the strength of our Army, in the Philippines. I think the general expression that I used in declining to agree with him in that action was that what we sent to the Philippines was seed corn, and that left us nothing back here at all -- if we sent the regular troops we had literally nothing for any expansion, and we had to send regular troops. There wasn't anything else we could send. We had a great many limitations on personnel at that time, but the main factor was the complete lack of adequate equipment, and until we had quantity production in full blast for a period of time, we were stopped from making these various moves;\*\*\*"  
(N.C.I. pages 854-855)

(2) In connection with the defense in the Philippines; it is to be noted that General Marshall, on 12 September 1941, sent a memorandum to Admiral Stark (N.C.I. Exhibit 12)<sup>1/</sup> reading:

"You asked me about what we are doing for the Philippines:

"August 26: "There sailed from San Francisco part of a regiment of anti-aircraft troops and some reserve supplies.

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1/ Admiral Stark sent a copy of this memo to Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Ex. 12)



"September 8: "There sailed from San Francisco the remainder of the anti-aircraft regiment, a tank battalion of 50 tanks, 50 of the latest pursuit planes, and the personnel to man them, which brings the modern pursuit planes in the Philippines up to 80.

"September 18: "50 Self-propelled mounts for 75 cannon to be shipped from San Francisco, and 50 more tanks.

"Today "The squadron of nine Flying Fortresses landed in Manila after successfully flying the route Midway, Wake, New Britain, Dutch East Indies.

"September 30: "Two squadrons (26 planes) of Flying Fortresses will leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.

"October: "A reserve of pursuit planes will have been in process of shipment, about 32 in October, rising to a total of 130 by December.

"November: "Probably a reserve of six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses, B-24 type planes will be transferred to Manila. These planes will have an operating radius of 1500 miles, with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means that they can reach Osaka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load. They have pressure cabins and can operate continuously 35,000 feet for bombing.

"December: "Another group of Flying Fortresses, some 35 planes, goes to Manila.

"A group of dive bombers, some 54 planes, also goes.

"A group of pursuit, some 130 planes, along with two additional squadrons to build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatch.

"A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes." (N.C.I. Exhibit 12).

VI

ADEQUACY OF FLEET TO ACCOMPLISH ITS MISSION  
AND OF LOCAL DEFENSES AGAINST SUBMARINES -  
KNOWLEDGE OF INADEQUACY OF LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES  
TO MEET A HOSTILE AIR RAID AND OF NECESSITY OF  
RELYING ON THE FLEET

During this period (May 1940 - 15 October 1941) it was admitted by Admiral Kimmel in June 1941 that the organization of U. S. Fleet and the Pacific Fleet was adequate to accomplish its war mission, and agreed that local defenses against submarines were sufficient. It was well known, however, by Admiral Kimmel that the local defense forces were not adequate to meet a hostile air raid. Admiral Stark subsequently wrote Admiral Kimmel that the fleet would have to supplement and supply the known inadequacies of the local defense forces.

(a) Adequacy of the Fleet to Accomplish its War Mission

(1) Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in his annual report to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 15 August 1941, covering the period 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941, (N.C.I. Exhibit 44), among other things made reference to the organization of the U. S. Fleet into the Asiatic and Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and the organization of the Pacific Fleet into Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE, and into the Base Defense Forces. The report then stated with reference to the adequacy of the Fleet to accomplish its mission in war:

"(4) The above organization its believed suitable and adequate, at the present time, for the accomplishment of the war mission of the Fleet. The strength of the Pacific Fleet in numbers of ships is adequate for only limited offensive operations in the Pacific because of the distances involved and the known enemy strength and strategic dispositions in that area. There is a serious deficiency in numbers in practically all Types, but particularly in aircraft carriers, improved aircraft of all types, destroyers and light cruisers and also in auxiliary tankers, supply ships, and transports including the destroyer transport.

"(5) In addition there are material deficiencies, including radar, close anti-aircraft defense weapons, sonic gear, aircraft radio identification advance Base equipment and landing equipment.

"(6) To all this must be added the total inadequacy of personnel." (N.C.I. Exhibit 44).

(b) Adequacy of Local Defenses Against Submarine Attacks

(1) In his letter of 30 December 1940 to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Bloch said:

"3. DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES

"The ideal defense against submarines would be conducted by patrol vessels and aircraft working in conjunction. The district has no aircraft for this purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division EIGHTY which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for anti-submarine and escort work. A large number of patrol vessels will be required for anti-submarine work in the vicinity of Oahu and the other islands. At present, the district has none and request would have to be made on the Fleet for such vessels and planes as could be spared for this most important work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be completed somewhat later." (N.C.I. Exhibit 28)

(2) In forwarding the above letter to the Chief of Naval Operations by his first endorsement dated 7 January 1941, Admiral Richardson also said:

"The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under present peace time conditions, but early installation of underwater sound-submarine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ships to the Fourteenth Naval District Defense Forces should expedited, particularly ships for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

"In this connection, it is urgently recommended that Local Defense Forces, adequate for the protection of naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units based thereon, be provided the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. In order to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and further, to avoid the necessity for detailing important Fleet units (because no other ships are available) to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the U. S. Fleet. It is further considered that the provision of adequate Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District should be given higher priority than continental Naval Districts, where both the possibilities of, and objectives for, attack are much less." (N.C.I. Exhibit 28).

(c) Knowledge of Inadequacy of Local Defense Forces to Meet a Hostile Air Raid and of Necessity of Relying on the Fleet for that Purpose

(1) On 30 December 1940, Admiral C. C. Bloch, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations via the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, having the subject "Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to meet Surprise Attacks". Admiral Bloch referred to the then inadequacy of the local defense forces, and to the necessity of relying on units of the Fleet for defense, and he stated that this included reliance on Fleet patrol planes for distant reconnaissance. Among other things, Admiral Bloch said:

"1. In view of the inquiries contained in references (a), (b), and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

"2. AIRCRAFT RAIDS



"Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area fifty-nine B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purpose intended. New bombing planes are expected sometime in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

"To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched will require both fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area thirty-six pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are six years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models, there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in production to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

"The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50 caliber out of the projected 120 37-millimeter and 308 .50 caliber machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficiency of a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army has made no plans for the anti-aircraft defense of Lualaie or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft barrages abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 caliber machine guns.

"In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning service which will consist of eight Radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and five mobile. When completed

(The next page is #192)



at an indefinite time in the future, this warning net should be adequate." (N.C.I. Exhibit 28)

(2) Admiral J. O. Richardson, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, forwarded Admiral Bloch's letter of 30 December 1940 to the Chief of Naval Operations, by first endorsement, dated 7 January 1941. In his endorsement, Admiral Richardson also discussed the inadequacy of available equipment to meet air raids, and of the necessity of reliance on the Fleet for defense. Among other things, he stated:

"The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. As a result of the conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in the opinion that the present Army Pursuit Squadrons and antiaircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number of larger and longer range antiaircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

"2. As neither the increased antiaircraft batteries nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an extended period the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for co-operation with the local defense forces are being made. At present the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or antiaircraft batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet Air Units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter squadron were required. (N.C.I. Exhibit 28)

"9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measure of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the district for any exigencies.

"10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that they are proceeding vigorously with a view to overcoming deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed at length. (N.C.I. Exhibit 28).

"11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the Fourteenth Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters." (N.C.I. Exhibit 28).

(3) Secretary of the Navy Knox in his letter of 24 January 1941 to the Secretary of War (*infra*, page 206), stated that the

"(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched; (and)

"(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives."

were "largely functions of the Fleet \*\*\*." (N.C.I. Exhibit 9).

(4) On 25 January 1941, Admiral J. O. Richardson, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, in collaboration with Rear Admiral Kimmel, prospective Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, wrote a letter, serial

number A16/0129, to the Chief of Naval Operations, subject "Chief of Naval Operations Plan Dog" (N.C.I. Exhibit 70). In this letter, Admirals Richardson and Kimmel, while pointing to and deploring the inadequacy of the local defense forces, sought to emphasize their view by stating the large extent to which that situation required reliance to be placed on Fleet Units, including Fleet aircraft, which, they pointed out, impaired the offensive functions of the Fleet as well as deprived Fleet personnel of a refuge and of rest. Among other things, Admiral Richardson and Kimmel said:

"3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created. (N.C.I. Exhibit 70)

"4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

"(a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.

"(b) War with Japan is imminent.

"(c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown.

"(d) At least three German raiders are in the Pacific.

"(e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form -- even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by sub-

marines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.

- "(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel, are possible.
- "(g) Local sabotage is possible. (Ibid.)

"5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below. Where deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under the tasks will be included.

#### Waiting Attitude

- "(1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port.

"In the performance of this task, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the existence of certain marked deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and equipment both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in detail later, but are mentioned here in order that certain measures listed below may be more clearly understood.

"At present, the following measure, among others, will be required to accomplish the above task:

- "(a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reenforcing patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One.
  - "(b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as necessary.
  - "(c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit planes; supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes.
  - "(d) Augment Army A.A. defenses with A.A. batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor. (Ibid.)
- "(2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service. (Ibid.)

"(3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District.

"This task will require augmentation of District forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become available to the Commandant. (Ibid.) \*\*\*\*\*

"(4) Protect United States' shipping. This will require the following: \*\*\*\*\*

"(f) Maintain striking group to operate against raiders (search for raiders might afford opportunity to reconnoiter the Marshall Islands without provoking Japan). (Ibid.) \*\*\*\*\*

"(6) Adjust U. S. Fleet training to war conditions.

"(7) Make initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and raiders in the Northern Pacific. (Ibid.) \*\*\*\*\*

"6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcements. If a carrier is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the LEXINGTON class should be selected due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

"7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu and in the Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet guns and Fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men and material can not but result in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the Fleet are:

"(a) The critical inadequacy of A.A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A.A. guns while in port.

"(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based



aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, necessitating detail of Fleet units to this duty. The detail of Fleet units to this duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the availability of important vessels, but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable characteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is particularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore. (Ibid.)

"8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain." (N.C.I. Exhibit 70).

(5) On 10 February 1941 Admiral Stark told Admiral Kimmel in a letter (N.C.I. Exhibit 29, Postscript) that he (Kimmel) had to supply from the Fleet the deficiencies in the defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District. He said:

"I wish we could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces for the 14th Naval District but we simply haven't got them. If more are needed I see no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving Heaven and Earth to speed up a considerable program we have for small craft and patrol vessels for the Districts but like everything else, it takes time and 'dollars cannot buy yesterday'

"I think I previously wrote you that I hope to be able to take over the Coast Guard after the Lend-Lease Bill is on the Statute Books. Of course if war eventuates Admiral Bloch can commandeer anything in the Islands in the way of small craft and I assume he

has a full list of what would be available." (N.C.I. Exhibit 29 Postscript).

(6) On the 18 February 1941 Admiral Kimmel again pointed out to Admiral Stark (N.C.I. Exhibit 30), the necessity that the Fleet supply the inadequacies in the local defense forces, saying:

"The detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District will have to be made from the Fleet. This is a further drain on our small craft. In this connection I am recommending in separate correspondence that you send out one squadron of PTs and one squadron of the new PTC sub-chasers at the earliest possible date. I presume Bloch has his plans for commandeering local craft, but I will check with him and also inform him of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over shortly." (N.C.I. Exhibit 30).

(7) On 7 May 1941, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning "Local Defense Measure of Urgency." (N.C.I. Exhibit 41). In this letter Admiral Bloch visualized that the most probable form of attack by an enemy was by submarines. (id., page 2). In this connection, he said:

"1. A careful study indicates that the only way that submarines can be kept out of an area or destroyed is by the use of:

"(a) Small, fast sea-going vessels equipped with listening gear, depth charges and guns.

"(b) Aircraft.

"(c) A combination of (a) and (b).

"(d) Mines.

"2. In any Pacific war, it appears very obvious that the principal effort of our enemy will be to concentrate its submarine activity in the area outside and near Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, the island bases and the other ports of the islands. The protection supplied by existing arrangements for this area, exclusive of the

Fleet, is very weak and unsatisfactory.

"3. At the present time, the District Commandant has four old destroyers only, and these vessels, in addition to their anti-submarine activities, also act as escorts and patrols in the coastal frontier; he has no aircraft and complete reliance has to be placed (exclusive of the Fleet) on Army planes. This necessarily requires much indoctrination of pilots and much training to qualify them for the recognition of various types of vessels and other matters pertaining to the sea before they become proficient in spotting and attacking submarines.

"4. At the island bases, harbors with some degree of security will be at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, but it is thought that craft as indicated in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1 of this letter will be required at these places.

"5. This is particularly true at Wake where it will be a couple of years before the harbor is dredged out. The quickest time ever made in unloading a ship at Wake is 10 days. Imagine a vessel moored 10 days off Wake Island to transfer freight and provisions to the men working there and to the garrison. This would appear to the undersigned as being a submarine picnic. Accordingly, it is believed that at that place it will be necessary to have several of the craft indicated in paragraph 1(a).

"6. Summarizing, the object of this letter is to invite attention to the weakness of the local defense forces in protecting the vital communication lines at Oahu and the island bases and to recommend that every effort be made to supply this district at the earliest possible time with the necessary implements to combat the most probable form of attack." (N.C.I. Exhibit 41).

(8) On 20 May 1941 Admiral Kimmel wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations (N.C.I. Exhibit 42) concerning local defense forces in the Fourteenth Naval District. In this letter, Admiral Kimmel referred specifically to Admiral Bloch's letter of 7 May 1941 to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning local defense forces necessary to counter hostile submarine activity, in connection with which Admiral Kimmel referred to the "serious weakness of the local defense force" of the

Fourteenth Naval District, "particularly in anti-submarine types."

"This", said Admiral Kimmel,

"continues to be a matter of grave concern to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. In case of war it seems certain that the Commander-in-Chief must divert important units of the Fleet from their proper function with the Fleet to supplement the inadequate local defense forces now available, or must accept the risk of serious losses to combatant ships, naval auxiliaries, and merchant ships. If the Fleet should be shifted from the Pearl Harbor area, or be temporarily absent, the local defense forces would be lamentably weak for carrying out their assigned tasks." (N.C.I. Exhibit 42).

Admiral Kimmel then reviewed the correspondence concerning this matter during the preceding year and stated that the "net accretion to Fourteenth Naval District forces to date, except for the arrival of Destroyer Division 80, is almost negligible, and in so far as the Commander-in-Chief is aware, suitable arrangements have not been made to build those forces up to an adequate state." (N.C.I. Exhibit 42, page 3).

Admiral Kimmel then referred to an attached tabulation showing the units allocated and required as well as those available. (Enclosure A to N.C.I. Exhibit 42). In this tabulation it is stated that there were allocated, among other units, 84 VP's and 48 VSO's, which were a part of the 15,000 plane program and none of which had been delivered to the Local Defense Forces (Ibid.).

(9) On 26 May 1941, Admiral Kimmel sent to the Chief of Naval Operations a survey of conditions in the Pacific Fleet (N.C.I. Exhibit 33). This was a lengthy document which discussed in considerable detail the problems affecting personnel, aviation material,

communications, operations, defense of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, national policy, public opinion, and the forwarding of information by him as Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

In connection with aviation material Admiral Kimmel's survey stated:

"(6) Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area and there is no early prospect for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area.

"(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol planes, corresponds to RADAR for ships, which will enormously increase the potentialities of these planes.

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"(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow." (N.C.I. Exhibit 33)

In connection with operations, particularly with those of the Fourteenth Naval District, the survey by Admiral Kimmel stated:

"(b) Fourteenth Naval District. The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more anti-aircraft guns, airplanes, and RADAR equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over Continental and expanding Army needs.

"The naval forces available to the Commandant are meager to the point of non-existence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resuscitation and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be employed for its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive operations is seriously curtailed - possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and other small craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent. The Fleet must be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the District. The Fleet does not have the destroyers or other vessels to take over those duties. The situation has been brought to the Department's attention by letter. It is now much more serious as many



destroyers have been detached from this Fleet." (N.C.I. Exhibit 33).

(10) On 23 June 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 43) in response to the latter's letter of 20 May 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 42), concerning the local defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District, again telling Admiral Kimmel that the Fleet would have to be employed in local defense, and that, for such reason, he had provided in the War Plans that Admiral Bloch was subordinated to Admiral Kimmel in all circumstances when so directed. Admiral Stark said:

"1. The Chief of Naval Operations is aware of the situation in regard to the naval local defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District discussed by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet in reference (a), and realized the necessity of increasing the strength of these forces.

"2. Until the unsatisfactory situation pointed out by the Commander in Chief can be remedied, the light forces and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet will have to be employed in the local defense of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. The Chief of Naval Operations has taken cognizance of this necessity by providing in reference (b) (WPL - 46), that the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier act as an officer of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, operating under orders of the Commander in Chief thereof, in command of task groups of that fleet under all circumstances, when so directed.

"3. The Chief of Naval Operations has taken action to increase the strength of the Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District by the immediate acquisition of four purse seiners for conversion to YP. It is also anticipated that at least five (5) sampans, recently condemned, will be available in the District. The SACRAMENTO is under orders to depart from Norfolk for the Fourteenth Naval District on June 23, 1941.

"4. The construction program of PC's and YMS's will not permit the delivery of vessels of this type to the Fourteenth Naval District before the late fall.

"5. The Chief of Naval Operations is considering the acquisition and conversion of a number of the vessels assigned to the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in appendix II, of reference (b). The questions of funds and personnel, and the suitability of these vessels

will affect the decision reached.

"6. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, will be kept informed of assignments made." (N.C.I. Exhibit 43).

(11) On 26 July 1941 Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark (N.C.I. Exhibit 34) in respect of his requirements, which included:

"(2) Priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific war: \*\*\*\*\*

"(g) Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers." (N.C.I. Exhibit 34) \*\*\*\*\*

"(4) Aviation Requirements. These items, all of which have recently been taken up with the Department, are summarized briefly:

"(a) Pre-Fleet Training. Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat readiness of active squadrons. (N.C.I. Exhibit 34).

(12) On 13 August 1941, the acting Chief of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, wrote a letter (N.C.I. Exhibit 45) to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, concerning the local defense forces in the Fourteenth Naval District, which was in response to CinCPac's letter of 9 August, serial 01231, which, among other things, the acting Chief of Naval Operations said:

"1. The Chief of Naval Operations is fully aware of the seriousness of the situation in the Fourteenth Naval District as again put forth by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet in reference (a). However, at this time it is impossible to obtain either authority or funds to acquire or build any craft other than that now under construction.

"2. At the present time, mainly due to lack of engines, it does not appear that any patrol craft now under construction will be completed before the middle of October.

"3. It is expected that Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 1 will leave for Hawaii in about two weeks. This squadron will be attached to the Pacific Fleet rather than to the District and consists of twelve motor torpedo boats.

"4. The situation as to the sampans which have been seized in Hawaii has not yet been determined although the Department is doing its utmost to obtain at least some of these boats expeditiously.

"5. Vessels now available for the Naval Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District include:

- 4 Old destroyers
- Coast Guard Cutter Taney, Tiger, Reliance
- 2 Coast Guard YPs
- 4 AMc's

There are also twelve tugs of various types assigned to and in the Fourteenth Naval District which, should the fleet leave, might be used for patrol purposes. In addition to the vessels now actually in the Fourteenth Naval District PG-19 SACRAMENTO should arrive there within two or three days and YT-146 HOGA and YN-56 WAFELLO are expected to sail from San Pedro for Hawaii on August 17, 1941.

"6. When patrol boats now under construction are completed as many as practical will be assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District but as previously stated construction is progressing very slowly." (N.C.I. Exhibit 45).

(13) The Annual Report of Admiral Kimmel to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 15 August 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 44), discussed Base Facilities in the Hawaiian Area, including Pearl Harbor, Kaneohe Bay, and outlying fields, stating in part:

"(3) Hawaiian Area.

"Pearl Harbor. Many of the deficiencies of this base, disclosed by the prolonged stay of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in this area, listed in last year's report either have been or are now in process of correction. The commissioning of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, and the stationing of 3 patrol plane squadrons there has relieved the congestion, for planes of this type, at Ford Island. However, facilities for carrier groups are still inadequate and considerable congestion still exists. It is probable that

this condition, while being ameliorated by progress of current projects at Ford Island, will not be completely satisfactory until completion of the work at Barber's Point - sometime in the future.

"Work on additional shops, the new drydocks, the net denot and target repair base at Bishop's Point is continuing and being accelerated as fast as delivery of material and availability of workmen permit. It is expected that, with the completion of the additional workmen from the mainland, the industrial capacity of the yard will be materially increased.

"Remaining deficiencies, on which satisfactory progress is not being made, are:

"(a) Insufficiency in numbers and types of small craft to adequately service a large fleet, particularly in the supply of oil, gasoline, provisions, water, general stores and ammunition. Provision for augmented means for delivery of fresh water, made necessary by reduced capacity of ship's distilling plants due to contaminated waters of Pearl Harbor, is a present pressing need.

"(b) Inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet in harbor and for the important functions of shipping control and other requirements for the Fourteenth Naval District. Specifically, the situation in regard to such forces is as follows:

"(1) Insufficient patrol craft, particularly anti-submarine types.

"(2) District patrol and observation aircraft, though allocated in the aircraft expansion program, not yet available.

"(3) Insufficient army anti-aircraft guns actually available.

"(c) Provision of additional torpedo overhaul and storage facilities.

"Kaneohe Bay. The Naval Air Station Kaneohe was commissioned February 15, 1941. It is still uncompleted, but is in operating condition and three squadrons are now based thereon. Communications, ammunition stowage and handling, and provision for night flying are the principal present deficiencies.



"Outlying Fields. Outlying or auxiliary fields are in operating condition at Maui, Molokai, and Ewa.

"Maui provides facilities for Utility Squadron Three and for semi-permanent operation of one carrier group. Widening and lengthening of runways is being accomplished by C.A.A. Molokai has limited facilities for day to day operation of one carrier group. Runways are being improved by C.A.A. Ewa has a partial cross runway 300' x 1800' and is in use, in an expeditionary status, by the Second Marine Air Group. Permanent runway and other minor improvements are being provided.

"Development of Keehi lagoon as a civil air base has been started, with C.A.A. funds. When completed, this will provide an alternate operating base for VP planes and will be an important contribution to the defense of this area.

"Outlying Fields.

"Midway. This station, as originally planned, is now nearing completion. Latest estimates give a date of November 1, 1941 with an additional 18-19 months for completion of the projected Submarine Base. It is useable for two patrol plane squadrons in emergencies. A landing strip, now useable in emergency by carrier planes is nearing completion on Eastern Island. No other facilities for land planes are being provided. Shore defenses have been installed at Midway and a Defense Battalion established there. The Naval Air Station, Midway, is scheduled for commissioning on August 1, 1941.

"Johnston. This station is currently due for completion about January 1942. It is at present useable by one squadron, with tender. Shore defenses have been installed and nucleus Marine personnel established there. Magazines, fresh water distilling apparatus, Housing and cold storage facilities for the defense garrison are being provided. A landing strip on Johnston Island has recently been removed from the augmented project for this station. It should be restored. The Naval Air Station, Johnston Island, is scheduled for commissioning on August 15, 1941.

"Palmyra. This station is currently due for completion about January 1942. It is useable at present by 6 VPB, with tender. Landplane runway is being provided. Shore defenses and nucleus of defense personnel have been established. The Naval Air Station Palmyra is scheduled for commissioning on August 15, 1941.

"Wake. Construction at Wake is now well underway and, although work is in initial stages, substantial progress is being made.



Presently planned projects are due for completion about December 1942. Landplane runways are a part of the project. In emergency, one squadron, utilizing contractor's and P.A.A. facilities, can conduct limited operations from Wake at the present time. There is no useable channel for tenders into the lagoon at this time. It is contemplated that some shore defenses will soon be established there.

"(5) Samoa.

"Considerable expansion of the establishment at this station is now underway. Fuel oil, diesel and gasoline storage, net depot, seaplane facilities, landing field and barracks and mess hall for defense personnel are being provided. This work is currently estimated for completion January-March 1943. Samoa is not suitable for heavy load operations of VPB's, but is satisfactory for emergency landings and light load take-offs. Marine defenses and a Marine Defense Battalion are established there.

"(6) Guam.

"Some bomb-proofing, construction of fuel oil storage and harbor improvements are underway at Guam. Present projects are scheduled for completion in January 1943.) (N.C.I. Exhibit 44)

(14) Admiral Stark replied on 22 August 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 35) to Admiral Kimmel's letter of 26 July 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 34), and, in respect of some of the questions raised by the latter concerning priorities for a Pacific war, discussed the questions of equipment, facilities, personnel, communications, radar equipment, and recognition.

With Admiral Kimmel's point that the Fourteenth Naval District should have additional small craft for patrol purposes, Admiral Stark stated that the project was under way "to send 12PT's to the Fourteenth Naval District as soon as the boats can be prepared and transportation provided." And, with reference to the request that the highest priority be given new torpedo plants, Admiral Stark said that such was not satisfactory to the War Department and the Office of Production Management "without unacceptable reduction in priority of other naval aircraft" (N.C.I. Exhibit 35). <sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> For further developments (16 October - 26 November 1941) regarding the adequacy of local defense forces and the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, (infra, pages 314-320).

VII

KNOWLEDGE OF POSSIBILITY AND PROBABILITY OF SURPRISE AERIAL TORPEDO  
AND BOMB ATTACK BY JAPAN ON PEARL HARBOR - FAILURE TO USE ANTI-  
TORPEDO BAFFLES

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(a) Possibility and Probability of Aerial Torpedo Attack

For upwards of a year prior to 7 December 1941, responsible officers of the Navy Department, including the Secretary of the Navy, had envisioned and had communicated to the Fleet Commanders, including Admiral Kimmel, their explicit estimate that the Fleet at Pearl Harbor might be subjected to a surprise aerial attack by Japan. Some of the written documents to that effect are:

(1) On 24 January 1941, the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, wrote to the Secretary of War concerning the defenses against aircraft raids at Pearl Harbor, the security of the Fleet, and the probability of a Japanese attack against the Fleet while at Pearl Harbor. (N.C.I. Exhibit 9; Hew. Exhibit 64). <sup>1/</sup> The Secretary of the Navy stated:

2/

"The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

"In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

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1/ and 2/ following page.

"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

"Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

"Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

"The counter measures to be considered are:

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- 1/ Admiral Stark testified that the letter from Admiral Bloch dated 30 December 1940, with Admiral Richardson's first endorsement of 7 January 1941 (supra page 192), may have been the basis for the preparation of this letter to the Secretary of War, but he was not certain. (N.C.I. page 96). With reference to the receipt of this letter in the War Department, of the preparation of the reply of the Secretary of War, see the testimony of General G. C. Marshall, supra, pages 173, 174, 175 .
  - 2/ A copy of the letter of the Secretary of the Navy, as well as a copy of the answer of the Secretary of War, was sent to Admiral Kimmel, and seen by him. (Hew. Exhibit 64).

- (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;
- (b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;
- (c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;
- (d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
- (e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

"The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

"Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

"Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 - 3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109.50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

"By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective

action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

"The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

"To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

"Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department." (N.C.I. Exhibit 9).

(2) Admirals Richardson and Kimmel in the letter of 25 January 1941, (N.C.I. Exhibit 70; supra page 194 ), in the writing which they



collaborated, outlined "certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated," which included:

"(e) Japan may attack without warning \* \* \* \* \*"

"(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against \* \* \* \* \* naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor \* \* \* \* \* are possible." (N.C.I. Exhibit 70).

(3) On 1 February 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (N.C.I. Exhibit 67; infra page 259), stating in full the report from Ambassador Grew, in Tokyo, that the Peruvian Minister had heard that the Japanese planned a surprise attack in Pearl Harbor.

(4) The Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, replied to the 24 January 1941 letter of the Secretary of the Navy, by his letter of 7 February 1941, in which he said:<sup>1/</sup>

"1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hos-

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<sup>1/</sup> A copy of this letter in evidence before the Naval Court of Inquiry has attached to it a memorandum endorsement from the Director of Naval Districts Division to the Director of War Plans Division dated 19 February 1941, returning the letter and recommending that a copy be sent to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, bearing a pencil notation reading, "done 015712 of 11 February." (N.C.I. Exhibit 24(2)). It is clear that the copy was received by Admiral Kimmel. (Hew. Exhibit 64).

tile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

"2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

"3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

"4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefore has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

"5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured -- forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified

opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impractical for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

"6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making these measures effective." (N.C.I. Exhibit 24(1)).

(5) Admiral Kimmel's testimony showed some confusion as to his agreement with, and his evaluation of, the correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, dated 24 January 1941 and 7 February 1941. He testified that he felt that the most probable form of attack on Pearl Harbor was by submarine and that a bombing attack was the second most probable form of attack, and that the danger of an air torpedo attack was nil because the water was too shallow (page 285). He then corrected his testimony and stated that his previous testimony was erroneous and that he had regarded an air attack as no more than a possibility (page 287) (N.C.I.)

(6) However, in the written record, on 18 February 1941, Admiral Kimmel in a letter to Admiral Stark (N.C.I. Exhibit 30) stated that he considered a surprise attack in Pearl Harbor a possibility, he said:

"I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces, - DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive. (N.C.I. Exhibit 30).

(7) On 21 February 1941, Admiral Kimmel issued his confidential letter to the Commander of his Fleet forces (N.C.I. Exhibit 58) subject, "Battle Organization and Condition Watches" stating in part, as follows:

"1. The problem of battle organization and Conditions of Readiness for Action for all types in the Fleet is an acute one, requiring immediate and realistic solution. The Fleet at any moment may find itself faced with actual war conditions requiring a state of alertness and readiness, at sea and in port, not experienced since World War I and incompletely anticipated in the intervening years. \* \* \* \* \* (N.C.I.)

"4. Since under modern war conditions it is impossible to man continuously all battle stations without relief, except when battle is imminent or actually joined; since men without adequate rest are soon rendered unfit for battle; and since, however, each ship must at all times be prepared to meet a surprise attack, the three Conditions of Readiness for Action have been devised. One fundamental consideration is stressed -- these conditions were devised as much to give men adequate rest as to keep all possible stations manned. If the sole requirement is to keep every station manned -- to provide maximum security -- there can be only one condition. Condition one. The object of the other conditions is to give the crews adequate rest, thereby bringing them fresh into battle, and at the same time to provide reasonable security. If in any Condition of Readiness, security becomes no longer reasonable and adequate, the next higher condition must be set. Operating, as we may soon have to operate, in a large theatre of war this delicate balance between security and rest must be carefully kept or we shall be worn out on the one hand or caught unaware on the other." (ibid) (N.C.I. Exhibit 58).

(8) Operation Plan No. 1-41, Naval Base Defense Force, Fourteenth Naval District, (supra pages 127-140), issued 27 February 1941, together with the annexes and addendums thereto, including the Bellinger-Martin joint estimate covering joint air action in the event of sudden hostile

action against Oahu dated 31 March 1941, contains numerous statements indicating that it was realized that Pearl Harbor and the Fleet when in port, might be subjected to a surprise air attack prior to any declaration of war. (see e.g., supra pages 128, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137).

(9) Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Naval Coastal Defense Plan (supra page 123-126) dated 28 March 1941, among other things, referred to the necessity of "joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war." (supra pages 123-124).

(10) The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange, (14ND-JCD-42), (supra 119-123), issued 11 April 1941, among other things, stated that the task of the Navy included:

- "i. Distant reconnaissance;" and
- "j. Attacking enemy naval forces." (supra page 122).

(11) The Basic Navy War Plan (Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46)) (supra, pages 97-106), issued 26 May 1941, explicitly envisioned the possibility of a surprise attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Among other things, WPL-46 stated that the U. S. Pacific Fleet was assigned the task of "destroying enemy raiding forces." (supra page 103).

(12) Admiral Kimmel visited Washington in June, 1941, and, according to Admiral Stark, they reviewed matters of policy (N.C.I. page 113). Admiral Kimmel said that in June, 1941, he told Admiral



Stark and the President of the dangers to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor from air attack, blocking of harbor, etc. He said he told the President that the only real answer to an air attack was not to have the Fleet in port if and when an attack came; that it took two to four hours to sortie; and that once an air attack started it would be completed before they could change in any degree the disposition of the Fleet. He said, he made no protest at any time against maintaining the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and made no recommendation for withdrawal of any of the battleships or carriers. (N.C.I. pages 366, 367).

(13) The U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5, WFPac-46 (supra page 106-118), promulgated on 21 July 1941, by Admiral Kimmel, also contained explicit provisions that envisioned a surprise attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. WFPac-46 stated that it was believed Japan's initial action would, among other things be,

"Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway or other United States outlying possessions," (supra page 108).

and that the initial Japanese employment was estimated to include

"Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area." (supra page 109).

Accordingly, the Pacific Fleet was assigned the task of

"patrolling as required by circumstances, and destroying enemy raiding forces;"

and of preventing

"the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions" (supra page 110).

Other tasks assigned the Pacific Fleet were to:

"Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea" (supra page 110);

"Guard against surprise attack by Japan." (supra page 111);

"Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases." (supra page 111).

(14) on 26 July 1941, Admiral Kimmel, in a letter to Admiral Stark (N.C.I. Exhibit 34), adverted to recent reports of the effectiveness of aerial torpedo attacks, and of defenses against air attacks as follows:

"(b) New Torpedo Planes. Highest priority -- A-1-a -- instead of present priority which is A-1-b. There are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater naval importance. \* \* \* \* \*

"(d) A.S.V. (Anti-Surface Vessel) Equipment. This is of the highest potential value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December. It can be carried by other planes, as shown by reports of British torpedo plane operations. It should be provided for every plan that can carry it and much earlier deliveries are essential.

"(e) I.F.F. (Identification, Friend or Foe) Equipment. This is absolutely complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for aircraft defense of the Fleet. Without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay whatever is acceptable. (N.C.I. Exhibit 34)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(15) On 22 August 1941 Admiral Stark, in replying to Admiral Kimmel's letter of 26 July 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 34) concerning the latter's request that the highest priority (1A-1-a) be given new torpedo planes, said (N.C.I. Exhibit 35):

"Comment. The A-1-a rating for torpedo planes was not satisfactory to the War Department and the Office of Production Management without unacceptable reduction in priority of other naval aircraft. There is good reason to question whether a higher priority for torpedo planes would have expedited their delivery. The Navy Department will continue to exert maximum effort to expedite the production of VTB for the Fleet." (N.C.I. Exhibit 35, page 30 of enclosed draft reply).

(16) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) (supra page 126-133), issued by Admiral Kimmel on 14 October 1941, expressly stated as a fundamental assumption of Fleet Security at Bases that "a declaration of war may be preceded by \* \* \* \* a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor" (supra, page 113).

In connection with this Security Letter assumption, Admiral Kimmel testified that it contemplated a surprise air attack which, however, he said, was never considered more than a possibility which ordinary prudence would make him guard against (N.C.I. page 287). Vice Admiral (then Captain) Smith, Chief of Staff (supra page 46) testified that the 14 October 1941 letter contemplated an air attack in Pearl Harbor, though the officers there did not expect it as they did not think the Japanese had the "guts" to make such an attack (Har. page 57).

(b) Failure to use Anti-Torpedo Baffles

The correspondence and records concerning awareness of the desirability of using and the failure to use anti-torpedo baffles as defenses for the protection in Pearl Harbor of ships of the Fleet, includes the following:

(1) There appears in the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, an intelligence report (NI 96, serial No. 1361, monograph #1004-1000) from the Naval Attache at London, dated 27 November 1940, having <sup>1/</sup>the subject "Control of Torpedoes in Air." A copy of this report was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, as shown by the notation in the routing space on the first page of the report.

The report described generally the work with glide torpedoes done by the Royal Air Force at Gosport, England. It states that on 16 November 1940, a torpedo equipped with auxiliary controlled tail surfaces and wire and drum gear, was released from a plane flying at about 100 feet altitude, and had a satisfactory run. The torpedo was described in detail, and, with

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<sup>1/</sup> This report was not introduced as evidence in the several Navy Investigations but was considered by the Secretary of the Navy in his action in the Pearl Harbor matter.

reference to the maximum altitude and speed and depth of dive,  
it was stated:

"7. The maximum altitude and speed at which torpedoes not equipped with the gliding gear are dropped are 120 feet and 150 knots. It is considered uneconomical to build torpedoes capable of withstanding conventional drops at higher altitudes and/or speeds. At these limits, the torpedo dives to an average depth of 30 feet and seldom will exceed an initial diving depth of 60 feet."

With reference to the range or extent of run of the torpedo after dropping, the report stated:

"9. It is considered that the torpedo attack must be made at a range of not more than 800 yards to insure an acceptable percentage of hits on an average ship target." \*\*\*\*\*

"15. The magnetic firing device requires a run in water of about 400 yards to arm, whereas the impact pistol arms in approximately 100 yards."

The report further stated that there was witnessed an apparently satisfactory glide torpedo release from an altitude of 500 feet, and the pilot training releases from 2,000 feet where being made regularly in preparation for the use of this weapon in some appropriate major effort. It was further stated that successful releases had been made from as high as 10,000 feet.

The general observations made in the report included the following:

"25. GENERAL - The officers associated with aircraft torpedo development regard the aircraft torpedo as an effective weapon for general use both by carrier and land based aircraft. This is in contrast to the school



of thought in our own Navy which considers the aircraft torpedo to be primarily a weapon of opportunity to be used under conditions of low ceiling or visibility. The inaccuracy of British bombing may be an important factor influencing the high regard for the aircraft torpedo by their Service."

(2) On 7 January 1941, Admiral J. O. Richardson, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his first endorsement, forwarding the letter of Admiral Bloch, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District <sup>1/</sup> (supra page 188), said:

"3. There does not appear to be any practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor, particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area any passive defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets." (N.C.I. Exhibit 28).

(3) On 11 February 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations wrote a letter to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, subject "Experimental and Development Work on Nets and Booms", (N.C.I. Exhibit 56), stating, in part:

1/ This was not Admiral Richardson's first letter on this subject. On 28 November 1940 he wrote Admiral Stark, in response to a letter from the latter concerning the security of the Fleet while operating in the Hawaiian area, and stated, "I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable." (Ex. 9, Cong. Inv. Pearl Harbor, Nov. 1945).

"3. There appears an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which can be laid and removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use, and which will give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes. The present Admiralty type net is designed to withstand torpedoes armed with cutters, and its appurtenances are very heavy. A lighter net which will stop a torpedo not armed with cutters would furnish some protection, especially against torpedoes which would explode on contact with metal net..

"4. Effort should be made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets and booms and their appurtenances without reducing their efficiency in order that they may be more readily handled. As a beginning, it is also suggested that plans be made to test sections of the old A/S net and of the new, as well as indicator nets, by attacking submarines. While such tests may duplicate British experiments, valuable lessons may be learned. It is requested that this Office be kept informed of development work and all tests and experiments conducted with nets and booms." (N.C.I. Exhibit 56)

(4) On 15 February 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote a letter, serial number 09330, to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, concerning the subject, "Anti-torpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks, Pearl Harbor", (N.C.I. Exhibit 49), in which he said:

"1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

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1/ A similar letter dated 17 February 1941 was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of various districts, including the 14th Naval District. (N.C.I. Exhibit 54).

"2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

- "(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.
- "(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching and leaving berths.
- "(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.
- "(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.
- "(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by shipping.
- "(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.
- "(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane attack from the land side most difficult.
- "(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can range their torpedoes.

- "(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages, and aircraft protection,
- "(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of the congestion.

"3. As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported range by the individual aviators of 400 to 1300 yards from the battleships, but the depths of water in which the torpedoes were launched were between 14 and 15 fathoms. The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire. The eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous balloon barrages, but there was no trawler borne balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.

"4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes. The main fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island protecting the main fleet anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid is approximately 17 fathoms. On the other hand constricted harbors, in which practically all available space is taken up by anchorages, and which is relatively deep probably must depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water, anti-torpedo baffles not practically surrounding a limited number of berths for large ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu; she is placed similarly as in a drydock, and evidently would have to open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very shallow.

"5. The present A/4 nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, their heavy anchors and moorings take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protected harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some such net can be developed in the near future.

"6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief are especially desired." (N.C.I. Exhibit 49)

(5) This letter was seen by Admiral Kimmel on 8 March 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 49; Hew. Exhibit 63). CINCUS routing sheet shows that it was also seen by the Chief of Staff (01) (then Captain now Vice Admiral W. W. Smith), the Operations officer (11) (then Captain now Rear Admiral W. S. DeLany), the Gunnery Officer (90) (the Commander W. A. Kitts, III), and the Aviation Officer (95) (then Commander A. C. Davis), (ibid). The Gunnery Officer made the notation:

"90/From considerations listed in letter it appears Pearl Harbor does not need nets. Kitts." (ibid)

while the Aviation Officer wrote:

"95/Concur with this letter. DeLany." (ibid)

At about the time the above letter was being noted by Admiral Kimmel and his staff, the copy of the companion letter of 17 February 1941 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the several



Commandants of the Naval Districts was also being circulated through Admiral Kimmel's staff. Admiral Kimmel saw this copy in 6 March 1941 (Hew. Exhibit 63). This was also seen and noted by the Chief of Staff (01) (then Captain now Vice Admiral W. W. Smith), the Operations Officer (11) (then Captain now Rear Admiral W. S. DeLany), the Assistant Operations Officers (12) and (13) (then Commander R. F. Good and then Lt. Commander H. L. Collins), by the War Plans Officer (16) (then Captain now Vice Admiral C. H. McMorris), by the Assistant War Plans Officer (17) (then Commander now Rear Admiral V. R. Murphy), by the Intelligence Officer (25) (then Lt. Commander now Captain E. T. Layton), by the Gunnery Officer (90) (then Commander W. A. Kitts, III) and by the Aviation Officer (95) (then Commander H. C. Davis), on this routing slip the Aviation Officer (95) wrote:

"95/Remember Taranto! I don't think Pearl Harbor need worry, however -- too shallow. 'D'"

(6) On 12 March 1941 Admiral Kimmel wrote the Chief of Naval Operations (Hew. Exhibit 63), in reply to the letter of 15 February, saying:

"In view of the contents of reference (a) the 15 February 1941 letter, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be shipped this area." (Hew. Exhibit 63).

(7) On 20 March 1941 Admiral Bloch, Commandant 14th Naval District, replied to the companion letter of 17 February 1941 that had been sent him by the Chief of Naval Operations (Hew. Exhibit 63), saying:

"1. In reply to reference (a) the following comment and recommendation on anti-torpedo baffles for vessels moored in Pearl Harbor is submitted.

(a) The depth of water in and alongside available berths in Pearl Harbor does not exceed forty-five (45) feet.

(b) There is limited maneuvering area in Pearl Harbor for vessels approaching and leaving berths which prevents the departure of a large group of vessels on short notice.

(c) Most of the available berths are located close aboard the main ship channels, which are crossed by cable and pipe lines as well as ferry routes. The installation of baffles for the fleet moorings would have to be so extensive that most of the entire channel area would be restricted.

2. Other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District have a water depth limitation similar to Pearl Harbor.

3. In view of the foregoing the Commandant does not recommend the installation of baffles for moorings in Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District."

(8) On 13 June 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a further letter, serial number 055730, to the Commandants of the various districts, including the Fourteenth Naval District, with copy of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, concerning

recent experience in dropping torpedoes from airplanes, and the use of anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, in which reference was made to the prior correspondence of 17 February 1941. Among other things he stated that no minimum depth of water could be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack. The letter (N.C.I. Exhibit 55; Hew. Exhibit 63) read:

"1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendation concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

"2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

"3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

"4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in the thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms." (N.C.I. Exhibit 55).

The copy of this letter of 13 June 1941 sent to CincPac, (Admiral Kimmel) was received by CincPac and filed. (Hew. Exhibit 63).

(9) Admiral Kimmel, may have had in mind the 13 June 1941 letter of the Chief of Naval Operations, (Hew. Exhibit 63) containing the reappraisal of the possibilities of air torpedo attack (supra, page 228), when, in his letter of 26 July 1941 to Admiral Stark (N.C.I. Exhibit 34), in asking for the highest priority in the production of new torpedo planes, he said:

"\*\*\*\*\*war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater Naval importance."  
(N. C. I. Exhibit 34).

(10) There was received on June 21, 1941, in the Navy Department, Washington, in the Registered Publications Section, two British periodical summaries entitled "CB 3053(1)" and "CB 3053(2)",

"Naval Aircraft." CB 3053 (1) consists of a periodical summary for the period ending 20 September 1940, and CB 3053(2) for the period ending 3 February 1941.

These booklets were retained in the Historical Library of the Registered Publications Section, Navy Department, from the date of their receipt until 21 July 1941. There is no indication in the files of the Registered Publications Section that either of them or copies of them were sent to the Pacific Fleet.<sup>1/</sup>

CB 3053(1) described the British aerial torpedo attacks at sea on the Scharnhorst, Strasbourg, and on light enemy forces. It also described British torpedo attacks on the Dunkerque, at Oran, the Richelieu, at Dakar, and on shipping in Tobruk.

In the attack on the Richelieu at Dakar in July 1940, the report stated that a "high speed (40-knot) torpedo setting was used, though the charted depth at the dropping position was only 7 fathoms." The report further stated that a document dated 13 July 1939, "clearly states that the low speed setting should be used for attacks in shallow water."

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<sup>1/</sup> The information concerning the attack at Taranto was, however, alluded to in the correspondence from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel (see supra page 230).



CB 3053(2) described British aerial torpedo attacks on shipping at Tobruk, in Augusta Harbor, in Bomba Roadstead, and on the Italian main fleet based at Taranto. It stated that in the attack at Taranto on 11 November 1940, torpedoes were dropped at distances of 400, 600, 700, 800, 1,000 and 1,300 yards from targets.

(11) There appears in the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, an intelligence report (NI 96 Serial No. 83-41), from the Naval Attache, Tokyo, dated 21 August, 1941, which outlines information given at a press interview by various Japanese Naval officer and published in the papers for propaganda purposes. In this interview, Rear Admiral Matsunaga, Japanese Navy, stated that "aerial torpedoes are far more effective than ordinary bombs as weapons of attack against a warship". Rear Admiral Matsunaga also said that the Naval Air Forces of every country were studying methods of discharging aerial torpedoes from high altitudes in order to overcome the customary sinking to the bottom of the torpedo when it strikes the water. Rear Admiral Matsunaga also stated that the Japanese Navy had been studying aerial torpedoes since 1941 and that it then was advancing for ahead of all other Nations in respect of aerial torpedo warfare.

(12) There appears in the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, an intelligence report, (NNI 96, Serial No. 570-41, monograph No. 1004-1000), from the Naval Attache at Ottawa, dated 5 September 1941,<sup>1/</sup> which outlines conversations had with flying officers who had been connected with aerial torpedo squadrons. A copy of this report was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, as indicated on the routing space on page one of the report.

This report describes the performance of two types of British torpedoes, the standard (old type) torpedo and the torraplane (new type) torpedo. It states that the old type was dropped usually from a height of 70 feet and that its angle of entry into the water was so controlled that it equalled 9° to the horizontal. The new type torpedo was stated to have been successfully dropped from heights of 7,000 feet and, the report stated:

"It is interesting to note that in dropping one of these Torraplanes at 180 knots, from 2,000 feet at a range of 2,000 yards the torpedo actually strikes the water only a few hundred feet from the target, making it more difficult for a ship to maneuver to avoid this type of attack.

"When making the low flying type of attack, it has been found better for the pilot not to turn away, after having released his torpedo, but to fly all-out directly over the top of the target. Apparently fewer hits are made on the attacking aircraft when this procedure is followed. Simultaneous attacks are often delivered from

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<sup>1/</sup> This report was not introduced as evidence in the several Navy investigations but was considered by the Secretary of the Navy in his action in the Pearl Harbor matter.

both sides, as a frequent method of defense has been to lay down what is known as a water barrage. This consists of the ship which is being attacked, firing everything that she can into the water about 1800 yards on either beam, forcing the low-flying attackers to fly through a curtain of shell splashes which frequently demolish the aircraft.

"Because of this and other difficulties encountered in low flying, the Torraplane has been developed, and now attacks can be carried out at altitude."

FLEET TRAINING POLICIES AND PRACTICES - FLEET EMPLOYMENT  
SCHEDULES FOR FALL OF 1941

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The Pacific Fleet policy of emphasizing training, which continued right up to the time of the Japanese attack, and the Fleet Employment Schedules for the fall of 1941, pursuant to which certain capital ship strength was scheduled to be in Pearl Harbor on 7 December, were fixed by Admiral Kimmel prior to his receiving the "war warning" message on 27 November. As is seen (infra pages 239-253), they were not changed materially after that event.

Fleet Training Policies and Practices

In his annual report to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 15 August 1941, covering the period 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 44), Admiral Kimmel stated his practices and policies in respect of Fleet training and the training of patrol aircraft, as follows:

As to Fleet training, it was stated that strategical training had been limited to studies by individual commands and special situations existing therein; that tactical training had been based on practical war requirements and instant transition from exercise to full war operational status; (id., page 3) and that the Fleet organization had been organized into three primary Task Forces as follows:

"Task Force ONE - Covering Force.

"6BB, 5 CL, 1 CV, 1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD.

"Task Force TWO - Reconnoitering and Raiding Force.

"3BB, 1 CV, 4 CA, 3 CL, 1 OCL, 1 CL, 8 DD

"Task Force THREE - Amphibious Force.

"8 CA, 1 CV, 2 DL, 16 DD, 5 SS, 5 DMS, 6 AP, 4 APD  
24 VP, Second Marine Division less defense battalions  
and advanced base detachments.

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The chronology being followed is departed from in this chapter, in order to tie in with events of this period.



It was further stated:

"Careful studies have been made of all available intelligence reports of foreign operations. Lessons learned therefore are being steadily incorporated into the doctrines and training of all Fleet components. (N.C.I. Exhibit 44, page 4).

With regard to the training of patrol aircraft, the report stated:

"(3) Patrol Aircraft:

"There has been an unavoidable trend toward lowering of the state of training of patrol squadrons during the year as a result of reduction of the average experience level with transfers of experienced personnel to meet the demands of the expansion and training programs. The rapid shift of squadrons to other commands, the formation of new squadrons, the high turn-over of personnel and the necessary concentration of effort on the basic training of fresh personnel have all contributed to this.

"Patrol squadrons are still functioning on the basis of single crews for flight and maintenance. Recently approved increased complements will eventually correct this deficiency and make it possible to obtain results more nearly approaching the potentialities of the planes.

"Action has been initiated to provide for the training of pilot and flight crew personnel in sufficient numbers to meet demands resulting both from increased complements and increased numbers of patrol plane squadrons. Pre-fleet, or transition, training for all concerned is mandatory and requires considerable time for each individual if the patrol squadrons are to be able to perform required Fleet missions. More important than any other feature of the program is the provision of the necessary enlisted personnel in time for adequate training prior to deliveries of the planes they must man.

"During the year, training and qualification of patrol plane commanders has been the major mission in Wings ONE, FOUR and SIX. Wing TWO has suffered less turn-over of personnel and consequently has been able to conduct its training more thoroughly, although a heavy patrol schedule in connection with the Fleet's presence in Hawaiian waters has caused some interference with the training program. Patrol wing ONE has conducted advance base operations from San Pedro. Advanced base operations have been conducted from Hilo, Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, French Frigate Shoals, Canton and Funafuti.



"Patrol Wing FOUR resumed operations in Alaskan waters commencing March 31, with Patrol Squadron Forty-one basing at Sitka. Advanced base operations were conducted at San Diego, Tongue Point, San Francisco and Kodiak. Patrol Squadron Forty-Three transferred P2Y airplanes to Pensacola, with stops at Magdalena Bay, Acapulco, Carmen and Corpus Christi.

"With the delivery of P2Y models to training activities at Pensacola via Mexico (Acapulco to Carmen), deliveries of new models and transfer of PBY models are currently being made in flights overland across the southwestern states." (N.C.I. Exhibit 44, pages 16-17).


With reference to the status of the Fleet in respect of damage control, Admiral Kimmel, in his annual report, said:

"(c) DAMAGE CONTROL.

"The merits attained in Damage Control Practices held during the year were not high. This is believed due to a recognition of the necessity for realism, and the general tautening which resulted. Casualties listed in intelligence reports have been studied and solutions worked out. Exercises in shoring have been stressed; also in effecting repairs to carrier flight decks. Security measures dictated the curtailing of the underway portions of the practices toward the latter part of the year. In the older ships, inadequate ventilation when operating for extended periods under required conditions, adversely affects the efficiency of the personnel. Action has been initiated to correct this." (N.C.I. Exhibit 44).

The annual report of 15 August 1941, also referred to "Joint Army and Navy Exercises", and stated that during the period 14 to 26 May 1941, Units of the Pacific Fleet, Fourteenth Naval District, and all echelons of the Hawaiian Department participated in joint exercises, which involved offense by Fleet forces. Specific operations carried out by Fleet units were:

"Air attacks; submarine attacks, including entrance to harbors; mining; bombardment; offensive blocking of channels; and landings, including simulated demolition of installations and capture of outlying airfields. The fleet forces employed in these exercises were Aircraft Carriers, 9 Cruisers, 13 Destroyers, 4 Minelayers, 5 Submarines, 4 Auxiliaries (simulating transports), and a Marine Air Group." (N.C.I. Exhibit 44, page 18).



The Fleet Employment Schedules -- Fall of 1941

(a) It has been pointed out (supra, page 70) that Admiral Kimmel directed, by Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated 31 October 1941 (see supra, page 67), that the current Fleet Employment Schedules should be adhered to, or revisions submitted for approval, as follows:

(1) Current employment schedules were to remain in effect as to Task Forces, One, Two and Three (see supra, pages 67-68)<sup>1/</sup> except as to units transferred to Task Forces Seven and Nine (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 4).

(2) Commanders of Task Forces Seven and Nine were directed to "submit revised schedules for the period 15 November to 31 December 1941, at the earliest practicable date," including "in their schedules joint arrangements for exercises between patrol planes and submarines in recognition signals, visual and radio communications, and coordinated tactics" (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 4).

(3) The Commanders of Task Forces Seven and Nine were also directed as follows: (i) "For the present required intertype training of submarines and patrol planes with

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<sup>1/</sup> "Assignments to Task Force Fifteen will be indicated in the Task Force One, Two and Three Schedules" (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 4).

surface types will be limited to the Fleet Tactical periods listed in reference (b)" [Cincpac Conf. Ltr. A4-3 FF12(13) Serial 02154 of 13 August 1941]; and (ii), "if practicable, have at least two divisions of submarines and two squadrons of patrol planes available for each of these Fleet Tactical periods;" and (iii) "arrange for intertype training in addition to that required during Fleet Tactical periods by mutual agreement with Commanders of Task Forces One, Two, and Three during the regular at sea operation periods of the surface Task Forces" (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, pages 1, 4).

(b) Admiral Kimmel as Commander in Chief, by confidential letter dated 13 August 1941, addressed to the Fleet Commanders, had directed that there be prepared and submitted for approval, employment schedules for the Fleet during the second quarter of the fiscal year 1942. (Har. page 179; Har. Ex. 25).<sup>1/</sup> In this letter Admiral Kimmel indicated the division of the Pacific Fleet into Task Forces for purposes of training and operations, and directed that the proposed employment schedules conform to requirements as follows:

1/ The subject of this letter was "Employment Schedules; U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942," and it stated that there was an enclosure "(under separate cover)," referred to as Enclosure A, being a "copy of subject schedule" which had been "approved by the Chief of Naval Operations." (Har. Exhibit 25, page 1). The document referred to as Enclosure A is not attached to the exhibit in evidence and it was testified by the witness who produced the exhibit that when it was withdrawn from the files Enclosure A was missing (Har. pages 179-180).

(1) The division of the Fleet directed by Admiral Kimmel was into Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE, Base Force, and Naval Transportation Service. Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE, were indicated to have substantially the same composition as was subsequently set forth in Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated 31 October 1941 (see supra pages 67-69). (Har. Exhibit 25, pages 2-3).

(2) "One Task Force will be at sea at all times. When Task Forces enter and leave Pearl Harbor the same day, the departing force will clear before the entry of the other force commences." (Har. Exhibit 25, page 3)<sup>1/</sup>

(3) The periods assigned for Fleet tactics were:

Task Forces TWO and THREE - 23-26 October

Task Forces ONE and THREE - 22-25 November

Task Forces ONE and TWO - 18-20 December

(4) The Operating (at sea) and Up Keep (in port at Pearl Harbor) periods for Task Forces ONE, TWO and THREE, were to conform to the following schedule:

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<sup>1/</sup> Admiral Kimmel, as Commander in Chief, by confidential letter dated 10 November 1941, directed that the Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders prepare and submit employment schedules for the third quarter, fiscal year 1942 (Har. page 180; Har. Exhibit 26). The period of time to be covered by these Fleet Employment Schedules began 1 January 1942 and ended 30 March 1942 (Har. Exhibit 26, Enclosure A).



	<u>Task Force ONE</u>	<u>TWO</u>	<u>THREE</u>
At Sea:	10-18 Oct.; 1-10 Nov.; 22-28 Nov.*; 13-20 Dec.; 31 Dec.	24 Sept.-2 Oct.; 18-26 Oct.; 10-17 Nov.; 28 Nov.-5 Dec.*; 18-26 Dec.	2-10 Oct.; 23 Oct.-1 Nov.; 17-25 Nov.; 5-13 Dec.*; 26-31 Dec.
Upkeep:(In Port)	28 Sept.-9 Oct.; 19-31 Oct.; 11-21 Nov.; 29 Nov.-12 Dec.*; 21-30 Dec.	3-17 Oct.; 27 Oct.-9 Nov.; 18-27 Nov. 6-17 Dec.*; 27 Dec.	20 Sept.-1 Oct.; 11-22 Oct.; 2-16 Nov.; 26 Nov.-4 Dec.*; 14-25 Dec.

(Har. Ex. 25, page

(c) In his annual report to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 15 August 1941, covering the period 1 July 1940, to 30 June 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 44), Admiral Kimmel stated his policy in respect of Fleet Employment, as follows:

"(a) Policy regarding Fleet Employment.

"Caused by developments in the international situation, drastic changes have been made in Fleet employment during the fiscal year, 1941. Schedules were initially based on administrative organization and type controlled training, with certain periods set aside for the development of inter-type coordination and Fleet exercises. Under this system, ships averaged four operating weeks (of four or five days underway with week-ends in port for inspections and recreation) to two weeks in upkeep. With increasing necessity for basic war training and security measures in Fleet operating areas, transition to a Task Force operational program was effected. Two Task Forces were employed at first, each at sea and in port alternate weeks. This arrangement proved impracticable because of large fuel expenditures and loss of extended upkeep periods essential to material maintenance. With the organization of the Pacific Fleet, a three Task Force assignment was adopted to insure necessary coordinated Task Force training for war, to provide for instant transition to full war

\* Indicates subsequent critical period.

operational status, to conserve fuel, and permit most efficient use of repair ship upkeep facilities. Under this re-assignment, Task Forces average eight days at sea to thirteen in port. Of each underway period about five days are devoted to gunnery exercises and type training, three days to Task Force exercises. The time allocation to various activities under the current three Task Force system is satisfactory." (N.C.I. Exhibit 44, page 3).

(d) In pursuance of the directive of 13 August 1941 of Admiral Kimmel (Har. Exhibit 25, supra, page 240), Employment Schedules were submitted by the Commanders of Task Force ONE <sup>1/</sup> (Har. page 181; Har. Exhibit 27), Task Force TWO <sup>2/</sup> (Har. page 181; Har. Exhibit 28), and Task Force THREE <sup>3/</sup> (Har. page 181; Exhibit 29-Har.), U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, ON 13 September 1941, 12 September 1941, and 11 September 1941, respectively, covering the second quarter, 1942. This was the period from 1 October to 31 December 1941.

(1) The General Directive in the schedules of Task Forces ONE and TWO for the entire period was:  
"Fleet Tactics - Intertype Tactics - Gunnery - Miscellaneous Underway - Upkeep - Tender Upkeep - Material Inspections"  
(Har. Exhibit 27, page 1; Har. Exhibit 28, page 1).

The general directive in the schedule of Task Force THREE was substantially the same (Har. Exhibit 29, second sheet).

-----c-  
<sup>1/</sup> Vice Admiral W. S. Pye.

<sup>2/</sup> Vice Admiral William F. Halsey.

<sup>3/</sup> Vice Admiral Wilson Brown.

(2) The details of the Employment Schedules for Task Force ONE for the period from the latter part of November to 7 December 1941, were, in part, as follows:

(i) Batdiv 4:

WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48) - "Navy Yard, Puget Sound." <sup>1/</sup>  
COLORADO (BB 45) - 23-29 November, enroute Hawaiian area; 30 November - 12 December, "upkeep Pearl."\* <sup>2/</sup>  
MARYLAND (BB 46) - 29 November - 12 December, "upkeep Pearl."\*

(ii) Batdiv 2:

TENNESSEE (BB 43) - 29 November - 12 December, "upkeep Pearl" and "AMI-DCP."\*<sup>3/</sup>  
CALIFORNIA (BB 44) - 29 November - 12 December, "upkeep Pearl", "assist TENNESSEE" and "AMI-DCP."\*  
PENNSYLVANIA (BB 38) - 29 November - 12 December, "upkeep Pearl."\* (Har. Exhibit 27, page 1)

(iii) Crudiv 9:

HONOLULU (CL 48) :  
PHOENIX (CL 46) :  
BOISE (CL 47) : 29 November - 12 December,  
HELENA (CL 50) : "upkeep Pearl"\* (Har. Exhibit  
ST. LOUIS (CL 49) : 27, pages 2-3)  
RICHMOND (CL 9), :  
plus RALEIGH (CL 7) :

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<sup>1/</sup>-<sup>2/</sup>- & <sup>3/</sup>- see following page.

\* Indicates subsequent critical period.

(iv) Destroyer Squadron 1 (Desron 1) consisting of Destroyer Divisions 1 and 2 (Desdivs 1 and 2):

Desdiv 1:

PHELPS (DD 360) †  
†  
BEWEY (DD 349) † 29 November - 6 December,\*  
† "upkeep [tender] WHITNEY;"  
MACDONOUGH (DD 351) † from 7 - 12 December,\*  
† "buoy upkeep."  
WORDEN (DD 352) †  
†  
and HULL (DD 350) †  
†

Desdiv 2:

AYLWIN (DD 355) †  
†  
FARRAGUT (DD 348) † 29 November - 12 December,\*  
† "buoy upkeep," etc.  
†  
DALE (DD 353) †  
†  
MONAGHAN (DD 354) †  
(Har. Exhibit 27, page 3)

(v) Destroyer Squadron 3 (Desron 3) consisting of Destroyer Division 5 and 6 (Desdivs 5 and 6):

- 
- 1/ Contrary to this schedule, the WEST VIRGINIA was at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and was sunk by the Japanese. (Infra. 401).
  - 2/ Contrary to this schedule, the COLORADO was not at Pearl Harbor, but in the West Coast on 7 December, and it was of course, not attacked.
  - 3/ AMI-DCP indicates - Annual Material Inspection and Damage Control Practice.

\* Indicates subsequent critical period.

Desdiv 5:

CLARKE (DD 361) - 29 November - 12 December,\*  
"buoy unkeep;"  
|  
CASSIN (DD 372) |  
|  
CONYNGHAM (DD 371) † 29 November - 4 December,\*  
| "unkeep /\_tender\_/DOBBIN:"  
REID (DD 369) † 5 December - 12 December,\*  
| "unkeep buoys."  
and DOWNES (DD 375) |

Desdiv 6:

CASE (DD 370) |  
|  
CUMMINGS (DD 365) † 29 November - 12 December,\*  
| "buoy unkeep."  
|  
SHAW (DD 373) |  
|  
and TUCKER (DD 374) |  
(Har. Exhibit 27, page 3) |

(vi) Aircraft:

SARATOGA (CV 3) - 2 - 12 December, "enroute  
from Navy Yard Puget Sound  
to Pearl, via San Diego."\*  
(Har. Exhibit 27, page 4)

(vii) Patrol Planes:

VP-22, VP-23, and VP-24<sup>1/</sup> - 29 November to 12 December.  
"expansion training."  
(Har. Exhibit 27, page 4)

(3) The details of the Employment Schedules for Task  
Force TWO for the period from the latter part of  
November to 7 December were, in part, as follows:

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<sup>1/</sup> VP indicates a patrol squadron. Patrol squadrons 22, 23 and 24 were  
a part of Patrol wing Two (see infra, page 250).

\* Indicates subsequent critical period.



(i) Batdiv ONE:

ARIZONA (BB 39) - 18 - 27 November, upkeep Pearl; 6-17 Dec.; \*upkeep Pearl;

OKLAHOMA (BB 37) - 29 - 30 November, intertype tactics;  
30 November - 5 December, train and fire, etc.\*  
6 December - 17 December, upkeep Pearl. \*

(Har. Exhibit 28, page 1)

(ii) ENTERPRISE (CV 6): - 18 - 27 November, upkeep Pearl;

29-30 November, intertype tactics;

30 November - 5 December, \* train and fire, etc.;

6 - 17 December, upkeep Pearl.\* <sup>2/</sup>

(Har. Exhibit 28, page 1)

(iii) Crudiv Five:

NORTHHAMPTON (CA 26) † 18-27 November, upkeep Pearl;  
† 28-29 November, intertype tactics;

SALT LAKE CITY (CA 25) † 30 November - 5 December,  
† gunnery;

PENSACOLA (CA 24) † 6 - 17 December,  
† upkeep Pearl.

CHESTER (CA 27) †

(Har. Exhibit 28, page 2)

(4) Task Force THREE (Har. Exhibit 29):

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It happened that the ENTERPRISE was not in Pearl Harbor on 7 December, but was a part of the force at sea employed in reenforcing Wake. (see infra, pages 451-2)

Indicates subsequent critical period.

(i) Crudiv Four:

CHICAGO, (CA 29)	:	
LOUISVILLE (CA 28)	:	General Directive:
PORTLAND (CA 33)	:	17-21 November, gunnery;
INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35)	:	22-25 November, Fleet tactics;

(ii) Crudiv Six:

MINNEAPOLIS (CA 36)	:	
ASTORIA (CA 34)	:	26 November - 4 December, upkeep;
NEW ORLEANS (CA 32)	:	5-7 December, intertype tactics.
SAN FRANCISCO (CA 36)	:	
(Har. Exhibit 29, sheet 2)	:	

(iii) LEXINGTON (CV 2) - 26 November - 4 December,  
upkeep; \*  
5-7 December, intertype  
tactics.\* 1/ (Har. Ex.29, sheet

(e) The Revised Employment Schedule of Task Force NINE (the Fleet Air Patrol Wing) for the "Remainder of Second Quarter, Fiscal Year, 1942," which Admiral Kimmel on 31 October 1941 had directed to be submitted (see supra pages 70, 239; N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 4), was submitted by Rear Admiral Bellinger by letter to Admiral Kimmel on 19 November 1941, and approved by the latter by dispatch on 22 November 1941 (Hew. Exhibit 37).

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1/ It happened that on 7 December, the LEXINGTON was at sea engaged in the reenforcing of Midway. (see infra, page 430).

\* Indicates subsequent critical period.

There was also issued by Rear Admiral Bellinger, ComPatWing TWO, to the Patrol Squadrons Commanders, on 25 November 1941, a Watch and Duty Schedule for the period 1 December 1941 to 1 January 1942 (Hew, Exhibit 54), which was in accordance with the Revised Schedules of Employment.

Under the Revised Schedules, the patrol wings of Task Force NINE were given the "General Directive" to pursue "Expansion training tactics, Patrols, Indoctrination, Advanced Base Operations," and the several squadrons were to be employed as follows:

(1) Patrol Wing One:

(i) Patrol Squadron 11 (VP 11):

17 November - 30 November, Expansion Training. <sup>1/</sup>  
1 December - 5 December, Wing Tactics.\*  
6 December - 12 December, Expansion Training and  
patrol plane-submarine intertype tactics.\*  
(Hew. Exhibit 37, sheet 5).

(ii) Patrol Squadron 12 (VP 12):

17 November - 21 November, Expansion Training.  
22 November - 25 November, Fleet Tactics.  
26 November - 30 November, Expansion Training.\*  
1 December - 6 December, Wing Tactics. \*  
6 December - 12 December, Expansion Training and  
patrol plane-submarine intertype tactics.\*  
(ibid).

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<sup>1/</sup> "Expansion Training will be conducted in conjunction with other missions whenever practicable. Expansion training includes type tactics, gunnery, communications, advanced flight instructions, Pilot qualifications, Flight crew indoctrination, Recognition Foreign Ships and Aircraft, etc." (Hew. Ex. 37, sheet 5).

\* Indicates subsequent critical period.

(iii) Patrol Squadron 14 (VP 14):

17 November - 21 November, Re-equipment, San Diego.  
21 November - 22 November, Enroute Pearl.  
23 November - 30 November, Expansion Training.\*  
1 December - 6 December, Wing Tactics.\*  
6 December - 12 December, Expansion Training and  
patrol plane-submarine intertype tactics.\*  
(ibid)

(2) Patrol Wing TWO:

(i) Patrol Squadron 21 (VP 21):

17 November - 5 December, Expansion Training.\*  
6 December - 31 December, Advance Base Operations  
assigned to Task Group 9.1\* (ibid).

(ii) Patrol Squadron 22 (VP 22):

17 November - 5 December, Advanced Base Operations  
assigned to Task Group 9.1\*  
6 December - 12 December, Expansion Training and  
patrol plane-submarine intertype tactics.\* (ibid)

(iii) Patrol Squadron 23 (VP 23):

17 November - 21 November, Re-equipment, San Diego.  
21 November - 22 November, Enroute Pearl.  
23 November - 30 November, Expansion Training. \*  
1 December - 6 December, Wing Tactics. \*  
6 December - 12 December, Expansion Training and  
patrol plane-submarine intertype tactics\* (ibid).

(iv) Patrol Squadron 24 (VP 24):

17 November - 19 November, Advanced Base Operations.  
20 November - 30 November, Expansion Training.\*  
1 December - 5 December, Wing Tactics. \*  
6 December - 12 December, Expansion Training and  
patrol plane-submarine intertype tactics.\* (ibid)

(3) The Watch and Duty Schedules of the Patrol Squadrons  
of Patrol Wings ONE and TWO (Patrol Squadrons 11, 12, 14, 22, 23,  
24) for the period 1 December 1941 to 1 January 1942, issued 25

Indicates subsequent critical period.

November 1941 by direction of Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander of Patrol Wing TWO (see supra, pages 60, 61), to Patrol Squadron Commanders,<sup>1/</sup> outlined the daily tasks of the several patrol squadrons (Hew. page 496; Hew Exhibit 54).

These included, for the first seven days of December:

(i) Patrol Squadron 11 (PatRon 11):

- 1 December, Bomb loading drill and Kaneohe ready duty division.
- 2 - 3 December, Wing Tactics.
- 4 December, Kaneohe ready duty division.
- 5 December, Dawn Patrol. 2/
- 6 December, Secured.
- 7 December, Tactics with submarines and Kaneohe ready duty division (Hew. Exhibit 54, sheet 2).

(ii) Patrol Squadron 12 (PatRon 12):

- 1 December, Bomb loading drill.
- 2 December, Wing Tactics and Kaneohe ready duty division.
- 3 December, Dawn Patrol.
- 4 December, Wing Tactics.
- 5 December, Wing Tactics and Kaneohe ready duty division.
- 6 - 7 December, Secured. (Hew. Exhibit 54, sheet 2)

(iii) Patrol Squadron 14 (PatRon 14):

- 1 December, Bomb loading drill.
- 2 December, Wing Tactics.

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1/ Copies were forwarded to ComPatWing ONE and ComPatRon 21 (Hew.Ex.54).

2/ Rear Admiral Bellinger explained that the dawn patrol duty consisted of a patrol of the Fleet operating areas only (Hew. pages 496, 497). The Watch and Duty Schedule stated, with reference to the Dawn Patrol, that the "division making dawn patrol secures upon completion, other divisions normal duty 0700-1300 except Saturday and Sunday." (Hew. Exhibit 54, sheet 2).



- 3 December, Kaneohe ready duty division.
  - 4 - 5 December, Wing Tactics.
  - 6 December, Tactics with sub-marines and Kaneohe ready duty division.
  - 7 December, Dawn Patrol (ibid).
- (iv) Patrol Squadron 22(1) (PatRon 22(1st Division)):
- 1 - 5 December, Regular working hours.
  - 6 - 7 December, Secured (ibid).
- (v) Patrol Squadron 22(2) (PatRon 22(2nd Division)):
- 1 - 5 December, Regular working hours.
  - 6 - 7 December, Secured (ibid).
- (vi) Patrol Squadron 23(1) (PatRon 23(1st Division)):
- 1 December, Dawn Patrol
  - 2 December, Wing Tactics and Pearl Harbor ready duty division.
  - 3 - 4 December, Wing Tactics.
  - 5 December, Wing Tactics and Pearl Harbor ready duty division.
  - 6 December, Dawn Patrol.
  - 7 December, Secured (ibid).
- (vii) Patrol Squadron 23(2) (PatRon 23 (2nd Division)):
- 1 December, Bomb loading drill.
  - 2 December, Wing Tactics.
  - 3 December, Pearl Harbor ready duty division.
  - 4 December, Dawn Patrol.
  - 5 December, Wing Tactics.
  - 6 December, Tactics with sub-marines and Pearl Harbor ready duty division.
  - 7 December, Secured (ibid).
- (viii) Patrol Squadron 24 (PatRon 24):
- 1 December, Bomb loading drill and Pearl Harbor ready duty division.
  - 2 December, Dawn Patrol.
  - 3 December, Wing Tactics.
  - 4 December, Pearl Harbor ready duty division.
  - 5 December, Wing Tactics.
  - 6 December, Secured.
  - 7 December, Tactics with sub-marines and Pearl Harbor ready duty division (ibid).

(4) Rear Admiral Bellinger stated as illustrative of the schedules for the patrol aircraft that the Revised Employment Schedule of the Patrol Squadrons of Patrol Wings ONE and TWO for 7 December 1941, were as follows:

"On December 7th, Patrol Squadron 22, first division, was secured; Patrol Squadron 22, second division, secured; Patrol Squadron 23, first division, secured; Patrol Squadron 23, second division, secured; Patrol Squadron 11, tactics with sub-marines and Kaneohe ready duty division; Patrol Squadron 24, tactics with sub-marines and Pearl Harbor ready duty division; Patrol Squadron 12, secured; Patrol Squadron 14, dawn patrol; division making dawn patrol secured upon completion, other division normal duty, 7 to 1300 except Saturdays and Sundays. Not listed in the above squadrons was Patrol Squadron 21, which was on advance base duty at Midway. Patrol Squadron 22 had returned from Midway on 5 December after a tour of duty at Midway and Wake since 17 October. This squadron had had strenuous duty at those bases and was in a state of rehabilitation and maintenance."

(Hew. page 497)

INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON  
 SENT AND NOT SENT TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL  
 PRIOR TO 15 OCTOBER 1941 -- COMBAT AND  
 OTHER INTELLIGENCE OTHERWISE AVAILABLE  
TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL UP TO 15 OCTOBER 1941

(a) Intelligence Concerning Japanese Diplomatic and Espionage Moves Available in Washington and Not Sent as Such to Admiral Kimmel. 1/

There was available in Washington, by means of intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic between Honolulu, Tokyo and Washington, information that reports were being made by Japanese espionage sources to Tokyo concerning ships present in Pearl Harbor and in some instances their berthing plan. Information of this type was available in Washington for at least eleven months prior to 7 December 1941.

It does not appear from the evidence adduced thus far, that these messages as such, were forwarded from Washington to Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Kimmel in his prepared statement and testimony made much of this point, and stated that he did not know of the Japanese interest in the specific location in Pearl Harbor of U.S. Fleet units; he characterized this as a "withholding from him of information." 2/

It is to be noted that it is a common naval practice, followed by the United States Navy to the knowledge of responsible naval officers

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1/ It is to be noted that Washington did send by dispatches to Admiral Kimmel during this period some summaries of the Japanese diplomatic intercepts (see, e.g. infra pages 274, 275-276, 277, 278-279).

2/ Prepared statement before Naval Court of Inquiry, page 44.

(The next two pages are 254A and 254B)

and reflected in the many dispatches regarding Japanese ship movements herein referred to, to gather information as to the ship movements of other nations. This was the principal function of all combat intelligence; and such was supplied in volume to Admiral Kimmel (infra). It is, of course, obvious that the more particularized that information is, especially as to anchorages and berthing, the more valuable and important it is. It is also to be noted that information concerning Japanese espionage concerning our ships was being obtained in Washington prior to Admiral Kimmel's assumption of command of the Pacific Fleet on 1 February 1941, and prior to the time of Admiral Kimmel's visits to Washington in June 1941 and October 1941. Admiral Kimmel in his prepared statement said that he was "aware of testimony that Japanese curiosity as to the movements of the Fleet to and from Pearl Harbor and other places had been common in the past". 1/

The first of the Japanese messages dealing with the location of U.S. ships to be intercepted during 1941 was dated 6 January 1941. It was intercepted by the Navy on 10 January 1941, and was sent from Honolulu (Okuda) to Tokyo (Gaimudaijiu). It reported that vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on 5 January 1941 were "Five battleships (New Mexico, Mississippi, and probably the Idaho as well as two of the Texas class)," five heavy cruisers, nine light cruisers, 37 destroyers, five destroyer tenders, and two patrol boats. One vessel reported outside the harbor was said to be either a battleship or a cruiser.

The interception of Japanese espionage reports of this type was common. The following is a resume of intercepted reports containing

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1/ Prepared statement before Naval Court of Inquiry, page 45.

similar information sent out by the Japanese during January 1941:

<u>Interception Date</u>	<u>Message Date</u>	<u>Origin of Message</u>	<u>Report on Ships Present At</u>
1-10-41	1-3-41	Seattle	Bremerton
1-9-41	1-6-41	Los Angeles	San Pedro
1-10-41	1-6-41	Honolulu	Pearl Harbor
1-9-41	1-6-41	Panama	Balboa
1-11-41	1-6-41	San Francisco	Mare Island
1-25-41	1-6-41	Seattle	Puget Sound
1-10-41	1-7-41	Honolulu	Pearl Harbor
1-10-41	1-8-41	Seattle	Bremerton
1-25-41	1-9-41	Honolulu	Pearl Harbor
1-17-41	1-13-41	Los Angeles	San Pedro
1-17-41	1-14-41	Seattle	Anchorage, Alaska Bremerton
1-31-41	1-16-41	Honolulu	Pearl Harbor
1-30-41	1-18-41	Havana	Guantanamo
1-29-41	1-21-41	Seattle	Bremerton
1-30-41	1-21-41	Los Angeles	San Pedro San Diego
1-30-41	1-21-41	Honolulu	Pearl Harbor
1-30-41	1-22-41	Panama	Balboa
1-31-41	1-22-41	Los Angeles	San Pedro
1-31-41	1-24-41	Seattle	Bremerton Seattle
1-31-41	1-25-41	Seattle	Bremerton
1-31-41	1-27-41	Los Angeles	San Pedro
2-6-41	1-28-41	Honolulu (SecNav folder of intercepts). 1/	Pearl Harbor

1/ All references "SecNav folder of Intercepts", "SecNav Box of Despatches", or similar collections, were recently assembled in connection with the writing of this Report.



Some of the Japanese ship movements and diplomatic intercepts prior to 15 October 1941 were: 1/

(1) On April 5, 1941 the Navy translated a dispatch from Honolulu (Okuda) to Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) dated 10 March 1941 reading:

\*Vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on (9th) were the following:

Four battleships (two of the NEW MEXICO class, and two of the PENNSYLVANIA class.)

Five heavy cruisers (two of the \_\_\_\_\_ class, one of the \_\_\_\_\_ class, and two of the \_\_\_\_\_ class.)

Six light cruisers (four of the \_\_\_\_\_ class, and two of the OMAHA class.)

Yorktown.

25 destroyers (-----).

Two destroyer tenders.

Several submarines.

One submarine tender.

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1/ Later intercepts of this character for the period 16 October - 26 November 1941 are referred to infra pages 328-348.

Several transports.

Mailed to Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle.'

(2) On July 29, 1941 the Navy translated a despatch from Washington to Tokyo dated 25 July 1941, reading:

"Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U.S.-Japanese relations coincide with mine; he once told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be mutual exhaustion.

"Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of excellent character and qualifications.

"To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.

"Please relay this information to the Navy." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63).

(3) On October 9, 1941, the Army translated a despatch from Tokyo (Toyoda) to Honolulu, dated 24 September 1941, reading:

"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five-sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communicating  
water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)" (Hew. Exhibit 13, Document 2).

(4) On October 10, 1941, the Navy translated a despatch from Honolulu (Kita) to Washington dated 29 September 1941, reading:

"The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels:

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (the repair basin referred to in my message to Washington #48\*\*):KS.
2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (the Ten Ten Pier):KT.
3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island:FV.
4. Alongside in Fort Island:FG. (East and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.)

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco." (Hew. Exhibit 13, Document 3).

(b) Information Concerning General International and Far Eastern Situation Sent Kimmel -- Exchanges of Correspondence and Despatches.

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During the period prior to 15 October 1941, considerable intelligence and information concerning the Far Eastern situation was sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Chief of Naval Operations. Included were the following:

(1) On 21 January 1941 Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations <sup>1/</sup> released a despatch (212155) <sup>2/</sup> to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral J. O. Richardson, and to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, (N.C.I. Exhibit 76), in which he said:

"THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE X IT NOW APPEARS TO ME THAT IF WAR EVENTUATES ITS GENERAL CHARACTER WILL BE ACCORDING TO PLAN DOG MY MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY X IF THIS ESTIMATE PROVES CORRECT I CONTEMPLATE ORDERING MOBILIZATION ACCORDING TO PLAN RAINBOW THREE WITH FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS ATLANTIC FLEET PRINCIPAL CONCENTRATION NEW ENGLAND AND CANADA EXECUTE ALL TASKS EXCEPT AFIRM EXCEPT EARLY REENFORCEMENT FROM PACIFIC AND MUCH STRONGER BRITISH ISLES DETACHMENT X PACIFIC FLEET WAITING ATTITUDE OR EXECUTE ASSIGNED TASKS IN AREA EASTWARD OF 160 DEGREES EAST DEPENDING ON ACTION BY JAPAN X ASIATIC FLEET CAN NOT EXPECT EARLY REENFORCEMENT ALERT STATUS OR CARRY OUT TASKS ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES" (N.C.I. Exhibit 76).

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<sup>1/</sup> See letter of Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson, dated 20 May 1940 (N.C.I. Exhibit 26). (Supra, page 151 ).

<sup>2/</sup> The numbers in parenthesis following references to despatches are the date time group, i.e. this message was sent on the 21st of the month at 2155 hours or at 9:55 p.m.

(2) On 1 February 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet (N.C.I. Exhibit 67), subject, "Rumored Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor", which read in full as follows:

"1. The following is forwarded for your information. Under date of 27 January the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed the State Department to the following effect:

'X THE PERUVIAN MINISTER HAS INFORMED A MEMBER OF MY STAFF THAT HE HAS HEARD FROM MANY SOURCES, INCLUDING A JAPANESE SOURCE, THAT IN THE EVENT OF TROUBLE BREAKING OUT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, THE JAPANESE INTEND TO MAKE A SURPRISE ATTACK AGAINST PEARL HARBOR WITH ALL OF THEIR STRENGTH AND EMPLOYING ALL OF THEIR EQUIPMENT. THE PERUVIAN MINISTER CONSIDERED THE RUMORS FANTASTIC. NEVERTHELESS HE CONSIDERED THEM OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE TO CONVEY THIS INFORMATION TO A MEMBER OF MY STAFF. X"

"2. The Division of Naval Intelligences places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese Naval and Army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future." (N.C.I. Exhibit 67).

(3) In February 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch (032300) for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, consisting of information obtained from London, reading:

"OFFICIALLY INFORMED ORGANGE APPARENTLY PLANNING LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVE PRESUMED AGAINST INDO CHINA MALAY PENINSULA OR DUTCH EAST INDIES POSSIBLY TO BE COORDINATED WITH ATTACK ON ENGLAND ABOUT TEN FEB X DEFINITE THAT NAZI JAP RELATIONS BECOMING MOST INTIMATE AND ORGANGE CONDUCTING HATRED CAMPAIGN AGAINST BRITISH EVEN IN ORDINARILY PRO BRITISH PRESS ALSO TWO LARGE JAP MERCHANT SHIP SAILINGS CANCELLED X BELIEVED RELIABLE REPORT ALL SHIPPING BEING CALLED HOME TO BE TAKEN OVER BY



GOVERNMENT REQUEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE THIS X JAPS MEDIATING  
THAI INDO CHINA SCENE MEETINGS IN ORANGE CRUISER PRICE

OF UMPIRES SERVICES UNRELIABLE SAID TO BE BASES ON WEST  
COAST SIAM X USABLE BY LIGHT CRAFT FOR CUTTING SINGAPORE

COMMUNICATIONS VIA MALACCA STRAITS XX (Hew. Exhibit 70  
Document 115).

(4) On 10 February 1941 Admiral Stark wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel concerning propositions to involve the Navy on two fronts and of sending a Fleet detachment to the Far East, saying, in part:

"I continue in every way I possibly can to fight commitments or dispositions that would involve us on two fronts and to keep from sending more combatant ships to the Far East. I had a two hour struggle (please keep this absolutely secret) in the White House this past week and thank God can report that the President still supports my contentions. You may be amused to know that the Secretary of War, Colonel Stimson, has been of very great assistance to me in this connection in recent conference. Mr. Hull never lets go in the contrary view and having fought it so many times I confess to having used a little more vehemence and a little stronger language than was becoming in fighting it out this last week for the nth time. Present were the President, Stimson, Knox, Marshall and myself. I mention this just to show you that the fight is always on and that some day I might get upset. But thank God, to date at least, the President has and continues to see it my way." (N.C.I. Exhibit 29)

Stark told Admiral Kimmel of the struggle to obtain more personnel for the Navy, and of finally obtaining the President's permission to go to the Capitol in the matter. He said:

"I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possibly could, the President just has his own ideas about men. I usually finally get my way but the cost of effort is very great and of course worth it. I feel that I could go on the Hill this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from the White House. As a matter of fact what we now have, was obtained by my finally asking the President's permission

to go on the Hill and state our needs as I saw them at that time and his reply was "go ahead, I won't veto anything they agree to" However, the struggle is starting all over again and just remember we are going the limit, but I cannot guarantee the outcome." (N.C.I. Exhibit 29).

In a postscript to this letter of 10 February 1941, Admiral Stark discussed a further White House conversation concerning the proposition of sending a Fleet detachment to the Philippines and the Far East, saying:

"First, I had another hour and a half in the White House today and the President said that he might order a detachment of three or four cruisers, a carrier and a squadron of destroyers to make a cruise to the Philippines; perhaps going down through the Phoenix and Gilbert or the Fiji Islands, then reaching over into Mindanao for a short visit and on to Manila and back.

"I have fought this over many times and won, but this time the decision may go against me. Heretofore the talk was largely about sending a cruise of this sort to Australia and Singapore and perhaps the N.E.I. Sending it to the Philippines would be far less objectionable from a political standpoint but still objectionable. What I want you to do is to be thinking about it and be prepared to make a quick decision if it is ordered." (N.C.I. Exhibit 29, Postscript).

(5) On 18 February 1941, Admiral Kimmel expressed agreement with Admiral Stark's opposition to sending a Fleet detachment to the Far East, (N.C.I. Exhibit 30), saying:

"Will study, prepare plans, and be ready for a quick decision in case orders are received for a detachment of cruisers, destroyers, and a carrier to make the proposed cruise to Manila or elsewhere. From my standpoint this appears to be a most ill-advised move. Our strength in destroyers and cruisers is already limited. A carrier can ill be spared if we are to carry out other proposed plans. While my political horizon is limited, I believe we should be prepared for war when we make this move." (N.C.I. Exhibit 30).

(6) On 20 February 1941, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District sent a dispatch (192230) to the Chief of Naval Operations with information copy to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral Kimmel, advising that a message of extreme importance and secrecy had been delivered by the Japanese Consul to masters of Japanese vessels touching Honolulu on 20 February, but that the contents of the Message were not known. (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 117). The Message read:

"POSITIVE INFORMATION FROM HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE THAT MESSAGE OF EXTREME IMPORTANCE AND SECRECY DELIVERED VIA JAPANESE CONSULATE TO MASTERS ALL JAPANESE VESSELS TOUCHING HONOLULU SINCE 13 FEB X INDICATIONS ALL CONSULATES DELIVERING SIMILAR MESSAGE TO ALL JAPANESE VESSELS WHICH HAVE LEFT JAPANESE PORTS OR FOREIGN PORTS HAVING NO CONSULATE SINCE APPROX 1 FEB X CONTENTS OF MESSAGE NOT DETERMINED X ABSENCE OF USUAL NOON POSITION REPORTS JAPANESE VESSELS IN PACIFIC SINCE 11 FEB NOTED X 18 FEB LOCAL JAPANESE CONSUL THROUGH JAPANESE PRESS URGES JAPANESE REMAIN CALM IN ANY CRISIS X" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 117).

(7) On 21 February 1941, OpNav <sup>1/</sup> sent a dispatch (202250) to Coms 12, 15 and 14, <sup>2/</sup> with information copy to CinCAF and CinCUS, <sup>3/</sup> informing them that:

"DECREASE IN VOLUME OF JAP MERCHANT SHIPPING IN NORTH ATLANTIC CARIBBEAN AND SOUTH AMERICAN WATERS NOTED X INDICATIONS POINT TO FURTHER DIMINUTION DURING NEXT TWO WEEKS X TRANSOCEAN TRAFFIC IN NORTH PACIFIC SEEMS NORMAL X PRESENT TREND INSUFFICIENT FOR DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS BUT - SITUATION REQUIRES CAREFUL OBSERVATION X FURTHER REPORTS WILL BE FURNISHED AS SITUATION DEVELOPES." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 118).

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1/ This indicates the Chief of Naval Operations.

2/ This indicates the Commandants of the named Naval Districts.

3/ CinCUS is Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet; CinCAF is Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

(8) On 25 February 1941 Admiral Stark advised Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 31) that the question of sending a Fleet detachment to the Far East was still under consideration. He said:

"I hesitated to take the chance of upsetting you with my despatch and letter concerning a visit of a detachment of surface forces to the Far East. I agree with you that it is unwise. But even since my last letter to you, the subject has twice come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen, my view has prevailed, but the time might come when it will not. I gave you the information merely as a sort of advance notice.

"The difficulty is that the entire country is in a dozen minds about the war -- to stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate against Japan in the Pacific and the Far East -- I simply can not predict the outcome. Gallup polls, editorials, talk on the Hill (and I might add, all of which is irresponsible) constitute a rising tide for action in the Far East if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department recommendations, you would have to implement Rainbow III, and forget my later despatch concerning "Plan Dog". This would mean that any reinforcement to the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be reduced by just so much as we would send to the Asiatic. And that might be a very serious matter for Britain." (N.C.I. Exhibit 31).

In this letter (N.C.I. Exhibit 31), Admiral Stark enclosed to Admiral Kimmel copies of two memoranda to the President, dated 5 and 11 February 1941.

These Admiral Stark described as "our best estimate of the Far Eastern situation". (N.C.I. Exhibit 31).

(i) In the 5 February 1941 memorandum Admiral Stark in part told the President:

"2. A careful study, including an evaluation of information from many sources, leads me to believe that the following is the general plan of Japan: \*\*\*\*\*



"(c) Japan desires to move against the British, the Dutch and the United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a time. At present, she desires not to go to war with the United States at all, in order that she can continue her imports of materials useful for war and for here general economy. If Japan gets a favorable opportunity, and believes the United States has then definitely decided to remain out of war altogether, she will move first against Malaya and possibly Burma, hoping the Dutch will not participate. Her present economic conversations with the Dutch indicate she may be playing for time, and even may intend to conquer the Dutch primarily by economic and political penetration. \*\*\*\*\*

"3. The above are my present views. They will change if we get information that will warrant change. So far, everything leads me to believe that Japan is playing for a secure advance without too great an expenditure of military energy. The recent reenforcement of her defense in the Mandates indicates the seriousness with which she views the threat by the Pacific Fleet, so long as it remains strong and apparently ready to move against her eastern flank."

(11) In the 11 February 1941 Memorandum, Admiral Stark

in part said to President Roosevelt:

"Since your thought yesterday morning of the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines via the southern route consisting of approximately 4 cruisers, a squadron (9) of destroyers and carriers and perhaps to permit a leak that they were going out there just for a temporary visit and then to return, I confess to having pondered a good deal on it last night during the wee small hours because, as you know, I have previously opposed this and you have concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested this and the question arose as to getting them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind losing one or two cruisers (we have 2 out there now), but that you did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6. Frankly, I breathed a great sigh of relief and thought the issue pretty definitely closed.

"You also called it a "bluff" and questioned it from that standpoint. Obviously, if we permitted a leak about their coming back, there would be even less, if any, bluff, and again if we did not permit a leak with regard to their coming back, we would then certainly look like turning tail and running if something happened



and we did come back. I believe it pretty thoroughly agreed that we do not want that force in the Philippines in case of a sudden attack, and that even were we to consider in emergency increasing our Forces in the Far East, we would not send them to Manila Bay but rather to the southward or into Dutch East Indies where they would be better supported and not so open to attack, (N.C.I. Exhibit 31). \*\*\*\*\*

"Specifically:-

"Sending a small force would probably be no deterrent to Japan and would not increase Japanese difficulties in advancing southward. I feel we would be exposing our force without compensating results.

"There is a chance that further moves against Japan will precipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in in case we are forced into hostilities with Germany whom we all consider our major problem."  
(Ibid)

With reference to the strength of the Pacific Fleet and the further effect of sending a detachment to the Far East, the Memorandum to the President stated:

"The Pacific Fleet is now weaker in total tonnage and aircraft than the Japanese Navy. It is, however, a very strong force and as long as it is in its present position it remains a constant serious and real threat to Japan's flank. If any considerable division is sent to Manila it might prove an invitation to Japan to attack us in detail and thus greatly lessen or remove our serious naval threat to her for a considerable period to come. I believe it would be a grave strategic error at this time to divide our Pacific Fleet. We would then have our Fleet divided in three parts. Atlantic, Mid-Pacific, and Western Pacific. It is true we only contemplate a visit at out there but we might find recall of this additional detachment exceedingly embarrassing or difficult. (N.C.I. Exhibit 31)

"If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should at least at first remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains quiet, or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously attack the Mandates and Japanese communications in

order to weaken Japan's attack on the British and Dutch. We would also then be able to support spare forces for the Atlantic. (Ibid.)

"Right now, Japan does not know what we intend. If we send part of the Fleet to the Asiatic now, we may show our hand and lose the value of any strategic surprise. We might encourage Japan to move, rather than deter her, and also we might very well compromise our own future operations." (Ibid.)

The memorandum then discussed the question of occupation of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, saying:

"I feel we should not indicate the slightest interest in the Gilbert or Solomon or Fiji Islands at this time. If we do, the Japanese might smell a rat and our future use of them, at least so far as surprise is concerned, might be compromised. The Japanese could take steps to occupy some of them before we could because she has had long training and is ready for amphibious operations; we are not. If we lose the element of surprise or begin to show interest, for example in the Gilberts, such previous warning may delay our later operations because Japan would well consider nullifying our efforts in this direction.

"I just wanted to get this off my chest to you as I always do my thoughts and then will defer to your better judgment with a cheerful Aye, Aye, Sir, and go the limit as will all of us in what you decide. I do think the matter serious." (N.C.I. Exhibit 31).

The memorandum to the President concluded as follows:

"Finally I want you to know I am notifying Kimmel to be prepared to send a force such as we talked about yesterday to the Philippines, in case your final decision should be to send them.

"I have just read a paraphrase of a telegram of 7 Feb. from the American Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears the following:

"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the imponderable factor which such risks constitute, the risk should not be taken unless our country is ready to force hostilities."

"You undoubtedly have seen the entire dispatch and obviously I am picking out that portion which supports my view." (N.C.I. Exhibit 31)

(9) On 28 February 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch (281802) to CinCPac, <sup>1/</sup> directing the dispatch of a detachment of destroyers and heavy and light cruisers to Samoa, and indicated that it was thought that such would forestall the permanent reenforcement from the Pacific to the Far East. The dispatch read:

"CANCEL MY 272135 PARAGRAPH AS SOON AS CAN BE PREPARED DIRECT ONE SQUADRON DESTROYERS PLUS FOUR HEAVY CRUISERS OR PLUS TWO HEAVY AND TWO LIGHT CRUISERS PROCEED SAMOA ACCOMPANIED BY SUCH TANKERS AS REQUIRED FUEL TO CAPACITY ON ARRIVAL SAMOA PARAGRAPH IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION THAT EXISTS WHEN THEY ARRIVE AT SAMOA THE DEPARTMENT MAY DIRECT CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS MAKE A FURTHER CRUISE WHICH WILL NECESSITATE FUELLING TO CAPACITY THERE COMMA THE AUXILIARIES RETURNING DIRECT HAWAII X IF THIS EXTENDED CRUISE TAKES PLACE IT IS BELIEVED THIS WILL FORESTALL SENDING A PERMANENT REINFORCEMENT TO THE FAR EAST AND THAT THE SHIPS INVOLVED WILL RETURN TO HAWAII PARAGRAPH REPORT COMPOSITION OF DETACHMENT AND ANTICIPATED DATES DEPARTING PEARL HARBOR AND ARRIVAL SAMOA PARAGRAPH INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING ESCORTING WM P BIDDLE WILL BE SENT LATER AND PROBABLY AFTER HER ARRIVAL PEARL HARBOR" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 120).

(10) On 1 April 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (012358) to the Commandants of all Naval Districts directing that the personnel of all Naval Intelligence Services should be on the alert particularly on Saturdays and Sundays since experience had shown that the Axis powers often began activities on such days. The dispatch read:

"PERSONNEL OF YOUR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SHOULD BE ADVISED THAT BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT FROM PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWS THE AXIS POWERS OFTEN BEGIN ACTIVITIES IN PARTICULAR FIELD ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS OR ON NATIONAL HOLIDAYS OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED, THEY SHOULD TAKE STEPS ON SUCH DAYS TO SEE THAT PROPER

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<sup>1/</sup> This indicates the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, (Admiral Kimmel.)

WATCHES AND PRECAUTIONS ARE IN EFFECT." (Hew. Exhibit 81).

(11) On 3 ~~April~~ 1941 Admiral Stark in a letter to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Fleets, including Admiral Kimmel, in connection with his discussion of the Joint Staff Conversations leading to the drafting of the Rainbow Five War Plan, referred to the uncertainty as to Japanese action and to a British proposition to send the bulk of the American Fleet to Singapore, which he had rejected. He said:

"5. The difficulties are our present uncertainty as to Japanese action, and British insistence on the vital importance of holding Singapore, and of supporting Australia, New Zealand, and India. Their proposals, which I rejected, were to transfer almost the whole of the Pacific Fleet to Singapore to hold that position against the Japanese. In my opinion, the result of such a move on our part would almost surely be a British defeat in the Atlantic, and, thereafter, a difficult period for the United States. I have agreed to the present plan for the initial stages, but have insisted that the deployment at any one time must depend upon the situation which exists at that time. Elasticity and the fluidity of planning are therefore assured." (N.C.I. Exhibit 73, page 2).

Admiral Stark then referred to the dangers to Great Britain, as he saw them:

"6. There seem to be two principal dangers which immediately threaten the United Kingdom. The first is the very grave threat to its sea communications from submarines, aircraft, and raiders. The recent activity of the large German naval raiders foreshadows a wider, and even weaker, deployment of British surface forces capable of dealing with such raiders. The British are badly deficient in anti-submarine escort craft, and have as yet devised little defense of convoys and single ships against heavy bombers. Shipping is now being lost about three times as fast as it can be replaced. The only remedy, in my opinion, is a radical strengthening of the defense against all three forms of shipping attack, by greater



forces and new ideas to such an extent that the hazard to the attackers will be too great for them to overcome. The entire United States naval strength could be usefully employed in the Atlantic, were it to become possible to send it there.

"7. The second great danger is the continued deterioration of British production and morale through heavy bombing. This will become more serious as shipping losses become greater. At the same time the situation in the Mediterranean might become dangerous at any time; on the other hand, in spite of uncertainties, favorable elements are visible in that theater." (N.C.I. Exhibit 73, page 2).

He then referred to the seemingly more restrained Japanese attitude:

"8. The Japanese attitude will continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic. For some time past, Japan has shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch, and ourselves in the Far East. Her people are distinctly tired of the war in China and of the privations they now must undergo. Whether Matsuoka's visit to Berlin and Rome will strengthen the wish of some of them to help Germany, or will deepen their caution against rash action, may be disclosed within the next month. I advise you to watch this situation keenly. (N.C.I. Exhibit 72, pages 2 - 3 ).

He attributed this attitude, in part at least, to the concentration of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, such had, he said, "Unquestionably \*\*\* a stabilizing effect in the Far East." (N.C.I. Exhibit 72 pages 2 -3).

Admiral Stark then told Admirals Kimmel, Hart and King that there was a certainty that the United States would be involved in the war.

He said:

"10. The question as to our entry into the war now seems to be when, and not whether. Public opinion, which now is slowly turning in that direction, may or may not be accelerated. My own personal view is that we may be in the war (possible undeclared) against Germany and Italy within about two months, but that there is a reasonable possibility that Japan may remain out altogether. However, we can not at present act on that possibility." (N.C.I. Exhibit 73, page 3). \* \* \* \* \*



"12. In the meantime, I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into war." (N.C.I. Exhibit 73, page 3).

(12) On 5 April 1941, the Assistant Naval Attache at Chungking sent a dispatch (Ø5Ø255) to the Chief of Naval Operations with an information copy to CinCPac, concerning Japanese troop movements and possible operations in Asia, which stated:

"GROUP OF REPORTS FROM PRIVATE SOURCE HONGKONG CONFIRM JAPANESE TROOP MOVEMENTS WHICH PRECEDED RECENT FUKIEN OPERATIONS X ITAGAKI ARRIVED CANTON APRIL 16th CONFERRED WITH LOCAL ARMY COMMANDER PLUS TERAUCHI CHICHISU AND MATUSI X DECIDED ABOVE CAMPAIGN TO BE FOLLOWED EARLY IN MAY BY DRIVE FROM INDO CHINA VIA TWO ROUTES TO CAPTURE KUMMING CUTTING BURMA ROAD X WILL EMPLOY 2nd 5th 6th AND KONOYE DIVISIONS THIS MOVEMENT X 15Ø PLANES ALSO REPORTED TRANSFERRED TO THAILAND" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 124).

(13) On 26 May 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote Admiral Stark (N.C.I. Exhibit 33) in respect of his view of the manner in which the national policies were being executed, saying:

**"VI. NATIONAL POLICY.**

"(a) Although largely uninformd as to day-by-day developments, one cannot escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for example, made strong expressions of our intention to retain an effective voice in the Far East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer, as a diplomatic gesture, but almost simultaneously detached heavy cruisers to the Atlantic and retained new de-

stroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet by wholesale changes in personnel. \* \* \* \* \*

"The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplomatic branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgement as to the means available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant weight." (N.C.I. Exhibit 33).

In this same letter (N.C.I. Exhibit 33) Admiral Kimmel requested that he be immediately informed of all important developments occurring in Washington:

"VII. INFORMATION

"(a) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

"It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad

policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

"It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available." (N.C.I. Exhibit 33).

(14) On 23 June 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, sent a dispatch (231525) to OpNav with information copy to CinCPac, containing an analysis of diplomatic intercepts which indicated a possible Japanese war against Russia. The dispatch read:

"MY ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION (CHIEFLY DIPLOMATIC INTERCEPTS) INDICATES THAT IF JAPAN EMBARKS ON ANOTHER WAR VENTURE IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE IT WILL BE DIRECTED AGAINST RUSSIA RATHER THAN SOUTHWARD, WITH SUCCESS OF SUCH MOVE PREREQUISITE TO SOUTHERN ADVANCE XX HOWEVER THIS FLEET CONTINUES ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NEXT ORANGE MOVE WILL BE IN THIS DIRECTION XX DO YOU AGREE WITH MY ANALYSIS" (Hew Exhibit 70, Document 45).

(i) OpNav replied by dispatch (252148) to the above inquiry of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, dated 26 June 1941, stating that he thought CinCAF's analysis of a Japanese war against Russia not then justified. He said:

"YOUR 231525 ATTENTION INVITED TO FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES:  
(A) THE STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF KWANTUNG ARMY INDICATE A DEFENSIVE RATHER THAN AN OFFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT X AIRCRAFT DETACHMENTS FROM THAT ARMY MADE SOMETIME AGO HAVE NOT BEEN REPLACED X STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF RUSSIAN FORCES ARE SUCH AS WOULD REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE REINFORCEMENT OF KWANTUNG ARMY BEFORE IT COULD TAKE THE OFFENSIVE X QUESTIONABLE WHETHER REINFORCEMENT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE IN VIEW OFFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT OF JAPANESE ARMY AND PLANES IN CENTRAL CHINA AND COMBINED OPERATIONS NOW UNDERWAY VICINITY WENCHOW  
(B) PRESENT DEPLOYMENT JAPANESE NAVY NORMAL FOR EVENTUALITIES SOUTHWARD RATHER THAN NORTHWARD  
(C) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INDO CHINA INDICATE PREPARATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION THAT REGION  
(D) OWING TO SEMI-AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION OF USSR COLLAPSE OF WESTERN REPUBLICS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY UNDERMINE POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTEGRITY OF SIBERIAN REPUBLIC  
(E) ALL INDICATIONS FROM TOKYO POINT TO A STILL FLUID POLITICAL CONDITION  
IN VIEW OF THESE FACTORS CONSIDER YOUR ANALYSIS NOT NOW JUSTIFIED

ALTHOUGH THIS DOES NOT RULE IT OUT AS AN EVENTUALITY X MY ANALYSIS IS THAT JAPANESE HAVE REACHED NO DEFINITE DECISIONS AND THAT THEIR POLICY WILL CONTINUE ONE OF OPPORTUNISM X ADVISE CAREFUL AND CONTINUOUS EVALUATION OF INFORMATION FROM EVERY POSSIBLE SOURCE" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 47).

(15) On 26 June 1941, Com 16 and CinCAF sent an information dispatch (26ø31ø), to OpNav and to CinCPac, consisting of a brief of an intercepted message "Hsingking Embassy Secretary to Tokyo (Chief "OOA" Section)" reading:

"KWANTUNG ARMY AGREES WITH MY FIRST TWO POINTS  
(1) RUSSIAN DEFEAT EXPECTED SHORTLY X GEOGRAPHICAL VASTNESS ABUNDANCE HUMAN MATERIAL RESOURCES APPROACH WINTER REQUIRES CAREFUL CONSIDERATION PREDICTING OUT-COME X SINCE RUSSIA NOW THOROUGHLY COMMUNISTIC POSSIBILITY COUNTER REVOLUTION OVERTHROW STALIN VERY SLIGHT X JAPAN'S VIEWPOINT TOWARDS WAR SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS WATCHFUL WAITING SLOW DETERMINATION POLICY  
(2) UTILIZATION OF WAR FOR DELAY SETTLEMENT OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS OR JOINING OFFENSIVE AGAINST RUSSIA REQUIRES CAUTION X ADVANTAGE SHOULD BE TAKEN RUSSIAN DEFENSIVE POSITION FOR CONCENTRATING TOTAL STRENGTH SETTLEMENT CHINA AFFAIR WITH RESULT QUICKLY STRENGTHENING MILITARY POLITICAL POSITION WITH RESPECT BRITAIN AMERICA RUSSIA  
(3) JAPAN'S ACTION, SPEECH SHOULD BE SUCH (AS TO) OBIVIATE POSSIBILITY RUSSIAN DISTRUST X PREVENT STIMULATION ENCIRCLEMENT PERMIT  
CONTINUATION FRIENDLY NEGOTIATIONS SETTLEMENT RUSSIAN-MANCHURIAN PROBLEMS" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 48).

(16) On 3 July 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (ø31939) to CinCPac stating, among other things, that Japanese policy probably involved war in the near future, probably against Russia but possibly against the British and Dutch. The dispatch read:

"INFORMATION FROM NUMEROUS SOURCES LEADS UNMISTABLY TO THE DEDUCTION THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS DETERMINED UPON ITS FUTURE POLICY AND THAT THIS POLICY IS



SUPPORTED BY ALL PRINCIPAL JAPANESE POLITICAL AND MILITARY GROUPS X POLICY PROBABLY INVOLVES WAR IN THE NEAR FUTURE X WHILE AN ADVANCE AGAINST THE BRITISH AND DUTCH CANNOT YET BE DEFINITELY RULED OUT THE CNO IS OF OPINION JAPANESE ACTIVITY IN SOUTH WILL FOR THE PRESENT BE CONFINED TO SEIZURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL ARMY AND AIR BASES IN INDO-CHINA X RUSSIAN NEUTRALITY PACT WILL BE ABROGATED AND MAJOR MILITARY EFFORT WILL BE AGAINST RUSSIAN MARITIME PROVINCES PROBABLY TOWARD END OF JULY THOUGH ATTACK MIGHT BE DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER COLLAPSE OF EUROPEAN RUSSIA X ALL JAPANESE VESSELS IN US ATLANTIC PORTS HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO BE WEST OF PANAMA CANAL BY AUGUST FIRST X MOVEMENT OF JAPANESE FLAG SHIPPING FROM JAPAN IS BEING SUSPENDED ADDITIONAL MERCHANT VESSELS ARE BEING REQUISITIONED X UNDER STRINGENT SECRECY INFORM PRINCIPAL ARMY COMMANDERS AND OWN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES EXCEPT GHORMLEY INFORM AMBASSADOR AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF X THIS HAS BEEN PASSED TO COM FIFTEEN AND SPECIAL NAVAL OBSERVER LONDON FOR ACTION" (Hew Exhibit 70, Document 50).

(17) On 4 July 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (ø3213ø) to CinCPac referring to Japanese shifting of ships from the Atlantic and to rumors of a Japanese attack in Russia. The dispatch read:

"BRIEFLY ALL JAP MERCHANT SHIPPING WILL BE CLEAR OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AND CARIBBEAN AREA BY 22 JULY X STRONG RUMORS ARE CURRENT IN JAP BUSINESS COMMUNITIES THAT JAPAN WILL ATTACK RUSSIA ON 2ø JULY X INFORMATION FROM UNUSUALLY RELIABLE CHINESE SOURCES STATES THAT WITHIN TWO WEEKS JAPAN WILL ABROGATE NEUTRALITY TREATY WITH RUSSIA AND ATTACK X PRESENT STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF JAP ARMY IN MANCHURIA IS DEFENSIVE AND PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF JAP FLEET APPEARS NORMAL CAPABLE OF MOVEMENT EITHER NORTH OR SOUTH X FOREGOING INDICATES THAT DEFINITE MOVE BY JAPAN MAY BE EXPECTED DURING PERIOD 2ø JULY 1 AUGUST X" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 49).

(18) On 7 July 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (ø7ø224) to CinCAF with information copy to CinCPac, in which was stated the substance of intercepted diplomatic traffic between Tokyo and Washington,



and Tokyo and Berlin. The intercepts pointed to Japanese shifting of merchant ships to the Pacific, Japanese determination to join Germany in the fight against Russia, including a Japanese protest at not being advised in advance of the German intention to attack Russia. The dispatch read:

"TOKYO TO WASHINGTON 1 JULY 329:

"JAPAN DIRECTS EIGHT MARUS ON EAST COAST UNITED STATES RUSH CARGO HANDLING AND PROCEED COLON PASS THROUGH CANAL TO PACIFIC BETWEEN 16 AND 22 JULY ON FOLLOWING SCHEDULE: 16TH, TOKAI; 17TH, AMAGISAN; 18TH AWAJISAN; 19TH, TOSAN; 20TH, KIYOSUMI; 21ST, KIRISHIMA; 22ND, NORFOLK AND ASUKA X TOKYO TO BERLIN 2 JULY 585; (ENGLISH TEXT NOTE TO RIBBENTROP IN PART)

" 'JAPAN IS PREPARING FOR ALL POSSIBLE EVENTUALITIES REGARDING SOVIET IN ORDER JOIN FORCES WITH GERMANY IN ACTIVELY COMBATTING COMMUNIST AND DESTROYING COMMUNIST SYSTEM IN EASTERN SIBERIA X AT SAME TIME JAPAN CANNOT AND WILL NOT RELAX EFFORTS IN THE SOUTH TO RESTRAIN BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES X NEW INDO-CHINA BASES WILL INTENSIFY RESTRAINT AND BE VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO AXIS VICTORY!'"

"BERLIN TO TOKYO 2 JULY 825:

"OSHIMA DELIVERS ABOVE NOTE AND TELLS RIBBENTROP IN PART. "MATSUOKA WILL SOON SUBMIT A DECISION X IF YOU GERMANS HAD ONLY LET US KNOW YOU WERE GOING TO FIGHT RUSSIA SO SOON WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN READY X WE WERE PLANNING TO SETTLE SOUTH SEAS QUESTIONS AND CHINA INCIDENT HENCE DECISION CANNOT BE REACHED IMMEDIATELY, BUT JAPAN WILL NOT SIT ON FENCE WHILE GERMANY FIGHTS!'" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 51).

(19) On 7 July 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (070243), to CinCAF with information copy to CinCPac, summarizing intercepted diplomatic traffic between Tokyo, Berlin and Vichy, in which it was stated that Matsuoka was requesting Ribbentrop's aid in obtaining French acceptance of Japan's demand for Naval bases in Indo-China, and that Ribbentrop was reluctant to force the issue at that time. The dispatch read:

"TOKYO TO BERLIN AND VICHY 16 JUNE 519:

"MATSUOKA REQUESTS RIBBENTROP'S AID IN DEMAND ON FRENCH FOR FOLLOWING NAVAL BASES: "SAIGON AND CAMRANH"; AND FOLLOWING AIR BASES IN SOUTHERN FRENCH INDO-CHINA: "BIENHOA, PHNOMPENH, KOMPONTRACH, NHATRANG, SOCTRANG, TOURAINE, SIMREAP" X JAPAN DETERMINED ACQUIRE ABOVE QUICKLY, DIPLOMATICALLY IF POSSIBLE OR BY FORCE IF NECESSARY IN ORDER EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN THEM; X CHIEF REASON GIVEN IS TO PREVENT BRITISH MOVING IN

"BERLIN TO TOKYO 21 JUNE 739:

"RIBBENTROP RELUCTANT TO FORCE ISSUE NOW

"TOKYO TO BERLIN AND VICHY 22 JUNE 549 AND 246 RESPECTIVELY:

"MATSUOKA WILL NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH FRENCH X REPEATS DETERMINATION GET BASES SOON

"TOKYO TO VICHY 28 JUNE 258:

"FRENCH INDO-CHINA BASE QUESTION THIS DATE RECEIVED IMPERIAL SANCTION

30 JUNE 252:

"JAPAN NOW CONSIDERS IT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO FORCE FRANCE ACCEDE TO DEMANDS FOR ABOVE BASES" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 52).

(20) On 15 July 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (151924) to CinCAF with information copy to CinCPac containing further summary of intercepted traffic between Washington and Tokyo concerning Japanese-Vichy commercial negotiations and the Japanese intention of using force if necessary. The dispatch read:

"SUMMARY OF TOKYO TO WASHINGTON 15 JULY 368, RELAYED TO LONDON:

" WITHIN NEXT DAY OR TWO JAPAN VICHY COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. JAPAN WILL PROPOSE IN NAME OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TAKING OVER SOUTHERN FRENCH-INDO-CHINA NAVAL AND AIR BASES OUTLINED

IN DESPATCH (OPNAV) DATED 7 JULY. AT SAME TIME JAPAN WILL ATTEMPT TO STATION NECESSARY ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCES IN THAT AREA PEACEFULLY WITH FRENCH AGREEMENT IF POSSIBLE. IF FRENCH OBJECT JAPAN HAS DECIDED TO USE FORCE. JAPAN DOES NOT INTEND MOVE FURTHER SOUTH OR INTERFERE WITH COLONIAL GOVERNMENT. MOVE NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE SUPPLIES FROM COLONY AND THAILAND AND PREVENT SYRIAN TYPE BRITISH ACTION. TOKYO WISHES AVOID FRICTION WITH BRITAIN AND PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES IF POSSIBLE BUT RISK IS NECESSARY." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 55).

(1) On the same day, OpNav sent a further dispatch (152030) to CinCPac and to CinCAF stating there was an unconfirmed report from Admiralty sources that the Japanese had handed Vichy an ultimatum in reference to Indo-China (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 128). Some of the items in the Tokyo ultimatum to Vichy were stated in the dispatch from OpNav to CinCAF (180300) with information copy to CinCPac, of 17 July 1941. Among other things, this dispatch stated:

"JAPAN INTENDS CARRY OUT PLANS BY FORCE IF OPPOSED OR IF BRITISH OR UNITED STATES INTERFERES X" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 56).

(21) On 19 July 1941, Com SIXTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, with information copy to CinCPac, stating the Japanese cabinet change did not indicate change in Japanese policy. The dispatch read:

"TOKYO TO NET NUMBER FIFTEEN SIXTY OF NINETEENTH IN PREP AFIRM CODE STATES THAT ALTHOUGH CABINET HAS CHANGED THERE WILL OF COURSE BE NO DEPARTURE FROM THE PRINCIPLE THAT TRIPARTITE PACT FORMS KEYSTONE OF JAPANS NATIONAL POLICY AND NEW CABINET WILL ALSO PURSUE POLICY OF FORMER CABINET IN ALL OTHER MATTERS". (N.C.I. Exhibit 64, page 2).

(22) On 19 July 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (192230) to CinCAF with information copy to CinCPac, summarizing a Japanese diplomatic intercept from Canton to Tokyo of 14 July, which among things expressed Japanese resolution to put an end to Anglo-American efforts

to thwart Japanese expansion. The dispatch read:

" 'INFORMATION FROM MILITARY OFFICIALS TO ATTACHES  
IN CANTON FOLLOWS:

(1) THE RECENT GENERAL MOBILIZATION ORDER EXPRESS JAPAN'S IRREVOCABLE RESOLUTION TO END ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSISTANCE IN THWARTING JAPAN'S NATURAL EXPANSION AND HER INDOMITABLE INTENTION TO CARRY THIS OUT WITH THE BACKING OF THE AXIS IF POSSIBLE BUT ALONE IF NECESSARY. FORMALITIES SUCH AS DINING THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND SAYING FAREWELL TO THEM WERE DISPENSED WITH TO AVOID ALARM AND BECAUSE WE WISHED TO FACE THIS NEW WAR WITH A CALM AND COOL ATTITUDE.

(2) IMMEDIATE OBJECT WILL BE TO ATTEMPT PEACEFUL FRENCH-INDO-CHINA OCCUPATION BUT WILL CRUSH RESISTANCE IF OFFERED AND SET UP MARTIAL LAW. SECONDLY, OUR PURPOSE IS TO LAUNCH THEREFROM A RAPID ATTACK WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS SUITABLE. AFTER OCCUPATION NEXT ON OUR SCHEDULE IS SENDING ULTIMATUM TO NETHERLANDS INDIES. IN THE SEIZING OF SINGAPORE THE NAVY WILL PLAY THE PRINCIPAL PART; ARMY WILL NEED ONLY ONE DIVISION TO SEIZE SINGAPORE AND TWO DIVISIONS TO SEIZE NETHERLANDS INDIES. WITH AIR FORCES BASED ON CANTON, SPRATLEY, PALAU, SINGORA IN THAILAND, PORTUGUESE TIMOR AND INDO-CHINA, AND WITH SUBMARINE FLEET IN MANDATES, HAINAN, AND INDO-CHINA WE WILL CRUSH BRITISH-AMERICAN MILITARY POWER AND ABILITY TO ASSIST IN SCHEMES AGAINST US.

(3) OCCUPYING FORCE WILL BE REORGANIZED AS 25TH ARMY CORPS OF FOUR DIVISIONS AND ALSO 30TH ARMY CORPS CONSISTING OF SOUTH CHINA FORCES TO BE ASSIGNED SPECIAL DUTY WITH AIRPLANES, TANKS, AND HOWITZERS. GENERAL IIDA IN COMMAND WILL SET UP HEADQUARTERS IN SAIGON. PREPARATIONS COMPLETE. EXPEDITION WILL SOON PROCEED-FROM HERE.' "

"(NOTE BY OPNAV: IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ABOVE IS NOT A DIRECTIVE BUT APPEARS TO EXPRESS THINKING AND OPINIONS OF CANTON JAPANESE MILITARY)" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 57).

(23) On 20 July 1941, Com 16 sent a dispatch (201356) to CinCPac, CinCAF, Com 14 and OpNav, which relayed an intercept of a Japanese diplomatic message from Tokyo to Vichy, concerning a Japanese



decision to issue orders to advance as respect French Indo-China.

The dispatch read:

"ARMY HAS ALL PREPARATION MADE XX HAVE DECIDED TO ADVANCE ON TWENTY-FOURTH REGARDLESS OF WHETHER DEMANDS ACCEPTED OR NOT XX ORDERS FOR ADVANCE WILL BE ISSUED ON JULY TWENTY-THIRD JAPANESE TIME XX REMAINDER OF MESSAGE CONTAINS INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR REGARDING EXCHANGE OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CASE OF ACCEPTANCE X INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING NOTIFYING TOKYO OF FRANCE'S REPLY ETCETERA"  
(Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 58).

(24) On 24 July 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 71) saying, in part:

"Haven't much to write about; as a matter of fact the letter I dictated to Tommie Hart this morning contains what little I have and it is darned little I admit.

"This is more just to let you know I am thinking about you than anything else.

"We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can and for budgetary purposes you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 533,000 enlisted men and 105,000 marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But what a struggle it has been. If we could only have gone full speed two years ago but that is water over the dam and I am only hoping and praying we can take care of what we have in sight to man." (N.C.I. Exhibit 71)

(i) The letter enclosed from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart was dated 24 July 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 71) and in it Admiral Stark referred to conversation he had on 23 July with Japanese Ambassador Nomura:

"Yesterday, before Nomura went to the State Department, I had a two-hour talk with him; very interesting, as my previous talks with him have been, and of course he is worried. I believe him to be genuinely sincere in his desire that Japan and the United States do not come to an open rupture. Of



course, I have that same desire, but there are many flies in the ointment, and in my talks with him I have not minced matters one particle, or minimized the difficulties, or in any way condoned Japan's present course of action, or hesitated to discuss perfectly frankly the shallowness of some of the reasons she is putting out in defense of her actions. We have had very plain talk. I like him and, as you know, he has many friends in our Navy. Nomura dwelt at length on his country's need for the rice and the minerals of Indo-China. My guess is that with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being, consolidate their positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No doubt they will use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road. Of course, there is the possibility that they will strike at Borneo. I doubt that this will be done in the near future, unless we embargo oil shipments to them. This question of embargo has been up many times and I have consistently opposed it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that they will do nothing in regard to the Maritime provinces until the outcome of the German-Russian war on the continent is more certain. If Russians are well beaten down, I think it highly probable that they will move into Siberia. Meanwhile, they are merrily going their way and just where it all will end I do not know." (N.C.I. Exhibit 71)

Admiral Stark's enclosed letter to Admiral Hart then referred to two conversations he recently had with the President, as follows:

"I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing an appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate such a possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse. However, we can still struggle for something better, and I want you to know that I am." (N.C.I. Exhibit 71).

Admiral Stark then referred to the situation in Iceland as follows:

"You are undoubtedly familiar with the Iceland situation, and I am glad to say the Force is back, and just when the next contingent will go has not yet been decided. In both the Far East and the Atlantic, there is plenty of potential dynamite." (N.C.I. Exhibit 71).

Concerning the keeping of gun boats in China and the attitude of the State Department, Admiral Stark said:

"I may say that the state Department still agrees about the gunboats remaining in China, but of course it is my understanding that they could not well be removed at this season anyway." (N.C.I. Exhibit 71).

With reference to the taking over of the Coast Guard by the Navy, and of opposition thereto by Secretary Morgenthau, Admiral Stark said:

"I think I previously told you I have been pressing for months to take over the Coast Guard, but Morgenthau has successfully resisted until finally he has given way in certain spots; for example, he has just consented to turn over the Coast Guard in the Hawaiian Area to our control. Also, we hope to get seven of their large cutters, which will help a great deal in the Atlantic where King is pressed to the limit to perform the tasks given him. I am trying to get their 165-foot craft which also should be of assistance in the 14th Naval District. Waesche, Head of the Coast Guard, sees everything from our standpoint and is a great help. Mr. Morgenthau in many ways has been more than helpful to the Navy Department, but when it comes to letting go of the Coast Guard, he draws in. However, we shall keep on trying." (N.C.I. Exhibit 71).

(25) On 25 July 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (2516~~00~~) to CinCLant, CinCPac, ComBatDiv 3, ComCruDiv 2, and Commandants of several Districts, covering the execution of WPL-51, saying:

"AT 21~~00~~ GCT JULY TWENTY SIXTH 1941 EXECUTE WPL 51 EXCEPT THE NINTH TO EIGHTEENTH WORDS INCLUSIVE OF TASK BAKER OF PARAGRAPH SEVEN THE WORD UNITED STATES BEING CONSIDERED AS ONE WORD X THE EXCEPTED WORDS WILL BE EXECUTED AT A LATER DATE AFTER NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 131).

(26) On 26 July 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark (N.C.I. Exhibit 34) mentioning certain aspects of the international situation:

"(1) The importance of keeping the Commander-in-Chief advised of Department policies and decisions and the changes in policies and decisions to meet changes in the international situation.

"(A) We have as yet received no official information as to the U. S. attitude towards Russian participation in the war, particularly as to the degree of cooperation, if any, in the Pacific, between the U. S. and Russia if and when we become active participants. Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communication systems and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored and full advantage taken of any opportunities for mutual support. Pertinent question are:-

"(1) Will England declare war on Japan if Japanese attack Maritime Provinces?

"(2) If answer to (1) is in the affirmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively provided in case of attack on N.E.I. or Singapore?

"(3) If answer to (2) is in the affirmative, are plans being prepared for joint action, mutual support, etc.?

"(4) If answer to (1) is negative, what will England's attitude be? What will ours be?

"(5) If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, what is attitude in regard Japanese shipping, patrol of Pacific waters, commerce raiders, etc.?

"(b) Depending upon the progress of hostilities, the Russian situation appears to offer an opportunity for the strengthening of our Far Eastern defense, particularly Guam and the Philippines. Certainly, no matter how the fighting goes, Japan's attention will be partially diverted from the China and Southern adventures by either (1) diversion of forces for attack on Russia or (2) necessity for providing for Russian attack on her. It is conceivable that the greater the German success on the Eastern front, the more Russia will be pushed toward Asia, with consequent increased danger to Japan's "New Order" for that area. In my opinion we should push our development of Guam and accelerate our bolstering of the Philippines. The Russo-Axis War may give us more time." (N.C.I. Exhibit 34).

(27) On 2 August 1941, Admiral Stark wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 72), in which he enclosed a copy of a letter which he had written to Captain Charles M. Cooke.

(1) In this letter which was dated 31 July 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 72), Admiral Stark stated with reference to requests that Captain Cooke and Admiral Kimmel had made for information:

"(Some of the things that you have asked, and some of the things which Kimmel has recently asked, and which I will answer as soon as I can, are things for which I have been striving to get answers in Washington. The press on many of these points really gives you as much information as I have." (N.C.I. Exhibit 72).

Admiral Stark then adverted to the "break" of the Russian situation, stating that he had told the President that it afforded the United States the opportunity of commencing to escort ships to aid England. In this connection, Admiral Stark said:

"Within forty-eight hours after the Russian situation broke, I went to the President, with the Secretary's approval, and stated that on the assumption that the Country's decision is not to let England fall, we should immediately seize the psychological opportunity presented by the Russian-German clash and announce and start escorting immediately, and protecting the Western Atlantic on a large scale; that such a declaration, followed by immediate action on our part, would almost certainly involve us in the war and that I considered every day of delay in our getting into the war as dangerous, and that much more delay might be fatal to Britain's survival. I reminded him that I had been asking this for months in the State Department and elsewhere, etc. etc. etc. I have been maintaining that only a war psychology could or would speed things up the way they should be speeded up; that strive as we would it just isn't in the nature of things to get the results in peace that we would, were we at war." (N.C.I. Exhibit 72).

Concerning the Iceland situation, Admiral Stark's letter to Captain Cooke said:

"The Iceland situation may produce an "incident". You are as familiar with that and the President's statements and answers at press conferences as I am. Whether or not we will get an "incident" because of the protection we are giving Iceland and the



shipping which we must send in support of Iceland and our troops, I do not know. Only Hitler can answer." (N.C.I. Exhibit 72).

with reference to the situation in the Far East, Admiral Stark said:

"Personally, I threw into the arena that we consider along with the British a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies, as a move calculated to prevent further spread of war in the Far East. It is a debatable question. Certainly there can be no joy in our camp over the occupation of Indo-China. I think it is fairly safe to say opinion here in general holds that Japan will not go into the N.E.I. Incidentally, we are not nearly so dependent on raw materials from the Near East as the Public envisages. The real problem is a British one - and hence our consideration.

"As you probably know from our despatches, and from my letters, we have felt that the Maritime Provinces are now definitely Japanese objectives. Turner thinks Japan will go up there in August. He may be right. He usually is. My thought has been that while Japan would ultimately go to Siberia, she would delay going until she had the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there is some clarification of the Russian-German clash. Also she may concentrate on the China "incident". Of course, embargoes or near embargoes may cause any old kind of an upset and make a re-estimate of the situation necessary." \* \* \* \* \*

"Reverting to Japan again and to her holding off in Siberia until the Russian-German situation somewhat clarifies, I also think it possible, if not probable, that one of the reasons for Indo-China, and her pressure on Thailand, is a better position for an "all out" to clean up in China. I take my hat off to the Chinks." (N.C.I. Exhibit 72, page 4).

In a postscript to this letter, Admiral Stark added:

"Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual." (N.C.I. Exhibit 72).

As to the Philippines, the letter stated:

"Regarding the Philippines, as you know, even since I came here I have urged increasing their defenses. The Navy's contribution has not been great, but it has been about all Hart can handle with the facilities he has or which we have been able to make available. Still, the increase is a factor, namely 28 FBIs and 11 modern submarines.



"We are delighted with the Army move putting the Filipines in Harness; we recommended this. Also it is being supplemented by a considerable number of planes, fighters and bombers. The Philippines are not too easy a proposition to crack right now, and in a couple of months the Army will have 50,000 odd men there under arms. But that is two months away." (N.C.I. Exhibit 72).

Concerning the difficulties of obtaining equipment, Admiral

Stark stated:

"The pressure, incidentally, to give what we have in ships, guns, ammunition, material, and whatnot, to those actually fighting is constant, and increasing. Several times recently I have been approached for destroyers and the Lord knows whatnot, Marshall's troubles in this respect are legion and of course the fellow at the front wants frequently what we most lack, particularly such things as 50 caliber ammunition, anti-aircraft weapons, patrol vessels, fire control, guns for merchant ships, etc. etc." (N.C.I. Exhibit 72).

As to operating troubles of new airplanes and the obtaining of new air planes, the letter said:

"I have been much distressed over the operating troubles we have had with our new planes. Of course they are gradually being eliminated but it takes time. I still am glad for the 200 PBV repeats we early made and which are coming along. Of course they haven't got what the later ones will have in range and performance, etc. Also, performance will be handicapped by armor and protective features; but we will have them, and they have not delayed the newer models.

"Towers will have given you all the picture on the air game. He went out a good deal at my insistence. With regard to the air, I know also that the training situation has been a good deal of a nightmare. If anybody can convince us of a better solution than the one we recently sent out, we would be glad to get it." (N.C.I. Exhibit 72).

Concerning the neutrality or non-neutrality of the United States,

Admiral Stark said:

"We are doing what we can for China and taking unheard of chances on neutrality; or rather unneutrality. This along with sanctions on Japan make her road certainly no less easy." (N.C.I. Exhibit 72).

(28) On 22 August 1941, Admiral Stark, by personal letter of that date, forwarded to Admiral Kimmel a draft reply dated 19 August 1941 to Admiral Kimmel's letter of July 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 35). Admiral Stark explained that the draft had been prepared by Admiral Ingersol and that he had himself made additions to it in pencil.

(1) The draft reply to Admiral Kimmel discussed at length the various points raised in Admiral Kimmel's letter of 26 July 1941. In respect of Admiral Kimmel's request to be informed of the events in Washington, the draft reply for Admiral Stark said:

"I can readily understand your wish to be kept informed as to the Department's policies and decisions and the changes thereto which must necessarily be made to meet the changes in the international situation. This, we are trying to do, and if you do not get as much information as you think you should get, the answer probably is that the particular situation which is uppermost in your mind has just not jelled sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative." (N.C.I. Exhibit 35, page 1 of draft.)

Admiral Stark's draft then discussed the matter of aid to Russia which had been decided upon by the President and the fact that the conversations that took place at sea on 11 and 12 August between the Chiefs of Staff did not result in any "announced" (this word was substituted in pencil by Admiral Stark for the word "reached") decision that England would declare war on Japan if the latter attacked the Maritime provinces. Admiral Stark further stated that he could make no forecast of what our actions would be if England declared war on Japan. He said, however, that if England did declare war on Japan and we did not, he supposed we would follow a course of action such as we were pursuing as a neutral in the Atlantic and that we might conceivably

lay down a Western Hemisphere Defense plan with reference to the Pacific. He added, "I could get no plan from the British - They did not have one - ABC and Rainbow V still prevail." (id., draft reply, page 2)

(29) On 28 August 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (282121) to CinCPac and others, concerning tasks to be executed under WPL-51, because of the destruction of merchant ships by raiders in the Pacific Ocean. The dispatch read:

"IN VIEW OF THE DESTRUCTION BY RAIDERS OF MERCHANT VESSELS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN WITHIN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NEUTRALITY ZONE AS DEFINED IN THE DECLARATION OF PANAMA OF OCTOBER 3RD 1939 CERTAIN OPERATIONS PRESCRIBED FOR THE ATLANTIC BY WPL 51 ARE HEREBY EXTENDED TO AREAS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AS DESCRIBED HEREIN X FORMAL CHANGES IN WPL 51 WILL BE ISSUED BUT MEANWHILE ACTION ADEES WILL EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS X CINCPAC CONSTITUTE THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE CONSISTING OF TWO 7500 TON LIGHT CRUISERS AND DISPATCH IT TO BALBOA X FOR TASK PURPOSES THIS FORCE WILL OPERATE DIRECTLY UNDER CNO AFTER ENTERING THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA AS DEFINED IN WPL 46 PARA 3222 EXCEPT WESTERN LIMIT IS LONGITUDE 100 DEGREES WEST X WITHIN THE PACIFIC SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND WITHIN THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA THE COMMANDER PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND COMMANDER SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE WILL IN COOPERATION AND ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS EXECUTE THE FOLLOWING TASK: DESTROY SURFACE RAIDERS WHICH ATTACK OR THREATEN UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING X INTERPRET AN APPROACH OF SURFACE RAIDERS WITHIN THE PACIFIC SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER OR THE PACIFIC SOUTHEAST SUB AREA AS A THREAT TO UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING X FOR THE PRESENT THE FORCES CONCERNED WILL BASE BALBOA BUT CNO WILL ENDEAVOR MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR BASING ON SOUTH AMERICAN PORTS AS MAY BE REQUIRED X ACTION ADEES AND COMMANDER SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE INFORM CNO WHEN THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN EFFECT X SENT TO SPENAVO LONDON FOR INFORMATION" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 69).

(30) On 28 August 1941, Admiral Stark wrote a letter to Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 11) in which, among other things, he said:

"Have been trying to get a letter off to you for a week, although what I have already sent you covers fairly well our situation

to date. I do, however, want once again to thank you for your splendid letter of August 12th which has been so thoroughly enjoyed by everybody. It gave us a great close-up of the Fleet which was more than welcome. \* \* \* \* \*

"With regard to the general situation in the Pacific about all I can say is the Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them but just what they are going to do I don't know.

"I told one of their Statesmen this morning that I felt another move, such as one into Thailand, would go a long way towards destroying before the American public what good-will still remained. As you know, I have had some extremely frank talks with them.

"I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender.

"There is much talk of the Japanese barring ships carrying arms to Russia. I am delighted that when Admiral Hart asked us to make the Sulu Sea a closed area we did not do it although there was some pressure here for it. One of my principal reasons against doing it was because of the precedent which it might establish, and thus give the Japs something to hang their hat on if later they wanted to make a similar pronouncement regarding the Sea of Japan. We have to go through one of those holes in the wall to get to the Russian Maritime Provinces. This also brings up the case of the so-called neutrality zone encircling the Western Hemisphere. But that, like the recent closing of the Canal to Japanese ships, is water over the dam and I won't bother you with my troubles on those pronouncements.

"Regardless of the will to do all you want in the line of permanence of personnel, please keep in mind the tremendous expansion we are up against, and the many ships which have to be commissioned. Notwithstanding the fact that at least some of us foresaw that, regardless of our efforts, there just has to be considerable compromise in the arduous task of building up and manning the so-called Two-Ocean Navy, not to mention all the other stuff from AKs and APs to ANs and ATs. \* \* \* \* \*

" I expect all the kicks and forceful reasons you can send me for change and help and I will go just as far as it is humanly possible to do and so will everybody else in the Department. \* \* \* \* \*



" I am delighted the West Coast visits are proving so helpful. I hope they will not have to be stopped but only time will tell.

"I do not recall for the moment whether or not in previous correspondence I acknowledged receipt of your letter of 30 July regarding using one of your carriers for ferrying planes to the Russians. This is just one of the headaches we have here. Incidentally the Russian Ambassador with his gang is coming down to see me tomorrow. I will not put down on paper my feelings about the visit - I will just leave it to your good imagination." (N.C.I. Exhibit 11).

(31) On 12 September 1941 Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark (N.C.I. Exhibit 36) saying, among other things:

"We all listened to the President's speech with great interest. With that and King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in the Atlantic is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific?

"I noted that Bidwell's Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for surface raiders east of 100° West, which seems to clear that up as far as raiders are concerned, but just how significant was the restriction, limiting offensive action to "surface raiders"? Of course I know that the possibility of German or Italian submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improbable, but the question arises as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action. This uncertainty, coupled with current rumors of U. S. - Japanese rapprochement and the absence of any specific reference to the Pacific in the President's speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Specific questions that arise are:

"(a) What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them have been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible, but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, preclude taking the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive measures against German and Italian raiders? In view of the delicate nature of our present Pacific relations, with particular reference to their fluidity, I feel that you are the only one who can answer this question.



"(b) Along the same lines, but more specifically related to the Japanese situation, is what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity. As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea area. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?" (N.C.I. Exhibit 36).

Admiral Kimmel then discussed in general terms the advisability of having a strong Pacific Fleet, his concern over the shortage of carriers, cruisers and destroyers which were required to bear the early offensive operations, and the need that would arise for additional escorts in the Pacific in the event the United States became involved in war with Germany.

Admiral Kimmel then stated:

"I feel better now that we have gotten something at Wake. The success of the Army flight has re-emphasized its importance, and, while by no means "impregnable", its present defensive strength is considerable and will require the exposure of quite a force to capture it. It is even possible that should its capture be an early objective of Japan, such an effort might be supported by a substantial portion of their Combined Fleet, which would create, for us, a golden opportunity if we have the strength here to meet it. Do not misunderstand me - I don't discount the Atlantic problem - but from where I sit, I discount the Pacific problem even less. Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific - and the Pacific is still very much a part of the world situation.

"I know you have these thoughts in mind and share my concern, but I am not sure but that there are some in Washington who might be inclined to overlook them.

"Please let me have your views on the questions raised herein. With regard to offensive action against raiders in the Pacific and submarines off Hawaii, etc., I presume I will get official orders, if any change in present policy is desired." (N.C.I. Exhibit 36).

(32) On 23 September 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel, replying to the latter's letter of 12 September 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 36), and in part, said (N.C.I. Exhibit 12) that no "shocking orders"

had been issued by the President for the Pacific:

"At the present time the President has issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-area.

"The situation in the Pacific generally is far different from what it is in the Atlantic. The operations of raiders in the Pacific at present are not very widespread or very effective. Most of the merchantmen in the Pacific are of United States or Panamanian flag registry. Instituting any steps toward eliminating raiders outside of waters close to the continents of North and South America, might have unfavorable repercussions, which would not be worth the cost to the United States in the long run. The longer we can keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned.

"One of the things you did not mention is what action the United States and the United Kingdom would take were Japan to attack Siberia. The policy of either government under such circumstances has not yet been clarified. In the meantime we are preparing an agenda for staff conversations with the Russians.

"In reply to question (a) your existing orders to escorts are appropriate under the present situation. They are also in accordance with Art. 723 U. S. Navy Regulations; no orders should be given to shoot at the Present Time, other than those clearly set forth in this article. I believe there is little possibility of an Italian or German raider molesting a naval ship, but there might be another "Robin Moore" incident in the Pacific, in which case the President might give orders for action in the Pacific similar to those now in effect in the Atlantic; but that is something for the future. (N.C.I. Exhibit 12).

With respect to Admiral Kimmel's question whether submarine contacts should be depth bombed; he said:

"Regarding question (b), we have no definite information that Japanese Submarines have ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska or our Pacific Coast. They may have been near Wake recently. The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed. (N.C.I. Exhibit 12).

Admiral Stark then reassured Admiral Kimmel that the Pacific Fleet was not to be further reduced in strength:

"We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fleet, and new construction will not make itself felt until next year. (N.C.I. Exhibit 12).

Admiral Kimmel was then told that he should consider in his operating equations, the operations of our Asiatic Fleet and the Fleets of our Allies:

"The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the Far East. Furthermore, the Japan-Soviet situation requires considerable attention from Japan's naval forces. While offensives by the Pacific Fleet in the Central Pacific may not draw important Japanese naval forces in that direction, they ought to have an important effect in pinning the Japanese Navy to northern waters, or to bases in the Western Pacific, and thus divert them away from the Philippines and the Malay Barrier. By copy of my letter to Admiral Hart you now know that the Army is building up its Philippine Garrison, and plans important increases in Army air forces in the Philippines. Dutch and British air and land forces are also gradually increasing in strength. We are now informed by the British that they plan to send the Battleships *ROYAL SOVEREIGN*, *MAMILLES* and *RESOLUTION* to arrive on the East Indian Station by late December; to retain there the *REPULSE* until relieved by the *RENOWN* in January; and to send one or two modern capital ships to the East Indian Station early in the new year. These, with one carrier, and a total of four eight-inch cruisers and thirteen six-inch cruisers (seven modern) ought to make the task of the Japanese in moving southward considerably more difficult. It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time. (N.C.I. Exhibit 12).

Admiral Stark did not consider the Japanese Fleet would be sent in force to the Marshall or Gilbert Islands:

"I may be mistaken, but I do not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet is likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under circumstances that now seem possible. (N.C.I. Exhibit 12).

And he considered the Pacific Fleet strong enough to cope with the situation:

"With regard to the first and last paragraphs on page two, I believe that, in all probability, the Pacific Fleet can operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly can be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty."

Admiral Stark then called Admiral Kimmel's attention to a dispatch concerning Japanese reconnaissance over American territory in the Pacific:

"The following dispatch has just been brought to my attention. You no doubt have seen it but I will quote it as a reminder.

"Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga Retired in interview published in Hochi States Japanese should face future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over Guam total sixteen times once this year without sighting single American plane x American air power Far East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served twelve years as aviator Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Director Japan airways."

And suggested that Admiral Kimmel do likewise over the Mandated Islands:

"In connection with the foregoing would it not be possible for your force to "carefully" get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?" (N.C.I. Exhibit 12).

In a first postscript to this letter of 23 September 1941, (N.C.I. Exhibit 12), Admiral Stark told Admiral Kimmel that Secretary Hull had advised that conversations with the Japanese had reached an "impasse".

He said:

"PS. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse. As I see it we can get nowhere towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some agreement between Japan and China - and just now that seems remote. Whether or not their inability to come to any sort of an understanding just now - is - or is not - a good thing - I hesitate to say." (N.C.I. Exhibit 12)



In a second postscript to this letter of 23 September 1941, (N.C.I. Exhibit 12), he told Admiral Kimmel of a conversation which he had with Japanese Admiral Nomura, and of the success of the American landings in Iceland. He said:

"P.S. #2.

"Admiral Nomura came in to see me this morning. We talked for about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his rope; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before but whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results can not last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situation could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull and I think he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.

"Our transports which recently landed a contingent of Army troops in Iceland will, God willing, in another day be clear of the submarine concentration through which they have had to run and we will breathe easy with regard to them. However, it is a continuous game now and yesterday, I am glad to state, we delivered our first big convoy to the British after having gone through safely from Newfoundland well into the Eastern Atlantic. We also have a combatant force going up to strengthen the Iceland situation for the next few weeks because of the British situation and the possibility of a sortie of a German contingent which is under surveillance." (N.C.I. Exhibit 12).

(33). On 8 October 1941 OpNav sent a despatch (Ø82335) to CinCPac and others, reading:

"On October 11 at Ø2ØØ GCT CANCEL WPL 51 AND PLACE WPL 52 IN EFFECT". (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 77). 1/

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1/ Other information of a general nature, including warning messages, sent to Admiral Kimmel from Washington during the period 16 October - 26 November 1941, is referred to fully, infra, pages 349-359.



(c) Combat Intelligence Concerning Japanese Naval Dispositions  
Sent or Otherwise Available to Admiral Kimmel.

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It appears from the records of the several investigations by the Navy that there was sent or otherwise available to Admiral Kimmel much intelligence information concerning the Japanese fleet organization and ship dispositions. This intelligence consisted in part of despatches and bulletins from the Chief of Naval Operations, despatches and Daily Communication Intelligence Summaries from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District (Pearl Harbor), despatches from the Sixteenth Naval District (Cavite, P.I.) and the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and intelligence from the Pacific Fleet's own intelligence officer. Some of the pertinent despatches and other intelligence transmitted to Admiral Kimmel between May 1940 and 15 October 1941 follow. <sup>1/</sup> Other intelligence concerning Japanese fleet dispositions available to Admiral Kimmel during the later period, 16 October 1941 to 26 November 1941 is discussed in Chapter XIII, infra.

(1) On 6 February 1941, CinCAF reported to OpNav with information copy to CincPac (060845), the location of various units of the Japanese Fleet, as follows:

"PREVIOUSLY REPORTED COMBINED FLEET DETACHMENT CONSISTS OF CRUDIV SEVEN MADE UP OF KUMANO (FLAG) SUZUYA MOGAMI AND ONE OTHER X DESRON FORMED BY ABUKUMA -AND THREE DESDIVS X CARDIV TWO CONSISTING OF RYUJO (FLAG) AND SORYU PLUS FOUR DESTROYERS X A PAT WING OF TWO MIZUHOS OR ONE PLUS NOTORO XX ALL ABOVE UNITS IN TONKIN GULF OR VICINITY HAINAN EXCEPT CARDIV TWO WHICH IS AT

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<sup>1/</sup> The Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Summaries prior to 14 October 1941 are not included herein.

BAKO OR TAKAO XX ASHIGARA ALSO HAINAN AREA X NATORI NEIGHBOR-  
HOOD SAIGON X COMDR SUBFORCE IN KASHIMA AT LAT 29 LONG 135 E  
AT 0900 FOURTH XX OTHER MAJOR UNITS IN HOME WATERS XX CHINA  
SEAS FLEET DISTRIBUTED NORMALLY" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 34).

(2) On 8 February 1941, the Naval Observer at Singapore reported to OpNav with information copy to CincPac (081121) that the Japanese had a string of ships located across the Pacific Ocean from Panama to Auckland, and one off lower California, and that they were calling Tokyo daily. The dispatch read:

"BRITISH REPORT FIVE JAPANESE STATION SHIPS AT TWELVE HUNDRED MILE INTERVALS FROM AUCKLAND TO PANAMA AND ONE OFF LOWER CALIFORNIA SINCE ONE FEB CALLING TOKIO DAILY BETWEEN ZERO SEVEN HUNDRED AND ZERO EIGHT HUNDRED GCT ON EIGHT FOUR HUNDRED KCS USING NAVY PROCEDURE X CALL SIGNS CAN BE FURNISHED" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 116).

(3) On 10 February 1941, Com16 reported to OpNav with information copy to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and to Com14 (101645) among other things, that 5 Japanese submarine divisions had arrived in Saipan area. The dispatch read:

"CHANGES SINCE MY 070427 X ESTIMATED FIVE DIVISIONS SUBMARINES COMSUBFORCE AND TWO SHIPS OF FOUR FLEET ARRIVED SAIPAN AREA FROM JAPAN TODAY X CONVERTED AIRCRAFT TENDER WITH PLANES ENROUTE PALAO X TWO ADDITIONAL VESSELS ON SAIGON-CAMRANH BAY BEARINGS X UNIDENTIFIED SHIP FROM MAIZURU APPROACHING HAINAN" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 35).

(4) On 24 February 1941, Com16 reported to CinCAF with information copy to CinCPac (240940) among other things, that Japanese submarines recently in the Mandates had shifted to Naha Islands. The dispatch read:

"NACARA AND ONE DESDIV (ARE) ONLY COMBINED FLEET COMBATANT UNITS NOW KNOWN REMAINING SOUTH OF TAIWAN XX RYUJO REPORTED POSITION AT LAT 24-00 N. Long 124-00 E X NATORI AT LAT 26-00 N LONG 120-00 E X ASHIGARA AT LAT 22-00 N LONG 118-00 E AT 1800 TWENTYTHIRD XX COMDESRON ONE ABOARD ABUKUMA IN TAKAO AREA XX KATSURIKI REMAINS VICINITY SPRATLEY XX FLAGSHIP SECOND FLEET WITH UNKNOWN NUMBER VESSELS THAT COMMAND PLUS SUBMARINES RECENTLY IN MANDATES NOW IN VICINITY OF NAHA ISLAND" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 36).

(5) On 4 March 1941, Com 16 reported to CinCAF (dispatch 040616) with information copy to CinCPac, that there was a large concentration of the strength of the Combined Japanese Fleet in the Takao-Bako Area. This dispatch stated:

"ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF COMBINED FLEET UNITS NOW CONCENTRATED IN TAKAO-BAKO AREA AT 162 SURFACE VESSELS COMPOSED OF THE FOLLOWING TYPE XX 6 BATTLESHIPS, 24 CRUISERS (CA), 6 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, 4 SEAPLANE TENDERS, 60 DESTROYERS, 42 SUBMARINES, 20 AUXILIARIES XX THESE UNITS HEAVILY SUPPORTED BY COMBINED AIR FORCE INCLUDING GROUPS FROM KANOYA, GENSAN, AND OTHER UNIDENTIFIED UNITS AT PRESENT BASING AT TAKAO, NAHA, AND BASES ON TAIWAN XX THIS ESTIMATE EXCLUSIVE OF SOUTH CHINA FORCES AND IS BASED ON TRAFFIC ROUTING AND D/F BEARINGS XX ALL OF ABOVE PARTICIPATED IN PROBLEM REPORTED IN AREA BETWEEN NAHA AND TAIWAN IN MY 270755 OF FEBRUARY" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 37).

(6) On 5 April 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (051645) to Com14 with information copy to CinCPac, CinCAF, Com16 and Com13, advising of a reassignment of the tasks of tracking Japanese merchant ships in the Pacific Ocean and of taking bearings on the Japanese Mandate Force. The dispatch stated:

"TASK OF TRACKING ALL JAP MERCHANT SHIPS IN EASTERN PACIFIC ASSIGNED COMMANDANT THIRTEEN BY OPNAV SERIAL 45020 NOW IN MAIL X COM FOURTEEN HEREBY ASSIGNED SIMILAR PROJECT FOR MID PACIFIC AREA WEST OF HAWAIIAN ISLANDS AND TO ASSIST WHEN REQUESTED BY COM SIXTEEN IN TAKING BEARINGS ON MANDATE FORCE." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 38).

(7) On 4 June 1941, Com16 sent a dispatch (040830) to OpNav with information copy to CinCPac and CinCAF, advising, among other things, that there was located in the vicinity of Jaluit, the Katori, flagship of the Fourth Fleet, together with at least one squadron of destroyers, some submarines and one carrier. The dispatch further stated:

"KATORI SUBMARINE FLAGSHIP WITH AT LEAST ONE SQUADRON SUBMARINES PLUS KAMOI AND (A) MARU SEAPLANE TENDER BETWEEN GUAM AND FOURTH

FLEET UNITS XX TWO GROUPS NOT IN COMPANY BY RADIO COMMUNICATION XX CHOGEI PROCEEDING TOWARDS TRUK XX UNIDENTIFIED MAN OF WAR GIVES

POSITION ONE FIFTY SEVEN EAST ZERO TWO NORTH AT LOCAL NOON THIRD NOT VERIFIED BY BEARINGS." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 39).

(8) On 4 June 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (042257) to CinCPac, CinCAF and Com16, which referred to the traffic analysis by CinCPac and Com14 that indicated intense Japanese activity on the Marshall and Caroline Islands. The dispatch indicated the concern of the Chief of Naval Operations over such activity, stating:

"HAVE HEARD THAT RADIO TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND D/F OPERATIONS PRESUMABLY CONDUCTED BY CINCPAC AND COM 14 HAVE INDICATED INTENSE

JAPANESE ACTIVITIES IN MARSHALL AND CAROLINE ISLANDS FOR SOME MONTHS PAST X UNDERSTAND THAT ABOVE SOURCE INDICATES AT TIMES

A TOTAL OF ABOUT FORTY SURFACE VESSELS AND TWELVE SUBMARINES HAVE BEEN OPERATING IN THIS AREA THAT A CONSIDERABLE FORCE OF

LANDPLANE BOMBERS HAVE BEEN LOCATED AT SAIPAN AND THAT AIRFIELDS CAPABLE OF HANDLING LONG RANGE LANDPLANE BOMBERS HAVE BEEN CONS-

TRUCTED AT POINTS IN THE EASTERN MANDATES AND THAT SEVERAL ISLANDS IN THIS AREA HAVE BEEN GARRISONED X ADDRESSEES MAKE DES-

PATCH REPORT OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND ESTIMATES CONCERNING ACTIVITIES IN MANDATES X PARTICULARLY DESIRE LOCATION DISTRIBUTION IDENTIFICATION CHARACTER OF FORCES AND EXTENT OF IMPROVEMENTS NAVAL AND AIR FACILITIES X DESIRE THAT DEPARTMENT BE KEPT CONTINUOUSLY INFORMED THIS SUBJECT." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 40).

(9) On 6 June 1941, CinCPac sent a lengthy dispatch (060243) to OpNav with information copy to Com16 and CinCAF concerning Japanese activities in the Mandated Islands, reading:



CONTINUOUS SHUTTLE TRIPS MANDATES OF APPROX FORTY FIVE AUXILIARIES WITH SUPPLIES STORES MATERIAL X SUPPLY AND MUNITIONS ADMINISTRATION CENTERED TRUK BRANCH OFFICES OTHER ISLANDS X CIVIL ENGINEER DETACHMENTS ACTIVE ON JALUIT ENYBOR EMIDJ WOTJE ENIWEITOK TAROA KWAJELIEN PONAPE TRUK PALAO PELELIU SAIPAN PAPAN BELIEVED CONNECTION INSTALLATION EXPANSION AIRFIELDS X NAVY YARD DETACHMENTS ACTIVE ON TRUK PALAO SAIPAN JALUIT X DEFENCE FORCES AT JALUIT WOTJE ENIWEITOK TAROA PONAPE TRUK AND SAIPAN X KNOWN PRESENCE NAVAL ORDNANCE OFFICERS AT ENIWEITOK TAROA KWAJELIEN PALAO SIGNIFICANT POSSIBILITY SIMILAR WORK OTHER ISLANDS INDICATED X POSSIBLE ARMY GARRISONS AT PALAO SAIPAN TRUK JALUIT X NAVAL MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH NOT KNOWN ESTIMATED JALUIT AREA TRUK PONAPE SECTOR PALAO AND SAIPAN ONE THOUSAND EACH X FIELDS FOR LAND BOMBER OPERATIONS BELIEVED READY AT SAIPAN PALAO PELELIU TRUK PONAPE JALUIT WOTJE MANEUVERS RECENTLY SUGGEST MARCUS ALSO USED X INDICATIONS AIRCRAFT OVERHAUL REPAIR REPLACEMENT CENTERS AT PALAO SAIPAN POSSIBLY ALSO TRUK JALUIT X NAVAL STRENGTH X FOURTH FLEET PLUS SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT AUXILIARIES DISPOSITION LATTER BY AREAS YOKOSUKA TWELVE JALUIT THIRTEEN PALAO AND YAP TEN SAIPAN TEN TRUK NINE PONAPE TWO MARCUS FOUR X CURRENT MANEUVERS SUMMARY X JOINT FOURTH FLEET COMBINED AIR FORCE SUBRON

ONE OPERATIONS MANDATES SIMILAR LAST AUGUST SEPT X FOURTH  
FLEET NOW JALUIT AREA ACTING AS BLUE FORCE X COMBINED AIR  
FORCE NOW TRUK PONAPE AREA PLUS SUBRON ONE AND MANDATE  
AIRCRAFT MISSION SEARCH LOCATE DESTROY DENY MANDATES TO  
BLUE X COMBINED AIRFORCE PROBABLY PROCEEDING MARSHALLS X  
FOURTH FLEET OBJECTIVE BELIEVED JALUIT WOTJE SUBFOR MAY BASE  
AT KWAJELIEN X COMSUBFOR IN KATORI SEVENTEEN HOURS FOUR JUNE  
LAT NINE FORTY NORTH LONG ONE SIX NINE THIRTY EAST X INDICA-  
TIONS RYUJO KAMOI AND ONE XAV IN DEFENDING FORCE X MANEUVER  
CHARACTER EXERCISES ESTABLISHED UMPIRE IN KATORI X ACTIVITIES  
KURILES EXTENDING CAPE LOPATKA AREA BELIEVED PARALLEL EXERCISES  
PRINCIPALLY AIR OPERATIONS PROBABLY SHORE BASED SEAPLANES POS-  
SIBILITY HOSHO PARTICIPATION OFF ETOROFU ISLAND." (Hew. Exhibit  
70, Document 41).

(10) On 9 June 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet,  
sent a dispatch (ø9ø124) to the Chief of Naval Operations with in-  
formation copy to CinCPac, Com14 and Com16, in which he referred  
to the OpNav dispatch of 4 June 1941 (ø42257), and to CinCPac's  
reply. He stated that he considered these to indicate that he  
may not have been getting all the intelligence that was available  
to the Pacific Fleet and Mid-Pacific Communication Intelligence  
Nets, and he requested that he be given all such information. The  
dispatch read:

"OPNAV 042257 AND CINCPAC REPLY THERETO INDICATE THAT PACIFIC FLEET AND MID-PACIFIC COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE NETS MAY OFTEN HAVE INFORMATION OF ORANGE ACTIVITIES WHICH SHOULD PROMPTLY BE PASSED TO ME BUT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN DONE IN THE PAST XX IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT INSTRUCTIONS BE GIVEN WHICH WILL INSURE THAT IN FUTURE I BE FURNISHED SUCH INFORMATION WITHOUT FAIL." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 42).

(11) On 10 June 1941, Com16 sent a dispatch (100415) to CinCAF with information copy to CinCPac concerning Japanese forces and activities at Palao, Truk, Saipan, Jaluit, and other places. The dispatch read:

"SUPPLEMENTING GUAM'S MARCH REPORT MAILED VIA NITRO AND CINCUS TWO DESPATCHES OF SIX JUNE X PERMANENT NAVAL DEFENSE FORCES COMPOSITION ROUGHLY ONE DIVISION SUBCHASERS SIX TO TEN AUXIL-

IARIES LANDING PARTIES ENGINEERING AND ORDNANCE UNITS ASHORE WITH HEADQUARTERS AS FOLLOWS THIRD AT PALAO FOURTH AT TRUK FIFTH SAIPAN SIXTH JALUIT X EACH HAS DETACHMENTS ON ISLANDS IN GEOGRAPH-

ICAL AREA EXAMPLE UNDER TRUK ARE UNITS AT OLOL KUSAI GREENWICH PONAPE LAMOTREK XX IN MARIANNAS GROUP ARE NAVAL SHORE BATTERIES LOOKOUT STATIONS PROBABLY SEARCHLIGHT INSTALLATIONS AS REFERENCE

MADE TO NIGHT LIGHT DRILLS XX MINESWEEPER DIVISION SIXTEEN BASED JALUIT XX NAVAL AIR UNITS TYPES UNKNOWN AT SAIPAN X SEVENTH AIR CORPS AT PONAPE X SIXTEENTH SEAPLANE SQUADRON PALAO TWO OTHER

STATIONS OR FIELDS UNDER JURISDICTION PALAO INCLUDING BASE AT HELENS REEF X UNKNOWN AT TRUK IMIEJI MARCUS JALUIT XX ARMY ESTABLISHMENT ADMINISTRATION COMPLETELY SEPARATE FROM NAVY AS IN CASE

OF TRANSPORT SERVICE IN CHINA XX NO INFORMATION XX FOURTH FLEET DOES NOT BASE PERMANENTLY IN MANDATES INVARIABLY RETURNING TO JAPAN AFTER MANEUVERS XX CURRENT REFERENCES TO COMBINED AIR FORCE

SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS UNITS UNDER MAJOR AIR COMMANDER WITH HEADQUARTERS KANOYA BELIEVED TO ADMINISTER ALL NAVAL AVIATION EXCEPT CARRIERS X AIR UNITS NOW OPERATING IN MANDATES

ARE RYUJO KAMOI OMIKAZE ONE OR MORE CONVERTED TENDERS WITH ATTACHED SQUADRONS POSSIBLY SHORE BASED SQUADRON FROM KANOYA" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 43).

(12) On 20 June 1941, Com16 sent a dispatch (200635) to OpNav with information copy to CinCPac containing a summary of Japanese naval activity over a wide area and in many places, including the Mandates, Truk, Amoy-Bako area, Shanghai, etc., reading:

"SUMMARY ORANGE NAVAL ACTIVITY XX IN MANDATES SUBFORCE MINIMUM FIVE DIVISIONS CONTINUES OPERATIONS TRUK-PONAPE AREA X FOURTH

FLEET DESRON AND SUBRON UJELONG-KWAJELONG X RYUJO MOVED FROM TRUK TO NORTHEAST OF GUAM ON NINETEENTH X FIRST AND SECOND

FLEETS ENGAGED IN MIXED EXERCISES SUBMARINES OPERATING WITH CRUISERS AND AIRCRAFT GROUPS FROM BOTH FLEETS XX CARRIER DIVISION

AKAGI AND KAGA OFF SASEBO OR KAGOSHIMA AND HAS ESTABLISHED DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH KATORI IN MANDATES POSSIBLY INDICATING SOME

FUTURE RENDEZVOUS OR JOINT OPERATIONS XX SECOND FLEET COMMANDER ORIGINATED SERIES OF MOVEMENT REPORTS PAST TWO DAYS BUT TRAFFIC

ROUTING SHOWS FLEET NOT CONCENTRATED XX SOUTH CHINA UNITS ARE MOSTLY NORTH OF AMOY-BAKO LINE AS ARE ALL UNITS OF BASE FORCE XX

ADDITIONAL VESSELS NOTED IN LATTER ORGANIZATION SINCE MY 180630 DESTROYERS MATSUKAZE AND HATAKAZE FOUR MORE WARSHIPS THREE MORE

MARUS IN TWO DIVISIONS X SEAPLANE TENDER REPORTED IS NOTORO X FORCE FLAGSHIP NAGARA VICE ADMIRAL TAKAHASHI NOW AT SHANGHAI X

AT LEAST ONE SHIP ENTERED AMOY X NO HEAVY SHIPS NOTED." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 44).

(13) On 24 June 1941, Com16 sent a dispatch (240225) to OpNav with information copy to CinCPac, stating among other things that according to a decrypted message the 19th, the Japanese organization briefly referred to as the "Base Force" was referred to as "the Third Fleet". The dispatch continued:

\*\*\*NO CHANGES IN LOCATION OF UNITS SINCE LAST REPORT X ADD ONE MAN OF WAR AND ONE MARU TO LIST OF SHIPS X DECIPHERED

FRAGMENTS OF MESSAGE FROM CINC THIRD FLT YESTERDAY REFERS TO FUTURE OPERATIONS SCHEDULED BY OR WITH ARMY FORCES FROM OR IN VICINITY SWATOW XX SUBMARINES RETURNING FROM MANDATES TO JAPAN X FLAGSHIP FOURTH FLEET REMAINS ON BEARING 098 FROM GUAM." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 46).

(14) On 8 July 1941, Com16 sent a dispatch (080744) to OpNav with information copy to CinCPac, giving a summary of the dispositions and operations of the Third, Fourth, South China and Combined Fleets of the Japanese Navy, as follows:

"DISPOSITIONS AND OPERATIONS ORANGE NAVY X SUMMARY X  
THIRD FLEET:

ALL UNIT FLAGSHIPS ON BEARINGS BETWEEN AMOY AND FOCHOW

SOUTH CHINA FLEET:

ASHIGARA OFF SWATOW OR SOMEWHAT SOUTH X NATORI IN LADRONES OR BIAS BAY X OTHER UNITS ON NORMAL BLOCKADE DUTY X NAVAL OPERATIONS ON KWANGTUNG COAST VICINITY SWATOW APPEAR TO BE ON VERY

MINOR SCALE X EVIDENCE ACCUMULATES THAT CARDIV TWO COMPOSED OF HIRYU AND SORYU WILL PROCEED TO SOUTH CHINA IN NEAR FUTURE X EXCEPT FOR OCCASION OF PRESSURE ON INDO-CHINA IN FEBRUARY THE

DESPATCHING OF CARRIERS HAS ALWAYS BEEN PRELIMINARY TO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THIS AREA



FOURTH FLEET:

KASHIMA DESRON SUBRON AND AIRRON 24 WITH FLAG IN KAMO I IN MARSHALLS

COMBINED FLEET:

LITTLE EXACT INFORMATION AVAILABLE X NAGATO IN COMMUNICATION WITH YOKOSUKA ON SHORT RANGE LOW FREQUENCY NOT HEARD HERE VARIOUS MINOR UNITS MOVING BETWEEN MAIN BASES X SUBMARINES

AND FLEET AIRCRAFT LESS CARDIV TWO PLANNING OR COMMENCING SOME JOINT OPERATION PROBABLY EXERCISE." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 53).

(15) On 11 July 1941, Com16's dispatch (110705) to OpNav with information copy to CinCPac, referred to the fact that indications were increasing that the Japanese would carry out operations on a considerable scale in South China or French Indo-China. The dispatch then referred to some Japanese Navy radio traffic, and to the fact that the Japanese Third Fleet had a strength of 48 warships and 29 auxiliaries or converted merchantmen. The dispatch read:

\*\*\*\*NAVAL GENERAL STAFF YESTERDAY SENT TWO URGENT MESSAGES TO CINC COMBINED AND CHINA SEAS FLEETS WITH CINC SOUTH CHINA COM-

CARDIV TWO HAINAN AND BAKO INFORMATION ADDRESSEES X FOLLOWING THIS CINC CHINA ORIGINATED MOST URGENT DESPATCH TO FORCES UNDER

HIS COMMAND PLUS CARDIV TWO X JUNIOR COMMANDERS FOLLOWED UP WITH SIMILAR MESSAGES X SOUTH CHINA ADMIRAL AND STAFF SHIFTED FLAG

TEMPORARILY FROM ASHIGARA AND MAY HAVE GONE TO CANTON IN GUNBOAT X SENT MESSAGE TODAY WITH ENCIPHERED ADDRESS TRANSLATED AS SECOND

CONVOY FLEET LESS SUPPLY FORCE TO FLAGSHIPS OF CHINA SEAS AND THIRD FLEETS X AT NOON THIS DATE NAVY MINISTRY SENT URGENT TRAFFIC

BELIEVED TO BE DIRECTIVES FOR CRUISER DIVISION SEVEN (FOUR KUMANO CLASS) TO PROCEED TO SOUTH CHINA X AIRRON SIX INCLUD-

ING KAMIKAWA MARU AND NOTORO RETURNED YESTERDAY TO THIRD FLEET ZONE X IMPORTANT RADIOS FROM FLEET COMMANDERS AND MINISTRY

HAVE BEEN RELAYED TO NAVAL ATTACHE THAILAND AND HANOI-HAIPHONG OFFICES DURING PAST SEVERAL DAYS X SUMMARY OF THIRD FLEET

STRENGTH SHOWS 48 WARSHIPS 29 AUXILIARIES OR CONVERTED MERCHANTMEN." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 54).

(16) On July 1941, the Naval Observer at Wellington sent a dispatch (230803) to OpNav with information copy to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, reporting that the Japanese survey ship Katsuriki was operating on 17 July in the vicinity of the Gilbert Islands, and that British Intelligence reports indicated that this ship almost always made an appearance prior to important Japanese military operations. (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 130).

(17) On 24 July 1941, Com16 reported in a dispatch (241046) to OpNav with information copy to CinCPac that there was no doubt that a large movement of Japanese Army forces was under way. This dispatch read as follows:

"ASHIGARA WITH ARMY COMMANDER ON BOARD BEARING DECREASED TO 285 AT 0300 GCT X REMAINS UNCHANGED SINCE THAT TIME X NAGARA OFF SOUTHERN HAINAN X NAVAL CIRCUITS OVERLOADED WITH ARMY TRAFFIC X CINC SOUTH CHINA USING CALL OF COMMANDER CONVOY FLEET X MOST MESSAGES ARE OF HIGH OR UTMOST PRIORITY X THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT

MOVEMENT OF LARGE ARMY FORCES IS UNDERWAY." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 60).

(18) On 29 July 1941, the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, issued a monograph, serial No. 29-41, with 20 copies for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, (Admiral Kimmel) (Hew. Exhibit 81), showing the "Organization of the Japanese Fleet." The report stated:

"(1) The Japanese Naval Forces afloat are organized into two main commands - the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China.

"(2) The Combined Fleet includes units such as the Fourth Fleet, which were formerly presented as quasi-independent units. According to reliable information, the Japanese now have the following subdivisions in the Combined Fleet;

- (a) First Fleet or Battle Force.
- (b) Second Fleet or Scouting Force.
- (c) Third Fleet or Blockade and Shipping Control Force.
- (d) Fourth Fleet or Mandated Islands Defense Force.
- (e) Submarine Force (also called the Sixth Fleet)

"(3) The Japanese Naval Forces in China are divided into three main commands:

- (a) The 1st China Expeditionary Fleet (or Central China Fleet)
- (b) The 2nd China Expeditionary Fleet (or South China Fleet)
- (c) The 3rd China Expeditionary Fleet (or North China Fleet)

"(4) It will be noted that the Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. Only a few vessels are undergoing repair, or are attached to Naval Stations. Many merchant ships, not shown on the following pages,

have been taken over by the Navy. It is evident that Japan has marshalled its full naval strength and is on a full wartime footing.

s/ A. H. McCollum."

The monograph stated the exact composition of the several Japanese Fleets, and, with reference to the Carrier Divisions, stated:

(i) that there was attached to the First Fleet, Cardiv 3 (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU CVs), Cardiv 5 RYUJO, HOSHO CVs), and Cardiv 7 (CHITOSE, CHIYODA, MIZUHO, CVs);

(ii) Second Fleet, Cardiv 1 (AKAGI, KAGA CVs) and Cardiv 2 (SORYU, HIRYU, CVs);

(iii) Third Fleet, Cardiv 6 NOTORO, KAMIKAWA MARU, CVs) (Hew. Exhibit 81).

(19) On 7 August 1941, Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, issued and distributed to his Fleet Commanders and to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, an intelligence bulletin dated 4 August 1941, which stated in detail the organization of the Japanese Fleet as well as a summary of Japanese Naval activities in the Mandated Islands (Hew. Exhibit 65).

This Pacific Fleet intelligence bulletin stated  
that the Japanese Navy was organized in fleets as follows: <sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup>The word "orange" was used in this Bulletin to designate Japan.

- (i) Combined Fleet, Cardiv 3, (HOSHO, RYUJO, and SHOKAKU..? CVs);
- (ii) Second Fleet, AKAGI, CV, Flagship of Commander Cardivs, Cardiv 2, (KAGA, SHOKAKU ?) Cardiv 2, (SORYU, HIRYU CVs);
- (iii) Third Fleet, Carrier Division 2, (ex-Second Fleet) (SORYU, HIRYU CVs).

This bulletin pointed out that it should not be considered that the above organization would be adhered to at all times by the Japanese Navy, stating:

"The above organization is believed to be quite accurate but attention is invited to the fact that ORANGE may (and probably will) regroup Fleets or units of Fleets into special Task Forces (or new Fleets) for special operations or to meet given conditions; for example: when ORANGE wanted to make a show of force in connection with its benevolent mediation in the THAILAND -- FRENCH INDO-CHINA Dispute during the latter part of January 1941, a special reenforcement unit was sent from the FIRST and SECOND FLEETS to the SOUTH CHINA FLEET. This unit consisted of CRUDIV 7 (4 CA), DESRON 1 (1CL - 16 DD), CARDIV 2 (2 CV - 1 DESRON), 1 AV and 1 or more XAV. The THIRD FLEET was actually organized in April 1941, but did not operate as such until the political situation permitted the FRENCH INDO-CHINA BASE question to be forced in June - July 1941. It is of interest to note that the reenforcement of the SOUTH CHINA FLEET in January was a "Rehearsal Run" for the organization of the THIRD FLEET. Although the submarines were organized and operated in a separate Fleet (6th), they have also been split to operate with the 1st and 2nd FLEETS as well. The inclusion of the 3 COMBINED AIR FORCES into the 6th FLEET substantiates past reports of Joint Maneuvers of Submarines and Air Force with stress on their cooperation in Fleet Problems and Exercises." (Hew. Exhibit 65).

This intelligence report stated generally with reference to Japanese military installations in the Mandates:



"For many years Japan has effectively prevented observation of activities in the MANDATED ISLANDS. However, it is known that as a result of extensive hydrographic and meteorological surveys, considerable expansion and improvements have been completed in harbor development, "commercial" air facilities, communications and meteorological establishments in the principal islands (JALUIT, PONAPE, KUSAIE, TRUK, PALAO, and SAIPAN). Since late in 1940 ORANGE Naval and Air Operations in this area have increased and some forty to forty-five naval auxiliaries (cargo, transport, supply, and tankers . . . . . ex-merchant marine) now make continuous shuttle trips to the MANDATES with personnel, material, equipment and supplies." (Hew. Exhibit 65).

With reference to Japanese activities in progress in the Mandates, the report stated in part:

"When BLUE held Fleet XXI, the ORANGE FOURTH FLEET took up stations in the Eastern Mandates and intensified its radio intercept activities in conjunction with ORANGE trans-Pacific naval tankers. In late August - early September, 1940, ORANGE held maneuvers in the Mandated areas using the Air arm (carrier and shore-based planes) and Submarine Force to search for, locate, and attack a hypothetical enemy Force (represented by the FOURTH FLEET) advancing to the West from the vicinity of the Northern Gilberts. The general defense line seemed to be PONAPE - TRUK but details or conclusions of the exercises are not known. It may be significant that on the next Fleet reorganization, December, 1940, a separate SUBMARINE (SIXTH) FLEET was formed (See Section A).

"ORANGE's decision to speed up the militarization was apparently reached concurrently with the signing of the Tri-Partite Pact, as movements of naval reserve auxiliaries (taken over from the Merchant Marine) to the Mandates became apparent thereafter. Since late in nineteen forty this movement of personnel, materials and supplies has progressively increased until in July, 1941, there were approximately forty to forty-five ships constantly engaged in round trips between ORANGE mainland and the Mandates. An analysis shows about sixty-five percent of this shipping is destined for the Eastern CAROLINES and MARSHALLS.

"Considerable air activity has been in evidence at SAIPAN, PALAO, TRUK, PONAPE and in the JALUIT area. Foreign steamers

nearing these areas have been subjected to aircraft observations and close scrutiny by Patrol Planes, Bombers and Fighters. Heavy landplane bombers have made reconnaissance flights over the GILBERT ISLANDS (TARAWA, BUTARITARI, and BERU)." (Hew. Exhibit 65). \* \* \* \* \*

"During late May 1941 ORANGE held maneuvers in the Mandates in connection with the dispatch of a part of the COMBINED AIR FORCE to that area (indoctrinal training?). The RYUJO (and possibly the HIRYU) and about half of the SUBMARINE FLEET also took part in this exercise. It is believed that the FOURTH FLEET acted as an "Enemy Fleet" attempting to penetrate into the MARSHALLS, with the AIR FORCES plus the SUBMARINE FLEET attempting to intercept them. It was reported that the ORANGE strategic high frequency Direction Finder net was active in this Phase, funnelling information to the AIR and SUBMARINE FORCES on a common chain via SAIPAN and there is some evidence that these Forces were under a unified command. After visits at WOTJE, KWAJELIN, and JALUIT the additional forces returned to their normal operating units at the end of June." (Hew. Exhibit 65).

(20) On 30 September, 1941 Com 16 sent a dispatch (300211) to OpNav with information copy to CinCUS and Com 14, which estimated that three divisions of Japanese Fleet submarines were then exercising in the Chichijima-Marcus-Marshall area, and that the submarine force flagship was at Kure. The dispatch continued:

"TRAFFIC ASSOCIATIONS INDICATED NEW CARRIER DIVISION FORMED RECENTLY X INCLUDES THREE VESSELS WITH MAN-OF-WAR CALLS X LAST VESSEL JOINED THIS DIVISION ABOUT TWENTYFIVE SEPTEMBER XX ISUZU AND KASHII ONLY FIRSTLINE VESSELS REMAINING ON FRENCH INDOCHINA AND SOUTH CHINA COAST X SHIFT OF SOUTH CHINA FLAG TO ISUZU PROBABLY TEMPORARY SINCE ASHIGARA STILL INCLUDED AS PART SOUTH CHINA FORCE IN TRAFFIC." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 99).

(21). On 5 October 1941, the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai sent a dispatch to OpNav, with information copy to CinCPac, stating, among other things that the main Japanese

Fleet departed 28 October for the Kure area, that the Ixumo, converted carrier, was launched on 30 October at Kobe and moved to a dock formerly occupied by the Zuikaku, and that it was reported that all Japanese tankers were being armed with two guns. (Hew. Exhibit 27, Document serial No. 11-117).

(22) The Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Summary of 14 October 1941 stated there were 30 Japanese naval auxiliaries in the Mandates (Hew. Exhibit 22). The summary of 15 October 1941, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel, identified many Marus (Japanese Merchant Ships) and other ships in the Mandates, and other places (Hew. Exhibit 22). With reference to the Japanese submarines and carriers, the summary of this date stated:

"SUBMARINES - Continued activity on submarine frequency (6385) by vessels using secret calls. DF bearings indicate they are approximately in the Chichijima Yokosuka-Kagoshima area.

"AIR ACTIVITIES - Kaga continues as flagship of Cardiv. The SHOKAKU and Commander of the Cardiv are in the NAHA - Takao area. Also it is believed one of the large airons in Combined Air Force, (TOME 2) is also in same vicinity and that Commander Cardiv 3 (NUYA 88) and the HOSHO are connected with these vessels in some maneuver going on or planned as all were associated in despatch headings. Indications are that two or three large groups of Combined Air Force are in the Genzan - Chinkai Area. (YUMO 8, YOME 7, MOO 0?). Ashigara originated dispatch to 11th Air Base which was forwarded to Maizuru for delivery." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 45).