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- PART THREE -

W-A-S-H-I-N-G-T-O-N, H-A-W-A-I-I a-n-d t-h-e P-A-C-I-F-I-C

16 OCTOBER 1941 - 26 NOVEMBER 1941

CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING ADEQUACY OF FLEET AND DEFENSE FORCES
16 OCTOBER - 26 NOVEMBER -- PROPOSED RECONNAISSANCE TO GUARD
AGAINST JAPANESE CARRIER RAID IN OUTLYING ISLANDS -- OTHER
DEFENSE PROPOSALS

This very significant period (16 October 1941 - 26 November 1941), can be considered as commencing with the change in the Japanese Cabinet, and as ending with the almost simultaneous sortie of the Japanese Striking Force from Takanak Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles, for the attack on Pearl Harbor; the delivery to the Japanese envoys in Washington of the note of the United States outlining the policy of this country; and the sending by the Navy Department of its "war warning" message to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor.

During this period, there was a further exchange of correspondence between Admiral Kimmel and Washington concerning the adequacy of the local defense forces, and Admiral Stark again indicated to Admiral Kimmel that it was necessary to use the Fleet to supplement the local forces. There occurred in Hawaii during this period a coordination meeting between the Army and Navy with respect to the Information Center for implementing air defense measures. Also, during this period, certain defense actions were proposed and considered, including an air reconnaissance of areas to the westward and Army reinforcements of the outlying islands. For the most part these proposals were not put into effect.

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(a) Adequacy of Local Defense Forces and of the Fleet

(1) On 17 October 1941 the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations (N.C.I. Exhibit 46), via the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, subject, "Appraisal of Local Defense Forces, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier," stating in part:

"2. The only increment that has been made to these forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, is the U.S.S. SACRAMENTO which has no battery, to speak of, with which the vessel can fight, and no speed with which she can run.

"3. Although the writer of this letter is aware that the department has been fully informed about the deficiencies in this district, he feels it necessary to again bring this subject to attention.

"4. Recently, the Commandant endeavored to obtain, without much success, from the Commander-in-Chief the assignment of certain planes which could be used in connection with anti-submarine patrol. The only planes now available for this purpose are Army planes, and the types and numbers are inadequate for the purpose.

"5. The only anti-submarine vessels now in the district are the four destroyers of Destroyer Division EIGHTY, one still being unequipped with listening gear, and three Coast Guard cutters. These vessels will not only have to be used for hunting and tracking down submarines but will also be required for escort and security patrols in a very extensive frontier.

"6. It is urged that the department send a number of small, fast craft to this district equipped with listening gear and depth charges for this purpose. It is further urged that the department send to this district at least two squadrons of VSO planes which can be used for patrol against enemy submarines.

"7. Nearly all of the failures of the British have been caused by what may be expressed in the cliché 'too little and too late.' It is hoped that we may profit from their errors." (N.C.I. Exhibit 46).

Admiral Bloch's letter of 17 October was forwarded by Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet by first endorsement, the copy of which in evidence bears no date. (N.C.I. Exhibit 46). In his endorsement, Admiral Kimmel again stated that units of the Fleet should not be relied on for local defense, as such would prevent them from being at and protecting the security of the sea. He said:

"2. There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to furnish the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the U. S. Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A Fleet, tied to its bases by diversion to other purposes, of light forces necessary for its security at sea, is, in a real sense, no Fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned, but as many more as can possibly be made available.

"3. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs." (N.C.I. Exhibit 46, 1st endorsement).

(2) Admiral Kimmel stated in his letter to Admiral Stark of 22 October 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 14) that he desired to obtain additional PT boats and some destroyers. He said if he had one or two additional patrol ships it would ease his situation enormously, and that he desired to have also additional submarines and cruisers. With reference to aircraft carriers he stated:

"The type of operations we have planned in the early stages of the war puts a premium on aircraft operations from carriers. We have only three. One of them is occupied part-time in training

activities at San Diego. I note in a letter signed by Ingersoll and received today that the chances of getting a merchant ship converted to a carrier for training purposes at San Diego are very poor. I feel that this matter should be pushed; that we should have at least one such vessel in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. Until we do get such a ship we are required to occupy a considerable time of a carrier at a greatly increased cost, diversion from active operations and reduction in the efficiency of the carrier. These carrier training vessels will be useful so long as the war lasts and will pay for themselves many times over.

"We had information some time ago that you were converting two sea train vessels for use in transporting aircraft. What has become of them? Are they operating in the Atlantic and do you propose to send one of these to the Pacific? If so - when? We still find it necessary to send a carrier to San Diego to ferry planes." (N.C.I. Exhibit 14).

(3) In the same letter of 22 October 1941 to Admiral Stark, Admiral Kimmel referred to fleet training and radar experience:

"I feel that the training in the Fleet is coming along very well. The shooting so far has been very good by any standards. We are developing the use of radar and our principal handicap at the present time is lack of material and lack of trained personnel. Both are being remedied at a satisfactory rate. We have had no experience yet with the use of gunnery radar. The first sets are now being installed. The gunnery radar installed in the HONOLULU Class is a bitter disappointment. They have been able to get surface ships at ranges not in excess of twenty thousand yards on a big ship, and around twelve thousand on a destroyer. This radar is apparently useless for the detection of air craft. Luckily, this type is being installed in the HONOLULU Class only. It is useful only for short range work against surface craft at night or in low visibility. I presume steps are being taken to eliminate or radically improve this type of radar.

"The radar installed in the battleships and carriers is well worthwhile and we have got highly creditable results from its use." (N.C.I. Exhibit 14).

(4) Admiral Stark in his letter of 7 November 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 74), in responding to Admiral Kimmel's letter of 22 October 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 14), said in respect of Admiral Kimmel's

desire to have more ships:

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"I note the great desirability of many things for the Pacific Fleet - particularly destroyers and cruisers. We just haven't any destroyers or cruisers to give you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you with a recital of King's troubles, but he is up against it for DDs for escort - and defense against raiders.

"The NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON are not expected to be available before March. As pointed out in my letter of September 23, 1941, I do not think any permanent assignment of either or both of these ships can be made at this time. We are assigning them to King now in the interest of training, ***** etc.

"With the possible exception of one division, it is our intention to send the long-range submarines to the Pacific as they come along. As you no doubt know, twenty-seven (27) of the 1525-ton SS are due for completion in calendar 1942". (N.C.I. Exhibit 74).

(5) On 24 November 1941, a meeting was called at the Information Center in Hawaii for the purpose of determining how quickly it could be fully operative on a wartime basis and what additional equipment and personnel might be needed (N.C.I. Exhibit 62). 1/

The meeting was attended by the representatives of the Army and Navy in Hawaii, including Lieutenant Commander Coe from Patrol Wing TWO and Lieutenant Commander Taylor.

Many points were discussed and generally agreed upon, including the following:

(1) Function of Information Center:

"In this connection it was pointed out that it would not be the function of the Information Center to order various activities (other than Pursuit Aviation) to carry out particular operations, but rather to give information and warning of imminent hostile raids to these activities so that they might take immediate action according to prearranged plan. As all information is immediately

1/ This meeting is treated here rather than under "Action Taken at Hawaii" (infra pages 397-405), since only agreements were reached rather than effective action taken.

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and visually available to all liaison officers, it would be their duty to pass the pertinent information on to their respective units." (N.C.I. Exhibit 62).

(ii) Facilities:

In this connection it was stated that considerable material was necessary and would not be available for sometime to come and that the "Information Center could be made to function adequately within the next two weeks." (id., page 1).

It was stated that information would have to be drawn from sources which included "Naval Aircraft, ships and stations." (id., pages 1 and 2).

(iii) Operations:

It was stated that at the present time, "the Information Center is operating from 0700 to 1130," and that it was "desired to operate *** on a full time daily basis (0600 to 1800) as early as possible, and eventually, when personnel can be made available, on a 24-hour basis." (id., page 2)

(iv) Navy Liaison with Information Center:

"(4) It was brought out that the Naval Liaison Officer now assigned to the Information Center is attached to Patrol Wing Two. This is not a permanently shore-based unit, and therefore liaison personnel from Patrol Wing Two might be withdrawn at any time, leaving the Information Center without trained Naval Liaison. It is therefore suggested that the Commandant, 14th Naval District be approached with a view of obtaining naval liaison officers and coordinating the information for all naval activities, shore and afloat." (N.C.I. Exhibit 62).

(v) Concerning presently available mobile RDF and AFF equipment, it was said:

"(5) As the present mobile RDF equipment is not all that might be hoped for, it was agreed that the AA RDF might be tied in. This would permit information on heights of incoming raids sufficiently far from the coast to make interceptions. The AAA RDF equipment is already being tied in with the Information Center for this purpose." * * * * *

"(7) The question of IFF was raised as a possible solution to eliminate confusion in determining whether aircraft approaching the island were friend or foe. It would be a very long time before all aircraft could be equipped with IFF, in addition to which it was believed that the present IFF did not operate on all RDF frequencies; it was therefore decided that this is not a reliable solution for some time to come." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, page 3).

'(6) On 25 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark) wrote to both the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (N.C.I. Exhibit 47) and stated, in connection with the subject of the local defense forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier:

(1) The request of Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his letter of 17 October 1941, forwarded with the undated endorsement by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, requesting a number of anti-submarine craft and a number of VSO planes for anti-submarine patrol, had been given full consideration;

(11) That Admiral Stark noted that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in his War Plan, known as WFPac-46,

"has taken full cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with his tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. The forces available in the Hawaiian Area, both Fleet and Local Defense Forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile forces, will, of course, indicate the numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks." (N.C.I. Exhibit 47).

(111) Admiral Stark then stated, with reference to required

local defense plans which had not yet been received by him from
Admiral Kimmel and Bloch:

"4. Neither the Local Defense Force Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5 (Naval District Plan O-5, Rainbow No. 5) nor the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, both required by reference (b), (WPL-46), have yet been received by the Chief of Naval Operations. The joint plan should indicate what assistance in anti-submarine or other patrols will be rendered by Army air forces. A recent joint letter of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, contained in reference (g), provided for joint exercises of Army and Navy Frontier forces and called attention to the necessity of early completion of joint defense plans." (N.C.I. Exhibit 47).

(iv) The Chief of Naval Operations then stated that the augmentation of the local defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District was proceeding as fast as the conditions and the current situation permitted, and, with reference to aircraft:

"(e) The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment to the Fourteenth Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squadrons which become available in the near future will be determined by the requirements of the strategic situation as it develops." (N.C.I. Exhibit 47).

(b) Proposed Reconnaissance to Guard Against Japanese Carrier
Raid in Outlying Islands -- Army Reenforcement of Air Forces
in Philippines -- Air Route to the Far East -- Fortification
of Guam -- Army Offer to Relieve Marines and to Garrison
Midway and Wake

During this period (16 October 1941 - 26 November 1941), the Army and the Navy proposed, and in some instances undertook, certain actions in respect of making more secure the American outlying possessions in the Pacific. These included:

(1) In his letter of 17 October 1941 to Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 38), Admiral Stark discussed the Army's air reinforcements in the Philippines, and in a post script, General Marshall's request for some sort of reconnaissance to protect additional reinforcements while at Wake Island. He said:

"I know how you and Admiral Hart must be pleased with the Army increased air in the Philippines. The Island of Wake is a vital link in this connection. If it is put out of commission it stops Army air reinforcements. I hope we can maintain the integrity of these Island bases and push as fast as possible their completion. You have all the dope that I have on this and know the studies that are being made for alternate routes.

"Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry.

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"He also thought it advisable that I release him at this time from the aerial photographs I wanted him to get of the mandates, stating that they might be detected and might complicate the international situation. I agreed, and he stated that he would endeavor to make them later." (N.C.I. Exhibit 38).

(2) Though Admiral Stark told General Marshall "not to worry" about a Japanese raid in Wake Island, yet, on the same day, 17 October 1941, he sent a dispatch (171458) to Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 89), directing that precautions be taken for the safety of the airfields at Wake Island and Midway Islands. The dispatch read:

"BECAUSE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING TO REENFORCE PHILIPPINES WITH LONG RANGE ARMY BOMBERS YOU ARE REQUESTED TO TAKE ALL PRACTICAL PRECAUTIONS FOR THE SAFETY OF AIRFIELDS AT WAKE AND MIDWAY."

(3) On 17 October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, with information copy to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet (171811) (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 90), in respect of the proposed Army air reinforcements that were to be sent to the Philippines. The dispatch stated that the Army had requested the Navy to make available aircraft fuel at Midway and Wake Islands.

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On 18 October 1941, a dispatch was sent by General Short, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army, to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, (Admiral Kimmel) (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 91), advising that there had been a change in the substance of the flight plan of the Army's 26 (twenty-six) B-17 airplanes to the Philippines, in that Flight One would leave Hickam Field, Oahu, on 21 October, Flight Two on 23 October, and Flight Three on 25 October. (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 91).

(4) On 29 October 1941, a dispatch was sent from OpNav to CinCPac and others (281856), advising that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department (General Short), had been made responsible by the War Department for the development of a Western landplane route, west as far as and including the Solomon Islands and New Guinea, and that the Commanding General of the Army Forces in the Far East (General MacArthur) had been made responsible for that portion of the route west of the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 95).

On 13 November 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch to CinCPac (122357), which, among other things, directed that the Navy continue to cooperate in developing the Southern landplane route to the Philippines, but advising that the completion of the pro-

jects at Palmyra and Samoa had the highest priorities, while the Canton Islands had second priority. (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 13).

(5) On 14 November 1941, Admiral Stark wrote (N.C.I. Exhibit 39) to Admiral Kimmel, and discussed, among other things, the question of fortifying Guam. He said:

"The General Board has recently completed a study on Guam. I am enclosing a copy of this paper for your study. I would appreciate getting your reaction to it. Of course, If Guam were fortified and developed at the moment, we could make much use of it. One item to which I have been giving much thought and upon which I would like your advice - What do you think of going ahead now with the construction of a landing field out there? The thought I have is that we could construct such a field which might be of service to us. To be sure, we might lose it, but we could build into it provision for its at least temporary destruction." (N.C.I. Exhibit 39).

(6) On 23 November 1941, the Commandant of the Twelfth Naval District, sent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations, with information copy to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet (230258) (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 23), concerning large movements of troops, and of ships in convoy from San Francisco to the Far East. The dispatch stated that it appeared that the Navy Department's dispatches were not taking cognizance of the magnitude of the Army troops moving from San Francisco, which involved about twenty-two (22) ships, including the largest liners. The Commandant of the Twelfth Naval District stated with reference to routing, that they were "prescribed eastward

of Ellice Islands thence Torres Strait," and the

"X IN VIEW REPORTS JAPANESE PATROLLING THIS AREA BELIEVE IT VULNERABLE X SUBJECT TO FURTHER STUDY BELIEVE ROUTING SOUTH

ABOUT AUSTRALIA IMPRACTICABLE X IF TROOP MOVEMENT MUST BE MADE AT THIS TIME RECOMMEND GREAT CIRCLE COURSE TO SAN BERNARDINO

STRAIT WITH ADEQUATE FLEET PROTECTION." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 23).

(7) On 26 November 1941, Admiral Stark sent a dispatch to Admiral Kimmel (270038) (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 24; N.C.I. Exhibit 38, page 50), which advised that, in order to have the airplanes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use, he had requested, and the Army had agreed to station twenty-five (25) Army pursuit planes, both at Midway and Wake Islands, provided that Admiral Kimmel considered such to be feasible and desirable. The dispatch also advised Admiral Kimmel that he would have to transport the Army planes and ground crews from Oahu on an aircraft carrier, and that the Navy would have the responsibility for providing water and substance and in transporting other Army supplies. Admiral Kimmel was directed to confer with General Short and to advise as soon as practicable. This dispatch read in full as follows:

"IN ORDER KEEP THE PLANES OF THE 2ND MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AVAILABLE FOR EXPEDITIONARY USE OPNAV HAS REQUESTED AND ARMY HAS AGREED

TO STATION 25 PURSUIT PLANES AT MIDWAY AND A SIMILAR NUMBER AT WAKE PROVIDE YOU CONSIDER THIS FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE X IT WILL

BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO TRANSPORT THESE PLANES AND GROUND CREWS FROM OAHU TO THESE STATIONS ON AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER X PLANES WILL

BE FLOWN OFF AT DESTINATION AND GROUND PERSONNEL LANDED IN BOATS ESSENTIAL SPARE PARTS TOOLS AND AMMUNITION WILL BE

TAKEN IN THE CARRIER OR ON LATER TRIPS OF REGULAR NAVY SUPPLY VESSELS X ARMY UNDERSTANDS THESE FORCES MUST BE QUARTERED

IN TENTS X NAVY MUST BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPPLYING WATER AND SUBSISTENCE AND TRANSMITTING OTHER ARMY SUPPLIES X STATIONING

THESE PLANES MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WITH PLANNED MOVEMENTS OF ARMY BOMBERS TO PHILIPPINES X ADDITIONAL PARKING

AREAS SHOULD BE LAID PROMPTLY IF NECESSARY X CAN NAVY BOMBS NOW AT OUTLYING POSITIONS BE CARRIED BY ARMY BOMBERS WHICH

MAY FLY TO THOSE POSITIONS FOR SUPPORTING NAVY OPERATIONS X CONFER WITH COMMANDING GENERAL AND ADVISE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 24).

On the same date, 26 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations, sent a further dispatch (270040) to CincPac, (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 25), advising that the Army had offered to make available some infantry units to reinforce some defense battalions, if Admiral Kimmel considered such to be desirable. This dispatch read as follows:

"ARMY HAS OFFERED TO MAKE AVAILABLE SOME UNITS OF INFANTRY FOR REENFORCING DEFENSE BATTALIONS NOW ON STATION IF YOU CONSIDER

THIS DESIRABLE X ARMY ALSO PROPOSES TO PREPARE IN HAWAII GARRISON TROOPS FOR ADVANCE BASES WHICH YOU MAY OCCUPY BUT IS

UNABLE AT THIS TIME TO PROVIDE ANY ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS X TAKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATION IN YOUR PLANS AND ADVISE WHEN PRACTIC-

ABLE NUMBER OF TROOPS DESIRED AND RECOMMENDED ARMAMENT." (N.C.I. Exhibit 40; Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 25).

It appears from the evidence that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had a conference about the subject of the dispatches concern-

ing the Army's willingness to garrison Midway and Wake Islands, and that the project fell through because these two area Commanders could not agree as to who should command the Army troops. Each insisted he should be supreme. Admiral Smith, who was at the time, Admiral Kimmel's Chief of Staff, testified that Admiral Kimmel was shocked * * * * *

"* * * when we had orders from the Navy Department, and General Short had orders from the War Department, to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the Marines off the outlying islands, and all the Marine and Navy planes in the outlying islands, and replacing them with soldiers and with Army planes, and, as I remember it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two Staffs together. The Army was undecided whether to put P-39's or P-40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain there for the duration, in case of war, because they would have to take off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this, with General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then, they will be no damn good to me." The exchange was never made because the war broke before-hand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, "If I have to man these islands, I shall have to command them!" Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports", or words to that effect, and General Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them." That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried out." (Har. 40-41)

XI

INFORMATION 16 OCTOBER - 26 NOVEMBER CONCERNING JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND U. S. - JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS, AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON AND NOT SENT AS SUCH TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL

During this period (16 October 1941 - November 1941), various Japanese messages were intercepted by the Army and Navy and were available in Washington, which as such were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. Some of these dispatches referred to the then current diplomatic negotiations with the United States and mentioned a "deadline". Others referred to Japanese espionage activities in spotting and reporting the movements and locations of United States ships in various United States Ports.

A. Japanese Diplomatic Dispatches.

The intercepted dispatches referring to the current U. S. - Japanese diplomatic negotiations included the following:

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1. On 16 October 1941, the Army translated a dispatch from Ambassador Nomura, in Washington to Tokyo, dated 14 October 1941, in which Ambassador Nomura outlined information he had obtained as to the position of the American Government in an interview with Rear Admiral Turner. The latter was stated by Nomura as having said that the United States wished to obtain a definite promise from Japan and not just a pretense, that it would adhere to its points raised by the American Government, which included the withdrawal of Japanese Troops from China.

This dispatch read as follows:

"I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 2).

2. On 17 October 1941, the Army intercepted a message

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From Tokyo (Toyoda) to Washington, dated 16 October 1941, in which the Japanese Ambassador was advised that the Tokyo Government had been refusing the request of the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information as to the progress of the Japanese-American negotiations. The dispatch stated further that since the attacks by the Germans on the American merchant ships, followed by the movement in the United States for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities had demanded that the Japanese Government deliver a warning to the Roosevelt Administration, that if it "continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this * * * * * might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States." The dispatch then said:

"We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed. (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 3)

3. On 18 October 1941, the Navy translated a dispatch from Berlin to Tokyo, dated 1 October 1941, in which the Japanese Government was advised, among other things, of conversations had between the Japanese Ambassador and German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. The dispatch stated that Ribbentrop had said that

he had absolute proof that while the Japanese were withholding from the German Ambassador Ott in Tokyo, the contents of the Japanese-American negotiations, America was in secret communication with England with respect thereof. "Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude."

The dispatch went on to say that the German Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down were thoroughly disgusted with Japan and had spoken of their dissatisfaction. The dispatch stated further, that the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin was reporting in an interview with newspapers and others that Germany was cognizant concerning Japanese-American negotiations, "and that they are no indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany."

The Ambassador went on to state that he had received the impression that the greater number of Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents felt that Japan was avoiding war because of impoverishment resulting from the China incident. The dispatch concluded as follows:

"4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these machinations of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pretence that there is no change in her feelings toward Japan, the fact that the feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is getting bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan

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takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting Germany there is no telling what steps Germany may take without consulting Japan.

Please convey this to the army and Navy.

Relayed to Rome." (N.C.I. Exhibit.63, Doc't 4)

4. On 23 October 1941, the Army intercepted a dispatch from Ambassador Nomura in Washington to Tokyo, dated 22 October 1941, in which Nomura expressed his desire to resign from his position as Ambassador, going out with the former cabinet. Ambassador Nomura protested that the American Secretary of State knew that he, (Nomura) was sincere, but that he had little influence in Japan.

Ambassador Nomura then said that those Americans who trusted him were "poor deluded souls", and he stated that he thought another person (Wakasugi) could carry out the Japanese Foreign Minister's instructions. In that connection, Nomura said that he thought the latter would not have any objections, and that "I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people
* * * * * Please send me your permission to return to Japan."

This dispatch read in full:

"I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things

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will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63 - Document 5).

The Navy translated on 23 October 1941, the reply, bearing the same date, from Tokyo to Washington to Nomura's messages in respect of returning to Japan, which stated that it was hoped that the Ambassador would remain at his "post". This dispatch read:

"From your message(s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As such, it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excellency's reports for our information of this matter.

For the above reason, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 6)

5. On 5 November 1941, the Navy translated a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, dated 5 November 1941, stating that it was absolutely necessary that all arrangements be made for the signing of the agreement between the United States and Japan

by the 25th of November, 1941. This deadline message read as follows:

"Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 7).

6. On 12 November 1941, the Army translated a message from Ambassador Nomura, in Washington, to Tokyo, dated 10 November 1941, advising as follows:

(a) That Frederick Moore, the Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, had been sent by him to contact Secretary Hull and Secretary Thomas of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and that, Moore had reported to him as follows:

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."

(b) That on 9 November 1941 (Sunday), "a certain Cabinet member" said to him:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports

that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."

To which Ambassador Nomura stated that he had responded:

"I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.

He replied, however:

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State!" (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 8).

7. On 12 November 1941, the Army translated a message from Ambassador Nomura in Washington, to Tokyo, dated 10 November 1941, reporting that according to the American newspapers and magazines, with exception of the Hearst Papers and the Daily News, the Americans were more eager for a war with Japan than one with Germany. The dispatch went on to state:

"It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.

"3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the Presi-

dent today and talk with him on the basis of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 9).

8. On 17 November 1941, the Army translated a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 16 November 1941, stating that the "fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before." The dispatch then emphasized that the prior statements by Foreign Minister Togo in his dispatches to Ambassador Nomura that conditions in Japan would not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States, and that arrangements for the signing of the agreement with the United States had to be completed by 25 November 1941, must be accepted by Nomura. "Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. * * * * * I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations * * * * * [25 November 1941] and there will be no change. Please try to understand that." This dispatch, together with footnote references to the dispatches mentioned therein, read as follows:

"For your Honor's own information.

a

"1. I have read your #1090, and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

"2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message, is, of course, so, and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.^b Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,^c and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

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- a - See JD-1;6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.
 - b - S.I.S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.
 - c - S.I.S. #24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month." (N. C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 10).

9. On 22 November 1941, the Army translated a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, addressed to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, dated 22 November 1941, in which it was said that Tokyo found it awfully hard to consider changing the deadline date of 25 November 1941, which had been fixed in the Tokyo to Washington message of 5 November 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 7). The message went on to state that there were "reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th," but that, "if the signing can be completed

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by the 29th, (let me write it out for you — twenty ninth), and "if everything can be finished," by that date, "we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen." This dispatch, together with a footnote explanation of one referred to therein, reads as follows:

"To both you Ambassadors.

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736^a. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth), if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

a - See S.I.S. #24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 11).

10. On 26 November 1941, the Army translated a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 26 November 1941, stating: "The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of neg-

otiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him." The dispatch then established a code to be used in making the suggested reports by telephone. (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 12).

11. On 26 November, 1941, the Navy translated a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, which established the so-called "Winds Code", which was to be used at the beginning and at the end of General Intelligence broadcasts for the purpose of indicating if diplomatic relations with the United States, Russia, or Great Britain were "becoming dangerous". This message read as follows:

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- "(1) If it is Japan-U.S. relations, "HIGASHI".
- (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
- (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N.E.I.), "NISHI".

"The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

"Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 13; Hew. Exhibit 13, page 6).

(The next page is #342)

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Ship Reports Dispatches.

The Japanese dispatches referring to the location of U. S. ships, as well as to other Japanese espionage activities, intercepted during the period 16 October 1941 to 26 November 1941 included the following:

1. On 4 November 1941, the Navy translated a dispatch from Manila (Nihro) to Tokyo, dated 1 November 1941, which contained information of a general espionage nature. Among other things, it was stated that the gathering of information was extremely difficult; that the incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Army was progressing slowly but surely, and would include 120,000 men by the end of the year.

The dispatch stated that there was a great increase in the number of soldiers stationed in the vicinity of Lingayen during November, and that on 27 November 1941, between 2,000 and 3,000 infantry troops left Manila by bus for the North, possibly having as their destination Mariveles. (N.C.I. Exhibit 68, Numbered 31, 32)

2. On 8 November 1941, the Navy translated a message from Manila (Nihro) to Tokyo, dated 1 November 1941, making a detailed report concerning certain American warships, probably the U.S.S. HOUSTON, MARBLEHEAD, HERON, and others, which entered Manila on 31 October 1941. The dispatch also reported the departure of ships, including the President liners CLEVELAND and MADISON. A detailed statement of the number of Army and Navy planes in the Philippine Islands was given, as well as the fact that two Merchant ships had been requisitioned by the "local" American Army. The dispatch also contained information of the ships in Manila and at Cavite on 1 November 1941. (N.C.I. Exhibit 68, Document Numbered 27). This dispatch read:

"1. The TON*, MADDO*, HON*, 7 destroyers, 8 submarines and 3 mine-sweepers entered port on the 31st. But the TON* left again on the morning of the 1st, destination unknown.

"2. On the morning of the 1st the President Cleveland and President Madison left port loaded with American soldiers whose time was up, (number uncertain).

"3. According to reports received from what we believe are reliable sources the number of American military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands is as follows:

(a) Military planes.

Large bombers, 29.
Scout Planes, 324.
The same, B type, 62.
Fighters, 317.
The same, B type, 131.
Pursuit planes, 302.
The same, D type, 69.
Training planes, 49.
Total, 1283.

(b) Naval planes.

Large flying boats, 26.

"4. Ships in port on the 1st: MADDO*, BUKKU*, PISU*, HON*, BERU*, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, WOHOTOSU, 3 minelayers, In Cavite: REI*, PASU*, 2 Z.

"5. According to a report from the DeLa Rama steamship company two of their ships, the Dona Estaban (1616 tons), and the MADBUKARU (191 tons), had been requisitioned by the local American Army.

*Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are: TON (Houston); MADDO (Marblehead); HON (Heron); BUKKU (Black Hawk); PISU (Canopus); BERU (Isabel); REI (Langley); PASU (Canopus)."

(2a) On 12 November 1941, the Navy translated a dispatch from Foreign Minister Togo, Tokyo, to Manila, which referred to the Manila to Tokyo

dispatch of 1 November 1941, (N.C.I. Exhibit 68, Numbered 27), and particularly to that paragraph therein, in which Nihro had reported the number of Military and Navy airplanes in the Philippine Islands. As to this report, Togo said:

"Please wire immediately for our information as to the validity of the reports mentioned in paragraph 3. (Reports number of military and naval planes in Philippine Islands)."
(N.C.I. Exhibit 68, Numbered 26)

3. On 13 November 1941, the Navy translated a dispatch from Tokyo to Manila, stating that the "Naval General Staff" had requested that investigation be made in each port of call concerning the following:

"(1) Conditions at air ports on land.

(2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.

(3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces.

(4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments." (N.C.I. Exhibit 68, Numbered 30).

4. On 14 November 1941, the Navy translated a dispatch from Manila (Nihro), dated 8 November 1941, reporting that warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 8th were as follows:

"The Marblehead, the Black Hawk, eight destroyers, nine submarines, the Heron, the Wohotosu, (Kana spelling), the Isobel, and the tanker Trinity (the latter arrived on the 8th)." (N.C.I. Exhibit 68, Numbered 25).

5. On 14 November 1941, the Army translated a dispatch from Manila, (Nihro) to Tokyo, dated 10 November 1941, concerning ships present at Manila and Cavite, it read as follows:

- "1. The Houston touched port at Cavite on the 8th.
2. Four destroyers left port on the 10th. Destination unknown.
3. Two cargo boats (former President boats of the 10,000 tons class with the names painted over) entered port on the 9th, landing 2,300 soldiers." (N.C.I. Exhibit 68, Numbered 24).

6. On 18 November 1941, the Army translated a message from Manila to Tokyo, dated 12 November 1941, giving information of ships present. The message read:

"On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port. She is now tied up at dock #7 and is taking on ----- . It is thought likely that this vessel accompanied one of the President line ships into port. This vessel preceded the cruiser into port." (N.C.I. Exhibit 68, Numbered 23).

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7. On 19 November 1941, the Army translated a message from Seattle (Sato) to Tokyo, dated 10 November 1941, giving information of vessels anchored at Bremerton at 9 November 1941, which included the U. S. S. Saratogo, Colorado, and the H.M.S. Warspite. This message read

"Vessels anchored in Bremerton on the 9th: Saratoga, Warspite, Colorado, (I have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I have reported on successive occasions as the Maryland) and the Charleston.

Relayed to _____ and Los Angeles." (N.C.I. Exhibit 68, Numbered 33).

8. On 26 November 1941, the Army translated a message from Foreign Minister Togo to Tokyo at Manila, dated 20 November 1941, requesting immediate advice as to the investigations being made in connection with Subic Bay, (near Manila, P.I.), directing that the details of the information be given to the Japanese Merchant ship, Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo. This dispatch read:

"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of draft _____ presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay, (near Manila, P.I.). Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo." (N.C.I. Exhibit 68, Numbered 22).

C. United States Negotiations:

On 26 November 1941, the Secretary of State, Hull, delivered to the Japanese envoys in Washington, a message containing the proposals of the American Government for settling the outstanding points of difference between the United States and Japan, and this note was not, as such, sent to Admiral Kimmel.

The American note proposed an agreement which included the following points:

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(a) The Governments of the two countries agree on the principles of the inviolability of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations, of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries, of equality, including equality of Commercial opportunity and treatment, of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the pacific settlement of controversies.

(b) The Governments of the two countries, in order to provide a basis for peace, will agree to apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples the principles of non-discrimination, of international economic cooperation, including the abolition of excessive trade restrictions, of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw materials, of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations, and of the establishment of institutions of international finance to aid development of all nations and to permit payment to be made through process of trade.

(1) In order to accomplish these objects, the Governments of the two countries would endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States, and both Governments along with the British, Chinese, Netherlands, and Thai Governments would endeavor to conclude an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China.

(2) The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

(3) The two Governments will not support any Government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

(c) Both Governments will give up extraterritorial rights in China, and will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British Government to do the same. The two Governments will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between them of a trade agreement based on reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment. The two Governments will remove the freezing restrictions on the funds of the other in their respective countries. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate.

(d) Both Governments "will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area."

(e) Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to the principles set forth in this proposed agreement.
(Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington: 1943, pages 810-812).

XII

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INFORMATION OF A GENERAL NATURE CONCERNING THE FAR EASTERN-JAPANESE SITUATION INCLUDING WARNING MESSAGES OF PROBABLE COLLAPSE OF NEGOTIATIONS, SENT FROM WASHINGTON TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL BETWEEN 16 OCTOBER AND 26 NOVEMBER - EXCHANGE OF DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE

The general information forwarded during this period (16 October 1941 - 26 November 1941) by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel commenced with a message advising of the grave situation that had been created by the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet. The further exchange of correspondence and dispatches indicated a progressive deterioration in the situation.

(1) On 16 October 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations sent a despatch (162203), Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 80), to Admiral Kimmel, advising that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet in Japan; that a Japanese-Russian war was a strong possibility; that it was also possible that Japan, which blamed the United States and Great Britain for its situation, would attack us. Admiral Kimmel was also told to make preparatory deployments that would not constitute provocation to Japan. The despatch read:

"THE RESIGNATION OF THE JAPANESE CABINET HAS CREATED A GRAVE SITUATION X IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC AND ANTI-AMERICAN X IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS THE EFFECT WILL BE THAT IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE US X IN EITHER CASE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE A STRONG POSSIBILITY X SINCE THE US AND BRITAIN ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT DESPERATE SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS X IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AGAINST JAPAN X SECOND AND THIRD ADEES (CINCPAC AND CINCAF) INFORM APPROPRIATE ARMY AND NAVAL DISTRICT AUTHORITIES X ACKNOWLEDGE."

UNCLAS (2) On 17 October 1941, the day after sending the warning despatch (162203), Admiral Stark wrote a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel, (N.C.I. Exhibit 38), saying:

"Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours but from our despatches you know about all that we do.

"Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

"If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura and gave the dope as I saw it.

"You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, I said my own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together. * * * * *

"We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are working on it.

"The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personally without going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude, civil attitude and Navy attitude, I hardly see any way around it. I think we could settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the stumbling block. Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan before they get through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way anywhere. A nice setup for not sounding the gong. * * * * *

"We have no other news yet regarding the torpedoing of the KEARNY except that she was hit and is proceeding slowly to Iceland. She was deflected from an American escorted convoy to a Canadian escorted convoy which was being hard pressed. Of course losses are bound to be in order. My hope is that they can be kept to a minimum with the curve ever favoring our end."
(N.C.I. Exhibit 38).

* * * * * "In a post-script (p.s.) to this letter, Admiral

Stark, among other things, said:

"Pinky Schuirmann made up an estimate for me yesterday on the Jap cabinet situation, which sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to set them down. He and I see very much eye to eye on this. I am enclosing copy of what he gave me. * * * * *

"I have nothing else for the moment.

"I will send copy of this to Tommy Hart as usual, and I assume also, as usual, that you will show Bloch." (N.C.I. Exhibit 38).

(i) The memorandum prepared by Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, referred to by Admiral Stark in his post-script (p.s.), that was enclosed, was dated 17 October 1941. Admiral Schuirmann said:

"I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought or action.

"The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military adventuring is pursued is determined by the military based on their estimate as to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabinet is in power or on diplomatic maneuvering, diplomatic notes or diplomatic treaties.

"Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in office for the most of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have expressed disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial action has not been taken.

"Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's policy was to beat China to her knees.

"The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it may have restrained the extremists among the military not that it has opposed Japan's program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the coming months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they will be seized.

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"At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depending on the course of the war in Russia.

"The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some concession to the "moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" has been offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary of State and Debuchi Ambassador.

"Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worse than the one which has just fallen. Japan may attack Russia, or may move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what cabinet is in power." (N.C.I. Exhibit 38, enclosed memo).

(3) In his letter of 17 October 1941 to Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 38), Admiral Stark explained, with reference to his action in instructing that the routing of merchant shipping be commenced:

"With regard to merchant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly.

The action referred to in this letter concerning the routing of merchant shipping is reflected in two dispatches dated 17 October 1941 (162239 and 162258) from the Chief of Naval Operations to various Commanders of Fleets and Stations (Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document 80 and 82). The first of these messages (162239) called attention to the warning issued to merchant vessels of the Chief of Naval Operations on 16 October 1941, and stated that routing instructions would be sent later. The second of these messages (162258), directed effective immediately all Trans-Pacific United States shipping from the Far East, Shanghai, India, and East India, should be routed through Torres Straits and kept to the South and well clear of Japanese Mandated Islands.

(4) The direction of 17 October 1941 concerning shipping was followed by a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and others (222250), dated 22 October 1941, directing that all Army and Navy Trans-Pacific troop transports, ammunition ships, and other ships carrying important military cargo enroute between Honolulu and Manila should be escorted both ways, but that slow vessels in such categories might be routed via Torres Strait without escorts.

The dispatch further stated that "general escorting" of "other Trans-Pacific American Flag Shipping" was "not considered warranted at this time " in view of the routing prescribed in the dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations of 17 October (162258). (Hew. Exhibit 70 Document 92).

Subsequently, on 25 October 1941, the Commander-in-chief, U.S. Fleet, Admiral Kimmel, sent a dispatch (252352) to the Commandant of the 12th Naval District and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, stating that in order to comply with the dispatch of the Chief of Naval Operations with reference to escorting important American Cargo Ships (222250) he proposed certain convoy procedures, including the following of a direct route between Honolulu and Manila with stops at Guam when necessary. The dispatch further stated, among other things, that the Commandant of the 12th Naval District would control formation of the West-bound convoys and routing to Pearl Harbor or to

"SEA RENDEZVOUS WITH ESCORT IN HAWAIIAN AREA AS RESTRICTED HARBOR SPACE AND LACK OF SECURE OUTSIDE ANCHORAGE PROHIBIT HOLDING OF LARGE GROUPS AT HONOLULU X". (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 94).

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(5) On 1 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch (311955) to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, (Admiral Kimmel), and to Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet (Admiral Hart), and to the Commandant, 16th Naval District, quoting a British Admiralty dispatch (1719A/28) (Hew. 70, Document 101).

The quoted Admiralty dispatch stated, among other things, that it had been decided by the British to replace the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief, China, by a new appointment to be known as the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, and that while Japan remained neutral the duties of the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, would include a Sea Command and Administration of that Fleet and the preparation of plans and war orders for the whole Eastern Theatre in collaboration with the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, and United States and Dutch authorities. The dispatch further stated that "On outbreak of war with Japan" the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Fleet would assume strategic control of "All British and Dutch Naval Forces with the exception of local defense."

With respect to the Naval course of the United States, the Admiralty dispatch stated:

"THE DEGREE OF STRATEGIC CONTROL EXERCISED BY CINC EASTERN FLEET OVER NAVAL FORCES OF USA SHOULD LATTER BE A BELLIGERENT WILL BE GOVERNED BY SUCH AGREEMENT AS MAY BE IN FORCE AT THE TIME BETWEEN US AND GREAT BRITAIN". (Hew. 70, Document 101, Admiralty Dispatch 1719A/28).

The Admiralty dispatch also stated that it was possible that:

"A PART OF THE EASTERN FLEET MAY BE ASSEMBLED IN EASTERN THEATRE BEFORE OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH JAPAN."

The dispatch also defines the limits of the "Eastern theatre"

with respect to two conditions: one with the United States a non-belligerent; the other with the United States a belligerent. (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 101)

(6) Admiral Stark in his letter of 7 November 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 74) told Admiral Kimmel that there was a steady movement of events towards a crisis in the Pacific. He said:

"Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets "Worser and worser"! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go on forever - particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look good." (N.C.I. Exhibit 74, page 3).

To this letter, Admiral Stark added post-script (p.s.) in his own hand writing, as follows:

"British movement of BB to Far East area - I hope - will be completed in December-." (ibid.)

(7) On 14 November 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (N.C.I. Exhibit 39), replying to the latter's letters of October 26, November 6, and November 7. He said, in part:

"Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is a copy of our Estimate, which was recently submitted by General Marshall and me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or not our advice will be followed remains to be seen." (N.C.I. Exhibit 39).

Admiral Stark then discussed the question involving listening gear for ships, the sending of VSO's to the Asiatic, and the converting of merchant ships to aircraft carriers. He then said, with reference to the arrival of Ambassador Kurusu:

(The next page is #355A)

"The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Washington has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan will come of his visit. I note this morning in the press despatches a listing of a number of points by the Japan Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was necessary for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis." Complete capitulation by the United States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such divergent points of view." (N.C.I. Exhibit 39).

(1) The Estimate prepared by Admiral Stark and General Marshall for the President, a copy of which Admiral Stark enclosed for Admiral Kimmel, was dated 5 November 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 39 (a)). It was entitled, "Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation". In it, among other things, it was said:

"The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have re-examined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kuming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kuming and the Burma Road.

"There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident". If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal. * * * * *

"The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military

operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

The Estimate then stated that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff were in accord in the following conclusions:

"At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

"The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army Air Forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

"Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group." (N.C.I. Exhibit 39A)

Accordingly, Admiral Stark and General Marshall recommended:

"(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will

still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

"(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

"(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies:

"(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

"(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing War plans, i.e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

"(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

"(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

"(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies."
(N.C.I. Exhibit 39A).

Specifically, the two Chiefs recommended:

"That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

"That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

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"That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

"That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." (N.C.I. Exhibit 39A).

(8) On 18 November 1941 Admiral Stark sent a dispatch (181705) to Admiral Kimmel, and others, (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 18), stating in part:

"UNTIL INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS ON AND SUBSEQUENT TO 25 NOVEMBER BECOME DEFINED AND CLARIFIED ANY FURTHER DIRECT OR GREAT CIRCLE ROUTING BETWEEN HAWAII AND PHILIPPINES SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE USED X ROUTES SOUTH OF MANDATES SHOULD BE PRESCRIBED UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED BY DEPARTMENT".

(9) On 22 November 1941 Admiral Kimmel sent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the routing of ships across the Pacific and stating that in view of the difficulties confronting certain ships in traveling through the Torres Straits, including limited fresh water, and all information received from the Chief of Naval Operations in a dispatch (211755), it was considered that routing "Via Guam no additional hazard" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 21). In reply to this dispatch of Admiral Kimmel, the Chief of Naval Operations on 22 November 1941 sent a further dispatch to Admiral Kimmel (221805) stating that the Pacific situation remain unchanged and that Admiral Kimmel should comply with the directions contained in the dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations of 18 November 1941 (181705) (Supra page 358) which stated that until international conditions became clarified there should not be any further direct or great circle routing between Hawaii and the Philippines. The Chief of Naval Operations dispatch repeating this direction read as follows:

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"URDIS 220417 X PACIFIC SITUATION UNCHANGED COMPLY MY 181705 X GUAM CARGO SHOULD BE SENT MANILA THEN TRANSHIPPED FOR GUAM X MAKE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS PERSONNEL IN CHAUMONT FOR MIDWAY AND WAKE X BLOEMFONTEIN AND HOLBROOK OBTAIN WATER ENROUTE AT TUTUILA SUVA OR OTHER PORT AS EXPEDIENT" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 22).

(10) On 25 November 1941 the Chief Naval Operations sent a dispatch to Admiral Kimmel, and to others, (242005)(Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 105), advising that the chances of a favorable outcome of the negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that it was a possibility that Japan might make a "surprise aggressive movement in any direction". This dispatch read as follows:

"CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL X THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY X CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS DISPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS X UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION X GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 105).

XIII

COMBAT AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING JAPANESE
INTENTIONS AND FLEET DISPOSITIONS AVAILABLE TO
ADMIRAL KIMMEL -- 16 OCTOBER - 26 NOVEMBER

During this period, 16 October to 26 November 1941, there was available to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor intelligence information concerning, in part, Japanese intentions and Japanese Fleet and ship dispositions, in the form of dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, and, particularly, from the Communications Intelligence Unit of the Fourteenth Naval District and Admiral Kimmel's own Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer.

This intelligence was chiefly of a combat nature. It was delivered to Admiral Kimmel daily and it was voluminous. It may be summarized as follows: 1/

(1) The Communication Intelligence Summary 2/ of 16 October 1941, had as topics: General, Combined Fleet, Carriers, Air Force, Sub Force, China, Miscellaneous, D F Bearings, and Positions.

Under general information, the general nature of the Japanese Navy's radio traffic was analyzed and certain conclusions therefrom were stated. With reference to the Japanese Combined Fleet, under

1/ The Communication Intelligence Summaries referred to herein were prepared by the Communication Intelligence Unit of the Fourteenth Naval District. Each of them was delivered daily to Captain (then Lieutenant Commander) Edwin Thomas Layton, USN, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, who, in turn, delivered them to Admiral Kimmel. Almost all of the summaries were initialed by Admiral Kimmel personally.

2/ The abbreviation, 'CIS', will be used henceforth.

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which was discussed the Japanese First, Second, Third, and Fifth Fleets, information was deduced that certain units were located at certain places, including the Mandated Islands, Chichijima and Sasebo. As to Carriers, it was stated that they were "active in exchange of traffic as [of] yesterday," and there was an indication as to Carriers' locations, which included the AKAGI and SORYU at Yokosuka.

The Communication Intelligence Summary of 16 October 1941, is stated here in full in order to give a proper perspective of the type of documents involved. It read:

"GENERAL - Average amount of traffic intercepted, with complete absence of "dummy" traffic for the first time since early October. All forces active in originated and addressed traffic except South China. A considerable number of "WE" addresses appeared, usually associated with air activities. One broke as "Chinkai Defense Force" indicating newly organized activity at that location. Ominato transmitted a despatch with three "WE" addressees, which broke as Chief A Area, Chief B Area and Chief C Area. Stations addressed in this dispatch fit the call table line designated tentatively as "Temporary Shore" or "Advanced Base" stations, which were most commonly associated with the South China activities up to and including the Indo China campaign. Stations fitting this classification are increasing in the Chinkai-Chosen area, one unidentified unit (TAWI 7) which was formerly connected with So China Forces, has reappeared in the Chosen area, with line of bearing from Oahu D/F passing thru the Rashin, Seisin area. Units of 12 Air Corps are apparently embarked on two unidentified Marus and probably proceeding to join the 12 A.C. Commander at Genzan Air.

"COMBINED FLEET - CinC Combined, possibly back on NAGATO, appears to be acting as radio guard for an increasing number of units from 1st, 2nd, Carriers, and Subfor. The tentatively identified 5th Fleet appeared as action and information addressee in several despatches concerning addressees in the Mandates, Chichijima,

and major force commanders. The 2nd Fleet was a heavier originator with traffic addressed to major units of the Combined. No indication of change of location of 1st or 2nd fleets. Third fleet continued actively originating and receiving traffic from Sasebo area. Flagship of #2 Base Force, 3rd Fleet, with commander aboard at Sasebo.

"CARRIERS - Active in exchange of traffic as / of / yesterday. No indicated change of location. Planes from Kasanohara Air are operating aboard or with the HIRYU. Commander Carriers still aboard KAGA in area between Sasebo and Taiwan. AKAGI and SORYU at Yokosuka.

"AIR FORCE - Chitose Air enroute to Mandates, probably to Marshall area, with Yokohama Air at or near Truk. Indications that Yokosuka Air is, or will be, moving to the Mandates, possibly to the Palau area.

"SUB FORCE - Same activity on Subfor frequencies as previously reported, bearings remaining the same.

"CHINA - Activity appears confined Takao, and North China area, with Shanghai continuing normal. A despatch addressed to China Fleet collective exempted the North China Force from delivery, thus placing N. China Force as part of CINC CHINA FLEET (on Idzumo) Command.

"MISCELLANEOUS - Many new calls appearing, including MARUS, which have been very recently taken over, as they are not equipped with call books and use WE addresses for activities which have assigned calls. One new unit apparently containing both Marus and Combatant vessels appeared today without indication of which Force he is attached.

"D F BEARINGS - 31 Naval Auxiliaries in Mandates.

"POSITIONS -

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KINE 9 (?) Comm. KURE RETI 3 to Yokosuka HOMI 3.
ERO 6 (?) Comm. Takao FUWI 4 to Bako NOTI 7.
YUKO 9 (?) Comm. Canton RYUO 6 to Bako NOTI 7.
MURU 3 (M) Comm. Remain with Ponape and establish
with Truk RESU \emptyset to YUMI \emptyset
MISE 5 (Fleet Unit) - Comm. Sasebo KIMU 9 to KINU 7 (Maru)
KARO 9 (ERIMO) - Comm. Sasebo KIMU 9 to Kure RETI 3
NIRI \emptyset (M) Comm. Yokosuka HOMI 3 to Saipan OSI \emptyset
RETI 5 (M) Comm. Remain with Shanghai (KAMO \emptyset establish
with SIKA 8.
KUNA 1 (M) 10.7 166.7
TEFU \emptyset (M) 23.0 137.4
TIWI 1 (M) 28.5 140.9" (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 6S-7S) 1/

Attached to the CIS of 16 October was a further statement which summarized the information as to the locations of the several Japanese Fleets at that time. This summary is also stated here for the purpose of indicating the manner of and exactitude in which the Communication Intelligence Unit was able to state the location of foreign naval ships:

"1st Fleet:

BB's believed in INLAND SEA-SASEBO area.
AIRRON 7 and a CARDIV in NAHA-TAKAO area.
KONGO and HIYE had busy traffic with SAEKI AIR.

"2nd Fleet:

Some units are definitely at KURE.

"3rd Fleet:

Concentrated with few exceptions in general SASEBO area.
ASHIGARA is mentioned in 3rd. Fleet traffic with major units of that Fleet.
CHOGEI (Flag of NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE) appears with NAGARA (3rd. Fleet Flag).

1/ The first page of this two-page summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel -- "H.E.K."

"4th Fleet:

Definitely in TRUK area. Large air concentration in the MARSHALLS.

"5th Fleet:

Still in process of organizing. CHICHIJIMA RADIO, 4th. FLEET and CINC COMBINED are interested parties in traffic which includes this hypothetical fleet.

"SUBMARINES:

Many units definitely in KURE area. Perhaps a dozen are operating in exercises in the general CHICHIJIMA-YOKOSUKA area. With a few as far south as the MANDATES. From one indication it appears that COMSUBFORCE is at SASEBO.

"AIR:

A large part of the COMBINED AIR FORCE appears to be in CHINKAI-SASEBO-GENZAN area. One section of CAF operating with a CARDIV of 1st FLEET in TAKAO area. CARRIER LOCATIONS: AKAGI and ZUIKAKU in YOKOSUKA area. KORYU at KURE. KAGA at SASEBO.

"GENERAL:

Several fleet auxiliaries (tankers etc.) appear to be in SASEBO area. KASHII near SAIGON. ISUZU (Acting Flag South China) in HAINAN-SOUTH CHINA area." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 88).

(2) The CIS of 17 October 1941, among other things, stated:

"The resignation of the Cabinet was reported to the fleet by plain language today."

The Summary went on to discuss the general nature of the Japanese Navy radio traffic, which gave the impression that there was "underway a concentration of units upon the Combined Fleet Flagships." It was also stated that the SHOKAKU (CV) of Cardiv 4 had had a message routed to it for delivery at TAKAO. Other carriers were identified in the area east of TAIWAN and south of KYUSHU, and there was considered to be "some

slight indication" that the Flagship of the Combined Fleet was with those carriers. The Summary also stated that there were 28 auxiliary ships located in the Mandates. (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 98-115).

(3) The CIS of 18 October 1941 stated, among other things, that the Navy Minister had sent out a message announcing the appointment of Admiral Shimada Shigetaro in Premier Tojo's Cabinet, and that this message was given general distribution which included the Attache to Thailand. This, according to the Summary, "would make it appear that there was some sort of a military tie-up between Japan and Thailand." 1/

The Summary further stated that Tokyo Navy communications had originated several messages of general address, which, it stated, might indicate "a coming change of call or cipher systems." It was also stated that it was believed that all submarines were "nearing Sasebo", and that the carriers AKAGI and SORYU were near Yokosuka, while Carrier 4 was definitely in the TAKAO area. (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 125-135).

(4) The CIS of 19 October 1941* stated that the carriers AKAGI and SORYU were in the Yokosuka area, and that all other carriers except the SHOKAKU appeared to be in the Sasebo area. It was also said that some of the submarine service calls were associated with Carrier Division and Combined Air Force Units. (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 145-155).

1/ This portion of the summary had been stricken out by some person, who drew lines through it and who wrote on the margin opposite those lines - "No!"

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

(5) The CIS of 20 October 1941* stated that certain intercepted traffic indicated that a tactical problem was being worked out by the Japanese Navy, and that little traffic was seen concerning the First and Second Fleets. (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 168-178).

(6) The CIS of 21 October 1941* stated that traffic volume had returned to normal that day, and that the dummy messages had disappeared. Again the Combined Fleet had little traffic. It was concluded from the addressees of a message from the Commander Combined Air Force, which included the Minister of the Navy, the Chief of Naval General Staff, the Combined Air Force, the CinC Combined Fleet, Cardiv 4 less HOSHO and ORU 4, Cardiv 3, with information copies to all major Fleet Flagships, that whatever the Combined Air Force intended to do would interest the Combined Fleet, and that, since the Commander Combined Air Force had Carriers added to his force, which was not normal, there was indicated "a large scale operation over a long distance." (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 188-198).

(7) The CIS of 22 October 1941* stated that Cardiv 4 was addressed in care of the TAKAO radio, and that Cardiv 5 with the KORYU and ZUIKAKU were operating with the Yokosuka and Omura stations. The AKAGI and SORYU were said to appear to be leaving the Yokosuka area to resume operations, while the Commander of Carriers was still aboard the KAGA, in company with the HIRYU, and his traffic carried Sasebo routing. (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 208-218).

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

(8) The CIS of 23 October 1941* contained no information of particular importance, while that of 24 October 1941* contained a statement that the Communication Officer of the Japanese Carrier Divisions had sent a message to: The Commanding Officers of the Submarine Force, of Desron One, of Batdiv 3, of Crudiv 8, of Cardivs less Cardiv 3, with information to Tokyo and the Combined Fleet. 1/ (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 23S-26S).

(9) The CIS of 25 October 1941* contained no information of particular interest, while that of 26 October 1941* stated that Cardiv 3 was proceeding to join Cardiv 4, and that the Commanding Officers of the SORYU and KORYU on the preceding day were aboard the Carrier Flagship KAGA. The AKAGI was stated to have left the Yokosuka Navy Yard, probably to join the KAGA. (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 27S-28S).

(10) The CIS of 27 October 1941* stated that a survey of the traffic and location sheets of the past few days revealed the definite association of several auxiliaries with several units of the Combined Fleet, and some of those auxiliaries were known to be tankers. As an example, it was stated that the Commanding Officer of the KYOKUTO MARU, a fast tanker, was aboard the AKAGA. With respect to units of the First Fleet, it was said that Batdiv One and Desrons 1 and 3 appeared to be involved in movements. It was stated that Com16 reported a large part of the

1/ These addressees constituted, as was subsequently learned, the greater portion of the Japanese carrier striking force that attacked Pearl Harbor. (see infra, page 408).

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

Submarine Force to be located in the Inland Sea-Ariaki area. Further information with reference to submarines showed that one important submarine squadron (NASU-4) was frequently associated with Crudiv 8 of the Second Fleet and with Desron 1 of the First Fleet. 1/

In addition, Tokyo radio had originated a dispatch to Crudiv 8, with information copies to the Commanding Officers of the Combined Air Force, the Second Fleet, Batdiv 3, the Carrier Divisions, and the Jaluit radio. 1/ It was further reported that Cardiv 3 (HOSHO and RYUJO) appeared to be in the general Takao area, and that there had been an identification of what might be a new converted carrier, named or formerly named KASAGU MARU. (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 29S-30S).

The combat intelligence of 27 October 1941 further included:

(i) an Intelligence Report by the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer (Hew. Exhibit 26); (ii) two dispatches from the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai (Hew. Exhibit 27, pages 30T-31T); (iii) two dispatches from the Assistant Naval Attache at Chungking (Hew. Exhibit 27, pages 28T-29T); and (iv) a dispatch from Com16 (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 100). All of these reports and dispatches contained information as to the location of various Japanese naval units as follows:

1/ It is to be noted that Batdiv 3 mentioned above, together with Crudiv 8 and Desron 1, all reported on and associated together in the CIS of this date, were, as subsequently learned, a part of the Japanese striking force that attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. (see infra, page 408).

The dispatch from the Naval Attache at Chungking (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 28T) stated that information had been received from a private agency that the Fleet had been mobilized at Sasebo since 20 October. The other dispatch from Chungking (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 29T) stated that the Chinese claimed that the Japanese intended to attack Siberia in the near future.

The report of the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer (Hew. Exhibit 26 placed two Japanese Carrier Divisions (AKAGI and KAGA) and (HIRYU and HOSHO) in the Kanoya-Eastern Kyushu Area, and one Carrier Division (RYUJO and ZUIKAKU) in the Takao Area.

The dispatches from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai (Hew. Exhibit 27, pages 30T-31T), reported sightings of Japanese trawlers, transports, and a convoy at various places along the China Coast, including Amoy, Wenchow, Woosung, Foochow and Shanghai.

The Com16 dispatch (270916) (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 100) placed three carriers (RYUJO, ZUIKAKU and one unidentified) and four others (AKAGI, KAGA, HIRYU and HOSHO) in the Kanoya-Eastern Kyushu Area.

(11) The CIS of 28 October 1941* stated, among other things, with reference to the "FOURTH FLEET and MANDATES - Indications are growing stronger that the Fourth Fleet is preparing for operations." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 31S).

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

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(12) The CIS of 29 October 1941* stated, among other things, under the topic - 'China', that Carrier Divisions Three and Four "continue association with Combined Air Force Commander in the Takao Area," and, with reference to the Combined Fleet, that the carriers, AKAGI, SORYU and SHOKAKU, and the Commander of the Submarine Force, were apparently in the same south Kyushu area. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 23S).

(13) The CIS of 30 October 1941* in its general discussion of Japanese radio traffic, stated again that Tokyo was continuing to "originate messages for general distribution." The writer of the Summary then stated:

"This activity has covered a considerable period now and is, I believe, unprecedented. The subject matter is unknown because of the general address always involved. The only conclusions are that a major change in the communications system is imminent or that regular reports are being made to the Navy concerning communications."

This report also stated, in connection with the Fourth Fleet, that a new Japanese carrier had been identified as the KORYU. (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 33S-34S).

(14) The CIS of 31 October 1941* commenced by stating that the previous indications which had been so frequently noted, with reference to a change in Japanese Navy call signs, had been borne out at 0000 hours on 31 October. In this connection the Summary stated:

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

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"GENERAL - at ~~0000~~, 31 October, Japanese Navy service calls changed in all fleet and air units, as expected. Shore station calls and addresses remain unchanged. Insufficient data is at hand at time of writing to determine whether tactical calls in the fleet were also switched; however, these shifted on 20 September and may carry over. Traffic intercepted on 31st about normal volume with continuation of general address messages from Communication Division Tokyo, Naval Ministry and China Fleet Intelligence."

The dispatch then went on to say that the traffic of Carrier Divisions Three and Four was routed via Takao. (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 35S-36S).

(15) The CIS of 1 November 1941* stated, among other things, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet had originated considerable traffic to addressees in Submarine and Carrier categories, and that the Commander of the Carrier Divisions had taken a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast from Tokyo. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 37S).

(16) The CIS of 2 November 1941* stated that - "Solution of new call system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual calls." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 38S).

(17) The CIS of 3 November 1941* stated that "general messages continue to emanate from Tokyo communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities of this nature." The Summary continued, stating that

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

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a new address had been broken down which, literally read, meant "1st Air Fleet", and stated if such reading were correct, it indicated "an entirely new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate that this may be the case." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 39S).

(18) The Combat Intelligence on 4 November 1941, to Admiral Kimmel consisted of a further Intelligence Report from the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, Serial Number 84 (Hew. Exhibit 27), and the usual daily CIS.*

The CIS of this date stated, among other things, "High traffic level of air activities continues." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 40S). The report of the Intelligence officer was confined to navigation through the Uraga Channel, which, he said, required the taking of precautions. (Hew. Exhibit 27).

(19) The CIS of 5 November 1941* stated, with reference to the recent change in call signs and the uncertainties arising therefrom, that it was believed that a large concentration of naval forces was going forward. The Summary stated:

"Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown extent." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 41S).

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

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On the same day the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai sent a dispatch (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 27T) to CinCAF, with information copy to CinCPac, reporting the sightings of Japanese Naval craft at various places, including Namow Island, Amoy, and Shanghai, some of which were carrying troops.

(20) The CIS of 6 November 1941* pointed out that Tokyo had adopted new communication security devices in sending its messages, which included omitting the address and originator. "This," it was stated, "may be the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits."

It was also said to be "now certain" that there was a very heavy air concentration on Taiwan, comprising practically the entire Combined Air Force, "including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 42S).

On that same date, the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai sent another dispatch to CinCAF, with information copy to CinCPac, stating that on 30 October, thirty Japanese naval vessels including sixteen destroyers, had been anchored in the Wakasa Bay and Obama Harbor Area. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 26T).

(21) The CIS of 7 November 1941* adverted further to the difficulties of recovering information due to the newly inaugurated Japanese security measures, saying:

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

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"GENERAL - Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which attached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" (authenticator for bonafide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill". * * *

"Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 43S).

(22) The CIS of 8 November 1941* stated, among other things, that all Mandate circuits were active with emphasis on the Palao Area at one end and the Jaluit-Marshall on the other, while the Chichijima Air Station was included in much of the traffic by the Empire Offices. "Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified."

The summary stated: "Batdiv 3 of the First Fleet appeared to be operating separately from the main force, possibly in connection with Cardivs Three and Four, in the Taiwan-Naha area." It was also stated, with reference to "Air", that "the formation of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to be nearly completed" and

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

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this "force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Forces, also, possibly some units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force highly speculative and area of operations obscure." (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 44S-45S).

On the same date the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai sent a further Japanese ship movement report to OpNav, with information copy to CinCPac, stating that there was outward bound on the Pearl River 28 trawlers and 28 transports, and that 12,000 Japanese troops had been disembarked at Haiphong. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 24T).

(23) The CIS of 9 November 1941* stated, among other things, that CarDiv 3 arrived at Takao, and that there were indications that CarDiv 4 would return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions was said to be the AKAGI, which was in the Sasebo Area. The Summary went on to state that BatDiv 3 was associated with Mandate addressees. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 46S).

On the same date, the Assistant Naval Attache at Peking originated a dispatch to OpNav and CinCPac, reporting that 40 to 50 Japanese troop trains had passed through Tehchow and Shihnei enroute to Tsingtao during the past two weeks, but that there were no indications that Japanese troops were being transported during November from North China to Manchuria. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 23T).

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(24) The CIS of 10 November 1941* stated that it was believed that the Combined Fleet was located mostly in the Kure area, and also believed that the CinC Second Fleet and the whole of Batdiv 3, as well as two cruiser divisions, were in the Kure area. It was also said that it appeared that the commander of Cardiv 3 was also with the Combined Fleet, and that several carrier division units were at Kure and Sasebo. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 47S).

The Intelligence Report of the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer of 10 November 1941, Serial Number 85 (Hew. Exhibit 26), stated that reliable information indicated that the ZUIKAKU, NOTORO, and two Maru Tenders, had returned to the Sasebo-Kure area; that the RYUJO was still in Taiwan, and that the KENJO MARU was in the Saigon-Camranh Bay Area.

On the same day, the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai sent a dispatch to Opnav and CinCPac, reporting sightings of Japanese ships off and along the China Coast, which included 43 ships on a southerly course below Hongkong on 6 November, 17 ships in a convoy headed southwesterly off Turnabout Island on 4 November, and the departure of the cruiser NATORI from Amoy on 4 November. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 22T).

(25) The CIS of 12 November 1941* stated, among other things, that while the Combined Fleet remained relatively inactive in the Kure area, the association of Batdiv 3 with the Fourth Fleet and the several Mandate stations was borne out by a direction finder position on the Flagship of

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Batdiv 3, and that the latter ship was placed by the D.F. finding about halfway between Chichijima and Marcus Island. There was also associated with Batdiv 3, a Submarine Squadron, and possibly though not positively, Cardiv 4 (ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU). Cardiv 3 was stated to have returned from Takao to Kure, as reported by the Communication Intelligence Unit at Cavite. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 48S).

The 12 November 1941 Intelligence Report of the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer (Hew. Exhibit 26), Serial Number 86, stated that it was reliably reported that the RYUJO (which was the Flagship of Cardiv 3) had returned to Kure.

(26) The CIS of 13 November 1941* stated that several high precedence messages had been intercepted. It was also stated, with reference to the Combined Fleet, - - "The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is operating and was located by D.F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 49S).

On the same day, 13 November 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch to CinCPac, CinCAF, and Com16 (132120), requesting an estimate of the strength and range of Japanese aircraft permanently based in the Mandated Islands, and any possible recent additions thereto. (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 14).

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(27) The CIS of 14 November 1941* again discussed the problem raised by reason of the activities of Batdiv 3. It was stated, "The Flagship of Batdiv 3 is still operating but no information on this division." In respect of submarines, it was stated that one unit was eventually enroute to Palao. As to Carriers, it was stated that the Commander of the Air Force was still at Takao with a good representation of his command, and that the carriers "remain in home waters with most of them in port." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 51S).

On the same day, 14 November 1941, the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai originated a dispatch to OpNav, with information copy to CinCPac (140405), stating that the Japanese government contemplated opening to foreign shipping the Yangtze river as far as Hangkow, in order to influence American public opinion and to strengthen the position of Kurusu, as well as to demonstrate to the Japanese people that every effort was made to secure the cancellation of the existing freezing regulations. (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 15).

On 14 November 1941, CinCPac replied by dispatch (142045) to the OpNav request for an estimate of the Japanese strength in the Mandated Islands (132120), stating that the estimate had been forwarded by mail, and that there were indications that two additional Japanese air groups might move to the Mandates in the future. (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 16).

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

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In his letter of 14 November 1941 to Admiral Kimmel, (N.C.I.

Exhibit 39), Admiral Stark said:

"Your estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates has been received in the Department. It will be carefully studied. From a hasty examination, it appears to be a very complete paper." (N.C.I. Exhibit 39).

(28) On 15 November 1941, CinCAF replied by dispatch (150940), with information copy to CinCPac, to the OpNav request for estimate of the Japanese strength in the Mandates (132120), advising that Japanese Air Groups 16 to 19 inclusive were at Palao, Truk, Saipan and Imieji, respectively. It was also stated that groups from Yokohama, Yokosuka, and a third place which was possibly Chitos, were probably located at Wotje, Kwajalong and Ponape. This dispatch further stated that the strength of each of the air groups was estimated as one squadron of 12 planes. (Hew. Exhibit 70, document 17).

The 15 November 1941 CIS* stated, among other things, that a number of general address messages were originated by the communication division in Tokyo to radio officers at many shore stations and to staff communication officers of all major Flagships. The Minister of the Navy was said to have originated one AlNav and one message to all Naval Commands ashore. The Tokyo Personnel Division also originated several messages to the collective Fleet and Shore Stations. With respect to these messages, the Communication Intelligence Summary stated, "Significance

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is not determined though it is believed possible that a further partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect." It was stated further that the Secretary of the First Fleet had originated one Urgent Code to the Commanding Officer of the Flagship of Batdiv 3, and to the Communication Officer of Cardiv Four, but, with reference to Batdiv 3, that it had been associated on the preceding day through traffic with the South Expeditionary Force. As to possible operations the Summary stated:

"CinC Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units."

With reference to submarines, it was stated that it was believed that some submarine activity was preparing to operate in the Marshall Area.

The Summary concluded by referring to the difficulties in obtaining recoveries and making identifications, arising out of the alternate calls used by Japanese major forces. In this connection it said:

"The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes available for research." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 52S).

(29) The CIS of 16 November 1941* stated that the majority of the First and Second Fleet Units remained in the Kure area, and pointed out that the units of those Fleets which have been most active during the

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past ten days were BatDiv 3, Cardiv 4, Crudiv 7, Desrons 3 and 7, and Airon 7. The Summary then stated:

"It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently."

The Summary continued by stating that it was apparent that Desron 1 had been or was operating with Batdiv 3 and the Carrier Divisions. ^{1/} With reference to submarines it was stated that the association of the Submarine Force and the Fourth Fleet Command continued. Concerning the Fifth Fleet, it was stated that its composition was very indefinite even prior to the change of calls on 1 November, and, that since that time, little has "been recovered of the composition of this mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus." (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 54S-55S).

On the same day, 16 November 1941, a dispatch was originated by the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai, giving a further report concerning Japanese ship movements, most of which were sightings. The places where ships had been seen included the Pearl River, Shanghai, Canton, Bias Bay, Amoy and Turnabout Island. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 21T)

(30) The CIS of 17 November 1941 discussed the general nature of the Japanese radio intelligence, which included traffic with single call headings on the broadcast circuit, which were transmitted each hour on the hour, and which were thought to be drill messages. However,

^{1/} This was a further associating of the Japanese Striking Force (see infra page 408).

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

it was stated that it was "feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. Since none of this traffic has been found going in to Tokyo, it is probably originated in the Navy Ministry." The Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet was said to have been active as an originator, continuing to address not only units normally under his command but also addressing CinC Third Fleet, Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet, and the Palao Forces. It was further stated that the Commander of the Combined Air Force remained in Takao and that "The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the exception of a few that are operating in the Kyushu area." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 56S).

On 17 November 1941, the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai originated a further dispatch concerning the massing of Japanese military forces in respect of the Indo-China situation, which included the landing during the preceding ten days of large amounts of heavy artillery at Saigon and Haiphong. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 20T).

(31) The CIS of 18 November 1941* stated, among other things, that Tokyo originators were active with several messages of general addresses emanating from the communication section. One Tokyo originator sent an urgent message to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo-China Forces, and the Chief of Staff Second Fleet. Another urgent message was sent by the Maizuru Naval Station to the same addressees, plus the Combined Air Force. The Vice Chief of Naval General Staff

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sent one message to the Chief of Staff of the Carrier Divisions and to the Chief of Staff of the French Indo-China Forces. The CinC Combined Fleet was said to have been prominent both as an originator and addressee.

The Summary deduced future operations as follows:

"Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today, being addressed by N.G.S. [..... the double originator with Bumil.] and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several instances. The CinC Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches to him. These form the indication that CinC Second Fleet will be in command of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has been noted."

With respect to submarines, it was said to be noticeable that they were still interested in Jaluit. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 57S).

(32) The CIS of 19 November 1941* stated generally that Tokyo intelligence sent out several messages addressed to the Second Fleet, the Submarine Force and the Carrier Divisions. The Flagship of Batdiv 3 (HIYEI) was stated to appear to be on that day at Sasebo, "its southern jaunt apparently having been completed." The CinC Second Fleet was said to have continued his activity, being still associated with Cardiv 3 (which had been associated with the Third Fleet since its return to the Empire a week previous), Combined Air Force, Third Fleet, and the French Indo-China Force.

It was further stated that one call which had been recovered,

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which had been identified as Carrier Division Four, appeared to be at Jaluit that day, and that, if this message were correct, it showed that CarDiv 4 (ZUIKAKU) was in the Jaluit area. However, it was stated that this was not confirmed and it was thought possible that the message in question was a communication error. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 58S).

On that same day, 19 November 1941, the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai originated a dispatch concerning the strictness of Japanese regulations in the Camranh Bay area, stating that the surrounding hills had been fortified. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 19T).

On 19 November 1941, the U.S. Naval Observer at Wellington, New Zealand, originated a dispatch stating that on 16 and 17 November, planes which were apparently Japanese, had been sighted over the Gilbert Islands, and that the Japanese were apparently flying daily patrols over the Gilberts from Jaluit. This dispatch further stated that Truk and Saipan had been reenforced recently with fighter and bomber planes, and that reports had been received that the Japanese were sending troops or laborers to the Mandated Islands. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 18T).

(33) The CIS of 20 - 21 November 1941* among other things, stated that traffic volume during the past two days had been higher than normal, and that Tokyo originators had been active in sending messages to all

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

major commanders. The traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was said to be so heavy on 21 November that the circuit was on a duplex operation most of the mid-watch.

It was stated that most of the Second and First Fleet remained in the Kure-Sasebo area, and that Battleship Division Three was still in the Yokosuka area. It was also noted that traffic to and from the CinC Second Fleet continued abnormally high, and there were listed many units which were addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and to CinC Third Fleet, during the past two days, which included CarDiv 3, Airons 6 and 7, Crudivs 5 and 7, Desrons 3, 4 and 5, and many others. The Summary pointed out that the Task Force being formed under CinC Second Fleet appeared to be of considerable strength.

With respect to submarines it was stated to be significant -- "One item stands out," that there had been practically no submarine units mentioned in connection with South China activities, and that the Commander of the Submarine Force appeared, however, in the traffic between Tokyo, the Fourth Fleet and the Mandates. It was further stated that the message of the preceding day which had indicated that a carrier unit was at Jaluit, had since been identified as a Submarine Squadron of the Submarine Fleet. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 60S).

On the same day, 21 November 1941, the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai originated three dispatches (Hew. Exhibit 27, pages 15T, 16T, 17T) which dealt with Japanese transport, troop and supply activities on and along the coast of China. These included reports that many landing boats

had sailed from Shanghai between the 14th and 17th of November, of departures from Shanghai of transports, and from Amoy of destroyers and torpedo boats, and of various warships anchored off Bias Bay on 15 November. It was also stated that close to 14,000 Japanese troops with about 80 tanks had arrived in Shanghai from Nanking, and that many supplies had been shipped out of Shanghai.

(34) The CIS of 22 November 1941* stated that the traffic volume was somewhat greater than normal but that since only one tactical circuit had been heard that day, it was indicated that the Combined Fleet tactical exercises had been completed. It was further stated that the CinC Second Fleet had again addressed many messages to the Third Fleet and the Combined Air Force, and that the Commanders of the latter two had also sent many messages to him. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 61S).

The Intelligence Report of the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer of 22 November 1941, Serial Number 87 (Hew. Exhibit 26), stated that Dutch authorities in the Netherlands East Indies had received information that a strong Japanese Expeditionary Force had arrived in the vicinity of Palau, and that the Force was strong enough to constitute a threat against the Netherlands East Indies or Portuguese Timor. The Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies was reported to have stated if the Japanese forces moved past a certain line he would consider war to have begun.

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

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On 22 November 1941, the Naval Attache at Singapore originated a dispatch stating that it was reliably reported that an airplane had made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands on 15 and 16 November. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 14T).

(35) The CIS of 23 November 1941* stated that while the traffic volume was normal the high precedence traffic had increased. The First Fleet was said to have been very quiet and the Third Fleet to have been the most active in the day's traffic. "Indications are that Third Fleet units are underway in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and French Indo-China Force."

With reference to submarines it was stated that though there was no means of substantiating the impression, it was believed that more submarines were operating in or from the Marshalls than was possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. "It is recalled that there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that area." In respect of carriers, it was stated that the Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet but that Cardiv 3 was definitely associated with Second Fleet operations. The Summary for 23 November concluded as follows:

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Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering in the Palao area." (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 62S-63S).

On the same day, 23 November, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer submitted two Intelligence Reports, Serial Numbers 88 and 89 (Hew. Exhibit 26). The report bearing Serial Number 88 stated, among other things, that information to CinCAF did not indicate the presence in the Mandates of Japanese units other than the Fourth Fleet, but it was possible that there might be an increase in the number of transports and marus (merchant ships) there. It stated further that CinC Fourth Fleet was at Saipan on 22 November, and that it was possible that Airon 24 might also be there. "Slight indications are that one battleship division and two carriers are preparing to proceed to the Mandates but so far there has been no signs that movement has begun."

The Intelligence Report bearing Serial Number 89 stated that CinC Fourth Fleet was reported to have returned to Truk after a trip to Saipan in the Kashima. The Report estimated increases in the Base Force at Palao, Truk, Saipan and Jaluit, and stated that the activity of the Japanese Combined Air Force was increasing and that the Fifth Fleet was apparently at Chichijima. (Hew. Exhibit 26).

(36) The CIS of 24 November 1941* stated that while traffic volume

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was normal, high precedence traffic was above normal, and that the total traffic gave impressions which were "worth something" in the respect that (i) there had been a falling off of traffic to China addressees, (ii) an increased activity among Third Fleet addressees including a high percentage of movement reports, and (iii) above normal activity both ashore and afloat in the Mandates.

It was stated that CinC Second Fleet appeared to be the Task Force Commander of a large movement of units from the First and Second Fleets, plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units. The Fourth Fleet was stated to appear to be concentrated in the Truk area, and a large number of submarines from the Submarine Force was in the Marshall area. There was said to be "no definite indications of location" as to carriers. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 64S).

On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch (242239) to CinCAF for action, with information copy to CinCPac, Com16 and the Naval Attache in Japan and China, stating that since Com16's interceptions concerning Japanese naval movements were considered the most reliable among those reported by the information addressees, it was suggested that all such reports be sent to Com16 for action and to OpNav for information, and that Com16 should then combine all incoming reports in dispatches to OpNav and to CinCPac. This dispatch read in full as follows:

ORANGE NAVAL MOVEMENTS AS REPORTED FROM INDIVIDUAL
INFORMATION ADDRESSEES ARE OFTEN CONFLICTING BECAUSE OF

NECESSARILY FRAGMENTARY NATURE X SINCE COML6 INTERCEPTS
ARE CONSIDERED MOST RELIABLE SUGGEST OTHER REPORTS

CAREFULLY EVALUATED BE SENT TO COML6 FOR ACTION OPNAV FOR
INFORMATION X AFTER COMBINING ALL INCOMING REPORTS COML6

DIRECT DISPATCHES TO OPNAV INFO CINCPAC BASED ON ALL
INFORMATION RECEIVED INDICATING OWN EVALUATION AND PROVIDING

BEST POSSIBLE CONTINUITY X REQUEST CINCAF ISSUE DIRECTIVE
AS NECESSARY TO FULFILL GENERAL OBJECTIVE." (Hew. Exhibit 8).

On 24 November 1941, a dispatch was originated by the Assistant
Naval Attache at Shanghai, reporting Japanese shipping movements on and
along the coast of China. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 13T).

(37) The CIS of 25 November 1941* stated, among other things, that
a direction finder net controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret
calls being sent by five stations, and that the traffic level of the en-
tire fleet was still high, leading to the conclusion that organizational
arrangements or other preparations were not yet complete. It was also
stated that two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and
with the Task Force then forming were the North China Fleet and Defense
Division One. Concerning carriers, it was stated that "One or more of
the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates." (Hew. Exhibit 22,
page 65S).

On 25 November, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer made an In-
telligence Report, Serial Number 92 (Hew. Exhibit 26), in which he sum-

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marized the dispatch from CNO of 24 November 1941 (242005) (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 105; see supra page 359) which stated that the chances of a favorable outcome of the negotiations with Japan were doubtful. This report read as follows:

"Opnav reports that the chances of any favorable result coming out of the present negotiations with Japan are very doubtful. It is his opinion that this, coupled with the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements of their military and naval forces, indicates that they may make a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam. The Chief of Staff of the Army concurs in this opinion. Senior Army Officers in the Far East, Pacific and West Coast areas (including Panama) have been informed. Utmost secrecy is enjoined regarding this opinion in order to not further complicate the present tense situation or to precipitate Japanese action." (Hew. Exhibit 26).

On 25 November 1941 the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer prepared a further Intelligence Report, Serial Number 93 (Hew. Exhibit 26), concerning the composition and activities of the Japanese fleet. He stated, among other things, that: (i) During the past month the commander of the Second Fleet had been organizing a force composed of the Second and Third Fleets, the Combined Air Force, Airon 7, Desron 3, and Subron 5, and possibly units of Batdiv 3 from the First Fleet. These units, the report stated, were linked with the South China Fleet and the French Indo-China Force as well as the Naval Stations at Sama, Takao and Bako; (ii) The commander of the Second Fleet was also stated to be intensely interested in operations of the Third Base Force which was at Palao; (iii) The Combined Air Force was said to have

assembled at Takao, with indications that certain units had moved to Hainan; (iv) The Third Fleet was believed to be moving in the direction of Takao and Bako; (v) The Second Base Force appeared to be transporting the equipment of air forces to Taiwan, and (vi) A strong concentration of submarines and aircraft, comprising at least one Cardiv and one third of the Submarine Force, and Airon 24, was believed to be in the Marshalls.

On 25 November 1941, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer issued two other Intelligence Reports, Serial Numbers 90 and 91 (Hew. Exhibit 26), reporting general information concerning Dutch reports of a Japanese Expeditionary Force near Palao, and a British report that Germany was obtaining rubber from Saigon,

On 25 November the Marine Detachment at Wake Island sent a dispatch to Com14 with information copy to CinCPac, stating that on 24 November at 2115 hours, the Pan-American Clipper sighted four Japanese seaplanes about 1,000 miles east of Guam, flying south at an altitude of 10,000 feet. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 12T).

On 25 November 1941, there was also originated three dispatches by the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai (Hew. Exhibit 27, pages 9T, 10T, 11T) which reported Japanese ship movements on and along the coast of China, and further that about 24,000 troops had sailed from Woosung between the 15th and 23rd of November. It was also stated that many ships

were seen heading for Formosa off Saigon.

(38) The CIS of 26 November 1941* stated, among other things, that the Tokyo intelligence and direction finder plotting units had addressed a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands, and to the CinC Second and Third Fleets in particular. The Commander in Chief of the Submarine Fleet was said to be at or near Chichijima, and the CinC Fifth Fleet was said to be associated with the new task force. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 66S).

On 26 November 1941, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer prepared an Intelligence Report, Serial Number 94 (Hew. Exhibit 26), in which the information of the past few days was summarized and evaluated as follows:

(i) The CinC Second Fleet was believed to be directing in a loosely-knit organization, various units of the First, Second, Third and Sixth Fleets. It was stated that this organization appeared to be divided into two sections, and that it was expected that Section I would operate in the South China Area while Section II would operate in the Mandates;

(ii) The composition of the force under CinC Second Fleet was stated to be as follows:

"2. Forces which appear to be under CinC 2nd Flt.

Section I

CruDiv 7 (From 2nd Flt) (4 CA's - KUMANO, MOGAMI,
MIKUMA, SUZUYA)

* - Indicates CIS was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

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that all known carriers of the First and Second Fleets were still in the Kure-Sasebo area. (Hew. Exhibit 26).

The above Intelligence Report, Serial Number 94, was in fact an abstract by the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer of information contained in a dispatch (260110), (Hew. Exhibit 8), of 26 November 1941, from Com14 to OpNav, with information copies to CinCPac, CinCAF and Com16, which summarized Com14's information concerning the Japanese Fleet during the preceding month. This dispatch (260110) from Com14 read, in part, as follows:

"THERE IS BELIEVED TO BE STRONG CONCENTRATION OF SUBMARINES AND AIR GROUPS IN THE MARSHALLS WHICH COMPRISE

AIRRON TWENTY FOUR AT LEAST ONE CARRIER DIVISION UNIT PLUS PROBABLY ONE THIRD OF THE SUBMARINE FLEET

EVALUATE ABOVE TO INDICATE STRONG FORCE MAY BE PREPARING TO OPERATE IN SOUTH EASTERN ASIA WHILE COMPONENT PARTS MAY OPERATE FROM PALAO AND MARSHALLS."

The dispatch further stated that the second section of the loosely-knit organization which had been formed and operating under CinC Second Fleet was expected to operate in the Mandates, and that ships involved were Crudiv 5, Cardiv 3 (RYUJO), and one Maru, Desrons 2 and 4, Subron 5, and Desdiv 24.

The Com14 dispatch (260110) stated with reference to previous information that Japanese aircraft carriers and submarines were located

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in force in the Mandated Islands, as follows:

"CANNOT CONFIRM SUPPOSITION THAT CARRIERS AND
SUBMARINES IN FORCE ARE IN MANDATES X OUR BEST

INDICATIONS ARE THAT ALL KNOWN FIRST AND SECOND
FLEET CARRIERS STILL IN SASEBO-KURE AREA."

The dispatch concluded as follows:

"SPECIAL CALLS USUALLY PRECEDE FORMATION OF TASK FORCE
USED IN AREA OPERATIONS X CINC SECOND X THIRD AND CINC
SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEET APPEAR TO HAVE MAJOR ROLES X

TRAFFIC FROM NAVMINISTER AND CNGS TO CINCS OF FLEET APPEAR
NORMAL X EVALUATION IS CONSIDERED RELIABLE." (Hew. Exhibit 8).

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THE ACTION TAKEN IN HAWAII -- THE ACTION
TAKEN IN JAPAN -- 16 OCTOBER - 26 NOVEMBER

(a) The Action Taken in Hawaii -- Dispositions of Ships of the
Fleet -- Failure to Have Long Distance Reconnaissance

During this period (16 October 1941 - 26 November 1941), following receipt of the Chief of Naval Operations dispatch of 16 October 1941 (162203), warning of the possibility that the Japanese might attack the United States (supra, page 349), Admiral Kimmel directed certain alerts to be established in the outlying islands, made dispositions of Fleet units, failed to order any long distance air reconnaissance or search from Oahu, directed the continuance of training activities of the Fleet and of the Patrol Wings, and approved and allowed to remain in effect the revised and previously approved Fleet Employment Schedules under which the basic activities of the Fleet were training and regularly scheduled periods of time in port and at sea:

1. On 17 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel, by a dispatch (170319) (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 83) directed Admiral Bloch, Commandant 14th Naval District, to have placed in effect "an alert status in the outlying islands." The dispatch read:

"DIRECT AN ALERT STATUS IN OUTLYING ISLANDS" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 83).

In pursuance of this order, Admiral Bloch sent a dispatch on 17 October 1941 (170356) (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 85), to the Naval Air Stations at Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra Islands, and to the Marine Detachment at Wake Island, reading:

"IN VIEW INTERNATIONAL SITUATION ASSUME ALERT STATUS."

On the same day, 17 October 1941, the Marine Detachment at Wake Island replied by dispatch (171130) to Admiral Bloch (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 88), advising that the defense installations there were not complete. This dispatch read:

"YOUR 170356 X DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS FAR FROM COMPLETE X THIS SITUATION INDICATE DIVERSION CONTRACTORS MEN TO ASSIST."

2. On 17 October 1941, CinCPac (Admiral Kimmel), sent a dispatch to the ComSubScoFor (Commandant of the Submarine Scouting Force), with information copy to Com14, (170354), directing the dispatch of two submarines to Wake Island when in all respects ready for war service, the patrol of a radius of fifteen (15) miles of Wake, and the reporting of submarine contacts. The dispatch also ordered that offensive action should be taken only in event of a subsequent order by CinCPac or if attacked. This dispatch read:

"WHEN IN ALL RESPECTS READY FOR WAR SERVICE SEND TWO SUBMARINES

TO WAKE X PATROL RADIUS FIFTEEN MILES OF WAKE X DIRECT SUB-
MARINES REPORT CONTACTS AND BE PREPARED TAKE OFFENSIVE ACTION
ONLY IF ATTACKED OR IF ORDERED TO DO SO BY CINCPAC." (Hew.
Exhibit 70, Document 84).

On the same date, CinCPac sent another dispatch to
ComSubScoFor (170426) ordering that the submarines then op-
erating at Midway be directed to assume a war patrol. This
dispatch read:

"DIRECT SUBMARINES NOW OPERATING MIDWAY ASSUME WAR PATROL TEN
MILE RADIUS X REPORT CONTACTS X TAKE OFFENSIVE ACTION ONLY IF
ATTACKED OR IF ORDERED TO DO SO BY CINCPAC." (Hew. Exhibit 70,
Document 86).

On the same date, 17 October 1941, CinCPac also sent
a dispatch to ComPatWing 2 (Two) (Commandant Patrol Wing TWO)
(170429), directing when ready for war service the dispatch
of one squadron of patrol planes to operate from Midway, car-
rying out a daily patrol within 100 miles of that Island. Com
PatWing 2 was also directed to be prepared on further orders to
send some planes to Wake Island, and was also given the order not
to take offensive action unless actually attacked. This dispatch
read:

"WHEN IN ALL RESPECTS READY FOR WAR SERVICE SEND ONE SQUADRON
PATROL PLANES TO OPERATE FROM MIDWAY UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS X
CARRY OUT DAILY PATROL WITHIN 100 MILES OF ISLAND X REPORT

CONTACTS X IN ADDITION BE PREPARED ON FURTHER ORDER TO SEND SIX OF THE ABOVE PLANES TO WAKE AND REPLACE THEM AT MIDWAY BY SIX PLANES FROM PEARL X PLANES WILL TAKE OFFENSIVE ACTION ONLY IF PLANES OR BASES ARE ACTUALLY ATTACKED OR ON FURTHER ORDERS FROM CINCPAC." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 87).

3. In his letter of 17 October 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, (N.C.I. Exhibit 38), Admiral Stark referred to the normal visits of Pacific Fleet units to the west coast. Admiral Stark said:

"Off hand without going into the "ins" and "outs" I see no reason for your stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self-contained task forces. We have left it up to you and I am just giving you my reaction." (N.C.I. Exhibit 38).

4. On 14 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel issued Pacific Fleet Confidential letter 2CL-41 (Revised) (N.C.I. Exhibit 8), which prescribed measures for the security of the Fleet while operating and while based at the Hawaiian area. These measures were to be effective until further orders.

One of the assumptions stated in this letter was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships at Pearl Harbor.

Other assumptions and provisions of this security letter have been stated in considerable detail (supra, page 141).

5. On 22 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote a letter to Admiral Stark (N.C.I. Exhibit 14), in which, among other things, he described his dispositions for ships following receipt of Admiral Stark's dispatchs concerning the change in the Japanese Cabinet. He said:

"On receipt of your despatches following the change in the Japanese cabinet we made the following dispositions:-

"Continued to maintain the patrol of two Submarines at Midway.

"Despatched twelve patrol planes to Midway.

"Despatched two submarines to Wake. They will arrive there on 23 October.

"Despatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional marines, ammunition and stores.

"The CURTISS arrives at Wake on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs.

"Prepared to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, replacing the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor.

"Despatched additional marines to Palmyra.

"Placed Admiral Pye, with the ships making a health cruise, on twelve hours notice after 20 October.

"Had six submarines prepared to depart for Japan on short notice.

"Put some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

"Delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA until about 17 November when she is due to go for an overhaul to Puget Sound and deferred final decision until that time. 1/

1/ See the Employment Schedule of the WEST VIRGINIA, (Supra, page 244).

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"With minor changes I propose to continue the health cruises to the Pacific Coast until something more definite develops. The despatch in regard to the submarines for Manila went forward to you today." (N.C.I. Exhibit 14)

6. On 24 October 1941, CinCPac sent a dispatch (240350) to CinCaf, with information copy to OpNav and ComSubSocFor (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 93) advising that Task Group 14.2 composed of eight (8) submarines, was to depart from Pearl on 24 October 1941 at 0230, and that ComTaskFor (Commandant Task Force) Fourteen in a tender, with four (4) submarines, was to leave on 4 November 1941 at 2230. The routings of both of these groups was stated to be via "approximate great circle to San Bernardino thence to Manila". It was also said that the "submarines have painted out all identifying markings." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 93).

7. On 31 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel issued Pacific Fleet Confidential letter 14CL-41 (N.C.I. Exhibit 52), which prescribed the Task Force organizations, and the primary missions of the Pacific Fleet, and, as well, directed the adherence by all Task Forces to previously approved Employment Schedules, excepting that the Commanders of Task Forces Seven and Nine were directed to submit revised schedules for the period 15 November 1941 to 31 December 1941, at the earliest practicable date. The Task Forces prescribed, and their primary missions have been stated in detail (see supra, pages 67-70), as have the policy regarding Fleet employment, the Employment

Schedules, and the revised Employment Schedules, (see supra, pages 235-253).

The policy regarding Fleet Employment had been previously stated by Admiral Kimmel on 15 August 1941 in his Annual Report to the Secretary of the Navy (N.C.I. Exhibit 44), the basic feature of which was training, under which Task Forces were said to average eight (8) days at sea to thirteen (13) day in port. (N.C.I. Exhibit 44, page 3; see supra, page 243).

The primary mission prescribed for Task Force Nine in Pacific Fleet Confidential letter 14CL-41 included "(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at time prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units and bases." (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 3; see supra, page 61).

The basic Fleet Confidential Letter of 31 October 1941 also continued in effect the current Employment Schedules of Task Force One, Two, and Three, under which, in accordance with the prior Confidential Letter issued by Admiral Kimmel on 13 August 1941, (Har. Exhibit 25, page 4), certain "At Sea" and "Upkeep" (in port) periods had been prescribed. The in port and at sea periods as prescribed in the letter of 13 August 1941 (Hart Exhibit 25) were for the most part, being adhered to on 7 December 1941 when the Japanese attacked. The Fleet Employment Schedules have been stated fully. (supra, page 239-53).

8. On 7 November 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel, (N.C.I. Exhibit 74), replying to the latter's letter of 22 October 1941, (N.C.I. Exhibit 14), approving Admiral Kimmel's ship dispositions' following the recent changes in the Japanese Cabinet. He said:

"Ok on the dispositions which you made in connection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is - What next?!" (N.C.I. Exhibit 74).

9. On 22 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel approved the revised Employment Schedules of Task Force Nine (the Fleet Air Patrol Wing) for the period of 15 November 1941 - 31 December 1941 (Hew. Exhibit 37). 1/ It has been pointed out that Admiral Kimmel's Pacific Fleet Confidential letter of 31 October 1941 (supra, page 70), required the Commanders of Task Forces Seven and Nine to submit revised Employment Schedules from the period of 15 November to 31 December 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 52, page 4).

Under the revised Schedules of Task Force Nine, which was composed of Patrol Wings One and Two, the General Directive, as well as the details of the Schedules, required for the most part a continuation of expansion training, and no long distance reconnaissance or searches were included. The Task Force Nine revised Schedule, along with the watch

1/ See supra, page 248.

and duty Schedules of the Patrol Squadrons, have been stated in full, (supra, Pages 248-253).

In connection with the running of patrols and searches by the Fleet Patrol Planes, Admiral Kimmel assumed full responsibility for the manner in which they were employed. Among other things, he said:

"However, I want it clearly understood that it was my responsibility and I would give the orders to the planes."
(N.C.I. page 1125).

SECRET

(b) Events that Occurred in Japan But Were Not Discovered
by the Navy Until After 7 December 1941

The facts related in this section of this chapter, concerning the Japanese War Plans, and their implementation by Executing Orders, were obtained by the Navy (1) by a reconstruction of events as obtained by Naval Intelligence Officers in an interview with a Japanese prisoner of war, who was captured during the Mariannas Campaign and who had been attached to the Staff of Admiral YAMAMOTO, Commander-in-Chief, Japanese Combined Fleet, for some time prior to 7 December 1941. (Hew. pages 4-10; Hew. Exhibit 3); (2) from copies of the Japanese Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Orders Numbers 1 and 2, recovered by the Navy from the Japanese cruiser Nachi which was sunk in Manila Bay (now available in the Navy Department); and (3) from documents relating to the attack on Pearl Harbor furnished by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy to General of the Army MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, after the defeat of Japan (now available in the Navy Department). 1/

These sources of information, and others, which are referred to, show that there occurred in Japan during this period (16 October 1941 - 26 November 1941), the following events:

1/ These documents are hereinafter referred to as the MacArthur documents.

CLASSIFIED

(1) On 5 November 1941 (Japanese time) there was issued by the Japanese Navy, Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order Number One. This order provided that Japan expected war to break out with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, and that an approximate date for the outbreak of war, to be known as Y-Day, would be established by a subsequent order. It further provided that a date for the actual outbreak of war, to be known as X-Day, would be set by a final order.

This Top Secret Operation Order Number One, also provided that when so ordered, a Striking Force, centering around a number of carriers, would depart its base and proceed by way of Takan Bay (Hitokappu Bay), Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles, enroute to Pearl Harbor, where on X-Day it would deliver a surprise air attack against the U. S. Fleet. It was further provided that elements of the Japanese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet, composing part of the Advance Expeditionary Force, would leave the Japanese Inland Sea in advance of the Carrier Striking Force and proceed to the vicinity of Pearl Harbor in order to aid in delivering the surprise attack. Several submarines of the Advance Expeditionary Force were also to screen the Striking Force. (Hew. pages 4-10; Hew. Exhibit 3; Nachi Documents; MacArthur Documents.)

The MacArthur documents indicate that the idea of a surprise air attack against the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor had been conceived by Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, as far back as January 1941; that the essential features of the attack were decided upon in September 1941 at a Naval War Plans

CONFIDENTIAL
Conference held in Tokyo.

The composition of the Japanese Striking Force which was to attack Pearl Harbor is given in the Nachi and MacArthur documents. The Striking Force was to be under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, who was then Commander-in-Chief of the 1st Air Fleet, and was to consist of:

(i) Three of Japan's five Carrier Divisions, the KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1), HIRYU and SORYU (CarDiv 2), and the SHOKOKU and ZUIKAKU (CarDiv 5);

(ii) Two of the battleships of Battleship Division Three, (the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA);

(iii) Cruiser Division Eight (the TONE and CHIKUMA);

(iv) Destroyer Squadron One, consisting of the light cruiser ABUKUMA and sixteen destroyers;

(v) A supply force of eleven train vessels.

It has been pointed out (supra, page 334), that on 5 November 1941, which was the day of the issuance of Operation Order One, the Navy intercepted and translated a Japanese diplomatic message from Tokyo to Washington also dated November 5, 1941, which fixed as the deadline for the completion of the negotiations between the Japanese Government and the United States, the 25th of November. (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 7).

It is also to be noted that on this same day, 5 November 1941, the Japanese Government publicly announced that Ambassador Kurusu was to leave Japan for Washington, in order to attempt to bring about a settlement of the differences between the Japanese and the United States Governments.

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(2) On 7 November 1941 (Japanese time) the Japanese Navy issued Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order Two, setting the approximate date for the outbreak of war with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands (Y-Day) as 8 December 1941, Japanese time, or 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor time. This order directed that "first preparations for war be made".

(3) On or about 14 November 1941 (Japanese time), the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet directed the units of the enemy Striking Force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay, Etorofu Island in the Kuriles, by 22 November 1941 (Japanese time) for refueling (MacArthur documents).

(4) On 16 November 1941 (Japanese time) the Japanese Foreign Minister sent a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington, which was translated by the Army on 17 November 1941 (See supra, page 336), in which the Japanese Premier stated "that the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days," and reminded Ambassador Nomura that he had set 25 November 1941 as the deadline for the completion of the negotiations, stating "there will be no change". (N.C.I. Exhibit 63; Document 10).

(5) About 18 November 1941 (Japanese time) submarines of the Japanese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet, comprising a portion of the Advance Expeditionary Force, departed the Japanese Inland Sea, enroute to Pearl Harbor to participate in the attack. (Hew. pages 6-7; Hew. Exhibit 3; Nachi Documents).

(6) On 19 November 1941 (Japanese time) as has previously

been stated (supra, page/339), the Japanese Premier in Tokyo sent a message to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, which was not translated by the Navy until 26 November 1941, which established the so-called "Winds Code", whereby certain words were to be used at the beginning and at the end of Japanese General Intelligence Broadcasts in the event Japan's "diplomatic relations" with the United States, Great Britain, or Russia were "becoming dangerous". (N.C.I. Exhibit 63; Document 13; Hew. Exhibit 13; page 6).

(7) On 22 November 1941 (Japanese time) as has been pointed out (supra, pages 337-8), the Japanese Government at Tokyo sent a dispatch to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in Washington, which was translated by the Army on the same day, and which referred at length to the deadline date of 25 November 1941 that had been fixed in the Tokyo to Washington message of 5 November 1941. This message of 22 November stated that there were "reasons beyond" the ability of the Japanese Ambassadors "to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th", but that if the signing of an agreement settling the differences between the two countries could be "completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you --twenty-ninth). *****We have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that, things are automatically going to happen." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63; Document 11).

(8) On 25 November 1941 (Japanese time) the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet issued an order which instructed the Striking Force to depart Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 26 November,

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advance into Hawaiian waters, and on the opening of hostilities "attack the main force of the U.S. Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow". The order stated that the first air-raid was planned for the dawn of X-Day, the date of which was to be set by later order (MacArthur Documents).

(9) On 26 November 1941 (Japanese time) the Striking Force sortied from Hitokappu Bay, Etorofu Island, and headed eastward under a heavy front on its mission to attack Pearl Harbor, which it executed on 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor time (MacArthur documents). On the same date, the Japanese Government in Tokyo sent a diplomatic dispatch to its Ambassadors in Washington, which was translated by the Army on that same day, establishing code words to be used in making reports over the telephone because of the fact that the "situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63; Document 12). 1/

1/ Subsequent events in the Pacific are stated in Chapter XV, the day by day chronology of the critical period.

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PART FOUR

THE PERIOD

27 November 1941 - 7 December 1941

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WASHINGTON, HAWAII, AND THE PACIFIC
27 NOVEMBER - 7 DECEMBER 1941

1/

This, the critical period of 27 November 1941 - 7 December 1941, commenced with the sending, by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, of the explicit "WAR WARNING" message, which followed by two days the sortie on 25 November 1941, at 1330 Hawaii Time, from Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, of the Japanese Carrier Striking Force, for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The night before it ended there occurred the almost simultaneous decrypting and translating in Washington of the intercepted Japanese diplomatic dispatches indicating certain termination by Japan of the diplomatic negotiations with the United States, the final sprint during the night hours of 6 December 1941 of the fast Japanese Striking Force through the Pacific to the pre-chosen point 200 miles North of Oahu, where its airplanes were to be launched for the attack, the taking of stations outside of Pearl Harbor by submarines of the Japanese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet, lying in wait for any sortie of the Pacific Fleet. At this time the Pacific Fleet was, in large part as to major units, in port in accordance with an Employment Schedule at least four (4) months old, and in the lowest of the conditions of readiness prescribed by Admiral Kimmel.

1/ In order to avoid duplication, the dispatches to and from the Navy Department in Washington, which were also sent either for action or information to CinCPac, are stated in this Chapter in the sections which pertained to information available or events occurring in Hawaii. Only that information available in Washington and not available in Hawaii, is stated in this Chapter in the sections detailing information available and events occurring in Washington.

A. 27 NOVEMBER 1941

1. In Washington

(i) Intelligence

There was available in Washington on this day, and not sent as such, to Hawaii, the following information:

(a) There was translated by the Navy on 27 November 1941, an intercepted Japanese dispatch from Tokyo to Nanking, dated 15 November 1941, which stated that the Japanese Government was then in the midst of very serious negotiations which had not reached an agreement, and that the time limit was near. This dispatch was addressed particularly to Naval authorities, and read:

"Re your #818 (Not available)
To Naval Authorities:

We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer ?) for a while."

(b) On this day, there was also prepared in the Navy Department a statement showing the United States Navy and Army Air Forces then present in the Philippines, as compared with the Japanese estimate on the same subject as stated in the Navy translation on 8 November 1941 of the intercepted Japanese dispatch from Manila (Nihro) to Tokyo dated 1 November 1941 (supra pages 342-343).

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This summary showed a total number of American planes in the Philippines of 341, of which 43 were Navy and 298 Army; while the Japanese estimate of Army planes there was 1283, and 26 Navy, or a total of 1309. This estimate read as follows:

U. S. AIR FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

NAVY

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
PBY-4 (Patrol)	14
PBY-4 (Patrol)	14
SO3-3 (Scout Observation)	4
SO3-1 (" ")	2
J2F-4 (Utility)	3
SO3-1 (Scout Observation)	2
SO3-2 (" ")	2
OS3U-2 (Observation)	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	43

2 squadrons of OS3U airplanes, 24 in all, are being sent to the Philippines as soon as practicable. It is expected that they will be shipped from San Pedro in January, 1943.

ARMY

B-18 (Heavy Bomber)	18
B-17 C & D (Heavy Bomber)	35
P-55A (VF)	52
P-40B (VF)	30
P-40E (VF)	117
O-46A (VO)	7
O-49 (VO)	3
O-52 (VO)	10
A-27 (Dive Bomber)	9
O-29 (Combat)	1
O-49 (")	1
P-36A (VF)	<u>15</u>
TOTAL	298

In addition to the above 57 type A-24 dive bombers have been shipped to the Philippines this month, and further extensive reinforcements have been approved for completed delivery by February, 1943.

SUMMARY

<u>Bombers</u>	<u>Fighters</u>	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Patrol</u>	<u>Observation</u>	<u>Utility</u>	<u>Total</u>
62	214	2	28	33	3	341

CLASSIFIED JAPANESE ESTIMATES OF U.S. AIR FORCES IN PHILIPPINES

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>Military Planes</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Large Bombers		29
Scout Planes		324
The same, B type		62
Fighters		317
The same, B type		131
Pursuit planes		302
The same, D type		69
Training planes		49
	TOTAL	1283
	<u>Naval Planes</u>	
Large flying boats		26"

(ii) Memorandum to the President from General Marshall and Admiral Stark

On this day, 27 November 1941, General George C. Marshall and Admiral Stark prepared and sent to President Roosevelt a memorandum, dated the same day, in which they urged that the most essential thing for the United States at that time was to gain time, and recommended that no military counter-action be considered against Japan unless it attacked or directly threatened United States, British, or Dutch Territory. This memorandum is here stated in full:

November 27, 1941

"SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Situation.

ASSIFIED

"If the current negotiations end without agreement Japan may attack: The Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward.

The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct attack against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat exercised by United States forces in Luzon is removed.

Attack on the Burma Road or Thailand offers Japanese objectives involving less risk of major conflict than the others named, and is clearly within the means available, if unopposed by major powers. Attack on the Burma Road would, however, be difficult and might fail. If successful, the Chinese Nationalist Government might collapse. Occupation of Thailand gains a limited strategic advantage as a preliminary to operations against Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies, might relieve internal political pressure, and to a lesser extent, external economic pressure. Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Road, Thailand, or the Philippines can not now be forecast.

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence.

Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these Islands as a naval and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China.

"After consultation with each other, United States, British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counter-action against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

"Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100° East or South of 10° North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.

"It is recommended that:

"Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counter-action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;

"In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;

"Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

G. C. Marshall
Chief of Staff

H. R. Stark
Chief of Naval Operations"

(iii) Meaning of "WAR WARNING" Message:

As is hereafter stated (infra. pages 422-3), the Chief of Naval Operations sent the explicit "WAR WARNING" message to Admiral Kimmel on this date. The testimony concerning the drafting of this message and of the events in Washington leading up to it, was as follows:

(a) Admiral Stark testified that the "WAR WARNING" message was carefully considered by himself, by the Secretary of the Navy, and by his own advisors. (N.C.I. page 54.) He also stated that it was agreed in the Navy Department that an attack on Hawaii was a possibility but that that place was not mentioned in the 27 November 1941 message, and other places were mentioned,

because the best information available indicated that the Japanese attack would be either in the Philippines, Guam, and/or the Kra Peninsula. (N.C.I. page 797.)

Admiral Stark also testified that generally speaking he and his advisors did not expect a raid to be made on Hawaii, (N.C.I. 798), but that, as a result of "WAR WARNING" message of 27 November 1941, he anticipated that Admiral Kimmel would invoke in Hawaii full readiness measures, including distance reconnaissance. (N.C.I. pages 54-62, 84.)

(b) Admiral Ingersoll testified that he considered the warning message of the 27th to put additional obligations on the Pacific Fleet as to security and readiness, and that he considered that after its receipt it should have been considered in Hawaii that the training program was secondary rather than primary. (N.C.I. page 821, 849.)

(c) Admiral Turner testified that on 27 November 1941, Secretary Hull had told Admiral Stark that, to all intents and purposes, negotiations with Japan were terminated, though he (Hull) was not going to close them. (N.C.I. page 995.) Admiral Turner also said that he and Admiral Ingersoll prepared the draft of the "WAR WARNING" message after talking to Admiral Stark, and that that message meant just what it said. (N.C.I. page 839.)

(d) Admiral Turner also testified:

"As I recall, we were informed by the Secretary of State at a small meeting at which I was present, that the State Department had no further hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Secretary of State requested advice from the Military Services as to any further steps that his Department might make. It was apparent, from the talks that were going on between the State Department and Mr. Kurusu, as well as from information received from Intelligence sources, that the Japanese were killing time preparatory to an attack.

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We could not estimate the exact time that the attack would be made, but we knew of troop movements and naval movements in the Far East toward the South. It was at about this time that our search planes first picked up some of the Japanese ships moving along the coast of Indo-China. I think it may have been after the date of this despatch that we instituted plane search of the China Sea, but we were conscious of definite amphibious movements being made before the dispatch we are discussing was sent. The radio traffic, during the first half and middle of November, had been very heavy on the part of the Japanese, and suddenly it almost stopped some time between the 20th and 25th of November, as I recall it. Very little traffic was then sent out. That convinced us that the Japanese Fleet had put to sea. I was concerned, and had been through this entire period, over whether or not Japanese traffic analyses were being made by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I brought the subject up several times with the Director of Naval Communications and with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. I was assured, each time, that the Commander-in-Chief was getting everything that we were getting in Washington, and was making proper traffic analyses there. Japanese radio traffic analyses were under the cognizance of the Director of Naval Communications, and I am not very familiar with the exact methods employed, nor of the distribution which was made of their deductions. The Director kept War Plans fully informed as to these deductions." (Har., page 265.)

(e) Admiral Turner also testified that at the time of the drafting of the "WAR WARNING" message he expected that the Japanese would make some kind of an attack on Hawaii, (N.C.I. page 995), but that he did not mention Hawaii in that message because he believed that the places named were the strategic objectives for the Japanese, and he did not believe that they would inaugurate an amphibious attack against Hawaii. (N.C.I. page 1020). Admiral Turner invited attention to the difference between the dispatch of 24 November 1941, which had warned that a "surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines and Guam is a possibility" (242005), and to the wording of the dispatch of the 27th which, among other things, warned of an "amphibious expedition," saying that the first dispatch was the result of deduction and covered any type of action by the Japanese while, when the latter and later dispatch was written, they knew as a matter of fact that the Japanese were on the move. (N.C.I. page 996.)

CLASSIFIED

(f) Admiral Turner described the measures which the Navy Department expected to be taken in Hawaii as a result of the directions in the warning message of 27 November 1941 to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment," as follows:

"It will be noted that the dispatch orders a defensive deployment. We expected all war scouting measures to be undertaken, submarines to be sent out to protect our Fleet and territory against enemy naval forces; we expected the carriers with their protective vessels to put to sea and stand in readiness for war; we expected, in the Asiatic, the movement of ships to be made to the South in accordance with the plan agreed on. We expected a high degree of readiness on board ships against attack of any form; and on shore, we expected a high degree of readiness of defensive troops, including anti-aircraft. The dispatch was prepared jointly with the Army. We expected a deployment of the Army on shore appropriate with a defensive state of readiness, such as manning the coastal guns, and moving troops out to their deployment for defense of territory." (Har., page 265.)

(g) Adm. Ingersoll, however, stated that the deployment referred to in the 27 November 1941 warning message had reference particularly to the Asiatic Fleet, and that, with reference to the Hawaiian area, it was expected that steps would be taken to establish patrols. He said:

"Again, this despatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the Asiatic Fleet regarding the withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for operations contemplated elsewhere, and the movements in the Hawaiian area were those regarding observation, the establishment of patrols, and the reenforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remembered that an earlier dispatch in October had warned both Commanders-in-Chief against taking action which would provoke war." (Har., page 426.)

~~SECRET~~
In Hawaii

This was the most notable day in Hawaii of all those preceding 7 December 1941 when the Japanese made their surprise attack. On this day, Admiral Kimmel received the Navy Department's explicit "WAR WARNING" and the report of his own Intelligence Officer that the Japanese carriers had been formed into a separate Fleet, and he made his decision not to increase the security measures of the Fleet in port and not to inaugurate either a total or a partial long-range air search or reconnaissance from Oahu, though there were sufficient planes to conduct such a search in the known more dangerous sectors. On this day, the Japanese Carrier Striking Force had been at sea for two days after it sortied from Takan Bay, enroute to deliver its attack.

The details of the information available to Admiral Kimmel, and of the actions taken by him on this day follow:

(1) "WAR WARNING" Message from Washington:

(a) OpNav had sent a dispatch (271422) to CinCAF for action, a copy of which was written up for the information of and located in the files of CinCPac (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 26), advising that there was to be a revision of paragraph 3774 of WPL-46 in order to remedy an unintentional omission therefrom of CinCAF. The message went on to give instruction as to certain steps that were to be taken "if formal war eventuates with the United States and Japan". It also outlined courses of action "in case hostilities ensue without a formal declaration of war" (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 26).

(b) On this day, OpNav sent a further dispatch (271519) to CinCPac and others pointing out that merchant ship codes might be compromised soon, and that there should be inaugurated the use of secret positions in the assignment of routes for merchant ships, "as this will enable directions for diversions to be given without disclosing to Axis nations the location of our ships."

(c) On this date, 27 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark) sent a dispatch (272337) to CinCPac (Admiral Kimmel) and to CinCAF (Admiral Hart) for action, and to CinCLant (Admiral King) and to SpeNavO (Special Naval Observer in London) for information, which was released by Admiral Ingersoll, and which was expressly entitled a "WAR WARNING" message. In this dispatch Admiral Kimmel was told that negotiations with Japan had ceased and an aggressive movement by Japan was expected within the next few days. The dispatch went on to state, among other things, that the organization of the Japanese Task Forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Admiral Stark further directed in this dispatch that Admiral Kimmel should execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan WPL-46.

This message read as follows:

"THIS DESPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING X NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC HAVE CEASED AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS X THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND

THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATES AN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER THE PHILIPPINES OR KRA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO. X EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL46 X INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES X A SIMILAR WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT X SPENAVO INFORM BRITISH X CONTINENTAL DISTRICT GUAM SAMOA DIRECTOR TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES AGAINST SABOTAGE X"

Despite this express "WAR WARNING" and notice of cessation of negotiations, Admiral Kimmel stated that, after receiving it he "could not ignore" the newspaper accounts that the diplomatic conversations were continuing to take place (Prepared Statement before N.C.I., page 42).

(ii) Combat Intelligence Available to Admiral Kimmel:

(a) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 27 November 1941* (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 67S) stated, among other things, that some tactical traffic had been intercepted from Japanese Carriers, that the main Tokyo originator of the day was the intelligence activity which sent five dispatches to the major Commanders, and that the direction finder activity was very high with all stations, including those in the Marshall Islands that had been silent for the past four days, sending in bearings.

The Summary also stated, with reference to the Combined Fleet, that there was no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area, and that the Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet, who had recently been inactive as an originator, had originated several messages of general address.

As to the Third Fleet, it was said that there was nothing to indicate any movement of it as yet, and that it was still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama, the South China Fleet and French Indo-China Force.

*Indicates the Communication Intelligence Summary was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

With reference to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that CinC Fourth Fleet had addressed many dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates, and that the Commander of the Submarine Force, and several Submarine units had been addressed by Jaluit. It was further stated that the Commander of the Submarine Force was still in the Chichijima Area.

With reference to carriers, it was stated "No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates", and, further, that an Air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU. "Carriers are still located in home waters." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 67S.)

(b) On this same day, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, prepared two Intelligence Reports (Serial Nos. 95 and 96) (Hew. Exhibit 26). The report bearing Serial No. 96 stated that information from British Intelligence sources in the Far East had stated that Japan would commence Military Operations on 1 December against the Kra Isthmus and Thailand. This report read:

"Japan will commence Military Operation on 1 December against the Kra Isthmus, Thailand, with the objective of interposing between Bangkok and Singapore.

"Main landing and center of effort at SINGORA (SONGKHLA).

"Japanese Assault Forces to proceed direct from TAIWAN (FORMOSA) and HAINAN Is."

Report No. 95 stated:

"A reliable agent states that there appears to be ORANGE Army activity in the air that involves Imperial Headquarters, Combined Army Forces and Commander OPTION KING AFIRM. Commander OPTION KING AFIRM and Combined Army Taiwan and Combined Army Forces Sama."

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(c) On this day, Admiral Kimmel issued to the entire Pacific Fleet, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin 45-41 (Hew. Exhibit 21), which stated the latest information available as to the organization of the Japanese Navy, and the Japanese Forces and installations in the Mandated Islands.

(1) In respect of the organization of the Japanese Fleet, this Bulletin pointed out that there had been major changes in the Japanese Fleet organization since the issuance of the Office of Naval Intelligence Report Serial No. 27-41 (OP-16-F-2, O.N.I.). The principal change was stated to consist of an "increase in the number of Fleet commands," and, it was pointed out, that this increase had "arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces," as well as from the creation of special task forces in connection with the "southward advance into Indo-China." The regrouping of commands was stated to have "resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands," as follows:

"MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS

I. Combined Fleet

1. First Fleet	(Battle Force)	3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons.
2. Second Fleet	(Scouting Force)	4 Crudivs, 2 desrons, etc
3. Third Fleet	(Blockade & Transport Force)	Small craft.
4. Fourth Fleet	(Mandate Defense Force)	1 Desron, 1 Subron and many small units.
5. Fifth Fleet	?	?
6. Sixth Fleet	(Submarine Fleet)	6 Subrons
7. Carrier Fleet	(Aircraft Carriers)	5 Cardivs
8. Combined Air Force	(Seaplane Tenders etc.)	4 Airrons, & Shore-based planes.

II. Japanese Naval Forces (Staff Headquarters) in China
1 PG and 3 DD's." (Hew. Exhibit 21, Page 1)

(2) The Combined Fleet, First Fleet, was stated in this report to include Batdiv 1 (3BBs), Batdiv 2 (3BBs) Batdiv 3 (4BBs consisting of HIYEI*, KONGO, KIRISHIMA*, and the HARUNA which was noted to have been "inactive during 1941, probably undergoing major repairs". This Fleet also included 1 Cruiser Division (Crudiv Six) and 2 Destroyer Squadrons (Desron One and Desron Three). Desron One* was composed of Desdivs Six, Twenty-one and Twenty-seven, plus the ABUKUMA, Flagship, totaling thirteen (13) DDs. (Hew. Exhibit 21).

(3) The Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, was composed of 4 Cruiser Divisions (Crudivs Four, Five, Seven, and Eight)*, and 2 Destroyer Divisions (Desron Two and Four). Crudiv Eight consisted of TONE (F)* and CHIKUMA* (CAs) (id.).

(4) The Third Fleet consisted of two Blockade Forces and two Base Forces, composed of one light cruiser, twelve destroyers, and miscellaneous minelayers, minesweepers, and subchasers (id.).

(5) The Fourth Fleet consisted of one Cruiser Division (Crudiv Eighteen), one Destroyer Squadron (Desron Six), one Submarine Squadron (Subron Seven), Survey Patrols, Salvage Divisions, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Base Forces; Submarine Squadron Seven consisted of four Submarine Divisions (Subdivs Twenty-six, Twenty-seven, Thirty-three, and one not indicated by number). In addition, there was attached to the Third

*Indicates participated in the Pearl Harbor attack.

Base Force one Submarine Division (Subdiv Six), making a total of sixteen submarines attached to the Fourth Fleet (id.).

(6) The Fifth Fleet was a new Fleet, the composition of which was stated to be unknown (id.).

(7) The Sixth Fleet,* also referred to "as the Submarine Fleet," consisted of six Submarine Squadrons (Subrons One, Two, Three, Five, Six, and Ten), or a total of forty-two submarines (id.).

(8) The recently organized Carrier Fleet was stated to consist of five Carrier Divisions (Cardivs One, Two, Three, Four, and one without a given number.) having a total of ten Carriers and sixteen Destroyers. The Carrier Fleet was composed of ships as follows:

"CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)

	<u>CV</u>	<u>KAGA</u>	<u>Flagship*</u>
<u>Cardiv 1 *</u>	<u>Cardiv 2 *</u>	<u>Cardiv 3</u>	
AKAGI *	HIRYU *	HOSHO	
KAGA (F) *	SORYU (F) *	RYUJO (F)	
<u>Desdiv 7</u>	<u>Desdiv 23</u>	<u>Desdiv 17</u>	
OBORO (F)	UZUKI	ISOKAZE	
USHIO	KIKUTSUKI	URAKAZE	
AKIBONO	MIKATSUKI	HAMAKAZE	
AKATSUKI	YUZUKI		
<u>Cardiv 4 *</u>	<u>Cardiv</u>		
ZUIKAKU *	CV KORYU		
SHOKAKU *	CV KASUGA (MARU)		
<u>Desdiv 3</u>			
HOKAZE			
SHIOKAZE			
NAMIKAZE			
NUMIKAZE			
		<u>TOTAL</u>	
		10CV	
		16DD"	

(Hew. Exhibit 21, page 8)

*Indicates participated in the Pearl Harbor attack.

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(9) The Combined Air Force was stated to have its head quarters at the Kanoya Air Station, and to consist of shore-based land planes and seaplanes, as well as ship-based squadrons. In addition the Report detailed the composition of the Train for the Combined Fleet, and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. It was pointed out that the Fourth Fleet might also be termed the Mandates Fleet, since it apparently administered the Naval activities, as well as the Army units, afloat and ashore, in the Mandated Islands. The principal operating base of this Fleet was stated to be Truk, while the Yokosuka Naval District was said to be directly responsible for its supply of stores and provisions (id.). With reference to recent Japanese air activities in the Mandated Islands it was stated:

"6. Considerable air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN, PALAO-PELELIU, TRUK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close cooperation has been noted between the Defense Forces and the Aircraft activities at their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes, Bombers and Fighters. Heavy land plane bombers and patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE, have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA, BUTARITARI, and BERU)." (Hew. Exhibit 21, page 14.)

(d) On the same day, 27 November 1941, the Naval Attache at Tokyo, and the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai, originated dispatches to OpNav, with information copies to CinCPac (Hew. Exhibit 27, pages 7T and 8T). The dispatch from Tokyo named three Maru's (merchant ships) which had been engaged since December hauling supplies and workmen to the Mandated Islands, and stated that there was considerable equipment at the Yokohama Naval Pier, awaiting

similar transportation. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 7T). The dispatch from Shanghai advised that there had recently been sighted between Hong Kong and Shanghai many transports traveling in a general southerly direction. This dispatch also contained the information that there was a report that the amount of supplies on the Military Docks in Shanghai was unusually small. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 8T.).

(iii) Dissemination of "WAR WARNING" Message:

After the receipt of the "WAR WARNING" message of this date, the following events occurred at Pearl Harbor:

(a) There was communicated the fact of the receipt of the "WAR WARNING" message to the following major Commanders under Admiral Kimmel: Admiral (then Captain) W. W. Smith, CincPac, Chief of Staff, (N.C.I. page 531); Admiral (then Captain) C.H. MacMorris, War Plans Officer (N.C.I. page 895; Hew. pages 321-324); Admiral (then Captain) DeLany, Operations Officer, (N.C.I. page 506); Captain (then Lt. Comdr.) E. T. Layton, Intelligence Officer (N.C.I. page 911; Hew. page 189-190); Admiral Calhoun, Commander of Task Force Fifteen, (N.C.I. page 935, 939); Admiral William F. Halsey, Commander Task Force Two, (Har. page 299); Admiral W. S. Pye, Commander Task Force One, (N.C.I. page 424); Admiral Claude C. Bloch, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, (Har. page 393); Admiral Walter S. Anderson, next in command under Admiral W. S. Pye, Commander Patrol Force and Commander Task Force One (Har. page 393).

(b) Neither the fact of the existence or the receipt of the "WAR WARNING" message of 27 November 1941, was communicated, until after the attack by the Japanese on 7 December, 1941, to the following major Commanders under Admiral Kimmel: Admiral Newton, Acting Commander of Task Force Three and Acting Commander of Scouting Force in the absence

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of Vice Admiral Wilson Brown,^{1/} and Admiral P.N.L. Bellinger, Commander of Task Force Nine, Commander Patrol Wings ONE and TWO, Commander Fleet Air Detachment, Ford Island, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Hew. Pages 498-499); and Admiral (then Captain) W. A. Kitts III, Fleet Gunnery Officer (Har. page 185).

(iv) Failure to Make Long Distance Reconnaissance and the Patrols that Could Have Been Flown;

The evidence is not too clear as to whether there was an express decision by Admiral Kimmel not to conduct long distance reconnaissance or whether there was merely a default in deliberation and in action. No witness referred to any specific occasion on which the matter was deliberated and disposed of. According to Admiral Bloch's testimony, there was a decision by implication. According to General Short there was a quick dismissal by the Navy War Plans Officer of the possibility of an air raid (infra, pages 444-5). According

^{1/} Admiral Newton as stated (infra, page 578), left Pearl Harbor on 5 December, 1941, with a powerful Task Force, including the aircraft carrier LEXINGTON, 2 cruisers (U.S.S. CHICAGO, & U.S.S. PORTLAND) and five (5) destroyers, on a mission to Midway Island, where he was to fly off a squadron of airplanes. Even up to and at the time of his sailing, and thereafter, he remained in ignorance of the existence of the "WAR WARNING" message of 27 November 1941, as well as of the similar warning messages of 24 November and 16 October, 1941. (Har. pages 316-318).

to Vice Admiral McMorris the matter was considered and no affirmative action taken. This evidence is stated below:

(a) Admiral Claude C. Bloch testified that on this day, 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, of the U. S. Pacific Fleet "made his decision" * * * * * that the intensive training, material upkeep, and operation schedules would continue and that no changes would be made." (N.C.I. page 400). Admiral Bloch explained that this was a decision which necessarily included the further decision by Admiral Kimmel that no long distance reconnaissance would be conducted by the Fleet aircraft, saying, "This, by itself, would include the long-range aircraft reconnaissance." (N.C.I. page 400). Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the question of running a long-distance air search or reconnaissance was considered by Admiral Kimmel and his staff (N.C.I. page 888-889) from time to time, including in conjunction with the warning dispatches that came in about 27-28 November 1941, and that "it was determined that the

searches would not be initiated, * * * * *the matter was given con- siderable thought, and the searches were not established." (N.C.I. page 890). Admiral Bellinger said that in the absence of an emergency, Admiral Bloch, the Naval Base Defense Officer, did not have the authority to alter the daily employment schedules of the Patrol planes, nor to order them to discontinue training and to institute long-range reconnaissance. (N.C.I. page 600). Admiral Bloch testified that as Naval Base Defense Officer, he "had no Patrol planes for distance reconnaissance." (N.C.I. page 1144), and, after repeating that Admiral Kimmel had made his decision on 27 November 1941 "that he would not make any distance reconnaissance and upset his complete operating schedule", said that he himself could not inaugurate any such air search without a change in the decision that had been made by, and without the authorization of, Admiral Kimmel. (N.C.I. page 1144-1145). It is to be noted that in connection with the question of the direct responsibility for employing the Patrol planes for reconnaissance, Admiral Kimmel said:

"However, I want it clearly understood, it was my responsibility, and that I did give the orders to the planes." (N.C.I. page 1125).

(b) The evidence shows that while there were insufficient planes to have conducted a 360° search or reconnaissance for any considerable period of time, yet there were available sufficient planes to have conducted an effective long-range reconnaissance of a sector from Oahu of considerable extent for an indefinite period.

Admiral Bellinger testified (Hew. Exhibit 480-483; 485-487; 502-504; 505) that after 28 October 1941, though there were 107 patrol planes (VP's) assigned to all units of

the Aircraft Scouting Force, only 81 were available for use. Fifty-four of the planes had only recently arrived, and they were the PBV-5 type with limited available spare parts. He stated that the number of plane crews did not quite equal the number of planes. He explained that if it were considered that there were available 81 planes, and assumed that none would have been lost due to break-downs requiring non-available spare parts, it would have been practicable to have used one-third of them, or about 27 planes, for a daily patrol. Each of these planes, he stated, could have covered a sector of 8° with a radius of 700 miles, making a total patrol of about approximately 216° daily to 700 miles. Admiral Bellinger stated that a 216° daily patrol to 700 miles would have been the absolute maximum that could have been flown with the available equipment. He said that 18 of the 54 new PBV-5's could have run a daily patrol of 144° .

Adverting to the planes available on 7 December 1941, Admiral Bellinger stated that, on that day, there were only 61 planes on Oahu, one squadron of which had just returned from Midway and Wake Islands and required overhaul, leaving actually available only 49 planes, one-third of which could have run a daily long-range search covering 128° (Hew. pages 480-483; 485-487, 502-504). Admiral Bellinger also stated that the daily 128° search that could have been flown, using only one-third of the 49 planes available on 7 December 1941, could have been flown indefinitely or until the failure of the planes and the lack of spare parts destroyed their availability. He said that with the available planes a 360° long distance reconnaissance could have been flown con-

tinuously during the first part of December, 1941, for no more than four or five days. (Hew. pages 504-505).

Admiral Bellinger testified also that he considered the sectors north of Oahu to be the more dangerous from the standpoint of a hostile raid, primarily because of the prevailing winds which facilitated carrier based airplane operations in those sectors; and he explained that normal plans of search after an attack would have called for a search in those sectors. (Hew. pages 506-507).

(v) Continuation of the Status Quo as to training and Security Measures in Port:

(a) Vice Admiral MacMorris testified (Hew. pages 304-305), that as a result of the "WAR WARNING" of 27 November, there occurred considerable discussion between Admiral Kimmel and the key members of his staff, and the following determinations or conclusions were reached:

(1) No material changes would be made within the Hawaiian area because the Naval organization was already substantially on a war footing;

(2) It was essential that training continue until it became necessary to move the principal elements of the Fleet into offensive operations, and therefore, that there should be a continuation and no modification of the training schedules;

(3) That limitations in supplies and facilities, particularly defensive aircraft, had precluded stationing requisite defensive forces at Wake or Midway and other Island outposts until it became virtually mandatory, and, accordingly, the only two aircraft carriers, accompanied by cruisers and destroyers were dispatched, one to Wake, the other to Midway, with fighter aircraft;

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(A) That Midway and Wake, considering the personnel engaged in the preparation of defense, were not able to accommodate an increase in personnel, though possibly a small number of men and some specialized equipment were dispatched to Wake. (Hew. pages 304-305).

(b) Admiral Bloch testified in substance that there was no stepping up or increase to a higher degree of the prescribed conditions of security of the Fleet in port after the receipt of the "WAR WARNING" message. He said:

"So far as I know, I advised no condition of readiness. I might say that I felt that I could not independently advise a condition of readiness without the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief; I believe the order has a parenthetical expression in it that says I shall advise, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, the state of readiness that shall be kept, which indicates that the Commander-in-Chief would already know; I felt any action that I might take should be consistent with the other things in the Fleet, the conditions of employment, that they had been in or were in and the future movements. This belief of mine was borne out subsequent to the 7th of December when I advised the condition of readiness, and I was informed by the acting Commander-in-Chief that he wanted a different condition of readiness."
(Har. page 16).

3. In the Pacific

On this day, 27 November 1941, or 28 November 1941, E.L.T. (Japan Time), the Japanese Carrier Striking Force had been at sea two days after its sortie from Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, and was headed eastward on a course of about 095°, on its mission to attack Pearl Harbor, which it executed on 7 December 1941 (Hew. pages 4-10; Hew. Exhibit 3, page 16; see Nachi Documents; McArthur Documents).

B. 28 November 1945

1. In Washington

There was available in Washington on this day, several intercepts by the Army and the Navy of Japanese diplomatic dispatches between Washington and Tokyo, and Tokyo and Washington, which were not, as such, sent to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii.

(1) Intelligence

(a) The Army translated a message from Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in Washington to Tokyo, dated 26 November 1941, which referred to the tenseness of the situation and to the fact that unless there was a change, the negotiations would be inevitably ruptured, if they could not already be so called. The Ambassadors then put forward the proposal that President Roosevelt send a telegram to Premier Tojo, bespeaking a conciliatory attitude, and that Tojo reply in like manner. The Ambassadors also said that they supposed that the rupture of the negotiations did not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but that they thought the breaking off of negotiations would lead to a military occupation by England and the United States of the Netherlands East Indies, which Japan would oppose, so that a clash of arms would be inevitable. Nomura and Kurusu expressed the opinion that Germany would not feel duty bound to come to Japan's aid in event of such a war with the United States. They closed by saying that this telegram contained their last expression of personal opinions. This intercepted message in full read

as follows:

"From NOMJRA and KURUSU

"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

"In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly." (SecNav Folder of Intercepts)

(b) The Army also translated on this day, a dispatch from Ambassador Nomura, in Washington, to Tokyo, dated 26 November 1941, which outlined in part the conference held on the afternoon of 26

November 1941, by Secretary of State Hull and Ambassadors
Nomura and Kurusu. The message stated that Secretary Hull had said
that he was sorry that the United States could not accept the provisional
treaty proposed by Japan on 20 November 1941, but that the United States
felt compelled to propose an alternative plan to reconcile the points
of difference between the United States proposal of 21 June 1941 and
the Japanese proposal of 25 September 1941. Accordingly, the dispatch
to Tokyo said, Secretary Hull presented Nomura and Kurusu with his two
proposals. ^{1/} This intercepted dispatch, in full, reads as follows:

"At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador
KURUSU met with Secretary Hull and we talked for about two
hours.

"HULL said, "For the last several days the American Govern-
ment has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as
conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provi-
sional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this
month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree on it.
At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tenta-
tive and without commitment, reconciling the points of differ-
ence between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September
25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two pro-
posals:

"A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called
"four principles."

"B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty
between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and
Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, Eng-
land, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French
Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

^{1/} For the content of the American proposals, as stated by the State
Department, (see supra, pages 346-8).

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(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63).

(c) On this day, 28 November 1941, the Army translated a message from Ambassador Nomura, in Washington, to Tokyo, which pointed to what was described as the "disparity between the demands" set forth in previous proposals made both by Japan and the United States, and, referring also to the time limit set by Tokyo for the acceptance of Japan's "demands", stated: "Unfortunately, there are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within the time limit you set". The message continued

"Although we have requested the agreement of various countries to the numerous demands made, the United States presented this proposal after having conferred with the same countries. Although we cannot allow ourselves to be caught napping by this scheming, we must follow out instructions. Up to the present we have only been able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have not expressed any final intention. Even the President on the 17th said that there would be "no last words." If we do not cause any stop in the present negotiations, in the case of taking independent action after the time set - - - - -"

The second part of this message from Ambassador Nomura, which was not translated by the Army until 29 November 1941, urged the Tokyo Government not to enter into scheduled military operations which would give the United States the opportunity of placing on Tokyo the responsibility for the rupture of the negotiations. Ambassador Nomura stated that, subject to the opinions of the Japanese Government, he thought the better plan would be to cause the negotiations to be explicitly and clearly and irrevocably concluded by an announcement to the

American Embassy in Tokyo, or by a Japanese Government declaration for internal and external consumption, accompanied by parallel representations to be made by him in Washington, prior to Japan's carrying forward its military plans. He said:

"There have been times in the past when she [the United States] could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned." (SecNav Folder of Intercepts)

(d) On 28 November 1941, the Navy translated a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between Ambassador Kurusu in Washington, and Yamamoto, Chief of the American Division of the Japanese Foreign Office, in Tokyo, which was held on 27 November 1941. (SecNav Folder of Intercepts). In this conversation, Yamamoto inquired, "How did the negotiations go today?", and Kurusu answered "There wasn't much that was different from Hull's talk of yesterday." Kurusu referred to the Japanese concentrations in French Indo-China as the "southward matter", which, he said, were causing considerable difficulty in the diplomatic conversations in Washington, and Yamamoto replied: "Oh, the south matter? It's effective?", to which Kurusu answered, "Yes, and at one time it looked as though we could reach an agreement." Kurusu then inquired, using code language "Does it seem as though a crisis is at hand?", to which Yamamoto replied, "Yes, a crisis does appear imminent." Kurusu then checked himself after beginning to inquire as to the direction in which the crisis would make itself evident, saying, "In which direction * * * * *". Kurusu then said that he had made no statements to the newspapers regarding the meeting with

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President Roosevelt on that date other than the mere fact that they had met.

The telephone conversation was continued by Yamamoto, who referred to the telegram of 26 November 1941 from Nomura and Kurusu in which was outlined the substance of Secretary of State Hull's conversations with and proposals to them on 26 November 1941 (supra, pages 436-8), saying, "Regarding the matter contained in the telegram of the other day, although no definite decision has been made of it, please be advised that effecting it will be difficult", to which Kurusu replied, "Oh, it is difficult, huh?". Yamamoto then said, "Yes, it is.", and Kurusu responded, "Well, I guess there's nothing more that can be done then," to which Yamamoto responded "Well, yes". Yamamoto then enjoined Kurusu that the diplomatic negotiations should not be broken off. When this subject was brought up again in the conversation, Yamamoto stated he was going to send Kurusu another message, and Kurusu referred to the difficulty of keeping the matter open, since "We have a crisis on hand and the Japanese Army is champing at the bit". Kurusu told Yamamoto that President Roosevelt was leaving Washington the next day (28 November 1941) "and will remain in the country until Wednesday." The conversation was concluded by statements of both Yamamoto and Kurusu that "We can't yield," along with Kurusu's further statement that the "South matter" was making it difficult for him, though he and Nomura would do their best.

(e) On this day, the Army also translated a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, dated the same day, 28 November 1941, which

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constituted a reply to Nomura's 26 November 1941 message that outlined the conversations had on the 26th with Secretary Hull and the proposals that he had made (suora, pages 436-8). In this dispatch of 28 November 1941, Minister Togo stated that the Japanese Government could, by no means, use the proposals made by the United States as basis for negotiations, and that, with a report which he would make to the Ambassadors in two or three days as to the views of the Japanese Government on the American proposals, the negotiations would be de facto ruptured, which was "inevitable." However, Togo told Nomura and Kurusu that he did not wish them to give the impression that the negotiations were broken off, and that they should make a pretense that the condition might be otherwise by saying that they were awaiting instructions from their Government. This dispatch read as follows:

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 (The Navy Minister), and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63).

(f) On this day, the Navy translated a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, that almost paralleled the other message of the same date, which the Navy had translated on 26 November 1941 (see supra, page 339), in which the Japanese Government established the so-called "Winds Code" for the purpose of indicating, by the addition of words concerning the weather in news broadcasts, that there was danger of the diplomatic relations of Japan being cut off with either the United States, Great Britain, or Soviet Russia. This message read as follows:

"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

"(1) In case of a Japan - U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.*

"(2) Japan - U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI. **

"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE. ***

"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end of a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

"Forward as urgent intelligence.

* - Indicates East wind rain.

** - Indicates North wind cloudy.

*** - West wind clear."

(SecNav Folder of Intercepts)

(g) On this day, 28 November 1941, the Federal Communications Commission was requested by Major Wesley T. Guest, of the Army, to monitor

Japanese broadcasts for a "Winds Code" execute message appearing in
Japanese broadcasts as follows:

"GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP
GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND
AT END OF BROADCAST" (N.C.I. Exhibit 65).

2. In Hawaii

The outstanding events in Hawaii on this day were the receipt by Admiral Kimmel from the Chief of Naval Operations of a message quoting the "WAR WARNING" message that had been sent by the War Department to the Commander of the Western Defense Command, which included a direction to undertake reconnaissance, a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, advising of the establishing by the Japanese of the "Winds Code", the holding of a meeting between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, the departure from Pearl Harbor of Task Force TWO under Admiral Halsey on a ferrying trip carrying Marine airplanes to Wake Island, the issuing of an order by Admiral Kimmel to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Fleet operating areas near Pearl Harbor, and his receipt of the usual Daily Communication Intelligence Summary.

The details of the information available to Admiral Kimmel and actions taken by him on this day follow:

- (1) "WAR WARNING" Message from Washington Repeated:
 - (a) On 28 November 1941, Admiral Stark sent a dispatch

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(280110) to several addressees, including CinCPac, quoting the Army's "WAR WARNING" message to the Commander Western Defense

Command. This message read:

"ARMY HAS SENT FOLLOWING TO COMMANDER WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND QUOTE NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE X JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICATABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT X IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT X THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE X PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT REPEAT NOT TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT X REPORT MEASURES TAKEN X A SEPARATE MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO G TWO NINTH CORPS AREA RE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN UNITED STATES X SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN X LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS X UNQUOTE XX WPL52 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO PACIFIC AREA AND WILL NOT BE PLACED IN EFFECT IN THAT AREA EXCEPT AS NOW IN FORCE IN SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA AND PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER X UNDERTAKE NO OFFENSIVE ACTION UNTIL JAPAN HAS COMMITTED AN OVERT ACT X BE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL46 SO FAR AS THEY APPLY TO JAPAN IN CASE HOSTILITIES OCCUR." (N.C.I. Exhibit 19)

A short while subsequent to the receipt of the "WAR WARNING" message, General Short had a conference with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, which lasted for possibly three hours. Vice Admiral (then Captain) C. H. McMorris, War Plans Officer of the Pacific Fleet was present. General Short testified that at this conference, Admiral Kimmel asked then Captain McMorris what the latter considered was the probability of enemy aircraft attack, and that McMorris answered, "None". General Short said that there was

no disagreement by anyone to then Captain McMorris' statement. (N.C.I. pages 239-240).

General Short testified that he placed in effect the anti-sabotage Alert No. 1, within thirty minutes after he got the warning on 27 November 1941. He said he thought this Alert was sufficient, since he thought the greatest danger to Hawaii was sabotage. (N.C.I., page 239). One objection voiced by General Short to any action that would have put into effect Alerts Nos. 2 or 3, was that such would have stopped all air training. (N.C.I. page 239.) General Short further testified that he advised the War Department by dispatch, of the action taken by him, and that he received no reply. (N.C.I. page 244). He testified that at the conferences he held with Admiral Kimmel following the receipt of the "WAR WARNING" message, the latter made no requests of him for airplanes with which to conduct long distance reconnaissance (N.C.I. page 249), and said that he did not report to the War Department concerning long-range reconnaissance since such activity was the responsibility of the Navy. (N.C.I. page 246).

(11) Other Intelligence Available to Admiral Kimmel:

(a) On this day, CinCAF sent a dispatch (281430) to OpNav, with information copies to CinCPac and Com14, advising that the Communications Intelligence unit at Cavite had received from Singapore a translation of an intercepted message sent out by Tokyo, which established the so-called "Wind Code", whereby weather words were to be repeated, in ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts, in event Japanese diplomatic relations were on the point

of being severed with either the United States, England or Russia.

This dispatch read as follows:

"FOLLOWING TOKYO TO NET INTERCEPT TRANSLATION RECEIVED FROM SINGAPORE X IF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE ON VERGE OF BEING SEVERED FOLLOWING WORDS REPEATED FIVE TIMES AT BEGINNING AND END OF ORDINARY TOKYO NEWS BROADCASTS WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANCE AS FOLLOWS X HIGASHI HIGASHI JAPANESE AMERICAN X KITA KITA RUSSIA X NISHI NISHI ENGLAND INCLUDING OCCUPATION OF THAI OR INVASION OF MALAYA AND NEI XX ON JAPANESE LANGUAGE FOREIGN NEWS BROADCASTS THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES REPEATED TWICE IN THE MIDDLE AND TWICE AT THE END OF BROADCASTS WILL BE USED XX AMERICA HIGASHI NO KAZE KUMORI XX ENGLAND X NISHI NO KAZE HARE X UNQUOTE X BRITISH AND COMSIXTEEN MONITORING ABOVE BROADCASTS." (Hew. Exhibit 58).

The Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer prepared an Intelligence Report on this date, bearing Serial No. 97, which merely re-stated for the benefit of Admiral Kimmel and his staff, the substance of the above dispatch from CinCAF. (Hew. Exhibit 26).

(b) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 28 November 1941*, stated among other things, that the communications between the Mandates and the Empire was very heavy, and that no tactical traffic was seen. Tokyo originators were said to be active with messages of high precedence to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Second and Third Fleets, and of the Combined Air Force. It was stated that there was no indication of the movement of any Combined Fleet units. The bulk of the Fourth Fleet was said to still be at Truk, and there was no submarine activity except for the mention in two dispatches of Subrons Five and Six. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 68S).

* - Indicates that Admiral Kimmel saw and initialed this document.

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(c) The Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer prepared a further Intelligence Report on this date, Serial No. 98, which related that Com16 had reported the location in the Formosa Straits of four submarines, a submarine tender, and a Maru (merchant ship); that another Maru was sailing on the 29th from Yokosuka to Takao with military supplies; and that an unidentified light cruiser had apparently relieved the KASHII as the Flagship of a Southern Expeditionary Fleet and was then in the Camranh Bay Saigon Area. (Hew. Exhibit 26).

This Intelligence Report was merely a re-statement for the benefit of CinCPac and staff, of a dispatch (281510) from Com16 to CinCPac and others, dated 28 November 1941, in which was stated the same information as to Japanese ship locations.

(d) On this day, 28 November 1941, there was sent by Com14 to OpNav a dispatch (280240), stating that the British Consul had reported that the Japanese would attack the Krakow Isthmus on 1 December, without an ultimatum or declaration. The dispatch read:

"FOLLOWING RECEIVED BY BRITISH CONSUL FROM USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE. JAPANESE WILL ATTACK KRAKOW ISTHMUS FROM SEA ON 1 DECEMBER WITHOUT ULTIMATUM OR DECLARATION IN ORDER GET BETWEEN BANGKOK AND SINGAPORE. ATTACKERS WILL PROCEED DIRECT FROM HAINAN AND FORMOSA. MAIN LANDING TO BE MADE AT SONGKHLA". (Hew. Exhibit 58) 1/

(e) On 28 November 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (281633) to CinCAF, with information copy to CinCPac, summarizing at length information received by the Navy from the State Department. This message referred to strong Japanese troop arrivals in and movements to south Indo-China, and said, "This movement which is of large proportions, indicates hostilities against Thailand may soon begin". The message

1/ A copy of this dispatch was sent CinCPac.

then referred to further Japanese movements of military personnel and supplies at Paiphong, and along the coast of Tongking Province, and stated that it had been reported that "Around December 1, without either declaration or ultimatum, Nirpon Navy will attack Isthmus Kra. Simultaneously Army will advance on Thailand."

(iii) Proposed Reconnaissance Flight Over Mandates:

It has been stated that on 17 October 1941, General George C. Marshall had suggested to Admiral Stark and the latter had passed along to Admiral Kimmel (supra, page 321) a proposal to have conducted a reconnaissance flight over the Japanese Mandated Islands. In connection with such a reconnaissance, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, on 28 November 1941, wrote a memorandum for Admiral Kimmel, stating that the subject had been discussed on 27 and 28 November 1941, and would be further discussed on the afternoon of the 28th, with the Intelligence Section, Hawaiian Air Force. The memorandum stated that there was an urgent need for as wide a reconnaissance as possible of the Marshalls, Truk and Ponape Islands, with particular reference to Jaluit, Eniwetok, Kwajelein, Rongelap, Wetje and Maloelap.

The memorandum stated that the hours for such reconnaissance, as required by conditions conducive to good photographic work had been tentatively agreed upon. It was also said that the Army planned to fly two B-24 planes fully manned with defensive armament and photographic equipment from Wake, on the selected day, but that the photographic airplanes had not yet arrived in Hawaii. (Hew. Exhibit 28).

It appeared from the evidence of Captain Layton, that the proposed air reconnaissance of the Japanese Mandated Islands was never

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flown, because only one of the two Army photographic airplanes arrived in Hawaii prior to 7 December 1941, and it did not have the equipment required for the undertaking. (Hew. page 265). No effort was made to run this reconnaissance with Navy planes (Hew. pages 266-267).

(iv) Order to Depth Bomb Submarine Contacts - Reinforcement of Wake Island.

(a) On this date, Admiral Kimmel issued an order to the Pacific Fleet in a dispatch (280355), directing the exercise of extreme vigilance against submarines in the vicinity of Oahu, requiring his own submarines to conduct submerged operations only in designated areas, and ordering that all suspected submarine contacts in other portions of the operating area should be depth bombed. This dispatch read as follows:

"EXERCISE EXTREME VIGILANCE AGAINST SUBMARINES IN OPERATING AREAS VICINITY OAHU ESPECIALLY DURING SORTIE AND ENTRANCE X OUR SUBMARINES WILL CONDUCT SUBMERGED OPERATIONS IN AREAS CAST 5 AND CAST 7 ONLY PROCEEDING ELSEWHERE ON SURFACE X DEPTH BOMB ALL SUBMARINE CONTACTS SUSPECTED TO BE HOSTILE IN OAHU OPERATING AREAS EXCEPT AREAS CAST 5 AND CAST 7". (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 5).

Following the receipt of the order to depth bomb submarine contacts, the U.S.S. HELENA reported by dispatch (280835) to ComTaskFor ONE and to CinCPac, that one of its radar operators was positive that a submarine was in "Area Cast 9 during HELENA firing approach about 1900". (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 4). As a result of this dispatch, ComTaskFor ONE sent a dispatch (281050) to ComDesDiv Six, with information copies to CinCPac and Task Forces ONE and TWO, directing Task Group 1.4 with three destroyers, to search "Area Cast 9 for submarines," and also directing Task Groups 1.1 and 1.5 to keep fifty miles from Area Cast 9.

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(Hew. Exhibit 58, Document 7W). A similar dispatch (281133), to keep clear of Area Cast 9, was sent by ComTaskFor ONE to the U.S.S. BOGGS, and an information copy was sent to CinCPac (Hew. Exhibit 48, Document 6W). On the same day, ComTaskFor ONE sent a further dispatch (281704) to ComTaskGroup 1.4, with information copy to CinCPac, directing it to "abandon search in time to join Task Group 1.1 by 0900." (Hew. Exhibit 48, Document 5W). By dispatch (281845), from ComTaskGroup 1.4 to ComTaskFor ONE, with information copy to CinCPac, it was reported "Searched Western border and most of Northern half Cast 9, no contacts." (Hew. Exhibit 48, Document 4W).

(b) It has been noted that Admiral Stark had notified Admiral Kimmel that the Army had offered to supply planes to reinforce Midway and Wake Islands, and that Admiral Kimmel had declined this aid because he and General Short could not agree as to who would command under such circumstances. (supra, page 327).

Admiral Kimmel's views and actions in this respect are set forth in part in the CinCPac dispatch of 28 November 1941 (280627) to OpNav, which stated, among other things, as a reason for declining the Army troop reinforcements, that "All outlying forces must be exclusively under Naval Command." The dispatch further stated that twelve Marine fighter planes would leave on 28 November, 1941; in a carrier for Wake Island, and that CinCPac expected to later send other Marine planes to Midway Island. Admiral Kimmel's dispatch concluded by stating that he would investigate more thoroughly the feasibility and advisability of relieving Marine planes with Army pursuit planes.

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Admiral Stark replied to Admiral Kimmel's dispatch with his own dispatch (282054), of 28 November, 1941, stating that the arrangements described by Admiral Kimmel appeared to be the best that could be done under the circumstances, though he suggested the advisability of transferring "VMF-221 [Marine Fighter Squadron] from San Diego to Hawaii, via Saratoga." Admiral Stark also stated that the War Department would instruct General Short to cooperate with the Navy in plans for the use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines.

(c) On 28 November 1941, CinCPac sent a dispatch (280447) to ComTaskFor TWO, (Admiral Halsey), and to Com14, directing that twelve planes of Marine Fighter Squadron 211 were to base at Wake Island, their transportation to be provided by the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE. It was further directed that after departing from Pearl Harbor, there was to be formed Task Force Eight, consisting of the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, U.S.S. CHESTER, U.S.S. NORTHAMPTON, U.S.S. SALT LAKE CITY, and Destroyer Squadron Six, whereupon the Command of Task Force TWO was to pass to Rear Admiral Draemel, whose orders would be to carry out normal operations in the Hawaiian area. The dispatch further provided that the newly formed Task Force Eight would proceed to arrive at 0700 on 3 December 1941, at a point 070° and 200 miles from Wake Island, where it would fly off the Marine planes, and, upon receiving information that the planes had arrived at Wake Island, to return to Pearl Harbor. It was further directed that Task Force Eight should "pass through point affirm four hundred miles south of Midway," and stated that Patrol planes from Midway and Wake would cover and provide security for the Task Force while at Wake. The dispatch ended by stating

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that the submarines NARWHAL and DOLPHIN were enroute to Pearl Harbor, and that on 27 November at 1200 G.C.T. they were about 300 miles east of Wake (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 1).

On 28 November 1941, CinCPac also sent a dispatch (280450) to ComPatWing TWO, ordering that the twelve patrol planes then at Midway be directed to proceed on 1 December 1941 to Wake, and to conduct a search enroute. ComPatWing TWO was also ordered to provide one squadron to relieve the planes at Midway on 30 November 1941. This dispatch then directed ComPatWing TWO to order each of the two squadrons, after arriving at Midway and Wake, respectively, to comply with the prior CinCPac dispatch (280447), by covering the route and providing security for Task Force Eight. (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 2).

In pursuance of the arrangements made by Admiral Kimmel, there departed from Pearl Harbor on 28 November, 1941, Task Force TWO, under the Command of Admiral Halsey, on a mission to ferry some Marine fighter planes to Wake Island in order to reinforce it. (Har. page 291-293, 297).

3. In the Pacific ^{1/}

(a) On this day, 28 November 1941, the Japanese Striking Force was well out at sea on its dash across the northern Pacific toward the 180th meridian. At about the same time, Minister Togo was sending his message to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, dated 28 November 1941, stating that the Japanese considered the negotiations to have

^{1/} The detailing of events in Tokyo, chronologically, necessarily requires a certain amount of repetition of messages which are otherwise stated herein in accordance with the dates of their translation in Washington.

terminated, but that the Ambassadors should carry forward a pretense in order to create some other impression. (see supra, page 441).

On the same day, Nomura sent a dispatch to Tokyo, which was not translated by the Army until 1 December 1941, advising that the results of the 26 November 1941 conference with Secretary of State Hull had been made public, and that the American newspapers were playing up the story with headlines such as "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese" and "America Scorns Second Munich".

On this same day, a message was sent from the Japanese representative in Manila (Nihro) to Tokyo, which was not translated by the Army until 5 December 1941, advising that the American Defense Forces there had recently utilized a group of nine fighter planes in high level scouting patrols over Manila in the early hours of the morning (Infra, page 573).

(b) On this day, the Japanese Government sent two messages to Honolulu (which were not translated until 7 December and 8 December 1941). The first of these messages to Honolulu (translated 7 December 1941), instructed that certain code indicators were to be used in ordinary broadcasts when usual telegraphic channels had been severed at the time "When we are about to face the worst of situations", but that codes were to be retained as long as the "actual situation in your locality permits and until the final stage is entered into." (Infra P-637). The second message of this date from Tokyo to Honolulu (translated 8 December 1941), stated that Intelligence concerning the movements in and out of Pearl Harbor of battleships was of major importance, and it was requested that the same be transmitted to Tokyo. On the same day, a message was sent from Honolulu to Tokyo, which also was

not translated until 8 December 1941, reporting that a patrol was usually maintained off the Mouth of Pearl Harbor by a cruiser and one or two destroyers, that it was expected 1,200 Marines would reinforce Honolulu during December or January, and that there were at Midway Island, eight B-17 airplanes. This message also reported the Japanese observations of the maneuvers held at Sand Island.

On 28 November 1941, a Japanese diplomatic message was sent from Rio de Janeiro to Santiago, Chile, which was not translated by the Army until 9 December, 1941, stating that the counter-proposals made by the United States on the 27th of November [probably referring to Japanese dates] "over-looks all we stand for; therefore, of course we disregard it. There is nothing to do but break off negotiations, and our relations with England and the United States within the next few days will assuredly take a critical turn." (SecNav Folder Intercept

C. 29 November 1941

1. In Washington

(1) Intelligence

There was available in Washington this day and not sent, as such, to Hawaii, information concerning the Japanese diplomatic situation, which was obtained by the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages, as follows:

(a) The Army translated a message from Ambassador Nomura in Washington to Tokyo, dated 26 November 1941, which stated the text of the proposals made on 26 November 1941 by Secretary of State Hull to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. The message quoted the American proposals as follows:

"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary "modus vivendi" could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador

communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purpose above indicated.

"The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contains some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to receive our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already maintained.

"With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

"The plan herein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1942 and the Japanese draft of September 25th by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited." (SecNav Folder of Intercepts).

(b) On the same day, 29 November, 1941, the Army translated a further message from Ambassador Nomura in Washington, to Tokyo, outlining section one (1) of the text of Secretary Hull's proposed agreement between the United States and Japan. This message read as follows:

"Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan.

"Section 1.

"Draft mutual declaration of policy.

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial design in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

"(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

"(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

"(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

"(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes; the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

"(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

"(2) The principle of internal economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

"(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

"(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

"(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries." (SecNav Folder of Intercepts)

(c) On the same day, the Army also translated a third message, dated 26 November 1941 from Ambassador Nomura in Washington, to Tokyo, which stated the text of section two (2) of Secretary Hull's proposal of an agreement between the United States and Japan, as follows:

"Section 2.

"Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan:

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view of taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.

"Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

"4. The Government of the United States and the Government

of Japan will not support -- militarily, politically, economically -- any Government or regime in China other than the national government of the republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

"8. Both Governments will agree upon applying the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement." ^{1/}

(d) The Army translated on this day all four parts of a four-part message sent on 26 November 1941 by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, which outlined the gist of the conversation held on that day between Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu and Secretary of State Hull, when the

^{1/} SecNav Folder of Intercepts. For text of American proposals as stated by the State Department, see Supra pages 346-348.

latter handed the Japanese envoys the United States' proposals of the 26th. Nomura summarized the conversation (SecNav Folder of Intercepts) as follows:

(1) Secretary Hull was reported to have said that the United States had studied, and had conferred with various nations concerning, the Japanese proposals of "the 20th (B. proposal with 6 and 7 left out) for five days, we have decided that we can not consider it." Nomura stated that he replied that Secretary Hull's proposals were vastly different from the prior American proposals of 21 June and the Japanese proposals of 25 September, to which Secretary Hull is said to have retorted:

"As for that I want you to read and compare the paragraph I point out with the one immediately preceding it. I said that it was a plan for reconciling both the Japanese and American proposals. Since the opening of conversations the contents of it have been kept secret and, therefore, in this country where popular opinion counts for so much, various surmises are arising, particularly, rumors are being circulated to the effect that we are leaving China in the lurch. I myself am in the foreground and in spite of what Japan said at the time of our conversation of the 22nd, various important people are still uttering non-pacific statements. There does not seem to be much action today in the fact face of that."

(2) Nomura stated that he argued that the fourth of the principles mentioned in section 1 of the United States' proposals changed the so-called Stimson doctrine, and that he urged on Secretary Hull that the latter's insistence on the principle of non-discrimination, would, if applied immediately to China, cause a sudden darkening of the already cloudy economical situation there. To this, Secretary Hull is said to have replied, "I fully understand that and the principle as such does not necessarily have to be put into effect right away."

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(3) Nomura reported that Secretary Hull did not offer "strong rebuttal" to his argument that Japan could not "feature" paragraph one of section two "If this plan aims to revive a Nine-Power treaty set-up * * * because we have fought a four-year war in China without a cent profit."

(4) Nomura stated that he told Secretary Hull that paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section 2 "were out of the question", and that "for a country like the United States, who recognizes the Chungking government, to say that she cannot desert the Chiang Regime is just like us saying that we certainly cannot desert the Nanking Regime." Secretary Hull was quoted as having replied:

"The evacuation under 3 would be carried out by negotiations. We are not necessarily asking that it be effected immediately. As for the Nanking Government, according to the best report available to us, it hasn't much influence over China as a whole anyway."

(5) Nomura then stated that he told Secretary Hull:

"I said, 'Well, I have read this only cursorily. It is a very difficult plan for us to consider accepting. As far as the China part is concerned, it contains clauses which are entirely out of the question so I, who would like to see an understanding established between Japan and the United States, do not know if I should even report it to Japan as it now stands. I have grave doubts. We will both read it over again and consider it fully. Then we will reply.' Finally I said, 'I wonder if the United States means that there is no other way but for us to consider this plan. You know the President the other day said that between friends there are no last words. I wonder if you could arrange for an interview.' To the former he replied that in a word this was a plan, and to the latter he said that, although he did not think that much progress was being made, he would manage the matter."

(e) On 29 November 1941 the Navy translated a message from Ambassador Nomura in Washington to Tokyo, dated 27 November 1941,

which stated at length the conversation between President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, on 27 November 1941. This message read as follows:

"On the 27th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the President. (Secretary Hull was also present). The resume of our talks follows:

"The President: 'In the last Great War, Japan and the United States were together on the side of the Allies. At that time, both Japan and the United States were given ample proof that Germany failed to comprehend the way the people of other countries think.

" 'Since these conversations were begun, I am aware of the fact that much effort has been made by the Japanese side, too, by those who cherish peace. I am highly appreciative of this fact. It is clear that the majority of the American people are anxious to maintain peaceful relations with Japan. I am one of those who still harbors much hope that Japanese-U.S. relations will be settled peacefully.'

"I: 'Your recent proposal will no doubt be the cause of painful disappointment to the Japanese Government.'

"The President: 'To tell you the truth, I, too, am very disappointed that the situation has developed in the manner that it has. However, during the several months that these conversations were being conducted, cold water was poured on them when Japan occupied southern French Indo-China. According to recent intelligences, there are fears that a second cold water dousing may become an actuality.' (He apparently meant the increase in our troops to French Indo-China and our occupation of Thai.) (See my message #1205*.) 'I fully understand that the general public in Japan who has been living in war conditions for the past year, cannot see a parallel with conditions in the United States, which is living under peaceful conditions.

" 'During all of the time, however, that your Excellency and Secretary Hull have been conversing, we have never heard of or seen concrete proof of any peaceful intention by the leading elements of Japan. This has made these talks an exceedingly difficult undertaking.

" 'Even the suggestion that the present situation be overcome by a 'modus vivendi' would be without any value if in the final analysis the basic principles of international relations of Japan and the United States do not agree. If there is a basic

difference, no stop gap measure could carry any weight, it seems to me.

" 'In my conversations with Churchill on the high seas, for example, it was predetermined that our respective basic policies coincided. Moreover, even the subjects which were to be agreed upon had been clearly defined in advance.'

"Kurusu: 'Judging from the records of the developments of our negotiations in the past, the differences of opinions between Japan and the United States were not differences in the basic principles of each. Rather, the differences arose in the practical applications thereof. For a very simple example Japan had no disagreements to the principle of non-discriminatory treatment of commerce, strongly advocated by the United States.

"'However, it is when we consider the immediate application of this principle in China, bringing about a radical and sudden change in the economic situation there, it is only natural that Japan insists upon certain special conditions. I feel that this difference may have been the source of some misunderstanding.'

"Hull: 'By your frequent explanations, we thoroughly understand that point. According to advice I have received, however, there are approximately 250,000 Japanese merchants in China at present who followed or accompanied the military. These are engaging in various business enterprises. There have been indications that various incidents have arisen involving the relations between these merchants and nationals of a third country. If you are going to consider the profits of these people, the problem of course will become an exceedingly difficult one.'

"Kurusu: 'Japan's claims are not based on such minor factors, but concern only the various major problems.'

^{1/}
"In the middle of our talks, Hull, with reference to the cause for the failure to agree upon a modus vivendi, said:

" 'There are other factors other than those pointed out by the President. Japan has sent vast numbers of troops to French Indo-China with which to keep the military powers of other

^{1/} This last part of the message was not translated until 2 December 1941.

countries checked. With this advantage on her side, Japan carries in one hand, the Tripartite Pact, and in the other, the Anti-Communism Pact. Armed with these, she demands of the United States that petroleum be made available to her.

" 'It would be absolutely impossible to reconcile the people of the United States to granting such a demand. As I stated during our last conversations, while we here are putting forth our best efforts in attempting to bring about peaceful settlements of Japanese - U.S. differences, your Premier nor your Foreign Minister nor any other influential person utters not a single word nor moves one finger to facilitate these talks of ours. On the contrary, they insist upon promoting the establishment of a New Order through might, This is an exceedingly regrettable state of affairs.' "
(SecNav Folder of Intercepts).

(f) On 29 November 1941, the Army translated a message from Manila (NIHRO) to Tokyo, dated 22 November 1941, which constituted a report of ships present at Manila and Cavite. This message read as follows:

- "1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown.

On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and material.

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were:

Manila -- Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isabel; Heron; Wohotosu (Kana spelling); Pieu (Kana spelling); one mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines.

Cavite -- Houston (?); Canopus."

2. In Hawaii

This day in Hawaii was marked by the receipt by Admiral Kimmel of information placing the Japanese Commander of submarines in the Chichijima and Saipan area and that it was "positive" there was an "air fleet" the composition of which was "unknown." On this day it also occurred that Rear Admiral Bellinger, the Pacific Fleet Patrol Wing Commander, sent dispatches to some of his command at Midway and Wake Islands to be in substance on the alert for "possible enemy forces," and stating that the forenoon of 3 December was a "critical period."

(i) Combat Intelligence Available to Admiral Kimmel

(a) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 29 November 1941, which was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 69S), stated, among other things, that a good share of the Japanese Navy traffic on this day was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. It also said that the direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity, and that "One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Commander Submarines for information."

It was further stated that there was a unit which had been addressed as the "103rd Air Group", whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls, which had originated one dispatch that day. It was deduced that it was apparent that this unit had no Navy call list. It was also concluded that the use of a certain call was intentional and made "the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is unknown."

Among the units said to be under the immediate command of CinC Second Fleet were Cardiv 3 (RYUNO and HOSHO), Subrons 5 and 6, Crudivs 5 and 7, Desrons 2 and 4, the Third Fleet, and the French Indo-China Force. It was stated that there were associated with the Third Fleet two battleships but that their assignment was not yet definite.

The Fourth Fleet was reported to have been relatively inactive during the day. The Commander of the Submarine Force was stated to have been in Chichijima the preceding day, and the traffic for him on this day was routed through Saipan. (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 69S-70S).

(b) On 29 November 1941, Com16 sent a dispatch (291029) (Hew. Exhibit 58) to CinCPac, stating recent developments as to the disposition of Japanese Forces. The information in this dispatch was incorporated by the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer in an Intelligence Report of the same date, Serial Number 99, for the information of the Staff of CinCPac (Hew. Exhibit 26). The Report stated that Com16 had reported that the Commander of the First Patrol Force had headquarters either in Palao or Yokosuka, and that the location of the Commander of Air Borne Troops was unknown. (Hew. Exhibit 26; Hew. Exhibit 58, pages 14C-15C).

(c) On this day, CinCPac also received for information a copy of a dispatch (290542) from Com16 to OpNav, which, in requesting authority to time charter civilian vessels, stated that "Present situation indicates extensive minesweeping Manila Bay may be necessary near future." 1

(ii) Patrols from Midway and Wake Islands.

On 29 November 1941, Rear Admiral P.N.L. Bellinger, Commander of Task Force Nine, gave orders by dispatch for the making of limited air searches by the patrol squadrons based on Midway and Wake Islands. The dispatches embracing these orders were:

(a) Dispatch (292101) from Commander Task Force Nine to the Commander of Patrol Squadron Twenty-one (ComPatRon 21), with information to CinCPac and others, stated that the mission of ComPatRon 21 was to "conduct daily patrol from outlying bases in order to locate possible enemy forces threatening their security", and that its task was to "search area within 100 miles". 1/ SecNav Box of Despatches.

of Midway daily using sector search plan number 2". The dispatch also directed that ComPatRon 21 be prepared to shift his base to Wake Island, and instructed that offensive action be taken only on further orders from CinCPac or if the planes and bases were actually attacked. (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 10).

(b) Dispatch (292103) from ComTasForNine to ComPatRons 21 and 22, and to ComTasGrp 9.2, with information copies to CinCPac and others, advised the addressees that Task Force Eight, composed of the USS ENTERPRISE, USS CHESTER, USS NORTHAMPTON, USS SALT LAKE CITY and six destroyers were transporting a Marine Fighter Squadron which was to base on Wake Island, and that the planes would be launched on 3 December at 2000 GCT from a point 200 miles, and bearing 070, from Wake. This dispatch further advised that Task Force Eight had departed Pearl in the forenoon of 28 November, and that, while enroute from Pearl Harbor to Wake, and on returning, it would pass a point 400 miles south of Midway Island. It was also stated that the USS WRIGHT was expected at Midway from Wake on 3 December. The dispatch then stated that the mission of ComPatRons 21 and 22, and of ComTasGrp 9.2, was to cover the route and provide security for Task Force Eight while in the vicinity of Wake Island,

"In order to obtain information possible enemy forces in threatening position and provide readily available aerial striking power during period carrier will be launching Marine planes."

Accordingly, ComTasForNine, in this dispatch, made the following assignments of tasks:

(1) ComPatRon 21:

"Search as Indicated:

"Nov. 30 depart Pearl daylight search sector

260-280 Degrees to Longitude 165 Degrees

"Thence on track 270 to long 172-30 thence to Midway;

"Dec 2 Sector 170 dash 224 to 500 miles using 8 planes;

"Dec 2 Sector 209 -237 to 525 miles using four planes;

"Dec 3 Sector 206-248 to 525 miles using 6 planes;

"Dec 4 Sector 170-224 to 500 miles using 8 planes;

"Dec 5 Sector 126-168 to 525 miles using 6 planes."

(2) ComPatRon 22:

"Search as Indicated:

"Dec. 1 Depart Midway Daylight using 2 plane sections Sector 226-249 to 525 miles thence

on track 238 to far perimeter of 120 mile circle from Wake thence to Wake;

"Dec 2 Sector 060 - 102 to 525 miles using 6 planes;

"Dec 3 take off at 1800 GCT sector 048-092 to 500 miles using six planes: One plane

"be 200 miles bearing 070 from Wake at 2000 GCT remain with Task Force 8 until 2400 GCT

unless otherwise directed by visual: remaining 5 planes each load with 2 500lb bombs; unless

otherwise directed unload bombs at 0230 GCT December 4.

"On December four I On Dec 4 take off daylight for Midway.

"On December five X On Dec 5 take off at Daylight
for Pearl."

The dispatch from ComTasForNine giving the above instructions to ComPatRons 21 and 22, and ComTasGrp 9.2, concluded by stating:

"CRITICAL PERIOD ENTIRE OPERATION FORENOON
3 DECEMBER." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 11).

(c) Vice Admiral (then Captain)McMorris, CinCPac War Plans Officer, testified that the patrols being conducted from Midway and other outlying bases during the so-called critical period from 27 November 1941 onwards, were very limited. He stated that the aircraft at all outlying bases excepting Midway were entirely defensive, while those at Midway were partially defensive and partially for patrol. He said that the patrols from Midway were limited because of the limitation there in the amount of gasoline and upkeep facilities, which required conservation in order that the engines might not be worn out "before a critical period arose." (Hew. pages 327-328).

(iii) In the Pacific

On this day, 29 November 1941, which was the final deadline date set by the Japanese government for the conclusion and signing of an agreement completely settling the differences between the United States and Japan, while the Japanese Striking Force was enroute eastward across the Pacific, and the Japanese Submarine Fleet was nearing Oahu, the following messages were sent and received by Tokyo:

(a) Tokyo sent a dispatch to its Ambassadors in Washington, which was translated by the Navy on 30 November 1941, suggesting an approach

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which Nomura and Kurusu might avail of in carrying forward the pretense, which they had been instructed on the preceding day to do, that the negotiations had not been ruptured by Japan. ^{1/}

(b) Tokyo also sent a dispatch to its consul in San Francisco, which was not translated by the Navy until 4 December 1941, requesting that a "full report" be made "beginning December 1st" concerning the arrival and departure of ships, as well as the ports from which the ships had come, and their destinations. ^{2/} On the same day, Tokyo sent a message to Honolulu, which was translated by the Navy on 5 December 1941, stating:

"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements." ^{3/}

(c) On this day, 29 November 1941, Honolulu (Kita) sent a message to Tokyo (Giamudaijin), which was not decrypted until 14 March 1942, and not translated by the Navy until 17 May 1945, giving a detailed statement concerning movements of the Pacific Fleet in and out of Pearl Harbor. The message read:

"1. The Grand Fleet mentioned in message #231 which said the battleship Oklahoma and Nevada, the aircraft carrier Enterprise, 2 Chicago class heavy cruisers and 10 - (one unknown group) - destroyers left port and are just returning the evening of the 28th (?); and 3 heavy cruisers of San Francisco class passed each other at a point $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from outside TO bay.

"2. The fleet which left port at the above time headed south of MA and was on the west side. The fleet which entered port came from the southeast area and judging from the fact that it was on the east side, it is thought it was returning from practice in the area west, south, and east of Mawai (?).

^{1/}See infra page 472. to 30 Nov.

^{2/}See infra page 549. to 4 Dec.

^{3/}See infra page 573. to 5 Dec.

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"3. In the fleet which entered MA, each vessel maintained formation at slow speed in the order of battleships, heavy cruisers, destroyers and light cruisers. Between each vessel was an open distance - (in the case of the battleships - about 1 knot) -. They headed for OTORI bay and at that time destroyers and planes patrolled left and right flanks. After it reached SENTOO bay harbor the time necessary until all entered port - $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours.

"4. The main units of the fleet which entered MA took 7 days between departure and return." (SecNav Folder of Intercepts).

D. 30 November 1941

1. In Washington

(i) Intelligence

There was available in Washington on 30 November 1941, diplomatic intercepts which, as such, were not sent to Hawaii, as follows:

(a) The Navy translated a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 29 November 1941, suggesting a method to be pursued by Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in carrying forward their pretense that the negotiations had not been ruptured. This message began by referring to the Tokyo to Washington message of 28 November, which stated that the negotiations would be terminated in a few days but cautioned the envoys not to give any indication of that fact.^{1/} It then stated :

"We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

"The United States government has (always ?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

"However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

"With such change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U.S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

"(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)" (N.C.I. Exhibit 63).

^{1/} See supra pages 469-470

(b) On the same day, the Navy translated a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between Ambassador Kurusu in Washington and Division Chief Yamamoto in Tokyo, held on 30 November between 2230 to 2238 hours E.S.T. Ambassador Kurusu told Chief Yamamoto that arrangements had been made for a meeting the following day with Secretary of State Hull, and informed him that President Roosevelt was returning to Washington the next day. Ambassador Kurusu attributed President Roosevelt's return to Washington to the speech made by Premier Tojo, and he urged greater caution in speech-making be exercised by those in power in Japan. This conversation over the telephone, translated, was as follows:

"Kurusu: 'It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one.' (i.e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

"Yamamoto: 'Yes. I see.'

"Kurusu: 'The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home.'

"Y: 'Is there any special significance to this?'

"K": 'The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here.'

"Y: 'Is that so.'

"K: 'Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving.'

(Pause)

'Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by

the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tamu.'

"Y: 'We are being careful.'

"K: 'We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this.' (i.e. Premier's speech)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues. using voice code)

"K: 'What about the internal situation?' (In Japan)

"Y: 'No particular -- (one or two words faded out) --.'

"K: 'Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?'

"Y: 'Yes.'

"K: 'You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches ! ! ! ! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion!'

"Y: 'When will you see them. The 2nd?'

"K: 'Let's see...this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here.'

(Pause)

'Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?'

"Y: 'Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?'

"K: 'I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime.'

"Y: 'Well then -- Goodbye.' " (N.C.I. Exhibit 63,
Document 20).

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2. In Hawaii

(i) Combat Intelligence Available to Admiral Kimmel

The Communication Intelligence available to Admiral Kimmel on this day consisted chiefly of a dispatch from Admiral Stark, to the effect that there was information that Japan was about to attack points on the Kra Peninsula by an overseas expedition, the usual Communication Intelligence Summary, and the further information in a dispatch from Com16 that at midnight on the 30th, the Japanese Navy had made a complete change in all of its radio call signs. Whereas it was the custom of the Japanese Navy not to change their call signs for six months, the last preceding change of this nature had been made on 1 November 1941, so that on this occasion, the discontinued call signs had been used for only one month.

(a) The dispatch (300419) from Admiral Stark, was addressed for action to CinCAF with information copy to CinCPac. After warning of an indicated Japanese attack on the Kra Isthmus, it directed CinCAF to run an air reconnaissance over the line between Manila and Camranh Bay for three days. This dispatch read as follows:

"INDICATIONS THAT JAPAN ABOUT TO ATTACK POINTS ON KRA ISTHMUS BY OVERSEAS EXPEDITION X IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN DESTINATION THIS EXPEDITION X AND FOR SECURITY OUR POSITION

IN THE PHILIPPINES DESIRE YOU COVER BY AIR THE LINE MANILA CAMRANH BAY ON THREE DAYS COMMENCING UPON RECEIPT THIS DISPATCH X INSTRUCT PLANES TO OBSERVE ONLY X THEY MUST

NOT APPROACH SO AS TO APPEAR TO BE ATTACKING BUT MUST DEFEND THEMSELVES IF ATTACKED X UNDERSTAND BRITISH AIR FORCES WILL SEARCH ARC 180 MILES FROM TEDTA BHARU AND

WILL MOVE TROOPS TO LINE ACROSS KRA ISTHMUS NEAR
SINGORA X IF EXPEDITION IS APPROACHING THAILAND INFORM
MACARTHUR X BRITISH MISSION HERE INFORMED."
(Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 12).

(b) The daily Communication Intelligence Summary of this date, which Admiral Kimmel saw and initialed (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 715), stated, among other things, that the day's traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates, and that the number of new dispatches which were originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit heard during the day was between the carrier AKAGI* and several Marus.

The Summary stated that there were traffic indications that the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet was at sea. It was also stated that the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet had sent a message to one of his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but that he also included in it as an addressee, the battleships KONGO and HIEYA*, "which places them as members of his Task Force."

It was further stated in the Summary that there was no information obtained as to the location of the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet, which "gives the strong impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet or Mandates Fleet was believed to be still in the Truk area, and it was noted that the direction finder activities in the Marshalls were a little greater that day than normal.

It was pointed out that the Commander of the Submarine Force and Airon 24, had been addressed by Jaluit, and it was stated that the "continued association of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus

* - Indicates participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

his known progress from the Empire to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls." The summary then stated the belief of the Communications Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor that there was a submarine concentration outside of Empire waters and in the Marshalls, as follows:

"Since one of his large units (SITI 4) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago this unit cannot agree with Com16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS Presence in that area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls."

The summary further stated, with reference to Carriers:

"Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed." (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 71S).

Captain Layton testified regarding the information in the 30 November 1941 Communication Intelligence Summary, concerning the reference to the tactical circuit that was heard between the AKAGI and several Marus, and the identification of the battleship HIEYI as a unit of the Task Force under the Commander in Chief Second Fleet. Captain Layton explained that the significance of the information concerning the "tactical circuit" from the AKAGI was, that the AKAGI was using its own radio to call up and work directly the several Marus rather than following the common Japanese practice in Naval Communications of working Marus through shore stations via the broadcast method. This working of

the AKAGI directly with the Marus indicated, Captain Layton testified, that the AKAGI was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since Carriers would rarely address a Maru. (Hew, page 206).

Captain Layton also explained the apparent mistake of the 30 November Communication Intelligence Summary, in placing the battleship HIYI, which as was subsequently learned, was on the high seas enroute to Pearl Harbor as a part of the Striking Force, under the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Second Fleet, who with his force was then engaged in the Japanese Southern Expedition. He said that this was a "bad identification," a "mis-identification" of the HIYI for the KONGO, which in fact did take part in the Southern Expedition. Such mis-identifications, he stated, frequently occur "with ships of one type and within one organization;" such was "an error in fact but not an error in substance." (Hew. page 207-208).

(c) As noted above a dispatch was received this date, 30 November 1941, by CinCPac from Com16 (Hew. Exhibit 70, document 109; Hew. Exhibit 58), advising that the Japanese Navy had changed its call signs at midnight. This message read as follows:

"REASSIGNMENT ALL ORANGE CALLS OCCURED MIDNIGHT X
SAME GARBLE TABLE X NO CHANGE IN SHORE ADDRESSES XX"

Captain Layton explained that this change in service calls by the Japanese Navy was "considered rather ominous in view of the other information" (Har. page 223); that the change was of particular significance since it was the Japanese custom ordinarily not to change their radio calls until after the same had been in use for a period

of six months or more. The last change in calls, he explained, had occurred on 1 November 1941, so that the discontinued service calls had been in use for only one month. (Hew. pages 213-214).^{1/}

FIELD

Captain Layton pointed out that the Communication Intelligence Summary of the next day, 1 December 1941, which also carried the same information concerning the change in Japanese call signs, stated that this "indicated a progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale." He referred to this quotation from the Communication Intelligence Summary of 1 December, and stated, concerning it, that the "latter part of the sentence is underlined in red pencil, and to my best recollection, was underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time." (Hew. pages 213-214).

(d) On the same day, a further dispatch (301709) was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CinCAF, information copy to CinCPac, requesting CinCAF to make reports of the results of its air search between Manila and Comranh Bay even though no contacts were made. This dispatch read as follows:

"REF MY 300419 PRIORITY DISPATCH REQUESTED OF ANY CONTACTS.
IN CASE THERE ARE NO CONTACTS MAKE REPORT ONCE A DAY EVEN IF
INFORMATION IS ALL NEGATIVE."

(ii) Planned Action by CincPac if War Commenced Withing Twenty-Four Hours

On 30 November 1941, a memorandum was prepared by the Pacific Fleet War Plans Officer, for Admiral Kimmel, (N.C.I. Exhibit 69A), outlining the "steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next

^{1/} For information of prior change in Japanese call signs, see supra, pages 370-371.

24 hours." The memorandum stated:

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- "1. Despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
- "2. Despatch to Task Force Commanders:
 - (a) WPL 46 effective.
 - (b) Sweeping plan cancelled.
 - (c) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Task Force 8) carry out present mission. Upon completion cover WAKE against enemy operations until joined by Task Force Three. Remainder of Task Force Two (now at sea in operating areas, return to PEARL HARBOR.
 - (d) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Cancel cruiser operations west of NANPO SHOTO; delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Task Force Three units of Task Force Two present in PEARL HARBOR depart _____ and rendezvous with Comairbatfor at Point "A" at _____; Commander Base Force send two tankers to Point "A" with utmost despatch, report expected time of their arrival.
 - (e) Send one Marine Bombing Squadron to MIDWAY.
- "3.
 - (a) I would not modify the movements of the WRIGHT, now enroute WAKE to MIDWAY, nor REGULUS, enroute PEARL to MIDWAY, nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.
 - (b) I would continue WILLIAM WARD BURROWS to WAKE, directing Comairbatfor (ComTask Force 8) to have two destroyers join her as escort.
 - (c) I would not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.
 - (d) I would provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR. (Under present set-up, Commander Task Force Three has been directed to furnish this escort from his force which would be at sea on arrival of SARATOGA. Under the plan of paragraph 2, above, this order should be transferred to Com Task Force One. This note added by Good).
 - (e) I would not direct any change in passage of shipping to and from MANILA, nor would I send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur." (N.C.I. Exhibit 69A).

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3. In the Pacific

On this day, 30 November 1941, while the Japanese Carrier striking Force and Submarine Fleet still enroute across the Pacific, there was transmitted between Tokyo and Washington, and Tokyo and Berlin, diplomatic messages as follows:

(a) The trans-Pacific telephone conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and Division Chief Yamamoto, in which the former referred to the American newspaper reaction to Premier Tojo's speech. ^{1/}

(b) A dispatch from Ambassador Nomura in Washington to Tokyo, which was not translated by the Army until 5 December 1941, stated that President Roosevelt was returning to Washington from Warm Springs, Georgia, as a result of Premier Tojo's speech which had been in the American newspapers on that same day. Ambassador Nomura said that particular exception was taken by the American public to Tojo's statement which read, "the exploitation of the Asiatics by Americans, 'must be purged with vengeance'". ^{2/}

(c) A further dispatch from Ambassador Nomura in Washington to Tokyo, that was not translated until 5 December 1941, by the Army, being a reply to Tokyo's instructions that Ambassador Nomura and Kurusu should make a further attempt verbally to carry forward the pretense that the negotiations had not been ruptured. In this

^{1/} See supra pages 473-4
^{2/} See infra pages 568-9
^{3/} See infra pages 569-571

^{1/}CONFIDENTIAL
message, Nomura stated that he had requested an interview with Secretary Hull, but the time of the appointment depended, among other things, on the President's arrival in Washington the following morning.

(d) Four dispatches from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, which were translated by the Army on the following day, 1 December 1941, were as follows:^{2/}

(1) The first dispatch to Berlin stated that the conversations between Tokyo and Washington, which were inaugurated in April 1941, "now stand ruptured — broken." Accordingly, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin was instructed to immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, and to communicate to them the developments, including telling them "very secretly" - "there is extreme danger that war may break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams."^{3/}

(2) In the second dispatch, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin was told to report to the Germans that the Japanese attitude toward the Russians was made clear in the Japanese statement of July 1941. The dispatch went on to say that while Japan would not relax its pressure against Russia yet if the latter joined hands tighter with England and the United States, Japan would be ready to turn upon her with all her might, but that, at that time, it appeared to the advantage of Japan

^{1/}See infra, pages 569-571

^{2/}These dispatches were obviously intended to convey arguments that the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin was supposed to use in his efforts to align Germany in the war against the United States that was about to be opened by Japan

^{3/}See infra, page 487.

to stress the movement toward the South.

(3) The third dispatch to Berlin contained a resumé of the Japanese point of view in respect of the Japanese-American negotiations, emphasising to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin how strongly the Japanese government had adhered to the Tri-Partite Alliance with Germany and Italy as the corner-stone of its national policy. The dispatch stated that the United States had attempted to divorce Japan from the Tri-Partite Alliance, which would be detrimental to the Japanese cause.^{2/}

(4) The fourth message from Tokyo to Berlin of 30 November, stressed to the Japanese Ambassador how "insulting" it was that the United States had inserted in its proposals of 26 November, a clause to the effect that Japan no longer adhere to the Three Power Treaty with Germany and Italy.

^{1/} See infra, page 487.

^{2/} See infra, page 488.

^{3/} See infra, page 489.

E. 1 December 1941

1. In Washington

(1) Intelligence From Diplomatic Sources.

On this day, 1 December 1941, there was again available in Washington, through the interception of diplomatic messages, intelligence concerning the Japanese government's reactions to the diplomatic negotiations, and Japanese espionage reports from Manila concerning the defense activities there, none of which was sent as such to Hawaii. The more important of the messages that were intercepted were from Tokyo to Berlin, though several also passed between Washington and Tokyo.

(a) The Army translated a message from Ambassador Nomura in Washington to Tokyo, dated 28 November 1941, in which was stated the favorable American newspaper reaction to the proposals made by Secretary Hull on 26 November. This message read as follows:

"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers: 'Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese,' and 'America Scorns a Second Munich.' The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

"This we must carefully note." (SecNav Folder of Intercepts).

(b) The Navy translated a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated also 1 December 1941, which stated that the final deadline date set by Tokyo (29 November 1941) ^{1/} "has come and gone, and the situation

^{1/} See infra, page 485 .

continues to be increasingly critical." The message continued by urging the Ambassadors to carry forward the pretense that the negotiations were still open saying:

"1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63).

(c) On the same day the Navy translated a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 1 December 1941, giving instructions that when the time came for destroying codes, the same should be done by the use of chemicals. The message read:

"When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attache's office there and make use of chemicals they have on hand for this purpose. The Attache should have been advised by the Navy Ministry regarding this." (SecNav Folder of Intercepts).

On this day Tokyo sent a further dispatch to Washington, advising that its offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila

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had been instructed to destroy their code machines. This message was also translated by the Navy on the same day (1 December) and read as follows:

"The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my Circular message #2447, the U.S. (office) retains the machines and the machine codes.

"Please relay to France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey from Switzerland; and to Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico from Washington." (Idem.)

(d) On 1 December 1941, the Army translated four messages from Tokyo to Berlin, all dated 30 November 1941, which gave instructions to the Japanese Ambassador to advise Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop that the Japanese-American negotiations had been ruptured and that "there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." In these messages, the Japanese Ambassador was also given instructions as to the arguments which he should make to the Germans in order to cause the latter to consider that the Japanese had taken their position at least partly because of their sense of loyalty to their obligations under the Three Power Treaty (Germany-Japan-Italy). These four messages read as follows:

(1) The first message from Tokyo to Berlin read:

"1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured -- broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986.) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." (Idem.)

(2) The second message was a continuation of the first, and read:

"4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

"5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

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"6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

"Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message." (Idem.)

(3) The third message to Berlin was in the nature of Japanese propaganda. It read:

"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing inter-national relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United

States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. This is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause." (idem)

(4) The fourth message to Berlin was a continuation of the third:

"The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China -- they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy." (idem)

(e) On 1 December 1941, the Army also translated a message from Togo in Tokyo to Hanoi, dated 28 November 1941, which referred to the serious trend of the Japanese - American negotiations, and stated that "even though the worst possible situation developed, and it will in all likelihood" the Japanese government had made no decision as to changing the position of the French Indo-Chinese government. Accordingly, Togo instructed that Hanoi should give consideration to the policy of maintaining the status quo for the

time being. (Idem.)

(f) On the same day, 1 December 1941, the Army translated a message from Manila (Wihro) to Tokyo dated 24 November 1941, which reported on the amount of military stores that had been removed from the Manila "port area" during the blackout of the night of the 21st of November. Wihro also reported the movement of 40 or 50 civilian busses, and stated investigations were being made to find out if they were loaded with troops. He stated that on 22 November there was a movement of 60 light tanks and some American ammunition trucks near the headquarters of the port area military police, and it was conjectured that troops had arrived recently. (Idem.)

(ii) ONI Intelligence Memorandum and Fortnightly Summary.

On 1 December 1941, Commander A. H. McCollum, head of the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence, prepared a memorandum for the Director of Naval Intelligence, concerning Japanese military, naval and political movements during the preceding two months, and Rear Admiral (then Captain) T. W. Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, issued the Office of Naval Intelligence Fortnightly Summary of current national situations.

(a) The memorandum of Commander McCollum (Hew. Exhibit 10) was arranged into topics, and outlined information as follows:

"Army Preparations"

Under this topic Commander McCollum discussed at length the movement since 1 October by the Japanese of large quantities of

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military supplies and troops from North China to the southward, and he referred to an estimate that Japanese troops in French Indo-China ready for action numbered 95,000.

"Naval Preparations"

Under this topic Commander McCullum stated that starting about 1 October and continuing through November, extensive Naval preparations had been made, but none of the information referred to by him was other than of a general nature. All of the matter referred to by him as to the high points of the Japanese Naval preparations had been previously brought to the attention of the Naval Commanders in Washington, Hawaii and the Philippines by dispatches and other reports. These high points, as stated by Commander McCullum, were:

- "(a) All possible ships have been recalled to Japan for a quick docking and repair check up that has now been completed.
- (b) Some additional naval aircraft strength has been sent to the Japanese Mandate Island area.
- (c) An air and surface patrol was established on a line between the Marshall Islands and the Gilberts. Guam was placed under air and submarine observation.
- (d) The CinC 2nd Fleet organized two task groups, both rather loosely knit organizations; group No. 1 to operate in the South China Area and group No. 2 to operate in the Mandate Islands area. This organization is about finished and the CinC of the 2nd Fleet expects to be in Southern Formosa by 3 or 4 December.

"(e) The CinC of the Combined Air Force has just completed an inspection of all outlying naval air groups, particularly those in the Mandates, South China and Formosa.

(f) Many merchant vessels have recently been taken over by the Navy and at least three of these have been equipped as anti-aircraft ships."

"Political Preparation"

Under this topic Commander McCollum referred to the evacuation of Japanese residents, particularly women and children, from British India and Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippine Islands, Hongkong, Australia, the United States, Canada, and South America.

He also stated that preparations had been made to shift the center of the Japanese War Intelligence and Espionage net, which covered the Americas, from Washington to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where, he stated, the Japanese Embassy was equipped with a short-wave radio transmitter. Captain McCollum then stated that the Japanese had placed great stress on an espionage net in Thailand and Singapore, and he gave examples of Japanese activities at those places.

Among other matters referred to by Captain McCollum in reference to Japanese political preparations, were the sending of Ambassador Kurusu to the United States, the request of the Japanese Army General Staff for urgent information concerning United States and Dutch troop and plane strength, and dispositions, in the Philippines and in the Netherlands East Indies, the taking over by the

Japanese military of many police functions in French Indo China, and the information from the Japanese consul general at Shanghai that all preparations were complete for taking over physically all property of British and American nationals. (Hew. Exhibit 10).

(b) The Office of Naval Intelligence Fortnightly Summary of current situations of 1 December 1941 (Hew. Exhibit 9), made statements with reference to the diplomatic situation and the military and naval situations throughout the world.

With reference to the Japanese-American situation the summary stated:

"Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese Government and press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work of building the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The press also is criticising Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand.

"Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained. Japan signed a five-year extension of the anti-comintern pact with Germany and other Axis nations on November 25."

Concerning the Japanese military situation, the Summary referred to the pouring of Japanese troops and supplies into French Indo-China, and estimated the Japanese Army there was believed to number 25,000 near Tongking province, and between 70,000 and 100,000 in South Indo-China.

It was further stated that "Naval craft and aircraft also moved South", and estimated that there were about 2,000 Japanese

airplanes in Indo-China, and roughly the same number on Hianan Island.

In respect of the Japanese Naval situation, the summary referred to the Naval movement Southward towards Indo-China, for which there was indicated the creation of an extensive Task Force, the organization of which would probably take shape within the succeeding few days. It was stated, however, that this new Task Force was under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet, and that it appeared to be divided into two task groups, one of which was operating off the southeast coast, and one off the Mandates. It was stated that though one division of battleships "may" be assigned to CinC Second Fleet's new task force, "the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the Carriers." This part of the Summary read as follows:

"C. The Japanese Naval Situation

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

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"The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workman, engineers, etc."

(iii) Information Concerning Air Search From Manila.

On this day, 1 December 1941, CinCAF by dispatch (Ø1114Ø) to OpNav, made its first report of the air reconnaissance which OpNav had requested it to make on the line between Manila and Camranh Bay. The report was as follows:

"RESULTS OF TODAY'S RECONNAISSANCE NEGATIVE EVEN INCLUDING THE CLOSE VICINITY CAMRANH BAY; REFERENCE OPNAV'S DISPATCH 3Ø17Ø9."

2. In Hawaii

This day, 1 December 1941, was most notable in Hawaii chiefly from the standpoint of combat intelligence. It was on this day that significant information concerning the activities of the Japanese Navy was learned by Admiral Kimmel. At ØØØØ hours, as has been stated, the Japanese Navy changed its call signs, though the discontinued calls had been in use for only one month. This change was recognized by the Communication Intelligence Unit as "an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale", and this information was directly brought to the attention of Admiral Kimmel. On this day information was also delivered and brought to the attention of Admiral Kimmel that there had been no change in respect of the previous locating of the bulk of the Japanese Submarine Force eastward of a line between Yokosuka, Chichijima and Saipan.

From this day onward no information was obtained as to the

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location of the Japanese Carriers.

(1) Communication Intelligence available to Admiral Kimmel.

(a) There was sent by Com16 three dispatches, (010245, 010913, 011422), with information copies to CinCPac, advising as follows:

(1) The first dispatch (010245) advised that the Japanese Navy had made a reassignment of all its radio call signs, (Hew. Exhibit 58). The message read as follows:

"PLEASE CANCEL MY ONE FIFTY TODAY XX REASSIGNMENT ALL ORANGE CALLS OCCURRED MIDNIGHT X SAME GARBLE TABLE X NO CHANGE IN SHORE ADDRESSES"

(2) The second dispatch (010913) (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 110), reported that there had arrived in the Takao area during the preceding two days, ComDesRon 5 in the Natori, and the Maka, to join DesRon 4. It also said that there had arrived at the same place units of Base Force No. 2, and the Chogei which was believed to be a tender for two submarine divisions. All of these units were reported to be under the command of the CinC Third Fleet. This dispatch further advised that the CinC Second Fleet had shifted in the Atago from Kure to the Sasebo area, apparently enroute to South China waters.

The information contained in Com16 dispatch (010913), was incorporated in an Intelligence Report (Serial Number 100) prepared by the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, for the information of the Staff of Admiral Kimmel. (Hew. Exhibit 26)

(3) The third dispatch from Com16 (011422) (Hew. Exhibit 58), with information copy to CinCPac, advised that a Japanese broadcast

had closed at 1700 hours with the admonition that all listeners should be sure to listen in the next morning at 0700 and 0730, "since there may be important news." The message read as follows:

"JIG VICTOR JIG PRESS TONIGHT IN CLOSING SEVENTEEN HUNDRED SCHEDULE STATED QUOTE "ALL LISTENERS BE SURE AND LISTEN IN AT ZERO SEVEN ZERO ZERO AND ZERO SEVEN THIRTY TOMORROW MORNING, SINCE THERE MAY BE IMPORTANT NEWS" UNQUOTE XX SUGGEST FREQUENCIES SEVEN THREE TWO SEVEN X NINE FOUR THREE ZERO X AND ONE TWO TWO SEVEN FIVE X TIMES TOKYO LCT"

(b) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 1 December 1941 (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 728) which was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel, in referring to the change in the Japanese radio calls, stated that since the discontinued calls that lasted "only one month", there was indicated "an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale." In connection with this change in call signs, the summary stated:

"All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at ~~0000~~, 1 December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old."

The Summary went on to state that the Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security measures in respect of its radio traffic including the padding of the total volume of traffic in order to make it appear that "nothing unusual was pending." In this respect the

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Summary read as follows:

"It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December indicates that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending."

With reference to the First Fleet it was stated there was nothing to indicate it was operating outside of Empire waters. The Second Fleet was said to be believed to be proceeding in the direction of South China and Indo-China. In that connection, it was stated that CruDiv 7 and Desron 3, along with other units of the Second Fleet Task Force, were definitely in the Indo-China area.

The Summary stated that there was "no change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area," and, with reference to Submarines, that a large number of them were believed to be in the area eastward of Yokosuka, Chichijima and Saipan. In this connection the summary read:

"SUBMARINES - Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan. Flagship somewhere in this general area."

As to Carriers, the summary stated:

"CARRIERS -- No change"

(c) On 1 December 1941, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer prepared, at the request of Admiral Kimmel, a memorandum, dated 1

REF ID: A66541

December 1941, subject, location of the Japanese
Exhibit 23). After the typing up of the memorandum, the Fleet
Intelligence Officer made certain corrections thereon with red
pencil, which reflected later information received on the night
of 1 - 2 December. The memorandum was not submitted to Admiral
Kimmel until 2 December 1941, when, as a result of and during
the conversation between Admiral Kimmel and Captain Edwin T. Layton,
Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, certain notations were made on
it in lead pencil by Admiral Kimmel.

The memorandum stated that "From the best available informa-
tion, units of the Orange [Japanese] Fleet are thought to be
located," as follows:

"Yokosuka Area

TAKAO (CA)	1 CA	<i>JAPAN</i>
3rd Fleet HQ	?	
#1 Patrol Force	?	
AIR GROUP of 5th Fleet (Chichijima?)	36 planes?	

Total - 1 CA plus ? 36 planes

"Kure - Sasebo Area

CinC Combined Fleet
CinC First Fleet

BatDiv 1 & 2	6 BB ?	<i>JAPAN</i>
Crudiv 6 - may head for Mandates (?)	4 CA ?	
Desron 1	1 CL	
	12 DD	

~~CinC 3rd Fleet in NAGARA~~ 1 ~~CL~~ (4 TAKAO)

1 CL	1 CL
Desdiv-12 (?)	1 CL
	4 DD

Cruiser Division EIGHT 2 CA

Total - 6 BB - 10 CA - 1 CL - 16 DD 4 CN

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Shanghai Area

CinC China Fleets in IZUMO
Shanghai Base Force

1 - OCA
1 - PG
3 - ODD
plus miscellaneous
craft
36 planes (?)

#10 Air Group

Total - 1 OCA - 1 PG - 3 ODD - 36 planes, etc.

"Bako - Takao Area

THIRD Fleet Submarine Squadrons

Subron-5

1 AS

6 SS (I)

1 CL

6 SS

1 CL

4 SM

1 CL

8 DD

3 CM

5 XPG or XPC

17 AP or AK

1 CL

12 DD

Subron-6

Desron-5 less Desdiv-22

#2 Base Force SAME MAY BE
IN NAINAN + FIJINA AREA

Desron-4

12 of those I
class SS (3-49)
Suppres. EASW
of FANQUAN
Bay as S.
SHEETS 10+15KN.

Comdr. Combined Air Force

5th Air Battalion (Army ?)

11th Air Group

Air Squadron 6

Air Squadron 7

23rd Air Group

? Air Group

? Air Group

? Air Group

Genzan Air Group

Shiogama Air Group

Kanoya Air Group

Kasuga Maru

36 planes

3 XAV

30 planes

3 AV

48 planes

36 planes

36 planes

36 planes

36 planes

36 planes

36 planes

36 planes

1 XCV

36 planes

CinC 2nd Fleet with units ^{at} ~~haroute~~
TAKAO

plus Crudiv-5

- Desron-2

4 CA possibly 5 CA

1 CL

16 DD

"Bako - Takao Area

Cardiv-4	2 CV & 4 DD
Cardiv-3	2 CV & 3 DD
Batdiv-3 less HARUNA	3 BB (maybe 2 BB)
<i>SIN 1st in ICL + ICL + Desdiv 12</i>	<i>2 CL + 4 DP</i>
<hr/>	
Total -- 3 BB - 4 CV - 7 CL - 47 DD - 12 BB - 4 SM - 3 AV - 4 XAV -	
4 CA - 3 CM - 17 XAP - 5 XPC - 450 planes.	

"Hainan - Canton Area

CinC South China (in ISUZU)	1 CL
<i>SIN 1st So. Exp. Force</i>	1 CA
Crudiv-7	4 CA
Desron-3	1 CL
	15 DD
<u>1st Base Force (?)</u>	3 CM
(part of this may be in	12 AM's
Formosan waters)	6 XPG
	12 PC
	27 AP (<i>SOME AT SAMRANH BAY</i>)
<hr/>	
Total -- 5 CA - 2 CL - 15 DD - 3 CM - 12 AM's - 6 XPG	
12 PC - 27 AP	

"French Indo China

<u>CinC S. Exp. Fleet in CHOKAI</u>	1 CA - at SAMA, HAINAN
	1 CL
	1 CM
	9 Torpedo Boats
	1 XPG
<i>SAMRANH BAY at ANCOR</i>	<i>21-TRANSPORTS WITH 6 PLANE</i>
	<i>PATROL OVERHEAD</i>
Some of 1st & 2nd Base Force	Total -- 1 CA - 1 CL -
<i>are may be here (21 TRANSPORTS) (?) + 10 801T</i>	<i>1 CM - 9 Torp. Boats</i>
<i>ENROUTE SAMRANH BAY (?) 12 55</i>	<i>& Miscellaneous</i>

"OMURA AIR GROUP

12 Air Group) Some may be	36 planes
13 Air Group) on	36 planes (?)
14 Air Group) Hainan	36 planes (?)

"Mandate Area

<u>PALAO</u>	
16th Air Group	36 planes

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
Mandate Area

3rd Base Force

10 XPG
4 SS (Ro)

Total -- 36 planes -- 10 XPG -- 4 SS

Truk

CinC 4th Fleet

1 CL
2 OCL
1 CL
8 DD

4th Base Force

4 XPG
4 XAP
4 XAM's

17th Air Group

36 planes

Total -- 36 planes -- 2 CL -- 2 OCL -- 8 DD
4 XPG -- 4 XAP -- 4 XAM

Saipan

CinC Submarine Force
plus subs (?) 1 Subron (?)

1 CL
1 AS
7 SS

Chitose Air Group

36 planes

18th Air Group

36 planes

5th Base Force

2 CM
8 XPG
5 XAP

Total -- 72 planes -- 1 CL -- 1 AS -- 7 SS
2 CM -- 8 XPG -- 5 XAP

Marshall Area

19th Air Group

36 planes

Yokohama Air Group

36 planes

Wotje Air Group

24 planes

Kwajalein Air Group

24 planes

Air Squadron 24

2 XAV

KORYU (?) plus
plane guards

20 planes
1 CV
4 DD

"Marshall Area

Submarine Squadron 7 1 AS
9 SS (Ro)

Subdiv (?) 4 SS (I)

Submarine Squadron 3 9 SS (I)

6th Base Force 4 XAM's
8 XPG
3 PC

^{va}
KATSUOKI 1 AG (survey)

Total -- 140 planes - 2 XAV - 1 CV - 4 DD - 1 AS
22 SS - 4 XAM - 8 XPG - 3 PG - 3 PC - 1 AG."

(d) Captain Layton explained that the significance of the statement in the Communication Intelligence Summary of this date (1 December), that there was "No change" with reference to Carriers, was that this meant that there was no change in available information as to carrier locations as last reported, and the last report as to Carriers was that they were in the Empire area, with the exception of Cardiv 3, and with the further exception that there was possibly one Carrier in the Mandates (Hew. page 215).

Captain Layton gave an explanation of what was meant by the use of the term "Empire waters" or "home waters". He said this indicated the drill grounds of the Inland Sea and the approaches to Kyushu, the coastal off-shore area, Isai Bay area, and in general, the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu. He stated that the term "home waters" did not include Etorofu, nor places in northern Japan, including Hokkaido and the Kuriles, which were referred to as

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the high north area. The area east of Japan included in the term "home waters" would, he said, embrace perhaps 40 to 60 miles or more; it would be about the same distance that the operations of the United States Fleet would take it west of San Clemente, San Pedro or San Diego. Captain Layton said that his definition of the term "home waters", was understood by Admiral Kimmel. (Hew. page 198).

(e) Vice Admiral (then Captain) McMorris, the Pacific Fleet War Plans Officer, testified that insofar as he could recall, he believed the major elements of the Japanese Fleet were "fairly well" located on and after 1 December 1941. (Hew. page 314). However, after being called on to state the basis of his stated brief that the Japanese carriers were located in home water or towards Formosa after 1 December 1941, Vice Admiral McMorris examined and reviewed the daily Communication Intelligence Summaries from 24 November to 6 December 1941 (Hew. pages 314-317), and then admitted that between 1 December and the time of the Japanese attack, there was no intelligence or information concerning the location or movements of a Japanese Carrier Fleet as such. (Hew. page 319). He also stated that during the period in question the information available as to the locations of the Japanese fleet units was not specific; "taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at hand * * * we were extremely disturbed." (Hew. page 321).

SECRET

(f) Vice Admiral (then Captain) W. W. Smith, CinCPac Chief of Staff, was interrogated concerning the information available as to the location of the Japanese Carriers during the period 27 November to 6 December 1941. He testified that, based on the Communication Intelligence Summaries between those dates he had estimated that the Japanese carriers were "some in the Marshalls and the remainder in home areas." (Hew. page 362). Referring further to the Communication Intelligence Summary, Vice Admiral Smith said:

"Vice Admiral Smith: Now, I see nothing very alarming in these dispatches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very light, radio traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy right up to the 6th of December. The fact that you don't hear from the Second Fleet, he doesn't originate any message, doesn't necessarily mean that he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercising maintained radio silence. We had a very large force, almost half of the Pacific Fleet, in May, 1941, proceed to the Atlantic and no traffic was heard from them for a period of some six weeks. So the absence of radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.

"MR. SONNETT: Does it indicate that they are at sea, Admiral?"

"VICE ADMIRAL SMITH: It indicates the probability that they are at sea, yes.

"MR. SONNETT: And it is the fact that after December 1, 1941, there was no information from the Japanese carriers' radio traffic?"

"VICE ADMIRAL SMITH: No, except after saying there is no information, they usually wind up with, "They are believed to be in home waters." (Hew. page 363).

Admiral Smith also said that he had not known about the change in call signs of the Jap Fleet which occurred on 1 December. (Hew. page 364). He did not recall having discussed with Admiral Kimmel the lack of information on Japanese carriers indicated by the communication intelligence summaries after 1 December. (Hew. Page 365).

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(ii) Other Intelligence

(a) On 1 December 1941, Admiral Stark sent a dispatch (020145) to CinCPac stating that no landing field construction would be permitted on Guam in the present situation. This message read as follows:

"NO LANDING FIELD CONSTRUCTION ON GUAM WILL BE PERMITTED IN THE PRESENT STRATEGIC SITUATION BECAUSE OF THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF PROVIDING EFFECTIVE DEFENSE FOR THE ISLAND OR ITS SEA COMMUNICATIONS."

(b) On this day, 1 December 1941, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer prepared a further Intelligence Report (Serial Number 101) dated 1 December 1941 (Hew. Exhibit 26), in which was stated for the benefit of Admiral Kimmel's Staff, certain reports from Bangkok of Japanese plans designed to force the British to attack Thai:

"Absolutely reliable agent Bangkok reports that on the 29th conferences were in progress considering plans to force the British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Thai, at present, intends to consider the first invader as her enemy therefore Japan believes this landing in Malay would force the British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa. Thai would then declare war against the British and call on Japan for help. This plan appears to have the approval of the Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto. Up until 25 November Thai government circles have been sharply divided between pro-British and pro-Japanese but now those favoring Japan seem to have silenced the anti-Japan group and intend to force Premier Pibul to make a decision. They expect early and favorable developments."

(iii) Obtaining of Messages from the Radio Corporation of America.

(a) Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, attached to the District

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Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District, Honolulu, testified that efforts were made prior to 7 December 1941 to obtain copies of the coded messages from the Japanese Consulate to Japan, via RCA and that the same had been unsuccessful. However, he said, that as of 1 December 1941, following an informal understanding between Mr. David Sornoff of the RCA and Admiral Bloch, copies of all messages sent by the Japanese Consulate via RCA were made available to the District Intelligence Office. The first of these messages was received at the District Intelligence Office, according to Lieutenant Woodrum, on the morning of 5 December 1941, and none of them were decoded until after the attack on 7 December 1941. Lieutenant Woodrum understood that the messages had been sent immediately after their receipt to Commander Rochefort's Communications Intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor, but that the necessary code for translating did not become available until it was found during a search of the Japanese Consulate on 7 December, after the attack had begun.

(iv) Air Search From Oahu, 1 - 4 December 1941.

Admiral Bellinger testified that from 1 to 4 December 1941, there were conducted daily scouting flights from Oahu, covering an approximate 90° sector to a distance of 300 miles. These flights were made by one squadron of twelve planes per day for the sector.

1/ See Hew. Exhibit 40 for a summary of the decoded copies of messages sent by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu from 1 December to 6 December 1941.

Admiral Bellinger emphasized that these flights were flown as a part of the patrol wing tactical exercises only, in connection with the expansion training program; that these were training flights and did not constitute "directed fleet reconnaissance." Admiral Bellinger was unable to recall the sector utilized in flying these training flights. (Hew. page 494).

3. In the Pacific

(a) On this day, 1 December 1941, the Japanese Cabinet Council approved the commencement of hostilities against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands (MacArthur documents). On the same date an order of the Imperial General Headquarters was issued which stated:

"Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to start an action will be given later."
(MacArthur documents)

Under the authority of the Imperial General Headquarters order just cited, a Naval General Staff Instruction was issued on 1 December to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet:

"The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall, at the start of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area to reduce it to impotency, using the First Air Fleet as the nucleus of the attack force."
(MacArthur documents)

(b) On 1 December 1941, also, Tokyo sent messages to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, both of which were translated on the same day by the Navy, which, among other things, stated that the final deadline set by the Japanese government of 29 November,

had "come and gone and the situation continues to be increasingly
critical", ^{1/} and advised of the manner in which codes should be
destroyed. ^{2/} On this day, Tokyo sent a further dispatch advising
Nomura and Kurusu that the Japanese government offices in London,
Hongkong, Singapore and Manila had been instructed to destroy their
code machines, and this message was translated by the Navy on the
same date. ^{3/}

(c) On 1 December 1941, Tokyo also sent a dispatch to
London, which was not translated by the Navy until 5 December 1941,
directing that the Japanese Embassy there should immediately
dispose of its code machine. ^{4/}

(d) On 1 December 1941, Ambassadors Kurusu and Nomura sent
five messages to Tokyo, which were not translated in Washington
until 4 and 5 December 1941, which among other things, advised that
there were "indications" that the United States desired to continue
negotiations even if it were necessary to go beyond "their stand
on the so-called basic principles" and stated Secretary Hull's
"pained expression" as to the serious trend of events had given
way to a showing by him of visible signs of relief when the
Japanese Ambassadors told him that they thought Premier Tojo's
statements had been erroneously and exaggeratedly reported in
vernacular. ^{5/}

^{1/} See supra page 484-5.

^{2/} See supra page 485.

^{3/} See supra page 486.

^{4/} See infra page 571.

^{5/} See infra, pages 569-570.

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(e) On 1 December 1941, Tokyo also sent a dispatch to Hsinking, which was translated by the Navy on 4 December 1941, stating that it was expected that Manchuria would take the same steps as Japan in case war broke out with England and America and that great care should be exercised not to antagonize Russia. ^{1/}

(f) On 1 December 1941, reports were made to Japan from Manila (Nihro) and Panama concerning ships present, and ship movements at Manila and the Panama Canal respectively. These messages were not translated by the Navy until 8 and 10 December 1941. ^{2/}

1/ See infra, pages 543-544.

2/ (SecNav Folder of Intercepts)

F. 2 DECEMBER 1941

1. In Washington

(1) Intelligence

There was available in Washington on 2 December 1941, information obtained from the interception of Japanese diplomatic dispatches which, as such, was not forwarded to Hawaii, as follows:

(a) The Navy translated a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo, dated 23 November 1941, which outlined the conversations held between Secretary of State Hull, the Japanese Ambassadors and Chinese Ambassador Koteki, on the night of 22 November. This dispatch stated that the conversation developed that trade between Japan and the United States could be resumed if Japan was willing to take a peaceful attitude, and that the Japanese Ambassadors had presented the prelude to Japan's "B" proposal to Secretary Hull, which appeared to displease him because he felt it constituted a demand by Japan on the United States. The dispatch ended by stating that Secretary Hull explained that the United States was following a peaceful attitude in negotiations and that he expressed his hope that Japan would adopt a similar attitude. This message read in full as follows:

"General outline of conversation on the night of 22nd is as follows:

"Trade between Japan and the United States could gradually be resumed if Japan were willing to take a peaceful attitude, representatives of foreign powers that are friendly with the United States met in conference yesterday. They were all advised of this

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and are to meet again on Monday, after they have reported to their own government and received their answers.

"Hull continued that there was a limit to his powers, and although he understood the reason for Tokyo's demand of urgency regarding the matter, he does not seem to see the reason why Tokyo can not wait a few days.

"The Chinese Ambassador KOTEKI came to the conference yesterday, getting up from bed (due to illness) and arriving at the end of the conference.

"According to Hull he does not intend to act as a mediator in the Japan-China incident right now, or to give aid to China, (however the aid to China today is not to a very great extent). It seems as though he wishes to handle (discuss) the China incident later.

"According to reliable information it seems that to station troops for duration of necessity can be considered as stationing of troops indefinitely, but if it was stated that troops were to be stationed for a certain period of four or five years, at the end of which period conditions were to govern restationing of troops, there might not be so much opposition. But with just an indefinite stationing of troops for an indefinite period, it would be against the U.S. policy which is against annexation and interfering with self-government. (The fact that during the preparatory conference last July, the Japanese troops went into French Indo-China, causing the conference of that time to be broken off) - the above was mentioned again today and thus hinting that it was hoped a similar occurrence would not develop this time.

"He continued that to merely move troops which were in Southern French Indo-China to the north would not relieve the tension in the south Pacific or relieve the anxiousness of the countries of the south Pacific, etc., so that it was explained that to an experienced military observer this was great information and should add much to the peace of that part. Hull explained that the contents of the conference would be strictly restricted to himself alone, (then later said he would mention it to a few), so that gave the appearance of his not understanding much about military aspects.

"I presented the prelude of our B Proposal and tried to get his answer to yes or no on each item, and Hull seemed to feel that our B Proposal was a demand on the United States by Japan, and seemed very displeased. He said there was no cause for Japan's making such demands, and that he was greatly discouraged in the attitude of Japan of insisting on direct answers when he was trying so hard to arrange a peaceful negotiation between the two countries.

"We (Japanese Ambassadors) kept a calm appearance throughout the talk, and at no time became excited, and the opponent's attitude

was also the same.

"Hull explained that the United States was following peaceful attitude in the negotiations and he hoped Japan would also follow this peaceful attitude of the United States throughout the negotiations." (SecNav Folder Intercepts).

(b) On this day, 2 December 1941 the Navy translated a message from Ambassador Nomura in Washington, to Tokyo, dated 25 November 1941, which stated that Secretary of State Hull had been carrying on conversations with the diplomatic representatives of various nations, and that he had chosen the British representative as his main conferee.

This message read:

"Hull has conferred jointly with the diplomatic representatives of Britain, Australia, Netherlands East Indies, and China, on two different occasions recently. In harmony with developments however, he has chosen the British representative as his main conferee. Since this morning, the 25th, he is maintaining communications with the Australian and the N.E.I. representatives through the British Ambassador. He will confer with the Chinese Ambassador tonight, alone, after conferring first with the British Ambassador.

"The fact that he has dispensed with the custom of conducting joint conferences and has substituted separate ones is drawing considerable attention from the public in general." (Idem).

(c) On the same day, the Navy also translated a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 27 November 1941 (Hew. Exhibit 13, page 9), which stated that because of the fact that international relations were becoming more strained, an emergency system of dispatches was to be placed in effect. The message then established the so-called "hidden word or misleading language" code for use in telegrams between Tokyo and Japanese diplomatic offices, which was to consist of the inserting in messages an indicator word or clause, and of adding at the end of messages the English word "S T O P". It was provided in this dispatch that the Japanese

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word "OWARI" (end)" would not be used. This message, together with all of the code words and indicators mentioned in it, reads as follows:

"With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

"Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

EXAMPLE: A message meaning:

"Japan and U.S.S.R. military have clashed", will read:

"HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) STOP (end spell)."

"In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word S T O P will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used).

<u>Code Word</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
ARIMURA	Code communications prohibited.
ASAI	Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA	Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.
ASIKAGA	Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.
AZUMA	Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTI	Prepare for evacuation.
HANABUSA	Preparations for evacuation have been completed.

Code Word

Meaning

HANAZONO (?)

Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or consul) there.

HATAKEYAMA

Relations between Japan and(blank).....have been severed.

HATTORI

Relations between Japan and(blank).....are not in accordance with expectation.

HIZIKATA

Japan's and.....(blank's)..... military forces have clashed.

HOSINO

Japan and.....(blank).....are entering a full fledged general war.

IBARAGI

Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.

INAGAKI

Have you - - ? - - the...(blank)... matter?

ISHIKAWA

I have - - ? - - the ... (blank)... matter.

KASHIWAGI

We are commencing military action? against...(blank)...

KOBAYAKAWA

Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to persons of...(blank)...nationality.

KODAMA

Japan.

KOMIYAMA

China.

KOYANAGI

England.

KUBOTA

U.S.S.R.

KURIBARA

France (?)

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<u>Code Words</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
KUSUNOKI	Germany
MATUTANI	Italy
MINAMI	U.S.A.
MIWATA	Canada
MIYAZAKI	Mexico
MOROKOSI	Brazil
MOTIZUKI	Panama
NAGAMINE	Argentina
NAKAZATO	Thailand
NANGO	French Indo-China
NEGI (?)	Netherlands East-Indies
OGAWA	Burma (?)
OKAMOTO	Malaya
OKUMURA	Australia
ONIZUKA	Union of South Africa (?)
ONODERA	Enemy country
OTANI	? (Possibly: friendly, or allied country?)
ONISI	Year
SIMANAKA	Day
SAKAKIBARA	Tsuki Month
SIGENOI	(KŌ) Paragraph
SANZYŌ	(Toki) Time
ITIRŌ,	1

<u>Code Word</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
NISAKU	2
SANTARO	3
YOITI	4
GORO	5
MASAROKU	6
SIMETARO	7
YASOKITI	8
HISAMATU	9
ATUMI	0 (Hew. Exhibit 13, pages 9-12.)

(d) On the same day, 2 December 1941, the Army translated a message from Ambassador Nomura in Washington to Tokyo, in which he stated he was making certain financial arrangements, since to do otherwise might cause it to be thought that there might occur a sudden change in Japanese American relations. This message read:

"Although, as a result of a conference with NISHIYAMA of the Finance Office, we are negotiating with the State Department and Finance Department to reconsider, since we do not think it wise to have any indications today of a sudden change in Japan-American relations, it seems best in the above situation to act in accordance with the New York telegram. We have wired New York."

(11) Dispatch to ComSixteen Concerning Mine Sweeping

(a) On 2 December OpNav replied by dispatch (ø216ø7) to

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Coml6 dispatch (290542) of 29 November,^{1/} concerning the request of Coml6 for authority to charter boats because of the imminence of mine sweeping operations. In this Dispatch, which was released by Admiral Taffinder, it was stated that the chartering of boats was not practicable because of the necessity of converting them to the desired use, and, in it, the question was asked whether river gun boats might not be used for the purpose. The dispatch concluded as follows:

"ADVISE IN DETAIL REQUIREMENTS AND WHAT DOES EXTENSIVE MINE SWEEPING COMPRISE?"

2. In Hawaii

This day was notable in Hawaii because of the nature of the combat intelligence that was made available to Admiral Kimmel. There was brought directly to Admiral Kimmel's attention, the fact that the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer was unable to make any reliable estimate as to the locations of two Japanese carrier divisions (four carriers). In answer to a question by Admiral Kimmel concerning the locations of those carrier divisions, the Intelligence Officer responded to the effect that insofar as he knew those four carriers might at that moment be coming around Diamond Head, though he hoped that if such were the case they would have been sighted. On the same day that he received this intelligence, Admiral Kimmel wrote Stark, in which, among other things, he restated in considerable detail his continuing opposition to using Army personnel in garrisoning the outlying

1/ See supra page 466 .

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islands, because, as he saw it, those Islands "Must be under Navy command and the forces there must be subject to orders of the Commander-in-Chief without any qualification whatsoever."

(i) Combat Intelligence Available to Admiral Kimmel.

There was made available to Admiral Kimmel on this day the following information:

(a) The Communications Intelligence Summary, which was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22, Pages 73 & 74), stated, among other things that the most prominent factor in the day's radio traffic was an apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. It was stated that certain dispatches had been reported several times, and that an instance had arisen where Takao Radio had received a dispatch that it itself had previously sent. Com - Sixteen was said to have reported that the Second and Third Fleet was in the Takao area, but the ComFourteen unit stated that "Contrary to location reports, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao". The summary then stated that the change in call signs of 1 December had prevented the CI unit from being able to state which of the Japanese naval vessels were then in the southern area."

The summary reported also that there was a very high percentage of "high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo". With reference to the First Fleet it was said that Fleet

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appears relatively quiet though there was a lack of positive identifications. As to the Second Fleet, it was said that no units had stood out prominently the past two or three days, which was also due partly to lack of new identifications, which contributed "to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company." It was stated also that subsequent to the change in call signs, cruiser division seven and destroyer squadron three had not been located and had not been observed (heard). There was stated to be nothing to report concerning the Third Fleet.

As to the Mandates, it was stated that the "Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues".

With reference to Carriers, the Communication Intelligence Summary said that there was a "complete blank of information". This portion of the CIS read:

"CARRIERS - Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." (Hew. Exhibit 22, pages 73S-74S).

In his testimony, Captain Layton explained the significance of the statement in the C.I. Summary of 2 December 1941, that there was a "complete blank of information" on the Japanese Carriers, and the further statement in the Summary that a lack of new identifications had contributed to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet was underway in company. Captain Layton said that the above statements indicated

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that there was no radio silence insofar as the Second Fleet was concerned, but that that Fleet was using its radio and was on the air on known frequencies, handling a normal pattern of traffic, though a number of calls on its circuits were not identified. This lack of identification, he said, was due to the 1 December change in call signs. He explained, further, that the Second Fleet's normal amount of traffic, associated with the fact that a number of its calls were not identified, caused the belief that the Second Fleet was underway in company. However, Captain Layton also explained, with reference to the Japanese Carriers, and to the "complete blank of information" concerning them, that the Summary meant that the Carrier radio circuits were definitely not up to normal use. This, he said, meant either that the Carriers were under "radio silence" whenever they might be located or operating, or else that they were using a broadcast radio frequency which could not be heard at a distance. (Hew. pages 220 - 225).

(b) On 2 December Captain Layton presented to Admiral Kimmel his memorandum of 1 December (Hew. Exhibit 23) concerning the location of the Japanese Fleet. ^{1/} In this memorandum to the Admiral, the Fleet Intelligence Communication Officer did not make any reference whatsoever as to the location of Japanese Carrier Division Numbers One and Two, which in fact, at that time were enroute to attack Pearl Harbor. Captain Layton testified that during his

1/ Supra, page 503

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conference with Admiral Kimmel on 2 December, the Admiral noticed and commented on the absence of information concerning the locations of Japanese Carrier Division One and Two. Captain Layton described, in his testimony, his conversation with Admiral Kimmel, as follows:

"MR. SONNETT: Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?"

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of those units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope that they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect. . . . (Hew Pages 212-213).

"MR. SONNETT: Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?"

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

"MR. SONNETT: He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?"

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that

I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their position". (Hew. pages 255-256).

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(c) On 2 December Com16 sent a dispatch (~~021100~~) to OpNav, with information copy to CinCPac (Hew. Exhibit 58), advising that "Ambassador Bangkok" had requested permission on 30 November to destroy all but a limited number of his codes. This dispatch also reported that CinC Second and Third Fleets, and the Commander of the Southern expeditionary forces were in the Takao area. (Hew. Exhibit 58).

CinCAF sent two other dispatches on this day to OpNav, with information copies to CinCPac. The first (020345) reported that a patrol plane had sighted nine submarines at ~~0230~~ GCT on the 2nd of December at latitude 13-10, longitude 110-00, proceeding on force 180 degrees at a speed of 10 knots. The second dispatch (~~020730~~) reported that three I-class Japanese submarines were sighted in cruising formation bearing ~~070~~ from Saigon, a distance about 180 miles from that place, on course 180 degrees. This dispatch also reported that there were at Camranh Bay twenty-one transports which were being covered by six patrol planes.

These two dispatches from CinCAF were incorporated by the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer in an Intelligence Report, Serial Number 102, dated 2 December 1941 (Hew. Exhibit 26), for the benefit of Admiral Kimmel's staff.

(d) On this day, there was also sent a dispatch (~~012300~~) by the Assistant Naval Attache at Shanghai to OpNav, with information copy to CinCPac (Hew. Exhibit 58), stating that there had arrived in Shanghai 14000 Japanese troops, and that it was believed the Japanese Fourth Division sailed from Shanghai during the week ending 22 November.

(11) Submarine Contacts

On 2 December, the USS Nevada, reported by dispatch (022336)

(Hew. Exhibit 48) to ComTaskFor Two, with information copy to CinCPac, that the USS Gamble had reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 28° - 30°, longitude 158 - 23, but that the echo had been lost 3 minutes later. This was attributed by the Nevada to a change of range that appeared too rapid for a submarine. This dispatch read as follows:

"GAMBLE IN LAT 28-30 LONG 158-23 REPORTS CLEAR METALLIC ECHO PICKED UP BEARING 097 TRUE DISTANT 2800 YARDS X LOST ECHO BEARING 101 AT 4300 YARDS ABOUT 3 MINUTES LATER CHANGE OF RANGE APPEARED TOO RAPID FOR SUBMARINE."

(iii) Discontinuance of Telephone Taps in Honolulu.

This was also the day on which there was discontinued the taps by the District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, of the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul and Vice-Consul, in Honolulu. Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, attached to the District Intelligence Office, testified that these taps had been maintained since 1 October 1941, and that they were removed on 2 December in pursuance of an order by Rear Admiral (then Captain) Irving H. Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer. Lieutenant Woodrum said he understood that the taps were discontinued because security of that activity had been jeopardized by the accidental discovery by employees of the telephone company of a similar activity by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hew. Pages 379 - 338).

Rear Admiral Mayfield testified that the reasons he ordered a discontinuance of the telephone taps was because the telephone employees had discovered th FBI was also tapping the Japanese Consulate's wires, and he feared that the resulting disclosure of his tapping might jeopardize the security of that activity, by his office, and, also, because the information obtained up until 2 December through tapping had revealed

nothing of an intelligence value. (Hew. page 571).

(iv) Admiral Kimmel's Letters Concerning The Reinforcement of Wake and Midway Islands

On 2 December, Admiral Kimmel wrote two letters to Admiral Stark concerning the question of reinforcing, and the defense of the outlying islands. These letters were as follows:

(a) The first letter (N.C.I. Exhibit 50) concerned the reinforcement of the outlying Islands with Army pursuit planes Army personnel. It stated:

"We had your despatches in regard to reinforcing the outlying islands with Army pursuit planes and Army personnel. With regard to the use of Army pursuits on the island bases, sometime ago we investigated the feasibility of putting some kind of fighters on the outlying islands and decided at the time that our best chance of quickly reinforcing the islands and to make the minimum demands upon the supplies in the island that we should send a minimum number of ground crews to Wake and Midway in order when the time came, to be in a position to fly off the Marine planes from a carrier or to send them direct from Pearl to Midway in the case of the SBD's. At the time your dispatch in regard to Army pursuits was received we had the WRIGHT at Wake discharging the Marine ground crews and she arrives at Midway tomorrow, December 3, to discharge Marine ground crews there." (N.C.I. Exhibit 50).

Admiral Kimmel then referred to the mission of Admiral Halsey in the ENTERPRISE, who was carrying Marine reinforcements to Wake Island, stating:

"Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with three heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, will fly off 12 Marine fighting planes for Wake tomorrow morning after which he returns to Pearl. We have been covering his advance by 2 VP squadrons operating from Johnston,

Midway and Wake. Upon the completion of the movement we now plan to return one VP squadron to Pearl and leave the other one at Midway awaiting further developments. I will hold the Marine SBD's at Pearl awaiting further developments as they can fly under their own power from Pearl to Midway." (N.C.I. Exhibit 50).

Admiral Kimmel then discussed the situation concerning the development of the defenses of the outlying Islands, including Wake and Midway, and stated that the situation at the latter place was better than at Wake. He also said that the defenses at Johnston and Palmyra were not entirely inadequate even though they were not as he would like to have.

Admiral Kimmel then discussed the question of using Army personnel as a part of the defense forces of the outlying Islands, and touched on the problem of who should command those Islands in the event of mixing personnel from the several services. In this connection he said:

"Your despatches in regard to the use of Army personnel and the organizations of Army defense forces to be used in outlying islands is being given earnest consideration. I know you appreciate the difficulties of mixing Army, Marine Corps and Navy personnel in a small island base. I believe you will subscribe to the principle that all these outlying bases must be under Navy command the forces there must be subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief without any qualification whatsoever. I anticipate some difficulties along this line when Army personnel is injected into the picture unless a very clear directive is issued jointly by the War and Navy Department. On inquiry and conference with the Army I find that the Army in Hawaii has no guns, either surface or anti-craft, available for outlying bases. They can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and rifles. I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy of the Army anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this situation. With nothing but .30 caliber machine guns and rifles the replacement of Marines by Army at outlying bases now will result in an increased number

of Marines in Oahu with no suitable equipment as Army would require all of the Marine equipment now in the islands. The Marines in the outlying islands are trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards immediately obtainable by the Army even if they took over the present Marine equipment. We cannot appreciably increase the number of military personnel in the outlying islands unless we remove the defense workers. We cannot afford to remove the defense workers if we expect to reach a satisfactory condition in the islands.

"The Marine garrisons now at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra should be retained there for the present. They will not be withdrawn until arms and equipment for the Army defense battalions have been received and the Army trained. At this time a decision can be made according to the situation then existing." (N.C.I. Exhibit 50).

Admiral Kimmel then discussed the fact that the Army had received orders to defend Canton and Christmas Islands, and said:

"The Army has orders to defend Canton and Christmas. We are turning over to them two five inch 50 guns for use at Canton. These they will man with Army personnel and supplement with some obsolete anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. The expedition is now due to leave here on December 9th.

"The Army is also sending some obsolete guns and a garrison to Christmas. I will let you know more definitely what they send when I find out exactly.

"I feel that we cannot determine the defenses of Canton and Christmas until we find out how much personnel can be maintained there. Meanwhile the Army is sending some forces there." (N.C.I. Exhibit 50).

Admiral Kimmel then stated that in view of what he has said in reference to the activity of the Army and Navy defense of the outlying Islands, that he was

" * * * * * unable to understand the reason for the despatches from the War and Navy Department directing us to utilize the Army in the defense of the outlying bases, as we can hope for no relief from this quarter until they have been supplied with suitable equipment.

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"I feel the wiser course is to continue to organize Marine defense battalions and supply them with the necessary equipment. I believe we can train Marine defense battalions just as rapidly as the Army can do so and probably as rapidly as the equipment can be supplied. If there is any prospect of the immediate supply of considerable quantities of suitable equipment I can see some reason for injecting the Army into the picture.

"I think it would be well for you to read the despatch sent by the War Department to the Commanding General on this subject. It differs considerably from the one you sent to us in that the War Department says they will take over the defense of some outlying bases from the Navy in accordance with an agreement to be reached by the Commanding General and myself. Your despatch left me with the conviction that the Army was to reinforce the Naval and Marine forces on the outlying bases in case of necessity. I feel that this should be clarified."

"With these considerations in mind I am at loss to understand the considerations which injected the Army into the picture." (N.C.I. Exhibit 50).

In a post-cript (p.s.) to this letter (N.C.I. Exhibit 50), Admiral Kimmel made reference to a statement made by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment concerning the extent to which his pursuit planes could operate over at sea, stating:

"P.S. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment made the statement in conference that his pursuit planes could not operate farther than 15 miles from land. If this be the case, I can see very little use for Army pursuit planes in an outlying island. This, added to the inability of this type plane to land on a carrier, makes them practically useless for an overseas expedition of any kind. Except for the four-engined Army bombers, we must depend upon Navy and Marine Corps planes to support any overseas expedition and to man outlying bases. This is and has been one of my reasons for urging the supply of all types of carrier planes." (N.C.I. Exhibit 50).

Admiral Kimmel in a second post-script (p.s.) made reference to the fact that he had issued orders for the depth bombing of all submarines in the Oahu operating area, saying:

"P.S. You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area." (N.C.I. Exhibit 50).

(b) The second letter of 2 December from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, (N.C.I. Exhibit 51) and reference also to the question of the defenses of outlying bases. In it Admiral Kimmel stated:

(1) Concerning prior dispatches and correspondence involving this subject, that it was not clear to him that the Navy had in mind that the Army would alternately relieve the Marine Defense Patrols; if so, he said:

" * * * * * it is assumed that such action would be taken in order to have those battalions and their equipment available to garrison positions taken by assault in the Marshalls and the Carolines. Should such assumption be correct, it is pertinent to note that transports, trained assault troops, etc., are not now available to make the seizures. Moreover, the local Army authorities are not only short of anti-aircraft equipment, but of most other armament necessary for defense of an advanced island base. If the Marine Defense Battalions were withdrawn at this time it would be necessary to leave behind most of their equipment, and they would have none for use elsewhere." (N.C.I. Exhibit 51).

(2) Admiral Kimmel then discussed the information and considerations which appeared to him to make it unwise that the Army be given the defense of the outlying islands, which included an Army shortage of Anti-aircraft guns for outlying bases and even on Oahu, and that the Army did not have suitable guns for replacing Marine 7",

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5", and 37 millimeter guns, without weakening the defenses of Hawaii.

He stated that the fighting capabilities of the Army pursuit planes were superior to those of Marine fighters or light bombers but they had no offensive capabilities against hostile surface craft or submarines and that they lacked navigational equipment and personnel experienced in flying over water. He said that the Army planes were adverse to operating more than 15 miles from land, and that if the Army pursuit planes were landed on Wake or Midway, they could not fly off to carriers.

From the foregoing and from other reasons given by him, Admiral Kimmel concluded that at that time:

"(a) Marine armament can be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very limited extent.

"(b) If the Marines are replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking equipment, will be valueless as a defense battalion.

"(c) Replacing the Marines will very materially weaken the defenses because of less proficient personnel.

"(d) Considering all aspects of the matter, Marine planes are more valuable in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes." (N.C.I. Exhibit 51).

Admiral Kimmel referred again to the question whether the Army or Navy would command the outlying Islands in the event Army personnel were placed there, stating:

"8. The presence of Army forces on outlying bases will inevitably bring up the question of command. Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra are Naval Air Stations, designed and built primarily to support Fleet operations. Any other activities there, including defense, must be subordinate to this purpose. Defense itself exists solely for the purpose of insuring the availability of the bases. The establishments are small and close coordination of all activities is mandatory, extending to joint use of material and equipment

and even to joint participation by all hands in unusual tasks. This can be accomplished only by unity of command, which must be vested on the one officer qualified to insure that the base fulfills its purpose, whether under attack or not and no matter what organization operates the defenses. The interests of the Navy are paramount and unity of command must be vested in the Commanding Officer of the Station. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as already brought out in his dispatches, cannot too strongly emphasize this point." (N.C.I. Exhibit 51).

Admiral Kimmel then stated further reason why he considered the defenses of the outlying islands, except Christmas and Canton Islands, which had been assumed by the War Department, should remain under Navy and Marine cognizance. (id., pages 5 - 7).

He summarized as follows:

"18. To summarize: the Commander-in-Chief considers that the current setup in the existing bases is in accordance with long and well considered plans that should not now be changed. He intends to:

"(a) Continue the Marine Defense Battalions at Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra;

"(b) Continue use of Marine planes at such of those places as circumstances require;

"(c) Transfer a battery of five inch guns to the Army for use by Army personnel at Canton until the Army can obtain suitable replacement;

"(d) Continue cooperation and liaison with local Army authorities to develop and maintain in readiness Army units and equipment that may, on short notice, re-enforce or relieve Marines at aforementioned bases in whole or in part." (N.C.I. Exhibit 51).

3. In the Pacific

(a) On this date, 2 December 1941, a Japanese Imperial General Headquarters order was issued, which stated:

"The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British Empire and the Netherlands shall be commenced on December 8." (MacArthur documents)

Although no copy of this order is available, it may be regarded as having finally determined "X-Day", the date for the actual outbreak of war with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands within the terms of the Japanese Top Secret Operation Order Number One already referred to (Supra, page 407).

(b) However, on the same date a Naval General Staff Instruction, apparently directed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, was issued, which stated:

"Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to re-assemble and return to their bases." (MacArthur documents)

(c) On 2 December 1941 various dispatches were originated by the Japanese, including one from Tokyo to Washington, translated by the Army on 3 December 1941, which directed that the telegraphic codes used in connection with the machines, as well as the "code machine" should be destroyed.^{1/} A similar message, which was not translated by the Army until 8 December 1941, was sent from Premier Togo, in Tokyo, to Havana, Cuba. In addition, dispatches were sent by Tokyo to Singapore (translated 9 December 1941), Santiago, Chile (translated 11 December 1941), and one dispatch was sent from Rio de Janeiro to Santiago, Chile (translated 5 December 1941), establishing code words for use in messages, including, in the Rio de Janeiro to Santiago message, the "hidden word" code.

^{1/} See infra, page 532

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(d) On the same day, 2 December 1941, Minister Togo in Tokyo sent a dispatch to Honolulu, which was not translated by the Army until 30 December 1941, stating:

"In view of the present situation, the presence in port of war ships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Advise me whether or not the war ships are provided with antimine nets."

(The next page is #532A)

G. 3 DECEMBER 1941

1. In Washington

(1) Intelligence

There was also Intelligence available in Washington on this day acquired through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages, which was not as such, sent to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. These messages included, directing the Japanese Embassy in Washington to destroy all telegraphic codes with few exceptions. The message were:

(a) The Navy and the Army both translated a message from Togo in Tokyo, to Ambassadors Nomuro and Kurusu in Washington, dated 2 December 1941, with instructions to destroy codes and code machines as follows: 1/

"1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code (Oite and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)

"2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.

"3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna".

"4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.

"5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic official KOSAKA brought you."

1/ Information was sent by OpNav to CinCPac that the Japanese were destroying their codes. See infra pages 537-538.

(b) On this day, the Army translated a message from Nomuro and Kurusu in Washington, to Tokyo, dated 2 December 1941, which outlined the substance of an interview held by them on that day with Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles. At this interview, Secretary Welles turned over to the Japanese envoys, information which was forwarded by them to Tokyo in a separate dispatch, bearing the same date, but which was not translated by the Army until 5 December 1941. ^{1/} In this message, Nomuro and Kurusu stated that Sumner Welles had done this at the direct instruction of President Roosevelt.

In this message, Nomuro and Kurusu stated that they had told Under-Secretary Welles that they did not have any information concerning the troops in French Indo-China. It was then related that a conversation somewhat in the nature of a debate took place between the Ambassadors and Under-Secretary Welles, concerning the question of aggression as concerned with economic pressure. In the course of the conversation, Nomuro

^{1/} The substance of the separate Japanese message of this date, which was not translated until 5 December 1941, was a statement by Under-Secretary Welles that he had received reports of the continuing movement of Japanese troops to Southern Indo-China, and that the numbers involved were in excess by those provided for in the agreement by the Japanese Government and the French Government at Vichy. Under-Secretary Welles further stated that the presence of those forces implied their utilization for purposes of further aggression, since such a number was not required for police purposes. He stated that such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands and other places in Southeast Asia which he named. The Under-Secretary was reported as having stated that such new aggression would be additional to the acts of aggression already taken against China concerning which the American attitude was well known and had been stated to the Japanese Government. Accordingly, the dispatch went on to (continued on next page).

advised Welles that it was virtually impossible for Japan to accept the American proposals as they then stood, and Welles is reported as having stated that those proposals were brought about by the necessity of clarifying the position of the United States. The message in full read as follows:

"Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KUHUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. 1/ Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the tropps in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation. (H.C.I. Exhibit Numbered 36)

"Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that."

(continued from preceding page)

say, the Japanese Ambassadors were requested to inquire of their Government the intentions of the Japanese Government.

1/This is the message referred to in the immediately preceding footnote.

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I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinion that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

"I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

"Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63 Numbered 38).

(c) On 3 December 1941, the Navy translated a dispatch from Togo in Tokyo to Honolulu (Riyoji), dated 15 November 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, page 35), requesting that the "ships in harbor report" be made irregularly, but at the rate of twice a week, since the relations between Japan and the United States were most critical. This message read in full:

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"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63).

2. In Hawaii

This day in Hawaii was notable by reason of the information imparted to Admiral Kimmel that there was "no information on submarines or Carriers"; his receipt of two dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations advising that the Japanese Government had given urgent instructions to Consular posts at various places throughout the world, including Washington and Manila, to destroy codes and code machines; and the making of a submarine sound contact by a unit of Task Force TWO. The Combat Intelligence that was available to Admiral Kimmel on this date was as follows:

(a) The Communications Intelligence Summary, (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 75S), which was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel, stated that the "Present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained," and, referring to Japanese security measures which were designed to prevent the obtaining of information by radio intelligence stated, "The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far."

The Summary went on to state that radio traffic did not confirm that the CinC Second Fleet was in Taiwan waters, and

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that "It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means."

After discussing other matters very briefly, the Communications Intelligence Summary concluded by pointing to the fact that the Japanese submarines and aircraft carriers had not engaged in any radio traffic which revealed their activities or locations, saying:

"No information on submarines or Carriers." (Hew. Exhibit 22 , page 75S).

(b) The two messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel and to other Naval Commanders of importance in the Pacific Ocean area advising of the instructions of the Japanese Government to it's diplomatic and Consular posts to destroy their codes and code machines, were as follows:

(1) Dispatch (031850), which was released by Rear Admiral (then Captain) T. S. Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, read as follows:

"HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONGKONG X SINGAPORE X BATAVIA X MANILA X WASHINGTON X AND LONDON TO DESTROY MOST OF THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 29).

(2) Dispatch (031855), which was released by Rear Admiral (then Captain) Redman, Director of Naval Communications, read as follows:

"CIRCULAR TWENTY FOUR FORTY FROM TOKYO ONE DECEMBER ORDERED LONDON X HONGKONG X SINGAPORE AND MANILA TO DESTROY PURPLE MACHINE XX BATAVIA MACHINE ALREADY SENT TO TOKYO XX DECEMBER SECOND WASHINGTON ALSO DIRECTED DESTROY PURPLE X ALL BUT ONE COPY OTHER SYSTEMS XX BRITISH ADMIRALTY LONDON TODAY REPORTS EMBASSY LONDON HAS COMPLIED." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 111).

(3) Vice Admiral (then Captain) McMorris, the War Plans Officer, testified that he considered the dispatch (Ø3185Ø) (N.C.I. Exhibit 70, Document 29), from the Chief of Naval Operations, indicated strongly that there would be war with Japan. He said he could not recall whether this opinion was prevalent on the Staff of CinCPac, but he believed the thought entertained there was that war was quite likely. (N.C.I. page 895). Vice Admiral Pye, Commander of Task Force ONE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, testified that he saw the 3 December 1941 dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the destruction of codes, and that he discussed it with Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. Admiral Pye said that it seemed perfectly evident that such action as indicated in the dispatch could precede the breaking out of war by many days and that it would not indicate immediate war. He said that since the war news concerning the Japanese destruction of codes had appeared in the newspapers, and since those at Pearl Harbor were not aware of

the source of the information given in the dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, that dispatch[#] did not mean as much[#] at Pearl Harbor as it would have if the source had been known there. (Har. page 157).

(ii) Submarine Contact

(a) On this day, 3 December 1941, the Commander of Task Force T.O (Admiral W. Halsey), in a dispatch (030040), to the U.S.S. DETROIT, ComDesRon Four, and ComBatDiv One, with information copy to CinCPac (Hew. Exhibit 48), advised that a submarine contact had been reported and directed that DesRon Four should investigate while the Battleships would operate east of a given position. This message read as follows: "SOUND CONTACT REPORTED LAT 20 30 LONG 158 23 AT 1000 X DESRON 4 INVESTIGATE X BATTLESHIPS OPERATE EAST LONG 158 X DETROIT VICTOR 123 DURING NIGHT." (Hew. Exhibit 48).

(iii) Patrol Plane Flight to Wake Island

As indicated in a dispatch (030140) of this day, Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to ComTaskGroup 7.2 (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 28), a Marine Fighter Squadron of twelve planes was stated to be expected to land on Wake Island at about 2130 hours on that day. The message read: "12 VMF PLANES EXPECTED LAND WAKE FROM NORTHEASTWARD ABOUT 2130 GCT 3 DEC X MAIL TO COM 14 AND CGMSUBSCOFGR." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 28).

3. In the Pacific

While the Japanese Carrier Striking Force, and the Submarine Fleet were continuing toward Pearl Harbor, on this day, 3 December 1941, a series of messages were sent to and from Tokyo, as follows:

(a) In a message to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington, which was translated by the Navy on 4 December 1941 (see *infra*, page 548), the Ambassadors, in pursuance of the continuing of the Japanese pretense that the negotiations with the United States were being kept alive, were told to report that the increase in the Japanese Garrison in French Indo-China was due to an unusual amount of Chinese Forces in that vicinity. Another message sent on this day from Tokyo to Washington, which was translated by the Navy on 3 December 1941, followed the same line, but inquiring whether it would be appropriate if the Ambassadors again proposed that there be held a meeting between the leaders of the two countries.

(b) Tokyo sent still another message to Ambassadors Nomuro and Kurusu in Washington on 3 December 1941, which contained an attempted general justification of the position taken by the Japanese Government in its negotiations with the United States. It was stated that Japan had already made clear that its sincerity should not be doubted by reason of Japanese troop movements in the South of Asia, and that it had also fully explained "the truth behind the alleged Togo statement," in that the English translation of the same had been "very different from the original."

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This message went on to state that despite the information sent by Nomuro and Kurusu to Tokyo that Secretary Hull had expressed satisfaction "over the change for the better" in the conversations "the tone of some of the United States newspapers seemed to be unduly ominous." Reference was then made to the recent short-wave broadcasts from San Francisco, which in substance, were said to be inspired by persons who had access to the records of the diplomatic meetings. The message then said, "We feel that it is very inappropriate for the United States to criticize us without looking after her own house."

The Tokyo dispatch went on to give as an example of what it referred to as "a more and more antagonistic manner" toward it by the United States and Great Britain, a reconnaissance flight on 20 November by a United States airplane over Garanpi in the southern part of Formosa, which the Japanese Government had protested on 27 November 1941, and stated "In view of the very critical times, we cannot help but hope that such incidents would cease."

This message concluded by stating that the Japanese proposals submitted on 20 November were based on just principals, stating:

"We are insisting that all aid to Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-Chinese negotiations, at the instigation of the President of the United States, are launched. Hence, our proposal in no way conflicts with the spirit of the so-called fundamental principles being proclaimed by the United States. Please bear that in mind." (SecNav Folder Intercepts).

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(c) On 3 December, Kita, in Honolulu, sent three messages to Tokyo, which were not translated by the Navy until 10 and 11 December 1941, these messages were as follows:

(1) In the first message Kita made arrangements for changing his method of communicating by signals such events as preparations to sortie and departure of various elements of the Pacific Fleet. He proposed to do this by showing designated numbers of lights during the night from Lanikai Beach and by displaying a "star", with and without attached Roman numerals, on the head of the Star Boat in Lanikai Bay during daylight hours. Provisions were also made for the displaying of signal lights from the attic windows of Kalama House during certain hours of the night, and for the insertion in the daily newspaper of want ads as further indicators of intelligence. This message went on to state that if signals could not be made from Oahu they would then be made on Maui Island, six miles northward of Kula Sanatorium, halfway between lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road. (Idem)

(2) The second message from Kita to Tokyo, was a report. It stated that a military transport, the name of which was unknown, had sailed toward the mainland of the United States and that another ship (RABIN) had entered port from San Francisco. A second ship report from Kita on this date, stated that the U.S.S. WYOMING and two seaplane tenders had left Pearl Harbor, and that there were no other movements. (Idem)

H. 4 DECEMBER 1941.

1. In Washington

(1) Intelligence

There was again available in Washington on this day, information concerning Japanese diplomatic views, and four messages in respect to Japanese espionage concerning United States ship movements in ports of the United States, one of which was Pearl Harbor, which, as such, were not sent to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii.

Concerning Japanese Diplomatic Moves. 1/

(a) The Navy translated a message from Tokyo to Hsinking, dated 1 December 1941, which referred to the part Japan intended Manchuria to play "in case war breaks out with England and America ." This message read:

" - - - - - In the event that Manchuria participates in the war - - - - - in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

"A summary follows:

"1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

"2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

"3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be rec-

1/ The intercepts referred to here are from SecNav Folder of Intercepts.

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ognized.

"However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

"4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia."

(b) The Navy translated a message from Tokyo to Washington dated 3 December 1941, which stated at length an attempted justification of the Japanese position in its negotiations with the United States.^{1/}

(c) On this day, 4 December 1941, the Navy translated the second part of a three-part message from Washington to Tokyo, dated 1 December 1941.^{2/} This message referred to the state of the negotiations between the United States and Japan, and other matters as follows:

"For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatisfaction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.

"Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by successfully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction.

"With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China - - - - - the government of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been receiving report after report during the past few days, from U.S. officials stationed in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy; the landing of various types of arms; and the movements

^{1/} See supra, pages 540-41 for lengthy summary of this message.

^{2/} Parts 1 and 3 were not recovered.

of transport vessels. Concern is felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was they feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the southwestern Pacific area).

"As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans; even if, in actuality, that is not what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible eventuality, and all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces in that area."

(d) The Navy also translated a message on this day from Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in Washington to Tokyo, dated 1 December 1941, which contained general statements concerning the point of view expressed by the United States Government's representatives in the course of the negotiations. Among other things, Nomura and Kurusu told Tokyo that "Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles." The balance of this message read:

"However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Advisor to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreements, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

"We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final final decision as to war or peace.

"We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

"We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U.S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

"Please advise me of your opinions on this matter."

(e) The Army translated a message on 4 December 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo dated 2 December 1941, which related an attempt made on 2 December 1941 by the Japanese envoys to allay the reaction in the United States to the recent speech of Premier Tojo. This message stated:

"I know that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said, "At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present the newspapers of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please advise them hereafter concerning this point."

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(f) A further message was translated by the Navy on this day, which had been sent by Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo on 1 December 1941, in which the reaction in the United States to Premier Tojo's speech was further discussed, including the fact that Japan's true motives were questioned because of the reports of increased Japanese troop movements in French Indo-China. In this message the Japanese officials in Tokyo were cautioned to use more care in making speeches because it was "a very critical point" in Japan's history. This message read in full as follows:

"The immediate reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington are as I reported in my message #1222. Basically speaking, however, the United States has been aroused against us by the reports of Premier Tojo's speech to Parliament, and by the speech of Cabinet official Kaya and Suzuki to the Convention of the Imperial Rules Assistance Association. The dispatches concerning these speeches gave one the impression that anti-foreignism, crushing of Britain and the United States, were the points most emphasized.

"Japan's true motives are being further doubted here because of the reports of increased troop movements in French Indo-China.

"Thus, in the midst of this atmosphere, fraught with suspicion as it was, the report of Premier Tojo's speech arrived, in which it was alleged that the Premier advocated the purging of all Britons and Americans out of the Far East.

"Since the alleged speech was made at a time when the United States was expectantly awaiting our reply to their official note of the 26th to Japan, particular importance was attached to it. (It is possible that the U. S. Government assumes that the speech was made by way of expressing our complete disapproval of the U. S. proposal and that it foreshadowed our launching a military campaign. Some of the newspapers go to the extreme of commenting that if the speech is given a literal interpretation it can mean nothing except a declaration of war.)

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"The President's speeches concerning foreign affairs are consistently very cautiously worded, for they are usually taken as a description of U.S. national policy. It is almost natural that people who are accustomed to interpret speeches in that manner, reacted the way they did to the Premier's speech.

"I assume that you have already taken measures to do so, but may I suggest that when the Prime Minister or any Cabinet officer is to touch upon Foreign Affairs, careful consideration be given to those factors. I make this suggestion only because our country is at a very critical point in her history. Even if the worst eventuality materializes, we should be in a position to show all neutrals and outsiders the complete innocence on our part."

(g) The Navy also translated this day a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington dated 3 December 1941, which suggested to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu the statements they should make in order to allay the suspicions in the United States concerning Japanese intentions, and in order to carry forward the pretense that the negotiations were still in progress. This message read:

"Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement."

(h) There was a further translation by the Navy on 4 December 1941 of a message from Nomura in Washington to Tokyo dated 3 December 1941, which stated that the United States was expected to close up Japanese Consulates if the Japanese continued to increase its forces in French Indo-China. The message read:

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"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls."

Concerning Japanese Espionage

(i) On 4 December 1941, the Army translated a message from Minister Togo in Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 20 November 1941, which requested a comprehensive investigation of the fleet and bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation. This message read:

"Please investigate comprehensively the fleet — bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation."

(j) On 4 December 1941, there was also translated by the Navy three Japanese dispatches of an espionage nature, which either requested or made reports concerning ships in United States ports.

(1) The first of these messages was from Nomura in Washington to Seattle, dated 25 November 1941, requesting an investigation of the progress of repairs being made at Bremerton to the British warship War Spite. (N.C.I. Exhibit 68).

(2) The second was from Tokyo to San Francisco, dated 29 November 1941, requesting that there be made a detailed ships arrival, present and departure report beginning 1 December 1941. (N.C.I. Exhibit 68).

(3) The third was from Manila (Nihro) to Tokyo dated 25 November 1941, reporting certain ships present on 23, 24, and 25 November, including seven destroyers, five submarines, and a submarine tender. (N.C.I. Exhibit 68).

(ii) False Winds Code Message.

On this day, 4 December 1941, the Federal Communication Commission intercepted a message containing a weather report transmitted from Tokyo station JWW3 at approximately 2200 hours GMT, reading as follows:

"TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER

"KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS

"CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM."
(N.C.I. Exhibit 65).

The fact of the receipt of this message, which, if it were a winds code message, referred to Russia (North Wind) and not to either the United States or Great Britain, was relayed to the Navy Department, where the information was received by Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood, one of the watch officers in Communications (Security) Intelligence Section. Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood testified that he received over the telephone from the Federal Communication Commission the information that this message, in which words apparently relating to Russia had been used, had been received. He said that he informed Admiral Noyes, the Director of Naval Communications, who commented that the wind was blowing from a "funny direction." (N.C.I. pages 920-921; Hew. pages 144-147).

Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood also testified that the only written record he recalled concerning the Federal Communication Commission intercept of 4 December 1941, was a pencil memorandum.

This, he said, may have been a notation which he prepared when he received the message over the telephone. He stated that he turned the pencil memorandum over to the succeeding watch officer, and that he had no recollection of receiving any confirmation from the Federal Communication Commission concerning the message. He did not know of any other intercept of a "winds code" message of an execute nature. He accounted for the lack of any record in the Navy of the 4 December message from the FCC by stating that he had been instructed, in view of the urgency of any such message, to transmit it promptly and orally to Admiral Noyes, which he did. (N.C.I. page 921, 923, 925).

(iii) Question Whether Any "Winds Code" Execute Message Was Received Prior to Japanese Attack. 1/

The testimony concerning the receipt of any "winds code" execute message may be summarized as follows:

- (1) Admiral Stark stated that he knew of no execute of the "winds message" (N.C.I. page 783). General Marshall stated he thought he had been aware of the execute of the "Winds Code" (Document 15, Exhibit 63), but said he did not recall any execute message (N.C.I. page 872).
- (2) Admiral Noyes said no intercept of an execute of the "Winds Code" was ever received in the Navy Department (N.C.I. page 1033, 1047-1048). He stated the explanation of why a "winds" execute message was not in the Navy Communications files is that no such message was ever received by naval means (N.C.I. page 1040).

1/ For the text of the "winds code" as established by the Japanese see supra, page 550. Admiral Hewitt made a thorough investigation concerning any "winds code" execute message, and made findings that none had been received in the Navy Department prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. (Hew. Report, page 127).

Admiral Redman stated he had seen the Document 15 of Exhibit 63 "winds code" message but never any execute of it. (N.C.I. page 1103).

- (4) Captain Safford testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. He realized that he would be one of the important witnesses and that his memory was vague. Accordingly, he began looking around to get information in order to prepare a written statement which he could use in his testimony. He noticed that in the Roberts report there was no reference to the "Winds Message" or to the dispatch which McCollum had drafted. Safford then began talking to everyone who had been around at the time to see what they could remember, and to see if they could give him leads so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. He talked the thing over with various of the Army people. (Hew. pages 112-114)

Captain Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that Brotherhood had written back saying that he didn't care to tell Safford about the disposition of the copies of the "Winds Message," but when Brotherhood returned to the United States, Safford asked him about it and found out that there had been a misunderstanding. Brotherhood had been referring to the false "Winds Message" (Document 2 of Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court), which apparently related to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast (Hew. page 115).

Safford stated that he had information "third hand" concerning the Army's copies of the "Winds Message," and that he thought it might be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadler before the Army investigation. He stated that his information from the Army came through W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the War Department, and that the information was that the copies of the "Winds Message" had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that Colonel Bratton of the War Department had had some question about the message and had asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of the original of the "Winds Message," but that Admiral Noyes had refused to comply on the grounds that the Navy translation was correct. This, he said, should appear in Colonel Bratton's testimony before the Army investigation. He also stated that a Captain Shukraft of the Army knew that the "Winds Message" had been received (Hew. 114-115).

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Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his testimony during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier impression, Kramer told him that the "Winds Message " and various other intercepts relating to Japan had not been turned over to the Roberts Commission, but about 9 December 1941 had been collected and shown to Under Secretary Forrestal, during the absence of Secretary Knox. He also said that Kramer told him that he did not recall the "Winds Message" specifically. Safford also stated that the reference in McCollum's message to the "Winds Message" was very short and was the last item in McCollum's draft dispatch. (Hew pages 117-118)

Safford testified that it now appears more likely that the "Winds Message" was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than the night before, because the watch officers who were on duty recollected only the false "Winds Message," and not the "True 'Winds Message.'" The vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted in the message being intercepted only on the East Coast of the United States, and that such conditions were not unusual. He pointed out that they had to call on Corrigedor to cover the Tokyo-Berlin circuits because the combined efforts of intercept stations on the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than about fifty per cent coverage. Although he had no knowledge as to which Naval station allegedly intercepted the message, his first guess was the station at Cheltenham, Maryland, and his second guess was Winter Harbor, Maine. He stated that the logs of those stations and of the Navy Department had been destroyed during one of the numerous moves and no record had been kept. (Hew pages 119-122)

Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood at 9:05 p.m. on December 4th (N.C.I. Exhibit 65), Safford said that this was the "false" message which appeared on the surface to use the "winds" code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast. This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and later Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket. He said that that message was received twelve hours or more after what he referred to as the "true winds message." (Hew page 123)

Safford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65, as a true "winds" message relating to England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor (Hew page 124). He testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been monitoring for a "winds" execute message, but that prior to the attack they had intercepted no such message. (Hew page 540)

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On being recalled for examination before Admiral Hewitt, Captain Safford testified that he never had a conversation with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a "winds" message. He stated that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he received a call from Brotherhood about December 4th in which Brotherhood advised of the receipt of a message apparently using the Russian "winds" code words. He had had a vague idea that there was another "winds" message, and, he said, the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill. He said further, however, that until 1944 he did not recall having seen, or knowing of the FCC intercept in which the words relating to Russia were used (Hew pages 538-539).

- (5) Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously concerning the "winds" message but wanted to go over that previous testimony in the light of thinking it over since that time. He said that he had had no recollection of a "winds" message at the time it was first mentioned to him, the spring of 1944, but after receiving from Safford some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, he did recall a message some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of the week, and did recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and walking with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned it over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that that message had been a "winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it might have been one using the code words referring to the United States, as he previously testified, but he was less positive of that now than he had been at the time of his previous testimony. The reason for this revision of his view was that on thinking it over, he had a rather sharp recollection that in the latter part of the week preceding the attack there was still no specific mention of the United States in any of the Japanese traffic. For that reason he was under the impression when he testified during this investigation that the message referred to England and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too. He just didn't recall (Hew pages 131-132).
- (6) Lieut.Comdr. Linn testified that a 24-hour watch was maintained in Captain Safford's section; that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the four officers who stood that watch during the first week in December, 1941. Any intercept which had come into that section, he said, would have had to come through one of the four officers. He was familiar with the "Winds Code" and he

never saw any intercept prior to 7 December 1941 in which the "winds" code words relating to the United States were used (Hew Pages 140-142).

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- (7) Lieut. Comdr. Pering's testimony was that he was one of the four watch officers standing watch during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's section. He knew of the existence of the "winds" code and he never saw any intercept using the code words relating to the United States or to any other nation (Hew page 148).
 - (8) Lieut. Comdr. Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing a 24-hour watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week in December, 1941. He testified that no "winds" code message relating to the United States ever came to his attention during that week. He said that after the attack, Linn had told him that a "winds" message had come in on 7 December 1941 (Hew pages 433-441).
 - (9) Lieut. Freeman testified that he was in a section which disseminated to ONI intelligence received from the field radio intelligence units; that his unit worked very closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every effort was made to monitor for a "winds" message. Freeman was one of the officers mentioned by Captain Safford, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, as having personal knowledge of the receipt of a "winds" message relating to the United States. He testified that he never knew of or saw any intercept of a "winds" message relating to the United States (Hew pages 149-150).
 - (10) Captain McCollum testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted which contained the words relating to the United States; that the message which contained the words apparently relating to Russia had been received during the first week of December, 1941, but that in his opinion that was a bonafide weather report. He said further that during the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch summarizing the situation which he wanted to have sent out; that he remembered no reference to any "winds" message in that dispatch; and, that the dispatch was based on a memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941 which did not refer to a "winds" message (Exhibit 10). He did not know whether or not his draft dispatch had been sent out. It had been submitted to Admiral Wilkinson (Hew pages 28-32).
 - (11) Admiral Wilkinson testified that his only recollection of the "winds" code was that some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander McCollum, had mentioned to him that a message using a "winds" code had been received. Possibly, he said, it was the message received on the 7th using the words relating to England. He did not recall anything about the long dispatch which McCollum had drafted and which Captain Safford had testified Admiral

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Wilkinson had endeavored to have sent out (Hew pages 398-401).

- (12) Captain Mason, who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor, both testified that intensive efforts had been made there to monitor for any Japanese broadcasts using the "winds" code, and that nothing was received wherein the words relating to the United States were used. In this connection, it should be noted that it was the view of the Navy Department that the unit at Corregidor, because of its geographical location, was in a much better position to intercept Japanese radio broadcasts than were the units at Pearl Harbor or Washington (see Hew Exhibit 8).

Fabian and Mason also testified that close liaison was maintained with British Intelligence services in the Philippines, that the British had been monitoring for a "winds" message also, and that had such a message been received by the British, they most certainly would have been advised of its receipt, but that they received no information from the British as to the receipt of a "winds" message prior to the attack. (Hew pages 73, 78).

- (13) Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that efforts were made to monitor for the use of that code; and all available Japanese language officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan; that he checked up each day with Commander Rochefort and that no "winds" intercept was received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did they receive any dispatch from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard. (Hew pages 269-71)

- (14) Mr. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that prior to 7 December 1941 he had no information as to whether or not a "winds" message had been intercepted. He said that he had had several conversations with Captain Safford concerning the subject, the first one about a year and a half ago, and none later than six months prior to his testimony in this investigation. He said that Safford had indicated in the course of the early conversations that there had been a "winds" message, but that no copies could be found in the Navy's files, and that his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy East Coast station. Mr. Friedman also testified that about a year and a half ago he had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a "winds" message had come in on the 4th or 5th of December; that he had been notified either directly or by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message was in; that there had been some question about the exact Japanese words which had been used, and that Sadler

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had not seen the message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that Colonel Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verification from Admiral Noyes but had not been successful, whereupon the G-2 authorities simply passed the matter over since there was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the message. Mr. Friedman said that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen a copy of that message, and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testified that he regarded this as highly inconceivable, but that in conversation with Captain Safford he probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started, and that he had no idea that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr. Friedman had no knowledge, directly or indirectly, concerning the existence of a "winds" message relating to the United States, apart from his conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler (Hew pages 515-520).

- (15) Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, testified that they monitored for any "winds" code message, covering all known broadcasts from Tokyo on a 24-hour basis, and that results were nil. He testified further that he had made an exhaustive search of any "winds" message prior to 7 December 1941. (Hew pages 46-47)

(iv) Secretary Hull's Warning to Admiral Schuirmann

Admiral Schuirmann testified that the Navy Department had been kept fully informed of the progress of negotiations with Nomura and Kurusu. He recalled that on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl Harbor, Secretary Hull telephoned him and said that he wanted Admiral Schuirmann to know that he didn't seem to be able to do anything more with the Japanese and that they were liable to run loose like a mad dog and bite anyone. Admiral Schuirmann said he assured Secretary Hull that a war warning had been sent out, and he reported the conversation to Admiral Stark. (Har. pages 411-412).

(v) The "McCollum Dispatch."

There was testimony of several witnesses that Captain (then Commander) McCollum, on or about 4 December 1941, drafted a proposed dispatch summarizing the information on the Japanese -

United States situation for transmittal to and the information of
Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

(N.C.I. page 998)

Captain Safford testified concerning the "McCollum Dispatch",
as follows:

"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the "Winds Message", and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p.m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you think of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied, 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson stated, 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander-in-Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office.' Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes later." (Har page 360-361)

Admiral Turner said he had discussed the dispatch with McCollum but that he did not know what had happened to it or whether it had been transmitted (N.C.I. page 998). Admiral Noyes testified that he had discussed the proposed dispatch with Admiral Wilkinson and had told the latter that in his opinion he thought that the estimate of the situation should come from the Chief of Naval Operations. (N.C.I. page 1039)

Neither Admirals Ingersol, Redman or Stark could recall the draft dispatch prepared by Commander McCollum (N.C.I. pages 780 , 830, 1106). Captain Kramer stated that he had heard after 7 December 1941 that a long dispatch had been drafted by McCollum

but that he did not know how it was handled. (N.C.I. page 960)

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2. In Hawaii.

The highlights of 4 December 1941 in Hawaii were the receipt of an information copy of a dispatch which had been sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Station at Guam, instructing it to destroy secret and confidential publications and material, including codes, a dispatch from the Naval Attache at Singapore advising that British and Allied merchant ships had been ordered by the British Commander-in-Chief, China, to remain out of certain areas or to proceed to others which were considered safer, and the daily Communications Intelligence Summary, which did not record any radio traffic from or to the Japanese carriers.

(i) Instructions to Destroy Codes.

(a) The dispatch (042017) to the Naval Station at Guam, to destroy classified matter including codes was released by Admiral Ingersol, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, and information copies of it were sent to CinCPac, CinCAF, and Coms 14 and 16. This message read as follows:

"GUAM DESTROY ALL SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER CLASSIFIED MATTER EXCEPT THAT ESSENTIAL FOR CURRENT PURPOSES AND SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE RETAINING MINIMUM CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHANNELS NECESSARY FOR ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH CINCAF CINCPAC COM 14 COM 16 AND OPMV X BE PREPARED TO DESTROY INSTANTLY IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY ALL CLASSIFIED MATTER YOU RETAIN X REPORT CRYPTO CHANNELS RETAINED"

Admiral Noyes testified that he prepared the dispatch of 4 December 1941 to Guam, directing the destruction of codes. He said that this dispatch was motivated by the growing feeling that war

in the Pacific was imminent. (NC.I. page 1031)

(ii) Combat Intelligence.

(a) The dispatch (020235) from the Naval Attache at Singapore, concerning the orders of the British Commander-in-Chief, China, to Allied merchant ships, was sent to OpNav with information copies to CinCPac and CinCAF, and bears the date, 4 December 1941. This dispatch read:

"THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN ISSUED TO BRITISH AND ALLIED MERCHANT SHIPS THIS AREA BY CINC CHINA X ALL SHIPS NORTH OF HONG KONG BEAT IT SOUTH

THERE OF X CROWN COLONYS AND ALL OCEAN GOING SHIPS TO SINGAPORE AND BRING SUCH SHIP YARD EQUIPMENT AS POSSIBLE X EXCEPT FOR COAST MALAYA

AND WEST BORNEO NO VESSELS LEAVE HERE NORTH BOUND WITH OUT PERMISSION X NO DUTCH SHIPS SHALL GO NORTH THEIR ISLANDS WITHOUT AUTHORITY CAST ZED

MIKE ORDERS ISSUED BY THE DUTCH"

(b) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 4 December 1941, (Hew Exhibit 22, page 76S), which was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel, stated, among other things, that traffic volume was normal with fair receiving conditions, and that there was a large amount of urgent messages that day, mostly from Tokyo to the major commanders. It was also stated that Tokyo intelligence had sent twelve messages to major commanders, one of which was a seven-part message addressed to the Chiefs of Staff of the China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force and Sama.

With reference to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that "the outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet."

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The summary continued that it was believed that CinC Second Fleet was in the vicinity of Takao, and explained that the "apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC Second Fleet is still copying." It was stated that the CinC Combined Fleet had sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force at Palao, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet.

The CinC Fourth Fleet (Mandate Fleet) was reported to have sent a message to the Chief of Staff of the Combined Air Force, with information copy to the 11th Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron 24, and the Third and Fourth Base Forces at Palao and Truk respectively. It was also stated "no further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet Units in the Marshalls."

With reference to Submarines, it was noted that there was a continued association with Jaluit. The Summary stated Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, "being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed to be an oil tanker.)" The Summary concluded by stating that except for traffic from the South China Commander, all units in that area were quiet.

(c) On this day, 4 December 1941, CinCPac also received information copies of two dispatches, one having the date-time-group 020702, from the Assistant Naval Attache in Shanghai. (Hew Exhibit 27, page 2T, 3T). These messages advised that Nazis of military age in Shanghai were being transferred to Tokyo for

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remaining in order to serve on German ships then in Japan, and that several named Larus had recently transported oil to the Marshalls and Carolines, and that 3,000 laborers had been landed at Jaluit. (Hew. Exhibit 27, page 2T-3T)

(iii) Request for Sand Bags

ComL4 sent a dispatch (032248) to the Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, with information copy to CinCPac, on 4 December 1941, requesting that a contract be made to procure and arrangements made to ship to Pearl Harbor two million empty sand bags for distribution to the Naval Air Station and Bases in the Fourteenth Naval District, for use in constructing revetments to protect parked aircraft "in case of hostilities." This message read:

"MAKE CONTRACT PROCUREMENT AND ARRANGE SHIPMENT 2,000,000 EMPTY SAND BAGS TO TO NYPEARL FOR DISTRIBUTIONNAS AND BASES

THIS DISTRICT REQUIRED FOR CONSTRUCTION REVETMENTS TO PROTECT PARKED AIRCRAFT IN CASE HOSTILITIES. THIS ACTION TAKEN TO

PROVIDE FACILITIES REQUESTED BY CINPAC. REQUEST DISPATCH INFO AVAILABILITY AND ESTIMATED DATE OF SHIPMENT. REQUEST

BUREAU ALLOT FUNDS. TO CINCPAC BY MAIL."

(iv) Reenforcement of Midway Island

On 4 December 1941, CinCPac sent a mailgram (040237) to ComTaskForce 3, ComPatWing 2, and ComL4 (Hew Exhibit 70, Document 30), making reference to CinCPac's letter of 10 November 1941, and giving orders and directions concerning the transfer of a Marine Air Scouting Squadron to Midway. The mailgram directed that Marine ScoRon 231 would base 18 planes at Midway, and that transportation would be provided by the USS LEXINGTON.

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The Commander of Task Force Three was directed in this mailgram, after sortie from Pearl Harbor on 5 December 1941, to cause to be formed Task Force 12 under the command of ComCruScoForce (Commander Cruiser Scouting Force), consisting of the USS LEXINGTON (CV), USS CHICAGO, USS ASTORIA, USS PORTLAND (CAs), and DesRon 5 less DesDiv 10. The CinCPac mailgram further directed that Task Force 12 should proceed by a direct route to arrive on 7 December at 2230 hours GCT, 400 miles and 130° from Midway Island, at which point the Marine planes were to fly to Midway. After the arrival of the planes at Midway, the order provided that Task Force 12 should return to the fleet operating area and resume normal operations.

The mailgram from CinCPac further ordered that Commander Task Force 9 (who was also ComPatWing 2) (Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger) should direct the patrol planes at Midway to cover the flying off position at sea of the USS LEXINGTON, and to provide it with security while in that area, and to guard the Marine plane flight from the LEXINGTON to Midway Island. Com14 was directed in this dispatch to inform the Naval Air Station at Midway that the Marine planes were expected to arrive on 8 December at about 0800 GCT. This dispatch read in full as follows:

"MYSER 01825 OF 10 NOV MARINE SCORON TWO THREE
ONE WILL BASE EIGHTEEN PLANES MIDWAY X LEXINGTON
PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION X ON 5 DEC AFTER SORTIE
PEARL FORM TASK FORCE TWELVE UNDER COMCRUSCOFOR

CONSISTING OF LEXINGTON CHICAGO ASTORIA PORTLAND
DESRON FIVE LESS DESDIV TEN X TASK FORCE TWELVE
PROCEED BY DIRECT ROUTE TO ARRIVE FOUR HUNDRED
MILES 130 DEGREES FROM MIDWAY AT 2230 GCT ON 7

DEC X FROM THAT VICINITY FLY OFF MARINE PLANES TO
MIDWAY X RETURN OPERATING AREA AND RESUME NORMAL
OPERATIONS AFTER PLANES HAVE ARRIVED MIDWAY X
COMTASKFOR NINE DIRECT PATROL PLANES FROM MIDWAY

DOVER LEXINGTON FLYING OFF POSITION PROVIDE SECURITY
WHILE THAT AREA AND GUARD MARINE PLANE FLIGHT X
COMMUNICATIONS RADIO CONDITION 19 GUARD CONTINUOUSLY
NPM PRIMARY FOX X COM 14 INFORM MIDWAY PLANES

EXPECTED ARRIVE ABOUT ~~0200~~ GCT ON 8 DEC AND REQUIRE
MIDWAY REPORT ARRIVAL TO COM 14 BY CODED DISPATCH
X COM 14 PASS THIS REPORT TO COMTASKFOR 12 X MIDWAY
SUBMARINE PATROL WILL BE ADVISED." (Hew. Exhibit 70,
Document 30).

3. In the Pacific

On this day, 4 December 1941, the Japanese continued their pretenses that the diplomatic negotiations were still open, and their making of preparations through espionage for their scheduled attack on Pearl Harbor, while their fleet units were drawing nearer and nearer to Oahu. This is evidenced by the following intercepted Japanese messages.

(a) Tokyo sent a dispatch to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in Washington, which was translated on the same day by the Army. In this message, Tokyo referred to one of Nomura's messages of 3 December 1941, ^{1/} and to a prior message that had been sent by Tokyo to Washington on the same date, and which had been translated by the Navy on 4 December 1941.^{2/} The 4 December 1941 message read as follows:

^{1/} The message so referred to was not translated by the Army until 7 December 1941.

^{2/} This message is stated, supra page 548.

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"What you say in your telegram is, of course, true but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875. I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message." (SecNav Folder of Intercepts).

The statements which Tokyo described in this telegram, as "of course, true," which were made in Nomura's dispatch of 3 December 1941, had reference to the conversations between the American representatives and Nomura and Kurusu, concerning Japanese intentions in respect of French Indo-China and Thailand, arising by implication from the concentration of troops, included the following:

"If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation to give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them the United States Government nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping negotiations going. Therefore, * * * I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions." (Idem)

However, as stated in the Tokyo dispatch of 4 December 1941, Tokyo stated it considered it unwise to make further explanations than had been set forth in its earlier telegram of 3 December, in which Nomura and Kurusu were told to say to Secretary Hull that the Japanese garrisons in French Indo-China were being increased merely because of Chinese activity in that vicinity and that there had been no violation of the Japanese-French joint-defense agreement.

(b) On 4 December 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin sent a message to Tokyo, which was translated by the Army on 5 December 1941, stating that "in case of evacuation by the members

of our Embassy in London", he would like to arrange to have certain of them assigned to Berlin. On the same day, Premier Tojo in Tokyo sent a message to Honolulu, which was not translated by the Army until 12 December 1941, stating that "we here are giving a great deal of thought to the question of the return to Japan of your staff and their families. Therefore, wait where you are until I wire you at a later date." (Idem)

(c) On 4 December 1941, Honolulu (Kita) sent a message to Tokyo which was not translated by the Army until 12 December 1941, concerning the arrival of a British gunboat at Honolulu harbor. This message read:

"On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1, 100 ton class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4-inch gun fore and aft.

"Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail in return." (Idem)

I. 5 December 1941

1. In Washington

(1) Intelligence ^{1/}

There was available in Washington on this day further intelligence concerning Japanese diplomatic movements and Japanese espionage concerning United States ships which, as such, was not sent to Admiral Kimmel in Honolulu.

Concerning Japanese Diplomatic Movements

(a) The Army translated a message from Togo to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, dated 26 November 1941, suggesting that since "Time is getting short with but a few days left this month", and since the American newspapers seemed to think that there was a connection between the question of withdrawing the Japanese Army from French Indo-China and the question of the freezing of assets, the Ambassadors should contact the United States authorities and endeavor to have them accept Japanese "B" proposal in toto. This message read:

"To both Ambassadors.

"It seems that the American newspapers think that there is a connection between the question of withdrawing our army from French Indo-China and that of the freezing of assets. As I have already indicated in my #798, (which states that no further concessions can be made and if the U.S. does not consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off.), my proposal made on the 17th, even if submitted by you, would be inadequate to meet the situation. Our final proposal envisages an agreement on the basis of the "B" proposal in toto (it excludes from the "B" proposal paragraphs 6 and 7; namely, the question of non-discrimination in trade and the question of the Three-Power Agreement, and includes, as indicated in my #816,

1/ All intercepted Japanese messages referred to herein are, unless otherwise identified, from the SecNav Folder of Intercepts.

(If the U.S. accepts Proposal B, Japan will have no objection to letting Pres. ROOSEVELT act as mediator between Japan and China) the proposal which the United States Government made on the 12th; that is, the question of mediation by the United States for the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China as contained in our Proposal "B", and so the acceptance of this proposal is the most that we can expect. In view of the fact that time is getting short with but a few days left this month, I would like to have you at once contact the United States authorities again and do your utmost in getting them to accept our proposal.

"I need not suggest the following for you, no doubt, have already thought of it. I would like to have you make full use of influential Americans about whom you have wired me in the past and put pressure on the United States authorities indirectly as well.

(b) On the same day, 5 December 1941, the Navy translated a message from Togo to Ambassador Nomura in Washington, dated 27 November 1941, inquiring as to the reasons why the latter had stated in a dispatch to Tokyo, dated 26 November 1941,^{1/} that the United States might make a protective occupation of the Dutch East Indies. The message said further: "Now, this is a very important matter, and a point which we would like to know more about."

(c) On 5 December 1941, the Army translated a message from Ambassador Nomura in Washington to Tokyo, dated 30 November 1941, in which was stated the unfavorable reaction in the United States to the speech made by Premier Tojo, which was printed in the newspapers in the United States on that day. This dispatch read:

"Premier TOJO's speech was published here on the 30th in the newspapers under conspicuous headlines. They printed especially noticeably the sentence, 'The exploitation of the Asiatics by Americans' must be purged with vengeance'." On

^{1/} See Supra pages 435-436.

the other hand, according to the newspapers, a White House Secretary has issued an announcement to the effect that Secretary HULL had at once telephoned the President, resting at Warm Springs, concerning the Premier's speech and, as a result, the President, changing his schedule, was leaving Warm Springs on the afternoon of the 30th and is expected to return to Washington on the morning of the first. Inasmuch as this speech will be used extensively for propaganda purposes by the Americans will you please take suitable steps. Furthermore, will you please send me at once copies of the text (both Japanese and English)?"

(d) On this day, the Navy translated a lengthy dispatch from Nomura in Washington, to Toyko, dated 1 December 1941 (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, page 48, 50, 51), in which was stated the substance of a conversation between Secretary Hull and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu on 1 December 1941. The message read as follows:

"When I and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on the 1st, we conveyed to him the matter contained in your message #857. 1/ Roughly speaking, Hull's reply stayed within the bounds of his earlier explanations. He placed the most emphasis on two points, namely, the tone and trend of the Japanese Government's expressions and movements and that of the general public opinion organs; and, the increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China.

"From the beginning of today's conference, Secretary Hull wore a deeply pained expression. Without wasting any time, he brought up the subject of the Premier's statement (see my message #1222) 2/ and said that was one of the reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington. (Upon our arrival at the State Department, we found not only newspaper men, but even some members of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these speculators were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic.)

1/ This message from Toyko to Washington was dated 29 November 1941, and translated by the Navy on 30 November 1941. See supra page 472.

2/ This message from Nomura to Toyko, was dated 30 November 1941, and translated by the Army on 5 December 1941. It is the immediately Preceding message: See supra pages 568-9.

"We, therefore, replied that we were convinced that the Premier's statement had been erroneously and exaggeratedly reported in the vernacular. We pointed out that regardless of who the speaker may be if only an excerpt from his speech is reported, without having the entire text available, it is quite possible that the reader will get exactly the opposite meaning from that intended by the speaker.

"We went on to advise the Secretary that we were at present awaiting the delivery of the entire text.

"During the course of our explanations, the Secretary showed visible signs of relief.

"He said: 'Since our talks were begun recently, there has not been a single indication of endorsement and support from Japan. I have not heard of any steps being taken in Japan aimed at facilitating these conversations, all of which is exceedingly regrettable.'

"Hull: 'In the final analysis, that means that Hitlerism is being given indirect support, and for this reason please exercise the utmost caution.

'In view of the fact that Japan is acting in the manner described above, there is absolutely no way of bringing about a settlement of the situation.

'Disruptions in Japanese-U.S. relations is exceedingly unfortunate, not only for our two countries, but to the world in general. There shall be nothing constructive about a Japanese-U.S. war. We fully realize that it can be nothing other than destructive. For this reason, we are still highly desirous of bringing these conversations to a successful conclusion.

'However, with the existence of the above described conditions, and because of the nature of this country, the Secretary of State and the President are placed in an exceedingly difficult position.' "

"I: 'It seems mutually regrettable that all of our efforts which lead to the 21 June and 25 September proposals, should have been in vain.' "

In general he expressed his agreement to this.

"Hull: 'The recent situation in Japan and the U.S. public opinion made it necessary for us to return to the most recent proposal.' "

"We then said that behind the problems at hand, there has always been the China problem.

" 'As I have pointed out on several occasions', I said, 'this has been the bitterest experience since the Washington Conference. Peace between Japan and China could not be attained through any such terms as were contained in your most recent proposal. We hear your argument to the effect that you cannot stand by and do nothing while China dies. The converse of that argument should be even stronger. That is, that it is of the utmost importance for us to avoid standing by and watching our own respective countries die, just because of the China problem.' "

"Hull indicated his agreement with this, but went on to say:

'Because the situation is as I have already described, I hope that Japan will take steps to bring about order through her public organs.' "

(e) On 5 December 1941, the Navy also translated a message from Tokyo to London, dated 1 December 1941, instructing the latter place to discontinue the use and to dispose of its code machine immediately. This message read:

"Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

"In regard to the disposition of the machine, please be very careful to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.

"As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word SETUJU in plain language and as soon as you have carried out the instructions wire the one word HASSO in plain language.

"Also at this time you will of course burn the machine codes and the YU GO No. 26 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England.)"

(f) On this same day, 5 December 1941, the Navy translated a message from Rio de Janeiro (Ishii), to Santiago, Chili, dated 2

December 1941, conveying code words for use in connection with matters in the Santiago area. These included code indicators for statements concerning the possibility of sending Japanese ships to places to be designated. (SecNav Folder of Intercepts).

(g) On the same day, the Navy translated a message from Ambassador Nomura in Washington, to Tokyo, dated 3 December 1941, stating that he and Kurusu thought it a certainty that some joint military action would be taken by the United States and Great Britain in the event Japan occupied Thailand. This message read:

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 33).

(h) On the same day, the Army translated the dispatch from the Japanese Embassy in Berlin to Tokyo, dated 4 December 1941, in which the request was made that certain members of the Japanese Embassy in London be assigned to Berlin "in the case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Document 32).

Concerning Japanese Ship Reports Espionage

(i) On 5 December 1941, there were translated in Washington, two dispatches involving the reporting of ships present in Pearl Harbor, one of which was dated 18 November 1941, and the other 29 November 1941. On the same day, there were also translated two similar type

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messages from Manila to Tokyo, dated 27 and 28 November 1941, concerning ships present at and defense air patrol over the City of Manila. These messages were as follows:

(1) The 18 November 1941 message was from Togo in Tokyo to Honolulu, and read:

"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, (probably meant Mamala Bay) and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)" (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, page 54).

(2) The 29 November 1941 message from Tokyo to Honolulu, stated:

"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements." (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, page 53).

(3) The 27 November 1941 message from Manila, (Nihro) to Tokyo, reported that "The PORTLAND, and BUKKU (probably the BLACK HAWK), two destroyers, ten submarines left port on the 26th (?). Destination unknown."

(4) The 28 November 1941 message from Manila, (Nihro) to Tokyo read as follows:

"Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day."

(ii) Second False Winds Message:

(a) On 5 December 1941, the Federal Communications Commission reported that its monitoring service had intercepted a

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weather message, translated on 5 December 1941,^{1/} at approximately 2130 G.M.T. from Tokyo Station JBW3, which was repeated three times and read as follows:

"TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH. (N.C.I. Exhibit 65).

(b) On this day, 5 December 1941, the Navy Department received a further message from still another source that the Japanese had established a "Winds Code" for the purpose of notifying Japanese Consuls in event a war decision were made. This message was a dispatch (031030) from the Assistant Naval Attache Batavia to OpNav, which read as follows:

"FROM THORPE FOR MILES WAR DEPT. CODE INTERCEPT:- JAPAN WILL NOTIFY HER CONSULS OF WAR DECISION IN HER FOREIGN BROADCASTS AS WEATHER REPORT AT END. EAST WIND RAIN UNITED STATES: NORTH WIND CLOUDY RUSSIA: WEST WIND CLEAR ENGLAND WITH ATTACK ON THAILAND MALAY AND DUTCH EAST INDIES. WILL BE REPEATED TWICE OR MAY USE COMPASS DIRECTIONS ONLY. IN THIS CASE WORDS WILL BE INTRODUCED FIVE TIMES IN GENERAL TEXT."

(iii) Conference in the Navy Department

Admiral Turner testified that a conference was held in the Navy Department on this day, 5 December 1941, attended by Admirals

^{1/} This was another "North Wind" (Russia indicator) message. It is possible that this message, and the one intercepted by the FCC on 4 December 1941, were either genuine weather broadcasts or deliberately transmitted decoys intended by Tokyo to cause the United States Intelligence Services to conclude that a Russo-Japanese war was imminent. The latter possibility has never been explored in the several investigations. The decoy procedure might have been adopted by the Japanese, assuming that their very effective espionage system had discovered that there was taking place throughout the world intensive monitoring by a great many American and British radio stations for an execute of the "Winds Code". For the testimony concerning any "Winds" message of 4 December 1941, see *supra*, pages 550-7. See also the finding and conclusion of Admiral Hewitt that no winds execute message was received in the Navy Department or by the Navy prior to the Japanese attack. (See *infra*, page 699 .)

Stark, Ingersoll, and himself. He stated that the general situation was discussed, and that all three considered that all necessary information, orders, and directions preparatory to war had been issued to all echelons of the Navy Commands, including to Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and that no further advices to them in that respect were necessary. (N.C.I. page 1006).

2. In Hawaii

The highlights of 5 December 1941 in Hawaii were the Communication Intelligence Summary, which reported that the Commander of Japanese Carriers and of the Japanese Submarine Force were under radio silence; the departure of Task Force Three, Pacific Fleet, under the command of Admiral Newton, to Midway for the purpose of flying off a squadron of planes; the preparation for Admiral Kimmel by his War Plans Officer of a memorandum recommending "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next forty-eight hours", and the interception by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the suspicious "Mori" telephone conversation between a person in Honolulu and one in Japan. There was no decision made or action taken on this day to alter the decision made by Admiral Kimmel on 27 November 1941 ^{1/} that the Expansion Training Program of Patrol Wings One and Two should continue, and that there should be made no long distance air reconnaissance or search.

^{1/} See supra page 430.

(i) Combat Intelligence Available to Admiral Kimmel

(a) The communication intelligence summary of 5 December, which was seen and initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22, p. 77) stated, among other things, that the "traffic volume" of the day was "heavy", and that all circuits were overloaded, with Tokyo broadcasting over the "full 24 hours." The "Tokyo-Mandates circuit" was stated to have been in "duplex operation".

The Summary stated that there were "many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits". It was further reported that a plain language message had been sent from Tokyo addressed to Fujihara, Chief of the Bureau of Political Affairs, which said; "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you say is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon."

The Summary reported that neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic that day but that they were still frequently addressed and were receiving their traffic over broadcast frequencies. The Summary then stated, with reference to those Commanders, "They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic.

With reference to Aircraft Carriers and Submarines, the Summary stated: "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

It is to be noted that this was the fourth consecutive day that the Communications Intelligence Unit reported to Admiral Kimmel that the Japanese aircraft carriers were under total radio silence, and the fifth day since the Fleet Intelligence Officer reported to Admiral Kimmel that there was no information on which he could make a reliable estimate as to the location of two Japanese carrier divisions. It was also the fifth consecutive day that the Communications Intelligence Unit reported to Admiral Kimmel the presence of a large Japanese Submarine force eastward of a line between Yokosuka, Chichijima, and Saipan. Despite these definite questions as to the activities of important units of the Japanese Fleet (units which in fact were approaching and which participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor), Admiral Kimmel made no change in his eight day old decision not to have conducted any long distance reconnaissance. With reference to that matter, not a single plane was dispatched and not a single degree of the compass was covered, by any long distance air search from Oahu.

(b) On 5 December there was sent by the Naval Attache, Tokyo, to OpNav, with information to CinCPac, a dispatch advising that at that time two Marus were in the Yokohama area, and that two transports had recently left Yokohama carrying aircraft and Navy personnel. (Hew. Exhibit 27 P. 1T)

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(ii) Reinforcement of Midway Island

As had been previously arranged, ^{1/} Task Force Three, consisting of the U.S.S. Lexington (CV), and some cruisers and destroyers, under the command of Admiral Newton, left Pearl Harbor, on 5 December on a mission to ferry a squadron of Marine airplanes to Midway Island (Har. page 318).

It has been pointed out, ^{2/} that although Admiral Newton was sent to sea with this important Task Force on 5 December 1941, and though it was upwards of from 10 days to two weeks since the receipt by Admiral Kimmel of the warning message of 24 and the "WAR WARNING" message of 26 November, he was not advised of them their existence or receipt. (Har. page 317). Admiral Newton testified that he considered his mission to be solely one of ferrying reinforcements to Midway, and he attached to it no special significance. He thought at the time that there might be more danger from submarines than previously, and accordingly he zig-zagged on his course and had his ship-based scouting planes cover his advance. However, he said that he gave no special orders in respect of arming the planes other than ordinary routine (Har. page 318).

(iii) Plan for Fleet Action in Event of War Within 24 Hours.

On 5 December there was prepared by Vice Admiral (then Captain) McMorris, War Plans Officer of the Pacific Fleet, a

^{1/} See supra page 575.

^{2/} See supra pages 429-430

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memorandum for Admiral Kimmel, of "Recommended Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next forty-eight hours" (N.C.I. Exhibit 693). This memorandum recommended as follows:

- "1. Send dispatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
- "2. Send dispatch to Task Force Commanders:
 - (a) WPL 46 effective. (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below. (The SS and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them).
 - (b) Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nampo Shoto, cancelled.
 - (c) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost dispatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated.
 - (d) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Task Force 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join Task Force Three.
 - (e) LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p.m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake.
 - (f) Comtaskfor Three proceed to join LEXINGTON group. Return DMS to Pearl XXXXXX
- "3. (a) Do not modify the movements of REGULUS at Midway (departing 9th), nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.
 - (b) Direct that WILLIAM WARD BURROWS continue to WAKE but delay arrival until 10th. Direct that LEXINGTON group send two destroyers to join BURROWS prior to her arrival at WAKE.

- (c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.
- (d) Provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR.
- (e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from MANILA nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur.

(s) C. H. MC MORRIS." (N.C.I.

Exhibit 69B).

(iv) The "Mori" Telephone Conversation.

On the evening of 5 December 1941 the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in Honolulu, obtained, by tapping, the transcript of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation of a suspicious nature between a man named Mori in Honolulu and a person in Japan. In this conversation mention was made of the daily flight of airplanes in and around Honolulu, the Navy population present, the attitude of the local Japanese toward the current international situation, local construction projects, the numbers of the local population, the precautionary measures that were taken at night by defense forces including the use of searchlights, the visits of Ambassador Kuruu, of Japan, and Ambassador Litvinov, of Russia, enroute to the United States, and the number of Japanese in the United States Army. The person at the Japan end of the line inquired concerning the United States Fleet, to which Mori replied that he knew nothing about the Fleet and that talking about such matters was to be avoided. Mori

said that he did not know whether all the Fleet had left port, but that it seemed that the Fleet had left since it appeared from ships present to be small. The person in Japan strangely changed the topic of conversation, and inquired as to the kind of flowers then in bloom in Hawaii, to which Mori replied that flowers in bloom were the fewest out of the whole year but that the hibiscus and the poinsettia were in full bloom. Mori added later that the Japanese chrysanthemums were also in full bloom, (Hew Exhibit 39). This conversation in full, was as follows:

"The Mori conversation was as follows:

"IC (J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all.

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.

(J) Are they large planes?

(H) Yes, they are quite big.

(J) Are they flying from morning till night?

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

- "(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.
- (J) Is that so?
- (H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.
- (J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?
- (H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.
- (J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?
- (H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.
- (J) That's fine.
- (H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.
- (J) Has there been any increase in ..?... of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.
- (H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.
- (J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

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- (H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.
- (J) Are there many big factories there?
- (H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.
- (J) Is that so?
- (H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.
- (J) How large is the population?
- (H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.
- (J) What is the population?
- (H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.
- (J) What about night time?
- (H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.
- (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?
- (H) No.
- (J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?
- (H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

- (J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?
- (H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.
- (J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?
- (H) There are almost none wishing to do that.
- (J) What is the climate there now?
- (H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.
- (J) Is that so?
- (H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he explained for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.
- (J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?
- (H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the U.S.-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.
- (J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.
- (H) Yes.
- (J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?
- (H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.
- (J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?
- (H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already explained for the mainland.
- (J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

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- (H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't know whether all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.
- (J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?
- (H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.
- *(J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.
- (J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?
- (H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.
- (J) What do you lack most?
- (H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.
- (J) Thanks very much.
- (H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

"*(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamuno"; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year's celebration.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

(H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) Thank you.

(J) Off phone." (Hew. Exhibit 39)

The fact of the interception of this conversation was communicated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Rear Admiral (then Captain) Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer, either on the evening of 5 December or on the following day (Hew. page 381). Lieutenant Donald Woodrum who was attached to the District Intelligence Office, testified that he understood that a written translation of the conversation had been received at the DIO on 6 December, at which time it was studied by Commander Denzel Carr, who expressed a desire to be permitted to hear the original recording of the conversation. According to Lieutenant Woodrum, arrangements were made with the F.B.I. to have Commander Carr listen to the conversation on the following day, 7 December 1941. As a result of this delay, Lieutenant Woodrum testified, Commander Carr did not hear the recording until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Lieutenant Woodrum also testified that after Commander Carr had listened to the conversation, he stated that it was his opinion that Mori was not attempting to send information from the islands but on the contrary was greatly surprised and mystified by the tenor of the conversation from Japan.

It appears from the evidence that no action was taken prior to the attack by the local Navy authorities, in respect of this conversation, and that General Short, who also received information prior to the attack concerning this conversation, took no action as a result of it (N.C.I. page 233).

3. In the Pacific

On this day, 5 December 1941, with the blow by the Japanese Navy soon to be struck at Pearl Harbor, there were transmitted between Tokyo and other places messages concerning Japanese diplomatic moves and espionage as follows:

(i) Japanese Diplomatic Moves

(a) Tokyo sent a dispatch to Washington translated on 6 December, concerning the transfer of Terasaki, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Washington and head of the Japanese espionage net in the Western Hemisphere, along with his assistants to South America. ^{1/} On the same day, the Ambassadors in Washington sent their reply to Tokyo, also translated on 6 December, requesting that Terasaki be allowed to remain with them. ^{2/}

(b) The Japanese Embassy in Rome sent a dispatch to Tokyo, on this day, which was not translated by the Navy until 9 December 1941, reading as follows:

"1. We have had confidential report from the Embassy in Berlin that it is in progress. Therefore, it is said that separate declarations between Germany-Japan and Italy-Japan, or a joint declaration, is desired.

"2. [Too garbled to read]"

^{1/} See infra, page 594.

^{2/} See infra, page 594.

5

(c) Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu sent their message to Tokyo, which was translated on 6 December 1941, ^{1/} detailing the account of their conversation with Secretary Hull on 5 December 1941. In this message, Secretary Hull is reported to have said that the general tone of the Japanese press was making it difficult for the United States and Japan to reach an agreement.

(d) It was on this day, 5 December 1941, that the Japanese Embassy in Washington sent its message to Tokyo, which was translated on 6 December 1941, advising that it had completed the destruction of codes as instructed but requesting permission to retain one code machine. ^{2/}

(e) On 5 December 1941, a message was sent to Tokyo, apparently from Tiensin (though the point of origin is not positively indicated), which was not translated by the Navy until 11 December 1941, referring to action to be taken against Holland concurrently "with opening war on Britain and America". This message read in full as follows:

"Re my secret military communication #262 of November 30th.

"1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillance over her consulates and prohibited all communication between them and the enemy countries.

^{1/} See infra, pages 594-596.

^{2/} See infra, page 597.

"2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we have taken steps to prohibit the use of code message and the use of wireless by the Holland consulates.

"3. In case war breaks out with Holland we will take the same steps toward that country that we have taken in the case of Britain and America."

(ii) Espionage Concerning Ships Present

(a) On this day, 5 December 1941, a message was sent by the Japanese Consul (Kita) in Honolulu to Tokyo, which was translated by the Navy on 10 December 1941, advising concerning arrivals and departures of United States warships. Kita stated that three battleships, which had been at sea for eight days, had arrived that day, that the aircraft carrier LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers had left port that day, and that on the afternoon of that day there were in port eight battleships, three light cruisers, sixteen destroyers and other ships. This message read in full as follows:

"(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239 arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

"(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

"(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships
3 light cruisers
16 destroyers

"Four ships of the Honolulu class and - - -
were in dock."

(b) On 5 December 1941, Tokyo also sent a dispatch to
Singapore, which was not translated by the Navy until 13 December
1941, requesting a report concerning ships present and the move-
ment of capital ships.

J. 6 December 1941

1. In Washington

On 6 December 1941, there was again available in Washington intelligence concerning Japanese diplomatic and espionage moves, which was voluminous and important, and which, as such, was not sent to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii. This intelligence, obtained through translation by the Army and Navy of Japanese diplomatic messages, consisted of a group of messages from an accumulated backlog of intercepts that had not been previously translated, a message indicating compliance by the Japanese Embassy in Washington with Tokyo's instructions to destroy codes, and the first 13 parts of the "14-part message" from Tokyo, which indicated that Japan had decided to expressly terminate the diplomatic conversations and negotiations that had been pursued during the preceding months. 1/

(i) Group of Backlog Messages

The accumulated group of messages bearing other than the current date of 6 December 1941, which related to the general diplomatic situation as distinguished from code destruction and ship report messages, that were translated on 6 December 1941, were as follows:

- (a) A message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, dated 27 November 1941, which instructed the Japanese Ambassador to "convey to him [probably referring to some high German

1/ All intercepted Japanese messages, referred to herein, are from the SecNav Folder of Intercepts, unless otherwise identified.

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government official 7 confidentially and in a suitable way" that Japan would not permit its negotiations with the United States to in any way affect the validity of its treaty obligations to Germany and Italy. The message read as follows:

"Please convey to him confidentially and in a suitable way the following:

" 'Japan is going ahead with the Japanese-American negotiations with a dauntless attitude knowing that there may be many difficulties in the future course of the negotiations. However, Japan is exercising every care to see that these negotiations do not in any way affect the validity of the Tripartite Pact.' "

(b) In a message from Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, dated 28 November 1941, the Tokyo government was given Nomura's view that some action might be taken by the United States in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations in the event Japanese forces invaded Thailand. He stated further that even though the United States and England might not oppose Japan in a military manner, the United States might adopt a policy of so-called joint-defense in the South West Pacific area. This message read as follows:

"What the Imperial Government must, of course, consider is what Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and China, egged on by the United States, will do in case the Imperial forces invade Thailand. Even supposing there is no armed collision with British forces, in the oral Statement of President ROOSEVELT on the 17th of this month he prophesied that suitable action would be taken immediately in case Japan carries on any further penetration beyond French Indo-China.

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Moreover, newspaper reports at present would tend to lead to the conclusion that, even though England and the United States might not oppose us militarily within Thai, the United States assisting all nations concerned would adopt the policy of so-called joint defense throughout the whole southwestern Pacific area; thus, as I said in my #1204, there is no slight possibility that she might occupy the Netherlands Indies on the excuse that this action would be necessary for purposes of defense. I am sure you already have all these things in your mind, but in view of the gravity of the present situation, I just wanted to remind you again."

(c) A message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 5 December 1941, gave instructions that Terasaki, the second secretary of the Japanese Embassy, who was the head of the Japanese espionage in the Western Hemisphere, along with his assistants Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others, should leave Washington by airplane "within the next couple of days." ^{1/} On the same day, Ambassador Kurusu sent a message to Secretary Tasiro in Tokyo, requesting permission to keep second secretary Terasaki in Washington, because of the "importance of the intelligence set-up in view of the present condition of the Japanese-U.S. negotiations" and because Terasaki "would be exceedingly difficult to suddenly replace."

(d) A message from Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo, dated 5 December 1941, outlining the substance of the conversation held by them that day with Secretary Hull, in which the subject of discussion was the concentration of Japanese

1/ Further information indicated that these persons were to be sent by plane to South America.

troops near the border of Indo-China. This message read
as follows:

"On the 5th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on Secretary Hull, and, putting the matter contained in your instructions in writing, submitted it to him.

"Hull: 'You explain the matter as if the Chinese have concentrated troops near the border and that there is a fear that they would take aggressive action.'

"We: 'Whether or not they would attack and where from if they do attack, depends entirely on such things as the military strengths of each and on other considerations. We who do not have a clear picture of the exact conditions on the scene, cannot make any explanations other than those contained in the instructions we receive.

'However, the fact remains that there is a possibility that the Chinese would take the offensive. We have been in receipt of advices for some time past that the Chinese have been concentrating large forces in the Kwangsi area.'

"Hull said that he would relay the explanations to the President.

"While we were there, we continued along the following line:

'Fundamentally speaking, it was because we wanted to avoid just exactly what happened as a result - namely, the misinterpretations and the consequent belligerent arguments - of the President's most recent inquiries, that we wished to bring about a speedy settlement through our 20 November proposal.

'You keep bringing up the subject of our occupation of French Indo-China. Basically this is merely a phase of "power politics". Your country herself, has stated that the "best defense is an offense". Your military men in particular have taken this adage literally, and as proof thereof, have been making every effort to strengthen the army and the fleet of the ABCD. With this situation being flaunted before their eyes, our army and navy cannot remain unconcerned.'

"So saying, we repeated the gist of the contents of your message #878. 1/

"Hull: 'Since these conversations were started this spring until 24 July when Japan occupied the southern part of French Indo-China, the United States continued to permit the exporting of oil to Japan. During that time, I was the target of terrific criticism for allowing this, from Senators and from many other sources. Even in these times, the opposition would absolutely prohibit the resumption of exporting of petroleum to Japan today.'

"We: 'If the relationship between Japan and the United States underwent some improvement and if peaceful cooperation between our two countries is established, in accordance with that which is Your Excellency's custom to advocate, the concern you express now would automatically be dissolved.

'We are convinced that the correct starting point leading to the above described ideal situation, is to settle our major differences individually, rather than attempt to reach a blanket agreement, along the lines proposed by us on 20 November.'

"Hull then pointed out that the general tone of our press and other publications were making it difficult for the United States and Japan to reach an agreement. We therefore said that the same can be said of a portion of the U.S. press and went on to relate to him the contents of paragraph 1 of your message #878." 2/

(ii) Code Destruction Messages

There were translated on 6 December 1941 in Washington, two code destruction messages between Washington and Tokyo, as follows:

(a) On 5 December 1941, Councilor Iguchi of the Japanese Embassy in Washington sent a message to the Chief of the Japanese

1/ See supra, page 540-1.

2/ See supra, page 540-1.

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Communication Section in Tokyo, advising that the Embassy had complied with the Tokyo instructions contained in its dispatch of 2 December 1941,^{1/} by destroying its codes, and asked to be permitted to retain for a while one code machine. The message read:

"We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine."

(b) On 6 December 1941 Tokyo responded to the above request of Councilor Iguchi, authorizing the continued use for the time being of one code machine. This message read:

"What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867 was that of the two sets of "B" code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and for the time being to continue the use of the other."

(iii) Ship Report Messages

There was translated on 6 December 1941, in Washington by the Army, a ships present report message from Honolulu (Kita) to Tokyo dated 18 November 1941, advising of the entry and departure, and the berthing of U.S. ships in Pearl Harbor. This message read in full as follows:

"1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219 on that day.

^{1/} See supra, page 532.

UNC

b

"Area A -- A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

c

"Area C -- 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

"2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D d.

"3. At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

"Relayed to - - - .

- b - Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
- c - East Loch.
- d - Middle Loch."

(iv) First 13 Parts of "14-Part Message

During the late hours of 6 December 1941, the Navy Department translated the first 13 parts (N.C.I. Exhibit 63) of the "14-Part Message", which was sent on the same day from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington. The 14th part of the "14-Part Message" was

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not transmitted from Tokyo or translated in Washington until the morning of 7 December 1941, Washington time. Preceding the sending of the 13 parts, Tokyo sent a separate message to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu in Washington, which was dated and translated on 6 December 1941, advising that the longer message would soon be received, and it gave instructions with reference to its delivery. Subsequent to the sending of the first 13 parts, Tokyo sent an intervening message to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, also translated and dated 6 December 1941 which cautioned them with respect to the care they should exercise in preparing the memorandum to be presented to the United States Government so as to prevent a leakage of information. These messages were as follows:

(a) The first message from Tokyo on this day referred to the Tokyo to Washington dispatch of 28 November 1941, which had advised that in two or three days the negotiations with the United States would be "de facto ruptured." 1/ This message of 6 December then stated that the American proposals of 26 November had been considered, and that the answer of the Japanese government would be sent in 14 parts. In this dispatch the Japanese Ambassadors were also told that Tokyo would instruct them in a separate message as to the time of presenting to the United States the memorandum in which would

1/ See supra, pages 440-441.

be incorporated the "14-Part Message." This first message of 6 December 1941, read in full as follows:

"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 1/ (in English).

"2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."

The First 13 Parts

(b) The first 13 parts of the "14-Part Message" were intercepted by the Navy intercept station between 0810 and 1158 hours on 6 December. It read as follows:

"(Part 1 of 14)

"Separate telegram.

"MEMORANDUM

"1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since

1/ The Fourteen Part Message.

April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

"The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

"2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

"Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

"(Part 2 of 14)

"However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

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"(Part 3 of 14)

"Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental -- (75 letters garbled) --- The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

"(Part 4 of 14)

"Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

"(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

"(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

"(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

"(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

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"(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

"(Part 5 of 14)

"As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

"The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

"(Part 6 of 14)

"4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

"As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

"As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world,

the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

"Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

"(Part 7 of 14)

"It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

"On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

"1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

"(Part 8 of 14)

"Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

"Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is

far removed from the realities of East Asia.

"The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: 'Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.' It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

"(Part 9 of 14)

"The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

"3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

"(Part 10 of 14)

"4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr- - - - (45 letters garbled or missing) - - - been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the -----es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation

since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

"(Part 11 of 14)

"The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries, - Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand, - excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n -- (50 letters missed) - sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

"(Part 12 of 14)

"5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

"(Part 13 of 14)

"5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question

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ignores Japan's sacrifice in the four years of the China
Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and dis-
parages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its
entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot
accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

"6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an
early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simul-
taneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American ne-
gotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and
other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by
the American government. However, since the American
government has made the proposal of November 26th as a
result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Aus-
tralia, The Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND presumably 1/
by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the
questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMPT 2/ be concluded that all these
countries are at one with the United States in ignoring
Japan's position."

(v) Receipt and Dissemination of First 13 Parts

Lieutenant Commander George W. Lynn, the Senior Watch
Officer in the Cryptographic Research Section of Naval Communica-
tions during 1 October to 7 December 1941 (N.C.I. page 734), the
primary duty of which was to decrypt Japanese diplomatic crypto-
graphs, testified that there was an agreement for a division of
labor between the Army and the Navy in respect of the traffic of
each service. He said that the Army was responsible for the even
days, the Navy for the odd, and that the intercepts of each service
were cleared through the other. Each service translated its own
traffic, he stated, that is, the Navy translated the traffic of odd

1/ Probably "and as"

2/ Probably "China, can but"

cryptograph dates and the Army did the same with the even dates.
(N.C.I. pages 734-735).

Lieutenant Commander Lynn stated that he was on duty from 1600 to 2400 on the night of 6 December 1941 (N.C.I. page 738) and that he was present when the first 13 parts of the "Fourteen Part Message" were being processed, and that he saw all of the raw material of the 13 parts. (N.C.I. page 735). He testified that the 13 parts excepting part two, were received from one Navy intercept station and that they came to Washington by teletype. Part two, he said, was received from a different Navy intercept station.

Lieutenant Commander Lynn testified that neither the first 13 parts, nor the 14th part which came in the following morning, required translation (N.C.I. page 736) since they were in English. By that he meant that "they were in English under encipherment." He stated, however, that certain symbols used for punctuation had to be attended to and the dispatches had to be deciphered and written up in smooth form before being passed on. (N.C.I. page 736, 739).

Lieutenant Commander Lynn explained that as compared with GCT, Washington was on plus 5 time, and that the first 13 parts were received on 6 December 1941, Washington time, as follows:

Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4, at 1149 hours;

Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13, at 1451 hours; and Parts 9 and 10, between 1149 and 1451 hours. (N.C.I. page 736).

Lieutenant Commander Lynn stated that the first 13 parts had been processed and were delivered to Captain Kramer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence on 6 December 1941, between 2000 and 2200 hours. (N.C.I. page 737, 740). He stated further that Captain Kramer was present during the whole time the 13 parts were being processed. (N.C.I. page 740).

Captain Kramer testified that the 13 parts had been broken down, translated, and typed, and were ready for delivery at about 2100 hours on 6 December 1941. He said that at about that time he phoned Admiral Wilkinson at his home and advised him of the receipt of the message. Thereafter, following his obtaining of Admiral Wilkinson's approval of his plan for distribution, he went to the White House and left a folder containing the 13 parts with the Aide to Admiral Beardall, Naval Aide to the President, "with rather emphatic instructions to get it to the President as quickly as possible." Captain Kramer stated that the President "was entertaining at the moment." (N.C.I. page 962).

Captain Kramer further stated that he then went to the home of Secretary of the Navy Knox and delivered the 13 parts to him. He said that Secretary Knox discussed the message with him,

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and that he then made some phone calls, which Captain Kramer believed to have been to Secretary of State Hull and Secretary of War Stimson. Following the making of these calls by Secretary Knox, the latter indicated, according to Captain Kramer, that there would be a meeting in the State Department at 10:00 a.m. the following morning and that he (Kramer) should be there with his material and anything else that came in in the meantime. (N.C.I. page 962).

Captain Kramer then went to the residence of Admiral Wilkinson in Arlington, where Admiral Beardall, the President's Naval Aide was visiting for dinner, and where he (Kramer) remained until about fifteen minutes past midnight. Captain Kramer said that Admiral Wilkinson read the messages and then made some phone calls which Kramer believed, though he was not certain, included Admirals Stark, and Turner.

Captain Kramer said he had made an attempt earlier in the evening to locate the latter two officers at their residences, but without success. (N.C.I. page 962).

Captain Kramer further stated that he, himself, did not deliver the 13 parts to Admiral Stark. (N.C.I. page 963). Admiral Ingersol testified that he saw the first 13 parts on the night of 6 December. (N.C.I. page 828). Admiral Stark

testified that he did not recall receiving or having delivered to him on the night of 6 December, the 13 parts, or any conversation that night with either Secretary Knox or Admiral Wilkinson concerning those parts. (N.C.I. page 166, 780).

A further message from Tokyo to Washington, which was dated and translated on 6 December 1941, made reference to the prior Tokyo message transmitting the 13 parts of the 14-part message, and instructed that the preparation of the "aide memoire" be carried out with extreme caution so as to preserve secrecy and that no typist or other person should be availed of.

2. In Hawaii

On this day, the day before the Japanese strike, the outstanding events in Hawaii consisted of the receipt of information locally that the Japanese Consul in Honolulu had destroyed all but one of his code systems; a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations giving Admiral Kimmel the authority to authorize the destruction of secret and confidential documents by the naval units on outlying islands because of their "exposed position" and the "international situation;" the receipt from General Short by CinCPac of a copy of a dispatch from the War Department, stating that the War Department had abandoned its plan of sending two Army pursuit squadrons to outlying islands in view of the matters stated by Admiral Kimmel in a prior dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations;

the preparation of the usual daily communication summary, in which again there was no information about the Japanese carriers and which still associated the Commander of the Japanese Submarine Force with the Marshalls.

(i) Knowledge in Pearl Harbor of Destruction of Codes by the Japanese Consul.

The Naval Establishment at Pearl Harbor knew on 6 December 1941, that the Japanese Consul in Honolulu had destroyed a portion of his codes. Com14 sent a dispatch (060114) (Hew. Exhibit 58) to OpNav, reading as follows:

"BELIEVE LOCAL CONSUL HAS DESTROYED ALL BUT ONE SYSTEM ALTHOUGH PRESUMABLY NOT INCLUDED YOUR EIGHTEEN DOUBLE FIVE OF THIRD." (Hew. Exhibit 58).

Commander Rochefort, who was in charge of the Communication Intelligence Unit of the 14 Naval District during a considerable period of time prior to 7 December 1941, testified that at about this date the Japanese Consul in Honolulu was burning or destroying various papers. (N.C.I. page 474). General Short was also aware of this fact. (N.C.I. page 256).

(ii) Authorization to Admiral Kimmel to Destroy Codes

On 6 December 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch (061743) (N.C.I. Exhibit 22) to Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, with information copy to CinCAF, which was released by Admiral Ingersol, Assistant Chief

of Naval Operations, authorizing the destruction of classified material and documents by the U.S. Naval Forces on the outlying Pacific Islands. This message read as follows:

"IN VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE EXPOSED POSITION OF OUR OUTLYING PACIFIC ISLANDS YOU MAY AUTHORIZE THE DESTRUCTION BY THEM OF SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

NOW OR UNDER LATER CONDITIONS OF GREATER EMERGENCY X MEANS OF COMMUNICATION TO SUPPORT OUR CURRENT OPERATIONS AND SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SHOULD OF COURSE BE MAINTAINED UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT." (N.C.I. Exhibit 22).

Admiral Noyes testified that the above dispatch to Admiral Kimmel was treated as a priority dispatch (N.C.I. pages 1040,1042). Admiral Kimmel testified that he "presumed" he had received the above dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations prior to the time of the Japanese attack. (N.C.I. page 327).

(iii) Combat Intelligence

The combat intelligence of this date was characterized chiefly by the lack of information.

(a) The daily Communication Intelligence Summary for 6 December 1941, which was written on the afternoon of that day (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 77S), stated, among other things, that traffic volume was very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Some of the messages were dated as far back as 1 December. This was thought to be the result of confusion in traffic routing rather than an attempt to maintain

a high traffic level. It was stated that practically all of the Tokyo messages carried high priority precedence.

With reference to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that "there was still no traffic" from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. However, it was also stated that "the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders."

The Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Fleet was again reported to be in the Truk area, and doubt was expressed whether he had ever been to Jaluit although members of his Staff were said to have been there over the past few days. With reference to Submarines it was stated that the "Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is definitely in the Marshalls."

There was no other information in respect of Carriers in the Summary of this date. (Hew. Exhibit 22, page 78S).

On the Communication Intelligence Summary of this day, there is a notation reading "Delivered after bombing attack 7 December 1941." In this connection, Captain Layton testified that the 6 December 1941 Communication Intelligence Summary was not delivered until after the attack on the 7th. (Hew. page 235).

(b) On this day, CinCAF sent a dispatch (061255) to OpNav, with information copy to CinCPac, advising that the British CinC China had reported two large convoys, escorted by war ships and 3 additional ships, at various named points and on various courses which "indicates all forces will make for Kohtron." The CinCAF dispatch also advised that CinCAF's Scouting Force had sighted 30 ships and one large cruiser in Camranh Bay.

(iv) Abandonment of Army Plan to Reenforce Midway and Wake Islands

On 6 December 1941, CinCPac was furnished for information by General Short with a copy of a dispatch to him from the War Department (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 9), which stated that in view of the information contained in CinCPac's dispatch (280627)^{1/} to the Chief of Naval Operations, the movement of two Army pursuit squadrons to the outlying islands would be suspended. This dispatch also referred to the Army's offer to take over the defense of the Pacific advance bases from the Navy and of the Army's assumption of responsibility for the defense of Christmas and Canton Islands. This dispatch read as follows:

"489 29th CONSULT CINC PACIFIC FLEET REFERENCE HIS
DISPATCH NUMBER 280627 TO CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS STOP
IN VIEW OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN ABOVE DISPATCH COMMA

THE MOVEMENT OF THE TWO ARMY PURSUIT SQUADRONS AS INDICATED
IN WAR DEPARTMENT CABLE NUMBER 466 COMMA NOVEMBER 26, 1941
WILL BE SUSPENDED STOP THESE SQUADRONS SHOULD HOWEVER BE

PREPARED TO MOVE ON SHORT NOTICE STOP PARA WAR DEPARTMENT
HAS OFFERED TO TAKE OVER DEFENSE OF PACIFIC ADVANCE BASES
FROM NAVY EXCEPT FOR FURNISHING ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT STOP

1/ See supra, page 450.

CONSULT CINCPAC REFERENCE REQUIREMENTS AND AREAS TO BE DEFENDED STOP WAR DEPARTMENT HAS ALSO ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE OF CHRISTMAS AND CANTON STOP IT IS CONTEMPLATED

THAT YOU WILL FORM BASE DEFENSE UNITS FROM THE HAWAIIAN GARRISON SPECIALLY ORGANIZED AS TASK FORCES FOR PARTICULAR AREAS STOP IF THESE UNITS ARE MOVED FROM OAHU COMMA NECESSARY

REPLACEMENTS FROM THE UNITED STATES WILL BE FURNISHED STOP REPORT YOUR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE." (Hew. Exhibit 70, Document 9).

3. In the Pacific

(i) Japanese Diplomatic Situation and Naval Moves

(a) On 6 December 1941, Japanese time, the Japanese Navy Department sent a radio message to the enemy Striking Force then operating in the Pacific to the north of the Hawaiian Islands, "Climb Mt. Niitaka" - which was the signal to carry out the attack on Pearl Harbor. On 6 December 1941, Pearl Harbor time, therefore, the Japanese carrier force was making its final run to the attack position 200 miles north of Oahu, while enemy submarines were proceeding to their designated positions off Pearl Harbor.

(b) On this date, also, various Japanese messages were originated including the following: Tokyo advised Washington in a dispatch, which was not translated until 8 December, that regardless of the situation confronting Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu from an intelligence standpoint, Terasaki should be sent to his new post "without any delay."^{1/}

^{1/} This was in response to the appeal of Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu to be permitted to retain Terasaki in Washington.

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(c) Tokyo sent a message to Washington, which was not translated until 7 December 1941, argumentatively comparing the action taken by Japan in penetrating southern French Indo-China "for joint defense" with the action taken by the United States in "the recent occupation of the Netherlands Guiana" which was an "invasion of South America." Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu were instructed to send this message to all Japanese Ambassadors and Ministers in Central and South America.

(d) On 6 December 1941, Tokyo sent a message to Washington, which was not translated until 7 December, stating that according to press reports the United States State Department had announced that President Roosevelt had wired a personal message to "His Majesty, the Emperor." The message requested Nomura to wire "the facts" to Tokyo.

(e) The Japanese Ambassadors in Washington sent a further message to Tokyo on 6 December 1941, which was not translated until 7 December, advising that they had not only carried on "frontal negotiations with the President and HULL" but that they had also worked directly and indirectly through cabinet members and others equally influential.

(ii) Japanese Espionage

On 6 December 1941, the following messages reflecting Japanese espionage in respect of ships present in ports of the United States,

including Pearl Harbor, were transmitted.

(a) Seattle sent a message to Tokyo, which was not translated until 8 December 1941, advising that the ships at anchor in Bremerton on 5 December included HMS Warspite and the USS COLORADO. It was stated also that the USS SARATOGA had sailed the same day.

(b) A dispatch from Honolulu to Tokyo, which was not translated until 8 December 1941, advised that the U.S. Army had begun training barrage balloon troops in North Carolina during October, and though it was reported that consideration was being given to the use of balloons in the defense of Hawaii, an investigation had disclosed that there was no balloon mooring equipment or selected troops to man balloon barrages. This message continued:

"I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places. Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field, Ford Island and Ewa "

This message concluded by saying that in the opinion of sender, "the battleships do not have torpedo nets."

(c) On the same day, 6 December, Honolulu sent a message to Tokyo, which was not translated until 8 December 1941, reporting on ships present at and air reconnaissance near Pearl Harbor, as follows:

"1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were - and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.)

"2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm."

K. 7 December 1941

1. In Washington

On 7 December 1941, there were translated in Washington, and not sent to Hawaii as such, nor in substance in time and by means sufficient to reach there prior to the Japanese attack, intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which clearly indicated a final rupture by Japan of the Japanese-American diplomatic negotiations. These intercepts included besides a back log of accumulated messages of previous dates, the Fourteenth part of the Fourteen Part message, the message commonly referred to as the 1:00 P.M. message, instructing Nomura and Kurusu to submit the Fourteen Part message to the Secretary of State on that day at 1:00 P.M., and several messages thanking Nomura and Kurusu for their efforts in behalf of Japan during the preceding months. There was also intercepted on the morning of 7 December a plain language Japanese broadcast using code names (the "hidden word" code), which stated that relations between Japan and England and the United States were not in accordance with expectations; but this message was written up in a form omitting all reference to the United States, an error attributed by Captain Kramer who made it to a hurried translation whereby he overlooked one code word. This erroneously translated message was delivered to President Roosevelt on 7 December at 1100, Washington time.

These significant messages translated on 7 December, and the facts concerning their receipt and distribution, were as follows:

(i) The Fourteenth Part of the Fourteen Part Message

(a) The Fourteenth part of the Fourteen Part message reads as follows:

"(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase 'VERY IMPORTANT')

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.
(N.C.I. Exhibit 63)

The records of the Navy Department indicate that part Fourteen was intercepted by the Navy intercept station at 0810 (GMT), or 0310 (Washington time). (SecNav Folder Intercepts)

Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, one of the watch officers in the Communications Security Intelligence Section of Naval Communications, (N.C.I. page 919A) was on watch on the morning of 7 December from 0001 until he was relieved some time after 0700 (N.C.I. page 925). He testified that the Fourteenth part was received during his watch (N.C.I. page 925-926).

He stated that he "presumed" that he left the Fourteenth Part in the department when he was relieved from duty, which occurred before Captain Kramer reported for duty. (N.C.I. page 926).

Lieutenant Commander Alfred B. Pering, who stood watch in the Communications Security (Intelligence) Section on 7 December, commencing at 0700 (N.C.I. page 812), testified that at the time he came on watch the Fourteenth Part had been completely processed and was ready for delivery to Captain Kramer, which took place between 0900 and 1000. (N.C.I. page 812).

Lieutenant Commander George W. Lynn, of the Communications Security (Intelligence) Section testified that the Fourteenth Part was intercepted by the Navy Intercept Station on the morning of 7 December 1941, and was received in Washington at 0305, Washington Time. He stated that Part 14 was sent to the Navy Department by teletype on the punch tape, and that the work sheet indicated that it had been processed by an operator who went off watch at 0700, so, he concluded it necessarily had been processed prior to that time. (N.C.I. pages 736, 737). He said also that the Fourteenth Part was in English, and therefore did not require translation, and that it was handed to Captain Kramer between 0900 and 1000. (N.C.I. page 737).

Captain Safford testified that the Fourteenth Part had been received and was decoded and ready for delivery from his section at 0700. (N.C.I. page 758).

Captain Kramer testified that he arrived at the Navy Department at about 0730, at which time there was being processed material other than the first Thirteen Parts. He stated that the first thirteen parts, and the Fourteenth Part, along with other material, were, at about 0900, left at Admiral Stark's office, where there was apparently being held a meeting. He also testified that Admiral Wilkinson was present at the conference being held in the office of Admiral Stark, along with twelve or fifteen other officers, at the time of the delivery of the folder containing the Fourteenth Part of the message. Captain Kramer testified further, that he left the Navy Department at about 0930 for the State Department and for the White House, with material for delivery, including the First Thirteen Parts, and the Fourteenth Part, of the Fourteen Part message, and that he delivered the same to Secretary Knox at the State Department. (N.C.I. pages 963 - 964).

(11) The 1:00 P.M. Message and Other Final Messages

(a) There was intercepted by the Navy on this morning, a further message from Tokyo to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, giving instructions as to the time the Fourteen Part Message was to be delivered to Secretary Hull, commonly called the 1:00 P.M. Message. It read:

"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 P.M. on the 7th, your time."
(N.C.I. Exhibit 63).

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The records of the Navy show that the 1:00 P.M. message was intercepted at the Navy Intercept Station at 0937 G.M.T., which was 0437 Washington Time. (SecNav Folder Intercepts).

(b) After the receipt of the 1:00 P.M. message, other messages were sent by Tokyo to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, and translated in Washington. The first read:

"According to AP and UP reports, the State Department has announced that the President has wired a personal message to His Majesty, the Emperor. Please wire me the facts." (Id).

(c) The next message from Tokyo to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu expressed the Japanese government's appreciation of their work. This message in full read:

"All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations; matters have come to what they are now, despite all the efforts you two Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well as for what all the members of the Embassy have done." (Id)

(d) Another message of appreciation was sent by Bureau Chief Yamamoto in Tokyo, expressing the thanks of the members of his Bureau for the efforts of the Japanese Staff in Washington, this message read:

"I, together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many months in behalf of our country despite all difficulties in coping with the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good health."
(Id)

(e) On the same morning, there was translated by the Army, another message from Tokyo to Washington, giving final instructions in respect of the destroying of codes and code machines. This message read in full as follows:

"After deciphering Part Fourteen of my #902, and also #907, #908 and #909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machines and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents." (Id)

(f) Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood testified that the 1:00 P.M. message arrived at the Navy Department in the same teletype transmission as Part Fourteen (N.C.I. page 737). He explained that it was the custom to send in a batch of messages at one time, giving each a different serial number. The Fourteenth Part was assigned the number 380 by the intercept station, while the 1:00 P.M. message was given the number 381. (N.C.I. page 737, 738). Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood testified that the 1:00 P.M. message was processed before ~~0700~~, by the same man who processed Part Fourteen. The 1:00 P.M. message required translation he said, and it had a priority sticker attached to it, and was sent to the Army to be translated before ~~0700~~ (N.C.I. page 738, 813). He stated that the Army returned the Translated message to the Navy about ~~0715~~, where it was held by the Communications Security Section until the arrival of Captain Kramer. (N.C.I. page 813).

(g) Captain Kramer testified that when he returned from the State Department to the Navy Department at approximately 1020 hours, after delivering the Fourteenth Part, and other messages, he found awaiting his arrival the 1:00 P.M. message, and others, including the one directing final destruction of the Japanese codes still on hand, and the one thanking the Japanese Ambassadors for their services. (N.C.I. page 965). He said that he delivered the 1:00 P.M. message and others to Admiral Stark's Aide, Flag Secretary Wellborn, at about 1030 or 1035, at which time he said the meeting in that office was still in progress. (N.C.I. pages 965, 966-967). He stated that he also delivered the 1:00 P.M. message, along with the messages thanking the Japanese Ambassadors and giving final code destruction instructions at the State Department, at which time, he said:

"I made a point of verbally inviting the attention of Mr. Knox to the times involved. The reason I did that was the fact that Mr. Knox, being a civilian, even though Secretary of Navy, might not have seen, at first glance, the implication of the times * * * * * In other words, the directive for delivery of the Japanese note at 1300 was a time which was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor and was a few hours before sunrise at Kota Bharu. I simply pointed out the coincidence of those times to the Secretary. I did not feel it necessary to point out such a thing to the officers of the Navy Department, since it would be quite apparent to them." (N.C.I. pages 965, 966).

Questioned further, Captain Kramer withdrew completely his statement that he had made the above remarks to Secretary Knox. He stated:

"The remarks I made at the State Department were not to the Secretary directly * * * * * but to a State Department Foreign Service Officer who regularly handled this material for Mr. Hull and to whom I made similar remarks inviting attention to the importance of the material I was delivering; and it was this officer who took the folder into Mr. Knox, together with my remarks. * * * * *." (N.C.I. page 966).

Subsequently in his testimony, Captain Kramer also qualified his prior testimony with respect to what he had told the State Department employee concerning the significance of "times involved". He admitted that he "did not" suggest to the State Department employee that 13~~00~~ Washington Time was dawn at Pearl Harbor or that it might mean an attack at Pearl Harbor. He admitted also that he "did not" ask the State Department employee to suggest to Secretary Knox that the message might mean an attack at Pearl Harbor. (N.C.I. page 985).

Captain Kramer testified further that he delivered copies of the same messages (Fourteen Part and 1:00 P.M. and others), to the White House that morning. He said that he handed them to one of Admiral Beardall's assistants in the White House, and he stated that he thought that person was Lieutenant Commander Leahy, who he described as Admiral Beardall's Senior Assistant. (N.C.I. page 973).^{1/}

^{1/} Captain (then Lt. Commander) George A. Leahy referred to by Captain Kramer has advised the writer that he was not at the White House that day until after the Japanese attack.

Captain Kramer said that when he was at the State Department at about 1000, delivering the Fourteenth Part message and other material, and when he was there again about 1100 delivering the 1:00 P.M. message and other material, he saw Colonel Bratton of the War Department. (N.C.I. page 977).

(h) Captain McCollum, Officer in charge of the Far Eastern Branch of Naval Intelligence, testified that he arrived in the Navy Department at about 0730 on 7 December 1941. He said that shortly after his arrival, he was sent for by Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and a discussion was had by them concerning the situation in the Far East. He stated further that a little while before 0830, he and Admiral Wilkinson went to Admiral Stark's office, where, at about 0900, he received word that one of his officers was outside and wished to see him urgently.

Captain McCollum stepped outside; Captain Kramer was there, and delivered to him (McCollum) the Fourteenth Part as well as the 1:00 P.M. message. (Hew. pages 34-35).

(i) Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was with Admiral Stark in the latter's office, at about 0930, when they learned of the 1:00 P.M. message. (N.C.I. pages 729, 730).

(j) Admiral Ingersoll testified that he arrived at his office at about 0900, and that, according to his recollection, his first discussion about the Fourteen Part message and the 1:00 P.M. mes-

sage occurred when Admiral Stark told him of his conversation with General Marshall. He stated, also, that there was no discussion on the morning of 7 December 1941 that 1 o'clock in Washington was about sunrise in Pearl Harbor and midnight in Manila. (N.C.I. pages 831, 837).

(k) Admiral Turner stated that he arrived at the Navy Department between about 1030 and 1100, at which time he was called by Admiral Stark, who showed him a copy of the 1:00 P.M. message. He inquired of Admiral Stark what had been done about warning Admiral Kimmel, and Admiral Stark told him that he had already discussed the matter with General Marshall who was sending out a dispatch to Hawaii immediately. (N.C.I. pages 999-1000).

(l) Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff, Pacific Fleet, testified that Secretary Knox, while at Pearl Harbor shortly after the attack investigating for the President, said at a luncheon: "Frankly, I know of no one in the War Department or in the Navy Department, not even Kelly Turner, who expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor". (N.C.I. page 567).

(iii) The Warning Message that Arrived Too Late.

(a) Admiral Stark testified that the outstanding thing in his mind as of the evening of 6 December and the morning of 7 December

1941 was the 1:00 P.M. message, of which he learned on the morning of 7 December 1941. (N.C.I. pages 789-790, 791). He stated that he recalled discussing with Admiral Schuirmann the time element in the 1:00 P.M. message, but he could recall no suggestion having been made that it indicated a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. (N.C.I. page 172). Admiral Stark said that he was talking to Admiral Schuirmann when General Marshall phoned and asked him if he had the information about the 1:00 P.M. message. He first told General Marshall that he did not think the information should be sent out, but he soon changed his mind and called General Marshall back on the phone, and asked him to have the Army authorities in Hawaii inform the Navy there. He inquired of General Marshall if the message could be gotten out quickly by the Army, and he offered to send it by Naval Communications. However, he said, General Marshall responded that he could get it out quickly. (N.C.I. pages 168, 169, 170). After that, Admiral Stark went about his routine work, "knowing that the dispatch was on its way" via the Army. (N.C.I. page 171). He said that a paraphrase of the message sent by General Marshall, from the War Department, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, read as follows:

"Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amount to an ultimatum. Also, they are under orders to destroy their code machines immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication." (N.C.I. page 172; see also N.C.I. Exhibit 48).

Admiral Stark testified that he did not use the phone in communicating with Admiral Kimmel prior to the Japanese attack, (N.C.I. page 190), and said that his failure to use the telephone to communicate with Admiral Kimmel on 7 December 1941 was the "one regret that I have." (N.C.I. page 793). He stated also that "now" the question of telephoning, "is purely hindsight with me". He repeated that he regretted not picking up the telephone regardless of lack of secrecy, as well as his failure to parallel the Army message on the Navy radio.

(b) General Marshall testified that he went to the War Department on Sunday morning, though he was not able to recall at what time, and that after his arrival there he was given the Fourteen Part Message along with the 1:00 P.M. Message. He said that he did not read the latter message until about 1110 or 1115, and that because of their length he lost a lot of time reading the messages. (N.C.I. page 872).

General Marshall testified further, that he called Admiral Stark on the phone and proposed that they send a message to the various Army and Navy Commanders in the field, including Panama, the Western Department, Hawaii, and the Philippines. He stated that at first Admiral Stark thought it might not be advisable to send messages; that it would confuse the men in the field. General Marshall

stated that a few minutes after talking with Admiral Stark, he wrote out in long hand the message that was finally sent, and that just as he was sending it out of his office, at 1145 hours, Admiral Stark called back and asked if the message had yet been sent. On being told that it was just going, General Marshall stated that Admiral Stark said that he would like added to it "the usual thing, notify Naval opposite". Accordingly, General Marshall stated, "I added that to it", and then he sent the message to Colonel Bracken, who was in charge of such special papers. A while later, General Marshall was advised by Colonel Bracken and Colonel Bundy that the message would be in the hands of the recipients in thirty minutes. (N.C.I. page 873).

General Marshall stated that the message was received in the Army message center at 1150, and that it was sent by radio to all points except Hawaii where they were unable to raise the Hawaiian Station, and that therefore, it was sent on a straight Western Union circuit into San Francisco, and from there out to Hawaii, though he did not know about the latter fact until afterwards. (N.C.I. page 873, 874).

(c) Colonel Walter C. Phillips, Chief of Staff to General Short, testified that he called General Marshall over the phone at about 0822 Hawaiian Time, (1322 in Washington) and told him that

they were under attack. Colonel Phillips said that General Marshall asked "'Did you get my message?'" to which Colonel Phillips responded, "what message?" and General Marshall answered, "'The message I sent yesterday' I believe, or 'last night'." (N.C.I. page 490). He did receive the dispatch from General Marshall at "about 3:30 [1530 hours] the afternoon of December 7". (N.C.I. page 491).

Colonel Phillips said that it took "maybe five, maybe ten minutes; not over that" to get his call through to Washington, and that the connection was "excellent" (N.C.I. page 490).

(d) General Short testified that the dispatch from General Marshall was received by the Signal Officer at 1145 hours, and decoded by 1428 hours, well after the Japanese attack (N.C.I. page 251).

(e) Admiral Kimmel said that he received his copy of the dispatch on the afternoon of the 7th. (N.C.I. page 328).

(iv) "Hidden Word" Code Message

(a) There was also received at about the same time as the 1:00 P.M. message, a plain Japanese language message using the "hidden word" code, which was erroneously translated. This message as mis-translated, read as follows:

"Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations." (Hew. Exhibit 78).

In the translating of this message, one code word was overlooked. The proper translation reads as follows:

"Relations between Japan and the following countries are not in accordance with expectations; England, United States." (Hew. Exhibit 78).

Captain Safford testified that the "hidden word" code message was received in the Office of Naval Intelligence shortly before 1100. He explained that the message was translated in such a hurry that morning, that only two or three key words were given their hidden value, and as a result the message was mistranslated. He also said that if the third and omitted key word had been given its hidden meaning, the message would have read to include the United States (Hew. pages 126, 609 - 610).

Captain Kramer testified that prior to the time he appeared as a witness in the investigation conducted by Admiral Hewitt, he had been under the impression that the "hidden word" message of 7 December 1941 had been a "Winds Code" message, but he testified before Admiral Hewitt that he recognized the 7 December message as a "hidden word" message. In the Hewitt investigation he stated that he thought that the "hidden word" message, which he identified as being received in the Navy Department on 7 December 1941, was among a batch of messages shown by him to Secretary Forrestal about 9 December 1941, when he removed a folder of that type of traffic for Mr. Forrestal. This was done, Captain Kramer testified, because previously Mr. Forrestal had not seen such material. (Hew. pages 133-136).

Captain Kramer testified that he was the person who mistranslated the "hidden word" message of 7 December 1941. He said that in his haste, he overlooked the code word "MINAMI" (Hew. Exhibit 20 and 78), which was contained in the Japanese message and which referred to the United States. He said that after he returned to the Navy Department, following his visits to the State Department and the White House, which was shortly before 1:00 P.M. he discovered his mistake and made a pencil correction on the file copy. In this connection, it is to be noted that the copies of the translation in the files of the Navy Department do not disclose any correction (Hew. Exhibit 20). Captain Kramer testified that there were a number of copies made at the time and, he said, undoubtedly his correction had been made on one of the copies that had since been discarded (Hew. pages 133-135).

Captain Kramer's testimony in respect of his translation of the "hidden word" message of 7 December 1941 included the following:

"I do recall on that that after my return from the State Department near 10:30 the morning of 7 December, we had just had translated a message specifying the time of delivery of the Fourteen Part note from the Japanese Government to the United States. That item, together with several other minor messages, one thanking the Ambassador for his services and another to the embassy staff and another directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my mind to a crisis to take place at 1 o'clock, consequently, I was in very much of a hurry to get the word out. The books were made up in the course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the office, I looked at another short plain language message that had just come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it now, the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language text, a code word referring to estranged relations or breaking relations. As I recall it now I dictated to a chief yeoman the sense of the message, glancing through the entire

message, spotting another code word referring to England, and then two minutes after that was on my way. It wasn't until I returned to the office approximately an hour later and was looking over the morning's traffic again that I again examined more closely this particular plain language message which was one of many in the traffic that morning, and noted the omission referring to the United States . . .

" My recollection is not clear cut as to the time when the discrepancy was noted. I do, however, have a rather vague recollection of making two or more phone calls at the time the discrepancy was noted, which, if correct, would indicate that that discrepancy was noted perhaps a quarter of one or 1 o'clock. I do definitely recall, however, that no retranslation of that message was made for distribution because of the fact that before it could be delivered to the recipients of this traffic, who had left meetings respectively in the State Department and Chief of Naval Operations' Office for lunch, that it would be well after the time of delivery, 1 o'clock, about which there had been so much excitement late in the morning. I might further add that when the attack was first learned, I recall definitely feeling that there was no point in making the delivery at that time. That was perhaps 1:30." (Hew. pages 133-135).

(b) On 7 December 1941, the Navy Department was advised from still another source of the establishing by the Japanese of the "hidden word" code. A dispatch was sent by COMSIXTEEN to OPNAV (Ø71Ø25) (Hew. Exhibit 58), which read as follows:

"NEW CODE FOR EMERGENCY USE GIVEN IN TOKYO SERIALS TWENTYFOUR ZERO NINE X TWO FOUR TWENTY THREE QUESTION X AND TWENTYFOUR FIFTY X MESSAGES IN PLAIN LANGUAGE WILL CONTAIN ONE OR MORE CODE WORDS SUFFICIENT TO COMMUNICATE SECRET MESSAGE X EXAMPLE XX QUOTE JAPANESE AND BLANK TROOPS CLASHED END QUOTE REPRESENTED BY CODE WORD HIJIKATA COMMA AND RUSSIA BY KUBOTA XX A MESSAGE SIMILAR TO FOLLOWING WOULD BE SENT X ON FIFTEENTH SECRETARIES HIJIKATA AND KUBOTA HAVE BEEN APPOINTED TO DUTY IN YOUR OFFICE STOP XX ALL MESSAGES IN THIS SYSTEM TO HAVE WORD STOP REPEAT STOP AT THE END INSTEAD OF OWARI X (Hew. Exhibit 58).

Further evidence concerning the establishing by the Japanese of the "hidden word" code, was received by the Navy Department on 7 December 1941. On this day the Navy translated a message that had been sent by Togo in Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 26 November 1941, which referred to a prior Tokyo circular containing a "hidden word" code, and, in reference thereto, stated:

"Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraph communication being severed when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels. Do not destroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your locality, but retain them as long as the situation there permits and until the final stage is entered into." (SecNav Folder Intercepts)

(v) Message from Budapest

On 7 December 1941 there was also translated by the Army, a message from the Japanese Ambassador in Budapest to Tokyo, dated also on 7 December 1941, in which it was stated that the American Minister to Hungary had presented to the Government of that country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on 7 December. This message read in full as follows:

"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th". 1/ (N.C.I. Exhibit 63, Page 72).

1/ Thus far the significance, if any, of this message has not been disclosed.

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(vi) Backlog of Older Messages

On 7 December 1941 there were also translated in Washington several dispatches of prior dates, which had been sent from Ambassador Nomura in Washington to Tokyo. These were as follows:

(a) A message dated 3 December 1941, in which Nomura referred to a prior message from Tokyo which contained an attempted explanation of the increase of the Japanese armed force^s in French Indo China^{1/} and in which, among other things, Nomura stated, "If it is really the intention of our Government to arrive at a settlement," the explanation given by Premier Tojo would not be satisfactory to the United States.

(b) On the same day there was also translated a message from Washington to Tokyo dated 6 December 1941, in which Ambassador Nomura adverted to the fact that he and Ambassador Kurusu had not only been carrying on "frontal negotiations" with the President and Hull, but had also been working directly and indirectly through cabinet members and other influential individuals. This message read in full as follows:

"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

^{1/} Supra page 548.

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"(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President was his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understood that he did so on the advise of these individuals.

"(2) These carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating these sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us....." (SecNav Folder of Intercepts)

(c) On 7 December there was also translated by the Navy a message from Tokyo to New York, dated 5 December 1941, which was sent from the managing director of DOMEI to the New York Office of the DOMEI NEWS AGENCY, directing that "Yasuwo, Kinoshita, Teranisha and Taguti are recalled to Japan". This message further stated that those persons should "make unnoticable preparations to leave on the Tatuta Maru and that if such passage were not available, they should arrange to go to South America". (SecNav Folder of Intercepts)

(d) There was also translated on 7 December 1941 a message from Togo in Tokyo to Washington dated 6 December 1941, ^{1/} in which Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu were instructed to send to all Japanese Ambassadors and Ministers in Central and South America a statement, incorporated in this message, comparing the Japanese occupation of French Indo China with the "recent" American "occupation of Netherlands Guiana, the first example in the present war of the United States' invading South America." (SecNav Folder of Intercepts)

1/ Supra page 617.

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(vii) News of the Attack

Shortly after the Japanese attack commenced, news concerning it reached Washington, including the high officials of the Navy Department. Dispatch (Ø72244) from Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, to the Chief of Naval Operations, advising of the Japanese attack, stated that it commenced at 0750 Pearl Harbor time, which was 1420 (2:20 p.m.) Washington Time. This message from Admiral Kimmel read as follows:

"COMMENCING Ø75Ø LCT, ENEMY AIR RAIDS ON FLEET AT PEAPL HARBOR. DAMAGE KNOWN TO BE GREAT, THOUGH ITS FULLEST EXTENT NOT DETERMINED. THREE BATTLESHIPS SUNK; ALL OTHERS VARIOUSLY DAMAGED. LARGE PROPORTION OF PLANES DESTROYED ON GROUND. AM SEARCHING ENEMY WITH ALL AVAILABLE PLANES AND FORCES. CARRIERS AT SEA UNDAMAGED."

Eight minutes later Admiral Stark released a dispatch (Ø72252) addressed "For Action" to CINCPAC, COM PANAMA, CINCAF, PACIFIC NORTHERN, PACIFIC SOUTHER, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COSTAL FRONTIERS, and reading as follows:

"EXECUTE UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN X INFORM ARMY X CINCAF INFORM BRITISH AND DUTCH"

During the late hours of 7 December 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch (Ø8Ø13Ø) to Admiral Kimmel, which was released by Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, in which was stated the then estimate of the locations of various Task Groups of the Japanese Fleet, including the information that one group, plus one Kongo Class Battleship was accounted for by British

observations in Indo China, while the second Task Group plus three Kongo Class Battleships was unaccounted for. The estimate stated further that the unaccounted for Task Group might comprise all or a part of the Japanese force that was attacking Pearl Harbor, and that it was probably supported by elements of the Japanese First Fleet. This dispatch read in full as follows:

"REFERRING RECENT RADIO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS FORMATION SPECIAL TASK FORCE IN TWO GROUPS X BRITISH OBSERVATIONS INDO CHINA ACCOUNT FOR GROUP ONE AND ONE KONGO CLASS BATTLESHIP X GROUP TWO PLUS THREE KONGOS UNACCOUNTED FOR X FORCE ATTACKING PEARL MAY COMPRISE ALL OR PART THEREOFX POSSIBILITY SUPPORT BY ELEMENTS OF FIRST FLEET."

(viii) Action Ordered after News of Attack.

During the late hours of 7 December 1941, Admiral Stark released a further dispatch (~~081700~~) to the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet (Admiral King), ordering the assembling at Norfolk of Battleship Division Three plus the USS YORKTOWN (CV) and one Squadron of Destroyers, which were to be prepared for immediate transfer to the Pacific Fleet. It was ordered further that the YORKTOWN should have a full plane operating complement, and that three Squadrons of Patrol Bombers should be transferred to the Pacific Fleet immediately. This dispatch also authorized Admiral King to withdraw all capital ships and carriers from Iceland, and advised that a separate dispatch would direct him to reenforce the Canal Zone. The dispatch from Admiral Stark read in full as follows:

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"AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ASSEMBLE BATDIV THREE YORKTOWN AND ONE SQUADRON MODERN DESTROYERS AT NORFOLK PREPARE THEM IMMEDIATELY FOR TRANSFER TO PACIFIC FLEET X DESIRE YORKTOWN HAVE FULL PLANE OPERATING COMPLEMENT PLUS APPROPRIATE SPARES EXCEPT REDUCE TORPEDO PLANES TO TWELVE AND REPLACE THE SIX TORPEDO PLANES TRANSFERRED BY SIX DIVE BOMBERS X TRANSFER THREE SQUADRONS PATROL BOMBERS TO PACIFIC FLEET IMMEDIATELY X SEPARATE DESPATCH DIRECTS YOU REENFORCE CANAL ZONE X YOU ARE AUTHORIZED WITHDRAW ALL CAPITAL SHIPS AND CARRIERS FROM ICELAND IF YOU DESIRE."

This dispatch was followed by another dispatch (Ø8Ø329) from the Chief of Naval Operations to "All Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders", which was released by Admiral Ingersoll, directing:

"IN COOPERATION WITH ARMY EXECUTE UNDERWATER HARBOR DEFENSE MEASURES IN ALL COASTAL FRONTIERS."

2. In Hawaii

The attack on Pearl Harbor is said by all who were there to have been a complete surprise. It was first indicated by suspicious submarine contacts off the entrance channel, followed by the sinking there of a submerged submarine by the U.S.S. WARD. The nature of the attack became evident with the dropping of bombs by the first wave of Japanese aircraft. This was followed by Torpedo plane attacks and high altitude bombing. The attack ended with practically the entire capital ship strength of the Pacific Fleet sunk. The Navy casualties were high. All reports agree that the Navy personnel fought bravely and gamely, though the conditions of unreadiness made their efforts ineffectual to prevent or seriously minimize the damage done.

(i) Early morning submarine contacts

The first inklings of the impending hostilities occurred off the entrance channel to Pearl Harbor, about four hours and eight minutes prior to the commencement of the attack, in the form of suspicious submarine contacts, one of which was tracked down and sunk one hour and ten minutes before the attack by a destroyer of the Fourteenth Naval District Inshore Patrol. These early morning contacts and action may be summarized (see Hew. pages 87-96, 428-432; Hew. Exhibit 1875-76) as follows:

At 0342, the U.S.S. Condor, a minesweeper, sighted a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor, in the defensive sea area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged and to which the order of Admiral Kimmel to depth bomb suspicious contacts applied. When sighted, the submarine was proceeding toward the entrance buoys, and was about 100 feet from and on a collision course with the Condor. It apparently sighted the Condor at the same time, and turned sharply to port. The Condor simultaneously turned to starboard.

The Condor reported the incident between 0350 and 0358 by blinker to the U.S.S. Ward, a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol then engaged in patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor. The Condor then continued on its assigned mission. The Condor message to the Ward read:

"SIGHTED SUBMERGED SUBMARINE ON WESTERLY COURSE
SPEED 9 KNOTS"

After receiving this visual signal, the Ward made a sonar search for about an hour and a half, without result. It then communicated by radio with the Condor, asking:

"WHAT WAS THE APPROXIMATE DISTANCE AND COURSE OF
THE SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED?"

At 0520 the Condor replied:

"THE COURSE WAS ABOUT WHAT WE WERE STEERING AT THE
TIME 020 MAGNETIC AND ABOUT 1000 YARDS FROM THE
ENTRANCE APPARENTLY HEADING FOR THE ENTRANCE"

In response to further inquiries made by the Ward between 0521 and 0536, the Condor advised again that the last time it sighted the submarine was at about 0350 and that the submarine was apparently headed for the entrance. On receiving the message giving the submarine's course as about 020 magnetic, the captain of the Ward realized that his search had been in the wrong direction. He then continued searching, but again without result.

The Condor made no report of the incident, except to the Ward. The captain of the Condor considered that the identification at that time was not positive enough to make a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat, who was Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge, the Commanding Officer of the Ward. The latter made no report to higher authority. Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge testified that he thought that the Condor might have been mistaken in concluding that it had seen a submarine (Hew. page 87-92, 428-429).

The radio conversation between the Ward and Condor was overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, a radio station then under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District (Hew. Ex. 18). Since the conversation was solely between the ships, and was not addressed to the Section Base, and since no request was made that it be relayed, the Bishop's Point Radio Station did not relay or report it to higher authority. The loudspeaker watch on the same

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frequency, which was maintained in the Communications Office, Fourteenth Naval District, did not overhear or intercept the Ward-Condor conversation.

At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate vessel charged with opening and closing the anti-submarine net at the entrance. The instructions of the Captain of the Yard were that the net should be kept closed from sunset to sunrise, and opened only on orders from him, from the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or from the Yard Duty Officer, who could be reached via the signal tower (Hew. Exhibit 43). The log of the gate vessel indicates that the net was opened and closed a number of times during the night of 6-7 December. At 0458 the gate was opened and the Crossbill and the Condor stood in. It was not until 0846 that the gate was closed. Lieutenant Commander M. H. Hubbell, the Commanding Officer of the Condor, testified that at 0532, when the Condor came in, visibility was very good and approached "daylight conditions" (Hew. Exhibits 44, 45).

The log of the signal tower for 6-7 December 1941 records the closing of the gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by a log entry at 0600 that the Antares was reported off the harbor (Hew. Exhibit 46).

The U.S.S. Antares, with a 500-ton steel barge in tow, arrived off Pearl Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it exchanged calls with the Ward. At 0630 the Antares sighted a suspicious object, which appeared to be a small submarine, about 1500 yards off its starboard quarter. The Antares notified the Ward and asked it to investigate, and, several minutes later, at about 0633, observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two smoke pots near the object (Hew. Exhibit 73).

The Ward complied, and at 0640 sighted an unidentified submarine one point off its starboard bow, apparently following the Antares into Pearl Harbor. General Quarters were sounded and all engines ordered full ahead, increasing the Ward's speed from five to twenty-five knots. At 0645 the Ward opened fire with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun. The attack lasted only one or two minutes. The first shot, at a range of approximately 100 yards, passed directly over the conning tower of the submarine; the second, from No. 3 gun, at fifty yards or less, hit the submarine at the waterline junction of the hull and conning tower. It was at about this time that the Antares observed the fire of the Ward and noted that the Navy patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the submarine. The submarine keeled over to starboard and started to sink. The Ward ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. A large

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amount of oil appeared on the surface. The submarine, sunk in 1,200 feet of water (Hew. Exhibit 74).

At 0651 the Ward sent a radio message to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (Hew. Exhibit 18):

"WE HAVE DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBS OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREA."

The Captain of the Ward, after reflecting that this message might not be interpreted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653 sent the following supplementary message:

"WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREA" (Hew. Exhibit 18)

This message was received by the Bishop's Point Radio Station and relayed to the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Inshore Patrol, and delivered by the Communications Watch Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, to the ComFourteen Duty Officer. The Duty Officer notified the ComFourteen Chief of Staff at 0712 and, at the latter's direction, the Duty Officer of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715.

The ComFourteen Chief of Staff, Captain John B. Earle, informed Admiral Bloch. Because of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the Ward had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the Ward and the relief ready duty destroyer Monaghan, which was dispatched, could take care of the situation, while the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to whom they had referred the information, had the power to take any other action which might be desired (Hew. pages 414-416, 452-469).

(ii) The Air Attack

The War Diary of the Fourteenth Naval District (Hew. Exhibit 74) states that the air raid on Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field started about 0755. It recites also that some reports indicate the end of the raid came at about 0940, although there were reliable reports that enemy planes were active as late as 1130. Residents of Niihau reported that they sighted two Japanese planes flying over that island between 1300 and 1400.

The air attack was delivered in the following sequences:

- "1. Attack on the Naval Air Station, Ford Island, and Hickam Field. This started about 0755 and consisted of dive bombing and strafing.
- "2. Attack on major units of the Fleet, launched by torpedo planes and dive bombers and accompanied by strafing.
- "3. Attack on area by horizontal bombing from high altitude. This is reported to have occurred about 0815.
- "4. A second high altitude bombing attack apparently carried out immediately before the final intensive dive bombing attack and after a lull of approximately 15 minutes in the raid.
- "5. Dive bombing and strafing attack launched about 0910."
(Hew. Exhibit 74)

The reports made to the Fourteenth Naval District indicate that approximately 150 Japanese airplanes participated in the attack. It was variously estimated that there were from 30 to 50 planes in the initial attack on the Pearl Harbor area, including 20 torpedo planes;

from 5 to 18 in the high altitude bombing attack; and from 18 to 30 dive bombers in the final intensive bombing attack. (Hew. Exhibit 74)

Almost simultaneously with the raid on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese also launched an air attack on Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station, while Ewa Field at Barber's Point was subjected to strafing. Two attacks were executed at Kaneohe Bay.

The summary of the attack as seen by Captain John Gaffney, quoted in the ComFourteen War Diary, was as follows:

"The heavy pall of smoke from burning fuel oil afforded not only a point of aim for the dive bombing attack which came about 0920 but somewhat obscured vision. A seaplane hangar was on fire at Ford Island and the floating drydock with the SHAW appeared to be burning. The all directional bombing attack came shortly after the NEVADA cleared the dredge opposite Fox-1 where three hits halted the NEVADA in the channel. She dropped one anchor, backed on it, came over in the direction of the floating dock and finally moved over to Waipio Point. A hit in Drydock No. 1 struck the DOWNES and another hit of a smaller bomb was made on the PENNSYLVANIA. The Japanese pressed home the dive bombing well under 600 feet. Wing and fuselage marking were clearly visible. Their maneuverings to avoid collisions were noteworthy. The attack concentrated over the NEVADA which was underway in the channel and evidently every effort was directed toward sinking her in the channel. This attack was over by 0940." (Hew. Exhibit 74).

The report of Russell B. Smith, RM 3/c, on the U.S.S. Nevada, who was blown from his ship during the attack and swam ashore, was in part as follows:

"I proceeded to the bridge during the lull after the first attack. From there the ARIZONA was plainly visible, a mass of flames. Her after turrets and mainmast were all that could be seen, the rest was a mass of flames. We cast off lines and started to get underway. As we passed the battle line, I saw the OKLAHOMA completely capsized and the rest of the damaged battleships, some burning fiercely. There were several other ships underway in the harbor.

"As we neared the floating drydock the second attack began. Our anti-aircraft guns again went into action. Suddenly there was a deafening roar. Smoke and debris was flying everywhere. Shortly after another bomb struck, setting the ship on fire.

"The next thing I remember is the cold water hitting me in the face. I was near the drydock, which was burning fiercely, and quite a distance from shore. The life preserver that I had securely strapped on was gone. After reaching shore, I and several other men who had swam ashore started for the naval hospital. At this time the third attack came but the Jap planes were kept off by the anti-aircraft fire."

Admiral Kimmel in his letter of 21 December 1941 to the Secretary of the Navy, subject: "Report of Action of 7 December 1941" (Hew. Exhibit 73), gave an account of the attack as follows:

"The first indication of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 December 1941 was a telephone report received by the Staff Duty Officer from the Fourteenth Naval District Duty Officer at about 0720 (LCT). It reported an attack by the WARD on a hostile submarine off the entrance of Pearl Harbor. Twenty minutes thereafter another telephone report from Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO, was received that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile submarine south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional telephone report from the Fourteenth Naval District stating the WARD was towing a sampan into Honolulu. At about 0752 a telephone report was received from the Navy Yard Signal Tower as follows: 'Enemy Air Raid - Not Drill'. Almost simultaneously Japanese planes were observed over the Fleet. Dive bombers were bombing the adjacent air fields,

accompanied by torpedo plane attacks on the ships in the harbor. From then on there was almost continuous enemy air activity of some kind over the harbor, but there seemed to be separate periods of intense activity as if different new waves were arriving prior to departure of last one. The first of these periods lasted from about 0755 to around 0820. Another period was from about 0900 to 0930 and consisted mainly of dive bombers, a third wave, by high altitude bombers, interspersed with dive bombing and strafing came over about 0930. Meanwhile enemy submarines were reported in Pearl Harbor. One submarine was rammed and sunk by the MONAGHAN. All enemy planes withdrew about 1000.

"It appears that the raid on OAHU was excellently planned and executed in that every air field on the island was bombed and strafed in an attempt to demobilize all planes."

Admiral Pye described some phases of the attack, and the attempted sortie of the fleet from Pearl Harbor as follows:

"I was on shore at the time the attack occurred and returned to the CALIFORNIA at approximately twenty minutes of nine, about forty minutes after the original attack. Upon my arrival on board, my Chief of Staff informed me that this provision had been carried out and that the order for emergency sortie had been given by him. That was when the attack had first been made. By the time I arrived, about forty minutes after the first shots, some of the destroyers were underway; one or two cruisers were underway then or immediately afterwards; none of the battleships were in condition to proceed to sea with the exception of the NEVADA which started out in accordance with the order. About the time she passed the Flagship, executing this maneuver, we came to the conclusion that one ship outside would be no better off than inside and would probably be in more danger of submarines, and as she passed us, we directed her to anchor. She had not gone more than a quarter of a mile beyond that when she was bombed and was unable to maneuver to an anchorage and was actually beached in the channel. About this time, we received an order from the Commander-in-Chief that no other ships would sortie. That order was passed around by visual, I believe, but I think it had little effect, because

all of the ships that could move by that time were out. That's with regard to the sortie. Most of the destroyers did get out. There were several of the cruisers, among them the DETROIT, the Flagship of destroyers, got out. There were no carriers present; no heavy ships could go out. That was the condition after the attack. Several light cruisers had been damaged. No heavy cruisers were in port except alongside the dock under overhaul." (Har. page 166).

Subsequently obtained evidence established that the attack was carried out by aircraft launched from the Japanese Carrier Striking Force at a point due North of and approximately 200 miles from the Island of Oahu. The Striking Force arrived at this point in the early morning of 7 December 1941, Hawaii time. Following the attack, the Striking Force retired at high speed to the northwest, then proceeded by a circuitous route to Kure, arriving 23 December, Japanese time. En route CarDiv Two (Hiryu and Soryu), CruDiv Eight (Tone and Chikuma) and two destroyers were detached (15 December, Japanese time) to participate in the Japanese operations against Wake Island. (See Hew. Exhibit 3, page 16; MacArthur Documents).

(iii) Japanese Midget Submarine Attack

There participated in the attack at least five Japanese midget submarines, having the same numeral designations as their mother submarines. The latter, on the decks of which the midgets were clamped, brought the midgets to points near Pearl Harbor, where they were released. (Hew. Exhibit 5).

One of the midgets succeeded in entering Pearl Harbor, where it fired both of its torpedoes, its full complement, one passing between

the U.S.S. Raleigh and the U.S.S. Curtis, and the other burying itself in the mud near the U.S.S. Utah. This submarine was sunk and completely destroyed (Hew. pages 285-286). Another of the midget submarines was beached at Bellows Field, Oahu, and captured along with its Commanding Officer on 8 December 1941. This submarine bore the designation I-18, the designation also of its mother submarine.

The captured midget submarine contained many documents, including a chart of Pearl Harbor on which was laid a course into the harbor, around Ford Island, and out of the harbor, and, in addition, notations of positions of various ships in the harbor (Hew. Exhibits 32-A - 33-A). Other documents in the midget showed that it received intelligence reports as late as 5 December. The track map of Pearl Harbor recovered from this submarine had indicated on it notations of times and concerning future action; the times shown on the map were Tokyo times; the dates were East Longitude or Tokyo dates; and the track on the map was a projected track and not an actual logged track of past events (Hew. pages 279, 281-282). Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, stated in this connection that the track

"is too exact to be an exact track and the figures are written a little too carefully and meticulously to have been performed by the captain of this midget submarine, who had to control trim, use his periscope, and maneuver the submarine without assistance. The second member of the submarine was the machinist's mate, who closed and opened switches, cut in and out the CO2 absorbent material, and in general performed the duties of chief engineer and auxiliary gang." (Hew. pages 281-282).

Captain Layton also testified that the notations on the chart under the time 0450 did not indicate that the captain of the midget submarine recorded that he, himself, had sunk an enemy ship. He said that the submarine still had both of its torpedoes aboard when it was captured, and this was its full complement. He pointed out also that the track in question was carefully laid out both by course and distance, with the course in degrees and distance in meters, and the time in minutes and seconds. He said that the latter indicated the speed of the submarine was to be varied from point to point so as to make its arrival at the several points at predetermined times. He explained that the time indicated, 0450, which was Tokyo time, would be 0920 Pearl Harbor time, and that at 0920 Honolulu time the attack was still taking place and there was a tremendous amount of activity in the area indicated on the map. Accordingly, Captain Layton gave it as his opinion as a seaman that he doubted if the captain of the midget submarine would have been able to so meticulously follow his course all around the harbor and at the same time make notations from point to point. (Hew. Page 283).

It is also to be noted that the Japanese submarine commander who was captured admitted that he had failed in his mission (Hew. page 16).

With reference to the language appearing on the Japanese map, which is variously interpreted as "sink enemy ship" and "enemy ship sunk", Captain McCollum testified that it was not possible to infer whether the past tense was in the mind of the person who made the notations, because there were no kana symbols attached showing tense. (Hew. pages 25-26).

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It should be noted that the conclusion reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board that Japanese midget submarines must have been in the harbor a few days before the attack and that they evidently "moved in and out of the harbor at will", is based wholly on these captured Japanese maps and on the testimony of Robert L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge at Honolulu, 7 December 1941. Mr. Shivers' testimony, in turn, was also based solely on those maps. In this connection, Admiral Hewitt made a thorough study of the question (Hewitt Report, Pages 146-148) and concluded that there was no evidence warranting the belief that any Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December. (Hewitt Report, Page 157).

(iv) Dispositions of Pacific Fleet units at time of attack.

(a) At the time of the attack, there were at Pearl Harbor elements of the fleet (Hew. Exhibit 73) as follows:

Units of Task Force One, consisting of five battle-ships, four light cruisers, one old light cruiser, seventeen destroyers, one old mine layer and four light mine layers.

Units of Task Force Two, consisting of three battle-ships, one old light cruiser, nine destroyers and four light mine layers.

Units of Task Force Three, consisting of two heavy cruisers, and four light mine layers.

Units of Task Force Seven, consisting of five submarines and one submarine tender.

Six patrol squadrons of Task Force Nine, a total of sixty-one planes (exclusive of nine under overhaul), plus two aircraft tenders.

Two Marine air squadrons, a total of twenty planes.

Two destroyer tenders, plus auxiliaries and aircraft of the Base Force.

(b) The units of the Pacific Fleet at sea at the time of the attack (Hew. Exhibit 73), were as follows:

(1) Task Force Three (less units in port) (Vice Admiral Brown), consisting of one heavy cruiser, and one mine layer squadron less two of its divisions, was exercising with landing boats at Johnston Island.

(2) Task Force Eight (Vice Admiral Halsey), consisting of one aircraft carrier (ENTERPRISE), three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers, was located at approximately 20-50°N, 158-50°W, about 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward. It was returning to Pearl Harbor, after landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake Island.

(3) Task Force Twelve (Rear Admiral Newton), comprised of ships ordinarily assigned to Task Force Three, and consisting of one aircraft carrier (LEXINGTON), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, was located at approximately 18-30°N, 168-40°W, about 425 miles southeast of Midway and 300 miles west of French Frigate Shoal. It was proceeding on a westerly course to land a Marine Air Squadron on Midway Island.

(4) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of Task Force Three, were engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest of Oahu.

(5) Four submarines of Task Force Seven were somewhere at sea en route to Pearl Harbor.

(c) The units of the Pacific Fleet at other places were as follows:

(1) At Midway Island there were two submarines of Task Force Seven, and Patrol Squadron VP-21 (eleven planes) of Task Force Nine.

(2) At Wake Island there were two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Air Squadron.

(3) At Johnston Island there were, in addition to Task Force Three undergoing exercise, two Base Force PEY-1 planes.

(4) At Mare Island there were five submarines of Task Force Seven.

(5) At San Diego there were four submarines of Task Force Seven.

(d) To sum up: There were at Pearl Harbor eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, twenty-six destroyers, five submarines, various auxiliaries and repair ships, and 112 aircraft of various types, exclusive of nine under overhaul. At sea, there were two aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four submarines, and various auxiliaries. At other places, there were thirteen submarines, thirteen Navy patrol planes and one Marine Air Squadron. (Hew. Exhibit 73).

Except as to Task Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special missions to reenforce Wake and Midway Islands, the dispositions of Pacific Fleet Units were in accordance with previously worked out fleet employment schedules (Hew. Exhibit 73; Hew. page 605; see supra pages 657.

(v) Attempts to Locate Japanese Striking Force

(a) Admiral Kimmel's statement (Hew. Exhibit 73) of the attempts to locate the Japanese Striking Force, the reports of locations, and the searches made, was as follows:

"At 0817 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, directed Patrol Wing TWO to search for the enemy, and the PBV's in the air started to search. The 3 on the morning search started to search sector 310-000 to a distance of 300 miles. The first plane started out at once.

"The 4 PBV's operating with the submarines started search sector 245-285 to 300 miles out, the first plane of that search got away at about 0945."

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"While it appeared logical that the attack should come from the northward so that the planes would fly down wind with their loads, no such evidence was available from the nature of the attack. Certain information indicated that carriers or enemy forces were operating to the southward. A direction finder bearing of radio transmissions at 1046 was received to indicate that an enemy force bore 178 from Pearl. This was not a positive indication of an enemy position but did indicate the probability of an enemy carrier to the southward. A message was received from a ship with the MINNEAPOLIS call at 0950 stating that a carrier had been sighted. The MINNEAPOLIS was then south of Oahu. At 1010 4 DM's sent a message that they were in area Sail 2 and that two carriers were in sight. This was later corrected to say the message should have been NOT in sight.

"In addition, a message from Kaneohe received at 1000 stated 'Captured enemy have marked positions, bearing 223-90 miles from Pearl Harbor'. These marks in Japanese script were later found not pertinent to the attack.

"This information was passed to Task Forces at sea as an indication of probable location of enemy forces. In addition, at 1018 the Task Force Commanders were advised that there were only 12 VP's available in Pearl for search and that there was some indication that the enemy was to the northward. They were directed to locate and attack the enemy of unknown composition. Search was instituted at once by Task Force EIGHT who was then somewhat south by west of Pearl. At 1020, 15 YB from ENTERPRISE loaded with 1000 lb. bombs were launched to search for and attack a reported group of 4 transports off Barber's Point. The origin of the report about the transports is unknown and it probably was enemy deception because surface craft proceeding to attack them were attacked by enemy submarines in that area. Ships that could do so cleared the harbor by this time and were organized as a separate Task Force ONE at 1105 and directed to report to Commander Task Force EIGHT to assist in locating and destroying the enemy.

"It was not possible to start an organized search with aircraft with the forces on Oahu until the late morning. By about 1100, however, in addition to the 7 PBY's which had started the search between 0815 and 0915, as the planes became serviceable they were started on the following searches:

"Army - 2 B-17
 2 A-20A
 3 B-18
 3 B-17 095 - 165, 300 miles

"Navy - 4 planes VP-24, 245-275, 300 miles
 2 planes VJ, 355-005, 300 miles
 2 planes VP-14, 295-350, 200 miles
 4 planes VP-23, 215-245, 200 miles

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"Battleship & Cruiser Planes

6 VOS, 135-215, 200 miles
9 SED, 330-030, 200 miles
6 J2F in westward sector

"The concentrated air search was conducted to the northward and westward because of the belief that the major enemy attack force was in that direction. In addition, the disposition of Task Forces at sea was such that they were able to search to the southward.

"At about 1345 one plane of the ENTERPRISE reported contact with surface forces in position 20-32 N and 158-40 W, and followed closely by a report that the patrol was being attacked by a VF plane. This report was apparently in error because the position is only about 60 miles from Pearl.

"At 1330 a radio direction finder bearing on an enemy frequency and by a ship using the "AKAGI" call was picked up and gave a bearing of 183° from Pearl and another unidentified unit was found to be on bearing 167 from Pearl. This information was passed to the Task Forces at sea and on that information and the supposition that any enemy forces in the area south of Oahu would retire, toward Jaluit, the senior Task Force Commander at sea directed Task Force TWELVE at 1552, to intercept and destroy the enemy. In addition, Task Force ONE which had joined Task Force EIGHT was directed to proceed to search with surface force and attack. The surface force search was also based on a retirement toward Jaluit.

"No contacts were made and the enemy was not located, except that 2 planes from the cruiser NORTHAMPTON made contact with an enemy fighter at 1120 just north of NIIHAU and after 20 minutes in spite of the enemy's superior speed and gun power succeeded in shooting him down. No report of this attack ever reached the Commander-in-Chief.

"From the chart later discovered from enemy planes shot down there is no indication that any carriers operated to the southward of Oahu. The charts do indicate, however, that the attack was launched from a point about 200 miles to the northward and that the carriers retired to the northward at full speed while waiting planes to return from the attack. (It appears then that

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the enemy carriers in this area were well beyond the daylight search curve of the planes sent out to find them and therefore were successful in evading all contacts with our air forces in the area).

"The search by surface craft, carrier aircraft and their ship-based planes to the southward was not successful. It appears probable that the enemy used radio deception by placing a ship to the southward to use deceptive radio calls, to indicate the presence of enemy forces in that area. It may be possible too that if enemy forces were in that area that they retired at high speed to the southward beyond the range of our ships and aircraft."

Admiral Kimmel's statement described also the air search that was made on 9 December (Hew. Exhibit 73):

"Using Cahu based planes the following search was conducted starting in the morning of 9 December:

"	300 - 010	500 miles	10 VP
	010 - 060	300 miles	10 B-18
	060 - 210	200 miles	18 VSC
	210 - 030	300 miles	6 VJ

and in the afternoon

330 - 020	4 Army B-20
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"The sector to the southwest of Cahu was covered by the LEXINGTON planes as mentioned before.

"No contact with enemy or surface forces were made. Numerous submarines were reported, probably many false contacts, but all were attacked by planes."

(b) Captain Layton described the situation at Pearl Harbor with respect to the attempts to obtain information concerning the location of the Japanese Striking Force, and the disrupted communications and confused situation at Pearl Harbor. He testified that at

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about 1200 hours a direction finder fix was obtained about 358° or 000°. This, as subsequent knowledge established, was probably a true fix on the Japanese carriers. However, he explained, by the time that bearing had been received a series of others had already been obtained, ranging from 180° to 350°. In addition, he said there were conflicting and erroneous reports of the sighting of Japanese Carriers to the South, and also a report that one Carrier was off Barbers Point. Captain Layton said that it soon became apparent that the information being accumulated "was the greatest collection of erroneous, foolish, fantastic reports that was ever passed on a radio circuit". There was a report that there were two aircraft carriers 200° from Diamond Head, at a distance about 200 miles. There were even reports that Japanese Cruisers, Destroyers and transports were unloading troops at Barbers Point; and that the Japanese had dropped paratroopers on the north of the island, which went to the detail of including that the invaders were wearing red coveralls with blue insignia on the sleeves. Captain Layton stated that there had been so many conflicting reports that when he finally reported to the Assistant Operations Officer that a bearing had been obtained on the Carriers on the north, that Officer could well say, "All you have is bum dope". (Hew. pages 286-289).

(c) Admiral Halsey said that at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, he was with his Task Force about 150 to 175 miles from the entrance to Pearl Harbor. He had flown off some of his planes, and on the arrival of some of them at Pearl Harbor, they were shot down by Japanese planes though some shot down some Japanese planes.

A number of his planes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

(Har. page 305).

(d) Admiral Newton said he was about 300 odd miles from Midway when he learned of the attack. He said he thought he would receive orders to intercept the enemy, who he felt must be to the northward of Oahu, and therefore he signaled the LEXINGTON that the flight to Midway was cancelled because presumably Midway had also been attacked. Admiral Newton reported his position to Admiral Kimmel and told him that he had cancelled the Midway flight. Sometime during that morning, he received a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel directing him to report to Admiral Halsey, but he did not know where Admiral Halsey's Task Force was or where it had been. He sent a despatch advising Admiral Halsey of his position, and Admiral Halsey directed him to join him in the vicinity of Oahu. Accordingly he set a course for Oahu and at about ten or eleven that morning he received a message from Admiral Halsey directing him to assume enemy Carriers were about 200 miles south of Oahu and to intercept and destroy these Carriers. He changed course, and sent search planes to the south. The search for the enemy in the south was called off when Pearl received information indicating that the attack had been from Carriers located to the north. He returned to Pearl Harbor around the 13th or 14th, meanwhile continuing his air patrol. The U.S.S. PORTLAND, he said, was bombed by one of the United States' planes from Pearl Harbor (Har. page 319).

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Admiral Newton said that he had assumed the Japanese Carriers had attacked from the north, because they had a better chance for coming in from that direction without being observed, and because all shipping had been diverted to the southward, and the training grounds of the Fleet were also to the southward. He felt sure that the Japanese were cognizant of this, and consequently he was greatly surprised when he was told that the Japanese Carriers were to be assumed to be south of Oahu. (Har. pages 318, 319)

(vi) Casualties and Damage

The personnel casualties were summarized by Lieutenant Commander Robert D. Powers, Jr., U.S.N.R., as follows:

"These reports, examined by me in the office of the Bureau of Personnel, give in detail the names of ships and stations of the killed and wounded as a result of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. These reports are very voluminous. From this examination, I obtained a calculation of the total of the killed and wounded. This calculation shows that the total killed, including those who died of wounds and those missing and declared dead, was 3067, and those wounded, 896." (N.C.I. page 573).

The damage to ships was (N.C.I. Exhibit 61; Hew. Exhibit 73) as follows:

"BATTLESHIPS

ARIZONA sank at her berth as a result of one or more aircraft torpedoes and about eight heavy bomb hits. One of the bomb hits (estimated as 2,000 pounds) exploded the forward magazines.

CALIFORNIA sank at her berth as a result of hits by two aircraft torpedoes and one or more near bomb misses. Also received one large bomb hit on starboard upper deck abreast of foremast, which caused a serious 5-inch powder fire. It sank gradually for about three or four days.

NEVADA (beached to prevent sinking) struck by one or more aircraft torpedoes and by at least five bombs and two near misses. Each of the near misses caused rupturing of the hull on the port and starboard bows, respectively.

OKLAHOMA capsized at her berth within eight to eleven minutes after receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes.

PENNSYLVANIA one bomb hit in way of after 5-inch gun starboard side. The vessel was in drydock No. 1. The damage from bomb explosion was considerable but not of a vital nature.

MARYLAND damaged by two bomb hits on forecastle.

TENNESSEE damaged by two bomb hits (probably 15-inch shell type).

WEST VIRGINIA sank at her berth as a result of four or five aircraft torpedo hits and at least two bomb hits.

"CRUISERS

HELENA (damaged by) hit at frame 80 starboard side by aircraft torpedo causing the flooding of No. 1 and 2 fire-rooms and the forward engine room.

HONOLULU damaged by near miss of large bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through dock and exploded fifteen or twenty feet from the port side at frame 40.

RALEIGH hit by one aircraft torpedo amidships on port side which flooded out the forward half of the machinery plant. The ship was also hit by one bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through three decks and out the ship's side, and finally exploded about fifty feet away.

"DESTROYERS

SHAW hit by one bomb while docked on floating drydock; also hit by many fragments from another bomb which struck the drydock.

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CASSIN and DOWNES: CASSIN was struck by one bomb and DOWNES by two (probably 500 pounds). These vessels were in drydock No. 1 ahead of the PENNSYLVANIA. One bomb explosion aft between the two vessels apparently knocked the CASSIN partly off the drydock blocking and caused her to fall over on the DOWNES when the dock was being flooded during the raid. This caused a serious structural failure amidships and considerable local damage in way of the bridge. The torpedo warheads in the starboard tube of the DOWNES were set-off and blew out the maindeck and starboard side of the vessel in that area.

"AUXILIARY VESSELS

UGLALA sunk by one aircraft torpedo which passed under the ship from the starboard side and exploded against the starboard side of the HELENA. Vessel sank slowly at ten-ten dock, capsized against the dock about 1½ hours after being struck.

CURTISS struck on kingpost starboard crane by Japanese airplane out of control. This resulted in some wreckage and damage due to fire.

VESTAL struck by two bombs (probably 500 pounds). One bomb hit forward and exploded in the steel shape storage, which stopped a large part of the fragments and minimized damage considerably.

UTAH struck by two, and possibly three, aerial torpedoes, and capsized at berth." (N.C.I. Exhibit 61; Hew. Exhibit 73).

The damage to airplanes, as reported on February 15, 1942:

Type	Number present Dec.7	Number on hand after raid	Number usable after raid
Patrol planes	69	45	11
Inshore patrol planes	0	0	0
Fighters	24	15	0
Scout bombers	60	29	14
Torpedo bombers	2	2	0
Battleship & cruiser planes	92	82	11
Utility and transport planes(non-combatant)	54	48	16
TOTAL	301	221	52"

(N.C.I. Exhibit 61).

(vii) Air Reconnaissance

Admiral Bellinger said that on 7 December 1941 the actual situation of the planes was as follows: At Midway there were seven planes in the air, conducting search between 120°-170° to a distance of 450 miles, and four planes on the surface, armed with two 500-pound bombs, on ten-minute notice. At Oahu, there were twelve planes of Vp-11 ready for flight on four hours notice, six planes of VP-12 on 30 minutes notice, and five on four hours notice; there were three planes of VP-14 in the air on security patrol in the operating area, and three on 30 minutes notice, and four on four hours notice; there were twelve of VP-22 on four hours notice; there were eleven of VP-23 on four hours notice; there were four of VP-24 in the air exercising with submarines, and one on 30 minutes notice (N.C.I. page 684).

General Short testified that his aircraft defenses were very inadequate, and that on 7 December he had twelve B-17's, only six of which were in commission. In addition, he had ten A-20's, and fifty B-18's, which he characterized as death traps against a modern plane, and only twenty-four of them were in commission. (N.C.I. Pages 223, 224, 231).

(viii) Condition of Readiness

Admiral Kimmel testified that the condition of readiness of the Fleet in effect was condition No. 3 as set forth in 2CL-41, in addition to an order requiring two 5-inch guns and two 50 caliber guns on each battleship (one-fourth of anti-aircraft) to be manned at all times.

He said that the condition of readiness had not been changed since 27 November and that he considered condition 3 and the measures which he had in force sufficient under the circumstances (N.C.I. pages 278, 279, 303).

Admiral Kimmel stated also that on 7 December Vice Admiral Pye was the Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel's headquarters were at the submarine base, and the PENNSYLVANIA was his Flagship (N.C.I. page 278).

(ix) Condition of Personnel

Admiral Kimmel testified that regular liberty was granted the night of December 6th-7th; i.e., three-fourths of the officers and one-half of the men had liberty. The ones who remained on duty were required, he said, to be trained and capable of manning anti-aircraft guns. He stated that at the time of the attack there were aboard 90 percent of the men and 70 percent of the officers, and that there was no evidence of consequential indulgence in liquor (N.C.I. page 330).

General Short testified that he knew of no unusual intoxication on the night of 6 December, and that no effects of overindulgence were apparent on the morning of the 7th (N.C.I. page 269).

Admiral Kitts said that he was ashore on the night of 6-7 December, and that he saw nothing out of line as to behavior or sobriety. The officers and men of the ships were fit for duty, he said, on 7 December (N.C.I. page 526).

Admiral Pye testified that from the viewpoint of sobriety the conduct of the men and officers on the 6th and 7th of December was satisfactory (N.C.I. page 443). He considered their behavior during the attack to have been superb (N.C.I. page 445).

(x) The Aircraft Warning Service

General Short testified that the aircraft warning service was in the course of preparation and was being operated for training which had started in October 1941. He said that in October 1941 he sent fifteen men to sea with the Navy for training, and that the system could be counted on to do a fairly satisfactory job. In addition to the radar system, the Army maintained, he stated, 100 coast artillery stations as lookout stations; but they were not continuously manned, and on 7 December were not manned because of the low alert then in effect. No civilian lookouts were maintained, he said, because the distances at Oahu were so small as to make them valueless (N.C.I. pages 223-225, 227).

General Short testified further that the radar stations were supposed to be effective at ranges of from 75 to 100 miles. On December 7th, he said, the aircraft warning service was being operated from 0400 to 0700 daily, and that the system was operated after 0700 for training, if the personnel so wished. The radar system was operated from 0400 to 0700 because he estimated that that was the best time for an enemy to attack, if the enemy were going to attack. The Interceptor

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Command, he said, was functioning after 27 November on a 0400 to 0700 basis daily, although it was not established by written order until 17 December (N.C.I. pages 227, 228, 263, 265).

General Short testified that a request had been made for a Navy liaison officer in the Information Center of the aircraft warning system in August, and on 24 November the Navy took steps to set up liaison officers. He said that Admiral Kimmel assigned Commander Curtis as Liaison Officer the day after the request was made, but he felt that Admiral Kimmel did not understand that he wanted a working liaison officer in the Information Center and not a general liaison officer. Lieutenant Commander Taylor was sent by Admiral Kimmel to help with the aircraft warning system (N.C.I. pages 226, 261-262).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did everything he could to assist the Army on the radar setup. He said he sent officers to work with the Army, had taken Army personnel to sea for radar training. He knew that the Army radar system was far from perfect, did not know that it was not to be operated after 0700 (N.C.I. pages 289-290). The Army's radar crews, he said, were green and untrained; the equipment was not adequate; and the warning net needed polishing in order to make it effective (N.C.I. page 304).

PART FIVE

OFFICIAL NAVY ACTION

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THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND ACTION
BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

(A) Findings, Conclusions and Order.

On 13 August 1945 Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, in his fourth endorsement to the record of proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry made the official findings and conclusions of the Navy Department, and his order as Secretary assessing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The endorsement of 13 August 1945 that was signed by Secretary Forrestal has had deleted from it certain "TOP-SECRET" matter since, pursuant to the direction of the President, the findings and conclusions were to be made public. The endorsement with deletions therefrom was made public by the President on 29 August 1945.

The complete endorsement of Secretary Forrestal containing the findings, conclusions and action of the Navy in respect of the Pearl Harbor disaster is as follows:

"1. Pursuant to Executive Order dated 18 December 1941, a commission headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that:

"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform himself of and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department."

2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses having knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.

3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.

4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biese-meier, USN, as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.

5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET," and the balance "SECRET."

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6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by me, was that the evidence secured by the Court did not warrant and would not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.

7. In my Third Endorsement to the Record of Proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the evidence obtained indicated that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark, but that the investigation had not gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would be conducted by an investigation officer and that pending the completion of the necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.

8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the prior investigations and that an appropriate summary of all information developed in the prior Naval investigations be prepared. Upon the completion of this review of prior investigations and after examination of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 December 1944, I appointed Admiral H. H. Hewitt, USN, as investigating officer, and John F. Sonnett as counsel to examine such witnesses and obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further investigation directed by my precept of 2 May 1944

9. In his Second Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's Report of further investigation, dated 10 August 1945, the Judge Advocate General advised, among other things, that he did not believe that there was sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to Naval Law; that the evidence indicated that the officers in question lacked superior judgment rather than being guilty of culpable inefficiency; and that "lack of superior judgment" is not an offense triable by general court martial. The Judge Advocate General further advised in his Second Endorsement that: "I am of the opinion that any such court-martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the Naval service." Notwithstanding the difficulties pointed out by him, the Judge Advocate General was of the opinion, however, that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel tried by general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist. The Judge Advocate General recommended that Admiral Hewitt's investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and in prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to the public interests; and that if Admiral Kimmel insists, a general court martial should be convened to try him for any alleged offenses he may have committed on or before 7 December 1941.

10. In the Third Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report, dated 13 August 1945, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurred generally in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General and expressed the opinion that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial

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of any person in the Naval service in that it would not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy; that with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet was still of the opinion that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, although not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, nevertheless lacked the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties, and that appropriate action, consisting of the relegation of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment might not result in future errors, had been taken as to Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, and stated that no further action was recommended. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, also advised, in the Third Endorsement, that in any event he considered it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark or Admiral Kimmel to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to national security measures. He concurred in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to trial before a general court martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist, but stated that this action should not be taken until after the completion of hostilities with Japan. He concurred in the further suggestions of the Judge Advocate General that Admiral Hewitt's investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel and that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and in prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to national security.

11. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements to the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record, and in their endorsements to the

report by Admiral Hewitt, are approved subject to the following remarks:

(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II (1156). This finding states, in substance, that the presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and the battleships of Task Force Two was necessary.

The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the effect that he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he anticipated an air attack. The Second Endorsement indicates that the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, does not entirely "go along" with the opinion of the Court that the information available to Admiral Kimmel did not require any departure from his operation and maintenance schedules. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, states further in this connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port, and that this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding.

(b) Court of Inquiry Finding III (1156) This finding states that, "Constitutional requirements that war be declared by Congress . . ." make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded offensive action as a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had the responsibility of avoiding overt acts.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, comments that this gives an unscrupulous enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional requirement preventing offensive action as a means of defense was a definite handicap. It does not appear that there was any proximate casual relationship between the Constitutional requirement and the instant disaster. The Constitutional inhibition

and the injunction as to overt acts did not preclude either long distance reconnaissance or a sortie by the Fleet. Further, it appears that prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel did not regard this Constitutional provision or his responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent the issuance of orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in operating areas.

(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV (1159). This states That Admiral Bloch was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently, Admiral Bloch had a responsibility for naval measures concerned with local defense.

It should be noted in this connection that Admiral Hewitt found:

"75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.

"76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941, in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu."

(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V (1160). The Court here finds that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly, cordial and cooperative; that they invariably conferred when important messages were received, and that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being taken by the other.

In this connection the following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt are approved:

"1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means,

various types of attack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.

"2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.

"3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange."

The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were informal arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and Navy at Hawaii, which included the transmission to the Army of some information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates, however, that neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short was sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into effect by the other. It appears that after receipt of the "war warning" and prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on several occasions. They discussed the reenforcement of Midway and Wake. It does not appear that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in effect or to be placed in effect, or the question or advisability of placing in effect air reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel, he placed in effect Army Alert No. 1 (the anti-sabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what alert the Army had in effect, and that he made no specific inquiry of General Short in this connection.

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That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears from the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November 1941 relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to United States outlying islands to destroy classified material. He testified before the Naval Court that he did not direct that these be furnished to General Short, and that he did not know whether or not they were furnished to him. General Short testified that he had not seen these dispatches.

In view of these facts, I cannot agree with the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. The system of mutual cooperation, of joint command, was not working effectively - it failed. In this connection the following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt is approved:

"War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be "unity of command."

However, in respect of the above conclusion of Admiral Hewitt, it is important to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively demonstrated that there is no inconsistency between the existence of two or more separate military or naval organizations as the functioning forces and an effective exercise of unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of the major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more distinct military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations, but all acting under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the several forces and their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually in the higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command post.

I do not find, however, that Admiral Kimmel is open to criticism for having failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine contact had been made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly

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prior to the air attack. The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt supports the following conclusions by him, which is approved:

"26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced."

(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI (1160). This states in substance that unavoidable deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing on the effectiveness of the local defense of Pearl Harbor.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out, however, that the pertinent question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to the best advantage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief U. S. Fleet.

(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII (1165). The Court finds that Japan had an initial advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's numerical superiority, and the superiority of Japanese espionage.

The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the general statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court will always place this nation at a disadvantage during a period of strained relations. This finding, of course, in general was correct. Nevertheless, as applied to the specific issues here presented, it overlooks the fact that:

(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into account in the war plans;

(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a disadvantage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and

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War Departments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence advantages of their own which were not availed of to the fullest extent.

(g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII (1167). This states that it was the direct responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, is in agreement with "the fundamental concept of naval warfare" discussed by the Court, but takes a more realistic view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that in view of the weakness of local defense, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. It is to be noted, moreover, that under the defense plan the Navy was responsible for the maintenance of distant reconnaissance.

(h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX (1169). The Court finds that the air defense plans were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Fleet aircraft which could not be made permanently available for local defense.

The Second Endorsement states that the Court has overstressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes; that it was sound policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel's disposal; that it was his responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could; that the available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened; that it is doubtful whether with the available forces it would have been possible to destroy the carriers before they launched their planes, except by a lucky chance; that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation, not entirely due to his own fault; and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, with respect to this finding.

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(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV (1159). VIII (1167),

IX (1169).

Based on these findings the conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed his duties.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is approved.

(j) Court of Inquiry Finding X (1171). This holds adequate and effective Admiral Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.

(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI (1173). The substance of this finding is that Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called for by the information available to him, and that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense.

In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition of readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that condition which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the assumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the Fleet. Such was not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, further states that he does not agree with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of readiness would have added little to the defense, and is of the view that the information available to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening up of the defense precautions as 7 December approached. With the comments of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concur.

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(1) Court of Inquiry Finding XII (1176). The Court here finds that there was no information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to predict that attack.

The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point: "There was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits."

It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral Hewitt's investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel, particularly during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. This information, which consisted principally of daily radio intelligence summaries setting forth the results of monitoring Japanese naval communications and estimates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, is set forth in some detail at pages 112-114, inclusive, of Admiral Hewitt's report. It there appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese naval radio calls on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as indicating an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale; that on 2 December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet Intelligence Officer as to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and that during that conference Admiral Kimmel noticed and commented on the absence of information in the Fleet Intelligence Officer's written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned that these four carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high seas heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located by the Fleet Intelligence Officer in his written estimate, in Japanese home waters,

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with the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In his testimony before Admiral Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer described his conversation with Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as follows:

"Mr. SONNETT: Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?"

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now', or words to that effect."

"MR. SONNETT: Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?"

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2', and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location."

"MR. SONNETT: He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?"

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in a way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

It is to be noted further that, as set forth in Admiral Hewitt's report, the daily communication intelligence summaries received by Admiral Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that: "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service

calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." and that the daily summaries delivered to Admiral Kimmel thereafter, and prior to the attack, indicated that there was no information as to Japanese carriers.

In view of the foregoing, I do not approve the above finding by the Naval Court of Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concerning this finding. I am of the view that the information as to the location and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other information which he had received, including the "war warning" and other messages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.

(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII (1178). It is here stated that Admiral Kimmel's decision not to conduct daily long-range reconnaissance was sound; that there were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that such use of the available planes was not justified.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval Court record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors to be considered. He states further, however, that after considering all of the information that was at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears that Admiral Kimmel was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long-range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious that the means available did not

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permit an all-round daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched, but that there were, however, certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent, and that such particular cover would have been logical in the circumstances known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. Attention is called to the fact that Admiral Richardson had maintained distant reconnaissance, using the few patrol planes at his disposal, to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation, and that these patrols were discontinued when or shortly before Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.

In addition to these comments, with which I concur, it may be noted that Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long range patrol in the summer of 1941 on the basis of intelligence received and reported by Admiral Bloch at that time.

The following findings by Admiral Hewitt in connection with the question of air reconnaissance are approved:

"77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance."

"78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet Patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him."

"87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days."

"89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles."

"90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor."

"91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched."

"101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu."

(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV (1182). This states in substance that the Army radar detection system was ineffective.

The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding, which is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the radar detection system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic state, nevertheless, even in its then condition it could have and should have served to give at least an hour's warning of the attack. I concur in this comment and also approve the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt:

"15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft."

(o) Court of Inquiry Findings XV (1186). This states that the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December 1941, was that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions of shoal water and limited approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor, was not practicable, and that the Japanese attack was successful principally because of the employment of a specially designed torpedo, which was a secret weapon.

The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: "It is evident in retrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated." The principal point upon which the Court of Inquiry seems to rest its findings is the further finding that

it was not believed by American and British naval authorities at that time that torpedoes could be successfully launched from aircraft in waters as shallow as those at Pearl Harbor. As a basis for this view the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief of Naval Operations early in 1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could not be successfully launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of 75 feet (water at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that the Court also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval Operations in June 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict with the Court's finding.

This letter stated, among other things, that: "It cannot be assumed that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo." This letter also advised that torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13-15 fathoms of water, although several may have been launched in 11-12.

The records of the Navy Department indicated that in April, 1941, there was circulated in the Department an Intelligence report which described the demonstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this report that the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and that it required no greater depth of water for its successful launching than the depth at which it made its normal run.

It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the British reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which torpedoes were successfully launched in 42 feet of water.

Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year prior to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of an airplane torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated.

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Secretary Knox's letter of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of the types of attack upon Pearl Harbor which he considered likely. His letter had been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received in February by Admiral Kimmel.

In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.

(p) Court of Inquiry Finding XVI (1188). The Court here finds that Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made after receiving the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the approval of the steps which he had taken after the dispatch of 16 October which advised that hostilities were possible, and (b) the information then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November, 1941, which stated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.

The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underscores that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility...."

It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words, "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other than on those two places would be on foreign territory, but that the words also included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.

The Court refers in its finding to a part of a personal letter

sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel on 17 October, in which Admiral Stark stated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably." However, the letter also continued: "Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend." To the letter was annexed a postscript stating in part: "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we made some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."

It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal with the question of the soundness of Admiral Kimmel's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet, in the light of the highly important information which he received from the Chief of Naval Operations and otherwise during the critical period after the "war warning" of November 27th.

(q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII (1193). The Court here finds that there were good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the Far East.

In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He notes further that all concerned recognized the possibility that such a

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commencement of hostilities would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably strengthened by information available at Washington, all of which was not available to Admiral Kimmel.

It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation that the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of November 27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which had been approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the event of war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly possible. The information received by Admiral Kimmel as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least, consistent with these estimates. The following conclusion of Admiral Hewitt in this connection is approved:

"23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack"

(r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX (1196).

These state in substance that Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to 7 December 1941 to transmit to Admiral Kimmel important information in his possession, obtained from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages,

and summarized in the addendum to the Court's findings of facts, constitutes a military error.

The comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in failing to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington.

The endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, on the Naval Court of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, former Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the conclusions of the Court based thereon, were concerned principally with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department, and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling this information. It was concluded that the failure to obtain this testimony was unfortunate.

With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concurred. It further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who, according to other testimony in the record, had important duties in connection with the handling of such intercepted enemy information, would be most helpful. Captain McCollum was also unavailable as a witness to the Court. I ascertained that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy, and would be so engaged until some date in the future. From the nature of the duties which these officers were performing in their assignments, I determined that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort, their testimony in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.

During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. The following conclusions of Admiral Hewitt in this connection are approved.

"5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war, by means of interception, description, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages."

"6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to the intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready." . . .

"8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.

"9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the "1 p.m." message and its possible import, were unfortunate.

"10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.

"11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated

to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages."

12. The following conclusions by Admiral Hewitt concerning the intelligence secured by tapping the wires of the Japanese Consulate General at Hawaii and by intercepting cable messages of the Japanese Consulate General are approved.

Conclusion 12. "Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area."

Conclusion 13. "Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work."

13. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.

With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident, and that disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God" beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated in the Second Endorsement, that the Country

as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense until it was too late to repair the consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy as a whole, although its ranking officers were fully informed of the most recent developments in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the true significance of those developments until their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial portion of the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of hostile action by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet and Air Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile action, these factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the responsible officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them to bring about that implementation of the plans that was necessary if the initial hostile attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.

That this is so is manifested in the case of the instant disaster in several important respects.

(a) The destructive potentiality of air attack was not properly evaluated, although there was ample information available on this subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That this information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type of attack, but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial attack had been successful.

(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the fullest utilization of all of the available resources of

both the Army and the Navy; in practice, none of these measures came into being to any appreciable extent prior to the attack.

(c) Within the Navy itself, the organization was such as to submerge the Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to the procurement and material programs incidental to the rapid expansion of the Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans and operations the undivided and continuing attention which experience has shown they require, and tended to dull his perception of the critical significance of events.

In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage of hindsight, nor do I overlook the fact that this war has proved that any carrier strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost impossible to deflect. After giving due consideration, however, to all these factors, I am of the opinion that there were, nevertheless, areas in which sound military judgment dictated the taking of action which, though it might not have prevented or defeated the attack, would have tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack was able to inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must center upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective sphere, to take appropriate action.

14. I concur, therefore, with the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement to the Court of Inquiry record that it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action which Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, as the responsible officers, might have taken to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow.

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(a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington, particularly in respect of:

- (1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese, which was regarded by the Japanese as an ultimatum;
- (2) The intercepted Japanese messages inquiring as to the disposition of ships within Pearl Harbor;
- (3) The implementation of the "winds" message;
- (4) In failing to appreciate the significance of the "one p.m. message" received on the morning of 7 December 1941, and in the failure to transmit it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available.
- (5) Finally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement that there is a certain sameness of tenor in the communications sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the sense of intensification of critical relations between Japan and the United States.

I concur generally with these comments except as to (3) and (5). In connection with the failure of Admiral Stark to advise Admiral Kimmel of the implementation of the "winds" message, the following conclusion by Admiral Hewitt is approved:

"7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States."

Although there may be some basis for the comment that prior to 27 November 1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communication sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that the message of November 27 was stronger than any message which Admiral Stark sent previously to Admiral Kimmel. That message read as follows:

"THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING X NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC HAVE CEASED AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS X THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATE AN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER THE PHILIPPINES (printed in ink, "thai") OR KRA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO X EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL 46 X INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES X

A SIMILAR WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT ^{ENC} SPENAVO
INFORM BRITISH X CONTINENTAL DISTRICTS GUAM SAMOA DIRECTED
TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES AGAINST SABOTAGE"

Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it might be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not only in the failure to transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available information, but also in the failure properly and speedily to evaluate that information, particularly on 7 December 1941.

The evidence shows that the State Department reply to the Japanese of 26 November 1941 was in fact regarded by them as an ultimatum; that it was known in the Navy Department before 1 December 1941 that the Japanese regarded the reply as unacceptable; that it was known, as early as 1 December 1941, that the Japanese proposed to strike without warning. It was further known that subsequent to their receipt of the State Department's note the Japanese were directing their emissaries in the United States to do everything in their power to allay any suspicion of a hostile Japanese move. Against this background, there was received on 6 December 1941, in the Navy Department, an intercepted Japanese message to their emissaries here, which stated that a 14-part reply to the State Department's note of 26 November 1941 was being transmitted, and further that a specific time for delivery of this reply would be transmitted from Tokyo by a separate message. This message, together with the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply were all available at the Navy Department by 2100 hours of 6 December 1941. The language of the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply then available indicated that the reply constituted a final breaking off of relations. All this pointed to the conclusion that a surprise attack was to be simultaneous with the delivery of the Japanese message. Thus, while it was not known on 6 December precisely when the attack was to be delivered, there was ample evidence to

base on the conclusion that a surprise move was due within narrow limits of time.

On the morning of December 7th, by 10:30, Admiral Stark had all fourteen parts of the Japanese reply, which in its entirety made explicit the breaking off of relations. He had as well the direction for the delivery of that reply at one p.m., Eastern Standard Time, and there was information available to him that this time corresponded to dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although, as found by Admiral Hewitt, no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring about some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.

(b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5(b) of the Second Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the "war warning" message on 27 November 1940, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December that the Japanese had ordered destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands.

In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his personal letters, which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well in the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the information

received by Admiral Kimmel concerning the location and movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November 1941 should have been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as indicating the continued and increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially noted that while Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message of 27 November 1941, and again on 28 November when the Army message was relayed to him, to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him was carrying forward the arrangements for the reenforcing of and continuing the limited air patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging in unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued in effect the primary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition of readiness (Condition III) of the fleet in port. He neither ordered long-range air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet air wing commander of the receipt of the war warning message. His failure to take other and more effective action is neither explainable nor excusable by an ambiguity in the meaning of or disagreement as to what would constitute an "appropriate defensive deployment." Admiral Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan of maintaining fleet security at bases and guarding against surprise attack by Japan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase "appropriate defensive deployment", he should have asked the Chief of Naval Operations for an explanation.

The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record states that Admiral Kimmel could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action were open to him, viz:

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(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors, and thus made the Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have resulted in the detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers; (2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, and thus made it more difficult for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port; (3) He could have maintained a higher condition of readiness under which Naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and damage control organizations fully operational.

Admiral Hewitt's report concludes in part:

"The absence of positive information as to the location of Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:

"(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.

"(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.

"(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.

"(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.

"(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.

"(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.

"(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and aircraft warning installations."

I concur with these comments as to the various courses of action which Admiral Kimmel could have and should have taken. The evidence indicates clearly, however, that his most grievous failure was his failure to conduct long-range air reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack. That this is so is

manifest from the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt and from his following conclusion, which is hereby approved.

Conclusion 14. "The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the 'war warning,' as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu."

During the critical period after November 27 the limitations of the aircraft warning service and of radio intelligence were evident; the only remaining practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled to rely for information as to the Japanese naval movements was distant air reconnaissance which, covering the most probable approach bearings, would as Admiral Hewitt concluded have had a reasonable chance of success. The failure to detect the approach of the Japanese task force contributed more to the success of the Japanese attack than did any other single factor.

In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and by Admiral Hewitt, it was, of course, always open to Admiral Kimmel also to take steps to increase cooperation between his organization and the Army command, and to attempt to achieve effective joint command. That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing such an objective is indicated by the evidence in the record and the finding of the Court that the social relationship between him and General Short was excellent. The need for Admiral Kimmel taking such measures existed from the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in urgency as the 7th of December, 1941, approached.

15. The Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the Naval Court record concludes that:

"6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the

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superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.

"7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors."

16. In his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, states in part:

"I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:

"(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that the evidence will not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy.

"(b) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously expressed, that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency, due to the lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties.

"(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment may not result in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.

"(d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one of them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, nor are court martial or other proceedings (prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan) advisable because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to national security measures."

17. The Judge Advocate General in making his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report states in part:

1. "Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies

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omissions in the earlier investigations. It is considered that this and former investigations, taken together, present as clear a picture of the pertinent facts as will ever be adduced. With this report, therefore, I believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack should be considered completed.

2. "Admiral Hewitt's report brings out and confirms a distinction which impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a distinction which does much to clarify thinking on the question of placing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that there was no lack of appreciation on the part of any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming quickly, during the critical period immediately preceding 7 December 1941. The point on which those officers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment to be expected from officers occupying their positions, was their failure to appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of these officers, in estimating the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in that he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific.

3. "I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any great effect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that they each entertained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding would most likely merely have strengthened those views. Likewise, I submit that the importance of information from Japanese sources has been overemphasized; for had more basically sound principles been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have occurred. The security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our Pacific strategy, a fact which did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic concept of responsible officers.

4. "In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:

(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not believed that there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to naval law.

(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses which are worthy of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to define the duty of the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty to follow a course of action other than the one he did. In my opinion

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this would be impossible, as the acts of omission of these officers do not rise above the status of errors of judgment. No clearly defined duty can be established which was neglected or improperly performed. As stated by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on the findings of the Court of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the fact that the acts of the officers in question "indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency." "Lack of Superior Judgment" is not an offense triable by general court-martial.

* * *

(d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members of a general court martial will make it most difficult to constitute a court for the trial of the officers here concerned during war time or during a period of six months after the cessation of hostilities. Many of the officers of appropriate rank, both on the active and the retired lists, would be disqualified because of interest in the subject matter, the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue of having been connected with one of the investigations into the matter. If more than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an entirely new court would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried a former case arising out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to challenge. The Summoning of the necessary witnesses would result in temporarily removing from their duty stations many of the key officers in the naval organization. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the naval service."

* * *

18. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General thereto, and the Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, thereto; the record findings and conclusions of Admiral Hewitt, and the Second and Third Endorsements thereto; and on the basis of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:

(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.

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(b) Then Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold R. Stark, particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, failed to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties.

(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action should be taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to active duty in the future for any position in which the exercise of superior judgment may be necessary.

(d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, should be made as soon as such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.

19. Accordingly, I direct:

(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.

(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.

(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, will be made as soon as such action can be taken without injuring current military operations or the national security.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY"

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(B) Navy's Offer to Rear Admiral Kimmel of Court Martial.

On 7 September 1943 Rear Admiral Kimmel wrote to the Secretary of the Navy stating that he desired "to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date". On 28 August 1945 Secretary Forrestal offered a General Court Martial to Rear Admiral Kimmel if the same were still desired by the latter. The letter of Secretary Forrestal to Rear Admiral Kimmel read as follows:

"1. In your letter of September 7th, 1943, to the Secretary of the Navy, you stated 'It is my personal desire to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date.'

"2. In his letter to you the Secretary of the Navy gave you his assurance that a trial before General Court Martial would be had at the earliest practicable date that the public interest and safety would permit. In view of the present state of the war and in view of this assurance of the Secretary of the Navy I am disposed to order your trial by General Court Martial in open court in the event that you still desire to be so tried.

"3. It is requested that you advise me promptly whether or not you desire to be tried by General Court Martial."

On 8 September 1945 Rear Admiral Kimmel replied in writing to the Secretary's letter of 28 August 1945, stating that he desired to defer replying to the Secretary's inquiry whether he (Kimmel) still desired a Court Martial until after the pending Joint Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor was completed. This letter read as follows:

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"280 Bronxville Road, Bronxville 8, N. Y., 8 September 1945. From: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, (Retired). To: The Secretary of the Navy. Subject: General Court Martial in my case.

"1. In view of the agitation for a Congressional Investigation before Congress reconvened and the action of the Senate in ordering a Joint Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor, I wish to defer my reply to your letter of 28 August 1945 until that Investigation is completed."

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