

The radar installed in the battleships and carriers is well worthwhile and we have got highly creditable results from its use.

The new big drydock here has been pumped out and the contractors' forces are now in process of cleaning it out preparatory to finishing off the bottom. I am informed that an emergency docking will be possible any time after about the 15th of November, although the dock will not be entirely completed until sometime later than that.

The recreation facilities are being added to and I believe the men are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The shooting has, I believe, served to increase their confidence in themselves, to a considerable degree.

I send forward to you today an exhaustive study on the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. I hope it will be of assistance in deciding what you want done out here. I feel that a comprehensive plan is essential if we are to get coordinated results in the shortest time. This was tried to give you.

You will note that we recommend two full defense battalions over and above the requirements of the islands now occupied in order to provide two balanced forces to occupy any desired localities on short notice. Until such time comes these personnel are so used they can be used to rotate the defense battalions at the various permanently garrisoned islands.

The investigation of an alternate land plane route to the Eastward of the Marshalls and on to Australia has my hearty approval. We may be able to get some quick results from the expedition to Christmas Island sufficient to permit the routing of four-engine land plane bombers from Oahu to Christmas Is. Navy to Noumea and on to Australia. Additional stepping stones are, of course, highly desirable. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that there are not enough ships now available to handle our own island developments. Without greatly augmented shipping facilities we cannot possibly assume the additional burden for the Army.

My best regards to you always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, U. S. Navy,  
 Chief of Naval Operations,  
 Navy Department,  
 Washington, D. C.

EXHIBIT No. 15

SEALED SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE—NAVY DEPARTMENT

Phone Ext. No. Op-12. Br. 2992	Addressee		Message Precedence
From Chief of Naval Operations. Released by Ingersoll..... Date November 24, 1941.	ACTION	To. CinCaf CinCpac Com11 Com12 Com13 Com15	Priority Routine Deferred
TOR Code Room..... Decoded by..... Paraphased by.....	INFO.	Spenavo London CinClant	Priority Routine Deferred

Indicated by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.  
 242005 CR9443

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with DEFERRED precedence.

Originator fill in date and time for DEFERRED and MAIL DELIVERY.

Date Time GCT

TEXT Cincap, Cinepac, Coms Eleven Twelve, Thirteen, and Fifteen for action. Spenavo London and Cinclant for info.

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X this situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action ADEES to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will be informed separately."

Copy to (WPD, War Dept) and to Op-12 *but no other distribution.* Plus 3 copies to sealed secret file.

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4), Navy Regulations.)

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EXHIBIT No. 16

SECRET

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON, 25 November 1941.

In reply refer to  
Initials and No.

HMRS/Hu

Sec. #6

DEAR MURPHY: This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't appreciate your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's, I would not be working almost literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you.

We have sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a two ocean war; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. It was on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 were predicated and which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compromise we could get out of the situation actually confronting us.

I agree with you for example that to cruise in Japanese home waters you should have substantial increase in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC-1 or Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the exception rather than the rule.

It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking the destroyers which we now have in our West Coast ports, and the Secretary was sold on it; however it has been successfully resisted to date. King said that if they were out with you on the firing line he would not make such recommendation, but where they were he thought they were legitimate prey. He, too, you know is up against it for sufficient forces to perform his tasks. Just stop for a minute and realize that into his heavy routine escort work he has added at the moment large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on the one hand, British on another in Northern waters, and still another of 20,000 which have been brought over and are now on their way down to Cape Town and possibly to Durban because of submarines operating off Cape Town. Obviously these troop movements are highly secret. We are at our wit's end in the Atlantic with the better spread extremely thin and the job continuously increasing in toughness.

Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in getting the President to