

APPENDIX TO  
NARRATIVE STATEMENT  
*of*  
EVIDENCE  
*at*  
NAVY PEARL HARBOR  
INVESTIGATIONS

APPENDIX

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NARRATIVE STATEMENT  
of  
EVIDENCE  
at  
NAVY PEARL HARBOR  
INVESTIGATIONS

(Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to the Secretary of the Navy in Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations. See Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations, Vol. II, for official Navy action (formerly Top Secret) on the reports).

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
Washington, D.C.



COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES FLEET, THIRD ENDORSEMENT

TO

REPORT OF FURTHER PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION BY

ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT, U.S. NAVY

10675  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
**UNITED STATES FLEET**  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
NAVY DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



FF1/A17

Serial: 002008

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THIRD ENDORSEMENT to  
Adm. Hewitt's Report to  
SecNav dated 12 July 1945.

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet  
and Chief of Naval Operations.  
To: The Secretary of the Navy.  
Subject: Report of Further Pearl Harbor Investigation  
by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy.

1. I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:

(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that the evidence will not sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy.

(b) With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceedings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously expressed, that Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency, due to the lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their duties.

(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment may not result in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.

COMMON DELIVERY NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
 NAVY DEPARTMENT  
 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



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Subject: Report of Further Pearl Harbor Investigation by  
 Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy.

(d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one of them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, nor are court martial or other proceedings (prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan) advisable because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to national security measures.

2. I concur in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to trial before a General Court Martial, should Admiral Kimmel so insist. However, this action should not be taken until after the completion of hostilities with Japan.

3. I concur in the suggestion of the Judge Advocate that this record be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to security; that if Admiral Kimmel insists, a General Court Martial will be convened to try him for alleged offenses he may have committed on or before December 7, 1941.

4. As to Admiral Hewitt's deductions from war experience - paragraph 28, page 180 - I am unable to concur fully with (a) thereof but do concur fully with (b) thereof. Nor am I able to concur fully in his paragraph 29 (page 180) - which parallels his paragraph 28 (a) - for the reason that he himself sets forth in substance at various places in his "findings" and "conclusions", namely, that while the system of command was that of mutual cooperation it was, in reality, incomplete and inadequate implementation of that system which was at fault. There is the further fact that, given the information which was available in Washington, it is reasonable to assume that the system of mutual cooperation would have been fully alerted and made to function effectively.

*E. J. King*  
 E. J. KING.

THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S  
SECOND ENDORSEMENT  
ON  
THE REPORT OF FURTHER PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION  
BY  
ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT, U.S. NAVY



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

UNCLASSIFIED

10 August 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Second Enclosure.~~

From: The Judge Advocate General.  
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and  
Chief of Naval Operations.  
Subject: Report of further Pearl Harbor investigation by Admiral  
H. K. Hewitt, U.S. Navy.

1. Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies omissions in the earlier investigations. It is considered that this and former investigations, taken together, present as clear a picture of the pertinent facts as will ever be adduced. With this report, therefore, I believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack should be considered completed.

2. Admiral Hewitt's report brings out and confirms a distinction which impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a distinction which does much to clarify thinking on the question of placing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that there was no lack of appreciation on the part of any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming quickly, during the critical period immediately preceding 7 December 1941. The point on which those officers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment to be expected from officers occupying their positions, was their failure to appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of these officers, in estimating the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategic planning, in that he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific.

3. I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any great effect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that they each entertained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding would most likely merely have strengthened those views. Likewise, I submit that the importance of information from Japanese sources has been overemphasized; for had more basically sound principles been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have occurred. The security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our Pacific strategy, a fact which did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic concept of responsible officers.



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4. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:

(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not believed that there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense known to naval law.

(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses which are worthy of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to define the duty of the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty to follow a course of action other than the one he did. In my opinion this would be impossible, as the acts of omission of these officers do not rise above the status of errors of judgment. No clearly defined duty can be established which was neglected or improperly performed. As stated by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on the findings of the Court of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the fact that the acts of the officers in question "indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency". "Lack of Superior Judgment" is not an offense triable by general court-martial.


(c) The charges and specifications for any court-martial proceedings must be filed not later than a date "six months after the termination of hostilities in the present war with Japan as proclaimed by the President or as specified in a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, whichever is the earlier". Public Law 77 - 79th Congress, approved June 7, 1945. There are serious doubts as to the constitutionality of this and the earlier extensions of the Statute of Limitations enacted by the Congress since 7 December 1941 and applicable to trials arising out of the Pearl Harbor disaster as a violation of the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Admiral Kimmel has executed a waiver of the Statute of Limitations for a period of six months past the end of the present war, and therefore the question of the validity of the Congressional extensions is not controlling in his case. However, as it has become apparent since the time that Admiral Kimmel was requested to execute this waiver that other officers are also blameworthy, it is my opinion that the Navy Department would be acting in an inequitable manner in instituting any proceedings against Admiral Kimmel on his waiver, unless Admiral Kimmel himself so requests.

ADMITTED

(d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members of a general court-martial will make it most difficult to constitute a court for the trial of the officers here concerned during war time or during a period of six months after the cessation of hostilities. Many of the officers of appropriate rank, both on the active and the retired lists, would be disqualified because of interest in the subject matter, the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue of having been connected with one of the investigations into the matter. If more than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an entirely new court would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried a former case arising out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to challenge. The Summoning of the necessary witnesses would result in temporarily removing from their duty stations many of the key officers in the naval organization. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the naval service.

5. Notwithstanding the difficulties pointed out above, I am of the opinion that the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel tried by general court-martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist. In August 1943, Secretary Knox sent Admiral Kimmel a memorandum from which the following is quoted, "I feel that it would be to the best interests of all concerned if you should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial upon my assurance that the trial will be had at the earliest practicable date." And in Admiral Kimmel's waiver he agreed, "I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court-Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before Dember (sic) 7th, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter."

6. I suggest that this record be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and prior records as soon as that may be done without prejudice to the public interests; that if he insists, a general court-martial will be convened to try him for alleged offenses he may have committed on or before December 7, 1941; and that his decision be abided.



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY'S  
FIRST ENDORSEMENT  
ON  
THE REPORT OF FURTHER PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION  
BY  
ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT, U.S. NAVY



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON

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25 MAR 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT.

To: The Judge Advocate General.  
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and  
Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Record of proceedings and Report of further Pearl  
Harbor investigation by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN.

1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.
2. The endorsement by the Judge Advocate General will include his opinion (a) as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant court-martial or other proceedings, (b) as to the offense or offenses which might be made the subject of court-martial or other proceedings, assuming the sufficiency of the evidence concerning such offense or offenses, (c) as to the date prior to which any such court-martial or other proceeding must be instituted, and (d) as to the practicability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the regulations concerning the composition of a court and in view of the necessity of obtaining testimony from witnesses engaged in operations against the enemy.
3. The endorsement by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations will include his opinion (a) as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant court-martial or other proceedings, (b) as to the practicability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the regulations concerning the composition of a court and in view of the necessity of obtaining testimony from witnesses engaged in operations against the enemy, and (c) as to the advisability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the possibility of disclosure of information relating to current and prospective military operations and to national security.

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REPORT OF FURTHER INVESTIGATION  
INTO THE  
FACTS SURROUNDING THE JAPANESE ATTACK  
ON  
PEARL HARBOR  
7 DECEMBER 1941  
BY  
ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT, U.S.NAVY

12 July 1945.

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**From:** H. Kent Hewitt, Admiral, U. S. Navy.  
**To:** The Secretary of the Navy.

**Subject:** Report of further investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.

**Reference:**

- (a) Report of Commission appointed by the President to investigate and report the facts relating to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
- (b) Record of examination of witnesses having knowledge of the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Ret.).
- (c) Public Law 339, 78th Congress.
- (d) Precept appointing Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, 13 July 1944.
- (e) Record of proceedings and report of Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
- (f) First Endorsement, dated 2 November 1944, by the Judge Advocate General, and Second Endorsement, dated 6 November 1944, by Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, to record of proceedings of Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
- (g) Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944.
- (h) Letter 3 December 1944 from Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, to the Secretary of the Navy, on report of Army Pearl Harbor Board.
- (i) Precept 2 May 1945 appointing H. Kent Hewitt, Admiral, U. S. Navy, to conduct further Pearl Harbor investigation.
- (j) Memorandum 18 May 1945, concerning the scope of the further investigation and approval thereof by the Secretary of the Navy.
- (k) Precept 6 July 1945 amending reference (i).

**Enclosure:**

- (A) Report of further investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
- (B) Record of proceedings of this investigation, and exhibits therein.

1. The precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 2 May 1945, reference (i) as amended by reference (k), directed that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, make a study of the previous investigations, that such further investigation as might appear to be necessary be then conducted, and, that

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
upon completion of the investigation a report be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy setting forth the findings and conclusions reached.

2. Review of the previous investigations disclosed that various matters of importance, principally concerning intelligence, had not been investigated thoroughly. The subjects proposed for further investigation were approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 21 May 1945.

3. Counsel in this investigation was John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting were Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, III, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The reporters were Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR, and Chief Yeoman Raymond E. Reese, USNR. These men took a special oath to maintain the security of the information developed during the investigation.

4. During this proceeding, which commenced 14 May 1945, the testimony of 38 witnesses, some of whom had testified previously, was taken on 26 days, at Washington, D. C., at San Francisco, and at Pearl Harbor. 81 exhibits were received.

5. Delivered herewith are the report of this further investigation (Enclosure A), and the record of proceedings and exhibits therein (Enclosure B). In preparing this report, an effort has been made to present, in one document, the essential facts within the scope of this inquiry which have been developed by this and preceding investigations.



H. KENT HEWITT

REPORT BY ADMIRAL H. K. HEWITT

ON FURTHER

PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

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INTRODUCTION

PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS AND SCOPE OF THIS INVESTIGATION.

A. The Roberts Commission.

Pursuant to Executive Order dated 18 December 1941, a Commission, headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts, conducted an investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Commission reported its findings on 23 January 1942 and concluded:

"1. Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential to success in war and requires: First, the coordination of the foreign and military policies of the Nation; and, second, the coordination of the operations of the Army and Navy.

"2. The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan.

"3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.

"4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled their obligations by consulting and cooperating with each other, and with their superiors, respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier; and each knew of, and concurred in, the warnings and orders sent by the other to the responsible commanders with respect to such defense.

"b. The Chief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his command responsibilities by issuing a direct order in connection with his warning of probable hostilities, in the following words: 'Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.'

"6. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his command responsibility by issuing a warning and by giving a direct order to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, in the following words:

'This despatch is to be considered a war warning.'

and

'Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned.'

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"7. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area, in fulfillment of their obligation to do so, prepared plans which, if adapted to and used for the existing emergency, would have been adequate.

"8. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was to confer upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their joint defense plans.

"9. These commanders failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use existing plans to meet the emergency.

"10. The order for alert No. 1 of the Army command in Hawaii was not adequate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.

"11. The state of readiness of the Naval forces on the morning of December 7 was not such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.

"12. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations November 27, 1941, been complied with, the aircraft warning system of the Army should have been operating; the distant reconnaissance of the Navy, and the inshore air patrol of the Army, should have been maintained; the antiaircraft batteries of the Army and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well as additional antiaircraft artillery located on vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, should have been manned and supplied with ammunition; and a high state of readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon the warnings and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands in Washington.

"13. There were deficiencies in personnel, weapons, equipment, and facilities to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time, but these deficiencies should not have affected the decision of the responsible commanders as to the state of readiness to be prescribed.

"14. The warning message of December 7, intended to reach both commanders in the field at about 7 a.m. Hawaiian time, December 7, 1941, was but an added precaution, in view of the warnings and orders previously issued. If the message had reached its destination at the time intended, it would still have been too late to be of substantial use, in view of the fact that the commanders had failed to take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its anticipated receipt which would have been effective to warn of the attack or to meet it.

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\*15. The failure of the officers in the War Department to observe that General Short, neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief of Staff's message of that date, nor otherwise, had reported the measures taken by him and the transmission of two messages concerned chiefly with sabotage which warned him not to resort to illegal methods against sabotage or espionage, and not to take measures which would alarm the civil population, and the failure to reply to his message of November 29 outlining in full all the actions he had taken against sabotage only, and referring to nothing else, tended to lead General Short to believe that what he had done met the requirements of the warnings and orders received by him.

\*16. The failure of the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, to confer and cooperate with respect to the meaning of the warnings received and the measures necessary to comply with the orders given them under date of November 27, 1941, resulted largely from a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military and naval circles, and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the Pacific Fleet and our most important outpost.

\*17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department.

\*19. Causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were:

Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration of war by the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such laws and customs.

Restrictions which prevented effective counterespionage.

Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive action in the Far East, and on antisabotage measures.

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Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the antisabotage measures instituted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Nonreceipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the warning message of December 7, 1941.

"20. When the attack developed on the morning of December 7, 1941, the officers and enlisted men of both services were present in sufficient number and were in fit condition to perform any duty. Except for a negligible number, the use of intoxicating liquor on the preceding evening did not affect their efficiency.

"21. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors' orders without question. They were not responsible for the state of readiness prescribed."

B. Admiral Hart's Investigation.

Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses having knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.

C. Naval Court of Inquiry.

Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.

A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biese-meier, USN, as Judge Advocate, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944.



The Court of Inquiry concluded:

"Based on finding II, the Court is of the opinion that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules.

"Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the Constitutional requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, prevented the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking offensive action as a means of defense in the event of Japanese vessels or planes appearing in the Hawaiian area, and that it imposed upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which might be construed as an overt act.

"Based on Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations between Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., and Lieut. General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, were friendly, cordial and cooperative, that there was no lack of interest, no lack of appreciation of responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the part of either, and that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by the other for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree required by the common interest.

"Based on Finding VI, the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in personnel and material which existed during 1941, had a direct adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December.

"Based on Finding VII, the Court is of the opinion that the superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the U. S. Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, and the ability of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantage not attainable by the United States up to 7 December 1941.

"Based on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with the means provided the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. The Court is further of the opinion that the defense should have been such as to function effectively independently of the Fleet, in view of the fundamental requirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that of the vessels within its limits.

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"Based on Findings IV, VIII and IX, the Court is of the opinion that the duties of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U.S.N., in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor, were performed satisfactorily.

"Based on Finding IX, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed Naval Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed upon were complete and sound in concept, but that they contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning.

"The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer in view of the need for their employment with the Fleet.

"Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea and in the operating areas, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet, and that the steps taken were adequate and effective.

"Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated neither the possibility nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and bearing in mind that he had not knowledge of the State Department's note of 26 November, the Navy's condition of readiness on the morning of 7 December, 1941, which resulted in the hostile planes being brought under heavy fire of the ships' anti-aircraft batteries as they came within range, was that best suited to the circumstances, although had all anti-aircraft batteries been manned in advance, the total damage inflicted on ships would have been lessened to a minor extent and to a degree which is problematical; and that, had the Fleet patrol planes, slow and unsuited for aerial combat, been in the air, they might have escaped and the number of these planes lost might thus have been reduced.

"The Court is of the opinion, however, that only had it been known in advance that the attack would take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects, and that, beyond the fact that conditions were unsettled and that, therefore, anything might happen, there was nothing to distinguish one day from another in so far as expectation of attack is concerned.

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"It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned. The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is considered that it could not be known when an attack would take place and that, to make sure, it would have been necessary to impose a state of tension on the personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7 December.

"Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no information of any sort was at any time either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that Japanese carriers or other Japanese ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, the attack of 7 December at Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and that when it would take place was unpredictable.

"Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine, long-range reconnaissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of Fleet patrol planes for daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available, and was not justified in the absence of any information indicating that an attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time.

"Based on Finding XIV, the Court is of the opinion that the shore-based air warning system, an Army service under the direct control of the Army, was ineffective on the morning of 7 December, in that there was no provision for keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those friendly and those hostile and that, because of this deficiency, a flight of planes which appeared on the radar screen shortly after 0700 was confused with a flight of Army B-17s en route from California, and that the information obtained by Army radar was valueless as a warning, because the planes could not be identified as hostile until the Japanese markings on their wings came into view.

"Based on Finding XV, the Court is of the opinion that by far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to specially designed Japanese torpedoes, the development and existence of which was unknown to the United States.

"Based on Finding XVI, and particularly in view of the Chief of Naval Operations' approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made by Admiral Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October 1941, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's decision, made

after receiving the dispatch of 24 November, to continue the preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information then available to him.

"Based on Finding XVII, the Court is of the opinion that, although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise, there were good grounds for the belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere, and that the same considerations which influenced the sentiment of the authorities in Washington in this respect, support the interpretation which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the "war warning message" of 27 November, to the effect that this message directed attention away from Pearl Harbor rather than toward it.

"Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December, 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.

"The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken.

"Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service."



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Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, commented in detail on the findings of the Court of Inquiry in the Second Endorsement thereto. He concluded, in part:

"Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God", beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.

(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possession, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, particularly in the following respects:

(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.

(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain intercepted Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.

(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it

did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.

(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the "1:00 p.m. message" received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this message been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.

(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.

(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:

(1) He could have used patrol craft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.

(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.

(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been fully operational.

The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency."

#### 8. Army Pearl Harbor Report.

Pursuant to Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, an Army Board conducted investigation into the Japanese attack, and on 20 October 1944 submitted its report to the Secretary of War. The Army report discussed, among other things, various matters involving the Navy, such as the Navy's command relationships at Hawaii, the "tapping" of the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul in Hawaii by Naval Intelligence, information secured by Navy radio intelligence as to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces, the Navy's responsibility for long range reconnaissance ("The heart of the defense of Oahu"), and the entrance of Japanese submarines into Pearl Harbor on and allegedly prior to 7 December 1941. The Army report commented critically as to (a) the Navy's failure to conduct long range reconnaissance, (b) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of the presence of a Japanese task force in the Jaluits in late November 1941, (c) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of certain messages, relating to the destruction of codes by the Japanese during the first week of December 1941, and (d) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of the sinking of a Japanese submarine on the morning of 7 December 1941, prior to the air attack. The Army report included a finding that relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not satisfactory, as a practical matter, although cordial. Concerning intelligence generally, the Army report stated, at page 232:

"The Japanese armed forces knew everything about us. We knew little about them. This was a problem of all our intelligence agencies. This should not come to pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with the part which we are to play in world affairs.

"We must know as much about other major world powers as they know about us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent planning by those charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our security. Our intelligence service should be second to none in its efficiency. It must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M.I.D. It is a national problem.



"In the past our intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds, lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to correct all of these."

After consideration of the Army Pearl Harbor Report, Fleet Admiral King, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 3 December 1944, stated in part:

"The Army Board finds it difficult to understand the relations between the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the local Air Commander (Rear Admiral Bellinger). The Board makes the comment 'The Army had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility.' My comment as to this is that there are some unavoidable complexities in the Command relationships between a fleet, a frontier, and a fleet base in the frontier. However, in this case, there was no possibility of misunderstanding the fact that all naval forces were under Admiral Kimmel. He and General Short should have been able to work out better arrangements for cooperation than they did. The reasons why they did not have been discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5 above.

"The Army Board stresses the point that General Short was dependent upon the U. S. Navy for information as to what the Japanese Navy was doing and for estimates of what the Japanese Navy could do. This view is obviously sound. It was a naval responsibility to keep not only General Short but also the War Department fully acquainted with the estimate of the Japanese naval situation. There was some failure to pass on to General Short and the War Department information which should have been given to them by the Navy, but the basic trouble was that the Navy failed to appreciate what the Japanese Navy could, and did, do.

"The Army Board reports on three matters which should be further investigated by the Navy. These are:--

"a. It was stated that the War Department received information from some naval agency that on or about 25 November radio intercepts had located a Japanese task force, including carriers, in the Marshall Islands. About 1 December it was reported that this force assumed radio silence. It is noted in the Record that this information never got to General Short. There is some reference to this incident in the Record of the Naval Court, but it was not followed up, presumably because the officer who was Director of Naval Intelligence at the time was not called as a witness. The matter is probably not of importance, since even if there actually was a Japanese force in the Marshalls it apparently had nothing to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, for the sake of completing the naval Record, this matter should be pursued further.

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"b. The Army Board is of the opinion that Japanese midget submarines operated freely inside of Pearl Harbor for several days prior to the 7th of December, for the purpose of obtaining information. This opinion is based on the testimony of an official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who apparently reached his conclusions by a study of certain captured Japanese charts which were made available to F.B.I. by Naval Intelligence. So far as is known, there is no real ground for the supposition that Japanese submarines were able to roam around Pearl Harbor at will, but since the allegation is made in the Army Record, it is advisable to clear up any doubt that may exist by further naval investigation.

"c. There is reference to the fact that information was obtained from naval and F.B.I. espionage over telephones and cables in Hawaii, but no record of what this information was. This should be cleared up.

"The Army Board finds that the Chief of Staff of the Army was at fault in that he failed to keep General Short informed of the international situation and that he delayed in getting critical information to General Short. In these respects, the Army Report parallels the Naval Court findings as to the Chief of Naval Operations. The Army Board further finds that General Marshall was at fault and that he failed to keep his Deputies informed of what was going on, so that they could act intelligently in his absence; in that he did not take action on General Short's report on 28 November that he had established 'Alert No. 1'; and in that he lacked knowledge of conditions of readiness in the Hawaiian Command.

"The Army Board finds that General Short was at fault in that he failed to place his command in an adequate state of readiness (the information which he had was incomplete and confusing, but it was sufficient to warn him of tense relations), in that he failed to reach an agreement with local naval officials for implementing joint Army and Navy plans and agreements for joint action, in that he failed to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, and in that he failed to replace inefficient staff officers.

"I find nothing in the Record of the Army Board to cause me to modify the opinions expressed in my endorsement on the Record of the Naval Court of Inquiry, except in relation to the cooperation between Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In view of the extensive and explicit discussion of this phase of the matter by the Army Board, I am no longer of the opinion that cooperation between these two officers was adequate in all respects. The cordial, but informal, contact which they maintained evidently was not sufficient to coordinate the means at their disposal to the best advantage. However, as already pointed out, this fault was part and parcel of the

general blindness to Japanese potentialities in the Central Pacific which was the basic cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The many details discussed by the Army Board and the Naval Court are useful in showing how this blindness redounded to our disadvantage, but they do not, in my opinion, prove anything more than that the two naval officers in the high commands concerned -- Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel -- failed to display the superior judgment they should have brought to bear in analysing and making use of the information that became available to them.

"I recommend that the Secretary of the Navy cause further investigation to be made in the matter referred to in paragraph 8 above; namely, the alleged radio contact with a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands, the alleged presence of Japanese midget submarines inside Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December, and the substance of information obtained by naval and F.B.I. telephone and cable intercepts. I do not think it necessary to reconvene the Court for this purpose. The proposed investigation could be made by another Court, or by an investigating officer, for attachment to the Record of the original Court of Inquiry."

E. Findings of the Secretary of the Navy and Further Investigation.

Upon review of the previous investigations, the Secretary of the Navy found that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington. The Secretary further found that the previous investigations had not exhausted all possible evidence and that the investigation directed by Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress should be continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts should be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. The Secretary stated that his decision would be reviewed when the investigation was finally completed, in the light of the evidence then at hand.

The precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 2 May 1945, and amended 6 July 1945, directed that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, make a study of the previous investigations, that such further investigation as might appear to be necessary be then conducted, and that upon completion a report be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy setting forth the findings and conclusions reached.

Review of the previous investigations disclosed that various matters of importance, principally concerning intelligence, had not been investigated thoroughly. The subjects proposed for further investigation were approved by the Secretary of the Navy on 21 May 1945.

Counsel in this investigation was John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting were Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, III, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The reporters were Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR, and Chief Yeoman Raymond E. Reese, USNR. These men took a special oath to maintain the security of the information developed during the investigation.



F. Witnesses in this Investigation.

At Pearl Harbor in 1941:

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN,  
Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet. (R. 182)

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN,  
In charge of Communications Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District. (R. 43; R. 541)

Vice Admiral William W. Smith, USN,  
Chief of Staff, CincPac. (R. 335)

Vice Admiral Charles H. McMorris, USN,  
War Plans Officer, CincPac. (R. 293)

Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, USN,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations,  
CincPac. (R. 163)

Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, USN,  
Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings,  
Commander, Patrol Wing Two,  
Commander, Task Force Nine,  
Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. (R. 471)

Captain John B. Earle, USN,  
Chief of Staff, 14th N. D. (R. 451)

Mr. George Street,  
Manager, RCA, Honolulu. (R. 411)

Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN,  
District Intelligence Officer, 14th N. D. (R. 554)

Captain Thomas H. Dyer, USN,  
Cryptanalytical and Decrypting, Fleet Radio  
Unit, Pacific Fleet, (R. 418)

Captain Joseph Finnegan, USN,  
Translator, Fleet Radio Unit,  
Pacific Fleet. (R. 424)

Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN,  
Assistant Communications Officer, CincPac,  
on temporary duty with Com 14 Communications  
Intelligence Unit. (R. 442)

Lieutenant (jg) Farnsley C. Woodward, USN,  
Cryptanalyst, Communications Intelligence Unit,  
14th N. D. (R. 541)

ED  
Colonel Alva B. Laswell, USMC,  
Translator, Communications Intelligence Unit,  
14th N. D. (R. 541)

Captain William W. Outerbridge, USN,  
Commanding Officer, USS WARD. (R. 87)

Lieutenant Commander Monroe H. Hubbell, USNR,  
Commanding Officer, USS CONDOR. (R. 428)

Richard W. Humphrey, RM3c, USNR,  
Bishop's Point Radio Station.

Lieutenant Oliver H. Underkofler, USNR,  
Communications Office, 14th N. D. (R. 465)

Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, USNR,  
District Intelligence Office, 14th N. D. (R. 376)

Commander Harold S. Burr, USNR,  
Com 14 Liaison Officer at General Short's  
Headquarters. (R. 376)

Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA,  
Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department. (R. 387)

At the Philippines in 1941:

Captain Redfield Mason, USN,  
Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet. (R. 68)

Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, USN,  
Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit,  
Corregidor. (R. 68)

At Washington, D. C. in 1941:

Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, USN,  
Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence. (R. 389)

Captain Arthur H. McCollum, USN,  
In charge of Far Eastern Section, Foreign  
Branch, ONI. (R. 10)

Captain Laurance F. Safford, USN,  
Communications Security Section. (R. 97; R. 529)

Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN,  
ONI and Communications Security Section. (R. 128)

Mrs. Dorothy Edgers,  
Research Analyst, ONI. (R. 511)



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Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Brotherhood, USNR,  
Communications Security Section. (R. 143)

Lieutenant Frederick L. Freeman, USN,  
Communications Security Section. (R. 149)

Lieutenant Commander Allan A. Murray, USNR,  
Communications Security Section. (R. 433)

Lieutenant Commander George W. Linn, USNR,  
Communications Security Section. (R. 140)

Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, USNR,  
Communications Security Section. (R. 148)

Other witnesses:

Captain William R. Smedberg, III, USN,  
Now Assistant Combat Intelligence Officer,  
Staff, Cominch. (R. 4)

Lieutenant Commander Leo Reierstad, USNR,  
Now in charge of a translating unit in  
Op-16-FE. (R. 158)

Lieutenant (jg) Joseph M. Conant, USNR,  
Translation sub-section head in Op-16-FE. (R. 158)

Commander Walter Karig, USNR,  
Lieutenant Welbourn Kelley, USNR,  
Authors of "Battle Report." (R. 80)

Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Boone, USNR,  
Head of Op-20-GL. (R. 554; R. 607)

G. Exhibits Received in this Investigation.

Received in this investigation were the following exhibits:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Record Page</u>
1	Precept convening investigation.	1
1A	Modification of precept, directing report of findings and conclusions.	575
2	Narrative statement by counsel of previous Navy investigations.	2
3	CinCPOA Weekly Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 1944, relating to the attacking force.	5
4	A translation of a captured Japanese submarine chart, showing courses and location of U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor.	8
5	CinCPOA Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 20 October 1944, containing description of Japanese midget submarines.	9
6	ONI document "ONI 220-J, Japanese Submarines."	9
7	Berthing plan at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941 (Ex. 60 of Naval Court).	9
8	Photostatic copies of Com14 and Com16 dispatch estimates of Japanese fleet location and movements, 26 November 1941.	12
9	ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941, Japanese fleet locations.	17
10	McCollum memorandum estimating situation as of 1 December 1941.	21
11	"Battle Report."	22
12	FCC radio intercepts regarding "winds" code (Ex. 65 of Naval Court).	31
13	Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches.	56
14A:		
14B:	Photostatic copies of captured Japanese submarine chart,	
14C:	showing courses and location of U. S. ships in Pearl	
14D:	Harbor.	60
15	Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches (Ex. 63 of Naval Court).	66
16	Copies of dispatches sent from RI unit, Corregidor, regarding Japanese fleet movements.	75
17	Photostat of captured Japanese submarine chart used for Plate V of "Battle Report."	83

18	Log of conversation between WARD and CONDOR on the morning of 7 December 1941.	91
19	Tentative copies of Communication Intelligence Summaries, for 1 November 1941 to 6 December 1941, at Pearl Harbor.	103
20	Message from Tokyo-establishing the hidden word code.	135
21	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin of 27 November 1941 concerning composition of Japanese Navy.	185
22	Daily Communication Intelligence Summaries, 14 October 1941 to 5 December 1941, given to Fleet Intelligence Officer (Captain Layton) for delivery to Admiral Kimmel.	194
23	Memorandum of 1 December 1941 from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel, estimating Japanese ship locations.	211
24	November 24th dispatch from CNO to CincPac (Ex. 15 of Naval Court).	238
25	"War Warning" (Ex. 17 of Naval Court).	247
26	Layton Intelligence reports from 6 October 1941 to 2 December 1941.	259
27	Paraphrased copies of dispatches from various intelligence agencies delivered to CincPac.	264
28	Memorandum from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel regarding proposed Army aerial reconnaissance of Mandated Islands.	266
29	Intercepted Japanese consular dispatches delivered to Fleet Intelligence Officer about December 10th.	272
30	Two Japanese panorama views of Pearl Harbor with Japanese log on reverse side, recovered from submarine (returned to Captain Layton).	279
30A	Photostat of Japanese log on reverse of exhibit 30.	279
30B	Translations of exhibits 30 and 30A.	280
31	Panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor from position five miles south of Pearl Harbor, recovered from submarine (returned to Captain Layton).	280
31A	Photostats of exhibit 31.	280
32	Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from Japanese midget submarine (returned to Captain Layton).	281

32A	Photostat of exhibit 32.	281
33	Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from Japanese submarine, showing defensive installations (returned to Captain Layton).	290
33A	Photostatic copy of exhibit 33.	291
34	Staff Instructions, CincPac, 1941.	293
35	U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46).	295
36	Letter of 9 September 1941 from CNO to CincPac, approving Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five.	297
36A	Letter of 25 July 1941 from CincPac to CNO, submitting Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five.	297
37	Photostatic copy of schedules setting forth utilization of patrol planes of Pacific Fleet from 17 November to 31 December and approved 22 November 1941.	368
38	Transcripts of intercepted telephone calls of Japanese Consul and Vice Consul in Honolulu from October to 2 December 1941 (Consul's marked 38A; Vice Consul's marked 38B).	379
39	Copy of intercepted "Mori conversation."	382
40	ONI Summaries of messages sent by Japanese Consul in Honolulu from 1 December to 6 December 1941.	385
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THE WAR AND DEFENSE PLANS

A. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five.

On 26 July 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Exhibit 35) was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibit 36). The plan provided in part:

"INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION

"0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day."

"CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

"1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

NOTE: As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan." . . . . .

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

"1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:

"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East."

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action

"1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

"1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

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3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

"1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

- a. Capture of Guam.
- b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
- c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
- d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
- e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.
- f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

"1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

- a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
- b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.
- c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main base in Halmahera).
- d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.
- e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.
- f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area." . . . .



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"PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN - MISSION

"2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U.S. Pacific Fleet:

- a. SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST BY DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM THE MALAY BARRIER, THROUGH THE DENIAL AND CAPTURE OF POSITIONS IN THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH RAIDS ON ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS;
- b. PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLAND AREA, AND TO ESTABLISH AN ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN TRUK;
- c. DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;
- d. SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155° EAST;
- e. DEFEND SAMOA IN CATEGORY 'D';
- f. DEFEND GUAM IN CATEGORY 'F';
- g. PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES;
- h. PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE EASTERN HEMISPHERE BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;" . . . .

"CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE  
ASSIGNED MISSIONS

"2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:



- IFIED
- a. PHASE I - Initial tasks - Japan not in the war.
  - b. PHASE IA - Initial tasks - Japan in the war.
  - c. PHASE II, etc., - Succeeding tasks.

"2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

- a. COMPLETE MOBILIZATION AND PREPARE FOR DISTANT OPERATIONS; THEREAFTER MAINTAIN ALL TYPES IN CONSTANT READINESS FOR DISTANT SERVICE.
- b. MAINTAIN FLEET SECURITY AT BASES AND ANCHORAGES AND AT SEA.
- c. TRANSFER THE ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT, IF ORDERED.
- d. TRANSFER THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, IF ORDERED.
- e. ASSIGN TWELVE PATROL PLANES AND TWO SMALL TENDERS TO PACIFIC SOUTHERN AND A SIMILAR FORCE TO PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, ON M-DAY.
- f. ASSIGN TWO SUBMARINES AND ONE SUBMARINE RESCUE VESSEL TO PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER ON M-DAY.
- g. PROTECT THE COMMUNICATIONS AND TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE BY PATROLLING WITH LIGHT FORCES AND PATROL PLANES, AND BY THE ACTION OF STRIKING GROUPS AS NECESSARY. IN SO DOING SUPPORT THE BRITISH NAVAL FORCES SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155° EAST.
- h. ESTABLISH DEFENSIVE SUBMARINE PATROLS AT WAKE AND MIDWAY.
- i. OBSERVE, WITH SUBMARINES OUTSIDE THE THREE MILE LIMIT, THE POSSIBLE RAIDER BASES IN THE JAPANESE MANDATES, IF AUTHORIZED AT THE TIME BY THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.
- j. PROSECUTE THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEFENSE OF SUBSIDIARY BASES AT MIDWAY, JOHNSTON, PALMYRA, SAMOA, GUAM AND WAKE, AND AT CANTON IF AUTHORIZED.
- k. CONTINUE TRAINING OPERATIONS AS PRACTICABLE.
- l. MOVE THE MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE PORTION OF SECOND MARINE DIVISION TO HAWAII FOR TRAINING IN LANDING OPERATIONS.
- m. GUARD AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK BY JAPAN.

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"PHASE IA

"2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:

- a. CONTINUE TASKS OUTLINED IN 2202 a,b,g,h, and k.
- b. ACCOMPLISH SUCH OF THE TASKS IN 2202 c,d,e,f, and j AS HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETED.
- c. MAKE AN INITIAL SWEEP FOR JAPANESE MERCHANTMEN AND ENEMY RAIDERS AND TENDERS IN THE NORTHERN PACIFIC.
- d. CONTINUE THE PROTECTION OF THE TERRITORY AND COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS, AND OF THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, CHIEFLY BY COVERING OPERATIONS.
- e. 1. MAKE RECONNAISSANCE AND RAID IN FORCE ON THE MARSHALL ISLANDS.  
2. IF AVAILABLE CRUISERS AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, MAKE CRUISER RAIDS AGAINST JAPANESE SHIPPING IN WATERS BETWEEN NANSEI SHOTO AND NANPO SHOTO.
- f. ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN MAXIMUM PRACTICABLE SUBMARINE PATROLS AGAINST JAPANESE FORCES AND COMMUNICATIONS NEAR THE JAPANESE HOMELAND.
- g. MAINTAIN AIR PATROLS AGAINST ENEMY FORCES IN THE APPROACHES TO OAHU AND OUTLYING BASES.
- h. ESCORT IMPORTANT SHIPPING, INCLUDING TROOP MOVEMENTS, BETWEEN THE HAWAIIAN AREA AND THE WEST COAST.
- i. ROUTE SHIPPING IN THE FLEET CONTROL ZONE WHEN ESTABLISHED.
- j. AUGMENT THE LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES OF THE HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AS NECESSARY.
- k. MOVE FROM SAN DIEGO TO HAWAII THE REMAINING UNITS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE SECOND MARINE DIVISION.
- l. PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE MARSHALL ISLAND AREA."

"PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)

"3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

"3142. ON W-DAY TRANSFER TWELVE PATROL PLANES AND TWO TENDERS TO EACH OF THE PACIFIC SOUTHERN AND PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS. CONTINUE ADMINISTRATION OF THESE FORCES AND ROTATE DETAIL AT DISCRETION.

"3143. PERFORM TASKS ASSIGNED IN THE PATROL AND SWEEPING PLAN (ANNEX I)." . . . .

"PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS  
PHASES I AND IA

Section 1. Phase I

United States Pacific Fleet  
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship  
Place  
Date

Operation Plan

No. 1-R5." . . . .

- "1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five.
2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan." . . . .

"ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet,  
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship  
Place  
Date

Patrol and Sweeping Plan." . . .

- "1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

Phase I.

This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

- (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
- (b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
- (c) Covering.
- (d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
- (e) Routing shipping." . . .

'3. (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).

(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.



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(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-1)." . . .

4. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange L4ND-JCD-42.

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and FOURTEENTH Naval District (L4ND-JCD-42), was signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit ). The plan was based on the joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by mutual cooperation which was to apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy would operate in coordination until and if the method of unity of command were invoked. The tasks assigned were as follows:

"14. TASKS.

a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces."

The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" (Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu).

The plan provided that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for the following:

"17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

a. The beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.



b. An antiaircraft and ~~gas~~ defense intelligence and warning service.

c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D.C.A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.a.), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18. e.

i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by 'Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'.

j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

O. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

a. An inshore patrol.

b. An offshore patrol.

c. An escort force.

d. An attack force.

e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D.C.A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D.C.A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

i. Distant reconnaissance.

j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i., a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

O. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

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p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto."

C. Annex VII. Section VI. to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated 28 March 1941, and approved by Admiral Bloch and General Short 2 April 1941, (Exhibit 47), dealt with joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobilization for war, there were adopted the following agreements:

Paragraph II, in respect of joint air operations, provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things, that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations.

Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, the arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, and Army Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and, "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable."

FIELD

Joint Estimate Covering Army and Navy Air Action in the Event of Sudden Hostile Action Against Oahu.

On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph I of the estimate included a "Summary of the Situation," which indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained, uncertain, and varying; that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action; and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service.

Paragraph II of the estimate embraced a "Survey of Opposing Strengths," indicating, among other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.

Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." It stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two; that it appeared the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack, most likely launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. It was further pointed out that a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust; that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier;" and that in a dawn air attack there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using.

Paragraph IV of the estimate considered "Action Open to Us." It was stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period, and, as a practicable measure, could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence



indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was made to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred.

Paragraph V contained "Decisions." The primary decision was that the Naval Base Defense Air Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. A number of subsidiary decisions were made, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and, in accordance with current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons.



N. Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41, and Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan.

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Admiral Bloch, as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation Plan No. 1-41, on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit 53 of the Naval Court). The Task Organization prescribed was: (a) Destroyer Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol) consisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, and an A/B boom and minesweepers, (b) Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two) in conjunction with the Army, (c) Anti-aircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) in conjunction with the Army, (d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer) in conjunction with the Army. This plan directed attention, among other things, to the Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, and stated:

"By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as necessary for the joint protection of Pearl Harbor Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

"In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.

Assumptions.

- (a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:
- (1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.
  - (2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.
  - (3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.
- (b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:
- (1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area - probable.
  - (2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR - possible.
  - (3) A combination of these two - possible."

Annexed to Operation Plan 1-41 were: A detailed Inshore Patrol Plan, called Annex "A;" a detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, called Annex "Baker;" a detailed Anti-aircraft Defense Plan, called Annex "C;" a detailed Harbor Control Post Plan, called "D;" and a detailed Communications Plan, known as Annex "Easy."

Annex "Baker," the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, dated 9 April 1941, was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. It divided the Task Organization into (a) Search and Attack Group, consisting of patrol squadrons and other planes, including Army reconnaissance squadrons, and (b) an air combat group. This plan was made in accordance with the Joint Estimate, dated 31 March 1941, which is digested above. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was, according to this plan, to

locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against Oahu or Fleet units in the operating areas. The plan was effective upon receipt and became operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness, prescribed in Addendum Two to this plan, would be taken as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (ComFOURTEEN) for Navy units. The condition of material readiness was to be signified by a letter, such as "E," signifying that all aircraft were conducting routine operations and none were ready for the purposes of this plan, and the condition of operational readiness by a number, such as "5," signifying that all types of available planes would be ready in four hours. It was also required that a dispatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day, be made by each unit assigned by this plan to a task group, stating the number of planes and readiness.

F. Pacific Fleet Letter on Security of the Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in February, 1941 and reissued in revised form on 14 October 1941.

This order provided that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

Security measures were prescribed covering:

A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.

B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships, other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed by Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

C. Sortie and entry.

D. Operating areas.

E. Ships at sea.

F. Ships in port.

The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the principal Army anti-aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense battalions would assist the Army in manning them; and provided that in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; it prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further provided that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire; and that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval

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Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclusive of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding drills, etc.

Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:

"Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."

The procedure to be followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack was also set forth: the Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie order, sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc.; and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.

The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. It was provided that the ship attacked was, among other things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details; various actions were to be taken by other ships; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It was further provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack," that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."



G. Execution of Plans Prior to 7 December 1941.

(1) The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow 5 provided that the day of execution of the plan was to be designated as W-Day, and that the day upon which hostilities opened with Japan would be J-Day, which might or might not coincide with W-Day. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, W-Day had not been designated.

(2) The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan had been signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. It will be recalled that under this plan the method of coordination of Army and Navy effort was "by mutual cooperation" and not "unity of command." It will be recalled further that under this plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the Naval forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and protect shipping therein; and to support the Army forces; and, that the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.

(3) Annex VII, Section 6 of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which provided for joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations and for the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when Navy forces were insufficient), was to become effective when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action. No such agreement was made prior to the attack on December 7th.

(4) The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, which provided for an Inshore Patrol consisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, and an A/B boom and minesweepers, a Base defense air force, anti-aircraft defense, and a harbor control post, although effective as to the inshore patrol was not in operation as to the base defense air force.

(5) The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, dated 9 April 1941, which was an annex to the Naval Base Defense Force Plan and which had been made in accordance with the joint estimate of Bellinger and Martin, dated 31 March 1941, was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without a signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu and it might have been made operative by dispatch. It was not made operative until the attack on 7 December 1941.

(6) The Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which recognized the possibility of a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor and which set forth security measures including patrols to be conducted both by destroyers and by aircraft, was in effect during 1941, and in revised form after 14 October 1941.



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H. Admiral Kimmel's Views as to the Possibility of a Surprise Air Attack.

It appears from the War and Defense Plans, above summarized, that it was believed that prior to a declaration of war there might be a surprise attack by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor or a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas. The possibility of a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor had been expressed as early as 24 January 1941 by the Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of War (Exhibit 64), a copy of which was received by Admiral Kimmel shortly after he assumed command of the Pacific Fleet. In that letter, the Secretary of the Navy wrote:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor . . . The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probabilities are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."

In his testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel indicated some confusion as to his agreement with and his evaluation of the above letter by the Secretary of the Navy. He testified that he had felt that the most probable form of attack on Pearl Harbor was by submarine, and that a bombing attack was the second most probable, but that he had been of the view that there was no danger of an air torpedo attack because the water was too shallow. He then corrected his testimony, characterizing his previous testimony as erroneous, and stated that he had regarded an air attack as no more than a possibility.

It appears clearly that Admiral Kimmel at all times during his command of the Pacific Fleet was of the view that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility. Thus, in a letter by Admiral Richardson, prepared in collaboration with Admiral Kimmel, on 25 January 1941 (Exhibit 70, Naval Court), it was stated in part that the security of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated on certain assumptions, including an assumption that Japan might attack without warning and the further assumption that Japanese attacks might be expected against shipping, outlying positions, or naval units, and that surprise raids on Pearl Harbor were possible. Again, in a letter of 18 February 1941, concerning the adequacy of local defense (Exhibit 30, Naval Court), Admiral Kimmel stated, "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility." And, as previously pointed out, the Fleet Security Letter, reissued on 14 October 1941, predicated the security of the Fleet on two assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. This, Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court, referred to a surprise air attack.

In connection with Admiral Kimmel's statement before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he thought there was no danger of an air

torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor because the water was too shallow, several letters from the Chief of Naval Operations should be noted:

On 15 February 1941 (Exhibit 49, Naval Court), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac regarding anti-torpedo baffles for protection against attacks on Pearl Harbor. This stated that the shallow depth of water limited the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor and the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles. The letter indicated that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed necessary successfully to drop torpedoes from planes and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. There were various other considerations stated. The recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief were especially desired. A similar letter was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of various Naval Districts, including the Fourteenth, on 17 February 1941 (Exhibit 54, Naval Court).

The reply to the request for recommendations and comments was made on 20 March 1941, in a letter by Admiral Bloch, stating that the depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet, and for that and other reasons, he did not recommend anti-torpedo baffles. CincPac agreed, until such time as a light efficient net were developed.

In June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter to the Commandants of Naval Districts, copy to CincPac and others, referring to recent developments, and to experience at Taranto, which stated that no minimum depth of water could be assumed safe as regards torpedo attack if there were sufficient water around a ship to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo, but that such an attack in 10 fathoms or more was more likely than in shallow water (Exhibit 55, Naval Court). The torpedoes at Taranto, it was said, were launched in thirteen to fifteen fathoms although some may have been in eleven.

Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion that there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor - and that even after the June letter, he did not think that torpedoes would run in such shallow water. He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl Harbor. He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be made because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and did not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason.

I. Adequacy of Forces to Carry Out Tasks Assigned.

The adequacy of forces assigned to the Pacific Fleet for carrying out the tasks assigned in the war plans was the subject of testimony before both Admiral Hart and the Naval Court of Inquiry. From the testimony it appears that although there were shortages concerning which Admiral Kimmel had extensive correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations, there was general agreement by the witnesses to the effect that the Fleet was considered adequate to carry out the initial tasks assigned in the war plans. The initial tasks, it will be recalled, were primarily defensive in nature. As will appear subsequently in this report, the number of fleet patrol planes in the Hawaiian area was not sufficient to enable a 360 degree reconnaissance to be flown daily from Oahu for more than a few days, but was sufficient for air reconnaissance of the more dangerous sectors to have been flown for at least several weeks. To this extent, therefore, the patrol planes assigned to the Pacific Fleet were a limiting factor as to the Fleet's ability to carry out one of the initial tasks assigned in the war plans, namely, to "maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches of Oahu . . ."

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan stated that the Navy, through ComFOURTEEN, would provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu. Admiral Bloch had no air forces assigned to him and had to rely upon the Fleet planes, which were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, for the accomplishment of this task. Thus naval patrol planes could be and were used for long distance reconnaissance from Oahu only when they were made available by Admiral Kimmel for that purpose.

J. Command Organization.

(1) Methods of Coordination Between Army and Navy Commands.

According to "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935," (Exhibit 6, Naval Court), the operations of Army and Navy forces were to be coordinated by one of two methods:

- (a) Mutual cooperation, or,
- (b) The exercise of unity of command.

(2) Coordination Between Army and Navy Commands in Hawaii.

The command organization in the Hawaiian area was designed to function through "mutual cooperation" between the Army and Navy. This was the normal method of coordination according to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy (Exhibit 6, page 5), and applied to the defense of Pearl Harbor as well as the entire Hawaiian area.

(3) Desirability of Unity of Command.

(a) Unity of Command for Hawaii considered in Washington.

Admiral Stark testified before the Naval Court that, prior to 7 December 1941, he had given much thought to the question of unity of command in Hawaii but that no satisfactory solution or decision had been reached as far as the Navy Department was concerned. It had been the topic of many conversations with the Chief of Staff of the Army, but it was anticipated only for amphibious operations (page 29, Naval Court). He and the Chief of Staff of the Army could have placed unity of command into effect at Hawaii, subject to the approval of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy (page 39, Naval Court). However, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy" (Exhibit 6, Naval Court) does not indicate that the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy would have been required.

(b) Unity of Command for Hawaii considered at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in mutual agreement with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, could have placed unity of command in effect in Oahu (Naval Court, page 39; Exhibit 6, page 5). Admiral Kimmel testified (Roberts Commission, page 538; Naval Court, page 296) that he had never had any discussion with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the desirability of putting unity of command into effect in the Hawaiian area, but did state that where command is vested in one agency, much better results can be obtained than when responsibility is divided.

Admiral Kimmel testified that so far as the authority of ComFOURTEEN to accomplish unity of command was concerned, ComFOURTEEN did not have the authority without reference to him and that he would not have approved this nor accepted the responsibility for Army action without reference to the Navy Department.



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Under the Naval Base Defense Plan (Exhibit 53, NC), unity of command was vested in the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force over all offensive air operations and under the Army Air Commander for all defensive air operations, but only after the plan had been activated.

(c) Weakness of "Mutual Cooperation."

(i) Air Command. Admiral Bellinger testified that the weakness of the air defense plan was that there was no one officer in command until after the plan was activated. The Bellinger-Martin estimate (Exhibit 49) he believed to be sound, but said that it lacked sanction and that the missing sanction was unity of command.

(ii) Recommendation of Joint Command Center. In an endorsement dated 6 December 1941 from the Director, Radio Liaison Division, to the Director, Naval Districts Division, advocating a combined operating center for the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor (which was not established prior to the attack), Admiral Hooper stated "The most perfect set-up for command is one in which the supreme commander is exercised by one officer best equipped of any for the task . . . Because our defense is under two officers, Army and Navy, we must try and arrange matters so that when component parts of the commands are interwoven these two can function as nearly as possible as one." (Exhibit 77).

The recommendation for a Joint Command Center in Hawaii was originated by a dispatch from OpNav to ComFOURTEEN on 15 October 1941 (Exhibit 77), requesting that consideration be given to the construction of a combined operating center sufficient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and Navy in Hawaii. An informal joint working committee had been formed in Washington to endeavor to improve cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities by the formation of joint command centers. A reply to the above-mentioned dispatch strongly recommending against such a move is contained in a letter from ComFOURTEEN to CNO, via CincPac, enclosing a letter from General Short to ComFOURTEEN and an endorsement by CincPac.

General Short stated that while he was strongly in favor of combined operating centers for equivalent units of Army and Navy forces, he did not believe that all of the operating centers should be combined into one single building, because it was necessary that Army headquarters be located in separate command posts for efficiency of individual operation. It was also undesirable from the communication and security standpoint. He suggested that, as an alternative, additional space for Navy units be constructed adjacent to the existing command posts for equivalent Army units.



In the basic letter (Exhibit 77) ComFOURTEEN recommended that no steps be taken to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building and believed that the best interests of the CinC Pacific Fleet would be served by one building with only agencies of the Fleet therein.

The CinC Pacific Fleet in his endorsement to this letter stated that the mission of the Army and the Fleet were considerably different, the operation of one being defensive and local, while the operations of the other were offensive and far-flung. Strategic, rather than tactical, cooperation was indicated and therefore the necessity for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick decision was of less importance. He was of the opinion that the establishment of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii was not only unnecessary, but definitely undesirable.

(4) Disagreement concerning Unity of Command at the Outlying Islands.

The evidence in the previous investigations and in this investigation indicates that there was some consideration of unity of command at outlying islands during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. This occurred as a result of dispatches by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac on 26 November 1941 (Exhibits 18 and 40, Naval Court), in which it was advised that the Army had agreed to reenforce Midway and Wake with Army personnel and to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and 25 at Wake provided that Admiral Kimmel considered this feasible and desirable. It was stated that it would be necessary for Admiral Kimmel to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to Midway and Wake on aircraft carriers, that the planes would be flown off at destination and that the ground crews would be landed in boats. Admiral Kimmel was directed to confer with the Commanding General concerning this matter, and to advise as soon as practicable.

It appears that this subject was considered at some length in conferences held by Admiral Kimmel on and after 27 November 1941. The discussion of unity of command as to these islands was summarized by Vice Admiral Smith in his testimony in this investigation. He said that Admiral Kimmel asked the Army what he could expect of Army fighters at Wake, and that General Martin of the Army Air Force replied that the Army did not allow such planes to go more than 15 miles offshore. Admiral Kimmel then stated that the Army planes were, therefore, no good to him.

General Short stated that if he manned those islands, he must command them and "Kimmel replied, 'Over my dead body. The Army should exercise no command over Navy bases.' General Short replied, 'Mind you, I don't want these islands. I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I must put planes and troops on them, then I must command them.'" (Page 352, record of this investigation).

CLASSIFIED Admiral Kimmel's concern over the question of command at the outlying islands was indicated by his dispatch of November 28th to the Chief of Naval Operations, advising of the proposed reenforcement of Midway and Wake with Marine fighter planes and that he would investigate more thoroughly the feasibility and practicability of relieving them with Army planes. In this dispatch he stated, "All outlying forces must be exclusively under Naval command" (Exhibit 76, Naval Court). Similarly, in a letter of 2 December 1941 to Admiral Stark (Exhibit 50 of the Naval Court), Admiral Kimmel advised that the dispatches in regard to the use of Army personnel were being given earnest consideration, that he believed Admiral Stark would subscribe to the principle that all these outlying islands must be under Navy command and the forces there subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief without any qualifications whatsoever, and that he expected some difficulties along this line when Army personnel were injected into the picture unless a very clear directive were issued jointly by the War and Navy Departments.

It appears that Midway and Wake were reenforced with squadrons of Marine planes, and that therefore, unity of command under the Navy, actually existed at those islands. No solution of the command problem, in the event of possible future inclusion of Army forces, was reached.

## FINDINGS

1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or excluding Japan.
2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and raids on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, including the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.
3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases, at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory of the Associated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the establishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding against surprise attack by Japan.
4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, which, it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hostilities opened with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack.
6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans. The method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until and unless unity of command were invoked.
7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol the coastal zone (which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu), and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support the Army forces.
8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for distant reconnaissance.

9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.

10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.

11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided, among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations.

12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan also provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its aircraft warning service, and that prior to the completion of that service, the Navy, through the use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as might be practicable.

13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take steps to make available to the other the air forces at his disposal, in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the plan.

14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect any agreement prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI, in operation.

15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided, among other things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of the assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there might be a surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a combination of both forms of attack was possible.

16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of



fast ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.

17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex "Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provision for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The Plan was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime conditions of readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, for Navy units.

18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that a single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, including provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.

20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of 7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.



22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of threatening naval forces"; that initial action would include "possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other outlying United States positions"; and that the initial Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and that submarines in the Hawaiian area. . . ." (Underscoring supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.

23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility. Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a serious probability.

24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial. However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operating setup which could ensure the constant and timely exchange of information, decisions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the establishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.

25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in connection with a proposal for reenforcement of Wake and Midway by Army planes. General Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, the command must be his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases must remain with the Navy. The islands were reenforced with Marine planes.

II

JAPANESE ESPIONAGE AT  
HAWAII

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TOP SECRET

The center of Japanese espionage at Hawaii was the Japanese Consulate General located in Honolulu. As a matter of regular routine, information was collected by the Consulate General concerning the location and movements of United States ships in and around Pearl Harbor and concerning defense preparations. This information was forwarded by the Japanese Consulate General to Tokyo and elsewhere in coded messages sent via commercial communication companies. A collection of such messages, which has been decrypted and translated, appears in Exhibit 13 of this investigation and in Exhibit 63 of the Naval Court. This collection of messages does not include every such message, but does fully illustrate the type of espionage reports which were made. Subsequent to the attack, the incoming and outgoing message log of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was recovered and translated. These logs indicate the nature of all of the communications to and from the Japanese Consulate General and show the frequency with which espionage reports were sent by the Consul during 1941. A copy of the log is set forth in Exhibit 62 .

It is to be noted that the espionage reports submitted during 1941 by the Japanese Consulate General became increasingly more detailed and, in the first week of December, 1941, indicated the likelihood of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The possession of all of those messages by the American intelligence services prior to the attack would have been of inestimable value. Some of them, as will appear later, were obtained prior to the attack. Those obtained, however, although indicating Japanese interest in the location and movements of ships in and from Pearl Harbor, did not include those messages, particularly during the first week of December, 1941, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. It may also be noted at this point that those Consulate messages which were obtained prior to 7 December 1941 were decrypted and translated in Washington but not at Pearl Harbor.

Illustrative of the type of message sent earlier in 1941 is a report from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 10 March 1941, which describes various vessels seen in Pearl Harbor (Translated by Navy, April 5 - Document 1, Exhibit 13). The Japanese interest in the location of ships in particular areas of Pearl Harbor is demonstrated by a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 24 September 1941, requesting reports of vessels in five sub-areas of Pearl Harbor, and requesting reports of warships and aircraft carriers at anchor and tied up at wharves, buoys and docks. Particular request was made for mention of the fact when there were two or more vessels alongside the same wharf (Army translation, October 9 - Document 2, Exhibit 13). The Japanese Consul at Honolulu established a code to refer to the location of vessels in particular areas (Navy translation, October 10 - Document 3, Exhibit 13). Tokyo on 18 November 1941 requested a report on vessels anchored in certain areas and it directed that the investigation be made with great secrecy (Army translation, December 2 - Document 9, Exhibit 13). A report was sent by Honolulu to Tokyo on 18 November 1941 setting forth the warships in the harbor in certain areas, commenting on the

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presence or absence of aircraft carriers, and describing in detail the course of certain destroyers which were observed entering the harbor (Army translation, December 6 - Document 10, Exhibit 13). On November 20th, Tokyo requested a comprehensive investigation of the Fleet bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation (Army translation, December 6 - Document 7, Exhibit 13).

On 24 November 1941, Honolulu reported to Tokyo concerning the Fleet practice of leaving Pearl Harbor, conducting maneuvers, and returning, that the Fleet had not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers at Lahaina Road, that destroyers and submarines were the only vessels anchored there; that battleships seldom entered the port of Hilo, Hanalei or Haneo; that virtually no one had observed battleships in maneuver areas; and, stated that the Fleet maneuvered for one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest and pointed out that aircraft carriers maneuvered by themselves. This also mentioned the times when cruisers and other ships left Pearl Harbor and how long they were away, and generally how long they remained at Pearl Harbor when anchored there (Army translation, December 16 - Document 23, Exhibit 13).

On November 28th, Tokyo requested intelligence, which was described as being of major importance, concerning the movements of battleships out of the harbor, pointing out that if such movements were reported but once a week, the vessels could have traveled far, and that Honolulu was to use its own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements. As to capital ships, it was requested that reports of the entrance or departure and length of time at anchor from the time of entry into port until departure be made (Army translation, December 8 - Document 13, Exhibit 13). On November 28th, Honolulu reported to Tokyo concerning the B-17 planes at Midway and range of anti-aircraft guns, observations of maneuvers by troops, prospective reinforcements of troops at Honolulu during December or January, and advised of the presence of a cruiser usually about 15,000 feet south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance of the harbor (Army translation, December 8 - Document 16, Exhibit 13).

The messages sent by the Japanese Consul during the week of 1 December to 7 December 1941, are of particular significance. A message of December 1st reported on ship maneuvers and described the place where maneuvers were held as about 500 nautical miles southeast of Oahu, and stated the reasons why that conclusion had been reached. This message set forth the "usual" schedule for departure and return of the battleships and stated that they left on Tuesdays and returned on Fridays, or left on Friday and returned on Saturday of the following week, and that all ships stayed in port about a period of one week. In view of their importance, five other messages sent during the first week in December, 1941, are quoted in full

"From: Tokyo (Togo)  
To: Honolulu  
December 2, 1941 (translated by Army 30 December 1941)  
J-19

#123 (Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of

utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets."

"From: Honolulu (Kita)  
To: Tokyo  
3 December 1941 (translated by Navy 11 December 1941)  
(PA-K2)

#245 (in 2 parts, complete)  
(Military Secret).

From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3  
Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Signal</u>
Battleship divisions : Preparing to sortie:	1
including scouts and :	:
screen units :	:
<hr/>	
A number of carriers' : Preparing to sortie:	2
<hr/>	
Battleship divisions : All departed be-	3
: tween 1st and 3rd :	:
Carriers : Several departed :	:
: between 1st and 3rd:	4
<hr/>	
Carriers : All departed be-	5
: tween 1st and 3rd :	:
<hr/>	
Battleship divisions : All departed be-	6
: tween 4th and 6th :	:
<hr/>	
Carriers : Several departed :	7
: between 4th and 6th:	:
<hr/>	
Carriers : All departed be-	8
: tween 4th and 6th :	:
<hr/>	

2. Signals.

I. Lanikai Beach House will show lights during the night as follows:



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	<u>Signal</u>
One light between 8 and 9 p.m.	1
" " " 9 and 10 p.m.	2
" " " 10 and 11 p.m.	3
" " " 11 and 12 p.m.	4

II.

Two lights " 12 and 1 a.m.	5
" " " 1 and 2 a.m.	6
" " " 2 and 3 a.m.	7
" " " 3 and 4 a.m.	8

(Part 2)

III. Lanikai Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House will indicate the following:

<u>Times</u>	<u>Signal</u>
1900 - 2000	3
2000 - 2100	4
2100 - 2200	5
2200 - 2300	6
2300 - 2400	7
0000 - 0100	8

V. K.G.M.B. Want Ads.

- A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.
- B. CHIC..CO farm etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.
- C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40' N., longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

<u>Time</u>	<u>Signal</u>
From 7 - 2	3 or 6
From 8 - 9	4 or 7
From 9 - 10	5 or 8."

"From: Honolulu  
 To : Tokyo  
 5 December 1941 (translated by Navy 10 December 1941)  
 (PA-K2)

#252

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239 arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

- 8 battleships.
- 3 light cruisers.
- 16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and  
 - - - - - were in dock."

"From: Honolulu  
 To: Tokyo  
 December 6, 1941 (translated by Army 8 December 1941)  
 PA-K2

#253 Re the last part of your #123.

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually

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made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation."

-----  
"From: Honolulu.  
To: Tokyo  
December 6, 1941 (translated by Army 8 December 1941)  
PA-K2

#254.

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were \_\_\_\_\_ and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm."

F I N D I N G S

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26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the frequent transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations.

27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indicated the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C. prior to the attack; that others which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were, with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be decrypted there before December 7th; and, that three messages intercepted by Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department for decryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had been able to obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage reports sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.



### III

#### NAVAL INTELLIGENCE AND EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO THE ATTACK

##### A. The Organization of Naval Intelligence in General: Sources of Information, and Relations with the Pacific Fleet.

The Office of Naval Intelligence, which was under the Chief of Naval Operations, consisted of two main branches - Domestic and Foreign. The Domestic Branch had to do with internal espionage and other subversive activities of foreign nationals or organizations inimical to national and particularly naval welfare. It maintained branch offices in various of the principal cities of the United States, including Honolulu. The Foreign Branch was organized into a number of sections, of which one was the Far Eastern Section. The Director of Naval Intelligence was Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Jr. The officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Branch was Commander Arthur H. McCollum.

The primary sources of information which the Far Eastern Section had were Naval Attache reports from Japan and China, observers' reports from various ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet and from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, including reports as to radio intelligence, and reports of investigations conducted by the domestic branch of ONI, particularly from Honolulu, and State Department reports at Washington. A most important part of the information provided to the Far Eastern Section was supplied by a unit at Washington known as OP-20-G. This was under the command of Commander Laurence F. Safford and supplied information obtained from communication or radio intelligence. This section was staffed both by Communications officers and Intelligence officers. The information received by OP-20-G was supplied to Lt. Comdr. Alvin D. Kramer of ONI, who was working with that section, and was transmitted by him to the head of the Far Eastern Section and to the Director of Naval Intelligence.

The section known as OP-20-G was concerned with the interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese messages. In addition it was responsible for furnishing the Navy's own codes and ciphers and for the supervision of the security of the Navy's own communications. Japanese messages were intercepted by various methods, including radio interception by a number of radio intercept stations located in the United States, which transmitted the Japanese communications, as intercepted by them, to OP-20-G for decryption and translation. In addition to reports from intercept stations located in the United States, this section received reports from communication intelligence units located at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. This unit was concerned with the plans and intentions of foreign governments, principally Japan, and with intelligence relating to naval operations in the Atlantic. The communications intelligence organization at Pearl Harbor, which had subsidiary stations at Oahu, Midway, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor, was concerned primarily with the dispositions and

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plans of naval forces in the Pacific and with surveillance of Japanese naval communications. The communications intelligence unit in the Philippines, which was located at Corregidor, was concerned with Japanese naval communications and Japanese diplomatic communications. The Officer in Charge of the communications intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was Lt. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort. The officer in charge of the communications intelligence unit at Corregidor until September, 1941 was Lt. Comdr. Rudolph J. Fabian. He remained thereafter assisting that unit.

Japanese diplomatic communications were in various codes, such as the code known as the "purple" code, the "red" code, the "J-19" code, the "PAK 2" code, and the "LA" code. The so-called "purple" code contained the most important Japanese diplomatic messages. Messages in this and in other diplomatic codes were intercepted and read at the Philippines primarily for the purpose of local information. They were sent, as intercepted, to the Navy Department in one of the Navy's own codes. All intercepted diplomatic traffic was sent to Washington whether or not it was deciphered and read at the Philippines. None of this information was sent from the Philippines to Pearl Harbor. The unit at Pearl Harbor was intercepting and decrypting no Japanese diplomatic traffic. It had been directed to concentrate on Japanese naval systems. The unit at Washington was charged with the general control of the units at Corregidor, Pearl Harbor, and at Washington, and handled the Japanese diplomatic systems and also handled some Japanese naval systems.

Intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic received by the Washington unit was pooled with similar traffic intercepted by the Army and was decrypted and translated by the Navy and the Army on an alternate day basis. The resulting information was distributed daily by ONI to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to others in the Navy Department. The President and the State Department similarly were furnished this information daily.

It appears that, although the Navy enjoyed considerable success in decrypting Japanese diplomatic communications, the Japanese naval codes were not being read. Information obtained by radio intelligence, therefore, from Japanese naval traffic was based almost entirely on so-called "traffic analysis" and not upon reading of the messages themselves.

The units at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines advised the Washington unit of the results of their traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and of the estimated location and movement of Japanese naval forces, and also exchanged information with one another on that subject. The units also exchanged information on technical subjects, that is, pertaining to codes and ciphers and keys for decyphering codes.

Information developed from the reading of the "purple" messages was not sent to the Pearl Harbor unit as such. It does appear, however, that various of the warning messages and other dispatches sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based upon information derived from the Japanese diplomatic messages.

Thus it appears that the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet as to the status of diplomatic relations with Japan depended primarily upon the messages sent to him by the Chief of Naval Operations. The information received by the radio intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, however, brought directly to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet daily by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, as was other material of an intelligence nature.

B. The Approach of War: Intercepted Communications Available at Washington, and Messages Sent by CNO to Admiral Kimmel.

It should be noted that the Japanese communications which were intercepted and decoded and translated by the War and Navy Departments, as set forth in this section, were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. Various of the messages sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Chief of Naval Operations were based on these Japanese communications.

(1) The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and October 16th dispatch.

On 16 October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a dispatch to Cinclant, CincPac and CincAF (Exhibit 13, Naval Court), reading as follows:

"THE RESIGNATION OF THE JAPANESE CABINET HAS CREATED A GRAVE SITUATION X IF A NEW CABINET IS FORMED IT WILL PROBABLY BE STRONGLY NATIONALISTIC AND ANTI AMERICAN X IF THE KONOYE CABINET REMAINS THE EFFECT WILL BE THAT IT WILL OPERATE UNDER A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL NOT INCLUDE RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE US X IN EITHER CASE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA ARE A STRONG POSSIBILITY X SINCE THE US AND BRITAIN ARE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY JAPAN FOR HER PRESENT DESPARATE SITUATION THERE IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY THAT JAPAN MAY ATTACK THESE TWO POWERS X IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBILITIES YOU WILL TAKE DUE PRECAUTIONS INCLUDING SUCH PREPARATORY DEPLOYMENTS AS WILL NOT DISCLOSE STRATEGIC INTENTION NOR CONSTITUTE PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AGAINST JAPAN X SECOND AND THIRD ADEES INFORM APPROPRIATE ARMY AND NAVAL DISTRICT AUTHORITIES X ACKNOWLEDGE"

On 17 October 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 38, Naval Court). In this letter, Admiral Stark advised that things had been "popping" here for the last twenty-four hours, but from the dispatches Admiral Kimmel knew about all that they did. He said, "Personally, I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the 'possibility;' in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably. Perhaps I was wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."



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Admiral Stark continued that Admiral Kimmel would recall that in an earlier letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, Admiral Stark had said that his own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. In this letter he said that he thought this whole thing worked up together. He stated that efforts would be made to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it could be kept going, he did not know, but the President and Mr. Hull were working on it. To this letter was annexed a postscript, stating in part, "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships as far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."

Also annexed was a memorandum of 17 October 1941, by Rear Admiral Schuirmann, estimating the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet. The substance of this analysis was that the military would determine Japanese action whether to attack Russia or move southward, and would make that decision on the basis of opportunity and what they could get away with, and that it would not be determined by the cabinet in power.

(2) Japanese messages concerning German attitude: Nomura's desire to resign.

On 18 October 1941, the Navy translated an intercepted Japanese communication from Berlin to Tokyo, dated 1 October 1941, which stated that the Germans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japan's position, particularly because Japan was not advising Germany of the negotiations with the United States, although the United States was advising England (Document 4, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

A Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 16 October 1941, was intercepted and translated on 17 October 1941. In this Toyoda advised Nomura that although he had been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-United States negotiations, he had, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early in October, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent revival of the movement for revision of the neutrality act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message that if the Roosevelt Administration continued to attack the Axis powers, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany, Italy, and the United States, which, under the Three-Power Agreement, might lead Japan to join immediately the war against the United States. It was indicated that such a message was being considered and there were reasons which would not permit of postponement (Document 3, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).



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On 22 October 1941, Nomura sent a message to Tokyo which was intercepted and translated on 23 October 1941, in which he said that he was sure that he, too, should go out with the former cabinet; that he knew that the Secretary of State realized how sincere he was and yet how little influence he had in Japan; that there were some Americans who trusted him and who said that things would get better for him, but that their encouragement was not enough; that among his confreres in the United States there were some who felt the same way, but they were all poor deluded souls; that the instructions could be carried out by Wakasugi; that Nomura did not want to be the bones of a dead horse; that he did not want to continue "this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people;" that he was not trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor, that was the only way open for him to tread; and that he sought permission to return to Japan (Document 5, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

On 23 October 1941, a message from Tokyo to Washington of the same date was intercepted and translated, which stated that the efforts Nomura was making were appreciated; that, as he was well aware, the outcome of those negotiations had a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government would proceed; that as such it was an exceedingly important matter; that they were placing all of their reliance on Nomura's reports for information on this matter; that for these reasons they hoped that he would see fit to sacrifice his personal wishes and remain at his post (Document 6, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

(3) Action taken by Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Kimmel advised, in a letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 14, Naval Court), that the action taken included maintaining two submarines for patrol at Midway, dispatching twelve patrol planes to Midway, preparing to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, and to replace the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor, sending two submarines to Wake, and sending additional Marines and stores there, dispatching additional Marines to Palmyra, placing Admiral Pye and his ships on twelve hours notice, getting six submarines ready to depart for Japan on short notice, putting some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

On 7 November 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 74, Naval Court) in reply to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 22nd. He stated, among other things, "O.K. on the dispositions which you made in connection with recent change in the Japanese cabinet. The big question is - what next?!" Also, "Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets 'worsen and worsen'! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever -- particularly if one party cannot live with the setup. It doesn't look good."

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(4) The first Japanese deadline message: Japanese interest in American ships.

On 5 November 1941, the Navy translated a message from Tokyo to Washington, reading as follows:

"(Of utmost secrecy).

"Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

"This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only."

During the first half of November, there were translated in Washington various intercepted Japanese communications concerning ships and planes at Manila and Seattle (Documents 1-8, Exhibit 68, Naval Court). According to one of these messages, which was dated 5 November 1941, the Navy General Staff wanted investigation done at Manila as to the conditions of airports, types of planes and numbers of planes there, warships there, machinery belonging to land forces, and the state of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

(5) Arrival of Kurusu: Stark and Marshall recommendations as to ultimatum.

The situation existing early in November was summarized by Nomura, in a report to Tokyo, dated 10 November 1941, intercepted on November 12th (Document 8, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) by reference to a report from the legal adviser to the Japanese Embassy, who had conferred with Senator Thomas and Secretary Hull, that the United States was not bluffing, that if Japan invaded again, the United States would fight with Japan, that psychologically the American people were ready, that the Navy was ready and prepared for action. Nomura also reported that he had a conversation with "a certain Cabinet member" who had said that Nomura was indeed a dear friend, that he would tell him alone this: that the American government was receiving reports that Japan would be on the move again and did not believe that Nomura's visit to the President or the coming of Kurusu would have any effect on the general situation. Nomura said that he had explained how impatient the Japanese had become since the freezing, how eager they were for a quick understanding, how they did not desire a Japanese-American war, and how they hoped for peace until the end. The Cabinet member replied, however, that the President and Secretary of State believed "those reports."

Nomura also said that his friend had stated that the United States could not stop because if Japan moved, something would have to be done to save the "face" of the United States.

Admiral Stark was not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan would come from Kurusu's visit. His opinion was that it would be impossible to reconcile the Japanese and American views. Admiral Stark so advised Admiral Kimmel by letter dated 14 November 1941 (Exhibit 39, Naval Court). With this letter, Admiral Stark also sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of a memorandum, dated 5 November 1941, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall, for the President. This was concerned with the belief of Chiang-Kai-Shek that a Japanese attack on Kuming was imminent and that outside military support was the sole hope for the defeat of that threat. The memorandum considered whether the United States would be justified in undertaking offensive operations against the Japanese to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. The memorandum stated that the Fleet in the Pacific was inferior to the Japanese Fleet and could not undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. It pointed out that by the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines would become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The recommendations were in general that all aid short of war be given to China and that no ultimatum be given to Japan.

(6) Further and Final Japanese "deadline messages."

At this time, information was received in Washington that the Japanese Government had established a further and final deadline for the completion of diplomatic negotiations. This consisted of two messages from Tokyo to Washington, which were intercepted and translated by the Army, as follows:

(a) A translation on 17 November 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), of a dispatch, dated November 16th, the highlights of which were:

"... The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

"What you say is of course so ... but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725 (in which Togo says that conditions within and without Japan will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States) ... try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient ... the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how



short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution."

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(b) On 22 November 1941 (Document 11, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), a translation of a dispatch of the same date, reading in substance:

"To both you Ambassadors.

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you - twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."

(7) The November 24th dispatch to CincPac and others.

On 24 November 1941 (Exhibit 15), a dispatch (which before the Naval Court Admiral Stark said was based in part on the "deadline" intercept - page 775), was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF, CincPac, ComELEVEN, ComTWELVE, ComTHIRTEEN, and ComFIFTEEN for action, reading:

"CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL X THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY X CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS DISPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION ADDRESSEES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS X UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPLICATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PRECIPITATE JAPANESE ACTION X GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY"



TOP SECRET

On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 47, Naval Court), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel in response to his letter of 17 October 1941, on the inadequacy of local defense forces in Hawaii (Exhibit 46, Naval Court). Admiral Stark stated that CincPac had taken cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and that the forces available in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and local defense forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile forces would indicate the numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks. Admiral Stark's letter continued by summarizing the situation in regard to increasing the local defense forces and, among other things, pointed out that the Department had no additional airplanes available for assignment to the FOURTEENTH Naval District. A marginal note on a copy of this letter, apparently written in Hawaii, stated, "In other words, look to the Fleet. They seem to forget that the Fleet has offensive work to do."

On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 16, Naval Court), Admiral Stark also wrote a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel stating, among other things, that Admiral Stark agreed with Admiral Kimmel that, for example, to cruise in Japanese home waters, Admiral Kimmel should have a substantial increase in the strength of his fleet, but pointed out that neither ABC-1 nor Rainbow-5 contemplated this as a general policy; after the British strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious occasions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters might present themselves, but this would be the exception rather than the rule. A postscript to this letter stated that both Mr. Hull and the President confirmed the gravity of the situation indicated by the message which Admiral Stark sent a day or two before. It stated further that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack; that from many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us; and there were some who thought it likely to occur. Admiral Stark further stated: "I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not the time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely .... I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing - I think it is more likely to be anything."

(8) Dispatches concerning reenforcement of Wake and Midway.

On 26 November 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 40, Naval Court) was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac stating that the Army had offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station, if Admiral Kimmel considered that desirable; also, that the Army proposed to prepare, in Hawaii, garrison troops for advance bases which Admiral Kimmel might occupy, but was unable to provide any anti-aircraft units. Admiral Kimmel was instructed to take this into consideration and

advise when practicable the number of troops desired and recommended armament.

Also on 26 November 1941, another dispatch (Exhibit 18) was sent to CincPac, which stated that in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use, OpNav had requested the Army, and the Army had agreed, to station twenty-five Army pursuits at Midway and a similar number at Wake, provided CincPac considered this feasible and desirable; that it would be necessary for CincPac to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on aircraft carriers, and that the planes would be flown off at destination; that ground personnel would be landed in boats and essential spare parts, tools and ammunition would be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels; that the Army understood that these forces must be quartered in tents; that the Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies; that the stationing of these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to the Philippines; and, that additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. A question was raised as to whether or not Navy bombs at outlying positions could be carried by Army bombers which might fly to those positions in order to support Navy operations. CincPac was directed to confer with the Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable.

(9) Intercepted Japanese communications of November 26th and 27th.

On November 26th and 27th, there were available in Washington additional intercepted Japanese messages, all of which had been sent from Tokyo, as follows:

(a) A Navy translation on 27 November 1941 (Document 14, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message to Nanking, dated 15 November 1941, in the so-called "Purple" code, addressed to "Naval authorities" which stated:

"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while."

(b) A Navy translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 13, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, stating that:

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) if it is Japan - U.S. relations, 'HIGASHI',
- (2) Japan - Russia relations, 'KITA',
- (3) Japan - British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N.E.I.), 'NISHI'.

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"The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco."

(c) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 9, Exhibit 68, Naval Court), of a message to Manila, dated 20 November 1941, in the "purple" code, marked "Strictly Secret" and stating:

"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of draft --- presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay." (Near Manila, P.I.)

"Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo."

(d) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 12, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 26 November 1941, in the "purple" code, which stated:

"To be handled in Government Code.

"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your request to him. At that time we will use the following code:" (Codes were then set forth.)

(10) The State Department note of November 26th and Japanese reaction thereto; the war warning of November 27th.

The diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese representatives, Nomura and Kurusu, came to a head on 26 November 1941. At that time, the State Department presented a proposal to the Japanese and that Department reported to the Navy Department, among others, that it had no further hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Japanese reaction to this proposal appears from dispatches which were subsequently decrypted and translated. They are as follows:

(a) An Army translation (Document 17, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message from Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, dated 26 November 1941, in the "purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," which stated:

"At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

"HULL said, 'For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on



the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th.<sup>1</sup> So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called 'four principles.'

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggressive treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

"In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands, and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so."



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(b) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message from Washington to Tokyo, dated 26 November 1941, in the "purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," Message #1180, reading:

"From NOMURA and KURUSU.

"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our 'B' proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

"In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire back instantly."

(c) An Army translation (Document 18, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 28 November 1941, in the "purple" code, reading:

"Re your #1189.

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can."  
(Note: The man is the Navy Minister.)

On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from CNO, which has been termed the "war warning." It read:

"THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING X NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN LOOKING TOWARD STABILIZATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC HAVE CEASED AND AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY JAPAN IS EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS X THE NUMBER AND EQUIPMENT OF JAPANESE TROOPS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL TASK FORCES INDICATE AN AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITION AGAINST EITHER THE PHILIPPINES (printed in ink, "Thai") OR KRA PENINSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNEO X EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATORY TO CARRYING OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL 46 X INFORM DISTRICT AND ARMY AUTHORITIES X A SIMILAR WARNING IS BEING SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT X SPENAVO INFORM BRITISH X CONTINENTAL DISTRICTS GUAM SAMOA DIRECTED TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES AGAINST SABOTAGE"

(11) The dispatch of November 28th:

On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th (Exhibit 19, Naval Court), which repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:

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"NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITY THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE X JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT X IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT X THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE X PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT REPEAT NOT TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT X REPORT MEASURES TAKEN X A SEPARATE MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO G-2 NINTH CORPS AREA RE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES X SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN X LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS"

The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further:

"UNDERTAKE NO OFFENSIVE ACTION UNTIL JAPAN HAS COMMITTED AN OVERT ACT X BE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL 46 SO FAR AS THEY APPLY TO JAPAN IN CASE HOSTILITIES OCCUR"

(12) Intercepted diplomatic communications.  
November 29 to December 6, 1941.

On 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message from Tokyo to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated 29 November 1941 (Document 19, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), requesting that they make one more attempt to discuss the situation with the United States, and to state that the United States had always taken a fair position in the past; that the Imperial Government could not understand why the United States was taking the attitude that the new Japanese proposals could not be the basis of discussion, but instead had made new proposals which ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government; that the United States should be asked what had become of the basic objectives that the United States had made as the basis for negotiations for seven months; and that the United States should be asked to reflect on the matter. The emissaries were directed in carrying out this instruction to be careful that this did not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.

Also on 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation from Kurusu in Washington to Yamamoto in Tokyo, in which a telephone code was used (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). This indicated that Kurusu expected a long message ("probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals"); that the President was returning apparently because of the speech of the Japanese Premier which Kurusu said was having strong repercussions here; that Kurusu said that unless the Premier and others used greater caution in speeches, it would put the Japanese emissaries here in a very difficult position; that care should be exercised, that Yamamoto said that they were being careful; that Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister told that the emissaries here had expected to hear something different - some good word - but instead got this (the Premier's speech); that the Japanese-American negotiations were to continue; that Yamamoto wanted them to be stretched out; that Kurusu needed Yamamoto's help to do this, and that both the Premier and the Foreign Minister would need to change the tone of their speeches and that all would have to use some discretion; that Yamamoto said the real problem that the Japanese were up against was the effect of happenings in the South.

There were four significant Japanese communications intercepted on 1 December 1941, as follows:

(a) Navy translation - (Document 21, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
1 December 1941  
(Purple CA)  
#865 Re my #857

" 1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)

" 2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

" 3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter."



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(b) Army translation - (Document 22, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo

To: Berlin

November 30, 1941

Purple

#986 (Strictly Secret (To be handled in Government Code)  
(Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)

"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer

centinus negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause."

(Part 2 of 2)

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China - they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

(c) On 1 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, dated 30 November 1941 (Document 6, Exhibit 13), which in substance stated:

The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north.... Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

(d) Army translation - (Document 23, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington (Nomura)  
To: Tokyo  
November 28, 1941  
Purple  
#1214 To be handled in Government Code.

"Re my #1190.

"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like

this are appearing in the papers: 'Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese', and 'America Scorns a Second Munich.' The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

"This we must carefully note."

On 3 December 1941, there was available the Army translation of a report by Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated 2 December 1941 (Document 25, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which stated:

"Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. Thereupon we said: 'Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th.' The Under-Secretary then said: 'I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world.' Thereupon we replied: 'The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights or wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation. Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny.' Under-Secretary WELLES said: 'I am well aware of that.' I continued: 'We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in

the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve.' The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: 'The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here.' Then he continued: 'In regard to the opinion that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary.' I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233."

There were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest available on 4 December 1941, as follows:

(a) Navy translation - (Document 26, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo  
To: Hsinking  
1 December 1941  
(Purple)  
#893

"... In the event that Manchuria participates in the war... in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

"A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.



2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However, the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

(b) Navy translation - (Document 27, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington  
To: Tokyo  
1 December 1941  
(Purple)  
#1227

(This raised the question of a possibility of a conference between persons in whom the leaders have confidence to have the make one final effort to reach some agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway point, such as Honolulu... It was said that this last effort might facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.)

(c) Navy translation - (Document 29, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
3 December 1941  
(Purple)  
#875 Chief of Office routing.

"Re your #1232

"Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

"There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have

increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement."

(d) Navy translation - (Document 31, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington  
To: Tokyo  
3 December 1941  
(Purple)  
#1243

"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the consuls."

On 5 December 1941, there were available translations of additional intercepted Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic negotiations, as follows:

(a) Army translation - (Document 33, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington  
To: Tokyo  
3 December 1941  
(Purple)  
#1243

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."

(b) Navy translation - (Document 34, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Washington  
To: Tokyo  
1 December 1941  
(Purple)  
#1225

(This is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives with Secretary Hull on December 1st, which referred to the Japanese Premier's speech, the President's return, Japanese troop movements, and apparent agreement as to the impossibility of reaching an agreement.)

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(13) Intercepted Japanese espionage messages between  
29 November and 6 December 1941.

During this period there were available to the Navy and to the Army in Washington translations of intercepted Japanese espionage reports concerning Manila, San Francisco and Honolulu. From these it appeared that the Japanese were interested in the movements of ships to and from those ports. The messages relating to Honolulu were as follows:

(a) On December 3rd, the Navy Department translated a communication from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 15 November 1941 (Document 24, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which stated that since relations between Japan and the United States were most critical, the "Ships in the harbor report" should be made irregularly but at the rate of twice a week and that extra care should be taken to maintain secrecy.

(b) On December 5th, there was available at the War Department a translation of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 18 November 1941, requesting reports on vessels in certain areas of Pearl Harbor, and directing that the investigation be made with great secrecy (Document 37, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

(c) Also available on December 5th at the Navy Department was a translation of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 29 November 1941, stating that reports had been received on ship movements, but in the future Honolulu was also to report even when there were no movements (Document 36, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).

(d) On December 6th, there was available at the War Department a translation of a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 18 November 1941, (Document 40, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), reporting on ships anchored in Pearl Harbor and in certain areas of the harbor, and pointing out that the Saratoga was not in harbor and that the Enterprise or some other vessel was in a particular area. This message also reported on the course of certain destroyers which had been observed entering the harbor.

(14) Intercepted message advising of fourteen-part  
reply by Japanese and first thirteen parts of reply - 6 December 1941.

On 6 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese communication (Document 38, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), from Tokyo to Washington, which read:

\*1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

"2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."

Also on 6 December 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which had been sent from Tokyo to Washington in the Japanese diplomatic code. It may be noted that the translations of parts 8 and 9 of the reply which were originally indicated as Navy translations were corrected so as to indicate that they were translated by the Army. These 13 parts which are not set forth here, but particularly part 13, disclosed that the Japanese were of the view that the American proposal, viewed in its entirety, could not be accepted by the Japanese as a basis of negotiations.

The message concerning delivery of the Japanese reply, and the first thirteen parts of that reply, were received in the Navy Department by 3 p.m. on 6 December 1941. After decryption and translation by about 9 p.m. on December 6th, they were distributed by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to the White House and to the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of War and Secretary of State apparently also received copies and a meeting was called of the three Secretaries for ten o'clock on the following morning.

(15) Communications intercepted on 7 December 1941.

The Japanese communications which were translated and available on the morning of 7 December 1941 included the following:

(a) From: Washington (Nomura)  
To: Tokyo  
December 3, 1941  
Purple (Urgent)  
#1256. Re your #875

"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending



upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to - even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once."

(b) From: Washington  
To: Tokyo  
December 6, 1941  
Purple (Urgent)  
#1272

"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the 'introducing' at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us -----(MESSAGE INCOMPLETE)-----"

(c) From: Budapest  
To: Tokyo  
December 7, 1941  
LA  
#104 Re my #103

"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

"Relayed to Berlin."

(d) Navy translation - (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
7 December 1941  
(Purple-Eng)  
#902 Part 14 of 14

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."

(e) Army translation - (Document 41, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 7, 1941  
Purple(Urgent - Very Important)  
#907 To be handled in government code.  
Re my #902.

"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time."

(16). Delivery of Part 14 and the 1 p.m. message and action taken.

The evidence indicates that Part 14 of the Japanese reply, which required decoding but not translation, was received between 0305 and 0700 on 7 December 1941, and that it and the first 13 parts were distributed

by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to Admiral Stark's office between 0900 and 0930, and then to the White House and to the State Department. The "1 p.m. delivery message" was not distributed at this time. Kramer testified that he returned to the Navy Department at about 10:20 and found that message and certain other messages, such as a message which directed the destruction of Japanese codes, still on hand and another which thanked the Ambassador for his services. This material, Kramer testified, was delivered to Admiral Stark at about 10:30, and then to the White House and to the State Department.

The evidence indicates that the "1 p.m. message" was decrypted and was available in Japanese in the Navy Department prior to 0700 on 7 December 1941, and that because there was no Japanese translator on duty it was sent to the Army for translation at about 0700. It is not clear when the Army returned the translation of that message. Kramer stated that it was not in the Navy Department when he left to distribute the fourteen-part reply between 0900 and 0930 that morning, but that he found it upon his return to the Navy Department at about 10:20. It would appear, therefore, that the Army returned its translation of the "1 p.m. message" some time between 0900 and 1020 on 7 December 1941. It further appears that several hours' advance notice of the contents of that message may have been lost because there was no Japanese translator on duty at the Navy Department on that Sunday morning, and because it was necessary to wait for an Army translation.

Prior investigations developed the fact that, after consultation with Admiral Stark that morning, General Marshall sent a message to various Army commands, including the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. The message read:

"Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

The prior investigations also developed the fact that the Army radio was unable to raise Hawaii that morning and accordingly sent that message by commercial cable in code. The message, according to General Short's prior testimony, was received by the Signal Officer at Hawaii at 1145, and decoded some four hours after the attack.

Whether or not the Army message would have reached the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, prior to the attack if a Navy translator had been on duty on the morning of 7 December 1941, or if the Army had immediately translated and returned the "1 p.m. message," is speculative. It is, moreover, also speculative as to what action might have been taken by General Short or Admiral Kimmel had they received that Army message prior to the attack.

SECRET

(17) Messages sent to Admiral Kimmel between  
29 November and 7 December 1941.

The messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel during this period dealt primarily with the destruction of codes by the Japanese and with the advisability of destruction of United States codes at Guam. The messages are discussed subsequently in this report.

(18) Admiral Kimmel's failure to transmit information  
to subordinate commanders.

It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his investigation that Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor on 5 December 1941 with a powerful force consisting of the Lexington, Chicago, Portland, and five destroyers, to deliver a squadron of planes to Midway. He testified that on that mission he gave no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding preparation for war, other than the ordinary routine. He said that he never saw, nor was he ever informed of the contents of the October 16th dispatch concerning the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, of the November 24th dispatch advising of the possibility of a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, or the November 27th war warning. He said that except for what he read in the newspapers, he did not learn anything during the period November 26th to December 5th which indicated the increased danger of hostilities with Japan.

Admiral Bellinger, who was commander of Task Force Nine, consisting of the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified in this investigation that he never saw nor did he learn the contents of the October 16th, November 24th, or November 27th dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations.



C. The Interception of Japanese Telephone and Cable Messages.

It appears that in Washington, D.C., the Navy was receiving information obtained from intercepted Japanese telephone and cable messages. For example, on 30 November 1941, the Navy decrypted and translated a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation in code between Kurusu in Washington and Yamamoto in Tokyo (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). And, on 10 October 1941, the Navy decrypted and translated a cable message from Honolulu to Washington, in which a code was established for reporting the location of vessels in Pearl Harbor, which message had been photographed in the cable office in Washington and thus obtained by the Navy (Document 3, Exhibit 13).

For many months prior to the attack, the Office of Naval Intelligence at Honolulu had been tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul and of the Japanese Vice Consul. For a period of time also the home telephones of these officials had been tapped. The taps on the lines of the Consulate were removed on 2 December 1941 by direction of Captain Mayfield, who was then the District Intelligence Officer. The evidence indicates that he took this action because he was fearful that the existence of such telephone taps would be discovered by the Japanese Consul. His fear arose from the fact that an FBI tap on the lines of a Japanese official of the NYK Line had been detected by a telephone company employee who had advised the District Intelligence Office of this. A representative of the District Intelligence Office subsequently had informed the local FBI office. It was learned that the FBI office had complained to the telephone company concerning the disclosure of its tap. In light of this situation, Captain Mayfield directed that the Navy taps be removed.

It appears that no important military information was intercepted by means of the Navy Intelligence taps on the lines of the Japanese Consulate General. Exhibits 38A and 38B of this investigation consist of photostatic copies of the notes made of the telephone conversations over the Japanese Consul General's line and the Japanese Vice Consul's line during the period 1 October 1941 to 2 December 1941.

Subsequent to 2 December 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation apparently continued its telephone taps and in this fashion on or about 5 December 1941 learned the contents of a telephone conversation between a man named Mori in Hawaii and a person in Japan. The fact of this conversation was brought to the attention of the District Intelligence Officer, and on 6 December 1941, a transcript of the conversation was furnished to him and arrangements were made for a representative of the District Intelligence Office to listen to the recording of the telephone conversation; this, however, was not done until after the attack. A transcript of the telephone conversation, with marginal notes made by the District Intelligence representative after the attack, is Exhibit 39 of this investigation. It may be noted that it appears from prior investigations that this conversation was brought to the attention of General Short

on the evening of 6 December 1941, and apparently nothing could be made out of it and no action was taken concerning it. There is no evidence indicating that this telephone conversation was brought to Admiral Kimmel's attention prior to the attack.

In the conversation, there was mention of the flights of airplanes daily, the number of sailors present, the attitude of local Japanese, the local construction projects, the size of the local population, the precautionary measures taken at night time, the use of searchlights at night, the emphasis in Honolulu newspapers on the southern advance of Japan into French Indo-China, the visit of Kurusu, the local climate, the visit of Litvinoff, the Russian Ambassador, the recent return of a Japanese from Honolulu to Japan, and the number of Japanese in the United States Army. The person in Japan inquired for information about the United States Fleet. Mori stated that he knew nothing about the Fleet, and that since they tried to avoid talking about such matters they did not know much about the Fleet. He said he didn't know whether all of the Fleet had gone, but that the Fleet present seemed small, and it seemed that the Fleet had left. The person in Japan then inquired whether that was so and what kind of flowers were in bloom in Hawaii. Mori stated that the flowers in bloom were the fewest out of the whole year, however that the hibiscus and the poinsettia were in bloom. He later stated that the Japanese chrysanthemums were in full bloom.

There is some reason to believe that the statements concerning flowers in the Mori telephone conversation were the use of code words indicating the absence or presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. In this connection, the Operation Order for the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 3) provided for the use of a radio broadcast code in which the statement "The cherry blossoms are in all their glory" would signify that there were "No warships in Pearl Harbor." This lends support to the theory advanced by representatives of the District Intelligence Office in their testimony to the effect that the primary purpose of the Mori telephone conversation over the trans-Pacific radio was to provide information to Japanese Fleet units which would be listening in on that frequency.

The espionage reports submitted by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu have been previously discussed. It will be recalled that in those coded messages considerable information was given of the movement of ships and location of ships in Pearl Harbor and of defense preparations at Oahu. Certain messages sent during the first week of December, 1941, indicated the likelihood of an attack by air on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu transmitted its messages via commercial companies using the various communications companies alternately. During the month of November, the McKay Radio Company handled the messages primarily, and during the month of December, 1941, RCA was transmitting the messages.

Prior to December, 1941, efforts had been made by the District Intelligence Officer to get access to the files of the communications companies and thus to secure copies of the Japanese Consul General's messages. These efforts were without success, in view of the legal prohibitions against the disclosure of such messages. During a visit by Mr. Sarnoff, President of RCA, the District Intelligence Officer requested him to cooperate with the Navy by making such messages available, and pointed out the importance to the country of giving the Navy access to such messages.

On 5 December 1941, RCA Communications, at Honolulu, turned over to Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer, copies of some messages which had been sent by the Japanese Consul via RCA on the third and fourth of December. These messages, with the exception of a few unimportant plain language messages, were in code. Captain Mayfield turned them over to the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, headed by Lieutenant Commander Rochefort, for decryption and translation. That organization had not been working on Japanese diplomatic traffic. Efforts were immediately made to decrypt and to translate those messages. The messages so received by Captain Mayfield and turned over to the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation were not identified in any record made at the time. Lieutenant Woodward, who did the decryption of them, has identified, to the best of his recollection, the messages received on December 5th as those set forth in Exhibit 56 and at pages 7-11 of Exhibit 56A of this investigation.

Various Japanese codes were used in the messages, including the "IA" code, which was the simplest and evidently the least important. The messages in that code, and the plain language messages, were decoded and read prior to the attack. The "IA" code messages so read are pages 1-5 of Exhibit 56. They contained no important military information. One, for example, reported the departure of a transport and another related to the cost of sending families home to Japan.

The testimony of Lieutenant Woodward, who decrypted the messages, of Colonel Lasswell and Captain Finnegan, who translated various of the messages, of Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the unit, and of Admiral Mayfield, who was District Intelligence Officer, indicate that no information of military importance was obtained prior to the attack from any of the Japanese Consulate's messages. It has been testified that various of the other messages received on 5 December 1941 were in a Japanese code known as the "PA" or "PA-K2" system and that efforts to decrypt these were not successful until after the attack. These messages, as identified by Lieutenant Woodward, will be found at pages 6-23 of Exhibit 56 (supplied by the Radio Intelligence Unit) and at pages 7-12 of Exhibit 56A (supplied by the District Intelligence Office). They were as follows:

(1) December 3rd to Tokyo - Advising that a freighter in military service departed on the second and that a named ship arrived on the third (p. 10, Exhibit 56A).

(2) December 3rd to Tokyo - Advising that the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders left port. The balance of the message was not recovered (p. 8, Exhibit 56A).



(3) December 3rd to Tokyo - In connection with the handling of expenses for steamer passage to Japan.

(4) December 3rd to Tokyo - Advising of a change in method of communicating by signals, so that each of the numbers one to eight had a certain meaning as to departures and dates of departure of ships, which numbers were to be communicated by lights in beach houses, by the use of a sailboat, by certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and by bonfires at certain points if the previous signals could not be made (p.12, Exhibit 56).

(5) December 3rd to Tokyo and elsewhere - Regarding money taken in for sale of tickets (p. 16, Exhibit 56).

(6) December 3rd to Tokyo - Advising that the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders departed the third (p.22, Exhibit 56).

(7) December 3rd to Tokyo and San Francisco - Advising that a transport had sailed for the Mainland and that a ship had arrived from San Francisco (p.20, Exhibit 56).

A photostatic copy of the December, 1941, bill of RCA Communications at Honolulu, covering the Japanese Consul General's messages in November and December, 1941, was received from the District Intelligence Office at Honolulu (Exhibit 55). This indicates that there were four radiograms sent on November 2nd, two on November 13th, four on December 1st, and two on December 2nd. The testimony concerning these is to the effect that they were not received or read prior to the attack, that they were received later and were thought to be in more complex codes, probably machine codes, as there were no indicators by which they could be identified.

It further appears from Exhibit 55 that there were various other radiograms charged to the Japanese Consul General for December 4th and 5th, and three for December 6th. The testimony concerning these indicates that none was obtained prior to the attack.

The two messages listed on the RCA bill for December 4th, according to Lieutenant Woodward, were among a group of messages received on the night of December 7th (p.4-5, Exhibit 56A). It was later learned that one advised Tokyo that an English gunboat arrived on the third and departed and that the sailors had come ashore and had received mail at the British Consulate; the other advised that a light cruiser had departed hastily on the fourth (Exhibit 57).

The five radiograms listed on the RCA bill for December 5th were received after the attack and were actually two messages to Tokyo, the second having been sent also to San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. The first message reported the arrival on the morning of the 5th of three battleships, which had been at sea for eight days, also that the LEXINGTON and five cruisers had left the same day, and that eight battleships, three cruisers, and sixteen destroyers were in port. The second message has not been translated. It relates to funds of the Consulate General (Exhibit 57).



The three radiograms charged for December 6th were actually two messages in the "PA-K2" code (Exhibit 57). The first, which was translated after the attack, was sent to Tokyo and to Washington at 6:01 p.m. on 6 December 1941. It set forth the ships observed at anchor on the sixth and stated:

" . . . 9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

"2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm."

The other message of December 6th, which was filed at 12:58 p.m. that day, was, after decryption, translated by Joseph Finnegan, now a Captain, U.S.N., who reported for duty in the radio intelligence unit on the 9th or 10th of December, 1941. He translated that message (Exhibit 57) as follows:

"From: KITA  
To: F.M. TOKYO 6 Dec. 41

REFERRING TO LAST PARAGRAPH OF YOUR NO. 123

1. THE ARMY ORDERED SEVERAL HUNDRED BALLOONS FOR TRAINING AT CAMP DAVIS NC ON THE AMERICAN MAINLAND. THEY CONSIDERED (AT THAT TIME) THE PRACTICABILITY OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT IN THE DEFENSE OF HAWAII AND PANAMA. INVESTIGATION OF THE VICINITY OF PEARL HARBOR REVEALS NO LOCATIONS SELECTED FOR THEIR USE OR ANY PREPARATIONS FOR CONSTRUCTING MOORINGS. NO EVIDENCE OF TRAINING OR PERSONNEL PREPARATIONS WERE SEEN. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THEIR INSTALLATION WOULD BE DIFFICULT. EVEN IF THEY WERE ACTUALLY PROVIDED THEY WOULD INTERFERE WITH OPERATIONS AT NEARBY HICKAM FIELD, EWA FIELD AND FORD ISLAND. THE WHOLE MATTER SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DROPPED.

2. AM CONTINUING IN DETAIL THE INVESTIGATION OF THE NON-USE OF NETS FOR TORPEDO DEFENSE OF BATTLESHIPS AND WILL REPORT FURTHER."

Captain Finnegan admitted in his testimony that the last sentence of the first paragraph of his translation was an incorrect translation. As appears from an Army translation of that message (Exhibit 57), that sentence, correctly translated, was as follows:

"I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places."

As previously noted, among the messages turned over to the District Intelligence Officer and to ComFOURTEEN Communication Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation on 5 December 1941, was the

message from Honolulu to Tokyo dated 3 December 1941, which established a system of signals to be used from Oahu by means of lights at beach houses, the use of a sailboat, by want ads on a radio station, and bonfires. This message was in the possession of the Radio Communications Intelligence Unit from 5 December to 10 December 1941, at which time it was successfully decrypted and translated. The Japanese Consul General's signal message of December 3rd was not only in the possession of the Navy at Pearl Harbor prior to the attack, but was also in the possession of the Navy Department at Washington prior to the attack. A copy of that message as contained in the Op-20-G files at the Navy Department, indicates that it was translated on 11 December 1941, and that it had been intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Va. (Document 22, Exhibit 13). In fact, however, that message was decrypted and translated in rough form prior to 1 p.m., 6 December 1941, by Mrs. Edgers, a translator assigned to the Op-20-G Unit, Navy Department. She testified that she believed that it was shown that afternoon to Kramer and that he examined it in rough form. Kramer did not recall this but did recall going over the message thoroughly on December 8th. Evidently further work on this message was deferred on December 6th because of the pressure of work on the thirteen parts of the Japanese fourteen-part reply which were being decrypted that afternoon and evening.

It should be noted that a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated 2 December 1941, was intercepted by the Army radio intercept unit at Fort Shafter, Hawaii (Document 24, Exhibit 13). This message stated that in view of the present situation the presence of warships, airplane carriers and cruisers was of utmost importance, that there should be daily reports, that there should be reports whether or not there were observation balloons above Pearl Harbor, or an indications that they would be set up, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-mine nets. The message apparently was forwarded from Fort Shafter by mail to the Army. The Army translation of the message bears a note that the message was received on December 23rd and translated on 30 December 1941, by the Army. It has been testified by Brigadier General Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, that no decryption was done at Fort Shafter, but that all intercepted traffic was forwarded to Washington for decryption and translation.

Finally, it appears that the two highly significant messages sent by the Japanese Consul General during the afternoon of December 6th were both intercepted by the Army intercept station at San Francisco and forwarded to the Army in Washington by teletype (Docs. 14, 15, Exhibit 13). Both of these were in the Japanese code known as the "PA-K2" code and are indicated to have been translated by the Army on Monday, December 8, 1941. According to Captain Safford, the longer message, stating that there was "considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack" against Pearl Harbor, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets, could have been decrypted in about an hour and a half; and the shorter message, which stated in part that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm, could have been decrypted in less than an hour.

D. The "Winds Code" and the Alleged "Winds Message."

In the latter half of November, 1941, the Japanese Government by messages to Washington and elsewhere established two codes to be used for communication between Tokyo and elsewhere. The first has been referred to as the "winds code." In that code certain Japanese words were to be added in the middle and at the end of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcasts and could also be used in Morse code messages, which words would apparently be weather reports. Thus, the Japanese words "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" which meant "East wind rain," would actually mean that Japan-United States relations were in danger. Words were also supplied for Japan-Russian relations and for Japan-British relations. The existence of this code was brought to the attention of the Navy Department late in November through the interception and decryption of Japanese messages establishing the code; and also through information to the same effect received from other sources such as the United States Naval Attache at Batavia. It appeared that the use of the code words would indicate a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war between the countries designated.

The Japanese also established, late in November, 1941, a code system which has been referred to as the "hidden word code." This code was not discussed in previous investigations. The establishment of the code was first learned through the interception and decryption in Washington, D. C. of several Japanese diplomatic communications which had been sent from Tokyo on and after 2 December 1941 (Documents 6, 8, 12, 17 and 20, Exhibit 13). This code was intended to be used, when telegraphic communications might be severed, as a means of informing Japanese diplomats of the situation concerning the country in which they were located. Thus the word "KODAMA" meant Japan, the word "KOYANATI" meant England, the word "MINAMI" meant United States, and the word "HATTORI" meant that relations between Japan and another country, to be identified by a code word, were not in accordance with expectations. It may be noted that the meaning of the last word, as set forth in the Navy translation of the "hidden word code," differs from the meaning which the War Department cryptanalyst testified should have been given to the word. According to his testimony, the word should have been translated as meaning that relations were on the verge of crisis or that hostilities might commence.

Prior investigations conducted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry resulted in findings that prior to 7 December 1941 there had been a "winds code message" by the Japanese in which the code words relating to the United States were used, and that this message had been intercepted by the Navy Department prior to the attack and communicated to the Army, but that no copy of it could be found in the Army or Navy files. It appears that these findings were based primarily on the testimony of Captain Safford and of Captain Kramer of the Navy Department.

It should be noted that a Japanese message using the "winds code" words relating to the United States, if received on 3 or 4 December, or at any other time prior to 7 December 1941, would have conveyed no information of importance which the Navy and War Departments did not already possess. Such a message would have indicated either a break in diplomatic relations or possibly war with the United States. That both the Navy Department and the War Department, and Admiral Kimmel as well, were already aware that a break in diplomatic relations or war with the United States was imminent, is clearly established by the



November 27th "war warning" to Admiral Kimmel, and by the repetition November 28th by the Navy of the Army's warning dispatch to General Short.

In view, however, of the findings by the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board that a "winds message" relating to the United States was received about 3 December 1941, and that no copy of it could be found, further investigation on this point was deemed necessary.

(1) Prior investigations.

(a) The Naval Court of Inquiry:

In the "Addendum" to its findings, the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry stated concerning the "Winds Code" as follows:

"From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, there was much diplomatic dispatch traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and which was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. A message dated 19 November, 1941, Tokyo to Washington, translated on 28 November 1941, and referred to as "The Winds Code" was as follows:

'Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

'In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

'(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.\*

'(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KOTANOKAZE KUMORI.\*\*

'(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.\*\*\*

'This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

'Forward as urgent intelligence.

\*East wind rain.

\*\*North wind cloudy.

\*\*\*West wind clear.'



"The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November, 1941, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations, information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commandant 16th Naval District; and Commandant 14th Naval District, substantially the same information as outlined above. On 5 December, 1941, the United States Naval Attache, Batavia, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations substantially the same information. These messages stated that at some future date information would be sent by Japan indicating a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war between countries designated.

"All officers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in the Navy Department, considering the expected information most important, were on the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.

"It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.

"Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department."

(b) The Army Pearl Harbor Board:

The "Top Secret" and separate portion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board's report referred to the "Winds Message." The report stated that a winds execute message reading "War with the United States, war with Britain, including the Netherlands East Indies, except peace with Russia" had been received in the Navy Department on 3 December 1941; that the Navy admitted that that message was received prior to December 6th; and, that the War Department files contained no copy of the message. The report referred in this connection to testimony by Captain Safford, who stated that such a message had been received by Commander Kramer, who had been

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notified by Brotherhood of its receipt, and that it had been seen by Safford at 8:00 a.m. on December 4th. Safford stated that no copy of the message could be found in the Navy Department files.

The Army report further stated that on December 5th, Admiral Noyes called Colonel Sadtler, at 9:30 a.m., saying: "Sadtler, the message is in." Apparently based on Sadtler's testimony, the report also stated that Sadtler did not know whether this meant war with the United States, but believed it meant war with either the United States, Russia or Great Britain; that he discussed it with his superiors and was instructed to confer with Admiral Noyes; and that he telephoned Admiral Noyes, who said that he was too busy and would have to confer with Sadtler later. Sadtler then saw various officers in the War Department, all of whom did not think that any further information should be sent to Hawaii.

It also appeared that the Army Board had received testimony on this matter from Colonel Bratton, who said that Sadtler, acting on behalf of Colonel Bratton, had arranged for the FCC to monitor Japanese broadcasts. Apparently Bratton testified that no information reached him before December 7th which indicating a break in relations with the United States and that he did not think that any such information had reached anyone else. He referred to an FCC intercept which was not the message for which they had been looking.

(2) The basis of the previous findings that there was a Winds Execute message prior to the attack.

The basis for the Army Pearl Harbor Board finding that a "winds message" relating to the United States had been received appears, to the extent known by the Navy, in the above summary of the top secret portion of the Army Board's report. That indicates that primarily the basis for the finding was the testimony of Captain Safford. In addition to Safford's testimony, there was apparently testimony by Sadtler of a conversation with Admiral Noyes in which he referred to a "winds message" but not to the contents of that message.

Captain Safford testified before Admiral Hart and before the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry. His testimony was the primary basis for the Naval Court of Inquiry's findings that a "winds message" relating to the United States had been received. In addition to his testimony, the Naval Court of Inquiry had testimony from Captain Kramer bearing on this subject which tended to support the finding.

In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford said:

"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the 'Winds Message', and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my

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presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p.m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you think of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied, 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander in Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson stated, 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander in Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office.' Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this message of warning had been sent, and did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that McCollum's message had not been sent. In order to clarify the above statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the 'Winds Message'. The 'Winds Message' was a name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence duties to identify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain (including the N.E.I.), and Russia. We received a tip-off from the British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immediately forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. We also received a tip-off from the Dutch in Java through the American Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip-off was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State Department, War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the 'Winds Message' when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N.E.I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corrigedor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The 'Winds Message' was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington Time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the 'Winds Message' was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C.I. units, not hearing the 'Winds Message' themselves and not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed



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that the 'Winds Message' had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to send out information that the 'Winds Message' had been sent by Tokyo. The 'Winds Message' was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U.S.N.R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified the message as the 'Winds Message' we had been looking for. The significant part of the 'Winds Message' read: 'HIGASHI NO KAZEAME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI'. The literal translation of these phrases is: 'EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY'. The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: 'War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N.E.I., etc. Peace with Russia.' I first saw the 'Winds Message' about 8:00 a.m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U.S.N.R., came into my office with a big smile on his face and piece of paper in his hand and said, 'Here it is!' as he handed me the 'Winds Message.' As I remember, it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant 'Winds' underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S.I.S. in the War Department. As the direct result of the 'Winds Message,' I prepared a total of five messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result of the 'Winds Message,' McCollum drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but which the Navy Department G. I. Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department G. I. Unit regarded the 'Winds Message' as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the 'Winds Message': Captain L. F. Safford, U.S.N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U.S.N.R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U.S.N.R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Fresman, U.S.N. The following officers knew by hearsay that the 'Winds Message' had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves:

Commander L. W. Parke, U.S.N.  
Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U.S.N.R.  
Ensign Wilmer Fox, U.S.N.  
Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve ...."



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"The 'Winds Message' was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my understanding at the time."

Before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Captain Safford repeated in substance his prior testimony and stated that Lieutenant Murray or possibly Kramer brought him the message; that he couldn't determine from what Navy intercept station the message had come; that he had a vague recollection of a second "Winds Message", but had been unable to find any trace of it until he testified before Admiral Hart; that since that time he learned that the FCC had intercepted a "Winds Message" at Portland, but that he did not recognize that message. He did not recall any of the FCC intercepts contained in Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, none of which indicated a break with the United States. He stated further that despite repeated search since November, 1943, no copy of the "Winds Message" could be found in the files; that Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood had told him that he knew the disposition of them, but did not care to tell Safford. Also Safford said that he knew what had happened to the Army copies of that message through very "second hand and devious sources." He also repeated his prior testimony to the effect that about the middle of the first week in December, 1944, Commander McCollum had drafted a long dispatch which included information about the "Winds Message," and which dispatch had not been sent out.

Commander Kramer in his testimony before the Naval Court, said that on December 3rd or 4th he had been shown a "Winds Message" by the watch officer and took it immediately to Captain Safford, who took it to Admiral Noyes. This was a plain-language message and, as shown to him, contained the phrase translated as "East Wind Rain" which meant strained relations or a break with the United States. The message had been on teletype paper and indicated that it had come through an USN intercept station.

Among the witnesses before the Naval Court of Inquiry who testified that so far as they knew there had never been a "Winds Message" relating to the United States were Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and Admiral Noyes. Neither Admiral Wilkinson nor Commander McCollum, who were alleged by Safford to have had knowledge of the "Winds Message," was a witness before the Naval Court of Inquiry, as both were at the time actively engaged in combat operations.

(3) Evidence Obtained in this Investigation Concerning "Winds Message."

(a) Testimony of Captain Safford:

Captain Safford testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. He realized that he would be one of the important witnesses and that his memory was vague. Accordingly, he began looking around to get

information in order to prepare a written statement which he could use in his testimony. He noticed that in the Roberts report there was no reference to the "Winds Message" or to the dispatch which McCollum had drafted. Safford then began talking to everyone who had been around at the time to see what they could remember, and to see if they could give him leads so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. He talked the thing over with various of the Army people.

Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that Brotherhood had written back saying that he didn't care to tell Safford about the disposition of the copies of the "Winds Message," but when Brotherhood returned to the United States, Safford asked him about it and found out that there had been a misunderstanding. Brotherhood had been referring to the false "Winds Message" (Document 2 of Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court), which apparently related to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast.

Safford stated that he had information "third hand" concerning the Army's copies of the "Winds Message," and that he thought it might be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadtler before the Army investigation. He stated that his information from the Army came through W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the War Department, and that the information was that the copies of the "Winds Message" had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that Colonel Bratton of the War Department had had some question about the message and had asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of the original of the "Winds Message," but that Admiral Noyes had refused to comply on the grounds that the Navy translation was correct. This, he said, should appear in Colonel Britton's testimony before the Army investigation. He also stated that a Captain Shukcraft of the Army knew that the "Winds Message" had been received.

Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his testimony during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier impression, Kramer told him that the "Winds Message" and various other intercepts relating to Japan had not been turned over to the Roberts Commission, but about 9 December 1941 had been collected and shown to Under Secretary Forrestal, during the absence of Secretary Knox. He also said that Kramer told him that he did not recall the "Winds Message" specifically. Safford also stated that the reference in McCollum's message to the "Winds Message" was very short and was the last item in McCollum's draft dispatch.

Safford testified that it now appears more likely that the "Winds Message" was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than the night before, because the watch officers who were on duty recollected only the false "Winds Message," and not the "true 'Winds Message.'" The vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted in the message being intercepted only on the East Coast of the United States, and that such conditions were not unusual. He pointed out that they had to call on Corrigedor to cover the Tokyo-Berlin circuits because the combined efforts of intercept stations on the East Coast,

West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than about fifty percent coverage. Although he had no knowledge as to which Naval station allegedly intercepted the message, his first guess was the station at Cheltenham, Maryland, and his second guess was Winter Harbor, Maine. He stated that the logs of those stations and of the Navy Department had been destroyed during one of the numerous moves and no record had been kept.

Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood at 9:05 p.m. on December 4th (Exhibit 65, Naval Court), he said that this was the "false" message which appeared on the surface to use the "winds" code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast. This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and later Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket. He said that that message was received twelve hours or more after what he referred to as the "true winds message."

Safford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65, as a true "winds" message relating to England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Safford testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been monitoring for a "winds" execute message, but that prior to the attack they had intercepted no such message.

(b) Captain Kramer's Testimony:

Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously concerning the "winds" message but wanted to go over that previous testimony in the light of thinking it over since that time. He said that he had had no recollection of a "winds" message at the time it was first mentioned to him, the spring of 1944, but after receiving from Safford some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, he did recall a message some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of the week, and did recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and walking with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned it over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that that message had been a "winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it might have been one using the code words referring to the United States, as he previously testified, but he was less positive of that now than he had been at the time of his previous testimony. The reason for this revision of his view was that on thinking it over, he had a rather sharp recollection that in the latter part of the week preceding the attack there was still no specific mention of the United States in any of the Japanese traffic. For that reason he was under the impression when he testified during this investigation that the message referred to England and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too. He just didn't recall.

Captain Kramer testified that on the morning of December 7th, a Japanese "hidden word" code message was received and was hurriedly translated by him as he was about to leave the Navy Department to deliver other messages. The message as translated by Kramer was, "Relations between Great Britain and Japan are not in accordance with expectations" (Exhibit 20). In his



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haste, Kramer overlooked the word "MINAMI" which was contained in the Japanese Message and which referred to the United States. He testified that after he returned to the Navy Department and shortly before 1 p.m. on December 7th, he discovered his mistake and made a penciled correction on the file copy of the translation. He testified further that he believed that he made several telephone calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of ONI and an officer of G-2 of the War Department. The copies of the translation in the Navy Department's files do not disclose any correction of the translation (Exhibit 20). Kramer testified concerning this that a number of copies of the translation were made at the time, and that undoubtedly his correction was made on another copy which has since been discarded.

Captain Kramer also stated that he had been under the impression until he testified before this investigation that the "hidden word message" of 7 December 1941 had been a "Winds Message," but now recognized it as a "hidden word message." He stated that he thought that the "hidden word message", which he identified as having been received on 7 December, was among the group of messages shown to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December 1941, when he hastily reviewed a folder of that traffic for Mr. Forrestal. This was done, he said, because of the fact that previously Mr. Forrestal had not seen such material.

(c) Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood's Testimony:

Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch officers who were on watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week of December, 1941. He said that he had never received an intercept or message wherein the "Winds Code" words relating to the United States were used. He said that about December 4th, he received a telephone message from the FCC, in which the words apparently relating to Russia were used; that he called Admiral Noyes, who commented that the word was blowing from a "funny" direction, and that he, Brotherhood, did not think at the time that it was an actual "Winds Message." Brotherhood stated that shortly before he testified in this investigation, he had had a conversation with Safford who stated that Brotherhood had called him about December 4th or 5th and had told him that such a message had arrived. Brotherhood said he did not recall the telephone conversation and that he believed, therefore, that he had called Captain Safford at that time.

(d) Lieutenant Commander Linn's Testimony:

Linn testified that a 24-hour watch was maintained in Captain Safford's section; that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the four officers who stood that watch during the first week in December, 1941. Any intercept which had come into that section, he said, would have had to come through one of the four watch officers. He was familiar with the "Winds Code" and he never saw any intercept



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prior to 7 December 1941 in which the "winds" code words relating to the United States were used.

(e) Lieutenant Commander Pering's Testimony:

Pering testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing watch during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's section. He knew of the existence of the "winds" code and he never saw any intercept using the code words relating to the United States.

(f) Lieutenant Commander Murray's Testimony:

Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing a twenty-four hour watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week in December, 1941. He testified that no "winds" code execute relating to the United States ever came to his attention during that week. He said that after the attack, Linn had told him that a "winds" message had come in on 7 December 1941.

(g) Lieutenant Freeman's Testimony:

Freeman testified that he was in a section which disseminated to ONI intelligence received from the field radio intelligence units; that his unit worked very closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every effort was made to monitor for a "winds" message." Freeman was one of the officers mentioned by Captain Safford, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, as having personal knowledge of the receipt of a "winds" message relating to the United States. He testified that he never knew of any intercept of a "winds" message relating to the United States.

(h) Captain McCollum's testimony:

Captain McCollum testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted which contained the words relating to the United States; that the message which contained the words apparently relating to Russia had been received during the first week of December, 1941, but that in his opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said further that during the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch summarizing the situation which he wanted to have sent out; that he remembered no reference to any "winds" message in that dispatch; and, that the dispatch was based on a memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941 which did not refer to a "winds" message (Exhibit 10). He did not know whether or not his draft dispatch had been sent out. It had been submitted to Admiral Wilkinson.

(i) Admiral Wilkinson's Testimony:

Admiral Wilkinson testified that his only recollection of the "winds" code was that some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander McCollum, had mentioned to him that a message using a "winds" code had been received. Possibly, he said, it was the message received on the 7th using the words relating to England. He did not recall anything about the long dispatch which McCollum had drafted and which

Captain Safford had testified Admiral Wilkinson had endeavored to have sent out.

(j) Captain Mason's and Commander Fabian's Testimony:

Captain Mason, who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor, both testified that intensive efforts had been made there to monitor for any Japanese broadcasts using the "winds" code, and that nothing was received wherein the words relating to the United States were used. In this connection, it should be noted that it was the view of the Navy Department that the unit at Corregidor, because of its geographical location, was in a much better position to intercept Japanese radio broadcasts than were the units at Pearl Harbor or Washington (see Exhibit 8).

They also testified that close liaison was maintained with British Intelligence services in the Philippines, that the British had been monitoring for a "winds" message also, and that had such a message been received by the British, they most certainly would have been advised of its receipt, but that they received no information from the British as to the receipt of a "winds" message prior to the attack.

(k) Captain Layton's Testimony:

Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that efforts were made to monitor for the use of that code; and all available Japanese language officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan; that he checked up each day with Commander Rochefort and that no "winds" intercept was received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did they receive any dispatch from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard.

(l) Captain Safford recalled:

Captain Safford was recalled and testified that he never had a conversation with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a "winds" message. He stated that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he received a call from Brotherhood about December 4th in which Brotherhood advised of the receipt of a message apparently using the Russian "winds" code words. He had had a vague idea that there was another "winds" message, and, he said, the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill. He said further, however, that until 1944 he did not recall having seen, or knowing of the FCC intercept in which the words relating to Russia were used.

(m) Mr. Friedman's Testimony:

Mr. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that prior to 7 December 1941 he had no information as to whether or not a "winds" message had been intercepted. He said that he had had several conversations with Captain Safford concerning the subject, the first one about a year and a half ago, and none later than six months prior to his

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testimony in this investigation. He said that Safford had indicated in the course of the early conversations that there had been a "winds" message, but that no copies could be found in the Navy's files, and that his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy East Coast station. Mr. Friedman also testified that about a year and a half ago he had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a "winds" message had come in on the 4th or 5th of December; that he had been notified either directly or by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message was in; that there had been some question about the exact Japanese words which had been used, and that Sadler had not seen the message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that Colonel Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verification from Admiral Noyes but had not been successful, whereupon the G-2 authorities simply passed the matter over since there was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the message. Mr. Friedman said that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen a copy of that message, and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testified that he regarded this as highly inconceivable, but that in conversation with Captain Safford he probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started, and that he had no idea that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr. Friedman had no knowledge, directly or indirectly, concerning the existence of a "winds" message relating to the United States, apart from his conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler.

(n) Captain Rochefort's Testimony:

Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, testified that they monitored for any "winds" code message, covering all known broadcasts from Tokyo on a twenty-four hour basis, and that results were nil. He testified further that he had made an exhaustive search into all available Navy records and could find no trace of any "winds" message prior to 7 December 1941.



E. Information Concerning the Organization of the Japanese Navy.

(1) ONI Report of 29 July 1941.

On July 29th, the Office of Naval Intelligence issued a revised report, which had been prepared by Commander McCollum, dealing with the organization of the Japanese Navy. This stated that, as a result of information which had been received, it was possible to give a much more complete picture of the organization of the Japanese Navy. It stated that the Japanese naval forces afloat were organized into two main commands -- the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. The Combined Fleet included:

- (a) First Fleet, or Battle Force.
- (b) Second Fleet, or Scouting Force.
- (c) Third Fleet, or Blockade and Shipping Control Force.
- (d) Fourth Fleet, or Mandated Islands Defensive Force.
- (e) Submarine Force (also called the Sixth Fleet).

The Combined Fleet and First Fleet, under the command of Admiral Yamamoto, consisted of various BatDivs, a CruDiv, three CarDivs and two destroyer squadrons. BatDiv 3 (KONGO, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) was included. The carrier divisions were CarDiv 3 (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU); CarDiv 5 (RYUJO, HOSHO); and CarDiv 7 (CHITOSE, CHIYODA, MIZUHO).

The Second Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Koga, included various cruiser divisions, two carrier divisions and two destroyer squadrons. CruDiv 8 (CHIKUMA and TONE) was included. The carrier divisions were : (CarDiv 1 (AKAGI and IAGA), and CarDiv 2 (SORYU and HIRYU).

The Third Fleet included CarDiv 6 (NOTORO and KAMIKAWA MARU) and various minelayer and minesweeper divisions, a base force and sub-chaser squadrons.

The composition of the Fourth Fleet or Mandates Fleet, and of the Submarine Fleet and of the Japanese Naval Forces in China was also given. (Exhibit 81)

(2) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 45-41.

On 27 November 1941 (when the "war warning" was received), the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, distributed Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 45-41 (Exhibit 21). This bulletin dealt with the organization of the Japanese Navy and with Japanese Forces and installations in the Mandated Islands. It was a revision of the ONI bulletin above summarized and replaced that bulletin on the subject of the Japanese Fleet. This stated:

"The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable



specialization within the various commands, as shown below:

MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS

I. Combined Fleet

1. First Fleet	(Battle Force)	3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons
2. Second Fleet	(Scouting Force)	4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons, etc.
3. Third Fleet	(Blockade & Transport Force)	Small Craft.
4. Fourth Fleet	(Mandate Defense Force)	1 Desron, 1 Subron and 'many small units.
5. Fifth Fleet	?	?
6. Sixth Fleet	(Submarine Fleet)	6 Subrons
7. Carrier Fleet	(Aircraft Carriers)	5 Cardivs
8. Combined Air Force	(Seaplane tenders, etc.)	4 Airrons, & shore based planes.

II. Japanese Naval Forces (Staff Headquarters) 1 PG and 3 DD's  
in China.

1. First China Exped. Fleet.	(Central China)	Gunboats
2. Second China Exped. Fleet.	(South China)	1 CA, 1 CL and small craft.
3. Third China Exped. Fleet.	(North China)	Torpedo Boats, etc.
4. Southern Exped. Fleet.	(Saigon)	1 CL, transports and mine craft.

The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing."

The Combined Fleet and First Fleet as listed in this bulletin included three BatDivs, among which was BatDiv 3 (HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA and HARUNA -- as to the latter it was stated that it had been inactive during 1941 and was probably undergoing major repairs). Also included was a cruiser division and two destroyer squadrons.

The Second Fleet included four CruDivs and two destroyer squadrons. One of the CruDivs was CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA).

The composition of the Third, Fourth and Sixth (Submarine) Fleets was given in some detail in this bulletin. As to a Fifth Fleet, it stated "The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The flagship has been reported at Maizuru."

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The composition of the Carrier Fleet, with the KAGA as flagship, and consisting of ten carriers and sixteen destroyers, was listed as follows:

- CarDiv 1: AKAGI, KAGA (F) and a destroyer division.
- CarDiv 2: SORYU (F) and HIRYU and a destroyer division.
- CarDiv 3: RYUJO (F) and HOSHO and a destroyer division.
- CarDiv 4: ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU and a destroyer division.
- CarDiv 5: KOFYU and KASUGA (MARU).

As will appear subsequently, the forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 included six carriers, the KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1), the SORYU and HIRYU (CarDiv 2), and the ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU. The latter two carriers had been identified as CarDiv 4 in the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin, as CarDiv 3 (annexed to the First Fleet) in the earlier ONI bulletin, and as CarDiv 5, in Exhibit 3, which sets forth the composition of the attacking force.

Also included in the attacking force were the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two of the battleships of BatDiv 3) which had been listed in the intelligence bulletins as assigned to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, and the TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8) which had been listed in the intelligence bulletins as assigned to the Second Fleet.

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F. Information Concerning the Location and Movements of Japanese Naval Forces.

The evidence indicates that there were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

(1) Information available at the time of the "War Warning."

The procedure for handling radio intelligence information concerning Japanese movements was set forth in a dispatch of 24 November 1941 from OpNav to CincAF, information ComSIXTEEN, CincPac, ALUSNA Chungking, ASTALUSNA Shanghai, and ALUSNA Tokyo (Exhibit 8). This dispatch stated that Japanese naval movements as reported by the individual information addresses were often conflicting because of their necessarily fragmentary nature and that since ComSIXTEEN intercepts were considered most reliable, it was suggested that other reports be carefully evaluated and sent to ComSIXTEEN for action and to OpNav for information and, that after combining all incoming reports, ComSIXTEEN was to direct dispatches to OpNav, info CincPac, based on all information received and indicating the ComSIXTEEN evaluation.

The Japanese naval situation as estimated by ComFOURTEEN on 26 November 1941, was set forth in a dispatch of that date to OpNav, information CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN. This dispatch stated that for the past month the Commander of the Second Fleet had been organizing a task force consisting of Second Fleet and other units and, after discussing various other units, stated: "There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise Airon 24, at least one carrier division unit, plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls."

On the same day, ComSIXTEEN sent a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav, ComFOURTEEN and CincAF, discussing in considerable detail the estimate of ComSIXTEEN concerning the location and probable movements of Japanese Fleet units (Exhibit 8). This stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet was directing some units of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Fleets in a loose-knit task force organization that apparently would be divided into two sections. One section expected to operate in the South China area, was referred to in the dispatch as the "first section." The "first section" was estimated to consist of CruDiv 7, AirRon 6, Defense Division 1, DeSron 3, and Subron 6. The "second section" consisted of units expected to



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operate in the Mandates. The "second section" was believed to include CruDiv 5, Cardiv 3, RYUJO and one MARU. It was indicated that BatDiv 3 might be included in the "second section," but that this could not be clarified yet. The dispatch further stated: "Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in the Mandates X Our best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area." The evaluation was considered to be reliable.

During this time, the Office of Naval Intelligence was issuing fortnightly summaries of current national situations. The summary for 1 December 1941 (Exhibit 9) was distributed by air mail. The statements therein as to the Japanese naval situation, which portion was prepared by the Far Eastern Section of ONI, were based upon information which had been received at least three or four days prior to the date of the document. This stated:

"Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc."

(2) Admiral Kimmel's sources of information after the "war warning."

The ComFOURTEEN communication intelligence unit continued the practice, which had been followed for some time past, of preparing daily communications intelligence summaries for submission to Admiral Kimmel via Lt. Comdr. Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Photostatic copies of the communication intelligence summaries from 14 October to 14 December 1941,



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constitute Exhibit 22 of this investigation. Lieutenant Commander Layton, who presented these summaries to Admiral Kimmel, also prepared daily intelligence reports which were distributed to various members of CincPac's staff. The intelligence memoranda were not given to the Admiral or Chief of Staff because they saw the basic material upon which the reports were based. The intelligence reports by Layton for the period 6 October to 2 December 1941, constitute Exhibit 26. None was prepared after December 2nd, according to Layton.

The daily communication intelligence summaries together with the dispatches received by Admiral Kimmel from other organizations during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, constituted the only sources of information which he had during that period concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces.

(3) Information received by Admiral Kimmel after the "war warning."

The critical period commenced on 27 November 1941, when the Japanese force, which was to attack Pearl Harbor, secretly left Takan Bay, Etorofu Island and, in radio silence, proceeded undetected toward Pearl Harbor. The Japanese force, which included three of Japan's Carrier Divisions, CarDiv 1, AKAGI, KAGA; CarDiv 2, HIRYU, SORYU; CarDiv 5, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; BatDiv 3, first section, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA; CruDiv 8, CHIKUMA; and other lighter vessels, cruised for ten days to a point 200 miles north of Oahu, where the planes were launched for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

It will be recalled that the November 24th dispatch from CNO in part had stated that the diplomatic situation and statements of the Japanese Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility. The "war warning" of the 27th had stated that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days and that the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

The information which Admiral Kimmel subsequently received as to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was as follows:

28 November 1941:

The Naval Attache at Shanghai reported in his dispatch 270855 the sightings by the master of a foreign vessel, which had left Hong Kong en route to Shanghai, of many transports proceeding south singly or in small groups.

The November 27th ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary delivered on November 28th, stated that in general traffic volume was a little below normal, due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the Tokyo-Takao circuit was unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama and Saigon were active as originators. The main Tokyo originator was the intelligence activity which sent five dispatches to the major commanders. The direction finder activity was very high. As to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there was still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address; he had been fairly inactive as an originator. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander, it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates, and also that there was no further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. The Commander Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the Chichijima area. Concerning air forces in general, it was indicated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU and that "Carriers are still located in home waters." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel

It appears, therefore, that as of this time the ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, and Washington radio intelligence units were of the opinion that the major portion of the Japanese carriers were in "home waters;" that ComFOURTEEN was of the opinion that a carrier unit was in the Marshalls, and that ComSIXTEEN expected CarDiv 3 to operate in the Mandates. The evidence disclosed that the term "home waters" was understood differently by the Far Eastern Section of ONI, which prepared the 1 December 1941 ONI estimate, and by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet. Captain McCollum testified that the term meant the normal cruising grounds of the Japanese Fleet, roughly west of the 180 meridian of longitude and north of the southern end of Formosa, and included the Kurile Islands but not the Aleutians. Captain Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that "home waters" meant to him, and was understood by Admiral Kimmel to mean, the drill grounds of the Inland Sea and approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay Area; in general the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, but not including northern Japan and the Kuriles, to a point about 60 miles east of Japan.

29 November 1941:

On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th (Exhibit 19, Naval Court). This repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:

"NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITY THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE X JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT X IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT X THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE X PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT REPEAT NOT TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT X REPORT MEASURES TAKEN X A SEPARATE MESSAGE IS BEING SENT TO G-2 NINTH CORPS AREA RE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES X SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN X LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS"

The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further:

"UNDERTAKE NO OFFENSIVE ACTION UNTIL JAPAN HAS COMMITTED AN OVERT ACT X BE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT TASKS ASSIGNED IN WPL 46 SO FAR AS THEY APPLY TO JAPAN IN CASE HOSTILITIES OCCUR"

On the 28th of November, ComFOURTEEN addressed to OpNav, information CincAF, and stated:

"FOLLOWING RECEIVED BY BRITISH CONSUL FROM USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE X JAPANESE WILL ATTACK KRAKOW ISTHMUS FROM SEA ON ONE DECEMBER WITHOUT ULTIMATUM OR DECLARATION IN ORDER GET BETWEEN BANGKOK AND SINGAPORE X ATTACKERS WILL PROCEED DIRECT FROM HAINAN AND FORMOSA X MAIN LANDING TO BE MADE AT SONGKHOLA X " (Singora)

ComSIXTEEN in a dispatch of the 28th addressed to CincAF, OpNav, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, stated that an unidentified ship believed to be a light cruiser had apparently relieved the KASHII as flagship, Southern Expeditionary Fleet; that this ship was now in the Camranh Bay-Saigon area.

OpNav, in dispatch 281633, addressed CincAF, info CincPac, ComSIXTEEN, ComFOURTEEN, and supplied information from State Department, from Saigon, dated November 26th, which stated that five days previously

Orange troops and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon, taking up all available quay space; that 20,000 troops had landed and that 10,000 had arrived from the north by rail during the same period; that the total troops in South Indo-China totaled 70,000. It observed that there was an estimate of some 128,000, but considered that too high. It reported that many trucks had landed and were moving troops and supplies to the interior. It observed that this movement is of large proportions and indicates hostilities against Thailand may begin soon. It also forwarded information from Hanoi, also from the State Department, dated November 26th, that said supplies and military equipment, particularly railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Haiphong even recently augmented and are being trans-shipped south. Among recently landed artillery are anti-tank guns; that the Japanese had recently purchased a considerable number of native boats along the coast of Tongking Province. It was reported they desired to purchase 500. These boats were being sent south. Further reports from Hanoi, dated November 25th, said that the American Consul had received reliable information that the Governor General had ascertained from an agent that around 1 December, without either declaration of war or ultimatum, Nippon Navy will attack Kra Isthmus. Simultaneously the Army would advance on Thailand; that great increased troop landings and movements were noted south; that during last few days about 4,000 men have landed. On November 25th and 26th, 1,500 would go south by special train; that in Tongking there were approximately 25,000 Jap troops and at Gillam there were approximately ninety airplanes. Dated November 26th, Hanoi, was the report that on early November 25th the Haiphong mayor had advised all interested persons that the Japanese intended to sequester all freight en route to China, that the Japanese had demanded keys to all warehouses by noon November 25th.

The ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered the 29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communications to and from South China and between the Mandates and the Empire were very heavy. No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence net was very active and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed to the Tokyo direction finder command from various stations and this command also originated messages of high precedence to the major fleet commanders. It was said that "This activity is interpreted to indicate that the radio intelligence net is operating at full strength upon U. S. naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS." As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any of its units. As to the Third Fleet, there was little activity from its units save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Fleet was said to be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleets. There was little indication of submarine activity. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.



REF ID: A66547

The ComSIXTEEN communication intelligence unit sent a dispatch on the 29th noting various recent developments from radio intelligence, such as various encrypted addresses noted in the preceding two days traffic, that various additional units now appeared to be associated with the "first section" (South China area), referred to in ComSIXTEEN's November 26th dispatch, that the Hiyei (which in fact was en route to Pearl Harbor) and Kongo appeared to be associated definitely with the "first section," but no movement from the Takao area had been noted, and, that the Cinc Combined Fleet was to leave the Kure zone that day, the Sasebo zone on December 1st, and enter the Bako zone on the 2nd.

30 November 1941:

On 30 November 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch to CincAF for action and to CincPac for information (Exhibit 76, Naval Court), which advised in part:

"INDICATIONS THAT JAPAN ABOUT TO ATTACK POINTS ON KRA BY OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONX ... DESIRE YOU COVER BY AIR THE LINE MANILA CAMRANH BAY ON THREE DAYS COMMENCING UPON RECEIPT OF THIS DISPATCH X ..."

A second similar dispatch was also sent on the same day (Exhibit 77, Naval Court) requesting a daily report from CincAF, even if there were no contacts and the information were all negative.

The communication intelligence summary of the 29th delivered this day stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the traffic to South China was still very high. A good share of the traffic was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to major commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the major commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo radio Yokosuka (near Tokyo) sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual AINav, and the naval general staff addressed Commanders, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been addressed as the 103rd air group originated one dispatch whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he had no navy call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this had appeared before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was intentional in making positively known the existence of an air fleet. Its composition was unknown. The dispatches indicated that various units were under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, including Cardiv 3, and the Third Fleet.

Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships but their assignment was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held extensive communication with

the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako. The Cinc Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He was still in the Truk area. There was some traffic for Commander Submarine Force, who was at Chichijima the previous day, and also some traffic from the Commander in Chief, China Fleet.

1 December 1941:

A copy of a dispatch by GNO to CincAF, 301709, was received by CincPac, referring to the previous dispatch which had directed an air search on the line Manila to Camranh Bay, directing that a report be made daily even if the information were all negative (Exhibit 77, Naval Court).

A dispatch from OpNav, dated 1 December 1941, was also received referring to a Thailand-Japanese intrigue aimed at forcing the British to attack Thai as a counter-move to a Japanese landing in Kota Bharu, whereupon Thai would declare war and ask Japanese help.

A dispatch of 1 December from ComSIXTEEN advised of radio intelligence information indicating that various units under Cinc Third Fleet were in the Takao area and that Cinc Second Fleet had shifted from Kure to Sasebo apparently en route to South China waters.

The communication intelligence summary for November 30th, delivered on December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the past few days, that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates. No reason could be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for the past few days had prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of dispatches originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUs. As to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of those Fleets were in Kure. In the same message, the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was not listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was at sea. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent one dispatch to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included the KONGO and HIYEI, which it was said placed them as members of his task force. (The HIYEI was actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As to the Third Fleet, it was said, "No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be still in the Truk area. It was said that the continued association of Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force, plus his known progress from the Empire to Chichijima to Saipan made his destination obviously the Marshalls; also that since one of his large units arrived in the Marshalls some time ago, that unit could not agree with ComSIXTEEN that there was not a submarine concentration in that area. "Every evidence points to a concentration, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there, but also a good proportion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer.

A dispatch was received from ComSIXTEEN, addressed to OpNav, information CincAF, CincPac, and ComFOURTEEN, to the effect that a reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had occurred at midnight.

2 December 1941:

On 2 December 1941, ComSIXTEEN reported that Cinc Second and Cinc Third Fleets were in the Takao area, and, that broadcasts to fleet units were being sent by Takao or Bako in addition to Tokyo. Also reported was the fact that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok had requested permission to destroy codes.

CincAF also reported that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines on a southerly course in the South China Sea between Camranh Bay and the Philippines. Also that three submarines were sighted 070 from Saigon, 180 miles, heading south, and that twenty-one transports, with air patrol overhead, were at Camranh Bay.

A report from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised of the arrival of 14,000 troops sailing from there the week ending the 22nd.

The communication intelligence summary for the previous day stated generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000 1 December indicated that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromise. Either that, or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual were pending. It should be noted that the sentence in the above summary reading "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale" was underscored in red pencil commencing with the words "service calls." Captain Layton testified that to the best of his recollection this was underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time.

The summary further stated as to the First Fleet "nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated "This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China;" Takao did not appear to play an important role in the traffic; consequently, the assumption was made that this fleet was passing up Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was "nothing to report except that the

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same associations of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continued. As to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area." As to Fifth Fleet, "Nothing to report." As to submarines, it was stated a large number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area eastward of Yokosuka - Chichijima and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force, it was stated "No change." As to carriers, it was said "No change." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

In accordance with the request of Admiral Kimmel, Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, prepared a memorandum for the Admiral dealing with the location of the Japanese Fleet. This memorandum was prepared, according to Layton, on the evening of 1 December, and was submitted by him to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941. The original memorandum is Exhibit 23. The memorandum bears certain notations in red pencil which, Layton testified, were inserted by him on December 2nd prior to submission of the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, and which reflected the later information received after preparation of the memorandum on the night of December 1st-2nd. It also bears certain lead pencil notations which Layton identified as the handwriting of Admiral Kimmel. This memorandum, according to Layton, summarized his best estimate of the location of the Japanese Fleet, based on all information available to him and to Admiral Kimmel up to and including 1 December 1941.

Layton's estimate stated that from the best available information, units of the Orange (Japanese) were "thought" to be located as listed in the memorandum. In the Kure-Sasebo area he listed the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief, First Fleet, with six battle-ships, "(?)", and other units. He listed the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, at Nagara initially and then corrected it in red to indicate that it was at Takao. Also in the Kure-Sasebo area he located Cruiser Division 8.

In the Shanghai area, Layton's estimate located the Commander in Chief, China Fleet, the Shanghai base force, and an air group.

In the Bako-Takao area, Layton listed Third Fleet submarine squadrons and various destroyers and the Commander of the Combined Air Force with numerous air groups and the KASUGA MARU (thought to be a converted carrier with 36 planes). He estimated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, had been en route to Takao (this he corrected in red pencil to indicate that he was at Takao) with a cruiser division, destroyers, and with "Cardiv 4 - two CV and four DD; Cardiv 3 - two CV and 3 DD; Batdiv 3 less HARUNA - 3 BB (maybe 2 BB)" and, he added in red pencil, certain cruisers and Destroyer Division .2

In the Hainan-Canton area, Layton located the Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet and various cruisers and destroyers and transports. In the French Indo-China area, he located the Commander in Chief of an Expeditionary Fleet with various ships including 21 transports and some base forces among others. In the Mandates area, he located at Palao an air group 10



and base force; at Truk, the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet with cruisers and destroyers, and a base force and an air group. At Saipan, he located the Commander in Chief of the Submarine Force with possibly submarines and various air groups and a base force. In the Marshalls area, he located various air groups and the carrier "KORYU? plus plane guards", and several submarine squadrons and base force.

Layton's memorandum did not make any reference to the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese Fleet (which in fact were en route to attack Pearl Harbor). According to Layton, on 2 December 1941, during his conference with Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noticed and commented on the absence of information concerning Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. In his testimony, he described the conversation on this point as follows:

"MR. SONNETT: Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." . . . .

"MR. SONNETT: Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

"MR. SONNETT: He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?

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"CAPTAIN LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location." A

3 December 1941:

It will be recalled that on December 3rd dispatches were sent by CNO to CincPac and others advising that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London, had been ordered to destroy the "purple" machine and most of the codes and ciphers.

Layton testified that at the time Admiral Kimmel asked him what the "purple machine" was; that he did not know and made inquiry; that he advised Admiral Kimmel that it was the Japanese diplomatic electrical coding machine; that he did not then know whether or not the Japanese consul at Hawaii had such a machine; and, that he subsequently learned that the Japanese consul there did not have such a machine.

The communication intelligence summary delivered on the 3rd, covering the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic was the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. It was stated that ComSIXTEEN had reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not uncovered at ComFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances, Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was said that "Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units, has left Empire waters, but is either not close enough to Takao for good communications or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao." It was further stated, "The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this office from making definite statement as of this date of the units now in the southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area." Also it was pointed out generally that "There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo." As to the First Fleet, it was stated that despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that "from inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal combined fleet staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates one combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets, and apparently in company, while another combined fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated "No units have stood out prominently in

the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet, it said there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the association of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.

Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

4 December 1941:

On 4 December 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21, Naval Court) to NavStaGuam for action, and to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, and ComSIXTEEN for information stating:

"GUAM DESTROY ALL SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER CLASSIFIED MATTER EXCEPT THAT ESSENTIAL FOR CURRENT PURPOSES AND SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE RETAINING MINIMUM CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHANNELS NECESSARY FOR ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS WITH CINCAF CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN COMSIXTEEN AND OPNAV X BE PREPARED TO DESTROY INSTANTLY IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY ALL CLASSIFIED MATTER YOU RETAIN X REPORT CRYPTO CHANNELS RETAINED"

ComSIXTEEN advised, in a dispatch received on December 4th, that seven transports had been sighted off Saigon on 15 November 1941, and on the 20th a seaplane carrier northeast of Amoy.

The Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised, in a dispatch received 4 December, that several large liners had been carrying supplies and personnel to the Carolines, that 3,000 laborers had landed at Jaluit and that certain islands were being specially developed.

The Naval Attache, Tokyo, advised in a dispatch received this day that a transport loaded with aircraft and another with naval personnel had left Yokahama on 27 November 1941.

The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated under the heading "General," that traffic volume was normal with receiving conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slowed up identification of even these units. Very few units had been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third Fleets. Tokyo intelligence originated nine

dispatches to the same addresses. It was stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, in Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It was also stated that there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands but their identity was not known. It was stated also that there was "no information on submarines or carriers." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

5 December 1941:

There were no dispatches of an intelligence nature received by CincPac. The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated that in general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao radio instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there were two fleet broadcasts now in operation. So far only a few messages had been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intelligence originated messages to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force, and same. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated "The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CincSecond Fleet is still copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the Commander in Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check could be made on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls and that Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South China, it was stated that Bako continued as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China commanders, all units in that area were quiet. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.

6 December 1941:

Several dispatches dated 6 December 1941 were found in the CincPac files, but it does not appear whether or not they were received prior to the attack. One was an CnNav dispatch authorizing CincPac to direct the destruction of secret and confidential documents at our outlying islands "in view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands." (Exhibit 22, Naval Court). Other dispatches dated the 6th, from the Naval Observer at Wellington, advised of Japanese destruction of codes; from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised of the departure south of Japanese troops and increase of Japanese gendarmerie force in Shanghai; and, from CincAF, advised of a



25-ship convoy, a 10-ship convoy, and 3 ships, off Saigon, French Indo-China, all of which appeared to be headed in a westerly direction, also 30 ships and a cruiser were sighted in Camranh Bay.

The radio intelligence summary for 5 December, which was delivered on the 6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the attack. It stated in general that traffic volume was heavy. All circuits were overloaded with Tokyo broadcasts going over full 24 hours. Tokyo Mandates circuit in duplex operations. There were several new intercept schedules heard. It was noted that some traffic being broadcast was several days old which indicated the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits. A plain language message was sent by the captain of the OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau saying, "In reference to the Far Eastern crisis what you said is considered important at this end, but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon."

As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were still frequently addressed but were receiving their traffic over broadcasts. It was stated that "They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic to that fleet. There was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet addressed at Jaluit, strengthening the impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. As to South China, there was much traffic addressed to the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, by Sama. Bako continued as an active originator with many dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with the movement of air corps, several of which were moving probably to Indo-China.

## FINDINGS

29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its representatives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in Washington, D. C., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained of the Japanese Government's actual views concerning the diplomatic situation, of the Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and of the fact that hostilities were impending and imminent.
30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.
31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully informed on this subject.
32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at Washington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese might intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the transmission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have overtaxed the Navy's communications facilities; and, that it was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise CincPac of the important facts learned.
33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.
34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during November (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.
35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships to or from other ports.

36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after the November 27th "war warning," which made further evident the termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.

37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department at 1 p.m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p.m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.

38. This so-called "1 p.m. delivery message," which consisted of one sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army until after 0900.

39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information several hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.

40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.

41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum at 1 p.m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might have but that the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities were to be informed.

42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive movement by the Japanese is expected

within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."

43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.

44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and other countries. These were known as the "winds" code and the "hidden word" code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the use in weather broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.

45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during the first week of December, 1941, would not have conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.

46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op-20-G, a communications security section at the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op-20-G, who said that he recalled that there was a message but could not recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this



investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "hinds" message.

47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of delivering other messages, including the "1 p.m. delivery message," he overlooked a code word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes before 1 p.m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.

48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.

49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months prior to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District Intelligence Officer feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval significance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.

51. On 6 December 1941 the local representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be further studied by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to listen to the recording of the conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, references were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words signifying the presence or absence of ships, and a method of conveying information to the approaching Japanese ships, which presumably would have been listening in on the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.

52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications company, were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was the first time that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of particular significance.

53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the "PA-K2." It was decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat, certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would convey information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op-20-G of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received the message from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.

55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation, the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.

56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA-K2" code which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships

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did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm. These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.

57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

58. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence bulletin was distributed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command. This bulletin set forth the available information concerning the organization of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and pointed out that the principal change was a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each having two carriers.

60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such information also was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C.

61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included summaries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces which had been received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippines.



62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that the Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units of various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts might operate from Palao and the Marshalls.

63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in the Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch of ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two sections. The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. The second section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included "Car Div 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This dispatch also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates, and that their best indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. It was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.

64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not report the movement of carriers.

65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these summaries daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he initialed the summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received prior to the attack.

66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other things, that there was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next day, he received the November 28th summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was



operating at full strength upon U.S. Naval communications and "IS GETTING RESULTS." There was no information set forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, among other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed.

67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received, stated that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale." It also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."

68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which included four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU" (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "KORYU (?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.

69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.

70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following conversation:

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect."....

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location."....

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:

"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."

72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

#### IV

#### RECONNAISSANCE

##### A. The Responsibility for Long Distance Reconnaissance.

1. The Navy's obligation. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Exhibit 80), which was in effect prior to the attack, the Navy was responsible for long distance reconnaissance.

Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan made provision for joint air action by the Army and Navy for defense against hostile raids or air attacks prior to a declaration of war. Under this agreement, if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the Army aircraft were to be used by the Navy. This plan was implemented by the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, under which Admiral Bellinger would command the Navy and Army patrol planes. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan were not operative prior to the attack. An agreement between the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite to the operation of Annex VII, Section VI. No such agreement was made prior to the attack.

2. Control of the Pacific Fleet patrol planes. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were actually under the control and operating in accordance with the orders of Admiral Kimmel. Thus, on November 22nd he approved the schedules for the employment of those planes, which remained in effect up to the time of the attack. His responsibility for the operations of the patrol planes, which were under the command of Commander, Task Force Nine, of the Pacific Fleet, is further indicated by the fact that he directed search operations by those planes at Midway and Wake.

Admiral Bellinger, who commanded Task Force Nine, which consisted of Patrol Wings One and Two of the Fleet, was under the command of ComFOURTEEN only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was activated for the purpose of drills.

The responsibility for the employment of the fleet patrol planes was, as Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court, his responsibility and was accepted by him. He testified further that Admiral Bloch had asked for the dispatch of patrol planes for a search if he had felt that it was necessary. In this connection it should be noted that on October 17, 1941, Admiral Bloch had asked for certain Fleet utility planes to be used for inshore patrol and that they were not made available to him (Exhibit 46, Naval Court). It should be noted that ComFOURTEEN had no planes assigned to him.

Admiral Bellinger testified that he was responsible for the operation of the Fleet planes in accordance with the orders of Admiral

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Kimmel. He said, however, that it was not his responsibility to decide whether or not long range reconnaissance should be conducted. Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, who was the Fleet Air Officer on CincPac's staff in 1941, testified before Admiral Hart that his duties were primarily, if not almost entirely, concerned with technical training and logistic matters.

3. Conferences after 27 November 1941 concerning reconnaissance. There is no evidence that on or after 27 November 1941 the necessity or advisability of long distance reconnaissance was specifically discussed between Admiral Kimmel and any member of his Staff or Task Force Commanders. Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer, testified that he thought the subject was discussed, but that he could recall no specific conference dealing with this subject. Admiral Bellinger testified that there was no such conference in which he participated. Admiral Kimmel's testimony before the Naval Court was to the effect that on November 27th he decided not to conduct long range reconnaissance. It is significant that Captain Layton, who was the Fleet Intelligence Officer, stated that he did not tell Admiral Kimmel prior to December 7th that aerial reconnaissance from Oahu would be advisable in view of the available intelligence because he knew that reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet patrol planes. He said that he was not familiar with the extent of the reconnaissance, but definitely believed that reconnaissance was being conducted. Neither the Chief of Staff nor the Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer could recall any discussion of the advisability or necessity for long range reconnaissance from Oahu between November 27th and December 7th.

B. Reconnaissance Conducted from Oahu.

Although the schedules for the Fleet patrol planes (Exhibit 37) did not provide for any reconnaissance from Oahu, the Fleet Security Letter (Exhibits 8 NC) directed that there be a patrol of the Fleet operating areas. The Fleet operating areas were thirty miles to the south of Oahu.

During the period 30 November to 7 December 1941, certain searches were flown from Wake and Midway. The extent of these searches appears in Exhibit 50A of this investigation. One squadron had been sent to Midway on the 30th of November and searched en route; another squadron had been sent from Midway to Wake on the 1st of December and returned to Pearl Harbor prior to the attack, searching en route (Exhibit 50, 50A).

Prior to 7 December 1941 the last daily long distance reconnaissance flown from Oahu was in the summer of 1941. According to Admiral Bloch's previous testimony, some time during the summer of 1941, on the basis of some intelligence or information which he could not recall, he asked Admiral Kimmel to direct reconnaissance on a sector towards Jaluit and this was done for several days. Admiral Kimmel recalled that such reconnaissance had been flown for a few days on the line from Jaluit to Pearl Harbor and stated that they had in mind that they might catch a submarine on the surface out there and perhaps any other vessel there. Despite thorough examination of the available records of Patwing Two, of the CincPac operation files, of the COMFOURTEEN files, of the CincPac secret dispatches for 1941 and confidential and restricted dispatches for June, July, and August, 1941, no record of this reconnaissance could be found. None of the witnesses examined recalled the reconnaissance or the reasons for it.



C. Proposed Army Reconnaissance to Jaluit.

In the Army report it was stated that on November 26th the Army directed General Short to send two B-24's to Jaluit on a reconnaissance mission to look for various things, including ships. However, the Army report does not state whether this reconnaissance actually took place.

Before the Roberts' Committee, General Gerow said that reports had been received of Japanese concentrations in the Mandated Islands and they assumed that every effort was being made to identify any Japanese movements in that direction. He stated that those two B-24's were sent out with an idea of trying to confirm information that had been received from other sources. If no reconnaissance at all were done after the Army's message to General Short which directed such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary, General Gerow said that would have been considered a failure to obey orders.

The status of this reconnaissance has been quite definitely confirmed by Captain Layton's testimony in this investigation. In the latter part of November, 1941, Captain Layton stated, either Admiral Kimmel directed him to establish contact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance or else his opposite number, Colonel Raley, came to him with the information of the pending reconnaissance and requested his assistance towards delineating the appropriate objectives and to furnish the pilots and crews with intelligence material for briefing. He was also requested to assist in the projected reconnaissance. The reconnaissance unfortunately never materialized, he stated, because only one plane arrived and there were delays due to uncompleted camera installations. He was never informed that one plane had arrived, but later learned that it was destroyed in the attack on Hickam Field. The Navy was extremely anxious that the reconnaissance be made at the earliest possible date, and Admiral Kimmel, upon receipt of Captain Layton's memorandum concerning information he had obtained at the conference, asked him how soon the reconnaissance might be expected. Captain Layton relayed Colonel Raley's answer to the Admiral to the effect that the delay was due to non-installation or non-completion of installation of cameras and the time was still not definitely fixed. A photostatic copy of a memorandum of November 28th from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel concerning this reconnaissance appears in the record as Exhibit 28. Furthermore, Captain Layton was questioned as to his knowledge of any discussion concerning the possibility of the use of Navy planes for this reconnaissance. Captain Layton replied that it was not discussed with him, but he thought that PBY "Catalinas" could not be used because their appearance over the Marshalls would have been an overt act, while the Army planes, on the other hand, would have been flying ostensibly from Wake to Port Darwin en route to the Philippines. Captain Layton was particularly anxious that this reconnaissance be carried out to check on his information as to the presence or absence of air strength and carriers and submarines and naval concentrations in the Marshalls area, including Truk. This was an ideal opportunity to establish the reliability of existing intelligence on Japanese naval dispositions and developments in the Mandated Islands.

Admiral Bellinger recalled nothing concerning the proposed Army reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands.

D. The Direction to Execute an Appropriate Defensive Deployment.

Among the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet by the Basic Navy War Plan was to protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. It will be recalled that the Pacific Fleet War Plan, which was designed to implement the Navy Basic War Plan, provided, among other things, that in the event of war with the Axis Powers, including or excluding Japan, the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet were to conduct the maximum reconnaissance possible of the approaches to Oahu. The Pacific Fleet Plan was not ordered to be executed prior to the attack. On the 27th of November, however, in the war warning, which advised that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations had directed Admiral Kimmel to "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

On the following day, the Chief of Naval Operations, in his dispatch which repeated the Army dispatch advising that hostilities were possible at any moment, had directed that Admiral Kimmel was to "Be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court that as the result of the "war warning," he continued the security measures already in effect (supra, page 64); carried out the planned movements of carriers to Wake and Midway, with reconnaissance en route; carried out reconnaissance at Midway and Wake; increased security measures in fleet operating areas southward of Oahu; and, on November 28th, issued an order directing extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas and depth bombing of all contacts, suspected to be hostile, in certain of the operating areas (page 5, Exhibit 70). There is no evidence of any other specific action taken by Admiral Kimmel after 27 November 1941, in order to carry out the direction contained in the war warning or the direction in the message of November 28th. It does appear that so far as the Fleet patrol planes at Oahu were concerned, their training continued along the same lines which had been followed prior to the "war warning."

The testimony by Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer, and others in this investigation, is to the effect that the establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "Appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

It is interesting to note that the memoranda prepared by the War Plans Officer on November 30th and 5 December 1941, setting forth the action to be taken if war developed with Japan in twenty-four or forty-eight hours, contained no provision for the establishment of reconnaissance from Oahu (Exhibit 69A and 69B, Naval Court). As Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff, testified, what they were thinking about in the Pacific was not the defense of Pearl Harbor. They were thinking about the Fleet and the readiness of the Fleet.

E. The Reconnaissance that Could Have Been Flown.

A review of past reconnaissance during Admiral Kimmel's tour of duty sheds no light on this problem because he testified that he had never attempted to cover any large sector by long range reconnaissance and that a patrol out to 300 miles was almost useless unless as a guard against an air raid, although any patrol has some value as far as surface ships are concerned. However, his predecessor, Admiral Richardson, had established a distant patrol, "in view of the fact that constant and repeated warnings were received of the possible outbreak of the war in the immediate future" (p.1053, Naval Court). This patrol, he said, was designed to cover

a given sector adequately and was rotated daily. The sector which was primarily covered more adequately and frequently than any other was from 170° to the westward to about 350° That to the eastward was not covered.

Admiral Richardson also testified that this patrol would not have been adequate to positively detect an approaching combat force having as its intention the delivery of an attack early in the morning, but that it certainly would have made the attack more difficult. These patrols were discontinued when or shortly before Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.

Admiral Bellinger's testimony on the reconnaissance that could have been flown during the critical period is obviously the most valuable on the subject. He stated that after October 28th, while there were 107 VP assigned to all units of Aircraft Scouting Force, only eighty-one were available. Of these, fifty-four had just arrived and were the PBY-5 type, with limited available spare parts. The number of plane crews did not quite equal the number of planes available. If one could consider eighty-one planes available, and assuming that there would have been none lost because of breakdowns requiring spare parts, it would have been practicable to use one-third, about twenty-seven planes, for daily patrol. Each plane could cover a sector of eight degrees with a radius of 700 miles, totalling approximately 216 degrees daily. This, however, would have been the absolute maximum because of the lack of sufficient crews and spare parts. 144 degrees could have been covered daily based on the use of eighteen planes daily of the fifty-four new PBY-5's. Actually, on 7 December 1941 there were in all only sixty-one planes available at Oahu, one squadron of which had just returned from Midway and Wake and required overhaul. This left forty-nine planes actually available, one-third of which would have been able to cover 128 degrees.

Admiral Bellinger testified that if he had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, to conduct 360 degrees reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, it would have been possible to maintain such reconnaissance for not more than four or five days. His estimate of the duration of the daily 128-degree search was that it could have been flown until the failure of planes and the lack of spare parts reduced the planes to such an extent that further reconnaissance was impossible. It appears that such reconnaissance could have been carried on for an indefinite period and Admiral Bellinger's "vague" estimate was that it could have been carried on for several weeks.

Admiral Davis testified before Admiral Hart that: "There were not enough planes and pilots to establish and maintain a long range, 360 degree search indefinitely, or even for more than a limited time. There were, however, enough to approximate this by using relatively short range planes in the least dangerous sectors, and by obtaining some assistance by available Army aircraft, so that I think it could have been undertaken, had it been considered essential, on the basis that reinforcements could have arrived before personnel and materiel fatigue set in. Unless reinforcements arrived, it could not have been maintained."



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F. The Sectors Which Would Have Been Covered.

Had partial reconnaissance been flown from Oahu during the first week of December, 1941, it appears that the northern sectors would have been covered. Admiral Bellinger testified that he considered the northern sectors as the most dangerous sectors primarily because of the prevailing winds which would facilitate carrier-based plane operations in that sector. He stated that had the normal plan been carried out after the attack, on December 7th patrol planes would have searched the northern sector, and that some few planes did search that sector. But there had been searches made to the south because of information received from CincPac to the effect that a radio bearing indicated that the attacking force was to the south.



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FINDINGS

73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the only practicable way by which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, could have obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.

74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation, through Com 14, to conduct distance reconnaissance, and under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations. As previously pointed out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between the Commanding General and Com 14 that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite and no such agreement had been made prior to the attack. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements for joint Army-Navy air action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.

75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.

76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.

77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.

78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the war warning, as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.

79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Planes, and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which was used as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agreements, was prophetic in its estimate that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-measure included daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degrees, to reduce the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that such

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patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel and materiel available at the time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that such patrols were not practicable unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by the responsible officers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which was always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the available aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.

80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu was being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisions of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas.

81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissance flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer of 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.

82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by providing intelligence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were not made ready prior to the attack.

83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet patrol planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required for overhaul and repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.

84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that Admiral Kimmel "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which, among other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Navy dispatch directed that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

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87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and November, 1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reinforcements after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but at the expense of defenses in other areas. The Navy Department presumably knew that the number of planes available at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the Navy Department thought that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.

89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.

90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.

91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.

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THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

A. Prelude: Japanese Submarines on 7 December 1941.

At 0342, 7 December 1941, the USS CONDOR, a minesweeper, sighted a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. This was in a defensive sea area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged. When sighted, the submarine was proceeding toward the entrance buoys. It was about 100 feet from and on a collision course with the CONDOR, but turned sharply to port. The CONDOR simultaneously turned to starboard.

The CONDOR reported the incident by blinker to the USS WARD between 0350 and 0358. The WARD was a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol then engaged in patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor. The CONDOR then continued on its assigned mission. The message to the WARD read:

"SIGHTED SUBMERGED SUBMARINE ON WESTERLY COURSE,  
SPEED 9 KNOTS."

After receiving this visual signal, the WARD made a sonar search for about an hour and a half, without result. It then communicated by radio with the CONDOR, asking:

"WHAT WAS THE APPROXIMATE DISTANCE AND COURSE  
OF THE SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED?"

At 0520 the CONDOR replied:

"THE COURSE WAS ABOUT WHAT WE WERE STEERING AT  
THE TIME 020 MAGNETIC AND ABOUT 1000 YARDS FROM THE ENTRANCE  
APPARENTLY HEADING FOR THE ENTRANCE."

In response to further inquiries made by the WARD between 0521 and 0536, the CONDOR advised again that the last time it had sighted the submarine was at about 0350 and that it was apparently headed for the entrance. On receiving the message giving the submarine's course as about 020 magnetic, the captain of the WARD realized that his search had been in the wrong direction. He then continued searching, but again without result.

The CONDOR made no report of the incident, except to the WARD. The captain considered that the identification at that time was not positive enough to make a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat. The Senior Officer Present Afloat, Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge, who commanded the WARD, made no report to higher authority. The captain of the WARD thought that the CONDOR might have been mistaken in concluding that it had seen a submarine.

The radio conversation between the WARD and CONDOR was overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, a radio station then under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol, 14th N. D. (Ex. 18) Since the conversation was solely



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between the ships and was not addressed to the Section Base and no request was made that it be relayed, the Bishop's Point Radio Station did not relay or report it to higher authority. The loudspeaker watch on the same frequency, which was maintained in the Communications Office, 14th F.D., did not overhear or intercept the WARD-CONDOR conversation.

At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate-vessel charged with opening and closing the net at the entrance. This anti-torpedo net was, according to Admiral Bloch's previous testimony, 45 feet in depth. The deepest part of the channel was 72 feet. A Japanese submarine subsequently recovered was about 20 feet from keel to conning tower.

The instructions of the Captain of the Yard were that the net should be kept closed from sunset to sunrise and opened only on orders from him, from the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or from the Yard Duty Officer who could be reached via the signal tower (Exhibit 43). The log of the gate-vessel indicates that the net was opened and closed a number of times during the night of December 6-7. At 0458 on the 7th, the gate was opened and the CROSSBILL and the CONDOR stood in. It was not until 0846 that the gate was closed. The Commanding Officer of the CONDOR testified that at 0532, when the CONDOR came in, conditions of visibility were very good and were "approaching daylight conditions."

The log of the signal tower for December 6-7, 1941 records the closing of the gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by an entry at 0600 that the ANTARES was reported off the harbor (Exhibit 46).

The USS ANTARES, with a 500-ton steel barge in tow, arrived off Pearl Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it exchanged calls with the WARD. At 0630 the ANTARES sighted a suspicious object, which appeared to be a small submarine, about 1500 yards on its starboard quarter. The ANTARES notified the WARD and asked it to investigate, and several minutes later, at about 0633, observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two smoke pots near the object. (Exhibit 73)

The WARD complied and at 0640 sighted an unidentified submarine one point off its starboard bow, apparently following the ANTARES in to Pearl Harbor. General Quarters were sounded and all engines ordered full ahead, increasing the WARD's speed from five to twenty-five knots. At 0645 she opened fire with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun. The attack lasted only one or two minutes. The first shot, at a range of approximately 100 yards, passed directly over the conning tower; the second, from No. 3 gun, at fifty yards or less, hit the submarine at the waterline junction of the hull and conning tower. At about this time, the ANTARES, observing the fire of the WARD, also noted that the Navy patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the submarine. The submarine heeled over to starboard and started to sink. The WARD ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. A large amount of oil appeared on the surface. The submarine went down in 1,200 feet of water. (Exhibit 74).

At 0651 the WARD sent a radio message to the Commanding  
FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit 18):

WE HAVE DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES UPON SUBS OPERATING  
IN DEFENSIVE SEA AREA.

The captain of the WARD, after reflecting that this message might not be interpreted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653 sent the following supplementary message:

WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DROPPED DEPTH  
CHARGES UPON SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE  
SEA AREA.

This message was received by the Bishop's Point radio station, relayed to the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Inshore Patrol, and delivered by the Communications Watch Officer, FOURTEENTH Naval District, to the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The Duty Officer notified the ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff at 0712 and, at the latter's direction, the Duty Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715.

The ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff informed Admiral Bloch. Because of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the WARD had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the WARD and the relief ready duty destroyer MONAGHAN, which was dispatched, could take care of the situation, while the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to whom they had referred the information, had the power to take any other action which might be desired.

The CincPac Staff Duty Officer was given the report at about 0720 by the Assistant Duty Officer. After several attempted phone calls to ascertain whether Admiral Bloch knew of the report, the Staff Duty Officer received a phone message at 0740 from the duty officer of PatWing 2 that a patrol plane had reported that a submarine had been sunk in the defensive sea area; simultaneously, another phone call from FOURTEENTH Naval District advised the CincPac Staff Duty Officer that Admiral Bloch had been informed of the sinking and had ordered the ready duty destroyer out to assist the WARD and the standby destroyer to get up steam. The Staff Duty Officer then phoned Admiral Kimmel and gave him both messages and the information as to the action taken by Admiral Bloch. About this time, Captain Ramsey, of PatWing 2, phoned again and the Staff Duty Officer suggested he make his search planes available in case the Admiral wanted them.

Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court that between 0730 and 0740 he received a report that a submarine had been attacked off Pearl Harbor. He said that he was waiting for an amplification of this report when the air attack commenced. He also stated that the officer who reported the sinking of the submarine should have broadcast in plain language, but that he had reported in code, which caused delay. Admiral Kimmel also testified that after 27 November 1941, there had been about a half-dozen of such reports, and hence amplification of the report was necessary.

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The evidence indicates that the reports by the WARD were in plain language but that a request for verification by the WARD was later sent in code by the ComFOURTEEN Communication Officer at the direction of the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The WARD's reply to that request was also in code and was deciphered at about the time when the air attack commenced.

A Japanese midget submarine entered Pearl Harbor and, after the air attack had commenced, fired both of its torpedoes, one of which exploded on the beach of Ford Island, passing between the RALEIGH and the CURTISS, and the other buried itself, it was believed, in the mud near the berth of the UTAH. This submarine was sunk by the CURTISS and recovered from the harbor some weeks after the attack. It had been so thoroughly destroyed that nothing of intelligence value could be obtained from it. Whether or not this was the submarine which had been sighted by the CONDOR could not be determined. No other submarine was detected in the harbor.

Another Japanese midget submarine was beached off Bellows Field, Oahu, and captured on the next day, along with its commanding officer. Various documents were recovered from this submarine including a chart of Pearl Harbor, on which was laid out a course into the harbor, around Pearl Harbor, and out of the harbor (Exhibits 32A, 33A). On this chart (Ex. 33A) were indicated the positions of various ships in the harbor. The charted positions differed substantially from the actual berthing arrangements on December 7th. This fact led the Army Pearl Harbor Board to conclude that the submarine had been in the harbor for reconnaissance prior to December 7th.

The conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board that the Japanese midget submarines "must have been in the harbor a few days before the attack and evidently were moving into and out of the harbor at will" (Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, page 155) is based wholly on the legends appearing on the Japanese maps (Exhibits 32, 32A, 33, 33A) captured in the midget submarine that was sunk off Bellows Field, and on the testimony of Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge at Honolulu on 7 December 1941, which, in turn, is likewise based solely on the legends appearing on the same maps (Rep. APHB, page 155). At the present time, Mr. Shivers is Collector of the Port at Honolulu, and is in a precarious physical condition due to a serious heart ailment. Mr. Shivers was interviewed in Honolulu during the first week of June, 1945, and he stated, as also appears in the Army Pearl Harbor Board report (page 155), that his conclusion that Japanese submarines had been in Pearl Harbor prior to the attack was based on an examination of the maps in question, and that he had no other information to sustain his conclusion. Mr. Shivers likewise had no further information to supply in respect of the intelligence situation or the intelligence information that was available in Honolulu prior to 7 December 1941, except to say that he was mystified that the ONI tap of the telephone line of the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu was lifted on 2 December 1941, pursuant to an order issued by Captain (now Rear Admiral) Mayfield, the DIO. Since Mr. Shivers' statements were no different from those given by him in his testimony of record before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and since the basis of his, and the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, are shown to be erroneous by a careful study of the legends on the maps in question, on which those conclusions were based, and since his health was so precarious, it was deemed not necessary to call him as a witness.



For the following reasons, it appears that the Japanese midget submarine from which was obtained the chart of Pearl Harbor was not in the harbor on that day, and probably had not been there on any prior occasion:

(a) The following facts lead to the conclusion that the recovered chart was an attack plan rather than an actual track and log of events:

(1) The characters marking certain points on the chart (Exhibits 33 and 33A) were in Chinese ideographs which give no indication of tense. For instance, the notation which has been variously translated as "Enemy ship sunk" and "Attack and sink enemy ships" could have been the future meaning. Similarly the notation translated as "Fixed position," could mean "Position to be fixed," a natural course of action before entering the channel.

(2) The times marked on the chart were unquestionably Tokyo time (-9). This is confirmed by the computation, on the back of the chart, of the time of dawn and sunrise at Pearl Harbor on December 8 (Tokyo time).

(3) Based on (2), times along the track were all in daylight, commencing at the channel entrance at dawn.

(4) The northwesterly portion of the track, to the northward of Ford Island, passed through an area which was, and had been, occupied by a number of ships moored to buoys, and could not have been followed by a submarine.

(5) The courses and notations were much more neat and meticulous than any that could have been made during the passage of narrow and crowded waters by the navigator of a two-man submarine.

(6) The major Japanese operation plan for the Pearl Harbor attack, as reconstructed by a captured Japanese yeoman, and confirmed generally by captured documents, provided that the midget submarines were to enter the harbor and after the initiation of the air attack were to attack with torpedoes. The times on the chart were in conformity with this, since, converted into Honolulu time, there was a waiting period inside the harbor entrance from 0545 to 0640 and the turning point south of Ford Island was timed 0900.

(b) The submarine had its full allowance of two torpedoes when recovered.

(c) The submarine commander, on interrogation, stated that he had failed in his mission (Exhibit 68).

(d) The information on the chart was of a nature that could more readily be obtained by civilian observers from the area surrounding Pearl Harbor than by dangerous submarine reconnaissance. As has appeared earlier, the Japanese Consul General had been communicating just such intelligence to Tokyo.

(e) Notations on the chart indicate that the submarine commander received intelligence reports as late as December 5th.



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Intelligence information recently received indicates that midget submarines were carried by and launched from mother submarines (Exhibit 69). They were carried on the main deck abaft the conning tower and secured to the pressure hull by means of heavy clamps. The midgets used in the Pearl Harbor attack were 41 feet in length, had a reported cruising range of 175 to 180 miles at their most economical speed of 4 to 6 knots, did not have a radio transmitter, and carried a crew of two men. They were armed with two torpedoes and apparently carried the same designation number as their mother subs. The exact number with the Japanese task force is not definitely known, but there is substantial proof that there were at least five.

The midget submarine beached off Bellows Field from which the chart was recovered bore the designation of "I-18," apparently that of its "mother." In the recovered chart, at various points along the sides of the entrance channel from Hammer Point to Hospital Point, are notations in faint pencil, "I-16," "I-20," "I-22," "I-18," "I-24." From information received, it is now known that these are the designations of the submarines which carried the five midgets known to have been present. The times on the recovered chart indicate a waiting period in the narrow harbor entrance area from 0115 to 0410 (0445 to 0840, Hawaiian time). It therefore appears to be a logical assumption that the five midget submarines were to lie in wait in the narrow entrance channel, approximately in the positions indicated, with the object of torpedoing ships attempting to sortie, thus blocking the channel; and that after the initial air attack had been completed, they were to proceed around Ford Island and complete the destruction. The midget submarine which was sunk west of Ford Island apparently followed just such a plan. Confirmation of this assumption is found in a captured copy of the Japanese Plan for this operation, wherein the following initial task is assigned to the Sixth Fleet (Submarine Force): "Will observe and attack American Fleet in HAWAII area. Will make a surprise attack on the channel leading into PEARL HARBOR and attempt to close it. If the enemy moves out to fight he will be pursued and attacked."

B. Suspicious Submarine Contacts Prior to 7 December 1941.

It was suspected in Washington for some time prior to December 7th that our Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was being kept under observation by Japanese submarines, there having been, over a period of six months, reports by our destroyers of such contacts. The Fleet also received reports that Japanese submarines were reconnoitering the approaches to Pearl Harbor. The number of such reports at Pearl Harbor prior to the attack was placed by one witness at from ten to fifteen, several of which occurred in the immediate vicinity of the entrance to Pearl Harbor. The contacts were on underwater sound contacts, which were not confirmed by sightings.

A search of the files of CincPac has resulted in locating dispatches that refer to three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding Pearl Harbor:

(1) On 3 November 1941, an oil slick area in latitude 20-10, longitude 157-41 was observed by a patrol plane, and crossed by Task Force One; an air search of a fifteen mile area by the patrol plane, a sound search of an unspecified area by the USS WORDEN and an investigation by

the USS DALE produced negative results (Exhibit 48; dispatches 031920, 032035, 032133, 032300, 040042).

(2) On 28 November 1941, after the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had issued an order requiring extreme vigilance against possible hostile submarines, restricting submerged submarine operations to certain areas, and providing that all submarine contacts in other areas suspected to be hostile were to be depth bombed, the USS HELENA reported that a radar operator, without knowledge of the CincPac alert, was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area (Exhibit 48; dispatch 280835). A search by a task group with three destroyers, of the western border and the northern half of that area, pursued from 281050 to 281845, when abandoned by 290900, produced no contacts (Exhibit 48; dispatches 281050, 281133, 281704, 281845).

(3) During the night of 2 December 1941, the USS GAMBLE reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23, which was lost in a change of range, that was evaluated to have been too rapid to indicate the presence of a submarine (Exhibit 48; dispatch 022336). An investigation, ordered to be made by Desron 4 (Exhibit 48; dispatch 030040), apparently was negative.

#### C. Detection of Aircraft by the Army Radar System.

It appears from the prior investigations that about 0702 on the morning of 7 December 1941, two Army privates on duty at a mobile radar unit on the northern part of Oahu discovered an unusually large response on the radar in a northerly direction and from about 136 miles. This information they reported, at about 0715, to an Army officer on duty at the Army Information Center. The Army officer stated that he had some information to the effect that a flight of Army B-17's was due in that morning, and he thought that the planes detected by the radar were those Army planes. He did not suspect enemy planes and made no effort to report to his superior.

The evidence indicates that neither this information nor any other information as to the direction from which the planes approached or on which they departed was transmitted to the Naval authorities on the day of the attack.

#### D. The Air Attack.

The Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor, according to most observers, started at 0755. It began with dive bombing and strafing of the Naval Air Station at Ford Island, and at the Army's Hickam Field. This was followed at Pearl Harbor by attacks on major units of the Fleet, launched by torpedo planes and dive bombers, and was accompanied by strafing. Next there occurred two distinct horizontal bombing attacks from high altitudes, the last immediately preceding a final intensive dive bombing attack. Almost simultaneously with the raid on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attacked

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the Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station and Ewa Field at Barber's Point was strafed. Approximately 150 planes took part in the attack on Pearl Harbor. The raid is reported variously to have ended at from 0940 to 1130 and some Japanese planes are known to have been over Oahu after 1200.

The CincPac Staff Duty Officer learned of the inception of the air raid during his second telephone conversation of the morning with Admiral Kimmel, when he was advising of a report by the WARD, after its submarine reports, that it had detained a sampan. He immediately told the Admiral of his receipt from the signal tower of this message:

JAPANESE ARE ATTACKING PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NO DRILL.

E. Location of Pacific Fleet Units.

At the time of the attack, the forces of the Pacific Fleet were, according to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 73), disposed partly in port and partly at sea as follows:

(1) In Pearl Harbor:

(a) Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one battleship, one light cruiser and one destroyer) comprising five battleships, four light cruisers, seventeen destroyers, two light cruisers, and four mine layers.

(b) Task Force Two (under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey, who was at sea with units thereof constituting a separate task force - Task Force Eight) comprising three battleships, eight destroyers, one light cruiser, and four mine layers.

(c) Task Force Three (less detached units under command of Vice Admiral Brown at sea, and less a separate task force - Task Force Twelve - which was at sea under Rear Admiral Newton's command) comprising two heavy cruisers, and four mine layers which were under overhaul.

(d) Five submarines and the submarine tender PELIAS of Task Force Seven.

(e) The TANGIER, HULBERT, CURTIS, and THORNTON, and Patrol Squadrons (VP 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, and 24 (a total of about sixty planes) of Task Force Nine.

(f) Marine Air Squadrons VMSE 232 and VMJ 252 (a total of twenty planes) at Ewa, Oahu.

(g) Two destroyer tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, and planes of Base Force Aircraft Squadrons VJ-1, VJ-2, and VJ-3, as follows: 19 J2F, 9 JRS, 2 PBY-1, 1 J2V.

(2) At sea:

(a) Task Force Eight (Vice Admiral Halsey commanding) consisting of one aircraft carrier (ENTERPRISE), three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers, located 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward, was returning to Pearl Harbor after landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake Island.

(b) Task Force Three (Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less units in port, consisting of one heavy cruiser and one mine laying squadron, less two of its divisions, was exercising with landing boats at Johnston Island.



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(c) Task Force Twelve (Rear Admiral Newton commanding), ordinarily a component of Task Force Three, consisting of one aircraft carrier (LEXINGTON), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, located about 425 miles southeast of Midway, was proceeding on a westerly course to land a Marine Air Squadron on Midway Island.

(d) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of Task Force Three, were engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest of Oahu.

(e) Four submarines of Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en route to Pearl Harbor.

(3) At other places:

(a) At Midway Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and Patrol Squadron VP-21 (consisting of twelve planes) of Task Force Twelve.

(b) At Wake Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Air Squadron.

(c) At Johnston Island (in addition to Task Force Three, undergoing exercise), two Base Force PBY-1 planes.

(d) At Mare Island, five submarines of Task Force Seven.

(e) At San Diego, four submarines of Task Force Seven.

To sum up: At Pearl Harbor, there were eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, one old cruiser mine layer, eight destroyers, five submarines, twelve mine layers, two destroyer tenders, one submarine tender, four aircraft tenders, various auxiliary and repair ships, and 111 aircraft of various types, of which nine were under overhaul. At sea, there were two aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four submarines, and one mine layer squadron less one division. At other places, there were thirteen submarines, fourteen Navy Patrol planes and one Marine Air Squadron.

Except as to Task Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special missions to reinforce Wake and Midway Islands, the dispositions of Pacific Fleet Units as noted above were in accordance with a previously worked out fleet employment schedule.

F. Condition of Readiness.

(1) The ships in port:

The testimony in previous investigations showed some confusion as to the condition of readiness which was in effect on ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. It appears, however, that whether or not Condition III, as prescribed in the Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the Fleet, was in effect, the condition aboard the battleships was in excess of that condition. Each of the battleships had two 5-inch anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned. While the Fleet letter on security fixed responsibility on the senior officer present in each air defense sector for fire control in his sector, no particular damage control organization was prescribed in that letter or functioning on the ships in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that the anti-aircraft batteries of the ships were quickly manned and, considering the circumstances, were effectively used against the Japanese attackers.

(2) The aircraft of the Pacific Fleet:

The condition of readiness in force as to the Fleet aircraft was Baker 5 (50 per cent of the assigned aircraft to be ready on four hours notice) with machine guns and ammunition in all planes not undergoing maintenance work. Three squadrons (one at Midway, one at Pearl Harbor, and one at Kaneohe) were in condition Afirm 5 (100 per cent assigned aircraft to be ready on four hours notice). This was augmented on December 7th by specific duty assignments which required six planes from Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN and from Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR (at Kaneohe) and from Patrol Squadron TWELVE (at Pearl Harbor) to be ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. On the morning of December 7th, three patrol planes of a squadron based at Kaneohe were in the air on morning security patrol armed with depth charges, three were ready for flight on 30 minutes notice, and four on four hours notice; and four planes of a squadron at Pearl Harbor were in the air conducting tactics with submarines and one plane was ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.

G. Reaction to the Attack.

The hostile character of the attacking planes was not recognized until the bombs fell, but there followed an immediate and general realization of that fact, and a prompt application of such defensive measures as were then capable of being carried out. General Quarters was sounded in all units ashore and afloat and, as has been pointed out above, anti-aircraft batteries were manned and, considering the damaged condition of the ships, employed to the fullest possible effect. There was, however, an unfortunate lapse of time before damage control measures on the ships in Pearl Harbor could be carried forward, resulting in the suffering of much damage that might otherwise have been prevented or minimized. The damages so quickly suffered included a partial breakdown of the communication system, preventing an accurate interchange of necessary information, including radio direction bearings of the attacking force. The futility of the attempted counter-measures in locating and attacking the Japanese striking force was due, in

large part, to a flood of wild and conflicting reports as to the location and strength, and probable intentions, of units of the Japanese force.

The evidence obtained in the previous investigations demonstrates clearly that the officers and men of the Pacific Fleet met the attack, individually and jointly, with great heroism.

H. Composition and Movements of the Attacking Force.

The chief source of information concerning the Japanese force which attacked Pearl Harbor is a Japanese prisoner of war who was captured on Saipan during the Marianas Campaign. The POW was a chief yeoman in the Japanese Navy, attached to the staff of the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto. The reconstruction by the POW of the events preceding and leading up to Pearl Harbor has been substantiated and verified by other information, including that contained in a copy of Japanese Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1, recovered from the Japanese cruiser NACHI that was sunk in Manila Bay. The prisoner's reconstruction of the orders to the striking force is contained in Exhibit 3.

The movements of the striking force were provided for in the Japanese Secret Operation Order No. 1, dated 1 November 1941, which stated that war would be declared on the United States on X-Day, expected to be in the early or middle part of December, and that on or about X-16 Day the carrier task force would depart its base and proceed by way of Takan Bay (Hotokappu Bay), Etorofu Island and the Kuriles for Pearl Harbor, where it would deliver a surprise attack. Japanese Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 3, dated 10 November 1941, fixed as X-Day, 8 December 1941, E.L.T. (Exhibit 3).

The Japanese striking force actually left Saiki Anchorage near the Bongo Channel some time between November 20 and November 22, 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Takan Bay, Etorofu Island. At the latter place it assembled and fueled, and departed on or about 28 November 1941, E.L.T., and headed eastward under heavy front. The force proceeded in an easterly direction heading on course about 085°, to a point in longitude about 170°W; then turned southeast on course about 135 degrees, and proceeded to a point northwest to due north of, and approximately 200 miles from, the island of Oahu, where it arrived early in the morning of 8 December 1941, E.L.T. From that position the Pearl Harbor attack was launched. Following the attack, the striking force retired initially to the northwest, on a heading of about 300°, to a point about longitude 170°E, thence to the southwest, irregularly on varying headings to a point near 140°E, and thence northwest to Kyushu (Exhibit 3, page 16).

The striking force consisted of three of Japan's five carrier divisions, the KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1); HIRYU and SORYU (CarDiv 2); SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU (sometimes referred to as CarDiv 3, sometimes as CarDiv 4 and sometimes as CarDiv 5); the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two of the battleships of BatDiv 3); the TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv 3), and of various destroyers and submarines.

Cooperating with the foregoing striking force was a large part of the Japanese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet. That fleet left the Japanese Inland Sea about 18 November 1941, E.L.T. At the time of the attack, many Japanese submarines were concentrated at the mouth of Pearl Harbor for the purpose of making torpedo attacks on any United States ships that attempted to escape from the air attack in the harbor. As previously pointed out, the evidence indicates that only one midget submarine succeeded in entering the harbor.



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I. The Casualties and Damage.

The facts as to the casualties and damage appear fully in the record of the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry:

(1) An examination of reports in the Bureau of Personnel showed that there were 3,963 casualties as a result of the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack, of which 896 were wounded and 3,067 were either killed, dead of wounds, or are missing and declared dead.

(2) The damage to fleet units in Pearl Harbor was extensive. The Battleships ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OKLAHOMA, and WEST VIRGINIA were sunk and the NEVADA beached to prevent its sinking. The auxiliary vessels UTAH and OGLALA were also sunk. All other battleships in the harbor, PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND, and TENNESSEE, the Cruisers HELENA, HONOLULU, and RALEIGH, the destroyers SHAW, CASSIN, and DOWNES, and the auxiliaries CURTIS and VESTAL, were seriously damaged.

(3) The damage to airplanes was as follows:

<u>Type</u>	<u>No. present Dec. 7</u>	<u>No. on hand after raid</u>	<u>No. usable after raid</u>
Patrol	69	45	11
Fighters	24	15	0
Scout bombers	60	29	14
Torpedo bombers	2	2	0
Battleship and cruiser planes	92	82	11
Utility and transport planes	<u>54</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>16</u>
TOTALS	301	221	52

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FINDINGS

92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by ComFOURTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.

93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the air attack.

94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.

95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army commanders.

96. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and damage.

97. The battleships each had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charges and 4 engaged in tactics with submarines); ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forty-four on four hours notice.

98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were all in port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.

99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.

100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions, among which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.

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101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.

VI

A. FINDINGS

1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or excluding Japan.
2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and raids on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, including the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.
3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases, at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory of the Associated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the establishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding against surprise attack by Japan.
4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, which, it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hostilities opened with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack.
6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans. The method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until and unless unity of command were invoked.
7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol the coastal zone (which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu), and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support the Army forces.
8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for distant reconnaissance.
9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.



10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.

11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided, among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations.

12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan also provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its aircraft warning service, and that prior to the completion of that service, the Navy, through the use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as might be practicable.

13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take steps to make available to the other the air forces at his disposal, in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the plan.

14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect any agreement prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI, in operation.

15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided, among other things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of the assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there might be a surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a combination of both forms of attack was possible.

16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.

17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex "Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provision for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The plan was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by

ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, for Navy units.

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18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that a single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, including provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.

20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of 7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of threatening naval forces"; that initial action would include "possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other outlying United States positions"; and that the initial Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and that submarines in the Hawaiian area . . ." (Underscoring supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.

23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility. Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a serious probability.

24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial. However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operating setup which could insure the constant and timely exchange of information, decisions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the establishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.

25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in connection with a proposal for reenforcement of Wake and Midway by Army planes. General Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, the command must be his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases must remain with the Navy. The islands were reenforced with Marine planes.

26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the frequent transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations.

27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indicated the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C. prior to the attack; that others which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were, with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be decrypted there before December 7th; and, that three messages intercepted by Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department for decryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had been able to obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage reports sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.

29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its representatives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in Washington, D. C., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained of the Japanese Government's actual views concerning the diplomatic situation, of the Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and of the fact that hostilities were impending and imminent.

30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.



31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully informed on this subject.

32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at Washington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese might intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the transmission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have overtaxed the Navy's communications facilities; and, that it was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise CincPac of the important facts learned.

33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.

34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during November (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.

35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships to or from other ports.

36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after the November 27th "war warning," which made further evident the termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.

37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department at 1 p.m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p.m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.

38. This so-called "1 p.m. delivery message," which consisted of one sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army until after 0900.



39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information several hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.

40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.

41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum at 1 p.m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might have but that the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities were to be informed.

42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive movement by the Japanese is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."

43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.

44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and other countries. These were known as the "winds" code and the "hidden word" code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the use in weather broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.

45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during the first week of December, 1941, would not have conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.

46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op-20-G, a communications security section at the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op-20-G, who said that he recalled that there was a message but that he could not recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message.

47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of delivering other messages, including the "1 p.m. delivery message," he overlooked a code word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes before 1 p.m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.

48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.

49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

HONOLULU

50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months prior to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District Intelligence Officer feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval significance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.

51. On 6 December 1941 the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be further studied by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to listen to the recording of the conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, references were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words signifying the presence or absence of ships, and a method of conveying information to the approaching Japanese ships, which presumably would have been listening in on the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.

52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications company, were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was the first time that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of particular significance.

53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the "PA-K2." It was decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat, certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would convey information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op-20-G of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received the message from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the



attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.

55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation, the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.

56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA-K2" code which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm. These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.

57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

58. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin was distributed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command.



This bulletin set forth the available information concerning the composition of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and pointed out that the principal change was a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each having two carriers.

60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such information also was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C.

61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included summaries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces which had been received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippines.

62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that the Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units of various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts might operate from Palao and the Marshalls.

63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in the Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch of ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two sections. The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. The second section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included "CarDiv 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This dispatch also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates, and that their best indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. It was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.

64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not report the movement of carriers.

65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these summaries daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he initialed the summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received prior to the attack.

66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other things, that there was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next day, he received the November 28th summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval communications and "IS GETTING RESULTS." There was no information set forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, among other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed.

67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received, stated that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale." It also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."

68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which included four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU" (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "KORYU(?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.

69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.

70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following conversation:

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"CAPTAIN LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect."....

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location."....

"CAPTAIN LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:

"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."

72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the only practicable way by which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, could have obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.



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74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation, through ComFOURTEEN, to conduct distant reconnaissance, and under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations. As previously pointed out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite and no such agreement had been made prior to the attack. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements for joint Army-Navy air action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.

75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.

76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.

77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.

78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.

79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Planes, and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which was used as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agreements, was prophetic in its estimate that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-measure included daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degrees, to reduce the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that such patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel and materiel available at the time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that such patrols were not practicable unless other intelligence indicated that surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by the responsible officers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which was always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the available aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.



80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu was being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisions of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas.

81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissance flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer of 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.

82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by providing intelligence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were not made ready prior to the attack.

83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet patrol planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required for overhaul and repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.

84. In the war<sup>P</sup> warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that Admiral Kimmel "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which, among other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Navy dispatch directed that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."

87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and November, 1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reinforcements after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but at the expense of defenses in other areas. The

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Navy Department presumably knew that the number of planes available at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the Navy Department thought that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.

89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.

90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.

91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.

92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by ComFOURTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.

93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the air attack.

94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.

95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army commanders.

96. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and damage.

97. The battleships each had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charged and 4 engaged in tactics with submarines); ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forty-four on four hours notice.

98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were all in port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.

99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Takan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.

100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions among which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.

101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.



B. CONCLUSIONS.

1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.

2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.

3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange.

4. Current and detailed information which was obtained by the Japanese as to the location and movements of American naval forces and as to the preparations being made for defense against an attack on Pearl Harbor contributed to the success of their attack.

5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages.

6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States.



8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.

9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the "1. p.m." message and its possible import, were unfortunate.

10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.

11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages.

12. Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.

13. Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work.

14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.

15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft.

16. The principal basis for estimates of the location of Japanese naval forces was the intelligence obtained by the Navy from traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications.

17. A carrier attack could not, with certainty, have been prevented, for the following reasons:

(a) Certain prevention of such an attack requires interception and destruction of the carriers before attack planes can be launched.

(b) The forces necessary to insure such interception and destruction, anywhere in the vast area which would have had to be covered, were not available, and could not have been expected to be available.

(c) If the Japanese task force had been detected at nightfall, the probability of its successful interception and destruction prior to the following dawn would have been small.

18. Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as one half hour, would have served considerably to reduce the effectiveness of the attack, for the following reasons:

(a) Ships' anti-aircraft batteries would have been fully manned and ready. It is to be noted that the anti-aircraft fire was more effective against the subsequent attacks than the initial air attack.

(b) Enemy character of the approaching planes would have been immediately appreciated and they would have been engaged at once.

(c) The maximum condition of damage control readiness would have been set, thus facilitating the isolation of damage received.

(d) Many planes could have been in the air, in readiness.

(e) Ground dispersal of planes could have been improved.

19. The only adequate means of assuring detection of an approaching carrier attack was by 360 degree distant air search from Oahu. Sufficient planes were not available to carry out an all-round distant air reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

20. A thorough appreciation of the danger, the capabilities of the available planes, and the importance of the defense of Pearl Harbor might have justified the allotment by the Chief of Naval Operations of additional patrol planes to the Pacific Fleet. Although the additional planes, if assigned, would not have been sufficient for a 360 degree daily search, they would have increased the area which could have been effectively covered and might have acted as an inducement to such employment. Admittedly, in making over-all plane assignments, it was necessary for the Chief of Naval Operations to weigh the prospective needs of the Pacific and the Atlantic, where hostilities with Axis submarines were already in progress.

21. Partial air reconnaissance, covering a sector of some 120 degrees, could have been maintained daily from Oahu for a considerable period of time with the Fleet patrol planes controlled by Admiral Kimmel and could have been designed to cover the most probable approach bearings from which an attack might have been expected. Such reconnaissance would have had a reasonable chance of success.

22. Neither the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor the key members of the latter's staff, seem to have given serious consideration after 27 November 1941 to the possibility or probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor or of its possible effect.

23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:

(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.

(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.

(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.

(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.

(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.

(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.

(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and aircraft warning installations.

24. Admiral Kimmel's estimate as to the probability of submarine attack in the Hawaiian area was justified by subsequent events.

25. Throughout his incumbency as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war. In considering the action which he could have taken, it should be noted that:

(a) Establishment of the maximum plane reconnaissance would have meant the stoppage of aircraft training which was of great importance to the naval expansion program, and might have resulted in wear and tear on planes and crews which would have reduced their later effectiveness.

(b) Higher conditions of readiness would have interfered with the rest and relaxation desirable in port for the maintenance of personnel efficiency.

(c) Failure to install anti-torpedo nets was influenced (i) by information from CNO which made it appear that effective drops of aircraft torpedoes with the depths of water and length of run available in Pearl Harbor were not probable; (ii) the interference such nets would have caused in harbor operations due to crowded conditions.

(d) The presence of two carrier task forces at sea at the time on necessary ferry trips did, in a way, provide striking forces and some reconnaissance.

(e) In view of the submarine menace and the concentration of anti-aircraft batteries, it was questionable whether ships were safer in port or at sea.

26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced.



27. More effective action would have been taken both before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor had there been in existence in the Hawaiian area a suitable operating agency for the adequate exercise of joint command functions. This omission was the fault of no one person, but of the existing system.

28. War experience has shown that:

(a) The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be "unity of command."

(b) In planning and executing joint operations, responsible commanders of the different services, who are to act jointly, and the principal members of their staffs, must be in close physical touch, and not entirely dependent on telephonic, radio, or similar communications. In no other way can a full exchange of information and ideas be assured nor the possibility of misunderstanding be prevented.

(c) Command organizations which are to function effectively in an emergency must be in active operation prior to such emergency.

29. Based on the foregoing, military command of outlying stations, such as Hawaii, should, even in peacetime, be established under the principle of "Unity of Command." The commander exercising such joint command should be assisted by a joint staff, capable of advising him in the functions of both services concerned.

*H. H. Hewitt*

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY'S 3rd ENDORSEMENT  
( ON NAVAL COURT OF INQUIRY )

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED  
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THIRD ENDORSEMENT to  
Record of Proceedings  
of Pearl Harbor Court  
of Inquiry.

1 DEC 1944

**Subject:** Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.

1. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General, and the Second Endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, I find that the evidence obtained to date indicates that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. I am not satisfied, however, that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence.

2. Further investigation into this matter will be conducted by an investigating officer, and, in addition to the subjects recommended for further investigation by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet in the Second Endorsement, will include the taking of the testimony of Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum, and such other investigation as may appear to be necessary in order to ascertain all of the relevant facts relating to the Japanese attack. Pending the completion of the necessary further investigation into this matter, I withhold decision as to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.

*Foster*

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. FLEET 2nd ENDORSEMENT  
( ON NAVAL COURT OF INQUIRY )



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FF1/A17-25

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6 NOV 1944

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to  
 Record of Proceedings of Pearl  
 Harbor Court of Inquiry.

From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet  
 and Chief of Naval Operations.  
 To: The Secretary of the Navy.  
 Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack  
 made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor,  
 Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered  
 by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.

1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advocate General in the First Endorsement and to the following remarks.

2. (a) As to Facts I and II (page 1156), the routine practice of rotating units of the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two-thirds of its time at sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I discuss later on.

(b) In Fact III (page 1158) the Court points out that, because of constitutional requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite handicap.

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(c) Fact IV (page 1159) sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures concerned with local defense.

(d) Fact V (page 1160) sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal friends; that they met frequently; that their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect; that they frequently conferred, and invariably conferred when messages were received by either which had any bearing on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes. This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not cooperate with one another.

(e) Part VI (page 1160) sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base. It is further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of unpreparedness for war.

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(f) Fact VII (page 1165) sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on 5 November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and dispositions. My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage during the period of strained relations.

(g) Fact VIII (page 1167) stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base are necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment is that this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried to an illogical extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principle, this is not normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl Harbor should have been strong enough for self-defense. The



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fact that it was not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity for, employing the Fleet in defensive measures.

(h) Fact IX (page 1169). This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of necessity. The Court remarks that the basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact that naval participation in long range reconnaissance depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer (because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could between the Fleet and the base defense forces.



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(1) Facts X and XI (page 1171) set forth the states of readiness of the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a declaration of war might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive anti-submarine precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance, and the maintenance of "augmented Condition 3" on board vessels in port. "Condition of readiness No. 3" provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and anti-aircraft batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state of readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army forces were in "Alert No. 1" which provides for defense against sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect to this phase of the matter I offer the comment that "condition of readiness No. 3" is normally maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was well known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and Navy aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water, were not in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were in "day-off for rest" status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and exercises; 50% were on 4 hours notice (page 669). This is further indication of the lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of large

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numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Findings, also, points out that there were no long range reconnaissance in effect on 7 December, a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted that the last paragraph of Fact XI (page 1176) reads:

"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything, to their defense."

This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for reasons set forth later on.

(j) Fact XII (page 1176). The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before she can launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established fact that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii during November or December 1941. The Court deduces, and states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.

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(k) Fact XIII (page 1178) discusses the difficulty of long range reconnaissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, therefore, unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the information that was at his disposal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to some extent. And it would appear that such partial cover would have been logical in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes, using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the arc between 170° and 350° to be of primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson (pages 683, 1053, 1055).

(1) Fact XIV (page 1182). This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing radar and other



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elements of the air warning system, but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition to function. The system was partially in use for training, and it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese planes when they were about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only officer present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a flight of Army bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor — both Army and Navy. If there had been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning before the air attack struck.

(m) Fact IV (page 1186) states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against break-through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no anti-torpedo baffles within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made by the Navy Department (page 1187). Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated.

(n) Fact XVI (page 1188). In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more important items are as follows:



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(1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.

(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs would attack the United States.

(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and that indications were that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.

(e) Fact XVII (page 1193). In this section the Court sets forth certain information, which was known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel, which the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere. The summary of the information on which this is based is as follows:

(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO beginning with the words, "This despatch is to be considered a war warning," and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the next few days;

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that there were indications of an amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.

(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated; that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any time; and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.

(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information Addressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing him to scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.

(4) On 28 November, CMO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.

(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor at the time.

(p) Fact XVIII (1196). This section of the Findings deals with information that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November. It is set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming to an end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Department are set forth as follows:

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(1) A number of messages in Japanese codes, <sup>here</sup> received <sup>from a source</sup> during and prior to this period, were ~~decoded~~ in the Navy Department but were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. These messages are summarized in the Addendum to the Court's Finding of Facts at the back of Volume 5 of the record. The text of the messages is set forth at length in Volume 5, beginning at page 692. These messages indicate definite Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor, and mention, in some cases, a desire to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel these despatches, because to do so might jeopardize the secrecy which it was necessary to ~~maintain~~ <sup>obtain them</sup> as to the ability of the Navy Department to ~~break~~ the Japanese codes. This contention has some merit, in my opinion. It was Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the source of this information. However, it was equally his responsibility to give Admiral Kimmel a general picture of the information contained in these messages. Admiral Stark says that he considered that the despatches he did send to Admiral Kimmel gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set forth under "Opinions," the Court holds that the information given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate summary of the information at his disposal. I have to concur in this view.

(2) In addition to the foregoing the Court goes at length into the handling of the "14 part message", originated in Tokyo and addressed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The first 13 parts were received in the Navy Department on 6 December ~~and were broken down~~ at 2100, on that date. They set forth the Japanese views as to certain United States proposals for resolving matters under dispute between the

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countries, and leave no doubt that the United States proposals were unacceptable to Japan, but do not come to the point of indicating a break in relations. At or about 0700, 7 December, the 14th part of the message was decoded. This part of the message said that the Japanese Government had finally lost hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations. This part of the message was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 to the White House, and at 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox. Secretary Knox was conferring with Mr. Hull at the State Department.

(3) At about 1030 on 7 December, the so-called "1:00 p.m. message" was decoded in the Navy Department. It directed the Japanese Ambassador to deliver the 14 part message to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. on that day. This message was of significance because 1:00 p.m. in Washington was dawn at Honolulu. This message was delivered at once to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and immediately thereafter to the State Department, where the official who received it was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull the significance of the "1:00 p.m. time of delivery". In my opinion, the foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (0500 Honolulu time) the Navy Department, or at least, some officers therein, appreciated that the information just received pointed to the possibility — even to the probability — of a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall states that this message came to his attention about 11:00 a.m., and that he immediately telephoned to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General Short that a break with Japan was imminent, and that an attack against Hawaii could be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the



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need for sending this message, but after brief consideration asked General Marshall to include in his proposed despatch directions to pass the contents to naval commanders. General Marshall sent a despatch to the effect that the Japanese were presenting "what amounts to an ultimatum at 1:00 pm., Washington time, on 7 December; that Japanese are under orders to destroy their codes immediately; and that while the War Department does not know the significance of the hour set for delivering the note, you are to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of this communication." He sent this via commercial radio, which was then the usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The despatch left Washington at 12:17 on 7 December (6:47 a.m. Honolulu time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 a.m. Honolulu time. This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message had been decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already underway. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery had been used (plain language telephone) this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome, since there was already in effect a condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of Pearl Harbor naval base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go along with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance warning would have been of great value in alerting planes and in augmenting the condition of readiness existing on board ship.

(4) On 3 December (the date is not specified in the Findings; it is stated in Exhibit 20) Admiral Kimmel was

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 WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



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Serial: 003224

6 NOV 1944

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informed that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says (his statement, page 28) that "the significance of this despatch was diluted substantially by publication of the information in the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and that he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to strike the United States.

(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch directing the destruction of secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant destruction in event of emergency (Exhibit 21). This was followed on 6 December by authorization for outlying islands to destroy secret and confidential documents "now or under later conditions of greater emergency". (Exhibit 22)

(q) Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts (Volume 5). In this section the Court sets forth matters which have already been discussed in the three preceding sub-paragraphs; and, in addition, touches on the matter of the so-called "Winds message". This Japanese message, originating in Tokyo on 19 November, was intercepted and translated in the Navy Department on 28 November. It set forth that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" certain code words would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short wave news broadcast, and directed that when these words were heard codes were to be destroyed. This message was received in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel had it. A monitor watch was set at various places to look out for the expected "weather forecast". On 4 and 5 December, the Federal Communications Commission monitored the expected "weather forecast" which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200 on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December. The code words appearing in this implementing message meant that

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Japanese relations with Russia were in danger. These two messages have been preserved in the files of the Federal Communications Commission. In addition to this indication that the Japanese were about to break relations with Russia, there is evidence (Volume 5, page 746) that Captain Safford, on duty in the Office of the Director of Naval Communications, saw on 4 December, a "yellow slip" on which was written a different version of the implementing code, which meant that relations with the United States and Great Britain were in danger. Captain Safford thinks that this message was intercepted by an East Coast station, but he was not sure. No written trace of the message referred to by Captain Safford could be found in the files of the War Department or the Navy Department. There is considerable testimony in the record as to what was done with the "Winds message". Various officers testified that the implementing despatches were transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of Naval Communications, but Admiral Stark and Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them. It is an established fact that none of the decodes of the implementing messages were ever sent to Admiral Kimmel. However, as noted in paragraph 2(p)(4) above, the Court finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Washington, and London, to destroy certain codes.

(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII on page 1196) that on 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United States State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained therein were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after the attack. The Court points out that Admiral Kimmel in May 1941 had particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic situation in order that he might be "informed of all important developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available."



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(s) Fact XIX (page 1200). The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with information, and that Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the critical period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord with this view of the Court.

(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important phases of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in the Navy Department. In this connection it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy. It appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes that all essential information was obtained, despite the fact that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; however, it appears to me that the failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.

3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion.

(a) In the Opinion based on Finding II (page 1201), the Court expresses the view that the presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and maintenance schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion. Had all of the information available in the Department been properly evaluated and properly disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's dispositions on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on that occasion.



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(b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI (page 1202) the Court expresses the view that deficiencies in personnel and materiel which existed in 1941 had an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor, on and prior to 7 December. I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of men and materiel at the time and that available means were spread thin throughout the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of means available to Admiral Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used the means available to him to the best advantage. In my opinion, he did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not fully informed by the Navy Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions and of the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to some extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the implications of that information which was given to him.

(c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII (page 1202), the Court holds that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th Naval District, and that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. As I stated above, I think this is a narrow view of the question, and that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in general.

(d) The Court holds (page 1203) that Admiral Bloch performed his duties satisfactorily. I concur.

(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX, (page 1203), the Court states that naval defense plans were complete and sound in

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concept, but contained a basic defect in that naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December, these plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with this view. As I have already stated, there could be no question that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their planes, except by lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely due to his own fault. This had a bearing on the amount of damage that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.

(f) The Opinion, based on Fact X (page 1204), expresses the view that Admiral Kimmel's action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and that the steps taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.

(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI (page 1204), as to the effect that the measures taken for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only had it been known in advance that the attack was to take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that no such course of action could have been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The question at issue is whether or not indications called for a tightening up of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.

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(h) In the Opinion, based on Finding XVIII (page 1207), the Court holds that Admiral Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long range reconnaissance in the absence of any information indicating that the attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. I have already discussed this phase of the matter. I think that if all available information had been placed at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly, he would have found it necessary to do something about long range reconnaissance in the few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.

(i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XVII (page 1207), the Court expresses the view that there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State, War, Navy Departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere. I concur that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far East on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose that an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in a campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this possibility — a possibility that was strengthened by information received in Washington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel.

(j) In the Opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX (page 1207), the Court expresses the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had received regarding the Japanese situation, and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that ~~a message~~ had been

*information*



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received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate General takes exception to this Opinion, on the ground that the evidence shows that Admiral Stark and his principal advisers did not construe this message as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur in the view of the Judge Advocate General as to the construction which Admiral Stark placed upon the message in question, nevertheless, I note that Commander Kramer (attached to the Communications Division of the Navy Department) did take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary of the Navy to the fact that 1:00 p.m. Washington time meant dawn at Honolulu, and midnight in East Asia (page 14 of Top Secret Addendum to the Findings). It, therefore, seems evident, though Admiral Stark did not have his attention drawn to the possible significance of this message, nevertheless the implications were appreciated by at least some officers of his office. The Court further expresses the view that had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair conclusion that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of the information available at the Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situation better than he did.

4. In the final Opinion and Recommendation (page 1208) the Court finds that no offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter. I concur that there is not adequate evidence to support general court martial proceedings, but this does not bar administrative action, if such action is found appropriate.

5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor



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incident. That disaster cannot be regarded as an "act of God", beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It is true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine the possible courses of action they might have taken.

(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, particularly in the following respects:

(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of 26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking relations.

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(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain intercepted Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target.

(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds Message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's organization.

(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the "1:00 p.m. message" received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this message been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him to make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.

(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.

(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the "war warning" message on 27 November, the "hostile action possible at any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December

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concerning destruction of United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:

(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to conduct long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.

(2) He could have rotated the "in port" periods of his vessels in a less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese task less easy.

(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have been fully operational.

6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency.



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7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future errors.

8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views concerning how much of the record bears such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.

*E. J. King*  
E. J. KING

*King's Endorsements Court's Findings  
Sketch*



JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S FIRST ENDORSEMENT  
( ON NAVAL COURT OF INQUIRY )

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



*2 Nov*  
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FIRST ENDORSEMENT

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.

Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July, 1944.

1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.
2. The weighing of conflicting evidence and testimony is peculiarly the function of a Court of Inquiry or Board of Investigation, and not that of the reviewing authorities. Where the testimony is such as will reasonably support either of two or more different conclusions, it is not within the province of the Judge Advocate General to attempt to substitute his evaluation of the evidence for that of the Court. But where there is no creditable evidence in a record to support a finding or opinion, or where the weight of evidence is so preponderantly on one side that it appears unreasonable to reach a contrary conclusion, the Judge Advocate General must hold, as a matter of law, that such a finding or opinion is not supported by the evidence adduced. See CMO 9 of 1928, P. 8; CMO 12 of 1937, P. 8; CMO 5 of 1936, P. 11.
3. Attention is invited to the following portion of Finding of Fact XVIII:

"In the early forenoon of 7 December, 1941, Washington time, the War and Navy Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, by inference and deduction, that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon."

4. This Finding, standing alone, may be misleading, in the sense that it may convey an impression that the Court concluded that responsible officials of the War and Navy Departments did in fact make the inference and deduction underscored above. The fact that the Court, in phrasing this Finding, used the past tense of the verb "appear", and used the expression "appeared to indicate", rather than "should have indicated" lends support to this construction. Such an

impression would not be supported by the record, as the great preponderance of the evidence before the Court refutes any such conclusion. It is quite clear from the evidence that the responsible officials of the Navy Department had evaluated the information available to them in Washington to mean that a hostile move by the Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian area, except by submarines, but rather against Guam, the Phillipines, and British and Dutch possessions in the Far East.

5. Those witnesses who, on 7 December, 1941, held positions in the Navy Department which qualify them to speak authoritatively as to the prevailing opinion there just prior to the attack, are all in substantial accord that the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants had not deduced or inferred that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. On the contrary, the concensus in the Navy Department was that any attack would probably come in the Far East, and the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was given a comparatively low probability rating. Those witnesses who stated that the information available to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference and deduction, that an attack on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers who were not on duty in the Navy Department at that time, or occupied subordinate positions. Their testimony is opinion evidence, undoubtedly unconsciously colored by hindsight, and arrived at by a process of selecting, from the great mass of intelligence reports available to the Chief of Naval Operations, those which in the light of subsequent events proved to be hints or indications of Japanese intentions.

6. Therefore, any finding, opinion or inference that the responsible officials of the Navy Department knew, prior to the actual attack, that an attack on Hawaii was impending, is not supported by the evidence. The Court recognizes this fact, as shown by its finding (last paragraph of Finding XVII) that:

"These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere."

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7. The foregoing remarks apply equally to the underscored portion of the Opinion expressed by the Court (P. 1207) that:

"Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation, and especially in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately the fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon."

As has been previously pointed out, the message herein referred to was not construed by the Chief of Naval Operations and his principal advisers as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area.

8. It is noted that the Court finds (Finding of Fact XVIII) that the time at which the War and Navy Departments had information indicating a break in diplomatic relations on 7 December 1941, and the possibility of hostile action by the Japanese on that date, was "in the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time." It is not considered amiss to comment in further detail on this finding, in view of a widespread misconception in some quarters that this information was known in Washington on 6 December 1941. The evidence before this Court establishes, beyond any doubt, that the information referred to was not available to any responsible official in Washington prior to approximately 10:00 a.m., the morning of 7 December 1941.

9. The Judge Advocate General feels constrained to comment on the apparent contradiction between the Opinion expressed by the Court that the Chief of Naval Operations failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in failing to transmit certain information to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the final Opinion that "no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person in the naval service." That this is only an apparent, and not a real, incongruity, is shown by the Opinion that "had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken." This statement, as well as the Finding of Facts and Opinions taken as a whole, indicate

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that it was the conclusion of the Court, although not clearly expressed, that the evidence adduced did not prove that Admiral Stark's failure to transmit the information in question to Admiral Kimmel was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Fleet on 7 December, 1941, and that any causal connection between this failure on Admiral Stark's part and the disaster would be entirely speculative. Such a conclusion is fully supported by the testimony in this record.

10. Subject to the foregoing remarks, the proceedings, findings, opinions and recommendations of the attached Court of Inquiry are, in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, legal.



T. L. Gatch.  
The Judge Advocate General.

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ADDENDUM TO COURT'S FINDING OF FACTS

( NAVAL COURT OF INQUIRY )

ADDENDUM TO COURT'S FINDING OF FACTS

In the Finding of Facts, No. XVIII, the Court has referred to "certain other important information" as being available in the War and Navy Departments. This information was obtained by intercepting Japanese messages and breaking their diplomatic codes. The Court has been informed that these codes are still in use and, if it became known to the Japanese Government that they had been broken by the United States, the codes would be changed and, as a consequence, the war effort would be adversely affected.

For this reason, the Court has refrained from analyzing or discussing the details of the information in its Finding of Facts but feels that its report would not be complete without a record of such details. The Court, therefore, submits the following record in this addendum and transmits it to the Secretary of the Navy for filing with other highly secret matter referred to as such in the record of the Court's proceedings.

Highly secret messages, hereinafter mentioned, were intercepted by the War and Navy Departments during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, 1941, and prior thereto. The method of handling these messages in the Navy Department was as follows:

The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Communications operated directly under the Chief of

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ADDENDUM TO COURT'S FINDING OF FACTS

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The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Communications operated directly under the Chief of

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Naval Operations. They were responsible to see that all messages were transmitted to him in order that he might be kept conversant at all times with existing conditions.

Officers in Intelligence and Communications, Divisions of Naval Operations, remained on duty night and day. They made every effort to obtain all possible diplomatic and military information, in order that high officials of our government might be kept fully informed.

Messages were translated and placed in a folder immediately upon receipt or intercept. The important messages were marked with a clip and taken by a designated officer to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Directors of War Plans, Naval Intelligence, and Naval Communications, and to the Chief of the Far Eastern Division of Naval Intelligence. The Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Wilkinson, kept himself constantly informed regarding all messages. He checked as to whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations had seen the important ones and in many cases took them personally to the Chief of Naval Operations and discussed them with him.

Immediately after the receipt of the note of 26 November, 1941, from the Secretary of State, the Japanese representatives in Washington sent a message to Tokyo which was intercepted by the Navy Department. This is Document 17, Exhibit 63, which gave to Tokyo the following stipulations contained in the note:

- (a) The recognition of Hull's "four principles".
- (b) (1) Conclusion of mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Moscow, Washington, The Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

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(2) Agreement between Japan, United States, England, The Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) Complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely to promise to support no regime but that of Chiang Kai-shek.

(5) The abolition of extraterritoriality, the concessions in China, and other requirements bearing on reciprocal trade treaty, rescinding freezing orders, stabilization of yen, etc., and for Japan to amend her tripartite pact with Germany and Italy.

The Japanese representatives added in their report to Tokyo the following: "Both dumbfounded and stated to Hull we could not even cooperate to the extent of even reporting this to Tokyo."

No information regarding the delivery of this note or of its contents was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.

From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, there was much diplomatic dispatch traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and which was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. A message dated 19 November, 1941, Tokyo to Washington, translated on 28 November, 1941, and referred to as "The Winds Code" was as follows:

"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

"(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger:  
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.\*

"(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE  
KUMORI.\*\*

"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.\*\*\*

"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

"Forward as urgent intelligence.

\*East wind rain.  
\*\*North wind cloudy.  
\*\*\*West wind clear."

The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November, 1941, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations, information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commandant 16th Naval District; and Commandant 14th Naval District, substantially the same information as outlined above. On 5 December, 1941, the United States Naval Attache, Batavia, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations substantially the same information. These messages stated that at some future date information would be sent by Japan indicating a breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war between countries designated.

All officers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in the Navy Department, considering the expected information most important, were on the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or

war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.

It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.

Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department.

AL It is a matter of general knowledge that Japan has had for many years a thorough system of espionage throughout the world and continuously sought and received information regarding the location and movements of United States naval vessels. There were certain messages received in the Navy Department which showed very clearly that Japan, at this critical period, was particularly desirous of obtaining exact information from two sources, namely, Manila and Honolulu. Messages between Tokyo, Manila, and Honolulu inquiring especially about planes, ships, their places of anchorage, etc., in the latter ports, were intercepted. Similar messages were sent to Japanese officials in Honolulu clearly indicating that Japan was most

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desirous of obtaining exact information as to ships in Pearl Harbor.

The important messages having special reference to Pearl Harbor were as follows:

(a) On 15 November, 1941, Document 24, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department, 3 December, 1941, states:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular but at rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

(b) On 18 November, 1941, Document 37, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department on 5 December, 1941, states:

"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N" Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and areas adjacent thereto. Make your investigation with great secrecy." Note by Navy Department on this message, "Manila Bay" probably means "Mamala Bay."

(c) On 18 November, 1941, Document 40, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Honolulu to Tokyo and translated in Navy Department 6 December, 1941, gives information as to ships moored in certain areas in Pearl Harbor and movements of ships in and out.

(d) On 29 November, 1941, Document 36, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Washington 5 December, 1941, states: "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements but in future will you also report even when there are no movements."

Admiral Kimmel was not aware of and had no information regarding these messages.

On 5 November, 1941, Document 7, Exhibit 63, Tokyo to Washington, was intercepted. This message stresses the necessity of signing an agreement between the United States and Japan by 25 November, 1941.

On 22 November, 1941, Document 11, Exhibit 63, intercept from Tokyo to Washington, stated that the signing of agreement set for 25 November, 1941, could be postponed until 29 November, and in explanation this message stated:

"\*\*\*There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th,\*\*\*if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.\*\*\*"

No intimation of the receipt of this message was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat, nor was any information transmitted to them regarding contents of the messages mentioned in the following paragraphs.

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On 28 November, 1941, a dispatch, Document 18, Exhibit 63, was intercepted between Tokyo and Washington which in part reads as follows:

"\*\*\*The United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal" -- referring to note of 26 November -- "\*\*\*the Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions\*\*\*" etc.

The message indicates the position of Japan regarding the note of 26 November, and further indicates that within two or three days negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Further, it emphasizes the importance of delay. Neither the message nor any of its contents were transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat.

On 29 November, 1941, Document 19, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to Washington and translated by the Navy Department 30 November, 1941, directs that Japanese representatives make one more attempt to have United States reconsider and states:

"\*\*\*please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations."

Again, on 30 November, 1941, Document 20, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Washington to Tokyo, indicated that negotiations were to be stretched out.

These two messages indicate that the Japanese were sparring for time.

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On 30 November, 1941, Document 22, Exhibit 63, translated by the Navy Department on 1 December, 1941, was intercepted, being a message from Tokyo to Japanese representatives in Berlin, reading as follows:

"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has

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become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, The Netherlands, and China -- they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

On 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department intercepted a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin as follows:

"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is."

On 1 December, 1941, document 21, Exhibit 63, was intercepted, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington which reads as follows:

"1. The date set in my message #812\* \* has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the

United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124 \* \* \*. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

\*JD-1: 6921.  
\*\*JD-1: 6710.  
\*\*\* Not Available.

On 2 December, 1941, Document 25, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to Tokyo, translated by the Navy Department 3 December, 1941, reports that conversations with the State Department continue; that the Japanese representatives stated to Welles, the Under Secretary of State, that it is virtually impossible for Japan to accept new American proposals as they now stand, and that the Japanese representatives feel that the United States is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation.

On 3 December, 1941, Document 29, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to Washington, translated by the Navy Department 4 December, 1941, requests their representatives to explain Japan's increased forces in Indo-China.

On 3 December, 1941, Document 33, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to Tokyo, translated by Navy Department 5 December

1941, states:

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."

On 6 December, 1941, Document 38, Exhibit 63, from Tokyo to Washington, was intercepted, giving notice to the Japanese representatives that a reply consisting of 14 parts to American proposal of 26 November is being sent to them, directing that secrecy should be maintained and stating that the time of presenting this reply would be sent in a separate message.

The first 13 parts of this reply were intercepted and received by the Navy Department at about 3:00 p.m., December 6, 1941, and were translated and made ready for distribution by 9:00 p.m., Washington time, of that date. These 13 parts contain a very strong and conclusive answer to the note of November 26 and state in part, "Japan cannot accept proposal as a basis of negotiations."

Commander Kramer, the officer whose duty it was to distribute this class of information, prior to 9:00 p.m., 6 December, 1941, 'phoned Captain Wilkinson that an important message had been received and was being translated. He also tried to communicate with Admiral Stark and Rear Admiral Turner at their homes but found them out.

At about 9:00 p.m., Washington time, Commander Kramer proceeded to the White House with the 13 parts of reply and delivered copy to a White House aide, with the request that

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it be delivered immediately to the President. Kramer then proceeded to the home of Secretary Knox where he personally delivered to the Secretary a copy of the Japanese reply. Secretary Knox read the reply, did not discuss it in detail with Kramer, but 'phoned the Secretary of War and Secretary of State.

Kramer then proceeded to the home of Captain Wilkinson and gave a copy to him. Kramer told Wilkinson that he had tried to get Stark and Turner. Wilkinson made several 'phone calls, presumably to Admiral Stark and others. This information regarding receipt of these 13 parts or their contents was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet or other Commanders Afloat.

Kramer then returned to his office in the Navy Department, arriving about 12:30 a.m., 7 December, and as no other important messages were at hand, went home and returned to the Navy Department about 7:00 a.m. Upon his arrival he found the 14th part of the Japanese reply had been received and decoded. He then delivered a copy of all 14 parts to the Flag Secretary in his office of the Chief of Naval Operations at about 9:00 a.m., where he found several officers gathering for a conference with Admiral Stark. Kramer then proceeded about 9:30 a.m., to the White House and made delivery of the 14 parts of the message. He proceeded then, at about 9:50 a.m., to the State Department and delivered same to the Secretary of the Navy, who was there in conference with the Secretary of State.

At about 10:30 a.m., Kramer returned to the Navy Depart-



ment where he found another message had been translated. This message, an intercept from Tokyo to Washington, was marked "Urgent, very important" and read as follows: "Will the ambassador please submit to the U. S. Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the U. S. at 1:00 p.m., on the 7th, your time." Kramer delivered a copy of this message (hereinafter referred to as the "one p.m. message") to the Flag Secretary of Admiral Stark, the latter at the time being in conference with several officers.

Kramer then returned to the White House and delivered the "1:00 p.m. message". From there he went to the State Department where the Secretary of the Navy was still in conference with the Secretary of State. On arrival he requested one of the State Department assistants to present the message to the Secretary of the Navy and to invite his attention to the fact that 1:00 p.m., Washington time, meant dawn at Honolulu and midnight in East Asia.

Admiral Stark had arrived in his office at the Navy Department at some time between 9:00 and 10:30 a.m., on the morning of 7 December. Although he testified that he had no information prior to this time relative to the Japanese reply to the note of November 26th, he was informed of the 14 parts and "the 1:00 p.m. message" not later than 10:30 a.m., of that date. He testified that General Marshall 'phoned him and suggested that the information regarding the delivery of the 14 parts at 1:00 p.m. was most important and significant and, in his opinion, should be transmitted to Commanders


in the Pacific. Admiral Stark at first demurred and hung up the receiver. Shortly thereafter he 'phoned General Marshall requesting that, in the event he sent the message to the Commanding Generals in the Pacific area, he instruct them to relay this message to naval opposites.

The message which General Marshall sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Exhibit 48) reads as follows: "Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."


This message left the War Department at 11:52 a.m., Washington time, was sent out over R. C. A. at 12:17 p.m. (6:47 a.m. Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's R. C. A. office at 7:33 a.m. Honolulu time. There remained but 22 minutes before the attack for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action. Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the afternoon of 7 December, several hours after the attacking force had departed.

Had the telephone and plain language been used, this message could have been received in Hawaii before the attack began. Even in this event, however, there was no action open to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack or which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome. There was already in effect the condition of readi-


ness best suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the Fleet planes in their air bases in Oahu.



Orin G. Murfin,  
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.



Edward C. Kalbfus,  
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.



Adolphus Andrews,  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret), Member.

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