PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 2
NOVEMBER 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, AND 30, AND
DECEMBER 3 AND 4, 1945

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
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JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel

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SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
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EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel
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*Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.*
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1 Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster
and Ferguson; and representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A.
Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the
joint committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.
Before Secretary Hull is called, the counsel has some documents,
I understand, to present for the record.

Mr. Gesell. That is correct, Senator. We are starting today with
a series of witnesses from the State Department. I thought at the
outset we should place in the record certain document material which
can be used in the examination of certain witnesses. Additional docu-
ments will be provided from time to time, but this is the basis of the
initial set.

We have placed comparable sets to those being introduced before
each member of the committee.

These are all documents that were put in the hands of the members
of the committee sometime earlier. We simply arranged them and
regrouped them in exhibit form, to facilitate the committee's reading
the exhibits, but the material contained in these exhibits has been in
the hands of the members of the committee.

The first, to be marked as exhibit 15, is a series of three documents
from Mr. Grew to the Department of State, dated January 27,
November 3, and November 17, 1941, respectively.

The first is the dispatch in which Mr. Grew referred to the possi-
bility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and I want to call the
committee's attention to the mimeographed [1061] sheet in
that exhibit which shows the transmission of that document to the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet from the Chief of Naval
Operations. I would like to offer that as Exhibit 15.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that included in the transcript of the
hearings?

Mr. Gesell. No, these are merely exhibits, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it may be marked.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 15.")

Mr. Gesell. As Exhibit 16, we would like to offer a series of docu-
ments relating to the joint memorandum of General Marshall and
Admiral Stark to President Roosevelt under date of November 5,
1941. The memorandum itself, and certain material explaining the

1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of
testimony.
origin of the memorandum and the circumstances have been under discussion here and are all included in this exhibit.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 16.")

Mr. Gesell. As Exhibit 17, a joint memorandum for the President from Admiral Stark and General Marshall dated November 27, 1941, entitled "Memorandum for the President." Subject: "Far Eastern Situation."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 17.")

[1062] Mr. Gesell. As Exhibit 18 a series of approximately 20 or more documents relating to the so-called modus vivendi. This series of documents entitled "Draft Suggestions (November 11, 1941) to the Secretary of State" includes various drafts of the modus vivendi, the note of November 26, as well as communications between the United States Government and Government of other countries and memoranda prepared by Mr. Hull and others of his conference with representatives of foreign governments.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 18.")

Mr. Gesell. Exhibit 19 is a single document which was a proposed message to the Congress. This document, as is indicated, was discussed with the President by the Secretary of State and no further action was taken. The memorandum for the President is dated November 29, 1941.

I would like to call the committee's attention to the fact that at the end of this memorandum there is a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan dated November 29, 1941.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 19.")

Mr. Gesell. As Exhibit 20 we wish to offer additional communications concerning the proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan. This includes the draft of October 17 [1063] and the message as actually sent by President Roosevelt dated December 6, 1941.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 20.")

Mr. Gesell. Finally, as exhibit 21, a series of several communications, most of which were received in the very last few days before the attack, from Ambassador Winant in England, and other sources, giving information as to the possible movement of Japanese forces.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 21.")

Mr. Gesell. We will have occasion to refer to these exhibits during the testimony of the witnesses who are about to come, and of course we will have other exhibits to offer.

I also want to refer briefly to the official publications of the Department of State which have been made available in three volumes to all of the members of the committee. These include a substantial number of memoranda covering conversations held with the Japanese Government during the period with which we are concerned.

While the committee is no doubt familiar with the volumes, I want to call attention to page 806 of volume II, Foreign Relations of the United States—Japan, 1931-41. There is set forth on that page, as part of the index, and subsequent pages, a very detailed chronological presentation of the various [1064] economic measures and freezing orders which were entered from time to time beginning as early as the moral embargoes in 1938 and 1939, and continuing down to the Executive order freezing the Japanese and Chinese assets in the United States on July 26, 1941.

All those basic orders and other material relating to them are contained in these official documents. I think the members of this com-
mittee will find the chronological presentation helpful in finding the specific dates and other information that may be pertinent.

Mr. Murphy. What page is that?

Mr. Gesell. Page 806. It starts in the index of volume II, Congressman Murphy.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. Gesell. Those have all been received, have they, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes, these exhibits to which you referred will be marked as you have indicated, and will be available, and have already been available to the Chairman and members of the committee.

Mr. Gesell. We would now like to call Mr. Hull as a witness.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, will you be sworn?

[1065] TESTIMONY OF CORDELL HULL, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

The Chairman. The counsel and the committee have discussed, Mr. Secretary, if you will permit me to make a brief observation here, the question of whether your statement, which has been submitted to the committee and which all members are presumed to have read, and have also been given to the press two or three days ago, should be read now, or whether it should be printed as a part of the hearing, and based upon it the committee then proceed to examine you with reference to its contents, or any other matter that they might wish to inquire of you about.

The committee cannot expect you to read this document itself because of its length and the condition of your health. I think it is a matter for the committee to decide, whether they wish it read by someone or whether they prefer that it be printed at this point as a part of the hearing, and then the committee inquire with reference to it.

Does counsel have any suggestion in regard to this matter?

Mr. Gesell. Our suggestion, Mr. Chairman, would be that the statement be inserted in the transcript as if read, and that we proceed, in the time we have, with an examination of Mr. Hull. We discussed that with Mr. Hull, and I think that was the procedure we had all anticipated would be followed.

[1066] The statement was made available to the members of the committee and they have had it in advance more than is usually the practice to be certain that everybody had an opportunity to study it thoroughly.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I might first ask you what your wishes are, if you have any preference in regard to it.

Mr. Hull. Naturally I will defer to the desire of the committee. I had wondered whether, in view of the early release of the statement both to the committee and the press, whether the committee would decide to have it read at this time, assuming that the committee has read it. Naturally, if the members of the committee have been too busy to read it we could read it now. I defer to the wishes of the committee.

The Chairman. Senator George.

I will just go down the line and ask the committee what its wishes are about it.

Senator George. Mr. Chairman, I think the statement ought to be inserted in the record as if read. I see no reason why it should be again read, unless the members of the committee have not had an

1 See p. 5308, infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Mr. Hull.
opportunity to read it. We have had it a sufficient length of time. I have read the statement in its entirety and reread a great part of it a second time yesterday. So far as I am concerned I think it would be wise to put it into the record. And the Secretary will, of course, refer to [1067] it, and perhaps read portions of it in answer to questions.

The Chairman. Mr. Cooper.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I concur in the views expressed by Senator George and the request made by counsel.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. I concur in the statement made by the able Senator from Georgia.

The Chairman. Congressman Clark.

Mr. Clark. I concur in Senator George's statement.

The Chairman. Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I have had the statement and I have read it. I have been deeply impressed. I feel that in deference to the Secretary, Mr. Hull, this carefully considered statement of his, which, as I understand, has been prepared under his direction and represents a very careful and well considered presentation of the events leading up to this affair, certainly it deserves the consideration which it would receive by being read.

It is quite true that the members of the committee have had the statement. I have read it two or three times. I am perfectly ready to go ahead, but I think the committee as well as everybody else can profit by having it read.

While perhaps it may seem that this is an extra judicial observation, and we are not primarily concerned with the audience [1068] immediately gathered here, we are speaking to an audience of 120 million Americans that are concerned, and I think we realize very well, under modern conditions, that if we proceed immediately with whatever examination is to follow, that that will immediately pre-empt the statement, to the exclusion of Mr. Hull's statement, and I therefore believe that Mr. Hull's statement, which I assume would take the better part of the morning to read, should be read here at this time.

It is so important that it certainly deserves that amount of consider-ation by this committee. We could permit Mr. Hull to return at 2 o'clock and then take up whatever questions may be directed to him. And perhaps have it read by Mr. Gesell, who is very competent, cer-tainly, in this field.

I feel quite strongly that the public interest would be served by having it read.

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I have given a great deal of time and consideration to this statement. As far as I am concerned I am prepared to proceed without having it read. I concur in the statement of the gentleman from Georgia.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, while I have spent a consider-able time upon the statement I was compelled to do so at intervals and not to read it all at one time. I think that [1069] it would be well for the committee to hear the entire statement, as a whole, read before the committee, but I have no desire whatever that the Secretary remain here during that reading. I feel that he should not unless he so desires.
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. Of course, Mr. Chairman, I would not insist upon the Secretary himself reading the document, but, as it appears to me, Secretary Hull was one of the great actors in one of the greatest periods of our American history, and to take his carefully prepared statement and merely insert it in the record doesn't strike me as giving proper consideration to the statement of one who played so important a part in the development of the world situation.

I think it ought to be read in order that those of us who have already read his statement may have the essential points properly emphasized in our memory in this important day's proceeding. I would like to have it read.

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. I agree with my colleague Mr. Gearhart.

The Chairman. Well, the Chair has not expressed his view but in order that there be no partisan division in the committee the Chair will vote with the minority that the document be read at this time, and if agreeable, Mr. Gesell, who is competent in such matters, will proceed to read it.

[1070] Mr. Secretary, if you do not wish to remain here while the document is being read you may retire and come back at 2 o'clock; just as you wish.

Mr. Hull. Well, I would be disposed to retire unless my absence should be construed as a lack of interest by any of my friends who want it read.

Senator Brewster. No.

The Chairman. The Chair will assure the Secretary that, in view of his health, that his retirement while this document is being read, and about which no questions would be asked of the Secretary if he were sitting here while it was being read, his retirement at this time will not be interpreted as any lack of interest in the document on which he has spent, no doubt, weeks in preparation.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. Hull. Then I will be expected to be here at 2 o'clock?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I think if it would simply appear that the Secretary has incorporated in the record that this is his considered statement, very carefully prepared, of the background of all these events, that it does represent his considered conclusions and contribution, so that we will not understand that it is an incidental or minor document, [1071] it would be well.

Mr. Hull. I think everyone understands that we took the unusual step immediately or soon after Pearl Harbor to publish, first in one volume and then in two, containing some 1,800 to 2,000 pages, virtually every conversation and its record that took place between the Japanese and myself and the President. When this hearing was projected I undertook to prepare a statement, with the cooperation of the experts who understood the nature and location of all relevant documents, undertook to prepare a statement, which is now before you.

So far as I have observed, I consider it accurate and I would not under any circumstances want anyone to have any doubt about my standing for that statement.

The Chairman. That is sufficient to identify it as a statement which you would yourself present in person except for the condition of your health.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I ask the unanimous consent then that Mr. Hull have the permission and consent of the committee to retire during the reading of the statement and to return for an appearance before the committee at 2 o'clock this afternoon.

The Chairman. Without objection that consent is given by the committee.

Secretary Hull, you may sit here as long as you wish and retire when you wish. We will expect you back at 2 o'clock.

Mr. Hull. I may return shortly or I may not.

The Chairman. Go ahead, Mr. Gesell.

Mr. Gesell. I will commence the reading of this statement and if I find that my voice gets tired I would appreciate permission of the committee to ask one or two of the men from the State Department here to spell me a bit on the reading.

The Chairman. That is agreeable. The Chair will help you out if necessary.

Those who desire to retire will do so as rapidly and in as good order as possible.

The committee will come to order. You may proceed.

Mr. Gesell. I will not commence reading with the table of contents but start at page 2.

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Annex A Record of the Secretary of State's Conference, Consultations and Telephone Conversations (as entered in engagement books) with Representatives of the War and Navy Departments, November 20 to December 7, 1941

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Annex C Arrangements for Contacts Between the Department of State and War and Navy Departments in 1940 and 1941

Mr. Gesell. (reading):

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was preceded by months of conversations between the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan. The initiative in this matter came from Japan which, by the beginning of 1941, after nearly a decade of relentless pursuit of a policy of aggression and conquest, had apparently reached a stage in the development of that policy at which she felt the need for a showdown with the United States.

A comprehensive documentary history of these conversations, as well as of the whole course of our relations with Japan during the fateful decade from 1931 to 1941, which began and ended with acts of aggression committed by Japan, was prepared and published by the Department of State shortly after the attack at Pearl Harbor.
It comprises well over 2,000 pages and is contained in the volume entitled Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941, and much more fully in the two volumes entitled Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941. It is, I believe, the most complete account of a diplomatic record every published so soon after the events to which it relates.

I commend these volumes to the attention of the committee. In the present statement I shall attempt to supplement this documentary history with such additional material as might be of interest to the committee and with a personal analysis and interpretation of the events which led up to the treacherous attack launched by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor. While the story I am about to tell relates primarily to the year 1941, it is necessary also to deal, to some extent, with the developments of the preceding decades in order to lay bare the roots of the events which immediately antecedent the Pearl Harbor attack.

I. BACKGROUND OF 1941 CONVERSATIONS

The Japanese proposal for conversations was directed toward the conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the United States relating to the Far East. It was made early in 1941. Before accepting or rejecting this proposal, the President and I gave the subject thorough consideration against the background of such factors as Japan’s record of international aggression, her record of duplicity in international dealings, the sharp divergence between the policies traditionally and currently pursued by Japan and by the United States, and the current situation in the Far East, in Europe, and in the United States.

A. JAPAN’S RECORD OF AGGRESSION

The President and I had to bear in mind and to take into account Japan’s past record of aggression and the trend of contemporary developments in the Far East.

Almost from the outset of Japan’s emergence as a modern state she had been pursuing a policy of military aggrandizement. For the most part, expect during certain brief periods when forces of moderation appeared to be in the ascendency, the intervals between one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation.

In 1895, following Japan’s successful war against China, Japan annexed Formosa and tried unsuccessfully to establish a foothold in Manchuria.

In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway. At that time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin.

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea after years of encroachment by pressure and intrigue.

In 1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of her European allies with the war against Germany to present to China the notorious Twenty-one Demands.

At the end of the first world war Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921–22 and became a party to the treaties concluded there. Among those treaties was the Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China. That treaty envisaged the creation of conditions designed to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and main-

In 1928, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs.

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established there a puppet regime under the name of "Manchukuo." By that action, which was a flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan broke completely away from the policy of cooperation agreed upon in the Washington Conference treaties.

I recalled how early in 1934 I welcomed an approach by the Japanese Government in the form of a note (February 21, 1934) by Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that he firmly believed that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution." In my reply (March 3, 1934) I concurred in that view and emphasized our Government's belief in adjustments of questions by pacific processes.

Only a short time after that exchange of notes, however, Japan again unmasked the basic purpose of aggression consistently adhered to by powerful policy-making elements in Japan. [1079] On April 17, 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave out a truculent official statement known as the "hands off China" statement. In that statement Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed.

On December 29, 1934, Japan gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. That notice was another clear and significant move in the direction of a course of conquest. Following the giving of that notice, Japan proceeded energetically to increase her armaments, preparatory to launching her invasion of China.

About that time Japan entered into conversations with Nazi Germany which resulted in the conclusion by the two countries, on November 25, 1936, of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In 1937 Italy adhered. While the fact was ostensibly for self-protection against communism, actually it was a preparatory move for subsequent measures of forceful expansion by the bandit nations—the first step in the creation of the so-called "Axis."

In July 1937, Japan deliberately took advantage of a minor incident between Chinese and Japanese forces at a point near Peiping and began flagrantly to invade China on a huge scale. She poured into China immense armies which spread [1080] fan-like over great areas, including industrial and other key centers. These armies raped, robbed, murdered, and committed all kinds of lawless acts. Particularly barbarous were the outrages in Nanking following occupation of that city by Japanese military on December 13, 1937.

On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U. S. S. "Panay" in the Yangtze River.

To gain public support in Japan for its program of military expansion, slogans were used such as "The New Order in Greater East Asia" and "The East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The United States and other countries were charged with attempting to choke Japan's development.
In August and September 1940 Japan with German assistance extracted an agreement from Vichy France under which Japanese troops moved into northern Indo-China.

In September 1940 Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. That alliance was aimed directly at the United States. It was designed to discourage the United States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had completed their programs of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could turn on the United States then standing alone.

On October 4, 1940, Premier Konoe was quoted by the press in a statement on the Tripartite Pact as having said in part:

[1081] If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and acts * * * those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic relations and will make every effort to reduce friction between Japan and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to induce Russia, Britain and the United States to suspend their operations in assisting the Chiang regime.

B. JAPAN'S RECORD OF DUPLICITY

The President and I also gave thought to the fact that Japan had a long record of duplicity in international dealings. This duplicity was due largely to the fact that the Japanese military were a law unto themselves and consistently overrode commitments which civilian Japanese had given.

In 1904, Japan guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea.

In 1908, Japan pledged with the United States to support the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity there. In 1915, Japan presented to China the notorious "twenty-one demands."

In 1918, Japan entered into an interallied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any 1 power, [1082] were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be subsequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. The Japanese military saw in this enterprise an opportunity, in which they were eventually unsuccessful, to annex eastern Siberia and sent more than 70,000 troops.

In the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, Japan agreed to respect China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity. Japan also agreed to use its influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity there. Japan's whole course in China since 1931 of military occupation and economic domination was in violation of those pledges.

On November 21, 1932, Mr. Matsuoka, then Japanese delegate to the League of Nations, said: "We want no more territory." By the end of 1932 Japanese forces had occupied the whole of Manchuria and in subsequent years they moved southward and westward occupying a vast area of China.

On July 27, 1937, Prince Konoe, then Japanese Premier, said: "In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." In order to "preserve the peace of East Asia," Japanese forces for 4 years had carried warfare and suffering over the greater part of China.
On October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said, "Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy." Japan showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty.

On April 15, 1940, Mr. Arita, then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, said the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies." Following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany that spring, Japan sent a commercial commission to the Indies which asked concessions so far reaching that, if granted, they would have reduced the Indies practically to a Japanese colony.

After the outbreak of Japan's undeclared war against China in July 1937, Japanese civilian leaders time and again gave assurances that American rights would be respected. Time and again the Japanese military acted in violation of those assurances: To illustrate:

On July 30, 1941, Japanese planes bombed the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking and struck within 400 yards of the American Embassy there.

On July 31, 1941, Japan assured our Government that Japan would discontinue bombing the city area of Chungking. On August 11, only 11 days later, the American Embassy at Chungking reported that during the preceding 4 days Chungking had received unusually heavy and prolonged Japanese air raids.

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American lives and property in China would be respected. Yet there were reported in steadily mounting numbers cases of bombing of American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives.

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities.

**C. DIVERSION BETWEEN JAPANESE AND AMERICAN POLICIES**

The President and I had very much in mind the fact that the United States and Japan had widely different concepts and policies. We went over the successive steps our Government had taken to influence Japan to adopt peaceful policies.

We recalled that Japan's action in 1931 in embarking on a course of aggression and expansion by force and of disregard of treaties had ushered in an ever widening conflict between forces of aggression and those desirous of maintaining peace. Our Government's opposition to Japan's course in Manchuria was set forth in a communication addressed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, to the Japanese Government on January 7, 1932, and in a further communication of February 25, 1933, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations.
On January 17, 1933, the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, made clear his support of the principle of sanctity of international treaties by writing out, in reply to a question, a statement as follows:

I am * * * wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest.

In his first inaugural address, on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt said that in the field of world policy he would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor—"the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors."

Thus in 1931–33, when Japan was carrying forward its program of aggression, the American Government was moving steadily ahead in advocacy of world support of sanctity of treaties and peaceful processes.

On May 16, 1934, I had a general conversation with Japanese Ambassador Saito, one of many conversations in which I endeavored to convince the Japanese that their best interests lay in following policies of peace.

Three days later I talked again with the Japanese Ambassador. During the conversation the Ambassador repeated the formula which his Government had been putting forward publicly for some weeks to the effect that Japan had a superior and special function in connection with the preservation of peace in Eastern Asia. I brought to the Japanese Ambassador's attention the clear implications contained in the Japanese formula of the intention on the part of Japan to exercise an overlordship over neighboring nations and territories.

On June 12, 1936, in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, I told the Ambassador that the impression of the American people was that Japan sought economic domination first of eastern Asia and then of other areas such as it might select, and that this would ultimately mean political as well as military domination. I urged upon the Ambassador the benefit to Japan from its associating itself in a peaceful and constructive program.

Despite all our pleas and efforts, Japan in July 1937 proceeded to invade China. Therefore, on July 16 the Government of the United States issued a statement of fundamental principles of international policy which was directed at rallying all countries to the support of peaceful processes.

In a further statement of August 23, 1937, I applied the principles of the July 16 statement expressly to the situation in China. I stated that the issues in that situation of concern to the United States went far beyond the immediate question of the protection of American nationals and American interests. Serious hostilities in any part of the world were of concern to all nations. Accordingly, I urged on both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities.

On October 6, 1937, the American Government stated that the action of Japan in China was inconsistent with the principles which should govern relationships between nations and was contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Briand–Kellogg Pact.
In November 1937 the United States participated with 18 other nations in a conference held at Brussels to "study peaceable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far East. The conference was held in accordance with a provision of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922. The repeated refusals of the Japanese Government to participate in the conference effectively prevented efforts to bring about an end to the conflict by mediation and conciliation. On November 24 the conference suspended its sittings.

In the fall of 1937 our Government was confronted with the decision whether to apply the Neutrality Act to the hostilities between China and Japan. It was clear that the arms embargo authorized by the act would hurt China and help Japan, since China needed to import arms and Japan manufactured a large supply. The President used the discretion provided by law and refrained from putting the act into operation.

On July 26, 1939, our Government notified the Japanese Government of its desire to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911. It was felt that this treaty was not affording adequate protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese occupied portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. The treaty therefore terminated on January 26, 1940, and the legal obstacle to our placing restrictions upon trade with Japan was thus removed.

Beginning in 1938 our Government placed in effect so-called "moral embargoes" which were adopted on the basis of humanitarian considerations. Following the passage of the Act of July 2, 1940, restrictions were imposed in the interests of national defense on an ever-increasing list of exports of strategic materials. These measures were intended also as deterrents and expressions of our opposition to Japan's course of aggression.

On April 15, 1940, the Japanese Foreign Minister issued a statement disclosing an underlying purpose to extend Japanese control to the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies. On April 17 I took cognizance of that statement. I pointed out the importance of the Netherlands Indies in international relationships. I said that intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security, not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area. I urged that peaceful principles be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area but in every part of the world.

Throughout this period the United States increasingly followed a policy of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China. This took several different forms, including diplomatic actions in protest of Japan's aggression against China and of Japan's violation of American rights. Loans and credits aggregating some 200 million dollars were extended in order to bolster China's economic structure and to facilitate the acquisition by China of supplies. And later lend-lease and other military supplies were sent to be used in China's resistance against Japan.

During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind—and I was explaining to members of Congress and other Americans with whom I came in contact—that it was apparent that
the Japanese military leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves.

I was saying to those Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to find any new way to approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social aspects. The people of China were living on a very low standard. Japan, if it should conquer China, would keep China bled white and would not have the capital to aid in restoring purchasing power and social welfare. It meant everything for the development of half of the world's population to use the capital of all nations, such as the United States and other countries, in helping China, for example, to develop internal improvements and increase its purchasing power. We had reminded the Japanese of our traditional friendship and our mutually profitable relations.

During these years we had kept before the Japanese all these doctrines and principles in the most tactful and earnest manner possible, and at all times we had been careful not to make threats. I said that I had always felt that if a government makes a threat it ought to be ready to back it up. We had been forthright but we had been as tactful as possible.

I was pointing out in these conversations that if we had not, by previously modifying our Neutrality Act, been in a position to send military aid to Great Britain in the early summer of 1940 there might well have been a different story. Our aid assisted Britain to hold back the invaders for 7 months, while we had that 7 months in which to arm, and everybody knew that no country ever needed time in which to arm more than we did in the face of the world situation.

With reference to charges which at times were made that the Government did not reveal everything to the public, I pointed out that a Government could not come out every morning before breakfast and give a blueprint of its plans and purposes in times of extreme crisis. If we should announce one day that we were not particularly assertive of any rights or interest in other parts of the world, almost overnight we would see the aggressor nations move into those parts. I said that for a while after I went to the State Department I thought that when I was talking to representatives of the aggressor nations they were gazing up in the air, but I soon discovered that they were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our defensive preparations—that was all that meant anything to rulers bent on violence.

The President had an eye to the situation in the Far East when on January 6, 1941, in his address to Congress he declared that "at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today." The President said that the whole pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling num-
ber of independent nations and that the assailants were still on the march threatening other nations, great and small. The President defined our national policy as follows:

We were committed to an all-inclusive national defense. We were committed to full support of resolute peoples everywhere who were resisting aggression and were thereby keeping war away from our hemisphere.

[1093] We were committed to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security would "never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors."

On January 15, 1941, in a statement in support of the Lend-Lease Act before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, I said:

It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region.

I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, ruthless, and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests, and that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the security of the Western Hemisphere."

D. SITUATION IN EUROPE

The President and I had to consider also the effect which would be produced on the European war situation if by any [1094] chance we should be successful in stabilizing the situation in the Pacific area. We knew that as the forces of aggression gathered strength in Europe and overran one unprepared victim after another, Japan's appetite to add to her empire by seizing rich territories increased.

The record in Europe was an awful one.

In 1933 Hitler had come into power in Germany. From that time the menace to peace from Japan in the Pacific and from Germany in Europe had developed concurrently.

On October 14, 1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and also gave notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations.

On October 3, 1935, Italian armed forces invaded Ethiopia.

In March 1936 Hitler in flagrant violation of the Locarno Pact proceeded to occupy and fortify the demilitarized Rhineland.

In July 1936 peace in Europe was dislocated further by the outbreak of civil war in Spain.

On March 11, 1938, Hitler sent his armed forces into Austria, and on March 13 proclaimed the union of Germany and Austria.

In September 1938, at Munich, Hitler and Mussolini forced a settlement by which Germany acquired the Sudetenland.

On March 14, 1939, Hitler, in violation of pledges given in the Munich settlement, invaded and occupied [1095] Czechoslovakia.

In September 1939 war broke out in Europe. Continued Axis aggression which had been proceeding step by step for several years thus sent the European continent into conflagration.
This weakened the military position of all countries, including the United States, opposed to Japanese banditry in the Pacific.

In the early summer of 1940 France's effective resistance collapsed. Britain was virtually under siege. Germany's vast and powerful military machine remained intact.

Nazi submarines and long-range bombers were taking a heavy toll of ships and materials in the North Atlantic. Shipping was inadequate. The countries resisting aggression desperately needed supplies to increase their defenses.

It was clear that any aggravation of the situation in the Far East would have a serious effect on the already dangerous situation in Europe, while conversely, an easement of the Far Eastern tension would aid enormously the struggle against the Nazis in Europe.

E. SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Finally the President and I, in considering the suggestion regarding negotiations with Japan, had to take into account the situation in the United States, especially as it affected foreign policy. A review of this situation is [1096] presented not in a spirit of criticism, but merely to remind ourselves of the inner turmoil through which the whole Nation was then passing.

In the years following 1931 the United States, like most of the world, was in the throes of a severe economic crisis. Many of our people had a profound sense of disillusionment over our participation in World War I. The Nation was much more intent on internal affairs than on potential threats thousands of miles away.

In the spring of 1933 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations rejected a proposal, supported by the administration, which would have authorized cooperation by the United States in an arms embargo against an aggressor nation.

In January 1935 the President sent a message to the Senate, requesting the advice and consent of the Senate to United States membership in the World Court. He pointed out that Republican and Democratic administrations alike had advocated a court of justice to which nations might voluntarily bring their disputes for judicial decision. The President declared that the United States had an opportunity "once more to throw its weight into the scale in favor of peace" at a time when "every act is of moment to the future of world peace." The measure, nevertheless, failed of passage.

[1097] In August 1935 in the shadow of a new European war, Congress passed a joint resolution known as the Neutrality Act providing that upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between or among two or more foreign states the President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war from the United States to any belligerent country.

In signing the joint resolution the President said he had done so "because it was intended as an expression of the fixed desire of the Government and the people of the United States to avoid any action which might involve us in war." But the President said, with emphasis, that the "inflexible" arms-embargo provisions "might drag us into war instead of keeping us out." A few months later I urged, in reference to the application of the Neutrality Act, the wisdom of leaving discretion to the Executive.
In January 1936 a "neutrality" bill containing a provision for restricting the export to belligerents of abnormal quantities of war materials was introduced in Congress at my request. Although extended hearings were held in which I and others urged the adoption of the measure, isolationist sentiment was so strong that it failed of passage.

During this period our Nation still showed signs of deep suspicion of and hostility toward any line of policy which appeared to extend our commitments abroad.

These signs were interpreted by the aggressor nations as meaning that the United States would not oppose effectively their policies of conquest.

A few examples of this public state of mind may be cited.

Early in 1938 a relatively modest naval expansion program received a great deal of criticism and suspicion as to the use to which the program would be put. So strong was this feeling that I made a public reply on February 10, 1938, to a letter from a member of Congress in which I gave reassurances that the proposed program did not contemplate the use of any of the units in cooperation with any other nation in any part of the world. I also stated that it was the desire of our Government that the United States not be drawn into or forced into war. I warned, however, that if every peaceful nation insisted on a policy of aloofness, the result would be to encourage nations inclined to play lawless roles.

It was during this same period that the movement for a popular referendum as a prerequisite for a declaration of war was at its height. Such a proposal was rejected by the House of Representatives by a very narrow vote (January 10, 1938, by a vote of 209-188).

Fortune published in April 1938 a poll which showed that 54 percent of those polled thought that we should withdraw entirely from China, and only 30 percent thought we should take steps to make the Japanese respect our rights.

In the summer of 1939 an effort led by the President and myself to secure a revision of the neutrality legislation, which would have strengthened the hands of the western democracies against Hitler, was violently opposed and blocked on the wholly mistaken theory that no war was likely to occur and, if it did occur, no attack against us was likely.

Following the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 our Nation began gradually to awaken to the awful peril of two aggressors on the rampage, one on our left hand, and the other on our right.

Congress speedily enacted revision of the Neutrality Act.

When the Nazis crushed France in June 1940 and Japan began to show strong interest in French, Dutch, and other territories in the Far East, we accelerated our rearmament program and adopted the Selective Service Act.

But most of those measures were attended by strenuous public debate and dissension. Many well-meaning people of all political faiths were confused as to what our course should be in a world apparently falling apart. A considerable number of our people were still clinging to the fundamental belief that no serious danger from foreign wars did or could threaten this country, and that about all the Nation had to do to keep out of war was to stay at home and mind its own business.
During this period of internal debate, while the Nation [1100] was gradually moving toward awareness of the menace from abroad, there was forced into the Selective Service Act inclusion of a provision that our new-citizen army could not be used outside the Western Hemisphere except in our own possessions. In August 1941, only by the narrow margin of a House vote of 203 to 202, did Congress extend the service of men inducted under the act, after the measure had been urged in the strongest terms by the President, myself and other members of the Administration.

Throughout these years the President and I repeatedly called attention in public addresses to the darkening clouds of war in the east and west and to their menace to ourselves. We attempted to explain the basic problems confronting us, and at the same time we tried to avoid playing into the hands of the aggressors or causing irritations that would slam the door. The text of the more important public statements made by the President and by me is given in Peace and War.

F. DECISION TO ENTER INTO CONVERSATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE

The constantly growing danger in the Far East, the acuteness of the situation in Europe, the vast expanse of territory to be defended, the necessity of building up our own armaments, the necessity of supplying materials for defense of this hemisphere, of the British Isles, of the Near East and of the Far East, the generally divided attitude of the American [1101] public toward the world situation, and growing realization of the far-reaching consequences to the whole world which would follow the extension of the European war and of the hostilities in China to the entire Pacific area and of the importance of averting if possible such a development—all these constituted significant and inescapable factors which the President and I reviewed in considering the Japanese suggestion.

In the light of Japan's past and current record and in view of the wide divergences between the policies which the United States and Japan had been pursuing in the Far East, I estimated from the outset that there was not 1 chance in 20 or 1 in 50 or even 1 in 100 of reaching a peaceful settlement. Existing treaties relating to the Far East were adequate, provided the signatory governments lived up to them. We were, therefore, not calling for new agreements. But if there was a chance that new agreements would contribute to peace in the Pacific, the President and I believed that we should not neglect that possibility, slim as it was.

We had in mind doing everything we could to bring about a peaceful, fair, and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific area. Such a course was in accordance with the traditional attitudes and beliefs of the American people. Moreover, the President and I constantly had very much in mind the advice of our highest military [1102] authorities who kept emphasizing to us the imperative need of having time to build up preparations for defense vital not only to the United States but to many other countries resisting aggression. Our decision to enter into the conversations with the Japanese was, therefore, in line with our need to rearm for self-defense.
The President and I fully realized that the Japanese government could not, even if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in Japan's course of aggression. We realized that so much was involved in a reconstruction of Japan's position that implementation to any substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful courses would require a long time. We were, therefore, prepared to be patient in an endeavor to persuade Japan to turn from her course of aggression. We carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a basic position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not only to Japan but to all countries.

[1103] II. Conversations and Developments Prior to July 1941

On February 14, 1941, the President received the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, in a spirit of cordiality and said that they could talk candidly. He pointed out that relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating and mentioned Japanese movements southward and Japanese entry into the Tripartite Agreement. The President suggested that the Ambassador might like to re-examine and frankly discuss with the Secretary of State important phases of American-Japanese relations.

On March 8, in my first extended conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, I emphasized that the American people had become fully aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary control and to profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims.

On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters between our two countries could be worked out without a military clash and emphasized that the first step would be removal of suspicion regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious [1104] concern and suspicion.

On April 16 I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;
2. Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries;
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;
4. Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be consistent with those principles.

On May 12 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal for a general settlement. The essence of that proposal was that the United
States should request Chiang Kai-shek to [1105] negotiate peace with Japan, and, if Chiang should not accept the advice of the United States, that the United States should discontinue its assistance to his government; that normal trade relations between the United States and Japan should be resumed; and that the United States should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural resources—such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel—in the southwest Pacific area. There were also other provisions which Japan eventually dropped, calling for joint guaranty of independence of the Philippines, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a nondiscriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe.

The proposal also contained an affirmation of Japan’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact and a specific reference to Japan’s obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly excepted.

The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas whereby Japan would retain control [1106] of various strategic resources, facilities and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for “joint defense against communism,” for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of China proper and Inner Mongolia.

Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility of working out a broad-gage settlement, covering the entire Pacific area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this country stood.

On May 14, Mr. Matsuoka, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of a conversation with Ambassador Grew, said that both Prince Konoe and he were determined that Japan’s southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful means, “unless,” he added significantly, [1107] “circumstances render this impossible.”

In reply to the Ambassador’s inquiry as to what circumstances he had in mind, Mr. Matsuoka referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures. When the Ambassador pointed out that such measures were of a defensive character, the Minister’s reply was that those measures were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public, which might bring pressure on the Government to act.

On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt proclaimed the existence of an “unlimited national emergency” and in a radio address on the same day he declared that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been based on concern for our own security. He warned of the conditions which would exist should Hitler be victorious.

The President and I were sure that the proclamation would be noticed not only by Hitler but also by the Japanese war lords.

[1108] On May 28 I told the Japanese Ambassador that I had it in mind before passing from our informal conversations into any ne-
Gotations with Japan to talk out in strict confidence with the Chinese government the general subject matter involved in the proposals.

During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference. We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points—the necessity of Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of nondiscrimination in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific and assurance of Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an instrument of peace.

The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that redraft there was suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed to take action against the United States should the latter be drawn by [1109] self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further effort be made to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the interest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement with our stated principles.

III. Japan's Warlords Disclose Their Intention of Further Aggression

On June 22, Germany attacked the Soviet Union, and this action started a chain of developments in Japan.

Following an Imperial conference at Tokyo on July 2, in which, according to an official announcement, "the fundamental national policy to be taken toward the present situation was decided," Japan proceeded with military preparation on a vast scale. One to two million reservists and conscripts were called up. Japanese merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean were suddenly recalled. Restrictions were imposed upon travel in Japan. Strict censorship of mails and communications was carried out.

During this period the Japanese press stressed the theme that Japan was being faced with pressure from many [1110] countries. It charged the United States with an intention to establish military bases in Kamchatka and with using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." It warned that if the United States took further action in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese-American relations would face a final crisis.

In July our Government began receiving reports that a Japanese military movement into southern Indochina was imminent. This Japanese movement into southern Indochina threatened the Philippine Islands, the Netherlands East Indies, and British Malaya. It
also threatened vital trade routes. We immediately brought these reports to the attention of the Japanese representatives, pointed out the inconsistency between such a military movement and the discussions which were then proceeding, and requested information as to the facts.

On July 23, the Japanese Ambassador stated in explanation of the Japanese advance in Indochina that Japan needed to secure an uninterrupted source of supplies and to ensure against encirclement of Japan militarily. The Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, replied that the agreement which was being discussed between the American and Japanese representatives would give Japan far greater economic security that she could gain by occupying Indochina. He pointed out [1111] that the United States policy was the opposite of an encirclement policy. He said that the United States could only regard the action of Japan as constituting notice that Japan was taking the last step before proceeding on a policy of expansion and conquest in the region of the South Seas. Under instructions from me, he told the Ambassador that in these circumstances I could not see any basis for pursuing further the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador.

Thereafter, no conversations were held on the subject of a general agreement with Japan until in August the Japanese Government took a new initiative.

On July 24 President Roosevelt made a proposal to the Japanese Government that Indochina be regarded as a “neutralized” country. That proposal envisaged Japan’s being given the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring for itself a source of food supplies and other raw materials which—according to Japanese accounts—Japan was seeking to obtain. The Japanese Government did not accept the President’s proposal.

It is pertinent to allude briefly to the estimate which we made of the situation at this juncture.

The hostilities between Japan and China had been in progress for 4 years. During those years the United States had continued to follow in its relations with Japan a policy of restraint and patience. It had done this notwithstanding [1112] constant violation by Japanese authorities or agents of American rights and legitimate interests in China, in neighboring areas, and even in Japan, and notwithstanding acts and statements by Japanese officials indicating a policy of widespread conquest by force and even threatening the United States.

The American Government had sought, while protesting against Japanese acts and while yielding no rights, to make clear a willingness to work out with Japan by peaceful processes a basis for continuance of amicable relations with Japan. It had been desired to give the Japanese every opportunity to turn of their own accord from their program of conquest toward peaceful policies.

The President and I, in our effort to bring about the conclusion of an agreement, had endeavored to present to the Japanese Government a feasible alternative to Japan’s indicated program of conquest. We had made abundantly clear our willingness to cooperate with Japan in a program based upon peaceful principles. We had repeatedly indicated that if such a program were adopted for the Pacific, and if thereafter any countries or areas within the Pacific were men-
aced, our Government would expect to cooperate with other governments in extending assistance to the region threatened.

While these discussions were going on in Washington, many responsible Japanese officials were affirming in Tokyo and elsewhere Japan's determination to pursue a policy of cooperation with her Axis allies. Both Mr. Matsuoka and his successor as Minister of Foreign Affairs had declared that the Three Power Pact stood and that Japanese policy was based upon that pact. Large-scale preparation by Japan for extension of her military activities was in progress, especially since early July. Notwithstanding our efforts expressly to impress upon the Japanese Government our Government's concern and our objection to movement by Japan with use or threat of force into Indochina, the Japanese Government had again obtained by duress from the Vichy Government an authorization and Japanese armed forces had moved into southern Indochina, occupied bases there, and were consolidating themselves there for further southward movements.

The Japanese move into southern Indochina was an aggravated, overt act. It created a situation in which the risk of war became so great that the United States and other countries concerned were confronted no longer with the question of avoiding such risk but from then on with the problem of preventing a complete undermining of their security. It was essential that the United States make a definite and clear move in self-defense.

Accordingly, on July 26, 1941, President Roosevelt issued an executive order freezing Chinese and Japanese assets in the United States. That order brought under the control of the Government all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Chinese or Japanese interests were involved. The effect of this was to bring about very soon virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan.

On August 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which he said was intended to be responsive to the President's proposal regarding neutralization of Indochina. In essence, the Japanese proposal was that:

1. The Japanese Government should undertake to refrain from stationing troops in regions of the southwest Pacific, to withdraw from French Indochina after "settlement of the China incident," to guarantee Philippine neutrality, and to cooperate in the production and procurement of natural resources in east Asia essential to the United States; and

2. The United States should undertake to "suspend its military measures in the southwestern Pacific areas" and to recommend similar action to the Governments of the Netherlands and Great Britain, to cooperate in the production and procurement of natural resources in the Southwestern Pacific essential to Japan, to take measures to restore normal commerce between the United States and Japan, to extend its good offices toward bringing about direct negotiations between Japan and the Chungking Government, and to recognize Japan's special position in Indochina even after withdrawal of Japanese troops.

The proposals advanced by the Japanese Government completely ignored the President's proposal, and on August 8 I so indicated to the Japanese Ambassador.
The movement of Japanese forces into Indochina continued unabated after the President's proposal was made known to the Japanese Government. Also since then Japanese forces bombed Chungking more intensely than ever before, Japanese troops were massing on the Thailand frontier, Japan was making demands on Thialand, and Japanese troops were massing on the Siberian frontier of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, on August 8 and again on August 15, an official Japanese spokesman declared that encirclement of Japan by the ABCD powers—the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Netherlands—was an actual fact. The Japanese press, while affirming its approval of efforts by the Japanese Government to improve relations with the United States, stressed that the basis for any negotiations must be predicated upon there being under no circumstances any change in Japan's policies, namely, the "settlement of the China Incident, the firm establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the Axis Alliance."

IV. JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR ROOSEVELT-KONOYE MEETING

In the conversation which I had with the Japanese Ambassador on August 8, the Ambassador inquired whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the two Governments to meet with a view to discussing means for reaching an adjustment of views. After reviewing briefly the steps which had led to a discontinuance of the informal conversations, I said that it remained to the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find means of shaping its policies along lines which would make possible an adjustment of views.

At the Atlantic Conference in August, Mr. Churchill had informed President Roosevelt that the British Government needed more time to prepare for resistance against a possible Japanese attack in the Far East. This was true also of our defense preparations. Furthermore, President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill had agreed that the American and British Governments should take parallel action in informing Japan that, in the event the Japanese Government should take further steps of aggression against neighboring countries, each of them would be compelled to take all necessary measures to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of its country and nationals and to insure its country's safety and security. The President and Mr. Churchill were also of the view that the American Government should be prepared to continue its conversations with the Japanese Government and by such means to offer Japan a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which Japan was engaged.

Accordingly, President Roosevelt on August 17, the day of his return to Washington, informed the Japanese Ambassador that if the Japanese Government took any further steps in pursuance of a program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries our Government would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests and toward insuring the security of the United States. At the same time President Roosevelt informed the Japanese Ambassador, in reply to the Ambassador's requests of previous weeks, that we were prepared to resume the conversations.
At this meeting on August 17 the President also informed the Japanese Ambassador that before proceeding with plans for a meeting of the heads of the American and Japanese Governments, as suggested by the Japanese Government, it would be helpful if the Japanese Government would furnish a clearer statement than had as yet been given of its present attitude and plans.

On August 28 the President was given a message from the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, urging that the meeting of the heads of the two governments be arranged to discuss all important problems by Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area. Accompanying that message was a statement containing assurances, with several qualifications, of Japan's peaceful intent.

The President in his reply given on September 3 expressed a desire to collaborate with the Japanese Prime Minister to see whether there could be made effective in practice a program such as that referred to by the Japanese Government and whether there could be reached a meeting of minds on fundamentals which would afford prospect of success for such a meeting. It was suggested that to this end there take place immediately in advance of the proposed meeting preliminary discussions on fundamental and essential questions on which agreement was sought and on the manner in which the agreement would be applied. We felt that only in this way could a situation be brought about which would make such a meeting beneficial.

On September 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a new draft of proposals. These proposals were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement communicated to the President on August 28. In the September 6 Japanese draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula with regard to their obligations under the Tripartite Pact. There was a qualified undertaking that Japan would not "without any justifiable reason" resort to military action against any region south of Japan. No commitment was offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula contained in that draft that "the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis" clearly implied a concept that the conditions under which American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan.

On September 6 Prime Minister Konoe in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Tokyo indicated that the Japanese Government fully and definitely subscribed to the four principles which this Government had previously set forth as a basis for the reconstruction of relations with Japan. However, a month later the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated to the American Ambassador that while these four points had been accepted "in principle," certain adjustments would be necessary in applying these principles to actual conditions.
A meeting between the President and Prince Konoe would have been a significant step.Decision whether it should be undertaken by our Government involved several important considerations.

We knew that Japanese leaders were unreliable and treacherous. We asked ourselves whether the military element in Japan would permit the civilian element, even if so disposed, to stop Japan's course of expansion by force and to revert to peaceful courses. Time and again the civilian leaders gave assurances; time and again the military took aggressive action in direct violation of those assurances. Japan's past and contemporary record was replete with instances of military aggression and expansion by force. Since 1931 and especially since 1937 the military in Japan exercised a controlling voice in Japan's national policy.

Japan's formal partnership with Nazi Germany in the Tripartite Alliance was a hard and inescapable fact. The Japanese had been consistently unwilling in the conversations to pledge their Government to renounce Japan's commitments in the alliance. They would not state that Japan would refrain from attacking this country if it became involved through self-defense in the European war. They held on to the threat against the United States implicit in the alliance.

Our Government could not ignore the fact that throughout the conversations the Japanese spokesmen had made a practice of offering general formulas and, when pressed for explanation of the meaning, had consistently narrowed and made more rigid their application. This suggested that when military leaders became aware of the generalized formulas they insisted upon introducing conditions which watered down the general assurances.

A meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister would have had important psychological results.

It would have had a critically discouraging effect upon the Chinese.

If the proposed meeting should merely endorse general principles, the Japanese in the light of their past practice could have been expected to utilize such general principles in support of any interpretation which Japan might choose to place upon them.

If the proposed meeting did not produce an agreement, the Japanese military leaders would then have been in a position to declare that the United States was responsible for the failure of the meeting.

[1122] The Japanese had already refused to agree on any preliminary steps toward reversion to peaceful courses as for example adopting the President's proposal of July 24, regarding the neutralization of Indochina. Instead they steadily moved on with their program of establishing themselves more firmly in Indochina.

It was clear to us that unless the meeting produced concrete and clear-cut commitments toward peace, the Japanese would have distorted the significance of the meeting in such a way as to weaken greatly this country's moral position and to facilitate their aggressive course.

The acts of Japan under Konoe's Prime Ministership could not be overlooked.

He had headed the Japanese Government in 1937 when Japan attacked China and when huge Japanese armies poured into that country and occupied its principal cities and industrial regions.
He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces attacked the U. S. S. _Panay_ on the Yangtze River on December 12, 1937.

He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces committed notorious outrages in Nanking in 1937.

He as Prime Minister had proclaimed in 1938 the basic principles upon which the Japanese Government, even through—[1123]—out the 1941 conversations, stated that it would insist in any peace agreement with China. Those principles in application included stationing large bodies of Japanese troops in north China. They would have enabled Japan to retain a permanent strangle hold on China.

He had been Prime Minister when the Japanese Government concluded in 1940 with the Chinese quisling regime at Nanking a “treaty” embodying the strangle hold principles mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

Prince Konoe had been Japanese Prime Minister when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940.

As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese over a period of months, in which they showed no disposition to abandon their course of conquest, we were thoroughly satisfied that a meeting with Kanoe could only result either in another Munich or in nothing at all, unless Japan was ready to give some clear evidence of a purpose to move in a peaceful direction. I was opposed to the first Munich and still more opposed to a second Munich.

Our Government ardently desired peace. It could not brush away the realities in the situation.

Although the President would, as he said, “have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan,” it was felt that in view of the factors mentioned—[1124]—the President could go to such a meeting only if there were first obtained tentative commitments offering some assurance that the meeting could accomplish good. Neither Prince Konoye nor any of Japan’s spokesmen provided anything tangible.

At various times during September discussions were held with the Japanese. On September 27 the Japanese Ambassador presented a complete new redraft of the Japanese proposals. He urged an early reply.

On October 2, I gave the Japanese Ambassador a memorandum of an “oral statement” reviewing significant developments in the conversations and explaining our Government’s attitude toward various points in the Japanese proposals which our Government did not consider consistent with the principles to which this country was committed. Disappointment was expressed over the narrow character of the outstanding Japanese proposals, and questions were raised in regard to Japan’s intentions regarding the indefinite stationing of Japanese troops in wide areas of China and regarding Japan’s relationship to the Axis Powers. While welcoming the Japanese suggestion of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister, we proposed, in order to lay a firm foundation for such a meeting, that renewed consideration be given to fundamental principles so as to reach a meeting of the minds on essential questions. It was stated in—[1125]—conclusion that the subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought had engaged the close and active interest of the President and that it was
the President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions might be so developed that such a meeting could be held.

During this period there was a further advance of Japanese armed forces in Indochina, Japanese military preparations at home were increased and speeded up, and there continued Japanese bombing of Chinese civilian populations, constant agitation in the Japanese press in support of extremist policies, and the unconciliatory and bellicose utterances of Japanese leaders.

For example, Capt. Hideo Hiraide, director of the naval intelligence section of Imperial Headquarters, was quoted on October 16 as having declared in a public speech:

America, feeling her insecurity . . . is carrying out naval expansion on a large scale. But at present America is unable to carry out naval operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific simultaneously.

The imperial navy is prepared for the worst, and has completed all necessary preparations. In fact, the imperial navy is itching for action, when needed.

In spite of strenuous efforts by the Government, the situation is now approaching a final parting of the ways. The fate of our empire depends upon how we act at this moment. It is certain that at such a moment our Navy should act about on its primary mission.

[V1127] V. Tojo Cabinet and Continuation of Conversations

On October 16, 1941 the Konoe Cabinet fell. On the following day it was replaced by a new cabinet, headed by General Tojo.

The new cabinet informed our Government that it desired to continue the exploratory conversations looking to peace in the Pacific and to an agreement with the United States. But it showed no willingness to effect any fundamental modification of the Japanese position. Instead, Japanese bellicose utterances continued.

On October 17 the American press carried the following statement by Major General Kiyofuku Oamoto:

Despite the different views advanced on the Japanese-American question, our national policy for solution of the China affair and establishment of a common co-prosperity sphere in East Asia remains unaltered.

For fulfillment of this national policy, this country has sought to reach an agreement of views with the U. S. by means of diplomatic means. There is, however, a limit to our concessions, and the negotiations may end in a break with the worst possible situation following. The people must therefore be resolved to cope with such a situation.

Clearly, the Japanese warlords expected to clinch their policy of aggrandizement and have the United States make all the concessions.

On October 30 the Japanese Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that the Japanese Government desired that the conversations be concluded successfully without delay and he said that “in order to make progress, the United States should face certain realities and facts,” and he thereupon cited the stationing in China of Japanese armed forces.

The general world situation continued to be very critical, rendering it desirable that every reasonable effort be made to avoid or at least to defer as long as possible any rupture in the conversations. From here on for some weeks especially intensive study was given in the Department of State to the possibility of reaching some stop-gap arrangement with the Japanese so as to tide over the immediate critical situation and
thus to prevent a breakdown in the conversations, and even perhaps to pave the way for a subsequent general agreement. The presentation to the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to keep alive the conversations would also give our Army and Navy time to prepare and to expose Japan's bad faith if it did not accept. We considered every kind of suggestion we could find which might help or keep alive the conversations and at the same time be consistent with the integrity of American principles.

[1120] In the last part of October and early November messages came to this Government from United States Army and Navy officers in China and from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he believed that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent. The Generalissimo requested that the United States send air units to China to defeat this threat. He made a similar request of the British Government. He also asked that the United States issue a warning to Japan.

At this time the Chinese had been resisting the Japanese invaders for 4 years. China sorely needed equipment. Its economic and financial situations were very bad. Morale was naturally low. In view of this, even though a Chinese request might contain points with which we could not comply, we dealt with any such request in a spirit of utmost consideration befitting the gravity of the situation confronting our hard-pressed Chinese friends.

I suggested that the War and Navy Departments study this Chinese appeal. In response, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations sent a memorandum of November 5 to the President giving an estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation. At the conclusion of this estimate the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations recommended:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for [1130] intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

I was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations that United States armed forces should not be sent to China for use against Japan. I also believed so far as American foreign policy considerations were involved that material aid to China should be accelerated as much as feasible, and that aid to the American Volunteer Group should be accelerated. Finally, I concurred completely in the view that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan. I had been striving for months to avoid a showdown with Japan, and to explore every possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United States and Japan. That was the cornerstone of the effort which the President and I were putting forth with our utmost patience.

On November 14 the President replied to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in line with the estimate and recommendations contained in the memorandum of November 5 of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. The [1131] Generalissimo was told that from our information it did not appear that a Japanese land campaign against Kunming was immediately imminent. It was indi-
cated that American air units could not be sent and that the United States would not issue a warning but there were outlined ways, mentioned in the memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, in which the United States would continue to assist China.

On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.

Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world—on the far side of the Pacific"; and the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense.

On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were breaking high both in the East and in the West", he said, and and were threatening, more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our own shores." He warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917; that "at any moment war may be forced upon us."

Early in November the Japanese Government decided to send Mr. Saburo Kurusu to Washington to assist the Japanese Ambassador in the conversations.

On November 7 the Japanese Ambassador handed me a document containing draft provisions relating to Japanese forces in China, Japanese forces in Indochina, and the principle of non-discrimination. That proposal contained nothing fundamentally new or offering any real recessions from the position consistently maintained by the Japanese Government.

In telegrams of November 3 and November 17 the American Ambassador in Japan cabled warnings of the possibility of sudden Japanese attacks which might make inevitable war with the United States.

In the first half of November there were several indeterminate conversations with the Japanese designed to clarify specific points. On November 15 I gave the Japanese Ambassador an outline for a possible joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic policy. I pointed out that this represented but one part of the general settlement we had in mind. This draft declaration of economic policy envisaged that Japan could join with the United States in leading the way toward a general application of economic practices which would give Japan much of what her leaders professed to desire.
On November 12 the Japanese Foreign Office, both through Ambassador Grew and through their Ambassador here, urged that the conversations be brought to a settlement at the earliest possible time. In view of the pressing insistence of the Japanese for a definitive reply to their outstanding [1134] proposals, I was impelled to comment to the Japanese Ambassador on November 15 that the American Government did not feel that it should be receiving such representations, suggestive of ultimatums.

On November 15 Mr. Kurusu reached Washington. On November 17 he and the Japanese Ambassador called on me and later on the same day on the President.

In those conversations Mr. Kurusu said that the Japanese Prime Minister, General Tojo, seemed optimistic in regard to adjusting the question of applying the principle of nondiscrimination and the question of Japan's relation to the Tripartite Alliance, but he indicated that it would be difficult to withdraw Japanese troops from China. Mr. Kurusu offered no new suggestions on those two points. This was further evidence that Japan was bent on exercising a position of military, political, and economic control and dominance of China. The President made clear the desire of this country to avoid war between our two countries and to bring about a settlement on a fair and peaceful basis in the Pacific area.

On November 18 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called on me. In that conversation the question of Japan's relation to the Tripartite Pact was discussed at length. I asked the Japanese Ambassador if he did not think that something could be worked out on this vital question. The [1135] Ambassador made no helpful comment in regard to the continued stationing of Japanese troops in China.

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu suggested the possibility of a temporary arrangement or a modus vivendi. The Ambassador brought up the possibility of going back to the status which existed before the date in July when, following the Japanese entry into southern French Indochina, the United States put freezing measures into effect.

I said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo on the strength of such a step by Japan as the Ambassador had mentioned, we would not know whether the troops to be withdrawn from French Indochina would be diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. I said that it would be difficult for our Government to go a long way in removing the embargo unless we believed that Japan was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest. I said that I would consult with the representatives of other countries on this suggestion. On the same day I informed the British Minister of my talk with the Japanese about the suggestion of a temporary limited arrangement.

On November 19 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu again called on me at their request. During that conversation the Ambassador made it clear that Japan could not abrogate the Tripartite Alliance and felt bound to carry out its obligations.

[1136] VI. JAPANESE ULTIMATUM OF NOVEMBER 20 AND OUR REPLY

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu presented to me a proposal which on its face was extreme. I knew, as
did other high officers of the Government, from intercepted Japanese messages supplied to me by the War and Navy Departments, that this proposal was the final Japanese proposition—an ultimatum.

The proposal read as follows:

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indochina where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indochina upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area. In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied [1137] in the final agreement.

3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China, and for withdrawal of moral and material support from the recognized Chinese Government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send into Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until after either the restoration [1138] of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there were stipulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to the north of Indochina—for example, China and the Soviet Union. The proposal contained no provisions pledging Japan to abandon aggression and to revert to peaceful courses.

On November 21 Mr. Kurusu called alone upon me and gave me a draft of a formula relating to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. That formula did not offer anything new or helpful. I asked Mr. Kurusu whether he had anything more to offer on the subject of a peaceful settlement as a whole. Mr. Kurusu replied that he did not.

On November 21 we received word from the Dutch that they had information that a Japanese force had arrived near Palao, the nearest point in the Japanese Mandated Islands to the heart of the Netherlands Indies. Our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon had been reporting extensive new landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indochina. We had information through intercepted Japanese-
messages that the Japanese Government had decided that the negotiations must \[1139\] be terminated by November 25, later extended to November 29. We knew from other intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese did not intend to make any concessions, and from this fact taken together with Kurusu’s statement to me of November 21 making clear that his Government had nothing further to offer, it was plain, as I have mentioned, that the Japanese proposal of November 20 was in fact their “absolutely final proposal.”

The whole issue presented was whether Japan would yield in her avowed movement of conquest or whether we would yield the fundamental principles for which we stood in the Pacific and all over the world. By mid-summer of 1941 we were pretty well satisfied that the Japanese were determined to continue with their course of expansion by force. We had made it clear to them that we were standing fast by our principles. It was evident, however, that they were playing for the chance that we might be overawed into yielding by their threats of force. They were armed to the teeth and we knew they would attack whenever and wherever they pleased. If by chance we should have yielded our fundamental principles, Japan would probably not have attacked for the time being—at least not until she had consolidated the gains she would have made without fighting.

There was never any question of this country’s forcing \[1140\] Japan to fight. The question was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its principles.

To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in Japan’s program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position under intimidation.

The situation was critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our Government desired to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a peaceful solution and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this country’s armed forces continued to emphasize the need of time to prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling for a showdown.

There the situation stood—the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in their demands and we standing firm for our principles.

The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws.

Three possible choices presented themselves.

Our Government might have made no reply. The Japanese \[1141\] warlords could then have told their people that the American Government not only would make no reply but would also not offer any alternative.

Our Government might have rejected flatly the Japanese proposal. In that event the Japanese warlords would be afforded a pretext, although wholly false, for military attack.

Our Government might endeavor to present a reasonable counter-proposal.

The last course was the one chosen.
In considering the content of a counter-proposal consideration was given to the inclusion therein of a possible modus vivendi. Such a project would have the advantages of showing our interest in peace to the last and of exposing the Japanese somewhat in case they should not accept. It would, if it had served to prolong the conversations, have gained time for the Army and Navy to prepare. The project of a modus vivendi was discussed and given intensive consideration from November 22 to November 26 within the Department of State, by the President, and by the highest authorities of the Army and Navy. A first draft was completed on November 22 and revised drafts on November 24 and 25. It was also discussed with the British, Australian, Dutch, and Chinese Governments.

The projected modus vivendi provided for mutual pledges by the United States and Japan that their national policies would be directed toward lasting peace; for mutual undertakings against advances by military force or threat of force in the Pacific area; for withdrawal by Japan of its armed forces from southern Indochina; for a modification by the United States of its freezing and export restrictions to permit resumption of certain categories of trade, within certain specified limits, between the United States and Japan; for the corresponding modification by Japan of its freezing and export restrictions; and for an approach by the United States to the Australian, British and Dutch Governments with a view to their taking similar measures. There was also an affirmation by the United States of its fundamental interest that any settlement between the Japanese and Chinese Governments be based upon the principles of peace, law, order, and justice. There was provision that the modus vivendi would remain in force for three months and would be subject to further extension.

It was proposed as a vital part of the modus vivendi at the same time to give to the Japanese for their consideration an outline of a peace settlement which might serve as a basis for working out a comprehensive settlement for the Pacific area along broad and just lines. On November 11 there had been prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs for possible consideration a draft of a proposal along broad lines. This draft like others was drawn up with a view to keeping the conversations going (and thus gaining time) and to leading, if accepted, to an eventual comprehensive settlement of a nature compatible with American principles. This draft proposal contained statements of general principles, including the four principles which I had presented to the Japanese on April 16, and a statement of principles in regard to economic policy. Under this draft the United States would suggest to the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they enter into peace negotiations, and the Japanese Government would offer the Chinese Government an armistice during the period of the peace negotiations. The armistice idea was dropped because it would have operated unfairly in Japan's favor.

A further proposal to which I gave attention was a revision in tentative form made by the Department on November 19 of a draft of a proposed comprehensive settlement received from the Treasury Department on the previous day. This tentative proposal was discussed with the War and Navy Departments. In subsequent revisions points to which objections were raised by them were dropped. A third proposal which I had under consideration was that of the modus vivendi.
What I considered presenting to the Japanese from about [1144], November 22 to November 26 consisted of our modus vivendi draft and an outline of a peace statement which might serve as a basis for working out a comprehensive settlement for the Pacific area along broad and just lines. This second and more comprehensive part followed some of the lines set forth in the November 11 draft and in the November 19 draft.

While the modus vivendi proposal was still under consideration, I emphasized the critical nature of this country's relations with Japan at the meeting of the War Council on November 25. The War Council, which consisted of the President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, was a sort of a clearing house for all the information and views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts and in our respective circles. The high lights in the developments at a particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings. At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and desperate. They were likely to break out anywhere, at any time, at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their plans. I felt that virtually the last stage had been reached and that the safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.

[1145] In a message of November 24 to Mr. Churchill, telegraphed through the Department, President Roosevelt added to an explanation of our proposed modus vivendi the words, "I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon."

On the evening of November 25 and on November 26 I went over again the considerations relating to our proposed plan, especially the modus vivendi aspect.

As I have indicated, all the successive drafts, of November 22, of November 24 and of November 25 contained two things: (1) the possible modus vivendi; and (2) a statement of principles, with a suggested example of how those principles could be applied—that which has since been commonly described as the 10-point proposal.

I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were demanding—and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended later to November 29, for—acceptance by our Government of their extreme, last-word proposal of November 20.

It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal was remote.

So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared [1146] to the Japanese, it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton, oil and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding.

It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally
were unfavorable or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it, especially the serious risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance and even of disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible.

The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic effort, in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, on November 26 I recommended to the President—and he approved—my calling in the Japanese representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the modus vivendi plan. This was done in the late afternoon of that day.

The document handed the Japanese representatives on November 26 was divided into two parts:

The first part of the document handed the Japanese was marked "Oral." In it was reviewed briefly the objective sought in the exploratory conversations, namely, that of reaching if possible a settlement of questions relating to the entire Pacific area on the basis of the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. It was stated that it was believed that some progress had been made in reference to general principles. Note was taken of a recent statement by the Japanese Ambassador that the Japanese Government desired to continue the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement.

In connection with the Japanese proposals of November 20 for a modus vivendi, it was stated that the American Government most earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gage program of peace throughout the Pacific area. Our Government stated that in its opinion some features of the Japanese proposals of November 20 conflicted with the fundamental principles which formed a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each government had declared that it was committed.

Our Government suggested that further effort be made to resolve the divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned. Our Government
stated that with this object in view it offered "for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisions as something to be worked out during our further conversations."

The second part of the document embodied the plan itself which was in two sections.

In section I there was outlined a mutual declaration of policy containing affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two countries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area, and that they would give support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations would be based. These principles were stated as follows:

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

This statement of policy and of principle closely followed the line of what had been presented to the Japanese on several previous occasions beginning in April.

In section I there was also a provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples liberal economic principles. These principles were enumerated. They were based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

This suggested provision for mutual pledges with respect to economic relations closely followed the line of what had previously been presented to the Japanese.

In section II there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two governments. One unilateral commitment was suggested, an undertaking by Japan that she would withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina. Mutual commitments were suggested along the following lines:

(a) To endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area;
(b) To endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indochina and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein;
(c) Not to support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chunking;
(d) To relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights;
(e) To negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment;
(f) To remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other;
(g) To agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate with Japan and the United States each furnishing half of the fund;
(h) To agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement; and
(i) To use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement.
The document handed the Japanese on November 26 was essentially a restatement of principles which have long been basic in this country's foreign policy. The practical application of those principles to the situation in the Far East, as embodied in the ten points contained in the document, was along lines which had been under discussion with the Japanese representatives in the course of the informal exploratory conversations during the months preceding delivery of the document in question. Our Government's proposal embodied mutually profitable policies of the kind we were prepared to offer to any friendly country and was coupled with the suggestion that the proposal be made the basis for further conversations.

A vital part of our program of standing firm for our principles was to offer other countries worthwhile plans which would be highly profitable to them as well as to ourselves. We stood firmly for these principles in the face of the Japanese demand that we abandon them. For this course there are no apologies.

Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either Government was free to offer.

We well knew that, in view of Japan's refusal throughout the conversations to abandon her policy of conquest and domination, there was scant likelihood of her acceptance of this plan. But it is the task of statesmanship to leave no possibility for peace unexplored, no matter how slight. It was in this spirit that the November 26 document was given to the Japanese Government.

When handing the document of November 26 to the Japanese representatives, I said that the proposed agreement would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation which, however, had not been referred to in the outline for fear that they might give rise to misunderstanding. I added also that I had earlier informed the Ambassador of my ambition of settling the immigration question but that the situation had so far prevented me from realizing that ambition.

It is not surprising that Japanese propaganda, especially after Japan had begun to suffer serious defeats, has tried to distort and give a false meaning to our memorandum of November 26 by referring to it as an "ultimatum". This was in line with a well-known Japanese characteristic of utilizing completely false and flimsy pretexts to delude their people and gain their support for militaristic depredations and aggrandizement.

VII. The Last Phase

After November 26 the Japanese representatives at their request saw the President and me on several occasions. Nothing new developed on the subject of a peaceful agreement.

On November 26 following delivery of our Government's proposal to the Japanese Ambassador, correspondents were informed by an official of the Department of State that the Japanese representatives had been handed a document for their consideration. This document, they were informed, was the culmination of conferences during recent weeks and rested on certain basic principles with which the correspondents would be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions.
On November 27 I had a special and lengthy press conference at which I told the correspondents they were free to use the information given them as their own or as having come from authoritative sources. I said that from the beginning I had been keeping in mind, and I suggested that the correspondents keep in mind, that the groups in Japan led by the military leaders had a plan of conquest by force of about one-half of the earth with one-half of its population. They had a plan to impose on this one-half of the earth a military control of political affairs, economic affairs, social affairs, and moral affairs of each population very much as Hitler was doing in Europe.

I said that this movement in the Far East started in earnest in 1937. It carried with it a policy of non-observance of any standards of conduct in international relations or of any law or of any rule of justice or fair play.

From the beginning, we, as one of the leading free countries, had sought to keep alive the basic philosophy and principles governing the opposing viewpoint in international relations, that is, government by law, government by orderly processes, based on justice and morals and principles that would preserve absolutely the freedom of each country; principles of noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries; the preservation inviolate of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries; the peaceful settlement of disputes; equality of commercial opportunities and relations. These and other principles that go along with them have been, I pointed out, the touchstone of all of our activities in the conduct of our foreign policy. We had striven to impress them on other countries, to keep them alive as the world was going more and more to a state of international anarchy. We had striven to preserve their integrity. That was no easy undertaking.

I said that in the spring of 1941 there had come up the question of conferences with the Japanese on the subject of peace. The purpose was to ascertain whether a peaceful settlement relating to the entire Pacific area was possible.

I mentioned that for a considerable time there had been two opposing groups in Japan. One was the military group, sometimes led by military extremists. They had seemed to be in the saddle when the China undertaking in 1937 was decided upon. As the Chinese undertaking went on, there was an opposing group in Japan, representing honest lovers of peace and law and order. Another portion of this group comprised those who personally favored the policy of force and conquest but considered that the time was not propitious, for different reasons, to undertake it. Some of this group were inclined to oppose Japan's policy because of the unsatisfactory experience of Japan in China and of what they regarded as Japan's unsatisfactory relations with Germany under the Tripartite Pact.

I said that our conference with the Japanese during the preceding several months had been purely exploratory.

During that time I kept other countries who had interest in that area informed in a general way.

I pointed out that for the previous 10 days or so we had explored all phases of the basic questions presented and of suggestions or ideas or methods of bringing Japan and the United States as close together as possible, on the theory that that might have been the beginning of
some peaceful and cordial relations between Japan and other nations of the Pacific, including our own.

During the conversations, I said we had to keep in mind many angles. We had to keep in mind phases not only of the political situation but of the Army and Navy situation. As an illustration, I cited the fact that we had known for [1157] some days from the facts and circumstances which revealed themselves steadily that the Japanese were pouring men and materials and boats and all kinds of equipment into Indochina. One qualified observer reported the number of Japanese forces in southern Indochina as 128,000. That may have been too high as yet. But a large military movement was taking place. There was a further report that the Japanese Navy might make attacks somewhere there around Siam, any time within a few days.

I told the correspondents that we were straining Heaven and Earth to work out understandings that might mitigate the situation before it got out of hand, in charge, as it was to a substantial degree, of Japanese military extremists.

Referring to Indochina, I said that if the Japanese established themselves there in adequate numbers, which they seemed to be doing, they not only had a base for operations against China but they would be a distinct menace to the whole South Sea area. When we saw what this signified in extra danger, naturally we explored every kind of way to avoid that sort of menace and threat.

I said that we had had the benefit of every kind of view. Some charged us with appeasement, others with having let other countries down. All the time we had been working at just the opposite. All these various views were made in good faith and no fault attached to the proponents thereof. [1158] This was just a condition which was not without its benefits.

We had exhausted all of our efforts to work out phases of this matter with the Japanese. Our efforts had been put forth to facilitate the making of a general agreement. We wanted to facilitate the conversations and keep them from breaking down but at all times keeping thoroughly alive the basic principles that we had been proclaiming and practicing during all those years.

On November 26, I continued, I found there had been so much confusion and so many collateral matters brought in along with high Japanese officials in Tokyo proclaiming their old doctrines of force, that I thought it important to bring the situation to a clear perspective. So I had recounted and restated the fundamental principles and undertook to make application of them to a number of specific conditions such as would logically go into a broad basic peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

There had been every kind of suggestion made as we had gone along in the conversations. I said that I had considered everything in the way of suggestions from the point of view whether it would facilitate, keep alive, and if possible carry forward conversations looking toward a general agreement, all the while naturally preserving the fullest integrity of every principle for which we stood. I had sought to examine [1159] everything possible but always to omit consideration of any proposal that would contemplate the stoppage of the conversations and search for a general agreement for peace.

To a correspondent’s question whether I expected the Japanese to come back and talk further on the basis of what I gave them on No-
vember 26, I said that I did not know but, as I had indicated, the Japanese might not do that. I referred to the military movements which they were making and said I thought the correspondents would want to see whether the Japanese had any idea of renewing the conversations.

In reply to a further question whether in order to conform to the basic principles of our Government's policy it would be necessary for the Japanese to withdraw the troops they were sending to the southward, I said, "Yes." In reply to another question as to whether it would not mean withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Indochina, I said that of course our program announced in 1937 covered all that. The question of getting the troops out of China had been a bone of contention.

In reply to a question whether the assumption was correct that there was not much hope that the Japanese would accept our principles and go far enough to afford a basis for continuing the conversations, I said that there was always a possibility but that I would not say how much probability there might be.

In reply to a question whether the Japanese had proved adamant on the question of withdrawing from the Axis, I replied that they were still in it.

In reply to a question whether the situation took action rather than words from the Japanese, I said this was unquestionably so, but it took words first to reach some kind of an understanding that would lead to action.

In reply to a question how the Japanese explained these military movements to the south, I replied that they did not explain.

On November 28, at a meeting of the War Council, I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the Japanese, and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. I emphasized that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. With due deference I expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination.

On November 29 I expressed substantially the same views to the British Ambassador.

I said the same things all during those days to many of my contacts.

On November 25 the American Consul at Hanoi, Indochina, had communicated to the Department a report that the Japanese intended to launch an attack on the Kra Peninsula about December 1, and he reported also further landings of troops and military equipment in Indochina in addition to landings he had previously reported from time to time. On November 26 the American consul at Saigon had reported the arrival of heavy Japanese reinforcements in Southern Indochina, supplementing arrivals he had reported earlier that month. On November 29 the Department of State instructed its posts in southeast Asia to telegraph information of military or naval movements directly to Manila for the Commander in Chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet.
On November 30, I was informed by the British Ambassador that the British Government had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam—and that this attack would include a sea-borne expedition to seize strategic points in the Kra Isthmus.

In a message from Premier Tojo to a public rally on November 30 under the sponsorship of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the "Great Japan East Asia League" he stated among other things that—

The fact that Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by putting (pitting?) the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the United States.

For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance.

[1163] On that day, Sunday, November 30, after conferring with our military regarding the Japanese Prime Minister’s bellicose statement and the increasing gravity of the Far Eastern situation, I telephoned the President at Warm Springs and advised him to advance the date of his return to Washington. Accordingly, the President returned to Washington on December 1.

On December 2 the President directed that inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in regard to the reasons for continued Japanese troop movements into Indochina.

On December 3 I reviewed in press conference certain of the points covered by me on November 27. I said that we had not reached any more advanced stage of determining questions either in a preliminary or other way than we had in November.

On December 5 the Japanese Ambassador called and presented a reply to the President’s inquiry of December 2, containing the specific statement that Japanese reinforcements had been sent to Indochina as a precautionary measure against Chinese troops in bordering Chinese territory.

On December 6 our Government received from a number of sources reports of the movement of a Japanese fleet of 35 transports, 8 cruisers, and 20 destroyers from Indochina toward the Kra Peninsula. This was confirmation that the long-threatened Japanese movement of expansion by force to the south was under way. The critical character of this development, which placed the United States and its friends in common imminent danger, was very much in all our minds, and was an important subject of my conference with representatives of the Army and Navy on that and the following day.

On December 6, President Roosevelt telegraphed a personal appeal to the Emperor of Japan that the "tragic possibilities" in the situation be averted.

On December 7, the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.

Throughout the critical years culminating in Pearl Harbor and especially during the last months, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and the heads of our armed services kept in constant touch with each other. There was the freest interchange of information and views. It was customary for us to pick up the telephone and for the caller to ask one of the others whether he had anything new of significance on the situation and to
communicate whatever the caller may have had that was new. These exchanges of information and views were in addition to those which took place at Cabinet meetings and at meetings during the fall of 1941 of the War Council, and in numerous other conversations.

[1165] As illustrative of the contacts which I had with officers of the War and Navy Departments during the especially critical period from November 20, to December 7, 1941, I attach a record of the occasions when I talked with such representatives as compiled from the daily engagement books kept by my office (Annex A). That record may, of course, not be complete.

In addition, I attach a statement of the record of the occasions on which I talked with representatives of the War and Navy Departments from October 1940 to December 7, 1941 (Annex B).

I attach also a statement in regard to the arrangements for contacts during the years 1940 and 1941 between the State Department and the War and Navy Departments (Annex C).

In the foregoing I have endeavored to give a simple narrative and analysis of what happened in this country’s relations with Japan, especially as they bear upon the inquiry of this Joint Committee. If I can throw light on any aspect of our relations not covered in this statement, I shall be glad to do so.

**Annex A**

[1166]

**Record of the Secretary of State’s Conferences, Consultations and Telephone conversations (as entered in engagement books) with Representatives of the War and Navy Departments, November 20 to December 7, 1941**


November 24: 12:15 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

12:50 p. m., Captain Schuirmann.

3:30 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Knox.

3:30 p. m., General Marshall, Admiral Stark.

November 25: 9:30 a. m., Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox.

12:00 noon, Meeting at White House with President, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox. General Marshall, Admiral Stark.

4:30 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

November 26:

9:20 a. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

9:50 a. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

1:20 p. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark.

November 27:

11:05 a. m., Telephone call to Secretary Stimson.

4:00 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

5:10 p. m., Telephone call to Captain Schuirmann.

November 28:

12:00 noon, Meeting at White House with President, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, General Marshall, Admiral Stark.

3:20 p. m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.

4:40 p. m., Telephone call from Admiral Stark.

November 30:

10:30 a. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark.

12:08 p. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark.

[1168] December 1:

12:00 noon, Admiral Stark at White House.

December 3:

4:45 p. m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark.
December 6:
10:45 a.m., Telephone call from Secretary Knox.
11:50 a.m. Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.
1:00 p.m., Telephone call from Secretary Stimson.
1:15 p.m., Telephone call from Admiral Stark.
1:50 p.m., Captain Schuirmann.
5:15 p.m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark.
8:45 p.m., Telephone call to Secretary Knox.

December 7:
10:30 a.m., Telephone call to Admiral Stark.
1:00 a.m., Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox.
1:15 p.m., Telephone call from Admiral Stark.
1:50 p.m., Captain Schuirmann.

[1169] Witness HULL

ANNEX B

Record of the Secretary of State's Conversations in the State Department with Representatives of the War and Navy Departments. October 1940—December 7, 1941.

With Secretaries Stimson and Knox:
October 18, 1940.
October 23, 1940.
October 30, 1940.
November 12, 1940.
November 29, 1940.
December 3, 1940.
December 13, 1940: Attended also by Admiral Stark, Captain Deyo, General Marshall.
December 23, 1940: Attended also by Secretary Morgenthau, Senator Byrnes, Admiral Spear, Colonel Maxwell, Mr. Philip Young, Admiral Stark, General Marshall, Major Timberlake.
January 7, 1941.
January 14, 1941: Attended also by Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. Foley.
January 23, 1941.
January 28, 1941.

February 14, 1941.
March 31, 1941.
April 8, 1941.
April 10, 1941: Attended also by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Secretary Morgenthau and Admiral Stark.
April 22, 1941.
April 29, 1941.
May 5, 1941.
May 13, 1941.
May 20, 1941.
May 27, 1941.
June 3, 1941.
August 12, 1941.
August 19, 1941.
August 29, 1941.
September 30, 1941: Attended also by General Marshall, Admiral Stark.
November 25, 1941.
December 7, 1941.

[1171] With Secretary Stimson:
October 14, 1940.
November 1, 1940.
December 3, 1940: Lunch.
March 4, 1941: Attended also by Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. Foley, Mr. Forrestal and Mr. Harold Smith.
May 9, 1941.
August 8, 1941.
October 6, 1941.
October 28, 1941.
December 10, 1941.
With Secretary Knox:
November 4, 1941.
November 10, 1941.

With other Army and Navy Officials:
November 5, 1940: Admiral Stark, Admiral Greenslade, Captain Schuirmann.
November 6, 1940: Admiral Stark.
November 9, 1940: Captain Schuirmann.
November 27, 1940: Admiral Stark.
December 2, 1940: Captain Schuirmann.
December 5, 1940: Captain Schuirmann.
December 31, 1940: Captain Schuirmann.
January 2, 1941: Captain Kirk.
January 3, 1941: General Marshall, Admiral Stark.
January 9, 1941: Colonel Bratton, Admiral Anderson, General Miles and Commander Cramer.
April 11, 1941: Colonel Betts.
April 12, 1941: Colonel Betts.
April 16, 1941: Colonel Betts.
April 17, 1941: Colonel Betts.
April 17, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
April 18, 1941: Colonel Mason.
April 26, 1941: Colonel Betts.
May 1, 1941: Admiral Stark.
May 2, 1941: General Arnold.
May 7, 1941: General Marshall.
May 9, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
May 13, 1941: General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
May 15, 1941: Admiral Stark.
May 21, 1941: Commander Peal (Naval Attaché Berlin).
August 9, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
August 21, 1941: General Miles, Major Hansen, Captain Schuirmann.
August 23, 1941: Colonel Bratton.
September 4, 1941: Admiral Stark.
October 4, 1941: General Embick.
October 14, 1941: Admiral Turner.
October 17, 1941: Colonel Bratton and Major Smett.
October 27, 1941: General Miles, Captain Schuirmann.
October 30, 1941: Admiral Stark.
November 1, 1941: Captain Schuirmann and Commander McCollum.
November 4, 1941: General Marshall, Admiral Ingersoll.
November 8, 1941: General Miles.
November 19, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
November 19, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
November 21, 1941: Admiral Stark, General Gerow.
November 24, 1941: General Marshall, Admiral Stark.
December 24, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
December 6, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.
December 12, 1941: Captain Schuirmann.

[1174]

Annex C

Arrangements for Contacts Between the Department of State and War and Navy Departments in 1940 and 1941.

During the years 1940 and 1941 there were maintained arrangements for contacts between the Department of State and the War and Navy Departments as follows:

(a) The regularly constituted Liaison Committee which began to function in April, 1938, and which consisted of the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations. That Committee customarily met at
weekly intervals. The meetings of the Liaison Committee were for the purpose of taking up matters of mutual interest to the three Departments and for the interchange of views and information.

(b) The Liaison Office which was established in the Department of State in 1939 and which was responsible under the Under Secretary of State for the regular channeling and expeditious transmission of pertinent information to the War and Navy Departments. The information thus transmitted, in addition to that having an obviously military and naval character, included basic related political and economic information needed for use in the preparation of estimates of the military and naval situation.

(c) Arrangements which the political and functional divisions of the Department had for direct communication with representatives of the War and Navy Departments under which information of pertinent interest received by the Department of State from its representatives abroad was made available to the War and Navy Departments. Conversely, the War and Navy Departments kept the Department of State informed of data of interest.

(d) Other conferences and conversations at frequent intervals between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy as well as other representatives of the War and Navy Departments, including the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. These conferences sought a full interchange of information and views relative to critical situations all over the world, including—of course—developments in the Pacific area. At those conferences the Secretary of State was given the benefit of the knowledge which representatives of the War and Navy Departments possessed of military factors involved in the world situation and the Secretary in turn took up the political factors in the world situation of which he had special knowledge. These conferences became increasingly frequent, as the world situation became more critical, especially during the final stages of the conversations with the Japanese representatives.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, we will adjourn at this time and reconvene at 2 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m., of the same day.)

[1177] AFTERTNOON SESSION—2 P.M.

TESTIMONY OF CORDELL HULL, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

(Resumed)

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, your statement was completed before the recess, including the exhibits which were attached to it, so that you are now free to be examined by members of the committee in any way they see fit.

Mr. Gesell. Counsel first.

The Chairman. Yes, counsel first; I beg the counsel's pardon. The counsel will proceed.

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Hull, can you, as best you now recall it, fix the approximate time when you concluded that the possibility of solving the Japanese matter through diplomatic negotiations was most improbable and that it was likely Japan, with or without a declaration of war, would strike at the United States, or its possessions in the Pacific?

Mr. Hull. I might say by way of preface that we had been in conversation, through the late spring and summer and early fall, with the Japanese—that we maintain the basic principles that we started out with and the Japanese maintain the basic policies they started out with.

There was some camouflage by them at times of some of their policies, but it was manifest, after long months of close-in con-
conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, and taken in connection with information we were receiving from, among other sources, including our own Ambassador, Consuls, interceptions, and so forth. It was reasonably clear to me that they had no idea of yielding their policies, which were policies of conquest and aggression by force, and enslavement of the conquered peoples wherever they went.

It was manifest that they were not going to depart from that and, we knew that we were not going to depart from our basic policies, which were the policies prevalent among civilized and peaceful nations.

I will refer to that later, perhaps, and I am not sure that I should do it at this moment, except to refer to them as the policies of peace and law and order, and justice, and equality, and peaceful settlement of controversies.

Mr. Gesell. Well, was it clear——

Mr. Hull. Now, during those early days in October, it looked more and more like they were prepared to, and were intending to, adhere to their policies. I take it you do not want me to cite any instances indicative of that attitude. But the situation floated along until Tojo's government came into power, about the 16th, I think, of October, the 15th [1179] or 16th, and the Konoe government fell.

While they started out with a professed disposition to keep up the conversations, we could detect circumstances and facts indicative of duplicity and double dealing, and the real purpose was to go forward more energetically with their plans, as was indicated by numerous demands on us to make haste, and statements that this matter could not go on without something serious happening.

We were moving in those days on with the so-called temporary proposal of the Japanese, on November 20.

Mr. Gesell. So that by November 20, the gradual process that you just outlined, it had become apparent to you and those with whom you were conferring in Government that the Japanese really had no bona fide intention of settling the matters under discussion in a peaceful, diplomatic manner?

Mr. Hull. The impression we received, at least myself, and some others, was that during those months they tried to prevail on this Government by persuasion and threats and other methods, to yield its basic principles, so that Japan could maintain intact her policy and her continued course of aggression and conquest.

Mr. Gesell. Well, did you tell the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and the President, as these negotiations proceeded, your conclusions as to whether or [1180] not there was any chance of their being successful?

Mr. Hull. It seemed to me that we were all very much like a family. We were seeing, talking among and with each other, making things known to each other in one way or another most of the time, and we made it a point to make known to each other whatever the other person might think of things that would be desirable to communicate.

So at all times, I think it is accurate to say that each of us in the State House have always tried to impart to the other, and with reasonable diligence, anything new that we learned that would be of interest.
Mr. Gesell. I not only refer to anything new you might learn, but also the conclusions that you might have reached from the diplomatic side.

Mr. Hull. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. As to the status of the negotiations, and the likelihood of their success?

Mr. Hull. Well, after Mr. Kurusu—I might say when he reached here about the 15th or 16th of November, I had different talks with him in conjunction with the Ambassador and he had nothing new to talk about. He had no new ideas, no new information. He was simply pleading that we must agree on the diplomatic side of this, or something awful would happen. About the first words he said to me were that [1181] the Pacific Ocean was like a powder keg. Then, he went on and pretty soon made the statement that Japan had reached the explosive stage, so we were given the benefit of all such views.

On the 20th, they came in and handed me a proposal that they well knew was an utterly impossible proposal for us, in the light of our 4 or 5 years' explorations of each other's situations, and attitudes.

The next morning, Kurusu came to my apartment in the hotel and was talking about the Tripartite Agreement, endeavoring to minimize that, and I suddenly inquired of him if his government had anything more to offer on the general peace situation, and he quickly said, "No."

So there we had nailed down what he said was the last proposal, and what their interceptions had informed us was very final in the matter.

Mr. Gesell. That was the proposal that you knew that, in the light of the principles which the United States Government had announced, would not be accepted, was it not?

Mr. Hull. It was utterly incompatible with them.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, during this period—you have referred to the various sources of information you had—am I correct in the belief that the most reliable source of information, or the one upon which you placed the greatest [1182] foundation, was the Japanese intercepted messages?

Mr. Hull. I looked on them as I would a witness who is giving evidence against his own side of the case.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, you were in a position during this time, in effect, through these intercepts, to know what they were saying between themselves, were you not?

[1183] Mr. Hull. We knew something of that. It confirmed our course and our questions and our arguments about the situation, the true situation.

Mr. Gesell. I gather from what you say that you saw the intercepts regularly as they were translated?

Mr. Hull. I understood that they were to come to my office, among other places, from the Navy and War Departments. I had, in particular, one secretary who was exceedingly well-informed on all these things, and he would receive interceptions of messages, from the War or Navy Department, and if they contained anything of importance he brought them in to me at once. I looked at it and handed it right back to him because we were following the policy of the War and
Navy Department to the effect that it was all-important that information about the interceptions should not get back to the Japanese.

Mr. Gesell. You had no reason during his time, did you, to feel that the Japanese knew we were intercepting the messages?

Mr. Hull. None whatever.

Mr. Gesell. Now, is it your understanding, Mr. Hull, that you saw all the messages, or only those that had a diplomatic significance?

Mr. Hull. Mainly, so far as I know, it was messages within my sphere of duties, and others, that were not important to me, or to what I was dealing with, were passed on to the Far Eastern Division.

Mr. Gesell. But the State Department, one way or another, saw all of them, is your understanding, that were distributed?

Mr. Hull. I wouldn't say that we saw all of them. I couldn't say that. Sometimes it would require a little time to decode them and get them to us. We would be late, sometimes, in getting them. But apparently that was unavoidable. There may be, and I am satisfied that there was, a number scattered through this entire list that we didn't see at all.

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember at this time whether or not you saw intercepted messages that were really of a nondiplomatic nature, concerned with the ship movements in and out of Pearl Harbor, and the military installations at Pearl Harbor, reconnaissance being conducted, and other matters of what we might call a military espionage nature?

Mr. Hull. My impression now is that I was aware of the circulation, but I myself didn't give them any attention, any real attention, so far as I recall.

Mr. Gesell. These all came to you from the Army and Navy, did they not?

Mr. Hull. They would have come from there.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, during this period, in fact, at any time during this period, did you ever receive any information or any reports or any rumors to the effect that Japan was contemplating a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Hull. I never heard Pearl Harbor mentioned during the later months by anyone.

The Chairman. May I suggest to the Secretary, that if you move the microphone a little closer, you can be more easily heard with less exertion.

Mr. Hull. Pardon me.

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember Mr. Grew's dispatch of January concerning the rumor that there was to be an attack on Pearl Harbor which was transmitted by the State Department to the Navy Department?

Mr. Hull. I remember his telegrams in the fore part of January and later telegrams. I overlooked whatever there was in reference to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Gesell. During the latter period that you have referred to, I understood you to say that you had no information.

Mr. Hull. That was January of 1941?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Mr. Hull. Oh, yes. I was familiar with that. I misunderstood. I had November on my mind for some strange reason. I was entirely familiar with the one in January.
Mr. Gesell. Now, other than that do you recall any information that came to you in writing or orally from people in our own Government or from representatives of foreign governments or from the President or any source that was to the effect that the Japanese were planning or considering or were likely to make an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Hull. I saw nothing that came in during that period, the correspondence which I later saw, or knew of, between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, which took place in January 1941, that is all I know of, that and the Grew telegram.

Mr. Gesell. You mean the letters of Secretary Knox and Stimson concerning preparations against an attack?

Mr. Hull. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Well now, you have stated in your statement that was read today that beginning around the latter part of November you were remarking to all your contacts that it was quite likely that the Japanese would strike and strike with boldness and daring in any direction, and we introduced here this morning a memorandum of your conference with Mr. Halifax in which you referred to that subject.

I take it then from what you say that while you were considering and had in mind the possibility of some sort of a surprise action, you at no time had in your mind the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Hull. You may, or may not, recall that for some time we were receiving messages, constantly, almost, about the Japanese movements of men and ships and fleets bound to the lower end of Indochina. We knew that was the jumping-off place for an attack on the south—well, toward Singapore, Burma, Thailand, the Philippines, and other areas, and we were watching that pretty closely, very closely as the days passed by.

So I just, myself, I didn't think anything either way about other places in the Pacific that might be attacked, including Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Gesell. Well now, do you recall—

Mr. Hull. Pardon me. Of course, I was in the diplomatic branch of the service.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall, Mr. Hull, that on November 27 a warning message was sent to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, at San Francisco and at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, and to other points, signed by General Marshall, which was apparently sent for the purpose of putting the armed forces at those points on notice of the possibility of some hostilities, do you recall that such messages were sent?

Mr. Hull. I think I do.

Mr. Gesell. Secretary Stimson testified before the Army Board that in connection with that message, which he partici-pated in drafting, he had some conversations with you at the time. Do you recall any conversation with him?

Mr. Hull. I never sat in on the drafting of Army and Navy instructions to their field forces. Sometimes they would call me over the telephone about some particular thing.

Mr. Gesell. Secretary Stimson states just that.

Mr. Hull. He probably called me; if he says he did I am sure he did.
Mr. Gesell. The phrases in the message reading as follows, which he discussed with you on the telephone, I wonder if you recall. The message at the outset reads:

Negotiations with Japan appear to have terminated to all practical purposes with only the rarest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

Mr. Hull. That first sentence, first line or two there is about the language I was using in talking to high officials during those last days about the situation.

Mr. Gesell. Was the question of sending a warning message to the various theaters in the Pacific, to your recollection, ever discussed at any of the meetings with the President at the White House?

Mr. Hull. I don’t recall it. As I say, I didn’t participate in the purely military phases, except as sort of an outsider, and more or less as a layman. That was given attention by the Army and the Navy heads and the President.

For that reason I didn’t sit in on the drafting of their orders, which would have contemplated, perhaps, previous conferences. I don’t recall having any conferences on those particular orders.

We did always, at these meetings, report to each other everything we knew in our respective lines of activities and sometimes we discussed numbers of questions that were presented.

Mr. Gesell. Well now, at about this time Secretary Stimson reports that there was a meeting at the White House, on the 25th of November, at which you and Secretary Knox and himself were present, and General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

He says there:

The President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, as soon as, perhaps, next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem.

Do you remember any conferences at that time or at about that time with the War Council as to what should be done about the general problem?

Mr. Hull. The main point I was making during those and subsequent days was the very great improbability that Japan would seriously continue to participate in any conversations. We had learned through the intercepts not only that they had determined on their ultimatum but that they had ordered that conversations cease on the 25th, and then finally they worried me almost sick after the 20th about getting a quick reply.

I couldn’t get them, couldn’t prevail on them to give me the reason that was rushing them off their feet. I finally said, “Well, I can’t make any reply before”—I think it was—“the 26th”—I am not sure but it went beyond the time they wanted me to make it, and I said, “If you can’t get on with that situation that confronts me, why, you will have to do the best you can.”

I don’t recall except they acquiesced in that.

Then, as I say, I felt that first we should keep up these conversations to the last split second, going on and ignoring their ultimatums, ignoring anything that went on, so long as we kept a consistent record, showing an earnest desire for peace and an earnest desire to
prevail on Japan finally, by some remote speculative possibility, to change her mind, and also automatically, as well as very desirable, to secure some more time.

For some time, really during much of the summer, whenever [1191] I met any of our head military men or high British or Australian or Dutch officials, they would refer to this very great need, each of them had, for more time to prepare for defense.

We proceeded then in an atmosphere of practically grabbing at straws, putting up a development, propositions that we would hope to put up to Japan, and force her to expose her duplicity, that we had overtaken so often.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now——

Mr. Hull. If you will pardon me, I left this out a while ago.

So we hoped, I hoped that we could, by constant pressure, that if by any hook or crook it should prove possible for the Japanese to decide that they would be willing to wait a month or two it would be a fine thing for us, and I earnestly hoped we could get through with these different arrangements, but when we reached this War College meeting that you talk about, on the 25th, there wasn’t much discussion, except the various phases, including my statement that it would be a mistake to assume that this thing is going on. I said, "The Japanese are heavily armed; they have been on this movement for a number of years, this movement of conquest, yoked hard and fast with Hitler most of the time."

And then I said—if I can recall what I wanted to say, [1192] what I wanted to get in here—at any rate I said it will not do to trust any phase of that situation because they are in control of this whole movement; we are not in control of it. We can only effect that movement of the Japanese armies of invasion by surrendering to them the principles for which peace-loving nations, including ourselves, stand.

[1193] Mr. Gesell. Well, now, was there anyone at that meeting who advocated a withdrawal from the principles which we had been taking in the negotiations?

Mr. Hull. That never was done, so far as I know, by any high American official in the State, War, Navy, or the White House.

Mr. Gesell. When you say it was not done you mean it was not urged upon you by anyone?

Mr. Hull. It was not.

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember the President making a statement which I quoted from Mr. Stimson’s diary, to the effect that at that meeting on the 25th he mentioned that there was a likelihood that we might be attacked as soon as next Monday?

Mr. Hull. I do not recall definitely except that there was nothing new, really, if he said that because I was talking along those lines during those strenuous days after we got their ultimatum and other information about their purposes.

Mr. Gesell. Yes. Would it be fair to say that that view was the prevailing view among the Cabinet officers and military officers who attended the meetings at the White House of this war council group at this time?

Mr. Hull. Well, only the Army and the Navy Cabinet [1194] heads attended it.
Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Mr. Hull. So far as those Cabinet heads were concerned, I do not know really the precise state of mind they were in but I received the definite impression that they felt that the outlook was critical and called for the closest attention.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, you have reviewed in your statement some of the meetings at this time and I do not want to go over it except I wanted to ask you about one specific meeting before taking up the note on the 26th with you in some detail, and that was a Cabinet meeting which the records of the White House indicate was held on December 5th, at which you lunched with the President prior to the Cabinet meeting.

Do you recall any discussion that took place at that meeting or with the President at that luncheon concerning the problems we are concerned with here?

Mr. Hull. I might refresh my recollection in some way, somehow, but I do not remember just at the moment.

You will understand that in justice to the Army and Navy, I informed them when I felt that diplomatic efforts to deal with the situation had ended, that the security and safety of the country was then in the hands of the Army and the Navy, so I did not have so awfully much to talk about, in fact, concerning the difficulties that the Army and Navy were then dealing with, but I was frank to express any comment that I thought would be helpful.

Mr. Gesell. Now, in that connection, do you recall discussing with representatives of the Army and Navy the question of whether or not you should abandon consideration of the proposed modus vivendi before it was done?

Mr. Hull. As happened now and then in the State Department, when we would run into some terrific problem that called for affirmative action at once we would prepare different trial drafts on the subject by different persons who had jurisdiction down in the Department and we would thresh out those questions in the most vehement manner sometimes.

We did that in connection with our plan to the effect that we would keep up the conversations. We would not refuse to answer their ultimatum of November 20th; we would not take any action that would deviate from our fixed policy of driving along, hit or miss, in the hope that somewhere even then that something might develop suddenly and out of the sky. So we went along in that fashion. And your question now relates to—

Mr. Gesell. My question is whether before it was definitely decided that you would not attempt the modus vivendi you discussed that specific decision with the Army and Navy?

Mr. Hull. Yes. Pardon me, I was trying to bring out another thread or two of this thing.

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Mr. Hull. We discussed, I think elaborately, with the heads of the Army and the Navy up to and ending on the 25th. We had not decided that it would not be feasible to present it to the Japanese until perhaps the afternoon of the 25th, as I remember it, refreshing my mind as best I can from documents and other things. So we knew that the Army and Navy people were fairly familiar with it.
They should have been because we sought to talk with them at any and all times that they might be interested in talking and to keep them informed.

Mr. Gesell. I think it is clear from the documents and from what you have said that the Army and Navy knew what you were considering.

Mr. Hull. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. And you consulted them.

Mr. Hull. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Now, I wondered, however, whether you recall specifically taking up with them the question of whether or not as a governmental matter it would be advantageous or disadvantageous to deliver the modus vivendi to the Japanese?

[1197] Mr. Hull. As I say, we talked about the different phases of it right along and near the last we ran into so many terrific difficulties that those of us who were striving most actively to put this up to the Japanese and let them turn it down, as we thought the chances largely were that they would, it would clear the atmosphere and clarify to the public both here and in Japan some of the confusion that had arisen.

I do not recall that we had conferences with the Army and Navy after we discussed that, I and my associates in the State Department and whoever we talked to, I do not recall that we had any further conferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to the effect that it was possible to know.

One reason, perhaps, was that Secretary Stimson, I think, expressed himself readily to the effect that the Japanese would not accept this because it was too drastic.

Mr. Gesell. That I gather was generally the view as to the modus vivendi at that time.

Mr. Hull. Yes. Now, as to Admiral Stark, at that last stage I do not recall what he was thinking or saying.

Mr. Gesell. We introduced in evidence the memorandum from you to President Roosevelt recommending that the ten-point note be handed to the Japanese and that the modus [1198] vivendi not be handed to the Japanese.

Mr. Hull. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. I was wondering whether you had any discussions with him on that subject or whether he acted on your memorandum without a conference. Do you recall on that point?

Mr. Hull. I was talking with him almost constantly on different phases of this highly acute situation and I do not remember whether I talked in any detail with him on this phase but the nature of my memorandum would indicate that I had talked with him.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, one other question with reference to this policy. You refer to the delay, the need for delay that you felt in talking to our officials and to the officials of other governments so that steps could be taken for military preparations. Do you remember whether during this period you had any particular time limit in mind for which you were seeking to stretch the negotiations out to?

Mr. Hull. We were just trying our best, as we had been for weeks and really months. I felt that the Japs, as I say, were over here for the single purpose of inducing us to surrender our policies and principles and let her policy of war and conquest and so on continue intact.
I still think [1199] that that was their business over here. At the moment I am not sure whether I understood fully your question.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, I would like to ask you one other question which relates to a somewhat different subject.

Mr. Hull. Maybe I did not answer all of this question. If I did not, I wish you would repeat it.

Mr. Gesell. Well, I wanted to know whether there was any time limit—

Mr. Hull. Oh, yes. Pardon me.

Mr. Gesell (continuing). For which you had been seeking to extend the negotiations too?

Mr. Hull. No. We were doing our best to keep this going for at least three reasons. One was our interest in peace. Another was to save time for our Army and Navy—

The Chairman. The Chair would like to suggest to counsel and to the Secretary that under our arrangement we agreed not to question the Secretary more than 45 minutes at a time, but that is subject to the Secretary’s desire if he is not growing tired.

Mr. Gesell. I think I can probably in about 10 minutes cover the principal points that remain, if you feel that it is all right, Secretary Hull.

Mr. Hull. It is perfectly all right, Mr. Chairman, to [1200] run on for another 15 minutes, as far as I know.

The Chairman. All right, we will go ahead.

Mr. Hull. So the Army was speaking about certain preparations that it hoped to complete by the 5th or 8th of December. The Navy had some other date still further. In the memorandum by the President the word “6 months” was written up at the top of it in longhand. He probably felt that if by any hook or crook the Japs should decide, on account of conditions in which they were interested, to keep this matter running along a few days or a few weeks, he would like to put in 6 months. Now, that is not a fact that I am undertaking to state.

Mr. Gesell. We have that memorandum.

Mr. Hull. Yes. It is all in there.

Mr. Gesell. We have that memorandum with the “6 months” note handwritten on the top.

Mr. Hull. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Now, there are only one or two other subjects, Mr. Hull. They are not related to the modus vivendi discussions.

The first question is this: Do you know of any arrangement or agreement or understanding made by President Roosevelt or any other official of the United States Government prior to December 7 to the effect that in the event Great [1201] Britain or the Dutch or any other of the ABCD powers was attacked in the Pacific by the Japanese this country would go to war against the Japanese without its being attacked?

Mr. Hull. I never heard of anything except, as the danger became more imminent, there was a conference among the staff people, first I think over at Singapore and then more or less discussion among the heads of the Army and the Navy.

As to what the President said to them I do not know but, at any rate, I understood what took place to be that with Japan on the tip
end, with all of its armies and navy and air forces marshalled for a
general movement in Indo-China, that this was the jumping off place
and they were poised just like a diver on the end of a plank before
the plunge. There they were, and we received and were receiving
messages at all hours.

Finally, the latest message we received was that they were actually
moving, sailing, a bunch of, I think, about 8 cruisers, 20 destroyers,
and 35 transports, sailing from Indochina straight across the Bay of
Siam toward the—what is that "K" Peninsula?

Mr. Gesell. Kra Peninsula.

Mr. Hull. Kra is the specific pronunciation.

At any rate, those were the things that greater us and I think it was
about that time that our Army and Navy officials [1202] got up
these statements, especially the one on the 27th of November.

Mr. Gesell. Yes. Now, that one has been introduced and we are
going to, of course, go into the events concerning the Singapore con-
ferences, but I was really directing my questions to events before that
time, at the Atlantic Charter conference meeting or any other meet-
ing before that time, whether you got any intimation or any state-
ment from the President or Mr. Welles or anyone else to the effect
that we had made such a commitment with Great Britain or any other
nation?

Mr. Hull. No, I did not. I only knew what was contained in the
order of November 5 by Admiral Stark and the other of November
27.

Mr. Gesell. Both of which we introduced this morning.

Mr. Hull. That we might render some military course by this
Government in case the danger reached that stage, that they would
be derelict to their duty unless they had some plan to recommend
to their government and that is as far as it got so far as I know.

Mr. Gesell. With respect to the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor,
Admiral Richardson has testified to conversations that he had with
you and has indicated that he felt the State Department was exercising
some influence over the disposition of the fleet and I wanted to ask
whether you had any [1203] information you could give us on
that question.

Mr. Hull. May I introduce that with what I said almost in my
statement, in my written statement? I said soon after I came to the
State Department, when I would be talking with the representatives of
these thugs at the head of governments abroad, a government of ag-
gression, that they would look at me in the face but I soon discovered
that they were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our Army
and that our diplomatic strength in dealing with governments that
were not very honest, that were more or less dangerous, that have ul-
terior purposes, the first thing they throw their ayes on is not you or me
or any other official—it is on our Army and Navy.

Now, diplomatic strength goes up or down with their estimate of
what that amounts to. It does not mean that they expect to rush in
to fight, perhaps, but it is like a desperado who goes around in a suspi-
cious place and he sees somebody who is armed and he is just a little
bit more cautious in exploring his plans to explode a safe or commit
some other crime than he would be if there was no remote possibility of
danger.
That was the feeling that I absorbed during my 10 or 12 years over there as we moved through the awful conditions that finally led into the war.

Now, I do not think our people have time and perhaps the opportunity in this of terrifically critical periods to grasp the full facts and factors that are involved. They did not stop to think.

Some person said, "Why, we were trying to bluff the Japanese?"

Well, if he was going into that why didn't he say we were trying to bluff Hitler and Tojo, because they were hooked together by links of steel in their plans. Why leave them out if you are going to take up that sort of a thing?

Now, the truth is, I have always said from my experience with them that a bandit government headed by such unmentionable persons as Hitler and Tojo, that such a government recognizes nothing, nobody, unless there is something translated into force, something it is able to rest its attention on. So I said the world is in a state of anarchy.

Here are two great nations in the East and the West, leading millions of people on armed to the teeth and using them to alter the peace. They are killing and massacring and robbing and conquering with all the methods of a savage. So just to illustrate, if I may, I happen to think of this:

When the Tripartite agreement was entered into between the Japanese and the Germans in September 1940 the average citizen in this country or any ordinary person with a grasp of intelligence could not begin to know all of the ramifications and the factor and the facts that were related to this transaction. He just thought that they had agreed to fight [1205] off each other. He did not know what they agreed to by any means. So I notice here a statement, a communication by the Foreign Minister to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington and if you will pardon me, it is two or three lines.

Mr. Gesell. Would you like me to read it for you from the exhibits?

Mr. Hull. All right. It is section 2 there.

Mr. Gesell. All right. This is from Exhibit 1, section 2, message to Washington from Tokyo dated October 8, 1941, translated October 8, 1941, on page 57 of the exhibit (reading):

When we conclude the Three Power Pact, we hoped while maintaining amicable relations with America, and to tell the truth throughout this very means, to conclude the China trouble.

Mr. Hull. That is two points.

Mr. Gesell (reading):

To win the Soviet over to the Japanese-German-Italian camp.

Mr. Hull. Three.

Mr. Gesell (reading):

To have Germany use her good offices between Tokyo and Moscow (Stahmer)——

Mr. Hull. Four.

[1206] Mr. Gesell (reading):

(Stahmer said that Germany would be an honest go-between and would be sure to bring about the solution of our troubles with the Kremlin and OTT sent us a letter to the effect that he himself was going to work for an understanding between Japan and the Soviet).
Mr. Hull. Five.
Mr. Gesell (reading):

To guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy who, in turn, were to give us mechanical and technical assistance. But since then——

Mr. Hull. Six.
Mr. Gesell (reading):

But since then times have changed and unexpected events have taken place. All that remains unchanged is Japanese-American relations and that is about the only thing that could be patched up.

Mr. Hull. I just intruded to bring that out, to show the interminable factors that are and were in the international situation.

Mr. Gesell. Well, Mr. Hull, we very much appreciate your coming.

Mr. Hull. May I add one sentence?

Mr. Gesell. Certainly.

[1207] Mr. Hull. I felt myself that any country that showed too much weakness in the face of these desperadoes and their armies would be much more likely to get into trouble and get all of us into trouble than if we maintained in our case a firm, a reasonably firm policy. I do not think I ever used the word "strong" policy unless I did it unintentionally. I always stood for what I called a firm policy and I do not know whether you asked me—no, you did not ask me about Hornbeck.

Mr. Gesell. No. I thought perhaps I would do so at some other time.

The Chairman. The Chair thanks the Secretary. He has now been on the stand for an hour and the Chair would like to inquire when it would be convenient for the Secretary to come back?

Mr. Gesell. We will arrange that.

The Chairman. You will arrange that?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

The Chairman. You arrange then with counsel, Mr. Secretary, when you should reappear.

Mr. Hull. Oh, I shall be glad to come here in the morning, attend the morning session.

The Chairman. Tomorrow morning?

Mr. Hull. Yes.

[1208] The Chairman. That is agreeable with the committee.

Mr. Gesell. We might see how our schedule runs and get in touch with Mr. Hull at the close of today's session or possibly get in touch with Mr. Hull Saturday and maybe work it out for Monday.

The Chairman. There will be other witnesses that will go on in the interim between now and the time you are to reappear and counsel will get in touch with you, Mr. Hull, and I want to say we appreciate the generosity you have displayed in your giving us the time you have given us today. We do not want to tax your strength and we do not want you to tax it yourself.

Mr. Hull. I appreciate the courtesy of the committee in excusing me during the reading of my statement.

The Chairman. Yes. You will be advised, Mr. Secretary, by counsel when you will be expected to return. Thank you very much.

Who is the next witness?

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Sumner Welles is the next witness.

The Chairman. Mr. Sumner Welles. Please be sworn, Mr. Welles.
The Chairman. Mr. Welles, the Chair will suggest that you keep your microphone as close as possible on account of the acoustics in this room, which you are probably familiar with already.

Mr. Welles. All right, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gesell. I would like now to offer for the record as Exhibit No. 22 a document entitled, "Draft of Parallel Communications To The Japanese Government," on the stationery of Mr. Churchill, dated August 10, 1941; two telegrams and a draft of a proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to the Department by Mr. Welles following the conference between the President and Mr. Winston Churchill.

That number will be No. 22 and copies of this are before the various members of the committee.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Mr. Ferguson. May I inquire at this time whether or not we have had clearance from the other governments on the communications?

Mr. Gesell. We have had clearance on practically all the documents. There remain perhaps two on which we have not heard anything as yet one way or the other and as soon [1210] as they are available I will, of course, distribute them to the committee and if they seem to necessitate any examination of any of these witnesses on those points they, of course, will be available and be recalled before the committee on those documents. We have done our very best to get clearance.

Senator Ferguson. Was this a special clearance on this particular exhibit that you now offer? We received it here at noon and I wondered.

Mr. Gesell. Well, you received part of it this noon and part of it had been in your hands before. I believe, Senator. The draft of the proposed communication that Mr. Welles brought back has been in your hands, I believe, for some time. The top document is being distributed now.

The Chairman. That is Exhibit No. 22?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

The Chairman. Consisting of this single sheet?

Mr. Gesell. No, there are three documents that make a part of it; it is all in one.

The Chairman. All of this is 22?

Mr. Gesell. Yes, that is right.

The Chairman. That which is mimeographed and that which is photostated?

Mr. Gesell. That is right.

[1217] The Chairman. All right.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 22".)

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Welles, as a starting point could you briefly indicate your position in the Department of State during the years 1940 and 1941?

Mr. Welles. During those years my time and attention were primarily given to relations between the United States and the other American republics and, to a considerable extent, to our relations with
European governments. I had no participation in the diplomatic discussions which went on between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Government representatives and only at certain times, when the Secretary was away on a much needed vacation or was not in the Department and I had to act as Acting Secretary of State did I take any active part.

Mr. Gesell. You were present, were you not, during the meeting in the Atlantic between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill?

Mr. Welles. I was.

Mr. Gesell. Did you at that time participate in any discussions between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning Japan or developments in the Far East?

Mr. Welles. No. During the meeting at Argentia the President delegated to me the work which had to do with the [1212] drafting of the Atlantic Charter. My conversations were almost entirely taken up with talks with the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Cadogan, and those conversations related solely to the drafting of the Atlantic Charter text and to one of the diplomatic negotiations, none of which had to do with Japan.

Mr. Gesell. Did you receive any information at that meeting as to any agreement or arrangement or understanding that had been arrived at, if there was any, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning joint action of the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific?

Mr. Welles. When I left the President, since he was due to return to Washington before myself, he told me that he had had a conversation, or several conversations, with Mr. Churchill with regard to the Japanese situation and the increasing dangers in the Far East; that Mr. Churchill had suggested to him that the two governments, as a means which might be of some effect, should take parallel action in issuing a warning to the government of Japan.

As I recall it, the President stated that what Mr. Churchill had suggested was that the Government of the United States should state to the Government of Japan that if Japan persisted in her policy of conquest and aggression the United States, in the protection of its legitimate interests and [1213] in order to provide for its own security would have to take such acts as were necessary in its own judgment.

The President also asked me to tell Secretary Hull that he wished to see the Japanese Ambassador immediately upon his return and that warning which had been suggested as a parallel action by Mr. Churchill was communicated to the Japanese Ambassador by the President on August 17th of that year.

Mr. Gesell. Were you present at the meeting?

Mr. Welles. I was not. You mean the meeting between the President and the Japanese Ambassador?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Mr. Welles. No.

Mr. Gesell. Now, the Exhibit 22 which has just been introduced includes as the first document a document dated August 10, 1941, reading as follows:
Draft of Parallel Communications to the Japanese Government

Declaration by U. S. Government that:

1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the South West Pacific would produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take countermeasures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and Japan.

[1214] 2. If any Third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such countermeasures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power.

Declaration by H. M. G.

Same as above, mutatis mutandis, the last phrase reading: "... their support of them. H. M. G. would give all possible aid to such Power."

Declaration by Dutch Government.

Same as that by H. M. G.

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.

Do you recall ever having seen this document?

Mr. Welles. I do not remember having seen that document. I remember seeing the draft, however, which I took from Argentina to Washington and which is one of the exhibits itself in this collection.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, did you prepare that draft or do you know who prepared it?

Mr. Welles. As I recall it that was prepared after discussions between the President and myself the last day of the Argentia meeting.

[1215] Mr. Gesell. The last paragraph of that draft reads:

The Government of the United States, therefore, finds it necessary to state to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government undertakes any further steps in pursuance of the policy of military domination through force or conquest in the Pacific region upon which it has apparently embarked, the United States Government will be forced to take immediately any and all steps of whatsoever character it deems necessary in its own security notwithstanding the possibility that such further steps on its part may result in conflict between the two countries.

Was that, in essence, your understanding of the agreement between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning the notice or threat which should be given to the Japanese?

Mr. Welles. That is correct.

Mr. Gesell. Now, referring to Volume 2, Foreign Relations of the United States with Japan 1931–1941, where the conversations between President Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941 is reported.

At page 556 I find in the paragraph beginning at said page what appears to be a somewhat different statement. This is the oral statement handed by the President to the Japanese Ambassador. It reads:

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

That statement that I have just read is a somewhat watered down version of the one you brought back, is it not, Mr. Welles?
Mr. Welles. That is correct.

[1217] Mr. Gesell. Is it your opinion that the statement that I have just read from volume II is, in fact, the statement which was made at this meeting rather than the statement that you brought back?

Mr. Welles. The statement was handed by the President, I understood, to the Japanese Ambassador in writing, as an aide-mémoire, and that is the statement to which you refer.

Mr. Gesell. Have you any information as to what accounted for the watering down process?

Mr. Welles. I am not informed on that point, beyond the fact that the papers I brought back were given to Secretary Hull and he discussed them with the President before the President handed them to the Ambassador.

Mr. Gesell. Now, we have had reference already, in some other documents in this testimony, to the ABCD bloc. Can you tell us what the ABCD bloc is? Is that an association of powers based upon treaties and other understandings, or what is it?

Mr. Welles. Those are the countries that were primarily concerned with the increasing march of aggression of the part of Japan.

Mr. Gesell. Do you know of any arrangements existing between them as to joint military action in the Pacific [1218] which any of them might take prior to December 7, 1941?

Mr. Welles. None whatever.

Mr. Gesell. Have you any information concerning the staff conferences held at Singapore, to which Mr. Hull referred in his testimony?

Mr. Welles. I have no knowledge of that.

Mr. Gesell. The documents indicate, in somewhat the same connection, Mr. Welles, that at the time of November 5, 1941, when there was under consideration, the request of the Chinese Government that the United States send assistance to meet the Japs who were proposing an attack on Kunming, and the Burma Road, that you participated in some of the conferences at that time.

You may recall that there was a joint memorandum submitted to the President at that time by Admiral Stark and General Marshall. Do you recall those conferences?

Mr. Welles. I am afraid, unless you give me some details as to who participated in the conferences and precise dates, I could not.

I should make it clear at this point, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, that I have not kept a diary and that, except for some copies of conversations which I have had, I have had no means of refreshing my memory on these points.

Mr. Gesell. Well, the joint memorandum was dated [1219] November 5, and there were minutes attached to it of the meeting of November 3, 1941, attended by various Army officials, at which you were not present, and there is reference of an earlier meeting at which you attended.

Mr. Welles. I suppose the meeting of the Liaison Committee would be the one.

Mr. Gesell. It possibly is. This is a conference at the State Department on the morning of November 1, and present were yourself, Secretary Hull, Mr. Hornbeck, and other State Department
officials, and Captain Schuirmann of the United States Navy, at which the problem was discussed.

[1220] Mr. Welles. Of course during that period there were many continuing conferences in the office of the Secretary of State in regard to the situation in the Pacific region. I was not generally present at those conferences on account of the burden of work I had in other parts of the world which took up the major part of my time, and I am unable for that reason to give you offhand an answer to your question.

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted at all in connection with the 10-point note of November 26 which Mr. Hull delivered to the Japanese Ambassador?

Mr. Welles. The note of November 26?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Mr. Welles. No; I was not.

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted concerning the modus vivendi which was under discussion prior to that time?

Mr. Welles. No. I was kept informed by Secretary Hull of what was going on, but I had no part in the formulating of policy with regard to that.

Mr. Gesell. Now in looking over the various records we have of meetings which were held in the days immediately preceding the attack, I find three meetings which you apparently attended. I think I will mention them all and then ask you if you can tell us your recollection of the discussions at any of those meetings, as far as they are pertinent here.

[1221] One was a meeting of November 24, attended by yourself, Mr. Hull, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark.

Another, a meeting on December 2, which was attended by President Roosevelt, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and yourself—possibly a Cabinet meeting on that same date; the meeting of December 6, attended by yourself and Secretary Hull, Admiral Schuirmann, Mr. Hornbeck, and Mr. Hamilton.

Do you recall any of those meetings and the discussions held?

Mr. Welles. I think I have very little to add to what Secretary Hull has already testified this afternoon with regard to the trend of those conferences and conversations. It was uppermost in the minds of all of us, I think, that the situation was becoming more and more serious as the hours passed. The entire purpose of the State Department, under the orders of the President, was to find every means possible to prevent a break in the negotiations which had been continued for so long a time.

A very large part of those meetings, as I recall it, was taken up with the consideration of intelligence information which had come to us. Since no minutes were kept of which I am aware, I am afraid, after a period of 4 years, I cannot give you any details.

Mr. Gesell. Now can you recall whether at that time, with [1222—3] reference to the intelligence information, you have any information, or any information was discussed at any of these meetings, which in any way pointed or indicated or suggested the possibility that the Japanese would strike at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Welles. I do not. During the preceding 7 or 8 weeks, after I think it had been perfectly apparent to all of us that the situation,
since the Japanese had moved into Indochina, meant in all human probability that the Japanese intended to extend further the operations upon which they had already engaged.

I do not recall at any time that anybody in high position in the Government indicated to me that Pearl Harbor or Hawaii was a probable objective.

Mr. Gesell. Did you hear Pearl Harbor even mentioned in those conversations, Mr. Welles?

Mr. Welles. I did not, except—let me interrupt there—except as one of the strategic points in the Pacific in which we were vitally concerned.

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember any discussions concerning Pearl Harbor in that connection, as to the question of its defenses, the question of it being alerted or not alerted, or any things of that sort?

Mr. Welles. No. I should make it perfectly clear that at that time there was no reason why that should be discussed with me by any high military or naval officer.

Mr. Gesell. I take it you say it was not?

Mr. Welles. It was not.

Mr. Gesell. Admiral Richardson has testified here to a conversation he had with Secretary Hull concerning the question of the fleet being based at Pearl Harbor, or on the west coast, and I think, as he put it, you sat in on that conversation. Do you recall it?

Mr. Welles. I remember the conversation with Admiral Richardson very well.

Mr. Gesell. What is your recollection of it?

Mr. Welles. I remember that the admiral expressed very grave concern at the situation resulting from the fact that the fleet was stationed at Pearl Harbor. I remember that I discussed it afterwards with Mr. Hull. I think the feeling of myself was quite as strong as that of Mr. Hull, that if any change in the arrangement which then existed were undertaken the impression would inevitably be given to the Government of China that the United States was withdrawing from the protection of its own vitally important defenses in the Pacific, and that short of some overwhelmingly imperative reason for such a change the whole situation in the Pacific by such a step would be so vitally affected as to make it in the highest degree prejudicial to our own interests.

[1225] I am not attempting to vouch for what conversations Mr. Hull may have had with the President with regard thereto, but that is the conversation, as I remember it.

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any conversation with the President concerning it?

Mr. Welles. No; because Mr. Hull was handling the question of the Far East with the President whenever he was in the Department.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall whether Admiral Richardson said anything at this meeting with Mr. Hull which indicated or suggested that the fleet was insecure in Pearl Harbor and subject to disaster through attack?

Mr. Welles. I do not recall such exact expressions of opinion on the part of Admiral Richardson, but the very clear construction that I drew from what Admiral Richardson said in that meeting was that he believed the fleet was insecure if it remained stationed in Hawaii.
Mr. Gesell. Was he discussing the question of security or was he discussing the question of the readiness of the fleet for combat?

Mr. Welles. To the average layman like myself I think there probably would be very little difference between the two expressions. I do not think the admiral went into any technical phases of the situation in that sense.

Mr. Gesell. He discussed, did he, the questions of better training on the west coast, the need of assembling a train, and matters of that sort?

Mr. Welles. No; not so far as I recall it.

Mr. Gesell. Now, one other topic that has to do with the Japanese intercepted diplomatic messages. Were you among those who saw those messages as they were intercepted?

Mr. Welles. The custom in the Department at that time was that the diplomatic intercepts went first to the office of the Secretary of State and from his office they came to me. Occasionally, intercepts of a military character would also come to me, but whether all of them came to me or not, I could not undertake to say. I am quite confident to say, however, that all of the diplomatic intercepts did come to me.

Mr. Gesell. Those came to Mr. Hull and to you from the Army and Navy, did they not?

Mr. Welles. That is correct.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall seeing messages of an espionage or military nature concerning fleet movements in Pearl Harbor reconnaissance?

Mr. Welles. No.

Mr. Gesell. And matters of that sort?

Mr. Welles. No.

Mr. Gesell. Do you have any record or do you know of any record which indicates what intercepts were in fact distributed in the Department of State and which ones were not?

Mr. Welles. That record would undoubtedly be available in the office of the Secretary of State, if it were kept.

Mr. Gesell. Do you know whether any was kept?

Mr. Welles. I could not answer that question.

Mr. Gesell. I take it you, like Mr. Hull, returned the intercepts after you read them, for security reasons?

Mr. Welles. They were taken back, as soon as I got through with them, to his office.

Mr. Gesell. I think that is all, if the committee please.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you one question.

Were your conferences on the far-eastern situation growing out of the fact that you were directly in charge of inter-American relations and European affairs, rather incidental, due to the absence of the Secretary?

Mr. Welles. They were entirely incidental, Mr. Chairman. The matter was handled in this way, that since occasionally I had to act as Acting Secretary of State it was necessary for me to be kept in touch with what the Secretary of State and the President were doing in the far-eastern picture, and occasionally during any absence of Mr. Hull I had to act as the mouthpiece of the President in order to communicate certain messages to the Japanese representa-
tives, or in order to act in accordance with the request of Mr. Hull, if he were not available.

I think it is fair to say it was only in that connection that I was drawn into the picture.

The CHAIRMAN. During that period who was the Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of Far Eastern Affairs, or was it the head of the Division?

Mr. Welles. There was no Assistant Secretary of State at that time, Mr. Chairman, who acted as being in charge of far-eastern affairs. Secretary Hull, probably from the time that he commenced his negotiations with the Japanese Ambassador in March 1941, was in entire charge and took entire charge of those negotiations himself. The principal advisers whom Mr. Hull had in the Department at that time were Dr. Hornbeck, who was the political adviser for far-eastern Affairs, and Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine of the Far Eastern Division.

The CHAIRMAN. During your conferences, or during your presence at any conference with the Secretary, or with the President, or with the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of War, or any of the high ranking military and naval officers of the Government, did the question of the use of the Navy [1229] and its placement in the region of Hawaii for diplomatic reasons arise?

Mr. Welles. Perhaps before I answer your question specifically, Mr. Chairman, it might be helpful for me to say that in the year 1939 a so-called liaison committee had been created, with Mr. Hull's approval and the President's authorization, between the State Department and the War and Navy Departments, of which at the outset General Marshall, Admiral Stark and myself formed part, together with various assistants. That liaison committee was established primarily for the purpose of bringing the three Departments into closer touch, so that it could act as a clearinghouse for information among the three Departments more familiar with the policies which each one was pursuing.

As the year 1941 came in Mr. Hull undertook himself to have weekly conferences, prolonged conferences, directly with the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War. In view of that, the meetings of the liaison committee, composed of General Marshall, Admiral Stark, and myself, dealt almost entirely with questions which affected the Western Hemisphere, questions of such vital importance, as to assistance which we might give to some of the Latin-American Republics who desperately needed some means of defense, or questions which arose occasionally with regard to the bases which the United [1230] States was acquiring in the Caribbean, and so on.

As to matters which affected the far eastern picture, those very rarely name under the cognizance of that liaison committee. For that reason matters of the kind which you mentioned were being handled by Mr. Hull with Colonel Stimson and Colonel Knox, and I do not recall that the question which you bring up, namely, whether the fleet should be used for diplomatic purposes or not, was ever discussed by me with members of the War and Navy Departments.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Congressman Cooper.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire of counsel for probably a little clearer understanding with respect to the exhibit, exhibit 22.

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. As a part of it I find about seven pages of the photostatic copy, and on the note, the first page, it states, "This draft was not given to the Japanese Ambassador." See communications given by the President to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941."

Now then, the following photostatic pages, are they a copy of the document that was given to the Japanese Ambassador or the one that was not given?

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Welles has testified that it was not [1231] given to the Japanese Ambassador. We have called attention to the text of the note which was given, which appears on page 556 of volume II of the reported conversations.

I think I might say in that connection, with respect to the whole subject, that the first sheet, the draft of paralleling communications to the Japanese Government, comes from the files of the White House, as it is the text of the two telegrams sent by President Roosevelt to Mr. Hull arranging for a meeting with the Japanese Ambassador. The photostatic document which you refer to comes from the files of the State Department and the note on there, as you have pointed out, indicates that it was not handed to the Ambassador.

The Vice Chairman. That was my understanding of it, but I wanted to be clear on that point.

Mr. Gesell. That is a correct statement.

Mr. Welles. That is my understanding as being perfectly correct, Mr. Congressman.

The Vice Chairman. And the document that was read from the book is the one that was delivered by the President to the Japanese Ambassador?

Mr. Welles. That is correct, Mr. Congressman. What is published in that book as having been delivered by the President to the Japanese Ambassador on August 16, 1941, is the document delivered.

[1232] The Vice Chairman. I understand you, Mr. Welles, to say you participated in the drafting of one of these documents. Did you participate in the drafting of the one that was delivered to the Japanese Ambassador or the one that was not?

Mr. Welles. The one that was not delivered, Mr. Congressman. That was merely a suggestion that was hastily drafted before I left Washington.

The Vice Chairman. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator George.

Senator George. I believe I have no questions.

The Chairman. Congressman Clark.

Mr. Clark. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. I want to pass for just a moment while I am looking through some testimony.

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Welles, as I understood your conversation with Admiral Richardson, you stated that he had informed you and Mr.
Hull that at Pearl Harbor the fleet was insecure, and then, as I under-
stood you further, you said it would not be moved out of Hawaiian
waters unless there was some matter of extreme importance. That
is not the exact language used, but something of that implication. I
was wondering if there was credence placed by Mr. Hull and your-
self in the statement [1233] of the commander in chief of the
fleet that the fleet was insecure in its position; I wonder if that was
not a matter of extreme importance, or would the fact that you did
not want to back up and return it to the west coast overcome the state-
ment of the admiral as to the security of the fleet.

Mr. Welles. I am afraid I must have expressed myself badly, Con-
gressman Murphy, if that is what you understood I said.

Mr. Murphy. I so understood it. I would like to have it cleared up
so there will not be any misunderstanding.

Mr. Welles. I will be very glad to. My understanding was that
the admiral stated that in his belief and opinion the fleet was in-
secure in Hawaii, and that it was my feeling in consequence that in
view of the fact of moving the fleet from Hawaii, leaving Hawaii
defenseless, would have a highly important and prejudicial effect
upon the willingness of the Chinese Government to consider resistance,
and also in the sense that it would persuade the Japanese Govern-
ment immediately to continue with its policy of aggression since it
would have interpreted it as an indication that the United States
was withdrawing and giving a wide-open road to Japan to dominate
the entire Pacific region.

That is what I intended by saying "as of utmost importance" it
seemed to me if the fleet was withdrawn at that time.

[1234] Mr. Murphy. Well, now, to pursue that a little further,
in the event that the Fleet was insecure—I mean, what would you
understand the Admiral to mean by that—that it was subject to and
likely to be attacked?

Mr. Welles. My understanding was, Mr. Congressman, that the
Admiral believed that from the Navy standpoint, there was not suf-
ficient security for the fleet at that point.

Mr. Murphy. And you felt that even though there was—I don't
want to misquote you—did you think at that time that there was any
any likelihood that the fleet might be attacked at Pearl Harbor be-
cause of the admiral saying that it was not secure there?

Mr. Welles. In my judgment there was no immediate danger at
that time, in the autumn of 1940. Having the greatest respect for the
Admiral's opinion, it was an opinion as being necessarily deserving
of every possible consideration, but I want to emphasize the fact that
I believed that was a matter for the Navy Department, primarily, and
for the President and the armed forces of the country to determine.

From the diplomatic standpoint, the effect would be disastrous, I
thought, if it were withdrawn.

Mr. Murphy. So that the President would be confronted with the
opinion of the commander in chief of the fleet from a purely naval
standpoint and at the same time with the [1235] opinion of
the Secretary and yourself from the diplomatic standpoint?

Mr. Welles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And it would be up to him, as the President, under
constitutional authority to make a decision based on all of the in-
formation presented to him?
Mr. Welles. From that standpoint, that would be his responsibility.

Mr. Murphy. There have been rumors throughout the country, in several of the papers, to the effect that at the Atlantic Conference, there was a promise by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of England, Mr. Churchill, that we would stall the Japanese for a period—that is a free translation—stall the Japanese for a period of about 4 months.

Mr. Gearhart. Baby them.

Mr. Murphy. I am using the word "stall." My colleague suggests "baby them" along. At any rate, was there any promise, so far as you know, on the part of the President of the United States, or any commitment by him, to the Prime Minister of England, that we would stall, baby them along, or anything of that nature, for a period of 4 months?

Mr. Welles. The only promise made by the President, [1236] Mr. Congressman, to the best of my knowledge and belief, is that I have already stated, namely that the United States would take parallel action with the British Government in warning the Japanese Government that we could not regard with indifference their continued expansion.

Mr. Murphy. And nothing else?

Mr. Welles. It was also the President's agreement, if it can be called that, an understanding was reached that the United States would again undertake the negotiations which, you remember, had been broken off when the Japanese moved into Indochina; would again undertake negotiations with the Japanese Government in an effort to avoid war.

Mr. Murphy. One other question.

Admiral Richardson said that having talked to you and having talked to Mr. Hornbeck, or Dr. Hornbeck, and having talked to Mr. Hull, that he gained the impression at the State Department and he said not from Mr. Hull, that we were trying to bluff the Japanese. Did you say anything to Admiral Richardson that would justify such an inference on his part, that we were trying to bluff the Japanese?

Mr. Welles. I never stated to Admiral Richardson in any conversation that I had with him that we were engaged in bluffing. Such would not have been the facts.

Mr. Murphy. No other questions.


Senator Lucas. Mr. Welles, I should like to direct your attention to the testimony of Admiral Richardson with respect to the statement you made on your impression as to the content of conversations you had with him about the security of the fleet and in order to make the record complete at this point, I am going to read what Admiral Richardson said in a memorandum submitted to the Secretary of the Navy as to why the fleet should be withdrawn. He said:

Retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian area:
(a) From a purely naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, some of which are:
(1) Difficulty, delay, and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies.
(2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security.
(3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due to difficulties of entry, berthing, and departure of large ships.
(4) Congested and restricted operating areas in the air and on the surface.
(5) Inadequate facilities for Fleet services, training, and housing.
(6) Prolonged absence from mainland of officers and men in time of peace adversely affects morale.
(7) In case of war necessary for Fleet to return to mobilization ports on West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measure resulting in confusion and a net loss of time.

On cross-examination, I think both counsel and myself asked the admiral if he had in mind, when he gave these reasons for withdrawing the fleet, an attack upon Pearl Harbor or a submarine attack, and he stated unqualifiedly "no." This was in 1940, at a time when we were pretty much at peace, when he gave this memorandum to the Secretary.

In his testimony he did not take into consideration the question of the security of the fleet as was described to you, and I wanted to call your attention to that.

Mr. Welles. Thank you, Senator.

The Chairman. Is that all, Senator Lucas?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

The Chairman. Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Welles, whatever word is used, it was your understanding, was it not, that the fleet at Pearl Harbor at that time was not prepared for war, or for an offensive action?

Mr. Welles. I couldn't say, Senator Brewster, that it was my impression that the fleet was not prepared for war.

Senator Brewster. After what Senator Lucas has read of the testimony of Admiral Richardson, is your recollection affected?

Mr. Welles. I can only remember that in the conversation that I had with Admiral Richardson in 1940, I gained the impression that the admiral felt, in a general sense, that the fleet station at Hawaii was not secure, and that it would be in a better condition if it were removed from Hawaii to some other position.

Senator Brewster. Did he indicate it was his idea that it should be based on the west coast?

Mr. Welles. Not to me.

Senator Brewster. He didn't indicate that he thought it ought to move toward the Philippines, I gather?

Mr. Welles. There was no specific indication that I can recall that he gave me at that time.

Senator Brewster. But your impression is that it was quite clear it was a matter of security rather than a readiness for war?

Mr. Welles. I should say insecurity in the most general sense, Senator Brewster. I do not remember that the admiral went into any detail as to why he thought so in his conversation with me at that time.

Senator Brewster. If you were to come to the conclusion that the fleet was not ready for war, as a result of Admiral Richardson's testimony, then the keeping of the fleet at Hawaii, in a condition not ready for war, would have some aspects of having your diplomatic position exceed your military power, would it not?

Mr. Welles. It seems to me almost impossible, Senator Brewster, to divorce in a critical condition as existed at that time, the diplomatic from the military, because the military is a very essential part of the diplomatic picture.
Senator Brewster. Isn't it a fundamental principle that you should not take a position that you cannot support?

Mr. Welles. I think that is an admirable principle, but under conditions which then existed, I was hardly in a position to state or to judge for myself, as I know you will agree, whether the fleet was prepared or not prepared.

Senator Brewster. Well, let's take a hypothetical question. If you were satisfied the fleet was not prepared for offensive action at Pearl Harbor, and you still kept it there as a diplomatic measure, your diplomatic position would be exceeding your military might, would it not?

Mr. Welles. I will have to say again, Senator Brewster, that in my judgment, I don't think you can divorce the two things. I think the whole picture had to be taken into account. I still feel, as I did 5 years ago, that if the fleet had been moved, it would have been regarded by the Japanese as an invitation to move in and to expand to the south, or in our direction.

Senator Brewster. Would your view on that have been affected prior to the moving of the fleet to Pearl Harbor, assuming the fleet were based on the west coast, whether or not it should be based at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Welles. I think the Japanese have always regarded Hawaii as essential to the protection of the west coast. That has always been my understanding, and an indication that we would abandon the defense of Hawaii would be regarded as open weakness on our part by them.

Senator Brewster. You regarded the Navy as one of the elements in the defense of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Welles. I did.

Senator Brewster. Rather than Pearl Harbor as being the base from which the fleet would carry out offensive action?

Mr. Welles. I would regard it as a combination of the two.

Senator Brewster. With reference to the question by the Congress-man as to deferring action by the Japanese through the fall of 1941, do you accept the rather general understood story as to the use of the words "babying along"?

Mr. Welles. I think the President's desire, if he used that phrase, and I do not remember that he used it to me, was to indicate that he desired to put off the possibility of war to the last possible moment.

Senator Brewster. You do make that reference in your book; you apparently accept it as established as having been used.

Mr. Welles. It has become almost classic, perhaps.

Senator Brewster. You did consider that it was, in the light of the advice of our naval and military advisers to gain time, that tactics of that sort were very essential?

Mr. Welles. Through most of the autumn of 1941, Senator Brewster, I never failed in my understanding that both the Army and Navy were doing their utmost to persuade the President and the State Department that any break should be avoided, if possible; that negotiations should be continued for as long as possible.

Senator Brewster. In order to build a proper picture, will you give your impressions of Nomura?
Mr. Welles. Did you ask me to give my impressions of Nomura?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Mr. Welles. My impressions of Nomura, from the time I first met him in the winter of 1941, were that the Ambassador was actually desirous of trying to avert war with the United States.

In the late autumn—and, of course, hindsight is always better than foresight—in the late autumn, I think it is incredible that he did not know in full detail what his Government intended; but I think he came, primarily, at least, I always believe he came primarily to Washington to try to avoid war, rather than to try to prepare for war.

Senator Brewster. And you had a somewhat different impression of Mr. Kurusu?

Mr. Welles. A very different impression.

Senator Brewster. What was that?

Mr. Welles. Mr. Kurusu came here primarily under orders from General Tojo to stall until they were ready for the attack which later came.

Senator Brewster. Now, did you have a conversation with the Consul of the Japanese Embassy on August 4, 1941?

Mr. Welles. I did, Senator Brewster. I had three conversations with Mr. Wakasuge.

Senator Brewster. Will you give the substance of those?

Mr. Welles. They are rather long and involved, Senator [1244]

Brewster. Do you want me to read from them? I have them here at hand.

Senator Brewster. I think that would probably be the best way.

Mr. Gesell. They are reported in volume II.

The Chairman. Are those conversations reported in this bound volume?

Mr. Welles. I think they are all reported in full, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Are they quoted in the same language you have them there?

Mr. Welles. I think identical, Mr. Chairman. I see here there is one on July 21.

Senator Brewster. I don't think it is necessary to read them then.

If they are identical we can insert them in the record later.

Mr. Welles. They are all in the record. They are all published.

Senator Brewster. I mean in our record here.

Mr. Gesell. Senator, when we had in front of us the problem of whether or not we should introduce as a formal exhibit these memoranda prepared at the time of the various conversations we felt it would burden the record to introduce them as an exhibit and have gone on the assumption that, so far [1245] as the actual reported conversations are concerned, that that material is available in the official Government publication to the members of the committee.

Senator Brewster. How much space would it occupy? I had the August 4 in mind.

Mr. Gesell. Of course, there are many others.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. They represent at least several hundred pages of conversations.

Senator Brewster. I was addressing myself to Mr. Welles—

Mr. Gesell. I am sorry.
Senator Brewster (continuing). And his conversations of August 4. That was not very extensive?

Mr. Welles. There were three conversations, Senator Brewster, one on July 21, one on August 4, and one on October 13. In addition to those conversations, Mr. Hull and I jointly saw Mr. Wakasuge on another occasion and those conversations in which Mr. Hull participated are also published in this book.

Would you care to have me read this?

Senator Brewster. No; not if they are available. We can decide subsequently as to what portions shall be incorporated in our record.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

[1246] Mr. Murphy. You will find the August 2, 1941, conversation at page 320. You will find the—

The Chairman. August 4 is the one he referred to.

Mr. Murphy. There was a press release on August 2, 1941.

The Chairman. Mr. Welles has not referred to a conversation on August 2. He referred to a conversation on July 21, August 4, and August 13.

Mr. Welles. October 13.

The Chairman. October 13.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Senator Brewster. That is all I have. We can decide later with counsel as to whether any portion of that shall go into the record.

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart, we only have 5 minutes until adjourning time.

Mr. Gearhart. That is all I will need.

The Chairman. All right, we will give it to you.

Mr. Gearhart. Referring again, Mr. Welles, to your conversation with Admiral Richardson, did he or any other person give expression to the idea that, because of the condition of unreadiness for war of the fleet, its presence in the Hawaiian waters could not operate as a restraining influence over the Japanese for the reason that Japan had a military government, the leaders of which thoroughly understood the lack of fighting capacity of the Navy at that time?

Mr. Welles. That statement was not made to me, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Gearhart. Was anything to that effect or along those lines said?

Mr. Welles. Not that I recall.

Mr. Gearhart. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. It is about 3 minutes to adjourning time. Does the Senator want me to start?

The Chairman. It has been suggested that we might, by running a few minutes overtime, conclude with Secretary Welles.

Senator Ferguson. It will take me considerable time.

The Chairman. Well, that being true, I suppose we may as well take a recess.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Welles could return at 11 o'clock in the morning. Secretary Hull will take, perhaps, an hour.
Mr. Gesell. We would like to inquire whether Secretary Hull will be available to come tomorrow morning before we make a definite arrangement with Mr. Welles.

The Vice Chairman. I suggest that counsel notify Mr. Welles and Secretary Hull both.

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

The Chairman. Obviously, if Secretary Hull will be here at 10 o'clock there will be no need for Secretary Welles to be here. But you should be available, of course.

The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Saturday, November 24, 1945.)
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Welles, I believe, is to continue now.

Mr. Gesell. That is right.

Mr. Chairman, I think perhaps a word or two about the schedule would be helpful at this time.

Mr. Grew is scheduled to follow Mr. Welles. He has engagements that he hopes very much to keep on Monday and Tuesday of next week, and so we thought we would put him on right after Mr. Welles to see if there was any opportunity of finishing with him today.

Mr. Hull will come again Monday morning at 10 o'clock.

Now, there has been placed before each member of the committee two documents which I would like to introduce into the record at this time. These are two documents which have been awaiting clearance by the British Government and were released last night.

The first is a message dated November 26, 1941, to the Secretary of State, signed by "Winant," who was Ambassador to Great Britain. "Triple Priority" captioned "Most secret for the President from the former naval person." The "former naval person" is Mr. Churchill. The committee will recall that Mr. Churchill in his early career was active in the British Admiralty, and that phrase "the former naval person" was used to designate him in these communications.

If the committee will recall, in exhibit 18, introduced yesterday, we placed in evidence President Roosevelt's message to Mr. Churchill concerning the modus vivendi which was sent on the basis of a draft prepared by Mr. Hull to which Mr. Roosevelt added the remarks concerning being prepared for real trouble soon, and this message, which I would like to introduce, and have designated as Exhibit 23, is the reply of Mr. Churchill to President Roosevelt forwarded through State Department channels.
The Vice Chairman. Read it into the record.

Mr. Gesell. The message reads as follows:

Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse our joint dangers would enormously encrease. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves.

As I indicated, this was in reply to the President's [1252] message concerning the modus vivendi to Prime Minister Churchill and, of course, relates to that subject.

The next and other document before the committee is another message forwarded in the same fashion to the President from "the former naval person," Prime Minister Churchill, dated November 30, 1941. This message we introduce because of its relation to the question of a commitment, which was discussed yesterday when Mr. Welles was on the stand, at which time you will recall we introduced an exhibit which included a draft of a proposed joint position to be taken by the United States and Great Britain with respect to Japanese developments. This is somewhat later, dated November 30, 1941. The other document was dated in August, at the time of the Atlantic Charter. This appears to have some reference to the same general matter.

The text of this message is as follows; this is the message of Prime Minister Churchill:

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your constitutional difficulties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her [1255] fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right, which may be very near, you should not say that "any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress" or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war.

I ask that those two documents be received in evidence.

The Chairman. They will be printed as part of the hearing at this time.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 23 and 24," respectively.)

Mr. Gesell. Now I think it is appropriate for Mr. Welles to return to the stand.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Gesell, will you indicate what the name "Winant" at the bottom of each of those exhibits indicates?

Mr. Gesell. It is my understanding that Mr. Winant was Ambassador and he was simply transmitting the messages.

TESTIMONY OF SUMNER WELLES (Resumed)

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson, I believe, was on the verge of examining Mr. Welles when we recessed yesterday.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Secretary, when did you first receive information that you were to go to the Atlantic Conference?

Mr. Welles. About 3 days before the time for my departure, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Can you state the day that you departed for the Conference?

Mr. Welles. I believe that I left on the, left Washington on the evening of August 8, leaving Boston the morning of August 9.

Senator Ferguson. And when did you arrive at the Conference?

Mr. Welles. I think I arrived the night of the 9th.

Senator Ferguson. Did you travel with the President?

Mr. Welles. I did not. The President went by sea and I went by airplane from Boston.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what day the President arrived at the Conference?

Mr. Welles. The President, I think, had arrived the morning of the day on which I arrived there, which was either the 9th or the 10th of August.

[1255] Senator Ferguson. You say he either arrived the 9th or the 10th?

Mr. Welles. I can't remember at the moment which date it was, but I think it was the 9th of August.

Senator Ferguson. This conference was held on a battleship?

Mr. Welles. That is correct, Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. What was the name of the ship?

Mr. Welles. The President was on the Augusta, as I recall it.

Senator Ferguson. But the actual conference between the President and the Prime Minister?

Mr. Welles. I think all of the conferences took place on the Augusta. I think the President only visited the Prince of Wales, the warship upon which Mr. Churchill had come, on one occasion. That was to go to Sunday services.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a conference with the President prior to going to the Conference?

Mr. Welles. I had a conference with the President as soon as I arrived there.

Senator Ferguson. And will you state whether or not the Far Eastern question was discussed with the President?

Mr. Welles. You mean when?

Senator Ferguson. When you arrived.

Mr. Welles. No; there was no discussion of it whatever.

[1256] Senator Ferguson. Was there an agenda?

Mr. Welles. May I repeat, Senator Ferguson, what I attempted to make clear yesterday.

The only part of the conference in which I took part was in preparation of drafts for the Atlantic Charter and in discussions which took place on three or four occasions between Mr. Churchill and
the President with regard to the Atlantic Charter. I was present at
no conferences that had to do with military or naval subjects.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you consider that in the Atlantic
Charter the far eastern question is involved?

Mr. Welles. In my judgment, Senator Ferguson, the text of the
Atlantic Charter is applicable to all the world and not to any partic-
ular part of the world.

Senator Ferguson. Did it involve parallel action?

Mr. Welles. You are now referring to the Atlantic Charter?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Welles. I do not consider that it had any connection with the
parallel declarations.

Senator Ferguson. That took place afterward?

Mr. Welles. Yes. The Atlantic Charter was, in my judgment, a
joint statement of the two Governments of general policy with regard
to the objectives which they hoped could be achieved when the war
was over.

"[1257] Senator Ferguson. After the war was over?

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you are familiar with the exhibit that was
handed to us yesterday, headed "10 Downing Street, Whitley Hall."
Do you have it before you?

Mr. Welles. I have not got it before me, no.

Senator Ferguson. Counsel, would you see that he gets a copy of it?

Mr. Welles. Thank you.

Senator Ferguson. That is dated August 10, 1941, and "10 Down-
ing Street" is in London, England; that would be correct, would it not?

Mr. Welles. That is correct, but my assumption was that the Prime
Minister was using his official stationery which was available on his
warship.

"[1258] Senator Ferguson. Did you consider that this was written
on the 10th on the warship?

Mr. Welles. I should assume that it had been prepared by the
Prime Minister after his arrival or while he was on the way over.

Senator Ferguson. You landed there the evening of the 9th?

Mr. Welles. That is my recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the 10th did you hear anything about
this subject?

Mr. Welles. My recollection, Senator, is that Mr. Churchill did
not arrive until the evening of the 10th, 24 hours after my arrival.

Senator Ferguson. He did not arrive until after you had arrived,
and that was the evening of the 10th?

Mr. Welles. That is my recollection.

Senator Ferguson. So, on the whole date of the 10th you had never
heard of this subject?

Mr. Welles. I had not.

Senator Ferguson. You had not been consulted about it?

Mr. Welles. I had not.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for this being written on
the 10th and Mr. Churchill not landing there until the evening of
the 10th?

Mr. Welles. I have taken it for granted that Mr. Churchill
"[1259] was preparing various papers which he wished to discuss
with the President, while he was on the way over.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with Mr. Hull's conference with Mr. Halifax, the Ambassador of Britain here, on the 9th?

Mr. Welles. I could not have been familiar with that, Senator Ferguson, since I was on my way up North at the time.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know there had been—at the time did you know there was a conference between Mr. Halifax and Mr. Hull?

Mr. Welles. Not so far as I can remember.

Senator Ferguson. That could relate to this same question, as to the number of ships that we could use in the Pacific?

Mr. Welles. No.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first see this exhibit, draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Government?

Mr. Welles. I don't remember having seen this document at that time. My recollection is that the President spoke to me about this question the last day of my stay in Argentia, told me of his conversations with the Prime Minister on this question and suggested that the matter be taken up as soon as I returned to Washington; and the draft which I brought back with me was prepared on that last day.

[1260] Senator Ferguson. The draft that you prepared, then, was prepared on what date?

Mr. Welles. On the last day of my stay in Argentia, which, I think, was the 13th.

Senator Ferguson. On the day of the 13th.

Mr. Welles. I think so, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Where did you prepare the instrument that was handed to us as your notes. Do you have a copy of those? I do not have the exhibit number. It is dated August the 15th.

Mr. Welles. This is dated August 15th.

Mr. Gesell. Number 22, I think.

Senator Ferguson. It is Exhibit 22. August the 15th is the date.

Mr. Welles. This must have been prepared after my return to the Department of State from a draft on notes which I had drafted before we left Argentia.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you know where the original notes would be?

Mr. Welles. Unless they are in the Department of State they probably were destroyed after the clean draft was prepared.

Senator Ferguson. This is not the instrument that you prepared at Argentia?

[1261] Mr. Welles. I should think not. It is dated August 15th and I think this is undoubtedly a clean draft which was prepared after my return to Washington.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, the instrument of August 10, 1941, from 10 Downing Street, Whitehall—would you say that that was the British idea as to what happened there? Does this fairly represent that? Is that your understanding?

Mr. Welles. My understanding is that this was a suggestion drafted by Mr. Churchill for presentation to the President and for discussion with him and that this draft which is headed "10 Downing Street" had been drafted by Mr. Churchill before his arrival at Argentia.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not there is in existence the actual agreement between the President and Mr. Churchill on this question?

Mr. Welles. So far as the President is concerned, the text of that agreement was presented to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17th by the President.

Senator Ferguson. Might I ask counsel where this paper came from, August 10, 1941? Where did he get it?

Mr. Gesell. As I stated when it was introduced, this is from the files of President Roosevelt and it is in the files relating to the Atlantic Charter trip, so that is how we [1262] relate it to that event. There will be testimony about that later.

Senator Ferguson. Now, this reads: "Declaration by United States Government That"—this is the draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Government. [Reading]:

Any further encroachment by Japan in the South West Pacific would produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and Japan.

2. If any Third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power.

Now, let us take the first declaration. There is nothing said in there about the President coming to Congress is there? That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. Welles. That is correct, Senator, yes.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, if Japan made any encroachments in the Southwest Pacific it would produce a situation in which the United States would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan? [1263] Mr. Welles. It would assume, in my judgment, however, in view of the fact that it states that it is a declaration by the United States Government, that the British Prime Minister foresaw the need for the President to act in accordance with the United States Constitution.

Senator Ferguson. But how do you account for the Prime Minister mentioning, however, that it would come to Congress in case a third power became the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of the counter measures, or their support, and not in the first situation where we would consider any further encroachment such conduct as we would go to war for?

Mr. Welles. You will, of course, understand, Senator that this is purely assumption and interpretation on my part.

Senator Ferguson. I am talking to you as a member of the State Department at that time.

Mr. Welles. My understanding would be that what is foreseen in article 2 is the possibility that the President in such circumstances would consider it desirable to enter into some kind of temporary relationship with that third power which would envisage the treaty-making powers of the Senate in addition to the war-making powers of the Congress.

Senator Ferguson. But that would not be involved in the first item, that we would go to war—be compelled to [1264] take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan in case of any encroachment by the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific. Is that the way you read that?
Mr. Welles. I think that the declaration by the United States Government constitutes, of course, a covering of the constitutional requirements laid upon the President also. I can conceive of it being entirely possible that the counter measures envisaged in article 1 might involve measures of security which would possibly lead to a clash between the United States Government and the Japanese Government forces while the United States Government was attempting to take care of the security of our interests.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next is the proposal of the British Prime Minister, the last phrase reading:

"... their support of them, H.M.G."—meaning His Majesty's Government—"would give all possible aid to such Power"—that might become involved in resisting, is that correct?

Mr. Welles. My interpretation is that the British Government, not being under the same constitutional provisions as the United States Executive, would make a flat declaration that it would give such aid to such Power.

Senator Ferguson. It was not necessary that Mr. Churchill [1265] ask anyone for that consent?

Mr. Welles. That is my understanding.

Senator Ferguson. And he was saying so by this instrument?

Mr. Welles. That is my understanding.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the declaration by the Dutch Government. The Dutch Government agreed and this would indicate it had already agreed, the same as the British Government, is that correct?

Mr. Welles. That is my understanding.

Senator Ferguson. And then the last item was:

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.

Now, when you drafted this instrument of August 15th—and, Mr. Gesell, I would like for you to inquire of the State Department whether or not there are any notes in existence that Mr. Welles made in relation to his conference with the President on this subject?

Mr. Gesell. We have seen none. We will inquire some more, however. We have been through the papers pretty thoroughly.¹

Senator Ferguson. Now, taking the instrument—have you the instrument before you of August 15, 1941?

[1266] Mr. Welles. I have it before me, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. You will notice that, in the beginning, on the first page, you use the words, "Joint Declaration." It reads:

On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he was willing to suggest to the Governments of Great Britain, of The Netherlands and of China that they concur in a joint declaration.

Now, that is, however, distinguished from a parallel declaration, is it not?

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. What is the difference in diplomatic language?

Mr. Welles. A joint declaration means that by prior agreement the governments concerned would make an identical declaration. A par-

¹ Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 22-A.
allel declaration, in my interpretation, means that two governments would agree that they would take action simultaneously but not necessarily in the same terms.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you know who the President did consult on this question of the parallel action? He did not consult you prior to entering into it?

Mr. Welles. The President upon his return undoubtedly [1267] consulted fully with Mr. Hull in regard to these terms.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whom he may have consulted prior to that time?

Mr. Welles. Prior to August 10th?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; or at the conference do you know whom he may have consulted with? Would you name who was with the President at the conference?

Mr. Welles. When I arrived the President had with him only some of the highest ranking military and naval officers of the United States.

Senator Ferguson. Would you give us their names?

Mr. Welles. My only difficulty is remembering whether they came with the President or whether they arrived after the President arrived, but by the time that August 10th had come, Senator, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Admiral King, and General Arnold were all there.

Senator Ferguson. Was there anyone with you when you had the conference with the President? Was there any other person at this conference when he gave you these ideas that you made a memo of, or were you personally with him?

Mr. Welles. I think I was alone with the President in his sitting room on the Augusta, the Admiral’s cabin.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the last page—page 6 of this instrument—and I think that is the part that relates [1268] to the joint—or not the joint action—the parallel action. (Reading):

The Government of the United States, therefore, finds it necessary to state to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government undertakes any further steps in pursuance of the policy of military domination through force or conquest in the Pacific region upon which it has apparently embarked, the United States Government will be forced to take immediately any and all steps of whatsoever character it deems necessary in its own security notwithstanding the possibility that such further steps on its part may result in conflict between the two countries.

Now, that is diplomatic language?

Mr. Welles. That is diplomatic language; yes.

Senator Ferguson. And what is a fair interpretation of that? What does that mean?

Mr. Welles. That means that the United States Government would take such steps as it might judge necessary to protect its legitimate interests and its safety, notwithstanding the possibility—and that word “possibility” should be underlined—that those steps taken in its legitimate interest and for its safety might eventually result in hostilities.

[1269] Senator Ferguson. How does that differ from No. 1? (Reading):

Any further encroachment by Japan in the South West Pacific would produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and Japan.
Mr. Welles. In the first place, article 1 and the suggestion made by the British Prime Minister limits the field of encroachment by Japan to the Southwest Pacific. The last part of this draft is broader in its structure. It says, "In the Pacific region."

Senator Ferguson. How inclusive would the Pacific regions be?

Mr. Welles. I should think it would be all-inclusive in the broadest sense of the word.

Senator Ferguson. So it means the same, would you say, practically the same, except that the region is enlarged in what you drafted?

Mr. Welles. That is correct, and I also stress the need to underline the word "possibility."

Senator Ferguson. Why do you stress the word "possibility"?

Mr. Welles. Because it was still conceivable in August [1970] 1941 that Japan might turn from her then course and that steps which were legitimate on the part of the United States to safeguard its interests and to provide for its security would not lead to hostility or conflict between the two countries.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, Japan could have lived within this and there would have been no conflict?

Mr. Welles. I think that is an entirely correct statement, Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. And that is why you used the word "possibility" here?

Mr. Welles. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. It lay within Japan's power——

Mr. Welles. That is entirely correct.

Senator Ferguson (continuing). To avoid the use of this rather than to have it exercised?

Mr. Welles. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. But a fair statement of this instrument would be that if Japan did not intend to live within it, then this would become operative even to the point of war?

Mr. Welles. What it implies—I think you are entirely accurate—what it implies is that the United States would have to take such measures as might be necessary for the safety of this country and for the preservation of this [1971] country's legitimate interests no matter what the consequences might be.

Senator Ferguson. And that would be the same as the first item of Mr. Churchill's instrument, according to your interpretation?

Mr. Welles. I have endeavored to point out the differences, Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the President returned to the United States on the morning of August 17, is that correct?

Mr. Welles. That is my recollection.

Senator Ferguson. The two telegrams indicate, that we have received in evidence, that the President desired to communicate with the Jap Ambassador.

Mr. Welles. In addition to those telegrams the President requested me to make all arrangements necessary so that he could see the Ambassador the moment after his return.

Senator Ferguson. Then when you drafted this instrument which I have read from, which says, "This draft was not given to the
Japanese Ambassador, did you help to draft the instrument that actually went to the Ambassador?

Mr. Welles. The draft which is dated August 15 was handed by me to Mr. Hull as an indication of what the President had in mind to say to the Ambassador. It was then re- 1272] drafted in the Department of State under Mr. Hull's supervision after consulting with various other officials of the Department and the draft of August 17 represented the joint views of the officials of the Department of State together with those of Mr. Hull as to the proper communication.

Senator Ferguson. When did you get back to Washington?

Mr. Welles. My recollection is that I got back on the 14th. It may not have been until the morning of the 15th.

Senator Ferguson. And you drafted this on that day that you returned?

Mr. Welles. It was drafted immediately after my return, as I remember it.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anyone in Washington that knew what this agreement was with the Prime Minister and with the Dutch other than you and the President?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. Welles. May I remind you, Senator Ferguson, that this was not in the nature of an agreement. It was a statement on the part of the President, which you can call a promise on the part of the President to the Prime Minister that this Government would make a parallel warning with the British Government to the Japanese but until—

Senator Ferguson. Did you know—

The Chairman. Let the witness finish his answer.

1273] Senator Ferguson. All right. Were you through?

Mr. Welles. Not quite through, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Will you continue.

Mr. Welles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To answer your question more fully, Senator Ferguson, until my return to Washington there was no one in Washington who was aware of the conversations which the President had had with Mr. Churchill.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I was getting at. So that until the President returned on the morning of the 17th, as far as you knew, no one knew of the understanding or promise or whatever we call it, other than you? You were the only man in Washington that you knew of that knew anything about it?

Mr. Welles. No. Only on the day when I returned I naturally informed the Secretary of State fully on everything that had taken place at Argentia of which I was informed.

Senator Ferguson. Did he get any knowledge, did he seem to have any knowledge other than what you were giving him on this subject?

Mr. Welles. There would not have been any means for him to have knowledge of it, Senator Ferguson, unless the President had telegraphed him directly about it. 1274]

Senator Ferguson. He did not appear to have such knowledge?

Mr. Welles. I am quite confident that he did not.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why the language was used that was given to the ambassador?

Mr. Welles. My recollection is that it was thought wiser at that time, in view of the fact that this Government was going again to
undertake to negotiate with the Japanese Government after the break in negotiations, to omit the phrase, "the possibility that such further steps on its part may result in conflict between the two countries."

The language in the memorandum of August 17 omits that phraseology.

[1275] Senator Ferguson. How does that alter the instrument? Mr. Welles. I do not think it alters the purport of the instrument, Senator. I think it leaves out a concrete phrase.

Senator Ferguson. The instrument amounts to the same thing? Mr. Welles. To all intents and purposes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know when the President, or when our Government, first made public this promise to the Prime Minister—I think those were your words, while I had used the word "agreement"—in relation to this parallel action?

Mr. Welles. When the public was informed?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; when it first came to the attention of the public.

Mr. Welles. I am not able to answer your question, Senator Ferguson, without going over the documentation to make sure.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you if you know when the white papers "Peace and War" were published.

Mr. Welles. They were published as soon as possible, I understand, after the Pearl Harbor incident.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. They were not published until 1942 or 1943, were they?

Mr. Welles. I do not remember the exact date.


Senator Ferguson. January 2, 1943. Now, do you know whether or not the President sent a message to Congress on August 21 or 22, 1941, in relation to the Atlantic Charter, the Conference?

Mr. Welles. I do not remember the exact date.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have a copy of "Peace and War"?

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. On page 717, Instrument No. 229, it is listed as "Message of President Roosevelt to Congress, August 21, 1941, embodying text of the Atlantic Charter."

Will you glance over that message and see whether or not there is anything in it at all about the parallel action and promise to the Prime Minister of Britain?

Mr. Welles. It had been my recollection, which is now refreshed, that there was no specific reference to it in that message.

Senator Ferguson. Is there any reference to it?

Mr. Welles. None that I see.

Senator Ferguson. None that you see. Did you ever discuss with the Secretary of State, or with the President, why that action was omitted from the message to Congress?

Mr. Welles. It had been my understanding from the very beginning that was the moment when we were endeavoring to start negotiations again with the Japanese, in order to find some peaceful solution, in order to prevent war, if at all possible, that the publication of a warning of the character which had been given by the President to the Japanese Government would not be conducive to successful results in attempting to find a peaceful solution. Public
opinion in Japan would have been exceedingly inflamed and would have made it far less likely for any peaceful solution to have been found.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not Japan did—well, they got the message on the seventeenth, so they knew it.

Mr. Welles. The Japanese Government certainly had it, but I have no recollection whatever that the Japanese Government permitted it to be made public in Japan.

Senator Ferguson. Well, it was indicated in Mr. Churchill's statement that he desired the President would have the intention to seek authority of Congress to give aid to such powers.

Mr. Welles. That, my understanding is, implied that in the event that Japan continued upon its path of aggression and conquest, and such action had been necessary, that only in that event would the President come to the Congress for the necessary declarations on the part of the Congress, if the Congress saw fit, but it was not the intention of Mr. Churchill [1278] that the President immediately announce to the public that this was his intention.

Senator Ferguson. It is a fair statement, then, that this was not made public either to Congress or to the people prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Welles. For the reasons which I have indicated.

Senator Ferguson. You discussed that with the President?

Mr. Welles. I do not remember discussing that specific question with him.

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss it with Mr. Hull?

Mr. Welles. Again I am sorry to say I cannot remember whether I did or not, but I imagine that every aspect of this question was discussed in full.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Admiral Stark ever knew of this promise and this parallel action?

Mr. Welles. I think the Navy Department and War Department undoubtedly were fully informed.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Admiral Kimmel or General Short ever had any information about this parallel action?

Mr. Welles. I have no means of having such information, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Britain ever gave parallel action?

[1279] Mr. Welles. I take it for granted that the British Government took parallel action at the same time and that the records of the Department of State will probably show that.

Senator Ferguson. You mean our Department of State records?

Mr. Welles. I would assume so.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why we do not have those records?

Mr. Welles. I did not know we did not have them, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know that Britain did take the parallel action?

Mr. Welles. I find it very difficult to answer that question specifically.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel if we have any record on that question, that Britain did take parallel action.

Mr. Gesell. We have no evidence that they did. We have not seen any documents on that subject.

Senator Ferguson. Will you endeavor to find out whether or not there is any evidence?
Mr. Gesell. Certainly.

Senator Ferguson. I want to hand you, Mr. Welles, a photostatic copy of the New York Times for August 13, 1941. Will you just glance at that article? I would like to have you read it.

Mr. Welles. The U. S. and Britain Tell Tokyo To Keep Hands Off Thailand? Is that the article?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Welles (perusing article). I have had a hasty reading of it, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Take the first part. Would you read that into the record? Then I will ask you some questions on that.

The Chairman. Would you mind giving the date line?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; August 13, 1941.

[1281] The Chairman. From what point did this article originate?

Senator Ferguson. Give the date line.

Mr. Welles. This is an article sent by wireless to the New York Times, dated Tokyo, Wednesday, August 13, by Otto D. Tolischus.

The American and British stand in the Far Eastern crisis, as expressed in recent statements by United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, was formally conveyed to the Japanese Government by both United States Ambassador Joseph C. Grew and British Ambassador Sir Robert L. Cruikshank in recent interviews with Vice Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, Japanese Foreign Minister, it was understood in political circles here today.

As a result of these steps as well as direct discussions between Mr. Hull and Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura, the Japanese Government was officially informed that any action that would threaten the independence of Thailand would be a matter of immediate concern to Britain and the United States and that the United States and Britain were prepared to meet any step Japan might take, move for move.

Do you wish me to continue?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

[1282] Mr. Welles (reading):

And inasmuch as Mr. Eden has warned that any threat to Thailand’s independence threatens the security of Singapore, on which hinges the whole position both of Britain and the United States in the Far East, there is little doubt in Japanese minds today what the next step would be.

Senator Ferguson. That will be sufficient.

Now, Mr. Secretary, that indicates parallel action, does it not, along the same line?

Mr. Welles. This relates, as I understand it, specifically to the question of the independence of Thailand.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; of Thailand, and the instrument, the Churchill document goes to the Southwest Pacific, and our document on the 17th, handed to him on the 17th, goes to the entire Pacific. That is the distinction.

Now I would like——

The Chairman. Let the witness answer that question.

Mr. Welles. May I examine the book?

The Chairman. Yes; examine the document in the book. I think he is referring to the August 17 note handed to the Japanese Ambassador by the President. That is on page 556. That is a different book, is it?

Mr. Welles. I have a different book, Mr. Chairman.
The final paragraph in the document of August 17 reads:

[1283] Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interest of the United States and American Nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

That, which is the actual document handed by the President to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, states specifically to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries—

[1284] Senator Ferguson. Now can you account for the fact that our Ambassador to Japan and the British Ambassador were taking parallel action on Thailand as early as the 12th or the 13th—that is, the 13th Tokyo time and 12th Washington time, is it not?

Mr. Welles. That is correct, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Can you account for that?

Mr. Welles. Well, in regard to this specific event of August 13, I was not in Washington, not in the Department of State at that time, and naturally I had no participation in the instructions which may have been sent to Ambassador Grew.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you—

Mr. Welles. May I just conclude?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Welles. It had been for some time the policy of this Government, whenever it saw fit, to take parallel action with regard to events that were happening in the Pacific which threatened not only the interest of the United States but the interest of the other countries that were also resisting—leave out the "also"—that were resisting action at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Would it be a fair statement to say that after you talked to the President, and from what you know of the instrument, on the parallel action, that from then [1285] on this country was to do the negotiating?

Mr. Welles. To do the negotiating with the Japanese Government?

Senator Ferguson. With the Japanese.

Mr. Welles. I know of no such commitment. I know only that it was told to Mr. Churchill by the President that negotiations would be resumed after the President's return.

Senator Ferguson. I assume that you know that from talking with the President.

Mr. Welles. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. You had no conversation with Mr. Churchill on this parallel action?

Mr. Welles. None whatever.

Senator Ferguson. Now, are you familiar with anything in the foreign relations papers, or the white papers, any messages to Mr. Grew in relation to that parallel action taken with Mr. Craigie?

Mr. Welles. I could not answer that offhand, Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. I would like, after you leave the stand, to have you make a search. I have tried to find them, but I have not been
able to. I would like to ask you to look them up, and I will then ask you that further question.¹

Are you familiar with Mr. Churchill's remarks in, I believe [1286] this would be the House of Commons, on the 27th of January? In Churchill's address in the House of Commons on the 27th of January 1942, as printed in the New York Times on the 28th of January 1942, he said:

On the other hand, the probability, since the Atlantic Conference at which I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make the final victory sure, seems to allay some of these anxieties, and that expectations had not been falsified by the events.

Did you discuss anything with the President that would confirm that statement by Mr. Churchill?

Mr. Welles. I at no time had any discussion with the President which would throw any light on this statement.

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that that statement is in conformity with the instrument drafted by you as a memo to the President on the 15th?

Mr. Welles. It would seem not in conformity.

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that it was in conformity with the instrument dated at Downing Street on the 10th?

Mr. Welles. I again would say that it was not in conformity.

Senator Ferguson. With that instrument?

[1287] Mr. Welles. With that instrument.

Senator Ferguson. You were somewhat familiar with the Far East, or the Far East situation, at the time you were at the Atlantic Conference?

Mr. Welles. With the general situation?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Welles. Yes, Senator.

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. In view of the fact that there have been so many requests made for original documents, I would like to see the original speech made by Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons, if you can get it.

Mr. Gesell. I think I have it here.

Senator Ferguson. Will you produce it, Counsel, to see if there is any variation from the language I read? I read it from the New York Times.

Mr. Gesell. The speech is referred to in "The Beginning of the End," by Winston Churchill. Of course, it is not the manuscript which he read in the House of Commons, if he had one, or he may have just been talking ad lib, but here is the text of it, I believe.

Senator Ferguson. Would counsel read that into the record so we will have it?

[1288] Mr. Gesell. Read the whole speech, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. No, just that part that I referred to.

Mr. Gesell. I was afraid you would have me in for another reading.

Senator Ferguson. You need not do it right now.

Senator Lucas. I am still asking for the original document. I am very concerned about the original documents which these statements

¹ See Exhibit No. 72. See also pp. 627–629, infra.
come from. I am not going to take the book, I want the original, Mr. Counsel.

Senator Brewster. I assume that refers to what correspondence is in our Congressional Library. What is that?

Mr. Welles. That is Hansard, isn't it, Senator?

Senator Brewster. I assume that is in the Congressional Library.

Mr. Welles. I imagine so, Senator.

The Chairman. Counsel will endeavor to secure the original document?

Mr. Gessell. I will.  

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Welles, were you familiar with the fact that Mr. Eden on August 6, then Foreign Secretary, made the statement to the effect that the threat to the independence of Thailand would constitute a menace to Singapore and Indochina and would not be tolerated by the British Government?

[1297] Mr. Welles. I remember, in general terms——

Senator Ferguson. That statement was made in the House of Commons.

Mr. Welles. I am not familiar with that specific statement. I remember in general terms that that was the position taken by the British Government.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you whether or not you knew that the Australian Government had taken the same position?

Mr. Welles. I remember that there was the general position taken by the Australian Government.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you whether or not Prime Minister Fraser of New Zealand did not, on August 26, take the same position?

Mr. Welles. That I do not remember.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the conversation between Lord Halifax and Mr. Hull when Lord Halifax asked Mr. Hull what aid the United States would give should Singapore or the Dutch East Indies be attacked, and Mr. Hull answered that the American discouragement of or resistance to the Japanese move would be affected by the number of American naval vessels the British would be requiring at that time in the Atlantic. That took place on the 9th of August 1941.

Mr. Welles. I was away from the Department of State on that date, Senator Ferguson.

[1290] Senator Ferguson. Did you become acquainted with that after you returned?

Mr. Welles. I undoubtedly read the memorandum on that conversation after my return.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the Roberts Commission, the Army Board, or the Navy Board went into the question of this parallel action?

Mr. Welles. I am unable to give you any information on that, Senator. I had no conversations with Justice Roberts or the other members of the committee.

Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with their report?

Mr. Welles. I, of course, have read their report.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall now whether there was anything in that report?

Mr. Welles. I do not recall it.

1 Subsequently admitted as Exhibit No. 92.
Senator Ferguson. What would you say was the fair appraisal of the note of August 17? What does it mean? What is it?

Mr. Welles. I think in essence it means, Senator Ferguson, that the United States had felt for some time past that the course which was being pursued by Japan threatened the legitimate interests of this country and the safety and future security of the United States, and that in its own self-defense should Japan persist in that course, the United States would inevitably and eventually be called upon to try and stop it.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, Mr. Wells, where you were on the 6th of December 1941?

Mr. Welles. I was in Washington.

Senator Ferguson. You were in Washington?

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. You were in the State Department at that time, on the 6th?

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the memorandum of November 30 on a conference between the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, to this effect:

The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me the accompanying memorandum, which is self-explanatory. He was very desirous of ascertaining what the United States Government would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus. I said that the President was returning tomorrow morning and that I would lay all phases of the situation before him on Monday noon. This I proceeded later to do and the President agreed to notify and see the Ambassador with respect to his inquiry. Previously the Ambassador had sent me a telegram (copy attached) received from his Foreign Office on the same matter.

The Ambassador continued his attitude of desiring more time for his Government to make preparations to resist in the Pacific area. He assured me that his Government would be in harmony with any steps we might pursue to this end.

This is dated November 30, 1941. Were you familiar with that?

Mr. Welles. I have seen that document, yes, but may I stress again the fact, Senator Ferguson, that I had no direct participation in any of the conversations that went on in regard to the far eastern situation at that time, except during the days when Mr. Hull was ill and not in his office.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever know whether or not the President, when he returned in the morning, did take this matter up, and what the result was?

Mr. Welles. I could not attempt to give you an answer to that, but I am sure Mr. Hull could.

Senator Ferguson. Now I want to ask you one question about the note attached to that. The note attached to that is marked "Most Secret," and I will read this from it—

Mr. Welles. What is the date of it, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. That is attached to the November 30 instrument that I just read.

R. A. F. are reconnaitering on arc or 180 miles from Tedta Bharu for three days commencing November 29 and our Commander in Chief, Far East, has requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air reconnaissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days.
Were you familiar with that?
Mr. Welles. I do not remember this memorandum at all.
Senator Ferguson. Well, were you familiar with the fact that there was an agreement between the countries known, as brought out yesterday, as the ABCD Bloc?
Mr. Welles. I am not familiar with any aspects of any such understanding.
Senator Ferguson. Would it not be necessary, if we were going to carry on diplomatic relations with a country, that we synchronize or at least collaborate between the Army, Navy, that is, our military powers, and the State Department?
Mr. Welles. Decidedly so.
Senator Ferguson. We could not hope to carry no negotiations without each understanding the other's acts?
Mr. Welles. I quite agree.
Senator Ferguson. And therefore it would be necessary for our military authorities to know what took place on this [1294] parallel action?
Mr. Welles. I agree.
Senator Ferguson. Now I am coming to the ABCD bloc and I am reading from page 203 of transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Monday, October 2, 1944: "I will repeat that"—
Mr. Gesell. Who is talking?
Senator Ferguson. This is General Marshall, I take it, who is speaking. Have you got a copy of it there?
Mr. Welles. I have not got the copy, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Here it is. It is General Marshall's testimony:
I will repeat that I must have known on the 26th of November that the negotiations were nearing an impasse, because Admiral Stark and I evidently directed the preparations of a draft of the 27th of November warning on that day, the 26th—
the following is quoted from that statement—
after consultation with each other, United States, Britain, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacked or directly threatened the territory, the mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, [1295] or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° east of or south of 10° north Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, off the Loyalty Islands.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Are not you reading substantially the same as is in evidence in this case in exhibit No. 17, paragraph 2?
Senator Ferguson. Substantially the same, but I wanted to read the actual record.
Mr. Gesell. The actual record, Senator, was a memorandum handed to the President, Exhibit 17, from which the language you have read from General Marshall's testimony is quoted.
Senator Ferguson. I want to know, Mr. Welles, whether or not you were familiar with this agreement between the military authorities?
Mr. Welles. I was not familiar with it, Senator, and the reason for that, as I have said before, is the fact that I had no direct participation in these negotiations. Those were handled by Mr. Hull, by the President, and by the top military and naval authorities.

Senator Ferguson. How would you be able to carry on at intervals if you were not familiar with it?

[1296] Mr. Welles. Because under those circumstances, while generally familiar with the trend of events and with the discussions that were going on, I was acting merely as a mouthpiece, to communicate messages from the President, or from the Secretary of State. Undoubtedly if I had been in a position where I was obliged, on account of the absence of Mr. Hull, to undertake any part of the negotiations, I would have had to familiarize myself with all of this material to which you are now referring.

[1297] Senator Ferguson. For you to properly carry on, you should have been informed about this military matter, should you not?

Mr. Welles. I think that in the event that I had any participation in the discussions, in the events that were then participating, I certainly would have been.

Senator Ferguson. Now I ask you about a telegram sent by Mr. Winant, our Ambassador to London, dated December 2, 1941, received 10:40 a.m. This was sent to the Secretary of State, personal and secret to the Secretary and the President.

British Admiralty reports that at 3 a.m. London time this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers.

Winant.

Do you know why the British Admiralty would be notifying our State Department and the President about these ships if we did not have some agreement in relation to their movement?

Mr. Welles. Because the information given in this telegram, which I remember now very well, was a clear indication that the Japanese were already moving further, proceeding [1298] further on their course of domination of the Southwest Pacific region.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what effect would that have on our notice, or on our memorandum given to the Japs on the 17th of August 1941, which was given in conformity with the parallel agreement or promise?

Mr. Welles. I should regard it as information which gave a clear indication that the Japanese were disregarding what we had asserted to be our legitimate rights and our security.

Senator Ferguson. And would bring that into action?

Mr. Gesell. Bring what into action?

Senator Ferguson. The notice that we had given.

Mr. Welles. Well, the notice that we had given was that we would then, in our own judgment, take such steps as we might regard as necessary for our safety.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct.

Now, on December 6 there was another telegram, and I will read the whole matter, because I want to bring out your part in it. This is dated December 6 and is marked "Personal and secret for the Secretary." It refers to the last telegram that I read, and it states:

My Number 5018 December 6, 4 p.m.
Again from Cadogan. He was in the British Admiralty, was he not?

[1299] Mr. Welles. Cadogan was the permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

Senator Ferguson (continuing):

Admiralty conference on information just forwarded, Cadogan attending. They were uncertain as to whether destination of parties is Kra or Bangkok. Latter would not be reached before Monday.

Note a discrepancy in time reported by me and time reported in our naval dispatch, latter stating 3 a.m., Greenwich time, my dispatch as given me 3 a.m., London time. Believe former correct.

British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand, fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before British have opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out President’s wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax.

Then I will read the rest so we will have it all in the record.

Leaving to spend evening with Eden in order to go over with him your Number 5682, December 5, although I had previously pressed on him each of the points you outlined prior to reception your message with the exception of paragraph 7 which I agree is not clear and which I will clear up with him this evening. I want you to know that I had nothing to do with the insertion of the reference to I. L. O.

I am having lunch with the Prime Minister tomorrow at his usual place in the country and will be constantly in contact with the Embassy over private wires in case you wish to communicate with me.

Winant.

Now, going back to the part that you did, “to guarantee support but wanting to carry out President’s wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax.” will you explain that?

I will ask counsel if we have those messages.

Mr. Gesell. We have asked for that message.

Senator Ferguson. You have made a request for it?

Mr. Gesell. We have asked for it, some time ago. No written record of such message can be found in the Department, so the assumption may be that it was an oral statement.

Senator Ferguson. All right, Mr. Welles, will you give us your memory on it?

Mr. Welles. I feel that I have here available, Senator Ferguson, the only conversations with Lord Halifax which I had at that time. They are dated November 27 and November 28.

Senator Ferguson. May I see those, Mr. Welles?

[1301] Mr. Welles. I think they are published, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. They are published?

Mr. Welles I will ask counsel: Are these published?

Mr. Gesell. I do not believe so. What date are those, Mr. Welles?

Mr. Welles. November 27 and November 28.

[1302] Mr. Gesell. They are not published, so far as I know. I don’t believe they are published, Mr. Welles, since volume 2 has only the conversations with the Japanese, not the conversations with representatives of other governments.

Mr. Welles. I see.

Shall I read these, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Well, I suppose so.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask the question. I will ask you to read them.

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1 See p. 508, infra; see also Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1697–1700.
Mr. Welles. They relate in a sense to——

The Chairman. Will you identify them?

Mr. Welles. They relate in a sense to the modus vivendi discussions and—I am not certain—to the telegram.

Senator Ferguson. Could I give you the telegram?

Mr. Welles. I have a copy here. Counsel has given me a copy. I am not certain whether they are illuminating on this subject. The first is November 27 and it is as follows:

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning urgently at his request. The Ambassador said that——

May I say in parenthesis that Secretary Hull was laid up with a cold during these 2 days and that is the reason I saw the Ambassador.

Mr. Gesell. This one you are reading has been introduced in evidence as part of Exhibit 18. The full text of that is three pages, is it not?

Mr. Welles. Three pages; yes.

Mr. Gesell. That one is already in evidence.

The Chairman. Unless the committee insists upon it, it won't be necessary to read it.

Senator Ferguson. No; there is no need of reading it, then.

Now, the other instrument.

Mr. Welles. The other is November 28. Has that been introduced?

Mr. Gesell. No.

Senator Ferguson. Would you read the one of the 28th, please?

Mr. Welles (reading):

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning.

The Ambassador began the conversation by saying that he had expected to spend the week end in Philadelphia, but, since he had heard from his Embassy here that his government was "greatly excited," he had returned to Washington. He read to me a telegram from his government which indicated that our naval officials in London [1304] had been informed by the Navy Department that the negotiations between Japan and the United States had been broken off and that an immediate movement by Japan was anticipated, and that consequently precautionary measures must at once be undertaken. The Ambassador inquired whether this was in fact the case. I replied that the situation so far as I knew was exactly as it was last night, namely, that the Japanese Ambassadors had submitted a statement of the position of this Government, handed to them by the Secretary of State, to their government and that no reply from the Government of Japan had as yet been submitted to this Government through them. I said that consequently I could not say technically that the negotiations had been broken off, although it was, of course, the assumption on the part of the Government of the United States that the Japanese Government would not accept the basis proposed by the Government of the United States. I told the Ambassador of the various reports which had reached the Department of State regarding the situation in the Far East today.

The next paragraph, the final paragraph, is as follows:

The Ambassador then said that his government was annoyed with him because he had not reported the conversation which had taken place yesterday between the two [1305] Japanese Ambassadors and the President and the Secretary of State. He asked me if I could give him a report on that subject. I informed the Ambassador consequently of the substance of the memorandum by the Secretary of State of the conversation which had taken place at the White House.

Mr. Keefe. May I ask you to state the date of that memorandum again, please?

Mr. Welles. November 28, Mr. Congressman.
I will immediately see if in my records I have any copy of later conversations with the British Ambassador which have any light to throw upon the telegram which Senator Ferguson has read.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the one that you did not read, does it have anything that relates specifically to the language of the telegram that I read you?

Mr. Welles. No. It has to do with the modus vivendi and the information given to the British Ambassador with regard to that matter.

Senator Ferguson. The first paragraph reads:

The Ambassador said that Secretary Hull had called him on the telephone last night to inform him of the nature of the document which he had handed the Japanese envoys. The Ambassador said that he was not quite clear [1306] in his own mind as to the reasons which prompted this sudden change in presenting the Japanese Government with a document other than the modus vivendi document which had so recently been under discussion.

This is dated November 27, 1941.

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that conversation?

Mr. Welles. I have that before me.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that conversation?

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Was that all that was said about that? Did you try to explain why we gave the note of the 26th rather than the modus vivendi note?

Mr. Welles. I think the rest of the memorandum goes into that.

Senator Ferguson. Goes into that?

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with why we gave the note of the 26th and not the modus vivendi?

Mr. Welles. I was familiar with the discussions which had taken place with regard to it, although I did not participate in the decisions reached. I wish to say, however, that I was wholly in accord with the decision which was reached.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how the Japanese treated [1307] it—whether they treated the note on the 26th as an ultimatum?

Mr. Welles. My own understanding is that their note of November 20 was in the nature of an ultimatum to us.

Senator Ferguson. There wasn’t any doubt about it that there note of the 20th was an ultimatum?

Mr. Welles. It seemed so to me, and any reply which we made short of complete acquiescence in the domination by the Japanese of the entire Pacific and eastern Asia would not have been regarded by them as complete.

Senator Ferguson. When did you decide that war was inevitable, in your own mind, considering the note of the 20th?

Mr. Welles. It had seemed to me from the middle of September, more or less, that there wasn’t the remotest possible chances of reaching a satisfactory and peaceful solution of the difficulties which had arisen and that consequently hostilities would probably be inevitable.

Senator Ferguson. And did it become more so after the Japanese note of the 20th of November?
Mr. Welles. The Japanese note of November 20 seemed to me an ultimatum which this Government couldn't possibly accept in its own self-defense and protection.

Senator Ferguson. Would the modus vivendi proposal have been an acceptance of that note?

Mr. Welles. Certainly not.

[1308] Senator Ferguson. It would not?

Mr. Welles. Certainly not.

Senator Ferguson. It would have extended the matter, in your opinion?

Mr. Welles. That is, of course, a question I can't answer. I doubt if anybody can. I should say every probability existed that it would not have been regarded as satisfactory by the Japanese.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the intercepted messages; for instance, the one saying the 20th of November was the last day?

Mr. Welles. Senator, I want to answer your question as clearly and as precisely as possible, but when you ask me if I had seen certain specific intercepted messages, I can only say that I saw, in my belief, all of the intercepted diplomatic messages received by us, but only a part of the intercepted naval or military messages.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that one about the 20th being the last day?

Mr. Welles. I remember that messages——

Senator Ferguson. That is rather important.

Mr. Welles. I remember messages which I saw which indicated that a time limit was set for the Japanese to receive acquiescence in their demand from us at that time. Later, it [1309] had been extended for a couple of days.

Senator Ferguson. Up until the 29th.

Mr. Welles. That is my recollection.

Senator Ferguson. And then we did not compromise, I mean we didn't do anything to change those dates, we didn't attempt to, because it was against our principles?

Mr. Welles. My understanding is that, no matter what reply had been made after the receipt of the note from the Japanese dated November 20—the only reply that they would have regarded as satisfactory was a complete acquiescence in the demands made in that note.

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would go to the note of the 28th, the memorandum that you read. I haven't seen it. It had something in it about the breaking off of relations. I wish you would read that paragraph again.

Mr. Welles. Certainly. [Reading]:

He——

that is the Ambassador——

He read to me a telegram from his government which indicated that our naval officials in London had been informed by the Navy Department the negotiations between Japan and the United States had been broken off and that an immediate movement by Japan was anticipated, and that consequently precautionary measures must at once be undertaken.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he could be speaking [1310] about the language of Mr. Hull to Secretary Stimson as related in his diary?
Mr. Welles. I couldn't possibly undertake to answer that question, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. I will try to find the one I want.

Page 119 of the Army Board Report:

On the morning of the 27th of November, 1941—

Mr. Stimson's diary reads—

the first thing in the morning I called up Mr. Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese, whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on 2 or 3 days ago, or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me how he had broken the whole matter off, as he put it, "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and the Navy."

Could the message from our Navy to the people in London have been that information?

Mr. Welles. I am not in position to answer that question.

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with the instrument of the 26th?

Mr. Welles. I am.

Senator Ferguson. Is that language that I read a fair interpretation of that instrument?

Mr. Welles. Namely, that it was a breaking off?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Welles. I think it is fair in the sense that any reply handed to the Japanese representatives at that time which was not a full acquiescence in their demands would probably have been regarded as necessary to be rejected by them.

Senator Ferguson. So that would be a fair interpretation of the note of the 26th, that it was a breaking off?

Mr. Welles. I shouldn't say that was a fair interpretation unless relations actually had been broken.

Senator Ferguson. What did you say to Mr. Halifax in relation to that particular paragraph that you read; did you know anything about the situation?

Mr. Welles. I knew, of course, that the note of the 26th of November had been handed to the Japanese representatives. I was familiar with some of the intercepts which had to do with the Japanese constructions that were being said. And on page 2 of my memorandum which I have already read—may I quote it?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, please do.

Mr. Welles. In reply to the Ambassador, I said:

* * * that consequently I could not say technically that negotiations had been broken off, although it was, of course, the assumption on the part of the Government of the United States that the Japanese Government would not accept the bases proposed by the Government of the United States.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, our Government assumed that they would not accept and therefore it would be breaking the relations off?

Mr. Welles. I can only repeat, Senator, the statement which I happened to have made to the British Ambassador. I said, "consequently I could not say technically that negotiations had been broken off * * *

Senator Ferguson. What did you mean by that?
Mr. Welles. So long as conversations continued, so long as diplomatic negotiations still are in existence, diplomatic relations are not broken off. One can assume that they will be broken off, but that doesn’t mean that they already are.

Senator Ferguson. Asking you as an expert in the State Department, when does the State Department turn the matter over to the Army and the Navy?

Mr. Welles. I think it is very difficult, if not impossible, to give a precise answer to a very general question like that. It would depend on the individual circumstances in every case.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you agree that we did turn [1313] it over to the Army and the Navy on the 27th as indicated by Colonel Stimson’s note or language?

Mr. Welles. I think that that is a question which only Mr. Hull himself could answer.

Senator Ferguson. What would you say was meant by a de facto rupture of diplomatic relations, as indicated by our interception of a message from Tokyo to Washington, November 28, 1941? Have you got the printed copy before you?

Mr. Welles. I have not.

[1314] Mr. Gesell. Here is one. What page?

Senator Ferguson. Page 105.

The Chairman. May the Chair ask the photographers to finish their work. While the witnesses are testifying we thought that we would try to keep this space clear. We would appreciate it very much.

Go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. It starts:

Therefore, with the report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal, which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable.

Do you find that language?

Mr. Welles. I have just found it, Senator, yes.

What is the question?

Senator Ferguson. I want to know what is meant by this language.

Mr. Welles. “De facto ruptured”?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Welles. As a question of fact.

Senator Ferguson. Would that be a breaking off of relations?

Mr. Welles. That would be an actual breaking off, as a question of fact.

[1315] Senator Ferguson. You used the word “technically” ruptured. The Japs, in their language, which we intercepted and knew, that language was that it was a de facto rupture, that is, as a matter of fact it was a breaking off of relations; is that correct?

Mr. Welles. That is their statement.

Senator Ferguson. That is their statement.

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Then here we have their statement as to how they are going to consider this.

Mr. Welles. That is their statement.

Senator Ferguson. The last sentence of your memorandum dated November 27, 1941 was, “The gravity of the situation, I thought, could not be exaggerated.” Will you explain that?
Mr. Welles. You ask me to explain my intention in making that statement?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; what you meant by it.

Mr. Welles. My intention in making that statement was that in view of my belief that the Japanese would not accept the reply which had been given to their note of November 25, that there was no other way to accomplish any satisfactory result of the diplomatic negotiations, that they had ended in a blind alley; consequently there was no hope of reaching a specific solution.

[1316] Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation with any of our military men on that point?

Mr. Welles. On this particular point?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that you thought that was true?

Mr. Welles. I was present, as I remember, at several conversations in Secretary Hull’s office in which intelligence was brought in with regard to increasingly alarming movements of Japanese troops and of Japanese naval vessels, all of which confirmed my belief, as expressed in the sentence which you have quoted from my memorandum of my conversation with the British Ambassador.

Senator Ferguson. Going back to your message of December 6, and after the questions I have asked you, is your memory refreshed as to what you could have been referring to on the bottom of the message about wanting to carry out the President’s wishes in the message transmitted by Welles to Halifax?

Mr. Welles. I shall have to see if there is any document I have. I have not got it available.

Senator Ferguson. Will you make a search and produce it, if you can, so that we may talk about that when you return?

Mr. Welles. I shall be glad to.1

Senator Ferguson. Were you present at the Cabinet meeting related yesterday by Secretary Hull that it was decided that some speeches would be made to the American public? I notice [1317] that afterward you made an address and Secretary Knox made one.

Mr. Welles. I was never present at any Cabinet meetings when Secretary Hull was present. I only attended when he was not available.

Senator Ferguson. How did the fact reach you that there was a desire that certain State Department or public officials make some utterances to the public?

Mr. Welles. To the best of my recollection the expression of that desire did not reach me.

Senator Ferguson. Then you would say that your utterance was not made in compliance with that suggestion?

Mr. Welles. To the best of my recollection the suggestion was not made to me. The address to which Mr. Hull referred in his statement of yesterday was an address made at the tomb of Woodrow Wilson on Armistice Day and it was my desire to make as clear as possible the gravity of the situation that the American people were then facing.

Senator Ferguson. Then you were speaking as a member of the State Department and not speaking in relation to that, having in mind that Cabinet meeting at all?

Mr. Welles. I am frank to say, Senator Ferguson, that I do not remember any suggestion having been made to me.

1 See p. 508, infra; see also Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1697–1700.
Senator Ferguson. Did you go over Secretary Knox's speech before he gave it?

[1318] Mr. Welles. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. You were not familiar with that?

Mr. Welles. I was not.

Senator Ferguson. Did you in any way contribute to the Davis-Lindley book on How War Came? They seem to write with some authority.

Mr. Welles. I did not contribute to it in any way. Both Mr. Lindley and Mr. Forrest Davis had many conversations in the Department of State with officials, including myself, with regard to the events that had taken place.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I didn't mean in contribution, that you directly contributed.

Mr. Welles. I see.

Senator Ferguson. Did you give them any of the information they printed in the book?

Mr. Welles. I talked with them upon several occasions and I have no doubt that some of the information published in their book was written in the light of the conversations that we had.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not they used the note of August 17? That is the parallel action note?

Mr. Welles. I haven't read the book for well over a year, Senator Ferguson. I couldn't attempt to remember.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what intermediaries our State Department may have used in their negotiations with Japan?

Mr. Welles. To be accurate would be difficult——

Senator Ferguson. You may not describe them as intermediaries.

Mr. Welles. To be accurate it would be difficult for me to be sure I was giving a correct answer since I individually had nothing whatever to do with any conversations that such persons may have had. I think there again Mr. Hull can give you the full information since in my case it would be merely hearsay.

Senator Ferguson. Had you known who was negotiating?

Mr. Welles. I had understood, again I repeat, only by hearsay, not through direct participation——

Senator Ferguson. From whom did your information come?

Mr. Welles. My information came both from Secretary Hull and other individuals.

Senator Ferguson. I wouldn't consider that in the same category as ordinary hearsay. Who did Mr. Hull tell you was negotiating?

Mr. Welles. I remember Frank Walker, then Postmaster General. Senator Ferguson. Did you finish?

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Frank Walker, Postmaster General.

[1320] Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whom he was negotiating with?

Mr. Welles. I think that he had conversations both with Admiral Nomura and later, when Kurusu was here, with him, as well.

Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Walker confer with you on these questions?

Mr. Welles. Not at any time. That is the reason I did not attempt to answer with any assurance of accuracy.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know of anyone else?
Mr. Welles. I couldn't be precise on that point.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear the name of Jones?
Mr. Welles. Rev. E. Stanley Jones?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Welles. I have never understood that he took any such part.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the note to the Emperor, due to any work on that at all, on the 6th? It was sent the night of the 6th.
Mr. Welles. I think that the President drafted that himself. I had nothing to do with it.
Senator Ferguson. You had nothing to do with it?
Mr. Welles. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn it was gone?
[1321] Mr. Welles. I think the following morning, if I remem-
ber correctly. I may have known it that night but certainly not until after it had been prepared.
Senator Ferguson. I note in your book The Time for Decision, you say that you were many times with the President in conference immediately following the attack. Now I ask you if you were in conference with him on Saturday or Sunday before the attack?
[1322] Mr. Welles. Not so far as I can remember. The Presi-
dent had been away December 6 as I remember it and I do not think that I saw him immediately before the attack.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know the President returned about De-
cember 1 from Warm Springs?
Mr. Welles. I did not remember the exact date.
Senator Ferguson. You do not recall any conferences, then, or any telephone messages between you and the President on the 6th or the 7th, up to the time of the attack?
Mr. Welles. Undoubtedly I saw the President and was in com-
munication with him but I cannot remember specifically now without a diary. As I told you, I have no diary. It is very difficult to be accurate on precise dates.
Senator Ferguson. I am speaking about the day of the 6th and the morning of the 7th, prior to the attack. Do you recall any conver-
sations you may have had in relation to any diplomatic negotiations or military operations?
Mr. Welles. I can be perfectly specific on one point and that is that I had no communication with the President on the morning of the 7th. I had no communication with the President until he tele-
phoned me to tell me of the attack; it was first from him that I knew of it.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn, when was the first knowledge that you had of the Winant note that I read [1323] you this morning, the wire relating to the ships?
Mr. Welles. The telegram you are speaking of, Senator Ferguson?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Welles. The telegram of December 6?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Welles. The telegram was undoubtedly put on my desk as soon as the Department of State had decoded it.
Senator Ferguson. Then it is possible that you had it on the 6th of December; is that correct?
Mr. Welles. I will have to check on the precise time of that tele-
gram.

Senator Ferguson. It came in, I think, 10:40 a.m.

Mr. Welles. Received 10:40 a.m., on December 6. I undoubtedly
saw it shortly afterwards.

Senator Ferguson. What did it mean to you in relation to your
negotiations?

Mr. Welles. As I think I said before when you first read it, Senator
Ferguson, it was an indication that the Japanese were moving, mov-
ing fast in large force and, furthermore, that it confirmed the fact
that they were having no further regard for the warning which had
been given to them.

Senator Ferguson. And the warning was particularly the
one on the 17th of August 1941?

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. And did it mean war?

Mr. Welles. As well as many other representations which were
made to them after that.

Senator Ferguson. Did it mean war?

Mr. Welles. Well——

Mr. Murphy. Between whom?

Mr. Welles. I should say that the chances had diminished from
one in a thousand to one in a million that war could then be avoided.

Senator Ferguson. And war between whom?

Mr. Welles. War between the United States and Japan.

Senator Ferguson. And Japan. Now, did you take that telegram
up, that message, with the Army and Navy, with the military authori-
ties? You say that it was reduced from one in a thousand to one in
a million. Did you take it up with the Army and the Navy?

Mr. Welles. May I repeat again, Senator, that these matters were
being handled by the Secretary of State, by the President, and by the
highest military and naval officials.

Senator Ferguson. Did you confer with Mr. Hull, the Secretary
of State, about that telegram?

Mr. Welles. I remember that on the morning of De-

[1325]cember 6 Mr. Hull received when I was with him, and probably during
the rest of the day, considerable intelligence which came to us from our
own officials, both of the War and Navy Departments, with regard to
the Japanese movements, all of which were of the most serious and
alarming character.

Senator Ferguson. Did all of the messages on the day of the 6th
lead you to the conclusion that you changed your average there from
one in a thousand to one in a million, or did this telegram?

Mr. Welles. I think this telegram was a factor in changing my
belief.

Senator Ferguson. It was the one that really changed your belief?

Mr. Welles. That was one factor——

Senator Ferguson. Did you——

Mr. Welles. Excuse me.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. Go ahead.

Mr. Welles. That was one factor among many.

Senator Ferguson. Well, what were the other factors that brought
you to change the one in a thousand to one in a million?
Mr. Welles. All of the other intelligence messages which were coming in and to which I have already referred.

[1326] Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any discussion that you had with Mr. Hull in relation to this particular situation, on the change that was taking place as it would relate to the military?

Mr. Welles. Every bit of information, Senator, including this telegram, made it more and more clear that the Japanese movements were such that both our naval and military officials would have to take charge.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know when they did take charge?

Mr. Welles. No; I could not attempt to answer that question with any precision.

* Senator Ferguson. You cannot give us any idea as to the time.

Now, going back into 1940, did you know that the Secretary of the Navy had communications with Admiral Richardson, then commander of the fleet, in relation to the blockade?

Mr. Welles. I had no knowledge of the conversations which Secretary Knox had with Admiral Richardson.

Senator Ferguson. Counsel, could you let me have the instrument that Admiral Richardson brought in?

Mr. Mitchell. He brought a good many.

Mr. Gesell. What instrument?

[1327] Senator Ferguson. The one in relation to the blockade.

Mr. Gesell. The proposed escorting, is that what you are referring to?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Well, it was more than an escort. It was a line.

I show you the letter from the commander in chief of the United States Fleet to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet. You were not here, as I understand it, when Admiral Richardson testified.

Mr. Welles. I was not present, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Will you just read that and read the last page?

Mr. Welles. The final page?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Read the first few pages and then the final page.

Mr. Welles [reading]:

Long Beach, Calif., October 6——

Senator Ferguson. No; read it just to yourself.

Mr. Welles. I beg your pardon.

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you some questions about it. It is already in the record.

Mr. Welles. Yes, Senator; I have looked over that.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever have any knowledge of that?

[1328] Mr. Welles. I had no knowledge whatever of the conversations which Admiral Richardson had with the President or Secretary Knox.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any knowledge in relation to the so-called blockade, or call it whatever name you desire?

Mr. Welles. The President discussed with me or, rather, told me of a plan which he had been formulating in his mind but always as a plan, to undertake a patrol of certain regions of the Pacific in order to limit the sphere of activity of Japan but I wish to emphasize the fact that he always discussed that with me as being in the nature of a project and not in the nature of any decision.
Senator Ferguson. How early did he discuss it with you?
Mr. Welles. I should assume about the middle of the autumn of 1940, some time in the latter part of 1940.
Senator Ferguson. That would be about the time that this letter is dated, October 11?
Mr. Welles. About that time; yes.
Senator Ferguson. And would, in your opinion, that have meant war between the United States and Japan?
Mr. Welles. I think it would have led to incidents which undoubtedly would have made more likely the outbreak of war between the two countries.
Senator Ferguson. What incidents did you have in mind?
Mr. Welles. If as a part of the patrolling operations the United States naval vessels undertook to prohibit the passage of Japanese vessels with the Japanese flag from one part of the Pacific to the other, the Japanese Government undoubtedly would have regarded that as being in the nature of a hostile act.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the Japanese had notified Mr. Grew to that effect?
Mr. Welles. I remember that there was some information which was available to me.
Senator Ferguson. Just one moment. I want to find something.
On May the 11th, 1941, reading from Foreign Relations of the United States, volume 2, page 145, down near the bottom of the page, speaking about the Minister of Foreign Affairs down in the last part, "He said that by way of example"—do you have it, Mr. Welles?
Mr. Welles. I have it before me, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read what he said?
Mr. Welles. Beginning with the second paragraph, I assume.
Senator Ferguson. I want you to begin there where, "He said that by way of example"—well, you can start back one sentence. "He said he knew that Hitler."
Mr. Welles (reading):

The Minister's subsequent remarks, which he said he was addressing to me as "an American friend and not as the American Ambassador" were bellicose both in tone and substance. He said that he was exceedingly worried lest the United States should proceed to convoy its ships to Great Britain, which would almost certainly lead to war with Germany. He said that to declare a neutral zone in the Atlantic or any other ocean was contrary to international law and that in the face of our supplying Great Britain with war materials he thought that Hitler had shown great "patience and generosity" in not declaring war on the United States. He said he knew that Hitler desired to avoid such a war but that it was doubtful whether his patience and restraint could continue indefinitely. He said by way of example that if the United States were to convoy its ships in bringing aid to Chiang Kai-shek they would be torpedoed by the Japanese Navy just as he would expect the American Navy to act similarly in a reverse situation. He said that if, in spite of previous forbearance, Hitler should now sink our ships in the Atlantic and if we Americans should then attack the German submarines he would regard this as an act of American aggression which would call for deliberation as to the applicability of article III of the Triple Alliance Treaty of September 27, 1940, and he thought there was no doubt that such deliberation would lead to war between Japan and the United States.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Mr. Welles—
Mr. Welles. But may I inject, Senator Ferguson?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Welles. That this message is dated May 14, 1941.
Senator Ferguson. That is correct.
Mr. Welles. More than 6 months after the time you were asking me about.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that you and I were talking about.

Now, did we consider that this was bluffing because he was saying it to the Ambassador not as Ambassador but as a friend? Were you familiar with that note?

Mr. Welles. I saw the note when it came in from Mr. Grew.

Senator Ferguson. How did you consider it?

Mr. Welles. I considered it as confirmation of my belief which had been going on for some time and which is now borne out by proven facts, that the Germans were instigating the Japanese to provoke trouble with the United States and were in large measure responsible for the attitude which the Japanese Government was taking.

This message from Mr. Grew relating his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister related almost entirely to Germany and to the action which Germany might take against the United States and referred to the extraordinary forbearance and patience which Hitler had shown.

Senator Ferguson. You did not place any significance then on that particular incident?

Mr. Welles. I placed a great deal of significance on it. I placed the significance on it that the relations between Japan and Germany were becoming even closer than before and that Japan very often was moving as the Germans were indicating.

Senator Ferguson. They would be the mouthpiece of Hitler, then, in effect?

Mr. Welles. That was certainly the impression that I drew from that message.

Senator Ferguson. Now, going back to October 8, had you any idea that if Admiral Richardson had carried out that memo that it may have meant war?

Mr. Welles. Well, may I say again, Senator Ferguson, that the President's conversations with me were always, with regard to this project, were always limited to it as an idea which he was thinking of, which he was considering; that no decision had been reached by the President in that regard. If it had been carried out, I think unquestionably incidents would have taken place, as I said before, which would have led to hostilities.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have any knowledge at the time the fleet was moved from the west coast to Hawaii, did you know it at the time it was moved?

Mr. Welles. I probably had.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted prior to that in relation to the effect it might have upon your diplomatic relations with Japan, with our diplomatic relations with Japan?

Mr. Welles. I am sorry to have to say the same thing so often, Senator, but I know you will understand the spirit in which I say it. I was not consulted because I was not taking part in making policy concerning the Far East.

Senator Ferguson. I may have used the word "consulted" because you were in the Department; you were Under Secretary.

Mr. Welles. I knew of it. It was being talked of.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you knew of the fact, you knew about it?

Mr. Welles. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that it was being sent out to Hawaii in May of 1940 as an arm of the diplomatic negotiations? Mr. Welles. I could not possibly say "Yes" to that question. I think the action taken, as I—

Senator Ferguson. It went out, I think, in March. It went out in March on maneuvers, but then there was a telegram sent that there was to be a release from Hawaii that it was going to be detained there for some time.

Mr. Welles. May I finish my earlier answer, Senator? Senator Ferguson. Yes; I want you to finish it.

Mr. Welles. My judgment was that it was done only as an integral part of over-all policy.

In answer to a question of Senator Brewster yesterday, I said that I thought that under conditions such as those which existed in the prewar years you could not divorce what was done in the military field from what was done in the diplomatic field, or vice versa—that it was a part of the whole policy. In other words, that the military was not being made subservient to the diplomatic nor the diplomatic subservient to the military; that the policy was being worked out along parallel roads.

Senator Ferguson. Are you through?

Mr. Welles. Thank you.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then do I understand that as part of the diplomatic negotiations and in cooperation with them it was decided by someone that the fleet would be transferred from the west coast to Hawaii?

Mr. Welles. My recollection is that it was felt that in view of the situation which was existing the continued refusal on the part of the United States to take measures which it regarded as necessary for the protection of its legitimate interests would be regarded as a sign of weakness and of acquiescence by the Japanese military leaders in their policies.

Senator Ferguson. Then it was the opinion of someone in our own Department, in our State Department, someone in our Government, that we would strengthen our position in the diplomatic field if we had the fleet stationed at Hawaii rather than on the west coast?

Mr. Welles. Those decisions with regard to the over-all policy covering both the diplomatic and the military and naval field were made, of course, by the President himself after consulting with the Secretary of State and his other advisers who were dealing with that question.

Senator Ferguson. So that would be the decision of the President of the United States?

Mr. Welles. It would have to be so.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did you understand, when you were talking about the fleet back in those days, that the fleet was to protect and defend Pearl Harbor, the Islands? Was that your understanding?

Mr. Welles. That the fleet was to defend Pearl Harbor?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Welles. My understanding was that it was part of a general strategy which was looked upon by the Navy Department for the protection of our interests throughout the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know why the Army had its installations at Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Welles. In the same sense, as a means of protection of our—
Senator Ferguson. Was it to protect the fleet?
Mr. Welles. As a means of protection of our interests throughout
the Pacific.
The Chairman. The hour of 12 having arrived, the committee will
stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.
(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock
p. m. of the same day.)

[1337]    AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Welles, you may resume the witness chair.
Senator Ferguson, you were inquiring.
Senator Ferguson. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF SUMNER WELLES (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Secretary, were you able to find any of the
messages I spoke to you about this morning?
Mr. Welles. I think, Senator Ferguson, I have the information
which you requested.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read it, please?
Mr. Welles. May I give you the information in full in my own way?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Welles. You will remember that there has already been read
the memorandum of my conversation of December 2 with the Jap-
anese Ambassador and with Mr. Kurusu in which I communicated
to them a message from the President. That is a part of the record,
as I understand it.
I found in my personal file, after the conclusion of the hearing this
morning, a copy of a letter which I sent on the same date to the British
Ambassador. I sent it by messenger. May I read the text of that?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; you may.
[1338] Mr. Welles. December 2d.

Personal and strictly confidential.
My dear Ambassador—

Senator Ferguson. It is 1941?
Mr. Welles. December 2, 1941.

My Dear Ambassador: In accordance with our telephone conversation I am
enclosing herewith for your personal and confidential information copies of the
two documents handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador
November 26th last.
Mr. Hull asks that I request you to see that every possible precaution is taken
to prevent any publicity.
I am likewise enclosing a copy of the document which I handed the Japanese
Ambassador this morning and which, as you will recall, is a copy of a memoran-
dum sent to me by the President.
Believe me, yours very sincerely.

My understanding is that the message from the President which I
communicated to the two Japanese Ambassadors and of which I sent
a copy to the British Ambassador on December 2 is the message
referred to in the telegram which was read this morning.
Senator Ferguson. Are those messages in the white papers
[1339] or in the Foreign Relations papers?
Mr. Welles. The message from the President which I communicated to the two Japanese Ambassadors and of which I sent a copy on December 2 to Lord Halifax is published as Document No. 262 in "Peace and War."

Senator Ferguson. That is commonly known as the white papers? Mr. Welles. I imagine so.
Mr. Murphy. What page?
Mr. Welles. Page 262, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Gesell. I might say the letters appear in volume II which many of the committee members have been using, the Foreign Relations of the United States, at page 778.

Senator Ferguson. One of the reasons I have asked you quite a number of questions, Mr. Welles, is that you had written a book, "The Time for Decision," and I noticed on the cover it had "Only a handful of men in the world have had access to the information on which this is based." Naturally I assumed that I had one of the men on the witness stand, or before me today, from whom I might get this information.

So I was trying to get as near the source as I could. I realize that it would be a great task for Mr. Hull to ask him the questions. So if you will just bear with me a little while I ask you questions—

[1340] Mr. Welles. I am entirely at the disposal of the committee and yourself, Senator Ferguson.

If you will permit me to make an observation with regard to my own feeling of modesty, an author is not always responsible for the blurbs on the covers of his publications.

Senator Ferguson. Even though he may benefit from that. I notice that on page 288 of your book you say:

The wisdom of any foreign policy can generally be determined only by its results. Any impartial estimate of our policy during these crucial years from 1936 to 1941 must, therefore, be appraised in that light. Our objectives, essentially, were those laid down for the Government by its chief military and naval advisers and in my own judgment our policy did delay the Japanese attack for at least a brief period.

Now, were you familiar with the note—call it a note—it is a memorandum—of November 5, of Admiral Stark and General Marshall, in relation to "no ultimatum." That was used in that note, as I remember it. I just use that to refresh your memory.

Mr. Welles. I have not got the text of that before me, but I do recollect it.

Senator Ferguson. Will you show Mr. Welles that, Counsel?
Mr. Gesell. Here is the memorandum on the top and the related documents. [Handing.]
Mr. Welles. Thank you.
Senator Ferguson. You may proceed, Mr. Welles.
Mr. Welles. I remember having seen this document, Senator. I couldn't at this moment say the precise date, however, upon which I first saw it.

Senator Ferguson. We might assume that you saw it near its delivery?
Mr. Welles. Approximately that time.
Senator Ferguson. And that indicates it was delivered on November 5?
Mr. Welles. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know there was another document delivered on the 27th, that either the Army or the Navy board refers to, one or the other?

Will you show him the one of the 27th?

Mr. Gessell. This is Exhibit 17 in this hearing.

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 17.

Do you know how it happens that that was delivered following the day of the note by Mr. Hull on the 26th, why it was not obtained before?

Mr. Welles. I could not answer that question. I am afraid that is a question that only Mr. Hull could answer.

Senator Ferguson. You haven't any knowledge on that?

[1342] Mr. Welles. I have no knowledge on that point.

Senator Ferguson. I think I asked you this morning whether or not it wasn't true, to your knowledge, that we carried on the negotiations subsequent to the Atlantic Conference, the Atlantic Charter meeting, that we carried it on?

Mr. Welles. That we——

Senator Ferguson. The United States Government.

Mr. Welles. The United States Government.

Senator Ferguson. The United States Government rather than the other governments—

Mr. Welles. Yes. That, of course, Senator, was a resumption of the negotiations which had been commenced in the preceding month of March by Mr. Hull. In other words, there is nothing new about it. It is the result of negotiations which had been interrupted.

Senator Ferguson. Could I see the instruments in exhibit 18, please.

Mr. Gesell. I think you have that.

Senator Ferguson. I may have it.

I have; if you will show Mr. Welles, the memorandum of November 24, 1941, I have a copy now. It is "Proposed Modus Vivendi for Submission to Japanese Ambassador."

Participants: Secretary of State Hull; the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax; the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih; the Australian Minister, Richard G. Casey; and the Netherlands Minister, Dr. A. Loudon.

If you will turn to page 3, I read:

They seemed to be thinking of the advantages to be derived without any particular thought of what we should pay for them, if anything. Finally, when I discovered that none of their governments had given them instructions relative to this phase of the matter, except in the case of the Netherlands Minister, I remarked that each of their governments was more interested in the defense of that area of the world than in this country, and at the same time they expected this country, in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area.

[1344]: Are you familiar with that?

Mr. Welles. I am familiar with the memorandum; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is initialed by Mr. Hull.

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with that fact at that time?

Mr. Welles. I was not present at this conference, if that is what you have in mind.

Senator Ferguson. No. How soon after this conference was had, did you become familiar with this memorandum or the information in the memorandum?
Mr. Welles. I remember that Mr. Hull spoke with me after the conference which he had had, and that he also saw the copy of this memorandum shortly after it had been dictated.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall reading that?

Mr. Welles. I recall reading it but my mind was more concentrated, perhaps, on the general conversation I had with him than on the precise phraseology of this memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what was meant by:

I remarked that each of their governments were more interested in the defense of that area of the world than this country and at the same time they expected this country—

I assume he means the other governments—

in case of a Japanese outbreak, to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area.

What is meant by that?

Mr. Welles. I think it would be perhaps more desirable, Senator, for you to get Mr. Hull to explain the language which he himself dictated, because this represents his own thinking at that time.

Senator Ferguson. What was your understanding as to his meaning?

Mr. Welles. My understanding is that what he had said here arose from the warning given to the Japanese Government by the President on August 17. If the Japanese Government undertook to continue its policy of conquest and expansion, the United States would be obliged, in its defense and safety, to take such steps as it considered necessary, and, obviously, those steps envisaged the possibility of military action.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, did you understand that the note of—the parallel note that I referred to this morning of August 17 committed us to the action that he is now mentioning in this note and at the same time they expected this country in case of a Japanese outbreak to be ready to move in a military way and take the lead in defending the entire area?

Mr. Welles. What I interpreted that note as meaning was that it envisaged the possibility that if Japan continued a policy of conquest and expansion in conflict with the legitimate interests of the United States the steps that this Government would then have to take to preserve its own security might lead to some form of conflict with Japan.

Senator Ferguson. Now, so that there won't remain any misunderstanding about this in the record I will read the rest of the instrument.

And yet I said their governments, through some sort of preoccupation in other directions, do not seem to know anything about these phases of the questions under discussion. I made it clear that I was definitely disappointed at these unexpected developments, at the lack of interest and lack of a disposition to cooperate. They said nothing except the Netherlands Minister who then replied that he had heard from his [1347] government and that it would support the modus vivendi proposal. I then indicated that I was not sure that I would present it to the Japanese Ambassador without knowing anything about the views and attitude of their governments. The meeting broke up in this fashion.

There were other details discussed but they were not of major consequence nor did they constitute anything new in the record.
And this is dated the 24th day of November 1941, a note or a memorandum of the conversation by Mr. Hull.

Could you give us the sequence of events which led to our position of being the negotiator with Japan in relation to this language used here?

Mr. Welles. As the statement presented to the committee by Mr. Hull on yesterday shows, the effort was commenced in the month of March of 1941 to find through direct negotiations between the United States Government and the Japanese Government some pacific solution of the crisis which was developing.

Those negotiations were interrupted when Japan moved into Indochina and occupied it and were later resumed shortly after August 17.

The United States Government was, therefore, in a position of already being a negotiator with Japan for a solution [1348] which, had it proved successful, would have solved all of the controversy arising in the Pacific area as an outgrowth of the militaristic policy of expansion and aggression upon which Japan had embarked.

The other countries involved, because of their vital interests in that region would under such circumstances, had the negotiations proved successful, found a solution of their difficulties as well. It, therefore, seems to me entirely logical that the United States should have been negotiating rather than other governments which were already participating in a major war.

Senator Ferguson. From then on would you say that we were receiving all of the information that the other governments, the ABCD part, all the military information in relation to the Pacific was coming to us from those governments because we were doing the negotiating?

Mr. Welles. I should say that we were receiving the bulk of the intelligence and other information from our own naval and military authorities; that very frequently information of value as to the developments was gained also from the British and Dutch and others of the governments primarily concerned.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not any of the other governments were breaking the Japanese diplomatic code?

[1349] Mr. Welles. My recollection is that the British Government was intercepting the messages just as we were.

Senator Ferguson. So that the British Government had all the information from the intercepted messages that we would have?

Mr. Welles. That is my clear recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you know whether any of the other governments, the Dutch Government, was breaking the code? I mean by "breaking the code" intercepting the messages and translating them.

Mr. Welles. My recollection is not clear on that point but my assumption would be that such information as was being obtained was made available to the Dutch Government by the British Government.

Senator Ferguson. The British Government, then, would be keeping the Dutch Government informed?

Mr. Welles. That is my assumption.

Senator Ferguson. And do you have any knowledge on the Chinese Government?

Mr. Welles. I am not informed on that point.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear of the "winds" message, so described?
Mr. Welles. I could not say that at that time I had any knowledge of it that I now recollect. As I said this morning, Senator, it is very difficult after 4 years—
Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that.
Mr. Welles (continuing). To recollect with any accuracy, particularly when you have been reading the newspapers, as I have, with regard to the hearings and with regard to the matters that are coming up for discussion.
Senator Ferguson. The word "winds" message or "wind execute" message, then, does not get a response?
Mr. Welles. I could not at this time say that I had ever seen it until I saw it in the press more recently.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you know what I am talking about when I speak of it?
Mr. Welles. Yes and—
Mr. Gesell, May I interpose, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. I do not suppose Mr. Welles could have seen the execute in the papers. The only discussion, or the only message released has been the code itself. The question of execute is something we are still—
Senator Ferguson. Working on.
Mr. Gesell (continuing). Working on, right.
Senator Ferguson. Well, Mr. Welles, did you ever know that there had been an execute? In other words, if there had been a carrying out of the original message that they would indicate the break in diplomatic relations by using the direction of the wind.
Mr. Welles. To the best of my recollection, Senator, I did not.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear from any source that the Japanese Ambassadors in various places, for instance, here in Washington and in London, were destroying codes, or did you ever hear of it?
Mr. Welles. I recollect that shortly before December 7th an intercept gave an indication that the Japanese Embassy here was instructed to destroy its papers.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall when that was?
Mr. Welles. Without referring to a record I could not give you the precise day or time.
Senator Ferguson. Was it prior to the 7th?
Mr. Welles. Prior to the 7th.
Senator Ferguson. What did that signify to you as a diplomat and Under Secretary of State?
Mr. Welles. That signified to me that the last stage had been reached.
Senator Ferguson. I did not catch that.
Mr. Welles. That signified to me that the last stage had been reached.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say it indicated war?
Mr. Welles. A rupture of diplomatic relations at the very least and under the circumstances then existing the probability of war.
Senator Ferguson. Did that help you to form your opinion on the percentage that you gave me this morning on the 7th?

Mr. Welles. That was decidedly one of the contributing factors.

Senator Ferguson. I am reading now from a memo that was given to us this morning. That is the telegram dated November the 30th, 1941, received at 1:28 p.m., sent by our Ambassador, Mr. Winant. Do you have a copy of that? That was given to us this morning.

Mr. Welles. Thank you.

Senator Ferguson. Now, in the text, this being the sentence, the last part of the sentence that I want to inquire about [reading]:

We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours.

[1353] Now, it is the part, "And in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours." What was he referring to?

Mr. Welles. The situation by November 30 had already reached such a point that it was very clear that the possibility of hostilities was imminent and in that event I would assume that the only construction that could be given to the sentence which you have read, Senator, would be that those arrangements to be synchronized with ours referred to naval and military operations.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever heard of that synchronizing of our military operations as being known as the ABCD bloc?

Mr. Welles. No; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. I asked you this morning if you recalled who were present at the Atlantic Conference. I have a copy of the New York Times here and it lists the names and I wonder whether you would check it to see whether it refreshes your memory.

Mr. Welles. Certainly.

Mr. Murphy. May we have the date for the record, please?

Mr. Welles. The date is Sunday, August 17, Mr. Congressman. Yes, Senator.

[1354] Senator Ferguson. Will you give the names of those listed as being present to see whether it refreshes your memory?

Mr. Welles. General Marshall, General Arnold, General Burns, Colonel Bundy, Admiral Stark, Admiral King, Admiral Turner, Captain Sherman, Mr. Hopkins, Averell Harriman, General Watson, Captain Beardall, and Dr. McIntire.

Senator Ferguson. Captain Beardall was naval aide to the President, was he not?

Mr. Welles. That is correct. Mr. Harriman had flown up with me at the time that I went.

Senator Ferguson. What was his position at the time, Mr. Harriman?

Mr. Welles. He was stationed, as I recall it, in London at that time in connection with lend-lease operations.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Hopkins' position? That was Harry Hopkins.

Mr. Welles. Harry Hopkins arrived some time after the Atlantic Charter Conference had started. I think that he flew over with Lord Beaverbrook, who had come down to see Mr. Churchill. My recollection is that they arrived 1 day or perhaps 2 days before the meeting broke up.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation with [1355] Mr. Hopkins about this parallel promise? Mr. Welles. None whatever. Senator Ferguson. Was he present when you discussed it with the President? Mr. Welles. As I said this morning, Senator, my recollection is that I was alone with the President at the time that our conversation on this point took place.

Senator Ferguson. Now, there is one other item in that book on the 24th that I have marked, and I would like to have you read that item from the New York Times of the 25th. I have marked the paragraph there.

Mr. Murphy. The page?

Senator Ferguson. Would you identify the paper that you are reading from?

Mr. Welles. Yes. It is the New York Times, Monday, August 25th. The article is headed: "Text of Prime Minister Churchill's address on meeting with President." The marked paragraph is as follows:

It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed, [1356] but this I must say, that if these hopes—there is a typographical error; I think the word must be "fail"—that if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.

That is the marked paragraph.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would you say that that would be, in effect, carrying out this parallel arrangement?

Mr. Welles. I should not, Senator. I should say that at that time that was a unilateral declaration on the part of the British Prime Minister.

Senator Ferguson. And had nothing to do, in your opinion, with the parallel action?

Mr. Welles. I think the parallel action should be regarded as separate from this. In my judgment this is a unilateral declaration, a unilateral declaration which, of course, arose from the fact that the two governments had agreed on a parallel course of action.

Senator Ferguson. This was a radio broadcast to the world, was it not, this particular language?

Mr. Welles. The heading of it as I read it, as I remember it, says, "Text of Prime Minister's Address."

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Welles. I do not remember whether it was or not.

[1357] Senator Ferguson. You would not say, then, that that was the carrying out of the British side of the parallel action?

Mr. Welles. I should not. I should interpret the British side of the parallel action as being a warning delivered to the Japanese Government by the British Government of the same character as the warning delivered by the President to the Japanese Government.

Senator Ferguson. And it would be an exchange of diplomatic notes rather than a radio address?

Mr. Welles. Most decidedly, in my judgment.
Senator Ferguson. Will you look at Peace and War—United States Foreign Policy—and see whether or not there are any notes between the date of the delivery of the note of August the 17th and their reply of the 28th?

Mr. Welles. I want to get your question clear, please, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I want to know what diplomatic relations we had, as far as notes were concerned, between the 17th, Sunday, when the President returned, on August 1941, and the date of the reply of Japan to that note on August the 28th, if I am correct on my date of the reply, the 28th.

Mr. Welles. There is nothing published here between August 17th and August 28th, except for the message of the President to the Congress.

[1358] Senator Ferguson. That is the message of August what?

Mr. Welles. August 21, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. 21st?

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, at this place I would like to insert where I referred this morning, or we can do it right here, I would like to insert in the record the message of the President to Congress on the 21st, being the only paper in this book between those dates.

The Chairman. Do you want it inserted as a part of the transcript?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; as part of the transcript. It is a short message; it is only several pages.

Mr. Gesell. May I interpose, Senator. While Mr. Welles has been looking at one book I have been looking at the other.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I want to get your help.

Mr. Gesell. And I see in volume 2, Japan, Foreign Relations with the United States, refers to several conversations which were held with the Japanese Ambassador on various subjects, particularly a rather lengthy one I haven’t read, “Memorandum by the Secretary of State on August 23rd of his talk with the Japanese Ambassador.”

Senator Ferguson. That is what I want to get in the record.

[1359] Mr. Welles. My volume, Senator, is entitled “Documents.” There probably is a distinction made in the publication between conversations and documents.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I have the message from the President inserted?

The Chairman. Without objection, it will be inserted at this point in the transcript here.

(The message referred to follows:)

Message of President Roosevelt to the Congress, August 21, 1941, Embodying Text of the Atlantic Charter

Over a week ago I held several important conferences at sea with the British Prime Minister. Because of the factor of safety to British, Canadian, and American ships, and their personnel, no prior announcement of these meetings could properly be made.

At the close, a public statement by the Prime Minister and the President was made. I quote it for the information of the Congress and for the record:

"The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, have met at sea. "They have been accompanied by officials of their two Governments, including high-ranking officers of their military, naval, and air services."
The whole problem of the supply or munitions of war, as provided by the Lease-Lend Act, for the armed forces of the United States, and for those countries actively engaged in resisting aggression, has been further examined.

"Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Supply of the British Government, has joined in these conferences. He is going to proceed to Washington to discuss further details with appropriate officials of the United States Government. These conferences will also cover the supply problems of the Soviet Union."

"The President and the Prime Minister have had several conferences. They have considered the dangers to world civilization arising from the policies of military domination by conquest upon which the Hitlerite government of Germany and other governments associated therewith have embarked, and have made clear the steps which their countries are respectively taking for their safety in the face of these dangers.

"They have agreed upon the following joint declaration:

"Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the essential national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

"First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

"Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

"Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security;

"Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

"Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

"Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments."

"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

"WINSTON S. CHURCHILL"

Senator Ferguson. Now, will counsel put in at least a memo on what the documents are between those dates?

Mr. Gesell. These are memos of conversations; they are not documents.

Senator Ferguson. They are not documents.

Mr. Welles, there were no exchanges of documents between those dates?

Mr. Welles. According to publications I have, there were no exchanges of documents between those dates.

Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask counsel to see whether or not we intercepted any messages during that period.

Mr. Gesell. You mean translated, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Yes, there were a number of messages translated in that period.
Senator Ferguson. Do they relate in any way to this document?

Mr. Gesell. Senator, I haven't had an opportunity to read them. They begin with the message on page 15 of exhibit 1, and they run through to—let me see, what date I was going to; the 28th, is it not?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, up to the 28th.

The Congress and the President having heretofore determined, through the Lend-Lease Act, on the national policy of American aid to the democracies which East and West are waging war against dictatorships, the military and naval conversations at these meetings made clear gains in furthering the effectiveness of this aid.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister and I are arranging for conferences with the Soviet Union to aid it in its defense against the attack made by the principal aggressor of the modern world—Germany.

Finally, the declaration of principles at this time presents a goal which is worth-while for our type of civilization to seek. It is so clear-cut that it is difficult to oppose in any major particular without automatically admitting a willingness to accept compromise with Nazism; or to agree to a world peace which would give to Nazism domination over large numbers of conquered nations. Inevitably such a peace would be a gift to Nazism to the take breath—armed breath—for a second war to extend the control over Europe and Asia, to the American Hemisphere itself.

It is perhaps unnecessary for me to call attention once more to the utter lack of validity of the spoken or written word of the Nazi government.

It is also unnecessary for me to point out that the declaration of principles includes, of necessity, the world need for freedom of religion and freedom of information. No [1364] society of the world organized under the announced principles could survive without these freedoms which are a part of the whole freedom for which we strive.

Mr. Gesell. Well, with one or two that do not seem to be on that point, they run to page 21. I have not read them [1366] all. Then there are several in volume 2 that relate to espionage activities in that same period.

Senator Ferguson. I notice in the one instance on page 17, Mr. Welles, it is from Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, August 16, 1941; which would be before this message was given, and part of it says:

"That this sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree."

Now, that was sent prior to the 17th. Had you ever heard whether or not Japan was intercepting our messages?

Mr. Welles. I had no reason to think so at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Did the State Department, to your knowledge, know that Japan knew we were intercepting their diplomatic messages?

Mr. Welles. The Department had no reason to think so. We were doing everything on earth, of course, to prevent such knowledge being obtained by them.

Senator Ferguson. As far as you knew, they did not know that?

Mr. Welles. So far as I knew, there was no chance that they did.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you recall any messages intercepted between the delivery of that note and the reply?

Mr. Welles. I do not offhand recall, Senator. I would [1367] have to refresh my memory by reading these messages here.

Senator Ferguson. Now I would like to go to the 6th of December 1941. You were in your office on that particular day, as you told me this morning, is that correct?

Mr. Welles. Yes, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. And on that day, will you relate from memory, unless you have some book or record, what occurred? I notice you
stated once that you had a private file, that you obtained a paper from a private file. Did I understand you correctly?

Mr. Welles. When I left the Department of State, Senator, all of my documents that related to official business became part of the archives of the Department of State, and I retained only copies of memoranda or conversations, and a small amount of personal correspondence.

Senator Ferguson. But the originals of those copies of memoranda or conversations should be in the State Department?

Mr. Welles. They are all on file in the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. So we would be able to find in the State Department anything that you have and there would be no need of going over your file?

Mr. Welles. Absolutely. The originals of everything I had were left in the Department of State.

Senator Ferguson. Have you anything relating to the 6th?

Mr. Welles. I have no diaries, as I said before, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I mean any memo of conversations.

Mr. Welles. I am afraid the files of the Department will have to be searched to find memorandums of conversations which I had on that day. I remember that the day was unusually rushed. At that particular moment I was exceedingly concerned with regard to the situation in the Western Hemisphere, and a good deal of my thought, time, and attention was given to that phase of the world problem. At the same time, as I said this morning, I think I had received information which was brought to the Secretary of State, in his office, when I was present, with regard to the Japanese troop movement, with regard to Japanese naval movement, all of which added to the gravity and burden of the day.

Senator Ferguson. So that was a very important day in the history of the United States, as far as the State Department was concerned?

Mr. Welles. In every sense of the word.

Senator Ferguson. You had received the message from Ambassador Winant at 11:40. I will ask you when you first knew that Japan was replying to the note of the 26th. What time on the 6th did you know that they were replying to Mr. Hull's note of the 26th?

Mr. Welles. I could not attempt to give you the precise hour.

Senator Ferguson. Can you give it near the hour?

Mr. Welles. What you have in mind, I assume from your question, is when I had knowledge of intercepts which showed that the Japanese were replying.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. When did you first know or get information that the Japanese were replying?

Mr. Welles. My present recollection is that I had no knowledge of it until the Sunday, not on the Saturday.

Senator Ferguson. Even though the Army or Navy, or both, were getting parts of the message during the day, you do not recall now any information on that?

Mr. Welles. The best of my recollection, Senator, is that I knew nothing of that until the following morning. But it is not very surprising that I should not have received any such message. Mr. Hull himself, as I said before, was in charge of that particular ques-
tion. It was occupying practically all of his time and attention, and I, since the Department of State had to continue operating notwithstanding, was doing the best I could to handle any important or difficult urgent problems which were coming up, and consequently my own feeling is that it was very natural that information of that important character should have been communicated directly to Mr. Hull and to the President and not to myself.

[1370] Senator Ferguson. Now, will you state to us the important matters that you were handling on that day?

Mr. Welles. I should have to go to the records of the Department in order to give you an accurate answer.

Senator Ferguson. Could you do that?

Mr. Welles. I think undoubtedly the records of the Department will show it.

Senator Ferguson. They were at least relating to the Far East, that is, the Pacific area there, were they not?

Mr. Welles. The matters that I was handling, Senator, at that particular time, as I have attempted to indicate, had to do primarily with the very grave situation which we were confronting in the Western Hemisphere, a grave situation in view of the fact that in the world situation as it then was it was to the highest degree necessary and desirable that the closest kind of cooperation and understanding be maintained between the United States and the other American Republics. That, in my judgment, was one of the foundations of our own security.

Senator Ferguson. And if war came, you felt it was necessary that we get the cooperation of the South American and Central American Republics at once?

Mr. Welles. I regarded them as of the most vitally important to the security of this country.

Senator Ferguson. That would be true because of the Panama Canal, if for no other reason?

Mr. Welles. If the United States was faced with the possibility of war on both oceans, which had been overshadowing all of our minds for weeks, it certainly was of the highest importance that we should not be faced with the possibility of any Axis machinations in the New World.

Senator Ferguson. But the record shows, and parts of the testimony indicate, that parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 would be in Washington. I am talking now about the reply on the 26th, at 11:49 Washington time. That was a.m. But you do not recall now any information about that particular message until Sunday?

Mr. Welles. I do not recall any specific information in regard to it until Sunday morning.

Senator Ferguson. And you would think that that kind of message, that kind of information that we were receiving their reply, would go directly to Mr. Hull and to the President?

Mr. Welles. That is my understanding. It seems to me the logical thing under those conditions.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on Sunday, do you know what hour of the day you had heard that we had intercepted their message or their reply?

Mr. Welles. I remember that I was informed in the early morning on Sunday when I reached my office that an appointment
had been requested by the Japanese Ambassadors with the Secretary of State, at approximately the same time, my understanding was, that they were going to deliver the reply which was coming through. I did not see Mr. Hull that morning, I did not see him until after he got through, to the best of my recollection, with his interview with the Japanese Ambassadors. The first knowledge, as I think I said this morning, which I had of the attack upon Pearl Harbor, came through a telephone conversation which the President had with me when he gave me the information.

Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask you to give us what the President of the United States said to you in that telephone conversation.

Mr. Welles. It would be very hazardous for me to attempt to give you anything that approached a textual version of what the President said to me on the telephone, and I would not attempt it.

Senator Ferguson. Would you give us the substance of what the President said?

[1373] Mr. Welles. The gist of what he told me was the fact that the attack on Pearl Harbor had taken place, and that he wished me to come over to the White House at some time which he fixed that afternoon.

Senator Ferguson. It was a very short conversation?

Mr. Welles. It was a very short conversation.

Senator Ferguson. Did you go to the White House?

Mr. Welles. I went to the White House at the time that the President fixed. I should say it was about 3 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know whether or not the President had conferred with anyone Sunday morning?

Mr. Welles. I could not undertake to answer that question.

Senator Ferguson. From what he had said——

Mr. Welles. The President did not tell me with whom he had spoken on the telephone.

Senator Ferguson. Did you then talk about the attack on Pearl Harbor, Sunday afternoon at 3 o'clock?

Mr. Welles. In the first conversation which I had with him at that time he gave me certain reports which were reaching him. I remember that some of the reports gave the impression that the Japanese were attempting to undertake landings on the islands, reports which were later disproved. At that time, as I remember it, he had no detailed or full information [1374] whatever as to the extent of the attack.

Senator Ferguson. Was there anyone present other than you and the President?

Mr. Welles. He was sitting alone in his office on the second floor of the White House. There was nobody with him.

Senator Ferguson. He was receiving messages on the attack?

Mr. Welles. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And it was solely on the attack that you were discussing, the Pearl Harbor incident?

Mr. Welles. I remember, even in the first conversation—I think I had three with him that day—he discussed the need for him at the earliest possible moment either to appear before the Congress or to send a message to the Congress.
Senator Ferguson. Did you help him to prepare the message to Congress?

Mr. Welles. He asked me to undertake to help him take care of that message; yes.

Senator Ferguson. Did you help him prepare that message.

Mr. Welles. I helped to prepare the original draft; yes.

Senator Ferguson. That was delivered on Monday morning, was it?

Mr. Welles. I would have to have my memory refreshed [1375] on that.

Senator Ferguson. That was the 8th?

The Vice Chairman. Monday noon.

Mr. Welles. Monday noon.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when Congress recessed the time before; that is, before the 8th? Do you know whether they recessed on the 4th? I think my able colleague, the Senator from Illinois, moved that it recess until Monday morning, or until Monday noon. Did you know that it had recessed?

Mr. Welles. On what day?

Senator Ferguson. On the 4th.

Mr. Welles. On December 4?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Welles. I undoubtedly knew at the time. I cannot at the moment say just when I knew it, or more about it, other than the fact that I did know it at the time.

Senator Ferguson. Had you worked on the message that is now in your file, that has been offered in evidence, but never delivered to Congress?

Would you show it to him, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. Welles. I do not know exactly what message you have in mind, Senator.

Mr. Gesell. That is exhibit 19, Senator.

[1376] Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 19. Will you just review exhibit 19 and see whether you had any part in it?

Mr. Welles. I had no part in the drafting of that message whatever.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not, or did you know, that the President had in mind the delivery of a message such as we have here now in evidence?

Mr. Welles. The draft which is dated November 29, 1941, is that the one you have in mind?

Senator Ferguson. Of any message prior to the 7th, to the day of the attack, on the Japanese far eastern question.

Mr. Welles. I have no knowledge whatever of the preparation of this draft which you have just asked me to refer to.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted on any draft prior to Pearl Harbor in relation to our far eastern question?

Mr. Welles. I do not remember that I was consulted with regard to any other draft.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted with relation to the draft of the message to Congress on August 21, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter message?

Mr. Welles. I had no part in the preparation of that draft, as I recall it. I remember that the President told me that he intended to deliver such a message to the Congress at the first opportunity, but I
had nothing whatever to do with the preparation of the text.

Senator Ferguson. Was the Atlantic Charter in writing and signed by the President and by Mr. Churchill, as indicated in the message?

Mr. Welles. The Atlantic Charter, Senator, was a joint communique issued by the heads of two governments. As is very often the case, it was not a signed agreement, simply an agreement on a public release by the chiefs of the two governments in order to indicate what their respective policies were and what the objectives were which they sought for a better and more decent world at the end of the war.

Senator Ferguson. It was what you would call, then, in the nature of a press or public release?

Mr. Welles. I should say it was, technically, if you will permit the use of the word "technical," it was technically a joint communique, which is a joint release to the public opinion of the world.

Senator Ferguson. And that may account for the fact that in the document now published in the address to Congress it indicates that it was signed by the authors of the communique?

Mr. Welles. They both agreed upon it. I remember, just before Mr. Churchill left, since he left before the President did, a final text was gone over, one or two slight changes were made, and it was then sent by the President to be retyped in order that it could be transmitted by radio to Washington.

Senator Ferguson. And was so transmitted, in your opinion?

Mr. Welles. It was so transmitted to the White House.

Senator Ferguson. No press release or communique was given in relation to the parallel action that we have discussed earlier?

Mr. Welles. No press communique was given in regard to that, because, in my judgment, the President's feeling must have been that it was impossible to conceive of any successful negotiation with the Japanese if it was publicly stated that we were delivering a warning to the Japanese.

[1379] Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss that with the President.

Mr. Welles. I do not remember discussing that phase of it.

Senator Ferguson. So that is your conclusion at the present time?

Mr. Welles. That is my conclusion, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. As to why no release would be given?

Mr. Welles. That is merely my conclusion.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, just in connection with the Senator's insertion in the record of one paragraph of the New York Times on the speech of Mr. Churchill, the first sentence that the Senator had read was, "It is certain that this has got to stop." I think, in order to show what was being referred to in the previous paragraph, certainly it ought to be incorporated, because Mr. Churchill talked about the menace to the Philippine Islands under the protection of the United States.

Senator Ferguson. I will be glad to have that paragraph in the record.

The Chairman. Why not let the whole speech go in?

Mr. Murphy. It should go in.
(An excerpt from the New York Times, August 25, 1941, containing the text of Prime Minister Churchill's address, follows:)

[1380] TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER CURTISCHILL'S ADDRESS ON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

[The New York Times, August 25, 1941]

(Following is the text of Prime Minister Winston Churchill's address yesterday as recorded by the New York Times:)

I thought you would like me to tell you something about the voyage which I made across the ocean to meet our great friend, the President of the United States.

Exactly where we met is a secret, but I don't think I shall be indiscreet if I go so far as to say that it was somewhere in the Atlantic. In a spacious, land-locked bay which reminded me of the west coast of Scotland, powerful American warships; protected by strong flotillas and far-ranging aircraft, awaited our arrival and, as it were, stretched out a hand to help us in.

Our party arrived in the newest, or almost the newest British battleship, the Prince of Wales, with a modest escort of British and Canadian destroyers. And there for 3 days I spent my time in company, and I think I may say in comradeship, with Mr. Roosevelt, while all the time the chiefs of the staff and naval and military commanders, both of the British Empire and of the United States, sat together in continual council.

President Roosevelt is the thrice-chosen head of the most powerful state and community in the world. I am the servant of King and Parliament, at present charged with the principal direction of our affairs in these fateful times. And it is my [1387] duty also to make sure, as I have made sure, that anything I say or do in the exercise of my office is approved and sustained by the whole British Commonwealth of Nations. Therefore this meeting was bound to be important because of the enormous forces, at present only a partially mobilized, but steadily mobilizing, which are at the disposal of these two major groupings of the human family, the British Empire and the United States, who, fortunately for the progress of mankind, happened to speak the same language and very largely think the same thoughts, or anyhow think a lot of the same thoughts.

MEETING WAS SYMBOLIC

The meeting was, therefore, symbolic. That is its prime importance. It symbolizes in a form and manner which every one can understand in every land and in every clime, the deep underlying unities which stir and, at decisive moments, rule the English-speaking peoples throughout the world.

Would it be presumptuous for me to say that it symbolizes something even more majestic, namely, the marshaling of the good forces of the world against the evil forces which are now so formidable and triumphant and which have cast their cruel spell over the whole of Europe and a large part of Asia.

This was a meeting which marks forever in the pages of history the taking up by the English-speaking nations, amid all this peril, tumult and confusion, of the guidance of the [1382] fortunes of the broad toiling masses in all the continents, and our loyal effort, without any clog of selfish interest to lead them forward out of the miseries into which they have been plunged, back to the broad high road of freedom and justice. This is the highest honor and the most glorious opportunity which could ever have come to any branch of the human race.

When one beholds how many currents of extraordinary and terrible events have flowed together to make this harmony, even the most skeptical person must have the feeling that we all have the chance to play our part and do our duty in some great design, the end of which no mortal can foresee. Awful and horrible things I have seen in these days.

BARBARISM PLUS SCIENCE

The whole of Europe has been wrecked and trampled down by the mechanical weapons and barbaric fury of the Nazis. The most deadly instruments of war science have joined to the extreme refinements of treachery and the most brutal exhibitions of ruthlessness and thus have formed a combine of aggression, the
like of which has never been known, before which the rights, the traditions, the characteristics and the structure of many ancient, honored states and peoples have been laid prostrate and are now ground down under the heel and terror of a monster.

The Austrians, the Czechs, the Poles, the Norwegians, the Danes, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Greeks, the Croats and the Serbs, above all the great French nation, have been stunned and pinioned. Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, have bought a shameful respite by becoming the jackals of the tiger. But their situation is very little different and will presently be indistinguishable from that of his victims. Sweden, Spain, and Turkey stand appalled, wondering which will be struck down next. Here then is the vast pit into which all the most famous States and races of Europe have been flung and from which, unaided, they can never climb.

But all this did not satiate Adolph Hitler. He made a treaty of non-aggression with Soviet Russia, just as he made one with Turkey, in order to keep them quiet until he was ready to attack them. And then, 9 weeks ago today, without a vestige of provocation, he hurled millions of soldiers with all their apparatus upon the neighbor he had called his friend, with the avowed object of destroying Russia and tearing her in pieces.

This frightful business is now unfolding day by day before our eyes. Here is a devil who, in a mere spasm of his pride and lust for domination, can condemn two or three millions, perhaps it may be many more, of human beings to speedy and violent death. Let Russia be blotted out. Let Russia be destroyed. Order the armies to advance. Such were his decrees. Accordingly, from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, six or seven millions of soldiers are locked in mortal struggle.

[1384]

RUSSIA NOT SO EASY

Ah, but this time it was not so easy. This time it was not all one way. The Russian armies and all the peoples of the Russian Republic have rallied to the defense of their hearts and homes. For the first time Nazi blood has flowed in a fearful flood. Certainly a million and a half, perhaps two millions of Nazi cannon-fodder, have hit the dust of the endless plains of Russia. The tremendous battle rages along nearly 2,000 miles of front. The Russians fight with magnificent devotion. Not only that, our generals who have visited the Russian front line report with admiration the efficiency of their military organization and the excellence of their equipment.

The aggressor is surprised, startled, staggered. For the first time in his experience mass murder has become unprofitable. He retaliates by the most frightful cruelties. As his armies advance, whole districts are being exterminated. Scores of thousands, literally scores of thousands of executions in cold blood are being perpetrated by the German police troops upon the Russian patriots who defend their native soil. Since the Mongol invasions of Europe in the sixteenth century there has never been methodical, merciless butchery on such a scale or approaching such a scale. And, this is but the beginning. Famine and pestilence have yet to follow in the bloody ruts of Hitler's tanks.

We are in the presence of a crime without a name. But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and devastated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as if it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about the vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now, they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They snatch Indochina from the wretched Vichy French. The menace by their movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and menace the Philippine Islands under the protection of the United States.

JAPAN MUST BE HALTED

It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.
And thus we come back to the quiet bay, somewhere in the Atlantic, where misty sunshine plays on great ships which carry the White Ensign or the Stars and Stripes.

We had the idea when we met there, the President and I, [1386] that without attempting to draw final and formal peace aims, or war aims, it was necessary to give all peoples, and especially the oppressed and conquered peoples, a simple, rough-and-ready wartime statement of the goal toward which the British Commonwealth and the United States mean to make their way and thus make a way for others to march with them on a road which will certainly be painful and may be long.

There are, however, two distinct and marked differences in this joint declaration from the attitude adopted by the Allies during the latter part of the last war and no one should overlook them. The United States and Great Britain do not now assume that there will never be any more war again. On the contrary, we intend to take ample precaution to prevent its renewal in any period we can foresee by effectively disarming the guilty nations while remaining suitably protected ourselves.

The second difference is this: That instead of trying to ruin German trade by all kinds of additional trade barriers and hindrances, as was the mood of 1917, we have definitely adopted the view that it is not in the interests of the world and of our two countries that any large nation should be unprosperous or shut out from the means of making a decent living for itself and its people by its industry and enterprise.

FAR-REACHING CHANGES

These are far-reaching changes of principle upon which all [1387] countries should ponder.

Above all, it was necessary to give hope and the assurance of final victory to those many scores of millions of men and women who are battling for life and freedom or who are already bent down under the Nazi yoke.

Hitler and his confederates have for some time past been adjuring and beseeching the populations whom they have wronged and injured to bow to their fate, and to resign themselves to their servitude and, for the sake of some mitigation and inducements, to collaborate—that is the word—in what is called the new order in Europe.

What is this new order which they seek to fasten first upon Europe and, if possible—for their ambitions are boundless—upon all the continents of the globe? It is the rule of the Herrenvolk—the master race—who are to put an end to democracy, to parliaments, to the fundamental freedoms and decencies of ordinary men and women, to the historic rights of nations, and give them in exchange the iron rule of Prussia, the universal goose step and the strict efficient discipline, enforced upon the working classes by the political police, with the German concentration camps and firing parties, now so busy in a dozen lands, always handy in the background. There is the new order.

Napoleon in his glory and genius spread his empire far and wide. There was a time when only the snows of Russia and the white cliffs of Dover with their guardian fleets stood between [1388] him and dominion of the world. Napoleon's armies had a theme. They carried with them the surges of the French Revolution—"Liberty, equality, and fraternity." That was the cry. There was a sweeping away of outworn, medieval systems and aristocratic privilege. There was the land for the people—a new code of law. Nevertheless, Napoleon's empire vanished like a dream.

But Hitler—Hitler has no theme—naught but mania, appetite, and exploitation. He has, however, weapons and machinery for grinding down and for holding down conquered countries which are the product—the sadly perverted product—of modern science.

HOPE FOR THE CONQUERED

The ordeals, therefore, of the conquered peoples will be hard. We must give them hope. We must give them the conviction that their sufferings and their resistances will not be in vain. The tunnel may be dark and long, but at the end there is light. That is the symbolism and that is the message of the Atlantic meeting.

Do not despair, brave Norwegians, your land shall be cleansed, not only from the invader but from the filthy quislings who are his tools.

Be strong in your souls, Czechs, your independence shall be restored.
Poles, the heroism of your people, standing up to cruel oppressors, the courage of your soldiers, sailors, and airmen shall not be forgotten. Your country shall live again and resume its [1389] rightful part in the new organization of Europe.

Lift up your heads, gallant Frenchmen. Not all the infamies of Darlan and of Laval shall stand between you and the restoration of your birthright.

Stout-hearted Dutch, Belgians, Luxemburgers, tormented, mishandled, shamefully cast away peoples of Yugoslavia, glorious Greece, now subjected to the crowning insult of the rule of the Italian jackanapes, yield not an inch. Keep your souls clean from all contact with the Nazis. Make them feel even in their fleeting hour of brutal triumph that they are the moral outcasts of mankind. Help is coming. Mighty forces are arming in your behalf. Have faith, have hope, deliverance is sure.

There is the signal which we have flashed across the waters and if it reaches the hearts of those to whom it is sent they will endure with fortitude and tenacity their present misfortune in the sure faith that they, too, are still serving the common cause and that our efforts will not be in vain.

You will, perhaps, have noticed that the President of the United States and the British representative in what is aptly called the Atlantic Charter have jointly pledged their countries to the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny. That is a solemn and grave undertaking. It must be made good. It will be made good, and, of course, many practical arrangements to fulfill that purpose have been and are being organized and set in motion.

HOW NEAR IS UNITED STATES TO WAR?

[1389] The question has been asked: "How near is the United States to war?" There is certainly one man who knows the answer to that question. If Hitler has not yet declared war upon the United States it is surely not out of his love for American institutions. It is certainly not because he could not find a pretext. He has murdered half a dozen countries for far less. Fear, fear of immediately redoubling the tremendous energies now being employed against him is no doubt the restraining influence. But the real reason is, I am sure, to be found in the method to which he has so faithfully adhered and by which he has gained so much.

What is that method? It is a very simple method. One by one—that is his plan. That is his guiding rule. That is the trick by which he has enslaved so large a portion of the world.

Three and a half years ago I appealed to my fellow countrymen to take the lead in weaving together a strong defensive union within the principles of the League of Nations, a union of all the countries who felt themselves in ever-growing danger. But none would listen. All stood idle while Germany rearmed.

ONE BY ONE

Czechoslovakia was subjugated. A French Government deserted their faithful ally and broke a plighted word in that ally's hour of need. Russia was cajoled and deceived into a kind of neutrality or partnership while the French Army was being annihilated. The Low Countries and the Scandinavian countries, acting with France and Great Britain in good time even after the war had begun, might have altered its course and would have had at any rate a fighting chance. The Balkan states had only to stand together to save themselves from the ruin by which they are now engulfed. But one by one they were undermined and overwhelmed. Never was the career of crime made more smooth.

Now Hitler is striking at Russia with all his might, well knowing the difficulties of geography which stand between Russia and the aid which the western democracies are trying to bring. We shall strive our utmost to overcome all difficulties and to bring this aid. We have arranged for a conference in Moscow between the United States, British, and Russian authorities to settle the whole plan. No barrier must stand in the way. But why is Hitler striking at Russia and inflicting this suffering on himself, or rather making his soldiers suffer this frightful slaughter?

It is with the declared object of turning his whole force upon the British Islands and, if he can succeed in beating the life and strength out of us, which is
not so easy, then is the moment when he will settle his account, and it is already a long one, with the people of the United States and generally with the Western Hemisphere.

One by one—there is the process. There is the simple dismal plan which has served Hitler so well. It needs but one final successful application to make him the master of the world.

I am devoutly thankful that some eyes at least are fully [1392] opened to it while time remains. I rejoice to find that the President saw in their true light and proportion the extreme dangers by which the American people, as well as the British people, are now beset.

IMPORTANCE OF UNITED STATES FLEET

It was indeed by the mercy of God that he began 8 years ago that revival of the strength of the American Navy without which the New World today would have to take its orders from the European dictators, but with which the United States still retains the power to marshal her gigantic strength and, in saving herself, render an incomparable service to mankind.

We had a church parade on Sunday in our Atlantic bay. The President came onto the quarter-deck of the Prince of Wales where there were mingled together many hundreds of American and British sailors and marines. The sun shone bright and warm while we all sang the old hymns which are our common inheritance and which we learned as children in our homes. We sang the hymn founded on the psalm which John Hampden's soldiers sang when they bore his body to the grave and in which the brief precarious span of human life is contrasted with the immutability of Him to whom a thousand ages are but as yesterday and as a watch that is passed in the night.

We sang the sailors' hymn "For those in Peril," and there are very many in peril on the sea. We sang "Onward, Christian [1393] Soldiers," and indeed I felt that this was no vain presumption, but that we had the right to feel that we were serving a cause for the sake of which a trumpet has sounded from on high.

When I looked upon that densely packed congregation of the fighting men of the same language, of the same faith, of the same fundamental laws, of the same ideals and to a large extent, of the same interests and certainly in different degrees facing the same dangers, it swept across me that here was the only hope but also the sure hope of saving the world from merciless degradation.

And so we came back across the ocean waves uplifted in spirit, fortified in resolve. Some American destroyers, which were carrying mails to the United States marines in Iceland, happened to be going the same way, too, so we made a joyous company at sea together.

And when we were right out in midpassage one afternoon a noble sight broke on the view. We overtook one of the convoys which carry the munitions and supplies of the New World to sustain the champions of freedom in the Old. The whole horizon—the whole broad horizon—seemed filled with ships. Seventy or eighty ships of all kinds, sizes, arrayed in 14 lines, each of which could have been drawn with a ruler, hardly a wisp of smoke, not a straggler, but all bristling with cannon and other precautions on which I will not dwell, and all surrounded by [1394] their British escorting vessels, while overhead the far-ranging Catalina airboats soared, vigilant, protecting "eagles" in the sky.

And then I felt that hard and terrible and long drawn out as this struggle may be, we shall not be denied the strength to do our duty to the end.

[1395] Senator Ferguson. I would like to put to Mr. Welles one more question.

Do you have anything that you want now to state in the record, that have been suggested or not suggested by any of my questions?

Do you want to make any explanation whatever on the record so that we will have all of the facts?

Mr. Welles. I thank you for that opportunity, Senator. I do not at this moment think of anything that I wish to add to what I have said this morning and this afternoon.

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Welles, I want to get clear in my mind the facts with reference to the so-called Atlantic Charter. As I understand
your testimony, and will you correct me if I misstate it, you assisted in drafting the memorandum which is known as the Atlantic Charter.

Mr. Welles. That is correct, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe. This memorandum resulted from the conversations held at sea between the President and Mr. Churchill?

Mr. Welles. That is correct, but may I interject and amplify in parentheses there?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Welles. The President had been considering such a statement of policy for some time before and had been seeking [1396] for an opportunity to make such a statement of policy. When we arrived at Argentia we found Mr. Churchill had some specific suggestions with regard to the statement of policy, and the Atlantic Charter contained both the President’s original ideas as well as some of the original ideas which Mr. Churchill had brought with him. I make that statement in amplification of my reply.

Mr. Keefe. The result was there was a clean typed document prepared, as you have indicated?

Mr. Welles. There was a final clean copy made, Mr. Congressman, and that clean copy was then rushed to the radio operator so that the copy could be sent immediately to the White House for further release or for future release.

Mr. Keefe. But that actual document, in whatever form it was, in the clean typed form that you indicated, as finally agreed upon, was not signed by either the President or by Mr. Churchill?

Mr. Welles. The revised text had been approved in detail by each of them and it was after that that the clean copy was made and then sent to be radioed to Washington and to London.

Mr. Keefe. Of course there never was any signature of either of the parties to that document.

Mr. Welles. There was no signature in that sense. There was full approval, of course, given by both of them to the [1397] final text.

Mr. Keefe. So that the interpolation of the signatures in the message of the President to the Congress, which appears on page 717 of the volume “Peace and War,” that I have before me, results from what he did that got into the document?

Mr. Welles. As an indication that both of them had given the document their official approval as representing the respective policies which they desired to pursue and achieve.

Mr. Keefe. So that there is actually not in existence a historic document known as the Atlantic Charter bearing the signatures of Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt?

Mr. Welles. Not in the sense that it is an agreement between the two governments signed and sealed, but I may say to you, Mr. Congressman, as you undoubtedly know, very often heads of governments in a joint communiqué, after a meeting, announce their agreement upon certain policies which their respective governments are going to attempt to carry out. If you will permit this addition, I do not regard the Atlantic Charter as any less valid because it did not have the actual signatures or any official seals put upon it. It had been approved in every syllable by both Mr. Churchill and the President and was released upon their instruction as containing the policies of their two governments.
Mr. Keefe. And that which appears in the President's [1398] speech to the Congress under date of August 21, 1941, is that identical agreement?

Mr. Welles. That is the text as agreed upon at Argentia.

Mr. Keefe. Did you have any part in the drafting of the October 17 proposed message to the Emperor of Japan? ¹

Mr. Welles. May I refer to the text of that before I answer you, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. Gessell. That is Exhibit 20, Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Gessell. I just said that so we would keep the record straight.

Mr. Keefe. Yes; Exhibit 20.

Mr. Welles. I remember the draft very well now that I have had a chance to look at it again. I do not think I actually had any part in the preparation of it, either.

Mr. Keefe. Were you consulted by Mr. Hull or anyone else in the State Department?

Mr. Welles. I think I must undoubtedly have sat in on the conference in Mr. Hull's office in which this was under consideration.

Mr. Keefe. In the memorandum to the President under date of October 17, which is part of the same exhibit, there appears this language:

There is attached a redraft of your proposed [1399] message to the Emperor of Japan.

I call your attention to the word "redraft."

In view of (a) the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister here in a two-hour conversation last evening with Mr. Welles and myself,

and so forth.

Now, this letter of transmittal indicates that there was a prior draft of the proposed message. Do you recall that?

Mr. Welles. I recall the fact that there had been several, at least one other if not more, drafts prepared. Whether the redraft was undertaken because the President desired it changed, or whether it had been undertaken because Mr. Hull had decided to undertake a redraft, I could not at this moment say.

Mr. Keefe. Well, did the suggestion of the dispatching of the message direct to the Emperor result from this so-called 2-hour conversation held on the evening of October 16?

Mr. Welles. That 2-hour conversation, Mr. Congressman, as I think I indicated in my testimony of yesterday evening, was one of a series of conversations which I had with the Minister Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, Mr. Wakasubi, which was the only direct participation, as I said yesterday, in the Japanese negotiations, and this conversation took place in Mr. Hull's office. As this memorandum to the President shows, the attitude shown by the Japanese Minister, indicating that the Japanese Government desires to continue its exploratory [1400] conversations, coupled with the fact that the Japanese Minister, at his request, is coming to call again "this afternoon for a further extended discussion and various other considerations," Mr. Hull told the President that he was inclined to the view it was premature to send the proposed message to the Emperor, pending further clarification of the situation in Japan, and probably the attitude of the new government.

¹ See Exhibit No. 73, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1700-1702.
Mr. Keefe. May I ask you on that point, had there been discussions between the State Department and the President prior to the 17th of October 1941 as to the possibility of making some direct address to the Emperor of Japan?

Mr. Welles. If there were any conversations on that point, Mr. Hull would be the individual who had those conversations with the President.

Mr. Keefe. Did you have any knowledge of any such discussions yourself prior to the 17th of October 1941?

Mr. Welles. I find it very difficult to say “Yes” or “No” categorically. I can only take it for granted, in view of the fact I was having these conversations with Mr. Wakasubi, that I must have been familiar with the general purport of the Secretary of State’s conversation with the President.

Mr. Keefe. I am now addressing you as a very experienced man in the diplomatic field, as an expert, and I would like to have your opinion on this. Was it ordinary or customary in crises such as were developing at this time in October, for the head of a government, such as the President of the United States, to address the message direct to the Emperor of Japan, or was that a departure from established diplomatic relations?

Mr. Murphy. The gentleman said “October.” Do you mean December?

Mr. Keefe. I mean October 1941.

Mr. Welles. There was nothing unusual, Mr. Congressman, about a chief of a state sending a personal message to another chief of state. You will recall that after the so-called Panay incident the President sent a message directly to the Emperor of Japan.

Mr. Keefe. Well, what was there in the situation that suggested the dispatching of a message such as the one that had been suggested here, direct to the Emperor?

Mr. Welles. What was in the situation, Mr. Congressman, was the fact that both the President and Mr. Hull were determined to leave no stone unturned to try to find some means of obtaining a pacific solution of the difficulties, to try to persuade the civilian elements particularly in Japan of the possibility of a pacific solution, and, beyond everything else, to avoid war, and if that proved impossible, to put off war to the last possible moment. That was the reason undoubtedly for the decision to consider any form of communication with any form of individual in the Japanese Government which might possibly be useful for those purposes.

Mr. Keefe. Now, this message was not in fact sent. You are aware of that, are you not?

Mr. Welles. Yes; it was not sent.

Mr. Keefe. And matters drifted along until finally the exhibit indicates that another message was prepared, which bears the date of December 6, 1941, a message from the President to the Emperor of Japan.

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. Did you have any part in the drafting of that message?

Mr. Welles. I had no part in the actual drafting of it, that I remember. I remember, however, knowing that it was to be sent.

Mr. Keefe. Well, was it drafted in the State Department?
Mr. Welles. My recollection is it was drafted under the supervision of the Secretary of State himself, but it may be possible that the President made the original draft himself, in view of his deep interest in the matter, and that that original draft of the President was later revised in the State Department. I could not attempt now to say, but I am quite sure Mr. Hull will be able to tell you.

Mr. Keefe. Would there be any record in the State Department that would indicate at what time on the 6th day of December 1941, this second appeal or message to the Emperor was prepared?

Mr. Welles. Was prepared or sent, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. Keefe. Was prepared.

Mr. Welles. I do not believe that there would be any indication as to what hour the draft was completed, no.

Mr. Keefe. The record indicates that a dispatch was sent from the State Department to Tokyo to the American Embassy at 8 p.m., indicating that "an important telegram is now being encoded to you containing for communication by you at earliest possible moment text of message from the President to the Emperor." That bears the time imprint of 8 p.m. The State Department papers indicate that the message was sent at 9 p.m. on the 6th.

Mr. Welles. That is not necessarily responsive to your question, Mr. Congressman. A draft might have been completed earlier in the afternoon.

Mr. Keefe. What I am getting at is that indicates at least it was reaching the point so that the message went to the Embassy in Tokyo, that the message was being encoded at 8 p.m.

Mr. Welles. That is undoubtedly true.

Mr. Keefe. And later at 9 when it was dispatched.

Mr. Welles. That is undoubtedly correct.

Mr. Keefe. Would there be any record in the State Department to show when that message was actually completed?

Mr. Welles. I think it is possible that Mr. Hull's records would show that he had an appointment with the President that afternoon, at what time that appointment was had, and also that he would remember whether or not, if such appointment was had by him with the President, the final draft of this proposed message to the Emperor was approved by the President.

Mr. Keefe. As far as you are concerned, you were not called into the conference, as I understand, by either the President or Mr. Hull on the final drafting of this message which was actually sent.

Mr. Welles. Not with regard to that message, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe. But you believe Mr. Hull could, from records in the State Department, furnish that information?

Mr. Welles. I should think it is very likely.

Mr. Keefe. When a message such as the one of October 17, 1941, or the message that was finally sent on the 6th of December, is being drafted and under consideration, is it the custom of the State Department to call in the responsible heads of the Army and Navy to go over the matter before final action is taken?

Mr. Welles. Mr. Hull at that time, Mr. Congressman, was having conversations with the Secretaries of War and Navy. He was also in constant communication with them, and I should think it in the highest degree probable that he would tell you, if you ask
him the question, that he had consulted with them in regard to these two messages to which you refer.

Mr. Keefe. Would there be any records in the State Department to show whether or not such consultations were had, aside from Mr. Hull’s own memory?

Mr. Welles. I think that he might have records showing the matters that he discussed with the Secretaries of War and Navy, but of that I am not certain. He would have to tell you that.

[1407] Mr. Gesell. Congressman Keefe, may I interpose for a moment?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. To call attention to appendix A to Mr. Hull’s statement showing telephone calls made by him with representatives of the Army and Navy on the 6th. That perhaps is in part of the record that you are looking for.

Mr. Keefe. Yes; I am aware of that, but I am aware also that Mr. Hull further stated that he was not at all sure that this was all inclusive of the telephone conversations or appointments which he had.

Mr. Gesell. Right.

Mr. Keefe. I note in this exhibit that we have been referring to, Mr. Welles, a written memorandum on White House stationery reading:

Dear Cordell:
Shoot this to Grew. I think can go in gray code. Saves time. I don’t mind if it gets picked up. F. D. R.

That would indicate, would it not, that the final drafting and final word on the matter came from the President himself to Mr. Hull?

Mr. Welles. I think that is entirely clear from this file which I have before me.

[1408] Mr. Keefe. Now, unfortunately that bears the stamp of the Secretary of State, December 6, 1941, with the word printed “Noted,” but there is no time stamped on it to show when it was noted or when it was received. Is that customary in the State Department?

Mr. Welles. This question of stamping, Mr. Congressman, I think varies in many of the offices of the Department. I think it is an indication that the Secretary of State’s office received this from the White House and that it was immediately given to the Secretary of State. There is no kind of stamping in either his office or mine, so far as I know, certainly not in mine, which indicated the precise hour when the document from the White House would have been received.

Mr. Keefe. I notice another part of this exhibit is a letter from the Department of State under date of December 6, 1941, which says, “Memorandum for the President.”

It says further:

There is attached your message to the Emperor of Japan with page 3 of the message amended to take care of the point with regard to which I spoke to you on the telephone. If you approve the draft as it now stands we shall see that it gets off to Grew at once.

Initials “C. H.”

Then on the bottom of this letter, in the handwriting of [1409] the President, appears “O. K., send the amended page 3 to the British Ambassador and send copy to me. F. D. R.”
That would indicate that the final draft of this message was being prepared in the State Department as a result of telephone conversations between Mr. Hull and the President, would it not?

Mr. Welles. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Did you participate in or were you consulted in any manner in connection with the drafting of this final message to the Emperor?

Mr. Welles. As I think I have stated, I had no part in the actual drafting of it, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe. Did you know that it was going on in the Department?

Mr. Welles. I knew such message was under contemplation and under preparation but, as I have said before, it was not always possible for me, in view of the volume of work which I myself was handling, and the urgency of this work, to sit in every conference which had to do with the situation in the Pacific. I doubt if I was able to sit in more than a very few of them, a very small proportion of them.

Mr. Keefe. I have been trying to fix in my own mind, for specific purposes, the time when the message was actually finally completed as a result of the conversations between the President and Mr. Hull. Is there any record that you know of or could volunteer to me in the State Department that would fix that time?

Mr. Welles. I wish it were possible for me personally to give you the information you want, Mr. Congressman, but if Mr. Hull's recollection or records don't give you this information I should think it highly possible that some of the officials of the Far Eastern Division, such as Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine, would be able to give you the information that you want, since they undoubtedly sat in in all of the conferences which had to do with the preparation, the drafting and the redrafting of this message.

Mr. Keefe. When was the notice, official notice from the State Department, given to American Nationals advising them to leave the Orient, issued?

Mr. Welles. I again in that case would have to refer to the records of the Department to give you that information, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe. Do you recall there was an official notice issued by the State Department warning all American Nationals to leave the Orient?

Mr. Welles. As the situation became more and more dangerous it was a matter of very necessary precaution on the part of the Department of State to safeguard the lives of our nationals who were still in those areas, and instructions were sent progressively during the autumn months from one point to another to our consuls instructing them to advise our nationals to leave, but I couldn't give you the full list without referring to the records of the Department of those instructions issued to our consuls or the dates when the instructions were sent.

Mr. Keefe. I have the press releases as of October 9 of 1941 and as early as October 1940, all during that period, the first press release emanating October 9, 1940, and into the fall of 1941.

Were those formal releases issued through our consuls and diplomatic representatives in various parts of the Orient which would be published in the newspapers advising the nationals to leave?

Mr. Welles. In certain cases the consuls, as I recall it, were instructed to see the nationals and explain the situation to them and give them the advice required.

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1 See Exhibit No. 74. Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1703–1705.
In other instances I think the consuls were instructed to take all measures necessary in their judgment to insure that our nationals would be warned of the situation and of the need in our judgment for them to remove themselves.

Mr. Keefe. The reason, Mr. Welles, that I have been endeavoring to locate some information through your testimony this afternoon arises from the statement that Mr. Hull himself [1412] made when he was a witness when he said this:

It seemed to me that we were all very much like a family. We were seeing, talking among and with each other, making things known to each other in any way or another most of the time, and we made it a point to make known to each other whatever the other person might think of things that would be desirable to communicate. So at all times I think it is accurate to say that each of us in the State House have always tried to impart to the other with reasonable diligence anything new that we learned that would be of interest.

He made that general statement, and you were the Under Secretary of State, and it now appears from your testimony that there were many things transpiring in relation to the far eastern situation that you were not personally involved in.

Mr. Welles. I think that is a perfectly easy thing to explain, Mr. Congressman.

During the autumn of 1941 the world situation was such that the interests of the United States were affected in every quarter of the globe. It was utterly impossible for Mr. Hull to take personal charge and supervision of the negotiations with the Japanese Government and the general situation in the Pacific which required all of his strength, all of his time and all of his abilities, and at the same time attempt to handle [1413] questions relating to what, in my judgment, was of the utmost moment to this country, and that is inter-American affairs, the maintenance and preservation of inter-American solidarity, and the assurance that the United States would be safeguarded on account of its completely friendly and loyal relations with other American Republics, and at the same time attempt to handle the innumerable questions coming up in regard to the countries of Europe, and it was necessary for some high official, consequently, to undertake that other part of the heavy burdens involved.

It fell upon my shoulders to attempt to handle that other part of the work. For that reason it was physically impossible for me to be receiving a great number of Ambassadors and Ministers and other foreign representatives and representatives of our own Government, representatives of other Government departments, all day long, morning, noon and very often the afternoon and evening, and at the same time sit in on conferences in the office of the Secretary of State or in the White House which had to do solely with Far Eastern affairs.

I made it a practice and a point of familiarizing myself through memoranda of conversations of the talks which the Secretary of State was having with regard to the far eastern situation, and Mr. Hull very frequently would talk to me about the developments in that field.

[1414] The reason why I am not able to give more precise information to you with regard to these detailed questions that you ask me, Mr. Congressman, is on account of the circumstances I have just endeavored to indicate.
Mr. Keefe. I can well appreciate that, Mr. Welles.
Mr. Welles. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Do you recall, Mr. Welles, where you were on the evening of December 6?
Mr. Welles. I think when I left the Department of State I went straight home to my own house, was there all night, and came in early the following morning to my office in the Department.
Mr. Keefe. What time did you leave the Department of State that evening, if you now recall?
Mr. Welles. I could not give you the exact time, but I should think undoubtedly it was fairly late in the afternoon.
Mr. Keefe. Did you receive any telephone calls at your home that night with respect to the receipt of the reply by the Japanese?
Mr. Welles. I did not.
Mr. Keefe. At what time did you get to the State Department the next morning, Sunday morning?
Mr. Welles. I should think probably a little before 10 o'clock.
[1415] Mr. Keefe. Was there a conference in progress there that Sunday morning?
Mr. Welles. To the best of my recollection—and on this I may be wrong because my memory is not clear on this point—to the best of my recollection I did not see Mr. Hull that morning before he saw the Japanese envoys, but I want to emphasize that I am not clear on that.
Mr. Keefe. Did you have any conferences with anybody that morning?
Mr. Welles. I had several conferences with the officials of the Department, all of them. I think, relating, however, to inter-American or European affairs. I remember that I went out to lunch with Dr. Berle, then Assistant Secretary of State, and it was upon my return to the State Department, my office at the State Department, that the President telephoned me, as I have already explained to Senator Ferguson.
Mr. Keefe. Then you knew nothing about the intercept of the Japanese reply that morning?
Mr. Welles. To the best of my belief I knew nothing of the Japanese intercept until Sunday. What exact time on Sunday I learned of it I could not say. It may have been at the time when I knew that the Japanese had requested an audience, an interview, with the Secretary of State. It may have been subsequent.
[1416] Mr. Keefe. Do you know from whom you got any information at all with respect to the Japanese intercept that morning?
Mr. Welles. I could not at this time endeavor to tell you. I think the officials in the Far Eastern Division were undoubtedly busy in Secretary Hull's office and I know that I had that morning some very urgent matters which had to do with the Western Hemisphere and I could not say now precisely when I learned of it nor from whom.
Mr. Keefe. Can you advise, for the purpose of the record, how the Atlantic Conference originated?
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield before he proceeds to that phase?
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. I want to suggest that the gentleman had asked about the Japanese intercept on Sunday and there will be evidence of several
intercepts on Sunday and it is not clear which he was referring to or about which the gentleman was answering.

Mr. Keefe. I think the record will show what I was referring to. The Japanese intercept which was a reply to the message of the 26th.

You so understood, Mr. Welles?

Mr. Welles. That was my understanding.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

[14/7] Mr. Keefe. Since the witness and counsel understand, why, it is unfortunate that one member of the committee does not.

The Chairman. Proceed.

Mr. Keefe. Will you proceed in answer to my last question?

Mr. Welles. Will you restate your question, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. Keefe. How did the Atlantic Conference originate?

Mr. Welles. I am unable to give you the precise background. The first I knew of it was when the President sent for me approximately a week or several days before the time of the meeting and told me that he had arranged to meet with Mr. Churchill, that Mr. Churchill was not taking Mr. Eden with him, but was taking the permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the British Foreign Office with him, and that consequently the President desired me to accompany him, since I was the corresponding member in our Government to the Under Secretary from the British Government.

Mr. Keefe. Were you advised that the military and naval staffs were going to be in attendance at this meeting?

Mr. Welles. The President gave me no information when he told me of his plans and his desire that I go with him as to what the precise nature of the conversations were to be; nor, so far as I was concerned, were there any agenda. If there were any they did not come to my cognizance. He did [14/8] tell me General Marshall and Admiral Stark and General Arnold were going to be at the meeting.

Mr. Keefe. Well, as I understand your answer then, there was no agenda prepared prior to your going to the meeting?

Mr. Welles. So far as I was concerned. What I wanted to make clear is the fact that if there was any agenda with regard to other matters taken up at the Atlantic Charter meeting other than the drafting of the Atlantic Charter, itself, I was not aware of it nor did I see it.

Mr. Keefe. So far as you know, as the Under Secretary of State, and the one designated to accompany the President, you had no prior notice that such a meeting was to be held until you were advised by the President of his desire to have you accompany him?

Mr. Welles. None until the President called me to his office to tell me of it.

Mr. Keefe. Did the President prior to your leaving advise you as to what the meeting was called for or what it was proposed to discuss?

Mr. Welles. The President had during preceding weeks told me of his thought that in view of the increasingly serious world situation, in view of the spread of the war in Europe, that nothing would be more valuable from the standpoint of keeping alive in a very quickly darkening world some principles [14/9] of international law, some principles of moral and human decency, than for him to make some kind of a public statement of the objectives in international relations in which the Government of the United States believed.
He discussed that with me upon several occasions and when he told me of his plan to meet Mr. Churchill at Argentia, he informed me that he thought it would be an extremely desirable thing for such a statement to be made upon his return from that meeting. He did not at that time indicate to me that he had in mind a joint statement, but what he did say, and my memory is very clear, is that he felt the time would be very appropriate upon his return for him to make such a statement.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. Keefe. It does.

Now, do you have any knowledge as to whether or not the message to Emperor Hirohito which was dispatched at 9 o'clock, according to the memorandum of the State Department, by the President, was released at that time to the press? 1

Mr. Welles. The records of the Department will show when it was released, but my very clear understanding would be that such a message would not be released until we had been informed by our Ambassador in Tokyo that the message had been received by the Emperor.

[1420] Mr. Keefe. The telegram to our Ambassador indicated that the press was being informed that the President was dispatching a message to the Emperor. Do you know as to what information was given to the press, if any?

Mr. Welles. The records of the Department will unquestionably show that in complete detail. I think probably the intention was to show that the President was doing everything in his power by communicating directly with the Emperor to prevent any deterioration of the situation, but just how much was said to the press I, of course, do not now remember.

Mr. Keefe. You were not at the White House at any time December 6th?

Mr. Welles. To the best of my recollection I was not.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

The Chairman. Does counsel have any further questions?

Mr. Gesell. One or two short questions, Mr. Chairman

Mr. Welles, what did the President ask you to do when he mentioned at the conference the preparation of a note to be handed to the Japanese Ambassador?

Mr. Welles. What did the President ask me to do?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Mr. Welles. You are speaking of the meeting at Argentia?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

[1427] Mr. Welles. He asked me to see to it that the Secretary of State was immediately given his ideas with regard to the communications to be made to the Japanese Ambassador and asked me, myself, to see to it that the Ambassador should be called to the White House to meet with the President as soon as possible after his return.

Mr. Gesell. Did you understand that the text that you were to prepare was to be final or that the text was to be worked out in collaboration with other Government officials?

Mr. Welles. My very definite recollection is that the text was to be regarded in no sense as final but simply as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Gesell. What was your understanding of the parallel action to be taken which was agreed upon at this conference?

1 See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1702.
Mr. Welles. My understanding of the parallel action was that a warning would be issued by the President to the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington in more or less the terms in which the warning was finally conveyed, and that at the same time, acting in a parallel way, the British Government through similar methods would give a similar warning to the Japanese Government.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, each Government would give some warning but the exact text of the warning was to be worked out by this Government and the British Government, to use your phrase, unilaterally?

Mr. Welles. That is entirely my understanding.

Mr. Gesell. One further question.

With respect to this draft on the stationery of the Prime Minister concerning which we have had discussion today, do I understand your testimony to be that you do not know whether or not this specific draft or parallel communications as proposed here was agreed upon by the President and the Prime Minister?

Mr. Welles. Your question is not very clear to me.

Mr. Gesell. I am afraid it is not.

Do you know whether this specific suggestion as drafted by the Prime Minister was sent in those precise terms by the President?

Mr. Welles. I have no reason whatever to think so. On the contrary, my understanding is that the President gave me the very clear impression when he talked with me about it that he would give a warning to the Japanese Government, that no agreement had been reached as to the phraseology of such warning, but that the promise which he had made to Mr. Churchill was limited to the fact that a warning would be given.

Mr. Gesell. That is all.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Welles, the press disclosed that late [1423] in November 1941 the President left Washington and went to Warm Springs for a rest. It also appeared in the press on or about November 29, while the President was attending a belated Thanksgiving dinner with the patients at that institution, that Mr. Hull called him on the long distance phone and conveyed to him a very urgent message, a message which the President received and returned to the table and announced that he was immediately leaving for Washington, arriving here by December 1, if I remember correctly.

I was wondering if you had any consultation with Mr. Hull prior to the placing of this emergency call?

Mr. Welles. I recollect no prior conversation with Mr. Hull with regard to his telephoning the President. My recollection, of course, however, is clear that the situation was becoming more and more serious, from all of the information coming to us, and that Mr. Hull very naturally telephoned the President, on account of that, that he had better return to Washington.

Mr. Gearhart. But you don't remember having overheard or participated in any conversations with Mr. Hull and other officials of the State Department in which the necessity of recalling the President to Washington was discussed?
Mr. Welles. My recollection is that it had to do with the information with regard to the increasing number of Japanese troops that were being sent to Indochina and that the President's memorandum to me of December 2, instructing me to communicate that message to the two Japanese Ambassadors, was one of the reasons why the situation was regarded as so urgent.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. Gearhart. No.

Now, wasn't there a message intercepted between the Japanese on November 28, translated on the same day, which indicated that the Japanese were considering military action?

Mr. Welles. The date of that, Congressman Gearhart, is November 28?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Mr. Welles. I have it now before me. That undoubtedly is another one of the factors which gave the impression, if not the assurance, that the situation was in the highest degree grave.

Mr. Gesell. That is the message on 195 of exhibit 1? Is that the one you are referring to, Mr. Welles?

Mr. Welles. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. You saw the President immediately upon his return, did you not?

Mr. Welles. I do not remember exactly when I saw the President after his return. I was trying to remember that this morning when Senator Ferguson was asking me, and I cannot now remember.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, when you did see the President, did you discuss with him as to why he had returned so unexpectedly, so precipitously?

Mr. Welles. The instructions given me by the President to communicate the memorandum he had sent me to the two Japanese Ambassadors was one of the reasons, in my judgment at that time, as it is now, which required the President's return in order that he himself could take charge of the communication.

Mr. Gearhart. Was it not the prevailing opinion among all the leaders of the State Department at that time that war was just a matter of days, or perhaps hours?

Mr. Welles. I think, Mr. Congressman, I really answered that in my replies to Senator Ferguson this morning. I said that as the time passed toward the beginning of December the one in a thousand chance which I had thought still obtained for maintaining peace had become about one chance in a million.

Mr. Gearhart. That is all.

The Chairman. Any further questions?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas. I desire to ask just a few questions.

Mr. Secretary, were you in the room yesterday when Secretary Hull testified?

Mr. Welles. I was here a part of the time, Senator Lucas, not all of it.

Senator Lucas. Have you had an opportunity to read his narrative and analysis of what happened in this country's relations with Japan?
Mr. Welles. I have read the full statement which was presented in testimony yesterday morning.

Senator Lucas. You are familiar with the table of contents contained on the second page and the annexes, A, B, C, and D?

Mr. Welles. I think so, Senator Lucas; yes.

Senator Lucas. Do you agree with Secretary Hull in this statement that he made to the committee?

Mr. Welles. I agree with Mr. Hull completely in the statement which he has made to the committee.

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you, Mr. Welles, how long have you been connected with the Government of the United States?

[1427] Mr. Welles. I entered the foreign service in the year 1915, Senator Lucas. I retired from the service in 1925. I came back when the President appointed me in 1933, and resigned in the late summer or early autumn of 1943.

Senator Lucas. Now, during that time it is obvious that you drafted and saw many diplomatic messages over that period of years, and I desire to call or direct your attention again to exhibit 22, which is the so-called draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Government by Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of England, and specially call your attention to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this exhibit which has been referred to as the agreement, promise, discussion, suggestion.

At the risk of repetition—I think you fairly and thoroughly explained it—but at the risk of repetition I wish you would again at this point state for the record just what you understand this to be.

Mr. Welles. I understand that this document was a suggestion made to the President by the British Prime Minister as to parallel action to be taken by the British and United States Governments, and possibly by the Dutch Government, and possibly by the Soviet Union.

Senator Lucas. Well, there was no agreement at the time between the President of the United States and Winston Churchill upon this question?

[1428] Mr. Welles. The only agreement reached at Argentia with regard to this question, so far as I know, was that the President made the promise to Mr. Churchill that the Government of the United States, in its own words and in its own way, would issue a warning to the Japanese Government of the character which actually was made by the President on August 17.

Senator Lucas. Exactly so, and that is what he did?

Mr. Welles. That is what he did.

Senator Lucas. Now, I should like also to direct your attention to the paragraph 1 of that exhibit, which says:

Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwest Pacific would produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and Japan.

Much has been said about that paragraph. What do you understand, again for the record, that Churchill was talking about when he was referring to the "United States Government"?

Mr. Welles. That the Government of the United States would issue a warning to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese persisted in the policy of conquest and military expansion the Government of the United States would find itself compelled to take such steps as
in its own judgment were necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the American people and the safety of the United States.

Senator Lucas. Now, one further question that I want to ask you about relates to Exhibit 24, which is the memorandum that was sent to our Ambassador by Winston Churchill on November 30, 1941, which states as follows:

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences.

Now, did that come after the declaration was issued to Japan by this Government with respect to Mr. Hull’s 10 points?

Mr. Welles. This came 4 days after the note of November 26 to which you referred had been delivered by Mr. Hull to the Japanese Ambassadors.

Senator Lucas. Now, what was this Government doing at that time insofar as continuing of negotiations were concerned with the Japanese Government?

Mr. Welles. This Government at that time was waiting for some reply from the Japanese Government to its communication.

Senator Lucas. Did that reply come? If so, when?

Mr. Welles. That reply came, as we all of us remember, on December 7, at the time that Pearl Harbor was attacked.

Senator Lucas. You were interrogated about the conversation that took place between Admiral Richardson and Secretary Knox in 1940 with respect to the patrol that was discussed from Hawaii to the Philippines to Singapore, as I recall. You stated very clearly that you had discussed this with the President and that the President considered that only as a plan or a project at that particular time and I presume it goes without saying that such a plan or project was in line with what you have been testifying to here all along; that is, it was such a plan or project that was definitely in the interest of the safety and the security of this Nation?

Mr. Welles. That unquestionably was the President’s intention when he was considering that plan.

Senator Lucas. That is right. And the plan did not, of course, materialize after he had talked to the Secretaries of Navy and War and Admiral Richardson?

Mr. Welles. It did not materialize.

Senator Lucas. When you spoke about the Atlantic Charter being adopted and that it might be applied to all the world after the war, obviously you were referring at that time to the European war?

Mr. Welles. After the termination of the European war.

Senator Lucas. One other question: Do you know from the records what time the message that was sent by the President on the night of December 6 was received by the Emperor of Japan?

Mr. Welles. Ambassador Grew, Senator Lucas, would be able to give you that reply with complete precision.

Senator Lucas. All right, sir. That is all.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. The Senator from Maine.

Senator Brewster. I want to address one or two questions which I think may be within the purview of this inquiry but that have not been covered heretofore. They might possibly not be thought to be within the scope of the resolution but in my judgment they may be. While the chairman introduced it with respect to Pearl Harbor, I take it while it has the aspect of a post mortem in determining what transpired, we are finally and fundamentally concerned with the future and with this as a prologue to avoid difficulties and I have been impressed with your experience in the State Department for something like 20 years and your qualifications, therefore, as an expert.

It struck me in your testimony that your opposite number to the Under Secretary was a permanent Under Secretary of State in Britain, indicating the difference in the conduct of our affairs.

Would you express an opinion as to whether the development of a permanent secretariat in our State Department hierarchy than has heretofore existed might be a constructive step?

Mr. Welles. I believe that it would, Senator Brewster, although I think it is fair to say that it is inconceivable that any President or any Secretary of State would be able to operate with success if permanent officials of that character were not in accord with the policies which they wished to follow.

Senator Brewster. How do the British overcome such a possible conflict?

Mr. Welles. Well, as you remember, Senator Brewster, the British Foreign Office has two under secretaries. One is the parliamentary under secretary, who changes with the government and who appears on the floor of the House of Commons to answer questions if the Foreign Minister is not available, with regard to foreign policy. The other is the permanent under secretary who is a member of the British civil service and who does not change.

If you will permit me to express my opinion, I have often wished, as I say now, that there were some method by which either the Secretary of State or the Under Secretary of State could appear on the floor of the Senate or on the floor of the House in order to afford the Members of the Congress a far greater continuing measure of information than has previously been available to them.

Senator Brewster. That brings me to my next question.

In the past few years a special subcommittee of the Senate composed of eight members of a bipartisan character, four on a side, were actively associated with the development of the United Nations charter, in almost constant consultation, we have understood, with the State Department and apparently working out very fruitfully. This was to constitute, we understand from recent reports, a more or less continuing arrangement.

To what extent do you feel a liaison of that character with representative members of the committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that have constitutional responsibilities may in some measure accomplish the integration of the executive and legislative branches of the Government which sometimes seems to be required?

Mr. Welles. I think, Senator Brewster, that it would contribute tremendously to the objectives which I have in mind. I think that
any continuing commission of that kind can do a great deal of work but it does not cover the entire field, of course, to the extent which a representative of the State Department appearing on the floor either of the Senate or of the House and subjected to questions from the Members of the Congress would achieve.

Senator Brewster. To what extent, now coming nearer to the event, would it have been at all feasible during this very critical period in the last 3 or 4 months of the Japanese situation if such a committee had been kept in any degree constantly informed as to the situation? Would it have been feasible, do you feel, as a diplomatic matter?

Mr. Welles. I think it would have been both feasible and in the highest degree useful.

Senator Brewster. Would it not be possible if eight members of the Senate were informed continuously in detail from week to week and told that they could furnish all pertinent and appropriate information that might be desired by the Senate and thus by the country, answering in substantial measure the purposes which would bear properly upon it?

Mr. Welles. I think it would certainly accomplish a very great deal in that direction.

Senator Brewster. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask a question or two if the other members are through.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have just a few but I am perfectly willing to follow the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; the Chair will wait.

Senator Ferguson. At the time that these negotiations were going on during 1941 was there any liaison officer between the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Department of State such as Senator Brewster mentioned?

Mr. Welles. My recollection is that Secretary Hull himself endeavored to keep in touch with the Foreign Relations Committee and to inform the members of the committee of the developments in the situation, but that matter was in his hands and not in mine.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar on November 24 with a statement by Senator Pepper in Boston that the United States had fixed—this was in 1941—the United States had fixed a line in the Pacific and if the Japs crossed that line the American Navy would start shooting without paying attention to the technicality of a declaration of war?

Mr. Welles. I do not at the present moment recollection that statement of the Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Would you check it and see whether or not the Department of State show such a statement and would you look, Mr. Welles, for counsel whether or not there was any such information in the State Department?

Mr. Welles. This was a statement, Senator Ferguson, which you tell me Senator Pepper made in Boston, which appeared in the—

Senator Ferguson. Yes; on November 24, 1941.

Mr. Welles. Which appeared in the press?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

1 See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1705.
Mr. Welles. Unquestionably then it was seen in the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. And do you know whether there was any foundation in the State Department for that statement?

Mr. Welles. I endeavored during my testimony this morning and this afternoon as well, Senator Ferguson, to make it clear that I know of no such arrangements as those indicated by Senator Pepper.

Senator Ferguson. Would the instrument or the parallel action, taking the document and the oral statement of the President to the Japanese Government on the 17th of August 1941 be such a statement?

Mr. Welles. In my judgment, decidedly not.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Senator Lucas asked you in relation to Exhibit 24 and he read to you:

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences.

Do you know of anything in the State Department, any record indicating that any such message was given, either secret or public? ¹

Mr. Welles. I know of no such message having been given.

Senator Ferguson. You would not consider the message from the President of the United States to the Emperor on the night of the 6th or the morning of the 7th, whatever the facts will show later as to when Mr. Grew gave it, would be such a message as I have indicated?

Mr. Welles. In my interpretations, no. I think the message from the President to the Emperor was in every sense of the word an attempt to avert war and not to bring it on.

Senator Ferguson. But at that particular time the ships were on the way to the Kra Peninsula, were they not, to our knowledge?

Mr. Welles. We had that information, of course, on December 6th.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Welles. My strong impression is that the President regarded his message to the Emperor as the last possible appeal which could be made and I think I have attempted to bring that out in the testimony.

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that the message to the Emperor was a change in the nature of the 26th by Mr. Hull?

Mr. Welles. I should not.

Senator Ferguson. Doesn't the nature of the sixth one relate to the withdrawal from Indochina and the message of [1439] Mr. Hull goes much further? Would you just refer to the language of the sixth? I am talking about the note to the Emperor.

Mr. Welles. This message from the President in its final form says:

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom. I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

¹ See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1705.
Senator Ferguson. Now, isn’t that the only requirement that the
President mentions in the instrument?
Mr. Welles. That is the only specific requirement.
Senator Ferguson. And that is not as broad as the language on the
26th?
Mr. Welles. On the other hand, Senator Ferguson, in my judg-
ment the President’s message can only be interpreted as a most urgent
appeal to the Government of Japan to cease in its policy
of aggression and while the specific request was limited to the with-
drawing of Japanese troops from Indochina, the whole spirit of the
message, I think, can only be interpreted correctly as meaning a cessa-
tion of a policy of aggression.
Senator Ferguson. Did you read in the State Department records
there where Colonel Stimson, Secretary of War, and the Secretary
of State had counseled with the President about sending such a mes-
sage to the Emperor?
Mr. Welles. I have read it. I have not, however, got it at hand.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the fact that there
had been such a conference?
Mr. Welles. I do not now recall the fact that I was familiar at the
time.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, did I understand you to say that
the State Department took note of the fact that Senator Pepper made
a speech in Boston on the 24th?
Mr. Welles. I did not attempt to say, Mr. Chairman, that the State
Department took note. I said that a press report of that character
would unquestionably have been brought to the attention of the Secret-
ary of State.
[1447] The Chairman. You do not mean thereby to intimate
that the State Department had any advance information in regard
to such a speech?
Mr. Welles. Certainly not. I am very glad that you made it
clear.
The Chairman. Well, would such a speech made by Senator Pepper
or any other Senator in Boston or anywhere else have had any bind-
ing effect upon the President or the State Department or upon Con-
gress?
Mr. Welles. In my judgment, it would not.
The Chairman. With reference to the message, the personal appeal
of the President to the Emperor and the suggestion that it was an
unusual course for the head of one state to pursue with reference to
the head of another state, do you know whether it is true that Presi-
dent Roosevelt appealed in the same way to Hitler prior to the out-
break of war in 1939 to avert war and bloodshed that might involve
large areas of the world?
Mr. Welles. That is entirely true, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Did he also make the same sort of an appeal to
Mussolini?
Mr. Welles. Upon several occasions to both of them.
The Chairman. Is it true that the President sent you as a Special
Ambassador to Europe to undertake to avert war prior to its out-
break in 1939?
[1444] Mr. Welles. That is entirely true, Mr. Chairman. I was sent for the purpose of reporting to the President, after interviews in the four capitals, whether there existed any chances whatever for the negotiation of a just and decent peace.

The Chairman. At the time of the suggested parallel messages which, as I understand it, were to be sent separately in the individual capacity of each government in 1941, Congress had some time therefo hence a Lend-Lease Act under which the President was authorized to give aid to any nation whose survival in his opinion was essential to the security of the United States?

Mr. Welles. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And the President was executing that law not only in the Far East but in European regions?

Mr. Welles. He was, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Yesterday in reply to the Senator from Maine you suggested that—I will quote your answer. Probably I should quote the question. [Reading:]

Senator Brewster. If you were to come to the conclusion that the Fleet were not ready for war, as a result of Admiral Richardson's testimony, then the keeping of the Fleet at Hawaii, in a condition not ready for war, would have some aspects of keeping your diplomatic position exceed your military power, would it not?

Mr. Welles. It seems to me almost impossible, Senator Brewster, to divorce a critical condition as existed at that time, the diplomatic from the military, because the military is a very essential part of the diplomatic picture.

In his testimony Admiral Richardson stated that in his conversation with the President on the 8th day of October 1940 the President indicated not only that he felt that the Fleet in the Hawaiian area would act as a deterrent against Japan, but, according to Admiral Richardson, he used the expression, “I know that it has already exercised a deterrent influence upon Japan.”

Did you have any conferences or conversations with the President about that time in relation to that phase of keeping the Fleet in the Pacific?

Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, when I saw the published text of Admiral Richardson's testimony my attention was drawn to that specific remark of Admiral Richardson with regard to the fact that the President had told him that the stationing of the Fleet at Hawaii had had a deterrent effect, and I could not at the moment, and I do not now, remember the exact facts that the President had in mind when he made that statement to the Admiral, but I am quite confident that members of the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State or Ambassador Grew or Mr. Hull could give you the information that you ask for.

The Chairman. Well, in view of the fact that the President did feel at that time that the presence of the Fleet in Hawaii had had a deterrent effect upon Japan, in view of the fact that Japan did not actually attack until 14 months thereafter, in December of 1941, would you be willing or feel able to express any opinion as to whether if the Fleet did exercise a deterrent influence in October 1940 that it continued to exercise such an influence during the remaining 14 months prior to the actual attack?

Mr. Welles. I can only emphasize, Mr. Chairman, what I have said before in the course of my testimony and that is my very definite
belief that if the Fleet had been withdrawn from Hawaii the Jap-
nese military lords would have unquestionably interpreted that with-
drawal as an indication that the United States was acquiescing in the
spreading domination of the entire Pacific and Asiatic region by
Japan and would have begun an increasing encroachment upon the
legitimate rights of this country.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your view is that whether up to
October 1940 it exercised by its presence a deterrent effect, or whether
it during the following 14 months [1445] exercised any such
deterrent effect, its withdrawal at that time, in your judgment, would
have exercised a very dangerous effect upon the safety and security of
the United States because of the interpretation of such withdrawal
placed upon it by Japan?

Mr. WELLES. That is precisely my feeling, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask one question?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know, Mr. Secretary, under what cir-
cumstances the Fleet first went to Hawaii? Do you know that it went
there first as a maneuver?

Mr. WELLES. I could not at this time, Senator Ferguson, tell you
with any accuracy as to my memory with regard to the manner in
which the Fleet first went to Hawaii. As you made that statement
I seemed to remember that I did recall it but if you had not made
the statement I could not have answered your question.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I have one more question that was brought
up by Senator Lucas, that the President had promised to give this
note of the 17th of August.

Did the President tell you that Mr. Churchill or his government
so far as I remember, did not make that specific statement, but when he-
[1446] Mr. WELLES. The President in his conversation with me,
so far as I remember, did not make that specific statement, but when he-
told me that he had promised Mr. Churchill that the United States
Government would make a parallel warning I took it for granted that
Mr. Churchill must have made that statement to him.

Senator FERGUSON. The same promise to the President?
Mr. WELLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Thank you.

Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Secretary, in connection with keeping the
fleet at Hawaii, I think the record is clear that the fleet went out to-
maneuver in March or April and that on May 3, 1940, a report was
issued by Mr. Knox’ office to the effect that Admiral Richardson had
requested that the fleet remain in Hawaii and that the request is
approved.

Do you recall any conversations in the State Department at or-
about that time concerning that decision to keep the fleet at Hawaii
and what considerations entered into it?

Mr. WELLES. My recollection is, Senator Brewster, that conversa-
tions did take place between the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of the Navy, and the Secretary of State and the President in regard to
the fleet at Hawaii. I did not myself take part in any conversa-
tions concerning that question, so far as I remember, except in the-
conversation which I had with Admiral Richardson, to which I have already referred.

**Senator Brewster.** That is all.

[1447] The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the committee thanks you for your presence and for the patience with which you have responded to questions, which have, I am sure, helped to clarify the situation so far as it came within your knowledge.

Mr. Welles. Mr. Chairman, may I to you and through you to the members of the committee express my very real gratitude for the consideration shown me by the committee.

The Chairman. That is all now. Does counsel have any suggestions to make now?

Mr. Gesell. We are ready to keep right on plowing just so long as the committee wants to go ahead.

There is one other matter.

The Chairman. The Chair understood that earlier in the day it was suggested that Mr. Grew had engagements on Monday and Tuesday, I am informed, that might interfere with his appearance. Is that correct?

Mr. Gesell. That has been changed.

Mr. Mitchell. He has decided to forego them in the interests of the committee.

The Chairman. The committee appreciates that, Mr. Grew, and the plan now is that Secretary Hull will resume at 10 o'clock on Monday morning.

[1448] Mr. Gesell. And then, following him, Mr. Grew will take the stand.

The Chairman. Well, with that understanding then, we will——

Mr. Gesell. I have one small matter, Mr. Chairman.

Reference was made in exhibit 18 to a memorandum of a conversation between Dr. Hornbeck and Sir Ronald Campbell, dated November 28, 1941, in which Sir Ronald Campbell refers to the fact that the British Army authorities have received a message from our Army authorities stating that, inasmuch as the United States-Japanese negotiations have broken down, and so forth.

That reference, we believe, will appear—and I want to point this out to the committee now for purposes of clarity—is based upon the message of November 27, 1941, sent by the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, to the commanders in the Pacific and to London for information, the so-called war warning message which the committee has copies of, the text of that indicating that the London naval authorities of our Government are to inform the British of the war warning message sent.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could counsel tell us if we have a copy of the message to London?

Mr. Gesell. Yes; that is before all of the members of the committee in the Navy folder and communications under date of November 27, 1941.

[1449] Senator Ferguson. Thank you.

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock on Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:17 p. m., November 24, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m. Monday, November 26, 1945.)
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Secretary Hull, are you ready to resume?

Mr. Hull. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF CORDELL HULL, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE
(Resumed)

The Chairman. Counsel were still examining Secretary Hull when his testimony was recessed the other day.

The Chair would like to state, in view of the request originally made that we not examine Secretary Hull more than 45 minutes at a time, that I hope the committee will keep that in mind notwithstanding that that time was extended the other day at the suggestion of the Secretary himself.

Mr. Hull. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me, I would like to undertake to run for an hour and to come here just as often and just as long as any member of the committee may desire. I may not be able to come both in the afternoon and the forenoon. I will do the best I can about that.

The Chairman. We appreciate your generosity in regard to time.

Mr. Hull. It is my throat that gives me this trouble about testifying.

The Chairman. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Hull, I inquired of you when you were last here as to what the Department of State's position was with respect to the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor and I do not believe you had an opportunity to complete your answer on that subject. We are anxious to know what position the Department of State took on that subject.

Mr. Hull. We unhesitatingly felt that it would be to a more or less extent useful, especially after the Navy was based at Pearl Harbor, that it remain there during the critical state of relations between us
and certain other countries, including Japan especially, on the policy
that I stated the other day to the effect that we were dealing with
one of the worst international desperadoes within the memory of man
and that he was at large and on the rampage, dangerous, treacherous,
undependable in every way.

We felt at the State Department—I think we all felt that way—
that it would be a little more wholesome in our many matters of dis-
cussion and our many relations with that Japanese area for our Navy
to be standing there and I think from all of the tangible and intangible
reactions I had we were thoroughly justified in that view.

Mr. Gesell. Did Admiral Richardson in discussing this matter
with you state anything to you which to your mind indicated that the
fleet was insecure or unsafe at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Hull. My memory could be at fault but I do not think at any
time that any person suggested the idea that the [1453] Fleet
could not protect itself, that it would have to be moved somewhere
where it could protect itself. I do not think anyone suggested that
view.

Mr. Gesell. Now, turning to another subject. We have in evidence
here Exhibit 19, a draft of a proposed message to the Congress which
you transmitted to President Roosevelt under date of November 29.

I would like to ask if you would tell the committee what the facts
and circumstances were which led to the decision not to deliver that
message to the Congress prior to December 7?

Mr. Hull. In brief the Japanese were completely in charge of the
war lords, as they were called, headed by Tojo. In this country the
President and I, with other supporters in Congress and out of Con-
gress, had a few weeks before dealt with the matter of the extension
of the Conscription Act.

We found that public opinion in the country was split wide open
on the question of nationalism, as some people call it, and a broader
international viewpoint. I think the best that Congress could do,
held down and held back as it was by public opinion, was to enact this
law reenacted by one vote and to do that they had to continue as one
of its provisions a prohibition against service by American soldiers
beyond [1454] this hemisphere and beyond our territories.

I felt, and I did not have much doubt about it from my knowledge of
the situation here and in Japan that to send a message to Congress
stating that we were just in the act of getting into a fight with Japan,
she assuming completely the offensive, that we were threatened with
danger there that was very imminent.

Knowing as we did that Japan was liable to break out on any day,
it was apparent that we could do but little more by exploiting this
situation at that time than to play into the hands of the Japanese
military.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, you felt that this message if sent out
might be seized upon in Japan and used as a provocation towards some
action on their part?

Mr. Hull. I got the impression that they did that precise thing
when we passed the Conscription Act a year before. They saw our
wide division here of opinion; we had just seen on any matter per-
taining to foreign affairs we were extremely nationalistic in our ideas
here to the extent of an immense portion of the public and of officials
wherever one went. They were all equally patriotic and possessed
of equally high purposes but that was an honest difference of view and that was the situation.

We would have gotten nowhere with any kind of affirmative legislation, in the first place, and we would have had no time to have gotten anywhere in the second place.

Mr. Gesell. Now, about this time, and indeed earlier, our records here in evidence indicate that messages to the Emperor of Japan were under consideration. We have drafts as early as October 17, 1941, and, as Congressman Keefe pointed out the other day, somewhere there is an indication that there were even earlier drafts.

Now, I wanted to ask if you could tell us a bit about the discussions between you and President Roosevelt concerning the advisability of sending a message to the Emperor and why, specifically why, a message was not sent sooner than it was.

Mr. Hull. Specifically, it was not sent for this primary reason, that the military element in Japan was in supreme, arbitrary control of the Government at this time and the little Emperor, so far as we could ascertain, was going along with them and under their domination.

We felt that, in the first place, this whole military situation was being ruled with an iron rod by the military group, not by the Emperor, that he was going along with them and we remembered that some time along there they were so powerful, the military group, that they touched the Emperor on the shoulder and said, "You sign up in blank a declaration of war." With what we knew was the fact, that the military group had him in control to all intents and purposes it was, we felt satisfied, that if they saw the President going over their heads to the little Emperor, as he was at that time, it would only react against the whole situation and the military group would merely tighten up—by reason of our action tighten up—their military situation, all the while keeping the Emperor under their domination. That was the main reason.

We analyzed every phase and every available detail of conditions both in Japan and in this country in our efforts not to overlook any fact or factor that might shed any light on what would be the correct decision in the matter.

Mr. Gesell. Now, if the committee please, we have no further questions from Mr. Hull. He is available for questioning by the committee.

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I gather from your statement which was read last week that during these days prior to the transmission of your message of October 26 you had also considered the question of the modus vivendi, and of course that meant a sort of temporary patching up method by which you would keep the negotiations alive for a short period of 3 months, as I gather, with the possibility of its extension, if it was entered into, and you decided against that because, among other reasons, it would have been regarded by China as an appeasement movement, and by most of the nations with which we were conferring and with which we were concerned about that Far Eastern situation, and therefore it was not wise to sign that.

Is that practically the situation?

Mr. Hull. Yes. The fact was that Japan had come in with what seemed to be the most extreme demands and proposals that she had made during the 6 or 7 months of conversations with us. That was on the 20th. We could not, under our view, say "No" and stop right
there; although Japan, as I have said here, Japan, after 6 or 7 months of intimate conversations with us, knew what our attitude was and that we could not think of accepting her proposal, not even remotely could we think of doing so, and, on the other hand, she knew how far we would go.

When we look back there and see that for 6 or 7 months we were at the closest possible grips with this American-Japanese situation in our conversations—I think I must have had 35 or 40 conversations in my Department with the Japanese, all in the most earnest effort to find some approach that would solve this threatened and threatening situation without it getting out of hand—so we knew after 6 months—and if we did not we ought to have been taken out and pilloried—we knew by some very remote possibility, some bare possibility, we knew where each other stood. But our policy was not to say "No" to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20. It was not to remain silent even, it was to grab at every straw in sight, in an effort to keep up the conversations and to give time to our armies and navies here, and among our future Allies, to make further preparation, and also to show our continuing interest in peace.

So this modus vivendi was given every possible consideration and attention. On November 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 we made a desperate effort to get something worked out that might stay the hand of the Japanese armies and navies for a few days, or a few weeks, at any rate, by some possibility. I am sure [1459] I was making every possible effort to get some delay.

I am sorry I have to depart to some rather pointed remarks I made to the Chinese and to the British and the others because of my disappointment at their course and attitude with respect to this matter, but with all of my efforts, and those who were cooperating, it became clear by the end of the 25th or the 26th that this was not feasible. The Chinese, as I said some days ago, the Chinese made a terrific attack on the situation. Secretary Stimson agreed with others of us that he was satisfied the Japanese would not accept it, but it could be tried as another grabbing-at-a-straw proposition.

Then you notice this last release of a dispatch from Mr. Churchill to the President where he went the whole distance in expressing his fear of a collapse generally of the Chinese situation.

Now, this modus vivendi was tied in with our basic principles. We were to go right along discussing our plan, not the Japanese plan, which negatived their whole proposition of force and conquest, we were to go right along with them while we gave them what, as I have said, was just a little chicken feed compared to the vast amount that they had demanded in their ultimatum of November 20 and which we knew they would need if they were going forward with their plans of conquest, as they evidently were.

[1460] So we had every reason to feel, under every rule of chances, the chances were overwhelming, not quite unanimously so, but overwhelming that they would not accept it, but this would explore their attitude and let the public here and elsewhere see that we were offering something in the way of an inducement, even though it was a day-to-day concern, such as the consignment of oil, $600,000 worth of money, which was nominal compared to what they had been getting before oil was cut off.
Now, it was in those circumstances, as I say, that I upbraided the other future Allied Governments for not taking more interest in this thing.

As I strove, with my associates, to get this thing over, the opposition, the difficulties, and virtually impossibilities from our standpoint got worse, so there was no other recourse except that that be laid aside.

The Chairman. Then you stated in your original written statement the other day, and you state now, that you regarded, and the State Department regarded, their note of the 20th of November as an ultimatum and your note of the 26th, which is described as the ten-point note, was a reply to that ultimatum?

[1461] Mr. Hull. Yes, that was the third alternative we had, either to refuse to accept the ultimatum, which was confirmed by their interceptions, as I recall, plus further interceptions directing the Ambassador to discontinue conversations, first on the 25th and, later, on the 29th I believe it was, and so we took the third alternative, which was to keep alive the negotiations. The fact that they had put up an ultimatum to us did not prevent us from offering a proposal for them to consider, if by any speculative possibility they should decide to consider, at anytime. That was the first proposition. The second, in Japan they had lashed the public to the highest possible war pitch. They had ignored our set of policies and principles that we had talked about to them. They had put forth one or two false issues that they were being choked by the British in the Far East, by the Dutch and by ourselves, and they were being denied the creation of what they called the coprospertity sphere. That was a spurious and false disguise of what they were really after in the Pacific area. In this country we were divided, unfortunately, among ourselves, with the result that our statement of principles had been confused in the public mind. They had almost been lost track of, and there was serious need to bring them back together, bring them up to date, especially as the Japanese were in the act of moving in the stage of events—they were going out.

[1462] Furthermore, the ten-point note contained at least five points that the Japanese would have found to their benefit had they accepted them. There has been more misinformation and more ignominy—misrepresentation—unintentionally, no doubt—of really what we were faced with there, the many angles, many factors, and what the significance of this last proposal was. The Japanese knew any hour what they could get out of us after 6 months of conversation. It did not take a soothsayer or some fortuneteller to make that clear to somebody who did not seem to know anything about it, but the fact was that there was nothing in there that any peaceful nation pursuing a peaceful course would not have been delighted to accept. It was a broad, constructive, progressive, up-to-date proposal for the most desirable and mutually profitable relations between nations. The only trouble with this was that the Japanese were bent—if I did not see ladies present, I would say were hell-bent—on carrying forward their military policy. They could not any more have abandoned that military policy at that stage, when they had their guns drawn, when their fleets were afloat, as we know since, for Pearl Harbor waters, when the conversations had been abandoned—there is nothing more clear
that they would hunt excuses about the so-called ten-point note. The whole truth is that whenever we have peaceful nations pursuing peaceful policies in their relations to each other, they will welcome, [1462] and would have welcomed, this formula that we suggested.

Furthermore, as I say, the Japanese could, at anytime, have said: "Let us see if we cannot narrow this somewhat. We will decide whether we cannot consider it further." They knew exactly how we could resume the conversations, leaving off a few of these things not extremely essential but retaining those that were absolutely basic. They knew they could get back at anytime to the same basis of conversations, if there was any difference in fact after we had rested our 6 months of discussions.

The Chairman. Just one other question, and that is with reference to the Fleet. You are familiar with the evidence, I presume, that the Fleet had been sent out to Hawaiian waters in the spring of 1940.

Mr. Hull. Yes.

The Chairman. Did you discuss that matter with the President? [1464] Mr. Hull. I don't undertake to recall everything that was said. I just know that I was favorably disposed toward it myself, and the President naturally was. He was accustomed to ask me an oral question now and then about what I thought of the psychological effect of sending the Fleet, for instance, to Pearl Harbor, and other consideration that might occur to him—orally. But we have no record anywhere, so far as I can find in the State Department on that subject.

The Chairman. Admiral Richardson testified that on the 8th of October, 1940, he discussed the matter with the President and that there was a disagreement between them. That is, the Admiral wanted to get the Navy back to the Pacific coast. The President felt that it ought to remain out in Hawaiian waters. Admiral Richardson says the President stated to him on that day in that conversation that he felt that the Navy's presence there, the Fleet's presence, was a deterrent against Japan and that he knew it had been up to that time. Were you in a position to concur in that position of the President at that time?

Mr. Hull. That was my judgment. I think we overlook some of the broader aspects of this situation. Japan, even before the Tripartite Pact in September 1940 was working along under the so-called Anticommitern Pact with Germany, working along in the course of relations with Germany, and we did not know, dealing with wholly unreliable and treacherous persons as we were, we did not know what express relations might then exist between [1465] Japan and Germany. Any evidence that we were preserving a fairly firm policy would find an echo even in Berlin at that time.

It was a world situation, that was knit together increasingly by every imaginable agreement between these international desperadoes who were waging world conquest and nothing else.

The Chairman. Now, in view of the fact that the actual attack occurred in December 1941, which was 1 month after the conversation related by Admiral Richardson, would you be in position to express any opinion as to whether during that period the presence of the fleet in Hawaiian waters continued to exert any deterrent influence over Japan?
Mr. Hull. Well, as I said, there were a vast number of facts and circumstances accumulating with respect to the Japanese mind on this subject. They were not available to us, except to a very limited and occasional extent. I got the impression somewhat back there that the Japs wanted not only to tell us where to keep our fleet in the Pacific to move it out into the Atlantic, keep it over there. I may have been wrong in that impression, but I think it is worth checking on if you are interested in running down every minute phase of this matter.

Now, someone suggested that the Government was trying to bluff the Japanese. The whole truth is that we were in our own waters, in our territory, on our own side of the Pacific, and that we were pursuing a perfectly peaceful and defensible course. In all our talks with the Japanese and all of our [1466] representations, we were pleading with them for peaceful relations and their continuance. If we happened to have a double-barreled shotgun sitting back in the corner somewhere in the house when we are talking to a desperado, it does no harm, to say the least. I always feel a little better and I think he would feel a little worse if he could see the outlines of that gun back there. It is a psychological thing that nobody can escape.

The Chairman. That is all.

Mr. Cooper.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly. Mr. Secretary, I want to invite attention to a few points made in your written statement presented to the committee, and as a convenience to you, I will quote the points that I want to ask you about.

On page 9, you include this statement:

Throughout this period the United States increasingly followed a policy of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China.

Mr. Hull. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. It had been the historic policy of the United States for a long time to favor a policy of a strong China, had it not? [1467] Mr. Hull. That raises a bunch of questions.

Back during the period of our difficulties extending through the 30's and on up to Pearl Harbor in dealing with Japan and Germany, I recall only too vividly our terrific distress when some American citizen would get shot or their women and children outrageously injured, or their property seized or their merchant shipping, like Panay, recklessly bombed and shot. When we protested to Japan, there were a few in our own country who would cry out and demand that we get out of there. "What are you doing over there on that side of the world, trying to start a war?" I think one of them lectured all over the country and his slogan was "Get the hell out of China; come back home where you belong; mind your own business and keep out of trouble."

That sounded to all of us people who were reared in a primitive section of this country very possible at first blush, but there were some points of opposition to that possible theory.

In the first place, we were under solemn obligation in writing in the Nine-Power Treaty to cooperate to preserve the integrity of Chinese territory and the sovereignty of China and the equality of ingress and egress to all nations alike in trading, in commerce, finance.

In the second place, we had always been the friend of China, and there were four hundred-odd million of people to deal with in the
future, and we felt that we could not act in a course of bad faith and in almost a cowardly way in the light of our obligations.

In the third place, Japan and we were under solemn obligation under the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

In the fourth place, we, ourselves, stood for a policy of international cooperation for the peaceful settlement of any controversies that might come up between nations in the future.

In the fifth place, we had discovered and proclaimed it as early as 1936 in this hemisphere that a war of a course of aggression in one country was a matter of concern to all the countries of the world.

On top of that we had discovered by this time that Germany and Japan were linked together, operating together as any two highway-men operate and as closely as any two could operate. We found this movement for each one to conquer his respective half of the world and to enslave the people just as they did enslave them later in both Europe and in parts of Asia.

That whole thing was developed, all those considerations were developed, right in front of us. We couldn't have retired and have come away. I would hate to look you gentlemen in the face and describe what I think would be our condition today had we done that.

The Vice Chairman. You think undoubtedly that subsequent events have clearly demonstrated that the policy we had with China was sound?

Mr. Hull. It was sound and it has been testified to by the leading Japanese statesmen in power in loud, vociferous speeches which they made, not only from year to year but from month to month and from week to week. So, we didn't have to go outside of that range of testimony to convince ourselves about their plans and purposes.

The Vice Chairman. Then, Mr. Secretary, on page 33 or your written statement there appear two brief paragraphs that I would like to read:

There was never any question of this country's forcing Japan to fight. The question was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its principles.

To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position under intimidation.

Mr. Hull. At that time—it is well to keep in mind a little of the background. At that time we could not tell just what would be the outcome of the German invasion of Russia. It was extremely critical. We did not know whether Japan intended to carry her reported desire to invade Russia in Siberia. The whole situation seemed to be very critical and very doubtful, and it was in those circumstances that Japan came back to us with her final offer and that, as I have said, was probably more extreme—substantially more extreme—than any she had made.

In the first place, she did not agree to abandon her policy of military conquest and aggression except in certain local areas and for 90 days.

In the second place, I think I must have observed dozens of times the Japanese close military alliance with Germany aimed at the United States primarily and paramountly.
[1471] If a person could flinch before one could get through speaking to him, the Japanese Ambassador would flinch before I could conclude my question about the Japanese hanging on to the Germans by this hard and fast pact aimed at the United States. They never came within sight of any acceptance of a proposal that they get out of that close military partnership with Hitler who, it seems now, was ordering not only the Jews but all the Poles, men, women, and children, killed.

This bunch of Japanese in extreme control, knowing what kind of a savage they were in partnership with, and Tojo and the others being savages themselves when they were at war or getting into war, they hung on to the Germans with this pact. They wouldn't talk about either stopping their military policy, their aggression policy, nor would they talk about getting out of this pact, but asked us to go into what they would call an honest and honorable agreement with them, while all the fruits of that agreement would go to Hitler as well as to themselves.

To the extent that it was possible, they wanted us to furnish them all the oil that they would need to fight us as well as others. They were on their way then to an attack and they said you must give us all the oil we need now or we might have trouble in attacking—and for some reason we declined to do it. There were a number of impossible things [1472] like that in that ultimatum of November 20.

The Vice Chairman. Then you did regard the Japanese proposal of November 20 as nothing but an ultimatum?

Mr. Hull. Well, they said so both in writing and orally, and we could only regard it as that from its very nature.

The Vice Chairman. Now, was your reply of November 26 in any sense an ultimatum?

Mr. Hull. Well, the truth is we were most anxious, as we have said here at different times, to go forward with the conversations, and we had every motive to desire to go forward with them, and we offered this, as I say, as an ordinary, normal plan for international relations, on these lines, and I think everybody in the State Department, the President and others, were in agreement; and, as I say, the Japanese would have found a way at once, all they had to do was to announce that they were through with conquest and aggression and automatically they would have become the beneficiaries of these proposals.

The Vice Chairman. Did you receive any information that the Japanese regarded your message of November 26 as an ultimatum?

Mr. Hull. Not until sometime afterward. They then had their fleet on its way, as I say, to Hawaiian waters. They themselves had ordered the discontinuance of conversations. We were satisfied, of course, that they would attack at any [1473] time. We didn't know what time. They had that solely within their own power. But it wasn't until they proceeded to manufacture a falsehood in order to dodge the effect of their own ultimatum, the old fraudulent cry, "Stop thief," they thought if they could pretend to their own people, they knew that that wouldn't travel far in this country, except at the hands of people who might be a little prejudiced or a little extreme in their views, but they felt that they could put over the idea in their own
country just as Hitler put over one falsehood after another to shield and disguise his own plans and his own course to his armies of invasion.

The Japanese alibi was taken up and adopted by a few people in other parts of the world but not to any very great extent.

The Vice Chairman, Mr. Chairman, I have a few other questions but I observe that the Secretary has been before us about an hour. So I suggest we might suspend at this point with his testimony.

The Chairman. We will excuse you now, Mr. Hull, for the time being, and you may consult counsel as to when you will return. If you wish to come tomorrow morning it will be entirely agreeable to the committee.

Mr. Hull. I apologize to the committee. My throat is not quite as strong as it should be. It is improving so long [1/7/4] as I give it a chance to improve. I don't want to give it a set-back. That is why I am taking these precautions that I am.

The Chairman. The committee thoroughly understands that, Mr. Hull, and you do not need to apologize. You may be excused now until you return.

Mr. Hull. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Mr. Grew.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Grew, will you state your full name for the record, please.

Mr. Grew. Joseph Grew.

Mr. Gesell. During what period of time were your our Ambassador to Japan?

Mr. Grew. I arrived in Japan on June 6, 1932; left on June 25, 1942.

Mr. Gesell. And you were there more or less continuously during that period, particularly during 1941, were you not?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, if the committee please, before proceeding with Mr. Grew I want to direct specific attention to exhibit 15 in evidence, a series of three dispatches from Mr. Grew to the Department of State dated January 27, November 3, [1/7/5] and November 17, 1941, respectively. I would like to read portions of these into the record.

The dispatch of January 27, 1941, states:

My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their various facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic, the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the information.

The second, the dispatch of November 3, is a lengthy one, and I simply want to call attention to the very last portion thereof, which reads as follows:

It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber rattling the exclusive purpose of giving moral support to Japan's high-pressure diplomacy. Japan's resort to measures which might make war with the United States inevitably may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness.

1 See p. 2480; infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Mr. Grew.
The third dispatch, dated November 17, reads as follows:

In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden military or naval actions by Japan in areas not at 1476 present involved in the China conflict, I am taking into account as a probability that the Japanese would exploit all available tactical advantages, including those of initiative and surprise. It is important, however, that our Government not place upon us, including the military and naval attacks, major responsibility for giving prior warning. The control in Japan over military information, both primary and secondary is extremely effective, and we have no expectation that any advance information would be obtained either through the press or from personal contacts with Japanese; the few Americans left in Japan are mostly concentrated in Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kobe, and are in no position to observe military movements and the absence of American and other foreign vessels in adjacent waters almost assures to the Japanese the ability to dispatch troop transports in various directions without foreign observation. Recent reports from our Consuls at Táihóku and at Harbin point to Japanese troop concentrations in both Taiwan and Manchuria, and all other available indications are that since the general mobilization of July last, troop dispositions have been made to enable new operations to be carried out on the shortest 1477 possible notice in either Siberia or the southwest Pacific or in both.

We fully realize that possibly our most important duty at this time is to watch for premonitory indications of military or naval operations which might be forthcoming against such areas, and we are taking every precaution to guard against surprise. However, our field of military and naval observation is almost literally restricted to what can be seen with our own eyes, which is negligible. We would, therefore, advise that our Government, from abundance of caution, discount as far as possible the likelihood of our being able to give substantial warning.

Now, with those dispatches in mind, Mr. Grew, I want to ask you whether, with the exception of the dispatch of January 27 which I have read referring to the possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, you had any information of any nature which indicated the possibility of the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I had no specific information or information of any character.

Mr. Gesell. I notice in your book, which I am sure will be referred to from time to time here, your note of that day, for January 27, 1941, in which you say:

1478 There is a lot of talk around town to the effect that the Japanese in case of a break with the United States are planning to go all out in a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor. Of course, I informed our Government.

Your reference to "a lot of talk around town" suggests that at that time you had heard the same rumor from sources other than the Peruvian Ambassador; is that correct?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Could you indicate to what extent there was talk around town at that time?

Mr. Grew. I wouldn't say that talk was widespread, but it came from various sources. I could not now recollect from what sources, because they were not important, but this telegram which I sent on January 27 was based practically entirely on the report which had been brought to me by my Peruvian colleague.

Mr. Gesell. Did that talk persist of a general rumor category or did it prevail only at or about the time of your dispatch?

Mr. Grew. I would say only about the time of my dispatch.

Mr. Gesell. You don't remember any talk about town subsequent to that time concerning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I do not.
[1479]  Mr. Gesell. Was there any talk or gossip or discussion of the possibility of an attack against the United States at any other point other than Pearl Harbor during this period from January on?

Mr. Grew. Well, do you refer to talk by Japanese, from Japanese sources?

Mr. Gesell. Well, I think my question was intended to be as broad as possible, but let's take the Japanese sources first.

Mr. Grew. Well, we were very largely during that last year cut off from our Japanese contacts. The Japanese did not dare to be seen with us and did not dare come to the American Embassy, and most of my contacts had just slipped away, so it was very difficult to keep in touch with what people were thinking. You see, the secret police were constantly watching every Japanese who had contact with any foreigner, and in many cases I am quite sure Japanese—in fact, I know—were arrested and kept in prison for some time as a result of having seen too much of foreigners. So it was very difficult to pick up what the people were thinking at that time apart from what was published in the press.

[1480]  Mr. Gesell. I suppose you received rumors second-hand, so to speak, through your other diplomatic colleagues who themselves may have been in touch with Japanese; is that correct?

Mr. Grew. Yes, of course I received reports of what was going on from diplomatic colleagues constantly during all that year.

Mr. Gesell. Did you get from any of your diplomatic colleagues any information indicating that Japan was to attack the United States at any point subsequent to January 27, which was of a specific military nature?

Mr. Grew. I couldn't put my finger on any one conversation which would confirm that, but all the evidence which we accumulated during those years intensified as time went on, made it abundantly clear that they were likely to attack.

Mr. Gesell. And, of course, my questions have had to do more with specific military objectives rather than the broad question of likelihood of an attack.

Now we have had here, Mr. Grew, the statement from a Navy officer concerning the Japanese plans for an attack, based upon captured documents and prisoner interviews, and I want to ask you two or three questions based on that.

The reports indicate that the Japanese task force left from Etorofu Jima sometime around the 26th of November, Jap time.

Did you have any information which indicated in any way that there was a Japanese task force at that Island at about that time?

[1481]  Mr. Grew. None whatever.

Mr. Gesell. The report also indicates that in August 1941 Admiral Yamamoto ordered the fleet commanders and key staff members to Tokyo for war games preliminary to the final formulation of operation plans for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and that war conferences were thereafter continuously held at the Naval War College in Tokyo from the 2d of September to the 13th of September.

Did you have any information concerning those war plans or those conferences that were being held which indicated in any way the possibility of a Pearl Harbor attack or an attack on the United States anywhere else?
Mr. Grew. Those conferences were generally of a routine nature. They took place from time to time. We knew, of course, that they were going on, but what they were talking about we did not know.

I may say here that we in our Embassy in Tokyo did not have access to any of the secret documents or intercepted telegrams. We didn’t even know that they existed.

Mr. Gesell. I want to ask you about that in a moment, but now let me ask you this.

This report that I have been discussing indicates that on December 1 the cabinet council met and approved the commencement of hostilities against the United States.

Were you aware that there was a cabinet meeting in December, around December 1 or 2?

Mr. Grew. I recollect we were informed at that time of such a meeting.

Mr. Gesell. Was any announcement made or any information made available to you in any way indicating that one of the matters considered at the cabinet meeting was the commencement of hostilities against the United States by an attack at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew. No, sir. That was all guess work.

Mr. Gesell. Did you guess that that had been considered at that time?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Did you report that you had so guessed, to the State Department?

Mr. Grew. Well, I think that my reports were complete in themselves. I think that the warnings that I had issued covered the field. I very likely did report that meeting but I cannot tell you without consulting our files.

Mr. Gesell. You don’t recall, do you, any specific report that you made at that time to the effect that you thought the cabinet was considering an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew. I don’t recollect any specific report to that effect. I would have to consult the records on that.

Mr. Gesell. I think we have your dispatch concerning the cabinet meeting. I will bring it forward in a moment.

Now, I would like to ask you a general question.

First I have this dispatch, your dispatch of December 1 to the Department of State, and with reference to the cabinet meeting the information that you appear to have given at that time was to this effect:

Tonight’s newspapers report that the Cabinet at its meeting today, while realizing the difficulty of adjusting the respective positions of the two countries, nevertheless determined to continue the Washington conversations.

Mr. Gesell. Does that refresh your recollection that you did not at that time have any information that you reported indicating that one of the matters discussed was the possibility of a Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. Grew. I doubt if I reported that precise point at that time.

Mr. Gesell. Now I would like to ask you a general question by way of leading up to several others.

During this period what was your general information as to the state of the Japanese preparations and readiness for war, the strength
of their military and their general mobilization activities as you reported them to the Department of State?

Mr. Keefe. May I ask what period that is? May I ask what period is embraced in your question, Counsel?

Mr. Gesell. I would like to have him cover in a general way his period there, perhaps, progressively to show what steps he knew were being taken.

Mr. Keefe. The whole 10 years?

Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, if I may read a few passages that were written at that time as contemporary comments I think that that would be the best way to answer this question. May I do that, sir?

The Chairman. Yes.

[1485] Mr. Grew. Shortly after my arrival in Japan in the spring of 1932 I wrote a series of letters to Mr. Stimson who was then Secretary of State, after sizing up the situation as we saw it in Tokyo at that time.

On August 13th, in a letter to Mr. Stimson, I said I was surprised—

Senator Brewster. Would you give the year in each case so the record will be clear?

Mr. Gesell. The year, Mr. Grew.

Senator Brewster. The year.

Mr. Grew. 1932, Senator. I told Mr. Stimson how the Japanese were working up an antiforeign and an anti-American psychology in the country, as a matter of fact against all countries but especially against the United States, and I said to Mr. Stimson [reading]:

This situation reminds me strongly of the efforts of the German Government, by calumniating foreign nations, to build up a public war psychology in 1914, the effort being repeated whenever some new venture, such as the indiscriminate submarine warfare, was about to be launched. Here in Japan the deliberate building up of public animosity against foreign nations in general and the United States in particular has doubtless a similar purpose—to strengthen the hand of the military [1486] in its Manchurian venture in the face of foreign, and especially American opposition.

I believe that on the part of the Japanese it is a sign of weakness, not of strength. * * *

Such a national temper is always dangerous. The German military machine, supported by a carefully nurtured public war psychology, took the bit in its teeth and overrode all restraining influences in 1914. The Japanese military machine is not dissimilar. It has been built for war, feels prepared for war, and would welcome war. It has never yet been beaten and possesses unlimited self-confidence. I am not an alarmist but I believe that we should have our eyes open to all possible future contingencies. The facts of history would render it criminal to close them.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may we have the page in the book that the witness is reading from?

Mr. Grew. The page of that in my book is page 64.

Then 2 years later I have some pages from a long report I sent to the Secretary of State which I think are probably pertinent to the point [reading]:

Behind our day-to-day diplomacy lies a factor of prime importance—

The Chairman. May I ask what is the date of that?

[1487] Mr. Grew. The date of this, sir?

The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Grew, December 27, 1934, page 145 in my book. This dispatch is on record in the Department of State. [Reading:]

Behind our day-to-day diplomacy lies a factor of prime importance, namely national support, demonstrated and reinforced by national preparedness. I believe that a fundamental element of that preparedness should be the maintenance of the present naval ratios in principle and the eventual achievement and maintenance of those ratios, so far as they apply to Japan, in fact. With such a background, and only with such a background, can we pursue our diplomacy with any confidence that our representations will be listened to or that they will lead to favorable results. General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, was recently reported in the press as saying: "Armies and navies, in being efficient, give weight to the peaceful words of statesmen, but a feverish effort to create them when once a crisis is imminent simply provokes attack." We need thorough preparedness not in the interests of war but of peace.

It is difficult for those who do not live in Japan to appraise the present temper of the country. An American Senator is reported to have recommended recently that we should accord parity to Japan in order to avoid future war. Wherever the Senator's views may be concerning the general policy that we should follow in the Far East, he probably does not realize what harm that sort of public statement does in strengthening the Japanese stand and in reinforcing the aggressive ambitions of the expansionists. The Japanese press of course picks out such statements by prominent Americans and publishes them far and wide, thus confirming the general belief in Japan that the pacifist element in the United States is preponderantly strong and in the last analysis will control the policy and action of our Government. Under such circumstances there is a general tendency to characterize our diplomatic representations as bluff and to believe that they can safely be disregarded without fear of implementation.

It would be helpful if those who share the Senator's views could hear and read some of the things that are constantly being said and written in Japan, to the effect that Japan's destiny is to subjugate and rule the world (sic), and could realize the expansionist ambitions which lie not far from the surface in the minds of certain elements in the Army and Navy, the patriotic societies, and the intense nationalists throughout the country. Their aim is to obtain trade control and eventually predominant political influence in China, the Philippines, the Straits Settlement, Siam and the Dutch East Indies, the Maritime Provinces and Vladivostok, one step at a time, as in Korea and Manchuria, pausing intermittently to consolidate and then continuing as soon as the intervening obstacles can be overcome by diplomacy or force. With such dreams of empire cherished by many, and with an army and navy capable of taking the bit in their own teeth and running away with it regardless of the restraining influence of the saner heads of the Government in Tokyo (a risk which unquestionably exists and of which we have already had ample evidence in the Manchurian affair), we would be reprehensibly somnolent if we were to trust the security of treaty restraints or international comity to safeguard our own interests or, indeed, our own property. * * *

When Japanese speak of Japan's being the "stabilizing factor" and the "guar- dian of peace" of East Asia, what they have in mind is a Pax Japanica with eventual complete commercial control, and, in the minds of some, eventual complete political control of East Asia. While Ambassador Saito may have been misquoted in a recent issue of the Philadelphia Bulletin as saying that Japan will be prepared to fight to maintain that conception of peace, nevertheless that is precisely what is in the minds of many Japanese today. There is a swashbuckling temper in the country, largely developed by military propaganda, which can lead Japan during the next few years, or in the next few generations, to any extremes unless the saner minds in the Government prove able to cope with it and to restrain the country from national suicide. * * *

I wish that more Americans would come out here and live here and gradually come to sense the real potential risks and dangers of the situation instead of speaking and writing academically on a subject which they know nothing whatever about, thereby contributing ammunition to the Japanese military and extremists who are stronger than they have been for many a day. The idea
that a great body of liberal though lying just beneath the surface since 1931 would be sufficiently strong to emerge and assume control with a little foreign encouragement is thoroughly mistaken. The liberal thought is there, but it is inarticulate and largely impotent, and in all probability will remain so for some time to come. * * *

In view of all these considerations, I have little hesitation in reiterating and emphasizing the potential dangers of the situation and the prime importance of American national preparedness to meet it. As a nation we have taken the lead in international efforts toward the restriction and reduction of armaments. We have had hopes that the movement would be progressive, but the conditions of world affairs as they have developed during the past twelve years since the Washington Conference have not afforded fruitful ground for such progress. Unless we are prepared to subscribe to a Pax Japanica in the Far East, with all that this movement, as conceived and interpreted by Japan, is bound to entail, we should rapidly build up our Navy to treaty strength, and if and when the Washington Naval Treaty expires we should continue to maintain the present ratio with Japan regardless of cost, a peacetime insurance both to cover and to reduce the risk of war. In the meantime every proper step should be taken to avoid or to offset the belligerent utterances of jingoists in the United States, many of which find their way into the Japanese [1492] press, because the utterances of the former tend to inflame public sentiment against our country, while the statements of the latter convey an impression of American weakness, irresolution, and bluff.

Mr. Gesell. Would it be fair to say, Mr. Grew, that those views which you expressed in those early dispatches were repeated and strengthened by you from time to time as we come nearer to December 7?

Mr. Grew. Yes; definitely.

Mr. Gesell. And that they represent your judgment that Japan was mobilizing both psychologically and militarily for gradual steps of aggression?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; definitely.

Mr. Gesell. Now, when did you reach the conclusion in your own mind that war with the United States was inevitable?

Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, I think my position on that is perhaps somewhat similar to the position of a candidate for political office who knows that he is going to be defeated but he does not admit it until it is all over.

Our foreign service is our first line of national defense and our duty is to hold that line if we can do it. For any diplomatic officer in the foreign service or for any foreign-service officer to go abroad and throw up his hands and say "War is inevitable" might as well go home because he [1493] would be a discredit to the service in which we are members.

I cannot tell you of any moment at which I really felt that war was inevitable.

Mr. Gesell. You recognized, I think, for a long period that it was a strong possibility?

Mr. Grew. Definitely.

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any views or opinions as to whether Japan was likely to strike without a declaration of war?

Mr. Grew. When a criminal commits a crime I find that the FBI or Scotland Yard look up the technique of that crime and go back and look at previous crimes committed with the same technique and thereby spot the criminal. If we had remembered our history we would have recollected that the Japanese did precisely the same thing at Port Arthur in 1905. It struck at Russia without a declaration of war, so that their attack on Pearl Harbor was exactly the same pattern.
Mr. Gesell. Would it be safe to say that in making references in your dispatches to the strong possibility of a surprise attack by Japan that you had in mind just those considerations of that part of history?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, in reaching your conclusion and in considering the developments I understood you to say that you [1494] did not know or have access to any information resulting from the intercept of the Japanese diplomatic messages.

Mr. Grew. That is a fact.

Mr. Gesell. No copies of intercepted messages were sent to you and you did not even know they were being intercepted?

Mr. Grew. I did not.

Mr. Gesell. Have you any information which would indicate whether or not the Japanese knew we were intercepting their messages?

Mr. Grew. I have no evidence to that effect, no.

Mr. Gesell. The question has come up here, Mr. Grew, concerning the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Did any information come to your attention which indicated that the basing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor had any effect one way or the other on Japanese opinion?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, definitely. The Japanese press from time to time and, as I remember, in public speeches took the position that relations between Japan and the United States could never improve until we removed our fleet completely from the Pacific to the Atlantic because it was always a source of suspicion to the Japanese.

I do not think that that preposterous suggestion was ever advanced officially but it certainly was heard from time to time.

[1495] Mr. Gesell. Of course, my question was directed to a more limited movement of the fleet from Pearl Harbor to the west coast. Was there any discussion of whether such a movement would have any effect or whether the movement in the opposite direction was having some effect?

Mr. Grew. I think the statement which I just mentioned had in mind the removal of the fleet completely from the Pacific, not merely to the west coast.

Mr. Gesell. You do not remember, I take it then, any reaction to the movement of the fleet from the west coast to Pearl Harbor in 1940, I believe it was?

Mr. Grew. I cannot recollect at present any specific reaction.

Mr. Gesell. Now, there has been considerable said here in the testimony so far concerning the relationship between the civil and military government of Japan, and Mr. Hull and other witnesses have expressed opinions that the military branch of the government was in a position to considerably dominate the civil branch of the government.

Have you any comments or information to give us on that subject?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. I think in order to shed light on that subject we ought to go back very briefly a little in history, to the middle of the last century we will say, [1496] around the time of the restoration of the Emperor in 1868.

The Japanese had watched what they considered the alleged encroachments of Western powers in the Far East. They remembered the opium war, the second Chinese war, and they were afraid that the same thing might happen to them. Therefore, they put the re-
sponsibility for the defense of the country entirely in the hands of the army and navy.

As I remember it, in the constitution of 1889 it was confirmed that the army and navy should determine their own organization. In any case, after many years went by and things quieted down there and Japan began to gather confidence and believed she was not in danger, the control gradually passed from the military to the civil element; and in the twenties, I have been told—I was not there myself, but I have been told—that the prestige of the Japanese military was so low that officers when they went off duty did not wear a uniform in the streets.

In any case, the days of the so-called Shidehara diplomacy then arose. Shidehara, who is now Prime Minister of Japan, was then Foreign Minister, and he and his associates did everything that was possible to bring about good relations with the United States, Great Britain, China, and the other countries.

I have always thought, and I think it is a fair premise, that one of the principal reasons why the Japanese Army invaded Manchuria in 1931 was in order to put itself on the map again, to bring up their prestige.

In any case, that is then what happened. The Japanese Army went into Manchuria and it was a question of time. Of course, they immediately were in a position of control.

Now, during that period a development came about which I do not think is provided for in any law, that the Navy and War Ministers in Japan could have their own access to the Emperor over the heads of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet; so, of course, that gave them tremendous power.

They also had it in their hands to make it impossible for the Emperor to form any Cabinet of which they did not approve. In other words, if they did not like a Prime Minister they would refuse to appoint a War or Navy Minister and the Cabinet could not be formed.

An illustration of that was in 1937, I think, where the Emperor asked General Ugaki to come forward and form a Cabinet. General Ugaki was a very fine military officer, but he was of a moderate type. He was not one of the extremists; he did not commend himself to the army as a whole and after working for 5 days he finally had to go to the Emperor and confess himself defeated, so that he never formed a cabinet, and he communicated to the press at that time that he never again would wear a Japanese military uniform. That was the way those things worked out during that period.

Now, to come down to the question of the relative control between civilians and military, I would put it more relative control between the moderates and the extremists.

You sometimes had a civilian Prime Minister, such as the first two ministries of Prince Konoye, in which the worst acts of international banditry in all history probably were carried out and yet, on the other hand, you had the cabinet of Admiral Yonai, who was a military and naval officer. His regime was one of the most moderate that there had been in Japan for a great many years.

Mr. Gesell. Well, during the period from July 1941, say, to December of 1941 were the extremists or the moderates in control of the government?
Mr. Grew. At the time of the Konoye cabinet, that was the third Konoye cabinet, up to during the summer of 1941, he, I believe, was doing his best to bring about an improvement of relations with the United States, but from the moment of his fall, when Tojo came in, it was quite clear that the extremists' policy prevailed.

Mr. Gesell. Did the Japanese give any publicity to their note of November 20? Did they at that time indicate what position they had taken to their own people, that you recall?

[1499] Mr. Grew. I do not recall that that note was published. It could have been. I will have to look up the records on that.¹

Mr. Gesell. You do not recall any substantial publicity being given to their November 20 note?

Mr. Grew. I do not recall it now.

Mr. Gesell. Did the Japanese give any publicity to our note of November 26?

Mr. Grew. They did not until after Pearl Harbor and then when it was published in a newspaper that newspaper was promptly confiscated. The Japanese did not want that note to become known and certain prominent Japanese at that time said to me that they had been informed that the note was in the nature of an ultimatum but they were unable to confirm that and in the light of the contents of the note which I passed on to my Japanese friends they said if that were a fact, if the note was couched along those lines, the Japanese people would be definitely opposed to an intransigent attitude on the part of the Japanese Government in dealing with it. That is on record.

[1500] Mr. Gesell. Did the Japanese attempt to characterize the note without revealing its contents at that time?

Mr. Grew. They definitely did.

Mr. Gesell. In what manner did they characterize it?

Mr. Grew. They characterized it as in the nature of an ultimatum.

Mr. Gesell. What did they say about it?

Mr. Grew. I do not know what more they said about it, because I have no access to the records. I suppose you are speaking of the Japanese press now?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Mr. Grew. I cannot recollect exactly how that was put forward, but that was the impression created among the Japanese public.

Mr. Gesell. Did you ask for any authority to release the text of the note of November 26?

Mr. Grew. I do not recollect having asked that. It would not have done any good if I had.

Mr. Gesell. Now, coming to a subsequent message, the message to the Emperor, which was transmitted by President Roosevelt to the Emperor on or about December 6, could you state to the committee the circumstances under which you received that note, when you first learned of it, and what steps you took to deliver it to the Emperor?

[1501] Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. That was the evening of December 7, Japanese time. I was listening to the radio broadcasts from San Francisco on that evening and heard that the President had sent, or was sending a message to the Emperor. I promptly telephoned to Mr. Doorman, the counselor for the Embassy to stand by. Not long thereafter I received a very brief, urgent message from Mr. Hull saying an important message for the Emperor was being then encoded and I should be ready to receive it. A long telegram containing the message

¹ See Hearings, Part 4, p. 1705.
was received in the Embassy at 10:30 p.m. The record on the face of the telegram showed it had been received in the Japanese post office at 12 noon. It was, I understand, sent from Washington 9 p.m., which would have meant 11 a.m. Tokyo time, 14 hours difference. So, in other words, the telegram appears to have been delivered to the Japanese post office, which handled telegrams 1 hour after its receipt, and they held it up throughout that day, from 12 noon until 10:30 p.m.

Finally, at 10:30 p.m., it came. I had already arranged for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to stand by. I said I would probably be able to see him about midnight, which I did. When the message was finally decoded, I saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs about a quarter past twelve, about 15 minutes after midnight. I showed him the communication and I said that I wished to ask for an audience with the Emperor to [150?] present it personally. I did not want any doubt as to getting it in his hands. The Minister began to discuss the matter with me, and I said, "I am making a definite application for an audience with the Emperor," which is the right of every Ambassador, and Mr. Togo—not Tojo, the Prime Minister, but Togo—and the Minister finally said, "I will present your request to the Throne."

I left the Foreign Office at about half-past 12 a.m., half-past midnight. I got to bed rather late. At 7 o'clock the next morning, the 8th of December, my telephone beside my bed rang, and Mr. Kasa, the private secretary to the Minister, said he had been trying to get me ever since 5 a.m. I said, "That is surprising, because the telephone is right beside my bed and it has not rung." He said, "Please come over as soon as possible to see the Minister."

I got to the Minister's official residence about 7:30 a.m. He came into his room dressed in formal clothes. Apparently he had been with the Emperor, and he had a document in his hand, he slapped it on the table, and he said, "This is the Emperor's reply to the President." I said, "I have asked for an audience in order to present that memorandum, that message, to the Emperor personally." Mr. Togo merely said—I remember his words—"I have no wish to stand between you and the Throne," but nothing more was said about it. Then he [1053] read it, and he asked me to notice especially the last paragraph. He said, "In view of the fact the conversations in Washington had made no progress it had been decided to call them off." That did not strike me as very serious. They had been called before, when the Japanese first went into Indochina and they had been resumed at a later date. So I said, "Well, I am very sorry. I hope we can get them started again." The Minister made a little pleasant speech to me, thanking me for my cooperation for peace, and came down and saw me off at the door. He said not one single word about the attack on Pearl Harbor, and yet that was at 7:30 o'clock the next morning and the attack had occurred at about 3:30 a.m. Japanese time, or at any rate it had occurred several hours previous. I never understood why he did not tell me, whether he did not have the courage to do it or whether he thought it was not diplomatic protocol—I have no idea.

I went back to the Embassy and a few minutes later we heard news-boys calling out "Gogi" in the street. "Gogi" is a special edition of the paper, it is a single sheet containing an important piece of news. I sent one of my secretaries out to get it and he brought it in and that is the way I learned about the attack on Pearl Harbor, was when this
news sheet was brought in and put on my desk. An hour later, the police came in and locked us up in the Embassy, and that is the story.

[1504] Mr. Gesell. We have no further questions of Mr. Grew.

The Chairman. It is 10 minutes to 12. You became a diplomatic prisoner from then on until you were exchanged?

Mr. Grew. Yes, Mr. Chairman, from then on until we were exchanged the following June.

The Chairman. So that getting back to the morning on which you were told by the Foreign Minister practically that you would not be permitted to see the Emperor, the attack had already taken place some 4 hours before that. When did you receive from the State Department here, or did you after that receive any dispatch from the State Department that was delivered to you in Tokyo?

Mr. Grew. After the attack upon Pearl Harbor?

The Chairman. After the interview with Togo.

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I think we did not receive any telegrams after that. I was able to establish a telephone connection with Mr. Hamilton of the State Department and we merely spoke for a minute about the attack and he said he hoped we were all well in the Embassy and a few personal remarks of that kind, but I recollect nothing else.

The Chairman. Does your record show whether, after the Japanese Government took over the embassy and locked you up, any messages were sent to you that were not delivered by the Japanese Government, and I presume they would have been delivered

[1505] by the Japanese Government if you had got them?

Mr. Grew. I recollect no messages received. I sent two or three messages to Washington and I did not know whether they got through. As a matter of fact, they did get through.

The Chairman. The testimony here shows that the Japanese Fleet, the task force, left the Kurile Islands headed toward Pearl Harbor on the 25th, United States time, which would have been the 26th, Japanese time, and that Secretary Hull dispatched or gave to the Ambassador of Japan here on the 26th his reply to the Japanese message of the 20th. When did you receive information, if you did receive information, that that message to the Japanese Government had been delivered on the 26th?

Mr. Grew. I presumably received that in a telegram from the Department of State, which kept me informed of the exchange of documents and conversations going on in Washington. Without consulting records, Mr. Chairman, I could not tell you just what moment I received them.

The Chairman. Your recollection is you did receive notification through the State Department that such message had been delivered?

Mr. Grew. In all probability, I think I did.

The Chairman. I do not think I want to ask any other questions now.

Mr. Cooper.

[1506] The Vice Chairman. I do not have any questions now.

The Chairman. Senator George.

Senator George. Nothing now, at this time.

The Chairman. Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark. I want to ask you if you inquired from your diplomatic colleague the source of his information in regard to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

1 Exhibit No. 75.
Mr. Grew. I do not think I did, Mr. Congressman. After all, sometimes when an official, diplomatic official, receives information of that kind or even a rumor report of that kind, it may put him in a rather difficult position to ask him to reveal the source. I do not think I did ask that question.

Mr. Clark. You did not ask him where he learned that there was likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew. What is that?

Mr. Clark. You did not ask him where he learned that there was likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew. I do not recollect having asked that question.

Mr. Clark. Well, now, I do not mean to insist upon this, but you considered it important enough to make it the subject of a special dispatch to your Government, did you not?

Mr. Grew. Definitely.

Mr. Clark. You say now you made no effort to find out the source from which he obtained that information?

[1507] Mr. Grew. To have gone to my Peruvian colleague and said, "I would like to know the source from which you received that information," would have put him in a very difficult position, because most of those pieces of information were received from Japanese friends who would have been endangered by the knowledge that they had passed that information on. I think in all probability if I had asked my colleague for the source he probably would have felt that he could not give it to me. In any case, it is a rather difficult thing to do, to ask for such a thing as that.

Mr. Clark. Did you know him pretty well?

Mr. Grew. I knew him pretty well. He was a man I trusted. I trusted his word and I trusted his judgment.

Mr. Clark. You made some reference in your testimony to some warlike activity by Japan, I think, in 1905 without a declaration of war. Was that against Russia?

Mr. Grew. That was against Russia; yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. There is just a hazy recollection in my mind that there was some activity by our fleet about that time. Probably it was headed entirely around the world as a kind of demonstration against Japan. Do you recollect about that?

Mr. Grew. I recollect the sending of the fleet around South America and into the Pacific. I do not recollect the date.

Mr. Clark. Well, did it have any connection with the military activity of Japan against Russia?

[1508] Mr. Grew. I would have to refresh my memory on that.

Mr. Clark. It is not material anyway.

Mr. Grew. I am sorry; that is a long time ago. It is a matter of history. I would not like to answer that question without looking it up.

Mr. Clark. I was trying to refresh my own memory through you.

Mr. Grew. I am afraid my memory is bad on that.

The Chairman. There is one question I omitted to ask, if I may do it now.

Mr. Grew. Yes.

The Chairman. In regard to this rumor brought to your attention by the Peruvian Minister or Ambassador.

Mr. Grew. Minister.
The Chairman. The testimony here shows that in January 1941, Admiral Yamamoto, I believe it is, the Japanese Admiral, had formulated some plan by which to attack Pearl Harbor at some indefinite date in the future. Would you be able to know whether the formulation of such plan by the Japanese Admiral might have had any connection with the rumors that the Peruvian Minister passed on to you?

Mr. Grew. I think that is very doubtful, Mr. Chairman. The Japanese were pretty effective in their secrecy. I think it is very unlikely that that information would have been allowed to leak out anywhere. It would have been probably retained in a very small group of the highest military and naval officers, so that I would doubt very much if the rumor which I telegraphed the Secretary of State on January 27 had any connection whatever with the elaboration of the plan.

The Chairman. The telegram—the dispatch—which you sent to Secretary Stimson in 1932 was sent to him as Secretary of State?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. In the meantime, by the time you sent your dispatch of 1934, Secretary Hull had become Secretary of State?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. He was at that time in the office of the State Department?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

The Chairman. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make one request of counsel before you adjourn?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I notice in the New York Times they have an article which is dated "Nuremberg, Germany, November 23":

The following excerpts from the official German report on discussions between Adolf Hitler and Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka in Berlin on April 4, [1510] 1941, were introduced in the Nuremberg war criminals trial today.

It shows the discussion of the plan of a war between Japan and the United States. I think that is pertinent in this inquiry in view of the interpretation that has been put by some people on the note of November 26, 1941. I request that we obtain an authenticated copy of it.

Mr. Gesell. We will try to do that. Is that mentioned in today's New York Times?

Mr. Murphy. Saturday's New York Times.

The Chairman. All right, the committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[1511] Afternoon Session—2 p. m.

Testimony of Joseph C. Grew, Former Ambassablor to Japan (Resumed)

The Chairman. The committee will be in order. The Chair thinks Mr. Clark had concluded his examination of Mr. Grew and Senator Lucas will now come to bat.

Mr. Gesell. If the committee please, before Senator Lucas commences, my attention was called during the recess to the fact that I

1 Exhibit No. 76.
had neglected to introduce the dispatch from Mr. Grew under date of December 1 referring to the meeting of the Cabinet, from which I have read during his examination, and I think, to make the record complete, I should offer that document in the record now as Exhibit 25.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be received as Exhibit 25.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 25.")

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Ambassador, do you have an opinion as to whether or not the message or memorandum that was issued by the President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan on the evening of December 6 was ever delivered to the Emperor?

Mr. Grew. No, Senator; I have no evidence to indicate that it was delivered to the Emperor.

Senator Lucas. Who was the Minister at that time of Japan with whom you conferred?

Mr. Grew. I conferred that night with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Togo, and I asked for an audience with the Emperor to present the document and he said that he would present my request to the Emperor and then I saw him the next morning at 7:30 and he said, "This is the Emperor's reply."

Senator Lucas. Did he give you that reply in writing—

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas (continuing). Or was it oral?

Mr. Grew. In writing.

Senator Lucas. Was it signed by the Emperor?

Mr. Grew. No, no, it was not signed by the Emperor.

Senator Lucas. And you do not know, other than what he told you, whether the Emperor ever saw this last message?

Mr. Grew. I do not know.

Senator Lucas. I should like to direct your attention to a statement which was made by Mr. Hull in his treatise on this subject on page 3, in which he said the following [reading]:

In 1928, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs.

[513] I should like to ask you whether or not you are familiar with the memorial presented to the Emperor of Japan on July 25, 1927, by Premier Tanaka outlining the positive policy of Japan for the conquest of the world?

Mr. Grew. That is the so-called Tanaka memorial?

Senator Lucas. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Grew. Of course, I have seen it in times past but I have never known whether it was authentic or not.

Senator Lucas. That is the question that I desired to ask you. I read it in a magazine entitled "China at War" which was published in this country in March 1942 and I was wondering whether or not you had ever read the article, or in your experience in Japan whether you had reached the conclusion that this memorial was an authentic document?

Mr. Grew. I never reached that conclusion, Senator. I do not recollect whether I read that precise article or not, but, of course, that was discussed at considerable length in the old days and nobody
that I ever saw was ever able to adduce any concrete evidence to prove its authenticity.


Now, I want to direct your attention, Mr. Ambassador, to the report made by the Army Board, including George Grumert, lieutenant general; Henry D. Russell, major general; and Walter H. Frank, major General, United States Army, who investigated, as I recall, at the request of Secretary Stimson the attack on Pearl Harbor, and in that report—and this is on page 51 of the September issue of the United States News, which purports to have a full text of the official report concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor—the following information was found. Starting at the top of the page in the right-hand column it reads in this way:

Apparently on the 28th, in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his mind not to go through with the proposal shown the day before to the Secretary of War containing the plan for the three months' cruise. Evidently the action to kick the whole thing over was accomplished by presenting to the Japanese the counter proposal of the ten points which they took as an ultimatum. It was the document that touched the button that started the war; as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed.

Now, as I understand it, Mr. Ambassador, you were a witness before that General Board, and I should like to have you elaborate or comment, if you care to do so, upon this conclusion that was reached by the Army board making this independent investigation.

[1515] Mr. Grew. Senator, may I read briefly the record of my actual testimony before that committee on that subject?

Senator Lucas. I want the testimony read, sir.

Mr. Grew. I was asked what was the reaction of the Japanese people, both private and official, to that document, if you remember. That is Mr. Hull's memorandum of November 26, 1941. I replied [reading]:

The reaction of the Japanese military people and also of probably the majority of the civil government officials, who took their cue from the military at that time, was that they characterized that memorandum as an ultimatum.

Senator Lucas. What page are you reading from, if I may ask?

Mr. Grew. I am reading now my actual testimony before that Army Board.

Senator Lucas. All right, sir.

Mr. Grew [reading]:

If I may do so, I should like in that connection—

I am still reading my testimony—

I should like, in that connection, to express the personal opinion that that attitude of the Japanese officials to the memorandum as an ultimatum was totally unsound and wrongly based.

Then I was asked:

It is your considered opinion, therefore, that they [1516] used it as a pretext for the accomplishment of what they desired?

My reply:

Yes, sir. It was in no respect an ultimatum, either in tone or in substance.

I continued—

Senator Lucas. What page is that on in the report?
Mr. Grew. That is on page 4208.

Senator Lucas. That is correct.

Mr. Grew. I go on to 4215, where the point came up again. This was my testimony. [Reading:]

Now, to go back and coming to your question, we will go back to the military people, the Army and the Navy. At what point did they decide definitely to attack? Naturally, they had all their plans made for years beforehand. In the case of war with America they were very far-sighted in those respects and they had their plans drawn up probably—

Although I had no means of knowing that, of course—probably right down to the last detail, but as for the moment at which the button was pushed I do not myself know exactly how long it would have taken their carriers to get from where they were to the point at which they attacked Pearl Harbor, but it has always been my belief that it was about the time of the receipt of Mr. Hull’s memo—[1517]—random of November 26th that the button was pushed. I cannot prove that; I have no evidence. It is just my general feeling.

Now, in that connection, Senator. I think that my testimony—a wrong impression has been given to my testimony because it appeared from the official report that I had said that Mr. Hull’s memorandum actually touched the button that started the war.

I never said that. I said it was my belief that the thing had been started at about that time; that is all.

Then, if I may, as throwing light on this general subject, I would like to read the brief comment that I wrote in connection with Mr. Hull’s memorandum. Shall I do that, sir?

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir.

Mr. Grew. This is on page 482 of my book, “Ten Years in Japan.”

Senator Lucas. 482?


Mr. Murphy. At the bottom of the page.

Mr. Grew. That is not in Foreign Relations.

Senator Lucas. Proceed, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Grew (reading):

[1518] November 29, 1941.

Our Government has handed to the Japanese—mind you, this was written on the spot at the time in Tokyo—

Our Government has handed to the Japanese a ten-point draft proposal for adjusting the whole situation in the Far East. It is a broad-gauge, objective, and statesmanlike document, offering to Japan practically everything that she has ostensibly been fighting for if she will simply stop her aggressive policy. By adopting such a program she would be offered free access to needed raw materials, free trade and commerce, financial co-operation and support, withdrawal of the freezing orders, and an opportunity to negotiate a new treaty of commerce with us. If she wants a political and economic stranglehold on the countries of East Asia (euphemistically called the New Order in East Asia and the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)—which most of her extremists do want—and if she pursues her southward advance by force, she will soon be at war with all of the ABCD powers and will unquestionably be defeated and reduced to the status of a third-rate power. But if she plays her cards wisely, she can obtain without further fighting all of the desiderata for which she allegedly started fighting—strategic, economic, financial, and social security.

[1519] Then I said further:

I have had conversations with friends and after examining their feelings I have come to the conclusion that they believe, with no knowledge of the actual
contents of the American document of November 26, that Washington has delivered an ultimatum—
now, wait a moment. I beg your pardon, sir, I am wrong. I was quoting a statement made to me by a prominent Japanese. I will withdraw that and begin again, just that last passage, if I may. This is written on December 5, 1941. (Reading:)

Yesterday I received in his own handwriting a letter from a prominent Japanese who is closely in touch with Government circles here. This letter reads in part as follows: "The situation is very regrettable. You know how I feel and I may understand your feelings. Permit me to set forth frankly to you what is now in my mind. I have had conversations with friends and after examining their feelings I have come to the conclusion that they believe, with no knowledge of the actual contents of the American document of November 26, that Washington has delivered an ultimatum to us. Such is the regrettable psychology of our people."

Now, that document as I think I said this morning was not published in Japan until after Pearl Harbor and when it was published the paper publishing it was immediately confiscated. In other words, the authorities did not want the Japanese people to know what was in that document.

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you if you are acquainted with any of the members of the General Board that made this investigation and so made the report that I have read to you heretofore?

Mr. Grew. I beg pardon, sir?

Senator Lucas. Are you acquainted with any of the members of the Army Board that made this report which was described to you in the statement "it was the document that touched the button that started the war as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed it"?

Mr. Grew. Are you asking me the names?

Senator Lucas. I am asking you if you personally know any of the generals that made that report.

Mr. Grew. Let me see. I do not recollect now. I may have met them. I did not know any of them well, certainly. Generally Russell, it appears, was the officer who questioned me on this particular point. I did not know him well.

Senator Lucas. Do you have any knowledge why the Army Board reached such a strained construction of your language and placed it in this report?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I never understood that. I think my evidence is clear.

Senator Lucas. I certainly agree with you, from what you have read. I examined the transcript and it is rather difficult for me to understand why the Army Board used that statement of yours in the way it did.

Another thing, while I am on that subject, it is difficult for me to understand why it was that the Army Board said practically nothing about the ultimatum that was issued by Japan, which has been testified to here over and over again by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Under Secretary Welles, and that they used the Ten-Point Program of Mr. Hull so far as their report on the question of ultimatum was concerned.

One other question and then I am through. During your stay, Mr. Ambassador, in Japan, did you have any opportunity to discover what
the Japanese naval forces or military forces were doing in the way of building up their military or naval machines?

Mr. Grew. We had very little opportunity to get really inside information on that. As I say, the Japanese were past masters at secrecy and their secret police were constantly watching all foreigners and all Japanese who were regarded as possibly pro-American or in any way pro-foreign, watching them continually, and if they felt there was any chance of them having imparted information they would generally arrest them immediately.

So it was very difficult to find out exactly what was being done, but those things dripped through from various [1523] channels from time to time.

We had a pretty good idea in the Embassy, apart from the statement published in the press, that they were steadily strengthening both their army and navy. While, of course, there were various announcements made from time to time of the building up of both forces.

Senator Lucas. Did you have any military or naval attachés in the Intelligence Department attached to your Embassy?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. How many did you have at that time?

Mr. Grew. I think a military and a naval attaché and several so-called language officers, young officers in the Army and Navy who were there to study the Japanese language.

Senator Lucas. Was that the only intelligence service that you had at that time in Japan that was connected with your department?

Mr. Grew. That was the only intelligence service we had, except insofar as we were able to receive information from various sources, our Consuls in the different places, and in some cases friendly foreigners, and in other cases I might say also friendly Japanese.

Senator Lucas. The reason for these questions takes me back to April 1940, when Admiral Stark appeared before the Naval Affairs Committee of the United States Senate, of which I was a member at that time, and he gave the committee the information that it was practically impossible to learn just what Japan was doing at that time in the way of strengthening her military and naval forces.

They knew from past treaties and past information as to the number of battleships, the number of cruisers, and so forth, but after the termination of the treaty in 1936 he advised us it was very difficult to obtain any information at that time as to what the Japanese were doing either in the way of building battleships or other ships.

Incidentally, he thought they were building at that time two battleships, but he was not certain about it. I just call that to your attention, because it seems to me their secrecy must have been of the highest order if our intelligence service was not able to ascertain whether or not they were building a couple of battleships.

Mr. Grew. Admiral Stark was quite right about that. They took the utmost precautions to see that information of that kind came into the hands of no foreigner. I know, for instance, on the railway trip from Tokyo down to Shimonoseki at the foot of Honshu Island, very close to one of the Japanese navy yards where they were building ships, they had a big stockade erected around the yard and as the train passed they [1525] always pulled down the curtains.
Of course, the police were watching all the time to prevent any foreigner from coming into that area. That is just one little instance, but that was the whole system throughout Japan, and it was exceedingly difficult to get accurate information about what they were doing.

Senator Lucas. Did I understand you to say in your direct examination that the ten-point program that was promulgated by Mr. Hull was published in one newspaper in Japan and that newspaper was immediately confiscated? Is that correct?

Mr. Grew. That is correct, sir, yes sir.

Senator Lucas. That was after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew. That was after Pearl Harbor. That, as far as I was concerned, was of course hearsay, because I was locked up in the Embassy and had no contacts with the outside.

Senator Lucas. Did you have an opportunity while you were locked up in the Embassy to read the daily Japanese newspapers?

Mr. Grew. After about two or three weeks of our interment, I have forgotten how long it was, they finally did allow the Japanese newspapers to come in to us. The first few weeks they did not.

[1526] Senator Lucas. The first few weeks you were totally ignorant of what was going on?

Mr. Grew. Yes. I would not like to set a date on it. I would have to consult my record.

Senator Lucas. Anyhow, they had no free press in Japan, as far as the publication of any document was concerned?

Mr. Grew. Absolutely not. It was completely controlled.

Senator Lucas. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Ambassador, you have already been asked about the Army Pearl Harbor Report at page 51. So that the record will be clear, I would also like to ask you about the part at page 27, which reads as follows:

This is the memorandum asking the President not to precipitate an ultimatum with the Japanese and to give the Army and Navy more time within which to prepare, but it was too late as the die had been cast by the Secretary of State in handing the Ten-points counter-proposals to the Japanese on the previous day, and it was, as the Secretary of State remarked, washing his hands of the matter.

Then, again, on page 56, and I quote:

The Secretary of State—the Honorable Cordell Hull. The action of the Secretary of State in delivering the [1527] counter-proposals of November 26, 1941, was used by the Japanese as the signal to begin the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor. To the extent that it hastened such attack it was in conflict with the efforts of the War and Navy departments to gain time for preparation for war. However, war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of irreconcilable disagreements between the Japanese Empire and the American Government.

I would like to state for the record that the Army Pearl Harbor Board did not have the benefit of the testimony of Admiral Inglis, apparently.

I am wondering if counsel is familiar with the report, whether the Army had the benefit of the testimony, to the effect that the Jap Fleet was advancing on November 25 in the direction of American waters? Are you familiar with that, counsel, whether there was such knowledge in the Army Board, or such evidence?
Mr. Gesell. I believe at the time of the Army Board hearing, at least a good portion of it was missing. There was even doubt as to where the Jap transport started from.

Mr. Murphy. Then, at any rate, this evidence which has been introduced would throw a new light on the advance of the Japs from November 25, and you, Mr. Ambassador, would be right in saying it was about the time of the note of the 26th, but not that the note of the 26th was the cause of the act; is that right?

Mr. Grew. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. Did you answer?

Mr. Grew. I said I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, Mr. Ambassador, I direct your attention to page 359 of your book—or first to page 358 of the book in which you stated that—and I am reading now from the second to the last paragraph:

it may become open to question whether we can afford to await a British victory and whether we should allow Japan to dig in throughout the area where she now visualizes a far-flung control. That question, I think, will depend upon the tempo of the Japanese advance. In the meantime let us keep our powder dry and be ready—for anything.

Those were your sentiments, I take it? That is on page 358.

Mr. Grew. Page 358?

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Those were your sentiments as of January 1, 1941; is that right? That is the second to the last paragraph, near the bottom of the page.

Mr. Grew. Yes: I have it.

Mr. Murphy. Did you hear my question?

Mr. Grew. I would like to have it again.

Mr. Murphy. Will you read the question, Mr. Stenographer?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Mr. Murphy. I say, those were your sentiments as on the first of the year 1941?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Now, will you turn to page 365?

At page 365 you make a statement to the effect that the Germans were opposing the sending of Ambassador Nomura to Washington and that they were trying to break diplomatic relations with the United States. Was that your considered judgment as of January 3, 1941?

Mr. Grew. That is true.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I direct your attention to page 366, to an editorial in the Kokumin. You refer there to a Japanese editorial and a warning of war with America. Is that the kind of editorials that were running in the papers in Japan on January 7, 1941?

Mr. Grew. Mr. Congressman, yes, that is the sort of editorial that was appearing at that time, but all sorts of editorials were appearing. The Japanese press, I would say, was totally irresponsible in its editorial statements and often in its actual reports.

Mr. Murphy. Then, I direct your attention to page 366, the luncheon at which you were present and at which Matsuoka practically threatened the United States with war, on January 18, 1941. Did that occur?

Mr. Grew. What is that?

Mr. Murphy. That is the first line of the second paragraph under your note of January 18.
The CHAIRMAN. He asked if that occurred.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; that did occur at that luncheon. I think it is rather important for the record that this whole passage should be read, that is, after I have looked into it.

The CHAIRMAN. Read it.

Mr. Murphy. Will you read the pertinent part that you think should go in the record?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

JANUARY 18, 1941.

At the Farewell Luncheon given by Matsuoka for Admiral Nomura today I was talking with them both and was expressing the hope that the Admiral would be able to exert his influence—I didn't say where the influence was to be exerted—to improve American-Japanese relations. Matsuoka remarked: "They certainly couldn't be worse," and turned away.

At the luncheon also practically threatened the United States with war, and I immediately replied to the following effect: "The Minister too has lived long enough in the United States to know that the American people are fundamentally peace-minded and furthermore that they stand for Justice and equity. He also knows that the American people are firmly determined on certain matters among which, on the one hand, are their obligations and, on the other hand, their rights. Their profoundest wish is to see peace, prosperity, security, stability, and happiness assured to all nations. In the present state of world affairs we must inevitably realize that what counts in international relationships today is the concrete evidence of facts and actions, regardless of the persuasive garb in which such facts and actions may be dressed. Let us say of nations as of men: 'by their fruits ye shall know them.'"

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, Mr. Ambassador, you were asked about the Fleet being in the Pacific, and you stated certain Japanese felt the Fleet should be taken entirely out of the Pacific. I direct your attention to page 368 of your book, to an editorial, or rather an item in the Korean-Japanese language daily newspapers in which the following occurs:

Should Japan make a proposal it would be for instant withdrawal of the American Fleet from the Pacific.

Were editorials of that nature, or statements of that nature made in other papers in Japan?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. That thought appeared from time to time in the Japanese press.

Mr. Murphy. I direct your attention to page 378 of your book and I note that you record the fact, under your entry of April 10, 1941, that "Matsuoka went to Europe." Is that right?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. That, Mr. Chairman, is the reason for my asking for the exhibit from the Nuremburg trials, to follow up with the trip of Mr. Matsuoka at that time.

I direct your attention to page 390 of your book. There was some testimony given to the committee by Admiral Richardson to the effect that his impression was that the United States was bluffing. In connection with the word "bluffing" and the idea of "bluffing" I direct your attention to page 390 of your book where you make reference to the fact that the Japanese had tried to intimidate you.

Will you expand on that a little bit, please? I direct your attention to the middle of the page.

Mr. Grew. This statement, Congressman, as I remember it, was based on a long talk I had with Mr. Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, at his own private house, walking up and down his garden, and just chatting about the things, and I say:
The Minister thereupon makes perfectly clear his interpretation of the Tripartite Pact to the effect that if the United States should convey its ships to England and if Germany should sink such ships, and if war with Germany should result, he, Mr. Matsuoka, would regard the United States as an aggressor in the sense of Article III of the Pact, and it is his belief that war would thereupon ensue between Japan and the United States. He adds that this is only his own opinion and that there would have to be a deliberation not only among his colleagues in the Japanese Government but with Japan's allies, in which deliberation Japan would have but one out of three votes. (In this connection it is interesting to note that when Germany attacked Greece this spring, Mr. Matsuoka, according to the Greek Minister here, informed Mr. Politis that Japan herself would determine her obligation under the Tripartite Pact, that her decision would be guided by common sense, and that Mr. Matsuoka thought that it was quite clear what the decision would be. Nothing was then said of Japan having but one out of three votes.)

I expressed my surprise at that statement.

I also noted in that entry on that particular day:

Soon after Mr. Matsuoka took office he indicated that his platform would be that the United States could and should be intimidated into adopting an attitude of complete isolation with regard to both the Far East and Europe. That platform was implemented by the Three Power Alliance, which action not only failed to have the desired effect but was one of the major factors in stimulating the trend of American opinion away from isolationism. It would seem that, despite the egregious failure of that attempt, Mr. Matsuoka would prefer to persist in a course fraught with the gravest dangers than to chart a new course which would constitute admission on his part that he had completely misread the character and temper of the American people, and which would inevitably make his position as Foreign Minister untenable.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate you did state in your entry on page 390 that:

He at once expresses his astonishment that Mr. Hull had sent for Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, and had told him that Mr. Matsuoka had sought to “intimidate” me in our conversation on the 14th.

Mr. Grew. That is true.

Mr. Murphy. Finally, I direct your attention to page 415 of your book. You were asked whether or not you knew of these Japanese intercepts. You were also asked the question, at least the question has been raised here, whether the Japanese knew of our messages. You make a statement on page 415 which would seem to indicate that the Japanese knew of some of our messages, except “one confidential code”; is that correct?

Mr. Grew. That is true. I can tell you how that came about. One of the high officials of the Japanese Government wanted to send a secret message to our Government which they did not want the Japanese military to see and in passing this message on they asked me to please put it in our most secret code. I said of course I would do so. Then after a little hemming-and-hawing this official said to me, “We understand that you have one code which is unbreakable.”

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions.

The Chairman. Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Ambassador, in connection with the basing of the Fleet at Hawaii, stationing it there, when did you first have knowledge of that?

Mr. Grew. I beg your pardon, I didn't understand.

Senator Brewster. When did you first have knowledge of the Fleet being retained at Honolulu?
Mr. Grew. Retained at Honolulu?
Senator Brewster. Retained; yes.
Mr. Grew. Well, I can't remember the precise date.
Senator Brewster. I inquire with particular relation to whether or not you were advised in advance or whether you learned of it after the event; that is what I am concerned with.
Mr. Grew. Frankly, Senator, I couldn't answer that question without consulting the record. I have no recollection of having been specifically advised of it.
Senator Brewster. Could you say whether or not you were asked for an opinion or whether you were consulted in advance, before that action was taken?
Mr. Grew. I have no recollection of that, Senator. I would have to look at the record.
Senator Brewster. You have no recollection that you were, but if you find that you were you will advise us?¹
Mr. Grew. Right.
Senator Brewster. So that if we have no further record we will understand that you were not consulted before the event.
Mr. Grew. That is correct.
Senator Brewster. You understand that the Fleet went out to Pearl Harbor for maneuvers in March or April 1940 and subsequently on May 7 I believe the decision was notified to Pearl Harbor that the Fleet would be retained there and so far as the evidence now shows it remained there from then on, based at Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Grew. Yes.
Senator Brewster. You have just spoken about the code. Did you ever have any reason to think that the Japs had knowledge of our codes or were getting any of our messages?
Mr. Grew. Well, I think that, from that which the official mentioned, to the effect that he understood that we had one code that was unbreakable, I think that implied that they were able to break our other codes, but I have no concrete evidence on that, Senator.
Senator Brewster. Did you ever have reason to think that they knew we were breaking some or all of their codes?
Mr. Grew. I have no evidence to that effect, Senator.
Senator Brewster. Nothing ever came to your attention which would indicate that they even had a suspicion of that?
Mr. Grew. No, sir; it did not.
Senator Brewster. Did you receive copies of any of these intercepts at any time, of the diplomatic communications?
Mr. Grew. No, sir; I received no copies of such intercepts.
Senator Brewster. Were you ever apprised of the information which they contained?
Mr. Grew. No, sir.
Senator Brewster. So you proceeded all through this period without whatever benefit there may have been to that knowledge in appraising the situation?
Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. As one of, perhaps, more experience than any other single person in our country with the Japanese, their preparations and their psychology, would you give us your opinion as to whether there was any possibility that if the modus vivendi, which

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1711.
we have heard discussed, which was under consideration in the latter part of November, had been submitted to the Japanese instead of the message that was sub-

[1539]mitted, that it would have made any difference in the action of the Japanese at that time?

Mr. Grew. My impression is that it would have made no difference.

Senator Brewster. That they were determined on that course and that they, irrespective of our replies, short of a complete surrender to their message, would have continued on?

Mr. Grew. I feel that.

Senator Brewster. Was that because of their situation at the time in a military sense or did it rest on other factors?

Mr. Grew. It was based mainly on the fact that throughout those many years the military had been developing the program, gradually exerting control over all of east Asia, which they called their prosperity sphere, first economic control, to be followed by gradual political control, and every step taken by the Japanese military was to the way of implementing that program.

Senator Brewster. Now, there had gone on, for a considerable period, over some years, the policy of allowing Japanese to secure scrap iron and aviation gasoline from our country before their right in that respect finally terminated. To what extent, if you recall, were you consulted in connection with the various decisions to permit that traffic to go on?

Mr. Grew. I cannot recollect now whether that precise [1540]question was asked me or not, but I frankly expressed my own opinion from time to time in my reports.

Senator Brewster. What were they?

Mr. Grew. Those opinions were rather concisely stated in the Army Report. Would you wish to have me rehearse that statement?

Senator Brewster. If you would; yes.

Mr. Grew. Shall I read it?

Senator Brewster. Whichever way you prefer.

Mr. Grew (reading):

During the period up to, I think it was, the autumn of 1940, I took the position that economic embargoes against Japan—and embargoes are in the nature of sanctions and therefore are always interpreted as international insults—I took the position that we should not put embargoes on Japan, until we were prepared to go all the way through with whatever might result from those embargoes.

I pointed out that when we put embargoes against Japan into effect, our relations with that country were bound to go steadily downhill and it might, and probably would, end in war, and that until we were prepared to go to war with Japan, I felt it would be very shortsighted to go into a situation where we might be obliged at a later date to withdraw those embargoes. There is [1541]nothing so conducive to a lowering of national prestige, reputation and authority as to make threats and then have to recall those threats or modify those threats.

We saw that working out in the relations between Great Britain and Italy at the time of the Abyssinian campaign.

But, in the autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that I felt that time had then come, since Japan was threatening not only our national interests, but, I would say, our vital national interests; I felt that the time had come to consider, not whether we must call a halt to Japan’s expansion, but when. It seemed to me at that time, whether we were fully prepared for war or not, that we must in our own interests put those embargoes into effect; and shortly thereafter, those embargoes were put into effect.
Our relations then started directly on a downhill course, and they ended in war but at least we were more prepared for war at that time than we had been three years earlier.

It was in the fall of 1940 that we cast the die and adopted economic sanctions.

That, in general, expressed my views at that time, Senator. In other words, I didn’t want to see us get into a position with the Japanese where we might be obliged to step back in our tracks until we were ready to go ahead with whatever program we put into effect.

Of course, at the same time, especially after the autumn of 1940, when we realized that there was always the risk of conflict, I felt we couldn’t afford to continue to give these materials to the Japanese, that might eventually be used against us.

Senator Brewster. So that you were of the opinion then, and events have seemed to justify it, that that did mean a very definite breach which might well eventually lead to war?

Mr. Grew. There was always that possibility. It was something to be taken into consideration.

Senator Brewster. The economic impact of the embargo upon Japan would tend to force them to some move in order to maintain their present economic position?

Mr. Grew. The longer those embargoes went on, of course, the more difficult their economic position became. They had very large stocks of those commodities themselves.

Senator Brewster. Of this scrap iron and gasoline?

Mr. Grew. Yes; very large stocks. So there was no telling at what point they would feel they must go down and get the oil by force. We couldn’t possibly foresee that.

Senator Brewster. Now, we were in the same position—

Mr. Grew. I would like to add, if I may, this statement.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Mr. Grew. Whether in the meantime they would be able to come to some kind of an agreement with the United States and satisfy the Netherlands Indies by which they would be able to have access to that oil without fighting.

Senator Brewster. The negotiations with the Dutch East Indies went on following that time in their attempt to secure access to those supplies?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. So that in both the case of the embargoes and the case of the fleet at Hawaii, they constituted action from which once taken we were compelled to follow through? That is, we couldn’t take then a backward step?

Mr. Grew. It was merely my personal view that it would be a mistake to initiate that action and then have to withdraw that action.

Senator Brewster. Both of those actions, the embargo and the stationing of the fleet at Hawaii, constituted a show of firmness on the part of the United States in the situation, did they not?

Mr. Grew. Yes; the policy which I had recommended.

Senator Brewster. In the case of the embargo, the embargo was recommended by you?

Mr. Grew. Yes.
Senator Brewster. So far as you know, the location of the fleet was not a matter on which you recollect being consulted?

Mr. Grew. I do not.

Senator Brewster. Subsequent to the stationing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, did you have occasion to express an opinion regarding its consequences or effects?

Mr. Grew. Senator, that is perfectly possible, but I made, of course, a great many reports to Washington during those years, and I can't for the moment recollect whether I actually touched on that point in some of my reports or not. I probably did. It would be rather difficult to put my hands on it.

Senator Brewster. Do you recall whether your opinion was ever asked regarding it?

Mr. Grew. I can't recall that particular point; no.

Senator Brewster. Would you examine the records and find out if you were and let us know subsequently, as it may be a matter that will be of considerable concern, as to any opinion which you did express as to the effect, as you were, naturally, the one on whom we would depend for an estimate of Japanese opinion?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

[1545] Senator Brewster. So far as you now recall, you do not recollect the expression of an opinion on that point?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Senator Brewster. But you will let us know?

Mr. Grew. I will do my best to check it.

Senator Brewster. You served subsequently for a time after you returned here as Under Secretary of State, did you not?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. For how long a period was that?

Mr. Grew. When I came back from Japan I was appointed assistant to the Secretary of State and spent most of that time going around the country making a great many speeches about what we were up against in fighting Japan, and I was later appointed Director of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department. I don't recollect the precise date. I held that position for something like six months or more. And then in December 1944 I was appointed Under Secretary of State and remained in that position until I retired from the service on September 30.

Senator Brewster. 19—

Mr. Grew. 1945.

Senator Brewster. How long did you spend in the diplomatic service?

[1546] Mr. Grew. I have been in the service for 41 years. From the 19th of July 1904 to the 30th of September 1945.

Senator Brewster. You heard our discussion with Mr. Welles yesterday. I would like an expression of your opinion as to whether or not in the functioning of our diplomatic service the creation of a permanent Under Secretariat might be of benefit to the functioning of the service and of our foreign relations?

Mr. Grew. I feel very strongly that it would be.

Now, in our service, of course, no matter what party we may have belonged to, when we come into the service we are supposed to be absolutely nonpartisan. We are to serve the Government.

1 See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1711.
For instance, William Phillips and I were both twice Under Secretary of State and we both served once under a Republican Administration and once under a Democratic Administration. So it is perfectly possible to serve administrations of both parties over a period of time.

Any officer who cannot go along with the policy of the Government in control at that time naturally wouldn’t be worth his salt if he felt he couldn’t conscientiously carry out that policy and should retire, without any question.

Senator Brewster. In the instance which you mentioned, in connection with the service of both yourself and Mr. Phillips, [1547] that illustrates the attempt of the administrations under which you served to accomplish this benefit of, let us call it, nonpartisan service, but did not give us the benefit of what the British accomplish by their permanent Under Secretariat, who are recognized officials, to continue irrespective of a change of administration.

So that, as I gather, you would feel that development along those lines might well be beneficial?

Mr. Grew. In general, in principle, I feel very strongly that it would be.

There is only one reservation I would make. That is this, that unless personal relations between the Secretary of State and his Under Secretary are of the closest and most intimate nature, with complete mutual confidence, it just doesn’t work. So if a situation arose where a new Secretary of State found that he could not establish those relations with the permanent Under Secretary, or vice versa, I think there would have to be a change.

Senator Brewster. I think Mr. Welles made the point that under the British system there were two Under Secretaries, one permanent and the other transitory.

Mr. Grew. One is a Parliamentary Under Secretary; he is a political appointee.

Senator Brewster. Yes. Would it not also be true that [1548] the personal difficulties of which you speak presumably would be eliminated as far as an individual is concerned before he had risen to the rank of a permanent Under Secretary, that he never would achieve such responsible position until he had demonstrated the capacity to serve varying points of view and varying administrations?

Mr. Grew. In all probability that is true.

Senator Brewster. That is all.

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Grew, there has been some discussion of what is and what is not an ultimatum. Would you define what you conceive an ultimatum to be?

Mr. Grew. I think, sir, to give a technical definition I would have to look it up in the dictionary, but I would say it was, essentially, a last word.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, Mr. Hull has defined the Japanese message which was handed to him on November 20 as an ultimatum.

That agreement would require the United States to abandon all of its time-honored principles, in the event we accepted the agreement the Japanese offered. You have so interpreted it?

Mr. Grew. Yes.
Mr. Gearhart. It would have required us to consent to the maintenance in China of the Japanese armies and the continuance of the Japanese armies in Indochina; it would have required us to confirm their occupancy of Manchuria; it probably would have required us to abandon the principle of the open door; it would require us to acknowledge the existence of, if not to consent to, the agreement they had made with the Axis; generally speaking that is true, isn't it?

Mr. Grew. That is true, I would say.

Mr. Gearhart. Therefore, if we had accepted the Japanese agreement of November 20 we would have had to give up everything that Americans call near and dear, pretty near?

Mr. Grew. We certainly would have had to abandon principles for which we had stood.

Mr. Gearhart. And had stood for for many years?

Mr. Grew. Exactly.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, we didn't do it. We offered on the 26th a counter-agreement which, if accepted, would have required the Japanese to have withdrawn their armies from Indochina; would have required the Japanese to withdraw their armies from China; would have required the Japanese to withdraw their recognition of the Wei Government; would have required the Japanese to recognize the Chiang Kai-shek Government; would have required them to interpret the Axis agreement so as not to interfere with any of those matters.

Now, if Japan had accepted our agreement she would simply have said, "Excuse, please," and withdrawn all her armies and abandoned her campaign of aggression and have gone back to Japan.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; but that is only a part of the story.

In other words, Mr. Hull, in his proposal of November 26, offered Japan a great many assets. It offered Japan, as I said a few moments ago, eventually a relaxation of our economic measures. It offered access to raw materials, free trade and commerce, financial cooperation and support, and various other things. So that Japan would have had, I would say, not only a great deal to gain but everything to gain by accepting that proposal.

Mr. Gearhart. There is no doubt but what there were some very generous inducements offered to the Japanese, but the other issues, the ones that I have named, were absolutely inconsistent with all that Japan had been trying to accomplish during the last several years. She would have had to admit that she was mistaken and would have had to withdraw and go back to Japan, withdraw her armies and admit that she was wrong, which she would have done, but she was not prepared to do it at that time, was she?

Mr. Grew. She absolutely was not prepared to, but my feeling was, at that time, and I so stated in my diary, that Japan, since public opinion in Japan is rather easily molded, in a comparatively short period, as the Government was able to bring pressure to bear on the people, my feeling was that they could persuade the people that the Japanese Government, in the face of the military, could have persuaded the people that they had achieved by peaceful measures everything that they were ostensibly fighting for.
They were ostensibly fighting for economic, political, and social security. Those things would all have flown from the implementation of Mr. Hull's proposals if they had carried it out. Not at once, but over a period of time. In my opinion, the Japanese Government, if it had really wanted to come to some kind of an agreement, could have persuaded the people that this was all in their interest.

Mr. Gearhart. But Japan would have had to abandon her ruthless campaign of aggression and conquest?

Mr. Grew. Very definitely. That was fundamental.

Mr. Gearhart. And that was what they had been doing. She had been spending millions of yen, whatever they were, she had sacrificed hundreds of thousands of lives, and if she had to give up and abandon her ruthless conquests that would have constituted an ignominious defeat for her statesmen who had led her into her awful position; isn't that true?

Mr. Grew. When you speak of Japan you must realize that there is more than one Japan. You have your military [1552] extremists.

Mr. Gearhart. They were running the show and had been ever since the so-called prosperity scheme of robbery began.

Mr. Grew. They had been in control from time to time, but there were periods of relaxation, and there is no question but what some, at least, of their more intelligent statesmen, especially those who had been in our country and knew something about our powers of production, our national spirit, and all the rest of it, realized they would probably, in the case of war with the United States, ultimately be defeated, and must have realized at that time that they were on the brink of an abyss.

If those statesmen had had the courage to take the bull by the horns they might then have shifted the whole situation. I don't say they could have done it, I don't say they would have tried to do it, but there was always that possibility.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, statesmen were not running Japan; the militarists were running it at that time, weren't they?

Mr. Grew. That is perfectly true.

Mr. Gearhart. They were the ones who led the people of Japan into this terrible mistake, and they would be the last to admit it by adopting any suggestion of the United States which would require them to withdraw their troops from China and Indochina and Manchuria.

[1553] Mr. Grew. True, and that is why the doubt was expressed that this proposal of Mr. Hull would bring satisfactory results.

Mr. Gearhart. Did Mr. Hull suggest that that statement was not an ultimatum? Do you mean to say Mr. Hull was willing to negotiate the question as to whether or not Japanese soldiers should stay in Indochina?

Mr. Grew. If you read the document—

Mr. Gearhart. I have read it.

Mr. Grew. I think you will see it is not in itself an ultimatum.

Mr. Gearhart. It is a tendered agreement.

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. It is in the form of a tendered agreement.
Mr. Grew. Yes.
Mr. Gearhart. One of the specifications is that Japan should get her troops out of Indochina.
Mr. Grew. Correct.
Mr. Gearhart. If that wasn’t an ultimatum in itself, that they should get their troops out of Indochina, then the United States was willing to compromise on that question and discuss something else.
Mr. Grew. No. All I can say is that document contained a very important quid pro quo—
Mr. Gearhart. Don’t talk about a quid pro quo. Whether [1554] the Japs thought there was a quid pro quo in there is one question. The other question is, were we willing to temporize on that question of her getting out of Indochina and China.
Mr. Grew. We were not willing to temporize.
Mr. Gearhart. Then that was an ultimatum on that question, wasn’t it?
Mr. Grew. Can you say, Mr. Congressman, because there is a point in a document which definitely must be carried out that the whole document and all the points therein constitute an ultimatum? I would not say so. I would say that was a carefully balanced document. There is a great deal on the other side of the picture.
Mr. Gearhart. There is another stipulation in the agreement providing that Japan should get out of China and recognize the Chiang Kai-shek government. Was that a point upon which we were willing to compromise and temporize or consult?
Mr. Grew. I think in the long run if we were going to stand on our principles it was essential that Japan should give up all her policy of aggression.
Now, I can’t say that we would have demanded on the basis of that document that the Japanese get out of China in a week or in a month. They probably couldn’t do it. But I think there was an opening there for an arrangement by which the Japanese could get out of Indochina and China and in the light [1555] of the great benefits which they would have received as a result could have done it.
Mr. Gearhart. The question I am asking you as an expert in statecraft is this: Were we willing to compromise or temporize or even discuss a change in that particular stipulation, in that contract, which required Japan to get out of China and recognize the nationalist government there headed by Chiang Kai-shek?
Mr. Grew. I couldn’t answer that. I couldn’t answer for what the administration might have done.
Mr. Gearhart. I thought we were contending for principles when we tendered that agreement to the Japanese.
Mr. Grew. You thought that we were what?
Mr. Gearhart. Wasn’t it a fundamental principle in our demands upon Japan that Japan should get out of China and Indochina and recognize the nationalist government and respect the territorial integrity of all those eastern countries?
Mr. Grew. That had been a fundamental principle with us for years.
Mr. Gearhart. Therefore that was not a matter which America would compromise on, was it?
Mr. Grew. It was not a matter on which we would have willingly compromised.
Mr. Gearhart. Then, insofar as that stipulation was concerned, the Hull tendered agreement constituted an ultimatum, didn’t it?

Mr. Grew. I would not say so.

Mr. Gearhart. Then if it were not an ultimatum, it was an item upon which we, America, were willing to compromise?

Mr. Grew. I am sorry, I can’t agree. In every document of that kind there are some points which are matters of principle which we do not accept. There are other points which would be open for modification. That doesn’t mean that because there are two points in a document such as that, that the whole document is an ultimatum. As I say, there was a great deal on the other side of the picture.

Mr. Gearhart. We undoubtedly would have offered greater inducements if she had negotiated further. At least I think we would have, if we could have gotten those other main concessions. If we had been able to induce her to sign an agreement by which she would get out of China and Indochina and would recognize the Chiang Kai-shek government we could give a lot.

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Those were the things she would not concede.

Mr. Grew. Without question.

Mr. Gearhart. Those were the things we would not concede and neither would she.

[1557] Mr. Grew. There were certain things we couldn’t have conceded.

Mr. Gearhart. Then the United States raised a stone wall and Japan had a stone wall. They came to an impasse at that moment, didn’t they?

Mr. Grew. I don’t think that that justifies us in calling that proposal an ultimatum, Congressman.

Mr. Gearhart. Don’t you see what I am trying to do?

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. I am trying to get you to admit that that document is what every American in his heart wanted it to be. I don’t think you should dodge on this ultimatum word. That, in days to come, is going to be one of the most glorious incidents in American history. The time when we took our stand. Why, of course, we told the world that America stood for principles, for good international relationships, for good neighborliness, in that agreement. For some reason a lot of people are quibbling and saying we didn’t really mean it; we were willing to discuss and talk further about Japan ending that despicable program of hers called the coprospertity sphere for East Asia.

[1558] The Chairman. Is that a question?

Mr. Grew. Is that a question?

Mr. Gearhart. Now, don’t be hurrying me, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I was simply asking whether the Ambassador understood that that was a question.

Mr. Grew. No; I did not, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I did not expect you to answer.

Mr. Grew. Was that in the form of a question, Congressman?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; I will put it in the form of a question. I would like to have your views on this subject.
Mr. Grew. In answer to that I can say that through all these years our Government stood on certain fundamental principles of international dealing; at least those were very comprehensively expressed in Mr. Hull's four points which had been put up to the Japanese Government before.

We have never, so far as I know, departed from those principles at any time. Mr. Hull said he supported those principles in every step he took, but at the same time in supporting those principles and in expecting that the Japanese, in order to abide by the principles, would have to get out of Indochina and China, he was offering them something which, as I say, would have completely justified their having accepted those points.

Mr. Gearhart. All right. Then will you go this far with me, Mr. Ambassador: Will you admit that that part of that document which would have required Japan if she had accepted it to get out of China and get out of Indochina and quit the aggression, was that part of it an ultimatum?

Mr. Grew. Mr. Congressman, I do not think you can take any part of any document and use the term "ultimatum" for it. The term "ultimatum" essentially applies to a complete document. I would not say that that term would apply to any part of that document; no, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? I have Webster here on the question of "ultimatum."

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Noah Webster, Mr. Daniel Webster, or who?
Do you want to read that into the record?

Mr. Murphy. I think it would help the record.

Mr. Gearhart. How many definitions are there?
The Chairman. The gentleman will read them all.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

A final proposition, concession or condition; especially, the final propositions, conditions or terms offered by either of the parties in a diplomatic negotiation; the best terms that a negotiator will offer, the rejection of which usually ends the negotiations.

Mr. Gearhart. Thank you very much.
Mr. Grew. I would not say so.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I would like to take the other view [1561] of it.

The Chairman. That having been settled, you may go ahead now. Mr. Gearhart. All right.

This phrase which you have used and which has brought you much fame, namely, that the document which Mr. Hull handed to Ambassador Nomura and Special Envoy Kurusu constituted "the document which touched the button which started the war."

When did you first use that phrase?

Mr. Grew. I did not use that phrase, Congressman Gearhart. I, a moment ago, I think, read the testimony which is, I believe, before the Army Board, which I think makes perfectly clear that I did not.

Mr. Gearhart. That is very true; I heard that testimony on that a moment ago. The question I am asking you now is when did you express that sentiment first? It could not have been at those hearings because we read it in the newspapers long before you gave that testimony. I want to know when you first expressed that sentiment?

Mr. Grew. Well, I do not believe, Mr. Congressman, that I ever expressed that sentiment in those precise terms. I realized that the Japanese military people had seen fit to call that document an ultimatum and to use it, as they alleged, to touch the button which started the war, but I do not think [1562] I have ever said that did, in itself, touch the button; no.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, it constituted, if nothing else, a flat rejection of the Japanese tendered agreement of November 20, did it not?

Mr. Grew. I do not think you can say, Mr. Congressman, that it constituted a flat rejection of the Japanese proposal because it added a great deal to the Japanese proposal. It added things that the Japanese proposal had not even asked, had not ever been touched upon.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, considering its form, it utterly rejected the Japanese-tendered agreement of November 20 and stated a counter-proposal, didn't it?

Mr. Grew. I do not know whether it was regarded as a counter-proposal or not. I was not here at the time and I do not know all the ins and outs of its preparation, and so forth, but I cannot alter my opinion, which is very definite, that in that document we offered the Japanese everything that they were ostensibly fighting for. I do not say that they actually were fighting for, or anything of that kind, but ostensibly what they were fighting for, what they said they were fighting for.

Mr. Gearhart. You heard the testimony of Mr. Hull the other day when he said they were forcing him and pressing [1563] him for an answer to the not of November 11 when he did not see any reason why he should answer it at all as he was tendering a counter-proposal?

Mr. Grew. I am not sure that I caught that particular point, but if Mr. Hull did say that perhaps it could be regarded as a counter-proposal.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Mr. Grew. But, as I say, I was not here at the time.

Mr. Gearhart. Since you have been back in America, have you looked over the intercepts or any part of them?

Mr. Grew. No, Mr. Congressman. I have only seen a very few of them. From the moment I came back from Tokyo I found myself
very busy immediately and I did not have much time to go into post mortems, but I have seen some of the main ones but I certainly have not seen them all. I think there are a very large number available.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you see the ones which the Judge Advocate General sums up in these words? [Reading:]

Referring to message to change dead line of 25th November and to press negotiations with the United States.

[1564] Mr. Grew. I do not recollect having seen that particular one.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know about the one which has been digested by the Judge Advocate General in a memorandum to the Secretary of War as follows?

Mr. Gesell. What date, Congressman?
Mr. Gearhart. Wait until I get my finger on it. [Reading:]

22 November; translated 22 November,
From Tokyo to Washington.
Extends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 20 November. Latter is absolute dead line. "After that things are automatically going to happen."

Have you seen that?
Mr. Grew. I think it was published, if I am not mistaken.
Mr. Gearhart. Oh, yes; both of these have been in the newspapers.
Mr. Grew. Oh, yes; I have seen it.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, the point is this: The State Department knew that the 29th was the dead line, and if the Japanese did not get an agreement acceptable to them by the 29th, "things were automatically going to happen."

Now, since the State Department knew about that message they knew that when they tendered the agreement of the 26th that there was no chance of averting whatever Japan was intending to do, having failed to get the agreement she wanted, didn't they?

Mr. Grew. Congressman, I saw one report in the press—I haven't seen the actual intercept—to the effect that if the conversations between the United States and Japan should come to a successful termination the Japanese Fleet, even though it was already on its way to Pearl Harbor, would have been turned back. Am I right in that remark, Counsel?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Mr. Grew. I think it is correct. In other words, I think that would answer that point.

Mr. Gearhart. That was much earlier, I think. The Japanese Fleet was sent, the testimony shows, I think you will all agree, it left Japan on the 25th of November and sailed to a designated rendezvous northwest of Hawaii under instructions to stand by there, and if Japan got the agreement it wanted, which would have required us to abandon all American principles for which we have contended for a generation, that they would turn back to their ports, but it all turned on Japan getting the agreement she wanted, didn't it?

Mr. Grew. I cannot answer that question.

[1566] Mr. Gearhart. And the last tender of agreement which Japan made was the one which was delivered to Mr. Hull on November 20, 1941, is that correct?
Mr. Grew. Congressman, I still have to stand on my point that that memorandum of November 26 contained a great deal on the other side of the picture besides what Japan wanted, and what we were going to be able to give to Japan and we were going to be able to give her a great deal, as expressed in that document.

Mr. Gearhart. Mind you, I am not criticizing the message of November 26. To me it was one of the grandest state papers ever delivered. I am not criticizing it. It might be a question as to timing, and on that I am reserving consideration, but it was a great document, upon which America announced its stand with clarity to the entire world, and we ought to be proud of it and not be ducking as to whether or not we really meant it as an ultimatum.

Let us pass from that now. In your testimony you remarked how the Japanese press treated the presence of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor. You had access to the press and read those statements from day to day as they appeared, did you not?

Mr. Grew. Oh, yes; certainly.

[1567] Mr. Gearhart. Now, you knew that Japan had the totalitarian form of government that was run by the war cabinet, did you not? I guess nobody knew it better than you did.

Mr. Grew. I would say that Japan had a totalitarian form of government after the Tojo cabinet came in. Prior to that time I do not know that you could call it a totalitarian form of government. Japan was made up of a great many pressure groups, a great many different elements in the country, all of which had to be, to a certain extent, pacified by the administration, by the government itself.

I do not think until the military dictatorship was actually established in October 1941, I do not think you could properly have called it a totalitarian government.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, after the Tojo government came into power and the militarists had a chance to consolidate their control of things, they first established a very rigid censorship, didn’t they, over the press?

Mr. Grew. Very definitely.

Mr. Gearhart. And that which the press printed for the consumption of the general public did not necessarily represent what the heads of the government were thinking?

Mr. Grew. True.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, they used the press as a propaganda agency, isn’t that correct?

Mr. Grew. Constantly.

[1568] Mr. Gearhart. So when you tell us that there were items appearing in the press from time to time expressing irritation because the American Fleet was kept in the Hawaiian waters your were speaking of a controlled press?

Mr. Grew. Yes; I was speaking of a controlled press.

Mr. Gearhart. And at that time the Japanese Government was busily engaged in promoting an anti-American feeling in Japan, were they not?

Mr. Grew. It was.

Mr. Gearhart. And it served their purposes, did it not, at that time to instill a measure of fear in Japanese hearts that the American Navy...
was about to assault them, or to leave the impression that we were threatening to? Wasn't that part of their program?

Mr. Grew. To increase in the minds of the Japanese people what? I did not get that.

Mr. Gearhart. To leave the impression with the Japanese people that the American Fleet at Hawaii was a definite threat against the security of Japan?

Mr. Grew. Oh, yes; that is true.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, the military heads of the government of Japan, being informed by their espionage system of the condition of the American Fleet, and so forth, did not necessarily feel that same way about it, did they?

[1569] Mr. Grew. That is quite possible. I cannot answer, though.

Mr. Gearhart. You heard the testimony of Admiral Richardson to the effect that the Japanese knew more about the American Fleet and battle positions in the Hawaiian Islands than the Americans did themselves, didn't you?

Mr. Grew. Was that my testimony?

Mr. Gearhart. No. You heard that testimony?

Mr. Grew. Well, I would not know, Mr. Congressman. Very probably, but I have had no evidence of being able to make a concrete statement on that.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, as a matter of fact, you are familiar with Oahu, aren't you, the island that appears on the map here? You know it is utterly impossible to conceal anything in Pearl Harbor from anybody that wants to go on those mountain sides with a pair of binoculars and wants to go up there and see what we have there; so if there were any Japanese spies on the islands—and it is suspected that there were possibly two or three, it is suspected by everybody that possibly there were, there may have been one or two—they knew exactly what was going on in the ships and different things in Pearl Harbor. It was not possible to conceal from a nation conducting espionage against us what was going on there, isn't that correct?

[1570] Mr. Grew. I think you are right.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. And those spies—if they had spies, and we suspect they did—reported, of course, to the militarists and not to the people?

Mr. Grew. That is true.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, do you thing, basing your answer upon the considerations I have just laid before you, that the military high command in charge of the Government of Japan felt any restraint upon what they were doing in behalf of their programs because of the presence of the American fleet in the Hawaiian waters?

Mr. Grew. Congressman, that is a question purely of opinion.

Mr. Gearhart. I have a very high respect for yours, Mr. Grew.

Mr. Grew. I think that the presence of the fleet in Hawaii was always, to a certain extent at least, a deterring influence on the Japanese, including the Japanese Government.

Mr. Gearhart. Would you have thought that if you had known, as the Japs undoubtedly did know, that our fleet was undermanned, understaffed, underammunitioned, and very much unready for war? Would you have believed that if you had known that, as a diplomat?
Mr. Grew. Well, that is a hypothetical question, isn't it, Congressman Gearhart? I did not know, and I do not know whether I can satisfactorily answer your question or not.

You merely wish my opinion as to whether it had a deterrent influence on the Japanese Government, who knew that it was not prepared, is that your point?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Mr. Grew. Well, if that were true—

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the answer is obvious.

Mr. Grew. All right, sir.

The Chairman. Well, let the witness make it, though.

Mr. Gearhart. If he wants to answer it I am willing to listen.

Mr. Grew. If that were true, Congressman, if the fleet, whether fully prepared for war or not, if it had not had a deterrent influence on the Japanese administration or government or military people, why did they let their press come out from time to time and practically, demand, convey the preposterous demand that we were to withdraw that fleet from the Pacific?

Having the general knowledge which they did, if they felt that it was a nonentity, and they did have to bother with it at all, I doubt if the newspapers would ever have carried that sort of material.

Mr. Gearhart. For the same reason you mentioned a moment ago, that the Japanese military people have used the press for the purpose of propaganda, to instill fear in the people and have used it for their own needs. That is the answer to that. The press means nothing. The question is what did the militarists know, and they had a spy system all over these islands and off our shores and they knew what the condition of the fleet was.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; all right, I yield.

Mr. Murphy. In connection with the statement that the press means nothing, it has been stated that the Japan Times and Advertiser reflected the attitude of the war department. I direct your attention to the editorial attack of the Japan Times and Advertiser as set forth on page 472 of the witness' book.

Mr. Gearhart. You are reading something that happened before 1941, when the militarists took over.

Mr. Murphy. No; it happened after 1941, when they took over.

Mr. Gearhart. Your purpose in having me yield to you was what?

Mr. Murphy. Read my statement, please.

The Chairman. The Chair thinks that the colloquy ought to take place between the committeeman examining the witness and the witness and not go into a discussion between members of the committee over the testimony of the witness. Will you proceed?

Mr. Gearhart. I want to know what the gentleman had in mind when he throws a 400-page book at me.

Mr. Murphy. There is a statement on page 472 as to the demands of Japan, taken from the Japan Times and Advertiser, very strong demands on America, stating the attitude of Japan toward America and it is supposed to reflect the attitude of the War Department in Japan. I want to get it in the record on the question of the press reflecting the attitude of the War Department.
Mr. Gearhart. That is precisely what the witness said before, that the totalitarians use the press for whatever purposes they want, to tell the truth or to tell falsehoods; it makes no difference.

Senator Lucas. Let us move on.

[1575] Mr. Gearhart. If you make a few more interruptions, you will probably speed it up.

The Chairman. Let the committee proceed to examine the witness without further interruption by the members of the committee.

Mr. Gearhart. All right. Then, I ask you, who, as a diplomat, believes that the presence of our American Fleet at Hawaii did have a restraining effect upon the Japanese, I will ask you what restraining effect it had on the Japanese on December 7, 1941?

Mr. Grew. In answer to the second question, definitely it had no effect. On the other hand, during all that preliminary period we always kept the Japanese in some doubt. They could not have known, for instance, in the preceding period they were going to be able to do the damage to our fleet that they did. They could not possibly have foreseen that. That was due to nothing that they could have calculated in advance. Therefore, I think that the mere presence of our fleet there and lack of certainty as to what it was capable of was, without question, a deterring influence on them. That does not mean that they were not willing to at least make the gamble of the attack, which they did, but it was a gamble just the same.

Mr. Gearhart. You will agree that the objective was to [1575] cripple the American Fleet in order that they could gain breathing time to consolidate their victories in the South Pacific.

Mr. Grew. Definitely.

Mr. Gearhart. And if the American Fleet had been off the shore of California, they would have had to travel 2500 miles further in order to cripple it, would they not?

Mr. Grew. That is geographically true.

Mr. Gearhart. And if we, for reasons of policy or reasons of compulsion had to contemplate aggressive action against Japan in the defense of this country we would have had to travel 5,000 miles further in order to get at the Japs and we would have had to take the fleet from where they were stationed and take them to the coast for conditioning for war, isn't that correct?

Mr. Grew. That is a naval question, Congressman. I do not think I am competent to answer that.

Mr. Gearhart. You showed you were pretty good in geography just a moment ago, and it is still a geographic question. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Secretary, do you have a copy of your testimony before the Army Board?

[1576] Mr. Grew. I have here only the pages which relate to that one single point, Senator, which was brought up today.

Senator Ferguson. I do not understand.

Mr. Grew. I have before me only the pages of my testimony before the Army which related to that one point which was brought up today.

Senator Ferguson. How did you come to bring just two or three pages?

Mr. Grew. How?
Senator Ferguson. How did you come to have just those pages on that particular point?
Mr. Grew. Because I happened to take occasion to acquire them because I thought that point might come up. I wanted to be prepared to read my testimony on that.
Senator Ferguson. Had anyone suggested that they might ask you that question?
Mr. Grew. Had anybody suggested?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; had anybody suggested that they might ask you that question?
Mr. Grew. No; it was only guesswork on my part.
Senator Ferguson. You had read the Army report then?
Mr. Grew. I had read the Army report; yes, sir.
[1577] Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to refer you to some other pages of your testimony and if counsel has a copy, I will ask him to hand it to you. Apparently some of your testimony has been taken off the record. Is that true?
Mr. Grew. I do not know, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you refer to page 4209?
The Chairman. May I inquire if the Senator means it has been taken off the record or whether he means that he gave it and it was not put on the record?
Senator Ferguson. It was taken and not put on the record. The record is clear on that.
Mr. Gesell. There is no proof on that.
Senator Ferguson. I am going to use the exhibit itself to show it. Then, I want you to refer to page 4211, and I read this language:
Now, that is for the record. I shall now speak off the record.
Mr. Grew. Yes, I see that.
Senator Ferguson. What was taken off the record?
You may want to read back.
Mr. Grew. I would like to just get the subject.
Senator Ferguson. Will you start back and read it into the record so it may refresh your memory? Will you read into the record, back a few questions so you will get what you did give off the record?
[1578] Mr. Grew. Yes. This part which is on the record about Mr. Kurusu is, I think, entirely covered in my book. In fact, I could read the references, if you wished me to do so.
Senator Ferguson. Did you give off the record what is in your book?
Mr. Grew. Apparently not. You see, this took place some time ago. It was September 27 a year ago. I frankly do not recollect what was left off the record there or why, Senator. I have no recollection.
Senator Ferguson. Now, go back to page 4209 and see whether that may refresh your memory why you did not answer a question and they withdrew it because you wanted to give the answer off the record.
Mr. Grew. Let me see what the question was. Do you know where that is?
Senator Ferguson. On page 4209.
Mr. Grew. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. I think you will find it at the bottom of page 4208, being number 34, "General Russell." I take it that is the questioner. So there is no doubt about it, "Mr. Kurusu came over in the fall of 1941, late in the fall,"—do you have that?
Mr. Grew. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it into the record—or I will read it.

to participate in these negotiations. There has...[1579]...been discussion as
to the type of man he was, and his outlook on international relations and Japanese
military ambitions and his friendship for the American Government. Would
you care to discuss him for just a moment for us?

Now, finally, General Frank says, "Or go off the record."

General Russell. Or go off the record.

General Grenier. I would suggest, Mr. Ambassador, that you speak to us off
the record, because I do not know who is going to get these records on this
investigation.

Mr. Grew. I can tell you the reason why that was off the record,
and that is because this was while the war was still in progress, and
anything I might have said about any Japanese individual could
readily have gotten back to Japan and might have endangered that
individual.

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the answer now?

Mr. Grew. What is precisely the question?

Senator Ferguson. At the bottom of page 4208 is the question.

Mr. Grew. You mean the question marked "33"?

Senator Ferguson. No. 34.

Mr. Grew. (reading):

General Russell. Mr. Kurusu came over in the fall of 1941, late in the fall,
to participate in these negotiations. There has been discussion as to the type of
man he was and his outlook on international relations and...[1580]...Japanese
military ambitions and his friendship for the American Government. Would
you care to discuss him for just a moment for us?

Senator Ferguson. Will you answer that question?

Mr. Grew. I would be glad to tell you anything I can about it; yes,
What happened was this: Along about, I should say, toward the
end of September or early in October 1941, before the Konoye Cabinet
was formed, Admiral Tojo wrote to the Foreign Minister and said
the Ambassador was fatigued and he wanted to send somebody to
help him. He said he was going to try to get the best English-speaking
man in the Japanese diplomatic service. He said he had not yet
approached him, he could not mention his name to him, but he just
wanted me to know he was going to have sent somebody over for the
reason he hoped I would cooperate in getting plans ready as quickly
as possible. Before he could act, the Konoye Cabinet fell out and
the Tojo Cabinet fell in, and in my first interview with Foreign
Minister Togo, we brought up this point at once. He said he had
picked Mr. Kurusu to come to Washington to help Admiral Nomura,
as he had the best command of English in the Japanese service.
There has been some question as to whether Admiral Nomura's report
of the conversations in Washington were always completely accurate
and completely comprehensive. His grasp of English was good, but
it was not 100 percent. I used to...[1581]...check up on that.
Every time a conversation took place in Washington, Mr. Hull would
send me a report of it, and I would take the report and give to the For-
eign Minister and he could check it up with his own report. I think he
probably saw some of the reports from the Japanese Embassy here
did not quite click with our report, and there was something lacking.
Anyway, Togo asked if I would arrange to get Kurusu to Washington
as soon as possible on a Clipper, as it was important to carry on the conversations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible. I said I would do so.

Kurusu came to see me that night. I had known him about 10 years in Japan. He spoke English almost perfectly, he had an American wife, and I negotiated with him, and I had seen him in a personal way in many respects. I always regarded him as decidedly pro-American in his outlook and sentiments, and the fact that he happened to be the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin at the time of the signing of the Axis agreement did not change my opinion of him very much, because after all an Ambassador, when he is at a post, takes the instructions of his Government and carries them out whether he approves of that particular document or not.

Kurusu came to see me that night before he left. He threw up his hands and said, "I don't know what it is all about. I don't know anything about these conversations. I spent all the afternoon studying them, and I realize that things seem to be in a very bad mess, but I will go over and do my very best to pull them out because we cannot afford not to come to an agreement." He talked to me for some time about it in a very frank outspoken way. Frankly, he was a Japanese whom I, through long experience, 10 years' experience in a fairly intimate way, both officially and personally, had come to put a good deal of trust in. Anyway, that is the reason, I think, they sent him over here, was to support and cooperate with Admiral Nomura.

As to whether Admiral Kurusu knew what was going to happen, knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor in advance, I have not seen all the secret documents, I have not seen all the intercepts, I have not seen all the statements received from Japan. Perhaps that question can be answered there. My guess is he did not know that Pearl Harbor was about to break, because I do not think the Japanese military people or naval people were taking any civilian into their confidence. The Foreign Office was always looked on askance by the Japanese military, and I doubt exceedingly if either of those men knew what was coming. They might, of course, have known pretty generally if the conversations had not come to a satisfactory conclusion that hostilities might break out, but that they knew where they would break out or how, I would find some difficulty in believing.

[1582] That is the whole story, as far as I know, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the other part was that you gave off the record on page 4211? There is a colloquy off the record there. Do you know what that was?

Mr. Grew. I do not recollect exactly what was said there that was off the record, Senator. My guess is it was something along the line I just told you about. Naturally, I did not want to say anything which would get back to Japan during the war and possibly put some Japanese into danger especially when I felt he had been friendly to our Government. I think that is probably the explanation of that "off the record."

Senator Ferguson. Along the same line?

Mr. Grew. I think so.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it now, you have given testimony here that you did not know that the fleet had been moved from the west coast, that is, the main part of the fleet other than the
Hawaiian unit, had been moved from the west coast sometime in the spring of 1940 to Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Grew. I do not think I gave that testimony, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Is that a fact, that you did or did not know it?

Mr. Grew. I think my answer was that I could not answer that question specifically without looking up the record. I think I must have known that without any question. I could not say definitely that I received a telegram from the Department of State.

Senator Ferguson. I am going to try to refresh your memory. Will you take your Foreign Relations Book on page 69, and I will ask you this question: What was Arita in the Japanese Cabinet?

You were speaking about Arita.

Mr. Grew. Yes, I have it here.

Senator Ferguson. "After his opening remark above referred to, the Minister had commented that the bulk of the United States Fleet remains in Hawaiian waters. My reply was that Hawaii is American territory and that one of our most important naval ports is that of Pearl Harbor, and I went on to say that the fact that our fleet remains in Hawaiian waters represents no threat whatsoever to Japan. The Minister, however, replied,"

Will you read what he said to you?

Mr. Grew. I see exactly, and, frankly there is so much material available over those 10 years of my stay in Japan—

Senator Ferguson (interposing). I am not criticizing you.

Mr. Grew. There it is. It shows that not only in the newspapers—

Senator Ferguson (interposing). What did the Minister say?

[1585] The Chairman. Let the witness complete his answer, please.

Mr. Grew. Not only informal suggestions were made that it would be well to withdraw our fleet from Honolulu, but official representations appear to have been made.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, will you read what the Minister said?

Mr. Grew (reading):

After I had completed the presentation of my views, Mr. Arita said, "I agree in spirit and in principle with everything you have said." He remarked, "Off the record" on the difficulties experienced by the Japanese Government in endeavoring to cope with various elements in this country which advocate a reapproachment with the totalitarian nations, and although he spoke in guarded language he conveyed beyond a doubt that the Government (mentioning especially the Prime Minister and himself) wished to see a different orientation developed. Judging by remarks which he made previously and subsequently, it was evident that this reference was to a desire on their part for closer relations between our two countries.

Senator Ferguson. Read on then what he said after that.

Mr. Grew (reading):

After his opening remark above referred to, the Minister had commented that the bulk of the United States Fleet remains in Hawaiian waters. My reply was that Hawaii is American territory and that one of our most important naval ports is that of Pearl Harbor, and I went on to say that the fact that our Fleet remains in Hawaiian waters represents no threat whatsoever to Japan. The Minister, however, replied that the continued stay of our Fleet in those waters constitutes an implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-a-vis the Netherlands East Indies and the South Seas, and he desired categorically to assert
that Japan entertained no territorial ambitions. Quite to the contrary, he added, Japan is exerting her best effort to promote good relations with her neighbors, and he cited as an example that a non-aggression pact is to be signed within a few days with Thailand. The emphasis which the Minister placed upon this matter is an indication of the important effect on Japanese consciousness of the stay of our naval forces in Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. I think that is sufficient.

Now, at that time, Mr. Grew, the State Department had not consulted you as to why they had the fleet out there, had they? Or had they consulted you?

Mr. Grew. That is the point. Remember when I was asked that before, Senator, I said I could not answer that point without looking up the records on whether they consulted me or not.

Senator Ferguson. Will you check up the records? ¹

Mr. Grew. I will check up and see.

[1587] The Chairman. The hour of 4 o'clock has arrived.

Senator Ferguson. We will have to recess until tomorrow morning. The Chairman. We will suspend to 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. Whereupon, at 4 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m. of the following day.)

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1711.
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

When we recessed yesterday, Secretary Hull, I think Mr. Cooper was questioning you. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF CORDELL HULL (Resumed)

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I notice on page 44 of your written statement you said:

On December 6 our Government received from a number of sources reports of the movement of a Japanese Fleet of 35 transports, 8 cruisers and 20 destroyers from Indo-China toward the Kra Peninsula. This was confirmation that the long threatened Japanese movement of expansion by force to the south was under way. The critical character of this development, which placed the United States and its friends in common imminent danger, was very much in all our minds, and was an important subject of my conferences with representatives of the Army and Navy on that and the following day.

You kept the responsible officials of the War and Navy Department constantly advised of any information you received?

Mr. Hull. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Anything the State Department had with respect to the situation in the Far East and especially as to Japan?

Mr. Hull. I did my best to comply with that function and duty of the State Department, and I am satisfied my associates did likewise. It is due, however, to the Navy to say that they were getting large amounts of information themselves directly—for example, all the interceptions came to them first. We received information about this threatened danger, I think, on the 6th from a British dispatch and from dispatches, one or more, of our consuls and other officials stationed in the Indo-French area, and that whole situation was naturally a matter for discussion, as well as the mere circulation of information among each other.
The Vice Chairman. I believe it was on November 7 that you stated that at a Cabinet meeting you spoke at some length covering the situation fully, and it was your opinion that all of the forces of our country should be on the alert and should be expecting any development that might eventuate in the Pacific.

Mr. Hull. Yes, and that the military situation might break at any time, and I think the Cabinet agreed entirely to that view, especially when by that stage there was so much information almost daily in the press, dispatches about bitter speeches of Japanese statesmen, dispatches about their continuing their movement down the China coast to Indochina, and other phases of information which, on their face, indicated clearly what was on hand.

The Vice Chairman. One other question, if I may, Mr. [1591] Secretary.

Evidence was presented to this committee by Admiral Inglis, of our Navy, which came from Japanese sources through intercepted messages and from Japanese prisoners who had been questioned, indicating that the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, and the special envoy, Mr. Kurusu, did not know of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and as I recall the statement of Mr. Sumner Welles, he indicated that he thought Ambassador Nomura was sincerely anxious to maintain peace between Japan and the United States but he indicated that he did not have such a high opinion of Mr. Kurusu.

As I understood the testimony of Mr. Grew on yesterday, he indicated that he had a rather high opinion of Mr. Kurusu. I was wondering whether you had any information or whether you desire to give an expression of your opinion as to that situation?

Mr. Hull. I had this impression, in a general way, and that is that they both knew by that time that they were here primarily to prevail on us to abandon our doctrines and policies and yield entire control of the Pacific beyond Hawaii, to and including India, all the important trade routes coming out of the Far East, yield the political, economic, and other kinds of arbitrary domination to Japan. That was what they were primarily concerned about, to clear the way for Japan to go [1592] forward with her plans of conquest without having to fight us.

So they went considerably in a superficial way along that route. They must have known, from what they said to us so often, so constantly, "We want to hear from you at once or something awful may happen; the situation is explosive now in Japan," and urging us, beyond all the ordinary rules of conversation between two governments. I think these two gentlemen must have been morally certain, if not absolutely so, that their Government was going on with this movement, that they must clear the way by having us get out of the way, if humanly possible, and if not, they must have known that the Japanese military forces were going on anyhow.

Now as to just when and where they would attack, I would not undertake to say definitely, because I could not. As to whether they, or either of them knew that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked, they may have known or they may not, I would hesitate to say.

The Vice Chairman. The conferences with those two representatives of Japan were continued right up to the time of the attack, were they not?
Mr. HULL. Yes. The main phase of the conference with them was due to the fact that when the President returned from Warm Springs about the 30th of November he asked us to call on the Japanese Government to find why they were concentrating all these troops in Indochina, and other phases relating to that question. They did not make a reply after the first conference, and they did not make a reply, I think, until about the 5th of December. I could be in error about this date.

However, there was nothing new about our general proposition for a basis of conversations. They made some reference to it and we would not have known but what they were going on with the conversations with us with that as a basis.

That was our last proposal on the 26th. But it will be borne in mind that, according to the interceptions, Kurusu and Nomura were instructed, from about the 27th or somewhere back there, to continue talking with us as though they were in earnest, when they were not.

The Vice Chairman. As I recall the press reports about that time, I think you expressed yourself in rather strong terms to them when you found out about the attack and they had been in conference with you right up to that time.

Mr. HULL. Up somewhere—it must have been up around midday, I received a telephone message from the White House stating that there was a report that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. After a few preliminary words, I said, "Can you have that confirmed? I have an appointment with the Japanese representatives here in my office at 1 o'clock." He said it had not been confirmed but they would give that attention. The upshot was that the last I heard from that source was that, until the Japanese came in.

I discussed before they came whether I would accredit that report as the unquestioned truth of the situation and refuse to admit them or whether in view of the extremely delicate relations I would leave open the 1 chance in 10 or more that the report was not correct. I proceeded to receive and confer with them although I felt that the chances were altogether virtually certain that the report was true.

So the proposal they made was comprised of a few pages defining the Japanese attitude just the reverse of what it was. It was, "Peace, peace, peace." And then they took our attitude and defined it as just the reverse of what it was.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Secretary, do you have any further statement you desire to make?

Mr. HULL. I don't know of much more that I can give the committee. Two volumes of publications are here. A 75-page statement was given to you at the outset. Every effort has been made to give you anything we can that is material in connection with your investigation.

The Vice Chairman. I thank you.

The Chairman. Senator George.

Senator George. Mr. Secretary, I merely wish to ask one or two questions.
The statement first made in your prepared statement for the committee emphasizes the meeting of November 7 with the Cabinet preceded by a detailed statement of the continuing critical situation in the world and especially with Japan.

Now, I would like to read, just briefly, from your statement:

On November 7 I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion that relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.

Now, that was the first Cabinet meeting at which you had drawn special and direct attention to the critical situation developing in the world and especially in the Pacific?

Mr. Hull. That was the first recent meeting, at least, where there had been an elaborate detailed consideration of the situation.

Senator George. They previously had been general.

Mr. Hull. At all Cabinet meetings, with few exceptions, either the President or I dealt with some phases of the situation as it was developing.

Senator George. Yes.

[1597] Now, Mr. Secretary, on November 25—read from your statement:

* * * I emphasized the critical nature of this country's relations with Japan at the meeting of the War Council on November 25. The War Council, which consisted of the President, the secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, was a sort of clearing house for all the information and views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts and in our respective circles. The highlights in the developments at a particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings. At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and desperate. They were likely to break out anywhere, at anytime, at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their plans.

Now, particularly:

I felt that virtually the last stage had been reached and that safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.

Is the committee to understand that you made substantially that statement last read at this meeting on November 25?

[5198] Mr. Hull. That is my recollection. I think you will find that right soon after that date, when the Roberts Commission was functioning, I gave that original statement.

Senator George. Yes.

Mr. Hull. Merely in justice to the Army and the Navy and to the diplomatic branch of the Government, for them to understand, which they doubtless did anyhow, that the diplomatic establishment had exhausted its efforts to every practical extent to maintain or preserve peace.

Senator George. Yes.
Now, again, Mr. Secretary:

On November 25, at the meeting of the War Council, I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the Japanese and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. I emphasized that, in my opinion, the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. With due deference I expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination.

Mr. Hull. That was mainly a repetition of what we had been [1599] saying among ourselves individually and sometimes in groups for a few days prior to that. In other words, I think everybody who was following this closely was obliged to have made up their minds by this time about the seriousness of the situation and the imminence of the danger. They knew that Hitler was not going to stop. They knew that the Japanese war party in supreme control in Japan was tied in hard and fast with Hitler, and we didn’t know what effect that might have on the Japanese move in addition to their own initiative.

So it was a most complicated and delicate and dangerous situation with these factors that would not ordinarily exist in the case of just one country. So after all these discussions back and forth with the Japanese and among ourselves, I think everybody reasoned the danger was imminent after their ultimatum. They couldn’t have been more definite in that respect. And wherever we met after that we were discussing the increasing dangers and increasing imminence.

Senator George. That is, the constantly developing world conditions which were drawing more and more serious?

Mr. Hull. Exactly.

Senator George. And on these dates that I have directed attention to in your formal statement, you had reached a conclusion that the matter was largely in the hands of the Army and the Navy; that is, the security of the country?

[1600] Mr. Hull. Yes; that was my judgment; and I think the developments as they existed during those days, soon after the 20th of November, the Japanese movements forward, plans of attack— I think that confirms fully our estimate of what was imminent at that time.

[1601] Senator George. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

The Chairman. Congressman Clark.

Mr. Clark. Mr. Secretary, I want to direct your attention to the decision not to withdraw the fleet from Pearl Harbor and its preparation for action and its being exposed to attack on account of being based at Pearl Harbor, and in that connection I desire to read you briefly from the testimony of Admiral Richardson when he was being interrogated by the gentleman from California:

Admiral Richardson. Yes; but I think when you consider the many, many other things that had to be done before active war operations could be undertaken, the question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was on the West Coast would have little effect on the over-all time, because you had to assemble a train, you might have to build some, and you might have to have drydocks, you might have to have repair facilities, you had to have a terrific amount of
stores and all kinds of equipment for building roads and airfields and every-
thing else, none of which was ready, * * *
So the question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was on the West
Coast when actual war started was a matter of no moment, in my opinion,
because other things controlled the time of getting ready.

[1602] Mr. Gearhart. Well, considering the other situation, the one which
actually happened, by having our fleet in Hawaiian waters we had our fleet 2,500
miles closer to the enemy for their sneak attack.
Admiral Richardson. Do you want an opinion on that?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes; unless it is a question of geography, unless it is a matter
of going over water, or something else.
Admiral Richardson. In my opinion, Congressman Gearhart, a Japanese Fleet
that could cross most of the Pacific Ocean and deliver an undiscovered attack
on Pearl Harbor would quite likely have been able to deliver the same attack on
Puget Sound.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, that is amazing.
Admiral Richardson. But the whole question is the amount of oil they have
got in the ships.

I wonder if you care to comment on whether such considerations as
those may have been discussed or entered into the decision not to with-
draw the fleet from Hawaiian waters under existing conditions?

Mr. Hull. I should say that, of course, none of us in the State De-
partment would profess to have a technical knowledge of the construc-
tion side of the Navy, the matter of enlarging its equipment or its
supplies, all that kind of thing are matters [1603] for Navy
people primarily and not for a layman.

I knew that we had a most touchy and delicate situation extending
around the world and that the opposition was interlocked and working
in many devious ways. I thought I knew at the same time as a matter
of psychology that the worst bandit—and they were bandits of the
most savage type, the leaders of Japan and Germany—the worst
bandit, as he prowls about and he looks about, has always got his eyes
open to see if any pistols or any guns or any weapons are in sight. He
does not like for the most innocent citizen to point an unloaded pistol
or an unloaded gun at him. None of us care for that, as a matter of
fact. And it was the same way as a matter of psychology with this
bunch of overlords who were running rife over the earth.

They will take cognizance of naval establishments, somewhere on
the high seas, whether fully equipped or not, and for that reason I
thought that, especially after it was out there, I thought that it should
stay there.

Mr. Clark. That is all. Mr. Chairman,

Senator Lucas. Mr. Secretary, when did you first see the President
of the United States on December 7, 1941?

Mr. Hull. We had a meeting that evening at the White House. I
talked with him over the telephone during the day; I do not recall
at this moment whether I was in the White House during the afternoon
or not.

Senator Lucas. Do you recall whether or not you talked to him over
the telephone on the morning before the attack?

Mr. Hull. He called me.

Senator Lucas. Do you remember about what time?

Mr. Hull. Oh, it was up somewhere—it was after Mr. Stimson and
Mr. Knox had left my office and they remained there until—

Senator Lucas. Was that after the——
The Chairman. He had not finished his answer.  
Senator Lucas. I am sorry. I beg your pardon.  
Mr. Hull. They remained in my office until, I think it was, a little after 12 o'clock, but I am giving my best impression.  
Senator Lucas. Was that before you received word that Pearl Harbor had been attacked?  
Mr. Hull. I had not received that word until the President called me. That is the first information I had on the subject.  
Senator Lucas. But that morning you did have a conversation with Secretary Knox?  
Mr. Hull. And Stimson.  
Senator Lucas. And Stimson?  
Mr. Hull. Yes.  
Senator Lucas. Now, what was the subject of the conversation between the three of you on that morning, as you recall?  
Mr. Hull. According to my best recollection it was in line with our increasingly frequent conferences over the telephone or in person as the dangers and the threatened outbreak in Japan increased.  
For instance, on the day just before we had received all of this information from our consuls and from a British dispatch that this Japanese armada had left its jumping-off point and was sailing toward the Kra Isthmus and that Prime Minister Tojo had made a speech some time about that time or a little before—yes; it was a little before this. But that, along with these actual movements, especially these movements, was the occasion, the chief occasion, I think, of our conference. Tojo’s speech was some days before, but it shed further light on what was happening then.  
Senator Lucas. Well, now, did you see the President of the United States on Saturday, December 6th?  
Mr. Hull. Oh, I do not recall at this moment.  
Senator Lucas. Do you recall whether you had conversations with him at that time?  
Mr. Hull. Oh, I was in touch in some way on each of those days, with somebody at the White House or the Navy and the Army.  
Senator Lucas. In the conversations that you had with Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson on Sunday morning of the 7th was there anything said in that conversation about the likelihood of Japan attacking Pearl Harbor?  
Mr. Hull. Nothing. As you understand, the attack was then on apparently. The fleet was moving toward the Kra Peninsula, which would greatly endanger the situation.  
Mr. Keefe. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman; I could not get your last answer. Will you read it, please?  
Mr. Hull. I said the attack was under way, according to the dispatches, on the sixth. This fleet was moving, not up north in the Bay of Siam or Thailand, but it was, so far as my impression extended, moving toward the Kra Isthmus, which was probably a threat all the way down toward Singapore, down the peninsula, and not far from Malaya.  
Senator Lucas. Mr. Hull, I was interested in your statement in regard to the conversations you had with the Japanese envoys.
You stated that while they apparently were looking at your eyes they were looking over your shoulder, out of the window, to determine the strength of our armed forces and that in dealing with a nation whose leaders were dangerous outlaws the only thing that they considered in these diplomatic talks was the question of how much military and how much naval power we had.

Am I correct about that?

Mr. Hull. Yes. That was based on this further view—and I never criticize anybody for their opinions. I accord to every American full patriotism and the highest motives in dealing with public affairs, but if we had—we and the British and the other peace-loving countries—had maintained when we saw Hitler moving as he did from 1933 on and when we saw the Japs moving as they did from 1933 on, if we peaceful nations had had sort of a Military Establishment all we would have had to do at that early stage would have been to turn to them and say, "We don't want you to take that course, we don't want you Japs to go into China on this sort of an outrageous expedition."
The chances are overwhelming that they would not have done it but, of course, that is one of the unfortunate phases of human experience.

[1608] Senator Lucas. Well, I assume from that answer that it is your view that any diplomatic or political relations of Japan with this country were definitely tied in with their own naval and military forces in their homeland?

Mr. Hull. Well, Tojo was the head of the whole concern. The military were in control from 1937, when they moved into China, and they controlled the Army and officials. They were in supreme control of Japan and everything Japan possessed, including the Navy and its direction.

Senator Lucas. Well, therefore am I correct in my assumption that, as a result of having to deal with a nation of that kind who tied their diplomatic and political relations with the military and the navy, that it was also necessary for us in dealing with Japan more or less to take a like course; and that that was one of the reasons why the fleet was in the Pacific at that time?

Mr. Hull. Exactly. That is a part of the psychology. As I tried to make clear a day or two ago, when a nation is dealing with lawless nations and governments, with every kind of dishonest and dishonorable and ulterior purposes in view, that the diplomatic influence is not much stronger than the military organization behind it.

Senator Lucas. In other words, the fleet based in Pearl Harbor was a tremendous factor in our political and in our [1609] diplomatic dealings with Japan at that time?

Mr. Hull. Oh, I think it was. We do not know—nobody knows with all of those machinations going on daily and nightly between representatives of Hitler and Tojo, planning every imaginable step—we do not know just how much influence the Navy at Pearl Harbor had in inducing a little more circumspection on their part and a little more consideration for this Nation and this Government, but I could not help but feel that it did have that restraining effect.

Senator Lucas. Well, a nation that lives on force, the only thing that it fears is force, isn't it?

Mr. Hull. Precisely. That is the old saying at least.
Senator Lucas. Now, in your manuscript which was prepared and presented to this committee I direct your attention to page 15, and I desire to ask one or two questions.

You state there that [reading]:

Existing treaties relating to the Far East were adequate, provided the signatory governments lived up to them. We were, therefore, not calling for new agreements. But if there was a chance that new agreements would contribute to peace in the Pacific, the President and I believed that we should not neglect that possibility, slim as it was.

In other words, as I understand it, and I think the [1610] English is very clear on it, the agreements that we had in effect at that time were sufficient to keep the peace in the Pacific if Japan had recognized the sanctity of international treaties?

Mr. Hull. Oh, we had copper riveted agreements with the Nine Power Treaty as the central point in the framework of international relations in the Pacific.

As I said, outside of the local agreements, outside of international law, outside of the Nine Power Treaty, outside of anything moral that the League of Nations provisions might have affected the mind of a person at all disposed to be law abiding and along with that I think that covers the main structure.

Senator Lucas. Now, on that same page you state [reading]:

We carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a basic position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not only to Japan but to all countries.

Now, the truth of the matter is that the 10-point program was based upon those fundamental American principles that you were talking about in that statement?

Mr. Hull. To be sure there is nothing new in it and nothing that any law-abiding nation would not be delighted [1611] to support and practice.

Senator Lucas. And how long has this Nation stood upon those fundamental basic principles that you have talked about?

Mr. Hull. We have from over an indefinite period in the past stood for all of the doctrines that you see set out. Other law-abiding and peaceful nations, law abiding and civilized, have stood for the same thing.

Senator Lucas. And that was regardless of what political party was in power, those fundamental basic American principles have been the same?

Mr. Hull. Oh, to be sure.

Senator Lucas. I direct your attention, Mr. Secretary, to the report of the Army Board that investigated the Pearl Harbor disaster. I will ask you whether or not you were a witness before that Board?

Mr. Hull. I was not. I sent some little data to them and I informed them that I would be pleased to appear before the Board at any time on any phase of the matters about which I might make contribution, but they sent word that they would not need my presence before the Board.

Senator Lucas. So they never called you as a witness after that?

Mr. Hull. No.

[1612] Senator Lucas. Now, you are familiar with that report, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Hull. Oh, I have been over it.

Senator Lucas. Did they ask you for any data or any statement concerning the 10-point program that was handed to the Japanese by you?

Mr. Hull. No.

Senator Lucas. In this report in chapter 4, headed "Responsibilities in Washington," I read the following:

Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of his long experience with the Japanese, with whom he dealt extensively when he was Secretary of State to this government, was concerned at the situation, for his diary continues:

"We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall."

Now, this is the finding of the Board:

Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was to be precipitated by the action of the Secretary of State, Hull, necessitated his informing the Chief of Staff immediately of the threatened difficulty.

They also in that same report, in the next paragraph or two, state [reading]:

[1613] Apparently on the 26th in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his mind not to go through with the proposals shown the day before to the Secretary of War containing the plan for the "Three Months' Truce."

Evidently the action "to kick the whole thing over" was accomplished by presenting to the Japanese the counter proposal of the "Ten Points" which they took as an ultimatum.

It was the document that touched the button that started the war, as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed it.

Now, they have charged in this report by direct charges and by implication and innuendo that you issued the ultimatum that started the war. I think you have demonstrated to any fair and impartial hearer at this hearing that that just is not true, but would you care to elaborate any further upon these comments?

Mr. Hull. That is not a very pleasant topic to me. I strove to cooperate with the Army and Navy Board without success and then I was gratuitously brought into the picture, apparently on the theory that Tojo and the military element moving abreast with Hitler on a world rampage, were not doing so and were not guilty of doing so, but that this Government of peaceful people, with no preparations in the Pacific [1614] to fight, with no two-ocean Navy on hand, with only peace appeals for months to the Japs, that this Government was the cause and that it forced poor, innocent, peace-minded Tojo and that bunch of savages and outlaws into war.

If I could express myself as I would like I would want all of you religious minded people to retire. I stood under that infamous charge for months, when every reasonable minded person knew that the Japs were on the same march of invasion in the Pacific area to get supreme control over it in every way so that we could not even land a boat load of goods on the other side of the Pacific except under extortionate terms—every person knew that they were on this move because if he had not known it in any other way, the heads of their Government were telling the world every week, sometimes every 2 or 3 days, precisely what they were doing and what they were going to do; and yet, somebody who knows little and cares less, now says, "Why didn't the United States make concessions and save us from the war?" when any person knows, and if you look back at the situation as it existed
during those last 10, 12, 14 days any rational person knows just what the Japs were doing.

They were off on this final attack and no one was going to stop them unless we yielded and laid down like cowards, and we would have been cowards to have lain down.

[1615] The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, your hour is up and the committee appreciates the fact that you have furnished so much information here. The committee feels that probably you are entitled to a rest for 2 or 3 days before resuming and, therefore, counsel will get in touch with you as to when you shall reappear.

Mr. Hull. Well, I do not desire to inconvenience the committee in carrying out its schedule in any way. I will do my best to cooperate with you in that respect.

The Chairman. The committee appreciates that.

Mr. Hull. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Mr. Grew, you may resume.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH C. GREW (Resumed)

Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, before the questions begin, may I clarify a point in the record in my testimony of yesterday?

The Chairman. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Grew. The record indicates that I said, in answer to a question, that after the Cabinet meeting in Tokyo of December 1, I guessed that they had discussed the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now, I cannot recollect exactly how I phrased my answer but it was far from my intention to leave that impression because I did not and could not have guessed that. What I did [1616] guess was that the Cabinet may have been discussing the opening of hostilities with the United States, but knowing the way that things work in Japan I do not believe for a moment that the military high command would ever have taken the civilian members of the Cabinet into their confidence as to their precise plans.

They had every reason to keep those plans in the utmost secrecy, so while I do think that that Cabinet meeting may well have discussed the question of opening hostilities, I do not think that they discussed the question of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson, I believe, was in the process of examining Mr. Grew when we recessed yesterday.

You may proceed, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, did you correspond with the President when you were in Tokyo as the Ambassador?

Mr. Grew. As I recollect it, Senator, I had only one exchange of letters with him. Those have been published. It is possible that I wrote him personally on other occasions but I do not think so. I think that was the only exchange, the exchange publishd.

Senator Ferguson. Where were they published?

Mr. Grew. They are published in my book. I think they may have been published in Foreign Relations. I am not certain [1617] of that.

Senator Ferguson. Would you have someone check that to see if they are?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. I can give you the date pretty quickly.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Grew. I will give you the date to check that up.
Senator Ferguson. Please. I think on page 360 you have a notation of one.
Mr. Gesell. 359.
Mr. Grew. What is that?
Mr. Gesell. Page 359, on December 14. Is that the letter?
Mr. Grew. December 14, 1940, was it?
Senator Ferguson. On page number 359?
Mr. Gesell. Page 359 of the book.
Mr. Grew. Page what?
Mr. Gesell. Page 359 of the book.
Mr. Grew. Yes; that is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. What year?
Mr. Gesell. 1940 that is.
Mr. Grew. December 14, 1940. Let me see whether there is anything here or not.

[1618] Mr. Gesell. I am quite sure that is not in volume 2, since that reports conversations.
Mr. Grew. I do not believe it would be in volume 1.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, could you have Mr. Hamilton check that while we go along with some questions on it?
Mr. Grew. It does not appear to have been published in Foreign Relations.
Senator Ferguson. It does not appear to be published?
Mr. Grew. No.
Senator Ferguson. Did you furnish copies to Mr. Hull? I am wondering how it would get into Foreign Relations if it went to the President direct.
Mr. Grew. Well, I have no record of that. I assumed that I sent copies to the Department of State, probably, without any question.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you refer to your letter to the President?
Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you review the foreign relations with Japan as of that time?
Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; I did.
Senator Ferguson. What is the substance of the relation? What was the point at issue?
Mr. Grew. The point at issue appeared to be stated as [1619] follows:

The chief factors in the problem would seem, from this angle—that is the angle of the American Embassy in Tokyo—to be:

1. Whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war;
2. Whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat;
3. To what extent our own policy in the Far East must be timed with our preparedness program and with respect to the relative strength of the American and the Japanese navies now and later.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you refer to page 360, where you use this language:
The principal point at issue, as I see it, is not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese program but when.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you elaborate on that and explain what you meant there?

Mr. Grew. The Japanese had moved out all through East Asia. They were into China, Indochina and they were in a position to threaten what I considered our vital interests. [1620] They were in a position to threaten the Philippines and they were also in a position to cut off one of the lines to Great Britain for her supplies to enable her to continue the war.

Senator Ferguson. Are you through with your answer?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would it be fair to say that at that time you saw in the near future a war between the United States and Japan?

Mr. Grew. Senator, during all my period in Tokyo I was doing everything in my power to prevent a war between the United States and Japan, up to the very end. As I said yesterday, that is the only position that I think any diplomatic representative should take.

Senator Ferguson. It is not a question of questioning your motives at all. I just wanted to know whether that sentence would indicate that at that time you saw a war between the United States and Japan and it was only a question of when the war was going to be?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I do not think that is the whole story. It was a question of whether we were going to be able to take steps which would prevent a war between the United States and Japan, which would prevent a war between the United States and Japan.

[1621] Senator Ferguson. Well, I will read another sentence from page 360 of your book.

We are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan.

It is not quite the whole sentence that I am reading.

The Chairman. I suggest you read the whole paragraph, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. All right, I will read the whole paragraph.

Mr. Grew. Which paragraph is that, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Will the Ambassador read the paragraph?

Mr. Grew. On page 360?

Senator Ferguson [reading]:

It therefore appears that sooner or later * * *.

Mr. Grew. Yes. [Reading:]

It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless we are prepared, with General Hugh Johnson, to withdraw bag and baggage from the entire sphere of "Greater East Asia including the South Seas" (which God forbid), we are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan.

Now, that clash need not have been a military clash. In other words, it was always my hope that the economic [1622] measures which we had taken against Japan would finally bring Japan to a position where she might come to a reasonable agreement with us.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, you were warning the President that it would be necessary for America to take some definite steps along definite lines if we were to prevent a military clash with Japan?

Mr. Grew. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And that Japan would have to take certain steps?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. I said that I thought that there were risks involved both in a positive policy and a laissez faire policy, but I thought that the risks of a laissez faire policy were greater than the risks of a positive policy.

Senator Ferguson. Well, was it a question then when we should take these steps?

Mr. Grew. Well, this letter was written in December 1940.

Now, the record show that our step on freezing Japanese assets took place on July 25, 1941, but in the meantime during that period we were tightening up, as I recollect it, all along the line in our embargoes of commodities to Japan which the Japanese could use for military purposes.

Senator Ferguson. When did we freeze aviation gas for Japan?

Mr. Grew. The date on which we put on an embargo on oil?

Senator Ferguson. Well, on aviation gasoline.

Mr. Grew. Aviation gasoline?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you know when that was?

Mr. Grew. That, I think, is contained in Foreign Relations.

Senator Ferguson. Was it July 31, 1940?

Mr. Grew. I could not say that, confirm that date without looking it up. "July 31, 1940, announcement of limitation by the Western Hemisphere of the exportation of aviation gasoline."

Senator Ferguson. That was at least a limitation on the exporting to Japan of aviation gasoline?

Mr. Grew. That was what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. A limitation, at least?

Mr. Grew. Oh, yes.

Senator Ferguson. Was it an absolute prohibition of any gasoline?

Mr. Grew. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. Aviation gasoline. All right.

Now, what was the President's reply to your letter of December 1940?

Mr. Grew. The President's reply is published on page 359 of my book.

Senator Ferguson. Well, what would you say was a fair appraisal, without reading the whole letter?

Mr. Grew. Well, the President's appraisal was that the whole problem was a global problem and that every development in any part of the world would affect other parts of the world.

In other words, he said [reading]:

I am giving you my thoughts at this length because the problems which we face are so vast and so inter-related that any attempt even to state them compels one to think in terms of five continents and seven seas. In conclusion, I must emphasize that, our problem being one of defense, we cannot lay down hard-and-fast plans. As each new development occurs, we must, in the light of the circumstances then existing, decide when and where and how we can most effectively marshal and make use of our resources.

Senator Ferguson. Did he agree or disagree with your opinion?

Mr. Grew. He says at the beginning of his letter:

I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusion.
Senator Ferguson. Now, can you give us the reason why [1625] you corresponded directly with the President rather than through Mr. Hull and the State Department?

Mr. Grew. I had been in the United States on leave of absence in 1931 and when I saw the President he said, "When you have some thoughts on the situation, drop me a line." In other words, this letter was written to him at his invitation.

Senator Ferguson. You say in 1931 that he suggested that?

Mr. Grew. No, 1939.

Senator Ferguson. 1939.

Mr. Grew. I was here in the summer and autumn of 1939.

Senator Ferguson. I misunderstood you.

Mr. Grew. 1939.

Senator Ferguson. I misunderstood you. In 1939 he suggested that and then you wrote him?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. At that time were you of the opinion that Japan would fight or were they bluffing?

Mr. Grew. I never thought that Japan was bluffing, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. From what you heard and what you saw in Japan you were of the opinion then that they were not bluffing?

[1626] Mr. Grew. I was.

Senator Ferguson. That they would fight under certain conditions?

Mr. Grew. Under certain circumstances.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever notify the State Department or the President as to what those circumstances were that they would fight for or under?

Mr. Grew. Senator, my reports to the State Department were continuous and many. I was constantly expressing my views to the Department of State and the Secretary of State. I cannot tell you without an examination of the records whether and when that particular point was covered.

Senator Ferguson. But would it be a fair appraisal of your communications to the State Department that you had told them that Japan was not bluffing, that they would fight under certain circumstances and you related from time to time the circumstances?

Mr. Grew. I think the record shows that completely, Senator; from my arrival in Japan in 1932 I quoted to you yesterday a statement which I made in a letter to Mr. Stimson, the Secretary of State at that time, shortly after my arrival in Japan, in which I said the Japanese Army has been built for war and it wants war and I said it would be criminally somnolent for us to close our eyes to any possible eventualities in the Far East.

[1627] Senator Ferguson. On page 4219 of your testimony before the Army Board, I notice that you give this as part of your answer:

Frankly, I could not answer that question without looking into it, but I am sure that everything I wrote was not published by any means.

What did you have in mind by that statement? You better look at the whole answer.

The Chairman. The Chair suggest you might also look at the question that you answered in order to get the context.

Mr. Grew. I would just like to read the record on that.
Senator Ferguson. If the Chairman please, the witness has the whole instrument before him.

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. There is no desire to get an answer except as to what he had in mind.

The Chairman. The Chairman simply wants him to refresh his recollection as to the question that he was answering, so he may have the whole thing in mind.

Senator Ferguson. Does the Chair think the witness might need his memory refreshed?

The Chairman. That is an academic question. I was merely suggesting that he look at the question that he was asked in order to refresh his recollection.

[1629] Mr. Grew. Yes. The question was: "Do the various books to which you made reference in your testimony convey all the information that you conveyed to Washington on the likelihood of war?"

And I replied, according to the record: "I could not say that, I do not believe, because I sent a great deal of material during all of that time to the State Department both by telegram and by written dispatch, and it would have been impossible, within the confines of two volumes"—I was referring to our Foreign Relations—"to have published all of that material. I think the highlights have been published, but I could not say it has all been published. Frankly, I could not answer that question without looking into it, but I am sure that everything I wrote was not published by any means. It would have been practically impossible to publish the tremendous volume of reports that I sent in during those 10 years."

Senator Ferguson. Who would determine as to what was to be published in the books?

Mr. Grew. I think that would have been determined by the various officials. I cannot tell you, because I had nothing to do with the publishing.

Senator Ferguson. You would have no part in it?

Mr. Grew. I would have nothing to do with the publication of Foreign Relations.

[1629] Senator Ferguson. I will ask you to refer to foreign relations in May of 1939. It is in relation to a telegram to the Department of State containing a message from the Foreign Minister.

Mr. Grew. Will you tell me what page that is, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.

Mr. Grew. May 18, 1939, volume I?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is the message from the Foreign Minister.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; I have that before me.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you notice that the message is published in volume II.

Mr. Grew. The first document in volume II?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then, the reply of the Secretary of State to this message is on pages 6 or 8 of that same volume. Will you look at the reply?

Mr. Grew. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. It says:

* * * this Government is sincerely interested in the suggestion contained in Your Excellency's [1630] message, and in giving further consideration to that suggestion would be pleased to have such further information as Your Excellency may find it agreeable to offer by way of amplifying and making more definite Your Excellency's concept as to the steps which might usefully be taken toward moderating the situation in Europe.

Now, did the Prime Minister at that time give you a more definite statement than the one that is stated there in the book?

In other words, do you know whether or not the Japanese Government ever gave you the "definite concept" requested in the Secretary of State's reply?

Mr. Grew. Well, sir, I do not believe that the Prime Minister gave me any further information on this correspondence at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Could I ask counsel to search the files to see whether or not there is any information on that?

Mr. Gesell. We will do that, Senator.¹

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall, Mr. Grew, to refresh your memory, that there was a definite statement and that it is not printed in the book?

Mr. Grew. To which statement do you refer? The press releases?

Senator Ferguson. No; I am referring to the statement that the Prime Minister gave you in May of 1939.

Mr. Grew. Yes; as far as I am aware, that is the complete statement.

Senator Ferguson. Have you access now to the Secretary of State's files?

Mr. Grew. Have I what?

Senator Ferguson. Access to the Secretary of State's files.

Mr. Grew. No; I am out of the Department now. I have no contact with the Department.

Senator Ferguson. So you could not help us to get that?

Mr. Grew. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you referred to a green light telegram in your book. Do you recall that?

Mr. Grew. That was merely a phrase which I applied to it informally.

Senator Ferguson. Will you turn to your book, to where you have that in your book?

Mr. Grew. That is published also, I think, in Foreign Relations.

Senator Ferguson. I think you said it was one of the most important telegrams that you had sent.

Mr. Grew. That was in December 1940, I think. That was sent in December.

Senator Ferguson. Was it December or September 1940?

Mr. Grew. It is September 1940.


Senator Ferguson. And that is what you call the green light telegram?

Mr. Grew. It is.

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2068.
Mr. Grew. In Foreign Relations?

Senator Ferguson. Will you see whether it is in Foreign Relations, among the white papers?

Mr. Grew. It does not appear to be in Foreign Relations. It might possibly be in Peace and War.

Senator Ferguson. Peace and War is there before you. Will you look and see whether it is in Peace and War?

Mr. Grew. There is a telegram in Peace and War that I sent from the Embassy in Tokyo on September 12, 1940, published on page 569. That was not the precise telegram referred to, however.

Senator Ferguson. So it is not in Peace and War or in Foreign Relations.

Now getting back to your telegram, will you tell me something about that telegram? What is it? What does your book say about it?

Mr. Grew. It is a fairly long comment here.

Senator Ferguson. Do you refer to it as one of your most important documents?

Mr. Grew. Yes; I do.

Senator Ferguson. What is that language?

[1634] Mr. Grew. What?

Senator Ferguson. Read that language about the importance of the instrument.

Mr. Grew. In the last part of that telegram I said:

If, by a firm policy, we can maintain conditions in the Pacific in status quo until such time as Britain may be successful in the European war, Japan will be confronted with a situation which will render it impossible for the present outlook of opportunism to remain dominant. After that time it might be feasible to set about a readjustment of the entire problem of the Pacific to the permanent benefit both of the United States and of Japan—on a just basis. Until the time when a thorough going regeneration of outlook takes place in Japan, only a show of force, coupled with the intention to utilize it if necessary, can effectively conduce to the attainment of such an outcome, as well as to the future security of the United States.

In view therefore of actual conditions here in Japan, and the present outlook, it is my belief that the time has arrived when a continuance of the use of patience and restraint by the United States may and probably will tend to render relations between the United States and Japan increasingly uncertain. I [1635] cherish the hope that, if the Japanese Government and people can be brought to believe that they are overplaying their hand, eventually the pendulum will swing the other way, at which time it will be possible to reconstruct good relations between our country and Japan. To me the alternative appears hopeless.

Senator Ferguson. I will read from page 334 what you said, if you will just check it:

Another important event, from my point of view, was the sending to Washington in September of what I can only call my "green light" telegram, perhaps the most significant message sent to Washington in all the 8 years of my mission to Japan.

Now will you tell us why you describe it in that way?

Mr. Grew. Because, Senator, I felt that the time had come to apply economic measures against Japan, and that is precisely what was done.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for it not being in Foreign Relations, if it is so important?

Mr. Grew. Senator, frankly, I had nothing whatsoever to do with the preparation of Foreign Relations. I was not in a position at that time to have anything to do with it, so I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Does the committee have a copy of your [1636] diary?
Mr. Grew. No, sir; the diary was a purely personal and private document. The important parts of my diary are published in my book, what I call the highlights.

Senator Ferguson. Does the committee have a copy of your diary?
Mr. Grew. No, sir; the diary was a purely personal and private document. The important parts of my diary are published in my book, what I call the highlights.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand, Mr. Grew, the committee does not have access—I am talking about counsel for the committee—does not have access to your diary to determine what might be important to this committee?
Mr. Grew. Senator, I would like to have the record straight on this, if you will permit me.

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would make the record straight.
Mr. Grew. I will read a copy of my letter to Mr. Mitchell, the General counsel.

Senator Ferguson. You may read it.
Mr. Grew. This is dated November 12, 1945.

My Dear Mr. Mitchell: I have received your letter of November 8 enclosing a copy of a letter of November 6 from Senator Brewster, as well as a copy of your reply to the Senator. Mr. Brewster requested you in his letter to secure for him a copy of the 13 volumes of my diary from which my book "Ten Years in Japan" was prepared. Your inquiry of the State Department brought the answer that there is nothing [1637] of the kind in its possession.

You may be sure that I shall do everything in my power to facilitate, support, and further the nationally important work of the Joint Committee and to be helpful in every way to Senator Brewster and the other members of the Committee. I strongly believe that all the facts bearing upon the Pearl Harbor attack should be brought out and laid before the American people, and that no pertinent material should be concealed. You yourself can depend equally on my full cooperation in eliciting these facts.

The few official documents contained in my book "Ten Years in Japan," which was published in 1944, were taken not from the diary but from two official publications already issued in 1943 by our Government: "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41" and "Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41" in two volumes. All official documents that passed between the Department of State and the Embassy in Tokyo covering the period of my ambassadorship to Japan, both incoming and outgoing, are on file in the State Department and, under the President's directive as published, any and all of these documents pertinent to the investigation are presumably available to the Joint [1638] Committee.

As to the diary itself, this is in no respect an official document. It is a private work, headed "Daily Personal Notes," containing my own personal records and prepared for my own guidance in analyzing and assessing day to day developments. The diary is in the nature of a private sketch book in which the main lines of my eventual official reports to the Secretary of State were traced, and it contains many inaccurate and sometimes misleading statements, hurriedly jotted down from day to day, which had to be ironed out and, so far as possible, corrected or confirmed before taking shape in my official reports. Only the official reports should therefore govern. Private matters of interest only to my family and myself are, as in any diary, contained in it, and it includes furthermore frank comments on individuals, comments which can only be regarded as of a strictly personal and private character and which I am in honor bound not to reveal.

It is my belief that all of the material in my diary which would be helpful to the investigation of the Joint Committee has been published in my book "Ten Years in Japan." To make assurance doubly sure, however, I have carefully examined these daily personal notes [1639] covering the months
immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, and I have found no comment or material, other than that already published, which would, in my opinion, be
helpful to any phase of the Committee's investigation. It is my belief that all of
the main facts on this subject, so far as my own observations and reports from
Tokyo are concerned, have been published in the four volumes mentioned above.

Senator Ferguson. Now will you repeat what those four volumes are?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. I just want to see whether there is something else in this letter that would be pertinent.

Senator Ferguson. I would ask you then to read the last of your letter.

Mr. Grew. Just the last paragraph:

If there is any further phase of this subject which Senator Brewster or any other member of the Joint Committee would like to explore and will let me know, I will, with pleasure, cooperate to the best of my ability.

Those four volumes are:
1. Peace and War.
2. United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41, published in 1943.
3. Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-41, [16/0] in two volumes, also published in 1943.

Senator Ferguson. Of course the last, your book Ten Years in
Japan is not an official publication.

Mr. Grew. No, sir; it is not an official publication.

Senator Ferguson. Now do I understand that you submitted your diary to the State Department to determine what you might put in this book Ten Years in Japan?

Mr. Grew. That is always done, Senator, especially in wartime. That, to my recollection is done in every case.

Senator Ferguson. That was not my question. My question was: Did you submit it to the State Department?

Mr. Grew. I submitted the manuscript of my book.

Senator Ferguson. Did they take anything out?

Mr. Grew. I do not think they made any actual demand, but they suggested that certain passages might be eliminated; some of them because they could have caused embarrassment or actual danger to individuals, sometimes, where they might have been misinterpreted by the foreign governments, and points of that kind.

Frankly, after receiving the suggestions of the Publications Committee in the Department of State I found myself in entire accord with it. There is nothing that I reluctantly withdrew.

[16/11] Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation with them about the green-light telegram of September 1940?

Mr. Grew. I do not recollect any precise conversation on that subject.

Senator Ferguson. I might ask counsel. Has counsel ever seen that telegram? Do we have a copy of it?

Mr. Mitchell. What telegram do you refer to?

Senator Ferguson. The telegram of September 1940. I have been referring to it for quite a while.

Mr. Mitchell. We have never seen it.

Senator Ferguson. Will counsel get us a copy from the State Department file?

Mr. Mitchell. We will try.¹

¹Subsequently admitted as Exhibit No. 26. See infra, p. 634 et seq., for text.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, what is a fair appraisal of that telegram of September 1940? What were you trying to do, and why did you try to do it?

Mr. Grew. I think the passage that I read to you covers the appraisal of the telegram.

Senator Ferguson. Now, why did you come to write it?

Why did you send it to the State Department?

Mr. Grew. Because I was continually sending to the State Department my views about the situation and, in many cases, recommendations, steps which I thought ought to be taken. That is the duty of any Ambassador abroad.

[1642] Senator Ferguson. Do you think your diary may have helped counsel to obtain from the files, which I understand are very voluminous, some of the important documents? For instance, this document?

Mr. Grew. I do not think so, Senator. I think, as I say, the high lights of the correspondence appear in my diary and then the running comment from day to day of what I was thinking at the time. I think the diary would not be an appropriate document in this investigation, and I would like to explain why, if I may.

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would.

Mr. Grew. You will find in my book, on page 348, under date of November 1, 1940, I made the following entry in my diary:

In the light of fast-moving developments I scarcely dare read back in the diary nowadays because of its many inconsistencies which show it up for the patchwork sort of day-to-day scribbling it is. At least it shows our thoughts and our information, some of it reliable and some of it wholly unreliable, at any given moment—the moment of writing. It shows how often we are groping and fumbling in the dark. Less and less are we able to know what is going on behind the scenes, simply because many of our reliable contacts are no longer available and [1643] also because, even behind the scenes, the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing.

Senator Ferguson. Of course, when you were referring there to "we," you were talking about the Embassy in Tokyo?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; I was.

Senator Ferguson. Did you send that information to the State Department, the substance of it?

Mr. Grew. Oh, certainly. I reported to the State Department that our Japanese contacts, sources of information were falling away simply because they were being very carefully watched by the secret police and most of them did not dare come to the Embassy any more, they did not dare meet me outside, and even when I went to the Tokyo Club, which was sort of a neutral meeting ground for Japanese and foreigners, I found the Japanese I knew would quietly slip away into other rooms or corners. They just did not want to be seen talking to me; they did not dare. Therefore, it was extremely difficult, under those circumstances, for us to keep in touch with everything that was going on there.

Senator Ferguson. Of course, that brought you to the conclusion that things were getting serious between the two countries, that matters were growing worse, and much worse, between the two countries?

Mr. Grew. Well, "worse" to the extent that the totalitarian [1644] regime was working in full force and the secret police was controlling all Japanese individuals.
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Senator Ferguson. Now, did I understand that they had a totalitarian government in Japan as early as you are talking about? I understood you yesterday to say you considered it came in when Tojo came in.

Mr. Grew. I said when Tojo came in, it was a complete military dictatorship, and everything was leading in that direction for a long time, but up to that point there were pressure groups in Japan who had to be listened to, and were listened to, and I would not say that it was completely a totalitarian regime up to that moment.

Senator Ferguson. But they had to have the secret police at that time?

Mr. Grew. They always had the secret police. It was just a question to what extent they should intensify it. They were functioning.

Senator Ferguson. In 1941, in the spring, were you getting any information from the British as to the military activities of the Japanese?

Mr. Grew. I cannot state any definite information, Senator, but, of course, I came in close contact with my various diplomatic colleagues, and in many cases we exchanged information. That is one of the ways we were able to keep in touch. So I have no doubt that during the period you mention my British colleague occasionally passed on to me information in his possession as I did to him.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any information with relation to the Japanese being nearer Singapore, that you obtained from the British?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I do not recall any precise information at this time.

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall any specific information that you may have received on the Japanese military movements at or near, toward, Singapore?

Mr. Grew. No; I do not recall any precise information on that subject.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever get any information in relation to any landings of troops on the Kra Peninsula?

Mr. Grew. Japanese troops?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; or on the isthmus.

Mr. Grew. You mean after they had been landed?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; or of their landing. I am talking about prior to December 7.

Mr. Grew. Well, no, sir. It would be utterly impossible for any foreigner in Japan to acquire information of something that the Japanese military were going to do. We might guess that they were going to do it, but certainly not know until it had been done. All those steps were shrouded in military secrecy.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then that you discounted anything that came in in relation to the Jap movements because you believed that no such information could get out of the war authorities, military or naval authorities?

Mr. Grew. Very little such information did come out. Of course, when information did reach me I sifted it and assessed it on the basis of my other knowledge, and in that light I was able to decide whether it was authentic or not.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you send only what you believed to be authentic to the State Department?
Mr. Grew. I was in the habit of reporting a great deal to the State Department. Sometimes only rumors, as in the case of that telegram of January 27.

Senator Ferguson. That is the Peruvian—

Mr. Grew. The rumor that in case of trouble they would attack [1647] Pearl Harbor. I sent many telegrams and dispatches of that kind. In many cases it was utterly impossible to confirm those rumors.

Senator Ferguson. By the way, did you ever get a reply to that Peruvian message?

Mr. Grew. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. That was nothing unusual, that you did not get a reply?

Mr. Grew. That was not unusual.

Senator Ferguson. You don’t recall, though, any information in the spring of 1941 from the British about landings or to-be-landings on the Kra Peninsula or Kra Isthmus?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I do not recall any specific information in that respect.

Senator Ferguson. Well, were there rumors of troop movements at that time?

Mr. Grew. Well, we knew from a variety of sources that the Japanese had moved down, were moving out all through that area there, and, frankly, we were ready for anything, but if the Japanese were going to land in a certain place at a certain time we in all probability would not and could not know.

Senator Ferguson. That brings me now to the note of August 17. Are you familiar with that note?

Mr. Grew. Note from whom, sir?

Senator Ferguson. From the United States to Japan. It is the [1648] parallel action. It is the note of August 17.

Mr. Grew. August 17.

Mr. Gesell. 1941.

Senator Ferguson. 1941.

Mr. Gesell. Page 556.

Mr. Grew. All of these papers, Senator, were as a rule cabled over to me; the records of conversations and letters.

Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with the particular document?

Mr. Grew. I shall have to read it first.

Senator Ferguson. Would you read it so that you become familiar with it?

Mr. Grew (perusing paper). Yes; I recall that document perfectly.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you refer to your message of August 18—no. I have in mind the conversation you had with Toyda on August 18.

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. 1941.

Mr. Gesell. Page 560.

Mr. Grew. I have it.

[1649] Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, I am fully familiar with that note; that record of conversations with the foreign ministers.
Senator Ferguson. Will you check and see whether or not it is in
the white papers?
Mr. Grew. It is in foreign relations.
Senator Ferguson. But not in the white paper?
Mr. Grew. What do you call the white paper?
Senator Ferguson. The Peace and War.
Mr. Grew. That was an incomplete publication but I will see.
It does not appear to be in the volume Peace and War.
Senator Ferguson. I want to show you an article in the New York
Times on August 13, Mr. Grew.
Will counsel pass him the article?
(The article was passed to the witness.)
The Chairman. What year is that?
Mr. Murphy. 1941.
The Chairman. 1941.
Mr. Grew. Yes, Senator, I have seen it.
Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with that article?
Mr. Grew. Well, I have heard about it recently. I haven't read
the whole article, no, but I know the pith of it.
Senator Ferguson. You know the what?
[1650] Mr. Grew. I know the principal point in it.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Grew. The report that the British Ambassador and I made
representations to the Japanese Foreign Minister—
Senator Ferguson. Will you talk into the microphone, please.
Mr. Grew. Pardon me.
I believe the principal point in it is a report that the British Am-
bassador and I had made representations to the Japanese Foreign
Minister.
Senator Ferguson. Along what line?
Mr. Grew. It appears to be an indication that any action by Japan
which would threaten the independence of Thailand would be of
concern both to the American and British Governments.
Senator Ferguson. Who is the by-line; under what name?
Mr. Grew. It is under the by-line of Otto D. Tolischus.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know him?
Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversations with him
from which that could be written
Mr. Grew. I often had conversations with him.
Senator Ferguson. From which that could be written?
Mr. Grew. No, sir. I would like to point out that in this article
it is stated, "It was understood in political [1651] circles here
today." It was understood. In other words that is not a—
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you have any conversation with him
from which that could be written?
Mr. Grew. No, sir, I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Would you say then that that was not a true
statement?
Mr. Grew. I can refer to my records. I made a point of keeping a
record of my calls at the Foreign Office in Japan. My calls on the
Foreign Minister in August were, August 1, August 15, 18, and 22.
And I have the subjects discussed at that time—just a moment.
No, sir, I find conferences with the Foreign Minister only on August 15, 18, and 22. Of course, a good many talks were going on also between members of my staff and subordinate officers in the Japanese Foreign Office. I only saw the Foreign Minister on most important matters.

Senator Ferguson. What am I to understand, that that is a true statement or not a true statement, that you did have such a talk with the Foreign Minister or you did not?

Mr. Grew. In the light of my own records, I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever taken up the question involved in that article with Japan?

Mr. Grew. I have no recollection of having done so.

[1652] Senator Ferguson. Had you ever had any information from the State Department that that was our understanding?

Mr. Grew. That that was taken up by the State Department?

Senator Ferguson. No; that that was where they stood on the proposition, that they stood as stated in the article?

Mr. Grew. That is a matter on which I would have to consult the records.

Senator Ferguson. Will you consult the records so that you can give us information on that?

Mr. Grew. I will. As to whether I was ever informed by the State Department?

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Mr. Grew. That they took this position?

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Mr. Grew. As to the independence of Thailand?

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

As I understand it, you don't recall ever taking it up with the Japanese Government.

Now, going back to the note of the 17th of August 1941, do you know when that first came to your attention?

Mr. Grew. I couldn't tell you the date on which it came to my attention, but, as I say, most of these documents and records of conversations were telegrams to me. I am not sure that they were in every case, but generally they were. I [1653] couldn't answer that question without examining the files of the Department of State and see whether they did actually send that information to me.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever take that note up with the Japanese Government? You have a memorandum, you say, that you talked to them on the 18th. What did you talk about on the 18th?

Mr. Grew. I have the record here, sir.

I saw the Foreign Minister August 15 [reading]:

I told the Minister that I was supporting the representations made by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on August 13, with regard to recent cases of interference with American rights and interest in Japan and in Japanese occupied areas in China and I thereupon read to the Minister and left with him a copy of the Department's telegram with the exception of paragraph numbered three. I then discussed this situation at length, pointing out the fact that these cumulative interferences with American citizens and American interests were assuming a serious aspect both in Japan and in Japanese occupied areas in China and emphasizing the radical discrepancy between this treatment of American officials and citizens of their activities by the Japanese and our treatment [1654] of Japanese officials and subjects and their activities in the United States. I expressed the belief that relief from these
interferences could be obtained only by the communication by the Japanese Government to Japanese authorities and Japanese sponsored authorities of categorical instructions to desist from the interferences and obstructions under complaint.

Senator Ferguson. What is the date?
Mr. Grew. That was on August 15.
Senator Ferguson. August 18, just glance at that. Did it relate to the note of August 17?
Mr. Grew. On August 18 the Minister asked me to come to see him, and it was a very long conference which lasted 2½ hours, and the whole question of Japanese relations was therein discussed.

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss the note of the 17th?
Mr. Grew. Nothing was said about Thailand in that conversation.
Senator Ferguson. No. Was anything said about the note of the 17th where the British and the United States Governments were to take parallel action?
Mr. Grew. No, sir; nothing whatsoever was said about that.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know about that at the time, on the 18th?

[1655] Mr. Grew. Did I—I don't quite understand—did I know that that action—
Senator Ferguson. That Britain and the United States had agreed, or at least there were promises, that we were to take certain parallel action.

Mr. Grew. I would have to consult the record.
Senator Ferguson. Will you read the last paragraph on page 556.
It may refresh your memory as to what I am talking about.

Mr. Grew. Of foreign relations?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Grew. Five hundred and fifty-six?
Senator Ferguson. Five hundred and fifty-six.
Mr. Grew. The was the statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador.

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals [1656] and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Senator Ferguson. Now, my question is, Did you take that matter up with anyone in Japan?

Mr. Grew. I do not think I did so. I have no record of having done so, but if I did so I certainly would have reported that step to the Department of State, and they would have it on file. I do not recollect having done so.

The Chairman. It is now 12 o'clock. Before recessing the Chair would like, if the committee is willing, inasmuch as paragraphs have been read from Mr. Grew's letter to the President, of December 14, and the President's reply of January 21, the Chair will ask that the full text of both those letters be printed in the transcript of the record at this point.

(The letters referred to follow:)

'Dear Frank: * * * About Japan and all her works. It seems to me to be increasingly clear that we are bound to have a showdown some day, and
the principal question at issue is whether it is to our advantage to have that showdown sooner or to have it later.

The chief factors in the problem would seem, from this angle, to be:

1. Whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war;

2. Whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat;

3. To what extent our own policy in the Far East must be timed with our preparedness program and with respect to the relative strength of the American and the Japanese Navies now and later.

Those are questions which, with our limited information here, I am not qualified even approximately to answer.

From the Tokyo angle we see the picture roughly as follows:

After eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept away as if by a typhoon, with little or nothing remaining to show for it. Japan has become openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and part of a system which aims to wreck about everything that the United States stand for. Only insuperable obstacles will now prevent the Japanese from digging in permanently in China and from pushing the southward advance, with economic control as a preliminary to political domination in the areas marked down. Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes, will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they tend to push the Japanese onward in a forlorn hope of making themselves economically self-sufficient.

History has shown that the pendulum in Japan is always swinging between extremist and moderate policies, but as things stand today we believe that the pendulum is more likely to swing still further toward extremes than to reverse its direction. Konoye, and especially Matsuoka, will fall in due course, but under present circumstances no Japanese leader or group of leaders could reverse the expansionist program and hope to survive.

Our own policy of unhurried but of inexorable determination in meeting every Japanese step with some step of our own has been eminently wise, and that policy has sunk deep into Japanese consciousness. But while important elements among the Japanese people deplore the course which their leaders are taking, those elements are nevertheless inarticulate and powerless and are likely to remain so. Meanwhile the Germans here are working overtime to push Japan into war with us. I have told Matsuoka point-blank that his country is heading for disaster. He has at least seen that his efforts to intimidate us have fallen flat and have had an effect precisely the reverse of that intended.

It therefore appears that sooner or later, unless we are prepared, with General Hugh Johnson, to withdraw bag and baggage from the entire sphere of "Greater East Asia including the South Seas" (which God forbid), we are bound eventually to come to a head-on clash with Japan.

A progressively firm policy on our part will entail inevitable risks—especially risks of sudden uncalculated strokes, such as the sinking of the Panay, which might inflame the American people—but in my opinion those risks are less in degree than the far greater future dangers which we would face if we were to follow a policy of laissez-faire.

In other words, the risks of not taking positive measures to maintain our future security are likely to be much greater than the risks of taking positive measures as the southward advance proceeds. So far as I am aware, the great majority of the American people are in a mood for vigorous action. The principal point at issue, as I see it, is not whether we must call a halt to the Japanese program, but when.

It is important constantly to bear in mind the fact that if we take measures "short of war" with no real intention to carry those measures to their final conclusion if necessary, such lack of intention will be all too obvious to the Japanese, who will proceed undeterred, and even with greater incentive, on their way. Only if they become certain that we mean to fight if called upon to do so will our preliminary measures stand some chance of proving effective and of removing the necessity for war—the old story of Sir Edward Grey in 1914.

If by such action we can bring about the eventual discrediting of Japan's present leaders, a regeneration of thought may ultimately take shape in this country, permitting the resumption of normal relations with us and leading to a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem.
In a nutshell that is about the way I regard the present and future situation. No doubt you have seen some of my telegrams which have tried to paint the picture as clearly as has been possible at this post where we have to fumble and grope for accurate information, simply because among the Japanese themselves the right hand often doesn’t know what the left hand is doing. Their so-called “new structure” is in an awful mess and the bickering and controversy that go on within the Government itself are past belief. Every new totalitarian step is clothed in some righteous-sounding slogan. This, indeed, is not the Japan that we have known and loved.

** You are playing a masterly hand in our foreign affairs and I am profoundly thankful that the country is not to be deprived of your clear vision, determination, and splendid courage in piloting the old ship of state.


DEAR JOE: I have given careful consideration to your letter of December 14.

First, I want to say how helpful it is to have your over-all estimates and reflections—based as they are upon a rare combination of first-hand observation, long experience with our Japanese relations, and masterly judgment. I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusions.

I also want you to know how much I appreciate your kind words of congratulation on my re-election and your expression of confidence in my conduct of our foreign affairs.

As to your very natural request for an indication of my views as to certain aspects of our future attitude toward developments in the Far East, I believe that the fundamental proposition is that we must recognize that the hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts of a single world conflict. We must, consequently recognize that our interests are menaced both in Europe and in the Far East. We are engaged in the task of defending our way of life and our vital national interests wherever they are seriously endangered. Our strategy of self-defense must be a global strategy which takes account of every front and takes advantage of every opportunity to contribute to our total security.

You suggest as one of the chief factors in the problem of our attitude toward Japan the question whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat. In this connection it seems to me that we must consider whether, if Japan should gain possession of the region of the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay Peninsula, the chances of England’s winning in her struggle with Germany would not be decreased thereby. The British Isles, the British in those isles, have been able to exist and to defend themselves not only because they have prepared strong local defenses but also because as the heart and the nerve center of the British Empire they have been able to draw upon vast resources for their sustenance and to bring into operation against their enemies economic, military, and naval pressures on a world-wide scale. They live by importing goods from all parts of the world and by utilizing large overseas financial resources. They are defended not only by measures of defense carried out locally but also by distant and widespread economic, military, and naval activities which both contribute to the maintenance of their supplies, deny certain sources of supply to their enemies, and prevent those enemies from concentrating the full force of their armed power against the heart and the nerve center of the Empire.

[1663] The British need assistance along the lines of our generally established policies at many points, assistance which in the case of the Far East is certainly well within the realm of “possibility” so far as the capacity of the United States is concerned. Their defense strategy must in the nature of things be global. Our strategy of giving them assistance toward ensuring our own security must envisage both sending of supplies to England and helping to prevent a closing of channels of communication to and from various parts of the world, so that other important sources of supply will not be denied to the British and be added to the assets of the other side.

You also suggest as chief factors in the problem the questions whether and when Britain is likely to win the European war. As I have indicated above, the conflict is world-wide, not merely a European war. I firmly believe, as I have recently declared publicly, that the British, with our help, will be victorious in this conflict. The conflict may well be long and we must bear in mind that when England is victorious she may not have left the strength that would be needed to
bring about a rearrangement of such territorial changes in the western and southern Pacific as might occur during the course of the conflict if Japan is not kept within [1664] bounds. I judge from the remarks which appear at the bottom of page 4 and at the top of page 5 of your letter that you, too, attach due importance to this aspect of the problem.

I am giving you my thoughts at this length because the problems which we face are so vast and so interrelated that any attempt even to state them compels one to think in terms of five continents and seven seas. In conclusion, I must emphasize that, our problem being one of defense, we cannot lay down hard-and-fast plans. As each new development occurs we must, in the light of the circumstances then existing, decide when and where and how we can most effectively marshal and make use of our resources.

With warmest regards.

As ever,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2:00 o'clock of the same day.)

[1665] AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P. M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW (Resumed)

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, may I interpose a moment, with Senator Ferguson's permission? I think I can clear up one question that came up during his examination.

Senator Ferguson. There were quite a number.

Mr. Gesell. This may be helpful. The question came up with respect to the green-light dispatch. We made an inquiry over the noon recess and find that an extract and paraphrase of that green-light dispatch will be found printed as Document 182 at page 569 of Peace and War, and inasmuch as that is an extract, we have obtained from the State Department the entire text of the dispatch, and we wish to offer that in evidence, in order that the record will be complete. This would be Exhibit 26.

Senator Ferguson. Could you explain why this instrument was not among those delivered to us before by the State Department, if it was Mr. Grew's most important instrument?

Mr. Gesell. Our inquiry into State Department documents has been confined to the year 1941.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then that the counsel had made no request for anything back of 1941?

Mr. Gesell. We have not requested any of Mr. Grew's dispatches back of 1941, Senator.

[1666] Senator Ferguson. Had the committee requested any State Department records back of 1941?

Mr. Gesell. I think there may have been a few instances where we have gone behind 1941, but very few.

Senator Ferguson. Will Counsel state for the record the reason for that limitation?

Mr. Gesell. Senator, the effort was to stay around the period which we thought was of major concern to the committee, the events leading up to Pearl Harbor.
The Chairman. In view of the fact that extracts have been referred to and Mr. Grew has been examined about it, don't you think, Counsel, that the instrument itself ought to go into the transcript of the hearing instead of being an exhibit?

Mr. Gesell. I think that would be a good idea, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Senator, I would like to have it read at this time.

The Chairman. It may be read at this time, but I think it ought to go into the transcript of the hearing and not simply filed as an exhibit. With the consent of the committee, that will be the order.

Senator Ferguson. Would Counsel read it into the record so-Mr. Grew will be familiar with it? I have not had time to read it.

Mr. Gesell. Perhaps, Mr. Grew could read it.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Let Mr. Grew read it.

Mr. Grew. I have a copy of it here.

[1667] Senator Ferguson. You have a copy?

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Read it.

The Chairman. You may read it, Mr. Grew, if you wish.

Mr. Grew. Read the whole thing?

The Chairman. Read the whole document.

Mr. Grew. All right.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 26.")

Mr. Grew. This is a telegram to the Secretary of State.

827 September 7, 9 p. m.

Strictly Confidential.

Mr. Keeffe. What is the date of that again, please?

Mr. Grew. September 12, 1940.

Senator Ferguson. Does your book give the date of it, Mr. Grew.

Mr. Grew. Does what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Does your book state the date?

Mr. Grew. No. I used the substance of the telegram in the comment in my diary on October 1, but it was only the substance, it was not the text.

Senator Ferguson. In your book, it is under date of October 1, 1940?

Mr. Grew. That is right, yes, sir. The telegram was sent on September 12.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

[1668] One. The observations of Mr. A. T. Steele.

Senator Ferguson. Just one moment, Mr. Grew, if I might interrupt.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. There would not be any way of telling that the instrument that you speak about on page 334 was the one of September 12, 1940?

Mr. Grew. That is in my book?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I mean without your information.

Mr. Grew. No; you are quite right. I used that merely as comment in my diary. I considered in September was one of the most momentous periods in Japanese history and in American-Japanese relations. I discussed the general situation and then I referred to the material used in that telegram, although it was not the telegram itself.
Senator Ferguson. Thank you.

Mr. Grew. Shall I proceed to read?

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Grew (reading):

One. The observations of Mr. A. T. Steele concerning (?) in Japan conveyed in Peiping's 300, August 31, 3 p. m., recently received here by mail, have had my careful attention. In general terms I believe that Mr. Steele's observations are well founded and [1669] sound, a belief which applies equally to the important considerations advanced in the final two paragraphs of the summary of Mr. Steele's statement.

I think, in order to make this perfectly clear, that telegram would probably be helpful to the committee and could be produced undoubtedly, Mr. General Counsel.

Senator Ferguson. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the counsel get a copy of it.

The Chairman. Is that the telegram from Mr. Steele?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; that is a telegram from our then location in Peiping, No. 300, August 31, 3 p. m. That could be found in the files and could be produced.

The Chairman. The counsel will produce it for the record.¹

Who was Mr. Steele, if I might inquire?

Mr. Grew. Mr. Steele was a prominent correspondent of the Far East. He was on one of the Chicago papers. I am not quite sure at the present time which—I think the Chicago Daily News, but I am not quite sure. He had a high reputation in the Far East.

The Chairman. All right, go ahead.

Mr. Grew (reading):

His thesis that "firmness is the soundest and safest American naval policy" and that "the risks involved are much less than is commonly supposed in the United States" is however of such far-reaching gravity as to deserve carefully studied analysis and comment. In presenting the [1670] present trend of my thoughts on this general subject I have constantly in mind the fact that the shaping of our policy vis a vis Japan must depend upon the broader viewpoint of the administration in Washington and upon many factors which may not be apparent to this Embassy.

Two. The situation and circumstances which led to the series of exploratory conversations with the former Foreign Minister Arita (my 400, June 3, noon) and to the recommendations for considering steps leading toward the negotiation of a new treaty of commerce with Japan (my 562, July 11, 9 p. m.) have now obviously passed. I earnestly hope that the time will come when I shall feel justified in renewing those recommendations, but with the fall of the Yonai cabinet and the radically altered policy and outlook of the present set up in Japan, further initiative on our part in proposing conciliatory measures at the present time would appear to be futile and unwise.

Three. Whatever may be the intentions of the present Japanese Government, there can be no doubt that the army and other elements in the country see in the present world situation a "golden opportunity" to carry into effect their dreams of expansion; the German victories have gone to their heads like strong wine; until recently they have believed implicitly in the defeat of Great [1671] Britain; they have argued that the war will probably (*) (end) in a quick German victory and that it is well to consolidate Japan's position in greater East Asia while Germany is still acquiescent and before the eventual hypothetical strengthening of German naval power might rob Japan of far flung control in the Far East; they have discounted effective opposition on the part of the United States although carefully watching our attitude. The ability of the saner heads in and out of the Government to control these elements has been and is doubtful.

¹The above asterisk indicates an apparent omission. [Footnote in original.]

¹ Subsequently admitted as Exhibit No. 77. For text see Hearings, Part 4, p. 1712 et seq.
Four. Now, however, I sense a gradual change in the outburst of exhilaration which greeted the new Government on its inception. The Japanese Government, the army and navy and the public are beginning to see that Germany may not defeat Great Britain after all, a hypothesis which I have constantly emphasized to my Japanese contacts in the plainest language and now to add to that dawning realization, they see the United States and Great Britain steadily drawing closer together in measures of mutual defense with the American acquisition of naval bases in British possessions in the Atlantic and with our support of the British fleet by the transfer of fifty destroyers. They hear reports of our haste to build a two-ocean navy and of our considering the strengthening of our naval bases. [1672] In the Pacific and even rumors of our eventual use of Singapore. These developments and rumors are having their logical effect on Japanese consciousness. On the one hand they tend to emphasize the potential danger which Japan faces from eventual positive action by the United States and Great Britain acting together (the danger of combined Anglo-American measures has long been appreciated in Japan as evidenced by efforts to avoid irritating the United States and Great Britain simultaneously) or by the United States alone. On the other hand they furnish cogent arguments for those elements in Japan who seek economic and political security by obtaining markets and source of raw materials wholly within the control of Japan. As for Germany, the Japanese are beginning to question whether even a victorious Germany would not provide a new hazard to their expansionist program both in China and in the southward advance. Meanwhile the future position and attitude of Soviet Russia is always an uncertain factor in their calculations. These various considerations are beginning to give them concern.

[1673] High pressure diplomacy, especially in the Netherlands East Indies, will continue, but the fact that the Japanese Government was able even temporarily to restrain the military forces from their plans for a headlong invasion of Indo-China indicates a degree of caution which I do not doubt was at least partially influenced by the attitude of the United States. What Mr. Steele describes as the "nibbling policy" appears likely to continue until the world situation, and especially the attitude of the United States, becomes clearer.

Five. In previous communications I have expressed the opinion that sanctions by the United States would set Japanese-American relations on a downward curve. It is true that our own newly instituted program of national preparedness now justifies measures which reed not fall within the realm of outright sanctions. On the other hand we must envisage the probability that drastic embargoes on the export of such important products as petroleum, of which the United States is known to possess a superabundance, would be interpreted by the Japanese Government and people as actually (2) sanctions which [1674] might and probably would lead to some form of retaliation. The risks which Mr. Steele sees as "much less than is commonly supposed in the United States" will depend less upon the careful calculations of the Japanese Government than upon the uncalculating "do or die" temper of the army and navy in case they should attribute to the United States the responsibility for the failure of their expansionist plans. Such retaliation might take the form of counter measures by the Government but there would be even greater likelihood of some sudden stroke by the army or navy without the Government's prior knowledge or authorization. These risks constitute an imponderable factor which cannot at any given moment be weighed with assurance. It would be short, however, to deny their existence or to proceed with the formulation of policy and the adoption of measures without giving these potential risks full consideration and determining the wisdom of squarely facing these risks.

Six. In the ensuing observations I am carefully considering both of the fundamental purposes of my mission, namely the protection and advancement of American interests and the maintenance of good relations between the United States and Japan. When these two [1675] desiderata conflict, the preponderant emphasis to be placed on the one or the other is a matter of high policy which does not lie within my competency. My object is merely to place before the administration in Washington the outstanding factors in the situation as we see them from the angle of this Embassy. Having carefully set forth the inevitable hazards involved in a strong policy I now respectfully turn to the hazards involved in a laissez faire policy.
Seven. In discussing the specific question of American-Japanese relations it is impossible to view that problem in its proper perspective without considering it as part and parcel of the world problem which, briefly, presents the following aspects: (A) The United States and Great Britain are the leaders of a great group of English speaking nations around the world standing for a "way of life" which is being appallingly threatened today by a group of Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia and Japan whose avowed purpose is to impose by force of arms their will upon conquered peoples. In attempting to deal with such powers the uses of diplomacy are in general bankrupt.

[1676] Diplomacy may occasionally retard but cannot effectively stem the tide. Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers from attaining their objectives. Japan today is one of the predatory powers; she has submerged all moral and ethical sense and has become frankly and shamelessly opportunistic, seeking at every turn to profit by the weakness of others. Her policy of southward expansion is a definite threat to American interests in the Pacific and is a threat at the British Empire in the east.

(b) American security has admittedly depended in a measure upon the existence of the British fleet which in turn has been, and could only have been, supported by the British Empire.

(c) If we conceive it to be in our interest to support the British Empire in this hour of her travail, and I most emphatically do so conceive it, we must strive by every means to preserve the status quo in the Pacific at least until the European war has been won or lost. In my opinion this cannot be done nor can our interests be further adequately and properly protected by merely registering disapproval and keeping a careful record thereof. It is clear that Japan has [1677] been deterred from taking greater liberties with American interests only out of respect for our potential power; it is equally (*) that she has tramped upon our rights to a degree in precise ratio to the strength of her conviction that the American people would not permit that power to be used. Once conviction is shaken it is possible that the uses of diplomacy may again become accepted.

(d) If then we can by firmness preserve the status quo in the Pacific until and if Britain emerges successfully from the European struggle, Japan will be faced with a situation which will make it impossible for the present opportunist philosophy to maintain the upper hand. At a moment it might then be possible to undertake a readjustment of the whole Pacific problem on a fair, frank, and equitable basis to the lasting benefit of both the United States and of Japan. Until such time as there is a complete regeneration of thought in this country, a show of force, together with a determination to employ it if need be, can alone contribute effectively to the achievement of such an outcome and to our own future security.

[1678] Eight. Passing from the general to the specific problem that now confronts us, and with the foregoing picture in mind, I applauded the timeliness of the instruction contained in the second part of Department's 331, August 23, 6 p. m. concerning the Shanghai defense sectors. The Department will have seen from my 791, September 4, 11 p. m. paragraph No. two that the Foreign Minister's complaint as to alleged threats on our part was met with the statement that what we have in mind is "a logical reciprocal adjustment of international relations". I feel that the appropriate time has come to proceed, gradually but progressively, with that adjustment. In the present situation and outlook I believe that the time has come when continued patience and restraint on the part of the United States may and probably will lead to developments which will render Japanese-American relations progressively precocious. It is my hope that if the Japanese Government and people can be led to believe that their hand is being overplayed, there will eventually ensue a reverse swing of the pendulum in which a reconstruction of good relations between the [1679] United States and Japan will be possible. The alternative seems to me to be hopeless.

Nine. The foregoing analysis, which has been drafted with care over a period of several days, has the expressed complete concurrence of the Naval, Military and Commercial Attaches and all other members of the immediate staff of this Embassy.

(End of message.)

(Signed) Grew.

(The above asterisk indicates an apparent omission.)
[1680] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, that was a very well considered instrument.

You had spent considerable time on that instrument and it was well considered?

Mr. Grew. I had.

Senator Ferguson. And will you give us the specific reason, if you had one, for sending it?

Mr. Grew. I can't say that there was any specific reason other than my duty to express to our Government from time to time my understanding of the situation in Japan and the Far East and from time to time my representations as to what policy could be followed in Washington.

Senator Ferguson. You wanted Washington to have the information that they might know how you felt.

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, is it true that that was a change of attitude as far as you were concerned?

If you will look at page 272 of your book, I would like to have you read into the record what your attitude was on December 5, 1938, on that same question.

I think it is expressed in "meanwhile there were buzzings * * *:" Mr. Grew (reading):

Meanwhile there were buzzings as to possible financial help to Chiang Kai-shek from American and British sources, and discussions as to possible economic measures [1681] against Japan. As to the latter, no matter how much I might personally like to see retaliation for the things that Japan is doing to us and to our interests in the Far East, I have consistently recommended against such measures unless we are prepared to see them through to their logical conclusion, and that might mean war, for sanctions are always a potential incentive to ultimate war. The British, at least some British, believe that Anglo-American economic sanctions would bring Japan to her knees in short order. I disagree with that thesis. I know Japan and the Japanese pretty well. They are a hardy race, accustomed throughout their history to catastrophe and disaster; theirs is the "do or die" spirit, more deeply ingrained than in almost any other people. They would pull in their belts another notch and continue. They can live on rice and, if necessary, fight on rice. The deprivation of oil, rubber and other necessities of war might cramp their style, once their considerable supplies had given out, but it would take a long time to bring about capitulation, I think.

Foreign support to Chiang Kai-shek is another matter altogether, and this does not need to be done officially, no matter what official blessings might accompany the unofficial act.

Thus lay the land up to the end of November.

1938.

[1682] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, can you state to the committee what there was that changed you from that statement and belief in 1938 to the statement of September 12, 1940?

Mr. Grew. Well, a great deal of water had gone over the falls, Senator, between those two messages; there was 2 years between them. The Japanese Army was steadily encroaching further into the Far East and into East Asia. They were potentially threatening our vital interests. And from that point of view the situation had very much changed indeed. That, I think, was the main reason why I sent that telegram, but one must remember that my so-called green-light telegram was not something which had developed in a question of a few hours or a few days. It meant a progressive line of thinking over a period to the crux of the situation.
Senator Ferguson. You wanted the State Department to know of your change?

Mr. Grew. Oh, very definitely.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I will ask you to look on page 359 of your book, the letter beginning “Dear Frank,” on that same page. That is to the President?

Mr. Grew. 359?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

The Chairman. That is on page 359 but the following page looks like 358; the pages seem to be misnumbered there.

[1633] Senator Ferguson. It is all right in my copy, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Grew. That is my letter to the President of December 14, 1940.

Senator Ferguson. I ask you to read where it begins “After eight years of effort.” Read that paragraph.

Mr. Grew. This is my letter to the President of December 14, 1940.

After eight years of effort to build up something permanently constructive in American-Japanese relations, I find that diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces utterly beyond its control, and that our work has been swept away as if by a typhoon, with little or nothing remaining to show for it. Japan has become openly and unashamedly one of the predatory nations and part of a system which aims to wreck about everything that the United States stands for. Only insuperable obstacles will now prevent the Japanese from digging in permanently in China and from pushing the southward advance, with economic control as a preliminary to political domination in the areas marked down. Economic obstacles, such as may arise from American embargoes, will seriously handicap Japan in the long run, but meanwhile they tend to push the Japanese onward in a forlorn hope of making themselves economically self-sufficient.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that you felt that diplomacy had failed and that we were going from a stage of diplomacy to some other instrument to settle the differences? You say:

* * * I find that diplomacy has been defeated* * *.

Mr. Grew. I said diplomacy has been defeated by trends and forces at that moment. As I recollect it it was after the fall of the Konoye Cabinet with which I had been able to work fairly closely in the hope of being able to build up our relations. When this Cabinet fell and a new Cabinet came in I saw that that work had been pretty well wrecked.

Senator Ferguson. What Cabinet came in in December of 1940?

Mr. Grew. December 1940. I think that was one of Konoye’s Cabinets. I will look. I have the complete record here.

That is Konoye’s. The second Konoye Cabinet came in on July 22, 1940.

Senator Ferguson. What is the next step if diplomacy failed? You use this expression:

Only insuperable obstacles will not prevent the Japanese from digging in permanently in China and from pushing the southward advance * * * and so forth.

What is the next instrument?

Mr. Grew. Senator, I had in mind all the time—- Senator Ferguson. What were you trying to convey to the State Department?
Mr. Grew. I was trying to convey to the State Department that the
time had come to take strong measures.

[1686] Senator Ferguson. Of course, this is to the President.
Mr. Grew. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And he is the one in charge of foreign rela-
tions. So you took it right to the top.
Mr. Grew. No. I was also reporting to Mr. Hull at that time, of
course, along the same lines as indicated by that so-called green-light
telegram.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I do find in the records your reports to
Mr. Hull along this same line in December, and let us have that.
Mr. Grew. Well, the one in September covers that ground.
Senator Ferguson. Oh, the one in September covers that?
Mr. Grew. The so-called green-light telegram covers that ground
completely.
Senator Ferguson. I see. So the one in September covered it to
the State Department and this one was to the President, on the 14th
of December?
Mr. Grew. That is right; that is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Thank you.
Mr. Grew. There were probably other telegrams to Mr. Hull along
the same lines but I haven’t the full records before me so I cannot
tell you.
My thought was that by taking these measures we would [1687]
eventually bring at least the thinking, the sane-minded statesmen in
Japan to the realization that unless they stopped in their tracks they
were going to have war with the United States and Great Britain
and other countries.
Now, that is precisely what happened. When Prince Konoye came
into power for the third time, his third Cabinet, with all his black
background and record and, certainly, as Mr. Hull pointed out the
other day, he had been responsible for one of the worst train of acts
of international banditry in world history, he still was an intelli-
gent man and he, in my opinion, as a result of the policy that we
followed, the measures we had taken, he saw the handwriting on
the wall.
He knew a good deal more about our country than the hot-headed
militarists did; he had been to our country, knew something about
our productive capacity, knew something about our national spirit.
In my opinion, he realized that Japan, if she got into war with us
and with other countries, other western powers, would probably in
the end be defeated and would emerge as a third or a fifth rate power.
In other words, I think at that time some of those more intelligent
statesmen in Japan realized that they were on the brink of an abyss
and it was my belief at that time that they tried their best to reverse
the engine. It was too late to do it but they tried to do it.
[1688] Therefore, this policy which I had recommended had led
up to that position where these intelligent Japanese statesmen, quite
apart from the hot-headed militarists and all the rest of them, real-
ized that they ought to step back and it was my hope that they would
step back and, as I said in this telegram, that this would lead to a
complete remolding of our relations with Japan and a remolding of
the entire situation in the Far East. That was always my hope.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, on the bottom of page 360, in the same letter, you say this:

It is important constantly to bear in mind the fact that if we take measures—and this is in quotations—

"short of war" with no real intention to carry those measures to their final conclusion if necessary, such lack of intention will be all too obvious to the Japanese, who will proceed undeterred, and even with greater incentive, on their way. Only if they become certain that we mean to fight if called upon to do so, will our preliminary measures stand some chance of proving effective and of removing the necessity for war—the old story of Sir Edward Grey in 1914.

So you had in mind to convey to the President that it was your opinion and the time had come for the State Department, for our foreign relations to be such that we would [1689] indicate that we were willing to go the whole way and that would be even to the point of war.

Mr. Grew. I felt at that time entirely certain about that, Senator, for the very reason that unless we were willing to build up our forces and to build up our armaments to the point where we would be ready for anything, the Japanese would know it in a hurry and we never could get away with any bluff of any kind. I wanted our forces built up as an insurance against war.

Senator Ferguson. And you had in mind then that we should build an army and a navy that we could implement every policy that you were telling the President that we should take?

Mr. Grew. I felt that that was an essential part of the policy, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, I will ask you whether or not when the President in his letter of January 21, 1941 said [reading]:

I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusion,

And then I turn to page 362, you are talking about that we go to the point of even going to war, I will ask you to read what he said to you on page 362, beginning with, "You suggest as one of the chief factors." [1690] He is talking now, as I understand it, the President, about war. Will you read that?

Mr. Grew. Which paragraph is that on 362?

Senator Ferguson. It is the first paragraph.

Mr. Grew. "You suggest"?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew (reading):

You suggest as one of the chief factors in the problem of our attitude toward Japan the question whether our getting into war with Japan would so handicap our help to Britain in Europe as to make the difference to Britain between victory and defeat. In this connection it seems to me that we must consider whether, if Japan should gain possession of the region of the Netherlands East Indies and the Malay Peninsula, the chances of England's winning in her struggle with Germany would not be decreased thereby. The British Isles, the British in those Isles, have been able to exist and to defend themselves not only because they have prepared strong local defenses but also because as the heart and the nerve center of the British Empire they have been able to draw upon vast resources for their sustenance and to bring into operation against their enemies economic, military, and naval pressures on a world-wide scale. They live by [1691] importing goods from all parts of the world and by utilizing large overseas financial resources. They are defended not only by measures of defense carried out locally but also by distant and widespread economic, military, and naval activities which both contribute to the maintenance of their supplies, deny certain sources of supply.
to their enemies, and prevent those enemies from concentrating the full force of their armed power against the heart and the nerve center of the Empire.

Senator Ferguson. Now, we could take that as meaning that notwithstanding your warning the President was conveying to you that he felt that it was necessary to go all out on this question; that he understood you, in other words.

Mr. Grew. Well, you mean that it would appear from this paragraph that the President accepted that position?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. Well, I think, Senator, from the letter as a whole that would be clear.

Senator Ferguson. That would follow.

Mr. Grew. That would be clear.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, I will ask you in the telegram that you read, the original, the "green light" telegram, whether or not there is not a clause in there about us using the Singapore base? Do you remember that?

[1692] Mr. Grew. Yes. It was, as I remember it, we might have. Let me see how that was stated about that.

Senator Ferguson. How did you express that?

Mr. Grew. I have it right here. That is the reference, Senator, on page 3, paragraph numbered 4 of my telegram 827, September 12, 9 p. m. I had better read the whole paragraph to make the context clear.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew (reading):

Now, however, I sense a gradual change in the outburst of exhilaration which greeted the new Government on its inception. The Japanese Government, the army and navy and the public are beginning to see that Germany may not defeat Great Britain after all, a hypothesis which I have constantly emphasized to my Japanese contacts in the plainest language and now to add to that dawning realization they see the United States and Great Britain steadily drawing closer together in measures of mutual defense with the American acquisition of naval bases in British possessions in the Atlantic and with our support of the British fleet by the transfer of fifty destroyers. They hear reports of our haste to build a two-ocean navy and of our considering the strengthening of our naval bases in the Pacific and even rumors of our eventual use of [1693] Singapore.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. There was nothing more definite than that.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, had you heard any rumors or information from the State Department—first, had you any rumors in relation to any agreement we might have, or some rights that we might have to use Singapore as a naval base?

Mr. Grew. So far as I recollect I received nothing of that kind from the State Department, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Had you heard rumors there?

Mr. Grew. Well, no, sir; I cannot say that I heard rumors.

Senator Ferguson. Did your Navy or Army attaché there in Tokyo give you any information on that?

Mr. Grew. They passed on to me, so far as I know, all the important information that they received. I do not recollect that either of them passed on to me any information to that effect.

Senator Ferguson. Could you give us any opinion as to where you may have received that information of rumors?
Mr. Grew. I did not receive that information, Senator. It is clear from the telegram that that was information which the Japanese had heard and were considering. I do not know where they got it from.

[1694] Senator Ferguson. Had they advised you that they had such information?

Mr. Grew. Well, of course, going back to this telegram, after all these years I cannot tell you exactly how that came to me. It was very likely in the Japanese press; it may have been passed on to me by individuals. All I can say was, "They hear reports." I cannot be more definite than that. I could not clamp that down.

Senator Ferguson. You do not know, though, but what the Army or the Navy attaché there may have given you the information also?

Mr. Grew. I could not answer that question, Senator, without looking back in the records.

Senator Ferguson. Did the British Ambassador ever give you that information?

Mr. Grew. I do not believe so. I have no recollection of it.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know of any agreement between the United States and Great Britain as to the defense of Singapore?

Mr. Grew. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Now we will go to page 556 of Foreign Relations. That is the note of August the 17th, 1941.

Mr. Grew. Five hundred and what?

[1695] Senator Ferguson. 556 of Foreign Relations.

Mr. Grew. 556; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I am particularly interested in the last paragraph, the one I had you read this morning.

Mr. Grew. Yes, we had that this morning.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, will you tell me, if you can, when you first considered that message and what did it mean to you?

Mr. Grew. Well, I cannot tell you on what date I received the message. I probably received it on the day of its delivery. You must remember there is a day difference between Tokyo and the United States, so that anything that appeared in the print—

Senator Ferguson. It was delivered in Tokyo—

Mr. Grew. On August 18.

Senator Ferguson. It was delivered on Sunday and you probably got it Monday?

Mr. Grew. I probably would have gotten it Monday. Monday would have been the 19th.

Senator Ferguson. What did that message—what did that information mean to you? That was coming from Washington to you.

Mr. Grew. Yes. It meant that we were following the policy which I had constantly advocated.

[1696] Senator Ferguson. That was the policy that you had advocated?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did the State Department give you any other information on that instrument?

Mr. Grew. Not to my knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. Did your Army or Navy attaché give you any information?

Mr. Grew. Not to my knowledge.
Senator FERGUSON. Would you consider that an ultimatum?

Mr. GREW. By no means.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I want to read to you on page 2 of exhibit 16 this information, and ask you whether it was conveyed to you.

This is a document to the President of the United States dated November the 5th, 1941, and signed by—this particular one is signed by W. P. Scobey, colonel, G. S. C. secretary, and it is on a message, attached to a message by the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and it is being delivered to the President. [Reading:]

Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China—At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at [1697] the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Now, was that ever called to your attention, that the Army and the Navy had considered that instrument of August the 17th as an ultimatum?

[1698] Mr. GREW. I do not think that that was ever called to my attention, Senator, but I would like to say right here that the application of the term "ultimatum" to that document could not be well taken owing to the fact that the conversations between the United States and Japan continued for a long time thereafter and if you submit an ultimatum to a country, you do not talk any more; it is finished.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the ultimatum was on this point, as I understood this morning, Mr. Grew.

Senator LUCAS. Whom is that from?

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement. * * *

He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression.

In other words, if Japan made further aggression after the 17th of August 1941 that we would act and that that was an ultimatum.

Mr. Grew. The fact remains, Senator, that the Japanese did take a great deal of action after that date and no such action was taken by us and meanwhile the conversations in [1699] Washington continued right along.

Senator FERGUSON. I want to read another statement and ask you whether it was ever conveyed to you, or whether it was your under-
standing that you had ever conveyed this information to the State Department. On page 4 of the same instrument [reading]:

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped—

and that is October the 5, 1941.

Now, reading again:

by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schuirmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

Now, did you ever give any information to our State Department that would lead our State Department to the notion that in case we got into war with Japan that they could be defeated in a military action in a few weeks?

Mr. Grew. I definitely did not, Senator, because I did not—

Senator Ferguson. Did you give them the opposite, that it would be a longer war than that?

Mr. Grew. I cannot tell you whether I gave any definite estimate at that time or not; probably not. But they had plenty of reports from me as to the toughness of the Japanese Army and Navy. I can bring out passage after passage to indicate that; that they were a fanatical race, they were a do-or-die sort of people, they would probably fight to the last ditch and that they were exceedingly military. I brought that out continually right from the very beginning of my stay in Tokyo, when I wrote that the Japanese Army is built for war, prepared for war, and anxious to go to war.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did the State Department ever convey to you that that was the attitude of the State Department of the United States?

Mr. Grew. I do not remember that they ever did.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you would remember such a statement, don't you think?

Mr. Grew. I think I would.

Senator Ferguson. That is so contrary to what your views were that it probably would have impressed you very keenly.

[700] Mr. Grew. I think I would have come back very quickly on a statement of that kind.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I have read you from the exhibit here. Whose views, when they speak about the State Department, whose views would that be? Mr. Hull was the head, was he not?

Mr. Grew. I cannot tell you who expressed those views, Senator, because I was not here. I frankly do not know.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Hull that question, as to whether or not that was his views of October 5 or near October 5, 1941?

Mr. Grew. I do not think that I ever have.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. Grew. I do not believe I ever did.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any correspondence with Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. Grew. I had a certain amount of correspondence from time to time of an informal nature but I do not recollect—

Senator Ferguson. Official correspondence?

Mr. Grew. I beg pardon?

Senator Ferguson. Official correspondence?

Mr. Grew. No; it was unofficial correspondence: purely personal correspondence, and I do not recollect that that [1702] subject was ever touched upon in our correspondence. I doubt that it was.

Senator Ferguson. When you were here in 1939 you had a conversation with the President and with Mr. Hull?

Mr. Grew. I did.

Senator Ferguson. Will you state as to whether or not at that time you told the President your opinion about the Japanese as far as fighting is concerned, that they could not be bluff, as you used the expression this morning, and as to how strong they were in a military sense?

Mr. Grew. I have no record of that conversation but it is my opinion that in all probability I did do just that.

Senator Ferguson. And would you say that you had the same kind of a conversation with Mr. Hull?

Mr. Grew. I would say that I probably did but, also, I have no record of that conversation, so I cannot answer your question definitely, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, how would you account, you being in Japan and knowing the situation, for our State Department to get the idea that I have just read to you as Admiral Ingersoll felt, that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in a military action in a few weeks?

Mr. Grew. That is a question, Senator, which I frankly [1703] am not competent to answer. I was not here at the time.

Senator Ferguson. Well, it certainly was not from anything that you gave the State Department?

Mr. Grew. It was not what?

Senator Ferguson. From anything that you ever gave the State Department?

Mr. Grew. No; it certainly was not.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, getting back to Captain Schuirmann's idea of the note of August 17. That note—have you got it before you there?

Mr. Grew. The note itself?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. Or Admiral Schuirmann's?

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Schuirmann. Have you got that?

Mr. Grew. Which page is that on?

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 3.

Mr. Grew. Can you find that for me, where it is?

Mr. Gesell. I think there may have been some confusion about the exhibit.

Senator Ferguson. Well, it is marked on the outside, "Exhibit 16."

Mr. Gesell. Yes. Only the first two or three pages are a memorandum to the President. The remaining portion is a [1704]
minute of a meeting which amplifies the memorandum to the President.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you understand then that the memo-
randum attached never went to the President?
    Mr. Gesell. I have no evidence that it ever did.
    Senator Ferguson. Well, have you any evidence that it did not?
    Mr. Gesell. I have no evidence either way.

Senator Ferguson. The reason is I got that as one exhibit and it is
attached and the President has acted on the instrument, as I under-
stand it, when we come——
    Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?
    Senator Ferguson. The next is November 14, 1941.
    Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
    Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will yield.
    Mr. Murphy. The memorandum is dated, however, under date of
November 5, 1941, and the notes of the meeting are dated November 3,
1941.

Senator Ferguson. That would be correct.
    Mr. Murphy. And they are separate papers apparently.
    Senator Ferguson. Yes, but there isn't any showing here that it all
did not go to the President because it is all on the same subject.

I ask, Mr. Chairman, that the counsel read the whole [1705]
instrument into the record so it will be clear.
    Mr. Murphy. May I just make this one statement?
    The Chairman. What is it, Congressman?
    Mr. Murphy. I just wanted to say that the statement, the memo-
randum that went to the President would carry the signatures of the
Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, and on the body of the
statement itself there is nothing incorporated in it, there isn't any
reference at all to the minutes of the meeting.

Senator Ferguson. Of course, it is difficult—that is the difficulty we
run into when the committee only gets photostatic copies. We cannot
tell whether this is a signed one or what.
    Mr. Murphy. But there is no reference——
    Senator Ferguson. This is a mimeographed copy rather than a
photostatic copy.
    Mr. Murphy. But there is no incorporation of the minutes in the
message by reference, at least.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have read into the record at this
place the instrument, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Which one is that? The memorandum to the
President?
    Senator Ferguson. No, the whole thing; November 5, the one from
the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval [1706] Operations. It
is addressed to the President. It is an estimate concerning the far
eastern situation.
    Mr. Murphy. Thirteen pages.

The Chairman. Well, it is a very lengthy document. It is not in
the transcript, it has not gone into the hearings as yet?
    Mr. Murphy. It has been offered.

The Chairman. It has been offered as an exhibit, but has it been
printed in the hearing?
    Mr. Gesell. No; it has not, Senator. I suggest we could just
arrange to have it spread upon the record at this point.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. If we could have it spread upon the record at this point.

The Chairman. That is agreeable, and it will be put into the record here at this point and made a part of the transcript.

(Exhibit No. 16 follows:)

[1707] Secret
Serial 0130012
Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attaché. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident." If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States [17068] and the British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided these troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened [17069] by withdrawing all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

The only existing plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct offensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will

1 Preceded by handwritten insertion "practically."
2 The preceding words struck out, and handwritten word "current" substituted.
make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached [1710] the projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kal-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan is defeated and Germany remained undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic [1711] against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

1. A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

2. The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans: i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

[d] Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete co-ordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group [1715] be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.
 Minutes of Meeting, November 3, 1941.

At the call of the Senior Member, the weekly meeting scheduled for November 5, 1941, was held today in Room 2003, Munitions Building. The meeting was called to order at 3:40 p.m.

Present:
Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations, Presiding;
General G. C. Marshall, U. S. A., Chief of Staff;
Rear Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations;
Major General William Dryden, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff;
Major General H. H. Arnold, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff for Air;
Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, U. S. A., Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division;
Captain O. M. Read, U. S. N., War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, in absence of Rear Admiral R. K. Turner; and
Colonel W. P. Scobey, U. S. A., Secretary.
Additional Officers Present:
Major General R. C. Moore, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff;
Colonel C. W. Bundy, U. S. A., War Plans Division, War Department General Staff;
Captain R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations;
Commander F. P. Sherman, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations; and
Lieutenant Commander A. H. McCollum, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence.
The Presiding Officer directed the minutes of the meeting of October 22, would stand approved unless there were objections. The minutes were approved.
The Secretary then announced the agenda for the meeting as follows:
Serial 693—Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain.
Serial 732—Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy." Communications between Ship and Shore.
Serial 665-11—Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the Navy.
Serial 725—Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being Established.—Revision requested by the British.
Discussion—Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China.
Discussion—Alternate Route via Canton Island for movement of airplanes to the Far East.
Action taken on the several subjects was as follows:
Serial 693—Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain. Following a discussion of this subject, during which General Arnold stated that the development of airplane ferrying facilities to the British Isles was provided for in Serials 683–1 and 723, the Board approved the Joint Planning Committee report of October 23, 1941, and directed that the subject be stricken from the calendar.
Serial 732—Revision of Paragraph 109, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report was approved.
Serial 665-11—Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report recommendation of October 30, 1941, was accepted and the Committee of Experts' report was approved.
Serial 725—Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being established. The Secretary announced that the Joint Planning Committee report before the Board, recommended certain revisions in the United States—United Kingdom initial agreement, which was approved by The Joint Board on September 19, 1941; and that the revisions now requested by the British had been accepted by the United States representatives. Following a properly seconded motion, the Board voted to approve the Joint Planning Committee report of October 29, 1941.
Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China.—At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schulmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schulmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Following Captain Schulmann's presentation, Admiral Stark read a Navy Department estimate of the recent dispatches received from Chungking. Admiral Ingersoll, gave his personal review of the situation. A summary of this review was that:

a. The decision on the Far Eastern situation, made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the Atlantic; and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort. The policy was stated in the U. S.—British Staff Conversations Report ABC-1.

b. A major war effort in the Pacific would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas.


d. The requirements in tankers alone for support of a Pacific war would create a serious oil shortage in this country, and the United States fleet cannot be supported in the Pacific without auxiliary shipping and adequate supplies.

e. The shortest line of communication is flanked by Mandated Islands, and is vulnerable to Japanese attack. Two other routes are available for communications to the Far Eastern Theater: one via Australia; the other via Cape of Good Hope.

f. Assuming that the fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilities are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present.

g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the Fleet due to the lack of adequate antiaircraft protection for the anchorage.

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of launching an attack in five directions: viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five operations, United States' action should be: In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East until the augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and army forces, becomes available.

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get fresh. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schirmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be Naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to
the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and. [1720] emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December, the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations.

Admiral Ingersoll gave summary of naval reinforcements scheduled for the Philippines. A stated number of submarine units en route to the Philippines. A stated number of submarine units on route to the Philippines were now in Guam. Other submarines scheduled for transfer to the Philippines were about to leave Hawaii. With reference to Japanese decision on National policy he felt that United States forces and shipping now being moved to the Philippines might be in danger if a decision adverse to United States interest should be made on November 5th. General Marshall emphasized the point that Japan could hardly take the risk of military operations with a powerful air and submarine force directly on the flank of their supply lines, and that when United States power is sufficiently developed in the Philippines, we would then have something to back up our statements. Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. It appeared that the basis of U. S. policy should be to make [1721] certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions.

Following these discussions the Board adopted the following proposal submitted by Admiral Ingersoll and amended by suggestions made by Admiral Stark and General Marshall:

War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following lines:

Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.
Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.
Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. military forces in support of Chiang Kai-Shek.
Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.
Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.
Point out the effect and cost a U. S.-Japanese war in the Far East would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U. S.
Emphasize the existing limitations on [1722] shipping and the inability of the U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive operation without the transfer of the major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines' Army Air Forces, General Arnold explained that the military authorities were building up reserves and were investigating reports that the Dutch East Indies were capable of supplying all United States and British requirements.

At this point, General Marshall presented a list of items of equipment considered necessary by the China Mission to enable China to maintain her war effort. He pointed out that the War Department was beset with many trials and difficulties in the allocation of Lend-Lease items as related to Great Britain, Russia, Dutch East Indies, China and other countries. In the case of Russia, a large amount of equipment allocated to that country would have to go via Archangel, Vladivostok or Basra. The shortage of shipping, the long lines of communications, and the difficult transport situation from the ports of debarkation might cause an inability to make prompt delivery of all equipment to its final destination. Under some conditions, this would mean piling up unused
equipment at various localities, while at the same time other localities would suffer from shortage of equipment. The matter resolves itself into a question as to whom Lend-Lease material should be released. It was General Marshall's [1723] opinion that control of Lend-Lease distribution, and diversions incidental thereto, is a strategic decision which should be made by the Joint Board. Since the matter of ocean tonnage is a critical feature in the delivery of Lend-Lease items and is related to the strategic situation, General Marshall felt that Admiral Land of the Maritime Commission should be called in to sit with the Joint Board in deciding matters of this nature. The Board agreed that Admiral Land should be asked to detail a member of his department to work with the Joint Planning Committee on reports involving the disposition of Lend-Lease materials. Navy members agreed to take the necessary steps to inform Admiral Land of this request.

Referring to the merchant shipping situation, Admiral Stark felt that merchant tonnage is so short and prospective requirements are so great that an effort should be made to get the 1942 merchant vessel construction program moved up to an A-1-a priority.

At the direction of Admiral Stark, Commander Sherman then read a report from War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the movement of airplanes to the Middle East for ultimate delivery to Russia. This report recommended that the *Normandie* be acquired to meet future requirements for transporting aircraft; that three additional sea trains also be acquired and placed in service without conversion; and that delivery of aircraft to the Middle East be effected by the use of these three sea trains [1724].

Alternate Route Via Canton Island for Movement of Airplanes.—Following a discussion of this subject the Board instructed that the following directive be given to the Joint Planning Committee:

It is directed that the Joint Planning Committee submit a report as to the action to be taken to complete the establishment of an additional landplane route between Hawaii and Australia, less vulnerable to hostile interference than is the existing route via Wake Island, and as to the defenses of additional air-dromes and landing fields acquired.

W. P. Scoeby, Colonel, G. S. C., Secretary.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. Discussion.

1. A conference was held at the State Department during the morning of November 1, 1941. Present were Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, Mr. Hornbeck, other lesser State Department officials, and Capt. Schulmann, U. S. N. The subject of discussion was the action which should be taken on the Magruder radiogram of October 28, 1941. Question arose as to the strength of U. S. forces in the Far East as affecting diplomatic pressure on Japan. Measures were discussed, such as sending U. S. Army Air Forces to China, which might lead to immediate involvement in war with Japan. Apparently, the statement of Chiang Kai-Shek, that an immediate Japanese attack on Kunming threatened and that this could be defeated only by the intervention of air forces, was accepted.

2. a. The War Department G-2 estimate (Tab A) does not support Chiang Kai-Shek's conclusions as to immediate initiation of a Japanese move toward Kunming. G-2 believes that the movement if contemplated will not be initiated in less than two months; the movement will be very difficult over nearly 300 miles of roadless, broken country; the Chinese, in favorable defense terrain, can defeat this offensive by proper concentration and use of ground troops alone.

1726 b. G-2 (Col. Bratton) agrees with the Magruder statement that with the fall of Kunming, Chinese resistance to Japan would be very seriously affected.

c. The G-2 estimate also covers the broader viewpoint of expected Japanese action.

3. An air estimate of the Far Eastern situation (Tab B) brings out the following: the most effective air aid to China can be given by units based in the Philip-
pines; there are, at present many shortages in ammunition and gasoline supply
which will militate against a sustained effort; logistical difficulties, aside from
general policy, make it undesirable to undertake operations of U. S. Army Air
Force units in China.

4. The status of the Lend-Lease program for China is shown in Tab C.

5. The status of ground troops and defense reserves in the Philippine Depart-
ment is shown in Tab D. The garrison has not reached the effective strength
desired by General MacArthur. Deficiencies are being overcome by the dispatch
of personnel and supplies from the United States and by accelerating the training
and equipping of the Philippine Army. The present combined air and ground
forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. The dispatch
of any considerable portion of the air garrison to China would leave Luzon open
to serious risk of capture.

1727 6. Informal contact with officers of the local British Staff Mission
indicate that the British have incomplete air forces for the defense of Singa-
pore, would refuse to allow units of the Royal Air Force to support Chinese
troops in Yunnan, and are of the firm opinion that the British Chiefs of Staff
would strongly disapprove any action in China which might bring on war with
Japan.

7. War Plans Division is strongly of the opinion that:

a. The policies derived in the American-British Staff conversations remain
sound, viz.:

(1) The primary objective is the defeat of Germany.
(2) The principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war.
(3) Military counter-action against Japan should be considered only in case
of any of the following actions by Japan:

(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or
Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to
define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of war". It is possible
for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could
be resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized [1728] that the deci-
sion as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Govern-
ment concerned.

(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the
west of 100° East or to the south of 10° North.

(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy
of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and
course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of
the Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of
6° North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to
Waigeo Island, or the Equator east of Waigeo.

(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor,

(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty
Islands.

b. Germany must be defeated. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain
undefeated, decision is not reached. The means to defeat Japan, (Army, Navy,
and tonnage,) must be withdrawn in quantity from the effort against Germany.
To defeat Germany will require the utmost total effort.

1729 7. It is desirable that large Japanese forces be kept involved in
China. However, from the larger viewpoints, prospective Chinese defeat would
not warrant involvement of the United States, at this time, in war with Japan.

d. Political and economic measures should be used wherever effective to deter
Japanese action.

e. Most effective aid to China, as well as to the defense of Singapore and the
Netherlands East Indies, is now being built up by the reinforcement of the
Philippines. The safety of Luzon as an air and submarine base should soon be
reasonably assured by the arrival of air and ground reinforcements. Strong
diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from the military viewpoint
at the earliest about the middle of December, 1941, when the Philippine Air
Force will have become a positive threat to Japanese operations. It would be
advantageous, if practicable, to delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure
until February or March, 1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached
its projected strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation.

f. Material aid to China should be accelerated consonant with the studied
needs of Russia and Great Britain.

g. Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China should be continued and accel-
erated as far as practicable.
II. Recommendations.

Substitution of the words "War Department" for "War Plans Division" in paragraph 7 above and approval of that paragraph as a statement of the War Department's position on the Far East situation at this time.

L. T. GEROW,  
Brigadier General,  
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

6 Incls.  
#1—Tab A—G-2 Estimate  
#2—Tab B—Air Estimate  
#3—Tab C—Lend-Lease Program for China.  
#4—Tab D—Ground Troops & Def. Res. Phil. Dept.  
#5—Tab E—Ground Reinforcements, Phil. Dept.  

Department of State,  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,  
Nov. 14, 1941.

The President's reply was handed to Hu Shih at 6 p. m. by Mr. Hornbeck.

M. M. H.

The White House,  
Washington, November 11, 1941.

Memorandum for General Watson.

I want to see Hu Shih for five minutes on Wednesday, and give this to me when he comes.

F. D. R.

Strictly Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 10, 1941.

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and [1732] that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Enclosure:  
Draft message.

Address Official Communications to  
The Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Strictly Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 10, 1941.

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Enclosure:  
Draft message.

(Signed) Hull.

1 Tab A is included in Exhibit No. 33; other tabs not included.
[1733] Strictly Confidential
To Generalissimo CHIANG KAI-SHEK from President ROOSEVELT:

I have for some days had before me your message of November 2 which was delivered to me through your Ambassador here on November 4; also, your earlier message which was delivered to me through Dr. T. V. Soong on October 30.

We have had for some time very much in mind the situation created by the menace of a Japanese attack against Kunming from Indochina to which you call special attention. When I received the first of your messages under reference, officers of this Government, including high officers of the Department of State, the Army and the Navy, entered immediately into consultations in order to give renewed and urgent consideration to all aspects of the problems underlying that situation. It soon became our conclusion that, while it would be a grave error to underestimate the gravity of that situation, it did not appear that preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunming had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack. Given the difficult character of the terrain and the formidable resistance which your land forces would offer in Yunnan, an invasion of that province from Indochina by land forces calls for substantial preparation and extensive operations. At the same time we fully realize that it is important that your forces be adequately prepared, equipped and disposed in all branches. Under existing circumstances, taking into [1734] reconsideration the world situation in its political, military and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition, our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible.

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering, adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against [1735] such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be developing. Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indochina, are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south.

This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the Government of Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of courses of aggression and conquest. We shall continue to impress this point of view upon Japan on every appropriate occasion.

In the present state of world affairs, I feel—and I am confident that you will agree with me—that there rests on the United States, in connection with every move which it considers and every decision which it makes, extraordinary obligation to give intensive thought to widespread political stresses and strains, to both long-swing and short-swing potentialities, and to the weight of various possible and probable advantages in comparison with the weight of other possible or probable disadvantages. The world conflict is now being waged in many theaters and with a great variety of weapons, both physical and moral. [1736] Resistance to the forces of conquest takes many forms. In all probability, the efforts of all of us who are engaged in that resistance, efforts of China and of the United States and of many other countries, will have to be continued and be sustained over a long period of time before our countries, one and all, will again be made secure and our people again be enabled to turn their whole thought and effort to peaceful and constructive pursuits.
I assure you that the situation and the problems which are the subject of this correspondence will continue to have my own and my country's constant attention.

FE:JWB:HE
PA/H:SKII
11-10-41 FE.

[1737] Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield for just one observation?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. On page 5 of the minutes, the recommendation of the Board, after hearing these references which the gentleman read, was that they opposed the issuance of an ultimatum.

The Chairman. Well, that will show from the document itself.

Senator Ferguson. That will speak for itself.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. Now, in the President's message, on page 3, the President's message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, from President Roosevelt, on page 3 of that same document [reading]:

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are considering, adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against such threat of an attack upon Yunnan as may be developing. Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, [1738] and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indo-China, are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south.

Was that your understanding of the situation, Mr. Grew?

Mr. Grew. Well, Senator, as I said, I was not here in this country at that time; I was not in a position to check up on all these steps that were reported as being taken. Frankly, I cannot give you an opinion on that.

Senator Ferguson. No, but, Mr. Grew, had you an idea that the fact that our fleet was on the flank was deterring the Japanese from taking action?

Mr. Grew. I said that this morning. I do agree; I do think that, yes.

Senator Ferguson. You think that that was true?

Mr. Grew. I think that that was true. I think it had a deterrent effect. In other words, I think if—

Senator Ferguson. In other words, Mr. Grew, you think—

Mr. Grew. I would like to finish, please.

Senator Ferguson. I beg your pardon. Go ahead.

Mr. Grew. I think it had a deterrent effect. More than [1739] that, I think to withdraw the fleet would have had a disastrous effect psychologically.

Senator Ferguson. Well, Mr. Grew, if it had an effect and there was going to be war between the United States and Japan, how do you account for us allowing that fleet to be there and being attacked as it was at Pearl Harbor?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that that is a totally unfair question.

The Chairman. The witness can take care of himself.

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Senator Lucas. Mr. Grew can take care of himself, but we have been running along here with one question after another that the witness absolutely does not know anything about and I think it is a question that other authorities and other witnesses should answer directly in the time to come. I do not object to it, because the witness is undoubtedly taking care of himself. It just seems to me that we are wasting a lot of time. Maybe I am wrong.

Senator Ferguson. Of course, I am of the opinion that you are wrong.

The Chairman. If the witness has any additional opinion as to why the fleet was there than the reasons that he has already assigned for it being there and the effect of it being there he may state.

Senator Ferguson. I understand that the Chair rules [1740] that the witness cannot answer that question.

The Chairman. The Chair makes no such ruling. On the contrary, he is suggesting that the witness answer.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Mr. Grew. I am simply stating my opinion that I believe that the fleet at that time was there and I assumed that the fleet would be in perfect condition.

Senator Ferguson. You mean by "in perfect condition" that it would be properly protected for all events?

Mr. Grew. I assumed that the fleet would fulfill its functions in case of necessity.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you understand, Mr. Grew, that the fleet was there and it would defend itself, or that the Army base was there to defend the fleet in Pearl Harbor and to defend Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew. Senator, I did not go into those very strategic details; naturally, I could not. You asked me merely what my opinion is about keeping the fleet in Pearl Harbor and I have expressed my opinion that the fact of the fleet being there, to me that had a deterrent influence on the Japanese and to have withdrawn the fleet from Pearl Harbor would have had just the reverse. It would have had a very disastrous influence. That was always my opinion and I haven't changed it.

[1741] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, I read to you last night from the Foreign Relations, I think it was May of 1940, where you expressed to one of the Japanese Ministers that it was not there as a threat to Japan. How do you account for that statement?

Mr. Grew. Very definitely it was not there as a threat to Japan because we had no idea of offense. Our whole policy was one of defense and nothing else. That was fundamental in our policy. What reason had we for offense? Our whole policy was based on defense pure and simple.

Senator Ferguson. Well, if our whole policy was one of defense—and was that told to Japan?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. I think that time after time our basic principles were fully explained to Japan, not only by myself in conversations with Japanese officials, not only in written documents to the Japanese Government, but by high officials of the United States Government in public speeches. That was constantly being expressed.

Senator Ferguson. Then you would say that the fleet was there as a defense, and as far as a defense was concerned it was a deterrent to
Japan but as an offensive weapon it was not a deterrent to Japan because we had never expressed that it was there for that purpose.

Is that a correct understanding, Mr. Grew.

[1742] Mr. Grew. Well, sir, I merely made the statement that our whole policy was one of defense because we had no reason for offense. We did not want any more territory or anything of that kind. From that point of view, as I say, our whole policy was based on defensive position.

Senator Ferguson. Now, is that your answer to my question?

Mr. Grew. Well, that is my opinion of the situation. Of course, as I say, I am not competent to go into military and naval strategy. There are cases, of course, where defensive measures require taking temporary offense. I do not know the strategy, that is not my business.

Senator Ferguson. No, I am not trying to get your opinion of the Navy strategy. I am trying to get your opinion as expressed to Japan, and the reason I am questioning you in detail, it is only for one purpose, Mr. Grew, and that is to try to find out what Washington knew, what the officials—I am covering all branches—what they knew here in Washington in relation to Japan, as far as their military force was concerned, as far as our diplomatic relations were concerned, so that the committee may judge what was known by Washington and what was known by you so that you could convey back to Washington your opinion from what they knew here in Washington.

[1743] Mr. Grew. Senator, as I said in reading that letter this morning, my whole desire is to be helpful as possible to the committee and to give every bit of evidence that I am capable of giving.

Now, the story from my point of view of Japan has been, I would say, pretty thoroughly spread on the records in the four volumes which I have mentioned. Where I can piece them out I am only too glad to do so and I will do my best, but some of the questions that you are asking me I am not in a position to answer. I could not do it.

For instance, I dare say that our military or naval attachés may have made technical reports to their respective departments which I did not see; I do not know. But I have given you everything that I can give you with regard to my own position and my own observations in Tokyo during that period.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, the only way, of course, I can find out whether you can answer my questions is for me to ask them.

Mr. Grew. Right.

Senator Ferguson. And I do not wish to convey the idea that you are not trying to answer the questions at all. I merely want to try to get answers, if we can, because you were the one man in Tokyo, in Japan, that could give to the various agencies in Washington—the Government, in other words—the information and there is only one way we can find out, as I view it, is from you, what information Washington had on the 7th, or the 7th of December, so that the committee may draw some conclusions as to what should or should not have been done; or the facts, rather, would draw the conclusions as to what should or should not be done.

Now, going to this instrument of August the 17th, do I understand that you place little significance on that instrument of August 17, 1941, which Admiral Schuirmann called an ultimatum?
Mr. Grew. As I said, Senator, in my opinion it was not in the nature of an ultimatum for the very reason that we did not act on it as an ultimatum. We continued the conversations in Washington with a view to trying to reach an agreement. You do not deliver an ultimatum to a country and then continue to negotiate after that.

Senator Ferguson. Were you here, Mr. Grew, when I asked some questions of Mr. Welles about the parallel action that was to be taken by Great Britain on this instrument?

Mr. Grew. Yes, I heard that question.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I will ask you whether or not you had any opinion then that Japan—no, that Great Britain took parallel action on this meeting between the President and Mr. Churchill on the Augusta in the Atlantic in relation to the message that we gave notice to the Japs on the 17th of August, 1941?

Mr. Grew. I knew nothing about that whatever, Senator, and so far as I am aware no step of that kind was taken by me in Tokyo.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, the information that came to you, Mr. Grew, was merely this instrument, which does not indicate that parallel action was to be taken, does it?

Mr. Grew. Probably so.

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you look at it and see whether or not it indicates parallel action?

Mr. Grew. Which document do you refer to now?

Senator Lucas. Of course, Mr. Chairman, there is no evidence before this committee that there was ever any agreement that parallel action should be taken. The Senator from Michigan is assuming in every one of these questions that parallel action was agreed upon.

Senator Ferguson. Well, Mr. Chairman, the record will speak for itself as to what Mr. Welles told us.

The Chairman. The Chair does not know whether it is customary when one government sends a message to another to include in that message things that another government has sent a similar message. Evidently that did not appear in this case.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think the record is clear here from what Mr. Welles said.

The Chairman. Well, if it is, it will speak for itself.

Mr. Grew. I could speak only from the point of view, less frankly, of Tokyo and I recollect neither having been instructed to take, nor having taken such parallel action on this issue.

Now, what happened in Washington I, frankly, do not know. I do not even know whether I was informed at that time. I would have to check the records to find out.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will ask you, Mr. Grew, whether you had any knowledge that parallel action was to be taken?

Mr. Grew. Not so far as I recollect, Senator. But, after all these years, I find myself in a very difficult position to give a categorical answer to a question of that kind without looking at the record. Sometimes my memory may be at fault.

Senator Ferguson. That would be a rather important matter, would it not?

Counsel, would you let me have the 10 Downing Street instrument? I do not recall the exhibit number.
Mr. Gesell. Exhibit 22.

Senator Ferguson. I want to show it to you, Mr. Grew, and have you interpret it for me.

(The document was handed to Mr. Grew.)

Mr. Grew. I take it from this document these were to be declarations by these various governments.

Senator Ferguson. What is meant by a "draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Government"?

Mr. Grew. That would have meant definitely a note to the Japanese Government which might have been presented by the Secretary of State here to the Japanese Ambassador, or might have been presented by me to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Senator Ferguson. Might we have the notes of August 17?

Mr. Gesell. They are attached to this exhibit, Senator.

The Chairman. Are you prepared to answer the question Mr. Grew?

Mr. Grew. May I ask what exactly was the question again?

Senator Ferguson. I was looking through the instrument, if the Chairman please.

The Chairman. All right.

Senator Ferguson. At the top of the page on Exhibit 22, the seal of the Prime Minister, what would that indicate as to where that instrument was drawn up, the "Seal of Prime Minister, 10 Downing Street, Whitehall"? It would be very difficult to tell what was meant by that without seeing the original instrument, would it not?

Mr. Grew. The only thing that is clear from this is that it was apparently written on the official paper of the British Prime Minister. I do not know that there is any indication further than that.

Senator Ferguson. Now does that instrument indicate to you that it was contemplated, if it was to be carried out, that it would be carried out by parallel action of the governments mentioned?

Mr. Grew. I do not see any indication here that it would, Senator. There is no indication whatsoever of parallel action here that I can see.

Senator Ferguson. What is meant by "draft of parallel communications to the Japanese Government"?

Mr. Grew. Well, it would mean presumably that each government would send communications along these general lines in its own language.

Senator Ferguson. It states:

Declarations by H. M. G., His Majesty’s Government—same as above, mutatis mutandis, the last phrase reading: * * * their support of them, H. M. G. would give all possible aid to such power.

"Mutatis mutandis" means using the proper language, does it not?

The Chairman. There might be some dispute about that. It might mean necessary changes having been made in the instrument.

Senator Ferguson. What is the witness’ opinion on the word?

Mr. Grew. Senator, I do not think, frankly, I am competent to answer the questions that you are asking about this, because I had nothing whatsoever to do with it.

Senator Ferguson. As a diplomat, can you answer it? I do not know that I will get a better expert on it.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield to the Congress-
man?

Senator Ferguson. Does he want to be the better expert?

Mr. Murphy. Haven't we already heard on the record from Mr. Welles, who was at the Atlantic Charter meeting, saying that another version was used and not the version that was asked the witness? Is not that already in the record?

Senator Ferguson. I already have had the instrument of the Presi-
dent read by Mr. Grew. He knows what went on, and I assume he received it in Tokyo.

Is that correct?

Mr. Grew. I assume I did, but as I say, I would have to consult the record. ^

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator Ferguson. Not at the present moment.

The Chairman. Let us get along.

Mr. Grew. I think we have gone over all this.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, then, as I understand it, you did not know of any parallel action to be taken, as far as the instrument is concerned on page 556 of Foreign Relations?

Mr. Grew. From my recollection, I doubt it. As I say, in order to give a categorical reply to that question I would have to look up the records and see.

Senator Ferguson. May we have this understanding, that if you do not return it is because you find nothing in the record on that question, and if you do find something you will bring it back or have it delivered to counsel?

Mr. Grew. That will be understood, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that understood?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, were you familiar with the voluntary Air Corps in China?

Mr. Grew. I know of its existence. You mean the American Corps that went out there?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. Of course I knew of its existence at the time, but I know very little about it.

Senator Ferguson. Was it ever discussed with you in the Japanese Government?

Mr. Grew. The Japanese Government from time to time would make representations to me about our aid to Chiang Kai-shek which, they said, prevented their coming to a peaceful conclusion of the so-called China incident. They never called it war but the China in-
cident. In the course of those representations it is quite possible that they did mention our assistance in connection with the Air Corps, but I cannot recollect any specific statement to that effect.

Senator Ferguson. Were you advised by our Government as to just what that Air Corps was?

Mr. Grew. Well, I presumably was.

Senator Ferguson. You were advised?

Mr. Grew. I cannot tell you without going into the record.

Senator Ferguson. Again might I ask you to get the records?

Mr. Grew. Yes.

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^ See p. 710, infra.
Senator Ferguson. And I assume if you do not come back then you have found nothing in the records on that point.

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. So that we will understand that.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.1

Senator Ferguson. When did you first get an idea that Konoye, the Prime Minister, wanted to meet with the President?

Mr. Grew. The proposal was, as broached to me in a long talk with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 18, 1941——

Senator Ferguson. I did not get the date.

Mr. Grew. On August 18, 1941.

Senator Ferguson. You had no information prior to that?

Mr. Grew. I understand that the matter had been taken up by the Japanese Ambassador at Washington. I do not think that I was informed prior to that. I think that was the first information I had.

Senator Ferguson. Well, as far as you are concerned, Mr. Grew, did you know of any outside intermediaries in the negotiations between Japan and the United States?

[1753] Mr. Grew. Outside intermediaries?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It has been mentioned here that Mr. Walker, the Postmaster General——

Mr. Grew (interposing). I know nothing about that.

Senator Ferguson. You have no knowledge about that whatsoever?

Mr. Grew. None whatsoever.

Senator Ferguson. Your sole point of contact was either the State Department or the President, as you have indicated?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Now will you tell us something about this proposed meeting of Konoye, as to what significance it could have had, as you saw it? I want to know merely as you saw it and conveyed it to our State Department, to find out what knowledge they had.

Mr. Grew. Konoye himself arranged a meeting with me on September 6 in order to discuss a meeting with President Roosevelt. As I have said this afternoon, Konoye is saddled with the responsibility for some of the war acts of banditry on the part of Japan which have been recorded in international history, but, as I also said, he, I think, saw the handwriting on the wall and realized that Japan was on the brink of an abyss and wanted, if possible, to reverse the engine. That is only opinion. Anyway, on September 6 he asked me to dinner, [1754] and he was very much afraid of any possibility of the military extremists learning of that meeting.

Senator Ferguson. How did you meet? Under what circumstances?

Mr. Grew. I will tell you, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Mr. Grew. Ordinarily a Japanese Prime Minister does not consort with diplomats. The contact is always with the Foreign Minister. Most prime ministers stay off it completely. But in this case Konoye wanted to talk the thing over directly. So we proceeded to the house of a mutual friend, and automobile tags on diplomatic and official automobiles were changed so nobody could recognize us. We had the dinner. All the servants were sent out and the dinner was served by the daughter of the house. We talked for 3 hours.

1 See Mr. Gesell's statement in Hearings, Part 4, p. 1715.
During that time Konoye sketched out to me what he had in mind. It is a pretty long story. It is all on record.

Senator Ferguson. Will you point out in the Foreign Relations where it is on record?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; I will.

Senator Ferguson. So we will have the record clear.

Mr. Grew. The report of the dinner is recorded on page 604 of Foreign Relations and my analysis of the purpose of the meeting is contained in a long telegram which I sent to the Secretary of State on September 29, 1941, on page 645 of Foreign Relations. I would like to read to the committee, if I may, the last paragraph of that message from myself to the Secretary of State:

In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does so in all deference—

I might say that all these telegrams were paraphrased by the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. So we might clear the record on that, all these messages in here are either substance or paraphrased?

Mr. Grew. Yes; and in some cases I regret to say I think the paraphrases are very awkward. I think sometimes the language is being obscured rather than clarified.

Senator Ferguson. Do they always convey what you intended to convey? Would a person reading them get an idea as to what you were trying to convey?

Mr. Grew. I think so. I do not think there has been any distortion of the meaning, but I do not think they are as clear an exposition as contained in the original text.

Senator Ferguson. Then it would be more difficult to convey what you intended to say?

Mr. Grew. I think my meaning is clear, in any case. These paraphrases were essential because we had to protect our code. The last paragraph reads:

In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does so in all deference to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan.

I preface everything I said in the position I took on this matter with that premise. In the first place, as I have told you already, I did not have access to any of the telegraphic intercepts, I did not even know that they existed, and I had no access to any of the secret documents which have appeared since, so my analysis of the situation was based entirely on my observation from the standpoint of our Embassy in Tokyo, what I could see at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, you say that the meeting was held as an absolutely secret meeting and you described how you changed the plates on the automobiles. Was it your understanding that this was to be a good faith meeting?

Mr. Grew. It was my understanding, and also after the meeting had taken place that was my understanding.

Senator Ferguson. There was not anything that happened at the meeting that would indicate to you that it was not a good-faith meeting, was there?
Mr. Grew. No, sir; there was not anything happened at the meeting that would indicate there was any lack of faith.

[1757] Senator Ferguson. And did you, in your opinion, properly report that to the State Department?

Mr. Grew. Well, sir, my report is all contained in that telegram.
Senator Ferguson. A fair appraisal of that telegram would be that you did express that it was a good faith meeting, is that correct?

Mr. Grew. Yes, very definitely; and that was developed still further in my telegram of September 29.

Senator Ferguson. Now did you get any opinions from Konoye, from what he said, that if he could get such a meeting his Cabinet may fall?

Mr. Grew. Yes, very definitely.
Senator Ferguson. Did you advise the State Department to that effect?

Mr. Grew. That is contained in that telegram of September 29, Senator. I think I better stick to the record here.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I wish you would.

Mr. Grew. This is a very long telegram.
Senator Ferguson. I want you to boil it down.

Mr. Grew. I think that the story as I saw it is pretty fully brought forward in this telegram, but there is no particular passage that I can pick out.

Senator Ferguson. Can you sum it up?

[1758] Mr. Grew. What is that?
Senator Ferguson. I want to know now about the Cabinet falling, if that is your opinion from what he said, that his Cabinet would fall if he could not get the meeting.

Mr. Grew. I, in my telegram, said this:

The logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States.

Senator Ferguson. Then you were of the opinion, and conveyed it to the State Department, that if the meeting did not take place that would mean a military dictatorship in Japan?

Mr. Grew. That was my opinion.
Senator Ferguson. And did you convey to the United States, or the State Department, what that would mean or could mean?

Mr. Grew. I do not think anything much could have been added to this statement here. Senator, "formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States."

Senator Ferguson. When you say "colliding head-on with the United States," is that another way of saying "war"?

Mr. Grew. I think that would be.

[1759] Senator Ferguson. That is a fair interpretation?

Mr. Grew. A fair deduction.
Senator Ferguson. A fair deduction. Then you were of the opinion, and conveyed it to the State Department, that if the meeting did not take place and the Cabinet fell, and you were of the opinion it would fall, it meant war with the United States?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I did not go as far as that. No, indeed.
Senator Ferguson. How far did you go?
Mr. Grew. I said that risk would be present, but I think the fact that, as far as I was concerned in Tokyo, I was working for peace up to the last minute, and conversations were going on in Washington. I do not think at any time it could be said any particular step or lack of step definitely meant war. No; I would not subscribe to that.

Senator Ferguson. How far did you go in that note as a warning to the State Department in Washington?

Mr. Grew. That is clear in the telegram.

The Chairman. Let me ask the Senator, that has that note been made part of the record?

Senator Ferguson. I would like now to have the whole note read in.

The Chairman. It speaks for itself, and should be made part of the record. [1760]

Mr. Grew. It speaks for itself.

The Chairman. When it is made a part of the record it speaks for itself, in its own terms.

Mr. Grew. I should think so.

The Chairman. Therefore it will now be made a part of the record, part of the transcript. It is a lengthy document.

Mr. Grew. That is telegram 1529, Tokyo, September 29, 1941, noon. That is on page 645 of Foreign Relations.

(The telegram referred to follows:)

(1) In regard to the preliminary conversations taking place at Washington and Tokyo, the Ambassador points out that a review of telegraphic correspondence on this subject since last spring reveals the Japanese Government's efforts, increasing steadily and intensified lately, to arrange a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt without further delay. While admitting his role to be chiefly that of a transmitting agent in these conversations, the Ambassador naturally wishes to aid in any constructive way, particularly by endeavoring to appraise accurately for the President and the Secretary of State the Japanese factors and conditions having direct or indirect bearing on the subject and also by trying to bring the Japanese Government to adopt measures and policies such as the United States Government deems to be essential for a mutual understanding or agreement between Japan and the United States. Since the fall of Admiral Yonai's Cabinet in July of 1940, American diplomacy in Japan has been in eclipse temporarily through force of circumstances. However, when the Konoye-Toyoda regime began last July, American diplomacy obtained a very active new lease of life. The Ambassador expresses his earnest hope therefore that so propitious a period be not permitted to slip by without a new foundation having been laid with enough stability to warrant a reasonable amount of confidence that the structure to be erected gradually and progressively thereon can and will endure.

(2) The Ambassador recalls his statements in the past that in Japan the pendulum always swings between moderate and extremist policies; that it was not then possible under the existing circumstances for any Japanese leader or group to reverse the program of expansion and expect to survive; that the permanent digging in by Japanese in China and the pushing of the Japanese advance to the south could be prevented only by insuperable obstacles. The Ambassador recalls likewise his views that the risks of taking positive measures to maintain United States security in the future were likely to be far smaller than the risks of not taking such measures; that only respect for potential power of the United States has deterred Japan from taking more liberties with American [1761] interests; and that Japan's program of forcible expansion could be brought to a halt only by a show of force and by a demonstration of American willingness to use this force if necessary. The Ambassador recalls also his statement that if Japan's leadership could be discredited eventually by such American action, there might take shape in Japan ultimately a regeneration of thought which would allow Japan to resume formal relations with the United States, leading to a readjustment of the entire problem of the Pacific.
(3) The Ambassador suggests that the United States has been following very wisely precisely this policy which, furthered by other developments in the world, has helped to discredit Japanese leadership, notably that of former Foreign Minister Matsukata. The Ambassador cites as world developments arousing a positive reaction from the United States the conclusion by Japan of the Tripartite Alliance and Japan's recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime at Nanking, which preceded Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Germany's action upset the basis for the Tripartite Pact, Japan having joined the Italo-German Axis in order to obtain security against Russia and thereby to avoid the peril of being caught between the Soviet Union and the United States. At the present time Japan is attempting to correct this miscalculation by getting out of an extremely dangerous position. The Ambassador recalls his reports to the Department to the effect [1763] that Japanese foreign policies are inevitably changed by the impact of events abroad and that liberal elements in Japan might come to the top in due course as a result of the trend of events. He considers that such a time has arrived. He sees a good chance of Japan's falling into line if a program can be followed of world reconstruction as forecast by the declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. American policy—of forbearance, patient argumentation, efforts at persuasion, followed for many years, plus a manifest determination of the United States to take positive measures when called for—plus the impact of world developments upon Japan, has rendered Japan's political soil hospitable to the sowing of new seeds which, the Ambassador feels, if planted carefully and nourished, may bring about the anticipated regeneration of Japanese thought and a complete readjustment of relations between Japan and the United States.

(4) Certain quarters have advanced the thought—and no doubt it is prominently in the mind of the United States Government—that at this juncture an agreement between Japan and the United States will serve merely as a breathing spell to Japan. During such a breathing spell, Japan, having successfully untangled itself with American aid from the China conflict, will regroup and strengthen its forces in order to resume at the next favorable opportunity its [1764] expansionist program. This thought cannot be gain-said with certainty. The same school of thought also holds that Japan will be forced to relinquish its expansionist program because of the deterioration of Japanese domestic economy and because of the threat of financial, economic and social collapse due to a progressive intensifying of economic measures by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands against Japan. The Ambassador adds that should this thesis be accepted as reasonably sound, the position will confront the United States of choosing one of two methods to approach its objective, namely, either the method of progressive economic strangulation or the method of constructive conciliation, not so-called appeasement. The Ambassador sees the second method as the definite choice of the United States Government following the beginning of the Washington preliminary conversations and President Roosevelt's acceptance in principle of the Japanese Prime Minister's proposed meeting. Indeed, the Ambassador remarks, the United States has never departed from its readiness to negotiate on any issues with Japan (see the American note dated December 30, 1938), despite the fact that Japan already had embarked at that time on its expansion by force program. He feels that, from the viewpoint of farseeing statesmanship, the wisdom of the American choice seems to be beyond cavil. Should failure greet the con- [1765] structive, conciliatory method of approach now or later, there will always be available the other method, the application of progressive economic sanctions. In the opinion of the Ambassador, whether the trend of American relations with Japan is for better or for worse, the United States obviously will have to remain for a long time to come in a state of preparedness. The thought that eventual British victory in the world war will solve automatically many problems may, meanwhile, afford whatever degree of encouragement is justified.

(5) The Ambassador, while admitting that risks will inevitably be involved no matter what course is pursued toward Japan, offers his carefully studied belief that there would be substantial hope at the very least of preventing the Far Eastern situation from becoming worse and perhaps of ensuring definitely constructive results, if an agreement along the lines of the preliminary discussions were brought to a head by the proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments. The Ambassador mentions his previous expressions of opinion that the principal point at issue between the United States and Japan is not whether the former must call a halt to the expansionist program of the latter, but when. He raises the questions whether the United States is not now given the oppor-
tunity to halt Japan’s program without war, or an immediate risk of war, and further whether, through failure to use the present opportunity, the United States will not face a greatly increased risk of war. The Ambassador states his firm belief in an affirmative answer to these two questions.

(6) Certain quarters hold the view that it is altogether improbable under existing circumstances that counteraction will be deliberately taken by Japan in response to any American action likely to be taken in the Pacific which would bring about war with the United States. The Ambassador states his inability to agree that war may not supervene following actions, whether irrational or deliberate, by elements either in Japan or in the United States tending so to inflame public opinion in the other country concerned as to make war unavoidable. He recalls in this regard the cases of the Maine and the Panay.

(7) The Ambassador stresses the importance of understanding Japanese psychology, fundamentally unlike that of any Western nation. Japanese reactions to any particular set of circumstances cannot be measured, nor can Japanese actions be predicted by any Western measuring rod. This fact is hardly surprising in the case of a country so recently feudalistic. The Ambassador conceives his chief duty to be an attempt to interpret accurately Japanese psychology, and he states that he has aimed to do this in his numerous reports during the last several months and years to the Department. Keeping this thought constantly before him, the Ambassador ventures at the risk of repetition to advance the considerations set forth below.

(8) Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese Government, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear-cut commitments which will satisfy the United States Government both as to principle and as to concrete detail, almost certainly the conversations will drag along indefinitely and unproductively until the Konoye Cabinet and its supporting elements desiring rapprochement with the United States will come to the conclusion that the outlook for an agreement is hopeless and that the United States Government is only playing for time. If the abnormal sensitiveness of Japan and the abnormal effects of loss of face are considered, in such a situation Japanese reaction may and probably will be serious. This will result in the Konoye Government's being discredited and in a revulsion of anti-American feeling, and this may and probably will lead to unbridled acts. The eventual cost of these will not be reckoned, and their nature is likely to inflame Americans, while reprisal and counter-reprisal measures will bring about a situation in which it will be difficult to avoid war. The logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States. There is a question that such a situation may prove to be more serious even than the failure to produce an entirely satisfactory agreement through the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, should it take place as planned. Worded otherwise, the question remains whether it will not prove to be a less serious case for the negotiations undertaken in good faith to fail of complete success, and for the United States to demonstrate its unwillingness to enter any such negotiations.

(9) The Ambassador continues by stating that he has been emphatically told on numerous occasions—and such declarations he considers must be accepted at their face value—that prior to the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting and formal negotiations it is impossible for the Japanese Government to define its future assurances and commitments more specifically than hitherto stated. The Ambassador explains that one reason for this Japanese position, as given him very confidentially, is that former Foreign Minister Matsuoka, after his retirement in July, recounted in complete detail to the German Ambassador in the course of the Washington conversations up to that time. Because many supporters of Matsuoka remain in the Tokyo Foreign Office, the fear has been expressed that these men will not scruple to reveal to both the Germans and the Japanese extremists any information which would render the present Cabinet’s position untenable. Although certain basic principles have been accepted provisionally by the Japanese Government, the definitions and formulae of Japan’s future objectives and policy, as advanced so far during the preliminary conversations, and the statements supplementary to those definitions, are so abstract or equivocal and are open to such wide interpretation that they rather create confusion than clarify commitments which the Japanese Government is ready to undertake. The Ambassador states that at the same time he has been told the Prince Konoye is in a position in direct negotiations with President Roosevelt to offer him assurance which, because of their far-reaching
character, will not fail to satisfy the United States. The truth of this statement cannot be determined by the Ambassador, who, however, points out that, in regard specifically to Japan’s Axis relations, the Japanese Government, though refusing consistently to give an undertaking that it will overtly renounce its alliance membership, actually has shown a readiness to reduce Japan’s alliance adherence to a dead letter by its indication of willingness to enter [1770] formally into negotiations with the United States. The Ambassador therefore does not consider unlikely the possibility of Prince Konoye’s being in a position to give President Roosevelt directly a more explicit and satisfactory engagement than has already been vouchsafed in the course of the preliminary conversations.

(10) In the opinion of the Ambassador, on the basis of the above observations which he has every reason to regard as sound, American objectives will not be reached by insisting or continuing to insist during the preliminary conversations that Japan provide the sort of clear-cut, specific commitments which appear in any final, formal convention or treaty. Unless a reasonable amount of confidence is placed by the United States in the professed sincerity of intention and good faith of Prince Konoye and his supporters to mould Japan’s future policy upon the basic principles they are ready to accept and then to adopt measures which gradually but loyally implement those principles, with it understood that the United States will implement its own commitments pari passu with the steps which Japan takes, the Ambassador does not believe that a new orientation can be successfully created in Japan to lead to a general improving of Japanese-American relations and to the hope that ultimate war may be avoided in the Pacific. The sole way to discredit the [1771] Japanese military machine and army is through wholesale military defeat, and the Ambassador sees no present prospect of this. The only alternative (and the only wise one in the view of the Ambassador) is an attempt to produce a regeneration of Japanese thought and outlook through constructive conciliation, along the lines of American efforts at present. The Ambassador inquires whether the better part of wisdom and of statesmanship is not to bring such efforts to a head before the force of their initial impetus is lost, leaving it impossible to overcome an opposition which the Ambassador thinks will mount inevitably and steadily in Japan.

(11) In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does so in all deference to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador’s approach to the matter is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan.

GREW.

[1772] Mr. Gesell. Senator, I just want to call attention again to the fact that these are official Government publications, and we have assumed that all of the conversations recorded in these publications are available to the committee and may be drawn upon in making any conclusions or anything of that sort.

We simply have not physically offered them as exhibits.

The Chairman. If an interpretation is to be made of the document which is part of the record, or which has been filed as an exhibit, it seems to the Chair instead of undertaking to have a verbal interpretation of a record of that sort, it ought to be allowed to speak for itself in its own terms.

Mr. Grew. I agree with you. It is all set out here.

Mr. Keeffe. May I interrupt?

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield to the Congressman from Wisconsin?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

The Chairman. Mr. Keeffe.

Mr. Keeffe. I would like to inquire whether or not the original document entitled “War and Peace” has been offered as an exhibit and is in evidence, the entire book, or is it considered that the committee is at liberty to consider anything in that book as a matter of reference, it being a so-called public document?
[1773] Mr. Gesell. Congressman Keefe, it is the latter. We have assumed the committee may take judicial notice of these three official publications, Peace and War, and the two volumes containing the actual notes of the conversations in Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-41.

Mr. Keefe. Now, Mr. Chairman, in order that there may not be any mistake at any time in the future in connection with these hearings, I think it would be perfectly proper to have the documents referred to offered as exhibits so we may have them.

I would like also to have offered as an exhibit the original, what I understand to be the original, short version published by the State Department in 1942, entitled "Peace and War," of which I have a copy, consisting of some 143 pages.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Senator Ferguson. I will yield.

The Chairman. Let us clear this matter up.

Mr. Murphy. Is not the proper legal procedure, Mr. Chairman, to incorporate that by reference, and was not that incorporated by reference? Since they are legal documents they are part of the record by reference.

The Chairman. In effect, there is not much difference between incorporating by reference and by making them exhibits which are available to the committee. The fact that they are Government publications puts on them the stamp of authenticity, I presume. Is there any reason why they cannot be referred to as exhibits?

[1774] Mr. Gesell. Not at all, Mr. Chairman. I think we can refer to Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-41, as the next exhibit, Exhibit No. 27; and I might say to Congressman Keefe that it is my understanding that includes in the front portion the document the Congressman has in his hand, the initial short summary which was originally released.

Mr. Keefe. The reason I suggest that this initial short summary be incorporated as an exhibit is because I have found in going through these four volumes after they have been edited and reedited and changes have been made in the arrangement of the material so that it becomes difficult for me to follow a lot of this material. I find that there is a lot helpful in this short volume, which can be identified promptly and quickly, and which tells in short form this story.

Mr. Gesell. We could make the short form the next exhibit.

The Chairman. The Chair suggests that it be made Exhibit No. 27 because it seems to have been published previously and that the full volume be made Exhibit No. 28.

Mr. Gesell. Very well.

As Exhibit 29, the two volumes, volumes I and II, Foreign Relations of the United States; Japan, 1931-41, which contains the actual documents of reported conversations held.

The Chairman. That will be done.

Senator Ferguson. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to now make [1775] Mr. Grew's book No. 30.

The Chairman. Well, the Chairman sees no objection to making it an exhibit. I do not know whether that would increase the circulation or not, but the committee will be glad to have it made an exhibit.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits 27, 28, 29, and 30", respectively.)

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you, Mr. Grew, when Mr. Dooman came to the United States? When did he come to the United States?

Mr. Grew. Mister—who?

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Dooman.

Mr. Grew. Nomura.

Senator Ferguson. Dooman.

Mr. Grew. Dooman. Well, he was the counselor of the Embassy in Tokyo. He came out there—I don't remember precisely what date.

Senator Ferguson. My question was, when did he return to the United States before Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew. I would have to check. Of course, he did not return while I was away, because he had to be chargé d'affaires.

Senator Ferguson. Does page 139 of Foreign Relations refresh your memory on that?

[1777] Mr. Murphy. Which volume?

Senator Ferguson. I think No. 2.

Mr. Grew. 139 of Foreign Relations, volume II?


Mr. Grew. "Memorandum by the Counsellor of Embassy in Japan."

Senator Ferguson. He had a conversation with Ohashi.

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember that conversation?

On page 139, I will ask you to read beginning down about 15 lines, "It would be absurd to suppose that the American people..."

Mr. Grew (reading): It would be absurd to suppose that the American people, while pouring munitions into Britain, would look with complacency upon the cutting of communications between Britain and the British Dominions and Colonies overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were to prejudice the safety of those communications, either by direct action or by placing herself in a position to menace those communications, she would have to expect to come into conflict with the United States. There are many indications of the Japanese moving down slowly toward Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. The United States cannot be concerned by the various initiatives [1778] taken by the Japanese in Indo-China and elsewhere for the reason that if Japan were to occupy these strategically important British and Dutch areas, it could easily debouch into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific and create havoc with essential British lines of communication. The United States for its part was well aware that an alternative source of supply for Japanese purchase of petroleum and certain other products of the United States is the Netherlands East Indies, and for that reason it has been reluctant to impose embargoes on the sale to Japan of commodities of which it has a surplus; but the Japanese must clearly understand that the forbearance of the United States in this respect springs from a desire not to impel Japan to create a situation which could lead only to the most serious consequences.

Senator Ferguson. That is far enough for my purposes, unless you want to read further.

Does that refresh your memory that Dooman had been here and obtained an opinion in the United States?

Mr. Grew. I think, as I recollect, that was the opinion he received from moving around the United States, but not necessarily from official sources.

Senator Ferguson. Did he convey this idea to you?
Mr. Grew. Well, I have no doubt of it. He returned from a leave of absence shortly before that, didn't he?

I don't know if the record shows. I think he undoubtedly told me of his general impressions.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I ask you to refer to page 137, "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State," No. 5397. I ask you to read the second paragraph.

Mr. Grew (reading): The presentation by Mr. Dooman of his impressions of the position of the United States as gathered during his recent furlough appeared to cause Mr. Ohashi astonishment. Mr. Ohashi is, for a Japanese, extraordinary direct and sparing of words. Upon listening attentively to what Mr. Dooman described as the philosophy of the American position, Mr. Ohashi remained perfectly quiet for an appreciable space of time and then burst forth with the question, "Do you mean to say that if Japan were to attack Singapore would she be at war with the United States?" Mr. Dooman replied, "The logic of the situation would inevitably raise that question." Mr. Ohashi then left that subject and adverted to the character of the reports sent to London by the British Ambassador.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what did Dooman, in your opinion, mean by that phrase?

Mr. Grew. Well, that referred definitely, when he said, "The logic of the situation would inevitably raise that question" that meant exactly what it says. It would come under consideration. It doesn't mean that it would necessarily bring about war. Inevitably raise that question. Of course, it would be raised.

Senator Ferguson. Now, your telegram, on page 143, being No. 334, will you read that? It is in relation, I take it, to the same matter. If it isn't, I wish you would explain it.

Mr. Grew. My short telegram?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, the short one.

Mr. Grew (reading):

Yesterday, I told Matsuoka that I entirely concurred in and approved of all that Dooman had said to Ohashi on February 14. As the latter had given only an oral report of the conversation to Matsuoka I read him the whole memorandum of it. I was somewhat surprised when the Minister stated his entire agreement with what Dooman had said. Today I am sending Matsuoka for his personal use a copy of the memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever hear from the State Department on this particular matter after you sent this information to the State Department?

Mr. Grew. Not to my recollection.

Senator Ferguson. So that they were fully advised as to what you had advised the Japanese?

Mr. Grew. I advised the State Department of every step taken, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Would you look up and see whether or not you did get an answer?

Mr. Grew. I think I can answer that.

Senator Ferguson. You say that you did not?

Mr. Grew. Definitely that I did not, but I will have it looked up.¹ Senator Ferguson. Now, Mr. Grew, did you send a telegram on November 3, 1941?

Mr. Grew. Yes, I did.

Senator Ferguson. At that time—will you get that telegram? I would like to have that telegram go into the record at this place, Mr. Chairman.

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 4, p. 1715.
Have you it before you?
Mr. Grew. I know it pretty well by heart.
Mr. Gesell. That is an exhibit, Senator.
The Chairman. You want it printed in the hearings?
Senator Ferguson. I think it should be, Mr. Chairman. It is an important telegram, is it, Mr. Grew?
Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; it is a very important telegram.
Senator Ferguson. Giving information to the Secretary of State? Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. It was addressed "Strictly Confidential for Secretary and Under Secretary Only."
Senator Ferguson. So that it was to go to the Secretary and the Under Secretary?
Mr. Grew. Very definitely.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to discuss that with you.
The Chairman. Are you going to have Mr. Grew read it?
Senator Ferguson. I would like to have it read.
The Chairman. Read it into the record.
How long is it?
Mr. Grew. You wish me to read it?
Senator Ferguson. I would like to ask you questions about it.
The Chairman. How long is it?
Mr. Grew. I think I can get through it in about 6 or 7 minutes.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. Just a minute. Inasmuch as it is an exhibit and has been made in that form a part of the record, do you insist on it being read, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. No; except that I wanted to ask him some questions, and I thought we could save time by reading it.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Before we go into the telegram, since the distinguished Senator from Michigan has had parts of the document on page 138 read, and since there are qualifying parts of it subsequently which are just to the opposite, I thing that the whole thing might go in.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to have it all go in.
The Chairman. Let it all go in, but it will not be read here.
(Excerpt from exhibit No. 29, Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, p. 138:)

Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)

[Tokyo,] February 14, 1941.
I called this afternoon by appointment on Mr. Ohashi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. He greeted me quite politely, saying that although we had several mutual friends it was, so far as he knew, the first time we had met. I replied that I had on various occasions taken notice of statements which he had made in various capacities of the past, in Manchuria, and elsewhere, but I had, unfortunately, not been able to profit by opportunities which had presented themselves to make his acquaintance. Mr. Ohashi said he understood that I had just returned from leave in the United States and that he supposed I had received a number of interesting impressions in the United States. I replied that my furlough in the United States coincided with one of the most significant and important periods in the history of our country, and that if he had time I would be glad to tell him briefly of what I had seen and heard while at home. Mr. Ohashi said that fortunately he was not busy that day and that I could stay as long as I wished.

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I gave Mr. Ohashi a fairly long account of the trends in opinion with regard to the war in Europe as they developed during the election campaign. I dwelt on the remarkably swift crystallization of opinion at home with regard to the question of America and England, and the American policy of large part first to the British, yet on the part of the British that they were rapidly approaching the end of the resources in dollar exchange, and second to the belief that the effects on Britain's capacity to produce aircraft and other munitions of German bombing raids had been more serious than the British communications would lead one to suppose. I said that although the large majority of the American people abhorred the idea of American involvement in war, the fact was that an equally large majority of the American people believed that there was one consideration which transcends even that of avoiding involvement in the war, and that is helping England to the limit of our capacity.

I said that all this was not without direct bearing on relations between the United States and Japan. I had found [1785] that American opinion is pretty clearly opposed to the taking of action by the United States which would make war with Japan inevitable. Nevertheless Mr. Ohashi could readily understand that the American people, being an eminently practical people, are quite aware that an adequate supply of airplanes and other munitions is not the only prerequisite to a British victory: the supply to England of foodstuffs and raw materials by the British dominions and colonies and the maintenance of British commerce with the outside world are equally essential to a British victory. It would be absurd to suppose that the American people, while pouring munitions into Britain, would look with complacency upon the cutting of communications between Britain and British dominions and colonies overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were to prejudice the safety of those communications, either by direct action or by placing herself in a position to menace those communications, she would have to expect to come into conflict with the United States. There are many indications of the Japanese moving down slowly toward Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. The United States cannot but be concerned by the various initiatives taken by the Japanese in Indo-China and elsewhere, for the reason that if Japan were to occupy these strategically important British and Dutch areas, it could easily debouch into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific and create havoc with essential British lines of communication. The United States for its part was well aware that an alternative source of supply for Japanese purchase of petroleum and certain other products of the United States is the Netherlands East Indies, and for that reason it has been reluctant to impose embargoes on the sale to Japan of commodities of which it has a surplus; but the Japanese must clearly understand that the forbearance of the United States in this respect springs from a desire not to impel Japan to create a situation which could lead only to the most serious consequences. I recalled the axiom in geometry that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time; however greatly Japan's security might be enhanced by occupying the Netherlands East Indies it must be realized by Japan that any such move would vitally concern the major preoccupation of the United States at this time, which is to assist England to stand against German assault.

Mr. Ohashi then took the floor and launched into an impassioned apologia of Japanese policies in recent years. He started by describing conditions in Japan during the middle 20's, the lack of employment in Japan at that time was driving young Japanese to despair; communism began to spread in amazing fashion, the estimates being that there were at one time more than 50,000 Japanese communists and there was fear of decay and disintegration of the Japanese political system. There developed at the same time a growing antagonism in China [1787] toward Japan. General Chiang Kai-shek initiated a series of military campaigns which resulted in the downfall of the northern group of Chinese generals, including Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and others. General Chiang Tso-lin made his historic trip to Nanking to consolidate himself with General Chiang Kai-shek, and upon his return to Mukden he raised the flag of Chinese nationalism and proclaimed that his action manifested the complete unification of China and at about this time, Mr. C. T. Wang, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, publicly declared in a speech at Nanking that China was now prepared to "drive Japan off the Continent of Asia". There had occurred elsewhere other events which also gave grounds for complete pessimism in Japan. Pressure by the United States on England had led to the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which England discarded after it had served British purposes; the United States in 1924 excluded Japanese from emigrating to the United States,
even though the granting of a small quota of 140 would have amply served to prevent Japanese pride and honor from being injured, and when Australia followed with its White Australia Policy and other parts of the British Empire had also taken action to exclude Japanese, the Japanese had found themselves irrevocably prevented from expanding into areas which could use their industry and initiative. At the same time the United States and Great Britain encouraged China in every possible way to implement the policy [1788] proclaimed by Dr. C. T. Wang to drive Japan off the Asiatic Continent. He recalled travelling with Admiral Kanji Kato in 1930 from Mukden to Japan. Admiral Kato expressed himself as being extremely despondent of the future if matters were allowed to proceed as they were then proceeding, and he disclosed to Mr. Ohashi the determination of certain elements in the Japanese Army and Navy to take action toward opening up a way for Japanese expansion. This determination manifested itself finally in the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. Mr. Ohashi said that the League of Nations had placed upon Japan the responsibility for seeking to alter by force the status quo in the Far East. However, it was clear that it was China and not Japan which had taken the initiative in seeking to alter the status quo, and the responsibility for the deplorable conflict now taking place between China and Japan must largely be borne by those nations which encouraged China to pursue this disastrous policy. The United States and England must also be responsible in some measure for Japan’s aligning itself with Germany and Italy, for the present Sino-Japanese conflict would never have occurred if the Anglo-Japanese alliance had not been abrogated. The United States and England had further driven Japan into a position of complete isolation, and it was accordingly necessary for Japan to find friends. Japan has no special friendly feelings towards Germany and Italy and certainly has no ideological association [1789] or identity with either of those two countries. Nevertheless Germany, Italy, and Japan have a close identity of interests in revolting against attempts to keep them permanently under subjection. It would be a great mistake to suppose that Japan would not honor its commitments under the alliance if the United States “were to attack Germany.”

I observed that Mr. Ohashi’s presentation of Japan’s case had the eloquence of one suffering under a sense of grievance. We do not deny that Japan has grievances, but we object to the methods pursued by Japan to rectify those grievances. After the war in Europe is over, there is bound to be a more rational world, and in the creation of the more intelligent world economy which we must earnestly hope will be brought into being after the war, there would be ample room for entirely satisfying Japan’s legitimate needs. I then quoted Mr. Churchill’s remark “if we allow the past to quarrel with the present, we shall lose the future.” As difficult and important as were the problems arising in China, they had not led to a war between the United States and Japan. It was certainly not the intention of the United States to seek a war with Japan, but at the same time I wished to make it clear that it would be idle and extravagant to believe that, so long as Japan remained a partner of Germany and Italy and so long as she was unable to resolve her troubles with China on a mutually satisfactory and equitable basis, a stabilization [1790] of relations between the United States and Japan could be hoped for. I believed that it was quite possible to pass over the present critical period without war, but that one essential condition to this more or less happy issue out of our difficulties must be the realization on the part of the Japanese that they cannot substantially alter the status quo in Southeast Asia, particularly, without incurring the risk of creating a very serious situation.

Mr. Ohashi asked whether he was correct in understanding me to say that war could be averted only by Japan standing still and allowing itself to be tied hand and feet by the United States and Great Britain. I replied that it was not my intention to give him specifications as to what Japan should or should not do, but I wished to express my opinion that if Japan did not exercise the same degree of restraint and forbearance as that being exercised by the United States, it was very difficult to see how a war could be averted.

Mr. Ohashi then asked me whether we had been sending to Washington such extravagant and sensational reports as those being sent by Sir Robert Craigie to London. Without waiting for a reply he said that Mr. Eden had recently called in the Japanese Ambassador at London and had talked to Mr. Shigemitsu very harshly about recent Japanese moves in Siam and Indo-China. Mr. Eden
was apparently greatly excited by telegrams which he had received from Sir Robert Craigie. Mr. Ohashi said that he [1794] had just had a talk with Sir Robert Craigie and that he had reminded Sir Robert that he had repeatedly given the latter assurances that Japan had no intention whatever of moving toward Singapore and the Dutch East Indies unless Japan was "pressed" by other nations through the imposition of embargoes by the United States or by the sending of an American fleet to Singapore. I said to Mr. Ohashi that, in my opinion, the award by Japan to Siam of the provinces of Laos and Cambodia would undoubtedly lead to the most serious disorders in Indo-China, as the French are strongly opposed to any substantial cession of territory to the Siamese. I asked Mr. Ohashi what Japan would do in the event that the disorders were beyond the French control. He replied "we shall have to suppress these disorders". I then went on to say "once having occupied Indo-China, Japan would be in a position to control Siam and to undertake operations toward Burma or the Malay States. You see how this intervention in Southeast Asia is capable of having the most widespread consequences". I asked whether he should not consider, in the light of Japanese intervention in the dispute between Indo-China and Siam, whether alarm over Japanese policies in this area is not justified. Mr. Ohashi protested that Japan's interests in Southeast Asia were predominantly economic. Was it our intention to prevent Japan from entering into more satisfactory and closer economic relations with Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies? [1792-1793] I replied that we were not concerned with arrangements calculated to be mutually profitable and which were entered into freely and not as a result of demands with menaces, open or implied. He would understand that proposals concerning trade arrangements presented under the guns of naval vessels could hardly be regarded as ordinary trade arrangements. Mr. Ohashi said that no Japanese warships were in the Indies and that the commercial negotiations now being carried on by Japan with the Netherlands Indies and Indo-China were of a normal character.

Mr. Ohashi said that he was waiting with great interest reports which Admiral Nomura would be sending shortly of his forthcoming interviews with the President and the Secretary of State. I had then been in Mr. Ohashi's office more than an hour. I rose to go. I said that upon my return to Tokyo I asked various colleagues what sort of a man Mr. Ohashi was and that they had all replied that he was extremely frank—that some had added that he was frank to the point of unpleasantness. I went on to say that I was very glad that he had been both frank and courteous with me, and that he could count on me to maintain equal frankness and courtesy with him in our future conversations. A faint smile came to Mr. Ohashi's face and he said that he would be glad to receive me at any time.

EUGENE H. D(ooman)

[1794] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, we will discuss that telegram. I would like to have you go to No. 4 paragraph. Will you just read part of that so that you are familiar with it? You need not read it aloud.

Mr. Grew. Section 4?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, just glance at it.

Mr. Grew. Well, this is all mixed up. I have the true reading here. Possibly you have the paraphrase.

Senator Ferguson. I have the paraphrase.

Mr. Grew. That is quite different. I hope the true reading will be made the record and not the paraphrase.

The Chairman. The exhibit is the true reading of the message.

Mr. Grew. Can you tell me how the passage begins that you wish to refer to?

Senator Ferguson. It begins in the book, "If the fiber and temper of the Japanese people are kept in mind."

Mr. Grew. I will see if I can find that. Yes, I have it here. Do you wish me to read that part?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. This is the original text.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Will you read the original text?

Mr. Grew (reading):

Having in mind the temper and fibre of the Japanese people, the view that the progressive imposition of [1795] drastic economic measures, while attended with some risk of war, would probably avert war, is a dangerously uncertain hypothesis upon which to base the considered policy and measures of the United States. Our own view is that if such a course is taken would not avert war. Nevertheless both views are no more than opinion, and it is therefore our belief that it would be contrary to our national interests to postulate the correctness of either opinion and to erect thereon a definite policy. To do so would be to put the cart before the horse. The primary point for decision would appear to involve the question as to whether our national needs, policies and objectives justify war with Japan in the event that diplomacy, our first line of national defense should fail, for only on the basis of such decision could the Administration follow a course divested so far as possible of elements of opinion, speculation and uncertainty. I do not doubt that such decision, which might well prove to be irrevocable, has already been fully debated and adopted, for the sands are running fast."

Senator Ferguson. What did you mean by "the sands were running fast"?

Mr. Grew. I meant that the risk of war was steadily increasing.

Senator Ferguson. Another part of the telegram, under section 4, 1736—I have just received the original copy:

[1796] The view therefore that war in the Far East can best be averted by continuation of trade embargoes and, as proposed by some, the imposition of a blockade is not supported by what has thus far occurred.

Were you of that opinion on the 3d of November?

Mr. Grew. What part is that? Is that a separate telegram?

Senator Ferguson. This is No. 1736. It is marked 1736, and it is November 3, 3 p.m., at the top, section 4.

Mr. Grew. Can you tell me what paragraph it is?

Senator Ferguson. Will you show it to him, Counsel?

It is underscored with red in my copy. I will show you my original.

Mr. Grew. All right, I have it.

The Chairman. Is there any significance to the underscoring in red?

Senator Ferguson. Not unless the chairman wants to make something of it.

The Chairman. I don't know who underscored it.

Mr. Grew. I have it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what did you mean by that paragraph?

Mr. Grew (reading):

The view therefore that war in the Far East can thus be averted by continuation of trade embargoes [1797] and, as proposed by some, the imposition of blockade is not supported by what has thus far occurred.

It is obvious that by November 3 our trade embargoes had not served to restrain the Japanese Army from its expansion. They were going right ahead.

Senator Ferguson. Am I correct that in 1938 you were somewhat of the opinion that embargoes would not avert war or they might cause war and then that you changed in 1940 your opinion and advised a different course, as you did in the telegram of October 12, 1940—or was that September 12, 1940?

Mr. Grew. September 12.

Senator Ferguson. And you letter to the President of December 14, 1940, that you changed your attitude.
Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And now, are you changing back on November 3?

Mr. Grew. Very definitely. You see, the policy which I had advocated in September, 1940, and which was put into effect brought up precisely the situation which I had envisaged, namely, that the Japanese intelligent leaders would realize that they were on the brink of an abyss and that they had better pull back. I think they tried to do so at that time. Unfortunately, those efforts failed and a military dictatorship [1798] cabinet came in and from that moment on the chances were very, very slim of being able to bring the thing about. So, naturally, I, under those circumstances, my views as reflected here, were of that particular moment.

Senator Ferguson. You wanted to convey that to the State Department, that your views had changed, and that is why you sent this telegram of November 3 to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State, so that it would receive their attention?

Mr. Grew. Naturally, Senator, every telegram which I sent the Secretary I wanted to have receive attention.

Senator Ferguson. Where you designated the Secretary and the Under Secretary, did that place more importance upon it?

Mr. Grew. That places more importance upon a telegram, that is true. I did want that telegram to receive special attention, without question.

Senator Ferguson. Because it was a change in your views?

Mr. Grew. It was a definite change, undoubtedly, because of changes of circumstances.

Senator Ferguson. From the original telegram, I would like to have you go to the last sentence.

Mr. Grew. The last sentence of the whole telegram?

Senator Ferguson. Well, it is in the book as “Action by Japan which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the [1799] United States”—

Mr. Grew. “It would be similarly short-sighted to base our policy on the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber rattling the exclusive purpose of giving moral support to Japan’s high-pressure diplomacy. Japan’s resort to measures which might make war with the United States inevitable may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness.

The Chairman. The Chair would indicate that it is now after 4 o’clock and unless the Senator from Michigan can conclude, we will recess.

Senator Ferguson. I cannot finish, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Then, we might as well recess.

The Chair is advised that Secretary Hull will return at 10 o’clock tomorrow morning. So, Mr. Grew, your further punishment will be deferred for an hour or so.

Mr. Grew. I shall be glad to be here. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., a recess was taken until 10 a.m., Wednesday, November 28, 1945.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1945

Congress of the United States, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Washington, D.C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[1800] The Chairman. The committee will be in order.

Yesterday when the examination of Secretary Hull was suspended, the Chair announced that the committee would excuse him for 2 or 3 days, to enable him to rest a little. Before we recessed yesterday afternoon, he sent word that he wanted to return this morning, but on account of the weather it is not thought advisable to bring Secretary Hull out, and therefore the committee is glad to excuse him for today, and until such time as it is convenient for him to return.

Therefore, Mr. Grew may return to the stand.

Senator Ferguson.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, I think we were on the last sentence in the November 3 message. You had just read that the the committee. I would rather you look at the original, rather than the paraphrased version.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is there a correction on the original?

Mr. Grew. I see no correction.

Oh, yes. Apparently the text must have been garbled in transcribing, Senator; so there appear to be two corrections. Shall I mention those?

[1801] Senator Ferguson. Yes, that is what I wanted to have you do. I wanted to know if you could tell us how it was when you sent it.

Mr. Grew. I think it was probably sent as it now appears corrected:

Japan's resort to measures which might make war with the United States inevitable. May come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness.

So far as I recollect that was the way the telegram was sent.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, you put in your book at page 470, you headed it "National hara-kiri not only possible but probable."

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So, when you wrote the message on November 3, you felt—that was how you were feeling, that Japan would "do or die," as you expressed it?

Mr. Grew. I thought that that danger, that risk, very definitely existed.

Senator Ferguson. And you end your quotation in your book, your paragraph, by saying "that important telegram is on the record for all time."

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what did you mean by that?

[1803] Mr. Grew. Well, I wanted to have my views and position perfectly clear. That is what that means.

Senator Ferguson. Did you want to indicate that you had conveyed to our Government and the State Department that war may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness?

Mr. Grew. Did I what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Did you want to convey that?

Mr. Grew. Yes; very definitely.

Senator Ferguson. You felt that you were conveying that by the message?

Mr. Grew. I felt that I was conveying that thought.

Senator Ferguson. You felt at that particular time, when you sent the message, that war was near, did you?

Mr. Grew. I felt that there was the risk and the danger of war. As I have already said, I never gave up hope up to the last minute.

Senator Ferguson. I realize you had the hope, but you felt the risk was great at that time.

Mr. Grew. I felt that the risk and danger of war was very great and increasing.

Senator Ferguson. Did you hear the statement of Mr. Welles when he changed his opinion from, I think it was, 1,000 to a million?

Mr. Grew. Well—

[1804] Senator Ferguson. Were you increasing—

The Chairman. Let the witness finish his answer.

Mr. Grew. Yes, I heard that statement of Mr. Welles. I have never tried to use percentages of risk because it was an imponderable question. I merely stated, and felt the danger of the risk of war was very great at that time.

Senator Ferguson. In relation to the note of the 17th of August, I don't know whether I put the direct question to you, but I want to put it now; did you ever have any knowledge as to whether or not Great Britain gave any parallel notice or action similar, or along the same line as that note of August 17?¹

Mr. Grew. I have no recollection to that effect, Senator. I have asked the officers in the Department to look that up, go into the files, and they have promised to do it. I don't know whether they have yet found anything or not. I think they will find nothing.

Senator Ferguson. The Ambassador was Mr. Craigie.

Mr. Grew. Sir Robert Craigie.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you recall any conversations with Craigie about parallel actions, or parallel notices.

¹ See Exhibit No. 71, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1695–1696.
Mr. Grew. I recall no definite conversation to that effect.

Senator Ferguson. That article in the New York Times [1805] on August 13, 1941, that you read yesterday, doesn't refresh your memory?

Mr. Grew. No. Senator, as I recollect, that article stated definitely that this statement in the New York Times——

Senator Ferguson. Would you care to see it?

Mr. Grew (continuing). Was a report of what was being said in political circles in general. I don't think that that report was ascribed to any individual.

[1806] Senator Ferguson. Now, in relation to the Konoye government, there is one other question I wanted to ask you. I think you said yesterday, did you not, that if there was a failure of the President and Konoye to meet, you felt that the Cabinet would fall and there would be a new dictatorship Cabinet; is that correct?

Mr. Grew. I did and I so reported.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Now, did you also gather from that that the Japanese, that is, the Government, would be convinced that the United States was stalling for time and that war might be counted upon at any time; was that connected with the Konoye-President meeting?

Mr. Grew. During that particular Konoye administration I did not feel that war was likely to break out at any moment; no, sir, not at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Did you think it would take some time after the Konoye Government fell before that would crystallize?

Mr. Grew. You mean before war should break out?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, before war would crystallize.

Mr. Grew. That was a matter which we could only guess about. After the Tojo government came in, Mr. Togo, the Foreign Minister, said that they were going to continue the conversations and try to come to an agreement with the United [1807] States and the conversations did continue, but, frankly, I felt that the possibility of coming to an agreement between the United States and Japan, after the Tojo Government had come into power, had very much decreased.

[1808] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, did you know at any time that we had in mind that if Japan went across a certain line—let me get that line; exhibit 15, I think.

Mr. Keeffe. I think it is exhibit 17, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have the November 5 letter? Counsel, please get me the November 5 letter of General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

Mr. Gesell. The 27th, isn't that the one you want, Senator, November 27, the joint memo of November 27?

Senator Ferguson. I think it is probably in this one. [reading]:

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.
Mr. Grew. So far as I can recollect, Senator, I was not informed of that fact.

Senator Ferguson. You had no knowledge along that line [1809] at all?

Mr. Grew. So far as I can recollect I had no knowledge along that line at all.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar, Mr. Grew, about the time or prior to the time you wrote your telegram of November 3 of the editorials that were appearing in the New York Tribune and also the New York Times? They appeared in September; that is, as to what our Government's opinion was on the Japanese question in relation to the fact that the economic pressure would have results.

Mr. Grew. No, Senator. Those leading editorials were often sent to me by our pouch, by mail. They arrived in Japan anywhere from 3 weeks to a month later. It may have been possible that on certain occasions an editorial or the substance of an editorial may have been cabled me but, frankly, I have no recollection of such messages.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you sent your telegram of the 3d and you considered that a very important message to our government.

Was there anything then existing as far as you were concerned that caused you to send that, "that our Government may not be thinking along the same lines", and that you did it as a warning?

Mr. Grew. No, sir. I recollect no such thought. My [1810] position was purely objective. I was trying to report the situation as I saw it from that point of view at that time.

Senator Ferguson. What is the significance, Mr. Grew, of your message that "the Cabinet has made up its mind and told the Emperor"?

Mr. Grew. What message is that?

Senator Ferguson. I think it is in the November 3. It is in one of your messages and I am quite sure it is in the November 3 message. Do you remember the fact that they hold told the Emperor?

Mr. Grew. I would like to refresh my memory on that passage if I may.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. Can you tell me in what section of the telegram that appears?

Mr. Murphy. It is a most indefinite question.

Senator Ferguson. It is the part that the Cabinet had made up its mind and had told the Emperor. I may be paraphrasing the language.

Mr. Grew. I do not find that passage, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that fact, Mr. Grew?

Mr. Grew. That I reported that the Cabinet had made a—

Senator Ferguson. No, that the Cabinet did make up its mind and told the Emperor what it was going to do.

[1811] Mr. Grew. Well, you mean that I have reported that statement?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, in effect.

Mr. Grew. I would like to have that.

Senator Ferguson. No, I will try and find it later for you, Mr. Grew.

Mr. Grew. I do not recollect reporting that fact.
Senator Ferguson. I tried to keep the Foreign Relations memo after my information but I do not have it on that one.

Mr. Grew. Of course, I could not possibly have known what the Cabinet had decided, so if I stated that it must have been merely opinion.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know whether or not you ever had that knowledge that the Cabinet had made up its mind? I am talking about the Tojo Cabinet.

Mr. Grew. Had made up its mind to go to war?

Senator Ferguson. Well, what it was going to do?

Mr. Grew. No, sir. It was practically impossible to ascertain what went on in Cabinet meetings. There were always a great many rumors in the press, a great many rumors flying around town, but to get at the actual facts of the procedure of any Cabinet meeting was practically impossible.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, I think you gave in your [1812] testimony earlier the fact that Japan might strike without a declaration of war and you had in mind what they did in 1904 at Port Arthur.

Mr. Grew. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would you say the last paragraph of your November message conveyed the same idea?

Mr. Grew. I think that idea is conveyed more definitely in my telegram of October 17.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, we will go to your telegram of November 17.

Mr. Grew. Of November 17, that is right.

Senator Ferguson. November 17, and will you give the part of the telegram that you think contains that on November 17?

Mr. Grew. Will you find that for me?

Senator Ferguson. I think you may find it on 743.

Mr. Grew. I said in that telegram:

In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden military or naval actions by Japan in areas not at present involved in the China conflict I am taking into account as a probability that the Japanese would exploit all available tactical advantages, including those of initiative and surprise.

I think that is the passage that you have in mind.

[1813] Senator Ferguson. So you think that that more nearly conveys the idea that they may strike without a declaration of war?

Mr. Grew. Very definitely.

Senator Ferguson. And you had in mind what they had done at Port Arthur?

Mr. Grew. I think that word "surprise" comprises that thought.

Senator Ferguson. And you conveyed that to our Government on the 17th of November?

Mr. Grew. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that that strengthened your former message of November 3?

Mr. Grew. I think it supplemented it.

Senator Ferguson. Supplemented it. You felt that you were conveying this knowledge that you had to the Government in as direct language as you could?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 485 of Foreign Relations, II, I think the statement is made that:

I said in that case I feared that everything was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan.


Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, 485.

Senator Ferguson. That was page 485 of your book [reading]:

I said that in that case I feared that everything was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan. Soon afterwards, however, the press announced that the conversations would be continued. But my friend seemed crushed.

Will you give us an explanation of that remark? That was made on December 1, 1941.

Mr. Grew. Yes. Well, if it had been true under the circumstances then obtaining that the Cabinet had decided to break off the conversations completely, I would have thought at that time that the situation was hopeless. As a matter of fact, my friend was wrong because the Cabinet decided, at least ostensibly, to carry on the conversations further.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, I notice in your book, the same page—do you have your book before you?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, I have.

Senator Ferguson. In capital letters and quotations on the same page, at the bottom of the page, before "December 5, 1941":

"WASHINGTON HAS DELIVERED AN ULTIMATUM TO US."

[1815] Do you see that?

Mr. Grew. Yes, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. "Washington has delivered an ultimatum to us."

Mr. Grew. I think it is a little misleading, perhaps, to take that sentence out of its context. I was discussing the whole telegram here.

Senator Ferguson. I am not taking it out of its context. I am asking if you see it. I am trying to call it to your attention.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, I have it before me.

Senator Ferguson. And it is in capital letters?

Mr. Grew. Not in capital letters in my book.

Senator Ferguson. The heading; I am talking about the heading. I am trying to convey to you the heading.

Mr. Grew. Oh, well, that is in quotation marks, that heading.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I said it was in quotation marks.

Mr. Grew. The headings were put in there purely arbitrarily.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Grew. They were not necessarily put in there to emphasize or to supplement the text.

[1816] Senator Ferguson. Well I am trying to get you now to look at what I am looking at.

Mr. Grew. I see it.

Senator Ferguson. And then I will ask you some questions.

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the word "ultimatum" is used in that quotation. Will you tell us why you used the word "ultimatum" in the quotation?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield to the Congressman from Pennsylvania?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I yield.

Mr. Murphy. Isn’t it a fact that the gentleman who wrote the book is quoting the Japanese spokesman’s feeling that it was an ultimatum?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Someone who was not familiar with the message of the 26th?

Senator Ferguson. The word “East” means the Japanese. This is the Japanese speaking. Isn’t that correct, Mr. Grew?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. It was not an American at all.

[1817] Mr. Grew. That is correct, that was a Japanese who was speaking and it was reflecting his point of view.

I think it is very important, in this connection, Senator, to have this whole passage put on the record.

Senator Ferguson. I want you to read the whole passage now. Will you read it?

Mr. Grew. I will do so. [reading:]

Yesterday I received in his own handwriting a letter from a prominent Japanese who is closely in touch with Government circles here. This letter reads in part as follows: “The situation is very regrettable. You know how I feel and I may understand your feelings. Permit me to set forth frankly to you what is now in my mind. I have had conversations with friends and after examining their feelings I have come to the conclusion that they believe, with no knowledge of the actual contents of the American document of November 26”—

and I think that that passage should be emphasized—

“that Washington has delivered an ultimatum to us. Such is the regrettable psychology of our people * * *.”

That is the pertinent part of that passage, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, all right.

Now, as I understand it, without any knowledge—we [1818] are talking now about the Japanese—without any knowledge on their part they were treating the instrument, the note of November 26 of the United States to the Japanese, as an ultimatum.

Mr. Grew. Yes. I can tell you why, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I mean that is what you were conveying.

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us why, in your opinion, the Japanese in Japan were treating it as an ultimatum?

Mr. Grew. The Japanese military government were clearly putting out the impression that that document was an ultimatum. It suited the military to do so.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that at the same time that the note was delivered that the Ambassador here, the Japanese Ambassador, was treating the note to the same effect?

Mr. Grew. I assume that—

Senator Ferguson. In other words, in Foreign Relations, 766, that the American proposal was unacceptable and was to be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end.

Will you look at page 766?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. That is in that long conversation beginning on page 756?
[1819] Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Grew. The statement that you refer to is on some other page.
Senator Ferguson. What page is it on?
Mr. Grew. I will have to look.
Senator Ferguson. It is on page 766. [Reading:]

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end and asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi.

It is on page 766, at the top. I starts, "Mr. Kurusu," It was written by Joseph W. Ballantine.

[1820] Mr. Grew. You say that is at the top of page 756?
Senator Ferguson. No, 766.
Mr. Grew. I beg your pardon. All right.

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end, and asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi.

Senator Ferguson. Now were you familiar with the fact that here they were also treating, in effect, the note of the 26th as an ultimatum? I am talking about "they" as meaning the Japanese.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield.
Mr. Murphy. In the book of the gentleman who is the witness he refers to "certain people in Japan," but the gentleman does not pretend to say who they were.

Mr. Grew. Senator, all I can say to that is the records of most of the conversations which took place in Washington between the Japanese Ambassador and the Secretary of State were telegraphed to me in Tokyo. Sometimes they were slow in coming, sometimes they were delayed for several days, and sometimes they were so garbled in transmission that I had to ask for repeats. They were very often delayed. I do not know whether this particular record was sent me or not. I will [1821] have to check up on that.¹

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever convey to the State Department that at least some of the people in Japan were treating the note of the 26th as an ultimatum?

Mr. Grew. I find, Senator, in a telegram which I sent to the Secretary of State on December 5, that I repeated the pertinent part of that conversation with that prominent Japanese which I have just mentioned.

Senator Ferguson. Would you tell me what it is, from that telegram?

Mr. Grew. Would you like me to read the whole telegram?
Senator Ferguson. Just that part, unless you want to read it all.
Mr. Grew. I think it would be well to read the whole thing for the record.

Secretary of State (rush)
1935, December 5, 5:00 p. m.
Strictly confidential for the Secretary and Under Secretary only.
You will no doubt be aware that the American proposal—

that refers to the memorandum of November 26—

is being represented here to the press and to the public as a mere restatement of "fanciful principles which ignore the realities of the situation", and that no intimation [1822] , whatever has been given out that the proposal, if im-

¹ Exhibit No. 75.
Mr. Mitchell. Shown.

Mr. Grew. I think this is the meaning:

The response of some Japanese to whom we have said—presumably to whom we have talked, there must be a mistake there—
The response of most Japanese to whom we have—

Mr. Mitchell. Shown.

Mr. Grew. I think this is the meaning:

The response of some Japanese to whom we have said that the American proposal, far from being a formulation of fanciful principles designed to preserve the old order of things, is a well-balanced, constructive, practical and forward-looking plan for creating order out of the disorders of the past, has been to express strong disappointment that the private individual is not in a position to form any intelligent opinion with regard to a matter of such supreme importance, while some have said that if the American proposal is actually such as we have described it to be, an attitude of intransigence on the part of the Japanese would be viewed with regret by the masses.

It is impossible to forecast precisely what effect [1823] publication of our proposal would have. Undoubtedly reaction to certain phases of the proposal, notably complete evacuation of China, would be strong and indeed might be so violent as to eliminate the last possibility of an agreement. However, there would seem to be even greater risks of the elimination of that possibility if the points at issue continue in Japan to be befoged by ignorance and misrepresentation. I feel sure that you will have considered the wisdom of publishing the proposal as soon as possible after consultation with the Japanese Government, but even without the latter’s assent if that should not be forthcoming, publication to be accompanied by a statement substantially along the lines of the thought expressed in paragraph two of my 1874, December 1, 8:00 p.m.

A prominent Japanese in close touch with government circles wrote to me in handwriting yesterday inter alia:

"The situation is most deplorable. I may understand how you feel and you know how I feel. Allow me to write to you frankly what I have now in my mind. After speaking with friends and studying their frame of mind I come to conclude that they feel without having the knowledge of the true nature of your document of the [1824] 26th November as if we received an ultimatum from Washington. Under such unfortunate psychology of your people"—

I think that is "our" people. I think he is referring to his own people there and I think it is garbled—

"Under such unfortunate psychology of our people the only way left us, I think, that your Government will broadmindedly take our proposal as a base of discussion for the modus vivendi with a view of arriving at final settlement on the line of your proposal. From sheer desire for happy ending I have to write you." I believe—

this is my statement—

this letter to be a fair criterion of public opinion here.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Mr. Grew, do you know how many messages you sent to Washington between the 27th, which would be our 26th, and the 7th? I think the book shows two. Is that all you sent?

Mr. Grew. I think I undoubtedly sent more than that.

Senator Ferguson. Would you look it up for the committee and see whether you sent any more than that, so that the committee might have all that you sent? ¹

Mr. Grew. There were certain telegrams which I sent to the Secretary of State subsequent to the commencement of war.

Senator Ferguson. I am just talking about up to and including the 7th.

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell, Hearings, Part 5, p. 2006.
[1825] Mr. Grew. I will look. I will have the files examined and see.

Senator Ferguson. Just to try and refresh your memory as to what was going on in Japan I will ask you if they have a paper known as Asahi?

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. How do you pronounce it?

Mr. Grew. Asahi.

Senator Ferguson. Under the December 1 date line the newspaper Asahi, in a dispatch from Washington, asserted that the closing of the Japanese consulates in the United States was imminent, and from the New York Times of December 5, 1941, I am quoting:

Tokyo, Friday, December 5.—Tokyo was struck by a bombshell, in the words of the newspaper Asahi today, with the revelation of the substance of the Japanese-American negotiation by President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull.

Then—

Domei, Japanese news agency, said last night: "It is utterly impossible for Japan to accept the stipulations of the American document."

Were you familiar with those quotes?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I never saw those messages, but I might say that everything that went out over the newspaper [1826] agency Domei was carefully controlled by the Japanese Government.

Senator Ferguson. I am assuming that in the question.

Mr. Grew. In effect the Japanese Government owns it. So anything that went out is simply what the Japanese Government wanted to have passed on to the public.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, our State Department should have been taking that kind of a message as the Government speaking rather than the people?

Mr. Grew. Very definitely. There was not any question about that.

[1827] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, the last question in the Navy report was this:

Can you remember any information received from our State Department as to the probability of the United States coming into armed conflict with the Japanese if Japan was at war with the British in the Pacific?

Here is your answer, on page 1068 of the Navy report:

I could not answer that, sir, without exploration.

Do you recall that question and that answer?

Mr. Grew. I do not happen to recall that particular question; no, sir. That hearing took place long ago.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I will read the question again to you, because I would like to have it answered.

Can you remember any information—

The Chairman. The Secretary was about to make a further answer.

Mr. Grew. No, sir. Thank you, I think not, Mr. Chairman, I will listen to the statement.

The Chairman. All right, go ahead.

Senator Ferguson (reading):
Mr. Grew. I recollect no such statement.

[1828] Senator Ferguson. Do you remember the answer that you gave there, "I could not answer that, sir, without exploration."

What would that mean?

Mr. Grew. That would mean I would wish to examine the official files of the State Department to see whether anything had been sent to me on that subject. I do not think it was, but I do not like to give a categorical answer in a case of that kind without exploration.

Senator Ferguson. Will you make such exploration so we will get the benefit of that?

Mr. Grew. I will, Senator. I want to be sure that the various points which you asked me to explore will be taken down.

Senator Ferguson. I assume that counsel will give you that. I do not want you to have to rely on your own memory either.

Mr. Grew, were there any confidential or secret communications from the State Department of our policy toward Japan that were not published by the State Department? Do you know of any now?

Mr. Grew. Senator, as I said the other day, there is a very large amount of material which passed between the State Department and the Embassy at Tokyo, and vice versa, during those years. If all that material had been published [1829] it would probably take a dozen or more volumes. I know of a great deal of material which was not published, but I cannot say that that material would have been pertinent to this investigation.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any of it that would be pertinent?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; offhand I do not.

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you think of some after you leave the witness stand, will you convey that information to the committee, so you may return with it so that we may all have the facts?

Mr. Grew. You wish me to think the matter over and see if I can remember anything which might be helpful to the committee?

Senator Ferguson. After you leave the stand. You do not have to do it now.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, I will do that.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, when you destroyed—does the chairman want to put something on the record?

The Chairman. No, I do not. If I do want to put something on I will do it. I was just talking to my colleague here.

I did not mean to interrupt the Senator. Go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, do you remember when you [1830] destroyed the Code in the Embassy at Tokyo?

Mr. Grew. We, as I recollect it, Senator, destroyed some of our codes a few days before Pearl Harbor, but we kept certain codes for use up to the last moment, which were destroyed actually after we had learned that war had broken out.

Senator Ferguson. What codes did the Embassy destroy prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, just a moment. Are we going to reveal the American code?

The Chairman. The Chairman is not able to answer that question. Senator Ferguson. I did not understand the Congressman.
Mr. Murphy. The question is does the gentleman now want the Ambassador to go into the discussion of the codes that America was using in its diplomatic relations?

Senator Ferguson. No.

Mr. Murphy. Does he want him to name which ones we were using?

Senator Ferguson. No.

Mr. Grew. I could not do it anyway.

Senator Ferguson. Will the reporter read the question please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

[1831] Mr. Murphy. I am wondering if the gentleman wants to press that? We have codes that we are using all over the world, and I do not suppose we have changed them. I am wondering if you want to spread on the record for the world the kind of codes we were using during the war?

Mr. Grew. I could not possibly answer that question in any case. I could not recollect. As a matter of fact I had very little directly to do with the handling of the codes, and in any case, I would not know which codes were kept and which were destroyed.

Senator Ferguson. But some were destroyed prior to December 7, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew. That is my belief. I think there is some reference to that in the record. I would have to look it up.

Senator Ferguson. There is reference to it. I am not bringing out anything new, except I wanted your knowledge on it.

Mr. Grew. I am afraid I cannot enlighten you on that. I did not know very much about it at the time.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, do you recall any messages to you or to the Embassy that you were to destroy codes prior to the Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. Grew. I do not recall a message having been received to that effect. I shall have to look that up. [1832] Senator. 3

Mr. Gesell. May I interpose, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. In Exhibit 18, under date of November 27, is a message to the Ambassador from Secretary Hull, which, in the last portion, while not mentioning codes specifically, appears to look toward the destruction of codes at that time.

Senator Ferguson. May I see the instrument?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Senator George. What is the date of it?

Mr. Gesell. November 27, Senator.

Mr. Grew. Is that published?

Mr. Gesell. That is one of the exhibits in this case.

Mr. Grew. But not published in Foreign Relations?

Mr. Gesell. I do not think so.

[1833] Senator Ferguson. Will you just show the instrument to Mr. Grew?

[The document was handed to Mr. Grew.]

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it, Mr. Grew, and give us your interpretation of it?

Mr. Grew. I have read the telegram, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it into the record?

Mr. Grew. Yes, if you wish.

1 See Mr. Grew's testimony, p. 743 et seq., infra. See also Hearings, Part 5, p. 2066 for statement by Mr. Gesell.
Confidential for the Ambassador.

In the light of the attitude of Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu when they were handed on November 26th for consideration the document described in a separate telegram and of such indications as we have cumulatively had of the general attitude of the Japanese Government, it appears that the discussions up to the present time have not yet afforded any basis which gives much promise of a satisfactory comprehensive settlement. It is of course too early to adopt any definite opinion whether the discussions will continue or will lapse, but the probability that they may lapse should not be lost sight of.

The existence of such probability makes it appear advisable that we give some advance consideration to various problems which may as a consequence arise in connection with our Foreign Service establishments in Japanese territory. As lapse of the conversations might result in withdrawal of our diplomatic and consular representation from Japan, it would seem to us that, without any intention of being alarmist or of too hastily envisaging serious contingencies, this question should be brought to your attention so that you may have it well in mind in case it should become necessary for the Department to consult you in regard to the making of arrangements for the packing of official and personal effects and the expeditions handling of other matters which would be involved in the closing of our Embassy and Consulates. It is, of course, desired that all phases of the matter be considered confidential that that discussion of it be kept to a minimum.

Senator Ferguson. Did you receive that telegram, Mr. Grew?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; undoubtedly I must have received it.

Senator Ferguson. Did that convey to you the idea that you were to dispose of some codes?

Mr. Grew. Not necessarily. This is the sort of telegram that any government, out of mere precaution, would send to its representatives abroad, as a pursely preparatory message, to guard against possible contingencies that might arise but would not necessarily arise.

Senator Ferguson. Did you or did you not have the codes destroyed as the result of that telegram?

Mr. Grew. That, Senator, I cannot answer definitely.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, will you look up and see whether or not you received any telegram from which you obtained the information that you were to or that you did destroy any codes?

Mr. Grew. I will.

Senator Ferguson. And then will you get us that information?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now you had a naval attaché at the Embassy?

Mr. Grew. We did.

Senator Ferguson. What was his name?

Mr. Grew. His name was Commander Smith-Hutton.

The Chairman. Smith what?

Mr. Grew. Smith-Hutton, S-m-i-t-h-H-u-t-t-o-n.

Senator Ferguson. If he received a message to destroy his code it would come through your Embassy, or would it be directly to him?

Mr. Grew. It may have come either way. It might have come to me or it might have come directly to him, I don't know.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any messages to the naval attaché to destroy codes?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Ferguson. Prior to the attack.

Mr. Grew. I do not.

Senator Ferguson. Who was the Army attaché in the Embassy?
Mr. Grew. The military attaché was colonel—it has gone out of my head at the moment. We had so many different attachés from time to time, that I would like to check up on it.

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel know, so he can help Mr. Grew?

Mr. Grew. It was Lt. Col. Harry I. Creswell.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any messages—was he a lieutenant?

Mr. Grew. No, sir.

The Chairman. Lieutenant colonel, he said.

Mr. Grew. He was lieutenant colonel at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember any messages to the lieutenant colonel to destroy any codes at that time?

Mr. Grew. I do not recollect it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now going to the President’s message to the Emperor, what time did you get it, Mr. Grew?

Mr. Grew. I received the message in final form, after being decoded, at approximately 10:30 p. m. on December 7, [1837] Japanese time.

Senator Ferguson. What time would that be in Washington and what date?

Mr. Grew. That would be 14 hours later. I understand that the message was sent from Washington at 9 p. m. on the 6th. I think the records show that.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. The records show it reached the Japanese Tokyo post office at 12 noon on the 7th. In other words, it arrived in just 15 hours. There was 14 hours difference in time, and allowing for 1 hour in transmission.

Senator Ferguson. So it took 1 hour to transmit it?

Mr. Grew. It took approximately 1 hour to transmit it.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. The telegram was stamped “12 noon”, and the telegram was delivered to me at the Embassy at 10:30 p. m. that day. It was held up all that time.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for that delay if somebody did not know the contents of that instrument?

Mr. Grew. If somebody did not know the nature of it?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. Well, my guess would be when that message came it was probably turned over to certain authorities of the Japanese Government, who could have readily decoded it, because [1838] it was in what we called our nonconfidential code at that time, the gray code which was perfectly open to anybody, and my guess would be that the military authorities did not want this message to get to the Emperor at that time. That was always my belief.

Senator Ferguson. It was held 15 hours by the Japanese before it was delivered to you?

Mr. Grew. It was held from noon to 10:30 that evening.

Senator Ferguson. That night?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You had some reasons then for believing that the military authorities were holding it up so that it would not possibly reach the Emperor?
Mr. Grew. Very definitely, because, as a rule, the Japanese were expeditious in getting the telegrams through.

Senator Ferguson. That is the explanation you want to convey?

Mr. Grew. That would be my opinion, my guess. I cannot prove it.

Senator Ferguson. Does that indicate that they knew our code, or do you think it would come from the fact that the President here made a press release that he was sending a note to the Emperor?

Mr. Grew. I think that must have been taken in conjunction [1839] with the other. Undoubtedly the Japanese had picked up the radio messages, which I picked up myself. I picked that up in the early evening, that the President had sent the message to the Emperor, I picked that up from Station KGI in San Francisco, which went all over Japan.

So the military authorities must have known that such a message was coming and they must have been on the lookout for it.

Senator Ferguson. So it would not be due to the fact that they were decoding the message because they did not know what was in the message, they could get it from the President's announcement here?

Mr. Grew. The President did not give the text at that time, did he?

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield to the Congressman from Pennsylvania?

Mr. Murphy. I would like to say I understand that it was only a press release, that the message had been sent, and when the President sent the message he said he wanted it sent in the gray code, so it could be easily uncovered, and he did not care whether it was uncovered before the Emperor got it. That is in evidence.

Senator Ferguson. I remember this "Dear Cordell" note. [1840] I remember the note, "Shoot this to Grew".

Mr. Grew. The President evidently did not mind if it was picked up.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. When you got the message 15 hours later and it was 10 something at night, you took it immediately, as I understand it, to Tojo.

Mr. Grew. To Togo, the Foreign Minister, not the Prime Minister, but the Foreign Minister Togo. I had made a provisional appointment as soon as I received the note over the radio that this was coming, and then as soon as I receive Mr. Hull's brief message, which was labelled "Triple Priority" and which did come to me—I do not know whether that was held up or not—saying this message was on its way, I promptly telephoned the message to the foreign Minister and made an appointment around midnight.

Senator Ferguson. You did not go into the contents of the note?

Mr. Grew. Of the President's message?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. I did not know the contents until the document had been decoded.

Senator Ferguson. I mean after you received it you did not discuss its contents with the Minister that you were delivering it to?

[1847] Mr. Grew. I did not. He asked to see it. I handed it to him to read, and he did read it. Then I asked that I be accorded an audience with the Emperor in order that I could present that message to him personally. The Foreign Minister quibbled on that. He said he would like to study it first. I said, "That is a very urgent
matter and I now ask for an audience at the earliest possible moment." So he finally said, "I will present your request to the Emperor." That is all.

Senator Ferguson. That was what hour?

Mr. Grew. That was about a quarter past midnight, about 12:15 a.m.

Senator Ferguson. What time would that be in Washington?

Mr. Grew. Fourteen hours later. That, in Washington, would have been 10 a.m.

Senator Ferguson. That would be 10 o'clock Sunday morning?

Mr. Grew. Ten o'clock Sunday morning, December 7.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, did you give your diary to the State Department when they checked your manuscript for your book?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have the parts that the State Department deleted from your book?

[1842] Mr. Grew. I had them at the time, yes.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have them now?

Mr. Grew. A good many of them were deleted by me myself, because when I prepared the original manuscript it is always easier to prepare too much rather than too little material, and many passages were already marked "cut" before they were handed to the State Department at all. I do not have that manuscript now. I sent it to my publishers at the time, nearly 2 years ago now, and I suppose it has been destroyed.

Senator Ferguson. You do not have anything then that would give us what was cut out or deleted by the State Department?

Mr. Grew. No, sir, I could not.

Senator Brewster. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. In connection with the matter of the diaries, you read into the record yesterday the letter, the reply which you sent in response to my request. I can appreciate the personal aspects of the matter. I certainly would have no desire to embarrass you. On the other hand, I think you will also recognize that there perhaps has never been a matter that is of more profound national concern. While I can recognize your position, your desire to cooperate, which you have demonstrated, your own conviction that you have made [1843] available everything that should be of possible interest and concern, that statement is made in your book with the addition of the phrase that there were things which it would not be proper for you to publish at that time.

On page X you speak of this. You say "Many of the items in the original possess no permanent historic value. Others overlap. Still others cannot properly be published now." Which, I take it, is a fairly frank recognition on your part that there was material there which would be of public interest, and important, but which, owing to the exigencies of the war it would not be proper to make available at that time.

[1844] Of course I think the rule, as far as court procedure is concerned, is entirely well established, that documents or diaries which are used for refreshing one's memory, or informing one's self are available for examination.
I, at the same time, recognize all the other aspects involved, and that this is not a court proceeding, although it is perhaps more important, and it has perhaps more important aspects.

So I wondered, Mr. Grew, whether or not, you might feel justified, and properly so on your part, if you should permit our counsel, Attorney William Mitchell, in whom we all, I am sure, have confidence, as to his discretion, intelligence, and integrity, at least to make such examination as might seem warranted, to be sure that his judgment entirely coincided with yours as to the public or private character of any items that might be involved.

That is simply and solely in the interest of doing complete justice to probably one of the most important matters with which certainly Congress has ever had to deal.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

Senator Brewster. I would like to have Mr. Grew's comment on this now.

Mr. Grew. I fully appreciate that position, Senator. In making the comment in my book that certain material "could not be published now," I had in mind at least some of the documents which have been presented to this committee, quite apart from the publications of the Department of State.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Mr. Grew. One telegram came up today with regard to our codes. That is the sort of thing that would not have been proper to publish at the time my book came out. I do not even know whether I had a record of that or not, but that is the sort of thing I had in mind.

Now, as I say, my diary was a private, personal document. I used it as a sort of sketchbook to get my ideas in order. It was a sort of scribbling from day to day, and many of the passages in it were incorrect, and could be misleading.

After ironing them out, and after checking up and trying to confirm the information which had come in to me, to elaborate my own thoughts on the situation at the time, that material then took shape in my official report to the Government, and all those official reports are on record, are on file and are available to the committee.

I would like, if I may once again, to read one little passage from my book, a very brief passage, on page 348. I will read this again. It is already in the record, but I will read it to you, to explain a little more clearly my attitude about this. This was written on November 1, 1940.

In the light of fast-moving developments, I scarcely dare read back in the diary nowadays because of its many inconsistencies which show it up for the patchwork sort of day-to-day scribbling it is. At least it shows our thoughts and our information, some of it reliable and some of it wholly unreliable, at any given moment—the moment of writing. It shows how often we are groping and fumbling in the dark. Less and less are we able to know what is going on behind the scenes, simply because many of our reliable contacts are no longer available and also because, even behind the scenes, the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing.

That indicates my diary was not the sort of material which ought to be used as a criterion of anything. It was full of inconsistencies, full of inaccuracies, and for that reason alone, apart from its private and personal character, I would feel very reluctant to make any of it public.

Senator Brewster. That was not my question. My question was
whether or not, in view of the tremendous public concern which is manifest in this situation, in order to obviate any possible personal question of purely personal adjustment, where both the wisdom and correctness of your official acts and that of others is necessarily under scrutiny, and where, as you have indicated, you have used this diary as a basis for refreshing your own recollection and determination as to any public questions that were involved, that the counsel for this committee, in whom everyone has confidence, should be permitted to make such an examination, in order that he might, at any rate, form his own judgment as to whether it concurs with yours.

That would at least be some measure of reassurance to the people of this country that no individual, as the chairman of the committee has said in presenting the resolution in this case, he emphasized very greatly that the public interest was so transcendent that no individual, high or low, living or dead, could possible hope to be exempt from the proper scrutiny which this resolution was designed to give.

In view of questions which have been raised regarding possible limitations of members of the committee in any impartial consideration. I make this suggestion on that account, with the sole hope of serving the great public interest that is involved.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement?

The Chairman. Yes. The Chair recognizes Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. Mitchell. Since this hearing commenced, I have taken the position with every department of government that any papers that came into my hands, and that are entrusted to me, would be open to every member of the committee and to the full committee. I have stood on that from the start and I don't want to make any restrictions now. I think that I will have to take the position with Mr. Grew and the committee that if he, Mr. Grew, turns anything over to me to look at, I shall not withhold it from the committee members or the committee itself.

I furthermore feel an embarrassment about being put in the position of passing judgment on the materiality of Mr. Grew's material now, after one member of the committee has examined him for over 5 hours. My judgment as to what is pertinent and material and the judgment of some members of the committee might radically differ.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Mitchell, am I correct in stating it to be the law and the procedure of courts that a document of that character is available for the examination of counsel in a court proceeding?

Mr. Mitchell. If a witness brings a memorandum into court and uses it to refresh his recollection in the courtroom, it may be examined by counsel and the court, and introduced. Whether or not Mr. Grew has a right to withhold a private memorandum which he doesn't want to turn loose is a legal question that I haven't considered. I don't know what action the committee would be able to take if Mr. Grew stands on his position. You might have to bring a lawsuit against him, or a subpoena to, compel him to produce it, and if he asserted his rights, then you would have a case in court for the next year or two to decide whether he had a right to withhold it or not.

That is all I can say about that.

The Chairman. Does Mr. Grew wish to make any statement about that?
The question whether the committee would, under any circumstances, feel called upon to issue a subpoena to Mr. Grew to bring his diary in before the committee on the theory that he had or had not testified by refreshing his own recollection from it as to all the pertinent facts in regard to this inquiry, that is a matter which I don’t think the committee could pass on here under snap judgment and might have to consider before any action would be taken.

In the meantime, the Chair feels that Mr. Grew’s examination should not be suspended or held up, while the committee might enter into a discussion on that subject.

[1850] So, Senator Ferguson, you may proceed. Is that all you wanted, Senator Brewster? Is there anything further on that, Senator Brewster?

Senator Brewster. Well, I quite appreciate, of course, what the Chairman says and I certainly have no desire to embarrass Mr. Grew or compel him here publicly to discuss further the various aspects of this situation. I am quite willing to let the matter rest here at the present time.

I should like to consider it further myself and I am sure that probably the members of the committee would like to consider also all aspects involved.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson has this time.

Senator Ferguson. I will yield.

Mr. Murphy. I wonder if there was any document, of any nature, exchanged between Mr. Grew and the State Department, from the State Department to Mr. Grew, or from Mr. Grew to the State Department, official document that is not available. It is my understanding that everyone of them are available.

Mr. Mitchell. I might add to that that they are all available and we have gone over scores and scores of them and exercised a judgment as to what was material or not.

We have also had laid out all the exchanges which we don’t think are material, and if any member of the committee [1851] wants to exercise his independent judgment on that, we will have all of the documents exchanged between them made available at once. There are hundreds of them. Relating to visas and passports, and all sorts of things. But everyone of them has been laid out so that any member of the committee who wants to see them, any official exchange between Mr. Grew and the State Department that we haven’t thought worth while to produce, it is available.

As Mr. Gesell said yesterday, we only went back to January 1, 1941. Now, if you want us to go back of that, way back into 1940, why, that can be done.

The Chairman. All right.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, I—

Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to make my own attitude about this whole matter abundantly clear. I have tried to do so heretofore. It is as was expressed in my letter to Mr. Mitchell with regard to Mr. Brewster’s request, in which I said I wished to do every-thing in my power to support and further the important work of this committee. I felt all of the pertinent facts should be brought out and laid before the American people. I believed that nothing of a perti-
nent nature should be concealed. And I think—I hope—I have shown, in my testimony, that [1852] I am not trying to conceal anything. I am trying to give every possible piece of information which will be helpful to this committee.

I also said in my letter that I had gone through the last several months in my diary before Pearl Harbor very carefully to see if I could find anything that might be pertinent to this hearing and, frankly, I found nothing.

That is my position, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, you do feel, however, that your position does place in you the determination as to what is material or not material to this inquiry?

Mr. Grew. Senator, as I have said constantly, after all, the controlling factor in all of these matters is the official correspondence. The official correspondence, everything that passed between the Department of State and myself is on the record here on file, and, as Mr. Mitchell said, available to the committee.

Now, the material on which those official reports were based, I don't think would be helpful to the committee.

Senator Ferguson. But it does place in you, in you solely, that determination, the attitude that you take; isn't that true?

Mr. Grew. That is a question of interpretation, possibly [1853] legal interpretation, and I don't believe I would want to try to answer; the question as to whether any man has a right to retain his personal and private documents, that is a legal matter I couldn't answer.

Senator Ferguson. I have just a few more questions.

Was it your custom to make over-all reports to the Secretary of State or the President, for instance, when you returned in 1939 to the United States to make a report to the President?

Mr. Grew. Well, of course, Senator, whenever I came back on leave of absence from my post, I saw the President and had a talk with him and saw the Secretary of State and had a talk with him, and naturally in those talks I painted the picture as I saw it at that time. I did not, I am afraid, keep records of those talks. When I came back I was in Washington only a short time and kept no records of those talks.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the Secretary of State kept records of those talks?

Mr. Grew. That I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. Would counsel inquire if he did?¹

Mr. Grew, it was customary then to make over-all reports when you finally returned after the war had started? I think you returned— in what year?


Senator Ferguson. Did you report to Mr. Hull at that time?

Mr. Grew. Yes, I did.

Senator Ferguson. Did you report in writing?

Mr. Grew. Everything had been written pretty well up to date.

Senator Ferguson. That isn't quite my question.

Mr. Grew. No; I don't recollect having submitted at that time any report in writing.

Senator Ferguson. Will you think about that? That could be an important report.

¹ See Mr. Gesell's statement; Hearings, Part 5, p. 2066.
Mr. Grew. I can answer that question now. I did not submit, I did not file any report, any written report.

Senator Ferguson. Did you make any report, did you have a report? You say you didn’t file it. What do you mean by that?

Mr. Grew. Well, I—what was the question, what did I mean by a report?

Senator Ferguson. You said that you didn’t file it, and that brought to my mind “what did you mean by you didn’t file it.” Did you have one, and not give it to him, or what do you mean by that?

Mr. Grew. I had notes, of course, which I had taken down which appeared in my diary, and I used those notes, of course, in any talks with the Secretary.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you have those notes now?

Mr. Grew. I have not.

Senator Ferguson. Where are those notes?

Mr. Grew. They have been destroyed long ago.

Senator Ferguson. They have been destroyed?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You made a report then in 1942 to the Secretary from notes that you had?

Mr. Grew. Notes to refresh my memory.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; to refresh your recollection.

Mr. Grew. But all of that material, as a matter of fact, is all here, in these books, all of it; the whole story is complete.

Senator Ferguson. You had at that time original notes that you used to refresh your memory to report to the Secretary?

Mr. Grew. Yes; I had taken notes down from time to time.

Senator Ferguson. Did you suggest that you wanted to make such a final report in writing?

Mr. Grew. Of course I did not.

Senator Ferguson. That would be an important report, [1856] would it not?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; not necessarily, because all of the records, everything that I had to report up to the last minute, was contained in the official communications in the Department of State.

Senator Ferguson. Then there is no way the committee could get what was in those particular notes that you had to refresh your memory; those have been destroyed?

Mr. Grew. They have been destroyed.

Senator Ferguson. Did you speak to Mr. Hull about giving him a memorandum rather than just an oral statement?

Mr. Grew. I talked it over with him and I discussed some of the notes that I had taken and the whole thing was completely on the record. That was the whole story.

[1857] Senator Ferguson. Then it was not his desire to have you report in writing or not report in writing, he didn’t express himself either way?

Mr. Grew. After I had expressed my views about the situation no request was made for a written report because all the facts were already on file in the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.
Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, before asking any questions of Ambassador Grew I would ask the privilege of making a short statement in order to make certain requests of counsel.

The Chairman. Yes, go ahead.

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, there is in evidence before the committee as part of exhibit 18 a document which contains a draft of a message from the President of the United States to the British Prime Minister dated November 24, 1941. This draft message was prepared by Mr. Hull. It contains a description of the so-called modus vivendi proposal for Japan.

The draft message is accompanied by a memorandum for the President signed by Mr. Hull which states:

If you approve of this draft telegram I shall arrange to have it forwarded.

The same document contains the notation, "O. K., see addition. F. D. R."

[1858] And it also contains an addition to the draft message of Mr. Hull suggested by the President.

It appears that that draft telegram prepared by Mr. Hull describing the modus vivendi proposal as approved by the President and with the President's additional paragraph added was actually sent to the British Prime Minister.

We also have in evidence a message from Ambassador Winant to the Secretary of State dated November 26, 1941, which bears the title "Most secret. For the President from the former Naval Person." This message from Mr. Churchill acknowledges the President's message about Japan, presumably his description of the modus vivendi proposals, and raises the question whether Chiang Kai-shek was not "having a very thin diet".

It appears from the evidence that the modus vivendi proposal was thereafter discarded by the Secretary of State and the so-called 10-point note of November 26 was handed to the Japanese Government. It seems entirely probable to me that the President of the United States having described at some length the modus vivendi proposal to the British Prime Minister in a personal message and having received Mr. Churchill's views thereon, would also have described the American note of November 26 which was actually handed to the Japanese representatives and to the British Prime Minister.

[1859] Moreover it seems equally probable that the President of the United States would acknowledge the British Prime Minister's message as contained in the telegram of Ambassador Winant to the State Department of November 26.

No such acknowledgement of the British Prime Minister's message of November 26 by the President has been introduced before us. Nor do we have in evidence any message from the President to the British Prime Minister describing the American note of November 26 in the same manner in which we describe the modus vivendi proposal in an earlier message.

Again on November 30 we have in evidence before us a communication to the Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant containing a message from the British Prime Minister to the President of the United States outlining what Mr. Churchill described as "an important method remaining unused to avert war between Japan and our two countries."
It seems to me most probably that the President forwarded some reply to Mr. Churchill’s message of November 30.

It now clearly appears from the evidence before us that the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States communicated messages directly to each other.

It is also obvious that we have no complete file of such communications before us.

We have no evidence or statement from counsel that the messages from Mr. Churchill to Mr. Roosevelt and the messages from Mr. Roosevelt to Mr. Churchill which have been introduced in evidence constitute the only communications between those two parties in this critical period of American-Japanese relationships.

Consequently I feel obliged to make the following requests of counsel:

1. Will counsel produce from the files of the State Department all communications from Mr. Winant, Ambassador to Great Britain, to the State Department, and from the State Department to Mr. Winant, for the period from November 24, 1941, and including December 7, 1941, together with a certificate from the custodian of such files in the State Department that the communications presented to the committee constitute all the communications from the State Department to Mr. Winant or from Mr. Winant to the State Department for the period specified.

I observe that the British Prime Minister in communicating with the President described himself as the “former naval person.” This description and the Prime Minister’s previous affiliation with the Admiralty suggests the probability that the President may have communicated with the British Prime Minister through the medium of the communications system of the Navy Department or the War Department, and that the British Prime Minister may have also communicated with the President through the medium of the British Admiralty and the Navy Department.

Consequently, I feel obliged to make the following request of counsel in order that we may be certain of all the facts:

Will counsel produce from the files of the War or Navy Department all communications from the President of the United States to the British Prime Minister, or to any intermediary of the British Prime Minister, such as the British Admiralty for the period from November 24, 1941, to and including December 7, 1941, together with a certificate from the custodian of such files, if any exists, and I do not know or say they do exist, in the War and Navy Departments, that the files presented to the committee contain all of the communications from the President to Mr. Churchill, or from Mr. Churchill to the President transmitted via the War or Navy Departments communications system, as the case may be, for the period from November 24 up to and including December 7, 1941.

If either Department informs counsel that there are no such files in existence in such Department, will counsel produce for the committee a certificate to that effect from the custodian of the files in either the War or Navy Department?

Now, will counsel also produce all records and copies of communications to and from Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill for the period from November 24, 1941, to December 7, 1941, which exists
among the papers in the custody of the Roosevelt Estate, together
with a certificate from the custodian of such papers that they con-
istute all such papers relating to the period specified in his or her cus-
tody or possession.

We are now examining important officials of the State Department
dealing with the critical phase of the Japanese-American negotiations
in the year 1941. We have affirmative evidence before us of direct
communications from the British Prime Minister to the President and
from the President to the British Prime Minister.

The communications which we have before us indicate, to me at
least, the likelihood of their being other communications not only in
reply to certain of the communications which we now have before us
but on the same general topics covered by such communications.

Now, knowing this situation, I do not see how this committee or
counsel can completely and adequately discharge their respective
obligations without presenting the complete file from whatever
source, War, Navy, or State Department, or the personal files of Mr.
Roosevelt, of all communications between him and the British Prime
Minister for the period of [1863] November 24 to December
7, 1941.

Senator Ferguson. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Mitchell, could you give us information on
the request that was made for all the admiralty messages, as to whether
or not we have, as a committee, received all the admiralty messages
that I requested many weeks ago?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes——

The Chairman. The Chair thinks counsel should answer first the
request propounded by the Congressman from Wisconsin.

 Senator Ferguson. I thought this might answer that one question
about the admiralty.

Mr. Mitchell. It is included.

Mr. Congressman. Would you mind letting us have a copy of that
memorandum?

Mr. Keefe. I will be very happy to. Pass it over to him, Mr.
Murphy.

Mr. Mitchell. So we will be able to work on it.

Mr. Keefe. Just hand it over.

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you.

I might say, without going into detail, that many of these things
have been under examination and investigation to [1864] de-
determine what there is. We would have to go over this memorandum
carefully and see what we have done and see what more you would
like to have us do. For instance, the White House records, we weren’t
going to rely on any certificate from Miss Tully. She was listed as
a witness, and she would explain everything asked for. I mention
that as one of the things involved. But you may be assured, Mr.
Congressman, that we will do our very best, after we have studied this
memorandum, to report to you what we have done and what we
can do.1

[1865] Now, as far as Senator Ferguson’s request is concerned—
his request put in, I think, 2 or 3 weeks ago—my memory is that
he asked for all communications that passed between the British

1 See Hearings, Part 8, pp. 3839–3842.
Admiralty and the Navy Department during the years 1940 and 1941.

We submitted—

Senator Ferguson. That related to the Far East.

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, no. The request did not say what it related to. It said all of them, on the theory, I think that—I was not to be the judge as to whether they were material or not—probably he wanted about all of them.

We made that request to the Navy Department. Their report, first orally to me, was that during those years while the battle of the Atlantic was going on and we were involved in the escorting and naval work on the Atlantic, thousands of messages passed between the Admiralty and the Navy Department.

They also told me that the communications to and from the Admiralty to the Navy Department were not all kept in one file. They were put in different files, according to the subject to which they related. That to comply with the member's request would require the investigation of files including over 375,000 papers and they said it would take 11 men I have forgotten how long, some extraordinary time to do it.

[1866] Realizing what that meant I asked the Navy if they would please at least start with December 7, 1941, and work backwards for a month or two and dig out everything they could and I reported that orally to the Senator, I think, at the time.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Mitchell, have you got all those that they have already dug out?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, we have all those that they dug out but it is only for a limited time and I would say this: If the Senator would only be willing to tell the Navy what subject matter he is interested in they may be able to locate it in one of these 375,000 papers much easier than it is with the information we have.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire? If counsel will give me what he already has I will be glad to point it out. I have not received them and I haven't any word that they received them. I haven't seen any except what you have placed here on the table.

Mr. Mitchell. Neither have I. One of my assistants reports that material of that kind came in 2 or 3 days ago and I haven't honestly, had a chance to look at it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then you do not want to criticize the member of the committee for not giving you the information when he has not even seen it.

[1867] Mr. Mitchell. Well, I suggested that if you would be willing to state what subject matter these messages relate to, which you are interested in, it would greatly facilitate the work of the Navy and they might go much farther back than they have done.

Senator Ferguson. Could I see now what you have?

Mr. Mitchell. You can see it as soon as we recess. I haven't it in the room.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I have in mind. Then I will give you definite information as to what I desire.

Mr. Mitchell. That will help.
Senator Ferguson. That will clear the matter up.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, do I understand now that the Navy at the present time is investigating 375,000 messages?

Mr. Mitchell. No. When I found that problem confronting them I said we won’t do it. We will start with December 7, 1941, and work backwards a month or two or three and get out some of this material and when you give it to us I will show it to the Senator and see if that is the sort of thing he wants. So it was finally impossible to do it as originally requested, but I am not criticizing the Senator. I am just answering his question and stating what the situation is.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, may I say to the [1868] distinguished counsel that the request which I have made is very specific. It does not cover 375,000 telegrams. It is very specific as to the type and character of information requested and very limited as to time.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the way we like to have them. This covers November 24 to December 7 and it is not an impossible proposition.

Mr. Keefe. In making that request I had in mind the fact that there must have been innumerable communications between the Admiralty and our Navy and War Departments and I am only asking, for my purposes, for the specific information contained in that written request.

Senator Lucas. May I ask if the Congressman from Wisconsin will yield?

The Chairman. Congressman, will you yield to the Senator from Illinois?

Mr. Keefe. I am very happy to yield. I have not taken much time, but I will yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas. I am not going to take much time, only to congratulate you in what you have done here in asking counsel for express information which they can get, which they can go into in a hurry and obtain the information.

The Chairman. All right. Proceed with your examination of Mr. Grew.

[1869] Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Now, Mr. Grew, I have listened carefully to your testimony and the rather extended cross-examination and my purpose in asking the few questions that I shall ask is to try and clarify some questions that have arisen in my mind and to get them into some sort of chronological order if possible.

Now, as I understand the situation, you reported to the State Department as our Ambassador in Japan beginning shortly after your arrival there, giving your impressions from time to time of the state of mind of the Japanese people and your observations and you made them rather full and complete; and during the period of time from 1932 on there developed, as I gathered from your testimony, a gradual disintegration, just gradual disintegration, with little spurts up and then spurts down diplomatically in the relationship between the United States and Japan.

I gathered from your testimony that there were in Japan some elements that were inclined to be bellicose and warminded and obsessed with their powers of greatness and expansion and aggres-
sion and that there were other groups that were fighting for peace. Is that correct?
Mr. Grew. That is correct, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Keeffe. And you reported to the State Department from time to time what you observed with reference to the activi-
[1870]ties of these various groups?
The Chairman. You had better make your answers orally so that they get into the record, instead of nodding your head, Mr. Ambassa-
dor. The stenographer does not get your nod.
Mr. Grew. That is correct, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Keeffe. And you observed the development of this Japanese war-minded spirit and the determination to expand as it developed in
the years from 1934, 1935, 1936, on up to the final outbreak of war?
Mr. Grew. That, obviously, was my duty, Mr. Congressman, and I tried to carry it out continuously during those years.
Mr. Keeffe. And in line with that attitude on your part, I was greatly interested in the report which you made to the Secretary of State on February 26, 1941, which transmitted to the Secretary of State a memorandum by the counsellor of the Embassy in Japan, Mr. Dooman, which had your full and complete approval. That is correct?
Mr. Grew. That is correct.
[1871] Mr. Keeffe. The message of transmittal appears on page 137 of volume 2 of Foreign Relations of the United States, and then follows on pages 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, and 143 the report of Mr. Dooman's conversations with Mr. Ohashi. You recall that, Mr. Grew?
Mr. Grew. I do, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. And then follows a memoranda from you to the Secret-
tary of State advising of the conversation which you had on Febru-
ary 26 Tokyo time, with Matsuoka in which you told him that you concurred entirely in the statement that Mr. Dooman had made to Ohashi on February 14. Do you recall that?
Mr. Grew. I do recall that. That is correct.
Mr. Keeffe. Yes. Now, in this report of the Counsellor of the Embas-
say, dated February 14, 1941, he goes into great detail in setting forth the conversations which he had with Mr. Ohashi who was the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, and you are very familiar with that report?
Mr. Grew. Yes.
Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Dooman, it appears from the report, had been on
furlough to the United States in the fall of 1940 and had, as he said, and I quote from it [reading]:

Mr. Ohashi said he understood that I had just returned from leave in the United States and that he sup-
[1872]posed I had received a number of interesting impressions in the United States. I replied that my furlough in the United States coincided with one of the most significant and important periods in the history of our country, and that if he had time I would be glad to tell him briefly of what I had seen and heard while at home. Mr. Ohashi said that fortunately he was not busy that day and that I could stay as long as I wished.
And then follows the statement to Mr. Ohashi by Mr. Dooman of his observations gleaned from his trips around the country during the fall of 1940 which, by the way, was an election year and he refers to it in this statement and it finally ended up by his general statement to Mr. Ohashi that in the event that Japan continued the course that it was following it would inevitably be considered that it might lead to a diplomatic rupture and then Mr. Ohashi took the floor, do you recall?

The report says on page 140 of volume 2 of Foreign Relations:

Mr. Ohashi then took the floor and launched into an impassioned apologia of Japanese policies in recent years. He started by describing conditions in Japan during the middle twenty's.

and going on for two or three pages here setting forth the Japanese attitude.

Now, does that statement of Mr. Ohashi—I will not take the time to read it into the record because it is now in evidence—in your judgment, Mr. Grew, fairly express the Japanese attitude as you understood it?

Mr. Grew. Mr. Congressman, I haven't read this record of that conversation for a long time and while my recollection is that it was a fair presentation, I do not want to answer that question categorically without studying it. I believe it was, as I recollect it, a fair presentation of the Japanese position.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, in view of your transmitting it to the State Department and your approval of the whole message I assume that it could safely be said that except for any omissions that might properly have been included it is a fair statement of at least the position of Mr. Ohashi as reflecting what the Japanese attitude was during the years from 1920 on down.

Mr. Grew. It is a fair statement.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. Now, it appears that the Lease-Lend Act was approved by the President on March 11, 1941, and that on June 6, 1941, an act was approved for taking over foreign ships lying idle in United States ports. Do you recall that?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. That was in connection with the freezing of Japanese assets.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, the freezing of Japanese assets did not come until July 25, 1941.

Mr. Grew. That is right.

Mr. Keeffe. That came later.

Mr. Grew. Well, I do not remember the exact dates.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, I have a memorandum. I have a paper showing these chronological dates.

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Mr. Keeffe. The freezing of Japanese assets took place on July 25, 1941. Now, when did the Konoye Cabinet fall? I just want to get that correctly.

Mr. Grew. As I recollect it, it fell on October 16. I can look that up very quickly if you wish.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, my recollection is I think you are correct.

Mr. Grew. I think it is October 16.

Mr. Keeffe. It was along about coincident with the proposal to reopen the Burma Road on the 17th of October, wasn't it?
Mr. Grew. That is right.
Mr. Keefe. Now, on August 1, 1941, President Roosevelt banned the export of aviation fuel to Japan. Do you recall that? [1875] Mr. Grew. I did not hear your statement, Congressman. Mr. Roosevelt passed what, the aviation what?
Mr. Keefe. Read it, please.
(Whereupon the reporter read the question as follows: "Now, on August 1, 1941, President Roosevelt banned the export of aviation fuel to Japan. Do you recall that?") Mr. Grew. Oh, yes, I recollect it perfectly.
Mr. Keefe. Now, these were intended to be sort of economic sanctions or pressures applied to Japan in hopes that they would be effective in implementing the diplomatic conversations that were going on, isn't that true?
Mr. Grew. They were. Those steps were taken with the thought that it would lead Japan to such a position that the more intelligent and liberal-minded statesmen might possibly come into a position where they would control.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Mr. Grew. That is a fact, yes.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, it was intended to implement our general diplomatic attitude?
Mr. Grew. That is true.
Mr. Keefe. That is true, is it not?
Mr. Grew. That is true.
Mr. Keefe. Now, as a matter of fact the imposition of [1876] these trade embargoes and the other economic sanctions that were imposed against Japan did not in any sense deter the war lords of Japan in their purposes and policies, did it?
Mr. Grew. They did not in the long run, in the end, no.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, can you point to any specific indication of any action on the part of Japan that indicated a change in their continued policy made and brought about as a result of the application of these economic sanctions?
Mr. Grew. Yes, Mr. Congressman, I think I touched on that yesterday. I think that is contained, the story is contained, in my telegram of September 29, 1941, in which I said that this economic situation in which Japan found herself had, in my opinion, brought about among the more intelligent statesmen in Japan the thought that they were approaching the brink of an abyss and it was my belief that at that time they tried to reverse the engine.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I understood your testimony, pardon me, Mr. Grew, in that regard, but my question does not relate definitely to that. There were intelligent people in Japan who could see the brink of the precipice, as you have indicated it so well, and that they were about to fall off into the abyss as you have stated, or as you stated it in September; but as a matter of fact those war lords who were running the show were not stopped at all. It may have had some effect on [1877] the other crowd, but not on the war lords. Isn't that true, Mr. Grew?
Mr. Grew. That is, in general, true, but I would like to point out in that telegram of September 25, which is already on the record—
The Chairman. The chairman might suggest that the hour of 12 having arrived, and obviously you cannot conclude before recessing, that we will take a recess until 2:00 o'clock and you will have time to refresh your recollection.

Mr. Keefe. Very well.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[1878] afternoon session—2 p. m.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Before proceeding further the Chair wishes to state that inquiry has been made of him concerning the question of having a session on Saturday. The Chair is advised that the Congressman from Wisconsin, Mr. Keefe, will be unable to be here on Saturday, Congressman Murphy of Pennsylvania will be unable to be here Saturday, and that probably two or three other members of the committee will find it impossible to be here on this particular coming Saturday.

So that the committee has felt it wise not to attempt to hold a session on Saturday of this week. That has no relationship to any program for Saturday meetings hereafter and in view of the importance of the hearing and the large number of witnesses, the Chair hopes that we will be able, after this week, to hold sessions on Saturday. For this coming Saturday there will be no session of the committee.

Now, Mr. Keefe, you may proceed.

Testimony of Joseph Clark Grew (Resumed)

Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, before the questions—

Mr. Keefe. Just a moment, please, Mr. Grew.

May I say to the Chairman that I want to thank him for his conclusion not to hold a meeting Saturday, so far as I am concerned, and having mentioned my name may I state, for [1879] the purpose of the record, that my interest in not being here Saturday was not prompted by the Army-Navy football game at Philadelphia.

The Chairman. Well, the Chair understands that, Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. I am compelled, because of illness in my family, as the chairman knows, to get away from here for at least one day.

The Chairman. The chairman is glad to confirm that and his announcement that there will be no session Saturday had no relation whatever to the Army-Navy game.

Mr. Keefe. May I say, observing the smiles on the faces of some of those in the room, they, perhaps, are likewise afflicted, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to say that several days ago Congressman Keefe advised him that on account of the illness of his wife he felt compelled to be away this coming Saturday, and the Chair is able to appreciate fully how the Congressman feels about it.

So this recess for this approaching Saturday has, for the benefit of anybody who may smile—over which the Chair has no control—no relationship whatever to the Army-Navy football game.

All right, Mr. Keefe, go ahead.
Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, may I correct one misstatement of this morning for the record?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Grew. Is it agreeable to you, Mr. Keefe?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Grew. I would like to correct one inaccuracy in my testimony of this morning and also bring forward two documents which were requested by Senator Ferguson and which I found in the meantime.

This morning Senator Ferguson asked me if I had on returning from Japan in August 1943 submitted a report to Mr. Hull.

Well, 3 years have gone by since that time and, frankly, I had forgotten the fact that I did submit to Mr. Hull a series of dispatches, quite a number of reports, covering the whole story of the last days before Pearl Harbor, the events as they occurred in Japan, all of which is on the record, completely on the record and has been brought out, I think, before this committee, and also a general statement with regard to the period of our internment in Japan from December 1941 until June 1942.

Those reports which were turned in to the State Department are all available but, as far as I am aware, all the pertinent information in them has been already brought before this committee.

Senator Ferguson. Might I, Mr. Chairman, inquire from counsel if we have a copy of the information that Ambassador Grew is now talking about.

Mr. Mitchell. He is talking about some reports he made to Mr. Hull. They haven't been distributed. We haven't seen them. We will get them.

The Chairman. Does the Chair understand those were reports made to Secretary Hull after the Ambassador returned from Japan in August 1942, after he was exchanged?

Mr. Grew. That is true.

The Chairman. Along with certain other Americans held by the Japanese Government for certain Japanese held by the Government of the United States.

Mr. Grew. Yes.

The Chairman. Such reports as you now refer to were made upon your return in August 1942?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, will counsel get for the committee that information?

Mr. Mitchell. You mean get the report?

Senator Ferguson. That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.¹

The Chairman. Go ahead, Mr. Keefe.

The Vice Chairman. I think Mr. Grew had another statement [7832] to make.

Mr. Grew. The second point, Mr. Chairman, is this: I was asked, with relation to my so-called green-light telegram, which I think was in December 1940, which referred to an article by Mr. A. T. Steele, far-eastern correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, I was asked to obtain that.

I find in the State Department files a long telegram from Mr. Smythe, who was our chargé d'affaires in Peiping at that time, in which he gives a complete summary of that article.

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2068, for statement by Mr. Gessell.
He says in this telegram:

Mr. A. T. Steele, Far Eastern Correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, returned last week from home leave in the United States spending some days in Japan and Manchuria before coming here. As Mr. Steele is an experienced and able observer, the Embassy asked him to prepare a statement of his impressions, and a summary thereof is respectfully submitted below as of interest to the Department.

As it is a very long telegram shall I pass it on to the general counsel?

The Chairman. Yes; I think that would be appropriate.

[1883] The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Grew. The other document that I was asked about, I was asked whether I had ever been informed in Tokyo on the conversation between the President and the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941.

Well, practically, as far as I knew, a report of all those conversations was telegraphed to me in Tokyo. I did not recollect this particular conversation but I have here the record in the shape of a telegram from the Secretary of State to myself dated August 18, in which it sets forth the record of the conversation between the President and the Japanese Ambassador on August 17.

Shall I also turn that over to the counsel?

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I see that through counsel?

The Chairman. Yes. I am sure that counsel will be glad to pass it on to the Senator.

Is that all now, Mr. Grew?

Mr. Grew. That is all I have now.

The Chairman. All right, sir.

Mr. Grew. I am still making an examination, I am still exploring for certain other documents which Senator Ferguson asked me to try to find and if we find them we shall promptly produce them.

[1884] The Chairman. All right, Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. When we concluded at the noon hour, Mr. Grew, I had asked you to state specifically a fact that would indicate that the imposition of economic sanctions upon Japan had restrained Japan in her warlike attitude and you stated, as I recall, that you wanted to make reference to a certain telegram.

Now, I repeat that question to you this afternoon.

Mr. Grew. The answer to that question, Mr. Congressman; I think is contained in two telegrams, the report of my conversation with Prince Konoye on September 6, 1941, the then Prime Minister of Japan——

Mr. Keefe. Well, will you refer to that telegram?

Mr. Grew. That is on the record, sir: It has been already referred to, I think, several times. Do you wish me to produce it?

Mr. Keefe. Well, what is there in that telegram that indicates specifically any action on the part of Japan that was retarded as a result of our imposing economic sanctions?

Refer to the telegram, if you please, and point out what there is in it that specifically indicates that the Japanese were ever retarded as a result of the imposition of economic sanctions.

Mr. Grew. All right, sir.
[1885] I think there is nothing in that telegram which would precisely answer your question but I think you will find material in the telegram which I sent to the Secretary of State on September 29, 1941, which would.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, will you point out in that telegram of September 29, 1941, specifically the incidents that you refer to?

Mr. Grew. I would like to get the original text if I may, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

Mr. Grew. September 29. It may be in my bag there.

I think to answer your question, Mr. Congressman, I would have to read a considerable passage from this telegram. Shall I do so? It is a very long telegram of September 29, of which I have before me only the paraphrase. I have not the true text. I shall be glad to read those passages.

Mr. Gesell. That is at page 645 of volume II.

Mr. Keefe. I have it before me.

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. Where do you propose to read?

Mr. Grew. I would like to read from the second paragraph.

Mr. Keefe. Very well.

Mr. Grew. The second and third paragraph, I think, will cover it.

The Chairman. What page?

Mr. Grew (reading): The Ambassador recalls his statements—

The Chairman. What page is it?

Mr. Mitchell. 645 and 646.

The Chairman. 645 and 646, all right.

Mr. Grew (reading): The Ambassador recalls his statements in the past that in Japan the pendulum always swings between moderate and extremist policies; that it was not then possible under the existing circumstances for any Japanese leader or group to reverse the program of expansion and expect to survive; that the permanent digging in by Japanese in China and the pushing of the Japanese advances to the south could be prevented only by insuperable obstacles. The Ambassador recalls likewise his views that the risks of taking positive measures to maintain United States security in the future were likely to be far smaller than the risks of not taking such measures; that only respect for potential power of the United States has deterred Japan from taking more liberties with American interests; and that Japan's program of forcible expansion could be brought to a halt only by a show of force and by a demonstration of American willingness to use this force if necessary. The Ambassador recalls also his statement that if Japan's leadership could be discredited eventually by such American action, there might take shape in Japan ultimately a regeneration of thought which would allow Japan to resume formal relations with the United States, leading to a readjustment of the entire problem of the Pacific.

The Ambassador suggests that the United States has been following very wisely precisely this policy, which furthered by other developments in the world, has helped to discredit Japanese leadership, notably that of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka. The Ambassador cites as world developments arousing a positive reaction from the United States the conclusion by Japan of the Tripartite Alliance and Japan's recognition of the Wang Ching-Wei regime at Nanking, which preceded Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Germany's action upset the basis for the Tripartite Pact, Japan having joined the Italo-German Axis in order to obtain security against Russia and thereby to avoid the peril of being caught between the Soviet Union and the United States.
At the present time Japan is attempting to correct this miscalculation by getting out of an extremely dangerous position. The [1888] Ambassador recalls his reports to the Department to the effect that Japanese foreign policies are inevitably changed by the impact of events abroad and that liberal elements in Japan might come to the top in due course as a result of the trend of events. He considers that such a time has arrived. He sees a good chance of Japan's falling into line if a program can be followed of world reconstruction as forecast by the declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. American policy—of forbearance, patient argumentation, efforts at persuasion, followed for many years, plus a manifest determination of the United States to take positive measures when called for—plus the impact of world developments upon Japan, has rendered Japan's political soil hospitable to the sowing of new seeds which, the Ambassador feels, if planted carefully and nourished, may bring about the anticipated regeneration of Japanese thought and a complete readjustment of relations between Japan and the United States.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Mr. Grew, I appreciate your courtesy in reading these two paragraphs from your message to the State Department of September 29, 1941. I must confess, however, that the reading does not in any sense answer the question which I asked you. [1889] I would like to have you point out, if you can, either from this message or from any fact within your knowledge any specific fact which demonstrates that Japan was deterred in its militaristic policy of expansion and aggression by the imposition of economic sanctions.

Here you are talking about going forward with military and naval force. I am referring and limiting my questions alone to the application of economic sanctions.

Mr. Grew. The point which I am trying to bring out, Mr. Congressman, is this, that the imposition of economic sanctions on Japan had placed Japan in an exceedingly dangerous position economically, socially, and in every other way. The result of this policy that we had followed had, in my opinion, brought certain leaders in Japan—I do not refer to the militarists: I refer to certain leaders—

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Mr. Grew, if I may interrupt right there.

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. We are interested in the impact upon those who were formulating and carrying out the policy of Japan, not isolated leaders that were intimate with you, that were intimate in talking with you in terms of peace, but the people that were actually formulating and carrying out the policies.

Mr. Grew. I am talking about the very person who was [1890] formulating and carrying out the policy, namely, the Prime Minister at that time.

Mr. Keefe. Very well.

Mr. Grew. Prince Konoye. He was the man. My talk with him, which is recorded on September 6, and the conversation which this telegram aims to analyze; that he, in spite of all his appalling record, which was set forth by Mr. Hull the other day, which, as I said, was one of the worst trains of events of international banditry in all history, he was responsible for many of the things which had been done by Japan through these years; at the same time he was intelligent enough, I think, to see the handwriting on the wall and to realize that Japan had got herself into an exceedingly dangerous position and that there were only two ways out: One way out was by war and the other way out was an arrangement and agreement with the United States.
Now, he had been in our country, he knew something about our productive capacity, he knew something about our national spirit, of which the militarists did not know, to which they paid no attention, and I think he realized at that time, I gathered from evidence which appeared from time to time, that he realized that Japan, if she should go to war with the United States and Great Britain, might readily be defeated and emerge from that war as a third- or a fifth-class power.

[1891] I think he realized the country was on the brink of an abyss and I think that with all his appalling record he honestly tried to reverse the engine.

Now, that is my precise answer to what effect our economic policy had on Japanese leaders and when I say the Prime Minister himself, I know that he was backed and supported by a considerable element among what I call the liberal leaders of Japan.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, now, can you point to one single objective of the Japanese war lords or militarists who were in control that they receded from or refrained from carrying out as a result of the imposition of economic sanctions?

Mr. Grew. I might read one more passage to answer that question, Mr. Congressman. I go back to——

Mr. Keeffe. Well, do you have any present recollection yourself?

Mr. Grew. Yes, I have and I can state it but I can state it more precisely by reading one passage from my report here of my conversation with the Prime Minister on September 6.

Now, nobody can possibly say how much weight we should attach to the following statement which I am about to read. It is one of those things that can never be proved, whether it was genuine or whether it was not genuine, whether Prince [1892] Konoye in trying to see President Roosevelt had wished to pull the wool over our eyes and cause a delay so that it would give Japan more time to arm and prepare, nobody can answer that question. The Japanese militarists seemed to be, so far as I could understand at that time, completely self-confident of their power; I do not think they needed more time and I think they realized that time would play in our hands.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, now, Ambassador Grew, pardon me. I do not want to interject myself into your answer but perhaps I am not making myself clear.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; you are. My answer will answer your question.

Mr. Keeffe. For the purpose of getting a clear answer may I state this at this time:

During the summer of 1941 and in the fall and especially in September Japan steadily continued her march to the south and her infiltration into Indo-China.

Mr. Grew. That is absolutely true.

Mr. Keeffe. Which caused you and the State Department and the President great concern.

Mr. Grew. Certainly.

Mr. Keeffe. So that the imposition of economic sanctions did not stop Japan from going on down into Indo-China.

[1893] Mr. Grew. It did not. It had not up to that point. The question arose at that time whether at the point that I am now speaking about it was going to be possible to stop that expansion.
Mr. Keeffe. May I also call your attention to the fact, so that you will have this in mind in answering my question, that we are now furnished with information that starting in January 1941 there was called into session in Tokyo representatives of the fleet to discuss a plan that had been devised in January, I believe, 1941 for an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Grew. Perfectly true.

Mr. Keeffe. And that as a result of those conversations which continued during the summer, in September 1941 they had reached a full and complete agreement, very secret, in their top naval circles setting out the exact plan and setting the date as of December 7, 1941. Those were the war lords in action, as we now know them to be.

Mr. Grew. That is absolutely true, Mr. Congressman, and in addition to that, I would say every country presumably has its war plans prepared long in advance to put into force, if necessary, with regard to any potential enemy. A country will have its so-called orange plan, its blue plan, its yellow plan, whatever it may be.

I have seen it in the old days in Europe. But the mere fact that this plan had been elaborated on paper in January 1941 does not necessarily mean that events might possibly have brought about a situation where that plan would, in fact, have to be put into effect.

Mr. Keeffe. Obviously, events did not occur that prevented placing that plan into effect, because it was put into effect on December 7.

Mr. Grew. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, I would like to have you also bear in mind the fact that you yourself have testified repeatedly here as to the infiltration and continued infiltration into Indochina, as to its concern on you and the State Department, and the assembling of this large fleet, which was being assembled, and which later sailed down apparently to land forces on the Kra Peninsula, and into Thailand.

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. They continued right straight on with their aggressive war in China, and with the infiltration into Indochina and down to the south, one step at a time.

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, what I have asked you to do is to point out, if you will, to me, any particular act that was stopped or retarded as the result of the imposition of these economic sanctions.

Mr. Grew. I cannot point out any specific act that actually did stop that procedure, but I can point out, as is perfectly clear on the record, that we in Tokyo at that time felt if the Prime Minister and the President of the United States could meet face to face, it might be possible to put a stop to that movement.

Mr. Keeffe. It was all guesswork?

Mr. Grew. We could not tell, but that is my answer to your question.

Mr. Keeffe. That was an expression of a pious hope that that would take place, was it not?

Mr. Grew. That was an expression of a pious hope, and also, as I have said repeatedly, and I would like to repeat now once again, that in that telegram of analysis of this situation, I said, in the last paragraph of my telegram of September 29:

In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does so in all deference to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and
That was a premise to all my reports.
To answer your question about the war lords I would merely read one paragraph of the report of my talk with the Prime Minister at that time. That is the telegram of September 6, 1941.
Mr. Gesell. Page 603, I think, is the one you quoted.
Mr. Grew. Page 605 of Foreign Relations.

The report which the Prime Minister has received—
Mr. Keefe. (interposing). Could I have the page again?
Mr. Grew. That is page 605 of Foreign Relations, volume II.
Mr. Keefe. I have it.
Mr. Grew. This is my report of the talk, of my conversations with the Prime Minister on September 6, 1941. Paragraph No. 4 says:

The report which the Prime Minister has received from the Japanese Ambassador concerning the latter’s conversations with the President and the Secretary, have led the Prime Minister to think that the Administration in Washington entertains serious doubts as to the strength of the present cabinet, and that the Administration is not certain that in the event that the Cabinet should adopt a peaceful program it could successfully resist the attacks of opposing elements.

Prince Konoe told me that from the inception of the informal talks in Washington he had received the strongest concurrence from the responsible Chiefs of both the Army and the Navy. Only today he had conferred with the Minister of War who had promised to send a full general to accompany the Prime Minister to the meeting with the President; the Minister of the Navy had agreed that a full admiral should accompany the Prime Minister.

Prince Konoe added in confidence that he expected that the representative of the Navy would probably be Admiral Yoshida, a former minister of the Navy. In addition, the Premier would be accompanied by the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Navy and other ranking officers of the armed services who are in entire accord with his aims. He admitted that there are certain elements within the armed forces who do not approve his policies, but he voiced the conviction that since he had the full support of the responsible Chiefs of the Army and Navy, it would be possible for him to put down and control any opposition which might develop among those elements.

[1898] Mr. Keefe. Well, were you suggesting to our State Department and the President that it was your opinion that there should be a meeting between the President and Prince Konoe?
Mr. Grew. That appears in this record, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Keefe. You warmly recommended that, did you not?
Mr. Grew. From our point of view in Tokyo at that time.
Mr. Keefe. You felt Prince Konoe was a man inclined to peace, and that some good would come out of such conference?

Mr. Grew. I think all of us in the Embassy at that time—when I say “all of us” I mean the senior officers, the military attaché, naval attaché, commercial attaché, and all of the senior members of the Embassy believed it was a good gamble; that Konoe had come to a position where he realized the dangerous situation in which his country had got itself, and he was trying to find a way out.

Now, whether he controlled the military elements or not is a question we can never answer. It is not susceptible to proof. We cannot do it.

Mr. Keefe. As a matter of fact, that meeting was never held?
Mr. Grew. That meeting was never held.
Mr. Keefe. The proposal was rejected here at Washington, was it not?

[1899] Mr. Grew. Well, the proposal was never acted on. Although you will find that in August—let me see if I can put my hand on it. This is in Foreign Relations, page 572. The record shows that on August 28, 1941, when Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador, had delivered to the President a letter from Prince Konoye, the record shows:

At the conclusion of the reading of the communication, the President said to the Ambassador that he could say to his government that he considered this note a step forward and that he was very hopeful. He then added that he would be keenly interested in having three or four days with Prince Konoe and again he mentioned Juneau.

He mentioned Juneau as the place of meeting.

Mr. Keefe. Do you know why the meeting was never held?

Mr. Grew. No, sir. I think Mr. Hull has made that amply clear in his statement. Mr. Hull felt that it would be futile to go ahead with the meeting unless the basis had been laid in advance in the Washington conversations.

Mr. Keefe. The futility of it appeared, according to Mr. Hull's statement, right while these negotiations were going on and Japan continued its unrepressed march of aggression.

Mr. Grew. That is perfectly true.

[1900] Mr. Keefe. Right on and on, day by day.

Mr. Grew. That is perfectly true.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Hull and the President continually suggested if they were in earnest and if they were honest about the peace they would put a stop to some of those things.

Isn't that the situation? But the war lords would not do it; isn't that correct?

Mr. Grew. It is more of a story than that, Mr. Congressman. It is a pretty complicated story. No one who has not lived in Japan and understands the way things work there could possibly understand it. I have tried to explain one phase of it.

Mr. Keefe. You are making it pretty tough for me, Mr. Grew, when you say nobody that did not live there can possibly understand it. I am going to be in a hopeless situation, then; if that is the case.

Mr. Grew. The facts are these: At that time in Japan there were two camps. There were the militarist war leaders who were all out for expansion, and were carrying out the plans, as you have just said, day after day, week after week, steadily.

One the other hand, there were certain liberal-minded statesmen who realized the position their country had got into, realized the danger of war, and wanted to avert it, if [1901] they possibly could.

Now, anything that appeared on the records had to go through the Foreign Office, which was always discredited by the military people. The Foreign Office was full of young officers of extremist tendencies, many of them playing in with the Germans, and anything that went on the record, went through the Foreign Office, was promptly put through the hands of the extremists, and the Germans were constantly pressing, pressing to prevent any possibility of an understanding with the United States. That was the reason for their fear of formulas.
That was the reason why I said in this telegram that they never would be able to bring about a satisfactory understanding in the conversations in Washington for the mere fact that they were so spread on the record. They had good reason to fear, because they were constantly trying to assassinate Prince Konoye, and they very nearly did assassinate him just at this time when four thugs jumped aboard his car with daggers and tried to get at him, but failed. The former Prime Minister was also attacked. His throat was cut and he was out of the picture for many months thereafter. All these statesmen who were not playing in with the military were constantly under attack by the militarists. That is, I think, a fundamental reason why they were afraid of formulas.

[1902] Now Prince Konoye said to me, "If I can meet the President face to face I will give him assurances, commitments which we will honorably carry out. We cannot carry them out overnight, but we will carry them out in as short a time as possible."

That is all on the record here, every bit of it. He said, "A settlement of this kind will so electrify the Japanese people, showing them that they can have what they want politically, economically, and socially, they can have security without any more fighting," and they were tired out with the China war, they were subject to the greatest economic sacrifices. Konoye said, "It will be accepted by the great mass of the Japanese people, with the greatest satisfaction," and he said, "I can guarantee that this will be carried out."

He said, "It can be carried out. It may take 6 months or more, it will take some time, but we will take our troops out of China, we will take our troops out of Indochina. Of course we have got to leave certain garrisons here and there for the purpose of our own security."

I said at once when this statement was made, "What do you mean by that?" He said, "I mean just the sort of thing like you yourselves are doing, the British are doing. You have garrisons in Peiping, in Tientsin, Shanghai, and so have the British, and so have many other countries." He said, "That is what we have in mind for the purposes of security."

[1903] There is the story. Nobody in the world can prove that even if Konoye had met the President and even if he had been able to give satisfactory commitments that he could have implemented them after he came back. That was definitely in the control of the military. Nobody could answer that question, and it cannot be answered today. It is not susceptible to proof.

Mr. Keefe. At least the President and Mr. Hull doubted his ability to implement any such suggestions with the military.

Mr. Grew. Very definitely.

Mr. Keefe. Because they declined the invitation for the conference.

Mr. Grew. Very definitely.

Mr. Keefe. That is true, is it not?

Mr. Grew. Absolutely.

Mr. Keefe. All right. That is in answer to my question, unless you have something further.

Mr. Grew. I just want to say once more everything I have said today represents the point of view of one spot, our Embassy in Tokyo.
and we were deprived of a great deal of the information which was available to the President and Mr. Hull. We had none of the secret intercepts or telegrams, we had none of the documents that have come into the State Department from time to time, documents of a secret nature, so of course the President and Mr. Hull saw the picture with a great deal more information than we had available to us.

Mr. Keeffe. Am I to understand then, Mr. Grew, that from the information available to you at the Embassy in Tokyo, being denied the information contained in the intercepts and all of the other information available here at Washington, you were recommending that this meeting with Prince Konoye be held and that it would be productive of some good?

Mr. Grew. Well, sir, to get the record straight on that—and it is all on the record—I better read you exactly what was said here. This is the telegram of September 29:

In the opinion of the Ambassador, on the basis of the above observations which he has every reason to regard as sound—

That was my analysis of the whole situation at that time—

American objectives will not be reached by insisting or continuing to insist during the preliminary conversations that Japan provide the sort of clear-cut, specific commitments which appear in any final, formal convention or treaty. Unless a reasonable amount of confidence is placed by the United States in the professed sincerity of intention and good faith of Prince Konoye and his supporters to mould Japan's future policy upon the basic principles they are ready to accept and then to adopt measures which gradually but loyally implement those principles, with it understood that the United States will implement its own commitment pari passu with the steps which Japan takes, the Ambassador does not believe that a new orientation can be successfully created in Japan to lead to a general improving of Japanese-American relations and to the hope that ultimate war may be avoided in the Pacific.

I want to make clear the fact that I felt that, as far as our economic measures went, we had great leverage there and we were certainly not going to relax those measures, our freezing measures, the abrogation of our treaty with Japan, the embargoes, and so forth, unless and until we found Japan was going to loyally implement whatever undertakings they might tell us they would undertake. That was our opinion in the Embassy at that time.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, now, on November 3, in your message which is in evidence, you made this statement in paragraph 5, and I am reading it:

Please realize that in discussing the foregoing grave and momentous subject I am out of touch with the Administration's thoughts and intentions thereon and it is far from my intention to imply that an undeliberated policy is being followed in Washington. It is equally far from my intentions for a single moment to advocate so-called "appeasement" on the part of the United States or that our Government should in the slightest degree recede from the fundamental principles which it laid down as a basis for adjustment and conduct of international relations, including our relations with Japan. My purpose is only to insure against my country getting into war with Japan through any possible misconception of the capacity of Japan to rush headlong into a suicidal conflict with the United States. National sanity would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity cannot be measured by our own standards of logic.

We need not be over-concerned by the present bellicose tone and substance of the Japanese press which has attacked the United States in recurrent waves of intensity during the past several years, but it would be shortsighted to underestimate Japan's obvious preparations for a program to be implemented if her
alternative program for peace should fail. It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber rattling with the exclusive purpose [1907] of giving moral support to Japan's high-pressure diplomacy. Japan's resort to measures which might make war with the United States inevitable may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. In that same message, Mr. Grew, you obviously must have had some knowledge of some statements that were being made in speeches here in the United States about the ability of the United States to knock the Jap Navy over in 24 hours, and all that sort of things. Those things had come to your attention, had they not?

Mr. Grew. Some of them had, undoubtedly.

Mr. Keefe. Were you prompted, in sending this message of November 3, to warn the State Department and perhaps the American people that perhaps the Japanese were of a character that had the capacity to strike suddenly and carry on war?

Mr. Grew. Definitely.

Mr. Keefe. And that these statements that were being made by them, and by speakers going around the country, as to the impotence of Japan and its Navy were far from the truth?

Mr. Grew. Very definitely.

Mr. Keefe. That was your information then?

Mr. Grew. That was my information then. But where you say "Japanese" that is a pretty relative term. There are [1908] different kinds of Japanese.

Mr. Keefe. Now I do not want to be captious or capricious about it. I am referring to those things which would govern.

Mr. Grew. Yes; I agree with that 100 percent, with every word said in that telegram.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Grew. Of course, the situation, when that telegram was sent, was very different from the situation which obtained under the previous Cabinet in September.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Grew. That was in November, under the Tojo regime.

Mr. Keefe. When did the Konoye Cabinet form?

Mr. Grew. October 13, 1941.

Mr. Keefe. Shortly before you sent this telegram of November 3 that I read from.

Mr. Grew. I took about 2 weeks to size up the new situation. I was not quite sure what Tojo's policy was going to be. I had been assured he was going to try to keep on the conversations, going to do his best to come to an agreement with us, and all the rest of it. Frankly, I had my fingers crossed. I was waiting to size it up, and after I had sized it up I sent the telegram of November 3.

Mr. Keefe. Now, as as matter of fact, the very fact that the Konoye Cabinet fell was an indication to you, was it not. [1909] Mr. Grew, that the militarists were continuing in full and complete control?

Mr. Grew. At that time, absolutely, Mr. Congressman. But the point which was brought out in these telegrams, is unless this meeting of the President took place, the Konoye Cabinet would fall definitely.
Mr. Keeffe. The meeting did not take place and the Konoye Cabinet did fall?
Mr. Grew. It did.
Mr. Keeffe. And who came in charge of the situation?
Mr. Grew. General Tojo.
Mr. Keeffe. He was a militarist of the first order, wasn’t he?
Mr. Grew. He was.
Mr. Keeffe. And a bandit of the first order?
Mr. Grew. I would say so.

[1910] Mr. Keeffe. He was in charge of running the show, wasn’t he, from then on?
Mr. Grew. Completely, he certainly was.
Mr. Keeffe. And he was not deferred by any economic sanctions, was he, after he came into control?
Mr. Grew. Not for a moment.
Mr. Keeffe. No; and nobody was deterred before he came into control, so far as their actions disclosed?
Mr. Grew. That is correct.
Mr. Keeffe. All right. Now, then, I want to get into another subject. The statement was made by you and by Secretary Hull that the presence of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor acted as a deterrent and had a deterrent effect. That was the language you used, “had a deterrent effect.”
Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Will you point out to me, for the purpose of this record, one single act in the program of the war lords of Japan which was deterred by the presence of the fleet at Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Grew. Mr. Congressman, that is a very difficult question to answer. I do not think I could do it. I felt out there to withdraw the fleet from Pearl Harbor would be a complete confession of weakness, and the Japanese might [1911] well have struck long before they did strike if we had done so. That is something we can never prove.
Mr. Keeffe. You did not know, of course, when you came to that conclusion that due to the knowledge of the intercepts that we had, all of the information that was in the possession of the State Department here?
Mr. Grew. I did not know that.
Mr. Keeffe. No. And of course we did not know either here, or in Washington, or in Japan, except by rumors that they had entered into an agreement to strike Pearl Harbor on December 7, as indicated by your message of January 27, 1941.
Mr. Grew. That is perfectly true.
Mr. Keeffe. Now, Mr. Grew, your answer to my question is, as I interpret it, that you were of the opinion that to withdraw the fleet would have been an indication of weakness on our part that might have stimulated the Japs to strike quicker than they did.
Mr. Grew. Quite possible.
Mr. Keeffe. Do I so understand it?
Mr. Grew. That would be my interpretation.
Mr. Keeffe. That was not an answer to my question. My question was: What act of the Japanese war lords, or the War Government of Japan, was deterred by the fact that we had the fleet in Pearl Harbor?
Mr. Grew. I could not point to any specific act, Mr. Congressman. As a matter of fact, this whole procedure passed over a considerable period of time. The movement of the Japanese expansionists into China and eventually into Indo-China did not take place overnight. It was going on gradually. It stopped for a while and then moved ahead for a while.

Now, it is quite possible if we had withdrawn the fleet from Pearl Harbor that expansionist movement might have gone a great deal faster than it did go. I cannot tell you that. I do not know. But I think that is a fair supposition.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, I must interpret the fact, Mr. Grew, in the light of all the evidence that has been presented here, and we now have before us the evidence taken from the Jap files. Their story has been presented here by Admiral Inglis. So we not only have the story as it existed here in America, and at Tokyo, but we have the situation as it existed as shown by the Jap files.

Now, as a matter of fact, the fleet went out there early in 1940, pursuant to regular plans for orderly maneuvers, as testified to by Admiral Richardson, merely for the purpose of maneuvers; its regular base being at San Diego, and San Pedro, up at Long Beach.

[1913] Now, when they concluded their maneuvers, the fleet went into Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Richardson thought they ought to be brought back to their bases, and he received information and instruction to issue a press release, which was certainly contrary to his expressed opinion as he gave it to us here, to issue a press release to the effect that the fleet was being retained for a time at his request, and being a Navy man be followed such instructions and issued such a press release, for the benefit of the Japs, I assume, and the fleet remained there thereafter.

Now, you are not able, as the Ambassador being on the ground in Tokyo, to give to this committee one single specific instance of a case where the Japs were deterred from taking any action as the result of that fleet being there, except the general statement that perhaps they might have infiltrated into Indochina and down south a little faster than they did, if the fleet had been out there. Is that the way I understand you?

Mr. Grew. Congressman, it is utterly impossible, and it would be utterly impossible for anybody to give one specific instance, because that is not the way armies work. They do not buck ahead all of a sudden, and you cannot put your finger on it and say that was a specific instance, or one specific step that might not be taken if we did not have [1914] the fleet there. Those things move slowly over a period of time. Nobody could give you one specific instance.

Mr. Keeffe. Then it would be likewise quite impossible, would it not, for anyone to say that the presence of the fleet in Pearl Harbor actually deterred the Japs at all? If you cannot give any instances of where it did deter them, it will be quite impossible to say that they were deterred; isn't that true?

Mr. Grew. I do not believe anybody could answer that question. You cannot possibly tell whether the presence of the fleet in Pearl Harbor did or did not slow up the Japanese advance, whether they might have struck earlier than they did, whether we were much less ready than we were. The position I am taking is, from our point of
view in Tokyo, we had the feeling that the presence of the fleet in
Pearl Harbor was a healthy thing, psychologically, and to withdraw it
would be a confession of weakness which would be immediately
taken up by the Japanese.

Mr. Keeffe. I understand that thoroughly. I am not attempting to
be critical of your position in that regard, or anybody else's. I am
simply trying to get the facts of this situation so I thoroughly under-
stand them.

Now, as a matter of fact, did you know the condition that the fleet
was in back in 1940 and 1941?

[1915] Mr. Grew. I knew nothing whatsoever about the condi-
tion of the fleet.

Mr. Keeffe. You assumed that the fleet was ready for action, did
you not?

Mr. Grew. I did.

Mr. Keeffe. Had you known that the fleet was not prepared for
action, would you still have been of the opinion that it would be a
deterrent?

Mr. Grew. I am afraid that is a hypothetical question which I find
very difficult to answer, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keeffe. If you cannot answer, Mr. Grew, I will not press you
for an answer. Unless you feel that you can answer it, I shall not
press it.

Mr. Grew. I think I would prefer to pass that question.

Mr. Keeffe. Very well.

Now, in answer to some questions by counsel, I believe, in answer
to some questions by my colleague, Mr. Gearhart, there was quite an
altercation as to the meaning of the word "ultimatum." Both you
and Mr. Hull were very positive in your statements that the Jap
message of November 20 constituted an ultimatum. Do you recall
giving that testimony?

Mr. Grew. I do not think I testified to that effect, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keeffe. Did you hear Mr. Hull so testify?


Mr. Keeffe. It is in his statement, isn't it?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And it is the basis of his statement that the November 20
message constituted an ultimatum. Did you so conceive it to be an
ultimatum?

Mr. Grew. Well, as for my personal views, Mr. Congressman, I
have never felt that any communication from one government to
another was an ultimatum if negotiations continued after that notice
was served.

Mr. Keeffe. Then, Mr. Grew, you must be in complete lack of agree-
ment with Secretary Hull, because the facts clearly evidence that
subsequent to the delivery of the Jap note to the Secretary of State,
the note of the 20th of November, negotiations continued right on,
conference after conference was held. You are aware of that, are you?

Mr. Grew. I am.

Mr. Keeffe. Conferences were held not only with the Japanese but
they were held with the British. They were held with the Dutch.
They were held with the Chinese, especially with relation to the pro-
posed modus vivendi proposal that the Japs had asked for.
Now, then, in view of those facts, and in view of your interpretation of what an ultimatum is, are you prepared to say yourself that the message of November 20, was, in fact, an ultimatum? Mr. Grew. I have not said so, but I will say this, Mr. Congressman, that I think if there is any difference of opinion between Mr. Hull and myself on that point, it is a pretty technical point; it is a point as to what is meant by the term “ultimatum.” It would be very difficult for people to differ as to the actual meaning of that particular word.

Mr. Keeffe. Have you read the note of the 20th of November?

Mr. Grew. Yes, certainly.

Mr. Keeffe. Did you find any language in it which indicates that negotiations were to be broken off?

Mr. Grew. I do not think it depends on the language in it so much as whether further negotiations continue after the delivery of that note.

Mr. Keeffe. Then the facts are clear, Mr. Grew, that negotiations did continue. You know that, do you not?

Mr. Grew. That is a fact.

Mr. Keeffe. They continued after the delivery of the note?

Mr. Grew. That is a fact.

Mr. Keeffe. And it resulted in our offering a counter— [1918] proposal on November 26.

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. You are sure of that, are you not?

Mr. Grew. That is right.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, the statement has been made here that over in Tokyo a friend of yours, high in the Government circles, wrote you a letter in which he said that the people of Japan without knowledge as to what was in the November 26 message, considered it to be an ultimatum, and you construe that to be the policy of the controlled press operating under the directions of the war lords to not give the Japanese people the truth; is that correct?

Mr. Grew. Very definitely.

Mr. Keeffe. To make them believe that we terminated diplomatic relations?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. Do I so understand your testimony?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, the record discloses—and I now refer to exhibit 27, which I am advised is the first of the publication Peace and War.

Mr. Grew. That is right.

Mr. Keeffe. Published in 1942.

On page 137 of that short report there appears, beginning [1919] on page 135, and continuing over to page 138, a memorandum entitled “United States Memorandum of November 26,” and I find this expression, a statement as to the handling of this November 26 message to the Japanese Ambassador in this language, and I quote from the top of page 136:

On November 26, 1941, the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan.
This was the culmination of these negotiations that had been going on between the 20th and 26th.

In a statement accompanying the proposal, it was said that the United States earnestly desired to afford every opportunity for the continuation of discussions with the Japanese Government; that the Japanese proposals of November 20 conflicted, in some respects, with the fundamental principles to which each government had declared it was committed—and so forth.

Then appears this on page 137:

After the Japanese representatives had read the document, Mr. Kurusu said that when this proposal of the United States was reported to the Japanese Government that Government would be likely to "throw up its hands"; that this response to the Japanese proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to the end of the negotiations. The Japanese [1920] representatives then asked whether they could see the President.

Now, there was an expression of opinion of the Japanese envoy, expressed at the time the note was handed to him on November 26, and before it had even been transmitted to Japan, indicating that, after reading it, on the day that it was delivered to them, they considered it to be an ultimatum.

Do you so interpret that language?

Mr. Grew. Definitely not, Mr. Congressman. Do I interpret the language of the Japanese envoys as themselves having believed it to be an ultimatum?

Mr. Keeffe. Yes.

Mr. Grew. That would appear to be clear from the record.

Mr. Keeffe. All right. That is what I asked. As evidence of the fact that subsequent to November 20 there were continuing negotiations between the State Department and the Japanese envoy, I refer to page 134 of exhibit 27, after the Japs had handed their proposal of the 20th to Mr. Hull, and this appears:

During a conversation on that same day with the Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu, Secretary Hull said that Japan could at any moment put an end to the existing situation by deciding upon an "all-out" peaceful course; that at any moment [1921] Japan could bring to an end what Japan chose to call "enclavement."

The Secretary said the people of the United States believed that the purposes underlying our aid to China were the same as those underlying our aid to Great Britain and that there was a partnership between Hitler and Japan aimed at enabling Hitler to take charge of one-half of the world and Japan the other half.

The existence of the Tripartite Pact and the continual harping of Japan's leaders upon slogans of the Nazi type, the Secretary said, served to strengthen this belief; what was needed was the manifestation by Japan, of a clear purpose to pursue peaceful courses. He said that our people desired to avoid a repetition in East Asia of what Hitler was doing in Europe; that our people opposed the idea of a "new order" under military control.

[1922] In this conversation the Japanese representatives reiterated that their Government was really desirous of peace and that Japan had "never pledged itself to a policy of expansion." Secretary Hull remarked that the Chinese "might have an answer to that point."

With which I, parenthetically, agreed.

Then:

During a conversation on November 22nd the Secretary of State informed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu that he had called in representatives of certain other governments concerned in the Far East and that there had been a
discussion of the question whether there could be some relaxation of freezing; there was a general feeling that the matter could be settled if the Japanese could give some evidence of peaceful intentions. The Secretary said that if the United States and other countries should see Japan pursuing a peaceful course there would be no question about Japan's obtaining all of the materials she desired.

Were you advised as Ambassador to Japan of these conversations relating to this proposed modus vivendi?

Mr. Grew. I couldn't answer that question. Mr. Congressman, without looking up the record. As I said before, I was advised [1923] of some of the conversations. In certain cases the records were telegraphed out to me. I do not know that I was advised of the records of all the conversations.

Mr. Keeffe. What records would you have to go to?

Mr. Grew. Those are on file in the Department of State available to counsel.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, of course, then these documents that we have in evidence here, War and Peace, Foreign Relations, and your book, don't contain all the messages?

Mr. Grew. That I cannot tell you.

Mr. Keeffe. Can you turn and find any evidence in your book of any messages in reference to this modus vivendi proposition?

Mr. Grew. I don't recollect that there is anything there. I don't think there is.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, do you have any present recollection now, Mr. Grew, that you were informed and knew about the negotiations?

Mr. Grew. I have no present recollection of that particular point.

Mr. Keeffe. Were you advised that before any settlement of the relationships between the United States and Japan could be accomplished that it was necessary to call in consultation other powers that were interested—Great Britain, the Dutch, and the Chinese?

[1924] Mr. Grew. Was I advised, you say, that it would be necessary to call them in?

Mr. Keeffe. Yes.

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I certainly was not advised to that effect. I may have been advised after the meeting took place. I can't answer that question because, as I say, there were a great many such messages sent out to me, and I would have to check up the record to see whether that particular point was telegraphed to me or not.

Mr. Keeffe. I believe you stated that you had no knowledge of the so-called A-B-C-D agreement.

Mr. Grew. I had no knowledge of any such agreement.

Mr. Keeffe. Have you been advised recently that there was such an agreement?

Mr. Grew. No, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you know anything about such an agreement?

Mr. Grew. I do not, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. I call your attention to the fact that General Marshall testified with respect to that agreement when he was a witness before the Army board of inquiry, and I read this just to attempt to refresh your recollection, if it will.

The question was:

Who constituted the military authorities representing the United States in entering into this agreement?
[1925] And the agreement referred to is the one already read into the record by the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Ferguson.

The answer is:

The agreement was reached in the so-called American-British-Dutch staff conversations held at Singapore in April of 1941. United States Army officers participated on my instructions and with the approval of the Secretary of State.

The participants were: Captain Purnell, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet; Colonel A. C. McBride, U. S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Military Forces in the Philippines; Captain A. M. R. Allen, U. S. Navy, the U. S. Naval Observer in Singapore; Lieutenant Colonel H. G. Brink, U. S. Army, U. S. Military Observer at Singapore.

Does General Marshall's testimony bring back any recollection to you of the fact that there was such an agreement entered into?

Mr. Grew. No, sir; it does not, and I do not think that any report of that meeting which you just referred to came to me in Tokyo, so far as I can now recollect.

Mr. Keeffe. All right. Now, I want to ask a couple of other questions in relation to your book and your diary.

Oh, before I get to that:

[1926] Where is Mr. Dooman at the present time, who was formerly the counselor of the Embassy at Tokyo?

Mr. Grew. Mr. Dooman lives in Washington but he is away for a few days. I think he will be back shortly but I don't know when.

Mr. Keeffe. What is his full name?

Mr. Grew. Eugene F. Dooman, D-o-o-m-a-n.

Mr. Keeffe. Did he return with you at the time you were exchanged and came back, which I believe was in July or August of 1942?

Mr. Grew. Yes, we came back together.

Mr. Keeffe. Is he presently occupying any position in the State Department?

Mr. Grew. No, sir. He recently retired from the foreign service and the State Department. He has now no official position.

Mr. Keeffe. He is in the same position that you are?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; exactly.

Mr. Keeffe. Did he work with you when you became Under Secretary of State?

Mr. Grew. Mr. Dooman, as I recollect it—when he came back, I think he was assigned to work in the Department of State, shortly after we came back. I would have to check up on that. But I had nothing to do with that because I was out in the field speaking for the first year or year and a half. [1927] In transmitting that report you used this language:

The presentation by Mr. Dooman of his impressions of the position of the United States as gathered during his recent furlough appeared to cause Mr. Ohashi astonishment. Mr. Ohashi is, for a Japanese, extraordinarily direct and sparing of words. Upon listening attentively to what Mr. Dooman described as the philosophy of the American position Mr. Ohashi remained perfectly quiet for an appreciable space of time and then burst forth with the question, "Do you mean to say that if Japan were to attack Singapore there would be a war with the United States?" Mr. Dooman replied, "The logic of the situation would inevitably raise that question." Mr. Ohashi then left that subject and adverted to the character of reports sent to London by the British Ambassador. Circumstantial evidence that Mr. Ohashi was accented by the interview was
given by Sir John Latham, the Australian Minister, who called on Mr. Ohashi a few minutes after Mr. Doorman left. Sir John without being aware that Mr. [1928] Doorman had just called on Mr. Ohashi, told me that he found Mr. Ohashi greatly agitated and distraught.

I propose to say to Mr. Matsuoka, with whom I have an appointment this morning, that the statements made by Mr. Doorman to Mr. Ohashi were made with my prior knowledge and have my full approval.

Now, this incident has been known quite widely in diplomatic circles as the Doorman Incident, has it not?

Mr. Grew. Well, I hadn't heard that term applied to it, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keeffe. It caused some astonishment in diplomatic circles in Tokyo, did it not, when it came out?

Mr. Grew. I don't think it ever came out in public in Tokyo, so far as I recollect. Those things very seldom did come out. Is there any indication there that it did? I don't think so. Sir John Latham, the Australian Minister, appears to have known of it.

Mr. Keeffe. Then you agreed at that time, when you sent this message, that it was the considered policy of the United States that if the Japs attacked Singapore we would go to war?

Mr. Grew. It is not a categorical statement to that effect.

Mr. Keeffe. I know it is not, but what did you mean?

Mr. Grew. I think that was pretty good doctrine to spread [1929] to the Japanese at that time. I always held, during that period, that only a display of force and the establishing of the conviction among the Japanese that we intended to use it, if necessary, would have any effect out there.

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Grew, if you will pardon me, I am not attempting to place any false interpretation upon the language. I could let it stand for itself. The words speak for themselves as to just what was said. I am not in disagreement with you. I hope you do not get that impression. The statement says the logic of the situation would inevitably raise the question as to whether or not we would go to war.

Now, do I understand you to say that the purpose of Mr. Doorman making this statement to Mr. Ohashi, of which you had prior knowledge and approval, was part of the program to attempt to deter the Japs from the course they had set out on?

Mr. Grew. Congressman, no one is omniscient at any one time, of course, but we in Tokyo had during those years watched the impression created among the Japanese people as to the attitude of the United States and the American people.

Whenever a speech by some prominent isolationist was made in America that speech was generally emblazoned in headlines in the Japanese press and very few other speeches were ever allowed to be published.

Whenever there was a strike in the United States, that [1930] strike was emphasized in the Japanese press in order to convey to the Japanese people that the American people were isolationists and pacifists and secondly that we were completely disunited and would never be able to fight a total war.

Therefore I felt that on Mr. Doorman's coming back from Washing- ton it was pretty sound doctrine for him speak as he did speak. There was no precise threat there. There was no categorical statement that
we would or would not do this. It was simply the general tone and
substance of his talk which I approved.
Mr. Keefe. Thank you, Mr. Grew, for that statement.
The fact is that Mr. Dooman was back here in the United States
during the campaign of 1940, wasn't he?
Mr. Grew. I believe so.
Mr. Keefe. That is when he was here; it says so in the statement.
Mr. Grew. Yes.
Mr. Keefe. Now, were the speeches being printed in Japan that
were being made during this campaign, do you know?
Mr. Grew. I can't recollect any particular speech at any time in
particular, but in general that was the type of thing which was being
published in the Japanese press because, apparently, the militarists
wanted to give the Japanese people the idea that we were timid, that
we could easily be intimidated, [1931] and that if they showed
enough force and power we would step back.
Mr. Keefe. As I recall that campaign, there were a great many
speeches made by people who never have been termed "isolationists,"
who were leading the people of America to believe that we weren't
going to war.
I recall Mr. Willkie making those speeches and I recall the President
making a speech in which he indicated that we weren't going to war.
Were those speeches published in Japan?
Mr. Grew. I can't answer that question, Mr. Congressman. I can't
recollect what speeches were and what speeches were not published.
Mr. Keefe. I wonder, Mr. Ambassador, whether or not the purpose
of Mr. Dooman having the conversation with Mr. Ohashi was not to
try to give him the impression that a lot of this stuff that they had
heard during this campaign did not represent the real and true spirit
of the people of America?
Mr. Grew. I think one of the purposes of Mr. Dooman's talk was to
create the impression that the American people were not completely
isolationist and pacifist as many of the Japanese had been led to believe.
Mr. Keefe. Well now, when you came back finally from Japan you
brought with you a diary consisting, as I understand [1932]
it, of some 13 volumes; is that right?
Mr. Grew. I believe that is correct, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Keefe. And that is the diary which has been the subject of some
discussion between you and the committee and Senator Brewster?
Mr. Grew. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. Now, Mr. Grew, after you came back with this diary of
13 volumes, will you state whether or not you submitted it to Collier's
weekly for publication; for publication by Collier's weekly first?
Mr. Grew. I did not submit the entire diary to Collier's weekly. I
did submit parts of it having in mind the possibility of a series of
articles but I later found that I could not write that series of articles
and the whole thing was dropped.
Mr. Keefe. Now, as a matter of fact—and you can answer this or
not, as you wish, Mr. Grew—isn't it a fact that you did submit your
diary to Collier's weekly for the purpose of having it edited into a
series of articles and that when it was submitted it was found that
there had been passages cut out of the diary and Collier's weekly was
not interested in publishing the diary with those deleted portions taken
out?
Mr. Grew. I don't recollect that. The whole diary was not submitted.

[1933] Mr. Keefe. What part was submitted?

Mr. Grew. I can't recollect. Certain parts were submitted to one representative of Collier's weekly to look over and see whether a series of articles would be worth while.

Mr. Keefe. Who was that man?

Mr. Grew. I can't recollect his name now. He is now dead. I think he died last year. But I can't remember his name.

Mr. Keefe. Was he not the Washington representative of Collier's weekly, the man to whom you submitted the diary?

Mr. Grew. I don't think so.

The Chairman. I was trying to think of his name. I think I knew him.

Mr. Grew. I remember that he came down to meet me when we got off the Japanese ship to see if he could sign me up for a series of articles. I wasn't willing to sign up at that time but as he had taken that trouble I realized that if I was going to write anything for the magazines that Collier's weekly had a reasonable priority. We looked over the ground and I finally decided that I did not want to write those articles at that time and the whole thing was dropped.

Mr. Keefe. Where were those conversations held, here in Washington?

Mr. Grew. Well—the talks about the diary?

[1934] Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Grew. I think so.

Mr. Keefe. What volumes of your diary did you submit to him?

Mr. Grew. I couldn't possibly tell you, Mr. Congressman. I wouldn't remember.

Mr. Keefe. Do you wish to say that Collier's weekly categorically did or did not refuse to publish an article because of the deletions which appeared in your diary?

Mr. Grew. I don't recollect any such decision now.

Mr. Keefe. Well, would you say that that decision was not reached or that you just do not remember?

Mr. Grew. I haven't thought of that incident. It is at least 3 years ago now. As far as I can recollect the matter, Collier's never abandoned the idea completely. I think I just didn't go ahead with it. I don't recollect that Collier's definitely declined to publish. No, I don't recollect that.

Mr. Keefe. Will you answer this question, please:

Was it your intention to personally write the diary or did Collier's suggest that you go over it with an editorial writer that would shape up the material?

Mr. Grew. I think the idea was that certain parts could be taken out and possibly an editorial writer might go over them and write up something for me.

Mr. Keefe. Did you discuss the matter with any editorial writer of Collier's weekly?

Mr. Grew. Only in a very general way. We never got down to details.

Mr. Keefe. What editorial writer of Collier's did you discuss the matter with?
Mr. Grew. That was that gentleman whose name escapes me. I can't recollect it. I believe he died last year. I can't remember his name.

Mr. Keeffe. What specific reason do you now ascribe for failing to go on and having Collier's publish the diary?

Mr. Grew. Well, I can't remember exactly the reasons. In the first place, I was exceedingly busy. I was making speeches all over the country. And I dare say that at that time I possibly was thinking of a book, in which case it would have been better not to do a series of articles. I think that was the idea, that I was proposing to bring out this book and therefore that I did not wish to go ahead with the articles.

Mr. Keeffe. How many volumes of your diary did you turn over to Collier's to inspect?

Mr. Grew. I don't remember whether I turned over the actual volumes or not. I had copies of various parts of the [1936] diary which I think I showed them. Whether I showed them the volumes or not, I don't know.

[1937] Mr. Keeffe. You just do not recall?

Mr. Grew. No, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, then, after you decided, or it was decided, whatever the fact may be, that you were not going to have Collier's publish this series of articles, to whom did you next submit your material for publication?

Mr. Grew. To whom did I next submit my material for publication?

Mr. Keeffe. Yes.

Mr. Grew. I then decided to go ahead with the book and I decided to put it in the hands of Messrs. Simon and Schuster of New York and Mr. Quincy Howe, one of their foremost editors whom I knew personally, went over the diary with me and helped me pick——

Mr. Keeffe. Now, you submitted your complete diary to Mr. Quincy Howe, did you not?

Mr. Grew. At one time he had it, yes.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. And he went through it for the purpose of editing this book, did he not?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. And he prepared the material that went into this book, Ten Years in Japan?

Mr. Grew. No, he did not prepare it.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, he put it together?

[1938] Mr. Grew. Well, he made suggestions as to passages that might be used and it was up to me to decide whether they should be used or not. In the last analysis I had this considerable amount of material and I decided what I wanted published and what was published.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, you supervised it, Mr. Grew, I think.

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. He actually drew up a manuscript, did he not?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. That is, under your supervision?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. And before publication could be had of that manuscript it had to be taken down to the State Department and cleared there, did it not?
Mr. Grew. As I said the other day, Mr. Congressman, in wartime everything which is published by an officer of the Government is supposed to be considered by a publication committee which then existed in the Department of State.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. Well, I understand that, of course. It is a simple question. It was submitted, regardless of reason, to the State Department?

Mr. Grew. That is a fact.

Mr. Keeffe. And the reason was that we were at war and they had a right to see what was being published.

Mr. Grew. That is a fact.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, then, when this original manuscript was prepared by Mr. Howe as the editor in charge of this, working for you and for Simon & Schuster, it was submitted to the State Department and there were suggestions for deletions from this manuscript, were there not?

Mr. Grew. There were.

Mr. Keeffe. And a new manuscript was prepared with the deletions?

Mr. Grew. I do not remember whether a new manuscript was prepared or whether the original manuscript was simply clipped. I dare say that the original manuscript was clipped of the passages which I determined to cut out and that manuscript was sent back to the publishers.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you remember what the deletions were about?

Mr. Grew. Well, as I said the other day, they were about a variety of things. Some of the deletions were taken out at my own initiative because I had prepared more material than could be comprised in the kind of book that my publishers wished to bring out. Therefore, that material had to be materially cut down.

In fact, when the original manuscripts were prepared there were a good many passages in there marked "cut", to be considered as to whether there was room for them or not and, if so, whether they would fit in with the type of book I was going to publish. A good many of those passages I cut out myself.

It was suggested by the committee, and I remember no demand on their part at all, but suggested that certain passages might well be omitted because they might embarrass or possibly even injure or endanger individuals during wartime, that they might be misinterpreted by foreign governments, passages of all kinds of natures which were cut out for one reason or another, but mostly of that kind.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you remember, Mr. Grew, that after the second revision of this manuscript had been prepared that the story of the death march on Bataan was published in this country?

Mr. Grew. Well, I do not recollect the precise chronology of that. I remember very well that the story on the death march in Bataan was published in this country.

Mr. Keeffe. And didn't the publication of that story precipitate the necessity for further revision of your manuscript and wasn't it revised after that story was published?

Mr. Grew. Not to my recollection whatsoever. I do not think that that had anything whatsoever to do with it.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, do you want to state categorically that it did not have anything to do with it?

Mr. Grew. No.
Mr. KEENE. Or that you just do not remember?
Mr. GREW. I frankly do not remember.
Mr. KEENE. All right.
Mr. GREW. I do not believe it had anything to do with it.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you finish your answer?
Mr. KEENE. I thought he said he had finished. Had you finished?
Mr. GREW. I finished, sir, yes.
Mr. KEENE. Yes. Well, in order to prepare this book under those circumstances it was necessary at least for Mr. Quincy Howe to have the benefit of reading your entire diary, was it not?
Mr. GREW. He had the benefit of reading the diary; yes, sir.
Mr. KEENE. And he is a reputable man, is he not?
Mr. GREW. He is a completely reputable man.
Mr. KEENE. And you would believe him, would you not?
Mr. GREW. I certainly would, otherwise I certainly would not have intrusted the diary to him.
Mr. KEENE. Now, do you know how many other people in the office of Simon & Schuster had access to your diary besides Mr. Quincy Howe?

[1942] Mr. GREW. I doubt very much if anybody did.
Mr. KEENE. Well, he was up in New York, wasn’t he?
Mr. GREW. Mr. Howe was in New York; yes.
Mr. KEENE. And the diary was with him?
Mr. GREW. That is right.
Mr. KEENE. And you were here in Washington and out on the road making speeches?
Mr. GREW. That is perfectly correct.
Mr. KEENE. Now, you cannot say how many people could have had access to this diary then, can you?
Mr. GREW. Well, I cannot tell you categorically but I know that Mr. Quincy Howe is a man of such reputability that he would not have for a moment left the diary in a position where other people could have access to it.
Mr. KEENE. Well, would you have any objections to Mr. Howe testifying here as a witness as to the material that was cut out of this manuscript?
Mr. GREW. Well, that comes right down, I think, to the question originally brought up as to whether I am not within my rights in claiming that the diary itself was of a personal and private nature; that I have produced in my book the pertinent material which I think would be helpful to this committee; that I have looked through the diary for the months preceding Pearl Harbor and have found nothing further that I think would be pertinent to this committee.

The question arises on that basis if I am not justified in regarding the rest of the diary as a personal and private document. I feel very strongly on that point myself.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chair might suggest that regardless of Mr. Grew’s attitude or his willingness or unwillingness for Mr. Quincy Howe to testify about this personal diary, it may be a matter, after all, for the committee to determine whether it would call Mr. Howe to testify about that.
Mr. GREW. Undoubtedly it would be, Mr. Chairman, yes.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the gentleman from Wisconsin if he feels that Mr. Quincy Howe would shed any light on the Pearl Harbor investigation and whether we should call him as a witness?

Mr. Keefe. Now, Mr. Chairman, I object to those kinds of interjections. I am acting in good faith.

The Chairman. The Chair hopes that the committee will not get into a discussion over Mr. Quincy Howe at this stage of the proceeding, so go ahead, Congressman, with your inquiry.

Mr. Keefe. I am not asking foolish questions. I am trying to ascertain some facts and pertinent facts, pertinent to this inquiry.

Mr. Keefe. Who is Mr. Stanley Hornbeck?

Mr. Grew. Mr. Stanley Hornbeck from 1928 to 1937 was Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State and in 1937 he was appointed political adviser in the Department of State. He was later, some time in the past year, made Ambassador to the Netherlands and so far as I know he is now at The Hague.

Mr. Keefe. I would like to ask the counsel at this time, is it expected to call Mr. Hornbeck as a witness here?

Mr. Mitchell. He is not so far on our list of witnesses and nobody has asked to have him placed on it.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I am making that request very definitely now, that I would like to have Mr. Hornbeck as a witness. He was in charge of the Far Eastern Branch in the Department of State all through these critical times, as I understand it.

Mr. Grew. Well, he was Chief of the Far Eastern Division, which handles far eastern affairs, only up to 1937 and after that he was political adviser, although he was still closely in touch with far eastern affairs.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. It may be of some help to the Congressman. We have been trying to find out what Mr. Hornbeck's schedule [1945] is.

Mr. Hornbeck is in Holland at the present time. We were hoping if he was planning to come to this country during the time the committee would be in session that we could consider his availability then.

Senator Brewster. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think it should be said in that connection that the committee have been assured that anyone anywhere in the world who could help in this situation would be available, so that I do not think it is material as to whether he is in Holland or not.

The Chairman. I have no doubt that if Mr. Hornbeck's testimony is desired here that he will be available even if he has to be brought back from Holland.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I conceive, Mr. Chairman, if you will pardon me, that Mr. Hornbeck is a very important witness in connection with the very things that we are going over and I think Mr. Grew will agree with that, that he ought to have plenty of information.

Mr. Grew. I agree completely.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Keefe. Now, as a matter of fact did you discuss Mr. Hornbeck at all in your diary?
Senator Lucas. Probably some Senators, too.
Mr. Keefe. That may be an unfair question. I will withdraw it.

Mr. Grew. All right. As a matter of fact, I have no recollection on that point, Mr. Congressman.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I will try to refresh your recollection at the proper time, which is not now. It will be at the proper time, on many of these things, I assure you.

Now, here is one last question that I want to interrogate you on. I have in my mind some place out of this mass of material that is hurled at you—it is hard to put your hands on it immediately—that at a time prior to the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 there was a memorandum submitted to the State Department with reference to a proposal made at that time by Japan for a meeting of the great powers, quite a long memorandum. I wonder whether you have knowledge of that proposal of the Japanese.

Mr. Grew. Can you tell me, Mr. Congressman, whether that proposal was made by Baron Hiramura as Prime Minister?

Mr. Keefe. Well, it is a proposal that I am advised does not appear in any of these documents but that is presently in the archives of the State Department. It was a proposal which embodied a proposal by the Japs for a conference of the great powers to be held in an effort to try to avert the outbreak of war in Europe. Do you recall that?

[1947] Mr. Grew. I am inclined to believe that that may have been a proposal which was made by Baron Hiramura, then Prime Minister of Japan, to Mr. Doorman when I was at home in the United States on leave of absence in 1939 and he was chargé d'affaires. That is my impression. I think he could answer that question better than I could.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might—

The Chairman. When was it?

Mr. Keefe. In 1939.

Senator Ferguson. Might I suggest that I brought that question up yesterday and asked you about it? I had the date of May or some time in 1939 and you were going to look that up. I think it is the same thing that the Congressman is talking about. That is the same point, is it?

Well, what he is asking refreshes my memory that it is the same point. You have in the book here a memorandum but not covering the particular point covered in the memorandum that I had in mind. It was a specific proposal some time in the spring of 1939 or summer, it was around in May.

Mr. Grew. Is there any indication in the record that that proposal was made to me? Because I am inclined to think it was a proposal which was made to Mr. Ferguson. It may not have been made to you but coming through the Embassy you would have notice of it if Doorman knew about it.

Mr. Grew. I think that took place when I was absent. I am not sure of it.

Senator Ferguson. I am sure you were in Tokyo in May because the book indicates on page 1 of volume II, it indicates that you were in Tokyo in May 1939.
Mr. Keeffe. Well, it was in 1939.

Mr. Grew. Well, I will look into that also, Senator. It is possible it is being looked into now, but if it is a fact that this was a proposal made to Mr. Dooman while chargé d'affaires I might prefer to have him elaborate the point than to try to do it myself, if it is agreeable to the committee.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, Mr. Counselor, on that point, is it proposed to have Mr. Dooman called as a witness?

Mr. Gesell. He is not on the list of witnesses.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, I would like to have him put on the list because he is a very important witness.

The Chairman. Well, the Chair would like to remind the Senators that when the committee was discussing the addition of other witnesses to those that were listed it was generally understood that any member of the committee could suggest to counsel and to the committee any additional witnesses on any subject and that in some way the committee would consider [1949] what the witness would testify to in order to determine whether his testimony was material.

Now, that might be regarded as a technical point, but it was discussed in the committee in executive session. I think we might keep that in mind.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, I have that in mind, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Keeffe. But may I say this: I would not for one moment ask to have someone called here who I did not feel from the search and examination of the records that I have made up to date could not throw relevant and pertinent light upon this inquiry.

We have already talked about Mr. Dooman and the message is in the record here, one of the messages.

Now, referring to the Senator from Michigan, he is referring to a very important communication that was sent to the State Department, I believe, during the time that you were on furlough, Mr. Grew, and while Mr. Dooman was in charge of the Embassy in Japan.

Mr. Grew. That is probably so.

The Chairman. The Chair is not suggesting anything to the contrary of that.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Brewster.

[1950] Senator Brewster. Perhaps this is the appropriate time to point out that there are many questions of procedure, the calling of witnesses, the order of witnesses, which must be determined from time to time.

I fully agree with the chairman that those questions should be the subject of committee consideration and I think it would be well if it were in a somewhat less public forum than this, but as I must remind the chairman, we have not been called together for the consideration of any questions of this character for some time and the result has been that the only way we can make suggestions is when the committee is in public convention assembled.

The Chairman. The Chair did not mean to suggest any objection in making these suggestions in public as to witnesses, but we have a long list of witnesses who were arranged for by counsel through con-
sultation with the committee and the Chair simply had in mind until
we have made a little more progress in exhausting the list which has
already been prepared and submitted to the committee, that we have
ample time to consider what other witnesses would be called later;
but, of course, the Chair has no objection whatever to putting Mr.
Dooman's name on the list and having him called at some appropriate
time when he is here.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the state-
ment. There are two things right now which it seems to me invite
consideration. One is the suggestion which has been made to change
the order of witnesses insofar as Mr. Hamilton is concerned; and,
second, in view of the announcement regarding General Marshall I
think that there should be immediate consideration of whether or not,
if he is to testify—

The Chairman. That is a——

Senator Brewster. May I finish?

The Chairman. Yes. I wanted to say something. General Mar-
shall is under consideration at the present time.

Senator Brewster. Fine.

The Chairman. We have got to consult with him as to when he
proposes to leave Washington.

Senator Brewster. I suggest this because I think that is obviously
an important matter. If General Marshall is to leave shortly, I think
we ought to suspend everything on the order of the hearing.

The Chairman. That is being considered and General Marshall
is being consulted about it. All right, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Now, Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions to ask
at this time of Mr. Grew, but I would like to suggest this to counsel:
I would like to have him produce and obtain, if possible, the message
or memoranda prepared by Mr. Hornbeck on December 1, 1941. I
understand that it is addressed to the Army and Navy and has reference to the condition of the Army and Navy at that time.

Will you kindly see if that message can be obtained? 1

Mr. Mitchell. We have made a note of it.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make one request?

The Chairman. Wait until we get this one disposed of. Counsel
has made a note of it and that document will be sought. Congressman
Murphy?

Mr. Murphy. I would like to make a request of the Navy to pre-
pare a statement as to when we established the port and base of Pearl
Harbor and whether or not we continued Pearl Harbor as our most
important base in the Pacific after December 7, 1941, until the present
time for our fleet. 2

The Chairman. Mr. Gesell will take note of that.

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, is Captain Kramer on the witness
list?

The Chairman. At two different times.

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn I would like to in-
troduce into the record a series of five documents which were distrib-
uted to the committee 2 weeks ago, between the dates of April and
December 1941, reporting conversations in South America held by
Japanese representatives with representatives of the Governments of

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1 See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2085 et seq.; see also Exhibits Nos. 95, 96 and 97.
Peru, [1953] Brazil, Dominican Republic, Chile, and so forth, concerning the attitude of those Governments in the event Japan were to declare war against the United States and I think this series, which is all related, might be designated—

The Chairman. The committee and spectators will please be in order. We have not yet recessed.

Mr. Gesell. I think this exhibit might be designated 31 for the record.

The Chairman. Those articles or exhibits will be filed under documentation No. 31.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 31").

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, has there been a change in the calling of witnesses for the near future?

The Chairman. The Chair is not aware of any change.

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, I think there has been one change indicated by our memorandums to the members of the committee indicating that we had felt under the circumstances it more appropriate to call General Miles, Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Turner, and General Gerow prior to calling certain witnesses scheduled prior to those officers, who were in subordinate positions, our thought being to call [1954] the heads of the various units, War Plans and Intelligence, and then following them with the witnesses that have been scheduled before.

We had also hoped that in view of the very detailed State Department inquiry which we have had over the last few days that we could dispense with calling Mr. Hamilton at this time. Mr. Hamilton was originally scheduled when it was thought that Mr. Hull would not be able to give as much time as he has to the committee and before Mr. Grew and Mr. Welles were added to the list of witnesses and we feel that those responsible officials have been in the best position to cover the matters of interest to the committee.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire then what the new order will be so that we might prepare?

Mr. Gesell. As indicated in the memo handed to the committee at the end of last week, General Miles and Admiral Wilkinson will be the next two witnesses, followed by Admiral Turner and General Gerow.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that if there is to be a change in the order, recognizing the consecutive character of the presentation of the State Department and the diplomatic corps, that it should be considered by the committee. I think it is a matter of considerable importance, the appropriate order in which witnesses are to be called.

[1955] The Chairman. The Chair will remind members of the committee that when the list of witnesses was originally submitted by counsel it was stated that it did not represent the order in which they would appear and, also, counsel stated that they would attempt to give the committee and the press and the public 2 or 3 days' notice of witnesses that would appear on any given day. That course has up to now, I think, been followed and the notice that we got at the end of last week with respect to General Miles, Admiral Wilkinson,
and the others, as I understood it, was in compliance with that understanding.

Mr. Gesell. We have had this problem. I am sure the members of the committee recognize this. We have had this problem in scheduling witnesses: We have had to bring responsible officers in from active theaters and we are anxious not to keep them in Washington any longer than necessary, so that they can return to their posts.

Senator Brewster. You are not applying that to General Miles, are you?

Mr. Gesell. No, I am not applying that to General Miles, although I do not believe he is stationed here.

The Chairman. Are there any further questions that counsel wish to ask Mr. Grew?

Senator Ferguson. I have a question that I spoke to him about the—

The Chairman. I was speaking to the counsel first.

Mr. Gesell. No, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Any other questions desired by members of the committee?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Brewster. I have one or two I would like to ask.

The Chairman. Well, it is now after 4 o'clock. The Chair had hoped that we might finish with Mr. Grew today, but it is entirely up to the committee whether it wants to adjourn now or continue.

Senator Ferguson. I just have one question that I was not able to find the citation for this morning and I have it now.

The Chairman. Well, if we could finish—

Senator Brewster. I have two or three questions. I do not know that they will take any extended time.

The Chairman. What is the wish of the committee about proceeding?

Senator Ferguson. I move to proceed.

Senator Brewster. What is the position of Mr. Grew as to returning in the morning?

Mr. Grew. I am entirely at the disposal of the committee, Senator. I will be glad to come back.

Senator Brewster. Well, I suggest this, that in view of the very extended examination of Mr. Grew that he might like to think the thing over a little himself and I am sure perhaps some of the rest of us would and perhaps get our questions in a form that would reduce rather than increase the time. I personally prefer to adjourn.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I just suggest one thing? The Chairman. Yes, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to call attention to the memorandum that was given to us on November 24 as following the State Department, the next series. That did not indicate, as I understand it, that Mr. Hamilton was not to be called. Could I show that to counsel and ask if that is the memorandum?

Mr. Gesell. That is the memorandum. I think I made clear that our point with respect to Mr. Hamilton was one that we were advancing to the committee at this time.

Senator Ferguson. Oh, at this particular moment?

Mr. Gesell. That is right.
Senator Brewster. Well, then there have been no previous suggestions to the committee on that.

Mr. Gesell. That is right.

[7058] The Chairman. Well, suppose we recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. You be back at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, Mr. Grew.

Mr. Grew. I will be here with pleasure at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The Chairman. I hope the committee can conclude with you tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 p. m., Wednesday, November 28, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Thursday, November 29, 1945.)
THE COMMITTEE WILL COME TO ORDER.

Before proceeding, the Chair wishes to announce that the committee has been officially advised that General Marshall will be able to testify before the committee prior to his departure for China. As soon as his schedule in this respect is definite he will advise the committee in ample time to arrange for his testimony before he leaves the country.

I might say, in that connection, that General Marshall is just as anxious to testify before the committee as the committee is to have him testify.

When we recessed I believe that Senator Ferguson announced that he wanted to ask some questions.

Senator Ferguson. I believe that Senator Brewster was ahead of me.

The Chair. All right.

Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, may I—

Senator Ferguson. I can go ahead if you want me to.

The Vice Chair. Mr. Grew has something to say.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW (Resumed)

Mr. Grew. Might I clear up two or three points, Mr. Chairman, concerning information which was asked of me?

The Chair. Yes.

Mr. Grew. One question raised was as to whether I had been informed of the consideration in Washington of a modus vivendi with the Japanese at the end of November. I could not recollect whether I was informed of that in the mass of correspondence and events that occurred at that time, but I now have found a telegram from the Secretary of State to me in which he tells me the whole story. I can submit that to counsel or read it, as you wish.
The Chairman. Go ahead and read it.
Mr. Grew. All right.
Mr. Keefe. May I ask a question?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Keefe. Does it relate to the question which I asked Mr. Grew yesterday?
Mr. Grew. I think you asked the question, Mr. Congressman.
The Vice Chairman. It is about the modus vivendi.
Mr. Keefe. Is that telegram published?
Mr. Grew. I do not think it has yet been published.
Mr. Keefe. It is not included in your diary?
Mr. Grew. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And it is not included in any of these publications of the State Department?
Mr. Grew. I haven't checked it but I do not think it is.
Mr. Keefe. And where did you get the telegram?
Mr. Grew. From the files of the Department of State.
Mr. Keefe. You went to the Department of State after your testimony?
Mr. Grew. No; I did not go myself but several requests have been made to see if certain things took place during that period, whether I had been informed of this or that. This is one of the points raised and I instituted a search to see if I was informed of the modus vivendi plan and I have only this morning, just now, just 5 minutes ago, received this telegram.
Mr. Keefe. Very well.
Mr. Grew (reading):

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1941.

Ambassador Tokyo, Japan, 796. Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the Counsellor only.

This is from Mr. Hull.

Following the Japanese proposals of November 20, the Department gave consideration to a number of alternate proposals and counter-suggestions or combinations thereof which suggested themselves to the Department for possible presentation to the Japanese Government. At one time the Department considered the question of presenting to the Japanese Government simultaneously with the proposal which was actually given them on November 26, an alternate plan for a temporary modus vivendi. The draft under consideration at that time called for a temporary modus vivendi to be in effect for a period of three months during which time conversations would continue toward the working out of a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. At the end of the period of the term of the modus vivendi both Governments would confer at the request of either to determine whether the extension of the modus vivendi was justified by the prospects of reaching a settlement of the sort sought.

The draft modus vivendi which we were considering contained mutual pledges of peaceful interest, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement in northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indo-China, to limit those in northern Indo-China to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number should not be subject to replacement and Japan should not in any case send additional naval, military or air forces to Indo-China. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunkers and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifications. Cotton up to $600,000 monthly, a small amount of petroleum within categories now permitted general export on a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount to be exported from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports
in general provided that raw silk constitutes at least two thirds in value of such imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase of the designated exports from the United States and for the payment of interest and principle of Japanese obligations within the United States. This Government would undertake to approach the British, Dutch and Australian Governments on the question of their taking similar economic measures.

At a certain point in our consideration of the draft modus vivendi the representatives in Washington of the British, Dutch, Australian and Chinese Governments were consulted.

After careful consideration of all factors in the situation within the United States and in the general world situation, including the reaction and replies of the Governments mentioned above, it was decided that we should drop the draft modus vivendi which we had had [1965] under consideration. That draft modus vivendi was not handed to the Japanese, and the fact that this Government had considered a modus vivendi was not mentioned to them.

“The Department has informed you in separate telegrams—

Mr. Keefe. Pardon me just one minute. Will you read that last sentence again?

Mr. Grew (reading):

That draft modus vivendi was not handed to the Japanese, and the fact that this Government had considered a modus vivendi was not mentioned to them.

The Department has informed you in separate telegrams of the documents handed the Japanese Ambassador on November 26 and of the conversation which took place on that date.

Signed “Hull.”

Mr. Keefe. What is the date of that telegram?

Mr. Grew. That telegram is dated November 28, 1941, 7 p. m., Washington. I will turn that over to the committee.

The Chairman. Does that conclude your statement?

Mr. Grew. I have one more point, sir.

The Chairman. Proceed.

[1966] Mr. Grew. I was also asked whether I had been instructed to burn our codes prior to the outbreak of war.

I have been given a telegram which was sent to me in Tokyo on December 5, 1941 but which appears to have gone via Peiping via naval radio. I do not think I ever received this telegram in Tokyo before the break. I do not think I received it at all.

It is a fairly long message, of many pages. Do you wish me to read it or shall I merely turn it over to general counsel?

The Chairman. Well, the Chair suggests that it be submitted to counsel and that it be put in the record, too.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, that was my question that I had asked. I wonder whether he could read the part relating to the destruction of codes.

Mr. Grew. I think there are two paragraphs which are very pertinent, which I could read.

The Vice Chairman. Put the whole telegram in the record.

The Chairman. We will have the whole telegram inserted but you may read the paragraphs in question.

Mr. Grew. All right, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Just read the two paragraphs which relate to this.

Mr. Grew (reading):

[1967] Strictly Confidential.

1. The following instructions are applicable to all offices in Japan, Japanese occupied areas in China, Hong Kong, Indo-China, and Thailand, and are intended to enable officers, in the event of sudden emergency and in case communications
with the Department are delayed or severed, to take appropriate action concerning Government property, alien employees, archives, leases, the evacuation of the American members of the staff, et cetera.

Now, the paragraph which applies to our codes would appear to be as follows [reading]:

7. It is of the utmost importance that all confidential files, seals, codes, ciphers, true readings, protectograph dies, et cetera, should be destroyed. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning in the presence of at least two competent witnesses whose affidavits should be obtained.

I think that is all in this telegram, so far as I know, that applies to codes but, as I say, I do not think that I ever received this message.

The Chairman. Well, it will be made part of the record.

(The telegram referred to follows:)

[1967-A] [Telegram sent] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, December 3, 1441. 10pm

Not for distribution.
American Embassy, Tokyo (Japan) via Peiping by naval radio.
Info: Amembasy Chungking American Consul Hongkong
Strictly confidential.

1. The following instructions are applicable to all offices in Japan, Japanese occupied areas in China, Hong Kong, Indo China, and Thailand, and are intended to enable officers, in the event of sudden emergency and in case communications with the Department are delayed or severed, to take appropriate action concerning Government property, alien employees, archives, leases, and the evacuation of the American members of the staff, et cetera.

2. The Department will endeavor to telegraph travel orders covering the transportation of all officers and American employees, of the Legation. In the event of a sudden emergency, and if regular travel orders have not been received, travel expenses (including expenses for travel by air) and per diem and shipment of effects, if possible, all in accordance with [1967-B] the Travel Regulations, are hereby authorized in the discretion of the Chief of Mission or principal consular officer for all officers and American employees of the Department of State and for their wives and minor children. In the absence of regular travel orders (involving charges against the appropriation for "Transportation, Foreign Service") expenses incurred under the authority of this paragraph should be charged to Authorization No. 11-1942; while separate drafts should be drawn and separate accounts rendered.

3. The services of all alien personnel (except as noted in paragraph 4 below) should be terminated effective at the expiration of thirty days' leave less any leave previously taken in the calendar year, leave to commence on the day after the effective date of the closing of the Legation. The office, or, if their services are needed thereafter to commence within two weeks after closing, the effective dates of leave and termination of services of each alien employee should be reported. Officers are reminded that no salary payments may be made in advance. Department will endeavor to arrange for payment after officers' departure.

4. At those posts where the office and/or residence are owned by this Government, it is suggested that officers endeavor to arrange for the retention of one or more trustworthy alien employees as custodians of the premises. Their salaries as custodians would be at the same rate they were receiving in [1967-C] other capacities at the time the office was closed. The Department will try to arrange to pay their salaries and to provide funds for the maintenance of the buildings by such means as may become possible. If custodians are retained they should be instructed to confine their activities strictly to guardianship of the property of this Government and they should refrain
from any activities, however informal, which could possibly be interpreted as going beyond their custodial functions.

5. At posts where offices are leased, the Department leaves to the discretion of the Chief of Mission or principal consular officer whether to retain the premises, leaving the property of this Government therein, or to store the property in commercial warehouses and terminate the lease. Depending on the time at their disposal and the availability of warehouses, officers should endeavor to make the most economical arrangements that are not incompatible with the security of the property concerned. If the premises must be retained, efforts should at least be made to reduce the amount of rental. Officers will know best whether, when premises are retained, property left therein may be entrusted to landlords, or whether custodians should be retained as outlined in the foregoing paragraph.

6. The property mentioned in the above paragraphs includes furniture, equipment, and nonconfidential archives. Such archives should be sealed, however, in such a manner as to prevent their inspection except by officers whose names are on the list of custodians. Confidential codes, ciphers, true readings, protectograph dies, et cetera, should be destroyed. Fee stamps should be destroyed by burning in the presence of at least two competent witnesses whose affidavits should be obtained.

7. All passports of any character, valid or invalid, extra visa pages, certificates of naturalization and certificates of registration and identity, blank or filled in, should be thoroughly mutilated and then burned. With the exception of passports the first page of which should be retained for delivery to Department, a complete list should be made of all documents destroyed with identifying data when possible. In no circumstances should you attempt to bring with you any of the above documents or supplies except the first pages of passports.

8. The Department would have no objection to the storage of the personal effects of officers and American employees in Government-owned buildings or in leased buildings that are retained. Of the personal effects of officers and employees: If such facilities not available, Department will pay local storage charges.

9. If possible, forms 285 and 298 should be submitted after closing the office. The Department should be informed by telegraph of the effective date of closing.

10. All offices concerned are requested to inform the Department immediately (farther than at the time of closing) by telegraph of any foreign interests represented by them which have not been the subject of any specific instruction from or report to the Department since January 1, 1941. The disposition of foreign interests in the event of closing of offices will be dealt with later in a separate telegraphic instruction.

11. Each office at the time of closing and in connection with authorizations to draw drafts and make payments to individuals against deposits made with the Department shall immediately inform it of all cases of noncompliance by citing instruction numbers and dates, amounts and beneficiaries.

12. The sending of this instruction is in the nature of a precautionary measure and the authority granted in the foregoing paragraphs is intended to enable the officers concerned to deal with a sudden emergency. The concerned officers should quietly formulate plans to deal with an emergency if and when it arises. It is highly desirable that discussion be kept to a minimum and that publicity be avoided.

Tokyo instruct officers in Japanese territory.
Peking instruct officers in Japanese-occupied areas in China including Manchuria.

Sent to Tokyo via Peking. Repeated to Chungking and Hong Kong. Hong Kong repeat to Bankgok and Saigon. Saigon instruct Hanoi.

Mr. Grew. That is all, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator, go ahead.

Senators BREWSTER. You were also, Mr. Grew, going to look to see whether you had been at any time consulted or informed in advance.
regarding the retention of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, any time before the May 7 date.

Mr. Grew. Yes, Senator. That is now being looked for but it has not yet been found, and the belief is expressed that I never was informed of that movement.

Senator Brewster. So unless we do receive—

Mr. Grew. So unless you hear to the contrary you may assume that I was not informed.¹

Senator Brewster. Now, I venture to ask this question because of its possible bearing on the situation and you are speaking perhaps with more authority than anybody else regarding this Japanese psychology and I venture it because it was a hypothesis advanced by Arthur Krock in the New York Times which, of course, vouches for its respectability.

He advanced the theory that the Japanese may have desired to have the fleet retained at Hawaii for their own purpose and thought that the American mentality of officialdom would be more likely to retain it there if the Japanese made some strong representations about its removal.

[1969] I do not know whether you noted that suggestion but I would be interested in your comment as as whether or not that was a possible hypothesis.

Mr. Grew. I think that is a perfectly possible hypothesis, Senator. I do not believe anybody could answer the question with any assurance. I was aware of the sometimes devious workings of the processes of Japanese mentality. They were perfectly capable of doing that sort of thing, but you will recollect that I said, so far as I could remember, no official representations had ever been made to me that the fleet should be withdrawn.

The only notation that I have come across was my talk with Arita, Foreign Minister, on a certain date, but it was labeled "informal and off the record." In other words, we occasionally got together, generally at the house of some mutual friends to avoid any publicity which was always splashed in the press and those conversations were distinctly off the record and informal.

Senator Brewster. It was at that time that he did indicate that they were somewhat irked by the presence of the fleet there?

Mr. Grew. Yes. That record I think has been read already.

Senator Brewster. Yes, I recall it. So you would think [1970] that was a possible hypothesis as to their state of mind?

Mr. Grew. I think that was a possible hypothesis. I do not think I would want to go further than that.

[1971] Senator Brewster. Now the modus vivendi which you have testified about this morning, you had indicated previously that you thought it was rather doubtful if they would have agreed to any modus vivendi along the lines that were being discussed at the time, in November.

You recall, in that connection, the inquiry of Kurusu on that morning whether or not they would consider—his exact language is on page 706—

Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end, and asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi.

¹ See statement by Mr. Gesell in Hearings, Part 4, p. 1711.
You still feel, in spite of that, that he was not serious in that suggestion?

Mr. Grew. I am inclined to feel, Senator, that the conclusion of a modus vivendi at that time would probably not have prevented the attack; but there again that is a supposition.

Senator Brewster. It was at approximately that time that the Germans were turned back from Stalingrad, in what was the beginning of their retreat and ultimate rout, was it not, early in December?

Mr. Grew. I think it was approximately at that time.

Senator Brewster. You have indicated in your early report—I am not sure whether you have this incorporated, but [1972] on page 702 of your report you comment on the effect on the Japanese of the varying fortunes of war in Europe. The exact quotation is:

For example, in Japan the pro-Axis element gained power following last year's German victory in Western Europe; then Japanese doubt of ultimate German victory was created by Germany's failure to invade the British Isles, this factor helping to reinforce the moderate element; and finally Germany's attack on the Soviet Union upset the expectation of continued Russo-German peace and made the Japanese realize that those who took Japan into the Tripartite Alliance have misled Japan.

Indicating, as I gather, that Japan was keenly conscious of what was going on in other parts of the world and the effect it might have on them.

By the end of the 3 months' period which is contemplated in the modus vivendi, although I think President Roosevelt indicated he preferred 6 months, but by the end of the 3 months' period the Germans were in full retreat on the Russian front, and I would like to ask you whether or not, if that had occurred—and here again it is hypothetical—whether that would have had a material influence on the Japanese position?

[1973] Mr. Grew. I doubt very much if that had any direct bearing on Japanese procedures at that time. The Japanese were pulling away more and more from the Germans. While the Germans were constantly egging them on and doing everything they could to prevent the Washington conversations from succeeding and to prevent a settlement between Japan and the United States, the Japanese did not like the Germans, a great many of them resented being tied up with them in the Axis Pact.

The Germans, as they had in other capitals, swarmed into Tokyo and more or less tried to control things, and the Japanese did not like it, so they were pretty unpopular there.

I do not believe the events which you speak of had any direct bearing on the event which occurred.

Senator Brewster. I, of course, recognize after the die was cast that was the end, but I am now speaking of the possible modus vivendi in connection with the events, that on December 1, 1941, the Germans had reached the peak of their power, they were at the gates of Stalingrad, had been for some time, and 2 weeks later they were turned back in a rather decisive retreat that turned into a rout. The coincidence of the two affairs had always impressed me, that Japan struck at the height of German power and it seemed almost as though the Germans had come on to Stalingrad for the purpose of getting the Japanese in.
So my question is not as to what happened but as to what might have happened if the modus vivendi had been in effect and at the end of 3 months the Japanese surveying the situation, had found their German friends in a very different position. I think you have hitherto emphasized that the Japanese had never believed they could conquer the world alone but that they were dependent on the success of the Axis armies in Europe for any final plan.

Mr. Grew. My belief, Senator, was that at that time the Japanese were pretty independent. They were certainly very cocky. They had complete self-assurance, and I rather doubt whether any fluctuations in the war in Europe would materially have altered their procedure.

But that is something that of course cannot be proved. It is only supposition.

Senator Brewster. Yes. Now what did you feel, Mr. Grew, as to the consequences of any further southern expansion, moving into the Kra Peninsula, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, as to it requiring that we should, at all odds, take action or whether we could have tolerated any further movement safely for the sake of gaining time?

Mr. Grew. The Japanese program, Senator, was constantly expanding. In the beginning they talked about the Greater East Asia coprosperity sphere, and later that developed into the coprosperity sphere for Greater East Asia including the South Seas, and that included Australia.

In other words, their visions of grandeur were constantly increasing.

Senator Brewster. You called it delusions.

Mr. Grew. It was constantly increasing.

Senator Brewster. You felt that at some point the line must be drawn, you could not let them go on indefinitely?

Mr. Grew. Very decidedly so.

Senator Brewster. That meant some parallel of latitude or some other definite spot beyond which you could not permit them to pass?

Mr. Grew. I never thought of it in terms of precise geography, Senator. It was the general movement which was threatening what I considered our vital national interest. It was not a question of arriving at any particular point or crossing any particular line, it was simply the general movement.

Senator Brewster. Now one other question, for the purpose of the historical record.

You spoke yesterday about the encouragement which was given to the warlike spirit of Japan by the publication of statements of an isolationist or pacifist character in this country, and that those were frequently featured in the Japanese press during the year 1940 for the purpose of stimulating the Japanese attitude that they could safely attack us.

Mr. Grew. It was for the purpose of creating in the Japanese mind a totally erroneous conception of the spirit of the American people.

Senator Brewster. In order to do complete justice I want to read the most distinguished publication on that score and I want to ask you whether or not it was published in Japan. This was on September 16, 1940, a statement which I took from volume IX of Public

1 Subsequently corrected to October 30, 1940.
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, President Roosevelt, on page 434, and I quote:

And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance.

I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again.

Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars. They are going into training to form a force so strong that, by its very existence, it will keep the threat of war far away from our shores.

That is the end of the quotation. Do you recall whether or not that was published at that time in Japan.

Mr. Grew. No, sir. I would not recall whether that precise statement was published in Japan at that time.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?


Mr. Murphy. In view of the fact that the Senator from Maine has brought out the quotation, I want to state in the record that there were a number of other speeches made by the same distinguished gentleman from which any fair-minded person would take a proper construction.

I would like also to say that on yesterday there was reference made by a member of this committee to certain things connected with politics, and now we have a reference to another political speech. I hope we will keep politics out of this investigation.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I certainly share the hope of the gentleman.

The Chairman. In order that politics may be kept out, the Chair suggests that the whole speech from which the quotation was read be made a part of the record.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, at the proper time the Senator from Illinois—

Senator Brewster. That is entirely agreeable.

The Chairman. As I understand it, you have concluded?

Senator Brewster. Yes, that is all.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that the Senator from Maine brings up this one quotation, the Senator from Illinois, at the proper time, will proceed to insert other [1978] speeches made by this distinguished President upon that same question, and those quotations will not be the same as the Senator from Maine quoted. I think the Senator from Maine, if he wanted to do real justice to the cause, would use more than that one quotation.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I might well have taken a single sentence, but I did not, I took the entire quotation. I think those concerned will point out the language which the President there used regarding the defense. In other speeches he used the words "unless we are attacked."

In this speech he used the words "that is for our defense," which may be considered as moderating its implication. However, I think the question is quite fair, and I certainly have no objection to any other statements of any kind being inserted, which I hope certainly are not in conflict or contradiction. I would expect a continuity of policy.

The Chairman. The speech from which the quotation was read may be made a part of the record.
(The speech referred to follows:)

"WE ARE GOING FULL SPEED AHEAD!"

October 30, 1940

(Rebuilding the Navy and naval bases—Expanding and training the Army—Defense contracts—Defense housing—Our Air Power is growing—Planes for Britain—Production capacity—Progress of agricultural recovery—Republican opposition to aid to the farmers.)

Mr. Mayor, my friends of New England:

I've had a glorious day here in New England. And I do not need to tell you that I have been glad to come back to my old stamping ground in Boston. There's one thing about this trip that I regret. I have to return to Washington tonight, without getting a chance to go into my two favorite States of Maine and Vermont.

In New York City two nights ago, I showed by the cold print of the Congressional Record how: Republican leaders, with their votes and in their speeches, have been playing, and still are playing politics with national defense.

Even during the past three years, when the dangers to all forms of democracy throughout the world have been obvious, the Republican team in the Congress has been acting only as a Party team.

[1980] Time after time, Republican leadership refused to see that what this country needs is an all-American team.

Those side-line critics are now saying that we are not doing enough for our national defense. I say to you that we are going full speed ahead!

Our Navy is our outer line of defense. Almost the very minute that this Administration came into office seven and a half years ago, we began to build the Navy up—to build a bigger Navy.

In those seven years we have raised the total of 138 ships in commission to 337 ships in commission today.

And, in addition to that, we have 119 more ships that are actually under construction today.

In those seven years we raised the personnel of our Navy from 106,000 to 210,000 today.

You good people here in Boston know of the enormous increase of productive work in your Boston Navy Yard. And that is only one of many Navy yards—one of the best. There are now six times as many men employed in our Navy yards as there were in 1933. The private ship-building yards are also humming with activity—building ships for our Navy and for our expanding merchant marine.

The construction of this Navy has been a monumental job. In spite of what some campaign orators may tell you, you cannot buy a battleship from a mail-order catalogue.

[1981] We have not only added ships and men to the Navy, we have enormously increased the effectiveness of Naval bases in those outlying territories of ours in the Atlantic and Pacific.

For our objective is to keep any potential attacker as far from our continental shores as we possibly can.

You here in New England know that well, and can well visualize it.

And within the past two months your Government has acquired new naval and air bases in British territory in the Atlantic Ocean; extending all the way from Newfoundland in the north to that part of South America where the Atlantic Ocean begins to get narrow, with Africa not far away.

I repeat: Our objective is to keep any potential attacker as far from our continental shores as we possibly can.

That is the record of the growth of our Navy. In 1933 a weak Navy; in 1940 a strong Navy. Side-line critics may carp in a political campaign. But Americans are mighty proud of that record and Americans will put their country first and partisanship second.

Speaking of partisanship, I remind you—when the Naval Expansion Bill came up in 1938 the vast majority of Republican members of the Congress voted against building any more battleships.

What kind of political shenanigans are these?
Can we trust those people with national defense?

[1982] Next, take up the Army: Under normal conditions we have no need for a vast Army in this country. But you and I know that unprecedented dangers require unprecedented action to guard the peace of America against unprecedented threats.

Since that day, a little over a year ago, when Poland was invaded, we have more than doubled the size of our regular Army. Adding to this, the Federalized National Guardsmen, our armed land forces now equal more than 436,000 enlisted men. And yet there are armies overseas that run four and five and six million men.

The officers and men of our Army and National Guard are the finest in the world.

They will be, as you know, the nucleus for the training of the young men who are being called under the Selective Service Act. $80,000 of them in the course of this year out of nearly 17,000,000 registered—in other words, a little less than 5 per cent of the total registration.

General Marshall said to me the other day that the task of training those young men is, for the Army, a "profound privilege."

Campaign orators seek to tear down the morale of the American people when they make false statements about our Army's equipment. I say to you that we are supplying our Army with the best fighting equipment in all the world.

Yes, the Army and the Defense Commission are getting things done with speed and efficiency. More than eight billion dollars of contracts for defense have been let in the past few months.

I am afraid that those campaign orators will pretty soon be under the painful necessity of coming down to Washington later on and eating their words. I cannot help but feel that the most inexcusable, most unpatriotic misstatement of fact about our Army—a misstatement calculated to worry the mothers of the Nation—is the brazen charge that the men called to training will not be properly housed.

The plain fact is that construction on Army housing is far ahead of schedule to meet all needs, and that by January fifth, next, there will be complete and adequate housing in this Nation for nine hundred and thirty thousand soldiers.

And so I feel that, very simply and very honestly, I can give assurance to the mothers and fathers of America that each and every one of their boys in training will be well housed and well fed.

Throughout that year of training, there will be constant promotion of their health and their well-being.

And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance.

I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.

I urge you to guide them every step of the way.

[1984] They are going into training to form a force so strong that, by its very existence, it will keep the threat of war far away from our shores.

The purpose of our defense is defense.

The Republican campaign orators who moan and groan (laughter) about our Army and Navy are even more mournful about our strength in the air. But only last year, 1933, the Republicans in the Congress were voting in favor of reducing appropriations for the Army Air Corps.

What kind of political shenanigans are these?

Can such people be trusted with national defense?

I stress particularly what every Army and Navy flier tells us—that what counts most in sustained air power is the productive capacity of our airplane and engine factories. That ought to be almost a first-grade lesson.

We are determined to attain a production capacity of 50,000 planes a year in the United States. And day by day we are working and making very rapid progress toward that goal.

You citizens of Seattle who are listening tonight—you have watched the Boeing plant out there grow. It is now producing four times as many planes each month as it was producing a year ago.

You citizens of Southern California can see the great Douglas factories. They have doubled their output in less than a year. You citizens of Buffalo and St. Louis can see the Curtiss plants in your cities. Their output has jumped to twelve times its level a year ago.
And, of course, we are training our young men, and training them successfully in sufficient numbers, to fly these planes as soon as they come off the lines.

But planes won't fly without engines. You citizens of Hartford, who hear my words: look across the Connecticut River at the whirring wheels and the beehive of activity which is the Pratt and Whitney plant which I saw today. A year ago that plant was producing airplane engines totaling one hundred thousand horsepower a month. Today that production has been stepped up tenfold, stepped up to one million horsepower a month.

And you citizens of Paterson, New Jersey, you can see the Curtiss-Wright plant which a year ago produced two hundred seventy thousand horsepower a month and this October is producing 859,000 horsepower.

In ten months this Nation has increased our engine output for planes 240 per cent; and I am proud of it.

Remember, too, that we are scattering them all over the country. We are building brand new plants for airplanes and airplane engines in places besides the Pacific Coast and this coast. We are also building them in centers in the Middle West.

Last spring and last winter this great production capacity program was stepped up by orders from overseas. In taking these [1936] orders for planes from overseas, we are following and were following hard-headed self-interest.

Building on the foundation provided by these orders, the British on the other side of the ocean are receiving a steady stream of airplanes. After three months of blitzkrieg in the air over there, the strength of the Royal Air Force is actually greater now than when the attack began. And they know and we know that that increase in strength despite battle losses is due in part to the purchases made from American airplane industries.

Tonight I am privileged to make an announcement, using Boston instead of the White House: The British within the past few days have asked for permission to negotiate again with American manufacturers for 12,000 additional planes. I have asked that the request be given most sympathetic consideration by the Priorities Board. I have asked the Priorities Board to give it that consideration—the Board made up of William S. Knudsen, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and Leon Henderson. When those additional orders are approved, as I hope they will be, they will bring Britain's present orders for military planes from the United States to more than 26,000. They will require still more new plant facilities so that the present program of building planes for military purposes both for the United States and Great Britain will not be interrupted.

Also large additional orders are being negotiated for artillery, for machine guns, for rifles, for tanks with equipment [1937] and ammunition. The plant capacity necessary to produce all this military equipment is and will be available to serve the needs of the United States in any emergency.

The productive capacity of the United States which has made it the greatest industrial country in the world, is not failing now. It will make us the strongest air power in the world. And that is not just at campaign promise!

I have been glad in the past two or three days to welcome back to the shores of America that Boston boy, beloved by all of Boston and a lot of other places, my Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Joe Kennedy.

Actually on the scene where planes were fighting and bombs were dropping day and night for many months, he has been telling me just what you and I have visualized from afar—that all the smaller independent nations of Europe—Sweden, Switzerland, Greece, Ireland and the others—have lived in terror of the destruction of their independence by Nazi military might.

And so, my friends, we are building up our armed defenses to their highest peak of efficiency for a very good reason, the reason of the possibility of real national danger to us; but these defenses will be inadequate unless we support them with a strong national morale, a sound economy, a sense of solidarity and economic and social justice.

When this Administration first came to office, the foundation of that national morale was crumbling. In the panic and misery [1938] of those days no democracy could have built up an adequate armed defense.

What we have done since 1933 has been written in terms of improvement in the daily life and work of the common man.

I have discussed the falsifications which Republican campaign orators have been making about the economic condition of the Nation—the condition of labor and the condition of business.
They are even more ridiculous when they shed those old crocodile tears over the plight of the American farmer.

Now, if there is anyone that a Republican candidate loves more than the laboring man in October and up to Election Day, it is the farmer.

And the first one that he forgets after Election Day is the farmer.

Do I have to remind you of the plight of the farmer—not just the Western farmer, but the New England farmer—during the period between 1920 and 1933—declining income, accumulating surpluses, rising farm debts—ten-cent corn, twenty-cent wheat, five-cent cotton and three-cent hogs?

But before 1933 the Administration did nothing to stop that slide. But, of course, before every Election Day they always uncork the old bottle of soothing syrup and spread it thick. *(Laughter.)*

The farmers of America know from the record what the state of American agriculture is today.

Farm income this year is just about double what is was in 1932.

Farm buying power this year is greater than it was even in 1929.

Tens of thousands of farmers have had their farms saved from foreclosure.

More than 800,000 low income farmers have been able to obtain credit from the Government which they could get nowhere else. And, incidentally, credit which they are repaying.

Over a million farms have been electrified since 1933.

Over 6,000,000 farmers have received benefit payments of more than three and a half million dollars.

What does it all add up to? It means an agriculture that is strong and vigorous.

And we all know how much this is due to the patient efforts and practical vision of Henry Wallace.

The people of New England, whether they live in the city or out in the country, know that if the farmers' income in this Nation had remained what it was in 1932, they would be buying fewer shoes, fewer watches and ice boxes, less woolen goods and cotton goods, than they are buying now. Prosperous farmers mean more employment, more prosperity for the workers and businessmen of New England and of every industrial area in the whole country.

Parity—the proper relationship between agriculture and the rest of our economy—will continue to be our guiding principle.

We now have great stocks of wheat, corn and cotton—in a sense really strategic materials in a world that is threatened by war.

Surpluses not needed for reserves are now being used to feed the hungry and the ill-nourished and that is a fact that is difficult for the old Republican orators to deny.

Our school luncheon program will this year reach three million children with milk and other foods. And milk does those children more good than political soothing syrup.

While this was being done, what were the Republican leaders doing? Here is the record:

In 1933, Republicans in the Congress, in both houses, voted against the first Agricultural Adjustment Act, 88 to 52.

In 1936 they voted against the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, 75 to 25.

In 1938, they voted against the second Agricultural Adjustment Act, 84 to 15.

And even in 1940, this year, they voted against parity payments to farmers by 143 to 32.

In the spring of this year, they voted overwhelmingly against the Stamp Plan to distribute food to needy people through private grocery stores.

The American farmers will not be deceived by pictures of Old Guard candidates, putting cows and pitching hay in front of moving picture cameras.

And even since the Convention in Philadelphia, all the sweet words of the Republican leaders in that Convention have not been worth the paper they were written on.

For listen to this: Last summer, only a few weeks after the Republican National Platform had been adopted endorsing commodity loans for the farmers, the Republican members of the House marched right back into the Halls of Congress and voted against commodity loans for the farmers, 106 to 37.

Among the Republican leaders who voted against that bill and against practically every other farm bill was the present Chairman of the Republican National Committee, that "peerless leader," that "farmers' friend"—Congressman Joe Martin of Massachusetts.
I would not single him out except that he is of national interest now, because at the time of his appointment as Republican National Chairman this handsome verbal bouquet, this expensive orchid, was pinned upon him: "In public life for many years Joe Martin has represented all that is finest in American public life."

Considering the source of that orchid, Martin must be slated for some Cabinet post. So let's look for a minute at the voting record of this representative of what they call, "all that [1992] is finest in American public life."

Martin voted against the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, the National Securities Exchange Act, and the extension of the Civilian Conservation Corps Act. He voted against practically all relief and work relief measures, and against the appropriation for rural electrification.

Martin voted against the Civil Service Extension Act and against the United States Housing Act.

What I particularly want to say on the radio to the farmers of the Nation, and to you here in this hall, is that Republican National Chairman Martin voted against every single one of the farm measures that were recommended by this Administration. Perhaps Brother Martin will be rewarded for this loyal service to the principles of his party by being appointed Secretary of Agriculture.

He is one of that great historic trio which has voted consistently against every measure for the relief of agriculture—Martin, Barton and Fish.

I have to let you in on a secret. It will come as a great surprise to you. And it's this:

I'm enjoying this campaign. I'm really having a fine time.

I think you know that the office of President has not been an easy one during the past years.

The tragedies of this distracted world have weighed heavily on all of us.

But—there is revival for every one of us in the sight of our own national community.

In our own American community we have sought to submerge all the old hatreds, all the old fears, of the old world.

We are Anglo-Saxon and Latin, we are Irish and Teuton and Jewish and Scandinavian and Slav—we are American. We belong to many races and colors and creeds—we are American.

And it seems to me that we are most completely, most loudly, most proudly American around Election Day.

Because it is then that we can assert ourselves—voters and candidates alike. We can assert the most glorious, the most encouraging fact in all the world today—the fact that democracy is alive—and going strong.

We are telling the world that we are free—and we intend to remain free and at peace.

We are free to live and love and laugh.

We face the future with confidence and courage. We are American.


Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, the telegram which you brought in this morning, dated December 5, in the typewriting it is December 3, and across the "3" is marked in pen "5". You say you do not have any recollection of ever receiving this telegram?

Mr. Grew. That is the one regarding the destruction of the codes?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. No, sir; I have no recollection of having received it.

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get this copy?

Mr. Grew. This telegram?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. This was one of the telegrams—you remember the question was asked me at the hearing—

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I am asking you, did you get it from the Secretary of State's office?

Mr. Grew. I asked that an exploration be made of the archives to see whether such telegram existed, and it was found and brought to me this morning.

Senator Ferguson. Could you tell me, Mr. Grew, notwithstanding whether you received the telegram or not, whether any codes were
destroyed? I am not asking you the kind of codes, but were there any of the American codes or code machines destroyed prior to the 7th?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. As I think I have already said, some of our codes were destroyed shortly before the break. I do not know, frankly, how long before they were destroyed or how many were destroyed. I remember simply taking steps to see that at least one code was left for last minute communication with Washington in case of necessity.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I notice that affidavits were to be filed, according to this message.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were such affidavits prepared and filed?

Mr. Grew. They presumably were, but I could not answer that question because this was really a matter of more or less routine which I probably had nothing to do with. It might have been the counsel of the Embassy; it might have been the first secretary who would have taken charge of this particular matter.

Senator Ferguson. The Secretary of State's office would have those affidavits?

Mr. Grew. The affidavits?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Grew. If they were kept, they were undoubtedly brought back by us to Washington when we came back on the Gripsholm in August 1942.

Senator Ferguson. Did you bring the papers back?

Mr. Grew. I brought a good many papers back, but I do not recollect, Senator, whether those particular papers were among them. It would have to be looked up.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then you want to convey to the committee that the destruction of the codes was a routine matter?

Mr. Grew. Well, the actual act of the destruction—

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that the actual destruction would be routine after your instructions, but you do not wish to convey to the committee that the giving of the orders to destroy the codes is a routine matter?

Mr. Grew. Oh, no, that is perfectly true.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you did not receive this message—and your memory is you did not—from what did you get the information to destroy the codes prior to the 7th? When I use the "7th" I am using the day of the attack, the time of the attack is what I have in mind.

Mr. Grew. I do not recollect having acted on any document or any report, but we knew the way things were shaping up at that time. This destruction of the code may have taken place very shortly before the final break. I shall have to check up on that to answer your question.

Senator Ferguson. Could you check up on that, as to just when they were destroyed?

Mr. Grew. I will, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would your diary give that?

Mr. Grew. No, I do not think it is mentioned there.

Senator Ferguson. Have you conferred recently with the military or naval attachés that were with you?
Mr. Grew. As far as I know they are both absent from Washington.

Senator Ferguson. Would you give them orders for the destruction of other codes or code machines?

Mr. Grew. That would have been undertaken by themselves on the basis of their own instructions.

Senator Ferguson. Would those instructions come through your Embassy?

Mr. Grew. In a matter of that kind I assume that they would have come direct to the attachés.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then that your opinion, from what you had in Japan, was such that you considered it advisable to destroy some codes and code machines and only retain one code? Is that correct?

Mr. Grew. That is correct, Senator, but I am not clear about the timing. I do not like to answer that question [1997] categorically until I look into it.

Senator Ferguson. But you will look into it and return?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; I will.¹

Senator Ferguson. Now, the quotation that I used the other day, that I could not find at that time is on page 701 of Foreign Relations. My phrasing was not quite accurate, and it could have been misleading, so I want to quote what I had in mind.

It is the message of November 3, or two messages of November 3, one is a long one and one is a short one. It is the first one. I had phrased it something like this:

“What is the significance of the message that the Cabinet had made up its mind and told the Emperor?”

Then I asked you whether or not that had caused you to send the November 3 message. I had in mind the long message.

Now, at the top of the page there is a quotation in the message, “Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan. Tokyo, November 3, 1941.” It is signed by you.

The Foreign Minister had told him—that is your friend, the reliable informant, as you called him—that during the past few days he had been constantly in conference day and night with the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Navy, and that as a result, the Government had reached a [1798] definite decision as to how far it was prepared to go in implementing the desires of the Emperor for an adjustment of relations with the United States. This decision, which was being held in strictest secrecy, had been communicated by the Prime Minister to the Emperor on the afternoon of November 2.

The Foreign Minister had conveyed to my informant the impression that he expected to ask me to call for an extended conversation within a few days.

Now, what significance has that had; that they in effect, as I read it, had told the Emperor what they were going to do?

[1999] Mr. Grew. Well, that is really an assumption, Senator. There again is one of those things that cannot be proved.

Senator Ferguson. I just want to know what you mean by this sentence, what you are conveying to the State Department. All I am after in these questions is merely to ascertain what knowledge the State Department had, what knowledge you had, and sometime we will get to the question as to what knowledge they had in Hawaii, to ascertain how this attack could have been as successful as it was at Pearl Harbor.

¹ See Exhibit No. 91.
Mr. Grew. You spoke a moment ago about my telegram of November 3 and asked me whether this conversation with the Japanese informant had brought about the sending of that telegram. I do not think so because that telegram had been elaborated over a period of time. It represented our thoughts in the Embassy in Tokyo at the time it was sent.

With regard to this particular conversation he says that the Foreign Minister expected to call me for an extended conversation within a few days. That Foreign Minister was Mr. Togo. I don’t recollect whether he did call for me or not. I shall have to go through the files to see.

Senator Ferguson. It goes further and says the Government had reached a definite decision as to how far it was prepared to go in implementing the desires of the Emperor for an adjustment of relations with the United States. That indicated that the Government, the war lords, were dictating to the Emperor just what they were going to do.

Mr. Grew. That is a fair assumption, certainly.

Senator Ferguson. I mean that is a fair statement from what you said?

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that these war lords had at that time, as far as your informant was concerned, had taken the matter out of the Emperor’s hands and they were going to dictate or decide what they were going to do; is that what you were conveying to the State Department?

Mr. Grew. I think that is a plausible assumption.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how are we going to get what you were trying to convey to the State Department? I don’t want to con- strue it. I want you to construe it.

Mr. Grew. Senator, I think the construction of that telegram of mine of November 3 to the Secretary of State is self-explanatory. It is a very long telegram. It goes over the whole ground and it indicates our feeling at that time based on what information came to us through various channels, but I can’t put my finger on any one piece of information that led to that telegram.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why you separated these two telegrams and sent two telegrams instead of putting it all in one, when you sent it the same day?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. There is a distinction there. This telegram before us, on page 700 of Foreign Relations, is reporting a specific instance. My telegram of November 3—the long telegram of November 3—is not reporting a specific instance. It was an analysis and survey of the whole situation. That is why the telegrams were separated.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did the Foreign Minister call on you as indicated in this first telegram that “he expected me to call for an extended conversation within a few days”?

Mr. Grew. That I shall have to look up the records on to see. The Foreign Minister did occasionally call for me. I cannot now recollect the dates.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that shortly after this that we had intercepted messages indicating that the 25th of November was the deadline date, as they called it?
Mr. Grew. No, sir; I did not know that fact. As I have already said, Senator, I knew nothing about any of those intercepted messages.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any information that what the Prime Minister and the Government had done was to tell the Emperor what the deadline had been?

Mr. Grew. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You had no such information?

[2002] Mr. Grew. I had no information whatsoever to that effect.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Grew, did you get any information that we had changed the course of our ships, that Admiral Stark had issued an order about—Counsel, can you give me the date of that order?

Mr. Murphy. November 25.

Senator Ferguson. Was it November 25?

Mr. Mitchell. It was in October, I think.

Senator Ferguson. Was it October?

Mr. Mitchell. The order shifting the fleet? October 16, I think.

My recollection is it is October 16, but we will check.

Senator Ferguson. That is the same date as the fall of the Cabinet and I don't associate the two together.

I will get the date for you later, Mr. Grew.

Mr. Grew. In any case I shall have to look that up, Senator, and see.

Senator Ferguson. You don't recall it now?

Mr. Grew. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that we had withdrawn certain shipping from the Japanese area?

Mr. Grew. My recollection is that I didn't know that but there again——

Senator Ferguson. You want to look that up?

Mr. Grew. Yes.

[2003] Senator Ferguson. I will get you that date, Mr. Grew, in relation to Admiral Stark's notice of changing the route of shipping.

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

Senator Ferguson. I thought it was November 25.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield to the Congressman?

Senator Ferguson. I yield.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in the record within the past several days the Senator from Michigan in questioning the witness on the stand made reference at various times to the note of August 17 handed by the President of the United States to the Japanese representative as being an ultimatum.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I just interrupt to say——

Mr. Murphy. Not that the gentleman called it an ultimatum but whether or not the witness did not think it was an ultimatum.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have given no opinion whatever on that note.

I wish to convey on the record that I have not purported to convey any opinion whatever upon that note. I used the language of

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1 See Mr. Gesell's statement, Hearings, Part 5, p. 2067.
Captain Schuirmann in a war committee meeting, on the instructions of Admiral Stark, as the note reads. But I have no intention whatever of saying that this is an ultimatum or conveying to anyone that I even think that this is an ultimatum. What I am trying to find out, Mr. Chairman, by these questions is what knowledge they had here in Washington and what knowledge they had in Japan and what knowledge they had at Pearl Harbor.

This statement came from the—

Joint Board, Washington, Secret Minutes of a Meeting, November 3, 1941, at the call of the Senior Members, weekly meeting scheduled for November 5, 1941 was held today, 2003 Munitions Building, meeting called to order at 3:40—

and this is a statement of action of the United States in the Far East in support of China; at the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action, and it is in that statement that that word was used.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I am glad to hear the Senator from Michigan say that because the question was asked on several occasions as to whether or not this was an ultimatum and reference made to Captain Schuirmann's statement that it was an ultimatum.

And so that no one will make any mistake, since the Senator has said he didn't think it was an ultimatum, I ask that there be inserted in the record a paper also handed to the Japanese representative by the President of the United States on the same day, in which the following sentence may be found:

The program envisaged in such informal discussions involved the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. It would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities.

I am not going to go on and read it all, but I ask that it be inserted in the record.

Senator Ferguson. I think that is already in the record.

The Chairman. The Chair's recollection might be at fault but he thinks that was included as part of the record. If it is not included, it may be included now.

Mr. Murphy. If it is not I would like to have it made a part of the record so I can ask Captain Schuirmann how the note of the 17th would be an ultimatum.

Mr. Mitchell. May we have the page?


Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I hope the time never comes when the asking of a question will assume that the questioner believes that the thing is true. He is asking for information from the witness as to whether or not the witness believes it was true or not.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. It is for the purpose of trying to get information.

The Chairman. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to answer Senator—

Senator Ferguson. No, Mr. Chairman, I have no other questions except this one:
Mr. Grew, did you find that May 1939 instrument, the definite instrument from the Prime Minister to the President of the United States or the Secretary of State, in relation to an over-all settlement of all matters?

Mr. Grew. No, sir. A search is being made for that document. It has not yet come to me.

Senator Ferguson. Thank you.

The Chairman. Does counsel wish to make a statement?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Senator Ferguson, you asked about the date of the order putting the merchant shipping out of the normal lines through Torres Straits. I am not sure whether that document is in evidence, but I missed the date by 1 day. I said October 16, but this message, which will be presented shortly, was dated October 17, 1941. It is addressed to the commander in [2007] chief of the Asiatic Fleet with information to all the other Pacific commanders and directs they immediately route all trans-Pacific United States flag shipping, and so forth, through the Torres Straits. That is the one you had in mind?

Senator Ferguson. That is the message. Whom is that signed by?

Mr. Mitchell. It is from the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Mr. Mitchell. To the commander in chief at Naval District 12; I think that is the Pacific coast—with copies to all the other Pacific commanders.

[2008] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Before the Ambassador leaves the witness stand, I should like to obtain permission from the committee to make a statement with respect to the personal private diary of Mr. Grew.

I have seen some of the headlines in the press overnight, and in view of the fact that the question had been raised I gave it some thought and study, and would like at this time to make a statement on it.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman—may I interpose?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

The Chairman. The Senator from Maine.

Senator Brewster. I fully concur with what the Chairman said yesterday that it is a matter that should receive the most careful consideration of the committee. Thus far I have simply been asking about it. Before I arrive at an opinion, I should welcome a full discussion among the members of the committee on this question. I had hoped that that discussion would be in a somewhat more private form.

The Chairman. The Chair has no information as to what the statement is that the Senator from Illinois wishes to make. It seems to be based upon some newspaper publication.

Senator Lucas. No; it isn't based on a newspaper [2009] publication. It is based on what the Senator from Maine said in this public forum and which got into the newspapers on the question of the private diary being admitted in the public record.

The Chairman. If it is a question of law, that is to be discussed, it might well be relegated to an executive session of the committee for discussion; if it is a matter of law to be thrashed out by the committee.

Senator Lucas. It is not a question of law.
The Chairman. If it is a correction of any impression—
Senator Lucas. That is exactly what I contend it is, a correction of an impression made.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman—
The Chairman. Will the Senator from Illinois yield to the Congressman from Wisconsin?
Senator Lucas. I yield.
Mr. Keefe. If statements of that character are to be interjected in the record at this time, I would like to reserve the right also to make a statement with respect to this diary at this time.
I had understood that the whole question as to the admission of this diary in evidence before this committee was a matter that was going to be discussed by the full committee in executive session, and it would seem to me highly improper [2010] for members of the committee to now indulge in statements with reference to the propriety or lack of propriety of bringing this diary before the committee. I think it is a matter that ought to be discussed by the committee in executive session. Therefore, I refrained yesterday, in connection with my examination——
Senator Lucas. I yield just for a question, not a long speech. If the Congressman from Wisconsin will just restrain himself a few moments, he will discover that in this statement I am not attempting to say anything about what the committee should or should not do with respect to bringing this diary before the committee. I am attempting to answer the Senator from Maine, who, on yesterday, said in his opinion that this diary of the Ambassador would be subject to a subpoena duces tecum to be brought into the record.
I don't think it is material or relevant to this hearing one way or the other, and I so stated, but in view of the fact that it has been raised, I desire to answer that point. Not whether or not the committee should have the diary before it.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?
Senator Lucas. I yield.
Senator Brewster. I am certainly sorry if any questioning by me of Mr. Grew, or the letter which I wrote, conduced [2011] to any extraneous discussion. I assured the Senator from Illinois privately yesterday that I had no final views on the matter, and I repeat that now, but I would comment that while I did mention the question of private court procedure, I wouldn't pretend to be as good an authority as the Senator from Illinois on that.
I think the chairman very correctly stated that irrespective of that, there would be no question regarding the power and authority of this committee; or, at any rate, it was a subject that could be considered by the committee. I won't say that the Chairman expressed any final conclusion.
The Chairman. The Chair did not do so.
Senator Brewster. I share the opinion of both the Representative from Wisconsin and the Chair that we ought to deliberate on this matter carefully, and with regard for Mr. Grew and his rights and interests, and for the high public interest involved.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman——
The Chairman. The Chair cannot pass on something that isn't before him and which has not been read, and the nature of which he does not know.
The Chair might express a sort of ex cathedra opinion that Mr. Grew took pretty good care of himself in his answers to these questions about his diary, and the Chair thinks he [2012] is capable of doing that not only on that subject, but on most any subject about which he might be interrogated.

But the Chair would certainly wish to discourage any discussion as to the legal power of this committee to summons Mr. Grew to bring his diary, or any other witness to bring his diary, his private property, before this committee without considering the legal aspects of it after a discussion in executive session. That is the Chair's view.

Senator Brewster. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Lucas. If the Chair does not want me to proceed with this memorandum I shall not do so.

The Chairman. The Chair is not expressing any objection to that. There is this one thing we might keep in mind. The newspapers every day in reporting these proceedings, I have discovered, are not always accurate, and the temptation is constant to say something here that would refute some impression of a newspaper reporter about what the witnesses have said.

Senator Lucas. I find there is a temptation also around this table to suggest certain things that do make headlines.

The Chairman. Well, there is no way to control that.

Senator Lucas. No; there is not.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Grew has a short statement of his own views, a one-page statement that he [2013] would like to read in supplementing his reasons already given for not producing the diary. I think it fair that he be given an opportunity to read it.

The Chairman. The Chair would be glad to have him do that at the conclusion of his testimony. I wouldn't want it to interfere with the questioning.

Senator Lucas. I do not propose to ask Mr. Grew any further questions and I will defer the reading of this statement until Mr. Grew gives to the committee what he has with respect to his personal diary. It may be that it coincides with what I have here, but I doubt that it does.

The Chairman. All right.

Does any member wish to ask any further questions?

Mr. Keefe. I have one question, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Grew, in connection with the examination by Senator Ferguson, reference was made to a telegram which you may or may not have received with respect to the destruction of the code material in the Embassy and certain other documents.

In that telegram it was suggested that when this destruction was undertaken, that it be witnessed by two witnesses who would place in affidavit form the fact of the destruction.

Now, whether under your direction or the direction of [2014] some other official of the Embassy, certain code material was destroyed at some time, and I assume that it was customary for an affidavit to be filed, and you were asked about that affidavit and I believe you stated that you do not have the affidavit but that you will search the records of the State Department to see if they are to be found; is that right?
Mr. Grew. That is correct, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe. I want counsel to understand that we are requesting that those affidavits be presented.²

Now, do you know a man by the name of Lawrence Salisbury? I believe you referred to him, or some witness did, in testimony here.

Mr. Grew. Yes, I know him.

Mr. Keefe. Didn't he occupy a position in the State Department?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. He was formerly in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. He has been in our foreign service for many years.

Mr. Keefe. He retired or resigned about a year ago?

Mr. Grew. That is true.

Mr. Keefe. Were you in the State Department at the time he left the service?

Mr. Grew. I was technically in the State Department. I [2015] may have been out in the field somewhere because I was moving around a great deal.

Mr. Keefe. I don't mean whether you were physically there.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. Technically, I was in the State Department.

Mr. Keefe. In what capacity were you acting at the time he left?

Mr. Grew. I don't recollect the exact status; I don't know whether I had then become Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, or whether Mr. Salisbury's retirement took place prior to that date. I will have to check the dates.

Mr. Keefe. Do you recall that prior to Mr. Salisbury's retirement, he wrote and delivered to the State Department a document of about 40 pages stating the reasons for his resignation and leaving the State Department?

Mr. Grew. I don't recollect that document now, Congressman. I should have to check the records.

Mr. Keefe. May I ask counsel then to undertake a search of the records of the State Department in an effort to find what I am very definitely and reliably advised was about a 40-page statement prepared by Mr. Lawrence Salisbury and filed with Secretary Hull shortly prior to the time that he (Salisbury) retired from the State Department. Whoever [2016] undertakes it, I don't care whether it is Mr. Grew or counsel.

Mr. Gesell. We will undertake it. Do you have the date of the resignation?

Mr. Keefe. I don't have the exact date, but it was some time during 1944. I do not have the exact date he left.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. Keefe. Now, I asked you yesterday, Mr. Grew, with respect to the proposal that was submitted by the Japanese Foreign Minister in 1939, and about which Senator Ferguson had likewise inquired into, wherein a proposal was submitted to the President and our State Department for an over-all review of the world situation just prior to the outbreak of war in Europe. Do I understand a search is being made for that document?

Mr. Grew. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. You have not yet discovered it?

Mr. Grew. Not yet found it.

Mr. Keefe. You were familiar with the instrument that I am requesting and that Senator Ferguson has requested?

Mr. Grew. Familiar with what?

² See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2067, statement by Mr. Gesell.
Mr. Keeffe. You are familiar that there was such an incident?


Mr. Keeffe. I understood you to say during my examination of you yesterday you are not certain that you were at the Embassy at that time, or whether Mr. Dooman was there.

Mr. Grew. That is correct. I should like to look up the record on that before I make a categorical statement.

Mr. Keeffe. You have not refreshed your recollection since yesterday on that point?

Mr. Grew. I have not had an opportunity as yet.

Mr. Keeffe. Very well.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. Keeffe. That is all.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. Gearhart. There are one or two points that I would like to better understand.

Mr. Grew, do you remember vividly the receipt of the telegram instructing the Embassy to destroy its codes?

Mr. Grew. Congressman, I think I have already stated that I have no recollection of having received that telegram. I am not sure whether it ever came or not.

Mr. Gearhart. You have since verified that such a telegram was received?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. A copy has been found and placed [2018] in the hands of general counsel.

The Vice Chairman. “Received” or “sent”?

Mr. Gearhart. You have verified that such a telegram was sent.

Mr. Grew. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. After reading that telegram which was sent, the copy, does that bring back to your mind anything?

Mr. Grew. Not at this moment, no.

Mr. Gearhart. You can’t even remember that any code machines or codes were destroyed; is that correct?

Mr. Grew. I have already stated, Congressman, that it is my impression that several of our codes were destroyed at about that time. I cannot give you the definite date because I don’t recollect it. As you know a great many things were happening at that time of a political nature. And, frankly, the act of destroying the codes would not have lain with me. It would have lain with the subordinate officers, presumably the counselor at the Embassy. I would have to look up the whole episode and find out just how it was done and when, and by whom, in order to give a clear report on it.

Mr. Gearhart. I take it you can’t remember at this date whether the codes were destroyed on your order or upon the order of a subordinate? [2019] Mr. Grew. They were certainly destroyed on my order. They were destroyed on my order.

Mr. Gearhart. You are sure of that?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; I am sure of that. As I say, I cannot give you the dates without looking them up.

Mr. Gearhart. Can you remember the incident?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir; certainly I remember the incident.
Mr. Gearhart. Why did you order them destroyed if you didn’t have a message from Washington.

Mr. Grew. Congressman, things were coming to a stage at that time where I realized fully it was wise to take precautions, but before stating exactly why that order was given, I would like to check up on the actual time, which is of great importance, and without looking up those records, I don’t feel that my testimony would be very helpful.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, at that time, and during that period, the tension was running pretty high; there was a good deal of suppressed excitement in the Embassy?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. Tension was high.

Mr. Gearhart. And do you mean to tell us that you are not clear as why you destroyed code machines. That is an unusual thing in an Embassy, is it not?

Mr. Grew. I have made no such statement, I believe, Mr. Congressman. The codes, when they were destroyed, were destroyed in view of the tenseness of the situation.

[2020] Mr. Gesell. Congressman Gearhart, I thing I can throw some light on this which will be helpful.

Mr. Gearhart. I am really exploring the condition of mind of the Ambassador. I am wondering how they could do such an out-of-the-usual thing as to destroy code machines and his not being able to remember vividly what transpired.

Mr. Gesell. I think we have the partial answer.

Mr. Gearhart. I will be glad to hear it.

Mr. Gesell. There is a naval dispatch, which we had proposed to introduce at the time Admiral Wilkinson takes the stand, dated December 4, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the naval attaché at Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, and Shanghai, for the information of the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the naval attaché at Chungking and the commander of the Sixteenth Naval District. That is dated December 4, 1941, and reads as follows:

Destroy this system at discretion and report by word “Jabberwock”. Destroy all registered publications except CSP 1085 and 6 and 1007 and 1008 and this system and report execution by sending in plain language “boomerang”.

That suggests that on December 4, the Chief of Naval Operations is sending instructions to the naval attaché at Tokyo—instructions to destroy certain codes.

[2021] I thought that might be helpful.

Mr. Gearhart. Would instructions to your naval attaché or your military attaché to destroy codes result in their destruction without an order from you?

Mr. Grew. Yes, Congressman, I would have nothing to do with the decision of the military or naval attachés to destroy their own codes. That lay entirely with them.

Mr. Gearhart. In view of what has been read by counsel, are you still sure that the destruction of the codes which occurred in the Embassy was done under your order?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. The codes could not have been destroyed without my instructions. There would be no question about that.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, do you remember whether or not you were making destructions and the naval attaché was making destructions simultaneously?
Mr. Grew. I cannot recollect the actual instance, that was a long time ago, and, as I say, a great many things have happened since then, and I was exceedingly occupied at that moment with very large affairs of a political nature. I cannot recollect at just what moment the codes were destroyed or which codes were destroyed.

As I say, I would have to look it up before I could give a categorical answer.

[2022] Mr. Gearhart. Now, you had at that time a large battery of files in the office of the Embassy?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, we did.

Mr. Gearhart. Those files contained a lot of information which would have been very valuable to the enemy if they had been able to seize them?

Mr. Grew. That is true.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you take any steps to destroy the secret files of the Embassy at about the same time?

Mr. Grew. Those secret files of the Embassy were destroyed, as I recollect it, immediately after the word came that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. We had those files in such a situation that they could be destroyed in a very few minutes and that step was taken, as I recollect it, immediately after the announcement of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Gearhart. Then so far as you now recall you never received any directions from any source to destroy your highly secret files prior to the actual bombing of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew. I should like to have a search made before I give a categorical answer and I shall have the files in the State Department examined in order to be able to give an answer on that point.

Mr. Gearhart. I will now ask you, did you accomplish the complete destruction of all secret papers and codes before the Japanese came into the Embassy?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, we did.

Mr. Gearhart. And the Japanese obtained no information of value to them from our secret files after war was declared?

Mr. Grew. None whatsoever.

Mr. Gearhart. That is all.

The Chairman. The Chairman would like to ask you a question to clear up a point.

These codes, these diplomatic codes and messages, were entirely separate from any naval or military messages or codes between the Navy Department and the naval attaché and the War Department and the military attaché?

Mr. Grew. That is true.

The Chairman. And the State Department and you?

Mr. Grew. That is a fact. The naval attaché and the military attaché had offices in what we called our Chancellery Building. They kept their own files and their own codes separate and apart from ours.

The Chairman. Now, when you came back in August 1942 you made this report to Secretary Hull and in that report I presume you canvassed pretty much the ground, the events, that had transpired immediately prior to your capture by the Japanese. You had no communication with the Secretary directly while you were in captivity?

The CHAIRMAN. So, when you got back in August 1942 the natural thing for you to do was to report to the Secretary and go over with him any pertinent things that occurred in regard not only to events leading up to Pearl Harbor but what had happened after Pearl Harbor?

MR. GREW. That is a fact.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you go to Tokyo first?

MR. GREW. You mean officially?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

MR. GREW. Officially I arrived in Tokyo June 6, 1932.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was Secretary of State at that time?

MR. GREW. Mr. Stimson.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall who was Secretary of the Navy?


The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall who was Secretary of War? Was it Mr. Hurley?

MR. GREW. Mr. Patrick Hurley.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you familiar with the Manchurian incident? Did you become familiar with it?

MR. GREW. I was familiar with it after the event. The Manchurian incident occurred in September 1931. I arrived some 6 months later.

[2025] The CHAIRMAN. What post did you occupy immediately prior to your assignment to Tokyo?

MR. GREW. I was Ambassador to Turkey, to the Turkish Republic, for 5 years prior to that period.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether at the time of your arrival in Tokyo in June 1932 or thereafter the Navy of the United States was in Hawaiian waters not in any way connected with the Manchurian incident?

MR. GREW. No, sir. Frankly, I cannot recollect whether the Navy was there then or not.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to read a couple of pages from the book that Mr. Stimson published shortly after his retirement as Secretary of State in regard to that to see whether that will refresh your recollection. The pages are 137 and 138 of Mr. Stimson's book called The Far Eastern Crisis, under heading, "The American Fleet at Hawaii" [reading]:

Under plans which had been made and published the preceding summer, long before the outbreak of the trouble in Manchuria, the American navy had been ordered to hold its annual maneuvers in the Pacific between the California coast and the Hawaiian Islands. The prosecution of these maneuvers brought the fleet in natural course to Hawaii. Soon after the outbreak in [2026] Manchuria we discussed whether the plans should be changed, but decided that, in view of the fact that it was so well known that they had not originated as a threat to Japan, the maneuvers would be allowed to continue. Thereafter, just when the Japanese were making their attack on Shanghai, the American fleet in the course of these maneuvers came to Hawaii on February 15th—that is 1932.

After further careful consideration it was allowed to remain in that neighborhood and was not dispersed or sent back to the Atlantic on the conclusion of the maneuvers. During the tumultuous and uncertain times which followed we were glad of that decision. With events showing that the Japanese government was falling completely into the control of militaristic leaders, backed by a
populace inflamed to a state of fanatical excitement by the events which had occurred, it was impossible to tell what coup might not be attempted. During that winter responsible foreign observers stationed in the Far East were informing their respective governments that in their opinion there was a real possibility of a Japanese attack being suddenly launched at the possessions of European and American governments in the neighborhood. In such a situation the presence of the entire American fleet assembled at [2027] a port which placed it on the flank of any such outbreak southward towards Hong Kong, French Indo-China or the Philippines, undoubtedly exercised a steadying effect. It was a potent reminder of the ultimate military strength of peaceful America which could not be overlooked by anyone, however excited he might be.

Does that passage from Mr. Stimson's book refresh your recollection in any way as to the presence of the fleet out in the Hawaiian waters?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir. Well, it refreshes my memory with regard to those maneuvers. Can you tell me when those maneuvers took place? I have forgotten the precise date.

The Chairman. Apparently the maneuvers took place prior to February 1932.

Mr. Grew. Prior.

The Chairman. Because this passage from Mr. Stimson's book recites the fact that the fleet appeared in Hawaii on the 13th of February, 1932, but it states that the plan for the maneuvers had been agreed to prior even to the Manchurian outbreak or the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 by Japan. That was in 1931, was it not?

Mr. Grew. Yes, that was in September 1931. That all happened before I arrived at my post.

The Chairman. It happened before you arrived there but [2028] I was wondering after you arrived whether you became acquainted with the fact that the fleet was in Hawaiian waters and remained there, according to Mr. Stimson's statement here in his book, on account of the outbreak in Manchuria and the general feeling that Japan might attack the territory of European and American Governments in that part of the world.

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, I do recollect that.

The Chairman. Now, just one question about the destruction of the codes. In view of your long experience in the diplomatic service I would like to ask you whether there would be anything unusual about the destruction of codes that might exist in an embassy under circumstances that might bring about at any time an imminent breach between governments and might even result in hostilities?

Mr. Grew. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the destruction of the codes would take place only under a very tense situation.

The Chairman. It would take place as a matter of precaution?

Mr. Grew. As a matter of precaution.

The Chairman. And would it necessarily require any instructions from the State Department in a case like that, if the Ambassador representing the country felt that the situation had arrived at a critical state so that it might result in the breach of diplomatic relations or even hostilities? [2029] As a matter of precaution would he not do that anyway?

Mr. Grew. I think in a situation of that kind the responsibility would lie entirely with the Ambassador to do that on his own initiative.
The Chairman. Yes. In your testimony the other day you stated that you did not receive information with respect to these intercepts that the American Government were making of Japanese messages to Washington?

Mr. Grew. That is true.

The Chairman. And the Chair understood you to say that it would have been indiscreet if you had been notified of that fact because if the Japanese were intercepting our messages or were in any way advised of the intercepting by our Government of their messages, it might have resulted in their changing their code so that we could no longer get the information which the messages were conveying. Is the Chair correct in that?

Mr. Grew. I am not sure that I made that precise statement but I entirely agree with it.

The Chairman. The Chair got the impression from what you said that it would have been indiscreet on the part of the State Department to have advised you at that time of the intercepting of these Japanese messages.

Mr. Grew. I think that is true.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I just have a few questions owing to the Chairman's question.

Was there any other means of getting to you this information than by wire? Weren't there personal messengers coming back and forth?

Mr. Grew. We received regular pouches from the State Department which arrived every fortnight. They came out by American vessels, American ships, but the material in those pouches was, of course, very old, sometimes as old as 3 or 4 weeks, so we depended a great deal on telegrams.

Senator Ferguson. They did not pass through any Japanese hands so that that would have been a secret means.

Mr. Grew. They passed through no Japanese hands. They were taken charge of by the captain of the ship, an American. They were turned over to an American officer on arrival of the ship in Yokohama and brought up to our Embassy.

Senator Ferguson. I spoke to you this morning that I thought that the message that I had in mind in relation to the route of shipping was on the 25th of November 1941. I have before me now the message that I did have in mind and I read it to you [reading]:

TOP SECRET

25 November 1941.

[2031] From: OPNAV.
Action: COM 12.
Info: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 14, COM 16.
252293

Route all transpacific shipping thru Torres Straits. CINPAC and CINCAF provide necessary escort. Refer your dispatch 230258.

There were two messages on that. And would you look up and see whether or not you ever received that information on the 25th of November 1941?

Mr. Grew. I will look into that, sir, yes.

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Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask counsel when he received this 4th of December 1941 [reading]:

Destroy this system at discretion and report by word jabberwocky. Destroy all registered publications except CSP 1986 and 6 and 1987 and 1988 and this system and report execution by sending in plain language "Boomerang".

How long has counsel had this in his possession?

Mr. Gesell. We have had it only a short time. We received it, as I recall it, about a week ago and immediately sent it back to the Navy Department to be mimeographed for distribution to all members of the committee. It is in a [2033] detailed folder that we received this morning while the hearing was in session, that has got the compendium of Navy messages, so we have been making them up and we will distribute them to the committee as soon as we have copies.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, can counsel explain whether or not he knew of this message last night, when I was asking Mr. Grew these questions?

Mr. Gesell. No; I did not know about that then.

Senator Ferguson. Counsel had no knowledge of it, then, at that time?

Mr. Gesell. No.

Senator Ferguson. He had knowledge, however, when I was asking Mr. Grew these questions this morning?

Mr. Grew. I did not get that question.

Senator Ferguson. I asked counsel if he had this. I asked counsel if he had this at the time I asked Mr. Grew these questions.

Mr. Gesell. No; we did not have any knowledge of that message and I have no recollection of it, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. This morning I mean, when I asked Mr. Grew the question. Is there any reason why counsel did not call it to my attention so that we could have the record and not take the time up with the witness?

Mr. Gesell. Well, I think there is a reason, Senator.

[2033] Senator Ferguson. What is the reason?

Mr. Gesell. The reason is, as I stated, this mimeographed publication did not come to my hands until the hearing was in progress and I did not have it placed before me to bring to the committee's attention until after you had finished your examination.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I want to assure counsel I will appreciate the cooperation, if he has any information when I am questioning a witness, that if he has it it may save considerable time.

Mr. Gesell. We have endeavored to do that from the start.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. My curiosity is still with me.

In the Japanese intercepts which directed the Washington Japanese Embassy to destroy their codes, they also directed the Japanese at the Embassy to use certain acids which they already had on hand. That suggests to me that the matter of destroying codes might be a somewhat intricate matter.

Did we use acids in the destruction of our codes and code machines in Japan?
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield before the question is answered?

The Chairman. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. Gearhart. I will yield.

Mr. Murphy. I just cannot see, Mr. Chairman, why we should reveal how we destroy our codes and how we could consider spreading that on the public records, or how it would help the inquiry. It may be that there is an excellent reason but I do not think that the satisfaction of curiosity is enough. I don't mean to be impertinent.

Mr. Gearhart. I assure the gentleman from Pennsylvania that I have a very excellent reason. It has to do with the credibility of the witness and the fitness of his memory on a very, very important affair. I am asking the question if it is an intricate process to destroy codes and code machines, or is it a matter as simple as the word suggests to an ordinary person's mind, of using an axe and chipping them up?

Mr. Grew. My answer to that question, Mr. Congressman, would be that in the case of certain codes it would be a very simple matter. In the case of other codes it would be an intricate matter.

Mr. Gearhart. Did we have some of each type of codes in our Embassy at Tokyo?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir.

[2035] Mr. Gearhart. Then it was not a simple matter to destroy all of our code and code machines?

Mr. Grew. I cannot tell you, Mr. Gearhart, just how intricate that process was or would be, or how long it took or would take. Frankly, I had a good many duties in the Embassy and the mechanics of our coding was one matter in which I had not gone into in technical detail. I am not in a position, really, to give you very much information on that general subject.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, isn't the matter of the destruction of codes and code machines of sufficient importance to engage the attention of the Ambassador, especially when he is called upon to supply affidavits that the result had been achieved?

Mr. Grew. I have already stated, Mr. Congressman, those codes would not have been destroyed without my instructions without any question; and as to the affidavits, in all probability they were contained in the papers that I brought home to the State Department and a search will be instituted for this and we will see if we can find them. We probably can.

Mr. Gearhart. Didn't the suggestion that the codes and the code machines should be destroyed immediately create in your mind the idea that hostilities were imminent?

[2036] Mr. Grew. As I have already stated, Mr. Congressman, a step of that kind would only be taken in a very tense situation, but I also say that I am not at the present moment in a position to tell you the precise day and time at which that step was taken. I should like to look it up before I give you any further information on it.

Mr. Gearhart. I subside until we can have further information upon it.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Senator Lucas. What would have happened to you, Mr. Grew, had you not taken the necessary reasonable precautions that you should have taken as Ambassador with respect to those codes?

Mr. Grew. They might well have fallen into Japanese hands. I think it would have been quite possible that they might have done something with them.

Senator Lucas. Supposing you had done nothing and they had fallen into the hands of the Japanese: Then when you returned to this country what would have been your status down in the State Department?

Mr. Grew. Well, it would have caused a ferment. If those codes had fallen into their hands, why those codes would have to be abandoned and new codes substituted, which [2037] would have been a very expensive and complicated matter.

Senator Lucas. What would have been your position with the State Department in view of the fact that you failed to carry out those particular destruc tions in view of the tense situation that you described?

Mr. Grew. I think it would have been a very embarrassing situation, a very embarrassing position.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

The Chairman. Congressman Cooper?

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly in an effort to be clear on a point, Mr. Grew, with respect to the message of November 26, 1941 from the State Department to Japan.

Am I correct in my understanding of your statement that that message of November 26, 1941, from the United States Department of State to Japan was not carried in any of the Japanese press?

Mr. Grew. It was not carried in any of the Japanese press. It was not allowed to be carried. And, as I said to the committee, one paper, as I recollect it, one paper published the document after Pearl Harbor and that paper was promptly confiscated. Whether the document was ever published completely and freely, that I do not know.

[2038] The Vice Chairman. But am I also correct in understanding you to say that the impression was conveyed to the Japanese people that an ultimatum had been received from the United States to Japan?

Mr. Grew. Yes, sir, definitely.

The Vice Chairman. Although the message itself was not an ultimatum, the Japanese officials in charge of the Government at that time sought to convey the information to the Japanese people that it was an ultimatum?

Mr. Grew. That is true, and in the case of one prominent Japanese, a very prominent Japanese, after I had told him the contents of the memorandum he said that if that were so, as I had related, he felt that the Japanese people if they knew those facts would be very much opposed to an intransigent attitude on the part of their Government.

The Vice Chairman. I thank you.

The Chairman. The chair understands Mr. Grew has a statement he wishes to read. Go ahead, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Grew. Mr. Chairman, as the question of the diary has been considerably discussed in the committee and possibly as being helpful to the committee in considering the question in executive session, I would like to submit one further point.
In these hearings the question of the submission of my [2039] diary kept in Japan has been raised. In my letter of November 12 to the general counsel certain reasons why, in my opinion, the diary should properly be regarded and treated as a purely private document were set forth. I believe those reasons to be controlling. I should like, however, now to advance another reason for taking this position, a reason which I do not believe can be open to question.

American diplomatic officers abroad, as in the case of diplomatic officers of other countries, depend in considerable measure among their sources of intelligence upon those foreign diplomatic colleagues with whom they have been able to establish relations of mutual confidence. This is not always easy to do, but once done, the trust must be mutual and complete. The result of such a relationship is often of the highest value to our national interests. It was of special value in Japan where friendly Japanese were in general prevented by the secret police from imparting information of any character to foreigners.

My diary, kept during my years in Japan, as probably is the case with every diary kept by any diplomatic officer, contains the records of many talks with foreign diplomatic colleagues, sometimes of a nature the confidential character of which I am in honor bound to respect. In most cases these records are interwoven with the comments in my diary and [2040] could not be separated therefrom. To reveal these records would not only place me in a position to which, I respectfully submit, no former American ambassador ought ever to be subjected, but would inevitably place all American representatives abroad in an invidious situation in establishing their own future contacts on a basis of mutual trust. I could not willingly subject our future representation abroad to the prejudice that would surely arise from the revelation of these private records.

I cannot believe that the American people would wish their representatives abroad to be placed in such a position, or that they would wish one of their former representatives to compromise on what, to him, is clearly and unquestionably a point of honor.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will undoubtedly give consideration to that statement.

The Chair, on behalf of the committee, wishes to thank you for your appearance here and for your obvious frank effort to give it all the information that you possess in this inquiry and the committee is under great obligations to you for your appearance and willingness to testify. Thank you very much.

Mr. Grew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should like to express on my part my full appreciation of the courtesy and [2041] patience of the committee in listening to me during these last several days. I thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The patience is mutual.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, in view of the statement made by the Ambassador and in deference to the wishes of the distinguished chairman of this committee, I shall refrain at this time from making the statement that I informed the committee I would make.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will proceed, gentlemen, with another witness.
MR. GESELL. Before calling the next witness, Mr. Chairman, we think we should read into the record two documents among those submitted in exhibit 18, because of their direct pertinence to matters which were considered by the committee during its examination of Mr. Grew.

These documents in exhibit 18 relate to the modus vivendi.

The first is the message to Lautchlin Currie from Lattimore, at Chungking under date of November 25, 1941, and it reads as follows:

After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador’s conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo’s very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan’s military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any “Modus Vivendi” now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President’s fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan’s escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

The other is a message of the same date, transmitted to Secretary Stimson by Mr. T. V. Soong under cover of a letter dated November 25 which was obtained both from the War Department and State Department files.

MR. KEEFE. May I ask counsel if those messages are included in Exhibit 18?

MR. GESELL. They are.

MR. KEEFE. It is part of Exhibit 18 that you are now reading for the record?

MR. GESELL. That is correct.

Telegram from General Chiang Kai Shek to Dr. T. V. Soong dated Chungking, November 25, 1941.

I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of my telegram yesterday. Please convey contents of the message to Secretaries Knox and Stimson immediately.

Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. If America should relax the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets, or even if reports that the United States is considering this should gain currency, the morale of our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two months the Japanese propaganda have spread the belief that in November an agreement will be successfully reached with the United States. They have even come to a silent but none the less definite understanding with the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore, there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the entire people will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most tragic epoch in the world will be opened. The Chinese army will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China alone.

We could therefore only request the United States Government to be uncompromising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies from China is not settled, the question of relaxing of the embargo or freezing could not be considered. If, on the other hand, the American attitude remains nebulous Japanese propaganda will daily perform its fell purpose so that at no cost to them this propaganda will effect the breakdown of our resistance. Our more
than four years of struggle with the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled in history would have been in vain. The certain collapse of our resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world, and I do not indeed know how history in the future will record this episode.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. May I request counsel to have the records of the State Department searched to see whether or not any instructions were sent to the American consuls in Japan during the last one-third of November, and first 7 days of December 1941, directing the destruction or disposition of codes and code machines and secret papers?

Mr. Gesell. We will do that, Mr. Congressman.\(^3\)

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. So the record will be clear, as I understand it, counsel now has the Army message to the attaché and will produce it sometime later, so we may put it \([2046]\) in as part of Mr. Grew's testimony where I have asked about the Army?

Mr. Gesell. The army is getting it and we will produce it Senator.\(^2\)

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could it appear in the record at the time I was questioning Mr. Grew, so as to make the record clear?

The Chairman. The reporter will transpose this at the proper place. That record has already gone to the transcription stage and may have been typewritten by now, but the reporter will make an effort to put it in the place where the Senator asked it to go.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. At the time I asked for the paper under discussion, the Chairman said it was his impression that it was already in the record. I want to make the statement that the paper of August 17, on which the Senator from Michigan was questioning, is separate and distinct from the one to which I refer. In other words, in one volume of Foreign Relations there is one outlined on page 554, one on page 556 and one on page 557, all on the same date. I want to make certain that the one on page 557 is copied into the record.

\([2047]\) The Chairman. All right.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection. In fact, I would like to have it copied into the record.

The Chairman. It is the unanimous view of the committee that that ought to be done.

(The matter referred to follows:)

\([2048]\) Statement Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on August 17, 1941

Reference is made to the question which the Japanese Ambassador raised on August 8 during a conversation with the Secretary of State whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States to meet with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment in relations between the United States and Japan might be brought about. The thought of Prince Konoe and of the Japanese Government in offering this suggestion is appreciated.

Reference is made also to the desire expressed by the Japanese Ambassador during a call on the Secretary of State on August 16 that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two Governments toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

\(^3\) See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2067.

\(^2\) Subsequently admitted as Exhibit No. 38. See p. 841, infra.
When the Japanese Ambassador brought up these suggestions, the Secretary of State reminded the Ambassador that the Government of the United States had shown great patience and had been prepared to continue in that course of patience so long as the Japanese Government manifested a desire to follow courses of peace. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that while proceeding along this course this Government had [2049] received reports indicating clearly that the Japanese Government was adopting courses directly the opposite of those on which the recent conversations between the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been predicated. It was pointed out also that the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to speak of encirclement of Japan by the United States and was being officially inspired in ways calculated to inflame public opinion. The Secretary of State made it clear that he did not see how conversations between the two Governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be discussed while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the United States.

On two occasions officers of the Department of State, pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State, called on the Japanese Ambassador to indicate concern over the reports that Japan intended to acquire by force or threat of force military and naval bases in French Indochina. Subsequently, on July 21 and July 22 the Acting Secretary of State raised with the Japanese Minister and with the Japanese Ambassador the question of Japan's intentions with regard to French Indochina and pointed out that the Government of the United States could only assume that the occupation by Japan of French Indochina or the acquisition of military and naval [2050] bases in that area constituted notice to the United States that Japan had taken by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking on further movements of conquest in the South Pacific area. The Acting Secretary pointed out further that this new move on Japan's part was prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials and to the peace of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

The Government of the United States accordingly had no alternative but to inform the Japanese Ambassador that, in the opinion of this Government, the measures then being taken by the Japanese Government had served to remove the basis for further conversations relative to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

Informal discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program attainable by peaceful methods. It goes without saying that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as they might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed. The program envisaged in such informal discussions would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of [2051] the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. It would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities. Such a program would envisage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific on a voluntary and peaceful basis toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own economies but also the economies of regions where productive capacity can be improved. The result would be to increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, to raise standards of living, and to create conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace. If such a program based upon peaceable and constructive principles were to be adopted for the Pacific and if thereafter any of the countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, the policy of aiding nations resisting aggression would continue to be followed by this Government and this Government would cooperate with other nations in extending assistance to any country threatened.

Under such a program for the Pacific area Japan would, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, attain all the objectives which Japan affirms that it is seeking. This program would not enable any country to extend its military or political control over other peoples or to obtain economic rights of a definitely monopolistic or preferential [2052] character. In those cases where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, the Government of the United States would expect to use its influence
to see that all countries are given a fair share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies and at a fair price.

If the Japanese Government is seeking what it affirms to be its objectives, the Government of the United States feels that the program above outlined is one that can be counted upon to assure Japanese satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with much greater certainty than could any other program.

In case the Japanese Government feels that Japan desires and is in position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, the Government of the United States would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which were interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views. The Government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal conversations between the two Governments, it would be helpful to both Governments, before undertaking a resumption of such conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting if the Japanese Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government has repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans.

[2053] The Chairman. Will counsel go ahead now?

Mr. Gesell. We would like to call as the next witness, General Miles.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness having been first duly sworn by the chairman.)

The Chairman. Counsel will proceed.

Mr. Gesell. General, will you state for the record your full name and your present rank, and duty, please, sir?

General Miles. Sherman Miles, major general, Army of the United States; stationed in Boston, Mass.

Mr. Gesell. You were head of G-2, were you, General, on December 7, 1941?

General Miles. I was, sir.

Mr. Gesell. How long have you had that duty?

General Miles. I reported on May 1, 1940.

The Chairman. Will the counsel permit the Chair, for the purpose of identification, to ask General Miles if he is the son of Gen. Nelson A. Miles, who was head of the United States Army.

General Miles. I am, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I think counsel might also, for the benefit of the record, show what "G-2" is.

Mr. Gesell. That was my next question.

The Vice Chairman. I beg your pardon.

[2055] Mr. Gesell. What, in a general way, would you say are the duties and the functions of G-2?

General Miles. The Military Intelligence Division of the General Staff is charged with the collection, analysis, estimation, dissemination of information primarily for the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War.

G-2 is a staff officer of the Chief of Staff, an assistant chief of staff for intelligence.

Mr. Gesell. G-2 is another name for Military Intelligence Division, is that correct?

1 See p. 2486 infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by General Miles.
General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, prior to assuming your duties as G–2, what had been your military experience, as far as the Far East was concerned? Had you had duty in the Far East or any particular contact with far eastern matters?

General Miles. No, sir, I had never had duty in the Far East.

Mr. Gesell. Had you ever had duty in Hawaii?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. What was the nature of that duty?

General Miles. I was G–3, operations officer of the Hawaiian Department, from April 1929 until May 1932.

Mr. Gesell. And who was your commanding officer during that time at Hawaii?


[2057] Mr. Gesell. Now during the entire time you were there you were G–3, operations, is that correct?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Generally, what was the nature of that duty?

General Miles. I had supervision over all war plans and defense projects of the Hawaiian Department. I was the staff officer in general charge of training, I prepared maneuvers, exercises of all kinds for the commanding general.

Mr. Gesell. Had you ever had any war plans duty in the General Staff here at Washington?

General Miles. Not before going to Hawaii.

Mr. Gesell. Subsequent to that time did you have such duty, and if so, what was it?

General Miles. I did, sir. I served 4 years on the War Plans Division of the General Staff, from June 1934 to June 1938.

Mr. Gesell. In what capacity?

General Miles. I was the head of the Plans and Projects Section of the War Plans Division and as such had supervision over war plans and defense projects of the three overseas departments, Philippine, Panama, and Hawaii.

Mr. Gesell. How long have you been in the military service, General?

General Miles. I entered the military service in June, 1901, as a cadet.

Mr. Gesell. When did your responsibilities as G–2 cease?

General Miles. I was relieved of G–2 the 30th, I think, of January, 1942.

Mr. Gesell. Now, if the committee please, before proceeding with the examination of General Miles, we would like to offer for the record two basic exhibits which will be the subject of consideration as the examination proceeds.

The first, to be designated as exhibit 32, is entitled "Messages Between War Department and Hawaii from July 8 to December 7, 1941."

I would like to explain to the committee that these messages are, of course, all in the nature of radio dispatches, and primarily we have assembled these messages of a warning character or of an alert char-
acter. We believe this is a fairly complete compilation of such messages.

Mr. Gearhart. What is the date?
Mr. Gesell. From July 8 to December 7, 1941. It has been distributed to the committee and is the thin volume in pink covers.

The title requires a slight explanation also, to orient the committee to the exhibit. On November 27 there was a message sent to General Short, with which of course the committee is familiar, warning of the imminence of hostilities. [2059] On the same day some similar messages were sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur and to the General in charge of the Panama area.

We have included in this group of messages the messages sent to those other theaters at the same time, and their replies as well, feeling that in order for the committee to have the full picture it would be of interest to compare the replies of other theaters to the reply of General Short to somewhat comparable messages.

We want to point out, however, as it will appear, that the messages were different in certain respects.

We would also like to offer at this time as exhibit 33, the thick folder in pink covers, entitled "Military Intelligence Estimates Prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C."

This includes, as the index at the beginning makes clear, military intelligence estimates during the period July 1 to December 7, 1941, and there are some 30 in number of various dates, the subject matters being indicated in the index.

May those be received, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Those will be made exhibits as indicated, 32 and 33.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 32 and 33, respectively.)

Mr. Gesell. Now, General, I believe you said the Military [2060] Intelligence Division had the responsibility of assembling and disseminating military information. Was it also a function of that Division to evaluate the information assembled?

General Miles. It was, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Could you indicate to us briefly how the Military Intelligence Division was organized, the principal branches and functions?

General Miles. I believe, Mr. Counsel, that there is before the committee a chart of the organization of the Military Intelligence Division. Am I correct, sir?

Mr. Gesell. I believe I have seen such a chart. Would you indicate generally what the principal branches of the Division are?

General Miles. The latest chart I have is October 10, 1941. The principal branches were the Administrative Branch, the Intelligence Branch, the Counter-Intelligence Branch, the Plans and Training Branch, and the Information Control Branch.

Mr. Gesell. Now what were the functions of the Intelligence Branch?

General Miles. The functions, in general, of the Intelligence Branch were those duties of the War Department General Staff which related to the collation, evaluation and dissemination of military information;
that is, positive information coming from foreign countries. I emphasize the word "positive" because in the preceding war we had designated these two branches as the positive and the negative.

In other words, the difference between the Intelligence Branch and Counter-Intelligence Branch was the difference between the assembly of actual information we needed on the one hand and the information which the enemy was seeking from us, or the potential enemy was seeking from us, and our following up that information in the Counter-Intelligence Branch.

Mr. Gesell. Now what was the general function of the Plans and Training Branch? Did that have to do with the evaluation of the intelligence?

General Miles. No, sir. The Plans and Training Branch was practically entirely a branch devoted to the plans for the expansion of the Military Intelligence Division, which, in the years in which I was G-2, was very considerable, and of the training of future officers, agents and other personnel for the Division.

Mr. Gesell. Did the Information Control Branch have to do with the maintaining of security regulations and controls over the information assembled?

General Miles. It did, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Was that primarily a function of the Military Intelligence Division?

General Miles. It was a function. The security of information was a part of the general duties of the Military Intelligence Division.

Mr. Gesell. Now did the Military Intelligence Division report to any particular officer or branch of the War Department?

General Miles. It reported to the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Gesell. In the collection, evaluation and dissemination of information was it charged with reporting to anyone other than the Chief of Staff?

General Miles. Not strictly reporting, sir. We did disseminate information to a good many people other than the Chief of Staff, but we reported only directly to the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Gesell. You mean reported in a command sense?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Was it the responsibility of the Military Intelligence Division to disseminate information to the various theaters?

General Miles. It was, sir, if I understand it to mean the overseas departments and major divisions of the Army.

Mr. Gesell. Was it the responsibility of the Military Intelligence Division to also distribute such information to the other branches of the General Staff, such as War Plans?

General Miles. Very definitely, sir, it was.

[2063] The Chairman. The hour of 12 o'clock having arrived, the committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[2064] AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Counsel will proceed with General Miles.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, before proceeding, there is a correction I want to make in the record.

In the quotation which I gave this morning I spoke of September 16, 1940. I find that I took the one above rather than the one below. It was October 30, 1940, so that should appear correctly in the record.

The Chairman. That correction will be made.

Senator Brewster. And there is another matter in connection with the quotation by the Chairman this morning from Mr. Stimson in 1932. I gathered that that was to lend support to the idea that the fleet in Hawaii did act as a deterrent in the view of Mr. Stimson and possibly of his chief at that time and, if so, in connection with that I would like to have the records of that time, if they will secure it from the Navy, showing the relative strength of the American and the Japanese Fleets at that time and also the strength of the air forces as then developed, in order that in appraising the deterrent possibilities of the fleet in Hawaii in 1932 and in 1941 we may have a complete picture.

The Chairman. Well, the Chair might state that in presenting that memorandum from the book by Mr. Stimson he was seeking to refresh the recollection of Mr. Grew, but he has no objection to the request of the Senator.

Senator Brewster. I think that was a very relevant matter, a very good piece to have in the record and I would like to have with it the relative strength.1

The Chairman. All right. Go ahead, counsel.

Mr. Gesell. General Miles, we are discussing the organization and the responsibilities of the Military Intelligence Division. Could you give us a little more fully a picture of the activities of that Division and the manner in which it functioned?

General Miles. The Military Intelligence Division comprised a good many activities and functions. I would say that they could be largely summarized by the statement that those functions were designed to secure, evaluate and disseminate the information, to prevent information from getting to any potential or possible enemy, and to train and expand the Division for possible eventuality, even war.

During my period with G-2 the war in Europe was increasing in tempo and the situation in the Far East was certainly becoming no better, so that we were constantly branching out into activities that had not been handled by the Military Intelligence Division in time of peace and expanding enormously our personnel to handle those activities.

Mr. Gesell. What was the size of the organization in Washington, roughly, at the time of the Japanese attack?

General Miles. Within the War Department I should estimate it as somewhere in the neighborhood of 400 or 450 persons.

Mr. Gesell. There were also representatives of the Division, were there not, in the various overseas departments?

General Miles. The G-2's of the overseas department, as well as those of the corps areas, were not directly representatives of the Military Intelligence Division. They were the staff officers of their particular commanding officers, chosen by them. We had only a liaison relationship with them, if I may so express it.

1 See table in Hearings, Part 10, p. 5133.
The military attachés and military observers overseas, on the other hand, were directly responsible to and selected by the general Military Intelligence Division.

The Chairman. The Chair desires to call your attention to the fact that the spectators do not hear you distinctly and will you turn your voice to the microphone in front of you so that you may be heard distinctly?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. Gesell. You were discussing the attachés, General, and I gather from what you say that the military attachés attached to the various embassies and legations were directly responsible to the Military Intelligence Division.

General Miles. Yes. They were selected by the Military Intelligence Division, of course, with the consent of the Department of State. In many cases I imagine the Department of State consulted the respective ambassador or minister, and they were while so serving, of course, members of the embassy or legation staff, but they had more direct responsibility to the Military Intelligence Division than with G-2’s of the various major commanders of the Army.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, as far as those G-2’s are concerned, let us take a specific situation such as prevailed at Hawaii.

I am understanding correct that the communication and contact between G-2 in Washington and the Hawaiian department would be through the commanding officer there rather than a direct relationship between the G-2 on General Short’s staff and officers of your own Division?

General Miles. That is not wholly correct, sir. The G-2 of the War Department sent out a great deal of information directly to the G-2’s of the overseas department and the corps areas, what might be called technical or static information. Information, however, which would imply the decision or belief of the Chief of Staff as to a particular situation, particularly if it was very important, would normally be and should be sent out by the War Department, as such, under the name of the Chief of Staff or the Adutant General because there you are speaking directly to the commanding general of this major unit.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, G-2 in Washington kept the G-2 members of the overseas department staff informed through the submission of basic information directly to them from time to time?

General Miles. That is correct. We supplied the overseas departments with static information, revised from time to time, on countries of interest to them and also current information which affected them.

Mr. Gesell. On the other hand, if, on the basis of that information, it was felt that some specific action should be taken that was communicated, as a matter of procedure, and practice from the War Department, as such, in the matters you indicated directly to the commanding officer, in the case of Hawaii, General Short; is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, whenever this information became more than information per se and became in any sense a directive or suggestion of the War Department, then that information should be and was transmitted through command channels.
G-2 was not in the command channel.

Mr. Gesell. Then I take it the reverse was also true, that G-2, at Hawaii, for example, would transmit what you call static information from time to time to the Military Intelligence Division for it to integrate with the information already available.

General Miles. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, will counsel have the witness explain what he means by static information? It is not clear to me what that term signifies.

Mr. Gesell. Will you explain that, General Miles?

Mr. Keeffe. I think I understand what the word “static” means, but as applied to this case, I do not synchronize it exactly.

[2070] General Miles. The Military Intelligence Division maintained what was known as a digest of intelligence on the countries of the world which were of military interest to us. Those were very voluminous documents. They were divided into headings of political, economic, combat, civil aviation, and military aviation. They were loose-leaf documents, added to and changed as information came in by the transmission of the new mimeographed sheet for inclusion in the digest.

From that digest was written, in the Military Intelligence Division, estimates on these countries. Those again were rather voluminous. They were divided into political, economic, and combat. They were always revised yearly, and from time to time also when necessary, by the forwarding of loose-leaves for inclusion in the estimates.

There was also a handbook on the Japanese Army gotten out by the Military Intelligence Division, on the 14th of May 1941.

There was another publication on the identification of Japanese aircraft, gotten out on the 24th of October 1941; a monograph on Thailand for the same year.

All that is what I have described perhaps loosely by the use of word “static.” It was more or less static information, which we kept up, however, currently, as new information was received.

Mr. Gesell. So we understand, General, would it be fair to say that that information was generally of a statistical and informative character, with little evaluation material contained therein? In other words, it was designed to keep the G-2’s posted as to the size of the armies and movements that might be anticipated of their forces, and matters of that sort?

General Miles. Generally speaking; yes, sir. But we also, of course, expressed definite opinion, as to the efficiency of the various forces that we were discussing.

[2072] Mr. Gesell. Some of those estimates are contained in this document that was introduced this morning, are they not, as they relate to the Far East, military intelligence estimates prepared by G-2, exhibit 33?

General Miles. Those are estimates of the situation prepared directly for the Chief of Staff. I think it is unfortunate we used the word “estimates” twice, referring to two different sets of documents. The estimates that I spoke of in answer to the Congressman’s question were the static estimates, so-called, which were revised from time to
time. The estimates of the situation were our opinions of current situations written for the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Gesell. They were distributed to all the G-2's, were they, and they were not prepared with any specific reference to any overseas theater as opposed to any other overseas theater?

General Miles. They were not written with any particular overseas theater in mind, but they were written directly for the Chief of Staff and General Staff.

Mr. Gesell. Of the theaters or of the overseas departments?

General Miles. No, sir, of the General Staff, the War Department General Staff.

Mr. Gesell. Now, I think there is some confusion here. I was talking still about the static information which we were referring to and not about this volume, exhibit 33.

General Miles. Then you are correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell. On the other hand, the estimates in exhibit 33 were prepared not for distribution to the theaters, but for the information of the General Staff?

General Miles. Chief of Staff and his General Staff; yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, what were your particular functions and duties in this organization, General Miles?

General Miles. I was the head of the whole organization, Military Intelligence Division, responsible for its administration, its expansion and for its output.

In other words, I spoke for the Military Intelligence of the General Staff. A paper would normally be prepared, we will say, of the Far East estimate by the far eastern section. That would then go for revision or comment to the immediate chief of the far eastern section, the head of the intelligence branch, and from that branch to me. But I am responsible for and was responsible for the output of the division.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, as head of the organization, of course, you had to give special emphasis to certain aspects of its activities, and I wondered whether there was any particular phase of the work of the Military Intelligence Division which you gave particular attention to.

General Miles. Normally I would say that my particular attention was devoted to our output in the way of analyzed and estimated, evaluated information which we called "Intelligence," but I also had a good many other irons in the fire.

Mr. Gesell. Now how were you organized within your division in respect to the handling of the far eastern information?

General Miles. The Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch was at that time under Colonel Bratton. He received all information that we obtained on the Far East from our military attaches, our observers, from the State Department, from the Navy Department, other departments of the Government, and although it was drying up considerably, information from civilian companies or press in the Far East, together, of course, with the secret information that we were getting from the intercepts—magic.

Mr. Gesell. Now to whom was he responsible?

General Miles. He was directly responsible to the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, at that time Col. Hayes Kroner. There was, however, also within that branch a situation section under Lieutenant
Colonel Betts, now brigadier general. That was in charge of information bearing on the situation in all parts of the world. I described it at that time as the heart of the Intelligence Branch. It maintained situation maps both for G-2 and for the Secretary of War. All special studies, and so forth, emanate from this particular section.

Mr. Gesell. And that section would work in close coordination. I gather from your statement, with the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch in the formulation of estimates and studies, is that correct?

General Miles. That is correct.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, during that time you have indicated you had several sources of information. You mentioned attaches, you mentioned, I believe, the Japanese intercepts, which you referred to as "magic." What other sources were there?

General Miles. We had some observers in the field. We had a mission under General Magruder in China. We had, of course, the Intelligence Division in the staff of the Hawaiian and Philippine Departments that were getting us information. We had started a nucleus of what might be called a secret service under Colonel Clear in Singapore. We had little money to give him, but at least he did make progress in tying in with the British Secret Service in the Far East. We exchange information, of course, with the Department of State and Navy Department particularly, and several other agencies, independent agencies of the Government in Washington, and with the military attaches and missions, particularly British, at that time in Washington.

Mr. Gesell. And I gather that all of these sources were sources of information which contributed data concerning the Far East?

General Miles. They did, sir.

Mr. Gesell. What sort of liaison did you maintain with the State and Navy Departments? What were the mechanics of that and how did it function?

General Miles. I should like to go into that in a little detail. When I took over G-2 I found that a daily liaison was being maintained with the Department of State and the Navy Department. With the Department of State it was handled directly by then Colonel Magruder. During my tour of duty three other officers in succession took up this duty. They were then Colonel Betts, Colonel Montague, and Colonel Sands.

In addition to that I personally knew several of the Assistant Secretaries of States and the Under Secretary of State, and at least two or three times went, at his request, to the office of the Secretary of State on intelligence matters.

With the Navy Department the same liaison existed, but more in detail. In other words, officers from my Far Eastern Section visited many times a week, perhaps many times a day certain days, the corresponding officers of the office of Naval Intelligence. I was always in constant touch with the three officers who successively occupied that post.

Mr. Gesell. You mean in the Navy?

General Miles. In the Navy.

Mr. Gesell. Head of ONI?

General Miles. Head of ONI.
The liaison, I think, was very close at all times. I seem to have misplaced some papers that I wrote out in respect to the time of this committee, but I can summarize it, I think, from memory.

Two steps were taken by the Military Intelligence Division during the year 1941 to increase considerably the liaison between the war Department, particular Military Intelligence, and the other departments of the Government here in Washington.

In June, I think—I have the record here—no, in July—July 14, 1941, the Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, at that time Captain Kirk, and I requested the joint Army and Navy Board, which was then the highest coordinating military agency under the commander in chief, for permission to appear before it with certain suggestions and plans for integrating intelligence into that body. We did so appear on the 16th of July, with written proposals and arguments as to why we thought a greater integration of intelligence with that body would be useful.

The three proposals were that the Chiefs of Naval and Military Intelligence be made members of the Board, or alternatively, that they be made members of the Joint Planning Committee, which was the committee serving the Board, or alternatively, that a joint intelligence committee [2079] coequal with the Joint Planning Committee be established by the Joint Army and Navy Board.

These proposals were processed through the Joint Planning Committee and the General Board, and they resulted in the recommendation of the Joint Board to the two Secretaries that a joint intelligence committee be formed.

I have records of the date.

Mr. Gesell. That was a joint committee between the Army and Navy?

General Miles. That is the Joint Army and Navy Board which had been established a great many years before. The establishment of a joint intelligence committee serving the Joint Board was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on the 1st of October, and the Secretary of War on the 29th of September, and appropriate orders were issued.

The Joint Intelligence Committee members had their first meeting on the 11th of October 1941, but did not actually function until the 8th or 9th of December.

The second step taken by Military Intelligence to enlarge liaison was this:

In April of 1941, a memorandum was written by G–2 suggesting that representatives of nine departments of the Government, including War, be assembled to discuss and formulate policies and means of exchanging information between [2080] the departments, all information which affected the policy formulation of the Government.

The Secretary approved that memorandum and wrote the letters to the other eight Cabinet members or chiefs of independent offices. Throughout that summer, meetings were held in the office of G–2, two separate plans were drawn up, two successive plans were drawn up, and finally, I think in late August or September, but I can obtain the date, the representatives of the nine agencies signed the draft of plan.
This was approved by the various Cabinet members and chiefs of independent agencies, successively, during the succeeding months. The last letter that I found in the files was dated the earlier part of October 1941, from the Secretary of Agriculture.

This plan was, in general, the establishment within each department of an officer or office specifically charged with disseminating the information received by that department to the other departments concerned and receiving from the other departments and disseminating within his own department similar information.

The plan also included certain provisions for the safeguarding of this information in the various departments.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now under the scheme you have just indicated and through the liaison that was established on a more informal basis between the State and Navy, I gather you had some facilities, at least for giving them what information you had and getting their information from them?

General Miles. I think we had very complete means of doing so, so far as any information was given to us. I don't mean to say that we would always control another department, nor did we attempt to.

Mr. Gesell. Now, one of the most important types of information with which we are concerned here, is the magic, or Japanese intercepts. Are you familiar with exhibits 1 and 2 in this proceeding, the diplomatic and military intercepts contained in these volumes which I show you?

General Miles. I have seen those volumes; yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. To what extent did these intercepts come to your attention as they were translated?

General Miles. They were brought to me and to a limited number of other officers in the War Department by my own officers in the far eastern section in lockboxes or dispatch cases to which I had a key, and I read them; put them back in the dispatch case, and sent them on.

Mr. Gesell. It was the procedure and practice then, I gather, for you to see all intercepted Japanese messages during the time that you were G-2?

General Miles. There was a great deal of what we call chitter-chat in those messages which was not disseminated. Only the messages of some importance to us were disseminated.

Mr. Gesell. Would you say that these two exhibits I have referred to contain information of a chitter-chat nature, or are these more of a type which would have come to you under the procedure, the diplomatic and military?

General Miles. These are the types of messages that were distributed.

Mr. Gesell. Have you any record, General Miles, of which particular intercepts you saw during this period?

General Miles. I have no record at this time, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Do you believe the committee would be correct in assuming that you, in all probability, saw all of the intercepts contained in these two exhibits which have been introduced?

General Miles. It is my belief that I saw them all, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, did G-2 have the responsibility for intercepting those messages?
General Miles. No, sir; they were intercepted by Naval Communications; they first reached Naval Communications, [2083] and the Signal Intelligence Service.

Mr. Gesell. The Signal Intelligence Service of the Army?

General Miles. Of the Army, which was not a part of G-2, nor was G-2 a part of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. Gesell. Now, did G-2 have, as far as the messages intercepted by the Signal Service were concerned, the responsibility for translating or decoding the messages?

General Miles. No, sir. The messages were decoded jointly by Naval Communications and S. I. S., Signal Intelligence Service.

Mr. Gesell. Then, do I understand that the messages reached G-2 from the Signal Service after they had been translated or from the Naval Communications Service after they had been translated.

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, to whom did these messages come in G-2?

General Miles. They came to the far eastern section, Colonel Bratton.

Mr. Gesell. Whose responsibility was it to determine which messages would be distributed among higher officers?

General Miles. Colonel Bratton, initially.

Mr. Gesell. Did you exercise any judgment or selection [2084] in that regard?

General Miles. No, sir.

Mr. Gesell. What other officers did in the Army?

General Miles. I think no one except Colonel Bratton and his subordinates.

Mr. Gesell. Now, can you tell us who, in the War Department, received the texts of the messages during this period?

General Miles. I have before me a confidential agreement drawn up in G-2 dated January 23, 1941, signed by Capt. Hugh James, Acting Director of Naval Intelligence, and myself, in which was laid down what officers or persons this magic was to be distributed to, and by whom.

Within the War Department, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the military aide to the President in exceptional cases only; he was, however, not an officer of the War Department.

Mr. Gesell. That was General Watson, was it?

General Miles. Yes, sir, that was General Watson.

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir.

General Miles. And the War Plans Division.

Mr. Gesell. The War Plans Division, or the Chief of the War Plans Division.

General Miles. The Chief of the War Plans Division.

Mr. Keeffe. Who was that?


Mr. Gesell. So that list would include Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, General Gerow, and transmission to the President through General Watson?

General Miles. And myself.

Mr. Gesell. And yourself?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, was there anyone else in the War Department who was authorized to see the intercepts?
General Miles. No, sir. I would like to point out also that General Watson received them in exceptional cases only as per this agreement and later on the messages were delivered to the White House through the naval aide to the President, and not the military aide.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, during the time that delivery was being made by the Army to the White House, who made the determination of what messages would be sent to General Watson for the President?

General Miles. That also was Colonel Bratton's duty.

Mr. Gesell. What was meant by "exceptional circumstances," particularly significant messages?

General Miles. I imagine that that was the meaning of that phrase at the time this agreement was written.

Mr. Gesell. For what period—put it this way: When did the War Department cease advising the White House and that function was taken over by the Navy?

General Miles. My recollection is the 1st of November 1941.

Mr. Gesell. Did the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden, receive these intercepts?

General Miles. No, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, what was the machinery for distributing them? Were they left with these various officials for their study, or how was it handled?

General Miles. So far as possible, the distributing officer remained in the office while the officer, whoever it was, read the message. That, of course, was not always possible, particularly the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and they were then left for him to read and he transmitted them back in the locked pouch.

Mr. Gesell. The practice was, I gather, then, for all the distributed messages, eventually to be returned to the point of distribution rather than remain in the files of the officers receiving them?

General Miles. They were never to remain in the files. They were always to be returned and burned.

Mr. Gesell. Who established that procedure?

General Miles. I was responsible for the establishment of it. I don't know that I personally did it. I imagine it was done on the recommendation of Colonel Bratton who was handling them directly. I also remember the Chief of Staff was personally very much interested in the procedure and the protection of those messages which constituted so important a military secret.

Mr. Gesell. One filed copy of the messages was retained, is that not correct?

General Miles. That is correct.

Mr. Gesell. Who determined what officers and officials should see these messages?

General Miles. I hesitate to answer the question, because I don't remember that it ever arose. It was so obviously the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of War Plans Division, and the Chief of Military Intelligence Division, were the officers directly responsible.

Mr. Gesell. Well, I quite agree that they are obvious people to be on a distribution list, but the question arises whether perhaps there should not have been others on the list, as well.
General Miles. I remember no case in which that question arose, sir.

The general tendency always was to limit these messages, the distribution of these messages, the knowledge of the existence of these messages, to as few people as possible.

Mr. Gesell. You didn't mention the Department of State. Am I correct in my understanding that these messages were sent to the Department of State, these magic messages, by the Navy?

General Miles. By the Navy and by the Army. We took over the distribution to the Department of State when the Navy took over the distribution to the White House, about the 1st of November. Before that we distributed to the Department of State and to the White House on alternative months.

Mr. Gesell. From November 1, 1941, the Army distributed to the State Department, and the Navy to the White House, as a general matter of practice?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Who, in the Department of State was authorized to see these messages?

General Miles. Our distribution was directly to the Secretary of State. What handling he had within his own Department, of course, we did not control.

Mr. Gesell. Was that handled in the same mechanical fashion as far as the dispatch cases were concerned and the return of the messages?

General Miles. That is correct, except that I believe the private secretary of the Secretary of State had a key.

[2089] Mr. Keefe. Might I interrupt?

The Chairman. The chairman didn't understand. The private secretary had a what?

General Miles. Had a key to the box.

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. It is not clear to me, this answer of the witness as to the disposition of the intercepts after they had made their routine delivery, delivery by the Navy and the Army to these various people. I think it was said that they were destroyed or burned.

Mr. Gesell. The testimony was, I believe, and will you check me on this—I understood the testimony to be that they were all returned and burned with the exception of one filed copy, which was maintained.

General Miles. That is true. That filed copy never went on the distribution rounds.

Mr. Gesell. So that following distribution through these precautions, you had one filed copy of all messages intercepted?

General Miles. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. What I am trying to understand is, the intercepts that were brought back, were returned to the Army by Colonel Bratton, and to the Navy by the officer in charge of distribution for the Navy, those messages were burned?

[2089] General Miles. That is true.

Mr. Keefe. By the Army and by the Navy?

General Miles. Respectively.

Mr. Gesell. Those messages that were distributed were duplicates of messages which were retained in the file that was kept, the complete file that was kept at the Army and Navy?
General Miles. That is correct.

Mr. Gesell. Any messages intercepted by the Signal Corps were made available to the Navy and any messages intercepted by the Navy were made available to the Army under this procedure; is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir. It was a joint operation of the Naval Communications and SIS.

The Chairman. What is SIS?

General Miles. Signal Intelligence Service. If one was overcrowded, the other would step in.

Mr. Gesell. Did I understand you to say that one copy or more than one copy was sent to the Secretary of State?

General Miles. One copy, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, we have been discussing here the distribution, have we not, of the actual translated texts of the different messages; not any evaluation or summary, but the actual text of the messages themselves?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

[2091] Mr. Gesell. Were there any facilities under Army control at Hawaii which enabled the Army to intercept these messages at that point?

General Miles. I believe not, sir. There was a naval intercepting station at Hawaii but I think not an Army. And by intercepting I mean simply taking the messages out of the air. I don't mean breaking the code or translating from the Japanese to the English, of course.

Mr. Gesell. What I had referred to was the latter, the question being whether or not there were any facilities at Hawaii through which General Short or persons in his command would have been in a position to intercept, translate, and decode these messages which we have been discussing the magic messages?

General Miles. No, sir.

Mr. Gesell. What steps were taken to distribute the intercepted messages to the commanding officer at Hawaii?

General Miles. There were no steps taken to distribute these messages to that general.

Mr. Gesell. Do I understand from your answer that these messages as intercepted and translated were not sent to Hawaii by the Army?

General Miles. They were not. In some cases the substance of some messages were sent to Hawaii, and almost always in naval code, I think always in naval code, because [2092] the naval code was considered to be more secure than the Army code.

Mr. Gesell. Who made the decision that these messages should not be sent to Hawaii as they were intercepted and translated as far as the Army is concerned?

General Miles. That followed from the general policy laid down by the Chief of Staff that these messages and the fact of the existence of these messages or our ability to decode them should be confined to the least possible number of persons; no distribution should be made outside of Washington.

Mr. Gesell. Was that determination by the Chief of Staff in writing or simply an expression of policy?
General Miles. As far as my recollection goes it was simply an expression of policy.

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted in connection with the formulation of that policy?

General Miles. I do not now remember, but I imagine that I was.

Mr. Gesell. Can you state to the committee what the considerations were underlying such a policy?

General Miles. Yes, sir. The value of that secret, the secret that we could and did decode Japanese messages, in their best code, was of incalculable value to us, both in the period when war threatened and most definitely during our waging of [2093] that war. That was the basic reason for the limitation on the distribution of those messages and of the constantly increasing closing in, as I might express it, on any possible leaks in that secret.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, I have been discussing Hawaii with you. I take it your answer would be the same as to other theaters, that these messages were not being sent by the Army to any other overseas area commanders?

General Miles. That is true, sir. It applies to all of them.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall ever having received any instructions not to transmit the messages to Hawaii, let us say?

General Miles. I do not.

Mr. Gesell. Do you ever recall any discussion with anyone concerning the advisability of sending such messages to Hawaii as they were intercepted and translated?

General Miles. I do not.

Mr. Gesell. Do you ever recall any request having been made of G-2 by anyone, a commander in Hawaii or elsewhere, asking that such information be transmitted?

General Miles. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. Gesell. Then I am to understand from your answers, am I, General, that the question of the distribution of these [2094] messages to the commanding general or anyone on his staff at Hawaii was not, to your recollection, discussed by anyone in your presence or requested or suggested by anyone in your presence?

General Miles. That is true, sir, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Gesell. And can you give us any further information as to what officer was primarily responsible for the decision to so limit the distribution?

General Miles. I regarded it as an important policy which I knew emanated from the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Gesell. Would it be fair to say that this magic information was the most reliable and authenticated information which the War Department was receiving as to Japanese intentions and activities?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. To your knowledge was anyone in responsible position in the War Department organization at Hawaii advised of the fact that we were in a position to intercept, decode, and translate these messages?

General Miles. To the best of my knowledge and belief no one was advised. That, sir, was the essence of the secret. Not so much what we were getting from these messages but the very fact that we could decode and translate these messages.
Mr. Gesell. And it was for those reasons that I understand you to say that the decision was made not to send the text of the messages or any summary therefrom to the overseas commanders?

General Miles. That was the primary consideration, as I understand it, for that fixed definite policy of the War Department.

Mr. Gesell. Would you say that it was one of the responsibilities of the Military Intelligence Division to keep the overseas commanders advised as to matters which might be important to them in gauging the potential activities of the enemies or potential enemy?

General Miles. In general, yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. The obligation of responsibility to disseminate information and the obligation to safeguard information then in this instance acted opposite to each other, did they not?

General Miles. Generally speaking, yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. I gather from what you say that you resolved that in favor of the closest type of security over the messages translated?

General Miles. I think that is hardly a complete answer, sir. It must also be borne in mind that a great deal of this information did not directly apply to the overseas departments unless and until it became more than information and entered the realms of an estimate of the situation which called for military action on the part of those high commanders, and that was a function of the command, in other words, of the Chief of Staff himself. A great deal of that information was of great value to us in Washington, to all departments of the Government that were within the distribution list, as indicating the course of diplomatic relations with Japan.

But was not considered at that time that the commanding generals of the overseas departments should know from day to day the course of those diplomatic negotiations. The essence of what they should know was any situation which would call for a military decision on their part or the part of the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Gesell. Now, that appraisal of the situation carries with it, does it not, General Miles, a perhaps unusually high degree of responsibility in the General Staff here to send appropriate messages to the area commanders warning them of impending developments to the extent that they were known to the General Staff?

General Miles. Yes, sir. It was a matter of great responsibility to notify the overseas departments, which were our great outpost of the moment, when war became—certainly when war became imminent, or the moment when any part of the war plans, so carefully drawn up in the preceding years, should be put into effect.

Mr. Gesell. I wonder if you quite understood my question. I take it that responsibility, in the general sense, is always present in the Chief of Staff. My point was rather that under these circumstances, having reached the decision, for the reasons you have indicated, not to transmit information to the area commanders, and knowing that you had information which the area commanders did not have, you were confronted with possibly even a higher degree of responsibility in that regard, were you not?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, some of these messages, General Miles, were not of a diplomatic nature, they were of a military nature, were they not, some of the magic intercepts?
General Miles. I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, does your testimony apply equally to messages of that character as compared to messages of a general diplomatic character?

General Miles. Yes, sir. Had we obtained through magic any information of a purely military character that should have been transmitted to the overseas departments, I think steps should have been taken to transmit that information in some secure way, providing always it did not come within the realms of command responsibility.

[2098] Mr. Gesell. You say you think some steps should be taken in those circumstances to transmit the messages?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, referring to exhibit 2, copy of which is handed you, will you turn to page 12. There is there a message sent from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated September 24, 1941, which was translated on October 9, 1941, reading as follows:

Strictly Secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines as far as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)
   Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
   Area B. Waters adjacent to the island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
   Area S. East Loch.
   Area D. Middle Loch.
   Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers. [2099] we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important), tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)

Do you recall seeing that message at the time it was intercepted and translated?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. I ask you whether that is not the type of message which carried a special military significance to such an extent, taken under your previous testimony, that it should have been sent to the Hawaiian Department?

General Miles. If that message were taken alone, Mr. Counsel, it would carry that military significance. It is, of course, primarily of naval interest. It should always be remembered that it was well known to everyone in the Intelligence Departments of the two services that the Japanese were following as closely as they possibly could the movement of all of our warships.

I remember on several occasions going to Admiral Kirk's or Admiral Wilkinson's secret room in the Navy Department and looking at his big map of the positions of the Japanese warships. Everybody was doing it. Furthermore, it is rather interesting [2100] to note that in that same volume, if one counts the number of messages similar to this which was sent to Hawaii or eliciting information from naval movements in Hawaii, which were translated before December 7, we find 24 of them, of which only 4 were received in the month preceding Pearl Harbor. Similar messages concerning naval movements in Panama, however, there were 20, and there were 5 in
the month preceding Pearl Harbor. Similar messages regarding the
Philippines, there are 56 in the book, 16 received in the month before
Pearl Harbor.

So that my answer to that question is that this message taken alone
would have been of great military significance but it was not taken
alone unless you look at it by hindsight, which focuses all right on
the event which did happen. It was one of a great number of mes-
sages being sent by the Japanese to various parts of the world in
their attempt to follow the movements of our naval vessels, a matter
which we knew perfectly well they were doing, and which we our-
selves were doing in regard to the Japanese.

Mr. Gesell. Why do you say this message is of great military
significance standing alone?

General Miles. That would indicate they were interested in one
place and one place only and it is the detail of Pearl Harbor.

[2101] Mr. Gesell. It is really, is it not, looking at it as one
message alone, and, if you will, from hindsight, a plan for laying
out what amounts to a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. That is exactly what it looks like now, sir, now
that we know Pearl Harbor was bombed.

Mr. Gesell. You say there are similar messages in this book which
were intercepted prior to December 7. Will you find me one such
message, General?

General Miles. Concerning Hawaii?

Mr. Gesell. Or concerning any other point in which the Japanese
were interested. Will you find me one message which is similar to
this one?

General Miles. Well, if you mean similar in dividing the harbor
into sections, there are no such messages that I know of, but all of the
messages here from page 2 to page 16 in this book, all are concerned
with information requested of or received by the Japanese on move-
ments in Hawaii.

[2102] Mr. Gesell. Well, you recognize, do you not, General,
that this message, looking at it now in the cold light of this hearing
room, is quite different than just a ship-movement message, is it not?
They are not anxious to find ship movements. They did not even want
to know much about the ships that are at the wharves. They want
to know the ones that are at anchor.

General Miles. The question is what?

Mr. Gesell. Would you consider this a ship-movement report?

General Miles. No. It is primarily a message dividing up the
waters of Pearl Harbor into convenient areas for reporting the pres-
ence of ships, United States warships.

Mr. Gesell. There is no other message like this in this exhibit, is
there, General?

General Miles. I have not found any, sir, similar to this in the
sense of dividing any particular waters, although I think you will
find in the Philippines messages questions of currents in Subic Bay,
I remember a message if my memory is not at fault, and other naval
information which might lead one to expect an attack in Philippine
waters.

Mr. Gesell. Would it be a fair statement to say that one of the
functions and responsibilities of a properly organized and functioning
military intelligence division would have been to single out this message, recognize its difference from the other message and attempt to evaluate its significance?

General Miles. Yes, sir, but we did not give it the significance at that time that it now has in the light of subsequent events.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, do you recall any discussion of this message with your staff, any review or critique of its importance?

General Miles. I do not. I recall discussing, I think, this message or certain such messages with my naval colleague, to whom they particularly applied even more than to the Army.

Mr. Gesell. Admiral Wilkinson you are referring to?

General Miles. Admiral Wilkinson after he joined; Admiral Kirk before.

Mr. Gesell. And what is your recollection of those discussions?

General Miles. My recollection is not very specific. I think that my naval colleagues agreed that it was perfectly normal for the Japanese to be searching in all areas for the position of our ships and certain specific information about the harbors occupied by our ships, or the waters.

Mr. Gesell. But this is neither of those. This is the specific location and situation of the ships in a particular harbor, is it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, do you recall discussing this message with Admiral Wilkinson or any of your other naval colleagues?

General Miles. I do not specifically recall discussing this message.

Mr. Gesell. Now, this message that was translated on October 9 and sent on September 24 was followed by other messages, was it not, messages translated prior to December 7 which indicated that the Japanese were implementing and following the pattern laid out in this particular message?

I refer, for example, to the one of November 15 on page 13 of the exhibit, where there is a message setting forth the code to be used in designating the various areas, and to another message on that page stating, under date of November 15, translated December 3:

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

Do you recall seeing those messages?

General Miles. I believe I saw both of those messages, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, do you recall finally on this subject, General Miles, seeing the message on page 15 of this exhibit from Honolulu to Tokyo, under date of November 29, translated December 5, which had this——

Mr. Gearhart. Pardon me. That was from Tokyo to Honolulu, wasn't it?

Mr. Gesell. From Tokyo to Honolulu, yes.

Mr. Gearhart. You had it just the reverse.

Mr. Gesell. Thank you, Congressman Gearhart.

Containing this single sentence:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.
At page 15 of the exhibit do you recall that message?

General Miles. I believe I saw that message, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, those three subsequent messages which I have just directed your attention to gave added significance, did they not, to the message translated on October 9 to which I first called your attention?

General Miles. They did, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Did those added messages lead to any discussion or further consideration as to the appropriateness or desirability of sending specific information on this subject [2106] to Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. Not that I remember, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, I noticed and I am sure the committee and all of us have noticed here, General Miles, that many significant military messages and, indeed, other significant messages in this magic category were not translated until after December 7 although sent often substantial periods of time before that date. You have noted that in looking at some of these exhibits, have you not?

General Miles. I have, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, I understood you to testify that the responsibility for translating the messages was placed in the Signal Corps of the Army as far as the Army intercepts were concerned?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, what steps did you take, if any, to encourage a more prompt and expeditious translation of these messages as they were intercepted?

General Miles. I remember no specific steps which I took. The S. I. S. was not under my direction. I do remember, however, discussing the matter and finding that it was primarily a question of personnel and of very markedly increased traffic. It took time to decode the cryptic messages, it took time to translate from Japanese into English. The [2107] S. I. S. and Naval Communications, like all other branches of the Army and Navy at that time, were much limited in personnel and in facilities.

Mr. Gesell. You say you recall discussing this matter with someone or you simply recall the conditions that prevailed? I did not quite understand you.

General Miles. I recall discussing the matter to the extent of arriving at the opinion that was the situation in Naval Communications and S. I. S. I do not specifically recall the exact incident of any particular discussion.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, it was perfectly apparent during these latter months before the attack that the situation between us and Japan was becoming more and more critical, was it not?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Mr. Gesell. All of you in G-2 would have been more and more interested in the prompt interception and translation and examination of these magic messages as they came in?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, under those circumstances and seeing as we do here from the messages that those translated before the seventh contained vital diplomatic and military information, it would seem to me to have been appropriate to take some steps to assure a prompter translation of the [2108] messages, or do I understand you
to say that you simply inquired as to the reason but you took no steps to facilitate the prompter translation?

General Miles. I assured myself that the men and facilities were doing all that they could do to get those messages out promptly. I was not able to furnish them with any additional specialists, nor with any additional equipment.

I do not like to go into the details of even the fact that I knew about the methods we used; I cannot.

Mr. Gesell. No; we do not expect you to.

General Miles. But I think it is safe to say that they are not easy to reproduce.

Mr. Gesell. Well, was any effort made to get additional manpower of this specialized type that may have been required?

General Miles. I think that manpower was being provided as fast as the two services could provide it. It had to be very specially trained manpower.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall ever having discussed with the Chief of Staff the desirability of increasing the forces and facilities for the interception and translation of these messages?

General Miles. No, sir, I do not recall bringing that matter up to the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Gesell. Turning to this exhibit 2, which I believe is still before you, General Miles, I want to direct your attention to certain messages which were sent prior to the seventh but translated subsequent to the seventh.

There is a message on page 17, for example—

The Chairman. May I ask, when you say "sent" you mean sent from—

Mr. Gesell. Sent from Tokyo to Honolulu.

The Chairman. Sent from Tokyo to Honolulu?

Mr. Gesell. Tokyo to Honolulu or Washington, a Japanese message.

The Chairman. They are all Japanese messages?

Mr. Gesell. They are all Japanese messages.

On page 17 the message of November 24, where Tokyo was advised concerning mine laying operations outside Pearl Harbor, the maneuvering activities of the U. S. Fleet and the time that the vessels lay in harbor.

On page 19 the message of November 28 where Tokyo was advised that there was usually one cruiser in the waters south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance of the harbor.

The message on page 20 of December 1 where more detailed information concerning fleet maneuvers in operational areas was given, with schedules of departures and return of battleships.

[2109] The message on page 21 of December 2, where Tokyo asked for information concerning barrage balloons and antimine nets.

The message on page 22 of December 3 where an agent in Honolulu sent detailed information concerning land signals to be given by flashing lights, ads in newspapers, and so forth.

The message on page 26 in December, an urgent request for information as to movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor since the 4th of December.
The message of December 6, on pages 27 and 28, where Honolulu gave Tokyo further information concerning barrage balloons and stated:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

And further stated:

In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets.

And, finally, the message on page 29 of December 6th, where Honolulu reported:

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

[2111] Now, with those messages in mind is it fair to state that if facilities had been available for the more prompt translation of these intercepted messages we would have had more than ample data in our hands to indicate that there was to be a surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. Those messages would certainly have indicated the strong possibility, if not actual probability, of such an attack.

I think I failed to state, sir, that it was not only a question of personnel and facilities here in Washington for the decoding and translation of those messages, but also very definitely out in the field. Those messages had to be picked out of the air by intercepting stations. They were not all picked up by the same station. There was no one station that could have picked them up.

In fact, I understand now that the best intercepting station for the few messages emanating from Japan itself was Manila.

Now, some of those intercepting stations had teletype facilities by which they could promptly transmit the message intercepted to Washington. Some did not. Some of the messages were received in Washington by air mail.

So we had not only a question of personnel and facilities and a very rapidly growing traffic to handle it in Washington, but also the actual intercepting of the message in the field [2112] and the transmission of those messages to Washington.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel one question? Those messages that you read last are messages that were sent from Tokyo or Honolulu and were not translated or decoded until after Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GESSELL. That is right. They are all Japanese messages which were not in translated form available, as far as these records show, prior to the attack.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Counsel does not want to leave the impression that all the messages referred to are in that category, because there were several that were translated before.

Mr. GESSELL. I took it Senator Lucas referred to this last bit of reading and not the first messages I have discussed.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask counsel whether he has indicated in his questions how far back prior to Pearl Harbor these messages went out that were not translated until after Pearl Harbor? Did you indicate that?
Mr. Gesell. I have indicated in most instances the date that the message was sent out. I think the ones to which I referred were all sent subsequent to November 24, 1941.

The Chairman. And prior to the 7th of December?

[2113] Mr. Gesell. And prior to the 7th of December.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, I think it might be helpful if counsel will be kind enough to point out, the first one on page 16 of the exhibit, dated November 24, 1941, shows that was translated December 16, 1941. That is what counsel has in mind, is it?

Mr. Gesell. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. And running all the way through this exhibit to page 31 it shows messages received and translated from a few days to a few weeks after they were received.

Mr. Gesell. That is correct; and quite a number on the 8th and the 10th and the 11th and some of them later than that.

General Miles. In the desire to make the record accurate it might be pointed out, I think, that certainly the message on page 26 from Tokyo to Honolulu, which was dated Tokyo, December 6, could not possibly have been translated even with the best facilities until early in the morning of the seventh. Tokyo on the 6th—yes, it might be on the 5th, that is right. And from there on the messages are dated the 6th of December.

Mr. Gesell. General, I meant to ask you—

Mr. Gearhart. That is Tokyo time on the 6th?

General Miles. Tokyo and Honolulu.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

[2114] Mr. Gesell. I meant to ask you, General, a little earlier. After the war started did the War Department change its procedure in respect of transmitting to the area commanders information from these magic sources?

General Miles. I believe not, sir; not to my knowledge. That was always regarded up to the termination of the Japanese war as a very important vital military secret.

Mr. Gesell. Now, I wish to read a paragraph to you from your affidavit given to Col. Henry C. Clausen under date of August 16, 1945 and ask if you will give to the committee a full statement concerning the matters covered in this paragraph. The paragraph reads as follows:

Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 8 August 1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944, I wish to add that I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called 'Magic', or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brig. General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke, of G-2, War Department, transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning [2115] the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that instruction.

General Miles. That statement is literally correct. I regret that it was worded in such a way because it has been twisted out of its meaning entirely and I think very unfairly to the Chief of Staff.

What happened, of course, was preceding that I appeared before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in early April 1944, when we were in the
midst of our war with Japan. We were approaching the crisis, if you like. We had not landed in Leyte, we had not fought the battle for the Leyte Gulf. We were in the midst of a great war and this was a military secret of incalculable value to the United States in that war, the secret that we could break that code and were breaking that code. It might well have been worth to us many thousands of valuable American lives. I knew that perfectly well.

I am sorry I mentioned the Chief of Staff because under no conditions would I have appeared before the Army Board or any other group and intimated in any way the existence of that secret without specific authority of the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff.

Now, when I made that affidavit to Colonel Clausen the situation had changed entirely. The war with Japan was over; Japan had surrendered. Colonel Clausen came to my headquarters in Boston with the written authority from the Secretary of War to take my testimony on any and all subjects.

He suggested, however, that the affidavit which he himself wrote from the conversations that he had had with me, all under oath, he suggested that my affidavit, which became part of his record, be tied in with my testimony before the Grunert Board, the Army Board, and I think he drafted or maybe I drafted that paragraph that the counsel has just read.

That, gentlemen, is the whole situation there. I was not gagged by the Chief of Staff or in any way suggesting that I should do anything to cover up anything other than this vital military secret that we were all guarding with the greatest of care.

[2116] Mr. Gesell. General Miles, the Army Board held top secret sessions at which magic information was discussed by a number of witnesses. Were you called to testify in the top secret sessions relating to magic?

General Miles. I was not.

Mr. Gesell. You were aware that such sessions were held, were you not?

General Miles. Not at that time, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, General Miles, I want to turn to another subject. You referred to your liaison with the State Department, which I gather was maintained by you and by officers acting under your direction, and you indicated that information was transmitted in both directions, that G–2 gave information to the State Department and the State Department gave information to G–2.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. I want to ask you some specific questions concerning information which may or may not have been given by the State Department to G–2. The first question has to do with the modus vivendi, which I believe you have become familiar with, at least sitting here waiting for your turn to testify. Do you recall whether or not the Department of State discussed with you, or officers acting under your direction, the question of the modus vivendi, and whether or not that should or should not be submitted in a note to the Japanese Ambassadors?

General Miles. I have no recollection of any such occurrence. I feel very sure that I would have remembered it had I been consulted, and I feel very certain of being able to make the statement that I was not consulted.
Mr. Gesell. Well, now, you were not advised, were you, in any way, when the decision was reached by the State Department to send the 10-point note and not to send the modus vivendi on November 26, 1941?

General Miles. I was not, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Did the Department of State advise you, to your recollection, that they had received information from various representatives in South American countries to the effect that the Japanese representatives to those South American countries had been sounding out South American governments as to their attitude in the event of war between the United States and Japan?

General Miles. I have no recollection of that, sir. I would have to check the records to see if it was ever transmitted through my liaison officer from the State Department.

Mr. Gesell. The exhibit in evidence indicates that at least some of that information was sent to military authorities, and I wondered if it had been a matter of any discussion, or had come to your attention specifically?

General Miles. I do not recall at this time having those matters brought to my attention.

Mr. Murphy. Will counsel state what exhibit is?

Mr. Gesell. Exhibit 31.

With respect to the message to the Emperor, do you recall any consultations or any information coming to you from the State Department concerning that message?

General Miles. I do not.

Mr. Gesell. Would you have been the officer that the State Department would have been most likely to consult under the liaison conditions which prevailed at that time, or did that come under the province of that other department of the General Staff?

General Miles. The liaison, Mr. Gesell, was maintained for the exchange of information. It did not, of itself, include any provision for consultation with the Military Intelligence Division by anyone. Generally speaking, the Military Intelligence Division was not consulted on the actions or decisions arrived at by the State Department.

Mr. Gesell. Do you know whether other officers of the War Department were consulted in that connection?

General Miles. I only know through listening to testimony that I have heard in this room.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall whether or not the War Department, and specifically the Military Intelligence Division, was consulted or whether its opinion was asked by the Department of State or the President, as to the appropriateness of applying embargoes and freezing orders against the Japanese?

General Miles. I can recall no action on which the Military Intelligence Division was consulted by the Department of State in those matters.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall discussing those problems in memoranda submitted to the Chief of Staff?

General Miles. I do.

Mr. Gesell. I notice, referring to exhibit 33, a series of memoranda on that subject. No. 7 of July 25, 1941, particularly paragraph 9, and item No. 9, memorandum of August 16, 1941——
Senator Lucas. Mr. Counsel, if I may make a suggestion, it seems to me that is important enough to have it read into the record at this time. It will be done sooner or later.

Mr. Geisel. Very well, I will read the paragraphs to which I refer.

On item 7, paragraph 9 of the memorandum of July 25, 1941, signed by you, General Miles, addressed to the Chief of Staff, and copies apparently were distributed to the Secretary of War and other officers, the 9th paragraph reads as follows:

Effective economic sanctions against Japan imposed by us, today, would not, in the opinion of this division, force Japan to take any steps in the way of aggressive action which she does not plan to take anyway, when a favorable opportunity arises, nor would they precipitate a declaration of war on us by Japan. Such action on our part need not and should not distract our attention from the main theatre of operations. On the contrary; by adopting such a policy, we will be able to conserve for Britain and for ourselves supplies which from the viewpoint of our national defense, are being worse than wasted when we place them in Japanese hands.

Item 9, the memorandum for the Chief of Staff, dated August 16, 1941, reading paragraph 6, which is another memorandum signed by you, which was distributed to the President, the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the War Plans Division, Office of Naval Intelligence, and General Embick, reads as follows:

Considering all of the above, this division believes that forceful diplomacy vis-à-vis Japan, including the application of ever-increasing military and economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific area, and of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.

Item 16 of September 23, 1941, signed by you, and distributed to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, reading from paragraph 7, states:

This division still believes as stated in IB-112 dated August 16, 1941, that forceful diplomacy vis-á-vis Japan, including the application of ever-increasing and economic pressure on our part offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific area, and also the hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.

The memorandum of October 2, 1941, item 17, to the Chief of Staff, again sent to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and others, this one being signed by Hayes A. Kroner of your staff, refers to this matter in several paragraphs, and I am reading from paragraph 10, the following:

This division is of the opinion that neither a conference of leaders, nor economic concessions at this time [2123] would be of any material advantage to the United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw from the Axis were obtained from Japan prior to the conference. The immediate objective of the United States is to weaken Hitler in every way possible. A Japanese guarantee not to attack Russia in Siberia would free Russia, psychologically, and militarily for stronger opposition to Hitler. With this in mind, a definite condition precedent to such a proposed conference should be a complete withdrawal by Japan from the Axis and a guarantee, backed by substantial evidence of sincerity not to attack Russia in Siberia.

There is then a discussion again of your position concerning economic sanctions in the same terms as before.
Item 28:

Item 28, December 5, 1941, to the Chief of Staff, reading just prior to paragraph 7 thereof, an unnumbered paragraph as follows:

Our influence in the Far Eastern theatre lies in the threat of our naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan, we could launch a serious offensive here by naval and air forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia. But such an attack would fail short of a major strategic offensive, because it could not be decisive within a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.

That again was signed by you, and sent to a number of officers.

And tab A—

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire what exhibit counsel is reading from?

Mr. Gesell. Exhibit No. 33.

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by tab A?

Mr. Gesell. Oh, that tab A, is attached to the last memorandum I read, item 28.

Now, those statements, and I believe there are others in this exhibit, General Miles, indicate that you were preparing memoranda supporting the idea of economic sanctions over a period of months preceding Pearl Harbor, and that this memorandum, while addressed to the Chief of Staff, were also distributed to the President and the Secretary of State. I wondered if you could give us a better idea of the circumstances under which the question of economic sanctions was reviewed by you, and why these memoranda were prepared?

General Miles. These memoranda were prepared in the face of a constantly increasing diplomatic crisis, and accurately express our then views as to what we believed should be the general policy of the United States vis-à-vis Japan. We arrived at that conclusion from long study of the Military Intelligence Division as such of the economic psychological factors of Japan, and, rightly or wrongly, they were our views as to the best means of gaining what we then assumed to be and what has transpired to be the national objective.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I just clear the record?

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. The reason I was not able to identify the exhibit is I thought counsel was referring to a pamphlet with tabs on his pamphlet. I saw him reading from a pamphlet with tabs, and I have not received such a copy. I inquired from counsel what it was. I have just received a copy so I know now what he was talking about.

Mr. Gesell. Senator, I am sure there is a misunderstanding. The items I was reading from are shown in the index of the copy. The tabs I was referring to are not the tabs on the copy you have.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I wanted to explain. I thought you were referring to the book you had having tabs, and I thought that you were referring to those tabs.

Mr. Gesell. I understand.

Senator Ferguson. I could not identify exhibit 33, because my exhibit 33 had no short tabs, and I now see that the other members of
the committee have them with tabs on. I have been unable to get such a copy.

The Chairman. There is supposed to be one for each member, but it seems that all the members do not have tabs on their copies, and therefore the Chair suggests that the tabs be furnished to all members.

Mr. Gesell. I believe we have one for each member of the committee.

[2127] I was inquiring, General, whether those views, as expressed in these memoranda at the time, were solicited from you as the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff by the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of State, or the President, or whether they were submitted by you voluntarily, so to speak, giving your position on an important subject?

General Miles. They were certainly not solicited by the President or the Secretary of State. I am not sure whether they were solicited by the Chief of Staff or not. It was a matter of routine for the Military Intelligence Division to prepare such memoranda for the Chief of Staff in situations in which it would appear that it might be useful to him.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, you were giving him the considered views of your department on matters of moment in the Japanese relations?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now during this period were you consulted at all in connection with the question of the need of getting a delay, or obtaining a delay through negotiations or otherwise, so that the maximum military preparations could be made?

General Miles. I knew that it was the desire of the War Department Chief of Staff, Secretary of War, that we obtain as much time as possible to increase particularly the forces in the Philippines, particularly the air forces in the [2128] Philippines.

Mr. Gesell. Did you participate in the drafting of the joint memorandum of November 5 which Admiral Stark and General Marshall submitted to the President? Are you familiar with that memorandum?

General Miles. I have seen that memorandum, and so far as my recollection goes, I am fairly certain in saying I had no part in its drafting.

Mr. Gesell. Your participation in that matter then was confined to making an estimate of the possibility of Japanese advance in the area of China which was under discussion at that time?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted at all in connection with the Joint memorandum which General Marshall and Admiral Stark sent to the President under date of November 27? Are you familiar with that memorandum?

General Miles. I would like to refresh my memory. Can you refer to it, or let me see it?

Mr. Gesell. That is Exhibit 17. Perhaps this would be an appropriate place to adjourn, Mr. Chairman. The witness can be shown that over the recess.

The Chairman. Yes. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the committee recessed until 10 a.m., Friday, November 30, 1945.)
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Counsel will proceed with General Miles.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)

Mr. Gesell. General Miles, I understand that you have one or two matters that you wish to bring to the committee's attention by way of amendment of your testimony yesterday. Would you please do that before we get under way?

General Miles. Yes, sir. There are a few points that I note in reading the transcript in which I was not as clear as I might be.

On page 2071 of the transcript, you suggested in a question to me that the digests and estimates of the Military Intelligence Division which I had referred to as static information had little evaluation material contained therein. It was a fairly long question, and I answered, "Generally speaking, yes, sir. But we also, of course, express definite opinion as to the efficiency of the various forces that we were discussing."

That is not wholly a complete answer. The digests and estimates on foreign countries were thoroughly evaluated. We had plenty of time, generally, to do that as they were static and encyclopedic information.

Mr. Gesell. Before you go on with that, I gathered from the testimony when you referred to static information, you meant background information as opposed to information requiring some immediate action. Would that be a fair statement?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

On page 2094 of the transcript, you asked:

Would it be fair to say that this magic information was the most reliable and authentic information which the War Department was receiving as to Japanese intentions and activities?
My reply was, "Yes, sir."
That also is an inadequate reply. It was the most reliable and authentic information which we received as to Japanese diplomatic intentions and activities, the activities, as far as we could read them, of the controlling Japanese Government. But we went much further afield in seeking information of Japanese military intentions and activities.

Then on page 2108, you asked, "Was any effort made"—by the Military Intelligence Division—"to get additional manpower of this specialized type"—SIS—"that may have been required?"
I replied, "I think that manpower was being provided as fast as the two services could provide it. It had to be [2132] very specially trained manpower."
That also is an inadequate answer. As a matter of fact, as I have since looked up and found, we, for many months before Pearl Harbor, were lending to SIS one of our specially trained language officers. We ran through at least five whose names we can now remember, and one of them was on duty at the time of Pearl Harbor. We were not permitted by the personnel policies of the War Department to lend more than one at a time.
There was a limitation on actual number of officers allowed the Military Intelligence Division.
We also furnished the SIS from time to time the names of civilians who were competent to do this work. That had to be a very special selection. In the first place telegraphic Japanese is a language within a language. There were very few people then and there are very few people now capable of translating it into English.
Furthermore, we had to be particularly careful as to security. We could have probably gotten a considerable number of Nisei Japanese to do this work, but we were limited always, not only to American citizens, but to American citizens whom we knew, and knew all about. Specifically, two young men were furnished that we can remember to SIS, whom we very carefully went over and provided.

[2133] Lastly, I would like to expand, if I may, my answer to your request for a general description of the operations of the Military Intelligence Division, found on pages 2060 and 2061 of the transcript.

Beginning with the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Branch, with which this committee is mostly concerned, I should like to note that the operations of that branch can perhaps be best judged summarily by a glance at the summary of far eastern documents which is now a part of the record before this committee, and which is supported by some 15 volumes of photostats of the actual documents gotten out and disseminated in the same way by the Far Eastern Section in the years 1937–41.

Then going out from that particular section, let me note the four sections concerned in the Intelligence Division in Europe, and the Empire Section. We were still primarily concerned, up to November 1941, with the European war, the outcome of that war. We were still feverishly preparing for what we called hemispheric defense. The success of German arms was the most obvious threat to the Western Hemisphere.
We were lining up against the Axis with our lease-lend, and other means, but hemispheric defense was vulnerable through the bulge of Brazil.

[2134] That brings up the Latin-American Section of the Military Intelligence Division. Intelligence Branch, we will say, or sub-section.

A side line of all of this work was the several Army schools into which we fitted Latin-American officers, arranged for their transportation to and fro, and so forth.

We also conducted two quite extensive tours for senior Latin-American officers through our training camps, and war plants.

[2135] The Dissemination Section prepared and sent out to the Army a series of tentative lessons, special bulletins on the war then waging. We were trying desperately to furnish our own people, the expanding Army, with information as to how the new war was being waged and what developments were taking place.

What did the Air Corps want to know? What did the Ordnance want to know, the Medical Corps, and so forth? We had a New York office which eventually furnished, and it was at that time furnishing, a great deal of information, later used by the Air Forces in their bombing targets. We got this information from certain civilian concerns that had detailed information of German and even of Japanese installations of great importance.

But that was only a very small part of it. Our Counter-Intelligence Branch was very extensive. We were one of the three agencies in Washington especially designated by the President to concern ourselves with all counter-intelligence activities, and we worked with two other agencies, the FBI and ONI in great detail.

The whole question of plant protection was up at that time, and the question of sabotage, strikes, labor agitation, and so forth; recommendations on the applications of aliens for employment in classified contracts, all had to be passed through us. We even sat on a committee with the FBI and ONI in the State Department passing on all passport controls issued by the Government at that time.

We were organizing and schooling and training a corps of intelligence police, something new that had to be put in in time of war.

We wrote the first antififth-column plan ever drawn up in the United States, and had considerable difficulty in writing it.

We also put into the Army a counter-subversive system by which we could gage, I hoped we could gage, any subversive activities going in the Army itself.

We ran Army extension courses in Military Intelligence for the Reserve officers and for newly appointed officers.

The geographic section of the Plans and Training Branch was expanding enormously. We knew the need very definitely for maps of all sort, and we were coordinating. We were the only coordinating branch for military graphic information between the various agencies of the Government then producing maps, such as the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and so forth, and our own Engineer Air Corps mapping activities.

In addition to that, of course, we ran all our own military attachés and took care of all the foreign military attachés and missions here in Washington. We ran language schools in Japanese
and Chinese and Russian for our own officers. We had a translation section doing an enormous amount of work in translation of various documents and magazine articles, and so forth, which were appearing of interest to the service.

We ran an office in New York which got out six foreign-language dictionaries, the only ones that were in existence when we actually got into war. They were, as I remember, German, French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, and Russian.

Mr. Gesell. I think, General, that gives us an idea of the very divergent and extensive activities of the division.

General Miles. I do not want to extend it too long. Simply in the interest of the division of which I was immensely proud, I want to get before the committee the fact that we were doing quite a number of things in those days.

Mr. Gesell. I meant to ask you, in that connection, when we were discussing your military experience, whether prior to becoming G-2 you had ever had any experience in the intelligence field?

General Miles. Yes, sir; quite a lot. I first joined Military Intelligence as a young officer in 1912 when I went abroad as military attaché for five countries, later ending up in Russia in the last war as an observer for the Russian Army. I mean the next to the last war. I served other times [2128] as military attaché. I served in the Military Division immediately after the First World War and also as an officer attached to the American Peace Commission in 1919.

Mr. Gesell. I think when we closed yesterday I had asked you whether you had anything to do with the joint memorandum which General Marshall and Admiral Stark sent to the President under date of November 27, which is exhibit 17 in this hearing.

General Miles. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I had no hand in it.

Mr. Gesell. Now, before going on, I want to return to the intercepts for a moment to see if I can clarify one or two points.

I asked you yesterday whether any of the messages which had been intercepted and translated were sent to the overseas departments and particularly Hawaii by the Army, and you said they were not.

Now, I want to be sure we understand. I take it your testimony is that the text of the messages as intercepted was not so transmitted; is that correct?

General Miles. That is correct, and also the essential information was not generally transmitted; in fact, it was only in rare cases.

Mr. Gesell. That is the point I wanted to get at. The same considerations which you have testified to of security [2139] which governed not sending the actual text of the message to Hawaii, let's say, applied equally as far as paraphrases or summaries or gists of the messages is concerned; is that correct?

General Miles. That is correct; and I would like to revert to what I said yesterday, that the heart and essence of this very important secret was the fact that we could break this code, not the message itself, and had the Japanese learned that we were transmitting, say to Hawaii, information which we could have received only by breaking their code, the secret would have been out just as clearly as if we had sent the text of the message itself.
Mr. Gesell. Now, you did state, at page 2091:

In some cases the substance of some messages were sent to Hawaii, and almost always in naval code, I think always in naval code, because the naval code was considered to be more secure than the Army code.

Could you amplify that for us? That indicates that a summary or substance or gist of whatever you want to call it of the message was sent by the Navy, as you state, in some cases. Did the Army have anything to do with that?

General Miles. Oh, yes, sir. We certainly knew that it was being sent by Navy and that was quite satisfactory to us. I remember two cases specifically when we first learned from [2140] magic that orders had been issued by the Japanese to certain embassies and legations to burn their codes and I think you will find that that information was transmitted by Navy to the overseas departments, or to the fleet, which meant the same thing.

Mr. Gesell. You are referring then to what were in effect joint messages which were sent by the Army and Navy when something of a special significance such as that developed; is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir; they were joint in the sense that we had every reason to believe, thought we had, that a message sent by Navy code would always be transmitted by them to their opposite numbers in the Army command.

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any understanding that the Navy as a regular matter of practice was sending to Hawaii the information contained in these magic intercepts?

General Miles. I knew they were not doing so as a regular matter of practice for the reasons I have given, sir.

Mr. Gesell. I gather, then, from your testimony that your reference at page 2091 which I read, in some cases the substance being sent by the Navy, had to do with very special circumstances and didn’t relate to a general practice of sending out that information?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

[2141]. Mr. Gesell. In those instances, where the Navy sent the information, was that after consultation with you or someone on your staff?

General Miles. I believe I am correct in saying it was at least, I am sure, with our knowledge.

Mr. Gesell. Were you aware of the fact that over the period up to July 1941 the Navy had been sending to their representatives in Hawaii rather detailed summaries and in some cases the actual text of intercepted magic messages?

General Miles. I believe that I must have been aware of it at that time, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Was that under any arrangement or understanding with the Army?

General Miles. That I do not remember specifically, but I do know that during all that period our liaison with the Office of Naval Intelligence was such as to make me believe that it was our understanding.

Mr. Gesell. Well, were you aware of the fact that in July 1941, or thereabouts, the Navy discontinued that practice and ceased sending such detailed summaries of the intercepts to Hawaii?

General Miles. I believe, for the reasons that I have given, that is, liaison, that I must have been aware of that fact at that time.
MR. GESELL. Were you consulted in connection with the question of discontinuing the sending of that information?

General MILES. I do not remember specifically being consulted but I do remember clearly that during that summer and the months preceding Pearl Harbor we were at all times progressively closing in on this secret, trying to protect the essential secret that we were breaking codes.

MR. GESELL. Do I gather from that then that the decision to discontinue the distribution of this magic information through Navy channels, which appears to have taken effect sometime in July 1941, was a joint decision of the Army and the Navy for security reasons?

General MILES. It was certainly based on a joint policy of the Army and Navy to close in on this secret. Now, just what conferences were held I am not at this time able to recollect.

MR. GESELL. Do you recall participating in any conferences on that?

General MILES. No, sir.

MR. GESELL. Do you recall any consideration being given to the question whether the discontinuance was of such a nature that the theater commanders should be advised that a change in policy was taking place?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not now recall any such discussion.

MR. GESELL. Do you know whether Admiral Kimmel or General Short was advised that a more tight control of this information for security reasons was being inaugurated?

General MILES. They were not so advised to my knowledge.

MR. GESELL. Was it your understanding that the information that the Navy was sending prior to July was information which would be passed on to the Army representatives at Hawaii?

General MILES. Yes, sir; it was.

MR. GESELL. Did you give consideration then to advising the Army representatives at Hawaii that the information would not be sent after, say, sometime in July?

General MILES. No, not specifically. I don't think we had ever informed them that they were getting this magic. The Navy was giving them the essence of certain information we received from magic, but I do not remember that they had been informed of the source, nor was there any reason, therefore, to tell them we were discontinuing that particular source.

MR. GESELL. Now, when I have been asking you whether that magic information was distributed by the Army to Hawaii and you have answered in the negative, your answer applies to the entire War Department, does it not, not just to G-2, since the dissemination of information was a responsibility of G-2?

General MILES. That is correct, sir.

MR. GESELL. Now, just how far, General, did this question of security go in this regard? To take an extreme case, assuming you had intercepted a message in which the Japanese said that they planned to attack Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December at dawn. I take it I am correct in assuming that that message would have been transmitted to Hawaii for their information?

General MILES. It would have been, by the Chief of Staff. I think that case is similar to the one which actually occurred on the morning
of December 7. We didn't know where this attack was coming but we very much feared an attack would come coincident with the 1 p.m. delivery of the Japanese reply and my action then was to bring this to the notice of the Chief of Staff so that an additional warning would be sent out.

Mr. Gesell. Am I correct that where the information from the intercepts was of such a nature that you felt it required some specific action by the commanders at Hawaii, you would bring that information to the attention of the Chief of Staff so that he might take such action as he felt necessary in advising the Hawaiian officers of the information you had?

[2145] General Miles. That is absolutely correct. G-2 had to be very careful that the information that he sent to General Short or General MacArthur didn't, ipso facto, practically force their hands into some definite military decision of importance. If the Chief of Staff desired such information to be sent to them, which would affect their military dispositions or inaugurate their war plans, it should definitely come through the command channels.

[2146] Mr. Gesell. Then, in other words, while you weren't as a matter of fact or procedure sending the text of the messages, or the gist of them, or a summary of them to the theaters, it was, even in the face of these security considerations, always open to the Chief of Staff to send specific instructions or directions to the commanders at Hawaii or the Philippines, or elsewhere, based on the information which had been obtained from the intercepts?

General Miles. That is true; and at that point I think I should like to go further and point out that from early August, I think it was the 5th of August, 1941, we discontinued, by direction of the Chief of Staff, presenting magic in evaluated form, so the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans Division Section of War, were, from then on, doing their own evaluation of the raw material that we were presenting to them in the form of magic.

Mr. Gesell. You mean that from August on, G-2 had no responsibility to evaluate the intercepted material?

General Miles. No, sir, I do not mean that, but I do mean that our responsibility in that respect was somewhat lessened by the direction of the Chief of Staff that he wanted not only the evaluation of the Military Intelligence Division, he wanted the material itself presented, the raw material itself, presented to him.

[2147] Mr. Gesell. But it was always still open to you to go to the Chief of Staff or any other officer concerned and present orally your evaluation of the circumstances?

General Miles. That is correct.

Mr. Gesell. On the other hand, the Chief of Staff and the other officers that you mentioned also had in their hands the raw material to make their own evaluation?

General Miles. That is true, yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. That is the point.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. There is another point in the record that is not quite clear on this point. I asked you whether the Army had facilities at Hawaii for intercepting, translating and decoding the magic material and you answered "no." You referred to a Navy intercept station at
Hawaii. Do you know whether or not the Navy had facilities at Hawaii which enabled them to intercept, translate and decode the magic messages?

General Miles. I believe not, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, was that condition at Hawaii the same condition as prevailed in the other overseas departments or was it, on the contrary, the fact that in the Philippines, or in some other points, facilities were available for interception, translation and decoding of these magic messages?

General Miles. There were no Army facilities capable of performing all three of those functions outside of Washington.

Mr. Gesell. Do you know whether there were naval facilities at any point outside of Washington capable of performing those three functions?

General Miles. Of that, I am not sure, sir, and would much prefer that the question be answered by the naval witnesses who will appear before the committee.

Mr. Gesell. We will ask Admiral Wilkinson that question when he takes the stand.

Now, on the mechanical side—

General Miles. May I make one point clear?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

General Miles. My testimony is perhaps not quite clear. I understood, sir, that you were referring to all three of these functions when you spoke of Hawaii, and I said we had no service capable of performing all these three functions. I now know there was a monitoring station in Hawaii capable of picking the Japanese codes out of the air, but that is all they could do.

Mr. Gesell. The coded messages?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

[2149] Mr. Gesell. But they couldn't read them.

Mr. Keeffe. That was an Army station?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. It had no reference to the Communications Commission monitoring stations out there?

General Miles. As well as the FCC. I understand there was also an FCC and a Navy.

Mr. Keeffe. I wanted to be sure what you were referring to in your testimony was the Army.

General Miles. That was the question I was asked, Mr. Congressman, the Army.

Mr. Gesell. Well, do you know whether or not the Federal Communications Commission had any facilities at Hawaii such as would make it possible for them to perform these three functions of intercepting or monitoring, translating, and decoding?

General Miles. I know that they did not, at Hawaii or any other place.

Mr. Gesell. And so far as the Army is concerned, the only place where these three functions could be performed was at Washington, D. C.?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, we have been referring to these magic communications, and I think perhaps we ought to [2150] clarify on the
record just what facilities the Japanese were using for transmitting the messages. Am I correct in understanding that their messages were sent by radio in most instances?

General Miles. In most instances, I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, there were other facilities for communication available to the Japanese, were there not?

General Miles. There were.

[2115] Mr. Gesell. They could, of course, use the mails to communicate back and forth. Was there any scrutiny of the mails?

General Miles. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, it is also apparent, is it not, that the Japanese could have used the commercial cable system?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Were we in a position to monitor messages sent over commercial cables?

General Miles. I believe we were, but I deliberately did not know anything about the details of how we got the messages from the commercial cables. It was not within my scope and I thought the less I knew about it the better.

Mr. Gesell. Would that be a subject to be considered with appropriate officers of the Signal Service?

General Miles. Yes, sir. They would know more about it than I do.

Mr. Gesell. Would your answer be the same with respect to telephonic communications?

General Miles. There was a law of Congress on the books in those days, sir, that imposed pretty heavy penalties on tapping telephone wires. So far as I know it was not done by the Army.

Mr. Gesell. Either telephone wires here or telephone [2152] wires in and out of Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. That applied to all American territory, sir.

Mr. Gesell. In referring to the laws you are referring to the provisions of the Federal Communication Act, are you?

General Miles. I do not remember which act it was, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, when a message was intercepted, I gather from what you say in your previous testimony that it might have been intercepted by the Army or it might have been intercepted by the Navy?

General Miles. Yes, sir, or the Federal Communications Commission.

Mr. Gesell. Now, did the Army and the Navy each receive the text of the Japanese message intercepted regardless of which branch did the actual interception?

General Miles. That is a detail of the joint operation of the S. I. S. and naval communications that I do not know, sir, but you will have witnesses before you who can answer that question.

Mr. Gesell. Now, at this time, General Miles, were there any orders in effect which required G-2 to send particular types of information to the overseas commanders?

General Miles. No, sir, only the general provisions [2153] of Army regulation 10-15 that put the responsibility for the dissemination of information—a broad term—in the hands of the Military Intelligence Division.
Mr. Gesell. What I was getting at was this: Take the position of any overseas commander such as General Short who, presumably, would be familiar with Army Regulations and procedure; I was wondering whether he in such a position had under prevailing orders and regulations any reason to feel that any particular type of information would be disseminated to him as a matter of course?

General Miles. I do not know that that would be covered by any orders or regulations. By the custom of the service I am sure that an officer of the experience of General Short or General MacArthur would have known that the Military Intelligence Division was supplying his command, and had been for some time, with a great deal of what we have called static information, a great deal of information on a possible enemy such as Japan, and by that the Japanese Army, and so forth, and that the War Department itself, the General Staff itself, would, one branch or another, supply him with information which would affect his military movements or instigate the war plans.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, my question is a bit more precise than that. I take it that he would from past practice have a reason to feel that certain information would be sent him, but my question was, rather, whether under orders and established procedures which were in effect at that time he had any reason to feel that any particular type of information would be required to be sent to him by G-2?

General Miles. I do not want to answer vaguely but I do not know that I can make the answer any more specific than that, sir. By custom and long custom certain information was gotten out by the Military Intelligence Division to all overseas departments. That comprised a great many different types of information. I am really trying to find out just exactly what you are getting at.

Mr. Gesell. Let us come down specifically again to this magic material. That was material which indicated diplomatic moves and, to some extent contained military information of a specific character related to Hawaii.

Did the prevailing orders, regulations, and procedures of the Army at that time specify that that type of information, either in summary form or evaluated form, had to be sent to General Short?

General Miles. I know of no such orders or regulations which specified anything like that, sir.

Mr. Gesell. The question of what information was sent, therefore, under the orders do I understand to have been a matter within the discretion of the General Staff?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, I want to turn to a somewhat different subject but closely related to this, General, and ask you whether prior to December 7, G-2 had reached any conclusions on the question of imminence of war between Japan and the United States and, if so, what its conclusions were?

General Miles. G-2 is a term used, as you said yesterday, to describe the Military Intelligence Division. It was also a term used to describe one person at the head of the Military Intelligence Division.

Mr. Gesell. Let us take the Division first.

General Miles. What?

Mr. Gesell. Let us take the Division first.
General Miles. The Division first, all right. I think it can safely be said that my Far East section consistently rated higher for many, many months the probability of war with Japan than did the Intelligence Branch of the Division or myself. They would have been less than human and certainly less than efficient if they had not. They were a group of men who devoted a large part of their careers to a study of the far eastern situation, who were concentrating their every thought on this one specific sector of the world. It was perfectly natural for them that they should think that their particular devil was the big devil.

I like to say that in trying to answer the question what did the Military Intelligence Division think. The estimates of the far-eastern section, of the very able and capable men that I had there, were then processed, as I say, through the estimating section and through the head of the Intelligence Branch, and then they came to me.

Now, immediately they got out of the far-eastern section they got into the much bigger picture that we were considering in those days, watching a very desperate war in Europe that seemed to hold possibilities of direct threat to the security of the United States and the whole of the activities of Latin America, and so forth, and so forth.

Now, may I speak for myself? I should say that—I am reading some notes I have here because I knew this was one of the questions I was to be asked, and to save time I put it out.

I should say that in mid-November my estimate might be summed up in this way: One thing we felt sure of was that Japan faced a crisis which would almost certainly result in radical action on her part. She had been unsuccessful in her military venture against Russia in 1939 and she had been none too successful in her long and costly war against China. Her military clique was losing face, although gaining power. We were closing in on her economically in our embargoes and other measures, but her radical action might take one or more of many forms. She might give direct aid to her Axis partners by an attack on Russia. She might seek further outlet to the south by a seizure, under some camouflage, of the Dutch East Indies. She might go for the wealth of Hong Kong and the Federated Malay States, or Thailand, or Burma. She might further increase her war efforts against China.

I remember during the months preceding Pearl Harbor a Chinese military attaché coming to me at least twice to discuss their fears that the Western powers closing in on Japan might force Japan to throw her whole effort against China to wipe her out.

Lastly, Japan might add to the enormous burden to her already strained military resources by attacking simultaneously the two great naval powers of the world. Only the latter alternative would surely involve the United States. I doubted whether, at that time, we would have gone to war in defense of the Dutch, the Siamese, or even the British in the Far East, and certainly not the Chinese or the Russians.

Mr. Gesell. Do I gather from what you have just stated, General Miles, that prior to December 7 you personally at least had not reached the conclusion in your own mind that there was an immediate possibility of hostilities between the United States and Japan?

General Miles. Oh, no, sir; that is not so. The crisis that resulted in General Marshall's telegram of November 27 certainly indicated
that the possibility of a war between the United States and Japan had very much increased.

By the 3d of December, when we knew that they were burning their codes, one would have rated that possibility, now well within the realms of probability, now even higher, so that if you are asking me on December 7 I am quite sure in saying that I would have rated quite highly the probability of an involvement immediate, or certainly in the fairly near future, of a Japanese-American war.

I remember on the 6th of December saying good-bye to an old naval friend of mine, Admiral Kincaid, who was leaving to take command of his division of cruisers, and telling him that I hoped he would hurry because I did not know whether he would make it or not.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, I would like to direct your attention for a moment to item 28 of the exhibit of estimates, which was introduced yesterday, exhibit 33. That is dated December 5, 1941, and appears to be the last of these periodical estimates of the situation which was submitted prior to the attack and turning to section 6, toward the end of that document, entitled, "The Far East Theatre," I see that you list a number of possibilities, stating that the initiative rests with Japan, as lines of action open to Japan and under none of those headings do I find any reference to the possibility of Japan being involved in war with the United States.

General Miles. Heading "E," "attack the Philippines and Hong Kong."

Mr. Gesell. Well, you felt that such an attack would precipitate the United States in war?

General Miles. I did, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Am I correct in gathering from this document and from others where the estimate of Japan's course of action is made from time to time, that are also contained in this exhibit, that the various items A to I which are printed here represent throughout this period preceding the attack the estimate of the variety of courses of action which were open to Japan?

General Miles. Yes, sir. We were trying in this document to list the various possible lines of action open to Japan.

Mr. Keeffe. What is that exhibit number, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. Gesell. 33.

You appear to have made a similar estimate on November 2, another on November 27, and another on November 29, which substantially state the same alternates of courses of action open to Japan?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, did these courses of action represent your views and the views of the Far Eastern Division?

General Miles. They did, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Did the Far Eastern Division rate during this period higher than you did the possibility of United States involvement in a war through an attack on the Philippines or United States territory?

General Miles. I believe that that was so and, as I said, consistently the Far Eastern Section rated that probability or possibility a little higher than I did.

Mr. Gesell. Did you at any time prior to December 7 have any information of any nature which indicated the point at which Japan would be most likely to attack the United States?
General Miles. None that I remember, except that rumor in January that came from Tokyo, from some Latin-American ambassador, that Japan would attack Hawaii, which was discounted both by Naval and Military Intelligence, and the ship information message, particularly the one you called my attention to yesterday, which as I pointed out at the time were only one of many and more so, actually, by an attack in perhaps the Philippines, Panama, and other parts of the world. We had no specific information then that the attack would fall on Hawaii.

Mr. Gesell. Will you explain why the Military Intelligence Division discounted the report from Ambassador Grew of January 1941 concerning the possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. One, because it was inconceivable that any sources in the know in Japan would have communicated that to the Latin-American Ambassador, I believe the Peruvian; and, second, for a great many years we had known that a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was always possible. It was inherent as a possibility in any war in which we became involved with Japan.

Perhaps at this point I should invite attention to the fact that the great fortress of Oahu—and it was one of the great fortresses of the world—was built solely for one purpose, the defense of that naval base against one sole enemy, Japan, the only enemy in the world that could put on a real attack against that naval base, and the Congress of 1929 discounted the United States in appropriating that money from time to time, and it was quite a bit of money, must also have had that in mind.

So that an attack on Hawaii was inherent in any war in which we might become involved with Japan. That is why we built the fortress. A surprise attack by the Japanese was inherent in view of the character of the Japanese.

Mr. Gesell. Well, you have not quite explained why you discounted the report. I would gather from what you said that that report would seem to tie in with the estimates that you had made of the situation, that Pearl Harbor was perhaps a likely point of attack and that the Japanese were likely to use surprise.

General Miles. Oh, I beg your pardon, sir. I discounted that report that came from the Peruvian Ambassador as being a bona fide piece of information that he got from a responsible Japanese source. I did not at any time discount the possibility of a Japanese surprise attack on Hawaii.

Mr. Gesell. You say that over the period of years before the attack it had been always considered that the Japanese might attack Pearl Harbor. Could you give us a bit more information on that?

General Miles. I have already pointed out that the only reason of being for the fortress at Oahu was a defense against a Japanese attack if we became involved in a war with Japan.

I have already testified that I was operations officer in Hawaii for 3 years, 1929 to 1932, and in charge of the Hawaiian War Plans Division in Washington from 1934 to 1938.

Now, during all those 7 years that the defense plans were under my supervision, or certainly with my very intimate knowledge, a surprise attack by the Japanese on Hawaii, made with little or no warning, was a basic consideration in the defense plans.
Many times I have drawn up a maneuver in war games situations on the assumption of a Japanese attack following a short period of strained relations.

We also assumed generally that we would not have the assistance of the United States Fleet, which might well be blocked in the Atlantic.

Mr. Keefe. I did not get that last.

General Miles. We also assumed generally that we would not have the assistance of the United States Fleet, which might well be blocked in the Atlantic.

After all these years of planning for defense against a single enemy, with little or no warning, I had no doubt that the messages of November 27 following long months of strained relations, would effect the immediate and complete alert of the fortress.

Mr. Keefe. Will you read that last? I did not get that.

Mr. Gesell. Would you read the question. Mr. Reporter, and let General Miles answer the question again.

(Whereupon the question was read by the reporter as follows:)

You say that over the period of years before the attack it had been always considered that the Japanese might attack Pearl Harbor. Could you give us a bit more information on that?

Mr. Gesell. Proceed to finish your answer, General Miles.

General Miles. Many times I have drawn up maneuvers in war-game situations under the assumption of an all-out Japanese attack following a short period of strained diplomatic relations.

These, you understand, are hypothetical assumptions on which you base a maneuver or a war game.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. I am unable to see the witness at times and I want to know whether or not he read that answer from a memorandum, or any part of it.

[2165] General Miles. Senator, I am reading from rough notes that I have prepared knowing that certain questions would probably be asked me. This is the fifth time I have testified on Pearl Harbor. I did this in order to save the time of the committee, among other things. I have drawn up some notes so I could answer certain questions.

Senator Ferguson. Was that entire answer in your notes?

General Miles. No, sir. I am interpolating.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could he designate on the record what part was read from his notes?

Mr. Gesell. Well, he has not completed his answer, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The general has not completed his answer. The Chair does not know whether, as he goes along, he can indicate what part of his language is taken from notes and what part is extemporaneous.

General Miles. These notes were made only the other day so that they are practically all the same thing. May I continue?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General Miles. Many times I have drawn up a maneuver in war-game situations on the assumption of an all-out Japanese attack following a short period of strained relations.
We also assumed generally that we would not have the assistance of the United States Fleet, which might well be blocked in the Atlantic. After all these years of planning for defense against a single enemy with little or no warning I had no doubt that the messages of November 27 following long months of strained relations would effect the immediate and complete alert of the fortress.

Senator Lucas. What does he mean by "those messages"?

Mr. Gesell. You are referring to the message of November 27 to the so-called warning message sent on that date, are you not, General?

I want to come to that later if that is your reference.

General Miles. To that and to the one I sent to the G-2's.

Mr. Gesell. On the same date.

General Miles. On the same date.

Mr. Gesell. The committee will find those in—

Mr. Keefe. This message that he referred to that was sent on the 27th, is that the message that was sent from General Marshall?

Mr. Gesell. Yes, and there is one from General Miles also.

Mr. Keefe. To the G-2's in Hawaii?

General Miles. That is right, sir.

Mr. Gesell. We will come to those two messages when we come to an examination of the first message.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. But I was interested at this time, General Miles, in getting a full understanding of the considerations which led you to feel that there was a possibility, shall we say, of the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor in the event of hostilities with the United States and of that attack being made without prior warning.

I gather that while you were out there you had actually war-gamed attacks somewhat of the character which took place, is that correct?

General Miles. Somewhat of the character; yes, sir. We tried to consider all possible situations.

Mr. Gesell. Was the possibility of an attack being made on a weekend or on a Sunday one of the considerations?

General Miles. I remember one war game that I got up and that we played of an attack right straight into Honolulu Harbor, landing troops early on a Sunday morning.

Mr. Gesell. Was the possibility of an air attack launched from carriers at dawn one of the factors which was considered in these war games?

General Miles. Very definitely. I remember during the maneuvers of 1932, when the fleet was out there—I am not sure whether a carrier was in that fleet or not, it was pretty early in the development of naval carriers, but I do remember that there was a great deal of discussion as to attacks by air and later on, after I left Hawaii and was here in the War Plans, there was a very considerable correspondence initiated by General Drum, then commanding the Hawaiian Division, on defenses against a surprise carrier attack.

I have recently seen those papers. They are very interesting as to the different factors, as to the time factors.

Mr. Keefe. As to the what?
General Miles. As to the time factors involved, how far the Japanese would be away when they launched the planes, and so forth, and then approach by night for this dawn attack.

Mr. Gesell. I am sure the committee would be interested in seeing that correspondence. Can you indicate about what the date of it was so that we might make arrangements to get it?

General Miles. General Drum went to Hawaii, as I remember, in 1935. It would have been 1935 or 1936. I have seen that correspondence recently in the War Plans Division and I can get it for the committee if you so desire.

[2169] Mr. Gesell. I wish you would. I am sure the committee would like to have it.1

Continuing on this same general line of questioning, did these plans and estimates recognize that Japan had it within her power to launch such an attack directly from Japan itself?

General Miles. Yes, sir. There was what is known as, what we used to call, the vacant sea.

Mr. Gesell. What do you mean by the “vacant sea”?

General Miles. A great stretch of that wild ocean in the Pacific which lies between the trade routes going from Honolulu to the Far East and Japan and the big circle trade route from the West Coast going all the way up via the Aleutians to Japan. There is, or we were so told at that time, an immense body of water in there in which there is very little traffic.

Mr. Gesell. The vacant sea was the course which the Japs actually followed in making the attack, is it not?

General Miles. That I do not know, sir. From what I have heard of our information I imagine that is true. I have not plotted that out or seen it plotted out.

Mr. Gesell. Well, I will get the exhibit where it is plotted out, so we may have your answer to that question.

Referring, General, to exhibit 6, item 18, you will [2170] see on there the track of the Japanese attacking force and I ask you whether or not that attack did not take place through the area which you have indicated was sometimes called the vacant sea?

General Miles. Most of the course of the Japanese task force, as indicated on this map, lies in what we called the vacant sea. They did cross, apparently, the northern trade route where, presumably, it would have been a little broader than probably down the coast of Japan.

Mr. Gesell. Well, General, did you have any information at the time concerning the orders which were issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in October 1941 routing all American shipping southward through the Torres Straits?

General Miles. Yes, sir, I remember having such information.

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted in any way in connection with the issuance of that order?

General Miles. No, sir; I was not.

Mr. Gesell. Can you state to the committee what knowledge you have as to the facts and circumstances which led to its issuance?

General Miles. I only remember, sir, that the War and Navy Departments were considerably worried about some convoys that we had at sea at that time and were attempting to route [2171] them where we thought at least they would be least likely to be attacked.

1 Read into the record infra, p. 868 et seq.
Mr. Gesell. Was it recognized and discussed at that time that such an order might have as one of its effects the elimination of traffic in the area where the Japanese advanced?

General Miles. I do not think so, sir. I certainly remember no such discussion and, as a matter of fact, there was very little traffic in that vacant sea at any time.

Mr. Gesell. Now, in this same connection, General, you were aware, were you not, that the Island of Oahu was, if I may state it that way, particularly vulnerable to espionage activities?

General Miles. Yes, sir; I knew that very well.

Mr. Gearhart. May I inquire as to the date of the Torres Strait order?

Mr. Gesell. I think it is October 17.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, does counsel also recall whether there was one on the 25th of November?

Mr. Gesell. The first order was, I think, in October. There is another one, Senator Ferguson indicates, subsequently issued to the same effect.

Having in mind, General Miles, this possibility of the Japs launching an attack directly from Japan, the existence of a vacant sea, the vulnerability of the island to espionage, and some of the other considerations we have been discussing, you recognized, did you not, that the defense of the island was, in large measure, dependent upon the establishment of an adequate reconnaissance?

General Miles. I did, sir. For a great many years, I thought it was pretty clearly established there was no possible way of catching a surprise attack before it actually fell, except from the Hawaiian end, by reconnaissance.

I made a statement before the Army Pearl Harbor Board which was taken up in their report, intimating rather a disagreement with it, but I would like to read it, because it is perfectly true:

I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed, and know where it was going. That was beyond our dreams of efficiency. We simply could not do it.

We knew a surprise attack was possible. We knew all of the advantages which would accrue to Japan in a war with the United States if she attacked Hawaii, and all the disadvantages which would accrue to us. There were those two vulnerable places, Hawaii and Panama, which would be essential to us in a war with Japan and essential to Japan to knock out if she possibly could. But we knew also that there was no possible way that we could see of warding off or detecting a surprise attack, except by reconnaissance from Hawaii, whether that reconnaissance was air, or surface, or subsurface, or radar.

Mr. Gesell. Having in mind the need for such reconnaissance and the inability of an intelligence service to obtain the information through its own machinery, did you ever make any inquiry during these weeks immediately preceding the attack as to whether or not a reconnaissance was in fact being conducted?

General Miles. I did not, sir. That was not at all within the responsibilities of military intelligence.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall that matter being discussed by other officers of the General Staff during that period?
General Miles. I remember it was certainly brought to my attention by the inclusion of the directive for reconnaissance in General Marshall's message sent out to all overseas departments.

Mr. Gesell. On November 27?

General Miles. On November 27.

Mr. Gesell. Except for that instance, do you recall the matter being discussed?

General Miles. I do not, sir.

[2175] Mr. Gesell. I want to direct your attention at this point to item 25 of exhibit 33, a memorandum written by you to the Chief of Staff under date of November 26, 1941, in which you refer to information concerning the disposition of the Japanese Fleet, and I direct your attention to the paragraph numbered 2, reading as follows:

The combined Air Force has assembled in Takao, Formosa, with some units believed in Hainan Island. The Third Fleet is believed moving in direction of Takao and Bako, Pescadores off West Coast of Formosa, from home waters in Japan. Units from the Second Fleet are at present possibly enroute to South China as advance scouts. Strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls.

Now this is the part that I want to address your attention to particularly:

Present location other units of this task force are not known.

Do you recall that memorandum?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. That indicates, does it not, that on November 26 you had information which was to the effect that we were not in a position to know the disposition of all of the units of the Japanese task forces?

[2176] General Miles. That is correct; but not surprising, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Had that condition occurred on earlier occasions?

General Miles. I cannot answer that question directly, but I would be very surprised to learn the Office of Naval Intelligence knew at all times the location of all the Japanese naval forces. They knew a great deal about it, and I was surprised at how much they did know.

Mr. Gesell. I quite recognize this is a subject we will want to pay particular attention to when Admiral Wilkinson is on the stand, but in view of the reference in your memorandum to the fact that the whereabouts of the units in the task force was not known, and in view of the date of the memorandum which, as we now know, was approximately the date when the Jap task force set out for Pearl Harbor, I wondered whether there had been any discussion concerning the inability to locate the task force at that time?

General Miles. I remember no such discussion, sir.

Mr. Gesell. And the fact that the task force disposition was not known did not, I gather from your prior testimony, lead to any specific consideration of the need for conducting the reconnaissance out of Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. Well, on the following day reconnaissance was ordered by the Chief of Staff of all overseas departments. [2177] It was an obvious precaution.

Mr. Gesell. Was the information contained in this memorandum one of the factors which led to the reference to reconnaissance in General Marshall's memorandum or warning message of November 27?
General Miles. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, I want to turn with you to these various messages and review some of them with you.

I have exhibit 32 before me, General, entitled "Messages Between War Department and Hawaii from July 8 to December 7, 1941." Have you a copy of that in your hand?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. The first message I wanted you to discuss is that appearing on page 2, dated July 25, 1941, which appears to be a joint dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff, calling attention to the fact that on the following day the United States proposed to impose economic sanctions against Japan; that message being sent for action to various points, including Hawaii.

Do you recall that dispatch?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Did you participate in the discussions which led to its transmission?

General Miles. I do not remember any such participation and do not believe that I did participate.

Mr. Gesell. This dispatch was of particular interest to me, General, because it is the only dispatch which I have been able to find where the Army gave to the overseas areas advance information of what we might call contemplated diplomatic action.

The Chairman. Might I ask right there, there is a word or symbol there that I do not understand, "adees." What does that signify?

Mr. Mitchell. Addressees.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Gesell. Was there any particular reason why this specific diplomatic action was felt to be of such a nature as to require advance warning to the overseas area commanders?

General Miles. I do not know, sir. I do not believe that I had any hand in its preparation.

Mr. Gesell. Turning to the message on page 3, dated October 16, 1941, and to the message on page 4 dated October 20, 1941, I wish to ask whether you participated in the discussions leading up to the transmission of those messages?

In that connection, while you are getting your papers, I would like to offer for the record the memorandum dated October 18, 1941, for the Chief of Staff from Brigadier General Gerow, with reference to the dispatches in question. This will be designated as exhibit 34, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Very well.

(The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 34.)

Senator Lucas. Will you read it into the record?

Mr. Gesell (reading):

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Resignation of Japanese Cabinet.

1. The Navy dispatched the attached message on October 16. Our G-2 does not concur in the situation pictured by the Navy. War Plans Division agrees with G-2.

2. Navy dispositions may require adjustment and a special alert. This is not true for the Army.

3. Recommendation.
That the Secretary of War direct that secret radiograms, as follows, be sent to the Command General, United States Army Forces in the Far East and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; C. G. Western Defense Command.

"Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat of abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent end"

Do you recall this memorandum and the related messages, [2180] General Miles?

General Miles. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. Gesell. Will you state your recollection of the discussions which took place at that time and the factors which led to the sending of the messages?

General Miles. I remember being consulted by General Gerow at War Plans Division as to whether or not we thought the naval message of October 16 gave a correct picture of the situation in Japan, due to the change of Cabinet, and saying that we did not; that we thought it might turn out to be correct, but we had no indication at that time that the new Cabinet would take the line in that naval message, that we had better wait a bit.

I do not actually remember seeing the memorandum that General Gerow sent to the Chief of Staff, but I do remember that I assisted in the preparation of the telegram that was sent out as a result.

[2181] Mr. Gesell. The November message, after referring to the resignation of the Japanese cabinet, stated, did it not, among other things, as follows:

Since the U. S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation, there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers.

I gather that that was the portion of the message which the Army felt at that time was too strongly stated.

General Miles. I do not think so, sir. I think the next sentence was what we particularly objected to, that the possibility at that time, based solely on the change of Cabinet, the personnel of which we were not thoroughly acquainted with, or at least their views, should call for the precautions which the Navy message included. In other words, neither General Gerow nor I felt that the information which we had on the 18th of October warranted the statement contained in the October 16 message of the Navy, and particularly in the directives therein contained as to precautions and preparatory deployments, in the Navy message.

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any knowledge at that time as to the state of the alert of the Army command at Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. I do not remember that I had any [2182] knowledge, except that I know no alert, or message which would call for alert, had up to that point been sent by the War Department. But I do not think I knew whether the commanding general himself had put any of that in his command.

Mr. Gesell. The feeling that you and General Gerow had, if I understand you correctly, came down to this, then, did it, that you did not feel the change of the Cabinet created a situation which justified Washington ordering a specific alert, or state of preparedness on the part of the Hawaiian commander?

General Miles. I think that is a correct summary of it, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That is the fall of the Konoye Cabinet and the assumption of power by Tojo; is that right, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. Gesell. I take it that is the reference, yes.

That is the reference, is it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir; the reference in the Navy telegram "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet is a grave situation," and so forth.

Mr. Gesell. Now, the next message, General Miles, is that on page 5.

Senator Ferguson. May I just inquire on that message on page 4, who "Adams" is? I do not think that is clear.

Mr. Gesell. Adams is the Adjutant General, is he not?

General Miles. He was, sir.

Mr. Gesell. And his function was what with respect to the signing of messages of this character?

General Miles. He signed all messages for the War Department, except in the very exceptional circumstances where the Chief of Staff desired to sign his own name.

Mr. Gesell. Did Adjutant General Adams have any responsibility for the decision to send the message or to formulate the contents of the message?

General Miles. No, sir.

Mr. Gesell. This, in effect, was a message from the General Staff which was transcribed and Adams' name was signed to it and then transmitted following the customary procedure.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. The next message is that on page 5, dated November 24, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to the various naval posts in the Pacific and elsewhere, which again appears to be a joint message with the Army because of the instruction for the addressees to inform the senior Army officers in their areas, and the reference that shows a copy of the message was sent to the War Department. That message states, in part:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, these messages are not very long. It seems to me they are important enough to read them.

Mr. Gesell. I will.

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch, concurs and requests action adees to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.

Do you have any recollection of having participated in any conference or discussion which led to the transmission of that message, General Miles?

General Miles. I do not.

Mr. Gesell. Do you know of any Army officers that did participate in the drafting and transmission of that message?

General Miles. I do not know of any officer, of my own knowledge.
Mr. Gesell. I now wish to refer to the message at page 7. This is a message dated November 27, 1941, and signed by General Marshall, addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., Message No. 472.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you should carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Signed "Marshall."

Before questioning you concerning this message, I would like also to read the message signed by yourself which appears on page 10 of the same date, November 27, 1941, addressed to G-2, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.:

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only.

Signed "Miles."

General, do you recall having participated in negotiations and discussions concerning the transmission of these two warning messages that I have just read?

[2187] General Miles. I do not recall having taken any part in the drafting of the first message that you read, the one signed "Marshall." The second message, as far as I remember, I drafted it myself and sent it out.

Mr. Gesell. You prepared, did you not, on January 31, 1942, a memorandum for the record on the subject of "warnings sent to Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941"?

General Miles. I did, sir.

Mr. Gesell. I would like to offer that memorandum for the record at this time in connection with General Miles' testimony, to be designated "Exhibit 35."

The CHAIRMAN. That will be done.

Mr. Gesell. Copies are before the members of the committee.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 35.")

Mr. Gesell. You state in that memorandum with respect to General Marshall's message of November 27:

The contents of this dispatch was known to me at the time, though I do not remember to have seen an exact copy.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Under what circumstances did you learn of General Marshall's message?

General Miles. To the best of my recollection I learned of it verbally and of its contents from General Gerow with whom I was, of course, in very close contact. I would like to point out, I would
like to state here, that General Gerow has a somewhat different recollection in regard to my participation in the drafting of that message. Mr. Gesell. I would like to have your recollection of your participation.

General Miles. My recollection is very clear that I had no part in the preparation of that message. I base that negative statement on the fact that on the 30th of January in preparing, as I did prepare very carefully that memorandum for record, I stated at that time, as you have read, that I had no recollection then of having seen the draft. I also base that negative statement on the fact that my recollection is very clear even today of the part I played in the second message that you have just read and in the subsequent Arnold-Adams message of November 28, which undoubtedly will be read, and I cannot understand how my memory, defective as it may be, could have entirely failed to recall the even more important Marshall message if I had had a hand in its drafting.

Mr. Gesell. I gather from your testimony, then, that you believe you had no hand in its drafting, but General Gerow spoke to you about the message?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, will you tell us what conversations you [2189] had with General Gerow concerning the message and what led to the transmission of the message signed by yourself of the same date?

General Miles. There must have been some conversation between General Gerow and myself regarding the question of whether subversive activity was included in the Marshall message. I say there must have been because there is in existence a photostatic copy of a first draft of the Marshall message in which there is such a sentence and it was scratched out by General Gerow.

Senator Ferguson. May I have the answer read?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel have a first draft?

Mr. Gesell. It is right in front of me and I was coming to it, Senator.

You may go ahead, General Miles.

General Miles. So that I knew that subversive activities had not been included in the message. Military Intelligence was specifically concerned, particularly concerned, and practically solely concerned so far as the General Staff went with antisubversive precautions and operations. That was one reason that I sent the G-2 message out.

Mr. Gesell. By the G-2 message you mean the one signed by yourself?

[2190] General Miles. Yes, sir. The other obvious reason was that I wished the G-2’s of corps areas and the overseas departments to be particularly alerted in view of the Marshall message.

Mr. Gesell. I would like to have designated as exhibit 36 a photostatic copy of a draft of the Marshall message of November 27 signed by Brigadier General Gerow which contains the text of the message as sent and as printed here in exhibit 32 with the following sentence which did not appear in the message as transmitted stricken. Apparently it is stricken by General Gerow because his initial is opposite the deletion.
The sentence which appears immediately before the phrase "Report measures taken," reading as follows:

Needed measures for protection against subversive activities should be taken immediately.

May that be received?
The CHAIRMAN. You want that first draft printed as a part of the hearings?
Mr. GESELL. I think as an exhibit. I have called attention to the only portion necessary.
The CHAIRMAN. It will be marked "Exhibit 36."
Mr. GESELL. That is the sentence that you refer to, is [2191] it not, as having been stricken?
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that there will be reference to that by members of the committee and in view of the fact that the message as sent was put in the record, I think that this ought to be spread in the record at this point.
Mr. GESELL. That is perfectly all right.
The CHAIRMAN. That is entirely agreeable.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 36" and follows herewith.)

SECRET

By authority of A. C. OF S., WPD

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
Washington

WPD 4544–13

Date: 11/27/41 Initials: CAG
NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

Memorandum for the Adjutant General (through Secretary, General Staff):
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.
The Secretary of War directs that the following secret, first priority, message be dispatched by cable, radio, or telegraph (whichever method is the most secure from the viewpoint of secrecy) to each of the following:
[2192] Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.
*Commanding General, Western Defense Command.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as requiring you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Needed measures for protection against subversive activities should be taken immediately** Report measures taken. Should [2913] hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

(Signed) L. T. Gerow
L. T. Gerow,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

*Written initials JB
**Written initials LTG
Nov 27 1941
Noted—Deputy Chief of Staff B
JB
Shown to Secretary of War
JB

Note: Paraphrased—information copy of radio No. 461, 11–27–41 to C.G., CDC
furnished C. of S., GHQ on 12–5–41 pursuant to instructions of Major Van Sickler. ehb—1712.

ACTION TAKEN

11–27–41 by priority radio No. 472 to C.G., Haw. Dept. & priority radio No. 461

Note: No come-back received with this memo. ehb—1712.

SECRET

[2194] Mr. Gesell. General, that is the sentence that you referred to as having been stricken, is it not?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gesell. The result of striking that from the Marshall message of November 27 was that the Marshall message did not contain any instructions to the addressees as to action to be taken concerning sabotage and subversive activities?
General Miles. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gesell. You stated that it was a function of G–2 to guard against such subversive activities and that for that reason you felt you had to specifically alert the G–2’s in that regard?
General Miles. That was one of the reasons, sir.
Mr. Gesell. What did you say was the other reason?
General Miles. The importance of the Marshall message being brought directly to the attention of the G–2’s, because of the critical situation therein exposed.
Mr. Gesell. Now, earlier we referred to the question of reconnaissance and I direct your attention to the fact that General Marshall’s message of November 27 contains, among other things, this phrase:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent.

Did you at that time have any knowledge as to the relative responsibilities of the Army and the Navy at Pearl Harbor in respect of the conduct of such a reconnaissance?
General Miles. I don’t think I had any detailed knowledge at that time, sir. I, of course, had general background knowledge of the war plans and the responsibilities of the two services for reconnaissance.
Mr. Gesell. Did you understand that the Army was in a position to institute a long-range reconnaissance?
General Miles. I don’t think at this time that I knew exactly what ships they had there. I believe I thought they had some reasonably long-range ships but I knew that a thorough system of long-range aerial reconnaissance by the Army was beyond its capability because of the enormous extent of the periphery which you would have to cover on a night approach of a Japanese task force.
Mr. Gesell. When you refer to “ships” you mean airplanes?
General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall any discussion at the time this message was sent as to the extent and nature of the reconnaissance which the Army was in a position to conduct, if any?

[2196] General Miles. No, sir; I recall no such discussions.

Mr. Gesell. Were you familiar with the message that the Navy sent under date of November 27, to Hawaii and other points also giving a warning?

General Miles. I was shortly after that. I don't remember on what day I became aware of that, but I certainly knew at the time I knew of the Army message that the Navy was sending a somewhat similar message.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I ask Mr. Gesell: Before you leave—you may be going to cover it, I don't know—but I would like to have this witness interrogated now as to his knowledge of the agreement which had been entered into between the Army and the Navy as to this matter of reconnaissance. I understood they had a written contract or agreement.

General Miles. That was one of the details of the Hawaiian war plans as existed at that time that I was not familiar with, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Gesell. You did not know what responsibilities the Army had and what responsibilities the Navy had at that time in respect of long range reconnaissance?

General Miles. The actual subdivision of that responsibility I do not believe that I was aware of.

Mr. Gesell. General Miles, when did you see General Short's report to the Marshall memorandum, Marshall message?

[2197] General Miles. Sometime in January 1942, sir, when I was preparing that memorandum for record which you have before you.

Mr. Gesell. The message I have been referring to appears at page 12 of exhibit 32, dated November 28, 1941, from Fort Shafter to Chief of Staff, which is signed "Short," and states:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad four seven two twenty-seven.

That is the message that you understood I was asking you about, is it, General?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. And you say you did not see that until sometime in 1942?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. You were aware, were you not, that General Marshall's message of November 27 specifically asked the addressees to report measures taken, were you not?

General Miles. I am not sure that I was aware of that detail. I knew the general contents of that Marshall message. I may or may not have been aware of the fact that it required an answer.

Mr. Gesell. Was responsibility for examining and appraising [2198] and evaluating whatever report was made a responsibility of G-2?

General Miles. No, sir.
Mr. Gesell. What division of the General Staff had that responsibility?

General Miles. The War Plans Division.

Mr. Gesell. That would be General Gerow's division?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall having any discussion with any officer of the General Staff concerning General Short's reply at the time it was sent?

General Miles. I did not know it was sent until the following month.

Mr. Gesell. Well, I asked you when you had seen the message and I wanted to be perfectly clear that you had not only not seen the message but you did not know of its existence until January 1942; is that correct?

General Miles. That is correct.

[2199] Mr. Gesell. You recall no discussions concerning whether or not there had been a report?

General Miles. I recall no such discussion.

Mr. Gesell. General Miles, on November 28 additional messages were sent to the Hawaiian Department concerning, among other things, the question of sabotage and subversive activities, were they not?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. The messages in question appear at pages 13 and 14 of Exhibit 32; is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. I would like to read the messages at this time.

The first is signed "Adams" and is dated November 28, 1941, and states:

482. 28th Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren C paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all [2200] activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

The second message of the same date, reads:

Commanding General,

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter:

Attention commanding general Hawaiian airforce period That instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units under your control and command is desired colon against those subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department paren C paragraph three mid SR three zero dash four five paren the present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at once period It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you immediately to provide the following [2201] colon protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda comma protection of all activities against espionage comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment comma personnel comma property and establishments period This does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures period Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be confined to those essential to security period Para II is also desired that on or before December five this year reports be submitted to the chief army forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions period Signed Arnold.

Adams.
I think, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, we might recess at this time. The Chairman. Twelve o'clock having arrived, we will recess until two. (Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2:00 p.m., of the same day.)

[2202]  

**AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.**

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. The chairman is detained a moment or two. You may proceed.

**TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)**

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, before you proceed may I ask one question?

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Murphy. It has been called to my attention that there was some reference to a top secret Army report. It is my information we have been furnished all of the top secret Army reports, but there has been something said about a top secret Army report that changes the previous report.

Mr. Gesell. There is no top secret Army report that has not been available to counsel from the outset and been available to the committee.

Mr. Murphy. Counsel has been furnished with all top secret Army reports?

Mr. Gesell. That is my understanding, Mr. Congressman.

At the recess, General Miles, I had just completed reading two messages on pages 13 and 14 of exhibit 32 which were sent, as far as the exhibit indicates, to the Hawaiian Department, concerning the question of subversive activities and sabotage.

It is my understanding, and I wish you would check me on this, that these two messages were also sent out at the same [2203] time and in the same text to other overseas departments. Is that correct?

General Miles. And to the corps areas in the United States; that is correct.

Mr. Gesell. Now, will you state to the committee what conferences and discussions you had at Washington with the other officers concerned relating to the transmission of these two sabotage messages of the 28th?

General Miles. I can best answer that question, sir, by referring to paragraph 4 of my memorandum prepared in January of 1942 and dated January 1, 1942.

Mr. Gesell. That is exhibit 35 before the committee.

General Miles. Shall I read that paragraph?

Mr. Murphy. Yes; you may read it, please.

Mr. Gesell. Page 2 of exhibit 35; is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir; paragraph 4. Do you wish me to read that paragraph?

Mr. Gesell. If that is your statement as to what occurred; yes.

General Miles (reading):

November 28, 1941. At some time during this day, I think in the morning, General Arnold told me that he was extremely worried about sabotage of planes.
He stated that a number of bombers had been received from different points in one of the western [2204] depots, all having a certain defect which indicated sabotage. He told me that he proposed to send out drastic orders to all Air Forces at home and abroad to take all precautions against sabotage. I told him that a general warning on sabotage had been sent the previous day to the G-2's.

Mr. Gesell. Just a moment there, General. That message that you were referring to is the one we have already discussed, that was sent out by you on the 27th, which appears at page 13 of exhibit 32; is that not correct?

General Miles. That is correct. I continue:

He was not satisfied with this, and insisted that specific directions be sent by his staff to all Air Corps Commands. This directive was written by Major C. R. Blake, Chief of the Counter-Intelligence branch, Office of Chief of Air Corps, at the direction of General Martin Scanlon, A-2. It directed inter alia the Air Commands to "initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for the protection of your establishments and equipment against sabotage, prevention of your personnel against subversive propaganda, and protection of all activities against espionage." I strongly objected to this message going out to Air forces only. I was in complete accord with the Air [2205] Corps in believing that sabotage was a real danger and that the necessary precautions should be taken, but I did not believe that the Air Forces alone should be given additional warnings, or that so broad and general a directive should be given to so many different commands. I feared all kinds of drastic measures against civilians which would have disastrous repercussions. I knew that the policy of the Chief of Staff was not to alarm the civilian population, as indicated in the WPD warning message of November 27.

That was the warning message of which we have recently spoken. I continue:

My objection to the proposed Air Corps directive finally resulted, late in the afternoon on the 28th, in a Staff conference in General Bryden's office attended by General Gerow, General Scanlon and, I believe, General Guillon.

Mr. Gesell. Will you indicate the duties of the various officers mentioned there? General Bryden was Assistant Chief of Staff?

General Miles. General Bryden was Deputy Chief of Staff. General Gerow was Deputy, War Plans Division. General Scanlon, A-2, that is to say, the Intelligence Officer on the General Staff of General Arnold, and General Guillon was Provost [2206] Marshall General. I continue:

The result of this conference was the approval of a message drafted by me but containing also the sentence quoted above from the Air Corps draft, modified, however, by a prohibition against illegal measures and a reference to the delimitation of responsibility in subversive activities as between the Army, Navy, and the FBI. This message as approved in the Staff conference was sent by the Adjutant General to the Commanding Generals of all corps areas and overseas departments.

Mr. Gesell. May I interrupt there and ask you which of these two messages that I read is the one that you are referring to? There were two messages on that day, appearing at pages 13 and 14. Is it the one with General Arnold's name signed prior to Adams' on page 14?

General Miles. No, sir; it is the one on page 13. I will get to the one on page 14, signed by both Arnold and Adams, later on.

Mr. Gesell. Thank you.

The message to Hawaii was numbered 482 and sent at 8:37 p. m. It was also agreed at the above mentioned Staff conference, at the insistence of the
Air Corps. [2207] that identical messages would be sent by the Air Staff to all Air Commands, and this was done.

I interject here. That is the message you referred to on page 14 signed by Arnold and Adams. I continue:

The message that went to Hawaii was numbered 484 and sent at 9:23 p. m. [2208] Mr. Gesell. Well now, so I understand the situation, you sent a message, a G-2 message on the 27th, in which you said, among other things, "Subversive activities may be expected," that message being addressed to the G-2 at the Hawaiian Department, and on the 28th there were two additional messages sent to Hawaii, one that was agreed upon in the General Staff conference, which you drafted, and another which was signed by General Arnold, which was intended for the specific attention of the Hawaiian Air Force, but also addressed to the Commanding General; so that in the space of these two days, there were three messages that went to Hawaii concerning subversive activities, or sabotage; is that correct?

General Miles. That is correct, except that I would like to add that I drafted that message in the Bryden conference.

In other words, I was the one who was raising these questions about it, so I got the job of drafting the message which resulted from the compromise decision of General Bryden.

Mr. Gesell. You were not in favor of sending either of the two messages on the 28th to Hawaii; is that correct?

General Miles. No, sir, I can't say that. I was specifically charged with subversive activities so far as the General Staff was concerned. I was deeply concerned [2209] with the danger, and I was certainly not in position, nor did I desire to, oppose anybody who went along with me in feeling the necessity for warnings. My objection, or whatever it amounted to, simply resulted in limiting it only to my pointing out that a general warning against subversive activities had gone out and in objecting to any other going out in drastic terms beyond the policy of the Chief of Staff and of our agreements with the FBI and ONI, and addressed only to Air Force officers.

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion or consideration given in these conferences to the question whether or not three messages concerned with sabotage being sent in such close proximity might not unduly emphasize that point in the minds of the addressee, General Short?

General Miles. I am very sure of my recollection that no such discussion was held and the idea did not enter my mind.

Mr. Gesell. Now, following the 28th, this exhibit 32 indicates that there were no other warning messages sent to the Hawaiian Department until the message of General Marshall on the morning of the 7th, with which we are all familiar, which did not arrive in time. Is that in accord with your recollection that there were no other warning messages sent from the 28th of November to the 7th of December?

[2210] General Miles. I think that is correct. You are speaking of warning messages that went directly from the War Department?

Mr. Gesell. That is correct, from the War Department to Hawaii. General Miles. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Do you recall any discussions or conferences being held in that period from November 28 to December 7, concerning the advisability of sending additional warning messages?

General Miles. I have been trying to recall those days and that specific point. I have a vague recollection of some discussion or conference with General Gerow and General Bratton and myself. I think it arose in connection with what we at the time thought might be the implementing broadcast of the winds message, but my recollection is not very specific in the matter.

Mr. Gesell. Well, we will have occasion to call you back to the witness stand at a later date to discuss conferences concerning the winds message, as I think you know under our proposed presentation we wish to put on everything concerning that at one time. The same, of course, is true with respect to the events of the 14th part and 1 o'clock message.

[2211] Do you recall any other conference or any other discussion of a proposed message except the one you have just indicated during the period of November 28 to December 7?

General Miles. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember ever having had a meeting at the Navy Department attended by Captain McCollum of the Far Eastern Branch of ONI either around the first of December or on the afternoon of the 6th of December at which there was any discussion concerning a proposed message?

General Miles. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. Gesell. Would it be correct for us to understand that by the 27th of November when the warning message that we have been discussing, signed by General Marshall was sent out to Pearl Harbor, that G-2 had reached the conclusion that there was a possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. I think it fair to say that by that time we had reached a pretty definite conclusion that war with Japan was rating as a fairly high possibility, if not probability; and, as I testified this morning, it was certainly in everyone's minds that inherent in a war with Japan was the strong possibility, if not probability, of a Japanese attack on Hawaii and on Panama.

[2212] Mr. Gesell. Well, with that in mind, and having in mind your testimony of this morning, as well as your present testimony, I have been wondering why the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor was not specifically indicated in your estimates of the situation, particularly in your memorandum to the Chief of Staff of December 5, 1941, which we discussed earlier, which was sent to him and other responsible officers in the Navy.

General Miles. In that estimate and the estimates of that time we were laying down the probable lines of advance of the Japanese, if they did advance. We were strongly persuaded that, late in November, I would say, and early October we were strongly persuaded that an advance to the South was indicated, and as subsequently transpired, that was the direction of the main Japanese effort.

Mr. Keefe. Let me get those dates. Did you say late in October and early in November?

General Miles. I thought I said late in November and early in December.
The Vice Chairman. You said late in November and early in October.

Mr. Keefe. How should it be?

General Miles. Late in November and early in December.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

[2213] General Miles. It is true that Hawaii was not mentioned in those estimates, nor was it ever considered necessary, because, as I have repeatedly said, it was a fortress, built for one sole purpose, defense in a Japanese war. It was quite obvious to all experienced officers that if we did get into a war with Japan, Hawaii and the Panama Canal were factors of immense value to us in the prosecution of that war, factors of immense value to Japan to attack. We did not mention other points that were also within certainly the realms of possibility, if not probability, of a Japanese attack if war came, such as, for instance, Guam, Samoa, the Aleutians.

Mr. Gesell. So that in these estimates you were emphasizing the points other than the United States points which you felt it was likely the Japanese might attack?

General Miles. The lines of advance, yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. You wish us to understand that you always had in mind that there was a possibility of an attack against other United States points, other than those mentioned, including Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. If war came, it was inherent in the situation that Hawaii and Panama, at least, were extremely liable to Japanese attack.

Mr. Gesell. Now, you said, I believe, that there were [2214] no other warning messages sent by the War Department after November 28, until the message of December 7. I want to direct your attention to exhibit 1 in evidence, page 195. There is a message here to Washington from Tokyo dated November 28 which was translated on the same day in which Tokyo advises the Japanese ambassadors, among other things, as follows:

Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable.

Mr. Keefe. What is the date of that, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. Gesell. November 28 and translated November 28.

Mr. Keefe. The same date.

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir.

I also direct your attention to a message which appears at page 204, Tokyo to Berlin. This message is dated November 30, translated December 1. There the American Ambassador at Berlin is receiving instructions concerning an interview with Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and is given this instruction:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms, and add that [2215] the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

Now, having those two messages in mind, General Miles, I want to ask whether any consideration was given to sending a message to Hawaii subsequent to November 28, which would have emphasized the information which you had received indicating the real possibility of some immediate action being in the offing?
General Miles. You asked if any discussions were held?
Mr. Gesell. Any discussions concerning sending such a message.

The message of November 27, signed "Marshall," was, I knew, designed to alert the Hawaiian Department. That was a command action.

Had the Chief of Staff or his Assistant for War Plans thought that the Hawaiian Department was not sufficiently alerted, they would have, I felt sure, taken appropriate steps.

G-2 was not a command agency, nor did its responsibilities cover the alerting of major commands for war or any other implementation of war plans.

G-2 was charged with the dissemination of information. The essential information contained in the Chief of Staff's November 27 message, that hostilities might occur at any time on the initiative of the Japanese, held good right up to December 7. The information on Japanese code burning and the President's appeal to the Emperor emphasized the increasing tension of the crisis.

But these things were known in Hawaii. That Fortress, like a sentinel on post, had been warned of the danger which was its sole reason for being. Anything else was considered to be redundant.

Mr. Gesell. I want to come in a moment to the code, but I want to stay on this for a second longer.

The two messages that I have read indicate that action by the Japanese was expected in a matter of days or very immediately. The message of November 27 referred, as you state, to a possibility of action at any moment. I merely asked you whether there was any discussion concerning sending a message which would give more information to the Hawaiian Department of the immediacy of the situation. I gather you said "No" as to that?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, with reference to the question of transmitting information concerning burning of codes, if the committee please I wish to introduce at this time, as exhibit 37, a folder which has been before the committee designated "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches."

These are Navy dispatches and this exhibit will be considered primarily in connection with the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson.

The Chairman. Exhibit 37.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 37").

Mr. Gesell. I wish to read to you from that exhibit, General Miles, two messages, the first one of December 3, 1941, which appears at page 40 of the exhibit, from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and others, reading as follows:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Senator Ferguson. What page is that?

Mr. Gesell. Page 40.

Senator Ferguson. Thank you.

Mr. Gesell. Now, turning to page 41.

Senator Ferguson. Will counsel just wait until the members of the committee get the exhibit.
Mr. Murphy. It is the one distributed yesterday.

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches." It has just been introduced as exhibit 37.

Senator Ferguson. The exhibit number is what?

Mr. Gesell. Thirty-seven.

The Chairman. The dispatch which you just read is on page 40.

Mr. Gesell. Page 40.

The Chairman. And it goes over?

[2219] Mr. Gesell. No. There is another message on page 41 which I now wish to read, of the same date, December 3, to Admiral Kimmel and others:

Circular twenty-four forty-four from Tokyo one December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila to destroy machine, Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo, December 2 Washington also directed destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents, British Admiralty London today reports Embassy London has compiled.

[2220] Mr. Gesell. There are other messages here concerning codes which I will not read at this time except for this message of December 6 to Admiral Stark.

The Chairman. What page is that?

Mr. Gesell. On page 46, to Admiral Stark, from "COM Fourteen" in Hawaii, stating:

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

My question, General Miles, is whether you knew at the time that the Navy was transmitting messages to their representatives in Hawaii advising Hawaii of the intercepted Japanese messages indicating code destruction?

General Miles. I did, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted in connection with that?

General Miles. I believe that I was. I know that I knew that those messages were going out.

Mr. Gesell. Did you know that a message had been received from Hawaii stating that they had knowledge there that the local consul was destroying his code?

General Miles. I believe that I did, sir.

Mr. Gesell. The Army did not send any messages to General Short in respect of code destruction, did it?

General Miles. No, sir.

[2221] Mr. Gesell. What is the explanation of that?

General Miles. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point, that their code was much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a message be sent in one code and not two and we had every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.

Mr. Gesell. It is a fact, is it not, General Miles, that none of these messages contained any instructions for the Navy authorities to show the information to the Army representative at Hawaii?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Mr. Gesell. And that was the practice where joint messages were sent sometimes, as we have seen, was it not?
General Miles. That happened on one or two occasions, yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Did you give any instructions or directions to the Navy that action should be taken to see that these messages were made available to the Army authorities at Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. Any instruction to the Navy?

Mr. Gesell. To the Navy here that they should so transmit the messages that the Army would be certain to receive them?

General Miles. No, sir; that was not considered necessary.

Mr. Gesell. May I ask you, General, what significance could properly be attached at this time to the number of messages which we had intercepted from the Japanese in the period from December 1 to December 5 and later indicating that the Japs were destroying their most secret and confidential codes in Washington and in fact throughout the world?

General Miles. The inference would be that the Japanese had either planned for the outbreak of war, in other words, planned to initiate a war as they did or feared war coming suddenly through what was described in that message you recently read, a class of arms.

Mr. Gesell. Therefore, the information concerning code burning and destruction was of a specific and vital military nature, was it not?

General Miles. It was, sir.

Mr. Gesell. You stated. I believe, a moment ago that the information concerning code burning was known in Hawaii. Was your reference to these messages that I have just read?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Do you have any information as to whether or not General Short or other Army officers knew of these Navy messages?

General Miles. I had every reason at the time to expect that they would be transmitted to General Short or his staff.

Mr. Gesell. But do you have any specific information?

General Miles. But I have no specific information on that point. Obviously, if the Navy in Hawaii on the sixth knew that the Japanese consuls there was burning his code, the Army must also have known it.

Mr. Gesell. Now, I wish to introduce at this time a message that we present in view of Senator Ferguson's questions the other day, a message signed "Miles" to the Military Attaché, American Embassy, Tokyo, dated December 3, 1941. This is to be designated Exhibit 38.

The Chairman. It may be so designated.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 38.")

Mr. Gesell. The message reads as follows:

Memorize emergency key word #2 for use of SIGNUD without repeat without indicators, destroy document stop SIGNQ, SIGPAP and SIGNDT should be retained and used for all communications except as last resort when these documents should be destroyed and memorized SIGNUD used stop destroy all other War Department ciphers and codes at once and notify by code word BINAB stop early rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan has been indicated. State Department informed you may advise Ambassador.

(Signed) Miles.

Do you recall sending that message?

General Miles. I do, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Just as a matter of information, General Miles, was it a practice for the Military Attachés to use the same or different codes than the Ambassador and the diplomatic staff?

1 P. 775, supra.
General Miles. It was, sir. We had our own Army codes.

Mr. Gesell. So this related to the Army code system of communication between you and the Military Attaché at Tokyo?

General Miles. It did, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Is that offered in evidence as an exhibit now?

Mr. Gesell. Yes. It is Exhibit 38, and has been so received, I understand.

The Chairman. And made a part of the transcript.

Mr. Gesell. Now, there is just one further question.

In exhibit 33, General Miles, there are two items—items [2225] 29 and 30, being two memoranda sent by you under date of December 6 to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, in which you set forth estimates of Japanese air and ground forces and strength in Indo-China.

Could you state to the committee, please, what were the circumstances which led to the preparation of these memoranda, if you recall it?

General Miles. I do not recall specifically what those circumstances were. I do recall that in general in connection with what was commonly felt would be the main line or certainly the first line of Japanese advance to the south, that the strength of the Japanese in Indo-China was a particular factor of interest. There were also, of course, as we know now, telegrams from the Chinese Generalissimo with regard to the possibility of cutting the Burma Road. That occurred sometime previous to those estimates of December 6.

Mr. Gesell. Just one final question, General Miles.

Did you know in the period from November 26 on that the Navy had lost track of the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers?

General Miles. I knew it about that time, sir; it was brought out by your question this morning that a part of the Japanese Fleet was not identified as to location by Navy.

Mr. Gesell. Specifically, did you know that that part [2226] included a substantial portion of the Japanese carriers?

General Miles. I do not believe that I did know exactly what that force was.

Mr. Gesell. I have no further questions, if the committee please. I simply would like to again point out that we have not included in General Miles' examination anything concerning the "wind" code messages or the events of the 6th and 7th as they relate to the fourteenth part and 1 o'clock messages, for the reason that those subjects are to be covered later on, and General Miles will return to the stand for that purpose, in accordance with the procedure we have outlined.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question before the cross-examination of this witness begins?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Does counsel have here the testimony of General Miles on all previous occasions? Is it available for examination? He said he testified five other times.

Mr. Gesell. I notice you said five, General Miles.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to see all five of them.

Mr. Gesell. I think on five occasions. Will you tell us what those five occasions were, General Miles, so that I can answer Congressman Murphy's question?
The Vice Chairman. He said this was the fifth.

General Miles. I appeared before the Roberts Board; I appeared before the Grunert Board, the Army Pearl Harbor Board; I appeared and gave testimony before Brigadier General Clark, G-2, the month after my appearance before the Grunert Board; and I was again under oath as shown by my affidavit to Lieutenant Colonel Clausen.

Mr. Gesell. All of that material has been available to us.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Murphy. And it will be available during the course of this examination?

Mr. Gesell. Well, we have in some instances only one copy. In some instances we have seen the material.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I make this request owing to the statement just made, that when counsel gets material that is available to the committee, if not for a member of the committee asking for it, that the committee members be individually advised as to the receipt of that material or of their having it so that we might inquire about it.

Mr. Gesell. Well, I am sorry. We will try to do that. I thought the committee understood that we had received all of the reports and transcripts of testimony of all of the various inquiries conducted by both the Army and the Navy, as well as the Roberts material.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you understand that the committee knew that Colonel Clark, or General Clark, had made an investigation?

Mr. Gesell. Yes, I thought so.

Mr. Keefe. I never heard of that one. It is news to me.

The Chairman. Permit the Chair to make this observation: In many instances in which documents or testimony has been made available, or in some instances at least, it has not been available in sufficient copies to permit each member to have a separate copy of his own. In other cases it has been. And in cases where there is only one copy of available testimony it is more or less difficult for all members to examine it simultaneously and in instances of that sort those who get it first ought to seek to accommodate themselves to the desires of other members so that sooner or later all of them can see it. I do not know how many have seen this.

Mr. Gesell. Well, would this be helpful to the members of the committee: If, prior to the appearance of each witness, we handed to each member of the committee the record references in these various reports and documents where that particular witness has appeared on prior occasions? We will do that if the committee wishes it.

The Chairman. It would help. The Chair might suggest that it obviously is impossible, as the Chair understands it, for each member of the committee to have simultaneously the complete record of the testimony given by all the witnesses in all the previous investigations that have been held. Is the Chair correct in that?

Mr. Gesell. We have only one copy of quite a bit of that material.

The Chairman. And to make additional copies sufficient for all members would be quite a task and quite an expense, but if any member gets possession of one of these copies first, the Chair would suggest that as soon as possible that he make it available to other members in turn.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I have a request to make.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, you may go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that if we get this material that we at least have it 48 hours beforehand or 24 hours, so that we may review it, rather than receive it at the time that a witness is on the stand or coming on. It is very difficult to prepare and we will cut down the period of time that it takes to question a witness if we have it sufficiently in advance.

Mr. Gesell. The Senator is quite right on that and we will try to make up a list for the members of the committee [2230] showing where each person testified and have it available as much ahead of time as we can.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is obvious that in cases where only one copy is available that, naturally, counsel who under our arrangement have the first examination of a witness, would like to feel that they should have the right to examine it first in order to become familiar with it, but as soon as possible in such cases after they do so that it be passed around as rapidly as possible to the various members of the committee.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I have one request.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. It seems to me in view of the nature of the testimony we have received from General Miles that each member of the committee ought to be furnished before Monday morning or before Sunday if possible with a photostatic copy of all of his previous testimony. I think it is extremely important and I would like to go into it pretty thoroughly.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is unable to say whether that is physically possible but every effort will be made to do that.

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keeffe.

Mr. Keeffe. I thought that I was more or less familiar [2231] with all of the so-called Pearl Harbor investigations but reference has now been made to a General Clark investigation, which is entirely new to me. I never heard of it until General Miles mentioned it and I would like at this time to make some inquiry as to the nature and scope and character of that investigation. When was it held and under whose direction and for what purpose and where are the records, if available?

Mr. Gesell. Congressman Keeffe, I think I can explain in this fashion. That was a technical investigation into a very detailed aspect of this situation and I have just explained—

Mr. Keeffe. You mean with respect to the codes?

Mr. Gesell. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. And that sort of thing?

Mr. Gesell. And I have just explained the situation to the Senator from Michigan. I will be very glad to discuss it with you, Congressman Keeffe, after we adjourn. That has been available to the staff and to the committee from the outset of the inquiry.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, it has never received any particular notice so far as the committee is concerned, I think; at least I have never heard of it before. Is it because of the fact that it does contain restricted material relating to [2232] codes and code breaking and that sort of thing?
Mr. Gesell. I believe that must be the reason, Congressman Keefe, yes.

The Chairman. The Chair might say he has heard in a general way of a report made by General Clark, who is a member of the General Staff, as he understands, but the Chairman of the committee has not seen the result or the testimony which General Clark took on the code situation, with which the Chairman understands he dealt exclusively.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I presume that will be made available to the committee at a certain time.

Mr. Gesell. Oh, yes; Congressman.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I am sure this is not in the spirit of "I told you so," but I raised this question at the very first meeting of the committee in executive session.

It now appears that there have been eight exhaustive investigations, eight reports written and testimony given in support of those reports. I knew that, with the exception of the Clark investigation, when we had our first meeting and I made the request that the testimony be digested so that we [2233]. would have it in such form that we could compare the testimony of witnesses given at different times and I was given the impression as a result of that first meeting that was being done.

Then at the last meeting of this committee in executive session I learned to my astonishment that nothing had been done along that line. I then asked, after having gone out of my way to call one of the great law book publishing companies to see if they could furnish us an editorial staff, I made the suggestion that even at that late hour that we employ people to compare that testimony for us, classify it as to subject so we could compare the testimony given by individual witnesses at different times to the same points and at that time the committee referred it to a sub-committee.

So today we are now confronted with the situation where we have a tremendous mass of testimony, probably thousands upon thousands of pages, probably eighty or ninety or a hundred volumes according to figures that have been given to me offhand and now we are talking about bringing that testimony in and dropping it on the desks of the different members of this committee expecting us to analyze that testimony on the spot, testimony given by the same witness at different times and then intelligently cross-examine a witness sitting on the stand here in respect of what he may have said at different times.

If anyone has ever been vindicated in offering something which should have been acted upon in the first place, which has not been acted on at all, I certainly am in reviewing the situation which confronts the committee at this particular time.

The Chairman. Well, the Chair simply wishes to observe that Congressman Gearhart did at one of our executive meetings suggest that the staff of the West Publishing Co. of Minneapolis, Minn., be brought down here to digest the previous testimony. The matter was discussed. No action was taken upon it. Whether wisely or unwisely may be a matter of opinion. It was not done. The Congressman did suggest that that be done.
Mr. Gesell. Yes; Mr. Chairman.

General Miles. Mr. Chairman, may I add one thing that I am afraid I did not make myself wholly clear on?

The counsel asked me several questions in regard to the messages of November 3, I believe, or December 3, sent by Navy regarding the Japanese and the burning of their codes and pointed out also to me that on some other occasions the War Department had specifically asked that the Navy messages be transmitted to Army.

[2335] I think it only fair to state, therefore, why I believed and why I think everyone in my department believed that Navy messages were being transmitted to the Army in Hawaii and vice versa.

I come down to three principal reasons. One is my intimate knowledge of the basis and policies governing the plans for the defense of Hawaii, in which it was always emphasized, so far as I can remember, the great importance of close liaison between Army and Navy. It was a tight little fortress which demanded primarily the close cooperation of the two services.

Second, my knowledge that General Marshall as Chief of Staff always emphasized the necessity of close cooperation and liaison with the Navy here in Washington and, I felt sure, to his senior officers in command of the major units of the Army that had any connection with Navy, as was particularly the case in Hawaii.

And, third, I received an official letter on the 17th of September, dated the 6th of September, from the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, Colonel Fielder, stating, inter alia:

The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete.

[2336] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the whole letter should go in. We should not have only the inter alia.

General Miles. I will read the entire letter.

The Chairman. Let the whole letter or message go into the transcript at this point.

General Miles. This refers to summaries of intelligence which we were sending them.

Senator Ferguson. What is the date of that?

General Miles. The date? I will read the whole message. [Reading:]

6 September 1941.

Subject: Summaries of Information
To: War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2,
Washington, D. C.

1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Information received from your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

[2237] 3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lieut. Colonel Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.
The Chairman. Is that all?
General Miles. That is the complete letter, sir.

The Chairman. General, I would like to clear up some of the terminology used by the War Department with respect to matters about which you testified.

You have down there, I believe, "G" by itself and G-1; G-2. G-3, and G-4 and maybe some other G's, but what is "G" by itself?

General Miles. "G" was an abbreviation that we adopted in the first World War from the French. To us it meant the General Staff Division.

The Chairman. Or the Chief of Staff? Would that also indicate the Chief of Staff?

General Miles. It was used both to describe an office or a department of the General Staff and loosely applied to the individual heading that department. There were five divisions of the General Staff, four G's, and the War Plans Division.

The Chairman. So that standing by itself "G" either means the General Staff or the Chief of Staff?

General Miles. A General Staff division or the Chief of Staff, depending upon context.

The Chairman. What is G-1?
General Miles. Personnel.
The Chairman. And G-2?
General Miles. Intelligence.
The Chairman. Intelligence.
General Miles. G-3 was Operations and Training; G-4 Supply and War Plans Division.

The Chairman. And you designate that by the initials "W. P. D."
General Miles. "W. P. D."; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Now, did the Chief of the Division of Intelligence, in Military Intelligence under the symbol G-2, have charge of all military intelligence in the War Department?

General Miles. He was the Assistant Chief of Staff to the Chief of Staff. He was the man in charge of military intelligence of the General Staff.

I had better read it directly from the Army regulations. The Army regulations current at that time, No. 10-15, state in paragraph 9 [reading]:

**MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, GENERAL DUTIES**

a. The Military Intelligence Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of military information.
b. The Military Intelligence Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of all activities concerning—

1. Military topographical surveys and maps, including their reproduction and distribution (except special situation maps prepared by G-3).
2. The custody of the General Staff map and photograph collection.
3. Military attaches, observers, and foreign-language students.
4. Intelligence personnel of all units.
5. Liaison with other intelligence agencies of the Government and with duly accredited foreign military attaches and missions.
6. Codes and ciphers.
7. Translations.
8. Public relations, to include all forms of publicity.
9. Censorship in time of war.
And added to it the acquisition of military topographical maps, as well as their reproduction and distribution, and the custody of the War Department map collection.

The Chairman. Did each of these divisions, G–1 and G–2, 3, and 4 and also the War Planning Division have at the top an officer who was a member of the General Staff and designated as Assistant Chief of Staff?

General Miles. Yes, sir; or Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

The Chairman. Yes, Acting Assistant.

Now, yesterday I think you testified that you had no control or supervision or what you call SIS, which I understood was Signal Intelligence Service?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. How does it happen that there would be any lack of supervision by the member of the General Staff or the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence of any particular phase of military intelligence such as SIS, Signal Intelligence Service, which is under the Signal Corps? Why would there be that hiatus between the control or supervision of the Chief of Military Intelligence of that branch, of that essential branch of military intelligence that came under the Signal Corps, which was very active and no doubt expected to be active in the obtaining of information?

[2241] General Miles. Senator, the theory on which the General Staff was established was that the divisions of the General Staff were not operating agencies. They were divisions of a staff serving the Chief of Staff whose principal duty was as military adviser to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States.

Now, the SIS was a technical branch which served Military Intelligence just as the Quartermaster Corps was a technical branch which served the Supply Division of the General Staff, if I may use that analogy.

Does that answer your question, sir?

The Chairman. Yes, in a way, but I would like to know to whom SIS was responsible and to whom it was expected under the regulations to make its reports?

General Miles. Directly to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army.

The Chairman. And they were under no obligation then to report to you as head of the Military Intelligence Division?

General Miles. They formed no part of the Military Intelligence Division. They were part of a technical service, the Signal Corps of the Army.

The Chairman. But that technical service was charged with the responsibility of obtaining information, was it not?

General Miles. No, sir, of transmitting. It was a communications service.

The Chairman. So that it reported under that arrangement directly to the Chief of Staff?

General Miles. No, sir; it reported directly to the Chief Signal Officer of the Army.

The Chairman. To whom did he report?

General Miles. All heads of the different branches of the Army were directly under the Chief of Staff. Those branches of the Army were divided in General Staff Divisions and the technical or service staff if you like to call them that.
The Chairman. So that there was no obligatory connection between the Military Intelligence of which you were the head and the Signal Service Corps except such as might be informal or voluntary?

General Miles. That is true, sir. I had no right or authority whatever to give any orders to the SIS or any other part of the Signal Corps or any other part of any other technical branch of the Army. It was, of course, expected that great cooperation would exist and if I want to General Maughborne, Chief Signal Officer, and said that I wanted something very badly he would and did get it for me if he possibly could.

The Chairman. Would there or not have been an advantage [2248] in a crisis such as that which we are discussing, an imminent conflict, if there had been a more direct connection between the Signal Intelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service of which you were the head?

General Miles. Well, Senator, that goes pretty deeply into the theory of the organization of the General Staff and the organization of the War Department which I do not feel competent to go into at this time. I can only say that it was set up that way with the approval of the Congress of the United States.

The Chairman. In exhibit No. 2 entitled, "Japanese messages concerning military installations, ship movements, etc.," which covers Hawaii and the Panama Canal, the Philippines, southern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, the west coast and then miscellaneous and under the respective headings of which we find many intercepted messages with respect to the movement of ships through the Panama Canal and also the movement of ships in Hawaii and in the Philippines and in the Southeast Atlantic, southeastern Asia, and the Netherlands, which is the Southeast Pacific region or Southwest Pacific—which was it geographically, Southwest Pacific. It was southeast Asia, but it was geographically where?

General Miles. Southwest Pacific, yes, sir.

[2244] The Chairman. The Southwest Pacific?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Was there any particular difference in the relative importance given to these intercepted messages with respect to the Panama Canal, Hawaii, the Philippines, southeast Asia, or any other regions covered by these intercepted messages relative to the movement of ships?

General Miles. If I understand your question, Senator, these messages as a whole primarily indicated to us what we already knew or could very easily suspect, that the Japanese were doing everything they could to follow the movement of our warships, as I said yesterday, just as we were doing with regard to following the movement of Japanese warships.

The Chairman. And they were getting information from their representatives either in Panama, for instance, or through some South American country with respect to all movements of not only warships but commercial ships through the Panama Canal in both directions?

General Miles. I did not get the question.

The Chairman. I say they were receiving information as to the movement of ships, both naval and commercial, through the Panama
Canal in both directions, according to these intercepted messages?

General Miles. That was their intent and I have no doubt [2245] they carried it out pretty thoroughly.

The Chairman. And they also were receiving information, as these intercepted messages show, concerning the movement of ships in and out of the Philippines region in Manila Bay, were they?

General Miles. That is true, sir. I mentioned yesterday that I have counted 56 of those that I have deciphered.

The Chairman. And the Hawaiian Islands. Somebody in each of these regions was reporting to Tokyo, or somebody who reported to Tokyo the movement of these ships over the various periods running form 1940, some period in 1940 up to and approaching the 7th of December 1941, and the question I would like to ask is whether the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department treated all of these intercepts, so far as you know, in the same way and with the same degree of importance, or whether they singled out this information from either the Panama Canal or from Hawaii or the Philippines or southeast Asia for any special treatment in regard to precautionary measures which might be taken in any of these different regions?

[2246] General Miles. Well, they were primarily messages which concerned the Naval Intelligence rather than the Military. Obviously, Senator, we were more interested in the fact that the Japanese were following our ships in our own waters, Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, than we were the Dutch East Indies, or any other places headed here "miscellaneous".

The Chairman. In view of the activity of the Japanese Government in obtaining this information through these messages from various people at the Panama Canal, Manila, Honolulu, the Dutch East Indies, and Southeast Asia, was there anything in any of them, so far as you know, as head of the Military Intelligence Division, to indicate whether the Japanese Government intended to make an attack at any of these points, and, if so, which one was singled out as the most likely to be the object of such an attack?

General Miles. No, sir, taking the messages as a whole, I do not think they indicated any particular place in which you could say the Japanese will attack there, or the most probable, that they will attack there, solely based on those messages.

The Chairman. Now yesterday I think you testified with reference to the shortage of competent help in the interception, the translation, and decoding of these various messages. I would like to ask you specifically what effort you made, as [2247] head of that Division, to secure additional help so that they might be translated, decoded and intercepted more promptly than they were in many cases?

General Miles. I testified this morning, Senator, that for a considerable period of time before Pearl Harbor, I cannot definitely define it, we had lent one of our language officers, successively through at least six of those gentlemen, to the S. I. S. We were not permitted, due to restrictions on personnel, to do more than that with those language officers. Although they were trained language officers, even then we had to put them through a course of training for that particular duty of translating from telegraphic Japanese, which is a language within a language, before they became fit to carry on.
In addition to that, we did what we could to find for the Signal Corps competent civilians, to aid them in this work. That, as I explained this morning, was very difficult, because there were very few in existence who could translate telegraphic Japanese accurately into English, and we must be accurate, and they had to be not only American citizens but American citizens on whose absolute loyalty and discretion we could count.

We were handling a very important secret.

The Chairman. How were those appointments made? Were they made under civil service, or did the War Department have [2248] some special plan by which it was able to secure competent persons who were able to intercept and also to translate and decode these messages?

General Miles. Well, the interception, Senator, was made by various stations of the Army, Navy, and FBI, and the FCC. That was simply a matter of pulling a message out of the air, then transmitting that message as it came out of the air in coded Japanese to Washington. Now the decoding and translation was altogether another matter, a very difficult proposition.

[2249] The Chairman. Now, pulling the message out of the air at Hawaii or Panama or the Philippines, or any other point, was simply pulling it out of the air as it was going through the air in Japanese?

General Miles. In coded Japanese.

The Chairman. In coded Japanese. They recorded the message in the Japanese code, and it had to be then transmitted from whatever station it may have been intercepted, Panama or elsewhere; is that true?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. Then it Washington it had to be decoded and translated into English; is that it?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. So that those who were charged with that responsibility and that duty had to be, in the first place, able to pull the message out of the air, then they had to be able to decode it and translate it so it could be understood in English, and then passed on to whoever was expected to get it finally; is that true?

General Miles. Yes, sir. The same personnel that pulled it out of the air was not the same that decoded and translated it.

The Chairman. He could pull it out of the air just like it was but he could not translate it after he got it out of the air? [2250]

General Miles. That is so, sir.

The Chairman. I notice many of these messages were translated and decoded within a few days after they had been received and in many other cases it was a month, or maybe in some cases, 2 months, before the translation and decoding took place. How did that happen? It seems they were not being decoded or translated in the order of their receipt or in the order of their being pulled out of the air.

How did that happen, that they were not decoded and translated in relation to the date of their receipt?

For instance, some messages received in December were not decoded and translated until February, and others were translated within a few days. Now, until they were decoded and translated, did any-
body have any idea of the relative importance of these messages so as to give priority to their translation and decoding? And if that is true, how did it happen that some of them waited a month, or 2 months, to be decoded and translated while others were decoded and translated within a week and in some cases, 3 or 4 days, and some on the same day?

General Miles. Obviously, Senator, we could not evaluate the messages or give them any priority in the ordinary case. In the case that we were looking for a particular message, [2251] as was the case in the days before the receipt of the Japanese reply beginning on the 6th of December, we knew that message would be coming. We knew it would be along, we knew to whom it would be addressed, and undoubtedly that got a high priority.

But to answer your question, primarily the delay was due two factors: One, the fact, as I have already testified, that, as I understand it, the intercepting stations that picked these out of the air—and there were various stations—did not have the same facilities for transmitting that message to Washington. Some had teletypes, and they could put the message on in teletype and send it through.

Sometimes I imagine they had to be checked and re-sent because many errors were made, and would be a perfectly meaningless message to the person sending or receiving it. Other stations had no such facilities, and had to send them by mail, and airmail usually was used.

The second reason, of course, was the traffic rate. Sometimes that increased enormously, and a backlog was created in the decoding and translating agencies here in Washington.

The Chairman. I find here a message intercepted from Honolulu (Okuda) which I suppose means the Japanese representative there, to Tokyo. It is No. 003. It seems to be in reply to No. 002.

Battleships New Mexico (flag)—

which I presume means flagship—

Oklahoma, Idaho, and Mississippi, together with many cruisers and destroyers left Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 6th for training.

That is the day before this message was sent.

It is reported that they will return on the (12th?)

Then there is a question mark after that in parentheses, indicating probably some doubt as to whether they would return on that day. That was a Navy translation on the 10th, which is three days after that message was transmitted.

Then there is another one on January 9, 1941, translated on the 25th, with reference to other movements:

It is reported that the light cruiser Cincinnati returned here from the Philippine Islands. This message sent to Washington and Manila.

That is a message by some Japanese representative to the Japanese Government at Tokyo.

Then on the 16th of January, 1941:

1. The capital ships returned to Pearl Harbor immediately. The Pennsylvania arrived on the 14th.

2. The number of vessels seen in the harbor on the morning of the 16th was as follows: Five battleships (Mississippi, New Mexico, Idaho, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma), five light cruisers of the Omaha class (of which one is in dock) 19 destroyers, 2 destroyer tenders, 1 - - - - - - , about 6 small submarines, 1 submarine tender, 1 patrol boat, 7 vessels which may have been patrol boats, 2 transports.

3. The Yorktown is not in port.
All of which would indicate that somebody in Honolulu almost day by day was reporting to Tokyo the movement of all of our ships in and out of Pearl Harbor, and in and out of Honolulu. Some of these messages were translated and decoded within a very few days, while others were not.

Some of these translations were by the Navy, probably most by the Navy, and some by the Army.

Do you know, as head of the Intelligence Division of the War Department, by what rules, or lack of rules, some of these messages detailing the movements of our ships in and out of Pearl Harbor and in and out of Honolulu as far back as January 1941, nearly a year before the attack was made, were translated and decoded in some cases almost immediately, and in other cases not for weeks? Have you any explanation from your knowledge, as to why that happened?

General Miles. Beyond what I have testified, Senator, I have not. I understand you are going to have Colonel Sadtler [2254] as a witness, who can give you the details of that. I could add, however, of course, that these messages we had already discarded. We knew the Japanese were following the movement of our ships, very naturally, in Hawaii.

Much has already been said before this committee as to whether or not the presence of that fleet was a deterrent to the Japanese, but their interest in the movement of the ships was a perfectly natural activity on their part, because of the obvious fact that there was a fleet on their flank, whatever direction they chose to go, north or south.

The Chairman. The question which arises in my mind is, in view of the fact that these decoded, intercepted, and translated messages go all the way from January practically up to the attack, showing that they had detailed information with respect to the movement of the ships in and out of Pearl Harbor and in and out of Honolulu in the Hawaiian Islands, whether that gave any emphasis to the possibility of an attack in Pearl Harbor more or less than any emphasis that might have been given with respect to a possible attack on Panama, in view of the same information they were receiving from Panama or Manila, in view of the information they were receiving from Manila, or the Southwest Pacific, or southeast Asia, with respect to the same traffic information they were [2255] receiving from that region. In other words, as these intercepted messages show that Japan at Tokyo was receiving from these various points similar information with respect to the movement of all ships in these four or five regions, did the War Department, through you or your division, give any particular emphasis to anyone of these points over other points about which the same information was being conveyed?

General Miles. No, sir. Those messages as a whole, as I tried to testify yesterday, meant simply to us what we already knew, or suspected, that the Japanese were following the movement of all of our ships anywhere they appeared.

The Chairman. Did the knowledge of that fact cause any particular apprehension to the Intelligence Division that there might be an attack at any of these points in the event the situation developed to a point where there might be hostilities between the two countries?

General Miles. We knew, Senator, that, as I have said before, attack on our principal bases, Honolulu, Hawaii, and Panama, in-
cluding the Philippines, was practically inherent as a high possibility or probability in any war with Japan. The messages themselves had very little effect in emphasizing that point.

The Chairman. You testified, I believe this morning, with respect to the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor and the possibility of a sudden surprise attack. How do you evaluate the possibility of a sudden and surprise attack at Pearl Harbor or Hawaii with relation to the possibility of a sudden or surprise attack on Manila or on the Panama Canal, or any other of these points about which the Japanese Government was making inquiry as to the movement of ships?

General Miles. I should say that our evaluation would have been that Hawaii and the Panama Canal were about equally likely to be attacked for somewhat different reasons, but both of them were of immense strategic importance to us and immense value to the Japanese, if they could be injured or put out of business.

The Chairman. When you were in Hawaii—as operations officer was it?

General Miles. G-3, operations officer; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Yes. For how long? Some three years?

General Miles. Three years, sir.

The Chairman. And you indulged in many war games, based upon assumptions of various kinds?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And in those war games you assumed that there might be an actual physical invasion of the Hawaiian Islands by the landing of troops in the harbor at Honolulu, did you, or Pearl Harbor, or both? Which was it?

General Miles. I only remembered one in which we envisaged the landing of Japanese troops in Honolulu Harbor. It was generally presumed they would land at different points of the island.

The Chairman. That was based, of course, on the possibility of landing military troops from transports and engaging such forces as we might have on land in the Hawaiian Islands?

General Miles. Based on the principle of surprise.

The Chairman. Yes. That they might produce a surprise landing of troops and actually invade the Hawaiian Islands.

General Miles. Yes, sir. One maneuver, or war game, that I mentioned was based on that.

The Chairman. Testimony has been adduced here to the effect that the Japanese rather insisted that we take the entire Pacific Fleet out of the Pacific Ocean and put it back into the Atlantic, in which event, of course, the air raid on the fleet itself in Pearl Harbor would not have taken place. But if that had been the situation, would you wish to express an opinion—which may be more or less speculative—as to whether the Japanese would have attempted or could have attempted and succeeded in effectuating a landing on the Hawaiian Islands by an army and thereby capture the islands themselves, instead of bombing from the air the fleet that was in Pearl Harbor? Would you care to express any opinion on that?

General Miles. Well, sir, it was subject to a long study during my time in Hawaii, and also it was up time and time again during my course of duty here in the War Plans Division.
I remember running a general staff study on that when I was in Hawaii. It was always considered a possibility. There were very cogent reasons why the Japanese, even with the fleet in the Atlantic, should have attacked Hawaii, preferably an attack based on the capture of Hawaii. Had the Japanese captured Hawaii, we knew perfectly well we could never begin the offensive war which we have fought against the Japanese until we recaptured Hawaii—a very difficult operation.

Could they have knocked out the naval facilities of Hawaii, it would have given them a lesser time, but still a very considerable period of time before we could have begun any offensive operations in the Pacific, because those facilities would have had to be built up again. All those things were inherent in the situation, if I may so express it.

[2259] The Chairman. Well, if we may presume that the object of the Japanese attack, as it took place, was to cripple or destroy the fleet in Pearl Harbor so as to make it ineffective in resisting the encroachment, the movement of the Japanese Army and the fleet from Japan south, and into Indochina, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or any of that territory, is it, from a military standpoint, sound to assume that if that fleet had not been there, or within that region, that instead of making an attack upon the fleet from the air and leaving with whatever damage occurred they could have captured the islands—and of course, such attack would have brought war just as the attack on the fleet had brought war—what effect would that have had on our ability to fight Japan in the region where we had to fight her, with the Hawaiian Islands in her possession and the necessity to recapture them before we got far beyond them, and if they had captured the islands, would they have been able to base their own fleet in Pearl Harbor instead of our own? What would the effect have been on our ability to fight Japan further west in the Pacific, in the region where she was up to that time making her depredations?

That may be an involved question.

General Miles. The effect would have been that we would have been forced to recapture the Hawaiian Islands [2260] before we undertook any major offensive against the Japanese in the middle or western Pacific.

The Chairman. Now, when did you first go to Hawaii, General?

General Miles. April 1929.

The Chairman. Did the military or naval authorities while you were there—you were there until 1932?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Were you there when the fleet was maneuvering in the Hawaiian region in 1932, 1931, and 1932?

General Miles. I was, sir.

The Chairman. You were in the Hawaiian Islands when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931?

General Miles. In 1931, yes, sir.

The Chairman. You were there when they made the attack on Shanghai?

General Miles. No, sir, that was considerably later, I think, sir.

The Chairman. What year was that?

General Miles. Somewhere in the middle thirties. I do not recall offhand.
The Chairman. Probably 1935. I do not recall exactly. As operations officer in charge of G-3, I believe you said, in the Hawaiian Islands from 1929 to 1932, was any consideration given to the possibility that the Japanese aggressions in Manchuria and the possible attack upon Shanghai, or an attack upon any European possession or any American possession in that region, would bring about hostilities between the United States and Japan, and was that in any way related to the maneuvers of the fleet in Hawaiian waters in 1931 or 1932?

General Miles. To answer your last question first, I do not believe that the Japanese aggression, which began in September of 1931, if I remember correctly, in Manchuria, had any particular bearing on the maneuvers, the joint Army and Navy maneuver of February or perhaps March of 1932.

To answer the second question, I think it is fair to say that beginning with the Japanese aggression of Manchuria in the fall of 1931, the possibility of a Japanese American war increased from then on. They were a bandit nation out on the rampage in a war game that was real.

[2267] The Chairman. Our Government protested against the invasion of Manchuria at the time it took place?

General Miles. It led the protest.

The Chairman. It led the protest and never at any time recognized the Manchukuo Government set up by Japan?

General Miles. I believe that is correct, sir.

The Chairman. Are you familiar with the position of the Secretary of State at that time as stated by him that when the maneuvers of the fleet were concluded that the fleet was still retained for a time in Hawaiian waters because of the Manchurian situation; are you familiar with that?

General Miles. I have heard that. I read that in Secretary Stimson's book. I did not know it at the time.

The Chairman. When did you finally conclude your service as Chief of Military Intelligence here in Washington?

General Miles. I think it was the 31st of January 1942; and 30th or 31st.

The Chairman. Some 2 months, approximately, following the Pearl Harbor attack?

General Miles. That is correct.

The Chairman. I think that is all.

Congressman Cooper.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I desire to inquiry briefly of General Miles.

[2262] First, General, along the lines of the chairman's original questions to you, I might refer to the fact that I had a brief service in the Army of 2 years during the First World War in the Infantry. Of course, the Signal Corps of the Army is a definite branch of the Army like the the Quartermaster Corps or any other part of the Army.

General Miles. That is correct. It is one of the technical branches of the Army—technical services of the Army.

The Vice Chairman. And this Signal Intelligence Service is simply part of that branch?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Of course, the Signal Corps has the responsibility of stringing telephone lines and indulging in various and sundry types of service—furnishing communications?

General Miles. Many other activities.

The Vice Chairman. Yes, and this Signal Intelligence Service was simply a part of that?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And, of course, intelligence was distributed all through various units of the Army; isn't that true?

General Miles. Yes, sir; all the tactical units and to a certain extent the technical services, particularly the Air Force, the Air Corps in those days, were running an intelligence of their own.

The Vice Chairman. Even during the First World War an infantry regiment had what was called an operations and intelligence officer.

General Miles. Oh, yes. All combat units in the field.

The Vice Chairman. Had intelligence service.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. If I may interrupt, Congressman Cooper, there is one question I overlooked.

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

The Chairman. When these intercepted messages, intercepted at Panama, Hawaii, or the Philippines, or southeast Asia, were sent here for decoding and translation, were the officers in these various regions thereafter notified of the contents of the message which they had interpreted but which they could not translate or decode?

General Miles. No, sir.

The Chairman. That was true of all these points, including the Hawaiian Islands?

General Miles. That is correct.

The Chairman. There was no different treatment of these messages, or no information given to high authorities, those at Panama, Manila, and southeast Asia, after these messages were sent here in the original form and decoded and translated, that information was kept with the War Department here and not disseminated to these various points?

General Miles. There was no difference made between the different overseas departments.

The Chairman. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. General, I would like to inquire briefly, if I may, with respect to certain pages of exhibit 2, with which you are thoroughly familiar, beginning on page 16, which has the heading "B. Messages translated after 7 December 1941?" and continuing to and including page 29 in this same exhibit, which, I believe, embraces the messages received before the attack on Pearl Harbor which were translated after the attack on Pearl Harbor; is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir; though not necessarily received in Washington, probably not received in Washington. This one, as an example, is dated November 24. It was not translated until the 16th of December. In all probability that was picked up, although I cannot state it as a fact, by an intercepting station which did not have the facilities for rapid transmission to Washington.
The Vice Chairman. Well, that was the next question I had intended to present to you, General. These pages to which I have referred show that the space of time from the date shown [2266] at the top of the message to the date shown at the bottom as the date of translation varied all the way from 2 days to 22 days.

Now, I was in the act of asking you whether that date at the top of each of these messages indicates the date that the message was received by the Army Intelligence Service here in Washington.

General Miles. No, sir; it does not.

The Vice Chairman. That means—

General Miles. It is the date which that message was sent from Tokyo, or wherever it was sent from.

The Vice Chairman. The date at the top of the message is the date that it was sent from Honolulu to Tokyo or from Tokyo to Honolulu, or whatever the case may be?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, is there anything on this page 16 to which I now invite your attention, that shows the date or the time that that intercepted message came to the attention of the Intelligence Service here in Washington?

General Miles. Yes, sir. The date at the bottom of the page is the date of its translation and almost invariably it was passed on from SIS to MID, ONI, on that same day.

The Vice Chairman. Then is it correct to understand that all of these messages contained on the pages to which [2267] I have invited your attention were decoded and translated in Washington the day they were received in Washington?

General Miles. No, sir; I do not say that. You asked me, as I understood it, Mr. Congressman, was there anything in this message to indicate the date on which the Military Intelligence Division received the message. I replied, “Yes, that was the date on which it was translated in the great majority of cases, or at least the next day.”

The Vice Chairman. Well, let’s try to be more specific, if I may, General. I am just seeking light. I know you are anxious to help us and give all the light you can.

Take this page 16 in exhibit 2:

From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo.
November 24, 1941.
Number 234 (part 1 of 2).
Re your number 114-a.
Strictly secret.

Now, I will not take the time to read the message, which covers most of the page.

Down at the bottom:

a—Not available.

Under that:

Army.
[2268] 26351.
(Japanese).
Trans. 12-16-41 (2).

What is there on that page to show when this intercepted message reached G-2 of the Army?
General Miles. The date of translation, sir, was almost invariably the date on which we received it. In other words, when this message was decoded, translated, it was very promptly sent from SIS to Military Intelligence Division. If it came in very late one night it might arrive very early the next morning. There might be one day's difference on the record.

Mr. Gesell. May I interpose, Congressman?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. I believe the difficulty is that General Miles is telling you when the message was received by G-2 and I believe the Congressman is anxious to know when the message reached Washington, i.e., the Signal Corps. That is, perhaps the difficulty in the question.

General Miles. To answer that last one, sir, there is nothing to show when this intercepted message, uncoded and untranslated, was received by SIS.

The Vice Chairman. That is the Signal Intelligence Service?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

But I have no doubt that they have records in addition to what is shown on this page which might indicate that.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I—will you yield, Congressman?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. I have in mind that if counsel through General Miles over the week end may be able to find in the Department some information on that, it will be helpful, so that we could have when each one of these messages was received by the Signal Corps here in Washington. The information is not complete on this data.

Mr. Gesell. The information is not complete here, Senator.

If I may suggest, since the question of receipt and translation is a matter within the province of the Signal Corps and not in the province of General Miles, it would be appropriate to present that information through the Signal Corps officers who are going to testify.

The Vice Chairman. They will appear?

Mr. Gesell. They will appear. Colonel Sadtler and others, who will be familiar with those details.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. I might say, naturally I felt disturbed when I examined these pages and saw that from what was apparent here from 2 days to 22 days of time had elapsed between the date of the message and the time it was translated. [2270] I was concerned about that.

Now, I was just wondering how General Marshall, Chief of Staff, to whom this information was given by you as G-2 of his staff, could operate with a full degree of understanding if 22 days had elapsed from the time that a message was intercepted before it was translated and decoded and presented to him for his attention.

That was one thing I was hoping to get some light and information on.

As I understand it, officers of the Signal Corps would be the ones to whom I should address those questions?

General Miles. They would be able to give you more tactical information than I. I think you will find that the average times was far less than 22 days.
The Vice Chairman. Well, this particular one to which I have been inviting your attention was sent November 24 and translated December 16. That is 22 days.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And the same thing is true of the one appearing on page 17. It was sent on November 24 and translated December 16, which was 22 days.

The one appearing on page 18 was sent November 28, translated December 8, which was 10 days.

The one appearing on page 19 was sent November 28, [2271] translated December 8, which was 10 days.

The one appearing on page 20 was sent December 1, translated December 10, which, of course, is 10 days.

The one appearing on page 21, the first one, was sent December 2, translated January 30, which was 28 days.

The Chairman. December 30.

The Vice Chairman. December 30, which was 28 days.

The second one on that page was sent December 3, translated December 10, which was 7 days.

On page 22, one sent December 3, translated December 11, which was 8 days.

And so on, without calling attention to each individual one. The time varies from 2 days to 28 days that elapsed from the time the message was sent until it was transmitted.

Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Keefe. I would like to ask counsel whether or not there has been produced up to this time the report of the SIS or the Signal Corps of the Army. Have you any reports from either the SIS or the Signal Corps with relation to their transactions during this period under questioning?

Mr. Gesell. I believe, Congressman, that some of the information that you inquire about is contained in the Clark report to which reference has been made.

[2272] Mr. Keefe. I have been trying to get my hands on the report of the Signal Corps and the SIS without success up to date. Now, is that a restricted report?

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, you asked for the annual report of the Signal Corps. It came into our hands either yesterday or the day before and I dictated a note and ordered it delivered at your office.

It was a Signal Corps report for 1 year that you asked for.

Mr. Keefe. That is what I wanted.

Mr. Mitchell. It ought to be in your office now.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I haven't been there, of course, this afternoon.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire from counsel—

Mr. Mitchell. I might say, I looked it over. I don't think there is much in it that helps but if there is anything else you want we will try to get it.

Senator Ferguson. Will the Congressman yield for a question?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. These messages, the Japanese messages concerning military installations, ship movements, and so forth, in the yellow booklet, do they come to us in the original, showing all the checks and
information on them? Do they come \[2273]\textsuperscript{1} to us just as you print them here?

Mr. Gesell. These messages, Senator, as contained in exhibit 2, as I am quite certain was explained at the executive session of the committee, have certain technical data deleted for reasons of security, but the text of the message is not in any way affected thereby.

Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get at is this, did they have any method of time stamping on the receipt of these messages by the various departments, so that if we saw the original message we could get the information that Congressman Cooper is now endeavoring to get?

Mr. Gesell. No. It is my understanding that that information is not on the originals of these messages that are in the file. I believe to the extent that the data is available, and there is a great deal of it that is, it will have to be assembled from work sheets and other detailed notes of the people concerned with translating and decoding in the SIS.

Senator Ferguson. Well, so that I understand, what is deleted from the messages? Let's take the one on page 25 as an example.

Mr. Gesell. I would prefer to discuss that question with the Senator, as we have done before, in executive session, but the text of the message is complete and full as here printed.

\[2274]\textsuperscript{1} Mr. Mitchell. The only thing deleted, Mr. Senator, is some technical information.

Senator Ferguson. You mean the kind of a code?

Mr. Mitchell. Things of that kind.

Senator Ferguson. I haven't any desire to get that kind of information, but I am desirous of getting the information as to the time of receipt of the message in the various departments and if they are not marked I would like to have some witness explain why the departments didn't keep track of when they received the message.

The Vice Chairman. That is exactly what I have been trying to secure but I got the impression from the statements of counsel and General Miles that probably we could get that information better from officers of the Signal Corps.

Mr. Gesell. That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. We will also produce photostats of some of these messages which are of particular moment, like the fourteenth part message, so you will have an exact copy of just the way the record looks in the War Department. We will have the original here and the work papers. That has been arranged for.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I will ask one more question and suspend, as the hour of adjournment has about arrived.

\[2275]\textsuperscript{2} General. I understood you to say that for years it had been understood by the Army—I assume that means, of course, the high-ranking officers of the Army—that hostilities with Japan would involve an attack on Hawaii, and that a knowledge of the Japanese people caused the anticipation of a surprise attack.

That is substantially and in essence your statement on that, isn't it? General Miles. That the possibility if not the probability of an attack on Hawaii was inherent in a Japanese war. You gentlemen of the Congress appropriated millions of dollars for that fortress. Against whom were you building it?
The Vice Chairman. I understand that, but what I am trying to get at is your statement that it had been understood by the Army for years that that was the situation.

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Then would it naturally follow that the military commander at Hawaii might reasonably be expected to understand that also?

General Miles. I could certainly say that the four generals under whom I have had the honor to serve at Hawaii gave me every indication that they understood that situation all right.

The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock on Monday morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Monday, December 3, 1945.)
MONDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Garhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

When the committee recessed on Friday, Congressman Cooper was in the process of examining General Miles.

Before we resume, the chairman would like to ask counsel, in view of the interest in the time when General Marshall will appear before the committee, and in view of the statement that was made the other day that he would advise counsel and the committee what his schedule might be so that we might determine that matter, I should like to ask counsel if he has any information on that matter.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, Mr. Chairman. On account of his plans to leave for China, he has a rather tight schedule and this morning, about a half an hour ago, I was advised that he would like to testify, commence his testimony on Thursday, December 6, at 10 o'clock and that arrangement has been made, subject, of course, to the committee's approval.

General Marshall's examination will cover all phases of the inquiry with which he was concerned, including the events of December 6 and December 7, as to which we had originally expected to make a special order later.

At the conclusion of General Miles' testimony, we would like to call General Gerow and get as far as we can with him before General Marshall is called, because there are certain things that General Gerow knows that would be well to lay into the record, if we can, before General Marshall is called.

But it is 10 o'clock Thursday, if that is agreeable to the committee.

The Chairman. In view of General Marshall's situation, I am sure there is no objection on the part of the committee to having him come Thursday, no matter whom it may displace.

Congressman Cooper.
Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, before Congressman Cooper begins, there are two other matters I would like to bring to the attention of the committee.

General Miles informed me this morning there are two points in his testimony which he wishes to modify, and I think he should be given that opportunity before the examination commences.

Also the question was raised during General Miles' examination, both by questions from counsel and members of the committee, concerning this matter of the delay in translations of certain messages which were sent by the Japanese prior to December 7, but not translated, decoded, and made available to the Military Intelligence Division until sometime after the 7th or late on the 6th.

I, when that came up, advised the committee that we had witnesses scheduled, both from the Army and the Navy, who [2280] would give detailed information concerning that matter. I would like to elaborate that statement for the information of the committee, and point out that in the case of the Army, the Signal Corps, not the Military Intelligence Division, was responsible for interception, decoding, and translation, as has been testified.

We have made and are making a detailed inquiry into the Army and the Navy records and will be in a position with respect to all of the messages in question, we believe, or at least, the great bulk of them, to present to the committee through those witnesses, both from the Army and Navy records, the following information:

The time at which each of the messages in question was intercepted;

The monitoring station which intercepted the message;

The time at which the message was forwarded by the monitoring station to the Army Signal Intelligence Service or to Naval Communications, as the case may be;

The method by which the monitoring station forwarded the message, whether by airmail, teletype or radio;

The time at which the intercepted copy was sent by the Army Signal Corps Intelligence Service, or Naval Communications, or vice versa, for processing, that is to say, decoding and translation.

[2281] That material is all being assembled and will be presented to the committee through the witnesses who were directly concerned in those phases of the matter.

The Chairman. General Miles, before Congressman Cooper proceeds, do you want to make a statement with reference to your testimony heretofore given?

**TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)**

General Miles. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I find that, on reading the transcript, that in one case my testimony was wrong. I understood, or got the impression, erroneously, that counsel was speaking in the past tense. What he asked me was:

Do you have any information as to whether or not General Short or other Army officers knew of these Navy messages?

The Chairman. Would you mind indicating what page of the record that appears?

General Miles. On the bottom of page 2223.
I replied:
I have no specific information on that point.
That was true as of 1941. It was not true as of today, or as of last week.
I had seen last week, and before I gave this testimony, a copy of an affidavit from Col. George W. Bicknell, assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, in Hawaii, before Colonel Clausen.
In this affidavit Colonel Bicknell says:
I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret Volume “C”, testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N. At about this same time this information was discussed with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers.
In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese Consul, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere.

The other point I would like to make, Mr. Chairman, is that I fear on rereading my testimony that I have given the impression of complacency on my part and on the part of my Division with regard to these delays in the magic messages. I very deliberately avoided testifying to the technical side of the decoding of these messages.
(1) Because I am not competent to really go into the technical side of it; and
(2) Because you will have before you a competent officer of the Signal Corps who handled this matter directly.
It was not, of course, my province, but I would like to say we were by no means complacent about it. We knew simply the difficulty of doing this work. Three processes had to be performed. A message had to be deciphered, then it had to be decoded, and then the Japanese had to be translated into English.
I have testified as to what my Division was able to do to aid the Signal Corps in translations. The other two very important and highly technical processes of deciphering and decoding we were not competent to aid in, and I felt sure that those devoted men who spent so much time on it were doing everything they possibly could in the matter.
The astonishing thing, Mr. Chairman, was not that these messages were delayed in the process of translation from Japanese to English, but that we were able to do it at all. It was a marvelous piece of work on the part of the highly technical men who handled that extraordinary job of breaking codes and ciphers.

The Chairman. Is that all?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Congressman Cooper?
The Vice Chairman. General, toward the end of your testimony at your last appearance I asked you a question that I would like to
repeat at this time to connect up with the previous testimony that you have given.

On page 2275 of the record I asked you the question:

General, I understood you to say that for years it had been understood by the Army—I assume that means, of course, the high ranking officers of the Army—that hostilities with Japan would involve an attack on Hawaii, and that a knowledge of the Japanese people caused the anticipation of a surprise attack.

And then I asked you if that is substantially and in essence your statement on that point.

Then you answered:

That the possibility if not the probability of an attack on Hawaii was inherent in a Japanese war. You gentlemen of the Congress appropriated millions of dollars for that fortress. Against whom were you building it?

Then I asked you:

I understand that, but what I am trying to get is your statement that it had been understood by the Army for years that that was the situation.

And you answered then:

That is correct, sir.

Then I asked you:

Then would it naturally follow that the military commander at Hawaii might reasonably be expected to understand that also?

And your reply then was:

I could certainly say that the four Generals under whom I have had the honor to serve at Hawaii gave me every indication that they understood that situation all right.

Now, that answer, of course, still stands as you gave it there?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And it does come within your knowledge, then, that the four generals who were in command of the Hawaiian Department during your period of service there understood the situation as you have indicated by the statement you have made here?

Senator Lucas. Did he answer?

General Miles. Yes, sir; I can make that absolutely flat statement. I worked under those commanding generals in the preparation of war plans, the revision of war plans and of the defense projects, and I am convinced that all of those four gentlemen, as well as General Drum, who later took command, and when I was here in the War Plans Division, thoroughly understood that that outpost had one sole mission, the defense of the naval base in a Japanese war.

The Vice Chairman. Then, as far as you know, that was the understanding by all of those who were in command of the Hawaiian Department?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, I assume that the whole purpose of all of these war games and similar activities in which the Army engaged from time to time was more or less as a practice to be trained and prepared for the time when the real thing might come, is that true?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And throughout the years there had been various war games and maneuvers and practices of that kind?

General Miles. That is true, sir.
The **Vice Chairman.** Now, the results of those war games and practices were reported to the War College and other divisions and branches of the Army for study and preparation, were they not?

[2289] General **Miles.** Reports were made on the large maneuvers by the Hawaiian Department to the General Staff in Washington. They were usually reviewed by the War Plans Division of the General Staff. Many local maneuvers, war games and exercises were not, as I remember it, reported to Washington.

The **Vice Chairman.** But it was the practice to make use of the experience gained during those war games and practices of that type, wasn’t it, for the benefit of our officers of the Army who were not engaged in the particular game at the time.

General **Miles.** Yes, sir. Our war plans for the defense of Hawaii, the defense project and the war plan itself had been built up during years of study and experience of various maneuvers and exercises. It was a splendid command in which to serve as a G-3, both from the point of training and of operations, because there was but one situation you had to consider and one enemy and all of your experience and the experience of men who had gone before you was all down one path.

General Wells particularly saw that every officer landing in Hawaii, saw to it that every officer landing in Hawaii for duty with the Hawaiian Department, read certain documents on the defense of Hawaii, documents which used [2290] the term “Orange” as the term for the enemy and everybody knew who “Orange” was.

The **Vice Chairman.** That was a part of his duty to do that, wasn’t it?

General **Miles.** That was an order of General Wells, certainly, regarding all officers of all ranks who joined the Hawaiian Department.

The **Vice Chairman.** Well, wasn’t it a part of the duty of any officer in command of Hawaii to do that, to be familiar with the experiences gained through these previous war games and maneuvers and experiences of that kind?

General **Miles.** I would say so, sir.

The **Vice Chairman.** So, then it would be reasonable to assume that it was a part of the duty of any commander in command of the Army forces in Hawaii to familiarize himself with the experience gained through previous war games and maneuvers of that type?

General **Miles.** Yes, sir; I think that is a correct statement. When I was in the War Plans Division in the middle thirties we went even beyond that and attempted to have ordered to Washington for a short period of duty not only commanding generals going out to Hawaii but their chief staff officers, so that we could have consultations with them on that very point, the existing war plans and the experiences [2291] that were behind those war plans. I remember distinctly General Patton coming to Washington at our request before he went to Hawaii as G-2.

Mr. **Gesell.** Congressman Cooper, I do not like to interpose but I think the committee should be informed—

The **Vice Chairman.** I yield with pleasure, of course.

Mr. **Gesell** (continuing), that General Miles has made available to us this morning the excerpts from the memoranda of General Drum which he referred to in his testimony as relating specifically to the matter that the Congressman is covering in his testimony.
I have one copy of these excerpts here and have just glanced at them. I think they are quite pertinent and I would like to hand them to you or have them put in the record.

The Vice Chairman. Well, read it at this point.

Mr. Gesell. The reference occurred at pages 2168 and 2169 of the transcript and I think one of the members of the committee or counsel, I forget which, asked General Miles to make available the material that he was referring to in the correspondence of General Drum and that is the reason that it is material to have this come to us at this time.

The Vice Chairman. All right, read it in at this point. Allow me to inquire, though, before you do that, when was General Drum in command at Hawaii?

[2293] General Miles. General Drum, as I remember, sir, took command in 1935, I should say about the middle of the year 1935 and I think he was out there 3 years.

The Vice Chairman. Three years, is that right?

General Miles. But I am not sure of that. I think 3 years.

The Vice Chairman. 1935, and that would take him to about 1938?

General Miles. And General Herron was in command before General Short.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

General Miles. Perhaps General Drum was there only 2 years.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Proceed then, Mr. Gesell and read them.

Mr. Gesell. The first is entitled: "Excerpt from memorandum from Major General H. A. Drum, Commander, Hawaiian Department, to the Adjutant General, War Department, dated September 21, 1935: Subject: Defense mission Hawaiian Dept." [Reading:]

Many assumptions are plausible as to an enemy's action against Hawaii. The variable factor relates to the location of our fleet at the time of an emergency or its success in an encounter with the enemy's main fleet. We can enumerate enemy's possible modes of action as including blockades, air raids, naval raids, landing raids, air attacks, naval attacks, landings in force, local uprisings and sabotage or any combination of these. We can assume with some certainty that local uprisings will occur on all the islands of the territory and that the first enemy hostile action will be attempted as a surprise. With our fleet present in the Pacific and undefeated, hostile external action will probably be limited to air, naval, and land raids combined with local uprisings. Hostile naval success would, no doubt, be followed by a combination of blockade and landing and air operations in force.

Pearl Harbor, with its drydock, its shops, gas and oil tanks, and ammunition storage, and our air installations on Oahu are extremely vulnerable to air attacks. One oriental power is strong enough in surface vessels and aircraft to execute successful air attacks against these objectives unless intercepted in sufficient time and with sufficient strength to defeat the attacks.

The doctrine that the only certain way to defeat an aggressive air force decisively is to destroy it on its base is sound and is applicable to the defense of [2294] Oahu. To prevent the destruction of or serious damage to our air fields on Oahu and Pearl Harbor by hostile aircraft, carriers must be sunk or driven off before they can launch their aircraft and the enemy must be prevented from establishing air bases on other islands within range.

From either an offensive or defensive viewpoint of our problem, timely information of a hostile approach is essential. The essential factor in this connection is to receive warnings of the approach of hostile air forces in sufficient time to permit our air forces to leave the ground and attack the enemy's carriers before they are within airplane operating radius of our vital installations on Oahu.

Assuming that carrier-based bombardment airplanes have an operating radius of 200 miles and that our bombardment is "in readiness" and loaded with the proper types of bombs—the highest practicable degree of readiness—first infor-

1 P. 822, supra.
mation of the carriers must be received when they are at least 300 miles from Oahu in order for our bombardment aviation to attack the carriers before they launch their aircraft. Advance notice of greater length of time is desirable. The maintenance of an aerial screen nearly 2,000 miles long requires a large number of airplanes. Economy demands the operation of some of our airplanes from the most distant islands in the Archipelago such as Kauai and Hawaii in order to reduce the time of flight to and from the 300 miles circle.

Now, the other memorandum, if the Congressman wishes me to proceed.

The Vice Chairman. Yes, I would like for you to proceed but let us have the date of the one you just read.

Mr. Gesell. That was dated September 21, 1935.

The Vice Chairman. That is a memorandum of General Drum?

Mr. Gesell. That is right.

The Vice Chairman. To the War Department?

Mr. Gesell. To the Adjutant General, War Department.

The Vice Chairman. War Department. All right, go ahead.

Mr. Gesell. Now, the next one is an excerpt from the memorandum of Maj. Gen. E. T. Conley, the Adjutant General, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated April 2, 1936.

I take it this is a memorandum going the other way, from the War Department to the Commanding General, dated April 2, 1936.

The Vice Chairman. That would be correct, wouldn't it, General?

General Miles. Yes, sir. That was the final answer of the War Department to General Drum's letter of September 1935, which the counsel has just read.

The Vice Chairman. And that was the statement from the War Department to the Army commander at Hawaii?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell. This reads:

4. "The need for suitable air fields (on the outlying islands) as an essential and vital element of the defense plans of the Hawaiian Department."

a. This point concerns our use of outlying air fields in defense, primarily against hostile sea-borne aviation. The enemy's use of such outlying fields would be dependent, as already indicated, upon our ability or inability to deny them to him, and upon his ability to repair the damage done to them by our initial demolition or subsequent air bombardments.

b. In the basic letter (Paragraph 3 b) the point is stressed that the only certain way to defeat an aggressive air force decisively is to destroy it on its bases. From this it is argued that our air forces based on Hawaii and Kauai would be of appreciable advantage in attacking hostile air forces while still on their carriers.

c. The War Department recognized that the installations at Pearl Harbor are vulnerable to air attack; that the enemy may have sufficient seawpower to make such an attack from carriers; that the only certain way to defeat such a hostile air force is to sink or drive off the carriers before they can launch their planes; and, finally, that timely information of a hostile approach would be the essential factor in this problem.

d. The question therefore arises whether our air forces based on Hawaii and Kauai could solve this problem. This appears very doubtful when viewed in the light of the latest information on possible enemy sea-borne air power.

e. Information received from the Office of Naval Intelligence is to the effect that each of the four Orange carriers is capable of a sustained maximum speed for 8 or 10-hour runs of between 25 and 28.5 knots an hour. This would mean that these carriers, during an 8-hour night, could make an approach of between 215 and 245 miles, or in a 10-hour night an approach of between 270 and 305 miles.

f. Furthermore, according to information from the Office of Naval Intelligence, the radius of action of existing Orange carrier-based bombers is 330 miles. This radius will undoubtedly be materially increased as
aviation is further developed. But it is not even safe to use the radius of existing Orange bombers in our calculations, since the enemy might conceivably expend his planes in non-return flights provided the target is of sufficient importance. On such flights they could go about 600 miles (the range equals somewhat less than twice the radius with bombing loads). Hence the fastest Orange carrier running in to launch a bombing attack against Oahu could be at least 600 miles, and might be 900 miles, from Oahu by dusk of a ten-hour night. If, upon reaching her dusk position, she were discovered by a Blue observation plane, she could be prevented from successfully launching her bombers the following dawn only—

(1) If our observation plane tracked her throughout the night, a most difficult operation involving continuous circling and about 900 miles of flight; and

(2) If our bombardment planes were so accurately directed as to catch the carrier just at dawn.

g. In order to surmount these serious difficulties and enable our bombers to catch the carrier before she enters the screen of night, we would have to discover her before she reaches her dusk position, i. e., 65 [229D] miles (or 100 miles if the enemy chose to expend his bombers) from that position (distances covered by carrier at cruising speed while our bombers were coming out 600 miles (or 900 miles)). Our observation plane would then have to track the carrier for 4 (or 6) daylight hours, in spite of whatever the carrier's pursuit planes could do. In any event, it would necessitate the carrier being discovered 605 miles (or 1,000 miles) from Oahu.

h. An observation screen even 665 miles from Oahu would require that our planes cover a perimeter of about 4,180 miles—an impossible task.

i. Lastly, it should be noted that, if the hostile carrier and her bombers approached from the northeast, with the trade wind, they would have the following advantages:

(1) The hostile sea and air speeds would be increased, whereas our air speeds would be reduced, and, in consequence, our observation screen would have to be still farther from Oahu than indicated above.

(2) The enemy would at all times be closer to Oahu than to Hawaii or to Kauai, because of the geographical configuration of the Hawaiian Archipelago.

(3) His bombers would approach Pearl Harbor from the most favorable direction, that over the Koolau Range, which is almost continually shrouded in a cloud bank.

j. The air bases on Hawaii and Kauai would be, respectively, 222 and 120 land miles from Pearl Harbor. It can be shown diagrammatically that should the hostile carriers approach Oahu from any point in a segment of 32° approximately from the northeast clockwise around to the north, these air bases would be of value, both in the maintenance of the observation screen and in the interception of the carriers by our bombers. But there would still remain a segment of 35° of possible hostile approach in which these air bases would be of no value, and a hostile approach from this segment would be materially aided by the prevailing trade wind.

k. For the above reasons it would appear that long-range bombardment based on Hawaii and Kauai, while of assistance in the defense of Oahu, would not solve the problem presented and, therefore, could not justify the great initial and continuing expenses involved in peace-time garrisons adequate to their ground defense in war.

[2301] I am sorry to interpose, but it seems that is pertinent to what you were reading.

The Vice Chairman. That is all right. Am I correct, General, in my understanding that these two documents just read into the record by counsel relate entirely to Hawaii?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. The first document read was a memorandum from General Drum, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, covering his views and ideas with respect to the defense of Hawaii, and that memorandum was sent to the Hawaiian Department; is that correct?
General Miles. Yes, sir; it was an official letter covering General Drum's ideas and desires with regard to the defense of Hawaii from an attack by Japanese planes based on carriers. That is to say, so much of the letter as has been read refers to that particular point.

The second letter the counsel read was the official reply of the War Department to the basic or original letter from General Drum in which the whole matter was thoroughly gone into from the War Department point of view. It should, of course, be noted that in early 1936 we were just beginning to build our big bombers and radar was unknown.

The Vice Chairman. The second memorandum read into the record by counsel was the War Department's views and position with respect to the points raised in General Drum's memorandum to the War Department?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And all of it related to the possibility of an air attack from carriers by Japan upon Hawaii and Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, is it correct to assume that succeeding commanders of the Hawaiian Department had the benefit of this expression and information from the War Department on this point?

General Miles. I have every reason to believe that that important letter, correspondence, was on file in the Hawaiian Department.

The Vice Chairman. And for practical purposes, that letter from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department amounted to a blueprint as to a defense to meet hostile air attack from carriers from Japan?

General Miles. It amounted to a discussion of that problem, Mr. Congressman. I cannot say it was a blueprint, because at that time we were not able to give General Drum, nor were we ever able to give the commanding general out there sufficient airplanes to cover this enormous perimeter.

It is a discussion of the problem as it existed in 1936 when, as I pointed out, radar was unknown.

The Vice Chairman. Well, the fact that radar later existed, would be an additional advantage that the commander of the Hawaiian Department might utilize in furthering that defense program, was it not?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. The fact is that everything the War Department told him in that letter or communication would still obtain, and if subsequent to that time radar or anything else that might contribute to a defense of Hawaii came into existence, why that would be that much additional that he might have to utilize for the purpose of defending Hawaii?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And of course the fact is that the actual attack on December 7, 1941, was made by Japan as an air attack from airplane carriers?

General Miles. So far as I know, sir, it was made almost exactly as we had worked it out with General Drum in 1935–36.

The Vice Chairman. The actual attack occurred almost exactly as was worked out in this communication from General Drum and
from the War Department back to the commander of the Hawaiian Department?

General Miles. So far as I know, from what has been published on the Japanese operation, the actual operation was [2304] very similar to what we had worked out with General Drum in 1935-36.

The Vice Chairman. Then, General, I understood you to state that during the time you were stationed in Hawaii—I believe as an Operations Officer—

General Miles. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. That war games were worked out and executed that involved an air attack by Japan on Hawaii at that time.

General Miles. Yes, sir. It was always assumed that no serious attack could be made on Hawaii without the use by Japan of strong air forces. It was always assumed, even in a landing attack, with no intent to bomb the fleet, it would have to be supported by very strong air forces.

The Vice Chairman. Now, General, just a few other questions. I do not want to detain you too long because I know other members of the committee want to inquire of you.

Did you, as a general officer of the Army, and as G-2 of the Army General Staff, consider the message of the Chief of Staff of November 27, 1941, to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department as sufficient warning to cause proper and necessary alerts to be put into effect?

General Miles. I did, sir, most definitely.

The Vice Chairman. And then the following day, I believe [2405] November 28, you, as G-2 of the General Staff of the Army sent a message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

General Miles. I did, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you regarded that as a sufficient warning to cause an alert to be put into effect?

General Miles. I did not regard my message to the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department as one which in itself would have caused any action by the Commanding General. If I had so regarded it, I would not have sent it. My message of November 27 was supplementary to the message sent by General Marshall, Chief of Staff, so that in any warning to my opposite number in Hawaii, the G-2, I was simply carrying out a policy, a decision which had been made by my chief, the Chief of Staff of the Army.

The Vice Chairman. Well, it would serve the purpose of further accentuating it, would it not?

General Miles. I understood so, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, isn’t it true that after a sufficient warning was given to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, such as you considered the message from the Chief of Staff of November 27, 1941, to be, he was presumed to know what to do to defend Hawaii, and those under his command?

General Miles. I assure, sir, that he had no other [2306] purpose or reason for having that command than that.

The Vice Chairman. No other reason for them being there, was there?

General Miles. That was the essential reason, from the commanding general down to every last soldier who was on that island.
The **Vice Chairman.** The commanding general of the Hawaiian Department at that time was a major general, wasn't he?

**General Miles.** He was a lieutenant general, sir.

The **Vice Chairman.** A lieutenant general.

Well, of course, then, there was not any corporal or sergeant in command there, and a lieutenant general of the United States Army would be presumed to know what to do if somebody started shooting at him, would he not?

**General Miles.** Yes, sir.

[2307] The **Vice Chairman.** Now one other question, if I may, General, with respect to these intercepted Japanese messages. I, of course, expect to wait until the officers of the Signal Corps appear to ask them more in detail about it, but I understood you to say that the Signal Corps of the Army was under the Chief of Staff, or the chief signal officer of the Army reported to the Chief of Staff.

**General Miles.** Yes, sir. The heads of all branches of the Army were directly under the Chief of Staff.

The **Vice Chairman.** And the Signal Corps did not come under G-2 or Army Intelligence?

**General Miles.** It did not come under G-2 or directly under any other branch of the General Staff.

The **Vice Chairman.** Now, did the Quartermaster Corps, the Engineer Corps, and various other similar branches of the Army also come under the Chief of Staff and not under G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, as the case might be?

**General Miles.** That is correct, sir.

The **Vice Chairman.** These intercepted messages had been received by you prior to the time about which I inquired the other day, had they not? The inquiries I addressed to you at the other session were with respect to the messages received and sent from November 24, 1941, to about December 6, 1941, but intercepted messages from Japan had been brought [2308] to your attention before that time, had they?

**General Miles.** Oh, yes, sir.

The **Vice Chairman.** Had your attention been attracted by unusual delay in the decoding and translation of those messages?

**General Miles.** No, sir. I remember that I knew and noted that the period of time between when the message was sent and when I saw it in English varied considerably with different messages, which I thought was perfectly natural, knowing something about the difficult science of cryptology, and the ability of all countries to change rapidly their ciphers although they could not change their codes very rapidly.

I thought at that time I had every reason to believe that the SIS section was doing everything possible to give us those messages as rapidly as they could, and I repeat, the amazing thing was that they could give them to us at all.

The **Vice Chairman.** I could well appreciate that point, General, but the fact is that they did intercept them and that they did decode and translate them.

**General Miles.** Decrypt, decode and translate them.

The **Vice Chairman.** And as shown by these exhibits to which attention has been invited, it took varying periods of time for that to be done.
General Miles. That is true, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, of course, the message was interpreted the day it was sent from Tokyo or from Honolulu, as the case might be, was it not?

General Miles. That was certainly true of all radio messages.

The Vice Chairman. Well, would not any message have to be interpreted at the time it was being transmitted?

General Miles. By radio; yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Yes, by radio. So that the date that it was sent was the date that time began to run so far as the decoding and translating of that message was concerned?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, one other question, I believe, if I may, General.

Has it been the custom of the Army for a long time in peacetime to allow all personnel of the Army who can be spared from essential work to take week-ends off?

General Miles. If they can be spared, if the situation is such that they can be spared it was normally the custom that, in times of peace, the officers could leave their posts by permission of their commanding officers, yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. What I was endeavoring to get at, General, has not been the practice, or the custom, for a long time when we were not at war for personnel of the Army to be given the opportunity to take week-ends off?

General Miles. Yes, sir; as long as I can remember. Of course that was under the limitation that you could not take too many of these. Somebody had to be back on the job.

The Vice Chairman. I realize that, but I just happen to recall, at times when I visited, as an illustration, Walter Reed Army Hospital, or the Navy hospital at Bethesda, to visit friends on Saturday or Sunday, I was rather impressed with the very minimum number of people who were on duty, and that all the others were taking the week end off. Was my impression correct?

General Miles. I think that is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Did that same custom prevail through all branches of the Army?

General Miles. I think you were correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. So that just the very essential and what might be termed the minimum number of people were kept on duty, and all of the others were given an opportunity to be off during the week end?

General Miles. I think that is generally correct, sir. Of course the essential number depended on what the situation was, but in the piping times of peace it was usually reasonably easy to get the permission of your commanding officer to leave on Saturday, or perhaps from Saturday to Sunday.

The Vice Chairman. Well, of course, whatever the situation may have been in Hawaii on that historic weekend of December 7, 1941, it was under the control of the commanding general in command there?

General Miles. In the final analysis it was under the control of the commanding general; yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And if personnel did have the week end off, why, it had to be at his permission, or certainly in accord with his policy?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

The Vice Chairman. I thank you.

The Chairman. Senator George.

Senator George. Mr. Chairman, I have a memorandum which I neglected to bring with me this morning. I will pass at the present time. I want to ask a very few questions later.

The Chairman. Congressman Clark.

Mr. Clark. General Miles, the term "alert" has been used frequently in the course of these hearings, the word "alert." Just what does that term fully signify in military parlance?

General Miles. "Alert" is a status of readiness. You alert a command, for instance, to be ready to receive an order to move. In the war plans for many years we had established a certain status of alert, 1, 2, 3, or A, B, C, each one being definitely directed to a certain situation, and the purpose of the alert was to see that the forces alerted were prepared to meet that situation.

Mr. Clark. Now the terms "surprise" and "surprise attack" were also frequently mentioned in this record. Would you mind stating to the committee what your understanding, in a military sense, of that term "surprise" is?

General Miles. Well, I should define a surprise attack as one whose objective was to catch the enemy unprepared, unalerted to meet that attack. There is no hidden or technical meaning that I know of in that term. It means exactly what the English words convey.

Mr. Clark. Well, there was a thought in my mind that coincides with your own, but I also considered whether or not a military attack without a previous declaration of war would be considered as a surprise attack.

General Miles. A surprise attack in the highest form of surprise, I would say.

Mr. Clark. Now in the analysis and evaluation of the military situation in the Pacific, which you have already been asked about, you stated several alternatives that would be open to Japan, including movement into Indochina, attack on Hainan, and other things, the Philippine Islands. You did not in that evaluation anywhere touch upon the question of the possibility of a surprise attack. I was wondering why you did not go into that.

[2313] General Miles. Those were lines of action which we were trying to define as possible lines of action for Japan. We did not go into the question of how she would conduct tactically any attack which she made, and surprise is one of the tactical principles. We knew, from the characteristics of the Japanese people and from sound military doctrine, that they would, if they could, utilize the tactical principle of surprise. But we were not, in those estimates, referring to any tactical principles she might employ, we were looking at it from the broader point of view of the lines of action she would be apt to take.

Mr. Clark. That was more or less the natural line of action, was it not?
General Miles. What we thought were the obvious actions. I would not say the natural actions, but the most obvious actions from all the information to the existing situation.

Mr. Clark. Now at that time there had been a message from the Ambassador to Japan to which you have referred, suggesting a surprise attack on Hawaii, and I believe the Secretary of State had something to say about the possibility of a surprise attack after the 26th of November.

I notice in the messages released by the Chief of Naval Operations, I think Admiral Ingersoll, in which he speaks of a surprise aggressive attack. Now in reading your analysis [2314] and evaluation of the military situation in the Pacific, and in the light of the action by Japan, the question arose in my mind as to why you should not deal in that analysis with the element of surprise.

General Miles. The documents to which I think you refer, Mr. Congressman, were written for the Chief of Staff and other military officials covering a great many difficult subjects. We did not think it necessary, and I still fail to see why it should be necessary, for us to constantly repeat in such documents the obvious. All soldiers have been taught the principle of surprise; it is among the principles of war. I knew in my own mind, so far as Hawaii was concerned, we constantly thought of the element of surprise being in any form of attack that the Japanese might make, that it was a possibility or probability.

I think that is the answer, sir. We did not want to constantly repeat the obvious to the gentlemen who had a great deal to read, and we were asking them to read an awful lot anyway.

Mr. Clark. I recollect your statement on your direct examination that you considered an attack on Hawaii as being inherent in the military situation.

General Miles. As the possibility or the probability of an attack on Hawaii I considered it inherent in any war with Japan we might have, no matter how that war started.

Mr. Clark. Now, from a military standpoint and aside from the fact that the Hawaiian command was taken unawares, leaving that out of consideration, was the attack of December 7 a surprise attack?

General Miles. I fail to understand the question, sir.

Mr. Clark. I am asking you, from a military standpoint strictly and in view of your statement that an attack there was inherent in the military situation, I am asking you whether in that sense the attack was a surprise attack.

General Miles. Surprise to me or to whom, sir?

Mr. Clark. Yes; to you.

General Miles. I would like to expand on that question a little bit, sir. In estimating the situation, whether verbal or on paper, there are two principles that should be followed: One is never to lose sight of or ignore anything that the enemy may do which is within its capabilities whether you think it is wise for him to do that or not.

The second is to concede to your enemy the highest form of good sense and good judgment.

Now I think we have followed both of those principles. Now if you would like to ask me whether I thought it was a surprise, we never lost sight of the fact that Japan, if engaged in war, would very probably attack Hawaii, and we took action [2316] on November
27 in warning our outposts, "This situation for which you have been billeted is facing you."

Then we also followed, I think, the same principle. We did grant the Japanese the best of good sense. We did very much question whether he would attack Hawaii, because such an attack must result from two separate decisions on the part of the Japanese, one to make war against the United States, which we though at that time in the long run would be suicidal, as has since transpired, and, two, to attack a very fortress and fleet, risking certain ships that he could not replace, and knowing that the success in that attack must rest very largely on that surprise being successful; in other words, finding that fortress and that fleet unprepared to meet the attack.

[2317] Mr. Clark. Do you mean unprepared or unalerted?

General Miles. I mean both, sir.

Mr. Clark. Well, cannot a command be prepared even if it is unalerted?

General Miles. Not if they were unalerted, sir.

Mr. Clark. I mean aside from that. You said something about there being no proper element of surprise, that surprise is based on unpreparedness, or the failure to be alerted.

General Miles. Are you speaking, sir, of the military weapons and means available or of the personnel that handle those things? No gun will go off unless the man pulls the trigger, and if the man who is supposed to pull the trigger is not prepared to pull the trigger then that gun is unprepared.

Mr. Clark. I am speaking of both, General, and asking you whether the success of that attack rested on the lack of the things you have just mentioned, the lack of alertness?

General Miles. I think, sir, it can safely be said that the success of that Japanese attack depended, in very large measure, on their catching the forces unalerted and therefore unprepared to meet that attack.

Mr. Clark. Well, it comes down then to a question of not being on the alert, does it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

[2318] Mr. Clark. I had in mind to ask you some questions about the delay in decoding and translating these messages, but in view of the counsel's statement that other witnesses will be called on that, I will waive that.

I would like to call your attention now to the message of General Marshall of November 27. I understood you to say on your direct examination that the mere fact that that message was signed by the Chief of Staff himself had a certain significance.

General Miles. Yes, sir; it had great significance.

Mr. Clark. What was it?

General Miles. The messages commonly go out on the signature of the Adjutant General. Any assistant chief of staff could have directed the Adjutant General to send a message, or an assistant chief of staff could sign it himself. Very rarely was there a message signed by General Marshall.

Mr. Clark. Let me interrupt you a moment just there. Messages were sent prior and subsequent to November 27 to the Hawaiian Command by the Chief of Staff?

General Miles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. What is the significance of this particular message being signed by the Commander in Chief himself, or the Chief of Staff himself?

General Miles. Well, the significance lies in the fact that he was Chief of Staff, that he was doing something which is not ordinarily done, and by putting his name to that message, it carried to any military mind. I think— it certainly would to mine—a much greater significance than had it been signed "Adams," or "Miles," or "Gerow," or anybody else.

Mr. Clark. And that would be well understood by the commanders, the several commanders to whom it was sent?

General Miles. I think so, sir.

Mr. Clark. Were any others of these numerous messages that we have examined signed by the Chief of Staff himself?

General Miles. I did not hear the first part of your question, sir.

Mr. Clark. I say, were there any others of these numerous messages we have examined signed by the Chief of Staff?

General Miles. I recall none, sir.

Mr. Clark. I wish to direct your attention briefly to the language of this message. It says: You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures you deem necessary. I understood you previously to say there were three methods of reconnaissance available: above the water, on the water, and under the water. Is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Now, what were the existing facilities in Hawaii at that time for reconnaissance generally?

General Miles. The Army Air Forces and radar.

Mr. Clark. Could ships have been used for that purpose?

General Miles. I presume so; yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. The reason I asked you that question. I understood you to say the other day there were three methods open: By air, by surface operation, and by submarine operation. That is what I understood you to say.

General Miles. Yes, sir. Of course, the Army controls no submarines and very few surface ships.

Mr. Clark. I was not speaking particularly of the Army, General. I mean all of the facilities at the command of the commanding general.

General Miles. You refer, Mr. Congressman, to that particular sentence in General Marshall's message to General Short?

Mr. Clark. Yes, sir.

General Miles. That is why I was answering for the Army only, sir.

Mr. Clark. This message also directed what should be done in the event of hostilities, that Rainbow No. Five should be put into operation insofar as the Japanese were concerned?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Now, there is a short sentence in this message consisting of three words "Report measures taken." That was an order from the Chief of Staff, was it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Can you direct the committee's attention to any message that complies with that order?

General Miles. The committee has, I believe, before it, General Short's reply to General Marshall's message referring to General Marshall's message by its number. I did not see that message.
Mr. Gesell. That is the one that appears at page 12, I believe, Congressman, of exhibit 32.

Mr. Clark. Yes.

Now, that message, dated November 28, from General Short, says, "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy"—the next word I am not familiar with, "REURAD"—

General Miles. "Reference your:"

Mr. Clark. "Reference your 472-27th."

[2322] That "472-27th" was, of course, General Marshall's message of that date, was it not; General Miles?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Now, you have told the committee that in the preparation of that message of General Marshall, all reference to sabotage was eliminated; is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Do you consider that message from General Short that I have just read, in any responsive to the message from General Marshall of the 27th?

General Miles. I certainly do not consider it an adequate reply, if that is what you have in mind, sir.

Mr. Clark. Does it in any way refer at all to the Marshall message except by number, or to anything in the Marshall message?

General Miles. That is true, sir; the Marshall message did not mention sabotage, nor did it mention liaison with the Navy.

Mr. Clark. Now, I am asking whether you, as a military man consider that message from General Short in any way responsive to the message from the Chief of Staff?

General Miles. No, sir.

Mr. Clark. Did you at the time catch the fact that it was not responsive?

[2322] General Miles. I didn't see the message until the following month, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Clark. Whose business was it to see this message and ascertain whether it was responsive to the message of the Chief?

General Miles. The message was sent by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division. I believe no other officers of the War Department.

Mr. Clark. Now, that is the only message, is it not, from General Short that even purports to refer to General Marshall's message of the 27th?

General Miles. So far as I know, that is correct, sir.

Mr. Clark. Well, doesn't it indicate to any military man who would examine it that the Hawaiian command had done no more than to go on an alert against sabotage?

General Miles. I would much prefer that that question be answered by one of the officers who did see the message, sir, at the time.

Mr. Clark. Well; I don't want to press you, General, but it seems to me with your long and varied experience, you are well qualified to give the committee an opinion.

General Miles. Very well, sir.

My opinion is that that message itself was a totally inadequate reply to the message it purported to reply to. [2324] Although it did not say the department was alerted against sabotage only, there
is certainly an inference that that was the fact. The next phrase about liaison with the Navy might or might not have implied that General Short was in consultation with the Navy regarding the measures which he would put into effect, and hence that a further reply might be expected from General Short, or might not.

Mr. Clark. Well, now, the Marshall message, as you have already said, contained the one sentence order to report measures taken, and on the following day this short Short message came in. What I am asking is whether or not that doesn't disclose to a military man that he had taken no measures other than anti-sabotage?

General Miles. There was that inference which might very well be drawn from General Short's reply.

Mr. Clark. What other inference would be possible from that reply?

General Miles. The further inference—the other inference was, or might have been, that a reference to liaison with the Navy meant that General Short was then in communication with the Navy regarding the measures which would be jointly put into effect and that a further reply from General Short might, therefore, be expected.

Mr. Clark. Now, this same message, from the Chief of [2325] Staff of the 27th was sent, in substance, to the West Coast Command and the Philippine Command and the Panama Command, was it not?

General Miles. It was, sir.

Mr. Clark. Now, I direct your attention to the action of the Philippine Command—it appears on page 11 of these messages, in which General MacArthur refers to the order from General Marshall, or the message from General Marshall, as to reconnaissance being extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy:

Ground security measures have been taken. Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations, every thing is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense. Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

I should like also to direct your attention to the action taken by the Western Command, a rather long message of more than a page, in which the state of alert is mentioned, and the measures that are being taken are gone into in some detail. And then the message from the Panama Command, which sent a short message on the 29th saying that a full report was being made by mail which was followed by a letter of some three pages detailing all of the measures taken by that command in response to the message from the chief of November [2326] 26th. You are familiar with all of those?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Isn't there a very marked and noticeable difference between the response from these other commands and the response from the Hawaiian Command?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Doesn't it make, in fairness now—I am trying to get my own thinking straight, General; that is all I am after. I am not meaning to cross-examine you in the ordinary sense of that term—but doesn't it make the failure of the Hawaiian Command to respond specifically at a time which you have yourself referred to as a crisis conspicuously outstanding?

General Miles. Yes, sir: it reflects the very definite degree of alertness of those four commands you mention.
Mr. Clark. Coming a little closer home, ought not somebody in the War Department to have detected and called attention to that difference?

General Miles. There again I would very much rather that question be answered by one of the gentlemen who did see that message.

Mr. Clark. But with this conspicuous difference, and what I hope I am fair in terming a wholly unsatisfactory response from the Hawaiian Command, the records in the War Department remained in that condition from the 27th of November to the 7th of December, without any further report from the Hawaiian Command; that is correct?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Clark. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. General Miles, with respect to the testimony that you just gave to the Congressman from North Carolina, did you see any of these messages that were sent by the other commands other than the Hawaiian Command?

General Miles. I saw no others.

Senator Lucas. You saw none of those messages until after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. Were any of those messages discussed with you by anyone in the Army previous to Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. I remember no discussion on those messages, sir.

Senator Lucas. So, insofar as these important messages are concerned, you knew nothing about any of them until after the Pearl Harbor attack?

General Miles. That is correct, sir. They were not a responsibility of my division, and I did not know about those messages.

[2328] Senator Lucas. Whose responsibility was it?

General Miles. The implementation of War Plans, war preparations, was the responsibility of the War Plans Division, General Staff.

Senator Lucas. Who was the head of that?

General Miles. General Gerow.

Senator Lucas. Did he ever discuss with you at any time, either before or after, these messages?

General Miles. No, sir; he did not.

Senator Lucas. General Miles, in the early part of your testimony, you related to the committee that being in charge of G-2 of the General Staff, you reported the information assembled to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall.

Will you give the committee just a little more detailed information upon that phase of your responsibility?

General Miles. Providing information to General Marshall?

Senator Lucas. That is right.

[2329] Can you elaborate just a little on what you did in the way of giving information to General Marshall, Chief of Staff. How often did you see him and what did you discuss when you gave him this information during this crisis?

General Miles. Well, sir, all of the magic, of course, was going directly to General Marshall through my own officers. I saw General Marshall from time to time when he sent for me. Largely I avoided
going to see him on my own initiative unless I had something very important because he was an extremely busy man. I had the responsibility and did prepare certain memoranda giving him information on various points and it is all now before the committee.

Senator Lucas. When you say General Marshall was an extremely busy man, would you care to elaborate just a little more on that for the record and tell the committee just what he was doing, say, a couple of weeks before this attack took place? What was his chief responsibility at that time?

General Miles. He was doing a herculean task. We were building an army. We weren't getting any too much support from the American people at that time. Looking back on it, we have had 4 years, nearly 4 years of war, when the Congress of the United States was giving us everything we asked for and the people were entirely behind us, but in those pre-Pearl Harbor days that did not exist. We were fighting [2330] to build an army of the United States. General Marshall had to appear before various committees of Congress on numerous occasions. He was doing a great deal of work himself in supervising the training, the maneuvers of the new army, the equipment of the new army, all sorts of problems were being presented to him. He was in direct communication with the higher policy-making officials of the Government: the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, of course, and the President, and the Secretary of the Navy. He was carrying an enormous burden, which later had to be very largely taken off of his shoulders by the complete reorganization of the War Department and the establishment of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff.

But at that time he was not only directing the higher policy and strategy of the United States so far as the military strategy went, but building an army, literally building an army, and administrating that army at the same time.

Senator Lucas. In that important work that General Marshall was doing at that time it was obviously necessary that he depend upon subordinates for much vital information that went into making the final decision?

General Miles. It was, sir.

Senator Lucas. G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 were the four important branches of the military government that was constantly furnishing him the information?

[2331] General Miles. Yes, sir; and he was even in more direct touch with War Plans Division.

Senator Lucas. You also stated, General, that this same information that you gathered from time to time from various sources was disseminated to others, including the overseas departments.

Now, I want to deal with the Pearl Harbor disaster as an example in your giving military estimates to the overseas departments from time to time. Let me first ask you this question: With whom were you dealing in Hawaii at the time of the disaster and some weeks before?

General Miles. All the information we were sending to Hawaii went through the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department.

Senator Lucas. And who was the officer in charge of G-2 in Hawaii?

General Miles. Colonel Fielder.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Senator Lucas. Colonel Fielder?
General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did General Short, who was commanding the Hawaiian Department, have complete control over the activities of Colonel Fielder in charge of Military Intelligence there?

General Miles. Yes, sir, Colonel Fielder occupied the same relation vis-a-vis General Short I occupied vis-a-vis [2332] General Marshall. Colonel Fielder was an Assistant Chief of Staff to General Short.

Senator Lucas. What were your instructions to Colonel Fielder with respect to disseminating information you sent to him to General Short?

General Miles. I had no responsibility and took no action in that matter, sir. That was a matter entirely within the purview of the Commanding General or the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, how they wanted to run their own staff.

Senator Lucas. In other words, after you sent information to G-2 in Hawaii that was the end of your responsibility?

General Miles. Yes, sir. It would have been absolutely and entirely out of my waters if I had attempted to lay down any rules or regulations as to how General Short's staff should be run.

Senator Lucas. I understand that, but you being interested in sending out this information to G-2 in Hawaii, from the standpoint of Intelligence, did the colonel who was in that branch of the service in Hawaii and under the direct command of General Short report to you as to the receipt of this information or give you any evaluation upon it from his point of view?

General Miles. Yes; the G-2's of the overseas departments were sending to us information which they had received or [2333] evaluations of information which we were furnishing them from time to time, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, then, am I correct in my understanding that what you sent to G-2 in Hawaii was information only?

Colonel Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Insofar as the Intelligence Branch of the Government was concerned?

General Miles. Yes, sir; evaluated information.

Senator Lucas. It was in no sense a directive and couldn't be under regulations?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. The only person who had the power to issue directives, as I understand it, to anybody in the Hawaiian Islands was General Marshall himself?

General Miles. Yes, sir; any directive that involved a tactical decision or implementation of war plans.

Senator Lucas. And if no directive was sent by General Marshall, then the evaluation of any information that you sent from the Intelligence Branch of the service in Washington to Hawaii became solely a matter for General Short and his officers in Hawaii?

General Miles. Yes, sir; for whatever use they wanted to make of it.

Senator Lucas. I think I asked you but I am not sure [2334] that I clearly understood you: Did you get reports from Colonel Fielder—was that his name?
General Miles. Fielder.
Senator Lucas. Colonel Fielder. Did you get reports from Colonel Fielder upon the information that you sent to him?

General Miles. I remember no specific instance, Senator, but I do know that it was the common custom from time to time to receive from G-2 overseas departments their "come-backs" as we used to call them on information that we were sending them.

Senator Lucas. Was there any regulation or order in the War Department which compelled Colonel Fielder to report back to you the receipt of this information and his evaluation of it in any way?

General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. In other words, whatever information you sent to G-2 in Hawaii, as far as the command there is concerned, they could completely ignore and you would have no way of knowing whether they acted intelligently on it or not?

General Miles. No, sir; that depended on the regulations or policies of the Hawaiian staff, as to how they wanted to use that information.

Senator Lucas. Well, don't you believe that it would have been wise and judicious for the Chief of Naval Intelligence [2335] here in Washington to have known whether or not they were intelligently using this information, from your viewpoint?

General Miles. The Chief of Naval Intelligence?

Senator Lucas. No, no. I am talking about the Intelligence Department in Hawaii in the command of General Short. I am merely asking you whether or not you don't believe it would have been valuable information for you to have been informed from time to time as to what they were doing with the information you were sending.

General Miles. It would have been valuable, and I think it was so understood. It was always valuable for Military Intelligence to receive what we called "come-backs" from our people in the field. But I want to make this point clear, that General Short's staff was General Short's staff.

Senator Lucas. I understand.

General Miles. And neither G-2 or War Plans Division, or anybody else in the General Staff in Washington had or should have had authority to require any of General Short's staff officers to do anything.

It it came to a situation in which G-2, we will say, in Washington, thought that G-2 in Hawaii, or Manila, was completely falling down, his only recourse was to go to the Chief of Staff and say, "Will you please inform the commanding general in this place that we are not getting the proper response from his staff and he is not being properly served by his staff."

[2336] Senator Lucas. Well, now, in addition to the intelligence officer in Hawaii on behalf of the Army, there was also an intelligence officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you know what the agreement or what the regulations were with respect to these intelligence officers in Hawaii coordinating the information that they got from Washington and agreeing upon the effect of it?

General Miles. The policy that has always been in effect, so far as I know in the Hawaiian Department, was a complete exchange of information between the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department and the
intelligence officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, or when the fleet was present, of the fleet.

Senator Lucas. Well, did your G-2 officer report to you at any time that that was being done?

General Miles. No, sir; and he was not my G-2 officer. He was General Short's G-2 officer.

Senator Lucas. Yes; that is correct, that is my error, but at the same time he is the individual to whom you were sending the information, and not General Short.

General Miles. I was sending it directly to the G-2; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, I want to ask you this, General Miles: In making up these military estimates that have been referred to by counsel from time to time in the record here, what were the factors here in making those determinations, and how did you acquire them?

General Miles. How did we acquire the information?

Senator Lucas. Yes; that is right. How did you acquire the information upon which you based these military estimates that you sent to overseas departments?

General Miles. We acquired information which eventually went into the estimate of, we will say, Japan in a great many different ways, Senator: Through our military attachés, through our observers, through the State Department and all of its ramifications, including its embassies, legations, and consulates, through contact with civilian firms and the press, through contact with the Office of Naval Intelligence, FBI, a great many different sources of information, and, as I testified, I was constantly trying to enlarge the scope of the information coming in by establishing close liaison with the other departments of the Government.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, much discussion has centered around the intercepted messages sent out by the Japanese Government. I think you have testified that those intercepted messages were also included as one of the factors in making your determination as to what military estimates you would send to the departments. Is that correct?

[2337] General Miles. The estimates actually sent to the departments were estimates on different countries, sir.

Senator Lucas. On different what?

General Miles. On different countries.

Senator Lucas. Yes, sir; that is correct.

General Miles. Based on the running digests that we maintained on that country.

Senator Lucas. Well, of course, I am confining these estimates primarily to the Japanese situation.

General Miles. Yes, sir. Magic gave us current information rather than static information as I have used the word, which formed the basis of the estimates that we sent out.

I have already gone into the fact that the information that we received from magic was not officially sent to the overseas department because of the great value of the secret that we were breaking the code.

Senator Lucas. I appreciate that but I was wondering what weight you gave, if any, to these decoded messages that were received from time to time in making up your military estimates on the Japanese situation, or did you give them any consideration at all?
General Miles. Oh, yes, sir; we gave them great consideration, as far as the estimates that we were submitting to the Chief of Staff and to the President and to the Secretary of War, and so forth.

Senator Lucas. Well, I understood you to say in answer to a question asked you by Senator Barkley—as I recall, the chairman, Senator Barkley, asked you this question:

Was there any particular difference in the relative importance given to these intercepted messages with respect to the Panama Canal, Hawaii, the Philippines, Southeast Asia or any other regions covered by these intercepted messages relative to the movement of ships?

General Miles. If I understand your question, Senator, these messages as a whole primarily indicated to us what we already knew or could very easily suspect, that the Japanese were doing everything they could to follow the movement of our warships, as I said yesterday, just as we were doing with regard to following the movement of Japanese warships.

And that was the answer that sort of led me to conclude that perhaps from your viewpoint this information was not considered so important because you say that it primarily indicated the things that you already knew.

General Miles. The intercepted magic on the movement of ships was not by the Military Intelligence Division considered of primary importance, it was primarily naval, and the messages taken as a whole indicated something that we [2339] already very strongly suspected, that they were following the movement of every one of our ships.

Senator Lucas. Well, I believe, General Miles, that I agree with you, taking these messages as a whole, that they were dealing with the arrival and departure of warships, but I want to direct your attention, as counsel did, to the message that was sent from Tokyo to Honolulu on September the 24th, 1941, and interrogate you just briefly about that message.

That message was transmitted by the Army on November the 9th, 1941, some 15 days after it was intercepted.

Mr. Mitchell. October.

Senator Lucas. On October the 9th, that is right.

Now, as I understand, this was an Army intercept and came directly to you in due course. After it was intercepted and decoded and translated it came then into your hands?

General Miles. It came to me; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, do you recall at the time of discussing this particular message with anyone when you received it?

General Miles. No, Senator, I do not recall any specific instance in which I discussed this particular message with anyone. Since this message has again been brought up I would like to point out that as we now see it, it looks very [2341] much like an indication of Japanese intent of some sort with regard to Pearl Harbor, but at that time also it meant, if you like, the interest of the Japanese as to whether or not and when the fleet was going in or out of Pearl Harbor.

Pearl Harbor is very narrow, has very restricted waters, and the position of those great ships, there, as I understand it, particularly those that are tied up to the dock, would indicate to a naval mind something of the intent of the commanding Admiral of the Fleet to take his fleet to sea within a reasonable time or not, or it might indi-
cate that the position of these ships was very much desired because of the Japanese intent to execute a submarine attack on these ships.

Senator Lucas. Well, either of these versions, had you looked at it then as you look at it now, of course, would have given you serious concern, I take it.

General Miles. Well, you cannot take a message like that singly, Senator, and say that it is very serious when you know that back of this message there have been all sorts of other messages that we had intercepted regarding Japanese interest in our ships wherever they might be.

Senator Lucas. Well, that is true, General, and I should like to direct your attention to the first message that is in this exhibit, which was received, decoded, and translated, [2342] dated December the 2d, 1940, and that message was sent from Honolulu to Tokyo and it tells about the ships that were observed in Pearl Harbor.

I don't know whether you know it or not, but from that time on, from December 2, 1940, until September the 24th, 1941, there were, as I understand from an examination of this exhibit, 17 messages sent between December 2, 1940, and September 26, 1941, from Honolulu to Tokyo and there wasn't a single message during that time that was sent from Tokyo to Honolulu.

Now, would that have any significance had you noticed that at the time in making up your military estimates on the Pearl Harbor situation?

General Miles. I do not think that that point came to my attention at that time, Senator. It was so obvious to me that Tokyo need say very little to Honolulu because Honolulu was in a position from those hills to look down on Pearl Harbor and to study the movement of every ship entering in and going out and her berth, and so forth, where she was berthed. It was obvious to us that we could not prevent the Japanese from reporting very accurately the movement of our ships in Pearl Harbor and its adjacent waters.

Senator Lucas. Well, that may be, General, but I want to take a little more time with this. I want to talk a little about this message in paragraph—well, first, it comes from Tokyo (Toyoda)—I don't know how to pronounce that, but as I understand it he was the Foreign Minister of Japan at the time the message was sent and that was during the reign of the Konoye Cabinet.

Do you know whether or not Tojo was in the Konoye Cabinet?

General Miles. In which Konoye Cabinet, sir?

Senator Lucas. Well, on October 16, 1941, when it fell; was Tojo connected with that cabinet in any way?

General Miles. I cannot tell at the moment.

Senator Lucas. Well, anyhow, he became the Premier immediately following the fall of that cabinet.

Now, in paragraph 2 of this message it says:

With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor.

Now, where did they anchor warships and aircraft carriers with respect to Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. Would you tell me what page you are reading from?

Senator?

Senator Lucas. Well, I am reading from exhibit 2 on page 12.
General Miles. Yes, I have that. Oh, yes.

[2344] Senator Lucas. It says:

With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor.

Then it says in parentheses:

these are not so important.

What does he mean by that?

General Miles. I think just what it says, sir, those anchored in Pearl Harbor and not tied up to wharves or in the docks.

Senator Lucas. Why does he say that? What would be your reaction now when he says “these are not so important”? What does he mean by that?

General Miles. Well, obviously, I suppose—it is not so obvious. I would suppose that the ships tied up at wharves and in the dock, he meant the drydock, were not prepared for immediate sortie from the harbor or at least prepared to leave the harbor as soon as those which were anchored in the fairway.

Senator Lucas. Well, I am glad to have your impression of what that means.

Then we go to the message, which proceeds to say:

If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.

[2345] Why should he want that information, in your opinion?

General Miles. I do not know, sir, of course, but I would assume that they wanted it because two or more vessels tied up at a wharf would mean that at least the inner one could not come out as quickly or as soon or did not expect to leave as soon as the outer one or the one anchored in the fairway.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, it seems to me—I do not want to press the question unduly, but it seems to me that a careful reading of this one message at the time, with a fair analysis of it, would have indicated that something pretty serious and desperate was going to happen at Pearl Harbor because, as I understand this message, it does not talk about the arrival and departure of warships. They are asking and seeking to get definite information about Pearl Harbor and the ships that are in there.

General Miles. Well, there was a great fleet in that harbor and I think it was perfectly natural that the Japanese wanted to know the condition of that fleet as to its ability to leave that harbor or its intent to leave that harbor within a reasonable time. I have forgotten how long it took the fleet to actually sortie from the harbor, but it was some considerable time.

Senator Lucas. Do the words “strictly secret” on [2346] that telegram indicate any unusual significance?

General Miles. I do not know what import that phrase had, sir. All of these, of course, were—

Senator Lucas. Well, on all the telegrams that were sent from Honolulu to Tokyo the words “strictly secret” or “secret” does not appear and I wondered if that had any significance at all in view of all of the telegrams going from Honolulu to Tokyo avoiding the use of the words. Apparently it does not, in your opinion.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, 12 o'clock having arrived the committee will suspend until 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 12 noon, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator Lucas, you may resume your questioning of General Miles.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)

Senator Lucas. General Miles, when we adjourned at noon we were discussing the message sent by the Tokyo Government to Honolulu on September 24 of 1941.

There is another question or two I desire to interrogate you upon with respect to that message.

You advised me this morning that this message was decoded and analyzed by the Army. I want to know what other members of your force in the Intelligence branch of the Government had an opportunity to examine and scrutinize that message or any others that came to your attention.

General Miles. That message, like all other messages of magic, was seen by Colonel Bratton and his small group of officers who were handling the Japanese intercepts. Aside from those few officers in the Far Eastern section of the Military Intelligence Division, no one except myself in the division saw those messages.

Senator Lucas. Did Colonel Bratton see this particular message, the message that we are now discussing?

General Miles. Did he see it?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

General Miles. I feel sure that he saw it; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you remember having any discussion with him about it?

General Miles. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Lucas. Now, I direct your attention to page 13 of exhibit 2, which is the reply message from Honolulu to Tokyo and also it seems as though they sent the same thing to Washington, D. C. Again they refer to the message as "strictly secret." Do you recall ever seeing that message in view of the fact that it was translated by the Navy?

General Miles. In all probability I saw that message. Senator, it made no difference whether the Navy translated it or the Army translated it so far as my seeing the particular message is concerned. If it was of importance I saw it.

Senator Lucas. In other words, you had a liaison between the Navy Intelligence and the Army Intelligence whereby all of these messages that were intercepted, decoded, and translated were analyzed and examined by both branches?

General Miles. It was more than that, sir. The actual translation, of course, including the decrypting and decoding was a joint activity of the Signal Corps and Naval Communications.

Senator Lucas. Thank you, sir.
Will you give to the committee those who were assigned to [2349] that joint mission of analyzing and taking care of these messages?

General Miles. The analyses of the messages were made by the Intelligence Service of the Army and Navy.

Senator Lucas. Whom did that include? What I am trying to find out is the different people in the Army and the Navy who actually saw these messages which started coming from Tokyo on September 24, 1941.

General Miles. Within the Military Intelligence Department, as I have already testified, Senator, were Colonel Bratton and one or two of his subordinates who immediately handled messages, and myself. That was all in the Military Intelligence Division. Who saw them in the SIS of the Signal Corps I am not prepared to state but you will have witnesses who can testify on that.

Senator Lucas. I am not going into that. You are not prepared to state who saw these messages or who analyzed them in Navy Intelligence, I take it?

General Miles. No, sir, I am not prepared to state that, in view of the other witnesses you will have.

Senator Lucas. On that same page of exhibit 2 there is another message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated November 15, 1944, No. 111, which reads as follows:

As relations between Japan and the United States [2350] are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

Do you understand that that message was referring to the message sent from Tokyo to Honolulu on September 24?

General Miles. I don't see any indication that it was directly—that it directly referred to the message of September 24, Senator.

Senator Lucas. All right.

This message comes from Tojo, who was at that time at the head of the Military Government in Japan, was he not?

General Miles. On the 15th of November?

Senator Lucas. That is right.

General Miles. This is "Togo". Not "Tojo".

Senator Lucas. "Togo". Who was Togo?

General Miles. I think he was Foreign Minister but I am not positive.

Senator Lucas. All right.

Now, do you recall having any discussion with any of the members of your staff with respect to that message or the message that I just previously read from Honolulu to Washington telling about the mooring of ships in the vicinity of Ford Island, the Navy dock in the Navy Yard, and other matters [2351] contained therein.

General Miles. I remember no specific instances, Senator, but I would like to point out that the message dividing Pearl Harbor into districts for espionage reports, like other messages concerning the fleet based on Pearl Harbor, were primarily within the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence to evaluate. I knew that ONI regarded them as being a part of the Japanese espionage net covering all movements of United States warships and vessels everywhere they
appeared. I am not competent to testify as to what ONI should have done or should not have done about messages directly concerning the fleet.

I can point out in the same book of messages items that might well indicate Japanese intentions to attack Panama and/or the Philippines. But what does all this come down to? We had known for many years that all three of those outposts would probably be subject to an attack in a Japanese war. That is why we had our forces on them and why the Chief of Staff warned them when he considered the time had arrived that hostile Japanese action was possible at any moment.

Senator Lucas. Will you point out to me one message that went from Tokyo to Panama that indicates that they are going to attack the Panama Canal, that is now found in exhibit 2?

General Miles. On page 34 is a message in which is exhibited Japanese interests in maps and charts of the Panama Canal Zone.

Senator Lucas. Page 34 of exhibit 2?

General Miles. Of this exhibit which we have before us.

Senator Lucas. My exhibit reads “From Buenos Aires to Panama; Buenos Aires to Tokyo.” Is that the one?

General Miles. From Buenos Aires to Panama.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

General Miles. It was regarding a series of maps and charts which we were very much interested in getting ahold of. It was being passed around among the Japanese agencies.

Senator Lucas. Of course, I am talking about messages that came from Tokyo to Panama; not from Panama to Tokyo. And that is because of the importance I attach to the first message that came from Tokyo to Hawaii on September 24, 1941.

General Miles. I do not find, Senator, any specific message from Tokyo to Panama in this respect, but the messages from Panama to Tokyo were along intelligence lines which might very well have indicated the interest of Japan in formulating plans for an attack on the Panama Canal.

[2353] Senator Lucas. Well, as the head of G-2, did it make any difference from the standpoint of the importance of a message whether it came from the consul in Hawaii to Tokyo or the consul in Panama to Tokyo, or whether the message came from the War Minister in Tokyo to Panama or from the War Minister in Tokyo to Hawaii?

General Miles. I think, sir, that it was more the substance of the message which was important rather than the sender. A message from Tokyo to one of the Japanese spy agencies, if we may call them such, if it indicated the line of intelligence they wanted followed was, of course, of great significance but also the messages going the other way indicating what line of intelligence was being sent and apparently received with approval by Tokyo was also significant.

Senator Lucas. I agree with you that both messages were significant but what I am trying to ascertain is what the intelligence branch of the military service considered more significant, whether a message coming from the War Minister of Japan to the consul or one from foreign countries to Japan or whether it makes any difference or not?
General Miles. I cannot say that it made any difference per se who sent that message. It was the substance of the message more than the sender.

[2354] Senator Lucas. In other words, then, your conclusion is that a message going from Honolulu to Tokyo, sent by some spy or the Jap consul, or somebody interested in the Japanese Government, took on no more significance from the standpoint of military intelligence than a message coming direct from the Foreign Minister of Japan to Hawaii or Panama or some other point?

General Miles. No, sir. Both indicated an interest of the Japanese in the particular line of intelligence which the message contained or directed.

Senator Lucas. Well, as I looked over these records, General Miles, I found that from August 2, 1941, to November 22, 1941, there were 24 messages going from Panama to Tokyo and there was only 1 message coming from Tokyo to Panama, and that was on August 2, 1941, which is the first message translated in exhibit 2; and as I examined these messages I hoped that I might even get the answer from you as to the real significance of messages going from foreign governments to the home government, or whether there was any significance, any different significance in the messages coming from the home government to the foreign government where consuls or their agents were located, and I hope that I am not wrong in my assumption that you say that there is very little difference.

[2355] General Miles. There is very little difference per se in the sender of the message. The substance of the message in both cases told us or indicated to us what the Japanese were interested in finding out about that particular place.

Senator Lucas. And that is your conclusion notwithstanding the fact that every indication from September on was to the effect strained relations with Japan were getting worse and worse all the time?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, I direct your attention to another one of these messages found on page 15 of exhibit 2, and it is dated November 20, 1941, "Strictly secret." It says:

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

Then the last one from Tokyo to Honolulu, November 29, 1941, and which does not have the secrecy attached to it. It seems to me there is a reason for it because they ask for no particular information other than this:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements that being transmitted by the Navy.

Now, with respect to the Philippines you stated that [2356] there were messages that you could pick out from the Philippines that were comparable to the one which I read, discussing and analyzing the blueprint for the bombing of Pearl Harbor. I would like to have you find that for me if you could.

General Miles. You wish one, sir, from Tokyo to Manila?

Senator Lucas. That is right, Tokyo to Manila.
General Miles. On page 71 from Tokyo to Manila, October 4, 1941, from Tokyo (Toyoda); I believe he was a member of the cabinet at the time. [Reading:]

I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west, and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest.

That was the first one I find; there may be others.

Senator Lucas. And you think that message is just as significant as the one that was sent to Hawaii or Honolulu on September the 24?

General Miles. I cannot say that it has exactly the same significance, no, Senator. What I am saying is that there are messages in here like the one I have just read, indicating strong Japanese interest in obtaining information which might help them in an attack on the Philippines as well [2357] as on the fleet. The fleet, of course, was primarily a matter of responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence and I hesitate very much to give an estimate or an evaluation of a purely naval message.

Senator Lucas. Well, you want the committee to understand that it is the responsibility, then, of the Naval Intelligence Service to evaluate these messages which went directly to Hawaii and the Philippines involving what seems to us now from what we know as a possible attack upon either Pearl Harbor or the Philippines?

General Miles. Those messages which had to do primarily with the United States Fleet then based in Pearl Harbor or near Pearl Harbor, yes, sir, that was primarily the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence to put a naval evaluation on those messages.

To continue further, if you like, with messages from Tokyo to Manila, there is another one on page 82 in which it is stated [reading]:

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same:
These items in regard to each port of call:
(1) Conditions at airports on land.
(2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.
[2358] (3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces.
(4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

Senator Lucas. Was that a factor in the consideration of the evaluations that you made for Military Intelligence in connection with the overseas possessions?

General Miles. I did not quite understand you, sir.

Senator Lucas. You just now read the message from Tokyo to Manila dated November 5, 1941. When you transmitted this military intelligence to overseas possessions did you take that into consideration?

General Miles. When we were estimating on the possibility or probability of Japanese lines of advantage we did take this message and other messages into consideration. We did not transmit any magic to the overseas departments.

Senator Lucas. No; I understand you did not transmit any magic to overseas possessions. What I am asking you is whether or not when you were notifying the overseas possessions of the possibility
of an attack on the Philippines by the Japs you took into consideration this particular message?

General Miles. Yes, sir. The Chief of Staff undoubtedly took all of these magic messages into consideration as I certainly did on the 27th of November when the Chief of Staff [2359] decided that the time had arrived to warn the overseas departments.

Senator Lucas. General, that brings me to this conclusion: It is difficult for me to understand how you took this into consideration with respect to an attack on the Philippines and did not take into consideration the message of September the 24th and the following messages into real serious consideration with respect to the attack upon Pearl Harbor, because to me the messages with respect to Pearl Harbor were more clear in what they were attempting to do than the latter. That is my opinion and my own conclusion.

General Miles. Well, Senator, exactly the same warning message was sent by the Chief of Staff on November the 27th to all three of the overseas departments and the West coast. They all had the same warning and the warning was based on the fact that we had believed for many years that they would be all subject to attack in the event of a Japanese-American war. That was why they were there and the only reason in the case of Hawaii, at least, why they were there.

Senator Lucas. I want to direct your attention to the testimony that you gave Friday on page 2244—no; I will strike that because I went over that this morning. That was the question that Senator Barkley asked you and which you answered and I think I have included that in the previous testimony.

But on the following page, 2245, Senator Barkley asked this question:

And the Hawaiian Islands. Somebody in each of these regions was reporting to Tokyo, or somebody who reported to Tokyo the movement of these ships over the various periods running from 1910, some period in 1940 up to and approaching the 7th of December 1941 and the question I would like to ask is whether the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department treated all of these intercepts, so far as you know, in the same way and with the same degree of importance, or whether they singled out this information from either the Panama Canal or from Hawaii or the Philippines or Southeast Asia for any special treatment in regard to precautionary measures which might be taken in any of these different regions?

And your answer is:

Well, they were primarily messages which concerned the Navy Intelligence rather than the Military. Obviously, Senator, we were more interested in the fact that the Japanese were following our ships in our own waters, Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, then we were the Dutch East Indies, or any other places headed here "miscellaneous."

[2367] And, as I understand it, your answer there, like the previous answers to my questions on all of these matters, was that it was your understanding that these messages primarily concerned the Naval Intelligence rather than the Military Intelligence for a correct analysis of what might or might not happen as a result of the information you were getting.

General Miles. Senator, the Chairman's question concerned the movement of ships and my answer is yes, sir; for all these messages concerning the movement of ships and particularly those which concerned directly the United States Fleet based in Pearl Harbor it was
primarily the responsibility of Naval Intelligence to analyze and evaluate such messages.

Senator Lucas. Well, of course, there you just talk about the movement of ships; but we have been talking all the way along about all of these intercepted messages regardless of whether or not they had anything to do with the movement of ships.

Your next statement below there on that same page [reading]:

Taking the messages as a whole, I do not think they indicated any particular place in which you could say the Japanese will attack there, or the most probable, that they will attack there, solely based on those [2362] messages.

Of course, that includes all of the messages that you received, I assume, upon which you based that statement.

General Miles. The latter reply does, sir, but the first reply at the top of that page was a direct reply to the Chairman's question concerning the movement of ships. [Reading:]

Somebody in each of these regions was reporting to Tokyo, or somebody who reported to Tokyo the movement of these ships over the various periods running from 1940, some period in 1940 to and approaching the 7th of December 1941 and the question I would like to ask—

all in one sentence—

is whether the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department treated all of these intercepts, so far as you know, in the same way.

That clearly referred to the intercepts on the movement of ships. I am very sorry if I misunderstood the Chairman in making my answer.

Senator Lucas. I may have misunderstood the question and answer and the General has explained.

Let me direct your attention now to page 2220 of the record where Mr. Gesell asked you this question—he was discussing there the question of the burning of the codes. [2363] There was a message sent out by Admiral Stark which states as follows—this was sent out on December the 6th, I think it is.

Mr. Gesell. December 3.

Senator Lucas. December 3?

General Miles. December 3.

Senator Lucas. (Reading):

Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

Mr. Gesell, continuing, says:

My question, General Miles, is whether you knew at the time that the Navy was transmitting messages to their representatives in Hawaii advising Hawaii of the intercepted Japanese messages indicating code destruction?

General Miles. I did, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted in connection with that?

General Miles. I believe that I was. I knew that—

General Miles, Senator, would you tell me the page again?

Senator Lucas. I am sorry. It is 2220.

General Miles. 2220, all right.

[2364] Senator Lucas. Beginning down past the middle of the page.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas (reading):
General Miles. I believe that I was. I know that I knew that those messages were going out.

Mr. Gesell. Did you know that a message had been received from Hawaii stating that they had knowledge there that the local consul was destroying his code?

General Miles. I believe that I did, sir.

Mr. Gesell. The Army did not send any messages to General Short in respect of code destruction, did it?

General Miles. No, sir.

Mr. Gesell. What is the explanation of that?

General Miles. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point, that their code was much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.

Do you know, General Miles, whether or not that message [2365] was transmitted from the naval authorities to the Army authorities?

General Miles. I know now, sir and have testified to it, bringing in the affidavit of the officer in the G-2 office in Hawaii who saw those messages regarding the burning of the code.

Senator Lucas. And it was transmitted then from the Navy to the Army?

General Miles. It was transmitted; they were transmitted.

Senator Lucas. According to that affidavit.

General Miles. According to that affidavit; yes.

Senator Lucas. You received no report on it at the time from anyone in Hawaii?

General Miles. I did not receive any report at the time.

Senator Lucas. Was there any arrangement or any agreement between the Navy and the Army at that time which would definitely fix that question as to when a message so important as this was transmitted by the Navy that it would be ultimately transmitted on to the Army?

General Miles. Yes, sir; there was a long-standing agreement or policy of complete interchange of information between the Army and Navy (both in Hawaii and other places [2366]) where we operated together.

I have testified, Senator, that not only was that so, but I knew the strong desire of the Chief of Staff for his subordinates of all ranks to keep in close contact with the Navy wherever we were operating together and I had received a letter from the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department stating specifically that his liaison with the Navy as well as with FBI was complete.

[2367] Senator Lucas. Of course I am only taking your statement, which was made in answer to an inquiry of Mr. Gesell, that you had every reason to believe that the message would be promptly transmitted.

It occurred to me to ask why, when war was hanging in the balance, you relied upon the assumption at that particular time that an important message of this kind was to be transmitted by the Navy rather than the Army.

General Miles. Well, sir, the question of relying on an assumption, based, as I say, on their good knowledge of what had been laid down as a policy, and the letter from the responsible G-2 say-
ing he had complete liaison, as against the risk of this secret of using the two codes, we were not ready to risk the secret if we could possibly avoid it.

Senator Lucas. Of course you did use two codes to Hawaii.

General Miles. Never in sending the same message.

Senator Lucas. What I am trying to determine in my own mind through these questions, General Miles, is as to the importance that you attached to obtaining a reply from General Short in connection with the burning of the codes, and what you did to follow it up, or whether you just trusted that the Navy would use its communication system, would it do it for you?

General Miles. We trusted the Navy and the Army. Liaison [2368] is a two-way proposition, Senator.

Senator Lucas. Yes; but the one-way proposition now is with the Navy, because that is the code which you fellows believed was the most secret.

General Miles. But it was equally the responsibility of the Army G-2 in Hawaii to see that we maintain a close liaison, that we should get such important information as the Navy collected, as it was the Navy’s responsibility to give it to the Army.

Furthermore, let me say Hawaii had already been warned many days previous of the impending war by the Chief of Staff, and the burning of the codes was simply a strengthening of the information which the Chief of Staff, over his own signature, had given to Hawaii, that there might be a Japanese attack at any time.

Senator Lucas. I certainly agree with you that the burning of the code would seem to any ordinary reasonably prudent man, whether he was in Washington or whether he was in Hawaii, as being about the last act before the happening of serious difficulties between the two nations.

I am not trying to defend anyone and I am not trying to offend anyone here. I am trying to ascertain what the facts really were with respect to knowledge and the importance attached to the burning of the code, and what you did with [2369] respect to it, or what the Navy did. That is my chief point, General Miles.

I wanted to direct your attention again to this page 2221 where Mr. Gesell asked you another question:

Did you give any instructions or directions to the Navy that action should be taken to see that these messages were made available to the Army authorities at Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. Any instructions to the Navy?

Mr. Gesell. To the Navy here that they should so transmit the messages that the Army would be certain to receive them.

General Miles. No, sir, that was not considered necessary.

I think you have already probably answered that question with the answer to my previous question that you did not consider it necessary.

Now that brings me to this question that I want to ask you. It may not be quite within the realm of this investigation, but in view of the fact that here was an important message that was to be sent by the Military Intelligence of the Army in Washington to the Military Intelligence of the Army in Hawaii, you depended primarily and solely upon another branch of the service to transmit that information for you at a critical [2370] period here in the history of our country. I am wondering whether or not you would care to make any state-

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ment as to what you think about having both of those branches, the Army and Navy Intelligence, under one command and one service, so that there could not be any question about you wondering whether or not the Navy, or assuming the Navy was going to transfer an important message of this kind?

General Miles. Senator, I believe thoroughly, and have believed for many years, in the unification of the services. I think that is one point that you have just brought out as an argument for unification.

Senator Lucas. Of course I do not know what the Navy would say about that, but I wanted to get your opinion upon it.

Now there is one other question. General Miles, do you know General Grunert, General Russell, and General Frank, who made the investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster in behalf of the Army?

General Miles. I do, sir.

Senator Lucas. They make this statement in their report concerning the Military Intelligence Division:

The advantages accruing from this situation could have been calamitous. The Japanese Armed Forces knew everything about us. We knew little about them. This [2371] was a problem of all-out intelligence agencies. This should not come to pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with the part which we are to play in world affairs.

Do you agree with that statement?

General Miles. I do not, sir. I think the documents before this committee show clearly we knew a great deal about the Japanese Military Forces. We certainly knew a great deal about the Japanese Army, the Japanese Air Forces, and the Navy knew a great deal about the Japanese Naval Forces.

Senator Lucas. I only have before me the report. I never examined the testimony that was taken before the committee.

Do you know what they based that conclusion upon?

General Miles. I do not, sir. They did not ask me any questions which would have, to my mind, substantiated such a statement.

Senator Lucas. Are these gentlemen who were selected to make this investigation retired officers or are they still active?

General Miles. They were all active at the time. General Grunert is now retired. I do not know whether General Russell and General Frank have been retired or not.

Senator Lucas. They further said:

We must know as much about other major world [2372] powers as they know about us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligence planning by those charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our security. Our Intelligence Service should be second to none in its efficiency. It must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M. I. D. It is a national problem.

In the past our Intelligence Service has suffered from lack of funds, lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to correct all of these.

[2373] Now, in view of the fact that they were talking about you primarily as head of the Military Intelligence at that time at the time of this disaster, I wonder if you would care to elaborate upon any statement that they made, or to discuss it?

General Miles. To the extent that the Japanese knew more about us than we knew about them, that is true, sir. The Army and Navy had no money for espionage service. I do not think that the Congress
of the United States, I do not think that the people of the United States would have been willing to appropriate the money through years and years which would have been necessary to build up an espionage service against the Japanese comparable to what we suspected and knew, and now know they had against us.

We have simply never gone into that. I think that to that extent the observations of the Grunert board are correct.

Senator Lucas. Well, it is true that all major powers of the world, except this country, have had for a long time past permanent world-wide intelligence services, have they not?

General Miles. And we had permanent world-wide intelligence services, but greatly limited in personnel and expenditure, and we kept above board also. We were not spying.

Senator Lucas. Did we have any foreign secret intelligence [2374] service prior to the war?

General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you believe, from what you know as an expert in military intelligence, that we should know, or that we should have that type and kind of service throughout the world, as other nations do?

General Miles. It depends on what you want, Senator.

Senator Lucas. I want to protect my America.

General Miles. So do I, sir.

Senator Lucas. National defense is all I am interested in in this country. I am asking that question for information of a man who is an expert upon this question.

General Miles. My answer then is decidedly "Yes." I consider a secret service, such as we eventually evolved in this war after we got into it, is a necessity for national defense at all times.

Senator Lucas. Do you believe that if such a system was provided for by the Congress of the United States, it should be linked with the military and naval intelligence, or should it be set out as an independent agency of its own?

General Miles. It must be linked with military and naval intelligence, sir, for the simple reason that only the military and naval intelligence can tell the agents of the people as to what type of information is really-desired.

[2375] The Chairman. The Chair desires to announce that the bell you heard is undoubtedly a roll-call vote on the Donnell amendment to the pending bill of the United Nations Organization.

While the Members of the Senate have been excused by the Senate from attending the proceedings of the Senate while these hearings are on, if any Senator wishes to vote on that, he is at liberty to do so. The Chair thinks he ought to know what it is about before he can exercise his own judgment.

Senator Lucas. Can the Chair tell me whether it is going to be a close vote or not?

The Chairman. The Chair cannot. The Chair can only hope it will not be a close vote.

Senator Lucas. Will the reporter read what General Miles said in his last answer?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Senator Lucas. You believe that would be true whether we were in peace or in war?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. One other question.

Something has been said, General Miles, about the men on watch in Hawaii on the evening of the 5th, 6th, and 7th. [2376] I think it would be well to state just how your men operated at that particular time with respect to hours; that is, in Washington, D. C.

General Miles. On the night of the 6th?
Senator Lucas. I was thinking of the 5th, 6th, and 7th, just previous to this attack, or anytime within a few days previous to Pearl Harbor.

The Vice Chairman. The 7th is when it happened.
Senator Lucas. Yes, the 7th.

General Miles. The officers of the Far Eastern Section concerned with magic were on duty in the War Department all the afternoon and evening of the 6th. There was also on duty an officer of the division itself. I was there, of course, during the 6th. I do not know exactly when I left on the afternoon of the 6th. I do know I returned early on the morning of the 7th.

Do you wish me to go into a little more detail?

Senator Lucas. I was trying to ascertain the number of men that you had on duty at that particular time, and what the hours were. Did they have a 24-hour watch at that particular time?

General Miles. I cannot answer that question without referring to the records, Senator, with any accuracy.

Senator Lucas. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

[2377] The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire.

Mr. Murphy. General, I notice on page 2216 of the record, that you make the statement, at the bottom of the page, speaking about whether or not any messages had been sent subsequent to November 28, you stated that General Marshall had sent a warning, and then you say, "Anything else was considered to be redundant."

Do you want to stand on that statement?

General Miles. What page?

Mr. Murphy. 2216.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Do you consider messages about the codes being burned by the Navy to be redundant?

General Miles. Redundant to the warning, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. By "redundant" you mean unnecessary, don’t you? Isn’t that what redundant would mean?

General Miles. Desirable, but unnecessary, I would say, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Well, it is redundant then, to tell them that the codes are being burned throughout the world?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You feel then, it was a waste of time to do it, do you? [2378] General Miles. No, sir, I agree entirely with this message.

Mr. Murphy. If it were up to you in your department, those messages would not have been sent to Hawaii, is that right?

General Miles. No, sir, that is not right.

Mr. Murphy. If you felt it was redundant, would you do it?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Why did not you do it?
General Miles. Because it was desirable to send those particular messages through naval channels. The command had been warned by the Chief of Staff and we had every reason to believe they were on their toes. We, however, did send, were glad to send, through naval channels a message still further strengthening the information which the Chief of Staff had already given the Hawaiian Command.

Mr. Murphy. You feel that the message of December 2, the two messages of December 3, the message of December 4, three messages, the message of December 6, two messages, were all redundant, do you?

General Miles. Which messages are those, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. Murphy. You said everything after the 28th was redundant up to the 7th. I am now speaking of exhibit 37, [2379] page 39, December 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Your answer is, as I understand it, they are all redundant.

Mr. Gesell. General, we have just handed you a set of those.

General Miles. Mr. Congressman, I think it only fair to look at my answer on page 2216 and the use of the word "redundant."

Mr. Murphy. Let me read it for you, if you will, please. I am quoting now from the record, at the bottom of the page:

But these things were known in Hawaii. That fortress, like a sentinel on post, had been warned of the danger which was its sole reason for being. Anything else was considered to be redundant.

Now, the interpretation I gather from that is you feel that these messages from the 28th to the 7th were redundant.

General Miles. Redundant in the sense of warning that command, yes, sir. That is what I am speaking about, the warning of the danger.

Mr. Murphy. You realize that the Navy sent them. I take it if they were here now in your office they would not have been sent.

General Miles. No, sir; that is not true.

Mr. Murphy. Then why did not you send them?

General Miles. You do not have to tell a commanding [2380] general but once that a danger faces him. You may, however, see fit to give him further information as to the situation he faces.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, your office did not send any of them, did it?

General Miles. My office did not send any of them for reasons I have given.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you also say it was inherent in the situation that there would be the possibility, probability and likelihood of an attack on Hawaii. Was it inherent in the situation that war would be commenced that way?

General Miles. Not necessarily.

Mr. Murphy. I understood you to say that the reason why you did not put in your message of December 5, and other messages, something about a possible surprise attack on Hawaii, was the fact you did not want to, in effect, explain the obvious.

General Miles. Did not want to what, sir?

Mr. Murphy. Explain the obvious.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Was not that the purport of your testimony as to why you did not include that in the note of December 5?

General Miles. The note of December 5?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, or the report of December 5. I will give it to you.

Mr. Gesell. Exhibit 33.

General Miles. Memorandum of December 5 to the Chief of Staff? Is that the one you refer to, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. Do you have that?

General Miles. I have the memorandum.

Mr. Murphy. On the 5th you spoke of all the likelihoods, you spoke about the possibility of an attack on Russia to the north, you spoke about an attack possibly on Indochina; you spoke about the possibilities to the south, and you spoke about the possibilities to the Philippines, but you did not say anything about Pearl Harbor.

I understand you, on many occasions throughout the record, say it was inherent in the situation about an unexpected attack there, and I am wondering why it would not also be inherent in the situation to expect an attack on the Philippines at the very time you gave the report, that you would include the Philippines in one or two paragraphs, but you never mentioned Hawaii?

General Miles. Mr. Congressman, in the document to which we refer, we were trying to evaluate the lines of action which the Japanese might take at that particular time, or in the period which we were trying to cover. Now, one of those lines of action which we thought very probable was a southern expansion, which might involve the Philippines and that was why the Philippines was mentioned, but since it was inherent in the situation if we went to war with Japan that Hawaii and Panama particularly might very well be attacked, because of the great advantage which Japan might accrue from a successful attack on those places, it was not necessary to repeat in that particular paper this obvious fact, known to military men.

The sole reason for the garrison on Hawaii was the defense of a naval base in a Japanese war.

Mr. Murphy. What was the reason for the garrison at Manila, if it was not for the same purpose?

General Miles. Primarily for the same purpose.

Mr. Murphy. Then why make a distinction in one and not in the other?

General Miles. We did not make a distinction as to the probability of Japanese attack, sir. We simply said one of the lines of advance might involve the Philippines.

Mr. Murphy. The thing that disturbs me, General, is that throughout your testimony I certainly get the inference that you were probably the only person in Washington who expected the attack at Pearl Harbor, simply from your testimony, because each time you go back to say how obvious it was, and how inherent it was in the situation, and yet I have read these reports of yours through from cover to cover and I have not seen it mentioned once. Apparently people at Hawaii did not think it was so obvious because they were taken by surprise, and apparently the others in Washington did not think it was so obvious because they were taken by surprise.

I am wondering if it is a fair inference to take from your testimony that you thought there was at least a great likelihood that there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor, and that, by the way, com-
menced the war? I think that is a fair inference from what you have been saying throughout this hearing.

General Miles. I am very glad to answer that question if that is your inference, Mr. Congressman. It comes down to what I have already testified on these two principles which follow in making an estimate. I did not ignore any action of the Japanese which was within their capability. I knew they were capable of making an attack on Hawaii just as I knew they were capable of making an attack on the Philippines or Panama.

I did not believe, up to a very late date, that it was probable that they would make that attack at the outbreak of war, for the reason that I have already stated, that such an attack as was actually made had to result from two separate decisions of the Japanese: one to take on a war with a great naval power, and presumably with the two great naval powers, a very risky proposition in the long run as has transpired; and second, to start that war, or to at least make this attack on a great fortress and fleet, which inherently jeopardized the Japanese ships making the attack to some extent, and which rested almost solely for success on the unpredictable circumstance that they would find that fortress and that fleet unprepared to meet that attack.

The Grunert board make a statement that before Pearl Harbor everybody in Washington expected the attack on Pearl Harbor, and afterward everybody was surprised except the Secretary of War.

Mr. Murphy. I think, judging from your testimony, that there was at least a likelihood of an attack. That is what troubles me.

General Miles. That is the difference between what you know is possible for the enemy to do, and what you are rather surprised at what he is doing, because you have given him credit for the best good common sense. I think "surprise" even in that sense is too strong a word. You did not think it probable that he would make that particular attack.

Mr. Murphy. General, I notice on your report of December 5, section 28 of exhibit No. 33, on the second page of that report, the following—and this is as of December 5, 1941—

The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important theatres of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces, subject to certain physical limitations, consonant with their chosen long-range strategy for the defeat of the Nazis.

Do you think that was an accurate statement on December 5, 1941?

General Miles. That is at page 2?

Mr. Murphy. That is on the second page, under tab 28.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. The last paragraph on the bottom of the page.

I assume you include in there the United States, and you make the statement that the anti-Nazi nations would have 4 months in which to strengthen their position, and that was 2 days before Pearl Harbor.

General Miles. I was not referring to the United States, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You were leaving the United States out when you spoke of the anti-Axis powers?

General Miles. Yes, sir. The anti-Axis powers were those powers then in war against the Axis powers.

Mr. Murphy. You did include Japan then under the theory that she was one of them under the Tripartite Alliance?
General Miles. She was an Axis power.
Mr. Murphy. And we were not an anti-Axis power at that time?
General Miles. We were not anti-Axis; we were neutral at that time.
Mr. Murphy. In view of what we were doing in the Atlantic to aid in the defeat of Germany, we were not at war, but would you not call us an anti-Axis power at that time?
General Miles. My use of the term "anti-Axis" in this paper referred to those nations actually at war with the Axis powers.
Mr. Murphy. All right.
Now, then, I ask you to turn over to the page at which you mention the Far Eastern theater under your subheading 6. Have you got the page?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. You state there, on December 5:
The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand.
Now, were you speaking only in the event she went south, or were you speaking of the next move when you said that?
General Miles. I did not quite understand that.
Mr. Murphy. Will the reporter read that?
(The question was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Murphy. Let me make it clearer. Under the subheading 6, you said:
Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of her military over-extension. She has the following lines of action open to her:
And then you list a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, and i, and then you say:
The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand.
Was that the action you expected Japan to take on December 5, 1941?
General Miles. That was the line of action we expected her to take as the most probable.
Mr. Murphy. You certainly were not looking forward to an attack on Hawaii as the most probable thing they were going to do at that date, were you?
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you state that the fleet was primarily a problem for naval intelligence while it was in the port at Pearl Harbor, and there has been time and time again through the reports I have read something to the effect that while the fleet was in port, its protection was the responsibility normally of the Army.
Would that change your answer? At sea the fleet takes care of itself, but while in port the fleet is supposed to be protected by the Army; is that true?
General Miles. Yes; that is true. My reply, however, is that the evaluation of those messages that primarily concerned the fleet was the primary responsibility of the ONI.
Mr. Murphy. It normally would be, General, but if there were going to be a bombing of Pearl Harbor, it was the prime responsibility of the Army to protect the fleet while it was in the harbor. That would be shifting quite a good bit of the responsibility on your shoulders, would it not, in the evaluation of the report?
General Miles. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I notice at page 2189, General, at the bottom of the page:

Military intelligence was specifically concerned, and this is General Miles speaking—particularly concerned, and practically solely concerned so far as the General Staff went, with antisubversive precautions and operations.

Is not that a very strong statement, in view of the fact that you were also obliged to give reports from time to time as to the situation of the armies throughout the world as viewed in the eyes of the Army, and what the enemy was doing?

General Miles. I see now, Mr. Congressman, that is an ambiguous answer. What I meant to say was that so far as the General Staff was concerned, we were the division primarily, particularly and almost solely charged with looking into antisubversive activities.

Mr. Murphy. That was one of your functions, but certainly not the sole purpose.

General Miles. No, sir; not in the least one of my main functions.

Mr. Murphy. You were one of the General Staff who was to look after antisubversive activities?

General Miles. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. You would not let your answer stand that "military intelligence was specifically concerned, particularly concerned, and practically solely concerned so far as the General Staff went with antisubversive precautions and operations"?

You mean by that that you on the General Staff, that that was one branch to take care of that, but not to the exclusion of your other duties?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I notice on page 2197, as well as in many other places throughout the record, that you did not see General Short's reply until the early part of January 1942, and I am wondering why or how it could happen that there was a message sent out on the 27th of November which would seem to indicate that war was coming, and your responsibility in G-2 was to find it out, and I cannot understand how it could be that your department would not know of the reply from the war theater, from November 27 to January 1942, when the very purpose that you were created for was to be advised and to be advising on what had taken place throughout the world, as well as in our own army.

General Miles. No, sir. Military Intelligence had no responsibility as to the measures taken.

Mr. Murphy. I did not mean that. But you were to advise. You were advising all of these people on this list about what was happening in Russia, what was happening in Germany, in the Middle East, and why you would not also want to advise what was happening in our own theaters?

General Miles. Mr. Congressman, please note that General Marshall's message of November 27 directed General Short, General MacArthur, and the other generals to report measures taken, I believe, is the phrase used. The answer then was presumably just that report of measures taken by one of the major divisions of the
United States Army, and on that subject Military Intelligence had no responsibility.

Mr. Murphy. It take it that it was part of Military Intelligence Division's responsibility to follow the movements of the Germans and Russians, and to follow the movements of the British Army and to follow the movements of the Dutch armies, but not to follow the movements of the United States armies.

General Miles. It was no responsibility of Military Intelligence to follow the movements of the United States armies. Generally, I knew, as did all officers of the Army, particularly those stationed in Washington, or the main movements, the maneuvers of the United States armies as a matter of interest, but it was no responsibility of Military Intelligence Division to follow those movements or any measures taken as the result of the warning message of General Marshall.

Mr. Murphy. I am talking about generally throughout the war. Did not Military Intelligence throughout the war follow [2392] the progress of the American armies and did not they have to write reports on what progress we were making, how the enemy was disposed, and how the American Army was disposed; would not that be the function of Military Intelligence?

General Miles. No, sir: that is the function of operations.

Mr. Murphy. The Military Intelligence did not stop working when the war started, did it?

General Miles. They did not what?

Mr. Murphy. They did not stop working when the war started?

General Miles. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. They followed only the enemy movements rather than following our own forces; is that right?

General Miles. I did not get that.

Mr. Murphy. They went only to the enemy instead of following our own forces in their movements?

General Miles. Yes, sir. Military Intelligence is charged with informing Operations and the Command as to what they think the enemy is doing or what they think the enemy is about to do, and not to follow our own forces.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you did not see the Short telegram, or know of its existence until January of 1942, [2393] or some 6 or 7 weeks after November 27, 1941?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I notice in all of these reports you have made, exhibit 33, that you have signed your name as the acting head of G-2. Were you not the actual head, or were you just acting temporarily?

General Miles. I was the actual head, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Why did you sign it "Acting"? Did Marshall sign his name as the acting Chief of Staff?

General Miles. No, sir. That "acting" was due to the fact that my previous service with troops in the 6 years preceding my detail as G-2 had not been sufficient to enable the Chief of Staff to make me a member of the General Staff, so he made me the acting Chief of Staff, G-2. For all practical purposes, I was Chief of Staff, G-2.

Mr. Murphy. Now, were you the only member of the staff, of the General Staff, who signed his name "Acting"?

General Miles. I believe I was, sir.
Mr. Murphy. I notice it is brigadier general on December 5, and I notice now you have the rank of major general. That was subsequent to December 5, was it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir; that was, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I also notice, General, throughout the record, that you first state that so far as the consular officials, the Intelligence, they were directly responsible to you; that would be our military attaché at Tokyo, he would be directly responsible to you, would he not?

General Miles. In the military hierarchy, yes. Of course, he was also a member of the ambassador’s staff.

Mr. Murphy. Right. G–2 at Hawaii you would reach ordinarily through General Short?

General Miles. The G–2 of any overseas department was an officer directly responsible to the commanding general of that overseas department selected by him.

Mr. Murphy. Then this question of intercepts, as to whether or not you would send the intercept, you stated quite clearly that you did not convey the intercept as such because of security reasons. You then stated, however, that you did not—at least several times in the record—that you did not [2395] convey any of the substance of the intercepts, and, apparently, because of the reason that the chief of staff, General Marshall, was responsible for that happening. There was one place in the record, however, where you do say that from time to time you did send some of the substance of intercepts. At other places you say you didn’t send it because of security reasons.

My question is would there be anything to prevent you from sending the substance of the intercepts without ascribing the origin to the intercept itself and thereby give the theater commander the benefit of information you were getting?

General Miles. Only the same security reason which prevented our sending the text of the message. In other words, if the Japanese found by breaking our code—we didn’t know whether they were doing it or not—that we were sending information to Hawaii or anywhere else you like which we could have gotten only from magic it would have divulged the secret just as much as if we had sent the text of the message.

Mr. Murphy. Didn’t the Navy do exactly that between December 2, 1941, and December 6, 1941?

General Miles. In certain cases they did.

Mr. Murphy. But the Army never did; is that what you mean?

General Miles. I am not prepared to state offhand without examining the record if the Army ever did.

Mr. Murphy. Wouldn’t it have been difficult in writing your appraisal of the situation from time to time to rule out of your mind the fact that you had these different impressions gained from a reading of the intercepts and weren’t you giving the Command the benefit of the knowledge that you had from the intercepts in your reports?

General Miles. I don’t quite get the question.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you wrote reports from time to time to the general staff. The general staff would send out messages to the theater commander. Do you follow me so far?

General Miles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then; in order for you to write your report to the general staff you based that upon certain information, some of which information you obtained from the intercepted messages; isn't that right?

General Miles. That is right; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. So that in effect in giving your reports based upon all the knowledge you had at the time to the general staff and then having that go out to the field you were in effect passing on the substance of what you had learned in the intercepted messages; weren't you?

General Miles. To that extent; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Throughout the record you have created the impression, to me, at least, that the responsibility for the substance of this information not going to the field was General Marshall's responsibility apart from any wishes you might have had in the matter. Did you mean to create that inference?

General Miles. I think I said, sir, that the responsibility for any message, whether it came from magic or otherwise, which caused the implementation of war plans, or any other major tactical decision by a major unit of the United States Army, should emanate from General Marshall or his principal assistant for war planning operations.

Mr. Murphy. Well, supposing it weren't up to the point of implementing the war plans, but was a very vital piece of information which the Commanding Officer ought to have. Was there anything said to you by General Marshall that prevented you from seeing that it went out to G-2?

General Miles. The magic had to be safeguarded.

Mr. Murphy. You could give the substance of it. The Navy did.

General Miles. We could have, if we thought it necessary, give the substance of that message, but we were closing on that secret as much as possible.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, at page 2188 of the record—I just want to lay the ground for what is to come. As I understand it, there is an absolute difference between you and General Gerow as to what part you took, if any, in the preparation of the message of November 27?

General Miles. Page 2188?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Is it General Gerow's feeling that you did have something to do with that message?

General Miles. It is, sir.

Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, you say you never saw that message except some weeks afterward?

General Miles. I stated in my memorandum of January 20 that I was not sure that I had seen the actual text, but I knew the substance. Mr. Murphy. I am wondering why you and several generals would sit around a table and discuss the adequacy or inadequacy of a message, as to whether or not it should be supplemented, without having a look at the message itself. You sat down with General Bryden and others and talked to them about warning the Air Corps group at Hawaii and elsewhere. Then you yourself sent a subsequent message and/or an additional message against subversive activities. That would have
you participating in the sending of two additional messages. Do I understand that you sent the two additional messages without having looked at the original message itself?

[2399] General Miles. Yes, sir. The two additional messages sent on November 28 had nothing directly to do with General Marshall's warning message of November 27. My message of November 27 to the G-2 did, however, and I knew, I must have known at that time, at the time I sent it, that antisubversive warnings had not been contained in General Marshall's message.

Mr. Murphy. Well, wouldn't it have been a good idea to look at the message to see what it did say when sending out supplemental messages? What was wrong with looking at that message of the 27th? Why didn't you?

General Miles. I don't remember that I saw the text of that message but I did know its contents. Why I didn't actually go over to War Plans Division and insist on seeing the textural message I don't know sir.

Mr. Murphy. G-2 wasn't interested in the contents sufficiently to have a copy in its files?

General Miles. No, sir; we would not have kept a copy of so secret a message in our files. It belonged in War Plans Division files.

Mr. Murphy. G-2 wouldn't have anything in their files to show the substance of that message in order to follow the progress of future events?

General Miles. Not in G-2 files; no, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Is it General Gerow's opinion that you did have some participation in the formulation of the message of the 27th of November?

General Miles. I believe it is, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, at page 2079 of the record you spoke about your accomplishments in setting up a Joint Intelligence Committee. You said that that committee had its first meeting on October 11, 1941. You also stated that you felt that a crisis was developing about the middle of November.

Why didn't you call a meeting, why didn't somebody call a meeting of that Joint Intelligence Committee instead of waiting until after the war started?

General Miles. That, Mr. Congressman, is one of the best examples that I know of the need of unification of the services. It actually took from July 14 to December 8, in those critical days, to integrate and establish a committee for intelligence within the Joint Army-Navy Board, which was the high policy-making agency of the armed forces.

Mr. Murphy. But you have already said, at page 2079, that you already had a meeting on October 11. Why didn't you call a meeting between then and December 7 or 8? What efforts did you make to have a meeting? Whom did you consult about it?

Here is a working organization formed on October 11, 1941, and a crisis is developing and there are no meetings until the day after the war started. Why not?

[2401] General Miles. I regret to say, Mr. Congressman, there were still discussions and difficulties going on between the War and Navy Departments as to just what the functions of that committee would be, where it would sit, what rooms it would have, what secretary it would be allowed, et cetera.
Mr. Murphy. Did you personally, as acting head of G-2 of the Army, make any effort to have a meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee after the middle of November and prior to December 7, 1941?

General Miles. I pressed several times for the establishment and operation of that committee.

Mr. Murphy. Will you state exactly what you did between November 15 and December 7, 1941; to whom did you talk and to whom did you protest and with whom did you press?

General Miles. I went several times, I am sure, to General Gerow, who was the War Department representative on the Joint Planning Committee, the Joint Board, urging action in that matter.

Mr. Murphy. Will you give the date, as best you can?

General Miles. I cannot give the dates from memory of any discussion of this matter. I only know that during that period I was constantly pressing for an establishment, which I myself had initiated, in which I was very much interested.

Mr. Murphy. Turning to page 2079 of the record I want [2402] to quote you exactly:

The Joint Intelligence Committee members had their first meeting on the 11th of October, 1941, but did not actually function until the 8th or 9th of December.

I ask you this question: Was General Gerow a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee?

General Miles. He was not.

Mr. Murphy. Why would you go to him to have your own committee meet? Who was the head of it? Who was the head of the Joint Intelligence Committee?

General Miles. The Joint Intelligence Committee was to consist of the head of Military Intelligence, myself, and the head of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. Murphy. Why would you ask General Gerow to hold a meeting?

General Miles. Because, sir, the whole proposition of the Joint Intelligence Committee had to be processed first through the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Board and then receive the approval of the Joint Board. There was great difficulty with the Joint Planning Committee as to how we would work with them, where we would work. General Gerow was the representative on that committee with whom I was dealing.

Mr. Murphy. Were there any minutes taken at the meeting of October 11, 1941?

[2403] General Miles. Any what, sir?

Mr. Murphy. Any minutes, notes?

General Miles. That I do not know, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Is there anything in writing that will tell what the functions of that committee were and why it was set up?

The record shows, while you are looking it up, that the establishment of the committee was approved by the Secretary of the Navy on the 1st of October and by the Secretary of War on the 29th of September, and that appropriate orders were issued.

That is your testimony at page 2079.

General Miles. In looking up this matter, Mr. Congressman, I consulted Colonel Montague, who was then one of my officers, and a former secretary to the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee. I think
he was the first secretary. He has given me a memorandum dated the 2d of November this year on this matter.

Mr. Murphy. Is there any official document we might call for that would show us the function of that committee and its purpose and what had been done to formulate it up to December 7, 1941, and why it didn’t meet?

General Miles. The memorandum from Colonel Montague states this:

* * * there are in the file rough drafts of J. B. 329 (Serial 710) by General Gerow and Admiral Turner respectively. These papers indicate a controversy between them as to the scope of the functions of the proposed J. A. N. I. C.*

Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee.

General Gerow wished the committee to collate, analyze and interpret information with its implications, to estimate hostile capabilities and probably intentions. Admiral Turner wished to limit it to presentation of such factual evidence as might be available, but to make no estimate or other form of prediction. In J. B. 329 (Serial 710) Admiral Turner won.

It also makes a statement here which sounds rather ridiculous in these days, but that was what was going on:

The Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee was not fully activated until 1941 because until then the head of the foreign branch office of Naval Intelligence was unable to obtain agreement within the Navy Department as to the office space to be provided. Except for this difficulty the committee might have been activated by the first of December.

Mr. Murphy. There were only two members. Wouldn’t you be able to have a meeting at your office, with war coming on and a crisis developing?

General Miles. No, sir; we did not meet until we could [2405] finally get actually to work on it. The personnel of that committee, the actual working personnel of that committee were not, I think, the heads of G–2 and ONI, but subordinate officers detailed by them. We were then to review their work.

Mr. Murphy. I am going to ask counsel, Mr. Chairman, to go into this matter more thoroughly. I think we ought to have brought before us somebody who can tell us the detail of why this committee didn’t function and a survey of the whole picture.

The Vice Chairman. Counsel will take note of that request.

Mr. GeSELL. Mr. Congressman, I think, on the request of why the committee didn’t function, on the Army side General Miles is the best witness.

Mr. Murphy. Now, General, as I take it, your answer on the record is that the reason you and the Admiral did not meet during the crisis from November 15 to December 7 was as contained in your answer which you read from the paper, a statement of Colonel Montague to the effect that the Navy man was having difficulty in getting an office in which you were to meet, you two men?

General Miles. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. That is what you read; that is the way the statement read. What was the reason you didn’t meet?

General Miles. Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkinson, and [2406] I met frequently during that period. The actual Joint Intelligence Committee, as such, as part of the Joint Board, was
having a great deal of difficulty in getting established, a difficulty which I think would be largely eradicated if we had had a unified department of national defense.

Mr. Murphy. I will come to that, but you do say, however, at page 2079 of the record:

The Joint Intelligence Committee members had their first meeting on the 11th of October 1941 but did not actually function until the 8th or 9th of December.

At any rate, that is a fact.

General Miles. That is factual so far as the meeting is concerned; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You talk about a unification of the services, and I am not going to get into that, but will ask this: If you felt the messages from the 27th of November to the 6th of December were redundant and the Army was the head of this board what would have happened to those messages?

General Miles. They would have been sent.

Mr. Murphy. By whom? Who was going to settle your differences?

General Miles. I thought they should be sent and have repeatedly so testified.

Mr. Murphy. You may interpret "redundant" a little differently than I do.

General Miles. They were redundant to the warnings of which I was speaking when I used the word "redundant."

Mr. Murphy. Now, let me ask this question, General:

I see in exhibit 37 a number of messages sent to all of the commands between the 27th of November and the 6th of December about destroying codes and machines, but I don't see any message from either the Army or the Navy to Hawaii as to what to do. Do you know of any such messages?

General Miles. No, sir; we didn't want them to destroy their codes.

Mr. Murphy. At Hawaii?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You thought that was a very likely place to be attacked?

General Miles. Surely.

Mr. Murphy. You have them destroying the codes every place else in the world except one of the places where an attack was quite probable.

General Miles. Mr. Congressman, the Army and Navy and State Department ordered the destruction of codes only in places in which those codes could be immediately seized by a foreign power.

Mr. Murphy. If they had ships that day they might have been; I mean on the 7th of December.

General Miles. What did you say?

Mr. Murphy. They might have been, isn't that so? God forbid, but they might have been.

General Miles. I think the authority in Hawaii would at least had time to destroy their codes. Even if they landed on Hawaii we did expect considerable resistance to be given to the Japanese.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, I see a message from the Navy, none from the Army, but a message from the Navy, to Alusna Tokyo Alusna Bankok, Astalusna Peiping, Astalusna Shanghai, I see an-
other for the co mardet Peiping, co mardet Tientsin, I see another for Navsta Guam. But I see nothing about Hawaii.

At any rate, neither the Army nor Navy told them at Hawaii to destroy their machines or codes?

General Miles. No, sir, we did not want those machines destroyed for any reason we could then foresee. We expected Hawaii, at least, to put up a very good fight and allow time to destroy codes and anything else.

[2409] Mr. Murphy. And that notwithstanding the fact that a message came from Hawaii on December the 6th that the Japanese at Hawaii were destroying their codes.

General Miles. Yes, sir; but our police at any time after war was declared could have jumped that consulate and taken those codes but they could not jump our headquarters.

Mr. Murphy. General Miles, as I understand it—and I wish you would correct me if I am wrong—in your predictions of what might happen you expected a possible attack on the Maritime Provinces to the north, which would be Russia, or an attack to the south, which would be the Malay Peninsula or Thailand or the Dutch East Indies and that the Japs would probably—not probably, but might—attack the Philippines so as to prevent the Philippines being on their flank, isn't that right?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. And then the other step, that if they were going to attack the Philippines because they did not want a flank movement they might take the other step and go on and get the fleet and stop that from being another flank, to protect them in their march to the south, isn't that right?

General Miles. That is correct, sir. The minute they became involved with the United States they might take Hawaii, Panama, or anything else.

[2410] Mr. Murphy. But, as I understand it, no one of responsibility in Washington or elsewhere anticipated that the Japs would take the move to attack the fleet before they attacked the Philippines, to remove any subsequent attack on their flank; isn't that right, so far as you know?

General Miles. If by the word “anticipate” you mean that they thought it the most probable thing or even a probable thing, I think you are right, sir.

Mr. Murphy. That is exactly what I meant, as the possible thing and the most likely at the beginning of the war.

General Miles. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. All right. I was wondering, General: Over at page 2177 there was a joint dispatch on economic sanctions and there was not a joint dispatch about the possible likelihood of war beginning.

General Miles. 21——

Mr. Murphy. On page 2177 there is a joint dispatch stating that economic sanctions would be placed in effect but there is a separate message about the likelihood of war.

Mr. Gesell. That joint dispatch is also in the exhibit, is it not, Congressman, exhibit 32?

Mr. Murphy. I think I have it here.

Mr. Gesell. At page——

79716—46—pt. 2——34
Mr. MURPHY. Exhibit 32, yes, at page 2; yes, page 2. [2411] Mr. GESELL. Page 2.
Mr. MURPHY. Dated July 25, 1941.
Mr. GESELL. That is right.
General MILES. What was the question, Mr. Congressman?
Mr. MURPHY. My question is why did they have a joint, or why did you, the Army and the Navy, have a joint dispatch dealing with or telling about the likelihood of economic sanctions and a separate dispatch on November 27, 1941 about the likelihood of war?
General MILES. I am not able to answer that question, Mr. Congressman. I do not remember that I had any part in the drafting of the dispatch of July 25 which you refer to as the joint dispatch on economics, and I have already testified that I do not remember of having had any part in the dispatch on November 27.
Mr. MURPHY. Did you have any part in the dispatch of November 24th on page 2184 of the record?

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.

Mr. MITCHELL. Page 5 of Exhibit 32.

General MILES. No, sir, I do not remember of having had any part in the drafting of that dispatch.

Mr. MURPHY. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster would be the next in [2412] order but he advises the Chair that he is unavoidably absent this afternoon and Congressman Gearhart will now proceed to inquire of General Miles.

Mr. GEARHART. General Miles, Hideko Tojo was the Premier of Japan and I am told that there was a Foreign Minister of Japan by the name of Togo. Now, that name Togo in Japan is just about the counterpart of the names of Jones, Smith, and Johnson in the United States. In view of that I wonder whether or not the name Togo which is signed to these telegrams which were sent to Honolulu inquiring about the disposition of ships was, in fact, the Foreign Minister or somebody else in the government who was assigned to carry on that particular inquiry. Do you know?

General MILES. I do not know, sir. I do not think it was the Foreign Minister, but I did not raise that point when I was being asked.

Mr. GEARHART. I don't think so either for the reason that he does not sign the similar notes of inquiry to Panama and to Manila.

I have been very interested in your testimony in respect to assuming that the attack might come at Hawaii, especially interested in view of the fact that that assumption is not reflected in any of the papers that I have seen that have been offered in evidence in this case. In fact, from the papers [2413] the contrary would seem to be the case.

As a matter of fact, wasn't there a widespread opinion in Navy and military circles that the mighty fortress of Pearl Harbor was beyond even thought of attack, as was the mighty British bastion down at Singapore?

General MILES. No, sir; I do not think there was any widespread—I never heard of any opinion that Hawaii or any other of our overseas departments were invulnerable to attack.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, then, how do you account for the fact that the exhibits that have been introduced here practically ignore the possi-
bility, as far as writing is concerned, of an attack upon either Singapore or upon Hawaii?

General Miles. Well, they did not ignore it, sir. The messages, the warning message of November 27 very definitely did warn Hawaii. Now, if you are referring to my estimates of the situation or other papers prepared for the General Staff it is, I have repeatedly said, true that I did not burden that very busy gentleman with what I knew that he knew.

Mr. Gearhart. Will you point out one message which warned Hawaii which was not one of a series of messages sent to all of our overseas commanders?

General Miles. I know of no message sent particularly to Hawaii and not to any other overseas command warning them.

[2414] Mr. Gearhart. Well, then, that does not answer my question, does it, that Hawaii was considered by everybody all of the time as being a place that was within danger during the last week of November and the first week of December of 1941?

General Miles. Yes; definitely I think, sir, that the message which went to Hawaii as well as the other overseas departments—

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you said there was no message which was sent to Hawaii which was not also sent to the other outlying departments.

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, there is one that was sent to Hawaii which was sent to Hawaii which was not also sent to the other outlying departments.

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, there is one that was sent to Hawaii which was sent to Hawaii which was not also sent to the other outlying departments.

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, there is one that was sent to Hawaii which was not sent to the others, is that not true?

The Chairman. Congressman, I think the witness said he knew of no messages sent to Hawaii that were not sent to others. He said that he knew of no such messages.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I do not want to put any words in the mouth of the witness.

The Chairman. Yes. Yes; I understand.

Mr. Gearhart. So I will ask you to answer the question yourself, General.

The Chairman. The question that the Congressman asked you was whether any other message was sent to Hawaii which was not sent to other stations and your answer was that you knew of no such messages.

General Miles. I knew of no warning message which was sent to other overseas departments.

Mr. Gearhart. Then to refresh your memory I will call your attention to the message that General Marshall sent on the 7th day of December 1941. Was that sent to all of the other outlying bastions?

General Miles. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. Gearhart. The same message was sent to Manila that was sent to Hawaii?

General Miles. It was.

Mr. Gearhart. The copy which appears among the other papers of this particular exhibit, the small one in the pink binding, does not indicate it; but do you know, as a matter of fact, that that message was sent to the Philippines and to Panama, other places?
General Miles. I do, sir, of my own knowledge know that that was the Chief of Staff's direction.

Mr. Gearhart. That appears very clearly from the other messages but it does not appear clearly from the copy of this particular message.

Why were not copies that were sent to the others included in this book, or if different ones were sent why were not they set forth, or if the same one was sent why doesn't [2416] it appear in this book? Are you sure of it? That is what I want to know.

General Miles. I am absolutely sure that the message of December 7 was by direction of the Chief of Staff sent to Hawaii, Panama, the Philippines and the West coast.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. What did you think should have happened in the Hawaiian Islands when they received their message of November 27?

General Miles. I thought that they would go on full alert prepared for any eventuality that might happen to them in a Japanese war.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you see the report that General Short made in reply to that order or that direction that he received on November 27?

General Miles. Not until the following month.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, his reply was:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy re your radio 472 27th. Short.

Do you know whether or not that message was received by General Marshall?

General Miles. I know now that it was received by General Marshall.

Mr. Gearhart. You know now that it was not received by him? [2417] General Miles. I know now that it was received by General Marshall.

Mr. Gearhart. That it was received by General Marshall.

You also know, as one who keep in touch with these papers, that General Marshall did not voice or telegraph any objections to the precautions that General Short had taken as reported in the telegram that I have just read?

General Miles. I do, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It must have been satisfactory; is that not a correct conclusion to draw from that situation?

General Miles. I would prefer, Mr. Congressman, that General Marshall answer that question. He is to appear before you this week.

Mr. Gearhart. I will draw your attention that a similar telegram was sent on the 27th to General MacArthur in Manila and in order to emphasize the difference in the reports I am going to read from the MacArthur report and then I will ask you how do you account for the difference. General MacArthur says in his report:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio 624, air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy. Ground security measures have been taken. Within the limitations imposed by present state of development in this theater of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense. Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between the Army and the Navy. MacArthur.
Now, how do you account for the fact that these two gentlemen, officers of the United States, replied so differently? How do you explain it?

General Miles. I can only account for that, Mr. Congressman, by the assumption that those two commanding Generals viewed General Marshall's message, a similar message sent to the two of them, in a totally different way.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, isn't it a fact that the telegram that was sent to MacArthur was different from the telegram that was sent to General Short and it was that difference which brought forth those differences in replies? Is that not correct?

General Miles. I do not remember, Mr. Congressman, that there was any material difference between the message sent to General MacArthur and that sent to General Short.

General Miles. I do not remember, Mr. Congressman, that there was any material difference between the message sent to General MacArthur and that sent to General Short.

Mr. Gearhart. There is a very material difference and it consists of just this sentence which is contained in the message to Short but is not in the message that was sent to MacArthur [reading]:

Suggest reconnaissance and other measure as you may deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civilian population or disclose intent.

Now, it is that omission of that phrase in the telegram to MacArthur that probably accounts for the difference in the two replies, is that not correct?

General Miles. I do not think that is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. All right. Let me hear what you think about it.

General Miles. The prohibition against disturbing the civilian population in this way applied far more at Hawaii, American territory, than to the Philippines, in which there was a much smaller number of American citizens, but the essential thing, Mr. Congressman, it seems to me, is that the prohibition was as old as the United States Army. We have always attempted to do our job without unnecessarily disturbing or alarming or alerting the civilian population. I think, since you asked me, that it had practically no effect in that very important war-warning message.

Mr. Gearhart. Then why did you prepare a different telegram, one containing it and the other not containing it? That is not your practice, is it, when you send joint telegrams all over the different departments that we have in the United States? You send the same telegram. Here you gave General Short definite instructions not to do something, [2420] whereas you did not give General MacArthur the instructions not to do the same thing.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, may I interrupt? This witness had nothing to do with it. He did not give these instructions.

Mr. Gearhart. I thought this witness testified that he had a part in the writing of this telegram of November 27.

Mr. Mitchell. No.

General Miles. I testified exactly the opposite, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You did not have anything to do with it? Then you cannot account for the differences in those two telegrams?

General Miles. I cannot state that of my own knowledge.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, then, as a military expert could General Short have sent airplanes all up into the air on reconnaissance and establish a reconnaissance all over those islands without exciting the people?

General Miles. I believe he could, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Could he have alerted the island under a No. 3 Army alert without apprising the people of some intent behind it?

General Miles. I had seen exactly that situation in the Island of Oahu under the guise of maneuvers, and I do not remember that the civilian population was very much disturbed. The preceding general, as we know, had them out on the No. 3 alert for several weeks.

The Chairman. General, have you completed your answer to that last question?

General Miles. Have I what?

The Chairman. Did you complete your answer to the last question?

General Miles. Yes.

The Chairman. Well, unless the Congressman is practically through we will recess here.

Mr. Gearhart. No; I am not practically through.

The Chairman. We will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow. General, you be back at that time.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., Monday, December 3, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday, December 4, 1945.)
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 319), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The chairman. The committee will come to order.

When we recessed, Congressman Gearhart was examining General Miles. You may proceed, Congressman.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)

Mr. Gearhart. General Miles, since our interrogation of yesterday I have ascertained to my satisfaction that the message of December 7 was sent in identical form to the usual points of distribution throughout the world in identical language. That seems to be established as a fact.

Now I am directing your attention to your message of November 27, 1941. As it appears in the pamphlet of copies of messages which has been furnished us, nothing would indicate that I can see that that message was sent to all of the distributing departments in outlying bases of the United States. The message that I refer to is the one reading as follows:

Japanese negotiations have come to practically a stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only. Miles.

General Miles. Yes, sir; that message went to Hawaii, Panama, and all nine corps areas in the United States; that is including the West Coast Command, of course.

Mr. Gearhart. Then as a rule, or would you say it was a rule, that all messages of this type that were sent out were sent out in identical form to all of the overseas outlying posts, such as Hawaii, Panama?

General Miles. As a rule, that is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That brings me to the point of inquiring again for the purpose of clarity, why was the Marshall message of November
27th sent out in different forms, one form to Hawaii and another one to Manila?

General Miles. I regret, sir, that I cannot answer that question. I had no part in the drafting of those messages.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you any information or have you any way of telling or have you as a military expert an inference which would explain the fact that General MacArthur and General Short acted differently on those different messages?

General Miles. I have no knowledge or information bearing on that, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you think it was just as important not to alarm the people of the Philippines as it was not to alarm the people of Hawaii?

General Miles. Mr. Congressman, I would very much rather that that question be answered by the two gentlemen who will succeed me in this witness stand and who did have a very direct hand in preparing those messages. I feel myself incompetent to [2425] answer.

Mr. Gearhart. Then you prefer not to comment upon this additional phrase that was put in the message to General Short:

But these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

You prefer that that comment be left to General Marshall?

General Miles. I would, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And still as head of Military Intelligence you are supposed to understand these messages and keep yourself abreast of the reasons of the whys and wherefores of these distinctions, are you not?

General Miles. I did know the substance of that message so that I was informed of the substance, at least, of that message pretty thoroughly I think.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you testified yesterday that you have not observed the distinction in these two messages.

General Miles. What is that, sir?

Mr. Gearhart. I say you testified yesterday that you have not observed the distinction in these two messages.

General Miles. I think I testified, sir, that I did not at that time, yesterday, remember this particular distinction that you were drawing up, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I have reminded you now. Do you have any further comment to make now?

[2426] General Miles. I would very much rather not comment on the Chief of Staff's message because it was the Chief of Staff's message and because I had no part in its drafting, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact isn't it true that in Washington and the Washington Naval and Army circles there was a fixed belief that Singapore and Hawaii were so impregnable and so invincible as fortresses that they would not be attacked?

General Miles. I never heard that opinion expressed in Washington circles, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, it was up to you to keep in contact with the policies and philosophy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was it not?

General Miles. No, sir. I had nothing to do with what might be called the Joint Strategical Staff unless and except when I was in-
formed by the Chief of Staff or by his direction through General Gerow what was going on. I commonly had no part in any of the activities of the—I think you call it the Joint Strategic Board.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, directing your attention to the message that was sent to the President by General Marshall and by Admiral Stark under date of November 27, I will read you the first paragraph:

[2427] If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: The Burma Road; Thailand, Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

Can you account or do you know why absolutely no mention is made of Singapore or of Hawaii?

General Miles. No, sir; I do not. I had no part in the drawing up of that particular document.

Mr. Gearhart. Wouldn't you say it was a legitimate inference that a possible attack upon those two bastions was not within the contemplation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Army and Navy high authorities of the United States?

General Miles. Mr. Congressman, I would rather not pass on the implications of a paper signed by the Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations in which I had no part in drawing it up.

Mr. Gearhart. All right, get back to your own personal self.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Will you cite me one document which you have yourself signed in which you spoke of the possible attack that might occur upon Hawaii?

General Miles. I do not think there was any document in those particular days which I signed in which the possible [2428] attack on Hawaii was mentioned because it was an obvious concomitant, if you like, result, an obvious possibility in any war in which we might become involved with Japan, so obvious that it would be known to all military men.

Mr. Gearhart. It was a possibility but did the Army and Navy regard it as a probability?

General Miles. I think they did, sir, regard it as probable for reasons that I have already testified, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And still it is not mentioned in this tremendous volume of literature that has been placed upon the desks of the committee-men anywhere, that there was a possibility, a probability that Hawaii singled out alone would be the object of attack?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. But there is plenty in all of this literature, an abundance, which points out the possibility of attack in the Philippines, in the Kra Peninsula, in Thailand, in Indochina, everywhere except on those two very great fortresses at Singapore and Hawaii.

General Miles. No, sir; not everywhere except. I do not think you will find any mention of the obvious fact that in a war with Japan the Panama Canal might be attacked, the Island of Guam might be attacked, the Island of Samoa might be attacked, Midway, and so forth, and so forth.

[2429] Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

General Miles. Those things were quite obvious as possibilities in a war with Japan.
Mr. Gearhart. They are all mentioned over and over again in this literature that has been laid on our desks, except Singapore and Hawaii. Singapore has been spoken of as possibly being menaced by an invasion of the Kra Peninsula but that is as far as any of this literature has gone in respect to Singapore and it has not gone that far in respect to Hawaii anywhere along the line. If I am mistaken in that will you point it out?

General Miles. I do not know what documents you are referring to, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Gearhart. I am referring to every document that has been laid before us.

General Miles. Well, I cannot very well answer about that but I think you are mistaken, sir. I do not remember any document of importance which specifically mentions the possibility or probability of attack on Panama, Guam, Midway, Samoa.

Mr. Gearhart. Why, there has been specific mention of Guam as an object of attack, there has been specific mention of Panama, of the Philippines, specific mention of Indochina, the Kra Peninsula, but never a specific mention of the Hawaiian Islands. If you have anything to the contrary I would like to have you point it out and if you find one document among all of these I will be surprised.

Why, even on the 27th, after Mr. Hull had handed his final statement to the Japanese, a letter was written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which they point out all of these other places as possible objectives of Jap attack, and Hawaii is not mentioned even then.

General Miles. Do they point out Panama or Guam?

Mr. Gearhart. No.

General Miles. Or Samoa?

Mr. Gearhart. No; but they point out the Burma Road, Thailand, Malay, Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, the Russian Maritime Provinces, and discuss each one on the basis of the paper later on.

But, General Miles, things happened on the 6th of December which suddenly centered your attention upon Hawaii as a possible object of attack, did there not?

General Miles. Things happened on the morning of the 7th of December, sir, which centered my attention on the probable Japanese attack somewhere coincident with the delivery of the Japanese reply at 1 o'clock that day.

[2437] Mr. Gearhart. You are familiar with the so-called 14-part Japanese reply to the Hull message of November 26, are you not?

General Miles. I am, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. When they speak of it as the 14-part message they are referring to the method the Japanese used in transmitting that message, are they not?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It came in in installments, in other words, rather than in a solid typed coded message; is that correct?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Thirteen parts of that message were received in Washington on the 6th day of December, were they not?

General Miles. On the late evening of the 6th they were received, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. When did they start coming in, and when was the thirteenth part finally received?
General Miles. Mr. Congressman, I cannot answer that question with any degree of certainty. You will have witnesses before you who can answer that, sir; witnesses who handled that particular activity.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Gearhart. I will yield.

The Vice Chairman. I just want to see if I am right about it. I understood General Miles was supposed to return at another time and a special inquiry would be made along that line. Is that correct, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. Gesell. That is correct, Congressman Cooper. The procedure called for having here at one time all witnesses concerned with those messages so that we could get a composite and detailed investigation into that.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a moment?

Mr. Gearhart. I will yield.

Senator Ferguson. Just for a question of the chairman. As I understand it now, Mr. Chairman, the plan is to call General Marshall on Thursday morning. I am just inquiring as to how we might proceed with General Marshall on the particular items that we are omitting from General Miles, such as the wind message.

Mr. Gesell. I think we indicated—if I may answer that—we indicated in the memorandum distributed to the committee that we felt, under the circumstances, an exception should be made to our procedure as to General Marshall, and that General Marshall should be questioned concerning the wind message and questioned concerning the events of the sixth and seventh, inasmuch as he may not be available again for some time to appear before the committee.

Our thought was there should be no division of his testimony, that all subjects should be covered with him while he is on the stand.

The Chairman. The Chair might say in that connection that the exigencies of General Marshall's departure have made it necessary to rearrange, if not disarrange, the order of witnesses, because of the necessity for him to leave before the time when he would be regularly reached.

Now, inasmuch as he will be away, the Chair understands he will be asked about all matters within his knowledge, just as if he had not come on the stand until he had been reached in the regular course of the schedule.

Mr. Gesell. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, that is not the inquiry I am making this morning. My inquiry is along this line: If we are to properly examine General Marshall on these points it appears to me evident that the men who dealt with him on those points, such as General Miles, General Gerow, should be questioned on those points first, so there will be no necessity of calling General Marshall back to try to get information from him after he leaves, because we haven't any idea what these gentlemen are going to say as to their dealings with him in relation to these particular messages.

The Chairman. The plan is to put General Gerow on prior to General Marshall's appearance, if we get through with General Miles in time.
Senator Ferguson. That does not answer my question.

The Chairman. The Chair does not know whether he can answer your question or not. The Chair cannot control questions that will be asked the witnesses by members of the committee.

Senator Ferguson. That is perfectly all right, if that is the rule.

Mr. Gearhart. I might say, Mr. Chairman, I am fully aware of the understanding we had with reference to grouping all the witnesses on this question and interrogating them at a subsequent meeting of this committee, but in view of the change in the program that has been made, it becomes incumbent now to go into this question with this witness, who is one of the actors with respect to what was done.

The Chairman. Go ahead. We will probably save time by going into it now to such an extent as the gentleman may be able to testify about it.

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, if that is to be the procedure we will, of course, want to present certain documentary material concerning those events, so there can be the fullest kind of examination. We did not cover it in our examination at all, as the committee is aware, for the reasons I have indicated.

The Chairman. Of course the counsel will understand that the change of the program by the necessity of calling General Marshall as soon as possible may make it necessary to change the collateral program surrounding his testimony and his activities.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, just a point of inquiry. The program that has been outlined is entirely possible, as I would conceive it. General Miles may not have with him certain documents and records that he might want to refer to. In fairness that ought to be borne in mind.

General Miles. I am prepared to answer any questions, sir.

The Chairman. We can probably find out about that by going ahead.

Mr. Gearhart. I do not intend to ask any questions that will require the revealing of a lot of documents, but I do want to ask these questions now in order to prepare myself, as I hope other members of the committee will, in their examination of General Marshall when he appears.

Now you have told us that the 13 parts arrived on the 6th. That is correct, is it not?

General Miles. On the evening of the 6th; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know when the last one was received on the evening of the 6th, the thirteenth part?

General Miles. No, sir; I do not know accurately the hour in which that was received, but you will have witnesses before you who can testify to that, which is more than I am able to do.

[2436] Mr. Gearhart. Do you know when the fourteenth part was received on the 7th of December?

General Miles. I understand that that was received fairly early on the morning of the 7th, at 7 or 8 o'clock. Again I am not able to testify as to the accurate hour.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know when the so-called parallel 1 o'clock directive was received and decoded?

General Miles. That also was received on the morning of the 7th, but I am unable to identify the hour.
Mr. Gearhart. Do you know whether it came before or after the fourteenth part of the reply to Mr. Hull was received?

General Miles. No, sir; I do not of my own knowledge know that.

Mr. Gearhart. As soon as those several parts were received they were immediately delivered to the usual recipients of that kind of information, is that not correct?

General Miles. I again would much prefer that question be answered by the officers who actually did it and will be witnesses before this committee.

[2437] Mr. Gearhart. That was a matter peculiarly within your jurisdiction, was it not?

General Miles. It was a function of my department to make those deliveries from my officers to the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of War Plans Division, G–2, and Secretary of State.

Mr. Gearhart. And the President?

General Miles. No, sir; not the President.

Mr. Gearhart. You did not make those deliveries to the President?

General Miles. Not at that time; no, sir. That was done by Navy.

Mr. Gearhart. You were impressed with the importance of that fourteenth part of the message, were you not?

General Miles. When I read it, I was very much impressed with the fourteenth part.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you make any out-of-the-ordinary directions in reference to its immediate delivery to the ones that were entitled to receive copies from an emissary from your division?

General Miles. It had been delivered to the recipients about coincidental with its delivery to me, with the exception of General Marshall with whom I was in touch either directly or through Colonel Bratton to get this information to him.

[2438] Mr. Gearhart. Did you make any special effort, by telephone or otherwise, or by calling at his office, to inform General Marshall of the receipt of that fourteenth part of the message?

General Miles. I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Were you successful in contacting him?

General Miles. I was, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. When did you inform him of the fourteenth part of the message?

General Miles. Mr. Congressman, I have written notes on my activities on the 6th and 7th which, perhaps for clarity and saving time, I might read.

My wife and I dined at the house of Admiral Theodore Wilkinson, then Chief of ONI. We were there from 8 p.m., until about 11 p.m. Shortly before we left, I think about 10:30 p.m., Commander Kramer came to the house, bringing with him a summary, I think, although it may have been the full translation of the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our note of November 26. This was the first knowledge I had that these 13 parts were in.

These 13 parts had little military significance. They concluded only with a Japanese refusal to accept the American proposal of November 26 as a basis of negotiation—a result which had been expected and discounted for some time. [2439] I, therefore, contented myself that night by calling Colonel Bratton at his home about 11:30
p. m., and assuring myself that the full reply would be disseminated the
next morning on Sunday, and that he and I would be in our offices then.

Mr. Keefe. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman, to ask the counsel
whether or not we have received the first 13 parts as they came in? I
have the full message, but in the form that it was received and delivered
that night, have we been furnished the first available copies of those
13 parts?

Mr. Gesell. Yes. Of course, the first 13 parts are printed in
exhibit 1.

Mr. Keefe. I see.

Mr. Gesell. By parts. Congressman Keefe, when you were absent
yesterday, we stated we were building up documentation on these
crucial messages, and it had been our plan to present that to the com-
mittee in connection with General Marshall's testimony. We are a
little ahead of that now.

The Chairman. The Chair suggests that General Miles be permitted
to complete his recital as he started out to do, so that we may have
that in the record in regular form.

Go ahead, General.

General Miles. Early on the morning of the 7th, Colonel Bratton
called me at my house, told me that important information was in and
that he was trying to get in touch [2440] with General Marshall.
I asked Colonel Bratton to tell General Marshall that I would come
out to Fort Myer to see him if he desired. Either Colonel Bratton or
I called General Gerow. These telephone messages were designed to
effect a meeting of the Chief of Staff with General Gerow, Colonel
Bratton, and myself, which subsequently took place in General Mar-
shall's office.

I then went to my office. There I saw the full Japanese reply, and
the 1 p. m. delivery message, and discussed them with Colonel Bratton.
The latter message and the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply struck
me immediately.

Some arrangement had been made for us to be notified when General
Marshall arrived. When so notified, I went to General Marshall's
office. What took place in his office is best recalled by me in a memo-
randum I prepared for the Chief of Staff, dated December 15, 1941,
subject: "Sunday Morning, December 7, 1941."

This is the memorandum that I refer to, as my recollection of what
occurred.

Mr. Gesell. May I interpose there?

The memorandum that General Miles is now reading we are just
distributing to the committee. I sent for it as soon as this change in
program developed. It is included in a series of memoranda, some
prepared by General Gerow, [2447] one by General Miles; and
some by other officers, all recording events that took place on the 6th
and 7th. I feel it will be of advantage to the committee to have all
these memoranda in the record as a basis for this examination.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you desire to read the memorandum of December
15, 1941, at this time?

Mr. Gesell. Well, General Miles is starting to read his memoran-
dum of December 15. I thought perhaps all of them should be intro-
duced as an exhibit, since they all relate to the same subject matter.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gearhart. What number will it bear?
The Chairman. Just a moment. One at a time, please.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. So that the record may be clear, I want to know when these papers that have just been handed to us were prepared and as to why we could not have them earlier; I want you to explain that on the record.
Mr. Gesell. You are asking me?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. These documents relate to a phase of the case which we had anticipated would come on several weeks [2442] from now. I think they were prepared and put in our hands a day or two ago. We had not distributed them because we did not think they were a matter to come immediately before the committee.
Senator Ferguson. I find, Mr. Chairman, I received papers this morning that are on my desk here, that are material to the committee's examination, and I wondered why I had not received them before.
The Chairman. The Chair is not in a position to explain why any document that comes to us did not come sooner. I suppose counsel are making every diligent effort to get the documents to us as soon as possible.
Mr. Gesell. What documents are you referring to?
Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the one signed by L. T. Gerow, brigadier general, dated November 27, 1941, placed before me this morning at 10 o'clock.
Mr. Gesell. That is right. That was placed there this morning. We were going to introduce that in connection with General Gerow's testimony. It is his memorandum.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think it has no connection with General Miles whatever?
Mr. Gesell. I do not know whether it has any connection with him.
Senator Ferguson. Isn't it connected directly with [2443] General Miles' testimony? I understand he was the intelligence officer, and I assume he had all matters pertaining to intelligence under his jurisdiction, and therefore he should be questioned on it.
The Chairman. This seems to be a paper prepared for the Chief of Staff by General Gerow on November 27. It does not seem to mention General Miles in any way. It is presented by General Gerow and directed to the Chief of Staff.
Mr. Gesell. This is General Gerow's memorandum concerning the message of November 27.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that, but we were talking yesterday with General Miles about the the information that was known in the Philippines, and he was telling us what he knew was known in the Philippines. This memorandum would indicate some things in relation to knowledge in the Philippines. There is attached to it an instrument, "H. R. Stark, 26 November 1941, G. L. Tucker," indicating that certain messages were going to the High Commissioner of the Philippines from the President.
My inquiry is why we could not have these at the time they were received, rather than to have them placed on our desk here at the opening of this morning's session, when we are examining the witness.
Mr. Gearhart. I think I can answer that question myself. The reason is, the members of this committee are not supposed to have before them, or consider any evidence whatsoever, until it is offered to us by the counsel of the committee. That is the policy which has changed this committee from an investigatory body into a judicial body.

The Chairman. That statement is without the slightest foundation in fact or theory, or even suspicion. Documents have been filed before us so voluminous—

Mr. Gearhart (interposing). I will point out I have received about 4 feet high of typewritten matter, any part of which could have been served upon me within the previous 2 months that we were waiting for these hearings to commence, brought to me and given to me at a time when it was utterly impossible for any human being to read it, and at the same time keep up the proceedings in this committee room.

Now, of course, I would not say for one moment that anybody planned it this way, but the result of it is—and there is no escaping this conclusion—that we are now sitting here listening to testimony, listening to the reading of documents which we have had no chance to contemplate or evaluate before these hearings commenced. That is a judicial proceeding. We are sitting as judges on the bench listening to evidence as it is fed to us, spoon-fed to us, [2445] if you please.

We have been denied the right to personally investigate and to personally have the papers before they were dumped in our laps in this hearing.

That is what I have objected to all along the line, and that I will constantly object to as long as there is breath in my body.

[2446] The Chairman. The Chair wishes that we could go ahead with the witness. The comment about whether we are being fed with a spoon is not very relevant. If the member is not satisfied with that instrument maybe we could get a scoop.

Mr. Gearhart. Undoubtedly other things of the same kind which will contain evidence that ought to be a scoop for the newspapers.

The Chairman. Let us proceed.

The Vice Chairman. Counsel offered as an exhibit these documents here. I request that they be received and we be given the number.

Mr. Gesell. Exhibit 39, I believe, Congressman.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 39.")

Senator Lucas. I would like to make one observation—

Mr. Gearhart. I do not wish to yield. My cross-examination has been interrupted for the last 15 minutes.

Senator Lucas. I am very sorry.

The Chairman. The Chair will try to protect the member from interruption. The Chair understood that he had yielded.

Mr. Gearhart. I had yielded and I think my yieldings to date have been very helpful.

The Vice Chairman. The witness was in the act of reading his memorandum. Do you want him to complete that?

[2447] Mr. Gearhart. Yes; I would like to have that completed, if possible.

Will you go on with your memorandum, General Miles?

General Miles. [Reading exhibit No. 39: ]
December 15, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff.

Subject: Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

1. My recollection of what occurred in your office on that morning is as follows:

I found you alone in your office at about 11:25 a.m. We were almost immediately joined by Colonel Bratton, who brought in the Japanese reply and the Japanese directive that the reply be given to Secretary Hull at 1:00 p.m. that day.

You then read aloud the Japanese reply, which was of considerable length. You then asked what Colonel Bratton and I thought should be done about it, or what it signified. We said that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply—1:00 p.m.—an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand, but it might be any one or more of a number of other areas.

I urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, and to be on the alert. You then picked up the telephone and got Admiral Stark. You told him you thought we should send out warning as indicated above. After Admiral Stark replied, you put down the telephone and said that the Admiral did not think any further warnings necessary, since all the forces had already been several times alerted. Colonel Bratton and I nevertheless urged that warnings be sent.

You then wrote out the warnings message. There was some discussion as to whether the Philippines should be included or not, but I am not quite clear exactly when this discussion occurred. You again got Admiral Stark on the telephone and read the message to him. He apparently concurred, and asked that the naval forces be informed. You added that at the bottom of the message.

At about this time General Gerow and Colonel Bundy arrived. You asked us in succession, beginning with me, what we thought the Japanese reply and timing meant. I said that I thought it probably meant Thailand, but that the timing had some significance and warning messages should be sent. General Gerow and Colonels Bratton and Bundy concurred. The message in your handwriting was then given to Colonel Bratton to take immediately to the Message Center. (There was a little discussion here as to whether it should go to General Gerow's office for typing first, but time was then pressing and I gave it to Bratton for immediate delivery.

General Gerow said as Bratton was leaving, "Tell them to give first priority to the Philippines if there is a question of priority" or something to that effect.) Bratton returned in a few moments and you directed him to find out how long it would take for the delivery of those messages. Again he went to the Message Center and returned and reported to you that they would have them encoded in three minutes, on the air in eight, and in the hands of the recipients in (I think) twenty minutes. I looked at his watch on delivering your message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a.m. He further states that the Message Center gave him no intimation that all four messages would not go over Army radio direct to the four Army Headquarters.

Signed by me.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you remember when you first saw the full message of the 14 parts?

General Miles. I cannot identify the hour exactly, sir. I only know that I got down there to the office fairly early after this telephone conversation with Colonel Bratton, and I think that General Gerow, although of that I am not quite certain, and that I had considerable time to read the message and discuss it with Colonel Bratton before the arrival of the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Gearhart. Who else was at that dinner party with you at Admiral Wilkinson's?

General Miles. It is my recollection that Admiral Beardall, the naval aide to the President, was there, but as Admiral Wilkinson will appear before you I think he could give you more accurate information.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, when you left the office from day to day at nighttime and General Marshall left his office from day to day at nighttime, did you always leave word as to where you could be found and did he always leave word as to where you could find him if you wished?

General Miles. I don’t know, sir. I don’t believe that we had that in effect in those days. It has always been in effect since. But I should doubt if we had it in effect at that time, although I am not sure.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you had a lot of discussions about the 1 o’clock directive, didn’t you, when that was decoded and laid on your desk? [2451] General Miles. Yes, sir; I discussed that with Colonel Bratton and, of course, as I testified, with General Marshall.

Mr. Gearhart. Various interpretations as to the possible meaning of that message were given by the various persons you talked with?

General Miles. I don’t remember any details of the discussion, sir, except that it obviously, we thought, fitted into the time schedule of the Japanese somewhere.

Mr. Gearhart. And, as a matter of fact, didn’t the officers that you talked with, all of the trained officers, immediately reach the conclusion that that meant an attack upon Hawaii, and that 1 o’clock in Washington mean dawn there?

General Miles. I don’t remember that that point was expressed, sir. We weren’t trying to guess where it was coming. We wanted to warn the overseas departments that something probably would come at that time somewhere.

Mr. Gearhart. But the very use of 1 o’clock by the Japanese Government in directing their Ambassador and Envoy to present that at that hour certainly excited in the minds of every officer who saw that message much comment in respect to its possible meaning, did it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir. It was a very unusual request to make on a Secretary of State of a foreign power, that he receive a message at 1 o’clock on a Sunday afternoon. [2452]

Mr. Gearhart. And isn’t it true that the opinion among those with whom you were in consultation was unanimous that it meant trouble in Hawaii?

General Miles. No, sir; I have no such recollection.

Mr. Gearhart. Was there anything said by any of the officers with whom you discussed this message that all previous maneuvers at Hawaii had all contemplated an attack at the dawn if the attack were to be an attack from the air?

General Miles. I don’t remember that those maneuvers were discussed at that time, sir. [2453]

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you wouldn’t forget what was discussed in respect to a matter of such tremendous importance, would you?

General Miles. I do not clearly remember the details of the discussion. My clear recollection is of the urgency of getting warnings out.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you have——

General Miles. At the last we knew something about a time, although we didn’t know anything about a place.

Mr. Gearhart. You have already testified that you regarded that 1 o’clock directive as highly significant of something. Now you tell
me that you don’t remember what anybody said about it that they thought was significant.

General Miles. No, sir. If I have given that impression. I have not clearly expressed myself. We all thought it was extremely significant as a time factor. We were guessing in the dark if we tried to determine where the operations, which were to be coincident with the delivery of the reply, 1 o’clock Washington time, would take place.

Mr. Gearhart. You contemplated what 1 o’clock would be at Hawaii, what 1 o’clock in Washington would be at Manila, what 1 o’clock in Washington would be at Indochina, didn’t you?

General Miles. I am trying to remember, Mr. Congressman [2454] but I do not remember that any of those places specifically were discussed, or that we related the 1 o’clock in Washington to any specific place. We thought the line of action would be Thailand, still thought it that morning, but we wanted our overseas departments and the west coast alerted, and it was an awful urgency about it.

Mr. Gearhart. All right. What did 1 o’clock in Washington mean in Hawaii?

General Miles. One o’clock, as we now know, meant about 7 o’clock, I think, in Hawaii.

Mr. Gearhart. Why did you put that phrase in your answer “as we now know”?

General Miles. Because I have testified—

Mr. Gearhart. Didn’t you know it then?

General Miles. I don’t remember the point being discussed on the day in question, the 7th of December 1941.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, at 7 o’clock in the morning is a likely time of attack upon the islands, under all of the opinions of the experts in yesteryears who had under consideration the possibility of an attack on Hawaii; isn’t that correct?

General Miles. That was a likely time; not the only time.

Mr. Gearhart. What time was that, I o’clock in Washington, [2455] in Manila?

General Miles. I wouldn’t be able to say offhand, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It was the middle of the night, in round figures; is that not correct?

General Miles. I would not be able to say offhand.

Mr. Gearhart. Is the middle of the night a likely time to attack anywhere?

General Miles. It depends entirely upon what kind of an attack. Landing attacks have been made at night. There have always been two schools as to whether a landing attack should be made under cover of night, or at dawn when you have the advantage of a little light.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, night fighting was developed in World War II for the first time as an important factor in attacks; is that not correct?

General Miles. No, sir. There was a great deal of night fighting in the first World War.

TheVice Chairman. Certainly.

General Miles. The landing at Gallipoli, one of them, was made under cover of darkness.
Mr. Gearhart. Early morning darkness, though, wasn’t it? The idea was to put the attacking force on the ground as the dawn broke; is that not correct?

[2456] General Miles. I wouldn’t be able to testify offhand without looking that up. I do know there were two definite schools of thought as to an overseas landing attack. Do you want to use the cover of darkness, or do you want to use the light of early morning.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you completed?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Three times I thought you had.

Now, as a matter of fact, prior to World War I, a dawn attack was considered about the best kind of attack that could be made because it would catch the enemy usually just before they got up, and it would give the attacking force the benefit of the first light to make their attack; isn’t that correct?

General Miles. I am trying to project my mind back to what we knew or thought in those days, sir. I don’t really remember. I expect you are correct.

Mr. Gearhart. Generally speaking. I know there are exceptions.

General Miles. I don’t want to argue the point. I think you are right. The consensus of military opinion would be that dawn was a very good hour to make a landing attack. Certainly before the First World War.

Mr. Gearhart. I know that night attacks have been made.

[2457] We haven’t forgotten the crossing of the Delaware on Christmas Eve when everybody was having Christmas parties. But it was a very unusual thing, and only because of very unusual circumstances that night attacks were ever undertaken.

So a dawn attack was within the range of probabilities; a night attack was merely within the range of possibility in the conception of military and naval leaders prior to World War II; isn’t that correct?

General Miles. I think that is substantially correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. When you consider air attack, it is especially advantageous to the attacking force to ride in on the rays of the sun, so to speak; is that not correct?

General Miles. I believe that is substantially correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That was the conclusion all military and naval experts had arrived at after studying for 50 years the island known as Oahu?

General Miles. Mr. Congressman, I think I can clear your line of questioning very easily by saying that on that rather hectic morning of the 7th of December, we probably didn’t stop to figure out what hour in the different parts of the world would coincide with 1 o’clock in Washington. [2458] What we all wanted to do was to get out warnings to all of the four vital areas and tell them the hour we feared something was going to happen. They knew in Hawaii what hour that was in their time. They knew in Manila. They knew in Panama. The main thing was to get the warning out and do it fast.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you mean to tell me that the 1 o’clock directive was not the principal thing discussed when General Marshall sent this message worded as it is? Doesn’t it reflect the very fact that 1 o’clock was the one topic of discussion, the one subject that was giving you very much concern at that time?
General Miles. That was one of the two main subjects. The other was the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply which, couched in the language that was used, meant very serious trouble, we thought. But, yes, sir, you are right. We wanted to get the hour out to the overseas departments and let them translate it into their own time.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, it was the use of 1 o'clock Washington time that directed your attention forcibly to the possibility, yea, probability of an attack upon Hawaii, for the first time. Isn't that correct?

General Miles. No, sir, I am sorry, I cannot agree.

Mr. Gearhart. Let's refresh your memory by reading the message General Marshall sent out on that day:

Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machines immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but we are alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication.

So General Marshall thought that the important idea was to tell everybody in the field that 1 o'clock was a significant thing?

General Miles. That is just what I have testified, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, but it was particularly significant in its application to Hawaii, wasn't it?

General Miles. Yes, sir. We know that now, looking back on the event.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you want to say and commit yourself as a military expert that it was not significant to you then?

General Miles. It was very significant to me then that this meant the possibility of attack on any one of our vulnerable points. I did not conceive the idea of an attack on Hawaii for the first time through reading that message. I had always thought an attack on Hawaii, as I have repeatedly stated, was possible if not probable, if we got into a war with Japan.

These two messages we had, the fourteenth part of the reply and the 1 o'clock, meant two things: (1) That war is very likely because of the language used by the Japanese, and (2) something is going to happen coincident with 1 o'clock Washington time. That is all we knew. That is what we sent out. But the main thing was to get it out.

Mr. Gearhart. What time did you meet General Marshall in his office on that fateful Sunday morning?

General Miles. I wrote on the 15th of December 1941, which was 8 days after Pearl Harbor, that I found General Marshall alone in his office at about 11:25 a.m., on Sunday morning.

Mr. Gearhart. When was the conference completed insofar as the determination to send a message was concerned?

General Miles. I wrote on that same day, December 15, that Colonel Bratton looked at his watch on delivering General Marshall's message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a.m.

Mr. Gearhart. 11:50?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Was the message at that time encoded, or did it have to be encoded after 11:50?

[2461] General Miles. It was in General Marshall's handwriting, in plain English, and had to be encoded by the Signal Corps.
Mr. Gearhart. How long did it take them to encode the message, if you know?
General Miles. I do not know, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. When was the message sent? When was it on the wires? Or in the air—which was it?
General Miles. The message to Hawaii went by Western Union, I understand, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. That means it went by wire to San Francisco, and by cable to Hawaii?
General Miles. That is correct.
Mr. Gearhart. The wire and cable were commercial wire and cable?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, as you sat in General Marshall's office, he writing the message, were there any other and faster methods of conveying information such as you were sending out that were available?
General Miles. Radio is about the fastest method that probably could have been used. There was, of course, the telephone and had that been used, it might have been faster. That depends on getting the communication, the connection in [2462] Hawaii. We also had a scrambler on the telephone in those days, and that could have been put on and a message sent that way.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, how many radios were available for the sending of that message?
General Miles. Mr. Congressman, I am not prepared to testify as to the technical details of signal communication. You will have witnesses before you who will testify on that.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, as a matter of fact, the FBI had a short-wave radio to Hawaii, and that was available to the use of the Army, if you had desired to use it; is that not correct?
General Miles. I have heard that statement made, sir. I don't know of my own personal knowledge.
Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact the Navy had a short-wave radio that could have been used to transmit this message to Hawaii; is that not correct?
General Miles. I have heard that also, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And right on General Marshall's desk was a telephone that he could have used to call Hawaii commercially, if he had so desired; is that not correct?
General Miles. There was a telephone on his desk.
Mr. Gearhart. And also, there was a scrambler apparatus that could have been attached to the telephone had he desired [2463] to use the telephone; is that not correct?
General Miles. Yes, sir. There was, as I remember it, a scrambler apparatus in a neighboring room.
Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, when you had decided to send the message, and General Marshall had written it out, was there any discussion among those present at that time as to what method of transmission should be utilized?
General Miles. No, sir; I remember no such discussion. It was a very important message, an urgent message, in the Chief of Staff's own handwriting. The Signal Corps had the responsibility of sending such a message by the fastest available means, and I don't think it occurred to anyone in the room to discuss that question or decide as to how the Signal Corps would handle their own affair.
Mr. Gearhart. You had in mind the difference in time in Washington and the time in Hawaii, the time in Manila and the time in Panama, and still the slowest method was selected without any comment from any of the high-ranking Army officers who were then and there present?

General Miles. I did not know what method was selected for the sending of the Hawaiian message until several days later and I am quite sure that neither General Marshall nor General Gerow knew what method was selected. But I would like to point out that General Marshall was so anxious to [2464] get this message out as rapidly as possible, that after Colonel Bratton had delivered it he directed Colonel Bratton to return and find out exactly how long it would take to send it to the recipients.

Colonel Bratton came back and made that report as to what he had been told by the Signal Corps.

Mr. Gearhart. And later you learned that it arrived in Hawaii just 22 minutes before the first bomb fell, and that it was not decoded and delivered until some two hours after the last bomb had exploded?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

I discovered that later.

Mr. Gearhart. I would like to have you tell us, General Miles, just where you were all day Saturday, up to Saturday night, until you went to bed and where you were all the time on Sunday until you went to bed.

General Miles. I am afraid I can't, sir. I can only identify in my memory two occasions on Saturday. Undoubtedly I was in my office most of the day, but I don't remember anything significant that occurred in the office that I can pin on Saturday, December 6. I do remember lunching with Admiral Kincaid, who was leaving that afternoon to take command of his ships. I do remember Admiral Wilkinson's dinner and what transpired that evening. I do remember telephoning [2465] Colonel Bratton when I returned home that evening. I do remember what I have testified to, and what I wrote out 8 days after Pearl Harbor as to what happened on Sunday morning. Beyond that I cannot recall.

Of course, I do recall, if you want to go into that, what happened when the announcement came over the radio that Pearl Harbor was being attacked, and I rushed back to my office. I had returned home for lunch. And I spent the rest of the day, and I think that night, in my office.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know why General Marshall was delayed in getting to the office that Sunday morning?

General Miles. I believe that he was out horseback riding that morning, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You know that he was informed of this message by telephone by Colonel Bratton, and he said that he would be in.

General Miles. I know he was informed of this message by Colonel Bratton; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And he was informed quite early in the morning, while he was still out getting his exercise, horseback riding?

General Miles. I cannot identify the hour, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. But he did not present himself at the office until the time you mentioned, around 11 o'clock?
[2466] General Miles. So far as I know, he came in about 11:25.
Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, a very eminent ambassador arrived in Washington by air that day, did he not?
General Miles. Not that I remember, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, I am not sure about it, but didn't Ambassador Maxim Litvinoff arrive from Russia on the morning of the 7th?
General Miles. If he did, I have no recollection of it at all, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, I may be in error, but I am informed that he was met by General Marshall on that morning; is that correct? Do you know?
General Miles. I have never heard that before, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, there is very much more I might go into, but I have consumed altogether too much time, so I will reserve any further cross-examination until you reappear when we go into these other messages in detail.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the committee, in view of the Congressman's statement, whether it is expected that General Miles will be recalled on that subject?
Mr. Gearhart. From the statement made by counsel, yes.
[2467] Mr. Gesell. We would like direction from the committee on that.
Mr. Gearhart. I understand that you are going to devote special time to a discussion of certain messages, such as the wind message. If you are going to do that, it will be necessary to recall General Miles.
Furthermore, I think that a witness who had such intimate contact with what was transpiring should stand by available for recall at any time his appearance may be necessary.
The Chairman. Well, it is difficult for the committee to say at this moment whether General Miles will be wanted back again.
The Chair assumed from what counsel said that when you went into these wind messages, and other messages, that General Miles was to be recalled to testify about that. Whether General Marshall's appearance earlier than expected will interfere or make that unnecessary, I don't know that the committee could determine at this time.
Mr. Gesell. My only question is, if we are to examine General Miles concerning the events of the 6th and 7th and the winds message now, there are a substantial number of questions in addition to those the Congressman has asked which should be asked. If he is to be recalled for that examination, we can defer that examination on those questions until that time.
The Chairman. The Chair can only express his view, that in view of the more or less superficial result of the inquiry of General Miles on that subject today, it might be well to hold him in reserve for further examination when we reach that phase of the question.
[2468] Mr. Gearhart. I might say to counsel that my cross-examination of this witness was directed to two specific ideas which I wanted to develop. One was the significance of the 1 o'clock message. The other the effect it had upon the minds of those who learned of it and what transpired in the sending of the warning message. That is as far as I wanted to go at this time.
The Chairman. The Chair would suggest to counsel, for whatever it is worth, in view of the fact that that phase is to be dealt with later,
the Chair sees no necessity for laying the foundation at this time for examination of General Miles on that subject which would be gone into at a later date.

Mr. Gesell. Very well.
The Chairman. Senator George, we passed you.
Senator George. No questions.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. General Miles, since the question of the 6th and the 7th has been brought up this morning, I want to ask you some questions on those dates.

Was there any discussion in General Marshall's office at the time that message was drafted or after, up until the message left the room, as to how the message would or could be sent?

As I understand it, when you arrived there it was 11:25. That gave you an hour and 35 minutes up to 1 o'clock.

[2470] Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?
General Miles. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was there any discussion as to how that message would be sent?
General Miles. I remember no discussion as to what means the Signal Corps would employ in sending that message. The only clear idea conveyed to Colonel Bratton was to get this off as soon as possible. We didn't even stop to have it typed or anything.
Senator Ferguson. Was there anything said about the Army radio being out of order?
General Miles. I never knew that the Army radio was out of order until some time later, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You knew that the Navy had a high-powered radio that you could have reached Hawaii with?

General Miles. I think I did; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you only think that you knew that? Didn't you know that?
General Miles. I can't say positively that I knew it, but I am very sure that it was within my knowledge at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Well now, had you ever used the telephone, the scrambler telephone, to Hawaii?

General Miles. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then you didn't know how long it would take to do that?

General Miles. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was there anything said to the effect that the Army wouldn't be up at 7 o'clock in the morning and therefore you would send it by commercial radio?

General Miles. No, sir; I remember nothing like that.
Senator Ferguson. Was anything said about that?

General Miles. I remember no such discussion, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, this was a Sunday in Hawaii, was it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would you anticipate that the commercial radio, at 7 o'clock in the morning in Hawaii—it would be before 7—would be functioning so that it could deliver immediately a message to the Army?

General Miles. You mean, Senator, the commercial cable?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did you consider that at the time of this meeting, that Sunday morning, before 7 o'clock, a commercial institution may not be functioning at that time?

General Miles. No, sir; I didn't consider that, Senator, because the question of the use of commercial cable never arose. I didn't know they were going to use commercial cable. I didn't know they had used it until several days later.

Senator Ferguson. General Miles, no more important message [2472] ever went over the wires or by communication between these two points, in your opinion; isn't that correct?

No more important message ever was sent between these two points than this particular message?

General Miles. I think that is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And speed was of the essence because it was 11:25 when you got together that morning, although you had had the message from 7 o'clock; is that correct?

General Miles. I cannot identify the hour when I first saw this message. I am quite sure it was not as early as 7.

Senator Ferguson. What time was it?

General Miles. I cannot identify the hour. I can only tell you I think reasonably early. I think between 7 and 8 I had this telephone call with Colonel Bratton and then went to the office.

Senator Ferguson. What time did you get to the office?

General Miles. I don't know, sir. I wish I did. I think I got down to the office before 9 o'clock but I can't identify the hour.

[2473] Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, would you say that you arrived there before 9 o'clock, or what time would you say Bratton called you and told you that the message was in, the 1 o'clock message?

General Miles. Certainly some time before that.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how long before?

General Miles. Senator, I wish I could answer your question, sir, but I cannot. I remember only that there was a telephone conversation with Colonel Bratton and I was trying to insure that I could meet General Marshall and General Gerow. I did not care whether I went to Fort Myer or went to the Munitions Building. I wanted to meet them, I wanted to see them.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, General Miles, you were the Intelligence officer?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the purpose of Intelligence is to anticipate what the opposition or the enemy is going to do, isn't that correct?

General Miles. That is the ideal, sir; that we strive to attain.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the purpose then, the use to which you could put this message was to anticipate what the Japs were going to do on Sunday, isn't that correct?

[2474] General Miles. That is true, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then do you tell us that, as the chief Intelligence officer, it took you from 9 o'clock to 11:20 to get the only man that had the right to act upon this message, and that was General Marshall? Is that what you want to convey to this committee—that it took you 2 hours and 25 minutes to get this message to General Marshall?
General Miles. I cannot state the exact time that it took me, but I think you are substantially correct, sir. I do not know when I first saw those messages.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. Now, will you explain why it took from 7 o'clock, if the message was in the office at 7, until 9 to get you, the only man that could act? It took 2 hours to get you and then 2 hours and 25 minutes for you to reach the man that could act, General Marshall, which is 4 hours and 25 minutes, to act on this important message. Will you give us an explanation on that?

General Miles. You are assuming, Senator, that the message came in or was known to Colonel Bratton at 7 o'clock. Accepting that assumption—I cannot deny it because I do not know the hour, but accepting that assumption—Colonel Bratton first attempted to get General Marshall. He then called me up and I asked him to convey to General Marshall when he did get him that I would be glad to go out to Fort Myer, Colonel Bratton having told me that he had important information, as I remember it, but I do not think he told me what it was, but I was looking for important information.

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. Will you read the last part of the answer? You were looking for important information?

General Miles. Yes, sir; definitely; the Japanese reply.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I then went down to my office. Whether I stopped to have a bite of breakfast, whether I was fully dressed or shaved when Colonel Bratton called me, how long it took me to get my car out and get down to the office I do not know. I would assume that I got down to the office about 9 o'clock, perhaps a little before, perhaps a little later, but I cannot identify the hour.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever known a soldier to go to his duty without shaving? This was important that morning, wasn't it?

General Miles. I do not know whether I shaved that morning or not, Senator, if you press me.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you just told us that is what you did.

Mr. Gesell. No; he has not said that.

Senator George. He did not say that. He said he did not remember whether he shaved or not.

Senator Ferguson. What did you say about shaving?

General Miles. I said I did not remember whether I was dressed and shaved when Colonel Bratton called me on the telephone, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know if you shaved before you went?

General Miles. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Ferguson. How far do you live from your office, I mean at that particular time?

General Miles. At that particular time?

Senator Ferguson. At that particular time; I am talking about that time.

General Miles. I lived at that time at 1761 N Street.

Senator Ferguson. How far would that be in miles?

General Miles. Well, at 10 blocks to a mile it was a little over a mile down to the Munitions Building.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a car?
General Miles. I had a car, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you know what time you got the message from Colonel Bratton that the message was in?

General Miles. No, sir; I cannot identify that hour. [2477]

Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, the night before you were at Admiral Wilkinson's and he was your opposite?

General Miles. My opposite number; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In the Navy?

General Miles. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. You had 13 parts in this message and from those 13 parts you could tell that relations were going to be broken off, there was sufficient in those parts?

General Miles. That that diplomatic conference was going to be broken was a clear assumption.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. Well, now, did you and Admiral Wilkinson—he was an admiral at that time, was he not, or was he a captain?

General Miles. Captain, I think, sir.

Senator Ferguson. He was a captain?

General Miles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss that message that night?

General Miles. Not in great detail. I remember that we discussed the—

Senator Ferguson. You expected the next morning that you would have to act on it. How does it come that you did not discuss it or go over it in detail that night that you got it?

General Miles. I think I only saw a summary of it that night but in any event, Senator, please note that the thirteenth part of that message only results or concludes with the statement that the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal, that is of November 26, as a basis of negotiation.

Mr. Gesell. That is the fourteenth part, isn't it?

General Miles. That is the thirteenth part.

Senator Ferguson. So that gave you an inkling as to what was going to happen.

General Miles. That had already been discounted. We were thoroughly prepared and had been for some days to receive an unfavorable reply to the message of November 26.

I would like also to invite your attention, Senator, to the fact that we had received a message and decoded it from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington directing him to put this Japanese reply in the safe when he received it and wait for further instructions on delivery.

Senator Ferguson. I am familiar with that and I want to call to your attention now on page 238 of these messages, "Re my 844a," from Tokyo to Washington December the 6th—will you read that—indicating that on the night that you [2479] were with Admiral Wilkinson, then Captain Wilkinson, that you knew or expected there would be a delivery time. Will you read that?

General Miles. Yes, sir. Read the whole message?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. (Reading:)
The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902b (in English).

This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in 14 parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

That was decoded on the sixth. It indicates very clearly that the message was not to be delivered automatically when received but that the Japanese Ambassador was to keep [2480] it secret until he received further instructions and in the meanwhile, although he had been told that was a very long message, he was to put it in nicely drafted form which should have taken some time.

I submit, sir, that that message would not indicate that the Japanese reply was likely to be delivered to the American government on Sunday the 7th of December.

Senator Ferguson. General Miles, it is a typographical error on page 239 saying that this translation was 1/26/41. It was 12/6/41.

General Miles. That is what I have testified, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you know what time this message was translated on the 6th?

General Miles. No, sir; I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. What time did you know of it?

General Miles. My impression is very strong that I knew of that message on the evening of December 6. I certainly knew it—

Senator Ferguson. Before you went home?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask you what arrangement was made at the Army for the receipt of the fourteenth part? Isn't it true they stayed up all night to get this and got it some time early in the morning and translated it?

[2481] General Miles. I believe that is true, sir, but I can not testify as to the mechanics of handling that message.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, who delivered the message to you at the Wilkinson home?

General Miles. No one delivered the message to me at the Wilkinson home.

Senator Ferguson. Who delivered it to Wilkinson?

General Miles. Commander Kramer of the Navy is my recollection.

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate to you that it at that time was being delivered to the White House and to the Secretary of State because they were in charge of that delivery?

General Miles. The Navy was in charge of delivering it to the White House.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.

General Miles. We were in charge of delivering it to the Secretary of State, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know whether or not it was delivered that night to the Secretary of State? Did you know that?

General Miles. I called Colonel Bratton and I am sure that I asked him what was the place of delivery of those messages.
[2482] Senator Ferguson. What did he tell you that night?

General Miles. I do not remember, sir, exactly what he told me but he satisfied me that the messages were being delivered or would be delivered early the next morning when the complete message was in.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then that the Navy was delivering 13 parts and you in charge of the delivery of the 13 parts to the Army decided with Bratton that you would not deliver those 13 parts until morning, is that correct?

General Miles. I do not remember, sir, exactly what was decided between Colonel Bratton and myself that night. I called him for the purpose of——

Senator Ferguson. Why did you call him?

General Miles. May I finish, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I called him for the purpose of finding out what had been done, what was going to be done with these first 13 parts, but I wish to call your attention, Senator, to the fact that the first 13 parts as such was not of great military significance. We had already discounted through many days the fact that in all probability the Japanese reply to our note of November 26 would be unfavorable and that was all that the first 13 parts [2483] told us. When we got the fourteenth part we saw quite a different picture, when we got the 1 p.m. message we saw quite a different picture, but there was no reason for alerting or waking up the Chief of Staff, we will say, or certainly Secretary Hull, on the night of December 6 that I could see.

Senator Ferguson. So, then, is it your opinion now that you told Bratton it would be all right to wait and deliver the remaining sections in the morning?

General Miles. I think that is probably what happened, sir. When the total message was in he was to see that it was promptly delivered, but I am not sure.

Senator Ferguson. That is your best judgment at the present time?

General Miles. Yes, sir; that is my best recollection at the present time.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did Wilkinson call Admiral Stark that evening when you were at his home?

General Miles. I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss with Wilkinson about calling Admiral Stark?

General Miles. Not that I remember, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you see Admiral Wilkinson, then Captain Wilkinson, on the morning of the 7th?

General Miles. No, sir; I did not.

[2484] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the message was going to Hawaii on the 7th, that is, the message of the 7th, by commercial radio?

General Miles. No, sir; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. That was not discussed, as far as you were concerned?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I want to read certain parts of the 13- or 14-part message and see whether or not it did not indicate what the fourteenth part would be. Page 240 [reading]:

...
While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

Will you see on page 240? I am reading the last sentence out of the one part, part 2 it is. It starts out [reading]:

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan’s constructive endeavors toward the stabilization of East Asia, and so forth.

Was that significant to you, those sentences, or the change of tone of these messages?

General Miles. It signified to me that this Japanese reply was unfavorable and it was going to be unfavorable, just as we had rather expected that it would be, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the part 2, then, carried out just what you had in mind. That the negotiations would end, is that correct?

General Miles. There is no clear indication that I can see in the first 13 parts that the negotiations as such are definitely ruptured. That comes in the fourteenth part. The 13 parts, as I see them, Senator, are a rehash of Japanese arguments which they have put up in this negotiation time and time again, ending with the conclusion that they could not accept our message of November 26 as a basis of negotiation. That did not mean even that they were going to rupture the conference per se, although it indicated that it probably would.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know at the time of the delivery of the message of the 26th that Japan had treated it as an ultimatum and said that the negotiations were de facto broken off?

General Miles. Yes, sir; we knew that Japan was, or [2486] certain Japanese officials regarded our message of November 26 as a last word or ultimatum in the diplomatic negotiations in Washington.

Senator Ferguson. Did you personally try to reach General Marshall on the morning of the 7th before he went to his office?

General Miles. I did, sir, through Colonel Bratton.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me?

General Miles. I did, sir, through Colonel Bratton.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us your conversation with Colonel Bratton in relation to trying to reach General Marshall and what did he say to you?

General Miles. Again I would like to refer, sir, to my memorandum which I wrote.

Senator Ferguson. When did you prepare that memorandum?

General Miles. I prepared this part of the memorandum, Senator, last week. I thought for a moment that you were referring to something that was contained in my memorandum of December 15, 1941, but I was wrong.

Senator Ferguson. Did you prepare a memorandum with Colonel Bratton on the 10th of December 1941?

General Miles. I prepared a memorandum which I read over to the Chief of Staff on the 15th.

Senator Ferguson. That was not my question. Did you [2487] prepare with Colonel Bratton or for him a memorandum on the 10th of December 1941?
Senator Lucas. On what?

Senator Ferguson. Any kind of a memorandum, the one that he testified from later.

General Miles. I do not recall it at this time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Bratton says on page 80 of Top Secret (B) [reading]:

Colonel Bratton. On or about the 10th of December 1941 I would say, sir, that was prepared by General Miles with my assistance as a memorandum for the record of what happened.

What memorandum was that?

General Miles. I think that is the memorandum which I read into the record of December 15, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. You haven't clearly identified the paper you are reading from.

Senator Ferguson. I identified it as Top Secret Testimony (B), page 80.

Mr. Murphy. That is better.

Senator Ferguson. You think that that is—

General Miles. I remember only one memorandum written [2488] at that time and that was the one written at the specific request of the Chief of Staff for a memorandum of my recollection of what had happened in his office on the 7th of December and that has been written into the record.

Senator Ferguson. Would you just refresh your memory on when the so-called pilot message or the one saying that it would have a delivery time coming, that it came in on the morning of the 6th? You indicated you did not know about that message until the evening of the 6th.

Mr. Gesell. No; he did not say that.

Senator Ferguson. When did you—now, is counsel telling the witness what he did say or are you trying to tell me?

Mr. Gesell. I am trying to tell you, Senator, that he did not testify.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, why don't you come and tell me?

General Miles. Senator, I think personally—

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment until I get counsel straightened out. What does counsel want to tell me?

Mr. Gesell. I want to tell you that my recollection is that General Miles did not testify that he saw the 1 o'clock message, or that it came in on the 6th.

Senator Ferguson. Wait. Now, I am talking about the [2489] pilot message, the one that indicated there would be a delivery time. If counsel had been listening he would have got that from the question.

General Miles. May I answer, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, you understand the question.

The Chairman. Yes, go ahead and answer the question. Please do.

[2490] General Miles. I cannot identify the hour in which I saw that pilot message. I believe that I saw it on the afternoon of Saturday, the 6th, or I may have seen it on the morning of Sunday, the 7th.

Senator Ferguson. Now when you were with Admiral Wilkinson on the night of the 6th, at his dinner, you mean to tell the committee
you did not know there was to be a time for the delivery of this message coming in in 14 parts?

General Miles. I do not remember whether I knew it at that time or whether I did not know it until the morning of the 7th. I think I knew it on the afternoon of the 6th, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The pilot message tells you that it will be in 14 parts, isn't that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Ferguson. So that you knew on the evening, the night of the 6th, that there was only one remaining part to come in?

General Miles. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you and Admiral Wilkinson discuss that at all, that there would be only one more part coming in?

General Miles. I do not remember any discussion of that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What time did you go home that night, do you recall?


Senator Ferguson. Did you communicate with Wilkinson after 10:30 until after the attack?

General Miles. No, sir, I do not remember to have done so, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, there was no collaboration between your office and the Navy in relation to this 14-point message or this 1 o'clock delivery time?

General Miles. So far as I can remember there was not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The Board was not functioning at that time?

General Miles. The what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. The Board that Congressman Murphy talked about yesterday?

General Miles. The Joint Intelligence Committee?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that you did not confer with the Navy on this important matter? You were the Intelligence officer and Wilkinson was the Intelligence officer and, as I understand it, Intelligence is to anticipate what the enemy is going to do. Now how do you account for the fact that you and Wilkinson did not confer on this important matter, which could indicate what the enemy was going to do?

General Miles. I do not remember to have conferred with Admiral Wilkinson probably because I saw no particular reason. I wanted to confer definitely with the Army authorities, the Chief of Staff and Chief of War Plans Division and get a warning message out.

Senator Ferguson. What did you do to get in touch with the War Plans Division on Sunday or Saturday night?

General Miles. I testified, sir, it was my recollection that either I or Colonel Bratton did call up General Gerow that morning.

Senator Ferguson. Did you reach him?

General Miles. I remember very definitely that it was my desire to have this conference as soon as possible with General Marshall and General Gerow.

Senator Ferguson. Did you reach Gerow before you went to General Marshall's office?

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General Miles. Either Colonel Bratton or I, whoever telephoned him, did reach General Gerow before we went in to see General Marshall.

Senator Ferguson. You say you did reach him?

General Miles. We did reach him.

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to him about this message?

[2493] General Miles. No, sir, we were not talking over the public telephone about this message.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Miles. I think if I personally talked to General Gerow I probably said, "G, we have got something important. Will you come down to your office?"

Senator Ferguson. Down to his office? Is that what you say?

General Miles. To his office; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now did he come to his office and did you meet him there?

General Miles. General Gerow, I have every reason to believe, did go to his office. I did not actually meet him in his office, I first met him in General Marshall's office.

Senator Ferguson. Did you attempt to meet General Gerow in his office?

General Miles. I do not remember to have done so, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you at General Marshall's office before General Gerow came in?

General Miles. I was, sir, as far as I remember.

Senator Ferguson. Then you had no conversation whatever with the War Plans Division about this message prior to going into General Marshall's office?

General Miles. That is my recollection, sir.

[2494] Senator Ferguson. They would be in control of putting war plans into effect, would they not?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did they have any exact knowledge of this message prior to going into General Marshall's office?

General Miles. Well, General Gerow was on the list of those who were to receive these magic messages.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he received this magic message on the night of the 6th or the morning of the 7th, or did he have it at all prior to the time that you met him in General Marshall's office?

General Miles. My recollection is I knew at that time that he had received the magic messages before going to General Marshall's office. I do not believe that he received them on the night of December 6.

Senator Ferguson. And that would be due to the fact that you had discussed with Bratton the fact that it would not be important to deliver those messages on the night of the 6th?

General Miles. Presumably; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now I want to take up the subject in relation to the British Intelligence. You knew, did you not, that the British were intercepting and decoding the Jap messages the same as you were?

General Miles. I did, sir.

[2495] Senator Ferguson. And when did you first learn that the British were decoding these messages?
General Miles. I think it was sometime in January of 1941 that they were given the means of decoding these messages.

Senator Ferguson. And after December 1941 the British, in your opinion, had access to all of the so-called magic messages; is that true?

General Miles. All that they could intercept; yes, sir. I do not remember whether they always had the same messages that we had.

Senator Ferguson. Now did you have a committee with the British on this question?

General Miles. Did I have what?

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a committee, or board, liaison, or joint committee between the British and the Americans on this question of intercepting these messages, or did you just give them the means of intercepting? You told us you gave them the means of intercepting and decoding.

General Miles. We gave them the means of intercepting, and I also had some discussions during that year 1941 with the British military attaché and Canadian military attaché, because certain of these messages were being intercepted by Canada, but not any other part of the British Empire. The Canadians did not have the means of breaking them nor did they know anything about the technical details of decoding. We were very anxious, however, to get from them any messages that they could pick up out of the air which, for any reason, we could not or the British could not.

Senator Ferguson. Where was the means of the so-called tracking the code, so far as the British were concerned; was it in London?

General Miles. I believe it was in London, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did not they have a means of picking it up in Singapore?

General Miles. I imagine they did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You just imagine it. Don't you know it as an intelligence officer?

General Miles. I know nothing now. I might have at the time, but I know nothing now about the details of where the British intercepting stations were, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now after you gave them the means of decoding and intercepting and getting the information in January, 1941, did you ever get from the British any information that they obtained from Japan by means of decoding?

General Miles. I cannot answer that question, Senator, offhand. I would have to look up the record.

Senator Ferguson. Why cannot you answer?

General Miles. Because my memory is not sufficiently good to allow me to say "yes" or "no".

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any files of any memoranda or any evidence that you have received information from the British?

General Miles. I doubt if we made those matters a matter of record. The whole question was treated with great secrecy, and these conversations I spoke of between the British and Canadian Military Attaché and myself were always verbal conversations, not reduced to writing.

Senator Ferguson. That is not what I am talking about. I want to know, after you gave Britain the means of getting these communications, decoding the messages, receiving the messages, whether or not they ever gave you any of the evidence, as intelligence officer, that they received? That is a clear question, isn't it?
General Miles. It is a very clear question, Senator. I wish my memory were sufficiently clear to enable me to give you a clear answer. Unfortunately it is not.

Senator Ferguson. Now you told us yesterday that Congress would not give to the Army enough money for intelligence work, and you told us about the money, as I recall, that England was spending, that it had a much bigger staff, and so forth.

That is true, isn't it?

General Miles. On the secret service; yes, sir.

[2498] Senator Ferguson. And you delivered to them—that is, our Government, delivered to them the means of decoding these messages and after we gave them the means in January 1941, we never received any information from them until we were struck at Pearl Harbor? Is that what you want to tell this committee?

General Miles. No, sir; that is not what I want to tell this committee.

[2499] Senator Ferguson. What do you want to tell the committee?

General Miles. I want to tell the committee that I cannot answer your question from my memory, Senator. I would, if you like, attempt to find the records, or other means of arriving at an answer to that question, but I would not do it purely from memory.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel, have we any files given to us by the Army showing that Britain did give us this intelligence service, that we enabled them to get, or cooperate with us in giving us what they received so we could compare it with what we received?

Mr. Gesell. We have no information, Senator, as to whether the British did or did not give us any results of their interceptions of magic. We can inquire about that if you wish.

Senator Ferguson. Now going back to General Miles, where do you think, General, that you will find information as to whether or not the British were giving up this intelligence?

General Miles. I should look into the records of the far eastern section of the Military Intelligence Division and also in the SIS, the Signal Corps.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether any other agency [2500] was getting this information? Have you ever heard of any other agency getting it? Now, I am talking about agencies such as the Secretary of State, the White House, executive branch, the Navy, the Air Corps, the FBI.

General Miles. No, sir; I do not remember ever having heard of any other branch or division of the Government receiving such information.

Senator Ferguson. Then I will ask you why we gave this means to the British if it was not to help us, if that was not one of the purposes.

General Miles. Senator, you phrase one of your questions "The United States Government gave this means," and you phrase the several others that I gave this means. I prefer the former one. I did not personally give the means, of course.

Senator Ferguson. Explain how it got there. You were the intelligence officer, and I assume you had full control and full knowledge of all intelligence. Is that correct?
General Miles. I did not have any control whatever over the SIS of the Signal Corps, from which these means were found when it was decided to give them to the British Government.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, the SIS, the Signal Corps, would not be interested in looking over all of the [2501] intelligence, analyzing it, and determining what it means, would it?

General Miles. No, sir; that was the function of Military Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson. And that was your function?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then you would be interested, and not SIS, in what the British were giving to us, in what messages they picked up; isn't that correct?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you now have absolutely no memory of ever receiving any information from the British?

General Miles. I have no recollection of any specific information we received from the British, coming from magic.

Senator Ferguson. But you will look that up. Can you do that at noon, General? Can you do that at noon so I can have it?

General Miles. I doubt very much that I can get an answer during the noon hour, but I will try, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Bratton is sitting right behind you, so you can confer with him, and so we can go into this matter.

General Miles. Do you wish me to confer with him now, sir?

[2502] Senator Ferguson. No. We only have 5 minutes, and after that you can confer with him.

General Miles. Very well, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I want to go into what means of intercepting we had on the Philippines. As an intelligence officer, do you know what means of intercepting we had on the Philippines?

General Miles. I think I knew that we had a radio station capable of intercepting wireless in the Philippines. I am pretty sure of that, but that again did not come under my responsibility of jurisdiction.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that in the Philippines they had a means of decoding these diplomatic messages?

General Miles. No, sir; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Would you now be surprised to learn that they did have that means and gave all the messages to General MacArthur?

General Miles. I would, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how could you evaluate what General MacArthur knew unless you knew what he was receiving? Tell us, as an intelligence officer, how you could evaluate that unless you knew what he was receiving?

General Miles. I knew what he was receiving from us. I thought that he was not receiving any magic directly from [2503] any facilities that we had available in the Philippines.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if I told you from the Hewitt report—

General Miles. From the what?

Senator Ferguson. From the Hewitt report. Did you ever hear from the Hewitt report?

General Miles. Admiral Hewitt; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. If I tell you that he was giving these messages, would that make any difference in your testimony?

General Miles. It would make no difference in my testimony, sir. I am testifying and have been testifying to what I remember, and what I thought I knew at the time.

Senator Ferguson. This will be along the line of cooperation—Mr. Murphy (interposing). Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. You have in your files there an affidavit from General MacArthur, himself, as to what he received.

Senator Ferguson. And I have testimony before me showing what he did receive.

Mr. Murphy. The affidavit is in the Clausen report, which you have.

Senator Ferguson. I have other testimony in the Hewitt Report indicating what he did receive. I will produce it this afternoon.

I want to know whether or not you knew about this message. This is a message of H. R. Stark, OPNAV, November 26, 1941, G. L. Tucker, from the President, for the High Commissioner, Philippines. I will ask you to look at it and see whether you ever knew about it? You were in the Intelligence Branch.

General Miles. Will you pass it over, please, sir?
(The document was handed to General Miles.)

General Miles. I have no recollection of ever having seen that dispatch until this moment.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it into the record? It may refresh your memory.

The Chairman. May the Chair inquire what exhibit this paper appears in?

Mr. Gesell. This is the dispatch that was laid on the committee table this morning, and will be the subject, or part of the testimony of General Gerow when he follows General Miles, and will also be part of the testimony of General Marshall.

[2505] Mr. Murphy. Part of exhibit 39?

Mr. Gesell. It is not an exhibit as yet.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it, General?

General Miles (reading):

From: The President.
For: High Commissioner Philippines.

A copy of a dispatch will be delivered to you by Admiral Hart which, with my approval, the CNO and COS addressed to the Senior Army and Navy Commanders in the Philippines. In addition you are advised that the Japanese are strongly reinforcing their garrison and naval forces in the mandates in a manner which indicates they are preparing this region as quickly as possible against a possible attack on them by U. S. forces. However I am more particularly concerned over increasing opposition of Japanese leaders and by current southward troop movements from Shanghai and Japan to the Formosa area. Preparations are becoming apparent in China, Formosa and Indochina for an early aggressive movement of some character although as yet there are no clear indications as to its strength or whether it will be directed against the Burma Road, Thailand, Malay Peninsula, Netherlands East Indies or the Philippines. Advance against Thailand seems the most probable. I [2506] consider it possible that this next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of hostilities between the U. S. and Japan. I desire that after further informing yourself as to the situation and the general outlines of naval and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur, you shall, in great confidence, present my views
to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I am relying upon the full cooperation of his Government and his people. Please impress upon him the desirability of avoiding public pronouncement or action since that might make the situation more difficult.

There is apparently no signature.

The Chairman. It is 12 o'clock. We will recess until 2 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[2507]  

Afternoon Session—2 P. M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Senator Ferguson. You were examining General Miles. You may proceed.

Testimony of Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles (Resumed)

General Miles. Senator, I am happy to report, sir, that Colonel Bratton has called to my mind a circumstance that enables me to state of my own knowledge that shortly after the British were given the means of deciphering the intercepted Japanese messages the Signal Corps, that is to say, the SIS, arranged with the British a simple code by which we could mutually assure ourselves that both got the same messages. If we failed to get one through that code, the British supplied us with that message, and vice versa.

I am also glad to know from Colonel Bratton that he has much more distinct information, specific information, as to the times of arrival and the sending of telephone messages, and so forth, on the evening of the 6th and the morning of the 7th than I was able to give you and no doubt he will be able to give you that information when he comes before you.

Senator Ferguson. General, you were over Colonel Bratton at that time? He was under you?

[2508]  

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You understood the question?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How did you learn about our negotiation with the British in relation to the codes? Who told you about the agreement that had been made in January of 1941?

General Miles. Undoubtedly the Signal Corps told me that, sir. I was in close relation at that time with General Maughborne, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, who was principally responsible, I think, for that magnificent work of breaking those codes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that only because of Colonel Bratton’s statement to you that you recall that we were getting messages from Bratton?

General Miles. Senator, the matter was a blank in my mind this morning. I was trying to remember. In a few words he recalled something that I now clearly remember. That very often happens I think, sir, after 4 years.

Senator Ferguson. Have you examined the book known as exhibit 1?

General Miles. The magic messages?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. Yes, sir.
[2509] Senator Ferguson. I note that on page 178 that the message that is coming through is 836.

General Miles. Page 178, sir? Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; page 178. Do you have that?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that is a message from Tokyo to Washington?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is about the time that we were delivering the message of the 26th, is it not?

General Miles. That was sent on the same day that we delivered the note of the 26th.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you will note, there is no other message from Tokyo to Washington in this book until you get to page 185 and the number of the message is 841. Do you have that?

General Miles. 841; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not these numbers were the Japanese numbers or our numbers that are being used on these messages?

General Miles. I understand the number that follows immediately the date is the Japanese number. Our number is to be found at the bottom of the message.

Senator Ferguson. And apparently they were using consecutive numbers to the messages sent here, is that true?

General Miles. I imagine that was true; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not we intercepted the messages between 836 and 841?

General Miles. No, sir; I do not know that point.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I would like to ask, does counsel know whether we did or not?

Mr. Mitchell. This is not a complete series. It was not intended to be in this book. There are messages that came in, administrative messages, visa messages, messages about shipping Japs home, and things of that kind that we left out of the compilation. They are available.

Senator Ferguson. My question to counsel is whether those numbers are available?

Mr. Mitchell. I assume they are.

Senator Ferguson. Would you check that?

Mr. Mitchell. We cannot tell till we look it up.

Senator Ferguson. Well, would you check that?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. I will just pass this then for the time being.

Mr. Mitchell. Between those dates?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; between those numbers, 836 to 841.

[2511] Mr. Mitchell. All right.1

Senator Ferguson. We may have to have this witness back. I wanted to question you now and bring out that these numbers were Japanese numbers and they indicated that they were sending them in consecutive numbers to the embassy here. Is that correct?

General Miles. That is correct to the best of my knowledge, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you will note that if they sent a message to Honolulu it had another number, did it not? I don’t think there is

1 Included in Hearings, Part 4, p. 1716–1717.
any in this particular book. Is that your recollection whether or not it did have another number?

General Miles. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, getting back to what you knew, and that is what I am interested in, what you knew that General MacArthur knew.

You say that you did not know about the message that I had you read into the record from the President—No—Yes; it is from the President to the High Commissioner of the Philippines.

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you know whether or not when a message was sent like that from Stark through the Navy if the Army would get it in the Philippines?

[2512] General Miles. From an examination of that message which I have seen only today, I would suppose that that would not be turned over to the Army. It was from the President to a definite High Commissioner. The message does, however, say something about Admiral Hart, but I see nothing to indicate that it would be turned over to the Army.

Senator Ferguson. Here is what it says [reading]:

I desire that after further informing yourself as to the situation in the general outline of naval and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur you shall in great confidence present my views to the President of the Philippines.

This message indicated that it was to be taken up with General MacArthur, did it not, before he conferred with the President?

General Miles. It directed the High Commissioner to consult General MacArthur and Admiral Hart before he, the High Commissioner, spoke to the President of the Philippine Government.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, as an intelligence officer, would you draw the conclusion that General MacArthur had seen this instrument?

General Miles. I should think it very likely that the High Commissioner in discussing the—in giving General MacArthur some reason for his discussing with General MacArthur the Army data that he was told to discuss, would have shown him a copy of that message from the President.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether there was close liaison between the Army and Navy and the Philippines?

General Miles. I have every reason to believe there was a close liaison, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then I show you this instrument, and ask you to read it.

(The document was handed to General Miles.)

The Chairman. Would you mind identifying that instrument, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Could we have an exhibit number given to it? Will you show it to counsel?

Mr. Mitchell. It is a typed copy of a message from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Forces to the Chief of Naval Operations, information copy to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated December 7, 1941.
The Chairman. Has that been filed as an exhibit, or is it a part of any exhibit that has been filed?

Mr. Gesell. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It was just received through counsel.

The Chairman. Read it.

Mr. Mitchell. It reads this way:

[2514] Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain Armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

The Vice Chairman. From whom to whom?

Mr. Mitchell. It is from Hart of the Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, information copy, it says to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

The Chairman. What is the date of it?

Mr. Mitchell. December 1941. I do not see a date on it.

Senator Ferguson. December 7. They strike out the number that is not used, and leave the one that is used.

Mr. Mitchell. I would not know about that. That identifies the message. Do you want it numbered as an exhibit?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 40 is used on that document.

(The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 40.)

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you read it into the record, General?

General Miles. Very well, sir. [Reading exhibit No. 40:]


No indication which one it is.

From: Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

To: OPNAV.

Information: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Senator Ferguson. That would be from Admiral Hart, would it not? He was the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet?

General Miles. Yes, sir. "To OPNAV."

Senator Ferguson. That is to whom?

General Miles. To Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, who was head of the Naval Operations here in Washington?

General Miles. Yes. And for information of Admiral Kimmel of the Pacific Fleet.

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

And at the bottom is "TOP SECRET."

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever know about that message?

General Miles. To the best of my knowledge and belief this is the first time I ever saw that message, or heard of it.

[2516] Senator Ferguson. Would it be material to evaluate the evidence as to what was going on? Would that have been material?

General Miles. Yes, sir; it would have been very material. It would have been checked and found to be correct, if we had made such promises to the British.

Senator Ferguson. I am going to come to that again a little bit later on so that would be an item that was known in the Pacific, and with
close liaison between the two, General MacArthur would have known about that?

General Miles. I should think he would, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You assume that he would.

Now, I call to your attention the basic exhibit of dispatches. Has that an exhibit number? Is that exhibit 37?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.


By the way, going back to that other exhibit, the 7th in the Philippines is the 6th here, is it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You would assume then that that came in here on the 6th? Is that correct, General?

General Miles. I did not quite hear.

Senator Ferguson. You would assume it was received here at Washington on the 6th?

[2517] General Miles. It was sent from Manila on the 7th; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that would be on the 6th here. Have you got page 39 of that exhibit?

General Miles. I have, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read that into the record, sir?

General Miles (reading from exhibit No. 37):

TOP SECRET

2 December 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: CINCAF.

That is from Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet.

Senator Ferguson. Will you interpret those? That is from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart?

General Miles. From Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart.

PRESIDENT DIRECTS THAT THE FOLLOWING BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WITHIN TWO DAYS IF POSSIBLE AFTER RECEIPT THIS DISPATCH. CHARTER 3 SMALL VESSELS TO FORM A “DEFENSIVE INFORMATION PATROL”. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH IDENTITY AS U. S. MEN-OF-WAR ARE COMMAND BY A NAVAL OFFICER AND TO MOUNT A SMALL GUN AND 1 MACHINE GUN WOULD SUFFICE. FILIPINO CREWS MAY BE EMPLOYED WITH MINIMUM NUMBER NAVAL RATINGS TO ACCOMPLISH PURPOSE WHICH IS TO OBSERVE AND REPORT BY RADIO JAPANESE MOVEMENTS IN WEST CHINA SEA AND GULF OF SIAM. 1 VESSEL TO BE STATIONED BETWEEN HAINAN AND HUE ONE VESSEL OFF THE INDO-CHINA COAST BETWEEN CAMRANH BAY AND CAPE ST. JAQUES AND ONE VESSEL OFF POINTE DE CAMAU. USE OF ISABEL AUTHORIZED BY PRESIDENT AS ONE OF THE THREE BUT NOT OTHER NAVAL VESSELS. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN TO CARRY OUT PRESIDENT'S VIEWS. AT SAME TIME INFORM ME AS TO WHAT RECONNAISSANCE MEASURES ARE BEING REGULARLY PERFORMED AT SEA BY BOTH ARMY AND NAVY WHETHER BY AIR SURFACE VESSELS OR SUBMARINES AND YOUR OPINION AS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE LATTER MEASURES.

Senator Ferguson. General, did you ever know about that message?

General Miles. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this is the first time I have ever seen that message.
Senator Ferguson. That indicates that that was sent from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart under the direction of the President?
General Miles. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. On the 2d of December 1941?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would that message have been of value to you in the evaluation of your information?
General Miles. It would have informed me that a small reconnaissance patrol was being established as per this dispatch.
Senator Ferguson. Would not the fact of the source of the instrument be of value to you? Would not that place more value on it than ordinarily?
General Miles. You mean that it came from the President?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Miles. That would have meant to me simply that the President was very definitely interested in the establishment of this naval patrol.
Senator Ferguson. And that he must have had certain things in mind, and you can read from the instrument what he had in mind, could you not?
General Miles. That he wished the Navy to pick up, if possible, movements of presumably Japanese ships or convoys in the waters mentioned.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you would assume that that went to General MacArthur, you would not?
General Miles. Yes, sir; I would have supposed that the Army and Navy in Manila, Admiral Hart and General MacArthur were maintaining so close liaison that an important message like that from the President would be communicated from Admiral Hart to General MacArthur.
Senator Ferguson. Are you through?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Let us analyze it and see whether or not it would have been of value to you.
The first thing was that they were to have “three small vessels to form a defensive information patrol.”
Then it says:
Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. Men-of-War.
Now, as an intelligence officer, what would you say that meant?
General Miles. That “minimum requirements” business?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Miles. That was for the protection, undoubtedly, of the personnel, had they been captured by an enemy.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, if they had been captured by the enemy, they could not be treated as spies; if that correct? They would have to be treated as prisoners of war?
General Miles. That is true, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What does that signify to you?
General Miles. That signifies to me only what we knew at the time, that there was a strong possibility of a clash of arms, or an outbreak of war with Japan in some other form.
Senator Ferguson. And this was a message directly from the Commander in Chief, the President?
General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I notice that it says "to mount a small gun and
one machine gun would suffice." Would that make it a man-of-war?

General Miles. I am not competent to answer that question, Sena-
tor. It is purely a naval question.

Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with that?

General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Let us go to the next sentence:

Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to
accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio—
that assumes, does it not, that there would be radio on the small boat?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. "Japanese movements in West China Sea and
Gulf of Siam."

The next one I better read:

I vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue,—
do we have a Navy man here that can put a map up with these places
on it?

Commander Baecher. We have some Navy men here.

[2522] Senator Ferguson. We have a Navy man here, but
could he handle a map?

Is there anyone here that could get us a map and show us where
these places are located?

I would like to get them on record.

Commander Baecher. We could supply that kind of information.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

[2523] Mr. Murphy. You have already been furnished such a
map. It is in your file. It is in the Navy folder.

Senator Ferguson. Has the Congressman got his map here?

Mr. Murphy. No.

Senator Ferguson. I haven't mine here.

Mr. Murphy. I say you have been furnished it. (A map was put
on the easel.)

Senator Ferguson. Apparently it is not on that map. Will you
try to place in the record where this vessel would be if stationed
between Hainan and Hue? Do you know where that would be?

General Miles. I know the Island of Hainan but I do not know
Hue.

Senator Ferguson. Would it be from Hainan over to the Philippi-
nes or would it be toward the China coast?

General Miles. I cannot say, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

One vessel off the Indo China Coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St.
Jaques.

Do you know where that would be?

General Miles. I know Camranh but I don't know Cape S. Jaques.

Senator Ferguson. Where is Camranh Bay?

General Miles. Camranh Bay, if I remember correctly, is in that
bulge of Indochina. Indochina comes out in a distinct [2524]
bulge to the eastward and it is right in there. It was the bay that
Admiral Roztrzezvensky took refuge in before the battle with Japan, and also Admiral Dewey before the battle of Manila.

Senator Ferguson. Would it be up in the Gulf of Siam?

General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I notice it starts out with "Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam."

General Miles. I think Camranh faces on West China Sea.

Senator Ferguson. Where would the next vessel be? It says, "One vessel off Pointedecamau."

General Miles. I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Could these vessels be scouting for transports, or Japanese men-of-war coming for the Philippines? How far would these points be from the Philippines?

General Miles. Well, as I remember, sir, quite some distance. It is very difficult to testify without even a map before you, Senator. They are on the other side of the water, the Chinese side.

Senator Ferguson. How many hundred miles? Do you have any idea?

General Miles. I should guess six or eight hundred miles. That is a pretty wild guess.

The Chairman. Don't make it too wild.

[2525] Senator Ferguson. Now it is said in here that the "use of Isabel"—that would be the name of a ship, would it not?

General Miles. Isabel, as I remember, was a small gunboat.

Senator Ferguson:

Use of Isabel authorized by President as one of the three but not other naval vessels.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what was in mind there, that we could use one naval vessel but the other two were not to be naval vessels?

General Miles. I should imagine that we did not want to reduce Admiral Hart's slim forces by more than the detachment of the Isabel.

[2526] Senator Ferguson. Now the next sentence, "Report measures taken to carry out President's views." Did you ever see a report coming back as to what had been done in relation to this message?

General Miles. I have no recollection of ever having seen such a report, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then going on:

At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea, by both Army and Navy, whether by air, surface vessels or submarines, and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

Did you ever get such a message, as to what reconnaissance was being used at sea, whether by air, by both the Army and Navy? It says:

whether by air, surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

General Miles. I do not remember, Senator, ever having seen any report on the reconnaissance, or types of reconnaissance being conducted by Army and Navy in the Philippines at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Now if you were having close liaison between Admiral Wilkinson and yourself, being the opposite, one in the Army
and one in the Navy, how do you account for not getting this original message and not getting the replies, if there were any replies?

[227] General Miles. Senator, I had very close contact with the Office of Naval Intelligence. I had no contact nor was I expected to have any contact with the Office of Naval Operations. I do not ever remember seeing, or being called into any consultation or handling in any way any message to or from Naval Operations. I do not want to appear to——

Senator Ferguson. I would like to now call attention——

Senator Lucas. Had you finished, General Miles?

Senator Ferguson. I thought you had finished, General. Go ahead if you have not.

General Miles. I don’t want to appear to avoid any line of questioning, but it might help if I would state frankly now that I did not know, I was not in the group consulted generally, and I think I can say always, as to Naval Operations’ messages or deliberations between the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Secretary of State or the President. All of those things were above my level, we will say, if you like to put it that way. I was not called into that group at all.

Senator Ferguson. I want to show you an affidavit made by General MacArthur.

Would counsel let me have the exhibit—it may not be in an exhibit. It is the Clausen report, which has an affidavit of


Mr. Murphy. Senator Barkley has it.

The Chairman. I was just reading it.

Senator Ferguson. I just want him to read it into the record.

The Chairman. Is that the one dated——

Senator Ferguson. Sometime in 1945.

The Chairman. May 1945.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Will you read that, General, because I want to ask some questions about it.

The Chairman. Read it, General, so we can all hear it.

General Miles (reading):


General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, presently Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Commanding General, USAFFE.

The Chairman. What does that mean?


The Chairman. All right.

General Miles (reading):

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit “B” consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I have no recollection of having seen any of these before. I did not see the messages described as the “Winds Code”, nor any activating or implementing message. I believe I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the Hq. USAFFE.

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I have no knowledge as to the basis or source of this
intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages were being transmitted to persons at Honolulu, T. II.

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before December 7, 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were delivered to the Navy at Fort Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages were delivered to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this intelligence. Whether all messages were intercepted by the Navy to the Army I do not know. All transmission of this subject matter was entirely in the hands of the Navy.

Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to December 7, 1941.

/s/ DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lieutenant Colonel.

Senator Lucas. What page of the report is that on?

Mr. Murphy. 186.

General Miles. 188. No. 186.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how General MacArthur spells his last name?

General Miles. I thought it was “M-a-c”.

Senator Ferguson. That is the way it is signed, is it not?


Senator Ferguson. Well, now, at the top how is it spelled?

General Miles. “M-c”.

Senator Ferguson. “M-c”. Well, at least that would indicate that no one in MacArthur’s headquarters prepared that affidavit, wouldn’t it?

General Miles. That was prepared, undoubtedly, by Colonel Clausen.

Senator Ferguson. Who didn’t know how to spell MacArthur’s name?

General Miles. I would say that was it.

Senator Ferguson. Let’s take up some things in that exhibit.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit “B” consisting of a file of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages.

Do you know what they are?

I would like to have you keep that affidavit.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that was?

General Miles. It was a collection of the magic messages, as I remember it, which was called “Exhibit B.”

[2532] Senator Ferguson. Was it all of the messages now in exhibit 1?

General Miles. That I cannot say, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What is an “ultra” message?

General Miles. What is a what message?

Senator Ferguson. “Ultra”?

General Miles. Ultra is the same thing as—it is another word for “magic” or “top secret” as applied to these intercepted messages.
Senator Ferguson. In that paragraph, the last line is:
I believe I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the headquarters U. S. A. F. E.

What would that mean to you?
General Miles. That would mean, sir, he saw all of these Japanese intercepts decoded by Navy which were turned over to his headquarters.

Senator Ferguson. Now, have you any knowledge as to how many were turned over to his headquarters?
General Miles. No, sir; I have not.

Senator Ferguson. But it would indicate that he had certain things turned over to him from the so-called magic messages; is that right?
General Miles. It would.

Senator Ferguson. Then we take this to be true, that if General MacArthur was getting the purple or ultra code messages, the magic, in the Philippines, and General Short was not getting them on the Hawaiian Islands, at Pearl Harbor, they were getting different information?
General Miles. Yes, sir. That is true. It would also apply to General Andrews in Panama and General DeWitt on the west coast.

Senator Ferguson. We come to the next sentence:
I have not previously seen the British S. I. S. message dated 27 November 1941, and 3 December 1941.

What is that?
General Miles. I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. You haven't any idea?
General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Can you give me any idea who would know, so we can ask counsel to get it?

Mr. Gesell. If I may interpose, Senator, those are exhibits in the Clausen report.

Senator Ferguson. Will counsel later on point those out to me?

Mr. Gesell. Certainly.

Senator Ferguson. Would you do it now?

Mr. Gesell. I thought you said later on. I will have to get it.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have it now because it may be material.

Mr. Gesell. It is in the exhibits, I believe.

The Chairman. What exhibit is that?

Mr. Gesell. Well, the Clausen report has 12 exhibits, 12 bound volumes of exhibits, which are not here before the committee now. This is only the report itself, that General Miles has in his hands.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next sentence:

I have no knowledge as to the basis or source of this intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages were being transmitted to persons in Honolulu T. H.
Do you know why such a question would be asked of General MacArthur?

General Miles. No, sir; I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. Coming down to the next sentence:

The Signal Intelligence Service—

is that your service?

General Miles. That is SIS.

Senator Ferguson. Transmitters and receivers of the messages.

General Miles. And decoded and decrypted in Washington.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before the 7 December 1941.

The next one—Do you know when that station was opened?

General Miles. No; I do not.

Senator Ferguson. Well, was that station used to collect intelligence for you?

General Miles. It was used to collect intelligence for the Signal Intelligence Service which later on transmitted it.

Senator Ferguson. To you?

General Miles. To me, when decoded and decrypted. It had nothing to do with my department until it came to me in plain English.

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't the source of material be material to you in evaluating material?

General Miles. No, sir; whether a message was picked up in Manila or in the State of Washington out of the air would have had no particular significance to me.

Senator Ferguson. That wouldn't have been of any value to you at all?

General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Just to give you an example, one of those small radio boats that was put out, as we find at least was ordered out, suppose that kind of a short-wave message had been transmitted and it had only a certain radius and would be picked up at the Philippines. Wouldn't that be an indication as to its value, where it was coming from, rather than coming out over a long-range radio?

General Miles. Well, I imagine that there would be some indication if it were picked up in the Philippines and not picked up on the west coast that it emanated from some station not powerful enough to cross the Atlantic, but the message itself when translated into English by the S. I. S. would have been the significant thing to me.

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't also the place where it was sent out and its radius have something to do with its purpose, its value, in other words?

General Miles. I can't imagine a situation in which the station, the location of the station that intercepted a message coming over the air, would have been of any particular value in analyzing that message from the point of view of military intelligence.
Senator Ferguson. Now, the next:

Diplomatic messages in purple code,—

and I assume, and is it correctly assumed, that all in exhibit 1 are purple-code messages, or is that not a correct assumption?

General Miles. That is my impression, but I am not sure of it. That is a technical question for the SIS.

Senator Ferguson. Well now the code used to send the most important messages from Japan was the purple code; is that correct?

General Miles. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, those messages, and they would be diplomatic messages would they?

General Miles. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would they be military and naval messages also?

General Miles. I imagine they would be in certain circumstances, but I do not know these different codes.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, those picked up by the Army, it appears, were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all were delivered to the SIS officer who delivered them to headquarters. USAFFE. It would indicate that the Army headquarters was getting the purple messages; is that correct?

[2538] General Miles. That is the inference from this statement; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

The decrypting and translating of these messages was a function of the Navy. The Army monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the Army I do not know.

I want to ask you there whether or not there was any system in the Intelligence Office or in the SIS office where a person could later ascertain what message had been sent from one agency, the Army or the Navy to the other. Had you any system that you could check whether a message had been sent or not sent?

General Miles. Here in Washington we did have a system. I am not acquainted with all the details, but I do know that Colonel Bratton is prepared to testify on that subject.

Senator Ferguson. Where would G-2 be in this picture over the Philippines? It would be in the headquarters USAFFE, would it not?

General Miles. I presume so, but that was a matter for decision of General MacArthur. It was his G-2 and not mine.

[2539] Senator Ferguson. Now, wasn't all of G-2 together, weren't you over all G-2 whether in the field or in Washington?

General Miles. No, sir. I have testified that the G-2's of the overseas departments were staff officers of their commanding generals, selected by them and directly under them.

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand that the intelligence in the field was not your concern, but the concern of the commanding officer?

General Miles. It was my concern so far as giving information to the field, and giving information to the Chief of Staff from the field,
but I did not directly control the G-2's of the overseas departments, staff officers of the commanding generals thereof.

Senator Ferguson. Did they inform you as to what they had?

General Miles. They sent us a great deal of information which they got from various sources. I have no recollection of any information coming from the G-2 of the Philippine Department regarding magic.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I come down to the message again in exhibit 37 on page 39.


The Vice Chairman. It is not in there. That is not in the Clausen report. You are not referring to the Clausen report?

Senator Ferguson. No.

The Vice Chairman. That is what he had in his hand.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I neglected to ask you one or two questions on that Clausen report.

Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to the 7th of December 1941.

Do you know what messages, what dispatches he was talking about there?

General Miles. I presume, sir, he was talking about General Marshall’s dispatch to the overseas department commanders on the 27th of November.

Senator Ferguson. Of course, that would have to be taken into account in evaluating with everything else, that MacArthur knew all the other purple messages he had, and all his own Intelligence had; isn’t that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir; but it was a message from the Chief of Staff of the Army which gave him a definite [2541] warning, directed him, as I remember it, to do certain things.

Senator Ferguson. Now, coming back to certain things, one of them was reconnaissance, was it not?

General Miles. I haven't got the message to General MacArthur before me, but that is my impression.

Senator Ferguson. He was to use reconnaissance. Will you look at it? I think you will find it at page 9.

General Miles. I have found it.

Senator Ferguson. It says:

* * * Take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in revised rainbow five which was delivered to you by General Brereton. Chief of Naval Operations concurs and requests you notify Hart.

So, there was reconnaissance mentioned in that message; is that true?

General Miles. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. We go back to the message on page 39 of exhibit 87. This is on the 2d of November 1941.

General Miles. Second of December.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.
It says:

[2542] Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At the same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both Army and Navy, whether by air, surface vessels, or submarine and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

That indicates that the President is anxious to know exactly what reconnaissance is being taken at the Philippines; is that true?

General MILES. I would assume so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was any such message sent to Admiral Kimmel or General Short?

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Wasn't the message of December 2 directed to all those sea areas that you couldn't find on the map and which were far distant from the Philippines? Not only to the Philippines, but up and down the coast down to Indochina?

Senator FERGUSON. What did we have at the places mentioned by the Congressman?

General MILES. What do we have there?

Senator FERGUSON. He mentioned other places.

Mr. MURPHY. Talking about the sea.

General MILES. You mean Camranh and Hainan Islands?

[2543] Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MILES. I don't think we had anything there.

Senator FERGUSON. So it couldn't be sent there? This message couldn't be sent to any of those places?

General MILES. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was Admiral Hart at the time?

General MILES. Where was Admiral Hart?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. On the 2d of December 1941?

General MILES. I do not know, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you account at all for the fact that you didn't get this information that was sent out on the 2d of December 1941, on page 39 of exhibit 37?

General MILES. Yes, sir. I think I have already accounted for it by my statement that I was not in that channel of command or concentration, whatever you would like to call it. I don't remember ever having been consulted or informed of, directly, any naval operation message or any Presidential message.

Senator FERGUSON. I find among your evaluations, on December 1, that you gave an evaluation of this whole situation, the Far East, on December 1, 1941. You recall that, or is it December 5? It is a supplemental brief periodic [2544] estimate of the situation on December 1, 1941, to March 4, 1942.

General MILES. Yes, sir. I have that before me.

Senator FERGUSON. Numbers 27 and 28 in exhibit 33?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How could you evaluate the intelligence without being in this circle you talk about and not know what was going on there? For instance, not getting the reply back as to the air reconnaissance at the Philippines?

General MILES. I had to depend on other sources of information, perhaps not so good in many cases. That was why I particularly, sup-
ported by my naval colleague, naval intelligence, was trying to integrate our activities and those of the joint Army-Navy Board.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know why specific reconnaissance, such as these three small men-of-war was being taken at the Philippines, and not taken—similar action was not being taken at Hawaii?

General Miles. I do not know but I would suppose that the action taken from the Philippines was directed primarily to the observation of the Japanese shipping of various sorts, military and commercial down the China seas. No such movement was obtainable or going on at the time in the vicinity [2545] of the Hawaiian Islands.

Senator Ferguson. In your opinion was not the Vacant Sea and the space north of Hawaii just as important an area as the one over along the China coast and the Gulf of Siam? Talking about your opinion now, as an expert.

General Miles. Yes, sir; I think it was, but it was a great deal harder to cover.

Senator Ferguson. You were not consulted as to what should take place in those areas? That was above your range?

General Miles. About the reconnaissance in the China Sea?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I was not.

Senator Ferguson. I mean the one in the Vacant Sea, you were not consulted as to what reconnaissance should be taken?

General Miles. I know nothing of any reconnaissance in the Vacant Sea.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to go to the Hewitt testimony. It is in the Hewitt testimony.

Mr. Murphy. What page, and volume? There are three volumes.

Senator Ferguson. Page 88-C.

Corregidor had liaison with the British unit at [2546] Singapore, and everything of interest or importance received from Singapore was forwarded to Washington.

Did you know that fact, that it first went to Corregidor and then later came here?

General Miles. From what source, sir? From the British?

Senator Ferguson. Well, it says:

Corregidor also had liaison with the British unit at Singapore and everything of interest or importance received from Singapore was forwarded to Washington—

General Miles. Well, we had a Colonel Brink—

Senator Ferguson (continuing):

In like manner, any translation of particular importance to the commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet was sent out from Washington.

In other words, Admiral Hart had two means of getting his information, one was from Washington, the other from Singapore, Corregidor to Hart. As I understand it, Kimmel had one means and that was Washington to Kimmel. Is that correct?

General Miles. Senator, I am not prepared to testify nor am I competent to testify on these naval-communications arrangements.

Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to find out, General, is how much knowledge you had, you being the top and the [2547] head of our Intelligence Branch in the Army—
General Miles. Yes, but—
Senator Ferguson. We had no source higher than you in the Army, had we, for Intelligence?

General Miles. I was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the War Department.

[2548] Senator Ferguson. The highest man in the Intelligence.

General Miles. In the Army?
Senator Ferguson. In the Army.

Now, the function of the Army was to defend the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, wasn't it?

General Miles. Defend that naval base at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet would have occupied the naval base, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the purpose of Intelligence is to anticipate what an enemy or prospective enemy is going to do; that is its very purpose?

General Miles. That is our ultimate, ideal purpose.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would anyone else have knowledge in a higher position than you, that could give us what knowledge was known by the Intelligence branch of the Army? Is there anybody above you in the Intelligence branch? It went from you to General Marshall?

General Miles. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Do you understand that there were consultations between people in a higher level on this Intelligence?

General Miles. There may have been. There were certainly consultations on a higher level than I occupied.

Senator Ferguson. It involved evaluations of Intelligence?
Senator Lucas. Let the General finish his answers.

[2549] Senator Ferguson. I mean to. Any time you haven't finished your answer, just say so.

Senator Lucas. Counsel continues to break in about the time the General has his mouth open.

General Miles. May I have the question again?
(The question was read by the reporter.)

General Miles. I imagine it did. Certainly action was taken on the information that Intelligence supplied.

Senator Ferguson. Did this higher level have certain intelligence that you did not have? For instance, I take it the reply to the instrument on page 39 of exhibit 37, which was the reconnaissance being taken at the Philippines, and the effectiveness of the measures.

General Miles. Yes, sir. I never saw the answer to that request.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, if those answers came back this higher level that you are speaking about would have different facts to evaluate than you had?

General Miles. That is true, sir. It was true not only of information coming from the Philippines but information here in Washington. I did not know, never did know, what the Secretary of State or the President was saying to the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you examine all the diplomatic [2550] messages so that you would have and know what this higher level knew? These diplomatic messages that we were intercepting?

General Miles. I examined all the intercepted messages that were
sent to me. In other words, all of the important messages that we intercepted from the Japanese. I knew a good deal of what was going on in this diplomatic conference. I knew also from my liaison with the State Department additional information about that diplomatic conference. I knew there was a great deal of information in the higher level that I did not get.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, did you know what messages we were sending out in our diplomatic relations with the Far East?

General Miles. Generally speaking not. Only if they were given to my liaison officers in the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. I ask you how you could evaluate the Japanese messages in reply and the memorandums sent by the Japs if you didn't know what they were replying to and what the original message was. How can you possibly evaluate?

General Miles. Well, generally I knew the important messages. I certainly knew the substance of our note of November 26.

Senator Ferguson. Doesn't it take knowledge of more than the substance of that note to realize its significance?

[2551] General Miles. Well, I think I also knew, I am pretty sure I also knew, from my liaison officer in the State Department, what certain officials of the State Department thought of the chances of acceptance of that note.

Senator Ferguson. Well, when you were giving your testimony on page 113, question No. 82 on page 112—

The Vice Chairman. Pages 112 and 113 of what?

Senator Ferguson. Secret, No. 2, Army Pearl Harbor Board, testimony of General Miles. [Reading:]

General, when in your opinion did it become apparent that war with Japan was inevitable?

This is your reply:

General Miles. On the 27th of November when we learned that we had practically given what might have been considered and probably would be considered by them an ultimatum to them. From then on I considered war as very probable if not inevitable.

General Miles. Senator, that testimony should be changed to "if not ultimately inevitable."

Senator Ferguson. That is a correction there?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. "If not ultimately inevitable."

General Miles. May I also call your attention to the succeeding page, and I would like to read my statement there.

[2552] Senator Ferguson. I wish you would read the one that I read the way it should be read.

General Miles (reading).

General Miles.—

Senator Ferguson. There are no corrections here, but as I understand it at the end you made many corrections?

General Miles. I made quite a few corrections, largely typographical errors.

Senator Ferguson. So that accounts for this mistake here?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. On the page it is just as I read it, is it not?
General Miles. On page 113 it reads:

On the 27th of November when I learned we had practically given what might be considered or probably would be considered by them an ultimatum, from then I considered war as very probable if not ultimately inevitable.

Then I wasn’t satisfied with that answer and you will find on page 114 of the same testimony:

I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer regarding inevitable war. I do not want to give the impression that I thought on November 27—

Senator Ferguson. Wait, General. That isn’t the way it is written here.

General Miles. I know. It is corrected here.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it first how it is on the page and then tell me how it was corrected later.

Let me clear something up.

Do I understand that you were given your testimony by the Army Board so that you could make corrections some time later?

General Miles. I was given my testimony by the Army Board almost immediately on my return from Boston, at my appearance down here before the Army Board. Whatever corrections were made I made in my own handwriting in ink and forwarded it by covering letter to General Grunert, and I understand those corrections were accepted.

Senator Ferguson. Now, is this true, then, that what I read was the way you gave it first and then you corrected it some days later?

General Miles. It was the way the stenographer took it down, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I mean.

General Miles. I am not at all sure it was the way I gave it.

Senator Ferguson. Very well.

The Vice Chairman. You may proceed now, General, with your original answer.

Senator Ferguson. I want you to read first the way the stenographer had it in the record and then the way you corrected it.

General Miles. You wish me to do that, sir?

[Reading:] Senator Ferguson. Yes. I want to see the correction.

General Miles. Very well. [Reading:]

I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer there.

Correction. Crossing out the word “there” and amaking it much more understandable, my answer regarding inevitable war. I continue. [Reading:]

I did not want to give.

I corrected it to say:

I do not want to give the impression that I thought on November 27th war was immediately inevitable. I thought that very definitely—

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. That is not the way it is in my sheet.

General Miles. Well, I am noting each correction that I made, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you first read it the way it is?
The Vice Chairman. You may may proceed to read it, General, and the Senator can follow and try to get the differences as they appear.

General Miles. All the corrections are in red pencil, sir, and I am reading the English as it was sent to me by the Board.

[2556] Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. Do I understand then the Chair will not permit the witness to answer the question?

The Vice Chairman. The Chair is holding that the witness, in the Chair's opinion, is trying his best to answer the question.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, is the question clear? I would like to have it read.

The Vice Chairman. If the witness has a different text from what the Senator has, why, the witness will have to be supplied with the text the Senator has.

Senator Ferguson. I give you the text that I have and ask you to read it the way the stenographer has transcribed it and then give us the way you corrected it.

General Miles (reading):

General Miles. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer there. I did not want to give the impression that I thought war was immediately inevitable. I thought that very definitely an action by Japan, a pretty radical action, would be taken almost at once; that, necessarily, would be an overt and open attack on the United States. I did not feel at all sure that war with Japan was practically inevitable at any time—

note the contradiction, please, in those two sentences—

but there were [2557] a good many things Japan could have done if she did break those negotiations short of open war with the United States and we were considering all of these matters.

My corrected statement is as follows:

General Miles. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer regarding inevitable war. I do not want to give the impression that I thought on November 27th that war was immediately inevitable. I thought that very definitely some action by Japan, a pretty radical action, would be taken almost at once but that need not necessarily be an overt and open attack on the United States. I did not feel at all sure that war with Japan was immediately inevitable at any time. There were a good many things Japan could have done if she broke her negotiations in Washington short of open war with the United States, and we were considering all of those possibilities.

Senator, you will please notice that in your version there is a direct contradiction between two sentences. I picked that up immediately and corrected it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, from the information that you had did you ever come to the conclusion prior to the attack—I am talking about any time prior to the at- [2558] tack, prior to that time that war was inevitable with Japan?

General Miles. No, sir. "Inevitable" precludes any other alternative as I understand the word and in that sense I never regarded war as inevitable until I knew that war was on.

Senator Ferguson. Now, getting back just for a moment where we were before, on the information known by the higher levels.

I want to call your attention to another instrument given to me this morning, dated November 27, 1941.

Does counsel have another copy he could give the witness?
Mr. Mitchell. What is it?

Senator Ferguson. It was given to me by counsel this morning, I would like to have the record show.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, here is a copy for the witness.

Senator Ferguson. This is a memorandum of November 27, 1941, "stamped notation: November 28, 1941 Noted—Chief of Staff (WBS—handwritten)."

Do you see what I am reading from?

General Miles. I think it is William Bedell Smith, but I am not sure, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was his position with the Army [2559] at that time, on the 27th of November 1941?

General Miles. He was Secretary of the General Staff.

Senator Ferguson. Then it is: "Noted—Deputy Chief of Staff (WBS—handwritten)." What is that?

General Miles. I think that is the same, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So he signed it for General Marshall and signed it for himself as Deputy Chief of Staff, is that correct? He signed it in two capacities?

General Miles. He did not sign for himself at all that I can see, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, "Deputy Chief of Staff." Who is Deputy Chief of Staff?

General Miles. General Bryden, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Right under that is "WBS—handwritten." What is that?

General Miles. I think, sir, that is the initials of General Bedell Smith.

Senator Ferguson. Then he signed for himself and signed for General Bryden, is that correct—or signed for General Marshall?

General Miles. For General Marshall and General Bryden.

Senator Ferguson. For General Marshall and General Bryden, is that correct?

[2569] General Miles. That is apparently correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. Murphy. Is that something that you have a copy of?

Senator Ferguson. You have received it this morning.

Mr. Gesell. We delivered it this morning in anticipation of General Gerow's testimony.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff.

That is General Marshall, is it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 A. M., November 27, 1941.

General Bryden was present.

This is signed by L. T. Gerow, Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff. He was in War Plans, was he not?

General Miles. Yes, sir. He was Chief of War Plans.
Senator Ferguson. He was Chief of War Plans. The Secretary of War was Mr. Stimson at the time, was he not?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

[2561] General Bryden was present.

Now, you say he was Deputy Chief of Staff?

General Miles. General Bryden was Deputy Chief of Staff; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading).

The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

What is that instrument? I will not try to identify it. You identify it. [Reading from the letter:]

I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

What is that message?

General Miles. I presume it is the message on page 5 of this exhibit 32, sir.

The Vice Chairman.. Is the Senator satisfied on that identification or can counsel help?

Mr. Gesell. You will note, Senator, that that message, while a Navy message, says: "Addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas" in the body of the text, making it a joint message and it bears the date November 24, 1941.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, we have identified that. Going on with the letter (reading):

[2562] I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting.

What is that, General?

General Miles. I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see it?

General Miles. I cannot identify it, Senator. I was not at that meeting.

Senator Ferguson. And now, reading it, you cannot identify it?

General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, continuing reading:

He—

meaning the Secretary of War—

He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

Mr. Gesell. You left out a sentence, didn't you, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. I beg your pardon. Yes; I left out a sentence. [Reading:]

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines.

I will read that over so the record will be straight. [2563] Strike the other out. [Reading:]

Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.
Did you ever have that knowledge?

General Miles. Did I have what?

Senator Ferguson. Did you have that knowledge that the President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines?

General Miles. I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted in relation to that at all, to give them what intelligence you had; what information you had?

General Miles. I have no recollection of any such consultation, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then it goes on:

Later in the morning, I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed.

Who was Mr. Sayre at the time?

[2564] General Miles. He was the High Commissioner in the Philippines, I believe, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would that indicate that what they were discussing was this instrument which you read right before the noon recess, the one from the President to the High Commissioner of the Philippines?

General Miles. It would so indicate, Senator.

Senator Ferguson (reading).

A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy attached).

May I ask, counsel, if there was a copy attached to this when we received it, having that joint message?

Mr. Gesell. Yes; I think that is the joint message printed in Exhibit 32, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. On what page?

Mr. Murphy. Page 5.

Mr. Gesell. No; not page 5. The one of November 27 to MacArthur, which is a joint message, telling him to inform Hart.

Senator Ferguson. So we get the right page. Page 9, is it not?

Mr. Gesell. Yes; I believe so.

Senator Ferguson. So it is joint between MacArthur and Hart?

[2565] Mr. Gesell. The last two words are, “Notify Hart.”

Senator Ferguson. Yes. That makes it joint with MacArthur and Hart?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with that message?

General Miles. I was not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that message was signed by General Marshall. Do you see that on the bottom of it?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you were not consulted prior to the 7th about that message?

General Miles. I was not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have knowledge of it prior to the 7th?

General Miles. I did, sir. I had knowledge of the substance of the warning messages which were sent out to all of the overseas departments and the west coast.
Senator Ferguson. But you had not seen the messages; you just had their substance?

General Miles. So far as I can remember, I did not, as I stated in my memorandum of January 30 of the following year, 1942, remember seeing an actual text of the message.

Senator Ferguson. But did you know that on the 27th of November that General Marshall was not in Washington?

[2565] General Miles. I probably did at the time. I remember very well that he was not in Washington on the 28th.

Senator Ferguson. Is it just the opposite, that he returned on the 28th and that he was not here on the 27th? Does that refresh your memory?

General Miles. I think not, sir, because he was not here when we were discussing the Arnold antisabotage messages on the 28th. That was the reason that General Bryden presided at the conference.

Senator Ferguson (reading on):

The Secretaries—

I take it that means the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy—were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President.

Now, what memorandum are they referring to there?

General Miles. I have seen recently a copy of a memorandum that I think that refers to.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I show you exhibit 17. Do you have it?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, does that refresh your memory?

General Miles. Exhibit 17 is apparently the memorandum referred to in General Gerow's memorandum of the 27th.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever seen it?

[2566] General Miles. I have no recollection of having seen it at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not certain recommendations were made in it?

General Miles. Yes, sir; three recommendations appear at the bottom of it.

Senator Ferguson. What are the recommendations made?

General Miles. Do you wish me to read it, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles (reading):

It is recommended that:

prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counter-action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;
in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;
steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first get knowledge of that paper, of those facts?

General Miles. To the best of my belief, Senator, I got knowledge of this particular paper about a week or ten days ago.
Senator Ferguson. Now, reading on from the memorandum:

The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations.

Do you know anything about that statement?
General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that General Marshall and Admiral Stark were to prepare a memorandum to the President? That is what is indicated immediately above, is it not?
General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that is the instrument that you read from?
General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations.

[2569] Would you say that that was an indication that the Secretary of War was telling General Marshall and Admiral Stark what they should put in their recommendations or what they should put in their memorandum?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. May I inquire whose message is this that the General is testifying from?

Senator Ferguson. It is L. T. Gerow's. I am trying to get him to interpret it as an Intelligence officer and also as to what knowledge he had.

Senator Lucas. If course, I am not going to make any objection but it does seem to me that General Gerow is about the only individual who can give the committee any real information as to what he had in mind when he gave out that statement. It is my understanding that General Gerow is to come on the stand and testify as to all of these matters.

General Miles here has practically told us nothing. He has assumed and supposed, and so on, and so forth. He does not know much about it and it does seem to me we are wasting a lot of time, but maybe we are not.

Senator Ferguson. Well, as far as this Senator is concerned we are not. I am trying to find out——

[2570] Senator Lucas. I knew that, of course.

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out exactly what this man knew, and what those above him knew, and what those below him knew, and if it is going to take some time, considering that the other time that has been taken I do not consider that I have wasted this time and I would like to continue asking these questions.

Senator Lucas. No; the only thing I say, if I may reply to the Senator, it is pretty well understood as to how this matter was to come on, and it does seem to me that we are adding a lot of confusion to what was presumed to be an orderly prepared case, and now counsel will have to go over this thing tomorrow, the same thing over and over again, when General Gerow gets here.
Senator Ferguson. General Gerow cannot say what this man knew.

Senator Lucas. General Miles doesn't know anything about Gerow's language and its interpretation.

The Chairman. The Chair would assume, and I suppose the committee would assume, that in a message sent by General Gerow to anybody, if there is any difference in the interpretation of that message as between General Miles and General Gerow, as between General Miles, who did not send it, and General Gerow, who did, the committee would consider whether General Gerow's interpretation was entitled to greater force [2571] and weight than General Miles'. I suppose that is a matter that the committee may have to decide.

Senator Lucas. Then I would like to inquire how many officers we can bring here from the Intelligence Service to interpret messages sent out by General Gerow and everybody else? There will be no end to this if we follow that procedure.

Senator Ferguson. I now ask the question. Did you ever know that the Secretary of War had spoken to General Marshall and Admiral Stark, or either of them, about what should be in their memorandum that went to the President, and as to whether or not they wanted to make sure, to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations?

General Miles. I did not, Senator, and I repeat, sir, that I was not called in in consultation in any way that I can remember between the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of War and the President, or the Chief of Staff and the President in reference to this paper or any other paper. I was simply not a part of that hierarchy that handled those matters.

[2572] Senator Ferguson. Did you have any knowledge about the paragraph:

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or South of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands?

General Miles. I have a distinct recollection, Senator, that I did know of the existence of certain negotiations or discussions going on at that time about a line beyond which certain powers would agree that the Japanese might not go without incurring war.

Senator Ferguson. When did you get that information? Pardon me. Are you through?

General Miles. Yes, sir; I am through.

Senator Ferguson. When did you get that information?

General Miles. I cannot say exactly when. It was during this period of late November, or the latter half of November or early in December.

[2573] Senator Ferguson. Do you know that there was a message given to the Jap Ambassador on August 17, 1941? That is in volume II of Foreign Relations.

The Chairman. Has somebody got volume II?
Senator Ferguson. I will get it later. I will pass that for the time being. Did you know of any message to the Japs by the President in August of 1941 in relation to their movement south?

General Miles. I cannot now recall any such message, sir. I might have, but I do not remember.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I read you what was in this memo of the 27th from General Marshall and Admiral Stark about the line, and you said you knew about that.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you get that information from General Marshall?

General Miles. I do not think I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know where you obtained it?

General Miles. I believe I obtained it verbally from General Gerow.

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate it was part of our war plan, would it not?

General Miles. Oh, no, sir; not a written war plan.

Senator Ferguson. Did we have a war plan on that?

[2574] General Miles. None that I know of, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you use that fact in evaluating your material?

General Miles. The fact that there was a discussion about such a line?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I presume I did, sir, but I would give it very little evaluation, knowing that no such definite agreement had been made or transmitted to the Japanese.

Senator Ferguson. Do you mean that last part of your answer? You would not expect us to transmit that to the Japanese in that particular language, would you?

General Miles. That is what the suggestion in this paper implies, sir. The United States, British, and Dutch Governments indicated that an advance beyond that line may lead to war, that Japan was warned by the United States, British, and Dutch Governments that an advance beyond that line that was indicated may lead to war.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether that warning was ever given?

General Miles. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversations with the Secretary of War during this period that you were evaluating this evidence?

[2575] General Miles. I do not remember any specific conversation, sir. I saw the Secretary not infrequently.

Senator Ferguson. Your best knowledge now is you got this information about the ABCD agreement from General Gerow?

General Miles. The ABC and D agreement No. 1, as I remember it, was the result of a Joint Staff conference with the British in the preceding winter. Are you speaking of that, Senator, or this line?

Senator Ferguson. Did that involve the line; the one in the winter?

General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. They are two different things, are they not?

General Miles. They are two separate things; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now the first agreement you say was agreed upon in the winter. What was that? What knowledge do you have on that?

General Miles. I sat as a conferee in that conference. I had pretty complete knowledge of that.

Senator Ferguson. You had direct knowledge of that?

General Miles. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was that agreement?

General Miles. That was an agreement contingent on the United States being drawn into the war, of certain basic concepts or policies that would be followed by the United States and Great Britain.

Senator Ferguson. That was in April of 1941, was it not?

General Miles. As I remember, that conference took place in, I would say, February or March, or it may have been March or April of 1941.

Senator Ferguson. And where did it take place?

General Miles. Here in Washington.

Senator Ferguson. Attended by the British, Canadians, and the Dutch?

General Miles. No, sir; by the British and Americans.

Senator Ferguson. Just the British and Americans?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now was this line fixed at that time?

General Miles. No, sir; I have no recollection of any such line being discussed at that time.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first get information on a line?

General Miles. As nearly as I can fix it, sir, sometime about the middle or latter part of November, perhaps even as late as the first days of December 1941.

Senator Ferguson. Now will you tell us, as nearly as you can, what that information was about the line?

General Miles. That there were discussions then in hand between representatives of our Government, the British, and Dutch, fixing a line by latitude and longitude beyond which Japanese penetration would not be permitted, except at the cost of war.

Senator Ferguson. Was that, to your knowledge, the line in the part that I read? Have you got it there?

General Miles. I think this is the same line, sir. But I, of course, am not familiar with this particular paper or memorandum to the President of November 27.

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would look on page 203, October 2, 1944, transcript of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, General Marshall's testimony, and see whether or not this same line was not discussed by you when you were in conference with the British?

General Miles. I haven't got the testimony before me, sir, and I have never seen it.

Senator Ferguson. Pass it to him.

(The document was handed to General Miles.)

General Miles. Page 204, did you say, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Page 203, at the bottom of the page. You will have to read it up in the other part to identify it.
General Miles. I think that General Marshall is referring here to a conference held in Singapore.

Senator Ferguson. When was that conference held?

General Miles. Sometime during the fall of 1941, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Look on page 204 and see whether or not it does not give it?

General Miles. Yes, it says here:

The agreement was reached in the so-called American, British, Dutch Staff conversations held at Singapore in April of 1941.

I think that is a mistake. I think it was nearer October 1941. There were no Dutch in the Staff Conference that we held here in Washington in the early spring of 1941.

Senator Ferguson. So you were not a party to the one that General Marshall is talking about?

General Miles. I have never been in Singapore, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever heard of that line before when you were dealing with the British in that conference?

General Miles. No, sir. I testified I have no recollection of the line ever being mentioned in the Staff Conference.

Senator Ferguson. Now I have volume II of Foreign Relations, and I ask you to look at the last paragraph on page 556—going back to the question I asked.

(The book was handed to General Miles.)

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know of that?

General Miles. I do not recall knowing of this at the time, sir, although I may have read it in magic.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have a talk with General Marshall about the Pearl Harbor attack after the attack on December 7, 1941?

General Miles. To the best of my recollection, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It would not impress you so that you would remember such a conversation, if you had one?

General Miles. A conversation with reference to the attack that had already occurred?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I do not believe that I ever had such a conversation.

Senator Ferguson. This memorandum that you made about the 15th of December, referred to at one place as the means of communicating with the General, you made a memorandum rather than talk with him about it; is that right?

General Miles. No, sir. My recollection is that he asked me and he asked General Gerow and I think Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy to prepare for him memoranda as to our recollection as to what happened in his office on the morning of Sunday, December 7.

Senator Ferguson. But you never spoke to him over the telephone or personally about it?

General Miles. About what occurred in his office?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; about the Pearl Harbor incident or attack.

General Miles. I do not remember discussing the attack that had already taken place with him subsequent to the event. I do not remember any discussion with him as to what had occurred in his office, just
prior to the attack. I think that was fully covered by his request to me, which may have been made by telephone, to give him a written memorandum on the best of my recollection as to what had occurred in his office.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were there any staff studies or investigations of the efficiency of G-2 after the 7th of December 1941, by the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, or a representative of either of them?

General Miles. Not that I remember, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, don't you think that you would remember that if they did make an investigation of your office, the efficiency of your office?

General Miles. I think I would remember. I was, however, absent a good deal of the time after December 7 until I was finally relieved at the end of January.

Senator Ferguson. Where were you when you were absent?

General Miles. In South America, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I assume on your intelligence work?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever hear that there was such an investigation, or study?

General Miles. No, sir. The nearest thing I can come to that is that I knew we were turning over a great many of our records to the Roberts Board, but I never heard of a representative of the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War making an investigation of MID at the time.

Senator Ferguson. In testifying before the Pearl Harbor Board on August 8, 1944, you said G-2 was trying, and I quote you, "to gather all possible information about Japan."

You stated further that your system was a running digest and will you tell us further whether it was not also a part of the function and mission of Military Intelligence to furnish all possible information to the commanding officers of overseas installations and their subordinate units of the Army?

General Miles. It was the duty of G-2 of the War Department General Staff to furnish all information to the major units of the United States Army which we believed would be of use to them, subject, of course, to the restrictions which I have already pointed out, of security, and of getting into the command channel.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any limitations from the Chief of Staff on your duties in relation to your last answer?

General Miles. He put no direct limitations on me that I know of, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Either in writing or verbally?

General Miles. Either in writing or verbally.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 96 of your testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board you stated that "Army G-2 freely exchanged information with the British and Dutch."

Did you ever receive from the British and Dutch any notice that they had intercepted any implementation of the winds messages?

General Miles. I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether there was any information at all from those sources that they had that message?
General Miles. The implementing broadcasts to the winds message?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.

General Miles. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no knowledge of that implementing broadcast ever reached the Military Intelligence Division.

Senator Ferguson. Had you any knowledge that they had the original message?

General Miles. That the British had the original winds code?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; the winds code messages.

General Miles. I assume that they had because of the arrangement that existed between SIS and British communications whereby we checked to see that each one received all of the broadcasts.

Senator Ferguson. How did you check to see that each one received all of the broadcasts?

General Miles. Senator, that is a question that I would very much rather you ask Colonel Sadtler when he comes, because it is a technical question of the SIS [2584] and British communications.

I did know that such a system existed, and was run by a reasonably simple code.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you recall whether any liaison existed at that time between the United States Navy, or Army Intelligence Service, and the British or Dutch in order that the final wind message would be promptly flashed to us by them, or to them by us if and when it was intercepted? Who would have knowledge of that?

General Miles. In our search for that implementing broadcast, we acted through the SIS, through the Federal Communications Commission, and we also asked SIS to check with the British to see that we did not miss that implementation, but it was a broadcast in plain Japanese that we were waiting for, certain Japanese phrases in plain Japanese put into weather reports in a certain way, and we undoubtedly were just as capable of picking that out of the air, or rather more so, than the British or the Dutch.

[2585] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I see it is 4 o'clock and we might adjourn before I start on the questions in relation to the wind message, that I ask to clean up in the morning.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, General Marshall is coming along Thursday morning. Of course, that has completely disarranged our schedule.

I would like to have the committee's consent that General Gerow may go on the stand in the morning and that the further examination of General Miles be taken up afterward. We cannot finish with General Gerow before General Marshall comes on, but we can do the best we can to lay down a lot of basic material that General Marshall will have to deal with.

Considering we are advancing General Marshall's testimony, completely upsetting our arrangement and causing confusion, that is the best solution I can offer. We can call General Gerow at 10 o'clock in the morning and go through with him until 4 and then we will have to let him get off and put General Marshall on Thursday, and then recall both General Miles and General Gerow.

The Chairman. The Chair thinks that is a reasonable request on the part of counsel.
Senator Ferguson. I have no objection to that, Mr. Chairman.
[2586] The Chairman. Without objection, it will be so ordered.
General, we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow. It appears that
you will not have to be here tomorrow, if you desire to be elsewhere.
General Miles. Very well, Mr. Chairman. I will not be called
until after General Marshall has testified?
The Chairman. That is right.
General Miles. Very well, sir.1
(Whereupon, at 4 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed until 10
o'clock a.m., Wednesday, December 5, 1945.)

Part 3—December 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945—follows.

1 Gen. Miles' testimony is resumed in Hearings, Part 3, p. 1541.