PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 3
DECEMBER 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, AND 13, 1945

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
Pursuant to
S. Con. Res. 27
(79th Congress)
A Concurrent Resolution Authorizing An
Investigation of the Attack on Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, and
Events and Circumstances
Relating Thereto

PART 3
DECEMBER 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, AND 13, 1945

Printed for the use of the
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 1946
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina
JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California
FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin

COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel
GERHARD A. GESSELL, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel

(After January 14, 1946)
SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part No.</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Transcript pages</th>
<th>Hearings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1-399</td>
<td>1-1058</td>
<td>Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>401-982</td>
<td>1059-2586</td>
<td>Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>983-1583</td>
<td>2587-4194</td>
<td>Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 1945.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2493-2920</td>
<td>6047-7888</td>
<td>Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>3379-3927</td>
<td>9108-10517</td>
<td>Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3929-4399</td>
<td>10518-12277</td>
<td>Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4601-5151</td>
<td>12278-13708</td>
<td>Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5153-5560</td>
<td>13709-14765</td>
<td>Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1 through 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>7 and 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>9 through 43.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>44 through 87.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>88 through 110.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>111 through 128.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>129 through 156.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>157 through 172.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>173 through 179.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 through 25</td>
<td>Roberts Commission Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Hart Inquiry Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 through 31</td>
<td>Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 through 33</td>
<td>Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Clarke Investigation Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Clausen Investigation Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 through 38</td>
<td>Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

**KEYED TO PAGES OF THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPTS, REPRESENTED IN THESE VOLUMES BY NUMERALS IN ITALICS ENCLOSED IN BRACKETS, EXCEPT WITNESSES BEFORE JOINT COMMITTEE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1911, to Jan. 23, 1912)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army-Harbor Board, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 21 to Oct. 29, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to Oct. 16, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allen, Brooke E., Maj.</td>
<td>203-209</td>
<td>3105-3120</td>
<td>4022-4027</td>
<td>148-186</td>
<td>5269-5291</td>
<td>3814-3826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen, Riley H.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, Edward B., Maj</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, Ray</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anstey, Alice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold, H. H., Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asher, N. F., Ens.</td>
<td>1127-1138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ball, N. F., Ens.</td>
<td>1033-1038</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballard, Emma Jane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barber, Bruce G.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartlett, George Francis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td>1719-1721</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beardall, John R., Rear Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens.</td>
<td>1219-1221</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm.</td>
<td>886-951</td>
<td>115-134</td>
<td>1575-1643</td>
<td>660-688</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benny, Chris J.</td>
<td>1382-1399</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benson, Henry P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berquist, Kenneth P., Col.</td>
<td>377-380</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berry, Frank M., S 1/c</td>
<td>1224-1229</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicknell, George W., Col.</td>
<td>314-320</td>
<td>1413-1442</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5089-5122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bissell, John T., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness Name</td>
<td>Index</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloch, Claude C., Adm</td>
<td>733-812</td>
<td>2-29,</td>
<td>1469-1537</td>
<td>385A-417</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boone, Gilbert E., Lt. Comdr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bothne, A. M., Btswn</td>
<td>1181-1185</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bragdon, John S., Brig. Gen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2894-2922</td>
<td>3831-3884</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brainard, Roland M., Vice Adm</td>
<td>399-403</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratton, Rufus, Col</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T.S.54-96, 227-241, 278-308</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brenchman, Albert L</td>
<td>520-527</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briant, Granville C., Comdr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>229-233</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooks, H. E., Lt. Col</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>974-994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brotherhood, F. M., Lt. Comdr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, Wilson, Rear Adm</td>
<td>1241-1259</td>
<td>135-146</td>
<td>2216-2221</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunner, Gertrude C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bryden, William, Maj. Gen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>898-909</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkley, Joel W., Rear Adm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>413-415</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgin, Henry T., Maj. Gen</td>
<td>258-283</td>
<td></td>
<td>2598-2664</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burr, Harold S., Comdr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3067-3073</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burton, H. Ralph</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>818-896</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butler, Bernard</td>
<td>1753-1765</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butterfield, James W</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calhoun, W. L., Vice Adm</td>
<td>951-960</td>
<td>225-228</td>
<td>4103-4121</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capron, W. A., Col</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015-2030</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmichael, W. A., Lt. Col</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4015-4021</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caulfield, Frances M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>143-144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chun, Philip Chew</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3258-3263</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarke, Chester R</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3623-3630</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claterbos, Louis J., Col</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4095-4103</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clausen, Chester C., Lt. Col</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coll, Raymond S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3160-3184</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colton, Roger B., Maj. Gen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>670-696</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combs, R. E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2127-2155</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conant, Joseph M., Lt. (jg)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2158-2198</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connolly, Thomas E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2158-2198</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooper, Howard F., Maj</td>
<td>473-478</td>
<td></td>
<td>2130-2133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INDEX OF WITNESSES
### NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 19, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to Oct. 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Chapin Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 18, 1945, to May 31, 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>478-483, 301-310</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5080-5089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crosley, Paul C., Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM)</td>
<td>1171-1178</td>
<td>179-184</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtis, M. E., Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td>105-114</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN</td>
<td>1178-1180</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davidson, Howard C., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>1650-1663</td>
<td>4125-4151</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis, Arthur C., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>96-105</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawson, Harry L.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>812-843</td>
<td>74-85</td>
<td>1695-1732</td>
<td>495-510</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>163-181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dickens, June D., Sgt.</td>
<td>591-599</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3826-3838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dillingham, Walter P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dillon, James P.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dillon, John H., Maj.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dingeman, Hay E., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donegan, William Col.</td>
<td>3190-3201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douc, Harold, Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunlop, Robert H., Col.</td>
<td>365-368</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumro, Mary J.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dusenbury, Carlisle Clyde, Col</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earle, Frederick M., W/O.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>418-423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN</td>
<td>1747-1753</td>
<td>368-378</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>451-464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness</td>
<td>Page Range</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>Page Range</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebey, Frank W., Capt., USA</td>
<td>437-442</td>
<td></td>
<td>511-514</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgers, Dorothy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eichelberger, Leslie B.</td>
<td>1286-1295</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elliott, George E., Sg.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel, Theodore, Ch/8. C.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evans, Joseph K., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabian, Rudolph J., Comdr.</td>
<td>832-848</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farthing, W. E., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>4385-4408</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferguson, Homer, Hon.</td>
<td>287-301,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fielder, Kendall J., Col.</td>
<td>311-313,</td>
<td></td>
<td>1670-1682</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnegan, Joseph, Capt., USN</td>
<td>288-290</td>
<td></td>
<td>2943-3010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitch, Aubrey W., Vice Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>190-193</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flannery, Harry W</td>
<td>2516-2522</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleming, Robert J., Jr., Col.</td>
<td>1254-1343</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood, William F., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>2848-2865</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeman, Frederick L., Lt., USN</td>
<td>1842-1847</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French, Edward F., Col.</td>
<td>186-206</td>
<td>1 1/2</td>
<td>1 B81-82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedman, William F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>149-150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuqua, Samuel G., Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td>1025-1033</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furbush, Edward A</td>
<td>4338-4345</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furlong, William R., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>960-975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabrielson, William A</td>
<td>1296-1310</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gailey, Charles K., Jr., Gen.</td>
<td>145-147</td>
<td>1 B198-200</td>
<td>983-1048,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gesler, Earl E., Col.</td>
<td>932-964</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibson, Ernest W., Lt. Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glover, Robert O., Capt., USN</td>
<td>170-178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grafe, Paul</td>
<td>2288-2320</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graves, Sidney C</td>
<td>4346-4355</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew, Joseph C</td>
<td>4197-4223</td>
<td></td>
<td>1062-1069</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffith, Edwin St. J.</td>
<td>517-520</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hain, Robert W., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>3304-3350,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>560-603, 615-773</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hall, Mobley, Sgt.</td>
<td>3600-3661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halsey, William F., Vice Adm.</td>
<td>428-437</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>978-1025</td>
<td></td>
<td>293-307</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 13, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Harrington, Maj., USN)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 29, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarkin Investigation, Sept. 14 to Oct. 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 13, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1076-1076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4797-4828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrington, Cyril J.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3957-3971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>241-274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayes, Philip, Maj. Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>207-240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heard, William A., Capt., USN</td>
<td>1571-1574</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100-101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henderson, H. H., Lt. USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>212-213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2934-2942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill, William H., Senator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holmes, J. Wilfred, Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100-101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col.</td>
<td>1664-1670</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>763-772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hornbeck, Stanley K</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2200-2214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horne, Walter Wilton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>469-473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard, Jack W., Col.</td>
<td>469-473</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1914-1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>428-432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100-101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hull, Cordell</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>403-457, 551-650, 605-615, 51367-5415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>414-417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunt, John A., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4221-4300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingersoll, Royal E., Adm</td>
<td>417-430</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26-34, 36-38, 40-49, 55-73, 75-79, 82-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>816-851</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Numbers in parentheses are page numbers.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness Name</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jensen, Clarence G., Col.</td>
<td>54-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judd, H. P.</td>
<td>1329-1333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaminsky, Harold, Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karig, Walter, Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katz, Benjamin, Comdr.</td>
<td>29-31, 54-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kay, Harold T.</td>
<td>3931-3951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelley, Welbourn, Lt., USNR.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kestly, J. J., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>3666-3677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimball, George P., Lt (Jg), USNR.</td>
<td>1507-1524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimball, Richard K.</td>
<td>1494-1506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimmel, Husband E., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>529-640, 660-723, 1469-1488, 1538-1571, 1744-1747, 1121-1135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King, Edgar, Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>2696-2707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King, H. J.</td>
<td>2521-2566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King, William, Capt., USA</td>
<td>4153-4185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingman, Howard F., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>335-337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingman, John J., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>543-568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitts, Willard A., III, Rear Adm.</td>
<td>185-194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klatt, Lovell V., Sgt.</td>
<td>1453-1467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kogan, Mary B.</td>
<td>1673-1677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kramer, A. D., Comdr.</td>
<td>950-987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 25, 1942)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 21 to Oct. 19, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to Oct. 16, 1944, July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN</td>
<td>1146–1159</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5555–5560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landreth, J. L., Ens.</td>
<td>1150–1171</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>1150–1171</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Layton, William S., Col.</td>
<td>1068–1095</td>
<td>3025–3067</td>
<td>904–918</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leahy, William D., Adm.</td>
<td>363–367</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leary, Herbert P., Vice Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis, Fulton, Jr.</td>
<td>1161–1185</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litell, S. H.</td>
<td>1272–1285</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loecey, Frank H.</td>
<td>2787–2802</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA</td>
<td>1014–1034</td>
<td>628–643</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorence, Walter E., Col.</td>
<td>1678–1694</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumsden, George, Maj.</td>
<td>3226–3250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN</td>
<td>500–504</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacArthur, Douglas, Gen.</td>
<td>1793–1805</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall, George C., Gen.</td>
<td>2–54</td>
<td>852–885</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>219–222</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marston, Morrill W., Col.</td>
<td>320–352, 1648</td>
<td>3126–3152</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>1816–1913</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness</td>
<td>Pages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, H. M., Comdr.</td>
<td>1206–1212</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, Howard W., Capt., USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mason, John M.</td>
<td>227–228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mau, Redfield, Capt., USN.</td>
<td>68–79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayfield, Irving H., Capt., USN</td>
<td>558–575</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McBride, Raymond F., Pvt.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCarty, William J., Col.</td>
<td>1918–1928</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCollum, Arthur N., Capt., USN</td>
<td>10–42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCormick, L. D., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>3381–3448</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCrea, John, Capt., USN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDonald, Joseph P., T/4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKeen, John L., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>57–58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKee, Robert Eugene</td>
<td>293–334</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKenney, Margaret</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McMorris, C. H., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meurlyott, Byron M., Maj.</td>
<td>886–902</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell, Frank E.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles, Sherman, Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>776–982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minkler, Rex W., Col.</td>
<td>1541–1583</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mollison, James A., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>1360–1375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moody, George H.</td>
<td>217–218</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murphy, Vincent R., Capt., USN</td>
<td>3181–3189</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray, Allan A., Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray, Maxwell, Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>433–441</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newton, J. H., Vice Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimitz, C. W., Adm.</td>
<td>1300–1305</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noyes, Leigh, Rear Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse, Howard B., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>153–157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Dell, Robert H., Lt., USA</td>
<td>4710–4792</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outerbridge, William W., Capt., USN</td>
<td>87–96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parker, Maurice G</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peake, Alfred R., Maj.</td>
<td>1357–1367</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peters, Alfred V., Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrie, Lester</td>
<td>2708–2721</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148</td>
<td>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149</td>
<td>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pettigrew, Moses W., Col.</td>
<td>212-247</td>
<td>1107-1160</td>
<td>477-495</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phelan, John, Ens.</td>
<td>284-287</td>
<td>1210-1252</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4933-5009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillips, Walter C., Col.</td>
<td>1584-1594</td>
<td>3636-3640</td>
<td>2375-2398</td>
<td>3990-3996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pickett, Harry K., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierson, Millard, Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pine, Willard B.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powell, Bolling R., Jr., Maj</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powell, C. A., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prather, Louise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratt, John S., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1968-1988</td>
<td>417-446</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pye, William S., Vice Adm.</td>
<td>1766-1783, 855-884</td>
<td>147-169</td>
<td>1055-1070</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafter, Case B.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>778-789</td>
<td>578-608</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raley, Edward W., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>76-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramsey, Logan C., Capt., USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1091-1108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Page Numbers</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reierstad, Leo, Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td>158-162</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renchard, George W.</td>
<td>202</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reybold, Eugene, Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>568-634</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richards, Robert B., Col.</td>
<td>730-745</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richardson, J. O., Adm.</td>
<td>1052-1061</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberts, Owen J., Mr. Justice</td>
<td>253-340</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robins, Thomas K., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>697-728</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robinson, Bernard L., Col.</td>
<td>3588-3623</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rohr, Hans William</td>
<td>2922-2287</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross, Mary L.</td>
<td>70-71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row, Lathe B., Col.</td>
<td>2092-2129</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rowlett, Frank B., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>67, 225-226</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudolph, Jacob H., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>19B-202</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell, Henry D., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>1221-1240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell, John E.</td>
<td>4362-4366</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadler, Otis K., Col.</td>
<td>T. S. 246-259</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safford, L. F., Capt., USN</td>
<td>355-362</td>
<td>744-761</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saltzman, Stephen G., Lt., USA</td>
<td>455-463</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scanlon, Martin F., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>4164-4186</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schlesinger, Helen</td>
<td>3287-3304</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schley, Julian L., Maj. Gen.</td>
<td>635-669</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schuirmann, R. E., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>404-412</td>
<td>194-218,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>311-318,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>692-732</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schukraft, Robert E., Col.</td>
<td>201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schulz, Lester Robert, Comdr.</td>
<td>1579-1583</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settle, F. A.</td>
<td>1138-1146</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaw, C. H., CH/T</td>
<td>1401-1447</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirley, J. P.</td>
<td>2351-2360</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shivers, Robert L.</td>
<td>3201-3225</td>
<td>88-96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoemaker, James M., Capt., USN</td>
<td>1191-1205</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoemaker, Thomas B.</td>
<td>4386-4388</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 21 to Oct. 19, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to July 19, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Chase Investigation, May 23, 1944, to Sept. 13, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Howitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short, Arthur T.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short, Walter C., Maj. Gen</td>
<td>37-169</td>
<td>276-541</td>
<td>220-270</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2921-3231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortt, Creed, Pvt.</td>
<td>452-455</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sisson, George A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Ralph C., Maj. Gen</td>
<td>3265-3286</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen</td>
<td>528-572</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, William W., Rear Adm</td>
<td>32-65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith-Illington, H. H., Capt., USN</td>
<td>1077-1081</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoot, Perry M., Col.</td>
<td>1738-1742</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5099-5027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff, W. F., CH/CM</td>
<td>1186-1190</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stark, Harold R., Adm</td>
<td>2-194</td>
<td>320-324</td>
<td>774-810</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephenson, W. B., Lt. USNR</td>
<td>233-331</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stilphen, Benjamin L.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimson, Henry L.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5416-5440 ²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone, John F.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5441-5463 ¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street, George</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen</td>
<td>185</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness</td>
<td>Pages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweeney, J. J., Rev.</td>
<td>1368-1372</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, Angus M., Jr., Capt., USA</td>
<td>1447-1469</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, Kenneth, Lt., USA</td>
<td>415-422</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, William E. G., Comdr.</td>
<td>1229-1240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thielen, Bernard, Col.</td>
<td>338-354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, James K., Lt., USA</td>
<td>484-486</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson, O. N., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throckmorton, Russell C., Col.</td>
<td>1387-1412</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tillman, Thomas E.</td>
<td>2134-2157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tindal, Lorry N., Col.</td>
<td>390-393</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinker, Clarence, Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>1706-1718</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truman, Louis W., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turner, Richmond K., Rear Adm.</td>
<td>1809-1829</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyler, Kermit A., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>1861-1862</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulrich, Ralph T., Sgt.</td>
<td>486-489</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underkofler, Oliver H., Lt., USNR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utterback, Charles J.</td>
<td>509-517</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Deurs, George, Capt., USN</td>
<td>299-292</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walker, Eugene B., Col.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walsh, Roland, Brig. Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterhouse, George S.</td>
<td>1262-1272</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterhouse, Paul B.</td>
<td>1373-1381</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weddington, Leonard D., Col.</td>
<td>1213-1219</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welch, George S., Maj.</td>
<td>422-428</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellborn, Charles, Jr., Capt., USN</td>
<td>338-390</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welles, Sumner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
2 Sworn statement presented to committee.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 113 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1911, to Jan. 23, 1912)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 21 to Oct. 19, 1941)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to Oct. 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1915)</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 18, 1915, to May 31, 1916</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[2588] The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

General Gerow, will you be sworn, please?

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW, UNITED STATES ARMY 2

(Having been duly sworn by the chairman.)

The Chairman. Is counsel ready to proceed?

Mr. Mitchell. I want to make a short statement to the committee which I think may help it in connection with the next two or three witnesses, including General Marshall.

Calling General Marshall out of turn, of course, upset our order of proof, and we are bringing up some matters now which we had not intended to present to the committee until sometime later.

One, I think, is the story of the so-called "winds" message, and the other is the detailed record in handling, analytically, and so on, what is known as the fourteenth part of the message which came in on December 6 and 7.

Our order of proof originally was for taking those things up as a special order of proceeding. We intended to call all our witnesses on that at one time, and in advance of General Marshall's testimony.

Now that he is coming on he will have to be asked about that.

My statement is intended to sort of orient the committee as to what we know about the situation, so that they will [2589] understand the testimony and be better equipped to do something about it until General Marshall comes in.

Now, the first thing is this "winds" message. That is a sort of a romantic term. I want to report now just generally what the state of the inquiry is in regard to the "winds" message, so the committee will understand.

1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.
2 See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2490, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by General Gerow.
The winds message, originally the winds code, which is found on page 154 of the diplomatic intercepts, exhibit 1, I want to call the attention of the committee to the fact at the start that if the Japanese had used that method of communication and we had intercepted their diplomatic message what you would have learned was that the diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were in danger, and that instructions had to be given to burn the code.

My first reaction to the winds message was, if we had intercepted it, we would have had little more than we had already, because we knew our diplomatic relations were in danger and we knew they had given orders to burn the code. So my original reaction was there was much ado about nothing in the winds message.

But passing that I want to also call to the attention of the committee the fact that the code, as set up by its very terms, provides:

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language shortwave news broadcast:

That shows on its face that the Japs only set this method up for an emergency system, in case they could not use the ordinary means of communication.

Now the proof already shows that they were using the ordinary means of communication right up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. So the question arises at once whether they did send out those messages.

Heretofore all the assumptions have been that they did, and there has been an inquiry by the other boards as to who received them and what was done with them.

Now we have made a plan to dig out all the facts on that, and I just want to report the present status of that.

In the first place, in our effort to find out whether the message ever was sent we have already the FCC report from one of the best monitoring stations, we have the exact report from them as to just what they picked up. That report was that one of the messages picked up on the 4th of December by the Japanese listener on the FCC station, which he picked up because it resembled—did not exactly comply with the code but resembled the code—had the statement in it, “North wind cloudy,” which meant war with Russia and not with the United States and Great Britain, and that we can talk about as the false winds message, which was probably a real broadcast and not a code broadcast, and caused, of course, confusion among witnesses as to whether they ever saw the message or not.

We also had from the FCC the report that on the afternoon of December 7, after the attack on Pearl Harbor and after the ordinary means of international communication had been closed, a winds message was received. That message said nothing about “East wind rain,” which meant war with the United States, because that was already known all over the world, but it did use the expression which meant war with England.

That is the message received by the FCC after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and was an implementing message to warn the Japanese people abroad that they were about to have war with Great Britain.

The next thing we did was to inquire from the Dutch and British and Australia, through the State Department, as to whether either of
those nations had any record of intercepting, prior to December 7, an implementing message which said “East wind rain,” which meant war with the United States. We heard from the Australians and they say no, they did not. We have not yet had our report from the Dutch and British.

Now we also had sent to General MacArthur some time ago a request that he endeavor to find from the Japanese, from their records, whether they ever sent a winds implementing message prior to December 7. The report from General MacArthur is that the Japs say they sent none out until the afternoon of December 7, which covers this implementing message they sent out which we intercepted, the FCC intercepted, showing a warning of war with Great Britain.

That report, for whatever it is worth, did not indicate that the Japs sent out any messages other than those picked up by the FCC.

Now we also have had communications from and have been busy bringing here witnesses from every one of the monitoring stations, witnesses who were in the stations during the critical period November 28 to December 7, and witnesses who were present at the stations at the time, and those witnesses will be here and we will find out all they know about the situation.

Now, there is just one other point about the winds message. There has been a statement to the effect that there was a message numbered 7001 in the Navy files. The tab in it shows the number is canceled, and there is no message in there. It has been thought that this missing 7001 was a winds message. The Navy reports, which are quite voluminous, in their search and effort to find what 7001 was, shows, among other things, that if the winds message had ever been received, it is not the type of message that would have been put in the file with the serial numbers which 7001 would require, for the simple reason that they filed under 7001 only coded intercepts.

Of course, this was in Japanese broadcasting language and would not have have been put in that file, if it had ever been received.

Now, that is as far as we have gone up to date with the winds message, and as long as we are to have General Marshall, I thought we ought to have a review of the situation.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I don’t understand, do I, from counsel that he is intending this morning to determine what the evidence will show, or what his opinion of certain evidence in other hearings is?

Do I understand that you are passing upon what the evidence will be?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am trying to explain to the committee what kind of witnesses we are going to call, and what the result of our present inquiry has been. If I have expressed any opinion about the weight of the evidence, I didn’t intend to.

Senator Ferguson. You don’t wish to convey to the committee the weight of any of this evidence?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I have my opinion about the weight of the evidence, and if it has crept out in this hearing, why, I don’t think I need to apologize.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, you do not wish to express to the committee what you think about the weight of the evidence?

Mr. Mitchell. I don’t know what you understand. My words
speak for themselves. As I stated, I am trying to report to the committee what the situation is. That is my only object.

The CHAIRMAN. As the Chair understands, counsel is, in a sense, forecasting for the benefit of the committee what the testimony will be.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. Now, I want to turn to the 1 p.m., and fourteenth part messages.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire whether there will be any conflict on this winds message, that it did come in?

Mr. MITCHELL. There was a great deal of conflict, as you know, among various witnesses called before the other boards of inquiry as to whether they saw a message of that kind. Great conflict with it. And that is one reason I was anxious to get at the root of the matter and find out whether the message was really sent or not. I don't understand that there is any conflict about anything I have told you except I haven't yet talked to the witnesses who had charge of the monitoring stations and I don't know what they are going to say about ever having received it, or anything they have to say about the destruction of their records.

Mr. KEFFE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel when it is contemplated that the testimony with respect to the winds message will be submitted to the committee?

Mr. MITCHELL. As soon as this inquiry is complete. Our original plan, Mr. Congressman, as our record shows, submitted on November 2, called for the story of the winds message pretty well down the line. And a great many witnesses before it, and the only reason I bring it up now out of order is because General Marshall has been advanced and has upset our schedule. But it is hard for me to predict with certainty when the witnesses will be called because I can't tell how long the examination of each witness is going to be.

We intend to, as soon as we can get around to it, and just as soon as it is ready, we will bring in all the witnesses that bear on the winds message and make a special order of it and give you everything we have. The only reason I am bringing it up today is to report on the extent and direction of our inquiry and what it relates to. And the things I stated as to what the record shows that we have already got are not in dispute so far as I can see.

Mr. KEFFE. Of course, Mr. Chairman, you would expect a member of the committee to give consideration to the testimony when it comes in and the weight to be given to it is a matter for determination when the testimony is in.

Mr. MITCHELL. Of course.

Mr. KEFFE. Any conclusions to be drawn must necessarily await the conclusion of the introduction of all of the testimony relating to this subject.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Congressman, have I said anything to the contrary this morning?

Mr. KEFFE. I make that statement because there seems to be an impression that your own conclusions are already formed in certain aspects of the situation, and while that may be proper, yet I think you would concede that as a member of this committee I should be compelled to await any conclusions on it until the testimony is all in. That would be proper, would it not?
Mr. Mitchell. I haven't any question about it. If you really want to know what my present impression is, for what it is worth, I confess that on the state of the inquiry up to date I have very, very grave doubts whether the Japs ever sent out a winds implementing message prior to the afternoon of December 7, but that is a matter for the committee to decide when they hear all of the proof, and I didn't intend to express an opinion that the committee would have to accept. I was just trying to give you a picture of our inquiry up to date so you would know.

[2598] Mr. Keefe. So it will not be necessary to cross-examine General Miles or General Gerow, or anybody else, with respect to their knowledge of this winds message now. The whole subject, if they have any testimony to give on the subject, or were in any way interested and can produce any proof, that will be submitted at the time you take up the winds message?

Mr. Mitchell. That is the way I would like to have it, but General Miles was already asked about the winds message, as I understand it, yesterday morning, although I wasn't here.

Mr. Keefe. I think only just a few questions.

Mr. Mitchell. Was that all?

Mr. Keefe. At the end of his testimony; yes.

Mr. Mitchell. It is quite agreeable to me to leave the winds message out of the picture as far as these two generals are concerned, but not General Marshall, because we won't have him back. So what he knows about it the committee will want to ask him about. That is the reason I made this statement, so you would be able to frame your questions in the light of the report as to how far our investigation has gone and what questions we have sought to resolve.

Mr. Keefe. You referred to a communication from General MacArthur this morning.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. I understand you have such a communication.

[2599] Has the committee been supplied with it?

Mr. Mitchell. No; we haven't given you any of those documents, I have been told, but we were planning to do that well in advance of our proof about the winds message. You see, General Marshall is coming and I wanted you to know what we had. If you want to look at anything we have up to date before General Marshall is called, you may.

Mr. Keefe. Will the committee be furnished copies of this before tomorrow?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you see General Marshall's inquiry has been advanced so rapidly, it has so disarranged it, that we haven't had time to have these reports mimeographed. I have only one copy. If you would like to have the information up to date on it, I will try and have it mimeographed. But I tried to tell you in a general way what these documents consist of.

The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask counsel whether after General Marshall's testimony, and such information as we may get from him with reference to the winds message, in view of his early departure and his probable absence during the rest of the hearings, is it then planned to go back as far as possible on to the original schedule and deal with the winds message, subject to, of course, General Marshall's testimony?
Mr. Mitchell. Precisely. Of course, our winds message inquiry isn't complete. When I get reports from the British and Dutch as to whether they received the message or not, why, if they say they did, I would recast my doubts about it ever having been sent. I am not in a position to express any opinion on it as yet.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Mitchell. The other thing I wanted to call attention to was the so-called 14 part and 1 p.m. messages. Before General Marshall was supposed to be called we had intended to call all the basic witnesses to show the exact routing of those messages and how they were handled and the hours it was done and what was done. That might take us a week, to call those witnesses, or more. So we have to go on with General Marshall leading up to that subject, and we haven't had an opportunity to present that proof.

Now, there are one or two things I have which I hoped would aid the committee. One of those things is the document which has been distributed this morning in mimeograph entitled "Information from Documentary Evidence on Messages No. 901, 902, 907, 910." That is the 14 part and 1 p.m. messages. The pilot message that came in. And the code-burning message afterward. This document which I am going to offer in evidence now, for whatever use the committee wants to make of it, will be Exhibit 41.

The Vice Chairman. It is this one [indicating]?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Prepared by the Army and Navy and is understood to state in detail all the information as to the handling of these messages. That is a matter of documentary proof, of course. They haven't attempted to put in any information that depended on recollection or memory of a witness.

So you find the history of the detailed handling of the fourteenth part message and the 1 p.m. message as far as documentary support of the routing is contained in this exhibit. And as to each part of the message.

The committee will remember that 13 parts were discussions by the Japs as to our position and the fourteenth part was the part of the message in which they said they had broken off negotiations. And the 1 p.m. message which followed was the message requiring or directing Ambassadors to deliver their message at 1 p.m. on Sunday, December 7.

Also, on this Exhibit 41 you will find there are references on the margin to exhibit pages on which the text of the parts, various parts, appear.

The Chairman. That refers to the pages in Exhibit 1?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry about that of counsel?

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. On page 6, at the top of the page, page 6 of Exhibit 41, at the top, will you have a witness, or will you supply the information as to when each of those processes was completed?

Mr. Mitchell. Wherever there is a gap in the information shown on this, it means that there are no documents, and we will have to call witnesses. So that whenever you find a gap—and there are gaps—
which you would like to fill, you will know we haven't the documents, but have to call witnesses and depend on their memory and recollection.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

The Chairman. This will be No. 41, and it is now before the committee as an exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I just offered it.

The Chairman. All right.

[2603] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 41.")

The Chairman. Thank you, Counsel, for your explanation.

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, will you state your present rank and station?

General Gerow. Leonard T. Gerow, lieutenant general; station, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

Mr. Mitchell. What are your duties at Fort Leavenworth?

General Gerow. I am in command of the post and also commandant of the Command and General Staff School.

Mr. Mitchell. Is that the principal general staff instruction point of the Army?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Were you in the War Plans Division in the War Department in 1941?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. When did you receive that assignment?

General Gerow. I reported, sir, in November 1940, and left the War Plans Division in February 1942.

Mr. Mitchell. You were head of the War Plans Division during that period?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans Division.

Mr. Mitchell. Had you had experience prior to that time in war-plans work?

[2604] General Gerow. Yes, sir. I had served previously in the War Plans Division as Executive for War Plans Division, during the period, as I recall, the early part of 1935 to the early part of 1939, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. When you left the War Plans Division, what was your next command?

General Gerow. I was assigned to command the Twenty-ninth Division, sir, at Fort Meade, Md.

Mr. Mitchell. And you had charge of training and the preparation of that division?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Infantry division?

General Gerow. I had complete command and trained the division as an infantry division.

Mr. Mitchell. What was your next move?

General Gerow. I took the division to England in October of 1942, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And remained in command how long?

General Gerow. Until approximately June 1943 when I was assigned to command the Fifth Corps.

Mr. Mitchell. The Fifth Corps?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. How many divisions in the Fifth Corps?

General Gerow. The number of divisions varied from time to time. The average, I should say, was three divisions at that time, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you take your Fifth Corps into France?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. The Fifth Corps was one of the corps that was designated to assault the Normandy beaches and the Fifth Corps landed on the Omaha beach on D-day, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And how long did you remain in command of the Fifth Corps?

General Gerow. I remained in command of the Fifth Corps until January 16, as I recall, 1944, shortly after the Von Runstedt breakthrough, when we started the counteroffensive. I was then assigned to command the Fifteenth Army.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you ever been stationed in the Hawaiian Islands?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. What were the functions of the War Plans Division in 1941?

General Gerow. Those functions, sir, are as stated in Army Regulations No. 10-15. If I may, I would like to read those.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. You may. Just a part of the regulations relating to the War Plans Division.


I quote paragraph 12:

War Plans Division, general duties:

a. The War Plans Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for the use in the theatre of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national defense.

b. The War Plans Division is specifically charged with the preparation of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning—

   (1) Location and armament of coast and land fortifications;

   (2) Estimate of forces required and times at which they may be needed under the various possible conditions necessitating the use of troops in the national defense;

   (3) The initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the movement of troops to execute the initial deployment to be the duty of the Operations and Training Division);

   (4) Actual operations in the theatre of war;

   (5) Consultation with the Operations and Training Division and the Supply Division on major items of equipment.

Those are the responsibilities of War Plans Division, 1941, sir.

[2608] Mr. Mitchell. I would like to offer in evidence now as exhibit 42 a copy of Army Regulations No. 10-15 dated August 18, 1936, which includes all amendments up to December 7, 1941.

The Chairman. All amendments, did you say?

Mr. Mitchell. It includes all amendments. It is an up-to-date copy of the Army Regulations, defining the War Department General Staff duties, each department. It not only relates to War Plans but to G-2 and gives a short picture of the complete set-up.

The Chairman. It will be filed as Exhibit 42.

Mr. Mitchell. Each member of the committee has it.

The Chairman. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 42.”)
Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, do you remember that during the time you were in the War Plans Division there were certain conversations with the British with respect to a joint war plan in case the two nations were drawn into the war?

General Gerow. I do, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That is called the ABC, which means American-British Conversations, does it?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir; ABC-1.

[2609] Mr. Mitchell. ABC-1?

General Gerow. And there was an ABC-2.

Mr. Mitchell. That was also a British staff plan, was it, a joint plan with Britain?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember whether during that time there were conversations between military officers of the United States and Canada with respect to a joint operation with Canada in case we were drawn into the war?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; there were such conversations conducted.

Mr. Mitchell. And do you remember also that there was a similar conference held at Singapore or some place in the Far East between officers of the Army and Navy of the United States and with the British and Dutch, which resulted in a plan or recommendations made by that conference out there?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; there was such a conference conducted.

Mr. Mitchell. I show you a document here which is entitled "American-Dutch-British conversations, Singapore, April 1941." You have seen that document, have you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have seen this document. It is a report of the conversations at Singapore, sir, between the Americans, Dutch, and British.

[2610] Mr. Keefe. Is that Exhibit 43?

Mr. Mitchell. I haven't had it reproduced. If the committee want it, we can do it. It is an elaborate staff plan.

These plans, I might say, the British-Canadian and the one with the Dutch, Americans, and British are brought up now with a view to ascertaining whether we can ascertain from them whether there was any commitment by the United States to engage in war with Japan, that is the purpose of it, but if the committee want it reproduced we will have that done.

Did you have anything to do with setting up the personnel—

Mr. Keefe. Before you finish I personally would very much like, in view of General Marshall's previous testimony, I would like to have that exhibit made available.

Mr. Mitchell. We will have it mimeographed. You mean copies to each member of the committee?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

The Chairman. Will the Congressman yield to his colleague?

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering if it would not be better to defer your request that it be reproduced until we see what significance there is to it and how much of it you might need? Maybe only a portion of it would be necessary for the examination of General Marshall or maybe we could use the original.
Mr. Mitchell. The exhibit has been available for some time and it has been loaned out to one member of the committee or another off and on, but we never have had it reproduced for all of them.

Mr. Keefe. That has always been the trouble, Mr. Counsellor, that when you ask for a thing it is always in the hands of some other member of the committee. Now, I would like to see that.

The Chairman. Well, if it is possible to have it all mimeographed the Chair would suggest that it be done so that each member can be furnished a copy.

Mr. Mitchell. We will do that.

The Chairman. It is rather difficult to see it when any member gets it and keeps it for awhile.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, my question, General, was whether you had anything to do with the assignment of United States Army or Navy officers to attend that conference at Singapore in April 1941?

General Gerow. The assignment was made, sir, by the Chief of Staff as I recall now, sir. The War Plans Division did make certain recommendations to the Chief of Staff with [2612] regard to such assignment.


You think they were selected by the staff here, by the Navy and Army?

General Gerow. No, sir. I would like to change my statement with regard to that. I think the commanders out there were instructed to furnish suitable representatives for this conference; that is, the Naval and Army commanders out there, sir, the Commanding General of the Far East and the Commanding Admiral of the Asiatic Fleet. That is my recollection at the moment.

Mr. Mitchell. On page 6 of this document I find under the head of “Introduction” the following statement:

The following conditions apply:
(a) State of war between Germany, Italy and Japan on one hand and British empire with its present allies and the United States of America, referred to [2613] herein as associated powers, on the other.
(b) No political commitment is implied.
(c) Any agreement is subject to ratification by the government concerned.

Now, is that the usual system that our staff plans had of making certain assumptions?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir. Practically all staff plans have as one of their initial provisions the assumptions under which the plan is drawn.

Mr. Mitchell. You called this “Conditions.” Was that a British or American term?

General Gerow. That was a British term, sir. This paper was apparently handled largely by a British secretariat.

Mr. Mitchell. “Terms of Reference,” it says. [Reading]:

(2) Prepare plan for conduct of military operations in the Far East on the basis of report of Washington conversation.
(3) Particular points for agreement are: plan for employment and disposition of forces in the whole area, Indian Ocean, Pacific, Australian and New Zealand waters before and after arrival of the Far East Fleet as agreed in Washington conversations and sum- [2614] marized in Admiralty telegram 1848, of 4th of April.

(b) Details of arrangements for cooperation, eg. communications, exchange of liaison officers.

You have examined this document thoroughly, have you?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, from your knowledge of War Plans and the systems of getting up war plans, how would you characterize this? What is it?

General Gerow. It is a technical agreement between military personnel for the conduct of operations in the event that the powers referred to should become engaged in war.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you find anything in the document to the effect that Captain Purnell or any of his associates had attempted to commit the United States to engage in war?

General Gerow. They had no authority to commit the United States to engage in war, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. What is meant by this term, “No political commitments and any agreement is subject to ratification by the government concerned”? Does that mean what it says?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; exactly what it says.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, this document refers to British-American conversations and I will ask you to refer to an- [2615] other staff plan I have here which is labeled “ABC-1 and 2.” Have you examined this document?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You are quite familiar with it, are you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I notice this document, the first part of it, is dated March 27, 1941. That was prior to the Singapore meeting?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. It states that:

The staff conversations were held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941 between the United States staff committee representing the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army and the United Kingdom delegation representing the Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand were associated with United Kingdom delegates during the course of these conversations but were not present at joint meetings.


You yourself were a member of that delegation?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And took part in those conferences?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And in framing this document?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I notice that under the head of "Purpose" it says:

(a) To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth, with its present allies, could defeat Germany and the powers allied with it should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

Without going through the details of this staff plan, is there anything in it, or was there any understanding reached or attempted to be reached that the United States would engage in war?

General Gerow. No, sir. Those were purely staff discussions.

Mr. Mitchell. On assumptions that she might be drawn into war?

General Gerow. She might be compelled to resort to war. [2617] yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any authority on behalf of the United States to make any commitment that the United States would engage in war under any conditions?

General Gerow. We did not have such authority, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. This document then is entitled "A Report." To go to whom, the Chiefs of Staff?

General Gerow. To be submitted initially to the Chiefs of Staff, yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you know whether this ABC 1 and 2 were even approved by higher authority in the United States?

General Gerow. My recollection, sir, is it was approved by the Chiefs of Staff, by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman permit an inquiry at that point, as to whether or not the question which you now relate, as I understand it, to the A-B-C agreements Nos. 1 and 2 having been approved by the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of War and Navy, have you asked or will you ask the same question with respect to the other agreement, the A-B-C-D agreement?

Mr. Mitchell. I should have done it before, but I was now getting to that.

I show you, General Gerow, copy of a memorandum taken [2618] from the files of the War Department, dated June 9, 1941, which appears to be signed by W. P. Scobey, lieutenant colonel, General Staff Corps, secretary of the Joint Board, and a letter dated June 2, 1941, preceding that, addressed to the President at the White House by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War and Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy.

I had better read these. They ought to go into the record.

The letter from Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox to the President, dated June 2, 1941, is as follows [reading]

Dear Mr. President: The Joint Board has prepared Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 which with the report of United States-British Staff Conversations concluded on March 27, 1941, we have approved, and now transmit them for your consideration, recommending your approval. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 is based upon agreements contained in the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations.

Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 states the concept of war and provides for initial dispositions and operations of United States forces, should the United States associate in war with the Democracies against the totalitarian powers. As such [2619] it constitutes the basic directive for United States Army and Naval Forces in a war effort.
The War and Navy Departments have been advised that the Report of United States-British Staff Conversations has been agreed to provisionally by the British Chiefs of Staff and that it has been submitted to the British Government for approval.

Now, the second document, a letter of June 9, 1941, or memorandum for the Chief of Staff, signed by Colonel Scobey, reads as follows:

Subject: J. B. No. 325 (Serial 642-5)—Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 and Report of United States-British Staff Conversations—ABC-1.

The President on June 7, 1941 returned the two subject plans without approval. In explanation of the President's failure to approve or disapprove the plans, his Military Aide, Major General E. M. Watson, stated to the Undersigned in substance as follows:

The President has familiarized himself with the two papers; but since the report of the United States British Staff Conversations, ABC-1, had not been approved by the British Government, he would not approve the report at this time; neither would he now give ap— [2620] roval to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, which is based upon the report ABC-1. However, in case of war the papers would be returned to The President for his approval.

(Signed) W. P. Scobey.

Now, you said that this ABC-1 had been approved by the two secretaries. Did it ever get any farther than that, do you recollect, in the way of approval?

General Gerow. To the best of my knowledge and belief it was never approved by the President.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I notice that this document says not only ABC-1 but ABC-2. I should have asked you what ABC-2 is.

General Gerow. ABC-2 was a report of a special committee that was set up to consider air collaboration only.

Mr. Mitchell. Air?

General Gerow. Air collaboration only; yes, sir.

The Chairman. Air what?

Mr. Mitchell. Air collaboration.

The Chairman. I see; air collaboration. All right.

Mr. Mitchell. That was the same type of document as ABC-1, a staff plan for a proposed plan of joint operations in case the Nation should be drawn into war?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

[2621] Mr. Mitchell. Now I would like to ask you whether you know whether the Singapore report, the Dutch-British-and-American joint report from Singapore about joint military plans, was ever approved?

General Gerow. That document was never approved either by the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Mitchell. So if it was not approved by them it never went to the President for approval, I suppose.

General Gerow. As far as I know it never went to the President, sir, and I do not believe it was submitted to either the Secretary of War or Secretary of the Navy for formal approval, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, let us turn to the Canadian document.

There were certain other staff conferences with Canada at about that time, were there not?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Which one of these documents would contain that report?
General Gerow. That would be ABC-22, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. ABC-22?

General Gerow. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. You have that before you, have you, and have you examined it?

[2632] General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have examined it and I have a copy.

Mr. Mitchell. I notice on the first page of that under date of August 12, 1941, is a memorandum from the Joint Planning Committee to the Joint Board (reading):

Subject: Joint Canadian—United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title—ABC-22).

Enclosure: (A) Subject Plan (draft of 28 July 1941) with permanent Joint Board on Defense letter of transmittal, dated: Montreal, 30th July, 1941.

The subject plan, which was prepared in collaboration with the War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments, is transmitted herewith with recommendation that it be approved.

(Signed) L. T. GEROW.

Did you personally represent the United States at that conference in Montreal?

General Gerow. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Mitchell. I notice the signatures of our representatives are S. D. Embick, major general, United States Army; H. W. Hill, captain, United States Navy; Forrest Sherman, commander, United States Navy; Clayton Bissell, lieutenant colonel, United States Army.

Did you have anything to do with the selection or appointment of our representatives?

[2633] General Gerow. I cannot recall specifically that War Plans did make such a recommendation to the Chief of Staff, but I imagine that it did recommend to the Chief of Staff who our representaives should be.

Mr. Mitchell. The section 1 of this document under the title, "Purpose of this plan," says (reading):

1. There has been submitted to the Government of the United States and to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom a report of Staff Conversations held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941. The United Kingdom Government has referred this report to the Canadian Government for their concurrence. The report, which bears the short title "ABC-1," includes a United States-British Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan.

2. ABC-1 assumes that joint agreements between Canada and the United States for common action in war under the concepts of ABC-1 will conform generally to the agreements reached in the United States-British Staff Conversations. This plan is intended to supplement those agreements, and to provide for the most effective use of Canadian and United States Forces for the purposes listed in paragraph 3, should the United States and the British Commonwealth be associated in a war against Germany and her allies.

3. Under such circumstances, cooperative action by Canadian and United States Forces will be required primarily for purposes connected with:

(a) the protection of overseas shipping within the northern portions of the Western Atlantic and Pacific Areas;

(b) the protection of sea communications within the coastal zones;

(c) the defense of Alaska, Canada, Newfoundland (which includes Labrador) and the northern portion of the United States.

You have examined this document and, of course, know its general tenor and purpose?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Was it anything different in scope or nature than any other United States or Joint Staff plan for joint operations in case of war?

General Gerow. No, sir. It followed generally the other war plans.

Mr. Mitchell. Was this Canadian-United States joint plan approved?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; it was approved by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and approved by the President.

Mr. Mitchell. I have here a document obtained from the War Department, dated August 20, 1941, signed by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, addressed to the President at the White House as follows [reading:]

Dear Mr. President: The Joint United States-Canadian Permanent Defense Board has prepared Joint United States-Canadian Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title ABC-22) providing for common action in war against Germany and her allies in the defense of contiguous territories, including Newfoundland and Alaska, and adjacent waters.

This plan has been examined and approved by The Joint Board, and we also have approved it. It is transmitted herewith for your consideration with recommendation that it be approved.

Following that is the other document from the War Department, dated August 29, 1941, as follows [reading:]

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Short Title—ABC-22), J. B. No. 325 (Serial 717).

[2626] 1. You are advised that The President has, on August 29, 1941, given approval to the subject serial by indorsing the Joint Planning Committee report as follows: "OK, F. D. R."

(Signed) W. P. Scobey,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C., Secretary.

And bears the endorsement:

Sep. 4, 1941
Noted—Chief of Staff
Noted—Deputy Chief of Staff.

So that of these three plans the Canadian was the only one that ever was finally approved by the President?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I have here a document which we will mark exhibit 43—the committee has this—captioned: "Statement by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff."

Have you a copy of that?

General Gerow. I have a copy; yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 43.")

[2627] Mr. Mitchell. This document is a document of instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the representatives of the United States at the American-British Staff conferences that resulted in the report which has been marked ABC-1 and 2?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; these are the instructions to the United States delegation, sir. It is a joint statement that was to be made by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations before a meeting of the Joint Committee, both United States and British.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you mean it was prepared and not given to the representatives, or wouldn't you know about that?
General Gerow. Well, sir; it was furnished the United States representatives and I think it was presented verbally at a joint meeting to the combined British and United States representatives.

Mr. Mitchell. I see. That document offered as exhibit 43 I think ought to be read into the record. I will read it.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army of the United States are aware of the advantages that will accrue to both nations in the prosecution of any war in which the United States and the British Commonwealth may participate as associates, [2628] should tentative understandings be reached in advance concerning military cooperation. Therefore, they have prepared this statement in the hope that it will clear the way for the discussions which are to follow.

2. As understood by these two officers, the purpose of these staff conversations is to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and the powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

3. The American people as a whole desire now to remain out of war—

The date of the document, I should have read, is January 27, 1941. Is that right?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell (continuing reading):

and to provide only material and economic aid to Great Britain. So long as this attitude is maintained, it must be supported by their responsible military and naval authorities. Therefore, no specific commitments can now be made except as to technical methods of cooperation. Military plans which may be envisaged must, for the present, remain contingent upon the future political action of both nations. All such plans are [2629] subject to eventual official approval by the two Governments.

4. The present national position of the United States is as follows:

(a) A fundamental principle of United States policy is that the Western Hemisphere remain secure against the extension in it of non-American military and political control.

(b) The United States has adopted the policy of affording material and diplomatic assistance to the British Commonwealth in that nation's war against Germany.

(c) The United States by diplomatic means has opposed any extension of Japanese rule over additional territory.

5. If the United States Government decides to make war in common with the British Commonwealth, it is the present view of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff that:

(a) The broad military objective of United States operations will be the defeat of Germany and her allies, but the United States necessarily must also maintain dispositions which, under all eventualities, will prevent the extension in the Western [2630] Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political and military power.

(b) The objective of the war will be most effectively attained by the United States exerting its principal military effort in the Atlantic or naval in the Mediterranean regions.

(c) The United States and British Commonwealth should endeavor to keep Japan from entering the war or from attacking the Dutch.

(d) Should Japan enter the war, United States operations in the Pacific and the Far East would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion of its principal military effort in the Atlantic or naval in the Mediterranean.

(e) As a general rule, United States forces should operate in their own areas of responsibility, under their own commanders, and in accordance with plans derived from the United States-British joint plans.

(f) The United States will continue to furnish material aid to Great Britain, but will retain for building up its own forces material in such proportion as to provide for future security and to best effectuate United States-British joint plans for [2631] defeating Germany.

6. The scope of the staff conversations should preferably cover the examination of those military efforts which will contribute most directly to the defeat of Germany. As a preliminary to military cooperation, tentative agreements should
be reached concerning the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the major lines of the military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme control, and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations. Staff conversations should also include an examination into the present military situations of the United States and the British Commonwealth, and also into the probable situations that might result from the loss of the British Isles.

7. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff would appreciate it if the British Staff Representatives could furnish the United States Staff Representatives with an estimate of the military situation of the British Commonwealth as a preliminary to the staff discussions.

Now, General Gerow, do you know of any other Joint Staff [2632] conversations between the United States and Great Britain, and the Dutch and the Canadians and the Australians or anybody else during that period in 1941, other than those I have adduced?

General Gerow. No, sir; other than informal conversations between members of our own staff and the members of the British mission and the missions of other nations that were assembled in Washington at that time.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I mean conversations of a more formal character that would produce some kind of a joint staff plan for possible future operations.

General Gerow. To the best of my knowledge and belief there were no such conferences.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you at any time during your service in the War Plans Division see or hear of any agreement which had been entered into by anybody, any executive officer of the United States, War, and Navy, or anybody else, including the President, which assumed to bind the United States to engage in war against Japan before Japan attacked the United States?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. There have been discussions here in the committee based on memoranda, I think, including this Singapore plan and memoranda by General Marshall and Admiral [2633] Stark, in which they recommended that no military operations should be conducted against Japan unless certain eventualities occurred, such as an attack by the Japs on the Philippines, and one of the eventualities was said to be "or unless the Japs should cross a certain latitude and longitude line." Do you remember that?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That was a recommendation and report based on the Singapore report, carried on forward to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy by the Marshall memorandum, is that right?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I think that statement appeared initially in the Singapore conversations, in the recommendation of the conferences at that conference.

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 17 has already been offered in evidence. It is a memorandum dated November 27, 1941. [Reading:]

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

Signed by General Marshall and Admiral Stark and addressed to the President. On the second page the report says:

79716—46—pt. 3—
It is recommended that:

prior to the completion of the Philippines reinforcement, military counter-action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;
in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;
steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

Do you know or did you know at the time whether the President took any action on that recommendation?

General Gerow. I do not know whether the President took any action on it or not, sir.

[2635] Mr. Mitchell. There was offered in evidence yesterday as exhibit 40, a message from the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations, marked “Information to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet,” dated December 7, eastern time, I suppose, Philippine time, 1941, which reads as follows:

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

Do you know of any assurances that we had given the British at Singapore of armed support under three or four eventualities?

General Gerow. I know of no such assurances, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. May this report, that has been obtained from Singapore, have been founded on this Dutch-American-British conference report to which we referred?

General Gerow. It may have been; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. May I have the last answer?

Mr. Mitchell. I asked him if it was possible that this report that Admiral Hart had might have referred to this Singapore plan. He said he does not know; it might.

We have tried to get Admiral Stark’s reply to this message, but we have not succeeded in doing it up to this morning.

[2636] Senator Ferguson. I might help counsel on the Admiralty report——

Mr. Mitchell. I would be glad to get any help I can.

Senator Ferguson. We asked that we have the Admiralty reports cleared up with the British.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean the messages from the British Admiralty?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; to our Navy.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, those, as I told you in our conversation yesterday, Senator, ought to go through clearance.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I say. I ask you now to get them cleared so we can clear up this point.

Mr. Mitchell. You were going to give me a list of those you wanted cleared so we could narrow it down as much as possible.

It is quite a job to send messages to England and to get the British Government to clear the message.

Senator Ferguson. I think you can clear that up later.

Mr. Mitchell. All right, we will try.

Now, General Gerow, getting back to another subject, I show you a document dated December 30, 1940, signed by Admiral Bloch, ad-
dressed to the Chief of Naval Operations \[2637\] which is already introduced in evidence here, which is a report by Admiral Bloch on the problem of aircraft raids on Hawaii. It bears the endorsement of Admiral Richardson, who forwarded it under date of January 7.

Do you remember whether you ever saw that? It went to the Chief of Naval Operations and not to the War Department?

General Gerow. I do not recall having seen that at the time, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. The record shows that the document I referred to is part of exhibit 9.

I call your attention now to exhibit 10, which is a letter from Secretary Knox to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, and part of the same exhibit, a letter dated February 7, 1941, from the Secretary of War Stimson to the Secretary of the Navy, in which, to refresh your memory, Secretary Knox said that the dangers at Pearl Harbor in the order of their probability, were—

1. Air bombing attack;
2. Airtorpedo plane attack;
3. Sabotage.

Do you remember having seen that correspondence?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I did see it.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember whether, as the result \[2638\] of the correspondence so instituted and during the year 1941, following this correspondence, various reports and plans were made dealing with air defense at Pearl Harbor?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. There has been offered in evidence here a book containing extracts from various plans, not joint plans but United States Army and Navy plans having to do with the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack.

I think this document itself, which the committee has, was not offered as an exhibit, but extracts of it were read into the record.

I think it advisable at this time to mark as exhibit 44 this document which is entitled “Copies of Defense Plans” and contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans dealing directly with the question of defense against air attack.

The Chairman. Let it be filed as exhibit 44.

(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 44.”)

Mr. Mitchell. Have you a copy of this document before you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you produced here the various plans on which this document, Exhibit 44, is based, as listed in \[2639\] the index in 13 items, that is, the War Department part of it?

General Gerow. I do not understand the question, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you checked these basic plans that have been produced here against the index?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Of Exhibit 44?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. There are 13 items in the list of contents. Have you checked these documents against that index?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Are all the documents that are listed in this index present here? You have checked them, haven't you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I will ask you to look at them and just state generally, as you go over each item, what they are. The first is extracts from joint Army and Navy basic war plan—orange (1938); is that right?

General Gerow. This is the joint Army and Navy basic war plan—orange, 1938, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. What does that mean?

General Gerow. That means it is a war plan that pertains specifically to operations against Japan. Japan was known as "orange."

Mr. Mitchell. And item 2, extracts from joint Army and Navy basic war plan—Rainbow No. 1, what is that?

General Gerow. This document is the joint Army and Navy basic war plan, Rainbow No. 1.

Mr. Mitchell. What is Rainbow No. 1? Can you tell us what the relation of it is to the other plans, or something of that kind?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. If I might refer to the document, I can give the scope of the plan, rather than from memory.

Mr. Mitchell. That is what I want you to do.

Mr. Keefe. Why not do the same thing with respect to the orange plan?

Mr. Mitchell. Start with orange, and tell the committee, in a general way, so we can orient these various plans and understand what they were and what their relations were to each other.

General Gerow. This joint Army and Navy basic war plan, orange, 1938, constitutes the basis upon which all Army plans, orange, and all Navy plans, orange, and all joint plans, orange, and all supporting allocations for an orange war shall be formulated and developed.

Orange, as I stated, was the code name for Japan. The document contains assumptions with regard to such a war, the concept of the war, the means assigned jointly to the Army and Navy and means assigned to each of the Army and Navy forces; joint decisions that were made by the Joint Board approving this plan; categories of defense.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that plan covered any sort of operations in that area in a war with Japan?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; limited to the Pacific area.

Mr. Mitchell. Limited to the Pacific?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And that, of course, included Hawaii?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. As part of the area?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, give us the same information about Rainbow No. 1, which is the second item. What is the date of Rainbow No. 1?

General Gerow. Rainbow No. 1, sir, was approved on August 14, by the Acting Secretary of the Navy.

The Vice Chairman. August 14, what year?

General Gerow. 1939, and August 14, 1939, by the Acting Secretary of War. This document was prepared prior to my assignment to duty in the War Plans Division.
Mr. Mitchell. I understand that. I am asking you, as a War Plans man, to tell the committee in a very general way, what that plan dealt with, and what its relation was to orange, 1938.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

The general situation on which this plan was based, was that at the time this directive was issued, the European war was in progress, which may involve other nations, and expand the field of military action.

There is an ever present possibility of the United States being drawn into this war. There is also the possibility that peace in Europe may be followed by a situation in which the United States will be forced to defend without allies the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine and our interest in the Pacific.

Mr. Mitchell. Does that plan cover operations in the Atlantic and Pacific?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Does it assume a possible engagement with Japan?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I should like to read the reference to the special situation on which it was based, sir.

[2643] Mr. Mitchell. All right.

General Gerow. Special situation for Rainbow No. 1 [reading]:

The termination of the war in Europe is followed by a violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine in South America by Germany and Italy. This is coupled with armed aggression by Japan against United States interest in the Far East. Other nations are neutral.

The purpose of the plan was "to provide for the most effective use of naval and military forces to defeat enemy objectives, particularly those in the territory and waters of the Western Hemisphere north of the approximate latitude 13 degrees south. This plan will restrict initially the projection of U. S. armed forces to the American Continents and their outlying islands, north of 13 degrees south latitude, and to the United States possessions in the Pacific westward to include Unalaska and Midway. This plan will visualize the subsequent extension of United States control into the western Pacific as rapidly as possible, consistent with the accomplishment of United States objectives in the Western Hemisphere, but no plan for such extension of operations will be prepared at this time."

Mr. Mitchell. Go to the third item in the joint Army and Navy basic war plan, Rainbow No. 5; please look at that [2644] and give us the date of that and briefly just what the scope of that plan is, or was?

General Gerow. This plan was approved on November 19, 1941, by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. I think I can best describe this plan by reading from the plan the general assumptions on which it was based, and that is:

That the associated powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Indochina, and Thailand.

That the associated powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1 and ABC-22.

That even if Japan, Indochina and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be able to fill logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, from sources in that general region.

That Latin American republics will take measures to [2645] control subversive elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected
to direct attack; in general the territorial waters and land bases of these republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere defense.

Those were the assumptions on which this plan was based.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, turn to the next item, extracts from War Department Operation Plan—Rainbow No. 5. What is that?

General Gerow. After the joint Army and Navy basic war plans were prepared, the Army and Navy then separately prepared their own plans, based on that joint plan. This War Department Operations Plan, Rainbow No. 5 of 1941, is the Army plan that was prepared, based on the joint Army and Navy basic plan—Rainbow No. It contains many of the statements that are contained in the basic plan. It contains the concept of the war, the assumptions under which the war will be fought, the means of allotment of forces, the directions to subordinate commanders to prepare subordinate plans, the coordination that must be had with other departments of the Government.

Mr. Mitchell. It includes in its scope the area of the Hawaiian Islands, does it?

General Gerow. It does; yes, sir.

[2646] Mr. Mitchell. Did you give the date of that?

General Gerow. This document does not contain on it the date of approval, but I am sure it was in August 1941, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 44 has a note on it "Approved by the Chief of Staff, August 1941."

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I think I have that somewhere in my documents.

Mr. Mitchell. Never mind. That is near enough.

General Gerow. I know it was sent out to Hawaii in August 1941, and the receipt was received back from the War Department on September 3, 1941.

Mr. Mitchell. The next item here is extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940. Will you look at that and tell us the scope and nature of that document, and the date?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. This document was prepared initially in Hawaii. It is a local plan based on the War Department plan which I have just discussed.

Mr. Mitchell. A plan worked out by the local commanders in 1940?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. By the commanding officer of the Hawaiian Department?


Mr. Mitchell. And the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District?

General Gerow. No, sir; this is not a joint plan. This is an Army plan. It is a little different from a plan, sir. It is what we call a defense project.

Mr. Mitchell. I see.

General Gerow. It contains the objective to be accomplished, but is primarily directed toward setting up the means that are required to carry out that war mission in considerable detail.
The Chairman. May I ask of the General: You say this was in 1940, and based on that previous item which you have just discussed which seems to have been approved in August 1941. Is not there some divergence as to dates?

General Gerow. This defense project is prepared annually and revised annually. This is the 1940 edition. The 1941 edition had not been completed at that time, but the orange plan of 1938 and the rainbow plan No. 1, contained the war missions for Hawaii, and those plans were taken together with the other data with which to revise the defense project which was in existence at that time, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. The next item is joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaii. What is that?

General Gerow. This is a joint plan that is prepared by the local commanders in Hawaii, Army and Navy, based on the joint plans. Army and Navy plans furnished by the War Department.

Mr. Mitchell. What is the date of it?

General Gerow. This document was approved at the Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, the 11th of April 1941, and Headquarters Fourteenth Naval District, 11th of April 1941.

Mr. Mitchell. I will state that that document is in Exhibit 44, set forth in full, not a mere extract of it. The whole thing is in this exhibit 44.

The next item is No. 7, annex No. VII, to joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaii. What is the date of that, and what is it?

General Gerow. Will you repeat that question, sir?

Mr. Mitchell. The next item is annex No. VII to joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaii. What is that document, the nature of it, and the date of it?

General Gerow. Annex No. VII, sir; to that document is a local plan prepared by the Fourteenth Naval District and the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. It is dated the 28th of March 1941, and covers joint security measures, protection of the fleet and Pearl Harbor base.

Mr. Mitchell. The next item in the same volume, No. 8, is the Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement).

What exhibit is that?

Mr. Gesell. Forty-four.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever see the report dated August 20, 1941, entitled "A Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii"?

Mr. Keefe. What is the date of that, please?

Mr. Mitchell. August 20, 1941.

It is entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii," addressed to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., through Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., which has heretofore been marked Exhibit 13. Did you ever see that report?

General Gerow. I cannot recall at this time as having ever seen that report, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the report which considered the vulnerability of Hawaii to an air attack at a time that it would likely come, in the morning, from carriers, and things of that kind, and then went on to estimate the ways of defeating it, and the number of planes that would be required to run a 360° long-range reconnaissance to detect the Jap carriers the evening before.
General Gerow. I have read the document since, just prior to this investigation.

[2650] Mr. Mitchell. You didn’t see it at the time?
General Gerow. At the time I don’t recall having seen it, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. No. 9, the next item in the index, “5 November 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department.”
Will you look at that and tell us what it is?
General Gerow. That document, sir, is contained in the operation orders of the Hawaiian Department dated 1941, sir. It is, as stated, a standing operating procedure.
Mr. Mitchell. Promulgated by whom?
General Gerow. By the commanding general, Hawaiian Department.
Mr. Mitchell. On his own, not a direction from Washington?
General Gerow. No, sir; on his own.
Mr. Mitchell. Is that the document in which General Short directed his air alerts 1, 2, 3, or am I wrong about that?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; they are included in this document.
Mr. Mitchell. Alert 1, sabotage without threat from without, and so on?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you see that document before December 7, 1941?
General Gerow. I don’t recall ever having seen it before [2651] December 7. I think the records of the War Department show it came in later in 1942.
Mr. Mitchell. The 10th item is “Field Order No. 1,” and 11, “Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan”; 12, “Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL–41.”
Those are Navy documents and Admiral Turner can describe them more fully, but just to complete the story here will you look at them and tell us in a general way what the nature of them is?
General Gerow. That is number 10, sir?
Mr. Mitchell. 10, 11 and 12. Ten is the first, “Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department.” Give the date of it and, if you can from inspection, the general nature of it.
Mr. Mitchell. It is?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. And it is the operations order as gotten out by the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. It has no date. It is intended as an order to be put into effect when the emergency arrives.
Mr. Mitchell. What is No. 11? 11, 12, and 13, they are Navy documents?
General Gerow. No. 11 is a Navy document, sir, based, as [2652] this paper indicates, on Rainbow No. 5.
Mr. Mitchell. It would be a corresponding document to the Army operations plan on Rainbow 5, similar?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. It was prepared in compliance with the directive contained in the joint Army-Navy basic plan, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. The next item is 12, “Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL–41 (revised)—Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.”
What is the date of that?
General Gerow. That is dated, sir, October 14, 1941.
Mr. Mitchell. By whom is that issued or authorized?
General Gerow. The heading shows that it is issued by the Com-
mander of the Pacific Fleet.
Mr. Mitchell. The 13th item is "Operations Plan No. 1-41.
Headquarters Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District."
What is the date of that and by whom issued or authorized?
General Gerow. That is dated 27 February 1941 and is issued by the
Headquarters of the Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District,
Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Mitchell. Now, General Gerow, you have gone over these doc-
uments and also you have gone over Exhibit 44 which contains either
extracts or complete copies of them, have you not?
Mr. Mitchell. And I asked you to prepare on the basis of your
study of all these plans a condensed statement giving as a War Plans
man, your analysis and conclusions as to the respective functions of
the Army and the Navy or the 14th Naval District or the Fleet at Pearl
Harbor. Have you done that?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you coordinate that with Admiral Turner who
was War Plans Officer in the Navy when you were in the War Plans in
the War Department? Did you submit the matter to him and get his
consideration of your memorandum, your conclusions?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. I took this paper, after I prepared it, over
to Admiral Turner and informally discussed it with him and asked
him if he concurred, and he said he did, sir, and I furnished him a copy.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you give to the committee the answer to the
question I submitted to you? That is, the question is to present to the
committee a brief statement of your analysis and conclusions of all
these plans with a view to stating what the respective functions of the
Army and the Navy were against an air attack in the defense of Oahu.
General Gerow. Yes, sir. May I read from this paper that I have
already prepared?
[2654] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, could the record
show the date of the request and whether the instrument was written
recently?
Mr. Gesell. It has been distributed to all members.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, but that brings up the
question of distributing these papers on the morning. It is just im-
possible to go through and read these papers while we are listening
to a witness. Is it possible to get these papers in the evening and not
have them put before us in the morning? This is an example. I
have been trying to read these papers and listen to witnesses.
The Chairman. The Chair can’t answer the question.
Senator Ferguson. Can we get an answer from counsel right now?
Mr. Mitchell. We got this document late last evening. We have
had the mimeographing agencies of about every department of the
Government chasing up and down getting these copies out, we have
been running them ragged about it, and we are doing the very best
we can.
I didn't get this summary, or even a draft of it, from General Gerow until a day or two ago, and then we had to have it mimeographed, and we got it last night.

Senator Ferguson. How long has counsel had these other papers that were put before us?

[2655] The Chairman. Might the Chair suggest that we go into other papers at a different time from a time when we are on the verge of hearing General Gerow read the paper that he prepared. You asked when it was prepared and I think that is proper. But let's not go to the other papers.

Senator Ferguson. We will go back to this one. Did we not have a rule, or at least a semblance of a rule, that we were to get any statements read by a witness 24 hours in advance?

The Chairman. We had an understanding that where a witness testified from a manuscript we would attempt to get the manuscript at least 24 hours in advance. The Chair does not understand that that applies to a mere memorandum that a witness would use during his testimony which is oral. If the Chair misunderstood, he is subject to correction.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, this is an answer to a direct question that was given to this witness sometime ago. Why could the committee not have had this answer in advance?

Mr. Mitchell. I have answered that question. I have stated that I asked the witness to give us his estimate. I didn't know that he wanted to write it out, necessarily, but to come here and testify to it. When he got to work on it he found he could do it better if he put it in memorandum form [2656] and consulted Admiral Turner about it. He did that within the last day or two and we didn't get the statement until late last night. If the committee wants him to state his conclusions orally he will do it. He has asked permission to read this document and comment on it so that his statement may be more accurate and better organized.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, as I understood counsel, the statement was received a day or two ago and then it had to be mimeographed. Did I understand correctly?

Mr. Mitchell. I don't remember of having seen it at all until yesterday. Yesterday was Tuesday, wasn't it?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Brewster. Don't you have a record—

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to know whether we are examining this witness or cross-examining counsel. I stated we have done our best in this matter and I don't see that counsel's office is under any criticism, proper criticism, in a case like this. You understand the facts fully. The witness was asked to prepare his conclusions and an analysis of those plans as to the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy. He went to work on it. At the last minute he wanted to put it in writing so that he could read it. He having put it in that shape we wanted to have it mimeographed so that the committee could follow it. It was done late last evening [2657] and delivered last night.

The Chairman. The Chair suggests that General Gerow proceed to read his statement.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman—

The Chairman. The Senator from Maine.
Senator Brewster. I think this thing should be clarified. I gather from what has been said that it may be that additional help is required to enable counsel to perform what the committee agreed was most desirable.

I have followed the practice with every document which I have received from counsel of noting not only the date but the hour. That practice is followed in all Government departments. I would like to know the day and hour when this document was received. And then, if counsel has not adequate mimeographing assistance, with all the facilities of the Government at his disposal, we ought to see that he gets more.

This is an illustration of what can be found in connection with Pearl Harbor, that they didn't have adequate help. We agreed we needed these things in advance. I see no reason why the committee shouldn't provide whatever facilities are necessary to do that in this matter.

The Chairman. The Chair does not know how many mimeographing outfits there are in Washington. All those that are available for our use are being utilized, I understand, for that purpose.

[2658] The Chair does not think that a memorandum, in the midst of oral testimony, comes within the rule that we provided for that in advance manuscript testimony should be furnished to the committee 24 hours in advance, or any other length of time in advance.

General Miles the other day read a memorandum which he wanted to read in the midst of his oral testimony and no question was raised about it. The Chair thinks General Gerow should be permitted to read this memorandum if he thinks it is more accurate than he could give it orally.

The Vice Chairman. As a suggestion, it is now 5 minutes to 12. I suggest that we recess at this point and that will give the members 2 hours to read this memorandum which is now before them and we can meet at 2 o'clock and hear General Gerow read it.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Gesell reminds me also that one of the difficulties we are up against right now is, as indicated by this situation, due to the complete disarrangement of our order of proof.

General Gerow was not on the list until we got through with General Miles. Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner also came ahead of him. We had to jam him on the stand today in order to give some basic material as a basis for General Marshall's testimony.

[2659] If General Gerow had come in his regular order we would not have this situation. We must take that into account.

The Chairman. The committee undoubtedly understands that it has been necessary to improvise due to the change of schedule, which is due to General Marshall's appearance this week.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make a short statement?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. The statement about which so much fuss is being made is 6½ pages. Substantially all of what the witness has covered has been in the hands of the committee for over 2 weeks.

The Vice Chairman. I suggest that we recess.

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Counsel will proceed with General Gerow.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW

(RESUMED)

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add something to my statement this morning. Since the noon recess, at half past twelve I received a report from the State Department. They heard from the British and Dutch about the intercept messages.

I reported this morning the Australians reported they did not get any such message, and that the British reported they haven't, but that report was not quite complete. They say some message got into Singapore 6 hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, and we are taking steps to get the text of that, to see what kind of message it was.

The Dutch said they haven't.

I also should have said this morning that the FBI have reported to us they have no trace of ever having had it, and having it in their file.

About this difficulty about mimeographing, I want to state additions to my staff would not help us any. It is a question of getting the mimeographing and photostatic equipment and the trained men. We are using now the mimeographing and photostatic equipment and personnel of the Navy Department, and that in the War Department, and the central mimeographing and photostatic equipment, and if there are any other mimeographs stationed around that I could get hold of I would be glad to take possession of it.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, will the committee be presented with that information? I have in mind the exact information that comes in on this so-called winds message.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I have not had it mimeographed because it is not complete. I wanted to do a complete job and hand it all to the committee in advance of our proposed arrangement to have the winds message taken up as a special order.

I have now one report from the FBI, and I have letters from the State Department. I have one copy, I think, and maybe more, and I think that has been mimeographed, of the report from General MacArthur. I will give you mimeographed copies as we get them.

The Chairman. The Chair understands that the counsel is now reporting informally but later he will give the committee the official report to which he referred.

Mr. Mitchell. The only reason I brought this up this morning was that once before I was criticized by allowing certain members of the committee to proceed in an examination that assumed certain facts to be so when I had information in my possession and kept quiet on it, so that they were proceeding on a false assumption. I was merely trying to aid the committee so they can guide their own questions and not make assumptions of fact which might not turn out to be so.

I also did it because, as I say, before General Marshall was called we expected to give the committee the full record on the thing, and,
not being able to do it, I thought I ought to make an attempt, at least, to show the state of the inquiry.

The Chairman. The committee appreciates that.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, the thing that disturbs me, as a member of the committee, is the fact—and it can be indicated here—that counsel has drawn certain conclusions. I am unwilling to draw any conclusions at this time, until the committee has all of the sworn testimony and evidence before it.

I am quite disturbed over the fact that, on this particular evidence, it appears that counsel is drawing certain conclusions at this particular moment, prior to the committee getting the exact evidence upon which those conclusions are drawn.

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to state that he hopes, and I am sure the whole committee hopes, that the committee as a whole and as individual members will draw no conclusions about any phase of this investigation until the whole testimony is in. The Chair understood counsel to be merely trying to bring the committee up to date as of today, in view of the disarrangement of the program and schedule made necessary by General Marshall's earlier appearance. The chairman did not understand that counsel was drawing any conclusions, except reporting up to this hour, or up to this morning, what had been found or had not been found in regard to official records and documents.

Mr. Mitchell. I did say this, Senator, I said on the record as it stood up to date I had grave doubts as to whether the winds intercept messages, indicating war with the United States, had ever been sent out, and I expressly reserve the right to change my view after I have heard all the rest of the testimony on it.

Now, I do not think a man is going to be blamed for having serious doubt, on the present state of the record, about it. I am guilty of that, I admit, for whatever it is worth. I never got this far in a lawsuit before without having some idea of what the probabilities of the case were. I do not think I would be worth anything as a lawyer if I didn't.

The Chairman. Of course the committee understands that any of our doubts, or I might say any of our preconceived notions can be subject to change in view of evidence that may be brought to the committee, and therefore we have all proceeded on the theory that we are open-minded on any proposition respecting this investigation until the whole evidence is in.

At any stage of the hearing we may have some doubts about something that has been done up to date, but we will not make up our minds until all the evidence is completed.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering whether or not the difficulty does not arise somewhat from the unusual relationship of the counsel in this hearing. We all more or less recognize our places. I take it that the counsel necessarily takes a position that this hearing is quasi-judicial, so that his expression of opinion in this fashion, before the evidence is all in, does have a little anticipatory aspect.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?
Senator Brewster. Certainly.

The Chairman. It will undoubtedly be overcome by evidence that any such message was received.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let us hear the witness.
The Chairman. The committee will proceed with the witness.

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, you were about to give a statement of your summary of the respective functions of the Army and the Navy at Oahu under the existing plans with respect to defense in an air attack.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That is, the plans up to December 7, 1941.


Mr. Mitchell. Will you please do that.

General Gerow. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

1. The broad responsibilities of the Army and Navy in Hawaii were contained in Army and Navy war plans prepared and issued to the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii. These responsibilities were expressed in the various plans in terms of joint missions and separate Army and Navy missions. With the exception as indicated below, these missions are stated identically in all war plans current in 1941, as follows:

JOINT MISSION

To hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

NAVY MISSION

To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

ARMY MISSION

To hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the Naval forces.

2. In the most recent plan the phrase in the Army mission "to support the Naval Forces" was deleted, and the following was substituted: "Support Naval Forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases."

That is the statement of the Army mission as it appears in Rainbow 5.

I desire to invite the attention of the committee to:

3. It should be noted that in all cases the missions called for mutual support.

4. Based on these broad missions the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Navy Commander in Hawaii agreed to accept certain responsibilities for defense against air attack. These agreements are to be found in the various local joint plans and the separate plans of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. The basic current plans in Hawaii on December 7, 1941 were: The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941, and the Army and Navy Operations Orders and agreements based thereon. These plans and agreements contain the following major provisions pertaining to defense against air attack:

I shall discuss, first, antiaircraft defense.

The responsibility of the Army for antiaircraft defense was as follows:

Army—(1) "Shall provide for: a. The * * anti- aircraft defense of Oahu:"

(2) Army Antiaircraft, "supported by Naval Units placed under the tactical control of the Army, will operate to defend Oahu from attacks by hostile aircraft."

(3) The Army, "Arrange for such coordination of the antiaircraft artillery fire of naval ships in Pearl Harbor and the Army antiaircraft defense as may be practicable."
The Navy's responsibility was:

"The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District * * * are taking certain security measures, which include:

"(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the control and distribution of the antiaircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor. * * *

In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shorebased on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

"The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District * * * shall: (a) exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack. (b) Arrange with the Army to have their antiaircraft guns emplaced." * * *

“(d) Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft fire with the base defense.”

I have drawn some conclusions from those different agreements. They are mine.

[2668] I believe that the commanders on the ground that made these agreements are in a much better position to interpret them, and say exactly what their intentions were at the time, than I am, but these are the conclusions that I have drawn from those paragraphs:

The orders and agreements on the part of the local Army and Navy Commanders lead to the conclusion primary responsibility for antiaircraft defense rested with the Army but that the Navy had a secondary responsibility in connection therewith.

I go next to the Aircraft Warning Service.

The responsibility of the Army for antiaircraft warning service was:

(1) The Army "shall provide for: * * *

b. "An antiaircraft * * * intelligence and warning service."

The Navy responsibility was:

During the period prior to the completion of the aircraft warning service installation, the Navy, through use of radar, and other appropriate means will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks that may be practicable."

My conclusion with regard to the aircraft warning service is as follows:

The Army had primary responsibility for the establishment of an aircraft warning service. The Navy, however, agreed to furnish such means as it had, pending the installation of the Army facilities then under construction.

Mr. Mitchell. Does that relate to what we have called radar, or is it broader than that?

General Gerow. It relates to radar, sir.

I might say in that connection that I understand that the radar on Navy ships is not particularly effective when there is an intervening terrain obstacle. It is all right across the water, but not so effective when close to an intervening article.

Aircraft defense: I have broken it down into three phases; the reconnaissance phase, the defensive air phase, and the offensive air phase. I state first the reconnaissance phase.

The responsibility of the Army:

(1) "Shall provide for:

* * *

"Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the Oahu Defensive Coastal Area in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol."

The responsibility of the Navy:

(1) Navy "shall provide for: a. An inshore patrol. b. An offshore patrol * * * i. Distant reconnaissance.

[2670] (2) "When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be
under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations."

Defensive air, I shall discuss next.
The Army's responsibility for defensive air operations is:
The Army was responsible for:
b. "Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army."

The Navy responsibilities were:

1. "Each commander will * * * make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant."
2. "With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable."

I turn now to offensive air operations.
The Army will:

"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea within range of Army bombers."

The Navy's responsibility——

[2677] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may we have order?
I can't hear the witness for the buzzing that is on the right.
The Chairman. The committee will be in order.
General Gerow. The Navy responsibilities. The Navy:

1. "Shall provide for * * * j. Attacking enemy naval forces."
2. "Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy."

My conclusions, as to the responsibility for aircraft operations in defense of Oahu against attack from aircraft are as follows:

The Navy was primarily responsible for close and distant aerial reconnaissance and offensive air operations against hostile surface craft. The Army was primarily responsible for defensive air operations. Regardless of the service primarily responsible, the opposite service was charged with supporting the operation within the means available to it.

To summarize, it will be seen from the above analysis that:
(a) Definite plans and agreements existed in Hawaii for defense against aircraft;
(b) Although the Army had the primary responsibility [2672] for anti-aircraft defense, aircraft warning service and defensive air operations and the Navy had the primary responsibility for close and distant reconnaissance, and offensive air operations, each service was charged with augmenting the forces of the other with the means available to them in order to provide the maximum effective defense.

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, returning for a moment to these three joint plans, the Singapore plan, the British conversations, and the Canadian plan that we took up this morning, were any deployments, or steps ever taken by the United States prior to December 7 to put any of those plans into operation? December 7, 1941. You told us that the British and Dutch plans were never approved and only the Canadian had been finally approved. I want to know whether approved or not approved, the United States ever put those plans, or any part of them into effect before December 7, the joint plans, if you know?

General Gerow. I don't believe, sir, I can answer that question offhand. We certainly made some preliminary dispositions so we would be prepared to carry out those plans but without studying the
history of the orders prior to December 7, sir, I prefer not to answer that question.

[2673] Mr. Mitchell. You will kindly look that up for us so that when you return to the stand after General Marshall has testified you may be able to answer, please.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Could any of these other nations, as you read these joint plans, put them into effect without the consent of the United States, so as at any time to obligate or make necessary that the United States do likewise?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, in this matter of preparation of war plans, whether our own plans or jointly with some other nation, has it been the practice of the War Plans Division from time immemorial to make all sorts of plans about war operations on the contingency that some day or other we might be involved in hostilities with other nations?

General Gerow. Oh, yes, sir. We had at all times kept current plans for operations against any major power or combination of major powers, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That is, you didn’t make any distinction, generally, between those we were friendly with and those we were unfriendly with. Do you have plans against everybody practically?

General Gerow. Yes, sir, at one time I think we had plans against most everybody, sir, and I think that is the [2674] practice of every general staff of every nation.

Mr. Mitchell. It is partly a matter of training in drawing plans and partly a matter of being ready if trouble comes; is that it?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And that is especially true, of course, in the situation where our foreign relations with any particular nation are becoming tense?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. We concentrate then on a particular plan that pertains to that nation.

Mr. Mitchell. If the General Staff did not do that and got caught without any plans if hostilities started, it would be a rather sickly situation for the General Staff, would it not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. We would be accused of neglecting our duty.

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to this pink book, telegraph messages between the War Department and Hawaii from July 8 to December 7, 1941. It has been offered in evidence as Exhibit 32. You have examined that, have you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Could you tell us whether you knew about those messages or had copies available to you at or about the time they were sent, what the practice was about that?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I knew about most of these [2675] messages. There are one or two that I didn’t know about, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Can you identify those that you didn’t know about?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I do not believe that I had the copy of the message referred to in this document at page 19, sir, dated the 4th of December.
Mr. Mitchell. That is a dispatch from the commanding general at Hawai to the Chief of the Army Air Corps; is that the one you refer to?


Mr. Mitchell. How did these dispatches come to you? Some of them you participated in preparing, did you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. Some of them are what might be called joint messages prepared by the war plans of both the Army and Navy working together. Others were messages that were prepared in the War Department for submission to the Chief of Staff for approval.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Counsel, if I may interject, this exhibit you are now referring to, the folder I have shows December 10. That must be an error.

Mr. Mitchell. What page?

Senator Lucas. Page 19. Exhibit 32. Is that the correct date?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

[2676] Senator Lucas. That came after the Pearl Harbor attack.

Mr. Gesell. There is an earlier message, Senator Lucas, from General Short, which appears earlier. This one, however, I think, was dated December 10.

Senator Lucas. All right. I apologize for interrupting.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Gesell. That may have been sent somewhat earlier. I think the December 10 date is the arrival date.

Mr. Mitchell. It says on it, "Received December 10."

Mr. Murphy. It says, at the beginning, "December 4. No. 1033." "No. 1033 December 4th." Right below "Chief Army Air Corps," top of the page on the left.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. Sent on the 4th, received on the 10th.

The Chairman. All right.

[2677] Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, on November 21, 1941, I understand you attended a conference with Secretary Hull, Admiral Stark, and Messrs. Hornbeck, Hamilton, and Ballantine, of the State Department, and I will ask you to refer to your memorandum of November 21 to the Secretary of State, part of Exhibit 18. Have you that before you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have that exhibit, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That was a memorandum you made of the conference that was held on the 21st, was it, at the time you made it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And it correctly records the proceedings at the meeting as you remembered them on the 24th of November 1941?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Why don't you read it?

Mr. Mitchell. Shall I read it? It is in evidence.

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. It is a memorandum to the Chief of Staff. "Subject: Far Eastern Situation," dated November 24, 1941, and signed by General Gerow. It says [reading from Exhibit No. 18]:

A conference was held in the State Department at 9:45 a. m., November 21, 1941. Present: Secretary Hull, Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, Admiral Stark, and [2678] General Gerow. Secretary Hull requested the Army and Navy rep-
representatives to express their informal views from a military standpoint on a 
draft of a tentative outline of a basis for agreement with Japan. (Tab A.) 
He explained that the outline was in a formative stage and had not been adopted 
by the State Department.

The various provisions were discussed. Both Admiral Stark and General 
Gerow were of the opinion that, in general; the document was satisfactory 
from a military viewpoint. They requested, however, an opportunity to make 
a more detailed study of its possible effect on the military situation. It was 
agreed that comments would be submitted early the same afternoon.

The comments of Admiral Stark (Tab B) and my own (Tab C) are attached. 
I informed Admiral Stark verbally that I regretted the reference to Army forces 
in the Navy comments on provisions A 1. I feel that no restrictions should be 
placed on Army's preparations to make the Philippines secure.

I informed the Secretary of War and General Dryden verbally of the con-
ference.

(Signed) L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General.

Do you remember what that related to?
Mr. Mitchell. What was it? That is, the document that Secretary 
Hull said was a tentative outline of a basis for agreement with 
Japan?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; it was a proposal, a tentative draft pro-
posal for delivery to Japan of a modus vivendi.
Mr. Mitchell. You got into the modus vivendi picture at that time 
then, did you?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you make a subsequent memorandum for the 
Secretary of State on that subject?
General Gerow. Yes, sir; I did.
Mr. Mitchell. Or was it an earlier one?
General Gerow. I made one the same afternoon of the conference, 
November the 21st, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I see. The memorandum I just read to you to the 
Chief of Staff was made on the 24th and related to the conference on the 
21st. Now, the memorandum I am just calling your attention to 
was made on the same day as the conference, was it?
General Gerow. Yes, sir. It was agreed we would put in our views 
on the State Department paper that same afternoon, sir.
[2680] Mr. Mitchell. And this one I have just referred to is 
your view on that?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. As you made it then?
General Gerow. The one dated November the 21st.
Mr. Mitchell. That has been offered but not read. Shall I read it?
The Chairman. Read it; yes.
Mr. Keefe. What is the exhibit number?
Mr. Mitchell. It was part of Exhibit 18. There were several docu-
ments together.
Mr. Keefe. All right.
Mr. Mitchell. It is a memorandum for the Secretary of State.
Maybe you should take a shot at it.
General Gerow. Yes, sir; I will read it.
Senator Ferguson. May I interrupt? Both are part of Exhibit 18?
Mr. Mitchell. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, General.

General Gerow. This is a memorandum headed [reading from Exhibit No. 18]:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
WAR PLANS DIVISION,
Washington, November 21, 1941.

[2681]
Memorandum for the Secretary of State.
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

War Plans Division has made a hasty study from a military viewpoint of your tentative "Outline of Proposed Bases for Agreement between the United States and Japan," and perceives no objection to its use as a basis for discussion. The adoption of its provisions would attain one of our present major objectives—the avoidance of war with Japan. Even a temporary peace in the Pacific would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British—both of which are highly important.

The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. War Plans Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe that we reach a modus vivendi with Japan.

War Plans Division suggests the deletion of paragraph B.—5. The proposal contained in that paragraph would probably be entirely unacceptable to Russia. The geographical layout in the Manchurian-Siberian area is such that military time and space factors are all in favor of Japan. Furthermore, it would be most difficult to reach an agreement as to what are "equivalent forces" and the measures to be taken to insure that no unauthorized increases are made in those forces. Such an arrangement would increase the vulnerability of the Russian position, particularly in the Maritime Provinces, and at the same time remove the very real threat to Japanese cities of the Russian air bases therein. From the United States viewpoint, it is greatly to our advantage to have the possibility of access to Siberian airfields securely guarded by a potential ally.

The paper has been considered as a whole. If major changes are made in its provisions, it is requested that the War Department be given an opportunity to consider the military aspects of such changes.

The Chief of Staff is out of the city and consequently this paper has not been presented for his consideration. War Plans Division believes that he would concur in the views expressed above.

(Signed) L. T. Gerow,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

[2683] Mr. Mitchell. Now, you had a meeting again on November 24. General Marshall, Admiral Stark, Under Secretary Welles, and yourself, and possibly others, were present. Have you any memorandum of that meeting? Do you have a record of such a meeting? Do you remember anything about it?

General Gerow. I cannot recall at this time, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, at this meeting on the 21st, when this proposed modus vivendi message was under consideration, do you remember the discussions that took place at that meeting beyond your memorandums?

General Gerow. No, sir. The memorandum would be much more correct than my memory at this time, sir. I cannot recall the details.

Mr. Mitchell. During your conferences with the State Department people about the modus vivendi, do you recollect having had your attention called to a message from Mr. Churchill in which he said it was all right with Great Britain, but how about the Chinese, and it was rather thin diet for the Chinese? Do you remember having
brought to your attention the message from Chiang Kai-shek in which he protested against the modus vivendi because it would result in the collapse of the Chinese Army and defense? Do you remember anything about that?

General Gerow. I do not recall this message; no, sir. [2684]

I attended this particular conference in the absence of the Chief of Staff, and that may have been discussed at some other conference at which I was not present. I do not recall that, however.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have more than one meeting that you attended with State Department people—here was Welles, of the State Department, not Mr. Hull—that dealt with this modus vivendi? Can you recall more than the one?

General Gerow. I can only recall the one, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, did you know at the time that the modus vivendi idea was going to be abandoned?

General Gerow. I do not recall that I knew that, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have a part in drafting the warning message sent by the War Department to General Short on November 27, 1941?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. What function had the War Plans Division in sending a message of that character?

General Gerow. It was the responsibility of War Plans Division to prepare such draft messages for consideration of the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, do I understand that it was not your function to send merely information messages? Weren't you confined to sending messages that had to do with active operations or orders?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. The responsibilities of War Plans Division were confined to operational messages. The sending of purely information was the responsibility of the G-2 Intelligence Section, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. So the reason that you were brought into this warning message was because it had something in it that directed some deployments or action on the part of the addressee; was that it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. It would require operations on the part of the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you your memorandum of November 27, 1941, to the Chief of Staff about that? Do you have a copy of it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have a photostat copy of it.

Mr. Mitchell. We will mark that Exhibit 45. It has not yet been introduced. I offer it.

The Vice Chairman. It has been distributed?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. It was distributed yesterday, Congressman Cooper.

The Vice Chairman. It may be received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 45" and follows.)

[2686] Mr. Mitchell. Will you please read that memorandum that you wrote to the Chief of Staff? Read all the notes at the top of it as well.
Mr. Mitchell. How does the first sentence start out so I can be sure I have the same thing?

General Gerow. "The Secretary of War sent for me."

Mr. Mitchell. That is it. Well, you read the photostat then.

General Gerow. Very well, sir.

Dated 11/27/41. Initials "C. A. G." Dated November 27, 1941. There is a number "4544-13." Under that, "November the 28th, 1941.

Noted: Chief of Staff" with initials that I cannot decipher. Also "Noted: Deputy Chief of Staff," with the same initials which I cannot decipher. [Reading from Exhibit No. 45:]

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 a.m., November 27, 1941. General Bryden was present. [2687] The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24. I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

2. Later in the morning, I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

[2688] 3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy attached).

(Signed) L. T. Gerow,

Brigadier General,

Acting Chief of Staff.

Then there is a notation, "Filed in O. C. S." "2 Incls: Memo. for President, 11-27-41; Memo. for TAG, 11-27-41."

And then written in: "Copy in General Gerow's book" and initials which I cannot decipher. The figures "11-28." Other figures "—11-27-41."

Then "Memorandum for TAG, 11-27-41." Then written in, "File in OAS record room." Then at the bottom lower right hand corner, "OCS-15" — it appears to be "36-125." Two letters there which I cannot decipher. Then "11-28-41."

The Vice Chairman. Is this Exhibit 45?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of counsel if that does correctly represent the copy furnished the committee?
Mr. Mitchell. No. The only difference is these different routings and notations on the bottom of it.

[2689] Senator Ferguson. But it does show who received it on the photostatic copy but not on the other?

Mr. Mitchell. The mimeographed copy contains these notations: "Noted: Chief of Staff, November 28" and "Noted: Deputy Chief of Staff" with the same date. The only difference is some of these routings or dates that are immaterial. The notations of who received it are on the mimeograph.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, at this meeting that you spoke about where the Secretary of War sent for you, was there considered at that meeting a draft of a proposed message to Hawaii, Panama, and other places, or only at that time the MacArthur message? Do you remember about that?

General Gerow. The conference was directed primarily to the message to the Philippines and the commanding general of the Far East, but the other messages, as I recall, were discussed in my memorandum to that fact. There were various messages to the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre discussed.

Mr. Mitchell. Can you tell in your own way, independently of this memorandum, just what happened at that meeting, or can you add anything to the memorandum?

General Gerow. I believe now, sir, that I was in the office at the time that the Secretary of War telephoned to the [2690] Secretary of State. I believe that I heard one end of the conversation.

Mr. Mitchell. That is, you were in the Secretary's office?

General Gerow. In the Secretary of War's office, yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And you heard him telephone the Secretary of State?

General Gerow. That is my recollection; yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And you heard one end of the conversation?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And then what did the Secretary of War report that you remember as to what the other end of the telephone had said?

General Gerow. The Secretary, after he had completed this conversation, stated to me that it is too abrupt to say the negotiations shall terminate, that the Secretary of State won't quite go along with that. "He says to all intents and purposes," I recall, "with the barest possibilities of their being resumed" and based on that I cannot recall whether I noted the exact wording in the message that was sent, or whether the Secretary wrote it down in his own handwriting. I cannot recall at this time, sir.

[2692] Mr. Mitchell. Well, you are speaking now of the message to the Philippines?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; the message to the Philippines, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you used that same phrase in your message later to Hawaii, didn't you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. The Philippines message, which was, I know, definitely approved by the Secretary of War, formed a basis for the preparation of the other messages to the other three commanders in the Pacific area.
Mr. Mitchell. In other words, the War Plans Division took upon itself the task of drafting in its own way the messages to the other commanders on the basis of the one that had been agreed upon for the Philippines, was that what had happened?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; but I cannot recall whether all of them were presented to the Secretary of War later on for approval or not; I cannot recall at this time, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I notice that so far as concerns the dispatch to General Short and the one from the Navy to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy did not put any qualification about negotiations being resumed, did they?

General Gerow. I cannot remember exactly what happened about the Navy message that was sent. I believe it was written earlier, prior to the conversation that I had with the Secretary of War, and I believe that it might have been sent prior to the dispatch of the message that was sent by War Plans Division.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the Navy was not present then when this conversation between the Secretary of War with Secretary Hull over the telephone took place. Is that your recollection?

General Gerow. No, sir; I believe that the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Stark were both there at the time of that conversation but I cannot be sure, sir. I cannot accurately state whether that was my first conference that I had with the Secretary of War when he called up or the second one, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I will call your attention to this: The message which you drafted for General Marshall, to go over General Marshall's name to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department says:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

That was put in there at the suggestion of Secretary Stimson after talking with Mr. Hull over the telephone, as I understand it.

[2693] General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, the Navy message of the same date from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet says this:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Stop. Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

Now, there is a difference between those and it is evident, I think, that the Navy dispatch did not know anything about the conversation with Mr. Hull or the man who wrote the Navy dispatch. So are you sure that the Navy was present at this conference that you spoke about, which you and General Bryden attended with the Secretary of War?

General Gerow. I am sure that the Navy was not present at the first conference. I am positive that Secretary Knox and Admiral Stark were present at the second conference.

Mr. Mitchell. You say:

Later in the morning I attended a conference with Secretary of War and Navy and Admiral Stark.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember whether at that second conference at which the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Stark were present their attention was called to the fact that Mr. Hull wanted to water down the statement that it was a complete breach or termination of negotiations with Japan? Do you have any recollection about that?

General Gerow. Well, the entire message was discussed. I cannot recall now whether there was any particular reference to that particular sentence.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, do you remember anything further about the discussion other than what you have stated in your memorandum here of November 27, 1941? Does anything come back to you that I haven't asked you about?

General Gerow. No, sir; I cannot remember anything else, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, the original draft of the message that was prepared to send to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department contained, I understand, some phrase about sabotage, did it not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you seen Exhibit 36, the photostat copy of the original draft?

General Gerow. I have a photostat copy, sir. I imagine it is the same one that you have, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That is it. I call your attention to the fact that in this draft, dated November 27, which was a memorandum for the Adjutant General through the Secretary of the General Staff, says:

The Secretary of War directs that the following, considered as a priority message, be dispatched by cable, radio, or telegraph to each of the following: Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department; Commanding General of the Caribbean Defense Command.

Then there is a line:

also to the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command,

and that seems to be stricken out.

Do you see that?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And then at the bottom of that page in the draft are these words:

Needed measures for protection against subversive activities should be taken immediately.

A line is drawn through those words and the initials "L. T. G." there. Did you cause both those deletions to be made? The upper one does not seem to be your deletion.

General Gerow. No, sir, the upper one is not my initials. I do not know who made that, sir, but I do positively recall making the deletion which referred to subversive activities, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. How did that, or at whose instance did that original statement about subversive activities get into the draft, do you know?

General Gerow. No, sir. Some time during the preparation of this message by the officers of War Planes Division under my instructions that phrase was inserted. Whether it was done after a conference
with G-2 or not, I do not recall it, but when it was brought to me for approval I objected to the inclusion in the message.

Mr. Mitchell. On what ground?

General Gerow. This message was intended to warn the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department of the possibility of an attack from without, not against subversive activities, so I asked for a meeting—

Mr. Mitchell. You mean not only against subversive activities?

General Gerow. Yes, sir, but primarily directed against the possibility of an attack from without.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, except for that sentence that you struck out, there isn’t a word in the draft about subversive activities or sabotage?

General Gerow. No, sir. That was primarily a responsibility of G-2, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And you state you struck it out because you did not want it limited, is that the idea, or you did not want any specific danger to be mentioned. What is your recollection about that?

General Gerow. Well, I wanted to be sure that this message would cover only—that this message could be interpreted only as warning the commanding general in Hawaii against an attack from without.

Mr. Mitchell. So it was stricken out at your suggestion?

General Gerow. At a conference held that afternoon in the office of General Bryden, attended by General Miles and Colonel Bundy and myself, there was quite a considerable discussion. It was finally agreed that the phrase should be stricken out and it was also agreed that General Miles would send a message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department with regard to being on guard against subversive activities.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, can you remember anything more about the discussion relating to striking out those two lines?

General Gerow. No, sir, except the fact that I did not feel it to be appropriate to include a reference to subversive activities in this War Plans Division operational message.

Mr. Mitchell. You made that point at the conference, you mean?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

[2697] Mr. Mitchell. And who urged the other view, if anybody did, that the subversive activities be mentioned in the main dispatch? Do you have any recollection about that?

General Gerow. General Miles felt very strongly, as I recall, sir, that some reference to subversive activities, protection against subversive activities should be transmitted to the commanding general in Hawaii.

Mr. Mitchell. And it was settled that it should not be in the main warning but would take the form of another sabotage dispatch from the G-2 in Washington to the G-2 officer on General Short’s staff?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know at the time of the sending of the second subversive and sabotage message over General Adams’ signature and the other one over General Arnold’s, at his request? Did you know about those?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I attended a conference with regard to that message, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Whom was the conference with?

General Gerow. As I recall—

Mr. Mitchell. There are two messages I am referring to, one over Adams’ name and the other one over the Chief of the Air Corps’ signature.

General Gerow. I do not recall the one over the signature of the Chief of Air Corps. I do recall the one that was sent over the signature of Adams. That was a conference attended by General Miles and, as I recall, General Scanlon and myself. I do not recall who else was present.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember the nature of the discussion?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. The discussion revolved, as I recall, largely around the fact that General Miles was concerned that in preventing subversive activities that the military might exceed authority and cause some difficulties.

Mr. Mitchell. That the military might what?

General Gerow. Might apply—

Mr. Mitchell. Illegal measures?

General Gerow. Well, not illegal measures, no, sir; but measures that might antagonize the—

Mr. Mitchell. People?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I am not clear in my mind, sir; on that particular message because that was a G-2 responsibility and I was called into that conference only incidentally.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, do you remember anything about the other message, sabotage messages that went forward over General Arnold’s signature?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That was addressed to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department?

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not recall that message.

Mr. Mitchell. Under date of November 28. It was sent over General Adams’ signature, but the last two words are “Signed—Arnold.” That would be an Air Corps message?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I do not recall being in on the preparation of that message, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have referred to you for examination the reports of the various commanders to whom these warning messages had been sent, the Army commanders?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. Those reports came over my desk, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You saw the report from General Short on November 28, 1941, 5:57 a.m.? Would that be Honolulu time?

General Gerow. May I find the report, sir?

Mr. Mitchell. It is on page 12 of exhibit 32, the pink book covering telegraph messages between the War Department and Hawaii. Do you have it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. 5:37 a.m. That means Honolulu time as you understand it?

General Gerow. I do not know, sir. That is put on by the Signal Corps and I do not know, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I see. That report reads this way:

[2701] Report Department alerted to prevent Sabotage Period Liaison with Navy REURAD Four Seven Two Twenty Seventh. SHORT.

Now, I will ask you to look at the one from MacArthur on the previous page, page 11, which reads:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy Stop Ground security measures have been taken Stop Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense Stop Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

You got also a telegram from General Andrews. Is that Frank M. Andrews in the Caribbean area?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Under date of November 28, on page 16 of Exhibit 32. His answer is:

REURAD four six one November twenty seven signed Marshall report requested being forwarded air mail.

And on page 18, 18–A and 18–B of this Exhibit 32 we find General Andrews’ report that came in by air mail in response to the message you sent him. He says:

[2702] Naval measures. At the present time, it is believed that the defensive measures for the Caribbean Defense Command center largely around the Panama Canal; however, a plan for furnishing Army support to the Navy has been worked out and coordinated with the various Naval commanders in the Caribbean Theater. In the Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal, by an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate reconnaissance.

Did you see that report from General Andrews?

General Gerow. I believe that I did, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you see also the one from General Dewitt on page 15, which goes at length into the measures he had taken?

General Gerow. Yes, sir, I believe that I did.

Mr. Mitchell. Was General Marshall out of the city on the 27th when the warning message was sent over his name?

General Gerow. To the best of my recollection and belief he was, sir.

[2703] Mr. Mitchell. Do you know whether he had anything to do with the draft of it before he left?

General Gerow. There was some discussion of a message, informal discussion, at the Joint Board meeting. I do not recall the details of that discussion, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That was a meeting at which General Marshall was in attendance?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. How long before the 27th?

General Gerow. That was the day preceding, sir; the 26th.

Mr. Mitchell. On the 26th?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. At the time you received Short’s reply was your attention directed to the brevity of it as compared with the other re-
ports, the reports that you had received from other commanding officers?

General Gerow. No, sir, it was not. The procedure in the War Plans Division at that time was for the executive officer to bring to my desk for information copies of important messages and letters. This document came to my desk and was initialed by me. It was then routed to the proper section of War Plans Division, which in this instance would be the Plans group, headed by Colonel Bundy who is now dead. I did not see this message from General Short again prior to December the 7th. I stated in my—

[2704] Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute. I show you a photostat of General MacArthur's report of action taken of November 28, to which is attached a photostat of General Short's report, and attached to that is a routing sheet, and I will ask you, have you that before you? General Gerow. Yes, sir, I have that.

Mr. Mitchell. Would the routing sheet show whether those two reports were attached together as they were routed through the department. Could you tell? The routing sheet shows two message numbers, doesn't it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I am trying to identify those numbers.

Mr. Mitchell. Look at the lower right-hand corner of each of the two messages, and you get the number as shown on the routing sheet, do you not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. So it is quite obvious, is it not, from these documents that MacArthur's report and Short's report were fastened together with a single routing sheet as they came to your hand? I notice, "Noted W. P. D." with your initials on it on the first message. That is right, isn't it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And the same thing on the second message?


Mr. Mitchell. I will offer this in evidence as Exhibit No. 46.

The Chairman. All right, that will be accepted as Exhibit 46.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 46.")

Mr. Mitchell. I notice also on the MacArthur message "Noted H. S." Is that Secretary Stimson?

General Gerow. It looks like his signature; yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Like his own writing? It says under it "Stimson." What does that mean? Is that somebody's else writing?

General Gerow. I should say so; yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Are the initials in "Noted H. S." Mr. Stimson's initials, do you know?

General Gerow. They look to me like they are, sir, from what I can remember of his writing.

Mr. Mitchell. And underneath that "Noted L. T. G." Can you tell which one of you saw it first? Would the routing message show that?

General Gerow. No, sir; I cannot tell from this who saw it first.

Mr. Mitchell. The same thing appears on the Short report on the next photostat page.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I notice at the top of MacArthur's message on the right, the words "To Secretary of War, G. C. M." Is that in General Marshall's handwriting?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That means that General Marshall probably saw it before Secretary Stimson saw it, does it not? He was directing it to be forwarded to the Secretary of War?

General Gerow. It would indicate that; yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I notice General Marshall's initials do not appear on the next page, which is the Short report, but only on the first one. Is that correct?

General Gerow. His initials do not appear on the Short message.

Mr. Mitchell. Senator Ferguson, Mr. Chairman, may I inquire where General Marshall's initials are on the photostat?

Mr. Mitchell. On the right-hand corner.

Senator Ferguson. Up at the top of the page?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

The Chairman. The Chairman might also note that the "Noted Stimson" looks like there are three initials there instead of "H. S."

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, his middle initial, "H. L. S."

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, does the original have on the bottom of it "Noted, Chief of Staff," and no initials under that? Both of them have "Noted, Chief of Staff," and then one has a special note up at the top of the initials. What does this stamp mean? Does counsel know?

Mr. Mitchell. I suppose it was stamped on there for the Chief of Staff to initial. He did not do it, but instead of that he noted up at the top "To Secretary of War G. C. M."

Senator Ferguson. What is the "O-4-c"?

Mr. Mitchell. I will have to ask the witness about that. I am not in a position to guess about it.

The first question, General, is on the first message, the first page being the MacArthur report, a photostat of it. Above the words "Noted W. P. D." and your initials, "L. T. G." are the stamped words, printed with a stamp, "Noted Chief of Staff," and under it there are no initials to the effect that General Marshall noted it. Now, can you understand why that stamp would be put on there? Would it be in preparation of a signature, or what? When the thing came to you, were the words "Noted W. P. D." stamped on there?

[2708] General Gerow. Yes, sir, they would be stamped thereon by my office. The "Noted Chief of Staff" would be stamped by the Office of the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Mitchell. I see. Before it was shown to him?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. By the way, it was stamped "Noted W. P. D." before it was shown to you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. So you infer instead of noting his initials down there, the general put the message up at the top, "To Secretary of War G. C. M."

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
May I bring up, sir, the question of this routing slip?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; anything you think of that we ought to know, General.

General Gerow. You will note that the routing slip is a routing slip from the office of the secretary, General Staff. That would normally come down to the War Plans Division, as is indicated here with those two papers attached. My executive may or may not have kept the routing slip on there. He may have removed it, or put the War Plans Division slip on it. What they did I do not know, sir, but it is necessarily true that that routing slip appeared on these messages when they were brought to me, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. This is the way the record stands in the War Department, that it was put on there at some time?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean after you saw it.

General Gerow. No, sir. When these messages went into the Office of the Chief of Staff, for example, sir, the secretary of the General Staff would put his routing slip on it to send it to the War Plans Division, attaching the two messages, and the messenger would bring it down to my executive and my executive would receive for it, and then that paper may or may not continue to keep the same routing slip.

Mr. Mitchell. What would be your conclusion from that? I do not quite get the drift?

General Gerow. No conclusion, sir, except I understood a minute ago you asked me if that routing slip was on it when it came to my desk. That was my understanding of the question, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, is that correct? You know that these two documents came together, do you?

General Gerow. I cannot testify to that fact. I do not recall that now, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. It is only because there is a routing slip, with both numbers on the same routing slip that you infer they did come together?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I think we would like to be sure about it.

Is it your conclusion that the routing slip does not show that they were together when they were presented to you, or that it does?

General Gerow. They show that they were together when they were presented—handed to my executive officer because he initialed it. Whether it continued on there I cannot testify at this time. I think it is rather immaterial as to whether it did or not, sir.

[2711] Mr. Mitchell. Well, where did your executive officer initial it?

General Gerow. He initialed, if you notice, on the routing slip, sir. You see “A. C. of S., WPD, noted WPD, CAG.” That was Colonel Gale, those initials, my executive officer.

Mr. Mitchell. This assistant secretary, or assistant chief of staff, War Plans Division, noted and those initials, are your secretary?

General Gerow. My executive, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Your executive?

General Gerow. Yes, sir,
Mr. Mitchell. Well, he initialed the routing slip covering both messages?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. So the routing slip must have been on there when it got to your office.

General Gerow. When it reached the War Plans Division; yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Why do you think it would be detached when it was handed to you?

General Gerow. It might have been detached, sir, since that was the routing slip from the Office of the Chief of Staff. Whether my executive might have put on other papers afterwards to route it to a division section within the War Plans Division, I cannot state at this time, sir, but we had certain routing slips within the War Plans Division itself, just as the Office of the Chief of Staff had a routing slip.

Mr. Mitchell. You say you saw both messages?

General Gerow. I saw both of those messages; yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You are in doubt whether you saw them both attached together at the same time?

General Gerow. I am in doubt, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it is certain that they both came together to your executive, did they not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And where was your executive’s office?

General Gerow. His office was adjacent to mine, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Then is it your theory that after the two papers with the routing slip came to your executive, he detached the routing slip before he handed it to you for initializing?

General Gerow. I do not remember his exact procedure.

Mr. Mitchell. Why should he take the routing slip off? If the two messages came in with the routing slip and he initialed the routing slip showing both messages were there and then he brought it into your office to show it to you, why would he take the routing slip off?

General Gerow. Well, you see, sir, the routing slip is a routing from the office of the Chief of Staff to the Office of the War Plans Division.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

General Gerow. Now the War Plans Division itself had routing slips if the executive routed the paper from the executive office to the chief of plans group, for example, or the chief of projects group.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean the routing slip was prepared in your War Plans Division then?

General Gerow. No, sir. This routing slip was apparently the routing slip that was prepared, as you notice, by the Office of the Secretary, General Staff.

Mr. Mitchell. It got to your office with both these messages attached to it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Then your theory is it may have been taken off before you saw it?

General Gerow. The messages may have been separated by the executive officer in War Plans Division for routing to the section of the War Plans Division which would handle that message.
Mr. Mitchell. After you saw it?

General Gerow. I do not know, sir, whether it was before or after, but I saw both the messages, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You may have a chance later to clear that up. I do not believe I quite get the result.

When you saw the Short message did you then know about the joint arrangement required under which the Navy would conduct long-distance air reconnaissance and that the Army would supply the Navy for that purpose such heavy bombers as it had available for that work?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I knew of the agreement in Hawaii, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. When you saw General Short’s reply I wish you would state, in your own way, General, just what your reaction was to it, and what you thought about it.

General Gerow. Well, sir, as I testified before the Roberts Commission, I assumed when that message came through that it was an answer to the G-2 message that was sent out by General Miles to the Hawaiian Department the evening before. I was probably led to that assumption by the fact that the question of sabotage had been discussed quite at length after that conference on the evening before.

I do not remember now, at this late date, what my reaction was to the message.

The message was then sent out, as I stated before, to the plans group, which was headed by Colonel Bundy, who is now dead. I do not know what Colonel Bundy’s reactions were to that message. I don’t remember ever discussing it with him. It is reasonable to assume that he may possibly have interpreted the message to mean, or that part of the message which said “liaison with the Navy,” that the commanding general out there had instituted protective measures against sabotage and was working with the Navy to arrange for other defensive measures, including reconnaissance.

I do not know that that was Colonel Bundy’s thought, but it was a reasonable assumption from the way the message was worded. I did not see the message after it was sent to Colonel Bundy prior to December 7.

The message contained two short sentences: One, “Alerted against sabotage,” and the other stating “liaison with the Navy.” It also contained a reference to a No. 472, as I recall. That message meant nothing to me at that time.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean the number meant nothing?

General Gerow. The number meant nothing to me, sir, because that number was put on by the Signal Corps and it was not the number assigned to that particular document by the War Plans Division.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean you had to go to the Signal Corps office to find out what the dispatch was that was numbered 472; is that it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. Insofar as I know, sir, no inquiry with regard to that message was sent to General Short. In the light of subsequent events, I feel now that it might have been desirable to send such an inquiry, and had such inquiry been sent it would probably have developed the fact that the commanding general in Hawaii was not at that time carrying out the directive in the message signed “Marshall.”
If that had been done, there would have been an opportunity to correct the situation, but I do not believe that the message could necessarily be interpreted as meaning that sabotage measures only were being taken.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there was nothing there to suggest that there was anything else but sabotage measures, except the words "liaison with the Navy"?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And what interpretation did you place then, if you know, on the words "liaison with the Navy"?

General Gerow. As I testified, sir, I had assumed that the message was in answer to the G-2 message and it was then routed to a section of War Plans Division. I did not see that message again, so I did not have an opportunity at that time, or did not make any assumption regarding what the phrase "liaison with the Navy" meant. I think my executive officer, or the chief of my plans group, might possibly have interpreted the message that way, and that is why it was not brought back [2717] to me and my attention invited to the fact that it did not explicitly cover the operation.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, if you interpreted this message as an answer to G-2, or Adams, as a sabotage message, then you were left in the position of having no report at all from Short about the main warning message that you sent over Marshall's signature?

General Gerow. That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. To strengthen that position?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did it occur to you to wonder why Short did not respond to the main warning message?

General Gerow. Well, sir, I was handling a great many papers at that time, and it was the responsibility of the officers in my division to check the messages and correspondence and bring to my attention anything of importance that required action on my part, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Even if your staff had the responsibility of following up on these things, the comparison between the two-lines dispatch from Short and the elaborate report from MacArthur and Andrews, and the western base command was rather sharp, was it not, General?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. The message that you helped draft on November 27, No. 472, was not a mere transfer of information. It was a command, was it not, involving an order or directive?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Let me read it again. We all know it. It says:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period. If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period. This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent period. Report measures taken period. A separate message is being sent to G dash two Ninth Corps area re subversive activities in United States period. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned [2719] in Rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan period.
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Now, there is a direct order there, is there not? It says:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissances and other measures as you deem necessary.

Now, did that mean if you did not deem it necessary, you were not going to take any reconnaissances or other measures?

General Gerow. No, sir. The intent of that message was to invite his attention to the necessity of conducting reconnaissances.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean he was supposed to take some measures, but the extent of them and the nature of them you left to the discretion of the local commander; is that it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You had given him an order then and you got a report that as you interpret the order, this message of Short's had been a response, or you thought it was a response, to 472, and it would be a report by Short that he failed to carry out your instructions, would not it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Is that why you thought it was a report about the sabotage messages?

General Gerow. Well, it never occurred to me, sir, that [2720] General Short would not take some reconnaissances and other defensive measures after the receipt of this message. He was an experienced commander and it never entered my mind that he would not take such action.

[2721] Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I have been following this testimony very closely, and I would like to ask counsel at this time, if he can, to pin down this one thing: This message is directed from Fort Shafter to the Chief of Staff. Short's message is directed to the Chief of Staff.

Now, if it had been a reply to the G-2 message, to whom would the reply to the G-2 message normally be directed.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you answer that question, General? You say you thought it might have been a report of Short's about the sabotage message. Now, one of those was Adams', wasn't it; that is, Adjutant General?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. The other was Adams over the signature of the Army Air Forces man.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. The third one was signed Miles.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.


General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, the Congressman would like to know, and so would the committee, the reply to any one of those three, when it was addressed to the Chief of Staff, wouldn't Short have wired back to the man who sent the message he was reporting about?


Mr. Mitchell. So that right on the face of it, it showed that it was a report on your message 472.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That is, if you stop to think the other messages weren't signed, "Marshall."

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel right there, because I would like to get this pinned down while we are going through it, do I understand the witness to testify now that upon further recollection and consideration of this message, the reply of General Short to the message that went to him from Marshall, the fact that the message is directed to the Chief of Staff is in itself proof that it was a direct reply to the Marshall message and not a reply to any message sent by G-2 or anyone else?

Mr. Mitchell. He has just stated that. Is that correct?

General Gerow. Yes. In my mind, the message in question was a reply to the message from General Marshall.

Mr. Mitchell. It is a little more than that. It is clear that it was, apparently, but I am asking you whether on the face of the message that ought not to have been clear to you when you saw it?

[2724] General Gerow. I didn't notice that fact, sir, when the message came over my desk.

Mr. Mitchell. Assuming that you thought it was not a reply to your main instruction to take reconnaissance and other measures, on that theory you never got a report from Short about your 472 message, although you asked him to report measures taken; isn't that correct?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. So far as you know there was no follow-up by you or any member of your staff to elicit from General Short a more complete report or further information or any word as to what he had done, no follow-up prior to December 7?

General Gerow. No, sir; there was no follow-up sent to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that counsel follow what Congressman Keefe had in mind. The message from General Short was routed to Secretary Stimson's office also by the Chief of Staff. Whether that would make any difference as to whether it was a reply to the Miles or the other message when the Chief of Staff routed it to the Secretary of War.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an inquiry.

I understand the anxiety of the distinguished Senator [2724] from Michigan, and I understand the anxiety of the distinguished Congressman. But there is an order of procedure here. I have a lot of questions I would like to ask too.

I realize they are anxious to get information, but the rule was to be that counsel would conduct the examination and then the witness would be turned over to each of us to dissect his testimony. If we are going to have suggestions, I have four or five to make too.

The Chairman. The Chair would like to state that the rule which we adopted doesn't seem necessarily to preclude the members of the committee from asking counsel to clear up a point that he is inquiring about at the time.

The rule applied to the examination of the witness by members of the committee by rotation after the counsel had concluded.
Mr. Mitchell. Within reasonable limits, it doesn’t bother me.

Mr. Murphy. I want to say that I agree that the suggestion of the Senator from Michigan and of the Congressman are excellent suggestions, in view of the fact that we are going to have General Marshall here in the morning.

The Chairman. Let’s go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. That was the reason I suggested counsel asking that question, because General Marshall will be here in the morning.

The Chairman. The Chair has ruled.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I don’t want to ignore the suggestions anyway.

I am going to ask the General whether he knows from this routing slip, or the notations on it, whether when it came to him, it had the notation by General Marshall to send it to the Secretary of War, and whether it had Mr. Stimson’s handwriting, the word in Mr. Stimson’s handwriting “Noted.” Could you tell us about that?

General Gerow. I can’t recall now, sir, whether it was on at the time it came to me.

Mr. Mitchell. In the ordinary course of procedure, would it have reached you before it went to the Chief of Staff? What was the practice with a message like this? Would it go directly to the Chief of Staff and then to you?

General Gerow. I would say that in this particular case it would go to the Chief of Staff first. Messages did come both ways. There were messages coming to me that I would send up to the Chief of Staff. This, I believe would have gone to the Chief of Staff first.

I think the way the initials are shown on there, we could presume that it had gone through that channel.

Mr. Mitchell. So your inference is that it went to General Marshall first, went to the Secretary of War next, and then came down to you; is that right?

General Gerow. I would presume that, yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. So that at that stage of the game, you know that the report had gone directly to General Marshall, being in answer to a message that had gone out over his signature?

General Gerow. I didn’t understand.

Mr. Mitchell. You knew from the face of it that it had gone—the Short report—had come first to General Marshall, because it was an answer to the message sent over General Marshall’s signature.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. If General Marshall signed a telegram and his name was appended to it, and the answer came in, was the practice to send it to him, was it, or did it come to you first?

General Gerow. I believe the practice would be it would go to him first, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know at the time you saw General Short’s report that he had established locally what he called Alert No. 1, which said “Look out for sabotage with no threat from without”? Did you know about that?

I think maybe I asked you that this morning. Did I?

[2727] General Gerow. No, sir; you didn’t ask me that.
Mr. Mitchell. I did ask you if you had prior to December 7 seen the local order of General Short establishing what he called Alert No. 1, and you said it didn't come in until the following year sometime.

General Gerow. That is correct. It came in sometime, I think, in March 1942, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Would you have had any way of knowing what his Alert No. 1 was, if you didn't have that order before you?

General Gerow. No, sir; I would not have known what Alert No. 1 was.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember after the Short report was received that you had any discussion with anybody, with General Marshall or anybody in the War Plans Division, about the Short report, or the question of its sufficiency, or the question of whether it ought to be supplemented, or a further report should be asked for?

General Gerow. I do not recall any such discussion, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, I am going to read to you a paragraph in Secretary Stimson's report on the Pearl Harbor incident, in which he says this:

Again, as I have pointed out, General Short, in [2728] response to a message which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a report of actions, had sent a message to the War Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage only, and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action.

While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of his message, nevertheless, a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged, would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered.

The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done, and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted.

Do you think that is a fair statement of the situation?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I do, and if there was any responsibility to be attached to the War Department [2729] for any failure to send an inquiry to General Short, the responsibility must rest on War Plans Division, and I accept that responsibility as Chief of War Plans Division.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, we find that the Short report and an opportunity to compare it with the MacArthur report went up higher than you. It went to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War. It wasn't their function to follow up things like this?

General Gerow. No, sir; I was a staff adviser to the Chief of Staff, and I had a group of 48 officers to assist me. It was my responsibility to see that those messages were checked, and if an inquiry was necessary, the War Plans Division should have drafted such an inquiry and presented it to the Chief of Staff for approval.

As I said, I was chief of that division, and it was my responsibility.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering whether the committee would be willing to sit a little longer tonight.

I have some other matters that we ought to go into before General Marshall is called.
The Chairman. The Senate is not in session. It has already adjourned for the day. Is it agreeable to the committee to sit a little while longer?

[2730] Without objection that will be done.

Senator George. Let me ask how long.

The Chairman. About how long, Senator George asks.

Mr. Mitchell. It is hard for me to estimate. I will keep going until you think I ought to stop.

The Chairman. All right.

The Vice Chairman. Might I offer one brief suggestion to counsel. General Marshall initialed this top paper, which is the MacArthur message. I think it would be helpful to find out whether this Short message was also attached to that and whether it would be reasonable to assume that those initials of General Marshall applied to both of these.

Mr. Mitchell. I have done all I can with the general about that. Those two were brought in together. The two documents were attached, and he saw them both together.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest that General Marshall has already testified on his impressions on that very thing and will do so tomorrow.

The Chairman. Let’s get going and get to him.

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, I show you four intercepted Japanese messages concerning military installations and ship movements that I found at pages 12, 13, 14, and 15, in exhibit 2, which is entitled “Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.”

We turn first to the one on page 12. You have examined that message, have you not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24, 1941, and translated October 9, which directs the spies or somebody in Honolulu—Jap spies—to divide the harbor area, the Pearl Harbor waters, into five different areas, and calls for specific information, not merely as to ship movements, but as to location of the vessels specifically in each one of those areas.

Then on page 13 is a message from Honolulu to Washington. The message states:

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels.

This is dated September 29, translated October 10

It is suggested repair dock in navy yard will be called KS.

Navy dock in the navy yard, KT.

Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island, FV.

And the east and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.

Then there is one in the same series on page 14 which is a report from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18, translated December 6. That is rather late, but I will refer to it. It is a report of battleships and other vessels in specified areas.

Finally, there is one on page 15, Tokyo to Honolulu, November 18, translated December 5, and one dated November 29, translated December 5, which reads:
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements but in future, will you also report even when there are no movements.

I have called your attention to those messages before, have I not, and their possible significance?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did they come to your attention at or about the time they were translated?

General Gerow. I believe they did, sir. Most of those important intercepted messages were brought to my attention, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you any personal recollection of their having been received by you?

General Gerow. Not of these particular messages; no, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Would there be any record in the War Department by which it could be told whether they were shown to you or not?

[2733] General Gerow. No, sir. These messages were brought to me in a locked dispatch case by an officer. He unlocked the dispatch case and stood there while I read the messages. Sometimes there would only be 1 message, and other times 10 or 15. I kept no record and I believe he kept none of the ones I actually saw.

Mr. Mitchell. And after you saw them, the officer would go out with the messages?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. They were not left with you for evaluation?

General Gerow. No, sir; they were not.

Mr. Mitchell. Unless something was shown you that was so apparent that you saw it instantly, and made an evaluation of it, you wouldn't do any evaluation work on it, would you?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Would you have been allowed to keep these dispatches in your possession for some time for the purpose of studying them if you wanted to?

General Gerow. No, sir. Under the instructions I had received, they were to be returned immediately to the officer presenting them to me.

Mr. Mitchell. Where would they go for evaluation?


[2734] Mr. Mitchell. And I suppose you don't know, not being in the Signal Corps, what the explanation may be for the delay between the actual interception of some of these Japanese messages and the time when they were actually translated?

General Gerow. No, sir. That was a Signal Corps responsibility, and I never had occasion to inquire into it. I did at one time ask a Signal Corps officer how it was done and he told me that he had positive orders not to divulge that except on order of the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Mitchell. You don't mean as to the delay?

General Gerow. No, sir; not the delay.

Mr. Mitchell. You never noticed that?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Suppose a message came in and was shown to you that was of a character that, when evaluated, would call for action by War Plans Division, not merely transmission of warning, or information, but a directive, such as the message you sent to General Short on November 27. As I understand it, the War Plans only interfered in
these messages when there was an operational directive involved? Is that right?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you depend on G-2 for evaluation of [2735] messages intercepted which might lead to directional orders by you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I depended on G-2 for the evaluation of all enemy intelligence.

Mr. Mitchell. Why were they shown to you?

General Gerow. For information, sir, and to keep me abreast of the general situation.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, is there any doubt in your mind about the respective responsibilities of G-2 and the War Plans Division for evaluating messages about the military installation?

General Gerow. There is no question in my mind at all sir. That is a responsibility of G-2.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, to put it bluntly, suppose one of these messages intercepted from the Japanese was brought in to your office in a pouch and that message had stated boldly “Be all ready on December 7. That is the date we are going to attack.” Would you have any responsibility to do anything with that message?

General Gerow. I certainly would have had; yes, sir.

I would have taken it and prepared at once the warning message for the approval of the Chief of Staff and submitted it to him as quickly as possible.

Mr. Mitchell. That would be a message directing him [2736] to take measures to meet the attack?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. That would have been an operational message.

Mr. Mitchell. So, if the evaluation of the message was obvious, then you were supposed to make an evaluation of it.

General Gerow. Yes, sir. If the message obviously indicated operations were necessary on the part of our Army forces, I would take action, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. The question was asked General Miles:

Then, in other words, while you weren't as a matter of fact or procedure sending the text of the messages or the gist of them or a summary of them to the theatres, it was, even in the fact of these security considerations, always open to the Chief of Staff to send specific instructions or directions to the Commander at Hawaii or the Philippines, or elsewhere, based on the information which had been obtained from intercepts?

General Miles. That is true, and at this point I think I should like to go further and point out that from early August, I think the 5 of August, 1941, we discontinued, by direction of the Chief of Staff, presenting magic in evaluated form. So the Chief of Staff and the Chief of War Plans Division, Secretary of War, were from then on [2737] doing their own evaluating of the raw material that we were presenting to them in the form of magic.

Do you remember anything about that?

General Gerow. I am sure I was never informed that G-2 had discontinued evaluating magic.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you know whether there was any direction of the Chief of Staff that you should make your own evaluations?

General Gerow. I do not. There was no such direction issued to me, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I would like to have you refer to your memorandum of November 3 to the Chief of Staff on the far eastern situation, exhibit 16. It is one of the documents in exhibit 16. Have you that before you?

General Gerow. I have it; yes, sir. That is the memorandum of November 3, sir.

The Chairman. The Chair asks that the committee be in order. There is a good deal of confusion—conversation.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, before we get into another subject, it is my understanding that General Miles’ testimony was that he was ordered in August to pass on the raw material, but there was nothing in General Miles testimony, as I understand, that he was to discontinue acting as G-2 in evaluating in addition to supplying the raw material.

[2738] Mr. Mitchell. I guess you are right, because the next question on this page, that I could have read to the general, was this:

Mr. Gesell. You mean that from August on G-2 had no responsibility to evaluate the intercepted material?

General Miles. No, sir, I do not mean that, but I do mean that our responsibility in that respect was somewhat lessened by the direction of the Chief of Staff that he wanted not only the evaluation of the Military Intelligence Division, but he wanted to see the material itself, the raw material itself, presented to him.

That seems to clear the matter up, doesn’t it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. From that time did you still continue to get evaluations from G-2?

General Gerow. I received from G-2 estimates.

Mr. Mitchell. And you had also the opportunity, under this pouch delivery system and inspection, a chance to at least read over the raw material, did you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Your memorandum of the 3d of November, 1941 to the Chief of Staff, part of exhibit 16, speaks of a conference held at the State Department on the morning of November 1. Do you want to add anything to the incident [2739] that isn’t contained in your memorandum?

General Gerow. I don’t believe there is anything I can add at this time from memory, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. In that memorandum you speak of the policy derived in the American-British Staff conferences. Does that include the Singapore conference, preliminary conference—on page 2 of the memorandum?

General Gerow. That would apply to both the ABC conference held in Washington, and the Singapore conferences as well.

Mr. Mitchell. You speak there of the fact that one of the recommendations is that the movement of counteraction against Japan should be considered only in case of any of the following actions by Japan, and one of those is the movement of Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the west of 100º east or south of 10º north, meaning there a recommendation that had been made by the Singapore conference?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I will offer now, Mr. Chairman, as exhibit 47, some supplementary documents that are underlying documents for this
memorandum, or report, of General Gerow on November 3, which is contained in exhibit 16.

This document I am now offering contains a telegram from Chungking to the Secretary of State in Washington, signed by Mr. Gauss. I think he was the State Department man out there. Dated November 3. Another one of the same date from Chungking to Washington, signed by Chiang Kai-shek.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they both included in exhibit 47?

Mr. MITCHELL. They are both included.

There is also another one in exhibit 47. This is Navy Department, office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, memorandum for the Director, dated November 1, 1941, signed by R. A. Boone for A. H. McColllum.

And a telegram from Alusna. That means the Chungking naval attaché.

The CHAIRMAN. The documents will be received as exhibit No. 47. (The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 47".)

Mr. MITCHELL. I will not stop to read them now.

General Gerow, you remember that there is in the record what we call a 14-part message and a 1 p.m. message, which was the Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to their Ambassadors in Washington which came in on the 6th and 7th of December, 1941.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

[2741] Mr. MITCHELL. We offered this morning in evidence, as exhibit 41, a summary of the movements of that message and the date of its interception, and when it was received in Washington, and when it was decoded and so on, and so far as the documentary proof shows, eliminating matters that have to be established by witnesses—I am just reminding you what the message was so that I can ask you questions about it.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have anything to do with that message or know if its receipt on the 6th or any part of it?

General Gerow. No, sir. I did not know of the existence of the message and I did not see it on the 6th of December. I understand there has been some testimony in previous investigations to the effect that it was presented to the War Plans Division. It was never presented to the War Plans Division on the 6th of December.

Mr. MITCHELL. The message, according to this record, which we will assume is correct for the present, 13 parts of it, if I may remind you, consisted of a long discussion by the Japanese about their diplomatic position and about ours.

The fourteenth part of that 14-part message was the clause that said they were through, that they thought negotiations were no longer necessary.

The record here shows that that fourteenth part, the breaking off, was translated at least after midnight December 6, because it bears the translation date of December 7. Then there followed what we call a 1 p.m. message, which was a supplementary message directing the Ambassadors at Washington to present that final message to the Secretary of State at 1 p.m., on Sunday, December 7.

That, according to this record, was translated on the 7th, which was sometime after midnight.
Does that refresh your recollection any on it at all as to the message, that is, as to any of the incidents connected with it?

[2743] General Gerow. Well, the first time the 14-part message or the 1 p. m. message was in the office of the Chief of Staff on the morning of December 7th was about 11:30 o'clock.

Mr. Mitchell. Can you remember what you were doing on the evening of December the 6th?

General Gerow. No, sir; I cannot recall at this time.

Mr. Mitchell. Would you have any record? Do you keep a diary?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. That is a great contribution to this cause.

Mr. Mitchell. You cannot recall what you were doing. You had a good many things since December 7 to engage you, including such little things as the Omaha Beach attack, haven't you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And you tried to cast your memory back to those events as far as you could?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; and I cannot recall what I was doing.

Mr. Mitchell. What you were doing on the night of December 6?

General Gerow. What I was doing on the night of December 6; no, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You do not remember whether you were at your office or at your quarters or what not?

General Gerow. No, sir; I cannot recall. If there was a large volume of work I probably worked down at the office until 6 or 7 or 8 o'clock. If there was not I probably was home. I do not recall being out to dinner on that particular evening.

Mr. Mitchell. But you are confident that you never saw that 14-part message, or any part of it, or the 1 p. m. message until you got into General Marshall's office around 11:30 on the morning of the 7th?

General Gerow. I am positive, yes, sir, of that fact.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest one thing? As I understand it he did not see the 13 parts either.

Mr. Mitchell. What is it?

Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, his testimony is that he did not see any part of the 14 parts, either one.

Mr. Mitchell. That is what he said.

The Chairman. That is what he says now.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you seen lately this memorandum from you that is already in Exhibit 39 in evidence, dated December 15, 1941, called a "Memorandum for Record" and signed by you, recording the events of the morning of December 7? Have you examined that lately?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I read it recently, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Suppose you take a look at it.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That memorandum states that about December—I suppose that this document is a more reliable record of what had occurred because it was made December 15, 1941, than your present recollection would be?

General Gerow. It will be, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You will have to depend on this, will you not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. That states that:

About 11:30 A.M. on Sunday, December 7, 1941, General Marshall called me to his office.

That was the occasion for your going to his office?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Does that mean that you were in your office?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And called to his [reading]:

General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the [2746] State Department at 1 P.M., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Government instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U.S. Army Forces in Far East; CG Caribbean Defense Command; CG Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army was read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed to take the pencilled draft of the message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach destinations in about thirty minutes. The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.

Do you remember anything more about that meeting in General Marshall's office on the morning of December 7, 1941, than is stated here in this memo?

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. Mitchell. This message was one which was obviously important, especially when it got down to part 14 and the 1 p.m. part of it. Is that message which in the ordinary course of practice in the War Department somebody with [2747] a pouch would probably have brought into your office in the Department?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Had that been done prior to your going to General Marshall's office?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever make any inquiry as to why it had not been delivered to your office before 11:30, when it had been translated at an earlier hour?

General Gerow. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, have you a memorandum of November 17, 1941, that you presented to General Marshall regarding efforts of the Army and Navy to arrange a unity of command in Hawaii and at other points?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have here a copy of such a memorandum, sir.

Mr. Keefe. What is the date of that, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. Mitchell. This is November 17, 1941.

Your memorandum to the Chief of Staff, dated November 17, 1941, "Subject: Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers," is a short one and a longer one on the same date.

Were they both presented at the same time? I have two memoranda for the Chief of Staff dated November 17, 1941, [2748] signed by you, both of which relate to the method of coordination of command in coastal frontiers. Have you both of them before you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I have both copies.

Mr. Mitchell. Both documents?
General Gerow. Both documents; yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to number as exhibit 48 and now offer in evidence three documents, all in one exhibit: November 17, 1941, memorandum from General Gerow to the Chief of Staff about the method of coordination of command in Coastal Frontiers; another one, memorandum of the same date on the same subject from General Gerow; and a letter which clears up the story, dated December 20, 1941, “Personal and Confidential”, addressed to “My dear Emmons.” That is General Emmons who succeeded to the command of the Hawaiian Department about that time?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. This memo or letter is signed by “G. C. Marshall.”

Senator Lucas. Was this memorandum dated December 20 issued after the Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. Mitchell. No, that is November 17.

Senator Lucas. Oh, I see; November 17.

Mr. Mitchell. The letter of General Marshall directed [2749] to General Emmons and dated December 20, 1941, was after the attack on Pearl Harbor. That letter was directed to General Emmons, who succeeded General Short. The two letters of General Gerow are dated November 17.

Senator Lucas. I see.

Mr. Mitchell. They both relate to coordination of commands in Coastal Frontiers and, among other things, do they include Hawaii?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell in your own way, General, just how—

The Chairman. Those documents will be received under the title of exhibit 48.

(The documents referred to were marked “Exhibit No. 48.”)

Mr. Mitchell. Will you just state in your own language how this subject happened to come up for consideration and who considered it and what the proposal was?

General Gerow. I just saw these papers yesterday, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I see, Would you rather have me read them first?

General Gerow. I can read them, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, read them into the record. They are somewhat important.


Mr. Mitchell. And I think the committee would like to hear them. Read the short ones first.

General Gerow. The short one of November 17 first.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the memorandum from you to the Chief of Staff?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. (Reading:)

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers.

1. The attached Joint Board case has been before the Joint Planning Committee since last February. At a recent meeting of The Joint Board, Admiral Stark suggested that the Army take action on the Navy proposal.

2. The case is divisible into two main subjects—Changes in Coastal Frontiers and the assignment of Command in the Caribbean, Panama, Hawaii and Philippine Coastal Frontiers. The Army and Navy sections of The Joint Planning Committee have reached an agreement with regard to changes in Coastal Frontiers. They disagree, however, as to the service that should exercise Unity of Command in the Coastal Frontiers.
3. The proposals of the Army and Navy Sections on command are outlined in the attached Memorandum to you. The Memorandum also embodies my views on the question of unity command in the Caribbean Area, Hawaii, and the Philippines.

4. If the Joint Board desires definite action on this case, I recommend that you approve the attached Memorandum. I believe the Navy will agree with the solution proposed, which simply means that we will continue to operate by mutual cooperation. If you do not wish to raise the question of command at this time I can hold the case in suspense for the time being.

(Signed) L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

The second and longer memorandum reads as follows:

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers.

I. Discussion.
1. Joint Board case (J. B. No. 350, Serial 678) prescribing coordination of command is now before the Joint Planning Committee.
2. The Navy section proposes changes in command relations in the following coastal frontiers:
   a. Caribbean. Coordination by the method of unity of command, command being vested in the Commandant of the 10th Naval District.
   b. Panama. Coordination by unity of command, command being vested in the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department except when major naval forces are based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations in either the Caribbean Sea or the Pacific Ocean. In this contingency command would be vested in the Commandant of the 15th Naval District.
   c. Hawaii. Coordination by unity of command as follows:
      (1) Command vested in Commanding General, Hawaiian Department when the most important strategic problem is one of territorial defense of the Hawaiian Islands and when major naval forces have been withdrawn and not based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations either in the vicinity or at a distance.
      (2) Command vested in the Commandant of the 14th Naval District when major naval forces are based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations either in the vicinity or at a distance.
3. The Army section proposes the following, applicable to cable to all coastal frontiers:
   a. Unity of command over forces assigned to the defense of a coastal frontier is vested in the Army, except when the United States Atlantic or Pacific Fleet or the major portion thereof is operating against comparable hostile forces within the radius of possible support by Army aviation operating from bases within the coastal frontier. In the excepted case, unity of command is vested in the Navy.
   b. In a specific operation, unity of command in coastal frontiers may be transferred from the Army to the Navy and vice versa, when the senior Army and Navy commanders concerned agree that such change is necessary and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.
   c. Unity of command does not authorize the service in which it is vested to assign missions that will require the forces of the other service to operate from bases outside the coastal frontier.
4. The Army and Navy sections of the Joint Planning Committee have been unable to reach an agreement on a compromise solution of the problem of unity of command. The Army section does not believe that unity of command in coastal frontiers is essential. It is believed that the Navy section will agree to a continuation of coordination by mutual cooperation.
5. The vesting in a single individual of full responsibility for a military operation is a generally accepted principle for the accomplishment of effective military action. In theory at least, no amount of personal willingness to cooperate can eliminate the objections inherent in the committee system of control of military forces. The most frequently cited recent example of the effect of such divided responsibility is that of failure of the defense of Crete as contrasted with the
successful attack on that island in which the attacking force presumably was commanded by a single individual.

6. Unity of command is the accepted method of coordination within the Army and within the Navy, themselves. However, the many practical difficulties encountered in the application of that principle as applied to joint operations of the Army and Navy have usually led to the adoption of the method of coordination by mutual cooperation except when specific tasks are planned.

7. The difficulty of determining the service in which unity of command should vest in the defense of a coastal frontier lies in the inability to determine in advance when hostilities will begin and the nature and the extent of the operations. For that reason it is difficult to foresee which service will play the major part in the defense and will have primary interest. The major responsibility may well pass from one service to the other during defensive operations. On the other hand, overseas landing expeditions or land operations requiring support from Naval forces, such as those in Libya, present problems in which the service having preponderance of responsibility can readily be determined. The time such an operation should begin, as well as terminate, and its nature and extent can be forecast and the service having the preponderance of responsibility definitely agreed upon between the two services, thereby indicating the service in which unity of command should vest. In such operations the preponderance of responsibility will not fluctuate from one service to the other as might be the case in defense of coastal frontiers.

A fact frequently lost sight of in consideration of the method of coordination under the principle of mutual cooperation is that although the major operation is being conducted under that principle, joint operations subordinate thereto may still be conducted under the principle of unity of command if so agreed to by the Army and Navy commanders concerned. This method is particularly applicable to joint operations by forces having similar combat characteristics, such as the air forces of the two services.

II. Action recommended.

That coordination of joint operations in the Caribbean, Panama and Hawaiian Coastal Frontiers continue to be effected by mutual cooperation. If this recommendation is approved, such a proposal will be discussed with the Navy section of the Joint Planning Committee.

[2757] Mr. Mitchell. Now that report states the fact that the Army and Navy representatives on the Joint Planning Committee were in direct disagreement about this question of unity of command in Hawaii and other coastal frontiers?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And your statement there is that the Army does not think the unity of command is essential. Was the Army making any effort to secure unity of command at that time?

General Gerow. I think that statement means essential under the conditions which we had at that time. I think the only way you can have effective unity of command is for the tops of the services to say, "So and so is in command, and he is in command from now on." You cannot vary that command from day to day depending on what the operation is. One man must be responsible for preparing that place for operation, and he must be responsible for commanding it after he has prepared it.

Mr. Mitchell. This report of yours would indicate that the people in that conference of the Planning Board wanted a scheme by which that command would shift back and forth from the Army to the Navy and from the Navy to the Army depending on the nature of attack or defense?

General Gerow. That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. You did not believe in that?

Mr. Mitchell. The result was, because of these differences between the Army and Navy you came in and recommended the only thing you can do is to get mutual cooperation?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I thought mutual cooperation would be better than a continual switching of command. I did not think either the Army or Navy planning group would agree to say wholeheartedly, "You take everything and it will be agreeable to us." Neither would agree to that. That is the only way I saw it could be done.

Mr. Mitchell. That somebody at the top had to knock their heads together and tell them what to do?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You remember that in the local plans—I call them "plans" but it may not be the right word—arranged between General Short and Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor there was a provision there that they had agreed, if they did agree to it, there would be unity of command if the two got together and fixed on one of them for the commandant, do you remember that provision?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; they do have authority, the commanders on the ground out there, to agree to such unity of command and who would exercise it.

Mr. Mitchell. But you had no information on that, as to whatever was attempted by the commander prior to December 7?

General Gerow. I have no information that such an agreement was entered into.

Mr. Mitchell. Now I will read this letter from General Marshall to General Emmons on December 20, 1941:

My Dear Emmons: Instructions to the Army and Navy were issued a few days ago assigning unity of command to the Navy in Hawaii. At the same time unity of command was assigned to the Army in Panama.

For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion as to responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a year to secure unity of command in various critical regions had been unavailing. All sorts of naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the coordination of efforts to locate purely naval objectives, and similar matters had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I must say at the same time that some of the Army staff brought up somewhat similar objections to naval control. Both [2760] Stark and I were struggling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed, at least under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two decisions I have just referred to have been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involved in our relations with allies.

I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate the problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work with Nimitz in complete understanding.

Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought to our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. These days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency.

This is a very hasty note, but I want General McCoy to take it off with him this morning.

You have my complete confidence and I will do everything possible to support you.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. Marshall.

General Delos C. Emmons,
Commanding Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, T. H.

79716—46—pt. 3—6
Now, if the committee please, I have not finished entirely with General Gerow, but I feel I have finished everything that I can do tonight which will help in the Marshall examination.

The CHAIRMAN. Under those conditions we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

General Gerow, you will come on later after General Marshall.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the committee recessed until 10 a.m., Thursday, December 6, 1945.)
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel, Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[2763] The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

General Marshall, will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMIES GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
SPECIAL ENVOY TO CHINA

The Chairman. Counsel may proceed.

Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, when were you appointed Chief of Staff?

General Marshall. I was appointed Acting Chief of Staff on July 1, 1939, and formally appointed and confirmed Chief of Staff on the 1st of September 1939.

Mr. Mitchell. And you served until what date?

General Marshall. I think it was until November 20 just past.

Mr. Mitchell. Of this year?

General Marshall. Of this year.

Mr. Mitchell. During your service in the Army have you ever had any service in the Far East?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I spent about 5 years in the Philippines and a little short of 3 years in China.

Mr. Mitchell. What was your service in China?

General Marshall. I was either in command or executive officer of the 15th Infantry at Tientsin.

The Chairman. General Marshall, will you move a little closer to the microphone, please.

[2764] Mr. Mitchell. Did you learn the Chinese language when in China?

General Marshall. I wouldn't admit that to a language student, but I can carry on a conversation.

Mr. Mitchell. The gentleman who said you didn't know anything about China the other day will have to revise his ideas, probably.

Now, will you state in your own way what the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army were during 1940 and 1941?

General Marshall. With your permission I will read the Army regulations on the subject.

Mr. Mitchell. That is Exhibit 42.

General Marshall (reading):

The Chief of Staff is the immediate advisor of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment, and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the military program. He will cause the War Department General Staff to prepare the necessary plans for recruiting, mobilization, organizing, supplying, equipping, and training the Army of the United States for use in the national defense and for demobilization. As the agent, and in the name of the Secretary of War, he issues such orders as will insure that the plans of the War Department are harmoniously executed by all agencies of the Military Establishment, and that the military program is carried out speedily and efficiently.

As Commanding General of the Field Forces.—The Chief of Staff, in addition to his duties as such, is, in peace, by direction of the President, the Commanding General of the Field Forces and in that capacity directs the field operations and the general training of the several Armies, of the overseas forces, and of the GHQ units. He continues to exercise command of the Field Forces after the outbreak of war until such time as the President shall have specifically designated a Commanding General thereof.

Those are the regulations.

Mr. Mitchell. During 1940 and 1941 will you state in a general way what your general activities were and what problems you were dealing with?

General Marshall. They rather subdivided themselves into about four categories. In the first place, there was the mobilization of the Army which referred specifically to personnel and the organization of that personnel. The mobilization procedure was carried out into the corps areas of which there were nine of the United States under my direction. The organization and creation of the Army I delegated in large measure to a command I set up at what used to be the Army War College with General Leslie McNary as my deputy and he with his staff was held by me directly responsible for the organization and the training of the Army in the continental United States.

The relations with the overseas theaters, the Philippines, Hawaii, Caribbean, that is, Panama, were carried out as to detail, as to plans, proposals for me by what was then called the War Plans Division of the General Staff, now the Operations Division.

The matériel aspects of the activities were in the hands of a series of bureau chiefs—Chief of Ordnance, the Chief Quartermaster, Chief Signal Officer—and in the case, for example, of the Chief Signal Officer he not only had the problem of procurement of matériel but also certain operational responsibilities.

I dealt with them partly in person but largely through the medium of the four sections of the General Staff which coordinate supply and the plans and policies relating to supply.

In addition to that, there were special groups on which I had to depend, notably, that of the allocation of matériel which was probably one of the most trying problems of the day in relation to the Russians, the Chinese, the British, and to our own training and to our overseas theaters for their defense.
There was also the problem of priority which a special board, Army and Navy Board, operated and with which I was directly concerned. There was a subdivision of responsibility here, in that the Assistant Secretary, now the Undersecretary of the War Department, was chargeable under the law for the procurement activities in the field of civilian production.

The ordinary administrative point of the Army, as to

records and matters of that kind, I depended largely on the Adjutant General's Department. The general coordination of administration details, I depended at that time on the senior Deputy Chief of Staff, but I created a second deputy who looked after for me the matériel factors concerned.

I think that is the general outline.

Mr. Mitchell. I notice in Secretary Stimson's report, in this Pearl Harbor Army inquiry, he makes this statement:

It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secretary of War and make plans for and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of the great army for global war, to advise on and himself to make decisions regarding the basic problems of military strategy in the many possible theaters in which the war might develop, and in any other fundamental and broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hopelessly cripple the performance of those great and paramount duties, should the Chief of Staff allow himself to become emerged in administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in our Army outposts.

Does that fairly picture in your mind the situation of the Chief of Staff?

General Marshall. I think it does, sir. Throughout all of that, of course, it was my responsibility to determine, as far as it was humanly possible, what were the critical affairs in all these activities.

I omitted one reference, which was a very responsible duty, and a very difficult duty. That was in the preparation of the budget estimates of the War Department, and the representation before the committees of Congress.

Mr. Mitchell. What policy did you have during your term as Chief of Staff with respect to the responsibility of commanders in the field, including overseas commanders, in respect to their independent initiative and responsibility and decentralization of action?

General Marshall. My endeavor was to select the ablest people available at the time, have their missions defined, and give them the responsibility for the positions which they occupied.

Mr. Mitchell. You attended the Atlantic Conference at Argentia, did you not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. Mitchell. What part did you take in that?

General Marshall. I was concerned with what amounted to a first getting-together, coming to know the British Chiefs of Staff. We had no agenda for our meeting.

We met and discussed general matters, largely regarding the matériel desired by the British, and then we broke up into groups, myself and Field Marshal Sir John Dill, the head man of the ground forces of the British Army.

There was no question of matériel between us because we had given them all of the matériel we could afford to dispense at that time.
I believe on the Navy side, and I am quite certain on the Air side, there was considerable discussion on matériel.

With Field Marshal Sir John Dill and myself, our conversations were almost entirely devoted to a general résumé of the war situation, what the hazards were, what the anticipations were, particularly as to the Middle East and the Mediterranean, and Singapore.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you at that meeting know of any commitment that the United States made at that meeting to engage the Nation in war if we were not attacked?

General Marshall. No, sir; I did not. I was not involved in the political discussions.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you learn anything at that meeting about this proposal to make the parallel protests to the Japanese by England and the United States?

General Marshall. My recollection as to that is that I knew nothing of that until a meeting of the liaison group of the State, War, and Navy Departments in Mr. Sumner Welles’ office after my return from Argentina.

Mr. Mitchell. And what did you learn then about that, do you remember?

General Marshall. I was given either the information, general information with regard to, or heard read—I do not recall which—a message the President had sent.

Mr. Mitchell. After he had sent it?

General Marshall. After he had sent it.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you seen, or did you know about certain conferences that were had by representatives of the Army and Navy with the British on the one hand, called the ABC-1 and 2 conferences, with the Dutch and British in the Far East and with the Canadians?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. Admiral Stark brought up the proposition and I acquiesced. He arranged the meeting. I went to his office when we were receiving these officers the day they arrived.

Mr. Mitchell. That was the British here in the United States?


Mr. Mitchell. Did you know about similar staff conferences that were being held at Singapore between the Americans, Dutch, and British?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I was familiar with that.

Mr. Mitchell. And the one with the Canadians?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. My recollection of that is, though, that except for the defense board we afterward created, of which Mr. LaGuardia, I think, was the senior American member, we only had one meeting and that was an informal meeting at dinner and after dinner at the home of the Chief of Naval Operations out near the Naval Observatory. That is the only time I saw them.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you had an opportunity to look over those three reports; do you have copies of them?


Mr. Mitchell. And are you familiar with them?


Mr. Mitchell. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I think we will offer those in evidence. We had only one copy heretofore but now they have been mimeographed. I will offer in evidence as exhibit 49——
The Chairman. All three as one exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir; I had better separate it. The report of the United States-British staff conversations in the United States; as Exhibit 50 the American-Dutch-British conversations at Singapore in April 1941; and as 51 the report of the conference with the Canadians. The Chairman. They will be filed as 49, 50, and 51?

Mr. Mitchell. That is it.

The Chairman. Yes.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 49, 50, and 51," respectively.)

Mr. Mitchell. Have you any knowledge as to which, if any, of those conferences were finally approved, the reports, I mean?

General Marshall. The report on the Canadian, with the Canadians was, I believe, formally approved by the President. My recollection is and my knowledge is at this time he gave no formal approval of any of the others.

Mr. Mitchell. In your examination of those reports do you find anything in that other than the ordinary military [2774] and naval plans to be used on the contingency that you get into trouble with somebody?

General Marshall. Would you please repeat that question?

Mr. Mitchell. What I want to know is whether you interpreted those plans as committing the Government of the United States to engage in war with anybody prior to our being attacked?

General Marshall. No, sir; I do not think they do. It was not our intention that they should; quite the contrary. It was our effort to be prepared against what appeared to be a possible eventuality.

Mr. Mitchell. Did the Army make any deployments or dispositions of troops pursuant to those plans that you remember prior to December 7, 1941?

General Marshall. I do not think there were any definite moves unless it may have been into Iceland and I do not recall that.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever hear, during your service as Chief of Staff, of any commitment that the President or anyone else had attempted to make with any of these other nations by which the United States was committed to engage in war without being attacked?

General Mitchell. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Mitchell. Was there anything about these plans that [2775] you can see by which one of the other nations who participated at the conferences by their action could bring us into war?

General Marshall. I do not think there is.

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to what we called in this case the Herron alert in 1940 and at this time, Mr. Chairman, I will offer in evidence as exhibit 52 the book containing the communications between the War Department and General Herron concerning the 1940 alert at Hawaii. General Herron was commander of the Hawaiian Department at that time.

The Chairman. It will be so filed. (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 52.")

Mr. Mitchell. Have you examined those communications as contained in that book, General?


Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember the fact that the alert was given to General Herron in June 1930?
Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember the circumstances under which that was done?

General Marshall. My recollection of the matter is that it was on the recommendation of Gen. George V. Strong of the General Staff of the War Department as a result of several branches of information, largely "magic," that there was a possibility of a threat by the Japanese in that area and, therefore, the alert.

Mr. Mitchell. The alert, the book shows, was given to him over the signature of Adjutant General Adams.

Mr. Mitchell. Was that at your direction?
Mr. Mitchell. And the book shows that he continued in his state of alert, though somewhat diminishing, for several weeks after that.

Mr. Mitchell. You are familiar with General Herron's reports that in obedience to the alert he puts his entire command on alert, kept his pilots out at daylight every day?
Mr. Mitchell. Ran reconnaissance by air?
Mr. Mitchell. And did all those things, kept his gunners at their guns with live ammunition?

Mr. Mitchell. And with the report he made that there was very little, if any, excitement among the population of Hawaii about it?

Mr. Mitchell. Do you know how it happened that the Navy did not send any corresponding alert to Admiral Richardson?

General Marshall. I do not recall the circumstances. I recall, apropos of the reconnaissance, that either through the Chief of the Air Corps or otherwise there was great concern over our wearing out the engines and we had no replacements in the planes. The problem was how long we could continue that; and, also, we were wearing out the crews.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the alert continued for several weeks?

Mr. Mitchell. And you have noticed the reports of General Herron to the effect that there was no serious destruction of matériel?

Mr. Mitchell. Of wearing out of personnel even during that length of time?

Mr. Mitchell. Now, General, Admiral Richardson has said that he had some conversation with you on one of his visits here respecting that alert and he quoted you as saying:

That was simply an exercise and I thought if I did not state it was an exercise, the exercise would be carried out more completely.

Do you remember any such conversations with Admiral Richardson?
General Marshall. No, sir. Admiral Richardson came out to my house for lunch and we had a talk then after lunch. There were some other guests at the time who also happened to be in Washington that day and I think there must be a misunderstanding in his mind because there was never any question about the purpose of that alert.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to make on behalf of Admiral Richardson a correction he wanted made in his testimony. He stated that he wired in to the Chief of Naval Operations and wanted to know what this was all about, this Herron alert, and never got any reply.

The Chairman. Will you read it into the record now?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. I will not read his whole letter but the substance of it is that he has checked up on that, examined the original record and that there was a reply sent to him on June 22 which reads as follows:

War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measure after consultation with Navy and State Department. Request you continue cooperation.

[2779] And he says that he has checked the records and found that that was actually sent and that he was mistaken. He actually received it.

The Chairman. Put the whole letter in the record.

Mr. Mitchell. We will put the whole letter into the transcript.

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman; could we have the date of the letter?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. The letter he writes me is dated the 28th of November 1945, and he said in his testimony that he would write such a letter after he had checked it up.

The Chairman. All right.

(Admiral Richardson’s letter follows:)

Navy Department,

Hon. William D. Mitchell,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

Dear Sir: On 21 November, 1945, I stated to the Committee: “I have not had an opportunity to verify what—[2780]—ever evidence there is in official records with respect to dispatches exchanged between me and Admiral Stark regarding the Army alert and, therefore, I request that the members of the committee hold in abeyance their judgment on that subject until I have had an opportunity to search the original records” (Page 815 of Report of Proceedings).

I have examined microfilm and photostatic copies of the original records and I find that:

(a) On 22 June 1940 I sent to the Chief of Naval Operations by radio a dispatch reading:

“Commanding General Hawaiian Department received orders War Department placing forces on alert against hostile trans-Pacific raid and since no information received Navy Department have assumed this exercise. Navy patrol planes are participating” (Page 810 of Report of Proceedings).

(b) On 22 June 1940 in reply to the above dispatch the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me by radio a priority dispatch reading:

“War Department directive concerning alert issued as precautionary measure after consultation with Navy and State Department. Request you continue cooperation” (Page 811 of Report of Proceedings).
The last quoted dispatch was sent from the Navy Department at 10:10 p.m. and was received by me in person as is shown by my initials on the photostatic copy of the dispatch. This dispatch was received by me after 5:00 p.m. Honolulu time on Saturday, June 22, when my mind was fully occupied with secret sortie of the major portion of the Fleet which was to take place early Monday morning and since the reply left me in doubt as to the reality of the warning the fact that I received any reply escaped my mind with the result that in early July in Washington I asked both Admiral Stark and General Marshall whether the Army Alert was a real one or an exercise and testified before this Committee that I never received a reply to my dispatch.

J. O. RICHARDSON, Admiral, USN (Ret.)

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to the document which is in our exhibit 16, being a joint memorandum presented by you and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, to the President under date of November 5, 1941; that is in evidence. Have you examined that memorandum?


Mr. Mitchell. Will you state in your own way what that incident was and how you happened to make that report or memorandum?

General Marshall. My recollection of the matter is that there was a very urgent appeal from the generalissimo, Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, for assistance in meeting what he thought was a dangerous Japanese threat in an advance from the south toward Kunming. He wished American and British air assistance and other assistance that might be made possible for him. That, of course, would terminate the Burma Road if successful. That is my recollection of the basis of this particular joint memorandum to the President from Admiral Stark and myself.

Mr. Mitchell. And your recommendations were?

General Marshall (reading):

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.
That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.
That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.
That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

Mr. Mitchell. Were you asked to prepare the memorandum?


Mr. Mitchell. There is another memorandum, joint, by you and Admiral Stark under date of November 27, 1941, that is our exhibit 17. Will you kindly look at that and state the circumstances or the occasion under which that was made?

General Marshall. The circumstances, as nearly as I can recall them now, were a combination of affairs: The quite evident threat south through the China Sea toward Malay, Malasia, and the Dutch East Indies, the development of Japanese power in Indochina, the report of the conversations recently completed at Singapore. Those, as I recall, were the principal factors which brought about this particular memorandum.

Mr. Mitchell. Your recommendations were what?

General Marshall (reading):

That prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;
In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war: prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken;

Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements [2785] with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

Mr. Mitchell. I notice a little earlier in the memorandum this statement:

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

Were you there referring to this military conference held at Singapore in April 1941 that we have just discussed?

General Marshall. That, I believe, was the basis of their recommendation, their conclusions there.

Mr. Mitchell. When you say there that the Dutch, British, and the United States military authorities had agreed to that action did you mean that they had made an agreement on behalf of the United States, or agreed to recommend it to their governments?

[2785] General Marshall. Agreed to recommend it. They had no power whatever to agree for our government and it was so stipulated, I think, in the—

Mr. Mitchell. Now, you made a recommendation at that time that the President join with the other nations in giving warning to Japan that if they did certain things or advanced beyond a certain point it might lead to war. Was that recommendation carried out, was any such message or warning sent to the Japanese at that time?


Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to exhibit 24, dated November 30, 1941. It is a message for the President of the United States from the former naval person—that was the term used to describe Mr. Church—in which he says [reading]:

It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your constitutional difficulties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the direct character of a further aggressive step. I [2786] beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right which may be very near, you should not say that "any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress" or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war.

That was just 3 days after your recommendation was made. Did you ever see this communication from Mr. Churchill?


Mr. Mitchell. It was the same proposal, wasn't it, to make some kind of joint message?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, that is the way I understand it.
Mr. Mitchell. Or some kind of threat to Japan as to what would happen?


Mr. Mitchell. Your recollection is that no such recommendation, either from Mr. Churchill or yourself, or Admiral Hart, was actually carried out?


Mr. Mitchell. I now go back to the question of preparations in defense of an air attack at Hawaii.

Admiral Richardson has testified that during 1940 he protested against keeping the fleet in Hawaii. He has also testified, and his documentary protests to the Secretary of the Navy, that he based his protest not on the question of security of the fleet in port, but because the facilities for training, equipment and preparing the fleet for war were inadequate and he wanted to go back to the coast to do it.

Then it appears he testified when he went back to Honolulu, or Pearl Harbor, in December 1940, at the suggestion of Admiral Stark, he started the investigation as to the situation, as to the defense against an air attack, and we have in evidence what I call the Bloch report, which is a report that he sent in under date of December 1940 to the Chief of Naval Operations, which was signed by Admiral Stark who was the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District out there, and endorsed by Admiral Richardson.

Did you have that called to your attention when it came in, or do you remember seeing that before?

General Marshall. As nearly as I can recall, this is the first time I have ever seen it.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, following that report the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War under date of January 24, 1941—that is our exhibit 10—in which letter he had some very strong statements, and he said:

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

1. Air bombing attack.
2. Air torpedo plane attack.
3. Sabotage.
4. Submarine attack.
5. Mining.
6. Bombardment by gun fire.

He called on the Secretary of War to give his attention to the matter, and the Secretary replied that he thoroughly agreed with him, and from that time on the subject was considered ended.

Did you see that correspondence of the Secretary of War.

General Marshall. Yes. My recollection on this particular matter is that I must have been absent when the letter was received, but the draft of the reply for the Secretary of War's signature to the Secretary of the Navy came to me from the War Plans Division.

As I recall that draft, they did not think there was any matériel that could be made available, or virtually no matériel that could be made available earlier than October. I am not quite certain about that, but that is the impression I have now. That, I felt, whatever the circumstances, would put the Secretary of War in a rather impossible position, and therefore I started in with the War Plans Divi-
sion, with General Moore, my Deputy for Supply, and with General Arnold on the air side, to see what radical measures we might take to meet, to a degree at least, some of the requirements set forth by the Secretary of the Navy.

I might insert here apropos of your question as to whether or not I had seen—did you call it the Bloch letter?

Mr. MITCHELL. The Bloch report, yes.

General MARSHALL. That I had thought it was not Admiral Bloch but it was Admiral Kimmel that had generated this letter from the Secretary of the Navy up until almost this moment.

The measures we took under the circumstances were, first, as to planes. After discussing the matter with General Arnold I made the decision that we would rob practically all the Combat Pursuit Squadrons of the United States of most of their P-36 planes which was our then most serviceable type as the new P-40 had certain engine defects which had not yet been eradicated.

My recollection is—General Arnold can give you the positive testimony—that we cut most of the squadrons in the United States down to three planes. The difficulty there was, of course, that stopped the training of the Air Corps, which had to be expanded from about 1,800 men to two million and a quarter.

I took up with Admiral Stark over the telephone the problem of getting these planes to Hawaii without the necessity for crating them, which takes time for disassembling and which takes time for assembling. Whatever the conversations were, it was determined that a carrier could come into San Diego in February and pick up those planes, and I think there were other naval and marine matériel to go on the same carrier.

A number of these planes were sent out, thirty odd, I think, sufficient, with the 19 P-36's then in Hawaii, to make an even 50.

I also directed General Arnold to take up with the Curtiss people in Buffalo the expediting of their production schedule, to turn out the new P-40, which had more modern equipment and presumably would have eradicated the engine difficulties of the original model, in time for them to be shipped out to Hawaii at an early date. The date was fixed as March 15, as I recall now, as the only time a carrier could be spared from Hawaii to come into San Diego to pick up the planes. Just why that time was fixed I do not recall now.

Therefore the schedule of the Curtiss-Wright plant had to be greatly expedited. General Arnold can give you the facts.

My understanding of the matter was that the head of the firm came to Washington to see General Arnold and stated that he could not expedite the program. General Arnold brought this to my attention and I directed General Arnold to go to Buffalo and bring heavy pressure to bear on those people to at least make the effort. He did that and was successful, they made the effort, and the last planes were cleared on March 9, in time to fly to San Diego and take off in the carrier on March 15.

The other details as to matériel are covered in the letter of the Secretary of War in reply to the Secretary of the Navy.

In all these matters the great problem was how we could meet the requirements of developing an army, which had to have the tools
with which to train and without which it cannot train; how we could get something for the Philippines, which literally had nothing; how we could develop the Panama Canal defenses, which were very deficient, and how we could meet certain commitments that we had with our Allies, notably the British, in order that they might not be found wanting at a critical juncture in the coming fighting.

It stated—do you wish me to read the letter of the Secretary of War?

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes.

General MARSHALL. This is addressed to the Secretary of the Navy, February—and I cannot read the date—1941.

In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of [2793] the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

The Hawaiian project provides for 148 pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii 36 pursuit planes; 19 of these are P-36's and 17 are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have 31 P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next 10 days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to 50 of the P-36 type and 17 of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, 50 of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

There are as present in the Hawaiian Islands 82 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, 20 37-millimeter anti-aircraft guns (enroute), and 100 caliber 50 anti-aircraft machine guns. The total project calls for 98 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, 120 37-millimeter anti-aircraft guns, and 308 caliber 50 anti-aircraft machine guns.

With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the [2794] equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and Base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and 54 being manufactured—40 for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for 2,950 balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the [2795] local Naval authorities in making those measures effective.

Signed, "Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War."

Mr. MITCHELL. Now during the remainder of 1941 did you keep in touch with the resulting plans that were made for defense against air attack at Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. We have in evidence as our exhibit 44 a joint estimate made by General Martin as commander of the Army Air Force at Hawaii, and Admiral Bellingher, who was commander of the Naval Air Force of the 14th Naval District, dated March 31, 1941.
The estimate was:

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange—

that was Japan—

are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

c) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

d) A strong part of our Fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service.

In paragraph III they say:

Possible enemy action:

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area;
2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

They say also:

It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles.

They say also:

A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

They say:

Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

Then, they go on on at great length, and I will not read the rest of it, but visualizing the way the situation could be handled and the possibility of long-range reconnaissance, and keeping track of the Japanese the night before.

Do you remember seeing that report?


Mr. Mitchell. There is another one that came in later by General Martin, a study of the air situation in Hawaii, addressed by him, under date of August 20, 1941, to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., and forwarded by General Short. That is exhibit 13. Have you had your attention called to that?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, I recall seeing it at the time.

Mr. Mitchell. He deals there very vividly with the possibilities of an air attack and the possible defense against it. You have that before you.

Now, I will offer in evidence as exhibit 53, a book containing the correspondence between——
General Marshall. May I interrupt?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, do so.

General Marshall. Before we pass these last two documents by, there was a memorandum from me regarding this air situation in Hawaii which more or less started up these various reports.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you that memorandum with you?

General Marshall. I haven't it with me, but I will obtain it and have it sent to you. I was shown it yesterday. It was signed by Colonel Orlando Ward.

Mr. Mitchell. Signed by whom?

General Marshall. Signed by Colonel Orlando Ward, the then Secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. Mitchell. We will get that later.

[2799] Senator Brewster. It is dated July 17, 1941. That is in exhibit 13.

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 13 is the letter from General Short to the Commanding General of the Air Forces.

Senator Brewster. The first paragraph.

Mr. Mitchell. It says in the first paragraph:

In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, OCS, 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, dated July 17, 1941—

General Marshall. That is what I am talking about.

Mr. Mitchell (reading):

that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii, there is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations therein.

That is the memorandum that you referred to, and that you prepared, that called for this report?


Senator Brewster. Has the whole memorandum been available?

General Marshall. I will obtain it and send it to the committee.

[2800] I interrupted you, Mr. Mitchell.

Mr. Mitchell. I am glad you did.

General Marshall. You started to read that correspondence.

Mr. Mitchell. We were about to offer in evidence as exhibit 53, a book of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short, commencing in February 1941.

Before we go into that, I will call your attention to a memorandum dated February 6, 1941, of a conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff. The initials are "O.W."

Whom does that mean, do you remember?

General Marshall. I think that is Col. Orlando Ward, the Secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. Mitchell. This memorandum states that the conference was held and present were yourself and General Arnold, General Miles, and General Gerow, and the subject was defense of Pearl Harbor.

General Marshall. Do you wish me to read it, sir?

Mr. Mitchell. I will save your voice a little and read it myself.


Mr. Mitchell. Try it, then. I will relay you occasionally.
General Marshall. (reading):

Present: General Marshall, General Arnold, General Miles, General Gerow.

Subject: Defense of Pearl Harbor.

General Marshall indicated that the Navy had insufficient nets for defense against either submarine or plane carried torpedoes. He further indicated that there was a possibility of a Japanese attack.

This is February 6, 1941.

General Miles stated that nothing in G-2 indicated any such probability.

General Marshall stated that the planes in Honolulu were, in general, obsolescent, and that we should have a reasonable number of top flight planes which would out-perform any the Japanese could bring on their carriers.

General Arnold recommended that 31 P-36s be sent immediately in a Navy carrier to Honolulu, and that 50 P-40Bs be sent as soon as available (in March).

General Marshall stated that we really had two active defense issues—one, Panama, and the other, Honolulu.

General Arnold was to make the necessary preliminary arrangements in connection with changing plans and report to the Chief.

Mr. Mitchell. When you said we had two active defense issues: one, Panama, and the other, Honolulu, will you develop what your idea was at that time? What was your idea in mentioning those two points?

General Marshall. They were the great outposts of our continental defense. We had the Philippines at that time but the equipment there and the number of troops was so inadequate that no defense against a first class power was conceivable; it would be just a desperate sacrifice.

(The correspondence between General Marshall and General Short, referred to above, was marked "Exhibit No. 53."

Mr. Mitchell. There is a letter from you to General Short which is dated February 7, 1941, in this Exhibit 53, which I will read for you, General.


Mr. Mitchell. It is addressed [reading from Exhibit No. 53]:

Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short,
Fort Shafter,
Territory of Hawaii.

My Dear Short: I believe you take over command today, however, the reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.

He spoke of Admiral Kimmel, the new Fleet Commander, regarding his personal characteristics. He said Kimmel was very direct, even brusque and undiplomatic in his approach to problems; that he was at heart a very kindly man, though he appeared rather rough in his methods of doing business. I gathered that he is entirely responsive to plain speaking on the part of the other fellow if there is frankness and logic in the presentation. Stark went so far as to say that he had, in the past personally objected to Kimmel's manners in dealing with officers, but that Kimmel was outstanding in his qualifications of command, and that this was the opinion of the entire Navy.

I give you this as it may be helpful in your personal dealings with Admiral Kimmel, not that I anticipate that you would be supersensitive, but rather that you would have a full understanding of the man with whom you are to deal.

Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army matériel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course the facts are as he represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber .50 machine guns. The 3-inch antiaircraft gun is on a better basis. What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this matériel throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.
The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration for us, there can be little question that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday—he had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines for the protection of Cavitè, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet—at the present time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavitè, and very little for Corregidor. By unobtrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines. However, before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until quantity production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.

I have not mentioned Panama, but the Naval requirements of defense there are of immense importance, and we have not been able to provide all the guns that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. However, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day, some of it in four hours.

You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of the P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days. This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the Japanese carrier based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it gives you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50 P40-B pursuit planes about March 15th by Naval carrier from San Diego. These planes just came into production this week and should be on a quantity basis of about 8 a day by the first week in March.

The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in China, according to our information, has a speed of 322 miles an hour, a very rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20 mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak-proof tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of 300 miles an hour with two .50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to climb of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and armor.

We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, delivered between August and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights over water. Up to the present time we have not had available a modern medium bomber or a light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into production, if not quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 miles, carries 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour—a tremendous improvement on the old B18 which you now have. It can operate with bombs 640 miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give you priority on these planes. I am looking into the question of providing at least a squadron of Flying Fortress planes for Hawaii.

I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-up, but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regarding barrage balloons. We have three now under test, and 50 in process of manufacture and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our estimates. However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I am looking into the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking us and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries in June will probably be made in Hawaii.

[2807] You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited material we have for Alaska, for Panama, and, most confidentially, for the possible occupation of the Azores, not to mention the new leased bases. However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine,
constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. [2868] Fortunately, and happily I might say, Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties.

Faithfully yours,


Does that letter to General Short fairly reflected the difficulties you had at that time in obtaining matériel, planes, and other equipment?


Mr. Mitchell. All through this letter in your discussions, were you considering equipment, planes, and guns needed for defense against an air attack?


Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention now to the minutes of a meeting of the General Council, February 19, 1941.1

What was the General Council as it stood at that time?

General Marshall. I haven’t the regulation here which creates the General Council.

Mr. Mitchell. Was that established by some regulation?

General Marshall. It was established, I think, by General MacArthur. That involved all the principal chiefs of the War Department.

Mr. Mitchell. It was a War Department council and not a general council?

[2869] General Marshall. Purely War Department. It was the basis for keeping all the various and numerous chiefs of the War Department coordinated and aware of the general situation and requirements.

Mr. Mitchell. The minutes of this General Council meeting show you were present, Major General Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Infantry, the Chief of Cavalry, Chief of Field Artillery, Chief of Coast Artillery, Chief of Air Corps, General Brett, and many other officers.

The minutes start out with the statement that this is not a complete record of the minutes, but contains extracts and the statement which we understand you made there was:

To give you a further view of the special circumstances we have been pressed by the Navy to provide more security for the Fleet that has been gathering at Manila.

And you discuss the Manila situation and the general Philippine situation and then you proceed:

Out in Hawaii, the Fleet is anchored, but they have to be prepared against any surprise attack. I don’t say any probable attack, but they have to be prepared against a surprise attack from a trick ship or torpedo planes. Our whole Navy power in general is concentrated there; they can’t cruise for the next six months.

1 Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 54.
And you discussed at some length the question of anti-aircraft guns and planes which might be available.

General Mauborgne said that another question has to do with change in priorities;—

General Mauborgne, is that?


Mr. Mitchell (continuing):

these pursuit people can't work without their detectors and if the situation is such that you need guns for the protection of the Navy somewhere in Hawaii, that you are going to have to change priorities and get some aircraft warning units mobilized.

General Marshall said we are on that right now.

General Moore said that we are making a complete study of that whole question on aircraft warning and also with reference to priorities and where we are going to establish this service first. The question came up in connection with the Alaskan aircraft warning service.

General Marshall said that with reference to priorities, he had put the cards on the table with Admiral Stark and said, where do you want it. The protection of the Fleet is of major consideration. He said that Admiral Stark was quite embarrassed. When the next planes come out over and above the .50 millimeter planes, it is a question of where [2811] they go, to Panama or the Philippine Islands. That will be up to the Navy. "I am going to allow them to practically dictate where those planes should go until we reach a certain degree of security." We haven't any modern medium bombers. They are just beginning to come off the line. The question is where do they go. That is a Navy decision, for the protection of the Fleet, and at the present time for the protection of our shores. I don't think they want the first ones in Manila. They will probably say that they want them first in Hawaii. Then how many in Panama. The Navy can almost tell us. Those priorities will all have to be solved in terms of protection of the Navy in the immediate situation.

Was that your policy all through this period?


Mr. Mitchell. Do you want to add anything to what the minutes of the meeting report?

General Marshall. I can think of nothing at the moment.

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to a letter from General Short to you under date of February 19, 1941, in this book we have just offered in evidence, Exhibit 53.

He says [reading from Exhibit No. 53]:

I was very glad indeed to have your letter of February 7, as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft we did not have.

He says that he is getting along well with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.

I have told them that from my point of view there will be no hair-splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined effort of the two forces.

As a result of my short study of the conditions here, I believe that the following are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes.

1. Cooperation with the Navy.
2. Dispersion and protection of aircraft and the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.
3. Improvement of the antiaircraft defense.
5. Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.
6. Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.
7. Bomb-proofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and Communications Centers.

8. Increase in the number of Engineer troops.

Then he discusses the dispersion and protection of aircraft and bombers; improvement of the antiaircraft defense; and other activities that didn't directly relate to antiaircraft defense.

He also mentions bomb-proofing of vital installations, such as command posts and communication service.

That is a defense movement against air attack, is it not, bomb-proofing of vital installations?

General Marshall. Against air attack, against, maybe, fleet bombardment and against, maybe, a landing, if it should take place.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you any comments to make on that letter, General Marshall?


Mr. Mitchell. It did make you aware of the fact that General Short had taken your letter of February 7 to heart and was actively interested in aircraft, antiaircraft measures out there?


Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to the minutes of a meeting of the "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff" Tuesday, February 25, 1941.

I think I did not offer this in evidence, the one of February 19, which I should have offered, as Exhibit 54. That is "Notes on General Council Meeting," February 19, 1941.

I offer it as exhibit 54 and I will offer the minutes of the conference of February 25, 1941, in evidence as Exhibit 55.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 54 and 55," respectively.)

Mr. Mitchell. Would you go through that, General Marshall, and make any comments on it that occur to you. I will read it if you like.


Mr. Mitchell. I think maybe I had better read it.

General Marshall. I can read it for you.

Mr. Mitchell. All right, sir.

General Marshall (reading Exhibit No. 55):

Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff at 10:00 a. m., Tuesday, February 25, 1941.


Chief of Staff. In view of the Japanese situation the Navy is concerned with the security of the fleet in Hawaii, and apparently the new commander of the fleet there has made a check and reported it to Washington and the Secretary of the Navy has outlined the situation to the Secretary of War. Their particular point is the type of air force in Hawaii, particularly Pursuit. They are in the situation where they must guard against a surprise or trick attack. It is necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are particularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even a probability but they must guard against everything. We also have information regarding the possible use of torpedo planes. There is the possible sudden introduction of Japanese carrier-based planes of the Messerschmidt type which has a speed of 322 miles per hour, armored, etc. The Navy viewpoint is that the whole fleet is involved and that the sea power of the United States might be jeopardized. We have already arranged to send 31 P-36 ships there. The Curtis plant has moved up the delivery date of 50 additional planes
to March 10th; the Navy is sending a Carrier back for these ships. The issue is the priority with regard to new equipment. Admiral Hart has six new submarines, one old cruiser, and not one AA gun. They have now brought up the question of moving some armament from Corregidor. The planes in the Philippines are of the Swedish type which the Chinese turned down. If we had a single squadron of modern planes in the Philippines, it would at least give the Japanese something to think about. Then we have the question of Panama—no modern planes. I understand that the P-40s have some engine trouble which makes them dangerous flying over water. Consequently, our original allocation will be changed by the Japanese situation. Also I have a memorandum with reference to a British request for 50,000 airplanes, to be delivered in 1942. We have a deficiency of 10,000 in organizing the 14,000 program. We are concerned with the reduction of the assignment to the GHQ Air Force. It was thought to our advantage to have as many as possible in foreign garrisons. I have just been talking about pursuit. We have started [2817] a proposition to fill up outlying garrisons, those close to home aren't so much of a problem.

Colonel Anderson. We have made a tentative allocation of planes as follows: First priority: to the Philippine Islands—one interceptor squadron, one medium bomber squadron. To Alaska—one composite group. To Hawaii and Panama—sufficient strength to meet a two-carrier attack. To Puerto Rico—one pursuit group and two bomber groups. Second priority: The equipment for an emergency force to South and Central America—three groups of heavy or medium bombers, two groups of light bombers, and two groups of intercept. Third priority: Remainder of the GHQ minimum training requirements for the remainder of the 54 group program. We will complete training requirements before January 1942; will complete the 54 group in intercept pursuit in January 1942; fighter pursuit in July 1942; heavy bombers in April 1942; medium bombers in December 1941; light bombers in April 1942.

Chief of Staff. What do you think about this, Emmons?

He was the commander of the GHQ Air Force.

General Emmons. We have little means to accomplish [2618] or plans in GHQ Air Force. We are 850 officers short on the 25-group program and we won't get the shortage made up until July, then we will only have graduates of training centers. If we make the normal assignments to staff echelons, we will have less than 100 officers with 2 years service to distribute over 34 groups. With respect to planes, we have 500 combat types for instance. With regard to the P-36 we had to get 31 to send to Hawaii, it took all we had (71) to get the 31 out, due to repairs, ships on the ground, etc. The backbone of our present airplane strength is the B-18 of which we have 140. Of the 193 P-40's we now have only 175, many are out of commission for lack of spare parts. We have 50 B-17's, also 3 P-39's and 5 A-20A. We are also short of spare parts. Although we have on paper about 500 planes, I doubt that we could put 500 in the air.

General Arnold. The 25 group program is supposed to be completed by July 1941; the 54 group by April 1942.

General Emmons. With regard to sending equipment on foreign service it would be a mistake to send new planes overseas until the defects inherent with new materiel have been ironed out. We have changes on the 50 P-10B's to go to Hawaii, probably won't make much [2819] difference except with the engine.

General Brett. The engine is improving all the time. The P-40D has a new engine.

Chief of Staff. How about the Air Depot in Hawaii?

General Emmons. It functions very well.

General Arnold. With regard to this shortage of parts, we are going to have to manufacture parts in the depots—we used to do it before.

General Brett. The shortage in parts is due to the fact that we have pushed the plane manufacturers so far the planes that they have been forced to neglect, in a measure, the production of spare parts.

General Emmons. With regard to organization equipment, we are in pretty good shape. The only shortage is in cameras and octants. With regard to the allocation, I don't know what to say. With regard to a tactical point, Hawaii has a peculiar situation—pursuit is of little value at night, at which time—due to phosphoresence in the water—primary targets, dry-docks, the fleet, etc., stand
out on the darkest night. They will have no warning service until they get detectors and pursuit would be useless. I would have long range bombers and not send pursuit, but bombers.

Conference Adjourned.

[2820] Mr. Mitchell. Does that reflect the problems you were dealing with at that time?


Mr. Mitchell. Have you any comment to make on that situation that is developed by that conference?

General Marshall. No, sir; I don't think of anything that isn't pretty well covered.

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to a letter you wrote to General Short on March 5, 1941. It says [reading from exhibit No. 53:]

My Dear Short: I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority. General Chaney has prepared a report of recent exercises held in the United States and incorporated therein his views and recommendations based on his experience in these exercises and his observation of the system and method employed by the British. A copy of this report is being sent to you.

An air defense exercise is contemplated for the West Coast in the Spring. This exercise is to include an establishment similar to that which has been set up in the Air Defense Command exercise in the Northeast and tested during January. It is highly desirable that representatives from Hawaii be present to observe the details of this exercise. If this is found to be impracticable, we will consider having officers sent to the exercise who shortly thereafter are due for station in Hawaii.

Now, what inspired that request for an early review at that date from General Short of the situation in the Hawaiian Department?

General Marshall. The fact that we were beginners at the business of organizing for the meeting of air attacks, the employment of radar and operation of these boards where all the movements of the ships were kept graphically illustrated, the directions to meet varying attacks. The British, of course, had developed that to a high degree in the Battle of Britain. General Chaney was directed to observe all the details of their procedure in England. He was an air officer. I recalled him to the United States, stationed him at Mitchell Field in Long Island, with directions to develop there a practical method of handling aircraft and antiaircraft in resisting air attacks and the employment of radar.

He carried on quite a development and finally had maneuvers. We carried those maneuvers eventually down the entire coast [2822] and also finally out on the west coast.

I was concerned that everybody in the Air Corps, everybody concerned with the anti-aircraft, understood the technique and its application. I, therefore, wished General Short to be brought into the picture and to have the last word so far as we could determine as to the best method of meeting air attacks.

Mr. Mitchell. Well now, your letter was dated March 5, and there appears in this book a letter from General Short to you dated March 6. That could not have been a reply to your letter. It doesn't so state. The letters probably crossed in the mail.

Mr. Mitchell. That letter to you of March 6, 1941, in it General Short says [reading from Exhibit No. 53]:

Dear General Marshall: One of the first projects which I investigated in this Department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these Islands. At the present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be detected is about 5 miles. The radar detector equipment of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this distance to 120 miles, and in these Islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by [2823] which the detection distance can be increased. With the present international situation it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here.

The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the Fleet in Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet has expressed his concern about this and had communicated this concern to the Navy Department; as you know, the Secretary of War has advised the Secretary of the Navy that the equipment would be received in this Department sometime in June and the stations be operating shortly thereafter. I have discussed this matter with Admiral Kimmel and have assured him that personnel would be trained and the stations in operation within 30 days after receipt of the equipment.

I probably ought to read the rest of it.

All this leads up to a radiogram of 3 March 1941 just received from the Adjutant General regarding the Haleakala installation. A copy of this radio and a paraphrase of my reply are enclosed for ready reference. The Adjutant General's radio indicates to me that the seriousness of this situation has not yet been [2824] appreciated in the War Department. It lists certain restrictions regarding construction, and if it is necessary to comply with these, the completion of this station will be unduly delayed. The fixed station at the summit of Haleakala is one of the two most important in the warning net; its commanding location gives it greater coverage than any of the others, and its early completion is vital. I believe that this matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War to see if permission cannot be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submitting detailed plans for consideration by the National Park Service.

Defense of these Islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a Board of officers in this Department who made several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions as to locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be [2825] decentralized and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details to expedite its completion.

Do you remember that Secretary of War Stimson was especially interested in these radar detectors?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, he was very much interested in that particular development.

Mr. Mitchell. It may be anticipating, but do you know how many mobile or fixed radar detector outfits were sent to Hawaii before December 6?

General Marshall. My recollection is that there were six mobile sets in operation at that time and three fixed sets known in operation.

Mr. Mitchell. In your letter of March 13 to General Short you say:

The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local Naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most gratifying.

Since the Navy deployment in Kaneohe Bay has exceeded the project originally contemplated, I agree with you that the Army should consider assuming responsibility for its defense, and meanwhile defend it within the means available.
The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General requesting personnel, materiel and funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiating projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including $3,000,000 in the estimates now being prepared.

Here is a letter from General Bryden to General Short, dated May 15. That wasn’t one of your letters.

Senator Lucas. March 15.
Mr. Mitchell. March 15, 1941. It says.

The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service stations in the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those cases where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, but they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of the reservation.

I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941 outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time. The War Department finds it necessary to ask the Department of the Interior for the use of many tracts of land in the National Parks, and for their cooperation in the transfer of large areas of public land. It is not believed that it would be advisable to attempt to alter the informal decisions of the Department of the Interior by carrying this matter to higher authority, or to prolong the discussion through official channels.

We are as anxious as you are to work out a solution for these problems with the least practical delay, and I know that I can count on you for fullest cooperation.

Signed “William Bryden, in the absence of the Chief of Staff.”

Senator Ferguson. Would counsel read the distribution of that letter?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. It says:

Distribution: 1 Chief of Staff.

Showing a copy of the letter went to the Chief of Staff.

Here is another letter from General Short to you dated March 15, 1941. It appears to be in answer to your request for a report from him about the air situation.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, before counsel proceeds, I am wondering if General Marshall would care to comment on that letter of March 15.

Mr. Mitchell. Thank you. I should have asked him for a comment. I get so interested in these myself that I forget.

General, you heard me read this letter of March 15 which related to sites for the installation of fixed radar stations in Hawaii and the discussion as to the attitude of the Department of the Interior.

General Marshall. My recollection of the situation here was General Short pressing very hard to have early action taken to permit the installation of that radar. He had selected a point in one of the National Parks which was a volcanic peak to which the Department of the Interior, or the National Park Service, rather, on the ground objected, and that objection was supported for the time being at least by the Department of Interior National Park Service here in Washington.
Another site was proposed but that site would have involved about either 25 degrees or 25 percent of the total arc of observation or, rather, of registration of the radar, so that being the case any planes that approached within that arc could not have been detected.

Therefore, General Short was very much concerned to have the radar established on the peak, which gave all around service. He can, of course, tell you the details of this much better than I can.

He was pressing us to get the authority out of the Department of the Interior and the National Park Service. He was also pressing us to secure authority to proceed with the building without any delay which would be involved in sending the plans to the United States for approval here by the National Park Service in the Department of the Interior.

We had been endeavoring through the ordinary channels, so far as I can recall, that follow any business between two separate departments of the Government represented by Cabinet heads and had quite a difficult time obtaining authority to establish the radar section on the peak of the volcano most desired by General Short. That authority was obtained.

However, we were unable, and I think that was the situation at the time of this letter of General Bryden's, though I am not accurate about that, to secure authority for General Short to proceed with the building without the delay of submitting plans to Washington. General Bryden evidently wrote this letter in order to make clear to General Short our difficulties here and just why we could not obtain that necessary authority.

The records will show. I think, and my recollection is that General Short sent another message or two pressing again that we go after this more vigorously. I then personally went into the matter and talked by telephone with the head of the National Park Service, I believe it was the head, I do not remember the gentleman’s name, to secure authority to go ahead with the construction of the station without the delay involved in sending the plans back to the United States.

He told me that could not be; that in each case, notably those where we were constructing similar radar station sites in Maine, along the coast of New England, each one had to be approved in the Department, in the Department of the Interior, before any building could be gone ahead with, if the site lay in any National Park area.

Mr. Mitchell. This letter—

General Marshall. I might finish, though, by saying that that conversation ended with the statement that they could not grant the authority for General Short to go ahead; and, incidentally, what he was trying to do was to get the station installed and ready to receive the equipment that was then due in June.

Later, and as I recall that afternoon, word came either from the National Park Service or the Department of Interior or otherwise which permitted, as I recall, us to go ahead with the plan, sending just the general statement of the plan by air mail. I think the records will show that development.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, this letter from General Bryden to General Short states that the reason the National Park Service and the In-
terior Department require the structure plans to be submitted to them in full before they would permit the reservation to be used for such a purpose was based on the question as to whether they were architecturally attractive or altered the natural appearance of the reservation.

Is that your understanding of their basis?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, this letter of March 15, 1941, from General Short to you appears to be a report in response to your letter of the 5th in which you asked him for a review of the air defense situation there. He starts out and says (reading from Exhibit No. 53:)

The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack.

He develops that at length and reports on the anti-aircraft artillery. He says:

In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch antiaircraft artillery, only 16 guns being required to complete our complement. As far as I know no provision has been made for 90-mm antiaircraft guns. 20 out of 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns have been received. The exact date of the arrival of the others is not known. We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns. Perhaps the most serious shortage is 8 long range detectors (AWS)—

What does “AWS” stand for?

General MARSHALL. Air Warning Service.

Mr. MITCHELL (continuing to read from Exhibit No. 53:)

—which are supposed to arrive in June. Our present sound locators have a range of only 4½ miles so they are practically useless. The new detectors will have a maximum range of 120 miles.

Then he discusses the shortage in personnel, which he says is serious. The coordination of antiaircraft defense. He says of that:

The coordination of Antiaircraft defense presents quite a different picture at Hawaii from that existing in most places on the mainland. The island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland. After the installation of our new detectors we shall have some warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in the most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. The pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time.

On account of the congestion in the areas at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and Barbers Point, the coordination of the Army and Navy aircraft and of the Antiaircraft Artillery presents a very serious problem. We have had a committee of the Army and Navy working on this subject.

Then he refers to the west coast defense exercise which you have mentioned and said he would like to send both General Martin and General Gardner.

When that report came to your attention did you consider that it showed a sufficiently lively and active interest in the antiaircraft defense on the part of General Short?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. You said in your letter to him of March 28 [reading from Exhibit No. 53:]

I was very glad to receive your letter of March 15 reviewing the air defense situation in your department. Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sufficient details
to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for these purposes will be included in estimates.

A company of aviation engineers will be sent to you during April, and further increases in your engineer garrison are contemplated when the necessary personnel can be made available.

Antiaircraft and aircraft warning service materiel to complete your project requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows:

Then you give him a list of guns and their dates [continuing to read from Exhibit No. 53]:

I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation of your antiaircraft garrison.

I approved your proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or their Executives, to the West Coast Defense Exercise.

Have you any comments to make about that?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

[2835] Senator Lucas. Those dates, Mr. Counsel, in the fourth paragraph are pretty important.

Mr. MITCHELL. The fourth paragraph?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Yes. I did not want to tire the committee or keep the general waiting on account of my reading too long [reading from Exhibit No. 53]:

Antiaircraft and aircraft warning service materiel to complete your project requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows: sixteen 3" antiaircraft guns, December, 1941; one hundred and fifteen 37mm antiaircraft guns, February, 1942; caliber .50 antiaircraft machine guns, in 1942; four SCR No. 268, April, 1941.

That means four outfits?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Were they mobile or fixed, those SCR's, or don't you happen to know about that?

General MARSHALL. I do not know offhand. I think they were mobile.

Mr. MITCHELL. (reading):

Five SCR No. 270 and three SCR No. 271, April and May, 1941.

Do you happen to remember whether those antiaircraft [2836] warning instruments, AWS, for radar were sent out there on the expected dates or would you have to look your records up on that?

General MARSHALL. I think you will have to go to the records for that. All I can tell you offhand at the moment is that there were six mobile stations in operation, as I understand it, on December 7, 1941 and three fixed setups not in operation.

Mr. MITCHELL. I only mention General Short’s letter to you of April 14 to call attention to the fact that in that letter he concludes with this statement [reading from exhibit No. 53]:

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy I am enclosing the following agreements made with them:

2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement.
3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement.

[2837] Would you have had time to examine those documents at length, or do you remember having done so?
General Marshall. I think that I remember the documents, although I am not quite certain, that arranged for the coordination of air action and defense. I became somewhat familiar with them for the reason that the air officials of the War Department—I do not recall whether it was General Arnold personally or part of his staff, or both—brought objections to me to General Short's arrangements in the coordination in this matter with the Navy, which had to do with the Army Air Corps reluctance in regard to the over-water reconnaissance responsibilities which in this coordinated agreement was naval, and the Air Corps was thinking of their long-range four-engine bombers and what later developed into the great strategical air bombing force.

I did not think their position was sound and I thought General Short's arrangement was sound under the then circumstances which, incidentally, included the fact that he had very few B-17's, about 12 of them, and possibly some old B-18's, that the agreement with the Navy, with its PBY's of long range and considerable endurance at the time, supplemented as might be considered necessary by the Naval Chief by Army planes, was the efficient method of meeting the conditions under the circumstances.

[2838] Mr. Mitchell. You thought that the long over-water reconnaissance ought to be handled by the Navy with such assistance as the Army Air Forces could give it?

General Marshall. Certainly, under the conditions that then existed as to equipment on both sides.

Mr. Mitchell. You understood at that time then that the arrangement was between the commanders out there that if the naval commander needed additional long range planes to make reconnaissance he would call on the Army for them?

General Marshall. And those planes would operate under naval direction.

Mr. Mitchell. That is right.

General Marshall. The complicated part of the procedure, of course, was not that. It was the control of the various fighter planes and the antiaircraft in the very restricted area, particularly of Oahu, especially if the Fleet were there. That was made the responsibility of the Army commander and I thought in terms that were practical of accomplishment.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you agree with General Short's conclusion when he spoke in his letter about radar equipment, that even if they had radar equipment of a range of maybe 130 or 150 miles it would necessitate very prompt take-off of pursuit planes in order to respond to such a warning?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I do not know just to what [2839] specific reference that you are referring in connection with that but this is certainly the case. One hundred and twenty miles represents a very few minutes of flying time and that study by General Martin presents possibly other factors which would make the issue even more complicated unless the force is picked up at a great distance.

The planes have to be ready all the time for immediate action and a certain number warmed up. We had that same problem in Panama where it went on week in and week out, almost year in and year out, making it a very difficult problem to meet, the more so where enemy action was not always evident.
Mr. Mitchell. After he sent you his letter on the 14th enclosing the joint plans and estimates concerning possible air action you seem to have written General Short on May 5, 1941, as follows [reading from Exhibit No. 53]:

My dear Short:
Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint plans and the estimate concerning possible air action. It is evident that you have been on the job, and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous cooperation.

You say at the end of the letter:

It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything is going along extremely well and do not hesitate to write at any time.

I take it you were assured by his report that this matter of anti-aircraft defense—I mean the defense against air attack—was being given very diligent attention out there?


The Chairman. This is a good time to stop. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon at 12 noon, a recess was taken until 2 p.m. of the same day.)

[2841]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P.M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Counsel may proceed with the examination of General Marshall.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, I know the reading of these documents is tedious, but there are only a few documents left that I want to call your attention to before I ask you some general questions.

The next one is a document signed by Harry J. Malony, brigadier general, addressed to the Chief of Staff on May 13, 1941.

I see that it generally relates to "installation of dispersed protection bunkers for 263 pursuit ships, and 95 bombers," and paragraph 3 says [reading from Exhibit No. 56]:

War Plans Division believes:
1. That the danger of sustained air attack against air fields in Hawaii from carrier based aviation is not serious.

Would you tell us what would be meant from a military standpoint by the word "sustained"?

General Marshall. My reaction to that at the moment—[2842] I couldn't tell you specifically what it might have been at the time—would be that he was referring to a continuous attack on Hawaii, such as occurred at Okinawa during the landing and heavy fire, rather than a raiding attack, which is of short duration.

Mr. Mitchell. And he thought for that reason the bunkers against gas and bombs of secondary importance; is that the idea?

General Marshall. That would be my conception of it now. I don't recall what conception I had at the time.

Mr. Mitchell. We will offer that memorandum in evidence as exhibit 56.

The Chairman. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 56.")
Mr. Mitchell. I have here a memorandum of a conference in the office of the Secretary of War under date of May 19, 1941. Have you that before you?


Mr. Mitchell. Would you mind reading it?

General Marshall. This is a conference on May 19, 1941, in the office of the Secretary of War:

Present: The Secretary of War—Mr. Stimson
The Under Secretary of War—Judge Patterson
[2843] The Assistant Secretary of War—Mr. McCloy
The Assistant Secretary of War for Air—Mr. Lovett
The Chief of Staff

myself—two deputies—three deputies at that time: General Bryden, General Moore, and Generald Arnold.

The Secretary, General Staff—Colonel Ward.

Mr. Mitchell. You might omit the first subject.

General Marshall. The first subject relates to Martinique which I understand you wish me to omit.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. The next paragraph having to do with boats for the First Division.

General Marshall (reading):

The French cruiser in Martinique is a first class cruiser ship with a top speed of 40 knots.

The Secretary of War asked whether she was in good condition, and was informed that she was.

General Marshall indicated that it would take about ten days for the Navy to get boats for the First Division. He further indicated that it was primarily a naval mission but that the Army Air should participate, both for the help it could give and the experience it would gain. He indicated that the B-17's in Puerto Rico would be staged at St. Croix. Puerto Rico is almost 400 miles from Martinique.

General Marshall then indicated that there were now in the United States 14 B-17's of the most modern type which he thought should not be sent out of the country in view of the current situation. These had been withheld from the Hawaiian Department contingent.

The Secretary of War asked if this would affect the impregnability of Hawaii.

General Marshall said that it would not. He further said that we need some B-17's (but not of the most modern type) in Panama, and that he is recommending that 9 be sent there. This matter is under consideration.

General Arnold. There is now available 50 B-17's without leak-proof tanks and without armor.

General Marshall. High bombing is possible in the Caribbean area, due to weather conditions, and these ships without leak-proof tanks could be effectively used there.

[2845] Mr. Mitchell. We will offer that in evidence as Exhibit 57.

The Chairman. That is dated May 19, 1941?

Mr. Mitchell. May 19, "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 57".)

Senator Brewster. You read it as if St. Croix was in Puerto Rico.

General Marshall. I missed the punctuation. I should have given the distance from St. Croix to Puerto Rico.

Senator Brewster. That is in the Virgin Islands, is it, St. Croix?

General Marshall. I am confused at the moment. I don't know.

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention further to a letter dated May 29 from General Short to you. Page 35. Have you found it?
General Marshall. I have a copy of it here.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you kindly refer to that and read the first two paragraphs.

General Marshall. It is dated May 29, 1941, signed Walter C. Short (reading from Exhibit No. 53):

[2846] Dear General Marshall: I know that you will not have time to look over a detailed account of our recent maneuvers but feel that you might like to have a birdseye view of what we did and the purpose back of it.

The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of Engineer Supplies for Field Fortifications and of Engineer Tools. During the air phase our bombers acted under Navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the Navy patrol planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made the attack. Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by Naval planes and our own bombers when they came in to attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of the warning for this phase our bombers were sent to fields on outlying Islands and pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of the Army Air Force, Navy Air Force, and antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise. Ammunition and engineer supplies had never been actually [2847] issued before and we got considerable data in regard to the time and transportation required to complete the issue.

Mr. Mitchell. You understand that relates to training or practice, simulated attack by air on Hawaii?


[2848] Mr. Mitchell. The rest of the document relates to the other phases that were not related directly to the air attack, were they?


Mr. Mitchell. On July 25 it appears that there was a joint Army and Navy dispatch to Hawaii about economic sanctions. That dispatch was sent by the Navy under date of July 25, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanding general of the—or to the commanding chief of the Pacific Fleet and others and it bears in it a statement that it was a joint dispatch from the C. O. and the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. It is on page 2 of Exhibit 32.

Was it the practice at that time occasionally for one department to send a dispatch and in it have a request that it be communicated to the other department in Hawaii?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; that was a very common practice all the way through in order to protect our codes.

Mr. Mitchell. What was the occasion of your notifying the Army and Navy commanders at Hawaii of the placing of these embargoes and restrictions?

General Marshall. I did not hear the last word.

Mr. Mitchell. Through these embargoes and restrictions on commerce.

General Marshall. That was to apprise them of the developments of the situation in relation to Japan.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, was there any idea in your head that the imposition of those embargoes might probably intensify the strain between Japan and the United States?
General Marshall. My best recollection is that it was as we say here:

Do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures.

Mr. Mitchell. There is a letter under date of August 19 from you to General Short. Would you kindly look at that?

General Marshall. Is that on page 40?


General Marshall. All right, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I think it relates all to air matters.

General Marshall (reading from Exhibit No. 53):

AUGUST 10, 1941.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Your letter of July 11 has been received recommending the selection of Kipapa Field rather than the Kahuku Point Field as a base for the 15th Pursuit Group. The advantages and disadvantages of each site have been considered. As a result, I feel that the advantages of the Kahuku Point Field outweigh those of the Kipapa Field sufficiently to result in my decision to establish the base on Kahuku Point.

The following factors are among those having a bearing upon my decision:

a. Low clouds and ground mist frequently obtain over the Wheeler Field-Kipapa area, while at the same time on the north shore of Oahu visibility conditions are good. It is believed tactically unsound to place two pursuit groups in an area subject to the same adverse weather conditions. Pursuit operations in defense of Oahu would be seriously hampered during such weather conditions. Selection of the Kahuku Point site places one group in a location where relatively favorable weather may exist when the reverse is true in the Kipapa area.

b. The close proximity of two Army and two Navy air bases in the Schofield Barracks-Pearl Harbor area has resulted in a situation under present conditions which necessitates continuous coordination and control of air traffic in the interests of safety. The addition of a fifth air base in this area will appreciably aggravate this situation.

I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance of adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and accordingly, will entertain favorably and proposal which will implement the efficiency of such defense. I hope, therefore, that they will be agreeable to our proposal to establish an air base at Kahuku Point to the extent of releasing any claim they may have previously established to any part of the area involved.

With best personal regards,

Faithfully yours,

(Stamped) (Sgd.) G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you happen to remember whether the site you recommended was actually selected?

General Marshall. I do not recall right, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I will ask you to turn, General, to the letter from General Short to you dated October 14, 1941, appearing on page 43.

General Marshall. Do you wish me to read that, sir?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, if you please.

General Marshall (reading from Exhibit No. 53):

[2852]

FORT SHAFTER, T. H., October 14, 1941.

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I have your letter of October 10th with reference to the use of men of the Air Force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7229
men. Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,885 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu would come only after destruction of our Air Forces. The fact that our planes had been destroyed would not mean that all the men had been put out of action. It is probable that several thousand men would still be left and it would not look plausible to have them sit down and do nothing while Infantrymen were detailed to protect them and their air fields. The training after the first two weeks takes up only about four hours per month of their time. It seems to me that they should continue to be trained as Riflemen in the immediate defense of air fields. As regards their use as Military Police that was not correct. The plan was to use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able to take over guarding all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges, etc.

If it is not desired to train Air Corps men for their own protection and for the final defense of the air fields I would like to be so advised.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, that was a proposal of General Short's to train Air Corps men for guard duty, wasn't it?

General Marshall. Well, it was Military Police duty.

Mr. Mitchell. And to defend the planes on the ground?


Mr. Mitchell. And on the next page I think is your letter in which you disapproved of that proposal.

General Marshall. I will read that if you wish me to, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

General Marshall (reading from Exhibit No. 53):

[2854]

October 28, 1941.

Dear Short: With reference to your letter of October 14, I can understand your motives in giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel which at present are excess for the equipment provided. However, the present rate of expansion of the Air Force is such that they are having considerable difficulty in obtaining experienced maintenance men and it is important that they be permitted to concentrate on the technical training of all potential mechanics, regardless of available equipment. Also, it is equally important that they utilize all available time on this specialized training and the men not be left without assigned duties particularly during the maneuver period.

I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their own specific requirements.

It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned. War Department Training Circular 47, which was issued July 18, 1941, can be accepted as a guide except in extreme situations.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember how many divisions General Short had at the time? We're there two divisions?

General Marshall. I think he had a division and a fraction; roughly a reinforced division. I am not quite certain. That is readily obtainable from the figures.
Mr. Mitchell. Do I understand your idea was that he should use part of his Infantry divisions for work of that kind rather than the Air Corps?

General Marshall. To the extent indicated in that. What was going on there back of the letters was this: The Air Corps was engaged in an unprecedented expansion both as to the extent of expansion and the speed with which we had to make it and the Air Corps people themselves were very sensitive to anything that diverted their personnel from the development under that expansion and their representatives here in Washington, General Arnold and his staff, appealed to me to get this modification so that nothing should interfere with the completion of the technical training of the Air Corps personnel.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, there is just one other document I want to refer to and that is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations dated November 24, 1941, addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, and commandants of the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th naval districts.

It was a joint dispatch with instructions in it to inform the senior Army officers. It states:

'Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippine or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.'

Do you remember having authorized that dispatch?


Mr. Mitchell. Now, General Marshall, with all these documents before us showing your contacts with Hawaii and your knowledge about the situation there and the question of defense against air attack, will you cast your mind back, if you can, to the latter part of November 1941 and give us the estimate you then had as to the capacity of the forces at Hawaii to resist an air attack, an air raid? I am not asking you now whether you expected one but what your estimate then was of the situation and the capacity with the matériel they had to resist such an attack successfully.

General Marshall. The Hawaiian garrison on the Army side was short of four-engined bombers, only having 12; it was short a few three-inch antiaircraft guns and it was short more seriously in lesser calibers of antiaircraft guns. It had been built up to a considerable extent in fighter aircraft.

It had a moderate radar set-up of the portable type then functioning. It had what I thought were ample troops to defend the beaches successfully against a landing attack.

The military forces on Hawaii were in numbers and in equipment more nearly up to the desired standards than any other installation in the Army. My own impression was that the garrison was sufficiently established and equipped and organized to prevent a landing and to successfully resist an air attack and to defend the naval base.
I was always of the opinion, as indicated particularly by my letter to General Short of February 7, I believe, that the principal problem there was to be prepared against an emergency of a surprise attack which might come at any time, presumably with the least possible advance notice. In that letter I stated, if you recall:

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

Would you repeat your question again to me, please, to see if I got it straight?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I was trying to draw out your judgment as of the latter part of November 1941 and the early part of December as to the capacity of the forces at Hawaii, assuming they used all they had to the best advantage to—

General Marshall. I think they had a sufficient amount of materiel at their disposal there to successfully resist [2859] an enemy effort in the form of either a raid or a more serious attack.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, these reports of Admiral Bloch and the Martin-Bellinger reports and all these other documents we have in evidence dealt very heavily with the question of reconnaissance. The general tenor of them was the conclusion that if you wanted a complete, sure defence against a carrier-borne air attack you should have a reconnaissance the evening before and catch the carriers at dusk before they started their night run, and the alternative, if that was not done, was to try to get the planes out and break up the attack after the carrier planes left the carriers the next morning, which was not so certain.

Now, the studies that were presented there that we have been offering and considering this morning indicate that a pretty large number of patrol planes would be needed for the long reconnaissance and then a very large number of bombing planes would be needed to go out and smash the carriers after they were discovered and I notice that in the recommendation of General Martin made in his study of the air situation in Hawaii under date of August 20, 1941, exhibit 13, which we referred to this morning, he made this recommendation [reading from Exhibit No. 13] :

It is recommended that the War Department give [2860] immediate consideration to the allotment of 180 B-17D type airplanes or other four-engine bombers with equal or better performance and operating range and 36 long-range torpedo-carrying medium bombers to the Hawaiian Air Force for the performance of search and attack missions in an area bounded by a circle whose radius is 333 nautical miles and center is Oahu, as follows:
72 for daily search missions.
36 for attack missions (these airplanes will be in readiness daily, fully armed and loaded with bombs for a mission).
36 for maintenance and reserve from which 36 may be used to augment the attack force.
180 total B-17D's.
36 torpedo-carrying medium bombers of the B-26 or other suitable type.

Now, his report shows that he was considering a 360° reconnaissance, all around the circle and which was the extreme requirement for a perfect defense against any attack from any direction.
Now, there are other figures in his report as to reconnaissance over limited areas.

Now, compared with what Martin recommended on August 20 for a complete security there against air attack we had [2861] a very slim equipment, did we not?

General Marshall. Well, I stated, if you recall, we had a serious shortage in four engine bombers. We only had 12. [2862] Mr. Mitchell. As an aid to Navy PBY air reconnaissance, that was practically nothing, wasn’t it, or almost nothing?

General Marshall. Little more than that, sir. Not only a small supplement to the Navy reconnaissance, but it left no striking force. Mr. Mitchell. That is it. After you located them, you had not any bombers to sink the carriers?


Mr. Mitchell. It seems to be the fact, according to these figures, and your judgment is, isn’t it, that as far as security by long-distance reconnaissance and bombing the carriers the night before the proposed air attack is concerned, the equipment was quite inadequate.


Mr. Mitchell. What would be the result of that—that they would have to confine their long-distance reconnaissance to the limited sector that you stated, or what could they do under those circumstances?

General Marshall. The provision of General Martin there is for complete and perfect reconnaissance. That is all right. That certainly is to be done, if you can provide the planes. I might, incidentally, say even at the top of our production, we were never able to give Hawaii, in 1943 and 1944, what the commander of Hawaii wanted, any more than [2863] we were able to give any commander all he wanted. That was an unavoidable situation always, in a war of the character we were involved in. However, there were ways to improve the situation by increased vigilance, by the operation of the attack planes, the interceptor planes, in every way we could in that fashion.

There was also this to be considered, which we always had in mind, and that is the great hazard the enemy undertook in sending his people so far from home. A surprise is either a triumph or a catastrophe. If it proved to be a catastrophe, the entire Japanese campaign was ruined, and advance into Malaysia, and advance into the East Indies would have been out of the question.

Singapore would not have been captured, the Burma Road would not be cut off, and the attack on New Guinea probably would not have occurred. So you have an enemy hazarding a great risk in this stroke. Therefore you measure somewhat your means of defense against the hazard he is accepting in doing it.

I agree with General Martin that if the planes were available that was a very appropriate assignment. It was on the side of conservatism which is certainly a good side to take in the defense of a fortress such as Hawaii, and the fleet more than the fortress against air attack. Does [2864] that explain my point of view?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Your answer deals with two problems: One is the question whether you expected an attack and the other one, what position you were in to defeat it.

Mr. Mitchell. I was intending to confine my first question to this proposition: Assuming the attack is made, to what extent, under the circumstances, and with the material they had available, would you conclude that they had adequate means for either breaking up the attack at sea, or on the carriers, or else destroying it, mitigating it the next morning.

General Marshall. I think they had at least the means to so have broken up that attack that it could do limited harm.

The Vice Chairman. What was your last answer?

General Marshall. I think they had sufficient means to sufficiently break up the attack so it could only have done limited harm.

Mr. Mitchell. By that, you mean if everybody had been on the alert and the radar operating and reporting planes at distances of 130 to 150 miles, and every pilot was in the seat, the motor going, everybody on the alert, and the antiaircraft men with ammunition, with that amount of [2865] warning that you could get from that sort of reconnaissance, you could have mitigated the attack.

General Marshall. Roughly, sir. I would not say every pilot in his seat, but in a condition of alert.

Mr. Mitchell. Your idea is with the forces available, they could have broken up the Jap planes in the air to an extent?

General Marshall. It would have greatly lessened the damage done.

Mr. Mitchell. These reports which you had and considered laid a great deal of emphasis on the need for an aerial reconnaissance, did they not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I might add at this time the question was the availability of matériel. I think at that time we had about 148 B-17's of which an appreciable number were of the old model, without leak-proof tanks and with other deficiencies of equipment; we had 12 B-24's altogether.

Mr. Mitchell. You do not mean in Hawaii, do you.


Mr. Mitchell. The whole army?

General Marshall. The United States Army. We had four in Panama; we had 35 in the Philippines; we had 12 in Hawaii; we had a few on the West Coast, and we had 50 to 60 to [2866] develop the pilots for the production of planes then in prospect.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know here in Washington at that time, or keep track of the number of bombers that were in commission and those that were not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. That was a continual check with us, because we had so few, and everybody wanted them.

I might add there again in connection with this, that the greatest trouble was we had to have crews prepared to fly these planes as they came off the production line which, as I say, was then approaching the full quantity production. That demanded planes that had to be in the air almost constantly, and tremendous maintenance, while at this time we only had about 50 or 60 altogether to produce crews for the flow of planes then in prospect.

[2867] Mr. Mitchell. The first days of our hearing we had figures introduced by Colonel Thielen and Admiral Inglis as to the types of planes, both Naval and Army planes, in Hawaii on December 7, and how many were in commission and how many were out. It is
given by fields there in that data, but we attempted to total it, and
while our compilation may not be absolutely correct, the way we
calculated it, it means the Navy had available on the Hawaiian Islands
on December 7 the following: Patrol planes, many of which were
not in full condition for use—but I am giving you the total planes
and some of them were out of commission—they had 54 PBY-5, 27
PBY-3, and 8 PBY-1, or a total of 89. And on that day there were
in addition, I think, 7 fighter Naval planes left by carrier.

On the same day the Army had 50 bombers of various types. B-17's,
they had a total of 12, and only 6 in commission. That is the four-
engine bomber. Then the B-18, what is that?

General Marshall. That is a two-engine bomber of an earlier type.

Mr. Mitchell. Fit for reconnaissance work?

General Marshall. They are good for reconnaissance, not because
of great range, but they are a sturdy, reliable plane.

Mr. Mitchell. There were a total of 33 there, of which 21 were in
commission. The A-20, what type is that?

[2868] General Marshall. That is a fighter or interceptor
plane.

Mr. Mitchell. What is the B-12?

General Marshall. That is a rather obsolete bomber type.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, they had in addition 152 fighters of various
types, of which less than 100 were in full readiness for use, I mean
fit to fly.

General Marshall. For operation.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, for operation. So there was a great shortage
of both fighters and bomber planes.

Now the Jap attack was made with six carriers, and I ought to
remember but I think there were two or three hundred planes, which
would greatly outnumber anything in the way of fighting planes that
existed at Hawaii.

Is it your idea that with that very large power of the Japs in the
air, with our limited fighter forces at Hawaii we could have mitigated
the attack very considerably or only partially?

General Marshall. I think so. They could not stop it, but they
could have greatly lessened the damage that was done. They could
disorganize it, taken it off its targets.

Mr. Mitchell. You say you had to weigh the situation there and
the risk by considering not only the matériel that [2869] you
had but the probability or possibility of the Japs risking an attack.
Your idea, as you stated it, as I understand, was it would be a risky
performance for the Japs and they might not have hazarded a con-
siderable part of their carrier fleet for such an enterprise.

General Marshall. It was accepting a hazard to do that, for several
reasons: One was the effect in bombing by a few planes on carriers.
It does not take very many hits to do grievous harm. The other was
the action of our shipping that was not damaged in the fight.

Mr. Mitchell. It might turn out in a chase and sink the Jap task
force?

General Marshall. We had some carriers in the Hawaiian district.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, with the Japs planning an attack down along
the Asiatic Coast as their main venture, the smart officers over there
would feel, would they not, that it would be a great stroke to protect
their flanks and give them more time if they made a surprise attack that is temporary but at least it would cripple the United States Fleet at Hawaii?

General Marshall. That was the whole purpose of it. It was a subsidiary raid in order to protect the Japanese operations in the south against any action by our fleet.

Mr. Mitchell. That would be an objective that any smart officer would think about as a thing to be attained, if he could, wasn't it? In other words, the Japs, in their plan of attack, stick that up as number one. Their proposal was to cripple the American fleet at Hawaii, if they could.

General Marshall. The distances in their advance south toward Singapore were very great. If there was an effective fleet on their flank their hazard would have been greater.

Mr. Mitchell. Would your judgment as to the probability of the Jap attempt by air attack be affected by the knowledge that the Japs had an espionage system in Hawaii which made them completely familiar with our whole situation there, our forces, our movements, their habits and nonalertness, nonreconnaissance, and that they had, up to an hour of that attack, free use of commercial cables and other international means of communication to report that situation to their home country, would not that have encouraged them very considerably to take the risk that you spoke of?

General Marshall. It could have. My own reactions, as nearly as I recall them, which is extremely difficult to disassociate with the back sight, is that that specific operation was not visualized by me. I was more inclined to feel that the hazards were too great and that they would not risk it, which would mean that in their movement to the south they would have to proceed somewhat conservatively rather than [2871] dash in to great distances, as they actually did, once our fleet was crippled. I think that is, as nearly as I can give it, a fair estimate of my thinking at the time.

Mr. Mitchell. In other words, you were 2,000 miles away and you might not visualize or be conscious of the local conditions, and you would expect your local commanders to be conscious of the local conditions?

General Marshall. No, sir; I do not mean that. I mean regardless of the distance from here to Hawaii my thinking, as nearly as I can recreate it now, was that the hazard of coming in there, with the sizable naval force, was so great, in my opinion, that they would not risk it, but would rather proceed on a more conservative basis of actual operations to the southward, to the China Sea, toward Malaysia. As it was, they went without regard to any fears, and went out on the end of the plank through all of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the New Guinea district.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, if they knew exactly what the conditions were at Hawaii, the lack of reconnoissance and alertness and all that during the few days in December, their risk would not appear to them to be quite so great.

General Marshall. You have to take into consideration the length of time involved in that movement, and of course it could be recalled at any time by radio message, and the [2872] great change that had been effected if active offensive-defensive measures had been
taken, as to what would happen to their air force, as to the loss of one or two carriers alone.

They knew we had other planes. Whether or not they knew they were en route there, whether or not they knew they were only passing through there, all those are factors to be considered.

As a matter of fact, as you know, the reinforcement planes from MacArthur, that finally took off after the delay due to adverse winds, arrived during the middle of the attack. All those were considerations that the Japanese general staff, the Japanese naval staff, would have to take into consideration themselves, and they could have made quite a difference in the result.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, all the time, I think the record shows or will show, they had complete data of the conditions right down to December 6.

General Marshall. No question about that at all.

Mr. Mitchell. And they could have recalled their flight at the time if they got information that an alert really had been made?


Mr. Mitchell. Were you aware of the fact that the merchant shipping had been diverted from the northern ship lanes and sent down to the Torres Strait area in October and that left a wide swath of the ocean without any traffic in it?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I was aware of that situation, and the reasons for it.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know that during the end of November and the first week in December the Navy, particularly its direction-finding system in the Pacific, for a week prior to Pearl Harbor had lost complete track of all but one division of the Japanese carriers?

General Marshall. I have a faint recollection that I did not know all the time where all the Japanese ships were. I do not recall being aware of the fact that it was the carrier divisions that were the missing ones. It may be I knew it, but I do not recall.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have anything to do with the decision to shift the merchant fleet, merchant vessels into the Torres Strait area, or was that purely a naval matter?

General Marshall. I do not recall. It may have been discussed with me, and it probably was, but I have no recollection. I do recall the shift.

Mr. Mitchell. The shift?


Mr. Mitchell. Was it a safety measure, to prevent the loss of the merchant shipping?


Mr. Mitchell. From Jap attack?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. Admiral Stark, of course, can give you more direct information on that, but that was the reason. It was a more secure voyage, in the light of the developing situation.

Mr. Mitchell. You used the words "merchant shipping." I think technically it would be more correct to say the slow boats.

General Marshall. The slow boats?

Mr. Mitchell. The slow boats.
General Marshall. It was those that made something around, probably, I will say, under 12 knots, maybe under 10 knots. The faster ships, like the Dollar Lines, went straight through to the north of Guam.

Mr. Mitchell. During the last week or two in November and early in December did you have frequent conferences with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Stark, and possibly the President about the situation?

General Marshall. I had practically daily conversations with Admiral Stark over the phone or personally, and the same with the Secretary of War personally, and very frequently with the Secretary of State, during which, I think on practically every occasion, the Secretary of the Navy was present, and usually Admiral Stark, when I was present.

Mr. Mitchell. What did those discussions relate to? In other words, did they have anything to do with the imminence of war and prospects of an attack by the Japanese?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. They had to do with the measures to be taken diplomatically, on a high Government level, toward Japan. They had to do with the military situation, as Admiral Stark and I viewed it. They had very specifically to do with our hope that action, war action in the Pacific, could be delayed as long as possible.

Mr. Mitchell. I will offer in evidence at this time as exhibit 58 a document labeled as follows:

1. List taken from President Roosevelt's appointment book specifying his engagements with the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, General Marshall and Admiral Stark, for period October 1 to December 7, 1941.
2. Telephone calls made from outside through White House switchboard on December 6, 1941, and December 7, 1941, as compiled from operators notes available.

I understand that means calls from outside through the White House switchboard with persons outside of the White House, not messages to people in the White House—

3. List of dinner guests at White House Saturday evening, December 6, 1941.
4. List showing the President's appointments Saturday, December 6, 1941.
5. List showing the President's appointments Sunday, December 7, 1941.

The Chairman. That is all exhibit 58?

Mr. Mitchell. All that is exhibit 58.

The Chairman. That will be filed.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 58.")

Mr. Mitchell. During these conversations you say they related quite often to the question of postponing Japanese attack, if possible, until you could get better prepared.


Mr. Mitchell. Was the situation at Hawaii discussed specifically in any of those conversations or conferences?

General Marshall. I think so. We covered the whole Pacific: Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell us in your own way just what, if anything, you can remember about the conversations at those discussions?

General Marshall. From a purely military side Admiral Stark and I together endeavored to put forward the policy of the necessity of taking every measure that we could think of, politically
or diplomatically, to carry along the situation in the Pacific without disruption, at least until we had an opportunity to prepare the forces there. The first consideration at that time in the matter of preparation was in relation to the Philippines, which up until April 1941 had literally nothing in terms of numbers and equipment. As early as February we had taken the women and children out.

I had gotten authority to double the number of Philippine Scouts from 6,000 to 12,000, and then I issued an order which stopped the return of men who only had 2 years, who had completed their 2-year tour, which I believe possibly was illegal; I do not recall now. In order to provide experienced people to assist General MacArthur, or to assist General Grunert at that time, in the development of additional scout organizations and also in the development of a Philippine Army, basic training, we also had to have the time to collect the shipping, to go through the lengthy procedure of withdrawing these ships from South American runs, against which there were very serious opposition from all sides virtually, and to obtain troops sufficiently trained at that time to be sent out there.

We were then in the process, beginning roughly the 1st [2878] of August, of receiving the first of real quantity production, and we were trying to rush that through to the Philippines primarily, until we gave them sufficient reinforcements to make it dangerous for the Japanese to make any movement either against the Philippines or, more particularly, to the south of the Philippines, leaving them free to be attacked on the flank.

We needed time for this. It was estimated that the principal reinforcements and matériel could be gotten out there by about the 5th of December. Of course, there were the delays in obtaining the ships, there were the delays in delivering the planes, and there were the delays produced by adverse head winds to that then difficult and considered dangerous flight by a B-17 in that period from the west coast to Hawaii.

On the naval side, Admiral Stark, of course, can speak for himself, but I recall very specifically he was struggling to get a delay until about the 1st of February, in order that the fleet could be outfitted. I believe the fleet training was the main consideration. That I cannot testify to with any authority. I refer to most of the items that pertain to the Army side of the affair.

Now in all these discussions we analyzed the situation as it changed from week to week, as delays developed which [2879] would not permit us to reach the stage of defensive security that we had hoped by the limiting date that had been suggested, some time in December, and a discussion of the measures that might be taken appropriately by the Government toward the Japanese which would at least maintain the status quo until we were in better shape.

Of course, in those matters I was not a factor, you might say, in the discussions, except where it had a military implication, although there was complete freedom for expression if I cared to inject myself into the diplomatic statement in the communications proposed.

But, of course, it was more appropriate for me to confine my observations to the phases of the discussion or the documents that had a direct military implication.

Does that give you a fair idea, sir?
Mr. Mitchell. That gives me a fair idea. You were kept informed, I suppose, of the diplomatic developments.

General Marshall. I think in the main I knew about all that was going on, because I not only sat in on a great many of the discussions personally, but in addition to that Mr. Stimson would always talk to me when he returned from any of his discussions with Mr. Hull.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember whether, in that latter period, the latter part of November and early December of 1941, [2880] in any of these discussions the question was raised about the security of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, or whether, because of lack of preparedness and the chances out there something ought to be done with the fleet, that it either put to sea or move back toward the coast? Was there any discussion of that kind?

General Marshall. I do not recall discussions of that kind once the fleet was in Hawaii. I have a very faint recollection, a very definite recollection, as a matter of fact, of a long series of discussions regarding the location of the fleet before it went out to Hawaii.

Mr. Mitchell. That was in 1940?

General Marshall. Well, at the time it went out there. I must admit that I have forgotten a good many of the pros and cons that were being discussed at the time.

Mr. Mitchell. Those discussions related to the suitability of Pearl Harbor as a training place for the ships. They did not have any question at that time, prior to December 1940, after the fleet had gone out there, as to the question of the security of the fleet in port. I am wondering whether in any of these conversations, as you approached December 7, you or Admiral Stark in your presence, or the Secretary of War or Navy raised any question about the dangers to the fleet in Pearl Harbor at that time, and the question whether, [2881] if air attacks were at all possible and you were not in perfect defense, you should do something about it?

General Marshall. I do not recall that specifically, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember with whom you had your discussions in 1940 about the question of basing the fleet originally at Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940?

General Marshall. I think they were with Admiral Stark, with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and I believe the President, although I do not know whether the discussion was with him directly or whether I got the result of his statement and then we made the presentations. I do not recall.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember yourself what objections were made or advanced at that time toward putting the fleet at Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall. As I said a little previously, I am sorry to have to state to you that I do not recall the details well. I do not recall the argument between the Atlantic and the Pacific, which at that time was a great issue, as to how much of the fleet would be in the Atlantic, how much would be in the Pacific. We had a tremendous problem then of the sea lanes across the Atlantic, the deficiency of the British in guarding the convoys, and the hazardous position of the [2882] British Isles during that period.

Now I do not recall exactly, as I say, the pros and cons of that, but I know it was going on at that time and I was in the middle of it.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, we come up to this question of the modus vivendi. You and Admiral Stark had been working for more time. Were you aware that on November 20 the Japs had made a proposal to the United States that involved practically our termination of aid to China and our opening up of the freezing regulations and furnishing the Japs with oil?

General Marshall. I have no definite recollection, but I am quite certain there was.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have access to those diplomatic intercepts during that period, that is, the decoded Japanese messages to and from Tokyo and Washington?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. The majority of them went over my desk, those that were supposed to be critical.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember seeing any of those in which the Japs instructed their Ambassadors here to get an affirmative agreement first by the 25th of November and later at least by the 29th?

General Marshall. I remember that very well, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember those messages which said, if they did not get it signed, sealed, and delivered at that [2883] date something automatically would happen?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I remember that.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, when the modus vivendi came up—what date was it, do you remember? Around the 25th or 26th?

General Marshall. I think it was earlier than that. About the 21st, was it not?

Mr. Mitchell. The 21st?


Mr. Mitchell. What part did you have in that discussion?

General Marshall. I was absent on that particular day on an inspection trip, as I recall, and I learned of the matter on my return from General Gerow. I believe there was a memorandum from him to me. He had attended the meeting with Admiral Stark and he had expressed a view in regard to the outcome.

Mr. Mitchell. That is right.

General Marshall. And he submitted the memorandum to me describing the conditions and giving me the data.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you agree with General Gerow’s position?


Mr. Mitchell. Which he reported in that memo?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; particularly that portion where he states that he informed Admiral Stark verbally that [2884] he regretted the reference to Army Forces in the Navy comments on proposition A-1. He felt that no restrictions should be placed on the Army’s preparations to make the Philippines secure.

The point was we had almost nothing there, we had everything to put there, and if we did not do anything we were helpless, and we continued helpless if the thing broke.

Mr. Mitchell. You learned that that proposal had been dropped?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I learned that.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you learn at that time of the fact that Mr. Churchill had wired him about it and that it was sent back for the Chinese, and did you know about Chiang Kai-shek’s protest in which he said the Chinese Army would collapse if anything like that occurred?
General Marshall. I have no recollection of seeing Mr. Churchill’s message, but I have a very clear recollection of Mr. Hull describing the Generalissimo’s reaction. Whether or not I read his message I do not know, but I know I was clearly aware of his very energetic opposition to the proposal.

Mr. Mitchell. In the light of what you just said and what you knew, were you reconciled to the Secretary’s decision not to attempt the modus vivendi proposal?

[2885] General Marshall. I think I was, sir. I recall this, that we were very much disappointed that we could not get this through, because it looked like a very slender hope of delaying matters to give us more time, and as I also recall, and the records will show, we had movements on the ocean at that time that were very critical, Marines coming out of Shanghai, and hazard to some movement, a more serious one was a group. I think, of four vessels of fair speed that were moving to the north of Guam straight into the Philippines and a large convoy of slow vessels that was moving south toward Torres Strait.

Mr. Mitchell. Now did you know, in advance of its submission to the Japanese, the contents of Mr. Hull’s statement to them of November 26, 1941?

General Marshall. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Mitchell. Were you consulted about that?

General Marshall. I do not think I was, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. To go back shortly to something I omitted, I call your attention to a document called "Aide Memoire—Defense of Hawaii." It is a photostat. It seems to have some writing at the head of it. Do you know whose handwriting that is?

General Marshall. I do not think that is mine. The writing at the bottom is distinctly mine.

[2886] Mr. Mitchell. That is a memorandum you gave to the President, is it, at or about the time that it is dated, 5-3-41?

General Marshall. I am told—that is purely hearsay—I am told that I was called to that conference at the White House to discuss—I have forgotten what the issue was, it did have a relation—I think it was the movement of the fleet—and I made a hurried call—this was sent me, and I made these notes on the face of it, and gave copies to the President. I made this note at the bottom of the page.

Mr. Mitchell. I am told, and it will appear later, that this handwriting at the top is—

Mr. Gesell. General Watson’s, the Military Aide to the White House.

Mr. Mitchell. We will offer this in evidence as Exhibit 59.

The Chairman. Let it be identified and filed as Exhibit 59.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 59.")

Mr. Mitchell. Would you mind reading it for us, General?

General Marshall (reading from Exhibit No. 59):

[2887]

AIDE MEMOIRE

Defense of Hawaii

The Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world.

To reduce Oahu the enemy must transport overseas an expeditionary force capable of executing a forced landing against a garrison of approximately 35,000 men manning 127 fixed coast defense guns, 211 antiaircraft weapons, and
more than 3,000 artillery pieces and automatic weapons available for beach defense.

**Air Defense.** With adequate air defense, enemy carriers, naval escorts and transports will begin to come under air attack at a distance of approximately 750 miles. This attack will increase in intensity until when within 200 miles of the objective, the enemy forces will be subject to attack by all types of bombardment closely supported by our most modern pursuit.

**Hawaiian Air Defense.** Including the movement of aviation now in progress Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses, 35 medium range bombers, 13 light bombers, 150 pursuit of which 105 are of our most modern type. In addition Hawaii is capable of reinforcement by heavy bombers from the mainland by air. With this force [2888] available a major attack against Oahu is considered impracticable.

In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East.

Now, the footnote refers back to the paragraph, "Hawaiian Air Defense," which reads as follows:

Including the movement of aviation now in progress, Hawaii will be defended by 35 of our most modern flying fortresses * * *

Due to make a mass flight from mainland to Hawaii May 20. A number of this type of plane could be dispatched immediately if the situation grew critical.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that number of the most modern flying fortresses that you visualized in May, did they arrive at Hawaii?

General Marshall. They did not, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. So this estimate was made then on the supposition—

General Marshall. As to the prospective delivery of planes.

[2889] Mr. Mitchell. Which couldn't be made?


Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember how you happened to give that memorandum to President Roosevelt? What was the occasion of it?

General Marshall. That was what I was trying to recall. I have forgotten at the moment just exactly what the discussion was. I will try to stir up my memory. There was some definite thing that was under discussion. I have forgotten what it was. Rather, a definite consideration under discussion.

Mr. Mitchell. General Watson has in his handwriting at the top:

Modern Planes have completely changed the situation as to defensibility.

Was that a subject of discussion on your part, that memorandum by him?

General Marshall. I had no discussion with General Watson at all that I can recall. I have a vague recollection that there was something about the capability of Hawaii to defend itself without the presence of the Fleet, but I will check up on that and try to refresh my memory.

Mr. Mitchell. I notice in the paragraph in the memorandum entitled "Air Defense," you assume here that "enemy [2890] carriers, naval escorts, and transports will come under air attack at a distance of approximately 750 miles." That visualized a sufficiently adequate patrol force at Hawaii, air reconnaissance to detect the enemy carriers at that distance?

General Marshall. It visualized the available reconnaissance force and also the available striking force.
Mr. Mitchell. To hit them after they were discovered?
Mr. Mitchell. That is pretty nearly the limit of the Martin-Bellinger requirement, isn't it?
Mr. Mitchell. There is a reference in that memorandum to "sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage."

Was that your point of view in May 1941 that sabotage would be a greater peril than any other kind of an attack on Pearl Harbor?
General Marshall. Not a greater peril, but it was, as expressed here, the first in sequence, because sabotage was always one of the difficult points—the disposing of troops to meet it without unduly exciting everybody, and the maintenance of them in that dispersed condition to control it. And, of course, military control of the islands would have exercised a very great restraint on all of the people, which [2891] would have lessened the hazard decidedly, just as was done when we got on a war basis.

Mr. Mitchell. In this "Aide Memoire" you also assume a state of alertness and the best use of the equipment at Pearl Harbor, a state of alertness against air attack?
Mr. Mitchell. We have, General, a memorandum for the President on the subject of ground forces, submitted to him by the Chief of Staff. It is undated. It does not seem to have so much to do with air attacks as the furnishing of additional ground forces for distant installations, and outposts. Have you a copy of it before you?
General Marshall. Yes, sir; in skeleton form.
Mr. Mitchell. The only thing it says about Hawaii is on page 3. In the first full paragraph, it says:

Hawaii. Authorized and present 41,000. Naval installation (Kaneohe Bay) being expanded requiring additional defenses. Presence of Fleet reduces threat of major attack. Reinforcements can be deferred as long as Fleet remains in Pacific. Reinforcements must be available in the United States to give Fleet freedom of action.

Did that paragraph refer wholly to the ground forces in Hawaii as distinguished from—when I say ground forces I mean forces to defend against landing attacks—or did it—[2892]

General Marshall. It is a résumé of the entire Ground Forces. The idea was to so build up that command in Hawaii that it required no naval assistance; that a secure base was maintained, with the task of defense resting in the hands of the Army.

Mr. Mitchell. In the margin of the paragraph I read about Hawaii, are the words "O. K. Leave as is." It will later appear that that is in the President's handwriting.

The Chairman. Is that made an exhibit?
Mr. Mitchell. We will make it one now. Exhibit 60 is the memorandum to the President, subject "Ground Forces" just referred to.
The Chairman. It will be filed as No. 60.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 60.")
Senator Ferguson, Has the date of that been fixed yet? Could counsel place the date?
Mr. Mitchell. I can't. It is a document we obtained from the White House files, but it is undated.
General Marshall. We have been unable to find any record of it in the War Department.

The Vice Chairman. This was a memorandum from General Marshall to the President?

Mr. Mitchell. That is right, on the subject of Ground [2893] Forces in all areas, a great many places.

The Vice Chairman. Does the General have any idea what time it was submitted?

Mr. Mitchell. Do you happen to have any idea yourself, General?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of it at all. It doesn't show here on this copy that I even signed it. Sometimes it was the case, and it may have been here, that the President would call me to appear very quickly to discuss a certain subject, on which I had no notes at all, and they would give me some papers that pertained to it and I would do the best I could with those papers.

There may have been something of that sort here. I don't know.

Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, we have here a transcript of proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, volume 35, as of Tuesday, September 26, 1944, and on page 4050 there is testimony given by Mr. Stimson about a statutory war council meeting in the Department.

Secretary Stimson said:

General Marshall read a long letter from General MacArthur in the Philippines, telling us of the progress of the reorganization of the Philippine Army and the construction of airports throughout the Islands.

[2894] Then again—I think Mr. Stimson was reading from his own diary here.

Well, I started too soon. I meant to start with November 25, 1941.

He read:

‘At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull’s office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a three-months’ truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all of our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don’t think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic.’

Then we had a long talk over the general situation there which I remember.

Then he quotes from his diary:

We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall. At 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one.

He says:

That’s an hour and a half.

Then the diary proceeds as follows:

At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that were [2895] likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do.

We conferred on the general problem.

The diary continues:

When I got back to the Department I found news from G–2 that a Japanese War had started. Five divisions had come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai, and there they had embarked on ships, 30, 40, or 50 ships and have been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the President, of the message.

Do you remember that conference?

General Marshall. I have no detailed recollection of the conversations back and forth, but I have a very distinct recollection of the
situation that was developing at that particular moment in the
China Sea.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you any recollection of this beyond the state-
ment of President Roosevelt, have you any memory of that?

General Marshall. I don't remember, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That was on the 25th.

Now, I call your attention to this message that was sent to General
Short over your signature on November 27. Were you in the city on
the 27th?


Mr. Mitchell. Where were you?

General Marshall. I was in North Carolina.

Mr. Mitchell. What was going on there?

General Marshall. General McNair was having a very large
maneuver, I imagine about 300,000 troops, or thereabouts. It was a
vital day, and I flew down on the afternoon of the 26th to see the
operations on the 27th, and flew back late that evening, so that I
appeared in the office on the early morning of the 28th.

Mr. Mitchell. Before you left on the 26th, had this proposal to
send a warning message out to the overseas outposts been discussed
with you?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. My recollection of it, which is rather
confirmed by the memorandum of General Gerow under date of the
27th, I believe that we had a considerable discussion on the joint
board on the morning of the 26th, at which it was decided that an
alert should be drafted and dispatched immediately.

General Gerow had the task of drafting the alert. Whether or
not he had a draft copy with him at the time or whether he was to
prepare it after he returned to the War Plans Division I do not recall.
I left in the afternoon following this meeting of the joint board in the
[2897] morning. Present at the meeting was Admiral
Stark, myself, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Bryden, General Gerow, and I believe at that time the officers of the
Air Corps, and their opposites were present from the Navy.

Mr. Mitchell. The message was sent over your name then while
you were away?


Mr. Mitchell. When did you see the draft after you returned?

General Marshall. I saw it, the actual message, as it was sent, I
think, the moment I reached my desk on the morning of the 28th.

Mr. Mitchell. This memorandum referred to by General Gerow
of November 27 is the one in which he states "The Secretary of War
sent for me about 9:30 a.m. November 27, 1941." That is the one
you refer to, is it?


Mr. Mitchell. When you saw the message of the 27th to General
Short after you returned from maneuvers, what was your reaction as
to its contents and sufficiency?

General Marshall. I concurred in the message and the manner in
which it was drawn.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you see at the same time the [2898] iden-
tical message sent to the Commander on the West coast?

General Marshall. I saw the message——
Mr. Mitchell. To all the commanders?


Mr. Mitchell. Did you see General Short's response and the responses of the other commanders to the warning message that had been sent to them?

General Marshall. I assume I did. I find in looking at the copy I did not initial it. I assume I must have seen it.

[2899] Mr. Mitchell. Have you seen this photostat?

General Marshall. Well, I saw the actual—

Mr. Mitchell. The original of it?

General Marshall. The original of it.

Mr. Mitchell. The photostat showing the report of General MacArthur of November 28 and the report of General Short on November 28.


Mr. Mitchell. It is our exhibit 46.

You are not relying on your present recollection but on the existence of this document?

General Marshall. In what respect?

Mr. Mitchell. To know whether you received it or not?

General Marshall. Well, I know I received this because there is my own reference of that to the Secretary of War and my initials on the copy, and the two were clipped together.

Mr. Mitchell. You remember that they were both clipped together?

General Marshall. No; I don't remember the clipping together. When I checked back to find out about the thing I found them clipped together and noticed I had not initialed the under copy but I assumed that I saw it.

Mr. Mitchell. How did you happen to route it to the Secretary of War?

[2900] General Marshall. Because I thought it was very important that he should see this particular message. It had been my custom always when there was anything up that was out of the ordinary that he might miss I always initialed it for him and had it taken directly to his room.

Mr. Mitchell. The fact that he participated in your absence in the drafting of the message to which these were responses, did that have anything to do with your sending it to him?

General Marshall. It might have; I don't recall, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. What do you remember now about your appraisement of or reaction to General Short’s message of the 28th?

General Marshall. I have not a clear-cut recollection at all because shortly after the attack—I presume about an hour and a half—I was in conversation with Colonel Bundy in regard to the measures we were then taking to reestablish ourselves on the west coast, to get the convoys straightened out, and see what other measures we had to take throughout the United States for security, and he mentioned this message, which he apparently had reexamined, and referred to the sabotage factor in it, and also referred to the implication he had gotten from the liaison with the Navy which is included in the message.

[2901] He did that while he was standing at my desk just before his departure from my room, when we concluded the other part
of the conversation, which was the virtual redeployment of all our military sources to meet the situation as it developed.

Mr. Mitchell. What was the date of that talk with Colonel Bundy?

General Marshall. I would say that was an hour and a half or an hour, thereabouts, after the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Mitchell. On December 7?


Mr. Mitchell. Well then, at that time Colonel Bundy brought up with you the question of Short’s report of November 28?

General Marshall. My recollection of it is that when we finished this business I had him in there for, he being the officer in immediate charge of all details relating to the Pacific, that was his subsection of the War Plans Division, or the section of the War Plans Division, he would be in charge, and so I was doing business with him direct as to what we were to do to reestablish the situation, and when we finished that, as I recall the incident he was leaving the room and stopped about halfway out of the room and made a reference to the message, which he evidently had looked back [2902] on it to see what was going on, and referred to this sabotage clause, and I have forgotten just what his reference to it was. I recall his reference to liaison with the Navy. He referred to that. They had gone ahead with the procedure.

[2903] Now, my difficulty in answering your question was it is very hard for me to associate myself with the statement about what came next because from that instant on I was completely involved in the most active period during the war, the next 6 weeks.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I was referring more especially to your appraisal of or reactions to this message of Short’s on November 28 when it was shown to you, or you saw it on the 28th?


Mr. Mitchell. Did you notice the brevity of it or the difference in contents—

General Marshall. I have no recollection regarding it at all.

Mr. Mitchell. (Continuing)—by comparison with any of the other reports that you received?

General Marshall. I have no recollection regarding it at all, other than the fact that I find the two messages together and that I signed the upper one.

Mr. Mitchell. In the ordinary course of operations in the department of the General Staff where would the messages have gone for consideration?

General Marshall. It would have gone to the War Plans Division and by the Executive officer there would have [2904] been routed to the particular section that had that, which was Colonel Bundy’s section.

Mr. Mitchell. At no time between November 28 and the 7th of December did anybody ever come back to you and mention the Short report or question its sufficiency or anything of that kind?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of any comment.

Mr. Mitchell. Had you any information that after the warning message was sent there was no air reconnaissance being conducted at Hawaii for any distance, any considerable distance?

General Marshall. No, sir; I had no intimation of that.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, did you after November 27, when this warning was sent out, make any inquiry as to what measures were being taken at Hawaii?

General Marshall. None that I recall.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you make any inquiry, any further inquiry about what measures were being taken at these other posts where the warning message had been received, or one like it?

General Marshall. None that I recall. We were deeply engaged in the business of trying to get our matériel rerouted to General MacArthur as rapidly as we possibly could and we had, as you will see, in magic, picked up the fact of the [2905] report that he was unloading at night. I learned that from the Japanese. I did not learn that from MacArthur.

Mr. Mitchell. To make my question clear, I was talking of the period between November 28 and December 7, as to what information, if any, you had about the stage of the alert or what steps were being taken in Hawaii for defense against——

General Marshall. I said as to Hawaii, I had no information and I thought you then asked me about the other places.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

General Marshall. And I said there, I think, that I had nothing regarding the alert but we had information regarding what was going on which we obtained through magic, as related to the Philippines. I have forgotten the date of the magic but it is in the record, as to unloading and rushing of supplies ashore being carried out at night so that the Japanese could not see exactly what was going on.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I take it then that your recollection about Short's reply of November 28 in the very brief examination you made of it you are not in a position now to remember and to state what your reactions were to it?

General Marshall. I cannot state any reactions that I had to it. It came through the office.

Mr. Mitchell. Was there any consideration given in the War Department that you had knowledge of after November 28 [2906] and before December 7 of sending any additional warnings to General Short or any other commander?

General Marshall. I had no recollection of such.

Mr. Mitchell. What was the liaison committee?

General Marshall. The liaison committee was a group consisting of the Under Secretary of State, representatives of the War Department—usually two would go over—the same from the Navy Department, which met in the office of the Under Secretary of State and discussed matters pertaining to all three departments, largely attaché details, equipment for South American and Latin-American countries, sometimes Chinese matters, and it developed during the period after I become Chief of Staff and before the outbreak of the war for us into many larger considerations; but in the early stages it was engaged mostly in minor details regarding requests of Ambassadors and the desires of the State Department that affected the Army and Navy, particularly as to matériel and equipment to Latin-American countries. Eventually the larger matters were discussed.

Mr. Mitchell. I think you told us that you currently saw these decoded intercepts of the Jap diplomatic messages.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you also see these decoded intercepts of Jap messages relating to military installations and ship movements?

General Marshall. I would assume I would, yes, the same as the diplomatic.

Mr. Mitchell. I think the record shows, I think General Miles said that at a certain date about that time, in the summer or early fall of 1941, you ordered not only the G-2 evaluations of those messages but the raw material or original copies of dispatches should be shown to you.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember that at that time?
General Marshall. I have a recollection of that.
Mr. Mitchell. He said it was commencing August 5, 1941.

Mr. Mitchell. How did they come to you? Were copies delivered and kept in your files?

General Marshall. I beg pardon, sir?
Mr. Mitchell. Were copies delivered and kept in your files?

General Marshall. At first they came in somewhat of a loose-leaf arrangement and they were all returned and I stopped that and required that they be put in a locked pouch because I found in the various offices there was inevitable carelessness and also I felt inevitably the fact that we were doing this would leak out.

I had been told when I became Chief of Staff that my predecessor, General Craig, was very guarded in the matter, primarily because he thought it was illegal and that, therefore, if we were to continue we would have to be exceedingly careful. That factor, of course, more or less vanished from consideration and was replaced entirely by the urgent necessity, from our point of view, of guarding the secret.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I understood that last statement of General Marshall. You mentioned the fact that your predecessor, General Craig, considered the practice, some practice, as being illegal?

General Marshall. The intercepting of these messages.

Mr. Keefe. The intercepting of these foreign messages?


Mr. Keefe. As being illegal?


Mr. Keefe. I wanted to be sure that I understood you.


Mr. Mitchell. Did you happen to know at that time of the provision in the Federal Communications Act which forbids the interception of communications?

General Marshall. What is that?

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know anything about it then?

General Marshall. I think that is the act I should have referred to. When I said the Espionage Act I should have said the Federal Communications Act.
Mr. Mitchell. And that the Supreme Court held before December 1941 some time that that applied to Government Intelligence or police authorities as well as to private persons?


Mr. Mitchell. Were you aware of the fact that at Hawaii, for instance, there wasn’t any legal way up to December 7, when the attack occurred, of obtaining copies of the Jap messages that the Japs sent from Hawaii to Tokyo or that Tokyo sent back to their spies in Hawaii that came over commercial cables?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I was aware of that, particularly because, as I recall, Mr. Stimson was very much concerned in his desire to obtain that information.

Mr. Mitchell. But afterwards you were concerned with the question of security?

General Marshall. When you say “afterwards,” I am not referring to December 7. I am referring to about a year back before that.

Mr. Mitchell. Prior to that day.

General Marshall. Prior to that day.

[2910] Mr. Mitchell. I mean after the remark had first been made to you about the matter.


Mr. Mitchell. And the fear of war became apparent.

General Marshall. The minute the danger of war to America became apparent our intense concern was the secrecy of the source because its value was quite evident.

Mr. Mitchell. Was there any regulation in the War Department that you established or knew about that forbade the people in the War Department, such as G-2 and War Plans Division, from sending of Hawaii not the text of any intercepted messages, nor a paraphrase of it, nor the fact that they had decoded it, but the substance of the information that they had derived by the intercept?

General Marshall. I am unaware of any regulation on that subject. As a matter of fact practically everything concerning magic was oral rather than written, in my recollection.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know that G-2 was not sending out the gist of those intercepted messages in all cases?

General Marshall. Was not sending out the gist?

Mr. Mitchell. Not sending out the gist. General Miles testified that he never, of course, sent a copy of a message, [2911] of an intercepted Jap decoded message to Hawaii and he would not send a paraphrase of it and he did not want to let them know at Hawaii that he was cracking the code and he went further, I understand, and I think said that the information derived in that way could not in a covered-up way be passed on to Hawaii. Was that your understanding of the practice?

General Marshall. I do not know as I got that understanding but I know that the G-2 of the War Department, whoever he was, General Miles, General Strong, General McCabe or Colonel McCabe, General Lee and later General Bissell, always were emphatic in their safeguarding of the source and not advertising anything that was done, to hazard the source.

The extent to which they might transmit the information was one that I am not familiar with, just what they did, because there was a
continual passage of data from the G-2 of the War Department in the performance of his mission to the G-2’s of the various overseas divisions and as the security factor was always ever present in the mind of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the Army, that thought that he would be reckless had never occurred to me. His fear was that I would be reckless.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember of ever seeing these intercepted Jap messages relating to dividing Pearl Harbor into area A, B, C, D, and E and locating the—

[2912] General Marshall. I do not recall the message. I know the one you are referring to.

Mr. Mitchell. You have examined the book?


Mr. Mitchell. And you have no recollection of ever seeing it?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of that.

Mr. Mitchell. Are you familiar with the decoded Jap message of November 19, translated November 28, which appears in the book of diplomatic intercepts at page 154, which set up an emergency system of communication between the Japs and their foreign representatives by the use of certain words and weather broadcasts?

General Marshall. I remember seeing this winds message at the time it came through. This is the winds message, I believe.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the message that established the code, the one on page 154. It is in Japanese there.

General Marshall. Oh, I see. I do not remember exactly that. I am familiar with that specific winds message which would utilize this code, I believe, would it not?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there are two. There is this message which came in on the 19th of November and was translated on November 28th, it says there, in which the Japs said to [2913] their Washington diplomatic representatives:

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

General Marshall. I think I can say now specifically I did see it.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember then that after that message was received that any attempt was made to alert monitoring stations to listen in to the Japanese weather broadcasts to see whether what we call an implementing message was later sent out?

General Marshall. I do not know whether I knew just what it was then but I know now what instructions were given by G-2, so whether I knew it then or not I am not prepared to say.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever see or know of any second message, an implementing message by which the Japs in the weather broadcast said the “East wind—rain” or “North wind—cloudy,” indicating war with the United States?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of such a message or such data, rather.

Mr. Mitchell. How?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of such data.

Mr. Mitchell. The FCC, the Federal Communications Commission monitoring station which had been alerted to listen. [2914] for this implementing weather broadcast report shows that on December 7, after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did intercept an implementing message weather broadcast which contained not the expres-
sion "East wind—rain," which meant trouble with the United States, but "West wind—clear," which meant trouble with Great Britain. That was after the Japanese attack. Did you ever hear or know of that?

General Marshall. No, sir; I do not know anything about that.

Mr. Mitchell. What were your usual office hours during the first week in December 1941?

General Marshall. Well, at that period of short days and cold it was my custom to arrive at the War Department about 7:30 and to leave the Department somewhere between 4:30 and 5 and then ride in the evening from 7 to 9. On Sunday, which brings into question December 7, it was my habit to have breakfast about 8 and then ride after that and then go to the War Department.

Mr. Mitchell. Then go to the War Department?


Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember this diplomatic message from Tokyo to their Ambassadors here, what we call for short the 14-part message and the 1 p. m. message?


[2915] Mr. Mitchell. Will you state in your own way just when you first knew about that, and under what circumstances?

General Marshall. I first was aware of this message when I reached the——

The Chairman. I suggest, General, it is now practically 4 o'clock.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, it is 4 o'clock.

The Chairman. Unless the General wishes to go on, the committee might wait until tomorrow.

General Marshall. What is your pleasure?

The Chairman. We have been adjourning at 4 o'clock. We will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m. an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Friday, December 7, 1945.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1945

Congress of the United States, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, yesterday in connection with Exhibit 13, which is the Martin report on air defense, you mentioned that you had instituted an inquiry that resulted in that report and you were going to produce the memorandum. Have you the memorandum here with you this morning?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I have it here. Do you wish me to read it?

Mr. Mitchell. If you will, please.

General Marshall. This is dated July 17, 1941 [reading]:

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, U. S. AIR FORCES

The Chief of Staff desires that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii to include:

"a. Provision for the increase of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength (personnel and planes) of the Hawaiian Department up to one group.

"b. Any further increases to be limited to pursuit, light and medium bombardment and observation types, in order to reduce the concentration of air power in Hawaii by holding any additional heavy bombardment aviation required from Hawaiian defense in readiness on the mainland for rapid reinforcement of the Hawaiian garrison as required.

"c. Outlying fields to be organized at operating strength by rotation of personnel and organizations from parent airdromes.

This study will be made in collaboration with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, who is being furnished a copy of this directive.

(Signed) Orlando Ward
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.
Mr. Mitchell. This memorandum, General, speaks of one group of heavy bombers. What does a group mean in the Air Corps?

General Marshall. I think at that time a group consisted of about 3 squadrons of either 9 or 12 planes each. The organization changed quite frequently. I am sorry I cannot give you an accurate count on that but the Air Corps officers who will follow me can.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, I want to refer to some testimony you gave—

[2919] The Vice Chairman. Does counsel intend to offer this as an exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it was read into the transcript and I did not think I would waste another number on it.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Mr. Mitchell. I want to inquire about a matter you testified to yesterday in connection with the so-called "winds" implementing message.

In reading over the transcript I am not sure that it is as clear as it should be and I want to be sure it is clear. In the first place, I want to call your attention again to the message in Japanese code that we intercepted and translated appearing on page 154 of Exhibit 1, which is the intercepted diplomatic messages.

At the left hand bottom of the page it is dated November 19, 1941, translated November 28, 1941 and it reads this way:

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

[2920] (1) In case of Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME", which translated, the record shows, means "East wind—rain."

(2) Japan-U. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI", which translated, according to the record, means "North wind—cloudy."

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE", which translated means "West wind—clear."

The dispatch continues:

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

Now, I spoke of that as the message which set up the code system. You understood that, did you? And on the next page, at the top of page 155, there is a second message from Tokyo to Washington intercepted on November 19, 1941, translated November 26, 1941, the Jap number on which is just the succeeding number to the previous message. That sets up a slightly different system of giving out this news. It says:

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end [2921] of our general intelligence broadcasts:

"(1) If it is Japan-U. S. Relations, 'HIGASHI' " - that is the first word, you will notice, in the number 1 in the previous messages and I understand that means "East", just the word "East": no "East wind-rain": no "wind" about it.

"(2) Japan-Russia relations, 'KITAI." That is the first word or part of the first word in the second paragraph in the preceding message. That means "North."

"(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.): 'NISHI." That is the first word in the third item in the previous message and means "West."
Now, those are what we call the initial messages which were received on the dates shown and in my questions I used the word "implementing" message which I intended to describe as any subsequent messages in which the Japs were using this code, in which the Japs using this code had sent out these warnings.

Now, I notice when I was inquiring on page 2912 of the transcript yesterday—my assistants have called my attention to the fact that one of my questions was not clear.

I called your attention to the first message this way:

"Are you familiar with the decoded Jap message of November 19th, translated November 28th, which appears in the book of diplomatic intercepts at page 154, which set up an emergency system of communication between the Japs and their foreign representatives by the use of certain words and weather broadcasts?

"General Marshall, I remember seeing this winds message at the time it came through. This is the winds message, I believe."

Did you understand I was referring to the one at the bottom of page 154?


Mr. Mitchell (reading from transcript of testimony):

Mr. Mitchell. That is the message that established the code, the one on page 154. It is in Japanese there.

"General Marshall. Oh, I see. I do not remember exactly that. I am familiar with the specific winds message which would utilize this code, would it not?

"Mr. Mitchell. Well, there are two. This is the message which came in on the 19th of November and was translated on November 28th, it says here, in which the Japs said to their Washington diplomatic representatives:

"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency."

And then without my having completed my question and shown what the other one was you said: "I think I can say now specifically I did see it."

Now, when I said "two" in that question I was referring to the one on the bottom of page 154 and the second one on the top of page 155.

General Marshall. Are you asking me now specifically did I see both of these messages?

Mr. Mitchell. Well, having that statement I would like to know if you remember knowing about these two messages of November 19th which set up these code systems? The first one had the "winds" word in it and the second one did not.

General Marshall. I have no distinct recollection of the break-down between the two messages.

Mr. Mitchell. I see.

General Marshall. But I am quite certain I saw them both.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, I think maybe we have been clear on this on the next page, page 2914, but I will ask you again:

Prior to December 7, 1941, did you ever see or hear of any later message in which the Japs in using this winds code sent out word that there was "East wind—rain," which meant trouble with the United States?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of either seeing or hearing of such a message.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, when we closed last evening I had just asked you a question. I will repeat it now:

"Do you remember this diplomatic message from Tokyo to their Ambassadors here, what we call for short the 14 part message and the 1 P. M. message?"
Your answer was, "Yes, sir."

"Will you state in your own way just when you first knew about that and under what circumstances?"

And you got as far as saying: "I first was aware of this message when I reached the"—and then we adjourned.

Will you give us now the answer?

General Marshall. When I reached the office on the morning of Sunday, December the 7th.

On that particular morning I presumably had my breakfast at about eight, and following the routine that I had carried out on previous Sundays, I went riding at some time thereafter.

I think in one of the previous statements I made in this investigation of Pearl Harbor incidents that I said I probably rode at 8:30. Discussions with the orderlies and also evidence that I had seen of other individuals leads me purely by induction and not by definite memory to think that I must have ridden later; just what time I do not know; but between [2925] 8 o'clock and the time I went to the War Department I ate my breakfast, I probably looked at the Sunday papers and I went for a ride.

Now, as to the probable duration of such a ride I can only say that there were very limited places to which one might ride unless you crossed from the Arlington side of the river up over Memorial Bridge and the park system on the Washington side, which I did not do but once, I think, in the previous 6 years. My rides took me almost invariably down to the site of the present Pentagon Building, which is the Government experimental farm.

On a few occasions I crossed the approaches to the Memorial Bridge, not the bridge itself, and rode along the Potomac about two-thirds of the way down to where the present National Airport is, but no farther. The average length of my rides was about, the time period of my rides is about 50 minutes because I rode at a pretty lively gait, at a trot and a canter and at a full run down on the experimental farm where the Pentagon now is and returned to the house, so I would say that the high probability is that the ride was an hour or less, generally or certainly not longer.

My recollection beyond that is that while I was taking a shower, either as I went into the shower or while I was actually taking a shower, word came to me that Colonel Bratton [2926] had something important and wished to come out to Fort Myer. I sent word that I was coming to the War Department, so I finished my shower, dressed and left for the War Department.

My average time of taking a shower and dressing would be about 10 minutes, possibly less. As to what time I arrived at the War Department is a matter of conjecture; I have no recollection.

[2927] On my arrival there Colonel Bratton handed me these intercepts which included the 14 sections of the Japanese message, and I started reading them through. You recall it is a rather lengthy document and of such a nature that there were portions of it that I read twice.

When I reached the end of the document the next sheet was the 1 o'clock message of December 7.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the message that directed the Ambassadors to deliver this thing at 1:00 p. m. Sunday to the American Government?
General Marshall. Yes, sir, that message. That, of course, was indicative to me, and all the others who came into the room, of some very definite action at 1:00 o'clock, because that 1:00 o'clock was Sunday and was in Washington and involved the Secretary of State, all of which were rather unusual put together.

I think that I immediately called Admiral Stark on the phone, and found he had seen the message, and I proposed a message to our various commanders in the Pacific region, the Philippines, Hawaii, the Caribbean, that is the Panama Canal, and the west coast, which included Alaska. Admiral Stark felt that we might confuse them, because we had given them an alert and now we were adding something more to it.

I hung up the phone, which was the White House phone, and in longhand wrote out the message. My recollection was that he called me back. I am told now that the White House telephone records show that I called him back. I had no recollection of reading the message to him. I thought, on the contrary, he called me just as I finished the message, saving the last sentence.

However, one way or the other, there was a call or conversation between Stark and myself, the effect of which was he wished me to add to the message specifically "Show this to your Naval officers," which I did in longhand.

I then directed Colonel Bratton to take it immediately to the message center and start it. There was a proposal then that we have it typed. The decision was there was no time for typing, and Colonel Bratton left with the message.

On his return I questioned him as to the length of time involved and I could not make out whether or not he was talking about the time of encoding as well as the time of dispatching and the time of receipt, so I sent him back accompanied by Colonel Bundy, the officer in charge of the immediate details of all Pacific affairs.

They came back and gave me the estimates of the time of deliveries in these various parts of the world. My recollection is that I sent at least Colonel Bundy back again, and I thought Colonel Bratton with him. I believe others state that there was no third trip. There were certainly two—my own recollection is there were three. However that may be, that was the procedure on the dispatching of the message.

Do you wish me to go ahead?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

General Marshall. The next information I had was the notification of the actual attack on Pearl Harbor. Of my own recollection I do not recall whether I was at the War Department or at the house. I am told on one side by the Secretary of the General Staff at that time, the Acting Secretary at that time, General Dean, that I had returned to the house. I am told, on the other hand by my orderly that I was at the War Department. I do not know where I was.

Anyway, shortly thereafter, if not immediately then, I was at the War Department, because it was a very quick drive, and on Sunday there was no traffic. It was a matter of about 7 minutes from my house to the Munitions building.

The information then came in in fuller detail, and telephone communication was established and I talked to General Short's Chief of
Staff, Colonel Phillips. You could hear the explosions at the time. He was endeavoring to tell me what was actually happening.

[2930] My questioning, as I recall, was with relation to a report that had come from somewhere—and there were many reports of course at that time, rumors and authentic, confusion—that a Japanese landing was being attempted, as I recall, below Barber Point, and my recollection is my inquiry of Colonel Phillips was to the facts in regard to that.

I talked to Colonel Phillips because, as I recall, at that time General Short had gone to his command post and therefore was not able to talk to me directly.

The procedure on the dispatch of the messages did not come to my attention in detail until I was before the Roberts Board. The fact that the one message had been sent by the Western Union to San Francisco on a direct line, relayed by the RCA and presumably tele-typed, which was not done in Hawaii, I did not know about that.

Admiral Stark tells me, and I am quite certain he is right—I do not recall it but he is undoubtedly right—that he asked me at the time of our second conversation that morning, or he said that they had rapid means of communication and if I wished to use it, and I told him no. That must be a fact—I do not recall—that must be a fact.

That, I think, covers the main details.

Mr. Mitchell. Now do you remember your movements on the evening of December 6, as to where you were?

[2931] General Marshall. I can only account for them by sort of circumstantial evidence. The only definite thing I have is that I had no dinner engagement. I found our engagement book, or Mrs. Marshall’s engagement book, and between the 1st of November and 7th of December I had one dinner engagement, that was the 2d of December.

Also they checked on the post movie. It was about our only recourse for relaxation, and I had never seen the picture. So I was not there.

We were not calling. We were leading a rather monastic life. There was also in that record the affairs of the day for her, which involved, I think, an old-clothes sale, I think, all day long, to raise money for one of these industries they had down there, so the probability is she was tired and we were home.

[2932] Mr. Mitchell. You are sure you were not at the White House that evening?

General Marshall. No, sir; not at all.

Mr. Mitchell. There is a statement in the Army Board report that the warning message that you got out on the morning of the 7th you telephoned to the Philippines. Is that your recollection?

General Marshall. No, sir; I talked to Colonel Phillips, as I explained here, after the attack was going on, because we could hear the explosions at the time.

Mr. Mitchell. You did not telephone any such message yourself?


Mr. Mitchell. After you drafted this warning message to the outposts that you were prepared to send as the result of having seen
this 1 p. m. message, is it your recollection that you called Admiral Stark first before he called you? Originally, I mean.


Mr. Mitchell. What did you say to him?

General Marshall. As nearly as I can recall, I asked him if he had seen the message. He stated that he had, and I proposed that we send a message apropos of this to the various commanders concerned, and he replied as I have outlined, he feared that that would tend to confuse them, that we had given them an alert and now we were putting something else into the picture.

I then went ahead and wrote the message, and I don't think I said to him in concluding that first conversation whether or not I was going to do it, but I did write it out immediately in longhand.

Mr. Mitchell. Then your recollection is he called you?

General Marshall. My recollection is he called me, but the records of the White House telephone exchange show I called him.

Mr. Mitchell. And what was the subject of the second conversation?

General Marshall. I had thought that he called me to say he wanted this shown to the naval officer. It would seem from the record at the White House that I called him and maybe read the message. In any event he did ask me, and I am specific about that, he did ask me to put into the message that it be shown to the naval officer.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you exhibit 58 before you?


Mr. Mitchell. I will have to show it to you, General.

This is a record of telephone calls on December 7 by outside parties through using the White House exchange.

It says, and I will show it to you—the record says "11:40 A" which means "A. M.," I suppose.

General Marshall cld Ad'm Stark—O. K.

11:30 A—Gen. Marshall cld Ad'm Stark—O. K.

In that particular instance, according to the White House records, these hours are reversed. The 11:40 A is ahead of 11:30, which does not seem to be the practice, and we are not sure just what it means.

Will you look at it and see if it means anything to you? That is exactly what the record shows there, that the time 11:40 precedes the entry of the 11:30 message.

General Marshall. I would not know what the significance of that is.

Mr. Mitchell. You would not know anything about it?

General Marshall. No, sir. It does this, though. It gives the time one way or another of the completion of the message following the reading of the 14-point thing and the preparation of this other message.

Mr. Mitchell. Then at least you did read the message and were in the act of preparing a warning by 11:30 or 11:40?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; 11:40 would be quite evidently the completion of it, because I had it all written except the last sentence.

Mr. Mitchell. I will offer now, as Exhibit 61, a photostat which reads as follows: "December 7, 1941." It is typed.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL (Through Secretary, General Staff)

Subject: Far East Situation

The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army;

And the message is this:

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

MARSHALL.

It has the signature of General Gerow on it. Has the committee a copy?

[2936] The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. And the committee will note that underneath it is a record:

"Radios as follows dispatched 11:52 AM, 12-7-41 by Code Room, WDMC."

General MARSHALL. War Department Message Center.

Mr. MITCHELL. And another was dispatched 12:05 to Manila; another one to Hawaii at 12:17; the one to the Caribbean Command is blurred. It looks like 12:00 o'clock, and the one to the Fourth Army at San Francisco at 12:11.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is Exhibit 61?

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 61.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 61").

[2937] Mr. MITCHELL. Did you give any instructions to the Communications Center as to the means of transmitting this message to Hawaii?

General MARSHALL. No, sir. Their business was to dispatch it in the most efficient and rapid manner possible. This photostat of this document of General Gerow's should be read in the light that it was written after the event. The message was sent from a longhand pencil copy on an ordinary ruled sheet of paper—which, incidentally, was before the Roberts board.

Mr. MITCHELL. The original message was in your hand-writing and you gave directions that it should not be typed?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. It was carried by hand by Colonel Bratton and checked on the second trip by Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy, and then I thought there also should be a third trip by Colonel Bundy, but there was a difference of opinion on that.

Mr. MITCHELL. In the message center it was necessary to take your handwritten draft and encode it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; encode it first.

Mr. MITCHELL. And then put it on the way?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was there any report made to you at that time that there was any difficulty in reaching Hawaii on [2938] the telephone?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I mean before the attack?
General Marshall. No, sir. I did not ask the question.

Mr. Mitchell. You didn't ask the question as to means of transportation?

General Marshall. I didn't ask the question about the telephone.

Mr. Mitchell. What did they estimate to you would be the required time for delivery to Fort Shafter of the Hawaiian message?

General Marshall. I don't recollect, sir. I have a faint recollection of being told that it would take 8 minutes to get it through, but I think you will have positive testimony on that.

Mr. Mitchell. You sent the message to all the commands without any special selection of Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall. Exactly. I sent each commander involved in the Pacific situation. The Western Defense Command, which is the Fourth Army, the Caribbean Command, the Philippine Command, and the Hawaiian Command.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you make any inquiry of the communications people or your subordinates as to the prospective time of delivery of that message to Hawaii?

[2939] General Marshall. That was the reason I sent Colonel Bratton back with Colonel Bundy, to give me a clear picture of what the time involved was, because when I first questioned Colonel Bundy I couldn't tell whether he was including the time necessary to encipher the message, and so I sent him back to determine that for me.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, what report did he make to you, do you remember, about that?

General Marshall. I do not recall the minutes. I think it is shown in one of the documents. I couldn't tell you offhand. I think they are prepared to give you that, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did anybody in your office, when you were reading the 14-part message and the 1 p.m. supplement, on the morning of the 7th, make any mention of the fact that 1 p.m. in Washington would be about 7:30 a.m. in Honolulu?

General Marshall. There was no mention of the 1 p.m. message until I came across it at the end of the pile. I am quite clear about that, because I was very much taken back by the time I had spent on the preceding lengthy message in trying to understand its significance, and then arriving at this, to me, very critical one of 1 p.m.

Mr. Mitchell. You thought you ought to have been shown the 1 p.m. part first?

General Marshall. I don't know about that. I am just talking about my own reaction.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, was any discussion had when you saw the 1 p.m. message? Any discussion about the corresponding time of day in Honolulu or the Philippines?

General Marshall. I don't recall that. I don't recall that at all. The whole thing was, it was a significant message, and what would we tell these commanders, and I went ahead and wrote it out myself.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you talk to the President on the morning of the 7th before the attack?

General Marshall. Not to my recollection. I think I had an appointment, I think the records show it, and that is my only source for speaking now, that I had had a previous appointment for 3 o'clock
that afternoon. I had no recollection of that until I was shown the record. I know I went to the White House that afternoon.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have your staff organized at that time so that if an especially significant or important intercept was made of a Jap message, was there anyone on duty who had authority, if they were unable to reach you, to send a warning message out?

General Marshall. No, sir, I don't think there was a set-up for that special purpose. We had always had an arrangement there whereby the officer on the receiving end, at the [2941] central point in the War Department, knew where the principal people were, where to reach them. In my own case, for example, during that period and for about a year thereafter, I always maintained an orderly at the house at the telephone. If I left the house to go to a moving picture, which was about the only place I went, he was there and knew where to reach me. These various sections of the War Department Staff, notably the G-2 section, were all working pretty much overtime. General Gerow's section, I know, was working at that rate practically all the time. Too much so, as a matter of fact.

Mr. Mitchell. If they had not been able to reach you on the morning of the 7th, or at any time when an important message came in, was there anybody but yourself that had authority to send a warning message to the outlying post?

General Marshall. Yes. The authority was vested, for instance, in the Deputy Chief of Staff. Or even the head of War Plans Division. There is no dispute about that. I do not think, because the actions always had been on a very decentralized basis. We selected the men and we trusted them. That does not go down the line, of course.

I was asked on one of the investigations if Colonel Bratton would have had authority to send such a message. I would think that would be asking a great deal of him, to do that. I don't think that would apply in this case. He would [2942] certainly not be responsible for sending such a message.

Mr. Mitchell. Was General Miles high enough up in the list to have authority to send out a warning message to G-2?

General Marshall. General Miles had responsibility for dispensing information. He could not issue a command message. This goes as a command message.

The same information, of course, might have been sent as just information of what was happening.

Mr. Mitchell. The thing that made this a command message —

General Marshall. Was the positive direction.

Mr. Mitchell. A direction to be on the alert accordingly?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. He would only have authority to send the facts. As to any deductions he might make, he couldn't tell them what to do.

Mr. Mitchell. But the War Plans Division would have operational authority to send a message that involved action?


Mr. Mitchell. Was the Deputy Chief of Staff the only other one that had authority to send a message without reaching you?

General Marshall. I think that would be the accurate way of stating it, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I have, of course, been speaking of the military officers. The Secretary of War, if he had information, for instance, he wouldn't have had to ask your permission. He would have directed an order.

Secretary Stimson, if this think had come to him, and he had felt a warning ought to be sent out, he would have had authority to send it out?


Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any talk on the morning of the 7th with Secretary Stimson before the news of the attack came in?

General Marshall. I don't recall it. He was at the State Department I knew, but I can't recall that I saw him before lunch.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you know at the time that a meeting was being held at the State Department?

General Marshall. I think I did, but I am not certain. You see, my time, when I reached the Department, was completely taken up in reading this lengthy message and trying to digest it, and nobody could talk to me while I was reading it.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any meeting with the President, or an appointment with him, on the 6th of December? The White House records say: 10 a.m., Justice William O. Douglas 11:15, Director Harold Smith. Those are under the head of President appointments. Nobody else for the 6th.

General Marshall. I have no recollection of any contact with him.

Mr. Mitchell. When one of these Jap intercepts was translated there was a system of delivering copies of the translation to you, was there not?


Mr. Mitchell. Was that done at your office?


Mr. Mitchell. Was it the practice to send copies of those intercepts out to your quarters, your home?

General Marshall. I do not recall that we ever did that. That would have been strongly opposed by the G-2 people. I don't recall ever having received any at my home.

Mr. Mitchell. You stated that the first time you saw this 14-part message and the 1 p.m. message was when you arrived at your office on the morning of December 7; is that correct?


Mr. Mitchell. Had you learned prior to that time of it, prior to the time you actually saw a copy, did you learn that any such dispatch had been received, had it been told or telephoned you?


Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember whether you had been told or telephoned or informed in any way on the evening of the 6th, late in the evening, that any arrangement had been made for a meeting between Secretary Stimson and Mr. Hull on the next morning?

General Marshall. No, sir; I have no such recollection.

Mr. Mitchell. General, I want to go back a little bit over the question of the estimates as to the possibilities of the success
of a Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor, and the estimates as to
the possibility of whether an attack might be made by the Japs.

The record here shows that the question of a possible air attack
on Pearl Harbor had been carefully considered. There is the Martin-
Bellinger report, and the Martin report, and others.

Those reports show that an assured, complete defense that would
practically guarantee the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor could
only be accomplished if you had a long-range reconnaissance which
captured the enemy carriers at sea at a distance of 800 or a thousand
miles the evening before, followed up by a bombing attack on them
to destroy the carriers before the planes had left.

The conclusion in all those reports was that the probable selection
by the enemy of the hour would be to reach a distance at a point some
thousand miles or so, or 600 miles, the night before and then run in the
dark, and discharge their planes early the next morning.

I think the reports make it clear that the quantity of patrol planes
needed to make a daily reconnaissance out that distance in all direc-
tions was something more than \( [2947] \) double the number of
patrol planes they actually had, and bombers available for a striking
force were quite few.

Now, on the basis of those reports and the available matériel on
December 7, isn’t it fair to say, first, that the best that could be done
with the available patrol forces was what you might call a sector
long-distance reconnaissance each afternoon, choosing one sector one
day and another sector another.

Isn’t that the conclusion you draw?

General Marshall. That is, I would say, roughly the case. They
had to, certainly, modify the procedure according to the means avail-
able, which, however, is a common situation with any commander.

Mr. Mitchell. That necessarily involved some element of luck.
If you selected one sector for a long-distance reconnaissance one day
and another for another day, you took some chance of missing the
Japs.

General Marshall. Yes, sir. You have to accept that.

Mr. Mitchell. So, with the available matériel, there would neces-
sarily be considerable risk of their not being able to run such a
reconnaissance as would locate the Jap carriers; is that the way you
judge these reports?


Mr. Mitchell. Now, that meant that there was no definite
\( [2948] \) assurance that they could strike the carriers and destroy
the attack before it got launched?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. The alternative to that, if they couldn’t reach them,
was to hit the Japs in the morning, put our fighters out with radar
detection, or some other reconnaissance, spot the Jap attack coming
in or just leaving the carrier, and try to destroy their planes and
break up their attack; that is the alternative, is it not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. It would be the alternative in one
sense, but also your dispositions might be changed to meet that situa-
tion. Your degree of alert arrangements might be altered accordingly.
The dispositions, Naval, as well as Army, might have been modified
to meet that.
Of course, what the modifications would be, I don’t know, but certainly you make various adjustments to meet a critical weakness in order to lessen the possibility of damage.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, all of my questions are based on the assumption that there was a complete alert, that everything was ready that could be ready. Of course, if you are not, that presents a different problem, but I am assuming in [2949] my questions that they are completely on the alert in the light of everything they had to face.

Now, the Japs had 6 carriers in this attacking force and their records show around 360 planes. The record isn’t quite clear as to whether they sent all of them in, or whether they may have kept some as a screen. But the number of planes that we had available in service to resist their attack seems to be less than a third of the Japs’.

General Marshall. Yes, sir; assuming on the Japanese side that they knew where our carriers were which also had some planes, and which also necessitated their holding certain planes on their Japanese carrier force.

Mr. Mitchell. I naturally assumed that because the daily ship reports which were intercepted kept reporting whether the carriers were in and out.

General Marshall. And, as I recall, the carriers were out.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Now, with the available matériel at Hawaii, there wasn’t sufficient in the way of air forces, bombers, and so forth to insure that the Japanese air force could not get in to the fleet, was there? Wasn’t there a risk that some of the planes would get through and that damage would be done?

General Marshall. There was always that hazard.

[2950] Mr. Mitchell. It was a question then, under the conditions, of whether if they had been completely on the alert, the air forces we had would have been able to break up the Japanese attack in such a way as to minimize or mitigate the damage?

General Marshall. It was a question of the deployment, the status, alertness, the various arrangements made with the means available.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, would it seem that under the circumstances, if it had been definitely expected that an air attack would be made, would you have felt, considering what I have just said, knowing or believing that an attack was going to be made, that the risk ought to be taken of keeping the fleet in the port. Have you any estimate of that?

General Marshall. You are getting, Mr. Mitchell, into a very technical naval question, which I do not think I am competent to answer, because how you might otherwise have disposed those vessels is distinctly a naval problem involving considerations of which, as a land man, I do not have the information to speak, and therefore I am not prepared to answer that. I will merely say that we created what we thought was a fair defensive set-up for our islands which was quite unusual for our degree of unpreparedness at [2951] that time and that everybody there was aware, as indicated by the communications of the hazard of an air attack or a submarine attack.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then I think it comes down probably to what you said yesterday, that considering what was to be done, the question of the hazards of an air attack and the lack of complete assurance that
it could be wholly defeated, was tempered with a question of judgment as to whether or not an attack ought to be expected at all in sizing up the situation; the two things blend, do they not?

General Marshall. I don’t know as I quite understand your question, but I would say this as to the problem of the attack not being expected at all, the question of whether or not there is an attack depends on what you do yourself, to a great extent, on which the enemy makes his estimate, and you always have to suppose that he will do the thing that is most embarrassing to you.

Perfection of defense is seldom ever achieved. Even in our most carefully laid-out operation, in which we took about 2 1/2 years to prepare for the landing in Normandy, we were short of LST’s, and there was a bitter battle over getting them from the Pacific and the Mediterranean.

I presume had that failed, there would have been an investigation as to why we went into Normandy until we had the full number of LST’s necessary for the operation.

Mr. Mitchell. You stated in your testimony before the Army Board, I think you used this phrase. I think “we” did not expect the attack at Pearl Harbor. When you said “we,” were you speaking generally of the high officers in the War Department?

General Marshall. That was a rather careless expression. I will make that “I.”

Mr. Mitchell. And when you say the enemy would judge whether he would attack on whether he knew you were going to be ready, did you, in that conclusion take into account the fact that the Japs knew we weren’t alert?

General Marshall. I didn’t take that into consideration because I thought we were on the alert.

Mr. Mitchell. Your estimate that you didn’t expect it was based on the theory that what you had was ready and if ready, the Japs probably knew it was ready?

General Marshall. It is a little bit like, in my mind, the present discussion as to the postwar organization of our Army. If we are ready, the other man will not involve us.

Mr. Keefe. I would like to have that last answer read. I didn’t quite get the purport of it.

(The answer referred to was read by the reporter.)

[2953] Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, it appears here from the record that commencing with Admiral Stark’s letter to Admiral Richardson of November 22, 1940, directing him when he got back to Hawaii to start in motion facilities for air defense against an air attack, from that time, the Bloch report, the Knox and Stimson letter, and all those plans, and the Martin-Bellinger report, and right up to the end of August, at least everybody that had anything to do with the subject, both in the War Department and the officers at Hawaii, seemed to be worried over the possibility of an air attack; people out there were reporting that they were vulnerable and were demanding new matériel and you were doing your level best to shoot matériel out there to help them prepare, and the thing was batted back and forth right up to that time, everybody seemed to be on his toes about an air attack, and the possibility of it.

Have you anything you could say that would help this committee by way of explanation that after all that stir, when it came to the last
critical days, the people at Hawaii, certainly the people in the War Department had gotten into a frame of mind where at least some of them, I don't say all, where they feared, or dreaded—thought—the danger of an air attack had faded away? To a layman that is the thing that is interesting, and if there is anything you want to say on that, we would like to have it.

General MARSHALL. Possibly I can explain it in this way:

In the first place, taking the latter part of your question—your statement—the fear of an air attack, as far as the War Department was concerned, had not faded away. The point was this. A new commander for the Fleet had been appointed. A new commander for the Air Forces in Hawaii had been appointed. They had brought up various things they wished to have done in order to insure capability of carrying out their missions. We were then in a state of woeful inadequacy of all such material. Also, combined with that fact, what little we had, a material proportion had to be used or we couldn't develop an Army or air force. We couldn't prepare the crews for the new planes which were soon to appear.

Therefore, through the late winter, at least beginning in February, and running up into the summer, we did our utmost one way or another to provide the things that the Navy thought were needed and the Army commander in Hawaii thought were needed. We did our utmost to provide the material that was needed. We had gone to the point where we thought they were reasonably prepared in meeting the requirements they had stated.

The last one, of course, was this Martin-Bellinger report, which we never did come up to, up until the end of the war.

We then, as quantity production came in, turned for the first time to try to send something to General MacArthur. The indications, the positive indications, by observation, by reconnaissance, by magic, were definitely a Japanese evil intention south of the China Sea. We had that, as I say, by reconnaissance. We had it by many sources. By magic.

General MacArthur had little or nothing. If we could make the Philippines then reasonably defensible, particularly with heavy bombers in which the Air Corps at that time had great faith, in their action against hostile shipping, we felt that we could block that Japanese advance and block their entry into the war by their fear of what would happen if they couldn't take the Philippines, and we could maintain heavy bombers on that island. So from the latter part of August, having given Hawaii all we could afford to give them up to that time, and there having been elaborate arrangements made, modifications, readjustments one way or another, we turned and tried to do something for General MacArthur, and most of that went through the Hawaiian Islands, incidentally, by Navy or by air. So our struggle from that time on was to give the Philippines an adequate defensive set-up. Theretofore they had little or nothing.

I might put in the record here now the fact that on at least two occasions and possibly three the President, a long time back, in 1940, and Admiral Stark, in the presence of the President and to me personally, had expressed the hope that we could do something for the Philippines and in each case I had given them the reply that we could not; that it would be the seed corn.
We first had the defense of the continental United States. Hawaii was a vital factor in the defense of the United States; the Panama Canal was a vital factor, a great bottleneck in connection with the defense of the United States. To create the necessary forces we had to have experienced people, we had to have matériel, we had to create those forces not so much to arm them as to permit them to prepare themselves.

Therefore, anything we sent to the Philippines that could have had any possible effect on the situation out there would practically deny us the ability to create an Army, to create a defense out there that was in any degree effectual.

Now, as I have said, quantity production was making its first appearance really in about August 1941 and, as I have said, we turned from the meeting of the demands in Hawaii and not fulfilling the Martin-Bellinger request for 180 B-17's of which in all we possessed all over the world 148 [2957] at that particular time. We turned to our endeavor to set up a sufficient force in the Philippine Islands to guard the islands to be a threat to any Japanese movement through the China Sea and to possibly avert a war in the Pacific.

We had equipped, so far as we thought it possible to equip and instructed, so far as we thought it was necessary to instruct, the garrison in the Hawaiian Islands. We were now engaged in trying to do for General MacArthur that what he so urgently required.

I think that is a reasonable explanation of why from August on we were working in the Far East rather than a continuation of discussions of one kind and another and of matériel items to the Hawaiian garrison. Have I made that fairly plain, sir?

Mr. Mitchell. It appears that some B-17's were flown from the Pacific coast to Hawaii leaving December 6 and that arrived at Pearl Harbor during the Jap attack. What do you know about that?

General Marshall. We had succeeded in getting 35 Flying Fortresses to the Philippines, incidentally, sending them via Wake Island and then Port Moresby or Rabaul or Port Darwin or Balikpapan in Borneo, north of the Philippines.

Those had been made available by reason of the additional funds that were appropriated by Congress to expedite production, which always costs a great deal more money.

The result of that was that the following deliveries, which we had assumed would immediately come after those 35 from the plants, were delayed several weeks. I think about 3 weeks. There was a gap, in other words, in the delivery of the B-17's.

Not only that, but after we got the crews into the delivered ships we then found that the adverse winds at an unexpected period between Hawaii and California prevented the flight.

I might add that the flight of the 35 was the first time that a B-17, in other words, a land-based plane, had attempted a crossing from 24 to 27 hundred miles. It became a common thing later on with wider cruising radius.

So these ships were held on the west coast, the B-17's. General Arnold can give you practical testimony regarding this. From my point of view and memory, I sent him out personally to the west coast to see if they were doing everything possible, first to get these
planes completed with the extra tanks and the things that it required, and next to take off for the flight.

Naturally, the young men, the squadron leaders, could not be told all the various factors in the case except that we wanted them to leave as quickly as possible.

[2959] So General Arnold made the trip personally. My recollection is he called me up on the 'phone shortly after he had arrived out there and he said, "These damn fellows don't realize how serious this thing is," and I told him, "Well," I said, "you are there and they are your people. You start them out." And he drove the harder to make an early departure.

His criticism, of course, must be moderated to the point that they were doing their best and it was a very dangerous flight. The limitation on the quantity of gasoline you could carry was very decided and it gave them a small factor of safety, so it was not one to be stepped into lightly unless a great emergency was in existence. The question was how thoroughly the great emergency was realized by the senior officers directing the men.

Actually, under his urging and presumably under a moderation of the winds, the adverse winds, the flight of the first squadron took off and arrived in the middle of the Japanese attack.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you say the first flight was the one that got there during the Jap attack?

General Marshall. My understanding is that they arrived in the air over Hawaii while the Japanese were bombing Pearl Harbor.

[2960] Mr. Mitchell. The record shows that those planes were unarmed; that is, they were not provided with ammunition.

General Marshall. I think they did not have any ammunition. That was explained, I think, by the fact these pilots were trying to get every gallon of gas they could in the plane and they did not anticipate fighting this plane on that long hop from California to Hawaii.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you know anything about their actual equipment at the time they left the west coast with regard to arms or anything like that?

General Marshall. I do not know that. General Arnold can probably tell you that specifically. My recollection is that they had their arms but they were covered with cosmoline to protect them against the salt air and that they did not carry ammunition.

Mr. Mitchell. I will ask you to consider the suggestion about unity of command in Hawaii. There has been a memorandum introduced here, General Gerow's, dated November 17, 1941, reporting to you about the efforts of the Army and Navy in joint conference to reach some agreement in respect to unified command at various posts, including Hawaii.

Will you tell us what you know about that? There was also offered in evidence with that a letter you wrote on the 20th. Is that attached to that file?

[2961] General Marshall. Yes, sir. There is missing from this my endorsement on General Gerow's paper, though. My recollection is that I wrote a specific endorsement to General Gerow on his paper; on his proposal. If you haven't got it here I will obtain it for the committee.
Mr. Mitchell. I wish you could get it from the War Department. Will you please tell us what you know about the situation dealt with in that report and your letter of the 20th?

General Marshall. We had been endeavoring for a long time to reach a more efficient command basis where the Army and the Navy were both in the same area. It presented, of course, certain very definite complications along the coast because you had the close-in defense, the coast defense guns, you had, we will say, the fighter planes which operated fairly close in and you had naval reconnaissance planes which go tremendous distances out to sea and may become involved with the fleet or naval task forces in a sense remote from the coastal defense itself, so it presented a complication in working out a system which would enable control without producing confusion.

Admiral Stark and I—I am certain for myself and I am quite certain from his point of view—were endeavoring all the time to find a basis of unity in control of these matters.

[2962] As has always been the case, you could do more at the top than you could down through the line because there a hundred complications would come up and differences of view, very decided.

I had considered a long time before this of a proposal to the Navy that they take unity of command in Alaska and the Aleutians because I thought that if there was an actual landing attempt up there by an enemy that the matter was predominantly naval. For various reasons it was not accepted. I do not know. I do not recall at the moment, I do not know that I knew at the time exactly why. I thought possibly—I may be utterly wrong—that they had felt that that would be taken as the basis for carrying the thing further on.

We thought it was very important that we have unity of command in the Panama Canal on the part of the Army, where its interests are so predominant, we felt, though the Canal was for the service of the Navy.

There was no question in my mind but what Hawaii was a predominant naval factor. The question was how you worked this out.

I have said this before; I will repeat it again. It is a very simple thing to have unity of command if you give it to the other man but that also applied in all of our dealings with the British and among ourselves and always will [2963] continue to be so.

So we made every effort to bring this to a head and as I think I stated in my letter to General Emmons when it was finally determined, I covered a good many of the reasons. I will read the particular paragraph. This is the letter of December 20 to General Emmons, then in Army command in Hawaii, an air officer who had been the commander of the GHQ air force and for that reason I had sent him out there.

Unity of command had just been ordered and it was to be a naval command in that region. The same occurred in Panama. It was to be an Army command in that region. (Reading:)

For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion as to responsibility. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a year to secure unity of command in various critical regions had been unavailing. All sorts of Naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines, the
coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives, and similar matters
had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I
must say at the same time [2965] that some of the Army staff brought
up somewhat similar objections to Naval control. Both Stark and I were strug-
gling to the same end, but until this crash of December 7th the difficulties seemed,
at least under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two
decisions I have just referred to—

That is Hawaii and Panama—

have been made and further ones are in process of being made, all of which I
feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever the local embarrassments.
Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to larger decisions involved in our
relations with Allies.

I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate
the problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to
work with Nimitz in complete understanding.

Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought
to our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and myself. These days
are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency.

[2965] Now I will add this further item in connection with that.
After Pearl Harbor and preceding this letter I brought General
Eisenhower in and he worked on the details, as I recall, and drew up
what I might designate a bill of particulars or exceptions in Panama
to meet various naval objections, things that we would guarantee on the
Army side we would not do, we would not do this, we would not do that, with these reservations in favor of a naval situation. It was
quite a long list. I know he worked most of the night on it, and I
worked with him part of the time.

When we turned to the Hawaiian side we put in no Army proviso, and bringing them in that way the net result was, as I recall, there
were no provisos on either side, and we accomplished unity on that
basis.

It might be interesting to the committee, although it is not pertinent
to this hearing, that we ran into exactly the same situation in determin-
ing unity of command in the western Pacific with Wavel. We had to
write a great many provisos and restrictions in the document in order
to get a general acceptance of the proposition. Later on those were
almost forgotten. The minute we had unity the solutions became
evident and resolved themselves right within the command. But the
start was always the same, and in that case also General Eisenhower
helped me with the details of [2966] provisos in order to get
the acceptance by the other party to the proposition.

Mr. Mitchell. Has unity of command at Hawaii been maintained
up to the present time?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I say the present time—I do not
know what has happened in the last 10 days.

Mr. Mitchell. Without asking you any questions about the unity
of command, complete unity of command generally in the Army and
Navy Departments, limiting it to the question of posts like Hawaii,
or Panama, for instance, do you want to express any views as to the
wisdom of maintaining such unity of command in peacetime as com-
pared with war?

General Marshall. I think it is an imperative necessity.

Mr. Mitchell. During this period, from what you learned about
the operations of the intelligence branches of the Navy and Army, and
what not, and the question of uncertainty or difficulty in exchanges
and assurance of having all branches informed of all information, have
you any views to express about unity of consolidation or centralization of the Military and Naval Intelligence?

General Marshall. I think it is very necessary.

Mr. Mitchell. I may have some more questions of the General but not until after lunch anyway, and if the committee want to inquire they can start in.

[2967] It is 10 minutes of 12.

The Chairman. It is 10 minutes to 12, and while some members of the committee might properly inquire of General Marshall in that 10 minutes, suppose we hold 10 minutes later this afternoon and make up for that lost time?

Therefore we will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:50 o'clock a.m., the committee recessed until 2 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

[2968] Afternoon Session—2 P.M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Counsel may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, before proceeding further with General Marshall there is one point on which I would like the instructions of the committee.

In September 1944 General Marshall wrote some letters to Mr. Dewey during the Presidential campaign. Without going into details I will say that I think that these letters are material to this inquiry and the incident ought to be gone into and the letters put in evidence but, unfortunately, in those letters there is a sentence or two, a few words, which disclose technical cryptoanalytical methods which we had adopted to break the Japanese code and the question arises whether those words should be deleted or whether the whole letter should go in.

I have here copies of the letters that are complete. I also have here copies of the letters in which those statements of our technical methods of cracking the Japanese codes are deleted.

The deletion, in my judgment, does not change the tenor of the letters or their continuity and for the purposes of [2969] this case I should think that the deletions have nothing to do with what you are interested in.

My own feeling is that in the interests of national security the deletions should be made but I do not think all the members of the committee have yet seen these letters.

I am bringing that question up now so that I can have the instructions of the committee as to whether we should offer in evidence the complete letters or those copies which have that cryptoanalytic information deleted. I can supply the committee with copies if anyone has not seen them.

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to make a statement in that connection which he thinks ought to be made on behalf of the committee and in justice to General Marshall and to the counsel for the committee.
In September 1944, during the Presidential campaign, it is the understanding of the Chair that General Marshall received information that the question of cracking the Japanese codes might become involved in the campaign; whereupon he wrote a letter or two letters to Governor Dewey who was a candidate for President.

In the letter or letters General Marshall referred to the cracking of certain codes which was then current. That is, they were in progress then in September 1944.

General Marshall felt that in view of the fact that this [2970] information was confidential and was not related necessarily to the Pearl Harbor situation but dealt with a situation that was current in 1944 and may be even current now in 1945, that there was a sentence and a phrase or two in that letter to Governor Dewey that might well be deleted so far as this record is concerned.

The committee met this morning in executive session to discuss that question and it transpired that there was a division within the ranks of the committee as to whether these parts that General Marshall felt that so far as he was personally concerned, due to relations existing between our Government and one of our allies, might well be omitted from the transcript.

I think the committee recognized the fact that unless they could unanimously agree to the deletion and even though they unanimously agreed to the deletion, that it would be difficult to maintain that situation in view of the avenues by which information is obtained, that notwithstanding General Marshall's feeling about it that so far as he was personally concerned that this information was given in confidence and notwithstanding the view of the counsel that it should be maintained in confidence, the committee was unable to agree that it should be and in effect decided that the letter should be made a part of the record and that it should be made a [2971] part of the record without deletion and that the committee accepts the responsibility of whatever consequences may ensue in regard to our relations with any other country among our allies for the publication of the full letter and its inclusion here in the record.

I think that it is fair to General Marshall and to counsel and to the committee to make that statement and, therefore, it is the viewpoint of the committee as a whole that the whole letter should be placed in the record at this time and made public.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson, the Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson. I think the record should also show that I was unable to bring my thought to the conclusion that I should attend the executive session where there was a witness who wanted to give statements or testimony to the committee as a committee in executive session. Therefore, I am not familiar with the contents of this letter.

I felt that because of the statements of the Chairman previously on the floor and my own stand that all meetings should be public meetings and that all evidence should be produced in the public and for that reason I am not familiar with the contents of this letter.

[2972] The Chairman. The Chair might also state—

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Illinois.

The Chair will also state that the Senator from Illinois also took the same position and excused himself from the executive session.
The object of the executive session was to discuss the very question involved here because it was thought it could be more freely discussed in executive session than here in an open session, as to whether the entire letter should go into the record or as to whether there should be eliminated the sentence or two to which I have referred and to which General Marshall called our attention.

Now, the Senator from Illinois may amplify that statement in any way that he may see fit.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, the position taken by the Senator from Michigan is not the same position that the Senator from Illinois takes. The Senator from Michigan absented himself from the committee meeting and refused to participate in executive session and hear General Marshall’s statement upon this question.

The Senator from Illinois also absented himself from the executive session. I know nothing about the contents of the letter. The Senator from Illinois was not willing for one member of the committee to absent himself from the meeting without himself going out with the General.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Congressmen from Pennsylvania.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, in my opinion it was a question whether or not the rules of this committee, or the feelings of any individual on this committee should come before the security of the Nation.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Senator from Maine.

Senator Brewster. I think in order to complete the record, it ought to appear that the members of the committee who remained excused General Marshall at the same time that we excused the Senator from Michigan, or the Senator from Illinois, so no information of any character was received from General Marshall aside from that given in the letter, with the underlining of the passages which he previously stated he thought perhaps might be left out.

The Chairman. That statement is correct. The committee excused General Marshall simultaneously with the excusing of the two Senators, who had excused themselves. The Chairman might suggest if we had excused anybody else we might not have had a quorum present.

The upshot of the whole thing is the entire letter will be read into the record and made public. I might say that the committee accepts responsibility for that procedure.

I might also say it was the viewpoint of the Chairman that notwithstanding any possible embarrassment that might accrue between our Government and an allied nation over the publication of confidential information contained in General Marshall’s letter, that in the long run, it would be less embarrassing to publish the whole letter than to be required later to explain why we left any of it out, and for that reason the Chair felt, and now feels that the entire letter should be made part of the record, and made public.

Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Congressman Clark.

Mr. Clark. I, of course, accept my part of the responsibility to which the Chairman has just referred, but I regret exceedingly that some sensible and perfectly simple plan could not
have been adopted, as I think it could, to the satisfaction of everybody who is reasonable about it, rather than to put us up against exposing a matter here that is wholly irrelevant to Pearl Harbor, that may have consequences that we cannot foresee.

Under the circumstances, while I accept my part of the responsibility, I regret the circumstances that make it necessary.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I might add one more sentence.
While I feel it is the responsibility of this committee at the present time, the occasion with which we were confronted this morning, was occasioned by two people other than people who are in this room, and one of whom will be before this committee later, at which time I wish to question him about the circumstances that brought about this morning's meeting.

The Chairman. We will cross that bridge when we reach it.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson. I want to make it clear that my only reason this morning, as I stated, was not that General Marshall was a witness—I have the highest respect for [2976] General Marshall—but it is the fact that I was unwilling to take any testimony in executive session, no matter what it was about, or who was the witness.

I sat on the sofa outside with General Marshall. We were very friendly, and we discussed a portion of Pearl Harbor, and things relating to it. It was not the question that General Marshall was the witness, it was merely that all meetings, in my opinion, should be open meetings, no matter what is to be discussed with the witness. They should be here and be sworn as witnesses. We should get our testimony from the witnesses in sworn statements, in an open hearing.

The Chairman. Of course, it is obvious that probably from time to time there will have to be executive sessions of the committee to determine with respect to testimony brought out in the open hearing.

The Chair might volunteer this suggestion. In view of this situation, it is his opinion that the result would have been the same in this particular instance if the entire committee had remained present and if General Marshall had been permitted to remain in it too, that the result would have been the same as we now face, and therefore the Chair is ready to suggest to the counsel that he proceed along the line of the committee's suggestion to inquire about [2977] this correspondence that he mentioned.

Mr. Mitchell. The only thing I have left to say is there are two members of the committee now in the position of never having seen the letter or the proposed deletions, and their judgment has not been asked as to whether the deletions should be made or not.

The Chairman. I think, gentlemen, it is the consensus of opinion, and the Chair is going to take that responsibility—if the committee decides otherwise, we will abide by the decision, but in view of the discussion, it is the view of the Chair that the committee decided these letters should be made a part of the record without deletion.

Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, did you have some correspondence with the Honorable Thomas E. Dewey in September 1944?


Mr. Mitchell. I understand you wrote him two letters.

General Marshall. I did, sir, and I have the letters here.
Mr. Mitchell. Will you read the two letters, first the one of the 25th of September, and then the one of the 27th of September?

These are complete copies, are they?


On the 25th of September I addressed the following letter to Governor Dewey, who at that time was traveling in Oklahoma.

[2979] Senator Lucas. Will you read the top two words, General Marshall?


Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, in order that we may understand this letter at the beginning, and before General Marshall starts reading, he is referring to the fact that he addressed the letter to Governor Dewey on the 25th of September, and another on the 27th.

I would like to have the record show, Mr. Mitchell, at the start as to whether or not this letter was sent through the mail or by courier, or delivered in some other way?

Mr. Mitchell. I will cover all that, Mr. Congressman, as to just how the letters were delivered and all the rest. I just want to get the letters in first.

Mr. Keeffe. All right, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. We will go right to that. Please read, General, the first letter of September 25th; every word on it.

General Marshall. The heading at the top of the paper is "Top Secret." To the left in capitals "FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY." It is dated the 25 September 1944.

My Dear Governor:

I am writing you without the knowledge of any [2980] other person except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor.

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you whether to accept it on the basis of your not communicating its contents to any other person and returning this letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer.

I should have preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Carter Clarke who has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

In brief, the military dilemma resulting from Congressional political battles of the presidential campaign is this:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our [2981] cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department—rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions towards Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes. German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the
[2982] battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

[2983] You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we now possess.

The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attaché Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such [2984] conclusion.

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you, for your secret information, in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign. I might add that the recent action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before certain dates has compelled me to bring back the Corps commander, General Gerow, whose troops are fighting at Trier, to testify here while the Germans are counter-attacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter compared to the loss of our code information.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd.) G. C. Marshall.

[2985] The second letter is dated the 27th of September, 1944, and is headed "Top Secret", and "FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY".

My Dear Governor: Colonel Clarke, my messenger to you of yesterday, September 26th, has reported the result of his delivery of my letter dated September 25th. As I understand him you (a) were unwilling to commit yourself to any agreement regarding "not communicating its contents to any other person" in view of the fact that you felt you already knew certain of the things probably referred to in the letter, as suggested to you by seeing the word "cryptograph" and (b) you could not feel that such a letter as this to a presidential candidate could have been addressed to you by an officer in my position without the knowledge of the President.
As to (a) above I am quite willing to have you read what comes hereafter with the understanding that you are bound not to communicate to any other person any portions on which you do not now have or later receive factual knowledge from some other source than myself. As to (b) above you have my word that neither the Secretary of War nor the President has any intention whatsoever that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation or sending of such a communication was being considered. I assure you that the only persons who saw or know of the existence of either this letter or my letter to you dated September 25th are Admiral King, seven key officers responsible for security of military communications, and my secretary who typed these letters. I am trying my best to make plain to you that this letter is being addressed to you solely on my initiative, Admiral King having been consulted only after the letter was drafted, and I am persisting in the matter because the military hazards involved are so serious that I feel some action is necessary to protect the interests of our armed forces.

I should have much preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, with which Admiral King concurs, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Clarke, who, incidentally, has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

Mr. Chairman, the remainder of the letter is a repetition of what I read in the first letter. Do you want me to read it?

[2987] The Chairman, No. I suppose it will be published in full as it is without the necessity of reading it. It is exactly the same?

General Marshall. It is exactly the same.

Mr. Mitchell. We will have it copied straight through in the transcript.

The Chairman. These two letters will be printed in full as they appear in the transcript at this point.

(The letters referred to follow.)

[2987A]

[Copy]

TOP SECRET

For Mr. Dewey's eyes only. 25 September 1944

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: I am writing you without the knowledge of any other person except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a grave dilemma in the political reactions of Congress regarding Pearl Harbor.

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of your not communicating its contents to any other person and returning this letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer.

I should have preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Carter Clarke who has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

In brief, the military dilemma resulting from Congressional political battles of the presidential campaign is this:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possess a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department—rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no refer-
ence whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes. German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler’s intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima’s message from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place \[2987B\] at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

The current raids by Admiral Halsey’s carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we now possess.

The Roberts’ Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As a further example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan’s people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

The conduct of General Eisenhower’s campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute \[2987C\] greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking toward the early termination of the war.

I am representing this matter to you, for your secret information, in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign. I might add that the recent action of Congress in requiring Army and Navy investigations for action before certain dates has compelled me to bring back the Corps commander, General Gerow, whose troops are fighting at Trler, to testify here while the Germans are counterattacking his forces there. This, however, is a very minor matter compared to the loss of our code information.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. Marshall.
[Copy]

Top Secret

For Mr. Dewey's eyes only.

27 September 1944.

My Dear Governor: Colonel Clarke, my messenger to you of yesterday, September 26th, has reported the result of his delivery of my letter dated September 25th. As I understand him you (a) were unwilling to commit yourself to any agreement regarding "not communicating its contents to any other person" in view of the fact that you felt you already knew certain of the things probably referred to in the letter, as suggested to you by seeing the word "cryptograph," and (b) you could not feel that such a letter as this to a presidential candidate could have been addressed to you by an officer in my position without the knowledge of the President.

As to (a) above I am quite willing to have you read what comes hereafter with the understanding that you are bound not to communicate to any other person any portions on which you do not now have or later receive factual knowledge from some other source than myself. As to (b) above you have my word that neither the Secretary of War nor the President has any intimation whatsoever that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation or sending of such a communication was being considered. I assure you that the only persons who saw or know of the existence of either this letter or my letter to you dated September 25th are Admiral King, seven key officers responsible for security of military communications, and my secretary who typed these letters. I am trying my best to make plain to you that this letter is being addressed to you solely on my initiative, Admiral King having been consulted only after the letter was drafted, and I am persisting in the matter because the military hazards involved are so serious that I feel some action is necessary to protect the interests of our armed forces.

I should have much preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, with which Admiral King concurs, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Clarke, who, incidentally, has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

In brief, the military dilemma is this:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphered their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turned was furnished the State Department—rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance,
we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.

The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we possess.

The Roberts' report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

[2987F] As another example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attaché Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A further most serious embarrassment is the fact that the British government is involved concerning its most secret sources of information, regarding which only the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and a very limited number of other officials have knowledge.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my most secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. Marshall.

Mr. Mitchell. General Marshall, what means did you take in presenting your first letter of September 25 to Governor Dewey?

General Marshall. It was sent by the hand of Colonel Clarke who flew out to some point in Oklahoma and he boarded Governor Dewey's train at some point in Oklahoma and saw Governor Dewey personally.

Mr. Mitchell. When Colonel Clarke came back did he bring back with him your letter of September 25?

General Marshall. He brought back the letter with the statement that Governor Dewey felt he could not accept the proviso of the first paragraph, which I will read again in order to make it clear:

What I have to tell you below is of such a highly secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you either to accept it on the basis of your not commun[2988] cating its contents to any other person and returning this letter or not reading any further and returning the letter to the bearer.

[2989] Mr. Mitchell. Did Colonel Clarke report that Mr. Dewey had stopped there and read no other part of the letter?

General Marshall. He read no further, according to Colonel Clarke.

Senator Brewster. I wonder if you are clear that the letter of the 27th, the remainder, is the same. It seems to me there is a paragraph
missing between the reference to Mr. Donovan, and the reference to Mr. Harness on the third page. That paragraph is left out.

Mr. Murphy. It is shifted over on the other page. It is in a different place in the second letter.

The Vice Chairman. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that General Marshall read the rest of the letter.

The Chairman. If there is any question about it, suppose you begin where you left off in the second letter, and read the rest of it.

Mr. Keefe. It is all in there, only it is on the third page.

The Chairman. The Chair thinks it is in there, but it is in a different place in the second letter.

General Marshall. I will continue reading.

Senator Brewster. I think it is important in connection with any copies that have been given out that we be clear [2990] for the information of everybody as to whether or not the paragraph which appears in the second letter appears in the first. I don't see where it is in the first.

Mr. Mitchell. What paragraph do you refer to, Senator?

Senator Brewster. With reference to the British—"a further most serious embarrassment."

Senator Lucas. The second paragraph on page 3 of the September 27 letter.

Mr. Mitchell. Go ahead, General, and read the letter of the 27th completely so there won't be any mistake about it.

General Marshall. Shall I go back to the beginning?

Mr. Mitchell. How far did you read?

General Marshall. I read to the words "in brief, the military dilemma is this."

Mr. Mitchell. Continue then with the letter of the 27th commencing with the words "in brief, the military dilemma is this."

General Marshall (reading):

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese [2991] were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department—rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their [2992] naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the
rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast
importance, we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys.
The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our
submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates
and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the
proper points.

The current raids by Admiral Halsey’s carrier forces on Japanese shipping
in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known move-
ments of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his
destructive attacks.

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the
present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German
or Jap, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we possess.

[2993] The Roberts’ report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from
it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily
appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more
important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As another example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan’s people
(the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy
offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attaché Japanese code all over
the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not
yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source
of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A further most serious embarrassment is the fact that the British government
is involved concerning its most secret sources of information, regarding which
only the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and a very limited number of other
officials have knowledge.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to
the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and
the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

[2994] The conduct of General Eisenhower’s campaign and of all operations
in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we
secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the
victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct
of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you will see your way clear
to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present
political campaign.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my most secret file subject
to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd.) G. C. Marshall

Mr. Mitchell. Now, I think I asked you if Colonel Clarke brought
the earlier letter of September 25 back to you.

General Marshall. He did. I discussed the matter with him, Gov-
ernor Dewey’s comments, and also with General Bissell, head of the
Army Intelligence. I came to the conclusion that the matter was so
important that we must make it a matter of record,1 and I sent Colonel
Clarke—incidentally, in civilian clothes—to Albany. He there secured
[2995] an audience with Governor Dewey, and he telephoned me,
as I recall, from Governor Dewey’s office that the Governor was unwilling
to read the letter until he had at least one adviser similarly aware
of the circumstances I was bringing to his, the Governor's, attention,
and also that he felt he must keep the letter in his file, because he did
not know what might happen to me, and he would have no record
whatsoever of the occurrence.

Governor Dewey, as I recall, then came on the phone, I having told
Colonel Clarke that I was ready to make those agreements. The

1 See General Marshall’s correction of this sentence, p. 1165, infra.
Governor spoke to me personally about a Mr. Bell, who was, I think, the State Bank Examiner——

Mr. Mitchell. Superintendent of Banks.

General Marshall. Something of that sort, who was thoroughly to be trusted, and he, the Governor would see that it was locked up in his most secret file case, whatever that might be.

He also said that he must keep the letters to have with his records.

I then agreed to that, and on that basis the letter was left in his hands. There was no discussion between us as to what his decision might be. As a matter of fact, I do not think he read the letter beyond the first paragraph at the time of this conversation.

[2996] Colonel Clarke returned to Washington and reported to me that the Governor had read the letter, had discussed it with Mr. Bell in the presence of Colonel Clarke,¹ and I do not recall that he gave us any assurances. All I know is that there seemed to be no further reference to the matter in the campaign.

Do you wish me to go on?

Mr. Mitchell. Go ahead, General.

General Marshall. Do you wish me to go into any further conversations with Governor Dewey?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

General Marshall. After the election and the defeat of Governor Dewey, I thought it was due him that he should know more the basis of this letter, so I had General Bissell proceed to Albany, gain an audience with the Governor, and General Bissell took with him a number of copies of magic showing at that time the movements of the various Japanese convoys, and of the Japanese naval craft on which we were basing our operations, so that the Governor could gather some idea of just how important the matter was. As far as I know, he was greatly interested. It was more or less in appreciation of the action he had apparently taken.

[2997] I saw Governor Dewey for the first time in connection with this incident at the funeral, I think, of Mr. Roosevelt. At the end of the funeral services we were thrown together there and I asked him to come to the War Department with me. He did and we showed him the situation out in the Pacific. Showed him also the current magic, giving the Japanese movements at that time, and made as plain as we could to him just what the importance of these matters were.

His attitude was very friendly and very gracious.

At a later time—no, I am wrong.

When General Bissell returned from Albany, having gone up in effect to see Governor Dewey and to show him these copies of magic as to the current operations in the Pacific, the Governor told him and he, General Bissell, told me orally on his return that he, the Governor, understood there was going to be a further discussion in the near future in the Congress regarding Pearl Harbor and he, Governor Dewey, inquired of General Bissell to me as to whether I desired him to intervene to the extent that he might be able to suppress such debates.

General Bissell was telling me this on his return to Washington. He suggested that I telephone Governor Dewey but I thought it was

¹ See p. 1165, infra, for General Marshall's correction of this sentence.
better that General Bissell should have the conversation, and I told him what to say. He called up. [2998] This is all hearsay.

Mr. Mitchell. Tell us what you told him to say.

General Marshall. I told him to tell Governor Dewey that I had already embarrassed him with requests which had affected his personal actions and that I would not make any further request of him. I told General Bissell that Governor Dewey would probably say that didn't matter, that he would be interested in the conduct of the campaign, the successful conclusion of the war, and if he said that to again repeat that I had anticipated that response and that I still had no request to make of him.

That is exactly the way it took place. General Bissell told him what I had said. He replied that that was not the point, it wasn't a question of personal embarrassment, it was a question of the progress of the war.

General Bissell told him that I had anticipated some such reply and I still had no request to make.

And I will add that, so far as I know, certainly not in the immediate future after that, there was no debate on the question in Congress.

Mr. Mitchell. I notice in these letters there is a reference to the fact that at some time prior to September 1944 as a result of the OSS getting into the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal, the military attaché Japanese codes [2999] all over the world were changed. Was that just one of the Japanese codes?

General Marshall. That was one of their codes, which we had broken down.

Mr. Mitchell. You continued to decode up to the time this letter to Mr. Dewey was written, the diplomatic codes that we have had here in evidence?

General Marshall. We continued right through that time, and, I might add, it played a very important part, the decoding of these messages, deciphering of these messages, played a very important part after the termination of the Japanese struggle in connection with our movement of troops into Japan and particularly into Korea, because we had the communications of the Japanese officers and we knew whether we had to go in with a regiment or an Army corps.

We went into Korea with—that was General MacArthur's action but I think this is approximately correct, on September 3 with, I believe—only a regiment, when the original plan was September 23 with a whole Army corps, because we had the communications of the Japanese commander in Korea appealing to his own government to expedite the movement of the American troops into Korea, which meant to us we need not anticipate any violent reaction from the Japanese.

Mr. Mitchell. That was about what date in 1945?
[3000] General Marshall. That was after VJ-day. That was some days in August and possibly early September.

Mr. Mitchell. With the exception of this change—

General Marshall. Also I might add that in the final phase of the war we obtained information regarding the campaign in Manchuria which was helpful to the occupation of the Allied troops.
Mr. Mitchell. With the exception of this military attaché code which you lost the ability to decode, prior to 1944 had you, since Pearl Harbor, lost the ability to crack these other Japanese codes?

General Marshall. They lost some of them from time to time due to the regular changes. Then it would take a while to bring it down to date. But on that attaché code the whole code went out. Almost all codes have frequent changes, some daily.

Mr. Mitchell. There is a sentence in your letter of the 27th of September, at the bottom of page 1, which reads:

Therefore we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific which in turn was furnished the State Department—rather than as popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until [3001] the last message before December 7th which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now, I would like for you to look in the intercept book, Mr. Hannaford, and find the messages you marked, and——

General Marshall. I can tell you the character. The only message I had in mind was where they were talking about lights in the windows. That was the first one that came to my attention regarding the Pearl Harbor affair.

Mr. Mitchell. That pointed at Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. Of course, at this time there had not been the exhaustive search of all of these various records.

(A document was handed to General Marshall by Mr. Hannaford.)

General Marshall. It is a lengthy message from Honolulu to Tokyo. 3 December 1941, from Kita to Tokyo.

The Vice Chairman. What is the page in the book?


Mr. Mitchell. That message we are showing you, about the lights in the windows, appears not to have been translated until December 11, and your letter refers to a message that didn’t come into your hands until the 8th.

General Marshall. Mr. Chairman, the point was, I didn’t [3002] go back and check on these dates and translations, but was speaking from memory three or four years afterwards in dictating this letter to Mr. Dewey. It may have been that it didn’t get to me until the 11th. I was not looking at any record. I was talking three years later. But it was a message that came to my attention after the event and this was the one I was talking about.

Mr. Mitchell. At page 27 of the book you are looking at there is a message that was sent from Honolulu to Tokyo, December 6, and was translated December 8. That is the message which says:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

General Marshall. The one I am referring to is this lengthy one.

Mr. Mitchell. You don’t identify the one I have read?

General Marshall. I don’t have a recollection of that. I have a definite recollection of this elaborate message here on page 22 though I didn’t read it at the time, I didn’t have it available, I have never seen it from that day until now.

Mr. Mitchell. In your letter of the 27th you refer to the last message before December 7 "which did not reach our [3003] hands
until the following day, December 8." As I understand it you were not referring to this 14-part and 1 p.m. message?

General Marshall. No, sir; I am referring to this message, as nearly as my recollection permits, and am quite clear this was the one, beginning at page 22, dated the 3d of December, 1941, from Honolulu to Tokyo; and I repeat I have never seen the message from the time I looked at it until today and I was dictating a letter offhand in a very few minutes to Governor Dewey.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell the committee what occasioned your writing Mr. Dewey at all?

General Marshall. It was reported to me by the Chief of Army Intelligence that these various comments were being made on the floor of Congress referring to Pearl Harbor, and the comments being made at frequent intervals in the campaign speeches of the various members of the parties were leading inevitably to the conclusion, the Chief of Army Intelligence, General Bissell thought, that other Governments would decide that we had a method of breaking their code, and the matter was growing more pointed as the campaign was becoming more violent, and some action ought to be taken in a hurry or we were going to lose our tremendous source of information in the Far East.

[3004] The recommendation made to me by General Bissell—and you can call him as a witness—was to go to the President for some assistance in the matter. I didn't think that would do. I thought it over overnight. The next morning I dictated this letter of September 25 and sent for General Bissell, read the letter to him, and asked him his view on this procedure. He thought that was all right.

I then sent him, as I recall, with the letter personally to Admiral King to let Admiral King see it and get his reaction. His reaction was to concur. Then the discussion was how to get the letter into Governor Dewey's hands without attracting attention to procedure. I have described the method we took.

In explanation of that procedure of addressing the letter to Governor Dewey, I feel, and Admiral King concurred, that it was absolutely necessary that Governor Dewey feel that no one other than ourselves, that is, that the President, the Secretary of War, and other officials of the War Department or the Navy Department, had no knowledge whatever of this action, and its success would depend entirely on Governor Dewey feeling that that was the case.

Therefore, we followed a purely nonpolitical procedure entirely in the interest of the conduct of the operation. That is the way, I understand, Governor Dewey accepted the approach. I never told the President, I think he died with—[3005]—out knowing anything about this, I am quite certain he did, and I have no recollection after the event of ever telling the Secretary of War.

Mr. Mitchell. I think I have finished, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. General Marshall, I have two or three questions I would like to ask.

Going back into the spring and summer of 1941, I think you stated on yesterday that not only you but other officers of the War Department and also officers of the Navy Department, insofar as you felt it proper to do so, were urging that everything be done to postpone any clash that might result in armed hostilities between the United States and Japan?
General Marshall. That is the case.

The Chairman. Were you present during any of the discussions in the latter part of 1940 or any part of 1941 with reference to the location of the Fleet in the Hawaiian region?

General Marshall. I was present at some discussions with reference to the fleet changing its base from Long Beach and San Diego to Hawaii and with regard to portions of the fleet being drawn into the Atlantic.

[3006] The Chairman. What was the general understanding, what was your understanding of the general opinion of those responsible in the various branches of the Government, that is, the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy, with respect to the maintenance of that fleet, Pacific fleet, as it finally came to be called, in the region of Hawaii?

General Marshall. I don't recall, as I said before in my testimony, the pros and cons of the argument regarding the fleet at Hawaii. I heard it—I am sorry to tell you that I don't remember. I think I had a very definite view in the matter. I know I had a very definite view in relation to the reinforcement of the naval forces in the Atlantic, and I am rather foggy about that.

So much happened after that, and it was a naval issue, that I have lost the thread of the discussions. I know that I was intensely interested in the development of the fleet train, as it was then called, and I recall specifically taking it up in a liaison meeting in an effort to assist Admiral Stark in getting the necessary craft which would have to be drawn from commercial use, particularly Latin America, at that time.

I am sorry I can't give you any definite reactions regarding the movement of the fleet from the west coast out [3007] to Hawaii, or regarding the reinforcement of the Atlantic portion of our Navy from ships in the Pacific, though I sat in on a good many of the discussions.

The Chairman. Do you recall what your own view was during the progress of the Japanese encroachments from Japan down to the south in the direction of Indochina, Thailand, and the Kra Peninsula, as to whether that encroachment endangered the security of our interests in the Philippine Islands, and other regions of the Southwest Pacific.

General Marshall. My view was that it clearly did endanger our interests, endanger the security of the Phillipines, if the Japanese moved in force into the south of the Philippines, southern Indochina, Borneo, Thailand.

The Chairman. And your view was, as I understand it, that while attempting to postpone any actual clash, while attempting to play for time, as we might say, in the relationship between Japan and the United States, such efforts might be, would be taken, or should be taken as would in some measure convince Japan that it was hazardous for her to proceed further south?

General Marshall. That was the effort that we were making in connection with the reinforcement of the Phillipines, which begin in a material way in August 1941 for the [3008] purpose of so strengthening the Phillipines that the Japanese would think it unsafe to proceed further south.
The Chairman. Did I understand you to say that, taking the Panama Canal, the Caribbean area, into consideration, and the Pacific Coast of the United States into consideration, and the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippine Islands into consideration, in view of the limited material we had for distribution to all of those points, that Hawaii was better taken care of in the way of matériel than any of these other points that I have mentioned?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. At that time, I think, to which you referred, virtually nothing had been done about the Philippines, and Panama had been about halfway developed up to the standard we thought necessary.

The Chairman. So that you began to make some intensification of effort to give General MacArthur in the Philippines something of the matériel and supplies which he had been for quite a time requesting?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. There were two factors.

One is, we had reached in the delivery of matériel or troops, or both, to Panama and to Hawaii to the degree where we thought they were reasonably safe, and, quantity production just coming in, we started to build up the Philippine Island defenses.

[3009] The Chairman. Was it in pursuance of that policy that these unarmored airplanes had left the west coast on the 6th of December for the Philippines? Were dispatched?

General Marshall. That is correct. That was the first squadron reinforcement of 45 flying fortresses, to be added to the 35 which had already reached the Philippines in early September.

The Chairman. They left from some point in California?

General Marshall. They left Hamilton Field, right near San Francisco.

The Chairman. Destined for the Philippines, but with a view of stopping in Hawaii to refuel.

General Marshall. Refuel and have the engines gone over and give the pilots a rest.

The Chairman. I presume it is safe to say that it was obvious to those planes, inasmuch as they were unarmored, they did not expect to run into a war in Hawaii on their way to the Philippines.

General Marshall. No, sir. That was a natural reaction on their part.

The Chairman. Now, this morning, I believe you said, or yesterday, that when General MacArthur's dispatch to you of November 28, which was in reply to yours to him of the 27th, and General Short's dispatch of the same date were handed to you, you did not recall whether they were attached [3010] together by a clip or not, as they now appear.

General Marshall. I don't think I said I did not know whether they were attached together, or not. I do not know. All I do know is that I initialed the first upper copy, and apparently they came in in that form.

The Chairman. Did I understand you to say you did or did not remember whether you saw General Short's reply?

General Marshall. I do not remember whether or not I saw General Short's reply, but the presumption must be that I did. In any event that was my opportunity to intervene which I did not do.
The Chairman. Now, you sent on the 27th almost identical messages to Panama, Hawaii, the Philippines, and the Pacific Coast of the United States.


The Chairman. There was apparently one difference, I think. In your message to General MacArthur in the Philippines you did not caution him with reference to alarming the civil population, which you did include in your message to the Hawaiian Islands. Do you recall that?

General Marshall. There is that difference between the two messages. The reason, quite evidently, is that Hawaii had quite a mixed population, including 130,000 Japanese, which is quite a different situation from that in the Philippines, and the position of vital installations which related to the city proper presented a condition in Hawaii considerably different from that in the Philippines.

Clark Field is to the north of Manila, and Corregidor at the entrance of the bay, 35 miles from Manila. And, may I add, a very definite reason in connection with that was to try not to upset the procedure that Mr. Hull was following in an effort to stall action in the Pacific.

The Chairman. In your conversations with the War Department and the Navy Department, and the President, with reference to obtaining time, as much time as was possible in order to prepare better before there might possibly be any clash of arms between Japan and the United States, do you recall what the President's attitude was toward that approach to the subject in conversations you had?

General Marshall. As far as I can recall, it was identical with ours, and Mr. Hull's. "Ours" meaning Admiral Stark and myself; the Secretary of War, Colonel Knox.

The Chairman. In your message to these various areas on the 27th of November, after calling attention to the fact that the negotiations with Japan appeared to be on the verge of termination, to all practical purposes, and so forth, you gave them what apparently amounted to instructions with respect to reconnaissance, and the taking of all other steps necessary in their judgment to meet an attack or to meet the situation as it might develop in view of that situation. That instruction, or that directive, was present in all these dispatches from you to Panama, Hawaii, the west coast, and the Philippines?


The Chairman. Now, you received a reply from General MacArthur on the 28th, the next day after you sent it, in which he stated:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio 624 air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy. Ground security measures have been taken within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations. Everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense. Intimate liaison and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

Do you regard that reply of General MacArthur as responsive to your message to him of the day before?

The CHAIRMAN. On the same day on which you sent these various messages, General Miles as Chief of G-2 sent this message to Hawaii:

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only. Signed "Miles".

You received from General Short on the 28th of November, the day following your message, this message:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy—there is some word there which I do not understand—"four seven two twenty seventh."

Did you say in your testimony yesterday that you remembered whether you saw that reply from General Short?

General MARSHALL. I said I could not remember whether or not I saw it but the presumption must be that I did see it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, whether you saw it or not, looking at it now as it is and comparing it with your message to him of the day before, do you now regard it as having been an adequate response to the instructions that you gave him?

General MARSHALL. In the light of all the events, Senator, it is quite evident it was not adequate.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that General Miles wired him tage and in view of the fact that his message to you mentioned only on the same day, the 27th, to look out for some [3014] sabotage, would it have been possible for him to have confused General Miles' message with yours and replied to General Miles but sent it to you?

General MARSHALL. I understand that you have the exact records here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Or, rather, I am told that the records show that the dispatch of General Short's, his message was dispatched prior to the receipt of General Miles' message. I did not know that, of course, nor did I know of General Miles' message.

The CHAIRMAN. Then if General Short's reply was sent before he received General Miles' dispatch, obviously it could not have been intended as a reply to General Miles.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. That would be a matter of record, I presume. The point here, I think, Senator, is this: that the fact that General Miles sent that message—because it was not known to me I presume it may have been known in the Operations Section, I do not know, but the G-2 was charged with the dissemination of information.

The CHAIRMAN. The Operations Section, that was the section that was originally called the War Plans?

General MARSHALL. War Plans.

[3015] The CHAIRMAN. War Plans Division.

General MARSHALL. War Plans Division. I am sorry. I misnamed it before. The War Plans Division.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the section or division of which General Gerow was the head?
General Marshall. He was the head. Whether or not he saw that I do not know, but, you see, G-2 was charged with the dissemination of information but not permitted to issue directives, and that was a report on the dissemination.

The Chairman. Was there any rule existing in the General Staff or in the War Department that required messages received in reply to messages like that which you sent on the 27th should be called to your personal attention?

General Marshall. No specific rule. I was supposed to be given the opportunity to see the important messages.

The Chairman. Yes.

General Marshall. I do not know just what the situation was at that time but at least since they sometimes came in a thousand or more a day and the important ones are brought to my attention; and, of course, specifically anyone that would be as important as this, because the directive went out over my name, presumably from my office.

The Chairman. Well, was there anything in General Short's reply referring to sabotage, being seen by an officer [3016] in the Operations or in the G-2 division, would have identified it as a reply to your message to him which did not mention sabotage but which did specifically mention reconnaissance and "all other measures that you deem necessary to be taken under the circumstances?"

General Marshall. I do not know quite whether I understand your question, but in the message there from General Short I think is a word that you said you do not understand, "REURAD", "referring to your radio", which gave the number and which identified the message that was sent to him.

The Chairman. And that answer gave the number of the message?


The Chairman. From the reply it would seem that was a reply to your message?

General Marshall. Yes. That says directly that is what it is.

The Chairman. Yes. Now, let me ask you this further question in regard to your view in reference to the facilities, men and equipment in the Hawaiian Islands with respect to the ability of those in charge of that operation, charged with the responsibility to have met the attack or have retarded it or have minimized its effects, if what was there in men and material had been reasonably alert and reasonably [3017] active and reasonably ready to meet any such possible attack, what was your conclusion about that—not that every gun had to be in its place and every man had to be in his cockpit, but if under ordinary circumstances, in view of the information which had been sent to them and particularly on the 27th, and the general attitude of alertness that it seemed had been invoked, what was your conclusion, that they could have retarded or minimized the effect of the attack or they could have defeated it altogether? I would like to get you to draw the distinction on it.

General Marshall. My conclusion is, and I might say was, that the utilization of all the means at hand, means and men, and the deployment of the matériel and the ships, and so forth, to the best advantage under the terms of the alert, that the attack could have been seriously interfered with, its damaging effect greatly limited; and I do not know whether the carriers could have been brought into
a position to operate or not, I am unfamiliar with that, but they were
great potentials out in that region at that time.
The Chairman. The testimony of Admiral Inglis and Colonel
Thielen shows, I think, that on the 6th day of December there was
no reconnaissance whatever in Pearl Harbor or on the Island of Oahu.
There was on that day some type of reconnaissance from the carrier
Enterprise which was some two hundred miles west of Oahu.

Have you received any information, or have you any information
that would offer an explanation as to why there was no reconnaissance
of any kind on the 6th day of December, the day before this attack?

General Marshall. No. I have not, Senator, and I should explain
that I haven't discussed this with anyone. I haven't discussed it with
General Short or Admiral Kimmel. I haven't discussed it with my
own people. I might say that I haven't discussed it with General
Gerow. I haven't seen General Gerow since October 1944. The event
occurred and my interest and my obligation brought me to the activi-
ties necessary to meet the situation which developed and which con-
tinued on, of course, as you know from one serious state to another.
I would also add that in my own mind I never could grasp what
had happened between the period when so much was said about air
attack, the necessity for anti-aircraft, the necessity for planes, for
reconnaissance, the necessity for attack planes for defense and the
other requirements which anticipated very definitely and affirmatively
an air attack. I could never understand why suddenly it became ap-
parently a side issue. I do not know just what the reason was. I have
never inquired of the individuals concerning it.

The Chairman. Following your directive, or order, or in-
structions of the 27th of November, did you receive any
further information that seemed to you to make it necessary to re-
iterate those warnings——

General Marshall. No, sir; I did not.

The Chairman (continuing). Until you received the message on
the 7th with reference to the 14-part dispatch and the 1 o'clock dis-
patch?

General Marshall. After I saw the alert message of November 27,
which was brought to my attention on the morning of November 28,
I recall nothing coming in from the Hawaiian Department or any
other matter which required an additional dispatch.

It is very important that you do not confuse a command direction.
Better completely cancel it and issue a new one, because the amend-
ments are dangerous things in relation to military operations. Once
the commander is alerted, the question then was when did you reduce
the alert. Of course, the G-2 functions of the War Department as
well as out in the commands were to furnish material as it developed,
but the command direction stood unless you dared to amend it, or
what would be a better procedure, completely cancel it and issue a
new directive.

The Chairman. Reference has been made all through this ex-
amination to Rainbow Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.


The Chairman. Rainbow No. 5 seeming to be the ultimate plan.
Did that mean that Rainbow No. 1 was cancelled or modified or
completely changed when a new Rainbow plan was promulgated, or was it a modification or change?

General Marshall. Senator, I will not try to answer that without actually looking at the papers and I would have to get the records of the War Plans Division. The presumption would be absolute that if a new plan was issued the other is cancelled by a certain date.

The Chairman. Well, probably General Gerow can explain that in greater detail.

General Marshall. He can tell you that direct.

The Chairman. I think that is all. Congressman Cooper?

The Vice Chairman. Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly.

When, did you state, General, you were appointed Chief of Staff?

General Marshall. I was appointed Acting Chief of Staff on July 1, 1939, and on the formal occurrence of the vacancy in the position of Chief of Staff by the retirement of General Craig on the 1st of September 1939 I then was nominated and confirmed as Chief of Staff.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you had been Assistant Chief [3021] of Staff while General Craig was Chief of Staff, had you?

General Marshall. I came to Washington on the 6th of July 1938 and became the head of the War Plans Division. In October 1938, I think about the middle of the month, I became Deputy Chief of Staff; therefore, the immediate assistant to General Craig.

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to state something the other day about General Craig taking the position that the interception of these Japanese messages was illegal. Is that correct?

General Marshall. That was his view of the matter.

The Vice Chairman. That was his view of the matter?

General Marshall. He considered that that was forbidden by the terms of the Federal Communications Act.

The Vice Chairman. I see. But the practice continued right on of intercepting all the Japanese messages that could be intercepted?

General Marshall. With such secrecy as could be enforced.

The Vice Chairman. Sir?

General Marshall. With such secrecy as could be enforced.

The Vice Chairman. My interest was challenged, General, while General Miles was before us with respect to these intercepted messages, especially with respect to the period of time that elapsed between the time the messages were sent—and [3022] of course, I assume they were intercepted at the time they were sent—and the time they were decoded and translated.

Had that attracted your attention at any time?

General Marshall. I do not recall that that attracted my specific attention because I was aware of the fact that they were short-handed and it was very difficult to obtain people that we could trust and that had the necessary qualities.

I looked up several days ago what the status of that was and, as I recall, on December 7, 1941, there were some 44 officers and about 180 men, women, civilians and soldiers, in Washington in the Army engaged in this work and some 150 out in the field at what they call the monitoring stations, that is, merely intercepting the material.

Now, I compared that to see what the change was with the situation at the end of the war and there were in Washington some 666 officers
and a total of 10,000 individuals here in Washington at this work. The British had 30,000. The Navy of ours here I think had 6,000.

Now, that had to be built up, of course. You had to have the right people, with the qualifications; you had to have them all examined by the FBI. It was a very slow procedure; and, of course, also at that time we had a shortage of personnel in all of our activities, and I recall at an earlier [3023] date they had a small group down at Fort Washington—I think, which is near Mount Vernon just on that side of the river, at least I think that is where it was; if it was not there it was across the river—and some 26 men, I believe; and one man was picked up or checked up endeavoring to sell this information up in Boston, I think, and we had the FBI nab him.

It was very difficult to get trustworthy personnel at that particular time in the state of general disregard of security matters and of interest and of an appreciation of the importance of what was going on in the United States with relation to the possibility of war. So I thought, if I might add, I thought that what they were doing was very unusual that they were able to turn out the critical messages in the manner that they did.

Now, there was always a backlog of messages which did take a long time to reduce. There was always the hazard—I presume that General Miles is the best witness—of some particular message being overlooked. There was always, as far as I was concerned, the possibility that the messages that might seem to me with very sober consideration as most important for me to see, that I might not see them all and there was always the possibility that in going through this mass of information, of which this was only incidental to my desk every day, that I might not absorb the true significance [3024] of each matter.

The Vice Chairman. I just noticed, while General Miles was before us here, that, as shown in exhibit 2, messages received from November 28, that were translated after December 7, 1941, the time varies all the way from 2 days to about 28 days, do they?


The Vice Chairman. And you say that during that time we had a hundred and some odd people engaged in this work?

General Marshall. We had, I recall rather accurately, we had 44 officers here in Washington at work at it and I think some 180 soldiers and civilians, but the exact numbers can be easily obtained for you by General Miles or others.

The Vice Chairman. And later you say that number——

General Marshall. Increased to 10,000 on the Army side.

The Vice Chairman. 10,000. And the British had 30,000?

General Marshall. Yes, and our Navy I think—I am not the witness for them—had about 6,000. The growth of that was comparable to the growth of the Army. It was changing every month.

The Vice Chairman. Well, I was just wondering at the time I examined those how this information could be very valuable to you, with the great responsibility that you had resting on you, if it came to you a week or two weeks or [3025] three weeks after the message was intercepted.

General Marshall. Well, that is natural, sir, but I was rather impressed with the fact that under the conditions under which they were then operating, which were pretty much unavoidable, they were able to pull out the most critical messages almost immediately.
The Vice Chairman. Then another question if I may, General. Were you kept fully advised as to diplomatic developments all through the latter part of November and on up to the first part of December?

General Marshall. I, of course, did not know all of the matters, but I would say that I was kept very fully advised; and so far as Mr. Hull personally is concerned, I remember hearing him say with considerable emphasis in those last day apropos of his discussions with the Japanese envoys, "These fellows mean to fight and you will have to watch out."

The Vice Chairman. You heard him say that?

General Marshall. I heard him say that and I have a very distinct recollection of it.

The Vice Chairman. Well, he stated before the committee that he considered, to use his words, "Japan was hell bent on conquest and aggression."

Did you entertain that view, that they were determined on conquest and aggression?

[3026] General Marshall. My appreciation of the situation, as nearly as I can recall it—I am trying to avoid the back sight thing—was that they were going to profit in every conceivable way by the opportunities presented on the destruction of Russia by the German Army and the fact that the German submarines had England by the throat, as it were, in the Atlantic, which widely affected the absolutely necessary reinforcement of England by matériel from the United States.

What I could not quite decide in my own mind, because of the peculiar way in which the war had been conducted in the entry into Austria and the entry into the Sudeten lands and later Czechoslovakia, in the movement into China which would have started a state of war, in the occupation of Indochina, in the beginning of the infiltration into Thailand, I could not be quite certain in my mind how far they were going by that method before breaking out into an overt act.

I was certain if given the opportunity, that is, security against Russian attack at their backs, that they would take as much as they could get for nothing and probably would fight for more if their position was a favorable one for it, which the occupation of Thailand would have been. Once they had their air fields, their gasoline, their bombs, and their maintenance established in Thailand, the Malay Peninsula, meaning Singapore, the Kra Isthmus, they were virtually at their mercy because Great Britain had very little they could send out there, very little in planes they could possibly afford to that theater. They were completely committed to the desperate battle that was going on in the European theater.

The Vice Chairman. Then did you consider war with Japan as inevitable?

General Marshall. It appeared to me that it would be inevitable if the Russian Army fell, if the Russian Army fell and my own conclusion before the end of the war, 2 years before the end of the war, was that the Japanese thought that Russia was going to be destroyed in December of 1941 with the capture of Moscow and they became committed in the Pacific thinking they were safe from any Russian involvement later in Manchuria.

The Vice Chairman. Well, about when did you reach the conclusion then that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable?
General Marshall. Well, that absolute conclusion would hinge somewhat on what happened to Russia, and Japan launched its overt act against us before the decision of the moment in the Russian campaign.

The anticipation was, if you go back, that Hitler's forces would attack Moscow before the middle of December, that was the announcement at that time. Instead of that they [3028] collapsed due to a terrific cold spell and there began the turning of the struggle in Russia which meant that the Japanese need not expect with a certainty that they would not eventually have a strong Russia at their back door, but they had committed themselves to the war, I think, on the assumption that the collapse of Russia was going to take place in the next 2 weeks. It did not take place. Had they not attacked on December 7, had they waited, for example, until January 1, there is a possibility that they would not have launched the attack, I do not know, because it appeared quite a definite possibility that Russia might get to her feet, which she did.

I hope I haven't confused you.

The Vice Chairman. No, that is all right, I am glad to have that. Well, where did you think the first Japanese attack on the United States would occur?

General Marshall. I thought it would occur in the Philippines. I thought the first Japanese attack was going to be directly south towards Singapore, that that would be the main campaign, and the Philippines, of course, would become involved in it. Just when they would strike and their method of striking with landing forces rather than just air, I did not know, but the air strike might occur very early, [3029] which it did.

I assumed that Guam would fall almost immediately and I assumed that Wake would fall almost immediately.

[3030] The Vice Chairman. Did you think the first Japanese attack would be at Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall. I did not anticipate that. I thought they would not hazard that. That, of course, was a raiding attack, to strike a crippling blow, which did not involve any landing, or any possible landing.

Their campaign was headed south through the China Sea. It was to cover their flank with that stroke. Those same carriers appeared quite quickly in the China Sea operations.

The Vice Chairman. I do not want to detain you too long, General, because I know other members of the committee want to ask you questions, but I have one or two questions, if I may, about what occurred immediately before the attack.

I understood you to state that you were out of Washington on November 27.

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I was down in North Carolina.

The Vice Chairman. Reviewing maneuvers in North Carolina?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I went down on the afternoon of the 26th, following a Joint Board meeting on the morning of the 26th.

The Vice Chairman. And the message about which you have been examined here at some length, which was sent over your name on November 27 to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the other commanders mentioned—that message [3031] of November 27, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
was brought to your attention early the next morning, the 28th, when
you returned?

General Marshall. I saw it about 8 o'clock on the morning of the
28th.

The Vice Chairman. Did you consider that message an adequate
warning to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department?


The Vice Chairman. Was there ever any doubt in your mind at
any time—

General Marshall. There was not.

The Vice Chairman. That that was adequate warning?

General Marshall. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. And it was your opinion at that time that
there were sufficient forces and sufficient material in Hawaii to defend
that fortress?


The Vice Chairman. I believe General Short, in command of the
Hawaiian Department at that time, was a lieutenant general, wasn't
he?

General Marshall. He was lieutenant general by virtue of that
appointment.

The Vice Chairman. Was he one of the senior officers of the United
States Army?

[3032] General Marshall. Yes, sir; he was one of the two
corps commanders at that time, who had actually had something re-
sembling an Army Corps to command, and had had the benefit of
training and maneuvers with the corps that they commanded.

The Vice Chairman. Back at that time we did not have many
officers with the rank of lieutenant general, did we?

General Marshall. We had none except those who were assigned
to their territorial Army commands, of which there were four in the
United States, one in Hawaii, and one in the Caribbean.

As long as they held the post, they held the rank. When they left
the post, they lost the rank. He proceeded to Hawaii as major general
and became lieutenant general on his arrival there.

The Vice Chairman. By reason of the fact that he took command of
that post?


The Vice Chairman. Several questions have been asked you about
these messages received on the 28th from General MacArthur and
General Short. I believe you stated you presumed that you saw
the message from General Short at the same time that you saw the
message from General MacArthur.

General Marshall. Yes, I think that must be presumed.

[3033] The Vice Chairman. But your attention was not at-
tracted by the message from General Short, as to whether it was
responsive to the message of November 27.

General Marshall. I said I had no recollection of it.

The Vice Chairman. I notice in the message of November 27, these
three words "Report measures taken."


The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated, in response to a question
by the chairman, that certainly in view of subsequent events, you
recognized that the message from General Short was not an adequate response to the message of November 27.

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. But you do not recall that that was checked on any further, or any further messages sent?

General MARSHALL. I am quite certain there was no further message sent. I might say here, Mr. Congressman, that the people working with him had sent an alert direction which all in the War Department then and now, I think, thought was a sufficient directive, and the comment out there, as far as we knew, from all our communications, had been insistent on measures to meet an air attack and submarine attack.

The thought of merely expecting an alert direction for sabotage was not in anybody's mind at all, which undoubtedly, in my opinion, may account for the fact that that word did not register, and when they spoke of liaison with the Navy that did register as to the assumption that the reconnaissance was on. That is merely a conjecture.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. I understood you to state in reply to a question of the chairman that the reply from General Short was not considered as a reply to the message from General Miles, G-2 of the General Staff of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department.

General MARSHALL. I testified to that purely because that message there says "Re so-and-so," which is the alert message.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. That is true. The message from General Short states, "Re your radio 472," and the message of November 27 bears the number 472.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. So that was regarded as a reply to your message?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. I believe that is all. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator George. General Marshall, I would like to ask you just one or two questions.

What proportion of the fleet in the Pacific, the entire Pacific area, was concentrated at Pearl Harbor? It is a naval question, I know, but I thought perhaps you would be able to answer it.

General MARSHALL. I could not answer that in detail. I happen to know that there were no carriers at Pearl Harbor. Two were at sea, one of them proceeding towards or in the vicinity of Midway and the other one returning to Pearl Harbor, and a third carrier was, I believe, at San Diego. Other than that I could not give you the data.

Senator George. But the main strength of the Pacific Fleet was at Pearl Harbor?

General MARSHALL. I believe that is correct, sir; but of course I am a poor witness on that.

Senator George. General, reference has been frequently made to a message, one of the intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24, 1941, actually translated, according to the notation at the foot of the message, on October 9, 1941, in which specific
inquiry is made about the waters in Pearl Harbor, and the suggestion of a rough division of the waters into five subareas, and specific inquiry made regarding the fleet.

Presumably that message might have had for its inspiration a submarine or other attack other than air, but is it not [3036] rather strongly suggestive that an air strike must have been contemplated by Japan?

General Marshall. In the light of what happened that is quite evident, Senator. But I may say as to that, we were getting messages making very specific inquiries about naval vessels of ours all over the Pacific, and to that extent it dispersed the attention.

However, it is inescapable, looking at this message and knowing what happened, that it must have had a direct relation to the planning of the attack.

Senator George. General Marshall, Secretary Hull in his testimony before the committee, specifically directed attention to his appearance before the War Council on November 25, 1941, which he described as consisting of the President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, and further described it as a sort of clearing house for all the information and views which were under current discussion by the State Department and any other Departments of the Government.

I merely wish to inquire if your recollection accords with this statement of Secretary Hull (reading):

At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and desperate. They were likely to break [3037] out anywhere at any time at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their plan. I felt virtually the last stage had been reached, and that the safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy.

Does your recollection accord with that statement?

General Marshall. I do not remember all those details, sir, but I got the general impression from Mr. Hull of his telling me "These fellows mean to fight and we should get ready."

Senator George. And immediately after that you approved the message of November 27, although it was actually sent on the day when you arrived from Washington?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; it was discussed on the morning of the 26th in the Joint Board by Admiral Stark and myself and the Deputy Chief of Staff and his opposite in the Navy, and General Gerow and his opposite in the Navy.

Senator George. General Marshall, of course the Fleet in the Pacific, or so much of our Navy as was in the Pacific and based at Pearl Harbor in November and December 1941 and sometime prior to that was of course a long distance from the southward movement of the Japanese forces. Isn't it almost compelling that we must have kept constantly in mind that Japan would make an air strike at the main naval forces [3038] in the Pacific as long as they were sitting out on their flank?

General Marshall. I would not put it quite that way, sir. They certainly would if they thought they had the opportunity. They would have to be on their guard against that Fleet. Of course they would know presumably the extent to which the Fleet was prepared
to go to sea for operations a long way from its base. The Japanese would know conclusively we had no means in Manila Bay to shelter the Fleet. We had virtually no antiaircraft at all. There were no guns at Cavite.

The submarines and small groups of ships of the Asiatic Fleet could offer not even one gun of antiaircraft fire in the Cavite naval region. Therefore the Fleet would have to be based at Hawaii, though it might operate a couple of thousand miles west of Hawaii, which is a very difficult procedure.

The Japanese of course would know that. They would know that if our Fleet moved out into the far Pacific it would be in a very tenuous position where any unfavorable action could result very seriously because of the distance of the Fleet from its base.

All of those were considerations in relation to what Japan would probably do. Given the opportunity to strike a crippling blow at the Fleet, it is useless to say she would probably do it, because she did do it.

Senator George. I have no further questions.

The Chairman. Congressman Clark I believe is absent.

Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. General Marshall—

The Chairman. Before you begin, Senator, may I ask General Marshall, for the benefit of the committee and to determine about its sittings a little later today and tomorrow, in an effort to conclude with you, what are your plans, as far as you have made them, to leave for China?

General Marshall. All I can do, sir, is have a plane in readiness as soon as you release me.

The Chairman. So your plans are to go forward at once as soon as we are completed?


The Chairman. Would it be agreeable for the committee to sit a little longer today, in view of General Marshall’s situation? Of course, we contemplate tomorrow anyway.

Senator Brewster. What is your question?

The Chairman. Would it be agreeable for the committee to sit a little later than 4 o’clock today to accommodate General Marshall, in the hope we might conclude with him tomorrow?

Senator George. Mr. Chairman, we ought to go on a reason-

[3040] able length of time.

Senator Brewster. I suggest 4:30.

The Chairman. Well, we will go at least until 4:30.

Go ahead, Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. General Marshall, I should like again to direct your attention to exhibit 32, dealing with the message you sent General Short on November 27, 1941. I will ask you if the same message with the same identical language was not sent to the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, San Francisco, Calif?

General Marshall. The message is not identical.

Senator Lucas. Will you point out the difference between the two, sir?

General Marshall. As I get it here in reading it, in the latter part of the message it states, “A separate message is being sent to G-2, 9th
Corps Area, re subversive activities in United States. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5."

That is a repetition of the message to Hawaii.

Calling attention to the "G-2 of the 9th Corps Area re subversive activities" was not included in the message to General Short.

Senator Lucas. For all alerting purposes, as far as the commands are concerned, they are the same?


Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I think this has already been put in the record a time or two, but I should like to have the record show at this point General Short's reply and General DeWitt's reply to those two respective messages.

The Chairman. That will be printed in the record again at this point.

(The messages referred to follow.)

Priority
From Fort Shafter TH
To Chief of Staff
No. 959 November 27th
Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy.
Read four seven two twenty seventh

Secret
Received: November 28, 1941. 11:18 PM
From HQ WDC Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.,
To General George C. Marshall

November 28th.

Report following measures taken as per your radio Nov twenty seven: Your radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC, Second Air Force, Fourth [3042] Air Force, Ninth CAD. Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area and Commandants Eleventh Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance control posts continuously manner. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities intensified. Six infy battalions and necessary motor transportation alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NCA to carry out his missions under rainbow five. Constant contact being maintained with corps area and naval district commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, sector and subsector plans rainbow five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies furnished CG SF P of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island. Paren in connection this report see my radio to CG GHQ Nov twenty fifth which recommended that WPL five two be extended to include Pacific coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps taken by me in preparation therefor. As air forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the execution of WLP five two or the preparatory stage of rainbow five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to [3043] direct operations of air forces in defense of the PCF or that instructions be issued specifying air action and that I be furnished a copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay.

DeWitt, Commanding.

Senator Lucas. I should like to call your attention also to page 13 of Exhibit 32 which purports to be a message sent out by the Adjutant General Adams, I believe, to the Hawaiian Department on November 28, and directing your attention to the last two lines, the following words (reading): "Telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this
does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instruc-
tions."

In the previous part of that message they have been talking about
sabotage, subversive activities. Would you—care to explain to the
committee what that last portion of that message means, if anything?

General Marshall. I am merely hazarding an opinion. I was not
aware of the wording of this message at the time it was
sent, or the fact that it was actually sent.

Senator Lucas. What, in your opinion, did Adams mean?

General Marshall. My opinion is he was trying to make certain
that this message in no way affects the terms of the command message.

Senator Lucas. That is the way I construe it.

General Marshall. That is undoubtedly what was the intention.

Senator Lucas. In other words, after Adams talks about subversive
activities and he concludes with that statement, which says, "Nothing
shall affect your responsibility under existing instructions" you un-
stand that the existing instructions would mean the previous instruc-
tions that had been sent out by you in your message of November 27?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; that was a definite alert message and
they signed my name to it instead of the Adjutant General's, to make
it quite clearly a command message.

This message also, as I believe the witnesses will testify, if they
haven't already done so, resulted from the Air Corps activities that
concerned all over the world and the Chief of the G-2 section became
involved in it, and it ended up with a message not with the signature
from G-2 but by the Adjutant General's signature.

Senator Lucas. Then on the following page, page 14 in this same exhibit, there is a further message to General Short, and that
message is signed by both Arnold and Adams, which continues to deal
with sabotage and subversive activities.

Now is there any higher or more important message that can be
sent to any command than that sent by the Chief of Staff?

General Marshall. No, sir; unless the Secretary of War personally
signed it or the President.

Senator Lucas. General Marshall, you were adviser, under the
Army rules and regulations, to the Secretary of War as well as the
President of the United States upon military matters?


Senator Lucas. During your tenure as Chief of Staff it goes without
saying that you had many conversations with both of these gentle-
men—


Senator Lucas. On the conduct of affairs of this Nation.


Senator Lucas. Did the President of the United States have any
information about the Japanese situation that the Secretary of War
or the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval
Operations did not have?

General Marshall. Did not have?

[3046] Senator Lucas. Did not have.

General Marshall. So far as I know, he did not—meaning the
President did not.
Senator Lucas. That is right. In other words, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations were in close contact with the President of the United States and the Secretary of State?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. There were incidents such as this— I only remember this one: On the return from Argentina the message actually sent by the President to the Japanese Government did not come to my knowledge until several days later at a meeting in the State Department, in Mr. Sumner Welles’ office, when I was informed of the message. So there was a period there of several days that I did not know of that message.

I am not citing that as an abnormal thing at all, but just as an incident.

Senator Lucas. The usual course was in the other direction?

General Marshall. The normal course was in the other direction.

Senator Lucas. After you saw the message that was sent by Mr. Welles, did you approve it later on?

General Marshall. I do not know whether I could express myself in terms of approval or disapproval. I listened to the message and I do not recall my specific reactions.

Senator Lucas. Did the President of the United States, in your opinion, have a right to assume that the commands at Hawaii and in the Pacific, California, and Philippines, were properly alerted on the morning of December 7?

General Marshall. I think he had every right to assume that.

Senator Lucas. One question with respect to the letter that has been introduced, or two letters that have been introduced in evidence, that were written by you to Governor Dewey.

Now, what specific information came to you that Governor Dewey knew that we had cracked the Japanese code?

General Marshall. I do not know at the moment that I knew at that time that he specifically had information that we cracked the Japanese code. I know that he made a statement of that character, as I recall, to Colonel Clarke.

Senator Lucas. What was that last?

General Marshall. I know that he made a statement of that character to Colonel Clarke, as I recall, in his interview with him, but there have been other references to the matter here in Washington by various people, and I think one speech on the floor of the House that clearly indicated such a condition of affairs.

Senator Lucas. Did you believe that he was the proper man to give this information so as to be able to stop the flow of this sort of information?

General Marshall. I thought he was the only man with whom I could deal.

Senator Lucas. It was testified to here by General Miles that this code secret was known only by a very limited few, and I was just wondering how this information got to Governor Dewey, that he knew you were actually cracking the code.

General Marshall. I would qualify General Miles’ statement by saying it had come to my ears several times that there were various whisperings in Washington, in the gatherings in the hotels and otherwise, dinners, that such things were happening. Specifically, there
was very dangerous whispering regarding the killing of the head of the Japanese Navy, Admiral Yamamoto, who was shot down by a group of Army aviators headed by one Major Lamphier, on the basis of the data we obtained on our intercepts which specified exactly the trip that Yamamoto was going to take.

Senator Lucas. That was the fellow who said he was going to write the peace in the White House?

General Marshall. I haven't the record here, but I believe you are correct. The point there was that the aviators had to be told exactly where to go and what to expect. That, of course, meant to them we must have a means of knowing whether their first discussions came back in the form of mere rumors, but whatever happened, it was so distorted, or so elaborated that it reached Washington [3050] and finally I was called up by a responsible citizen and informed of general statements on the subject based on that particular incident. Other similar things had occurred, so it was well known to me that there had been very careless talk here in Washington.

I might explain now, that I sought the services of the FBI a number of times to check particular Army officers in Washington, in an effort to make an example of somebody.

I might also, for the record, state that Mr. Hoover was very unwilling to do this, because he did not want the FBI investigating Governmental agencies for fear it would be regarded as a Gestapo, so he was always very hesitant about accommodating me, and yet, I felt it was imperative that I have his services. I almost caught the man once or twice, but some little thing intervened, and I was not able to do it.

I might say apropos of that, that the Russians were fearful of telling us anything, because they felt a leak was inevitable, and it reached the point where I was very much afraid that we would be embarrassed with them most seriously because of some leak affecting their campaign. Therefore, I instructed our officers on the mission in Moscow never to ask when an operation was going to be carried out, or when, or where, because I did not want to be responsible [3051] for the possible leaks of that information, and I so informed the Russians.

Senator Lucas. Well, your only thought in drafting this letter at that particular time was for the sole purpose of winning this war at the earliest possible time and the saving of American lives?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. This would be, of course, a guess upon your part, but without the cracking of the Japanese code in the way that we did, without the knowledge that came to us of their ship movements, and their convoys, would you care to hazard a guess as to how much longer it would have taken us to defeat the Japs?

General Marshall. I wouldn't want to involve myself in that estimate except to say that it could be operated in two ways. One, it would have made the operation much more difficult to stage, and also would have made it necessary, probably, at the time for us not to undertake certain things because we did not know enough about the Japanese dispositions, capabilities, and intentions. With positive knowledge, we were then free in our operations.

I tried to give you an illustration in relation to going into Korea where we could not obtain the shipping sufficient for the number of
troops first thought necessary \[3052\] to a landing in Korea, which was September 23. However, when we picked up the messages from the Japanese commander, who was earnestly hoping that American troops would arrive at the earliest possible date, they sent in a small command with perfect assurance that it would not be complicated by Japanese resistance.

The same considerations permitted our moving into Japan with a little driblet of people at the very start. We had the same information regarding the Japanese forces in China.

To go back into the active operations in the war, we found out what they were aiming to do, and what they had to do it with, and that left us free to make moves that we otherwise would not have attempted.

I might say that, of course, we always had to be very careful to check, because you never could tell at what moment that would boomerang. It would be the inevitable procedure of the other government, if they knew their business, and they suddenly discovered we had cracked their code and were picking up their information, to endeavor to capitalize on that, to lead us into a ruinous situation.

For example, the information which we received which led up to the appropriate disposition of the fleet and the accumulation of aircraft to fight the Battle of Midway, \[3053\] where our means were very limited, where, I believe, we only had the equivalent of one carrier and a half, and where we knew from magic that the Japanese were coming in with, I believe, five carriers, our relief was profound when planes of ours located the Japanese columns of ships moving to the east of Wake, because it meant the confirmation of what was in magic.

I might say, though it hasn’t any importance to this hearing, that we were very much disturbed because one Japanese unit gave Midway as its post office address, and that seemed a little bit too thick, so when the ships actually appeared it was a great relief, because if we had been deceived, and our limited number of vessels were there, and the Japanese approached at some other point, they would have met no opposition whatsoever: And those vessels that went to Midway had to virtually race from the Coral Sea to arrive in the Midway district in time.

I believe one carrier had been damaged at Midway—they made hurried repairs, superficial repairs, and rushed her up into Midway. Admiral Halsey’s ships had to steam at top speed in order to reach the Battle of Midway in time. I think he got there the first day or maybe on the day of the battle.

All of that was based on magic.

\[3054\] Senator Lucas. General Marshall, no doubt you are familiar with the Army board’s report.

General Marshall. I haven’t read it, sir.

Senator Lucas. You haven’t read it?

General Marshall. I have had a hard enough time reading these other papers.

Senator Lucas. You have something to look forward to.

General Marshall. I have been told the general characterization. That is all I know.

Senator Lucas. Are you acquainted with Gen. George Grunert?
General Marshall. Yes, sir. I have known him for years.

Senator Lucas. What position did he hold when war broke out?

General Marshall. When the war broke out?

Senator Lucas. December 7, 1941.

General Marshall. He was in command of the Philippines. When the war broke out?

Senator Lucas. December 7, 1941, yes.

General Marshall. I think he was commanding an Army Corps back here in the United States.

Senator Lucas. Do you remember what happened to him after that?

General Marshall. I believe he was given command of the corps area in Chicago.

I am not quite certain of that. I know that he became, I think, the head of personnel of the Army Service Forces under General Somervell and finally he was given the Eastern Defense Command with headquarters at Governors Island.

[3056] Senator Lucas. He did not serve overseas in the war?

General Marshall. He was overseas up until the summer of 1941.


General Marshall. He is the officer of the National Guard from North Carolina who commanded the Thirtieth Division.

Senator Lucas. Is he retired now?

General Marshall. Until recently he was on duty on some board here in Washington, I think.

Senator George. North Carolina or Georgia, General?

General Marshall. Well, Senator George, if you say Georgia, I will say Georgia. It was the Thirtieth Division though, was it not?

Senator George. Originally he may have been from North Carolina but he has been in Georgia for quite a long time.

Senator Lucas. Did he command the Thirtieth Division overseas?


Senator Lucas. General Frank?

General Marshall. General Frank is an Air Corps officer.

Senator Lucas. General Marshall, in this Army report, in the conclusion, they laid responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster to a lot of folks.

General Marshall. General Handy, the Deputy Chief of Staff, told me orally what they had referred to in regard to him.

[3057] Senator Lucas. After talking about Mr. Hull and its conclusion they then turn to the Chief of the Army, General George Marshall and in this report they say:

He failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little.

Would you care to expand on that statement, General?

General Marshall. No, sir; I think I will rest on the evidence that I believe has been submitted here.

Senator Lucas. I presume that is true with all of these statements that they have made?


Senator Lucas. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. General Marshall, there has been a great deal of talk throughout the country about the similarity between what happened at Pearl Harbor and what happened at Port Arthur back some years ago when there was an attack on Russia. I am not a student of military history but from what I have read there seems to be quite a difference.

[3058] Are you familiar with the history of the attack on Port Arthur?

General Marshall. I remember, as I recall the incident, it seemed that certain statements of the Japanese Government were delivered in St. Petersburg. There was a night attack made by destroyers, I believe, on Port Arthur.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I think from what I have read there is a little difference, and I wanted to put it in the record so that we might have what I have discovered in connection with that for this inquiry.

Mr. Keeffe. Are you going to be a witness?

Mr. Murphy. I am now reading from the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, page 1058, and I am quoting Admiral Pye as follows [reading]:

There are quite a few people who seem to feel that the situation in Honolulu was quite similar to that which existed at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, at Port Arthur. I would just like to point out that there were several differences in the situations.

In the first place, even at Port Arthur, the Japanese had broken off diplomatic relations with the Russians, on February 6, two days before the attack at Port Arthur, and, in the letter breaking off those diplomatic relations, they informed the Russian Government that they [3059] reserved the right to take such independent action as they might deem necessary, or words to that effect. In other words, adequate notice was given, both of the fact that the negotiations were at an end, and that the Japanese Government intended to take independent action.

The second great difference was, that the Japanese, in order to obtain their objective, had to land in Korea, or in the vicinity of Port Arthur. The only forces which could oppose these landings effectively were the Russian ships in Port Arthur and at Chinnampo.

So much for that.

Now, then, there has been reference made, General Marshall, to your trip to the South for maneuvers and I would like to have you for the record, so that we might have the facts on that, refer to your report covering the period from July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943.

As I understand it, you reported at page 2 as follows [reading]:

During the summer of 1941, large battle rehearsals continued which included maneuvers in August, September, and November of some 900,000 troops.

And I inquire now whether your visit to the South in the month of November was to attend one of those three maneuvers?

General Marshall. That was its purpose. I might add—[3060] I do not know as it is at all pertinent to the investigation—that the maneuvers presented my best opportunity to determine command ability and I had to arrive there at the time of the maneuver because the whole thing was very carefully programmed in relation to other movements in other parts of the country and transportation and so on.

On this particular trip the good roads in North Carolina offered facilities for covering the country, which made it a much more difficult
proposition than in some of the other points that they were having maneuvers and I would see less and the prospects were I would see more.

As a result of that particular trip I made several decisions. One was for the relief of three or four officers, two, I have in mind particularly, from command and assignment to other duties and the other was the decision to advance General Patton to corps command.

Mr. Murphy. Thank you.

I now would like to read, Mr. Chairman, from page 3 of the same report as follows [reading]:

Since 1935 the Hawaiian Islands, having been given first priority, had been provided with more complete troop garrisons and munitions than any other overseas garrison. It now became imperative that the defenses of the Panama Canal and Alaska be given immediate priority. Also, the uncertainty of the European situation involving the peril of the British Isles and the British Fleet made it urgently necessary for us to secure the defenses of the Western Hemisphere by establishing air bases and defensive garrisons throughout the Caribbean and in Newfoundland. With our limited means the situation developed into a problem of priorities in attempting to meet these requirements, and it was not until February 1941 that additional aircraft, antiaircraft, and other items of modern equipment could be shipped to the Hawaiian Islands. A little later the first shipments of modern aircraft were made to the Philippines and the Philippine Scout organization was doubled in strength, drawing the necessary personnel from the trained cadres of the new Philippine Army. The fighter planes secured for these purposes were largely obtained by stripping the limited number of squadrons then in training in the United States.

In July 1941 the development of quantity production made it possible for the first time to assign modern matériel in sizable lots to the Philippines. On August 28 the first flights of Flying Fortresses were started across the Pacific via Midway and Wake Islands and thence south through Rabaul, Port Moresby, or Port Darwin, and north to the Philippines. By the first week in November some 35 Fortresses had completed this trip. A gap in airplane deliveries from the factory combined with adverse winds between San Francisco and Hawaii prevented the ferrying of an additional 48 Fortresses prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

At that point, General Marshall, I recall your testimony relative to the difficulties of the ships leaving the west coast in the direction of Hawaii and their problem of having sufficient gas.

Are you prepared to testify, or should we ask General Arnold, whether or not having made the long distance from the west coast to Hawaii the very ships themselves, I mean the planes, would have sufficient gas in order to engage in any kind of combat?

General Marshall. I think under the conditions under which they operated then they would not, but General Arnold is the appropriate witness.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I would also like to ask whether or not you received this telegram, General Marshall—and then I will go on—whether or not on August 30 you received a telegram from General MacArthur reading as follows:

I wish to express my personal appreciation for the splendid support that you and the entire War Department have given me along every line since the formation of this command. With such backing the development of a completely adequate defense force will be rapid.

General Marshall. That is an excerpt from a message to me.

Mr. Murphy. From General MacArthur.


Senator Brewster. Would you give the date of that message?
Mr. Murphy. August 30.

Senator Brewster. Nineteen—

Mr. Murphy. 1941. Page 4 of General Marshall’s report.

In questioning you, General Marshall, counsel asked you whether or not you had any information of a Jap implementing message up to December 7. I would like to make it a little bit clearer and ask you whether or not you had any knowledge of the existence of any Jap implementing message to the winds code up to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor?


Mr. Murphy. You also testified that you had an orderly at your home at Fort Myer whose purpose it was to get phone messages and the like. Did you have that orderly on duty before December 7?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, I had him—I speak of him as one person, it was one of three or four—for about a year before that and continued it about a year after that and as the War Department became more fully organized I had an arrangement whereby all calls were diverted to the office of the Secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, do you have any information of any attempt to locate you at your home by telephone or messenger on the evening of December 6 or the morning of December 7 prior to the call which you received while you were taking your shower?

General Marshall. I am unaware of any such message to contact me.

Mr. Murphy. Then, as I understand it, from the time you received that call to the time you actually got to our office was a period of some 20 minutes?

General Marshall. I believe I said it generally took me about 10 minutes to bathe and dress. I can only make an assumption in the matter but I think I proceeded directly to the office.

Mr. Murphy. General Marshall, did you at any time ever hear, up to this very day, of any American having any information, specific information that an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

General Marshall. What do you mean by “specific information”?

Mr. Murphy. Well, there is talk—

General Marshall. I might intervene to say we had pretty much everything attacked.

Mr. Murphy. Knowledge to the effect that the Japanese were actually going to make an attack.

General Marshall. I am unaware of such.

Mr. Murphy. Have you any personal knowledge, General, of how much information General MacArthur might have had from Jap intercepts, which knowledge was not available to General Short?

General Marshall. I do not know that. I have learned that Admiral Hart had facilities which Admiral Kimmel, I think, did not have.

Mr. Murphy. And the Admiral Hart who had the facilities and who was then the commander of the Naval forces at Manila is presently a United States Senator from Connecticut, isn’t he?

General Marshall. That is the same man.

Mr. Murphy. And in Washington. Well, you wouldn’t know whether he was in Washington or not, I mean today.
Now, then, General—

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, would the reporter read the last remark?

Mr. Murphy. I said he would not know whether Admiral Hart was in Washington or not.

The Chairman. Well, if it is of any value, this information, I can tell you he is here today.

Mr. Murphy. Well, it may or may not become pertinent at a later stage of this inquiry.

General, in giving your opinion as to the ability of the force at Hawaii to meet the Japanese attack, did you take into consideration only the Army forces out there or did you also include all the forces the Navy had there, including their PBY’s?

General Marshall. I was including the naval potential also.

Mr. Murphy. Had you any warning, General, or any reason to expect on the night of December 6 or on the early morning of December 7 that there was any special urgency requiring you to be at the War Department earlier than the hour you did arrive there on the morning of December 7?

General Marshall. I had no such conception or information.

Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time prior to December 7 ever have anyone tell you that the fleet, the United States Fleet in the Pacific ocean, was not able to take care of itself in the event of an attack?

General Marshall. I do not think I ever did, sir. I had heard a discussion by Admiral Richardson as to the requirements that the fleet had to have to be built up before taking out to sea and be properly supplied.

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., December 7, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a.m., Saturday, December 8, 1945.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order.

The Chairman is detained for a few moments. We will continue. Does counsel have anything to present at this time before General Marshall resumes his testimony?

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

The Vice Chairman. General Marshall, do you have anything that you want to bring to the attention of the committee before you resume your testimony?

General Marshall. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to present two items in the record regarding my testimony yesterday which are incorrect statements as recorded. Is that permissible?

The Vice Chairman. You may proceed.

General Marshall. On page 2994, the next to the last sentence reads: "I came to the conclusion that the matter was so important that we must make it a matter of record, and I sent Colonel Clarke", and so forth.

I was referring to the discussion I had preliminarily to sending a second letter to Governor Dewey. The first five words on line 24, "it a matter of record" should have read "another effort", so the sentence would read: "I came to the conclusion that the matter was so important that we must make another effort, and I sent Colonel Clarke".

The Vice Chairman. That correction will be made.

General Marshall. Two pages further on, 2996, line 4, the sentence reads: "Colonel Clarke returned to Washington and reported to me that the Governor had read the letter, had discussed it with Mr. Bell in the presence of Colonel Clarke——." That is not a correct statement.
Line 4 should read, "with Mr. Bell but not in the presence of Colonel Clarke".

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That correction will be made, General. Is there anything further, sir?

General MARSHALL. Nothing further.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee has heard with profound sorrow that Senator Brewster's father passed away last night. Necessarily the Senator is absent this morning. The committee extends him its deepest sympathy in this time of bereavement.

Senator Brewster would next be entitled to recognition, and of course being unable to be present the Chair recognizes Congressman Gearhart of California, who will now inquire.

Mr. GEARHART. General Marshall, I regret the necessity of your being delayed in leaving for the Orient, and I regret especially that I must share a part of the blame for detaining you here, and for that reason I will make my cross-examination [3071] very, very short.

First I would like to inquire, what was the over-all desire of the Army and Navy during the months of October and November and first part of December in reference to delaying or accelerating the commencement of war with any nation?

General MARSHALL. It was our great desire, speaking specifically for the Army, but I am certain with naval agreement, the agreement of Admiral Stark, to delay in every way the possibility of our being involved in war.

Mr. GEARHART. The reason for that was that we were improving our defensive and striking capacity very rapidly under our preparedness program of the moment?

General MARSHALL. That, of course, was a prime factor. Mr. Congressman, but it goes a little further than that. Naturally it was our hope that we could avoid a war, but also, as a purely military proposition, it would be highly undesirable, if involved in war, that it should be on two fronts in widely separated parts of the world, and more specifically, that it should develop in the Pacific, where we knew the British had very little available means to resist aggressive action by the Japanese.

The British situation, or that of the British Empire, was so serious as to deficiency in men and matériel, particularly in planes at that time, and in naval shipping, which [3072] was engaged in the effort to keep the Atlantic lanes open for convoys from this country, carrying lend-lease supplies which were vital to the successful defense they were then laboring under, that if they became involved in war in the Pacific they were almost bound to weaken themselves in the Atlantic, meaning in Great Britain, at a time when the Germans were exceedingly strong.

So a war on two fronts was to be avoided, if it was at all possible to do so. War was to be avoided by us in our own view, if we could manage it, and every effort was to be made to gain us time in case war became inevitable.

Mr. GEARHART. And it was your belief, Admiral Stark concurring, that if the war with Japan could be delayed long enough, that our might and power would grow so great that Japan probably would be dissuaded from attacking us?
General Marshall. I have a very distinct recollection of my own reactions at the time. I thought if we once had accumulated approximately 100 4-engine bombers in the Philippines the Japanese could not dare to attempt to move to the south of the Philippines, or to make a naval attack on the Philippines, that is, to support a landing. I had great confidence in the potential threat involved in a large concentration of heavy bombers.

I might add that at that time no such concentration had ever been made before in the history of war, I think, and although now we think in terms of thousands, at that time 100 was a very large figure.

So we were making every conceivable effort to present in the Philippines to the Japanese a concentration of air power that they would not dare hazard active operations to the south in the China Sea or directly against the Philippine Islands themselves.

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark shared those views with you, did he not?

General Marshall. That was my understanding, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You and he took advantage of every opportunity to call the necessity for delayed action to the attention of the President and the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, did you not?

General Marshall. And the Secretary of State. Admiral Stark, as I believe I testified earlier in my appearance here, which, of course, he can give you authentic evidence on, desired in the discussions with Mr. Hull that, or stated, I believe, that February 1st was the essential date for the Navy in order that they might be able to make the completion of the Fleet’s requirements. I hazarded in early September, as I recall, that if we obtained the ships and delivery of planes, that we might or should be ready by December 5 to an extent that would probably deter the Japanese from making an attack.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, during the month of November large convoys, men and materiel were moving towards the Philippines and you had plans for still larger convoys to be moving in that direction for the month of December?


Mr. Gearhart. Of 1941.


Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, convoys were leaving San Francisco as the bombs began to fall in Hawaii; is that not true?

General Marshall. I did not hear the question.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, convoys were moving out of San Francisco at the time the bombs began to fall?

General Marshall. I think that is correct; I also know that a large slow convoy had been headed south toward Torres Strait and was somewhere between Samoa and Hawaii at the time of the outbreak of war.

Mr. Gearhart. In line with your and Admiral Stark’s desire to gain time, you jointly prepared a statement which you sent to the President on November 5?


Mr. Gearhart. And the gist of that document was an appeal to the President to use his good offices and the good offices of
our Government to prevent an outbreak of war with Japan for the time being?

General Marshall. I think that in general is a correct statement.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you or Admiral Stark, in your presence and hearing, protest at any time to Secretary Hull the sending of his message, the handing of his message of November 26 to the Japanese Envoys?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of such protest.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you know in advance of the handing of that message to the Japanese that Mr. Hull was contemplating the preparation of such a document?

General Marshall. I think I knew he was contemplating the preparation of such a document. I did not know the time and actual date of the document.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you, in any words, written or oral, urge him not to take that step?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of such action.

Mr. Gearhart. When did you first hear that he had handed such a note as the one which bears the date of November 26 to the Japanese Envoys?

General Marshall. I have not a clear recollection regarding that. I imagine it was on November 27, or 28th for me, because I was absent on the 27th.

Mr. Gearhart. You were a member of the so-called War Cabinet of the President?

General Marshall. I don't believe I could be considered a member of the Cabinet, but I sat in at the meetings of that group on most occasions.

Mr. Gearhart. Wasn't there an organization informally known as the President's War Cabinet consisting of the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, the Secretary of State and the two Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General Marshall. That group met in that form on several occasions. What I mean is that the military, I don't believe, would be considered part of the Cabinet, though we were a part of the meeting.

Mr. Gearhart. I will ask you if Secretary Hull, prior to the 26th day of November and prior to his handing the note to the Japanese, informed you and the other members of that so-called War Cabinet of his intention to hand a document at that time to the Japanese?

General Marshall. May I have the first part of the question?

Mr. Gearhart. You do not know whether he read the message to you prior to its delivery to the Japanese Envoys?

General Marshall. I do not think he did.

Mr. Gearhart. Did he read it to you, or was a copy placed in your hands, immediately after he delivered it to the Japanese?

Mr. Gearhart. But nevertheless you and Admiral Stark on November 27, the very next day, addressed a memorandum to the President in which you again urged upon the President, as the most essential thing, the necessity of gaining time.


Mr. Gearhart. Was that joint message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President inspired by the action of the Secretary of State in handing the message of November 26 to the Japanese?

General Marshall. I have not a clear recollection on that, Mr. Gearhart. I couldn't tell you, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. All right.

General Marshall. I certainly haven't an affirmative reaction of what the Secretary of State said he was going to do that caused us to take that particular action. We [3078] took it, but possibly Admiral Stark can remember more clearly than I can. I do not recall all the circumstances of it.

Mr. Gearhart. I will read you, for the purpose of refreshing your memory a paragraph from the pamphlet entitled "Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, 1931-41,"¹ the paragraph which appears on page 138:

On November 28 at a meeting of high officials of this Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan. He stated that there was no possibility of agreement being achieved with Japan, that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force, and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.

Are you familiar with that?

General Marshall. My recollection is roughly that, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Then, the Secretary on the 25th told you and the other members composing this so-called war cabinet that there was no chance of obtaining an agreement, and that the matter was in the hands of the Army and Navy at that time?

General Marshall. I think that is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. Isn't that the reason why you and Admiral Stark immediately devoted your attention to preparing the [3079] memorandum of November 27 for the President?

General Marshall. That may be, sir. I don't recall exactly the conditions under which we wrote that memorandum.

Mr. Gearhart. Going on and reading further in the same paragraph:

The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy, and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and coordination.

Do you remember his speaking to you to that effect?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of such detail. I testified yesterday to a very distinct recollection of Mr. Hull saying at one of those meetings, one of the last, "These fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared."

Mr. Gearhart. And to refresh your memory in respect to your having read this pamphlet at some time, or having had conversations

¹ Exhibit No. 27.
in December or November of 1941, let me read one further paragraph from this pamphlet I have in my hands, the succeeding paragraph to that which I just read:

On November 29, 1941, Secretary Hull conferred with the British Ambassador. The Secretary said that "the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan were virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and the Navy."

Have you any comment to make upon that statement of the Secretary of State?

General Marshall. I have not, Mr. Gearhart. Incidentally I have never read that pamphlet you are reading from.

Mr. Gearhart. Was it ever called to your attention by anyone who had heard that the Secretary had made that statement?

General Marshall. I don't recall anyone bringing it to my attention. I have a vague recollection of it, which I probably obtained from the newspapers.

Mr. Gearhart. Quoting further from the same page:

He said further that it would be "a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly, and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that the Japanese recognized that their course of unlimited conquest now renewed all along the line probable is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risks."

Do you remember having heard that from any one of the Secretary having so expressed himself to the British Ambassador?


Mr. Gearhart. But you did feel from that which he had to say that war was imminent and you felt also in harmony with the Chief of Naval Operations that everything should be done to delay the commencement of hostilities?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. My understanding from the Secretary of State was that the situation was most critical, using the word "most" in its accurate meaning, that these "fellows" meaning the Japanese, intended to fight, and that we must be prepared. That is a pretty complete estimate of the situation.

Mr. Gearhart. In your memorandum to the President of November 27, 1941, written just after you had heard of the President's message which he had handed the Japanese envoy's in Washington, you commenced by using these words:

If the current negotiations end without agreement Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward.

As a matter of fact, General, wasn't it your opinion, and wasn't it the opinion of Admiral Stark and all of the high-ranking naval and military officers with whom you were in conversation, that the Japanese attack was going to come to the Far East and that there was no thought of it coming at Hawaii?

General Marshall. Our thought at the time—my thought specifically—was that the Japanese were engaged in a campaign southward
from the China Sea, that that would be their operation. I assumed that Guam would be captured. I assumed that Wake Island would be taken, though there was a little less probability there than there was as regards Guam, because while the fleet was still in full being, the American Fleet, Wake, I would assume, would be a more difficult task for the Japanese.

We had in mind the possibility of an effort on the Panama Canal. We had in mind the possibility of an effort to strike a blow at our air plants in Seattle, at our air plants in San Diego, and we had in mind the possibility of a blow in the Central Pacific, in the Hawaiian district.

[3083] We thought the latter was the most improbable.

Mr. Gearhart. What was the latter?

General Marshall. The attack against the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. Gearhart. You thought that was improbable?

General Marshall. I said the most improbable.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, in the opinion of the people with whom you were in daily conversation, both naval and military, Pearl Harbor was considered impregnable, was it not?

General Marshall. Do you mean by that, Mr. Gearhart, it was impracticable as a naval base, or impracticable as a Japanese objective?

Mr. Gearhart. Why did we build it?

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

General Marshall. Did you say impracticable?

Mr. Gearhart. Impregnable.

General Marshall. I didn't understand.

Mr. Gearhart. We built it as a defense against possible trouble with Japan; isn't that right?

General Marshall. Yes. I thought you used the word "impracticable." We thought it was impregnable against a Japanese landing expedition.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, you were so convinced [3084] of that you wrote in 1940 in your aide memoire the following words:

The Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world.

General Marshall. I didn't write that. It was prepared for me. At the time I think it was a correct statement.

Also in the memorandum the implication is: when we get all the various arrangements there.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, referring to your warning message which was sent in slightly different forms to Manila, Hawaii, Panama, and other places, that warning message required the addressees to report to you, didn't it?

General Marshall. Required—

Mr. Gearhart. The addressees to report to you?


Mr. Gearhart. What they had done in response to your directions?


Mr. Gearhart. General Short reported that he had taken steps in accordance with your part of your directions against sabotage, in his message of November 28?

1172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[3082] Mr. Gearhart. You received that report, did you not?
General Marshall. I testified in regard to that, sir. The presumption is I did. The War Department received it and the presumption is that I read it.

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you remember whether or not you received such a message of that kind?
General Marshall. I do not remember, as I testified, and I did not initial the report.

Mr. Gearhart. What did you say?
General Marshall. I do not remember, as I testified, and I did not initial the report.

Mr. Gearhart. You heard, or were you present in this room when General Gerow testified and accepted full responsibility for not having acted on the inadequacy, as he called it, of this report?
General Marshall. I was not present in the room and I admire very much his attitude.

Mr. Gearhart. I, too, thought it was very generous, but prior to November 28 you had issued a directive to General Gerow and to General Miles, did you not, directing them to send you not only the reports on the messages that they received but to send you the material itself, had you not?

General Marshall. The message reads:

[3086] Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.


Mr. Gearhart. That is correct, but that is not an answer to the question, though, that I propounded to you, General.

My question was, did you not, prior to November 28, issue a directive to General Gerow and General Miles—


Mr. Gearhart (continuing). Where you accepted their evaluations on the messages they intercepted but also to send the material along as well?


Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from California yield?

General Marshall. That was, I believe, in the month of August, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. You understand the question, don't you?

General Marshall. I think so. In the month of August are you referring to?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, in the month of August, that they send the messages and their evaluations, if any, along with them?

Mr. Gearhart. Your reason for making that directive to the two generals was because you wanted to see yourself what was being intercepted and what messages were being received?

General Marshall. That, quite evidently, was my reason.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, can you give any reason now why you did not take exception yourself to the message of General Short's of November 28?

[3088] General Marshall. I can only say, sir, that that was my opportunity to intervene and have a further check made and I did not take it. Just why I do not know.

Mr. Gearhart. You expected immediate attention to be given to your message of November 27 by the various addressess to whom you sent it, didn't you?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. That was a command direction for alert against a state of war.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Did you expect General Short to take immediate action?


Mr. Gearhart. Then will you explain how he could have taken immediate action and ordered a No. 3 alert instantly without creating alarm among the people and disclosing the intention of the United States?

General Marshall. I think he could have, sir. We had done such things before out there. We had done it the previous summer. There are a good many ways to get at that.

The reconnaissance, for example by air over water—that was a naval directive responsibility—could not in any way have alarmed the population. The other matters in regard to planes and, presumably, ships, it seems to me, would have not alarmed the population.

The issue where the people came most closely in contact [3089] with the military might be as a change of attitude related to sabotage because that required the posting of a great many detachments in order to avoid action being taken.

I would like to say, in regard to this right now, it was necessary, we felt, specifically necessary, to include that particular direction regarding the public, both as to Hawaii and as to the west coast, because it was the strong desire of, I will say, the War Cabinet, certainly of the Army and Navy officials and I am quite certain of the President of the United States, that the Japanese be given no opportunity whatever to claim that we had taken some overt act which forced a state of war upon them.

The feeling was—I am now speaking as Chief of Staff only, from the point of view I could obtain as Chief of Staff—the feeling was at that time that if the Japanese could have created a situation, however unjustified, however illogical, in which they could have led at least a portion of the people to believe that our overt action had forced them into an act of war and we would have had a divided country, which would have been a terrible tragedy in a war situation.

Therefore, each move we made had to be taken carefully into account to avoid the possibility that the Japanese would instantly make a claim that we had forced the issue, that we had really made the overt act and they were forced to fight [3090] us.

Mr. Gearhart. In reply to that I entirely agree with you.
General Marshall. May I finish my statement, sir?

Mr. Gearhart. I entirely agree with you.

The Chairman. Let the General finish his answer.

General Marshall. At that time there was a very—I believe this is correct—divided opinion in this country and of course, the people generally could not know all the inside facts which we had obtained from one source or another about the very aggressive acts that the Japanese were carrying out in the Far East.

So we labored in this state of peace, in this state of normalcy; and, as for example, in Hawaii, in this state of not being able to check them up, for instance, through the phone service and things of that sort, in this state of having to allow them to send any information they wished back to their own country, we labored constantly under the obligation that we must have no act committed by one of our officers that would permit the Japanese to claim that we had started the war, and, therefore, would to that extent for the time being at least have left us with a divided people on a tragic issue.

Therefore, it was necessary to omit, that those messages to [3091] the west coast and the message to the Hawaiian Islands must have a proviso in them of that character.

Mr. Gearhart. I agree with you entirely, General. That was a tremendously important consideration and to further emphasize the arguments that you have made, the Constitution of the United States provides that war shall be declared only by the Congress of the United States. If you took any other steps it would have been in violation of the Constitution which all of us have taken an oath to uphold. I am just as firm in my agreement with you as I possibly could be on that necessity that you speak of.

What I am talking about now is whether or not the message of General Short's was in line with what should have been done under the circumstances and because of the very reasons that you have cited. "We must not alarm the people or give the Japanese the opportunity to say that we started the war."

General Marshall. I gathered the impression from your question, sir, that you thought or were implying that the message was impractical of execution.

Mr. Gearhart. No—oh, yes, that may be touched upon, too. I may be touching upon that, too, for the reasons you have outlined so well.

Now, if General Short had placed the Army on a No. 3 alert immediately upon receiving your message, that would have required him to fill the air with airplanes, it would have required every soldier on the island to put on a steel helmet and side arms, would it not, and appear on the streets in full war regalia?

General Marshall. Not necessarily appear on the streets in full war regalia and not necessarily fill the air with planes because deep reconnaissance takes off from the field and goes out over the water. It might be circling over the city, it might be on a training maneuver of any kind. It is not flying all the time; and the pursuits and interceptor planes did not need to take the air; quite the contrary. They needed to be armed and equipped and the pilots ready.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, that is exactly what happened when they had a No. 3 alert, isn't it?

General Marshall. I don't know what moment they went on the No. 3 alert and I would also like to say, Mr. Gearhart, that I had never
seen his various alert messages and they did not arrive here in this country until January.

Mr. Gearhart. Wouldn't the No. 3 alert require the men to take up battle positions immediately on the island?

General Marshall. It would, yes, sir. I presume that was a No. 3 alert. I have not got the details here before me. General Short can testify about that.

[3093] Mr. Gearhart. That would have required trucks with men with helmets and rifles to ride out to the battle positions from the barracks in which they were then living?


Mr. Gearhart. In other words, the sudden ordering of a No. 3 alert would have created a tremendous condition on the island that would have alarmed the civilian population on the island.

General Marshall. It seems to me that a No. 3 alert, whatever its exact details were, could have been carried out with certain modifications to attain the general result desired.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The Chairman. Will the gentleman yield to his colleague?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. A No. 2 alert would have been a defense against air attacks and surface and submarine attacks. They did not need a No. 3. A No. 2 would have made it.

Mr. Gearhart. Either 2 or 3.

General Marshall. I was not referring to 1, 2, or 3. That was the function of the commanding general in the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, when we have maneuvers over there, and we have had them for 30 or 40 years, the public mind was always prepared for the event, was it not, by prior announcements and by notices, so that they would not become alarmed at the display of military power?

General Marshall. I am not the best witness on that. General Herron and possibly General Short himself can testify as to that, and other commanders.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I—

General Marshall. You are asking me, sir, for the details of the condition of a command by the individual responsible for that command?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

General Marshall. There were commands all over the Pacific, there were commands in this country and there were commands in the Caribbean.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

General Marshall. I was not familiar with the detailed execution of their plans any more than I was familiar with General MacArthur's plans. I had given certain general directives and as general officers in a responsible position in the outpost he was carrying the duties out.

I testified, for example, the other day to an incident illustrative of that, that we only learned through magic his procedure of unloading at night and taking other measures to keep the Japanese in the dark as to what was going on.

[3095] It is impractical and there are no means in Washington to know all the details of the execution of commands by a higher
officer who is given the responsibility of carrying out a defense for air or certain operations.

Mr. Gearhart. At the present time you do not remember that you had or voiced any objections or criticism to General Short’s report?

General Marshall. I know specifically I did not.

Mr. Gearhart. The evidence shows that the 13 parts and the pilot message were received and decoded on December 6, 1941. All this became available on Saturday night. The President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Navy had it, your subordinates Miles and Bratton had it.

How do you explain the fact that none of it was given to your attention on Saturday, December 6, 1941?

General Marshall. As I recall—of course, the message itself will show—the first 13 parts were not of the nature of a vital threat as the 14th part. That was a message of direct importance to the Secretary of State and of related importance, of course, to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy who had been collaborating with him in his relationship in the dealings with Japan. The fact of the matter was it was not brought to my attention.

[3096] Mr. Gearhart. Do you now feel that General Short was not entitled to have information of that character to guide him in setting up the degree of alert that it was essential to have done?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, that was my view. He was issued a command and directed to do something. Now, if the directive was so written that he could not understand it, that is a matter for judgment. Once you issue an order, amendments or, you might say, codicils are very dangerous business when it is an operational order. In most instances it is far better to cancel the entire order and start anew. The transmission of information from the G-2, for example, of the War Department to G-2, for example, under General Short is another matter. That is informational and that is not directional.

Mr. Gearhart. Whenever a higher command, say the command in Washington, is in receipt of information of great importance to a commander in the field, it is the obligation of the command having that information either to transmit the information or issue directives in the light of that information, is that not correct?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Was that always done by G-2 and by your War Plans Division?

General Marshall. Are you referring to this incident or [3097] the whole course of the war?

Mr. Gearhart. I am talking about this thick volume of Japanese intercepted messages which throw so much light upon the Japanese attitude toward this country of ours.

The Vice Chairman. Exhibit 2.

General Marshall. I presume that in searching through that you will locate messages the sense of which might well have been communicated to General Short. However, the analyses of these messages, particularly as relates to the higher diplomatic operations of the Government, would properly be made here in Washington. It is the only place where all the information was available.

The problem was to keep the commander in the clear, as it were, as to what his action should be and not to confuse it.
I recounted in my testimony, I believe, yesterday and doubted for the moment as to whether the 1 o'clock message of December 7 should be sent out, though it was quickly decided that it was essential that it should go as quickly as possible.

There was another message, for example—no, that does not pertain.

The point, I think, that should be made clear, if possible, is that you must avoid confusing the commander with a mass of data.

For example, in this particular case, following General Short's assumption of command, as this record shows, there were a series of letters directly between General Short and myself. Those letters gave me the most definite impression of an extreme sensibility to air and submarine attack. They did not give me an impression of a similar sensitivity to sabotage matters.

Now, following that experience I practically never wrote another letter to any commander in the field and confined it purely to the operational directives. I did not write to General Eisenhower, I did not write to General MacArthur, and I did not write to the other commanders virtually at all during the course of the war. I confined myself entirely to the dry directive as to what they were to do.

In this case I gathered the impression from a series of letters which you have in the record, and the directive was issued having that impression, of an essential and understood policy and then the reaction developed, as you have been referring to here, wherein the attention went to sabotage and so on from an air and submarine attack.

Mr. Gearhart. Quite a number of the messages which you caused to be sent and which were sent by subordinates of yours and by Admiral Stark and subordinates of his emphasize the possibilities of hostilities in Indochina, the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula, Thailand, even Guam, but in no message that you sent did you call especial attention to the fact that Hawaii might be threatened.

General Marshall. Because at that time the opinion which we had most definitely in our own minds from the data available—in our own minds from the data available—was the Japanese threat south through the China Sea. We had it by magic. We had it by the actual reconnaissance of convoys, we had it by reports from other officials in Indochina and elsewhere, of very positive action which actually did confirm the main, the principal Japanese campaign.

Mr. Gearhart. What effect do you think it had upon the minds of Admiral Kimmel and General Short as these several messages went over their desks warning of impending war, true, but always centering attention upon the Kra Peninsula, the Philippines, Indochina, Borneo, what effect do you think it had on the minds of these two gentlemen warning them as to war and then always directing their attention to another side of the world? Do you think that there was any belief that Washington thought that Hawaii might be attacked?

General Marshall. I cannot say, sir. They were both long experienced in the military considerations. They were men of mature judgments and they were men of high rank and they were in a position of great responsibility. They knew, certainly, why Hawaii was set up in the military way as it was. They knew the capacity of an enemy to do certain things under certain circumstances. We did not have to tell them that.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, going to your letter which you wrote and had delivered to Governor Dewey, on page 2990 of the transcript, Volume 18, you testified as follows—

General Marshall. 90?

Mr. Gearhart. 90, yes. Line 21.

General Marshall. 90?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, 90.

General Marshall. What line, please?

Mr. Gearhardt. Line 22 [reading]:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphered their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department—rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Is that an entirely correct statement?

General Marshall. As to December 8 it was not. It was December 11, apparently, when I saw the messages, I had reference to there. As to the others, after all the files were dug out and the various messages were checked I think it would be proper to say that that was not entirely accurate as to that.

As to my information at the time I dictated this letter—and understand me, Mr. Gearhart, this was dictated in about ten minutes time while I was in the business of conducting the war from the Army side—that was my recollection of an event four years previously without any records of any kind in front of me, so that at that time I thought it was the day after instead of 3 days later that this message was shown to me at my desk. I was unaware of that particular message at any other time.

There were one or two other messages brought to my attention here recently which I was unaware of up to the time they were brought to my attention.

[3102] I would like to say that there is an immense mass of data involved in this and there were an immense number of things going on at this particular time, and at the time of the dictation of this letter we were in the throes of the war. I dictated it, as I say, in about 10 minutes. I had no records before me at the time; it would take quite a while to assemble them.

I think this is reasonably accurate according to my understanding of the facts at the time I dictated the letter.

Mr. Gearhart. You realized that you were assuming a tremendous obligation to convey a true and completely accurate picture of the situation to Governor Dewey when you were assuming to, or when you were asking him to do what was probably very hard for him to consent to do; is that not correct?

General Marshall. That is correct. I was thoroughly aware of that but I had been in that predicament almost every month through
the war and I just did what seemed to me right and that is the best I could do.

Mr. Gearhart. But now you admit that the statement you made was grossly inadequate in respect to having received no intercept of Japanese messages which pointed directly to Hawaii?

General Marshall. I wouldn't say this is grossly inaccurate. I should say the statement as made here is in--[3103] accurate, but only in the matter of three days. It would have no bearing, in general, on the main issue. I made this for the protection of the conduct of our operations by our troops. I did not make it with any regard whatever to a Congressional investigation.

Mr. Gearhart. In order that the record may be complete, I will ask you a rather long question now to which I would like to have your very careful attention. I intend to read from page 12 of exhibit 2, a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated September 24th, intercepted and decoded on October 9, 1941. "Secretly Secret." [Reading from Exhibit No. 2:]

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:
1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas.
2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tried up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

From Honolulu to Tokyo dated 29 September 1941, decoded October 19, 1941. [Reading:]

Honolulu to Tokyo #178.
Re your #083*.
(Strictly secret)
The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels:
1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message to Washington #48**): KS.
2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier): KT.
3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV.
4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG. (East and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.

[3105] There are some markings on it.
I have another message from Tokyo to--

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I should think there ought to be the complete message read.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, in the lower left hand corner is an asterisk.
Mr. Murphy. And up above "083" and there is a note at the bottom it is not available.

Mr. Gearhart. "Not available" asterisk "available" and then "dated 21 August." Lower down: "JD-1: 5730 23312." Over in the right hand corner, "(D) Trans, 10-10-41 (X)."
Another message from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu (Riyoji) 15 November 1941 (reading):

#111
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your “ships in harbor report” irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

In the lower right hand corner: “(Y) Navy Trans. 12–3–41 (S.)”
In the lower left hand corner: “JD–1: 6991 25644.”

Another message from Honolulu (Kita) to Tokyo, November 18, 1941, decoded December 6, 1941, reading as follows:

#222.
[3106] 1. The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219a on that day.
Area A—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.
Area C—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks KS. 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D.
3. At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to—.
b.—Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
[3107] c—East Loch.
d—Middle Loch.

In the lower left-hand corner: “Army 25817.” In the lower right-hand corner: “Trans. 12/6/41 (2).”

Another message from Tokyo (Togo) November 18, 1941, to Honolulu (reading):

#113.
Please report on the following areas as to vessels, anchored therein: Area “N”, Pearl Harbor. Manila Bay—“Manila Bay” is circled by a pen and up to one side “Honolulu” is written—and the Areas Adjacent thereto.
(Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

Lower left-hand corner: “a—Probably means Mamala Bay.” What is Mamala Bay? Is that in the Hawaiian Islands?

General Marshall. I think it is, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Lower right-hand corner: “Trans. 12/5/41 (S.).”

Lower left-hand corner: “Army 25773.”

Another message from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu dated November 20, 1941.

#111 Strictly Secret.
Please investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

[3108] Lower left-hand corner: “Army 25694 JD 7029.” Lower right-hand corner: “Trans. 12–4–41 (S.).”
One more, from Tokyo to Honolulu, 29 November 1941 (reading):

#122.
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.
In the lower left-hand corner: "JD-1: 7086 25823." In the lower right-hand corner "(Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)."

Then appear other messages which were translated after the sixth day.

So that it is quite apparent from the reading of those messages that were received, decoded, and placed on your desk, read or not read, that many messages directing the attention of our military and naval authorities to Hawaii had been received, is that not correct?

General MARSHALL. You stated, Mr. Gearhart, as I understand you, that it was quite evident that all those messages were placed on my desk. I have no recollection of that. I have a very definite recollection that the message on page 22 of the same exhibit was the one which I had in mind when I was writing to Governor Dewey. It was from Honolulu (Kita) to Tokyo and bore the December 4th date and it is that Navy [3109] message which was referred to in my testimony yesterday. I had a definite recollection of that particular message, and I have also a very definite recollection it came to my attention after the event and it shows here it was translated on the 11th of December.

The messages which you have just read I had no recollection of whatever at the time. In fact, I first read them in the 2 days when I was getting ready for this hearing here.

[3110] The CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Congressman?

Mr. GEARHART. General, in conclusion, I direct your attention to the report of the Army board. I haven't the official publication, but I have here the publication of the United States News of September 1, 1945. On page 56 of that particular printing, paragraph 2, "The Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. George C. Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little.

What have you to say to that?

General MARSHALL. Very much what I have said previously in answer to your question, sir, that we had given General Short a directive to do something which was an alert against the possibility or probability of war. He was a responsible commander; he had a definite task; he had indicated the various concerns he had in regard to that task; they were clear in our minds, and this mass of data which poured in here would normally, I think, merely impose an additional burden on him to undertake the analysis of it, which was [3111] going on at the same time back here.

He had a direction to do something; he had a direction to do something, a command direction for an alert. Now, the question of how much additional information should go to him is a matter of judgment. As a command direction, I think only the December 7 message of 1 p.m. applied.

As to the information which would be passed to his G-2 from the G-2 of the War Department, there is a question of judgment as to how much of that would be desirable.

I would say offhand that the messages you just read to me would have been helpful to General Short, but particularly more so to Admiral Kimmel.
Mr. Gearhart. Reading further from the report:

(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war.

What have you to say to that?

General Marshall. I have nothing to add to what I have already said to you, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. Reading further from the report:

[3112] (c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6 and the early morning of December 7, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.

What have you to say to that?

General Marshall. I have nothing to add to what I have already said in regard to that, except possibly this, that the first 13 sections of that message I do not believe had any specific bearing one way or the other on General Short's situation and responsibility with regard to the alert command direction that he had already received.

Mr. Gearhart. Reading further:

(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the immediate threat of war.

What have you to say to that?

General Marshall. I have only this to say, sir, that we had no intimation that that command was not ready, and I think we had every reason to believe that it was ready. With the rapidity of investigations that later became possible, or inspections that later became possible through the ease of air flight, some might have gone out there, but at that time it was not as simple a matter as it became later.

[3113] Incidentally, Mr. Gearhart, I went out to the Hawaiian Department myself at an earlier date while General Herron was in command, and I think I know the Chief of Staff who did go out there prior to the war, and I spent about a week going through every phase of their preparations against attack from the air and against attack from the ground.

I did not go into the details of the Naval concerns in Pearl Harbor itself.

I did go out, though, specifically to make certain that on the arrival of the fleet, in a maneuver which was to take place by, I believe, submarine action largely and a few destroyers on the Hawaiian side, and the fleet coming from the west coast on the fleet side, to make certain that our heavy bombers were involved in the program regarding which I was, sir, at some doubt, and that was arranged, and that was carried out in that operation, to make it a joint affair for the better cooperation and organization of the Hawaiian defense.

So I was aware of the plans that were in effect at the time General Herron—who was General Short's predecessor—was in command, by actual personal investigation.

I was aware shortly prior to that, while I was head of the War Plans Division in the summer and early fall of 1938, of the actual war
plans regarding Hawaii. I was only aware [3114] thereafter, with General Short’s assumption of command, as indicated by the letters General Short himself sent me and by the discussions that came up, brought up by the Air Corps in relation to General Short’s arrangements with the Navy, as to the control of the reconnaissance over water, and I had no reason to believe that that command was anything other than highly efficient and alert.

That is my view of it.

Mr. Gearhart. Thank you, General. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator, before we begin, may I call attention to what I think was an inadvertent mistake made by Congressman Gearhart in one of his questions when he assumed that the 13 parts of the 14-part message and pilot message were all received here on the 6th of December. I refer to page 248 of this pamphlet containing these Pearl Harbor decoded messages, and you will find that the pilot message was translated in Washington on the 7th of December instead of the 6th.

Mr. Gearhart. I may have been mistaken, but I was under the impression that there was a message that came on the 6th which carried information to the effect that there would be a directive at 1:00 o’clock, as it turned out, on the following day.

Mr. Gesell. That is at page 238, No. 901.

[3115] Senator Ferguson. I show you Exhibit 41, which shows that the pilot message was decoded, translated and typed at the Army SIS the 6th of December.

The Chairman. I am confused with the message on page 248, which reads as follows:

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.

Senator Ferguson. That is the eventual message.

The Chairman. All right. That correction will be made.

Go ahead, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. General, in order that we may clear up some points and in order that we may ascertain what was known in the field, the various fields, and what was known here in Washington, that we may, as a committee, ascertain why our forces at Hawaii were surprised, I want to ask you some questions.

I would like to have you refer to Exhibit 42, on page 2 of that exhibit. I will ask you whether or not you were the Commanding General of the Field Forces?

General Marshall. I was, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And did that include Hawaii?


[3116] Senator Ferguson. You were directly over General Short then, as I understand it.


Senator Ferguson. And the purpose of the Field Force in Hawaii was to defend Hawaii, defend the island where Pearl Harbor was, and the fleet, if the fleet was in?

---

1 Exhibit No. 1.
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now the second part of that exhibit indicates that if you were absent, then your Deputy Chief of Staff was in charge, is that correct?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What is meant by you being absent?

General Marshall. I imagine the best interpretation I can give you on that is "would be available," was I available or not. I say definitely if I am not in Washington I am absent, there is no question whatever about that.

Senator Ferguson. There isn’t any question of availability?

General Marshall. I would think so, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, would you say you were available on the morning of the 7th when you were horseback riding?

General Marshall. In one sense, yes; in another sense, no. They could not speak to me until they located me.

Senator Ferguson. Correct. So under this directive your [3117] Deputy Chief of Staff would be able to act?


Senator Ferguson. That is correct, is it not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I must say there, though, Senator, in fairness to him, that if he knew I was on an hour’s absence he would have quite a problem to decide whether he would take action then or wait until the expiration of the hour.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to get it right there. How far were you at any particular time on that morning from your residence?

General Marshall. I would say the present site of the Pentagon.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me?

General Marshall. I would say the present site of the Pentagon. That was the most distant point of the horseback trail I took.

Senator Ferguson. You would not be over 3 miles then from your residence at any time?


Senator Ferguson. So you would have felt that the Deputy Chief of Staff could have, if he desired, located you because you were within 3 miles of your residence?

General Marshall. I presume so; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did anyone know your custom of riding [3118] as to where you rode?

General Marshall. At the stables they knew. I do not know as General Bryden, my deputy, knew specifically where I rode. I never rode with him. I do not think. The variations from that were limited to following the trail along the Potomac down toward the present National Airport, but that was the only variation.

Senator Ferguson. You had regular places to ride?

General Marshall. Well, you are very much limited, you have to ride there unless you cross the river.

Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask you, General, you have stated here that Hawaii was alerted, that the Philippines was alerted.


Senator Ferguson. Was Washington alerted? Was your office alerted?
General Marshall. We had an officer on duty at night in the Secretary to the General Staff's office who received any important messages and routed them to the proper person. I am quite certain General Gerow will be able to testify he had a similar officer in the War Plans Division to receive any important messages that might come in.

Senator Ferguson. Then I want to get to this: Your office was alerted and you had a man there all night that [3119] could have acted, is that correct?

General Marshall. You used the expression "alerted," sir. That had been the state of affairs for quite some time.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, as we go along, if I use a word that is not correct in Army parlance, will you correct me?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I meant by that we had been doing that all along, just as I had been keeping the telephone open at 10 o'clock in the house.

Senator Ferguson. Would not this be true that on Sunday morning your office was alerted, or on the alert, the same as Hawaii, and that the Deputy Chief of Staff would be in a position to act?

General Marshall. I presume so; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now was G-2 alerted?

General Marshall. You will have to ask General Miles that. I do not know the details. I do know specifically about the War Plans Division; because I had so much business with it I am aware of it.

[3120] Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, he was a deputy under you?

General Marshall. He was Assistant Chief of Staff. A deputy operates directly under me.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct.

General Marshall. These others function up to him, or sometimes directly to me.

Senator Ferguson. He is classed as——

General Marshall. He handles the mass of ordinary business and acts for me in my absence.

Senator Ferguson. Would he get his alert from you?

General Marshall. He would have if I had given him a specific alert. He was responsible with the Secretary of the General Staff. The arrangements were such in that section of the War Department that there was a continuity throughout the night.

Senator Ferguson. Here is what I want to get at, if I can, by questions, to find out the facts. All I am trying to ascertain is, what are the facts.

On the 27th, when the message was sent to Hawaii, was G-2, War Plans, and your office alerted so that they knew that war was imminent? As I understand it, Hawaii was notified that war was imminent. Now, were these respective officers of G-2, G-1—War Plans was what? G-1?


Senator Ferguson. Was G-2, War Plans, and the Chief of Staff organization alerted at the same time?

General Marshall. They were all aware of the critical situation and of the issuance of a directive alerting the overseas theaters in the Pacific,
Senator Ferguson. Then, how do you account for the fact, if they were alerted, that the 13 parts of the 14-part message—and we understand each other on that—


Senator Ferguson (continuing)—and the pilot message were not delivered to the Chief of Staff? Who would be the man that was authorized to act on it, on the evening of the 6th as the Navy had done with their 13-part message? Have you ever looked into it? Have you ever looked into that question to ascertain why that was not done?

General Marshall. I did not look into it at all, until here about two days ago, or three days ago, at the time General Miles was testifying. That was my first opportunity to go into these records. The question of the delivery to me of the first 13 parts of that message, I think is a matter of judgment. The final, and fourteenth part is quite different, and that I believe did not become available until the next morning.

I want to get myself straight, Senator. You spoke of a pilot message.

Senator Ferguson. The pilot message was merely that they would give a time of delivery, not the 1 o'clock message.


Senator Ferguson. It is on page 238 of exhibit 1.

General Marshall. Yes; I understand it now.

Senator Ferguson. I wish, General, that you would always insist on completing your answers. I am sometimes a little fast with the next question.

General Marshall. I understand it entirely now.

Senator Ferguson. General, who was in charge, or who is charged with operations in peacetime?

General Marshall. There is a section, or there was a section of the General Staff, called the Operations Section, and that was the section from which maneuvers were directed, from which the simulated war training was operated. However, that was not the section of the General Staff which dealt with actual war measures. Those were dealt with in the War Plans Division, which is now called the Operations Division, and is virtually the GHQ.

Senator Ferguson. I have in mind in peacetime.


Senator Ferguson. Now, when would you say your regulations were peacetime, and when did they go over to wartime, so the committee can interpret this Exhibit 42?

General Marshall. In one sense, they did not go over; they remained in their status quo. What I was trying to explain to the preliminary questions was we had a section of the staff called Operations. That deals, however, with peacetime training operations, maneuvers, things of that sort, and organization, but the war measures were handled in the War Plans Division.

The war plans were in the War Plans Division.

The action of the Chief of Staff in relation to those plans would be prepared, presumably, unless he did it himself directly in the War Plans Division, and not at all in the Operations Section. That is a misnomer, so far as the war situation is concerned. So it is the War
Plans Division which is now the OPD, the operations of the General Staff.

Senator Ferguson. So that we may be able, when we read these various papers, to know when we were in peace and when we were in war, would you say, the dividing line, the line of demarcation, was the attack, or bombing of Pearl Harbor?

[3124] General Marshall. That was the definite subdivision dividing the line between a known status of peace and a known status of war, but so far as the operations of the General Staff are concerned, the war measures, the war plans, the war advice to the Chief of Staff came directly from the War Plans Division.

[3125] Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, we were acting on a war basis.


Senator Ferguson. And when did we go on that basis?

General Marshall. When you use the expression "war basis" there, you have me a little bit in difficulty, because always the War Plans Division was concerned with war plans, with discussions of the probability of war as to those plans, and the preparation of any instructions to be issued by the Chief of Staff regarding our war plans. They are not operations, of course, in the sense of actual movements, and deployments until you actually engage in war.

But the directions concerning the matter would be generated as a rule in the War Plans Division, unless the Chief of Staff did that himself.

So from that point of view there was no change in the General Staff between the peacetime operation and the wartime operation, so far as the responsibility and the method of doing business was concerned, between the War Plans Division and the Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson. General, on page 9 of Exhibit 42, under "b," I wish you would locate the directive, or the duty that would make General Gerow responsible for the reply of Short, where he stated—that is in Short’s reply to [3126] your message of the 27th—that he had alerted against sabotage, and liaison with the Navy. Now will you point out where WPZ, the War Plans Division, was made responsible, in this exhibit, just which one of these made Gerow responsible for action on the Short message?

General Marshall. Before answering that, Senator, I would like to say this: It was General Gerow's section in which the details of those matters would be concerned and would be carried out, but the responsibility was mine as well as General Gerow's.

Now as to this particular paragraph of this section—I will just refer to page 9—

Senator Ferguson. Yes; and anything else that you want.

General Marshall. I was trying to get the section number. It would be to a large extent under, I think, subparagraph b (3), "The initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the movement of troops to execute the initial deployment to be the duty of the Operations and Training Division)."

Also part of it comes under (2), "Estimate of forces required and times at which they may be needed under the various possible conditions necessitating the use of troops in the national defense."

It does not specifically mention the exact point you are bringing up.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I was getting at. There is nothing in the directive here that specifically covers Gerow's responsibility on the Short reply?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir, in this.

Senator Ferguson. And under the section, as I understand it, as I say it, it was part of your responsibility. You mean the Commanding General of the Field was over Short, and therefore you had a right to command him?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. That is in Army parlance?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Did Gerow have any right to issue orders to Short on a command basis?


Senator Ferguson. In peacetime. I change my question and add, before you answer, in peacetime did he have any right to issue a command to Short?

General Marshall. It would have required quite an assumption of authority on his part to do that without some confirmation from a senior officer.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, that province was in you as a senior officer, or in the case of your absence, it was in your deputy?

General Marshall. That is correct. As to mere matters of detail, of course, we communicated back and forth.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did Gerow have authority to order Rainbow 5, or any other War Plan into effect?

General Marshall. He did not, sir. He would have had to assume it.

Senator Ferguson. Who had authority to order a war plan, talking about Rainbow, or any other order, into effect?

General Marshall. The President, the Secretary of War, and myself, and in my absence, the deputy.

Senator Ferguson. General, I would like to go into how the General Staff is made up.

You went in sometime in 1939, is that correct?

General Marshall. I joined the War Department General Staff on July 6, 1938, as head of War Plans Division.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. In October of 1938 I was relieved from that job and appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff. I held that office until I became Chief of Staff on the first of July, 1939.

Senator Ferguson. Then, do I understand, the first of July, 1939, you became the Chief of Staff, and at that time was General Miles in G-2?

General Marshall. No, sir, he was not.

Senator Ferguson. Was General Gerow in War Plans?

General Marshall. He was in War Plans but he was not the Chief of Section.

Senator Ferguson. Who was the Chief of Section?


Senator Ferguson. Was he a brigadier general?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. He was a brigadier general. Colonel E. R. Warner McCabe was the G-2 of the War Department General Staff at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Who was at Hawaii? General Herron?
Senator Ferguson. Now, does the Chief of Staff have the right to select his own G-2, his War Plans officer, his deputy?
Senator Ferguson. Was that done in this particular case? Did you select them?
General Marshall. I found Colonel McCabe as G-2 when I became Chief of Staff; and I continued him as such until sometime—until he was relieved by General Miles. I found General Strong as a brigadier general in the War Plans Division when I joined it as Chief of War Plans Division.
When I left the Division to become Deputy Chief of Staff, he automatically became head of War Plans Division.
When I became Chief of Staff—my first direct appointment was the Deputy Chief of Staff, who had previously been the G-1 Personnel Officer—that was General Gasser.
From time to time I replaced people for various reasons as their tours expired, or as they retired, and General McCabe, Colonel McCabe rather, now General McCabe, was replaced by General Miles, and General Strong was replaced by General Gerow. I think.
General Gerow was replaced by General Eisenhower. General Miles was replaced by General Lee, shortly thereafter by General Strong. But those were my appointments.
Senator Ferguson. General Miles has told us that he was Acting Assistant for the Chief of Staff in G-2.
General Marshall. That, I think, Senator, was merely a technicality, because under the law we couldn't detail him directly on the General Staff.
Senator Ferguson. Why were you not able to put him on the General Staff?
General Marshall. Well, I can't think of it right offhand but it was merely a technicality.
Senator Ferguson. Was it one of the qualifications that he didn't have, the term of office?
General Marshall. Something of that sort. I think it pertained to how much duty he had had in Washington; something of that sort.
Senator Ferguson. Was that also true of General Gerow?
General Marshall. I don't think it was, sir; but my memory is not clear on that.
Senator Ferguson. Was there any more important deputy during this increasing tension that we were having, than your G-2?
General Marshall. Well, I should say that it lay between the G-2 and the head of the War Plans Division.
Senator Ferguson. So the combination of those two, they were, in your scheme of things, they were very important?
General Marshall. Very important, indeed.
Senator Ferguson. And were you at all times satisfied with the work in G-2?
General Marshall. As far as I was aware of the details of the work, I was satisfied.
Senator Ferguson. Were you also satisfied with the work in War Plans?
General Marshall. I was.

Senator Ferguson. So that up until the 7th day of December, you were entirely satisfied as to the heads of these two offices?


Senator Ferguson. Now, prior to the 27th, or let's say between the 27th of November 1941, and the 7th day of December 1941, that is, the period between the warning message and the attack, was there anyone in the War Department that made a staff survey of the incoming messages, talking about the magic, to see whether the alerts were being carried out in relation to the magic?

General Marshall. What were those dates, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. The 27th of November and the 7th of December 1941. That is between the war warning message and the attack, General Marshall. But when was this period that I was to reply to?

Senator Ferguson. That is the period. Did you make any survey during that period, when you had alerted these men, to see whether or not you were getting them at the moment they were being translated?


Senator Ferguson. Could you tell us, General, if there was any reason why General Miles left G-2?

General Marshall. I don't—he was relieved, I believe, in February. That is my recollection of the thing. I made several changes in the Chief of Staff. These [3133] people had been working very hard. We were reorganizing the whole War Department, and General Gerow was given an opportunity with troops and General Miles an opportunity of territorial command. I think that is about the condition.

Senator Ferguson. It was then in no way connected with the operation in his office?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. In relation to any of the messages, delivery of them, or not?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. It had nothing to do with that?

General Marshall. Nothing to do with that; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would the same apply to General Gerow?


Senator Ferguson. So that the record may be clear on that.

General Marshall. That is correct.

As to General Gerow, my difficulty with him was that he conscientiously overworked and stayed at the office late at night, and he was, I thought, exhausting himself, and that the thing couldn't go on. Therefore, I gave him what everybody in the War Department wanted, a troop command, I think the Twenty-ninth Division. I had brought General Eisenhower in [3134] a few days after December 7 and given him more or less direct responsibility over all Pacific affairs.

General Gerow not only had the affairs of the war as it pertained to the Atlantic, and, of course, the responsibility of General Eisenhower in the Pacific, but he also went through a very gruelling experience at the time the British Chiefs of Staff came here in the latter part of December.
So, he was pretty well exhausted, and I therefore gave him a troop command as both an opportunity and as a rest.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, there was no one specifically designated to see that the magic was translated and put into your hands, and that the alerts were properly carried out?

General Marshall. You use the expression "specifically designated."

There was an organizational arrangement that had been in existence. For example, you speak of the reply from the theater commanders to the alert. That would be rather directly in the subsection of the War Plans Division, which had immediate charge of all details with reference to the Pacific. That section was headed by Colonel Bundy, who later lost his life when I tried to rush him out to Hawaii shortly after the attack.

[3135] Then the main, the drafting work, the checking work, the filing work, the reference work would be carried out as a matter of procedure in that section for General Gerow. Then General Gerow would either bring it or send it to me as Chief of Staff.

Just as in G-2, my recollection of the status was that Colonel Bratton was in immediate charge of all magic affairs and was responsible, of course, to General Miles. General Miles was responsible for the bringing of these things to my attention, but in many instances Colonel Bratton, or at least, in instances, Colonel Bratton brought them in himself.

But the system and procedure started in the section under Colonel Bratton, just as the Pacific affairs started in the section of War Plans Division under Colonel Bundy.

Senator Ferguson. Then it is true that General Miles should have had access to all intelligences, State Department, Army, Navy, and all intelligence?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. He was the receipt source and the diffusion source of all intelligence matters in relation to the enemy.

Senator Ferguson. Was he also the evaluator of such intelligence?

General Marshall. He was responsible for the evaluation which would be done by a group in his section.

[3136] Senator Ferguson. Now, was that, the evaluation of these various instruments, all sources, ever taken away from General Miles in G-2?


Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand that your office, you as Chief of Staff, depended on General Miles' estimate of the intelligence?

General Marshall. You use the word "depend." He submitted his views, probably which in turn had been submitted to him by the section which did the laborious analysis, and with which he might or might not agree, or might or might not modify, and that estimate came to me at such times as he thought it was proper that I should be brought up to date or in response to my definite request, and I accepted it or modified it in my own mind, but I had the benefit of that advice.

Senator Ferguson. Before they went out would you approve them?

General Marshall. In some cases they were sent to the President. There I either approved it and sent it to the President or expressed
myself so it was clear, I think, that I was submitting it as a view. Whether I expressed concurrence or not I couldn't recall in each instance.

Senator Ferguson. Were there any evaluations, first, [3137] between the 1st of November and the 27th of November?
General Marshall. I will have to look at the record.
Senator Ferguson. Will you look at that and check.
General Marshall. The record shows that on November 1 there was an evaluation to the Chief of Staff from General Miles on the subject of a possible Japanese drive into Yunnan.
Senator Ferguson. You made a report to the President about the 5th of November on the same subject.
On November 2 there was a G-2 estimate on the Far Eastern situation addressed to the Chief of Staff—no, that was addressed to the War Plans Division. Whether or not I got a copy doesn't show.
On November 13 there was an estimate, signed by General Miles, in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, again on the subject of a possible Japanese drive into Yunnan. That estimate was distributed to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, Under Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, the Chief of Staff, Coordinator of Information, Chief of the Army Air Forces, Mr. Lauchlin Currie, who was the President's representative regarding Chinese matters, Division of Defense Aid Reports, Director of Naval Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, that was [3138] General Gerow, GHQ, that would be General McNair, Chief of Air Corps—that would be, I think, General Arnold.
Senator Ferguson. General Arnold at that time?
General Marshall. I don't know whether it was General Arnold or not.
And General Embick.
Senator Ferguson. At least that one would be approved by you.
Do you think any were delivered to the President without your approval?
General Marshall. I would assume that I would—well, certainly would have struck out anything that I thought was entirely wrong in it.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore if it went through it had your approval insofar as you struck it out?
Senator Ferguson. Any others, General?
General Marshall. One dated November 26, on the subject of Japanese naval task force. A memorandum for the Chief of Staff. Its distribution shows the: Secretary of War, Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD—that is General Gerow—I-B. file, the Far East Section, and the Record Section. That refers to his own, General Miles' department.
Senator Ferguson. Would you approve—before it would [3139] go to the Secretary of War, it would come over your desk?
General Marshall. No, sir. Normally I would give him the benefit of what I thought and if I thought it was important I would have spoken to the Secretary or written him a note.
Here is one on November 27, a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, on the subject of recent developments in the Far East.

The Chairman. Might I ask the committee if it is willing to sit a little later today, say 12:30, before recessing?

Senator Ferguson. I have no objection.

The Chairman. General, do you have any objection?


The Chairman. We will proceed to 12:30 then.

General Marshall. That estimate, in a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, on the recent developments in the Far East, dated November 27, was delivered to the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Chief of Army Air Forces, Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, Director of Naval Intelligence, and GHQ, which is General McNair.

Senator Ferguson. You haven’t been reading that these went to the Director of Naval Intelligence except in this last one. Do you recall whether any went to the Navy?

General Marshall. I do not presume they did unless it shows in this.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were there any between—is that all up to that date into November?

General Marshall. No, one more. November 29, memorandum for the Chief of Staff, on the subject Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941–March 31, 1942.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. The message of November 1 went to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the message of November 13 did, I believe.

Senator Ferguson. We would be glad to have that correction on the record.

General Marshall. This memorandum covers operations and the situation throughout the world with the various estimates of probabilities or possibilities.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall whether any of these reports indicated an air attack on Hawaii or any kind of an attack on Hawaii?


Senator Ferguson. Was that all between those dates?

General Marshall. That is all, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were there any, to your knowledge, called to your attention between the 1st of December and the 7th of December?

General Marshall. There was one on December 6, estimate of the Japanese strength in Indochina.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when that one reachel you, item 29?

General Marshall. I presume on December 6. I don’t know. I suppose the records of my office in the War Department show that.

Senator Ferguson. Well, that one would have no evidence in it whatever of any idea of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall. It is devoted entirely to Indochina.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. Then there is another on the 6th of December, estimate of Japanese air and ground forces in Indochina, Thailand,
and Formosa. That was distributed also to the Secretary of War, the Assistant Chief of Staff, General Gerow.

Senator Ferguson. General, would you say that you had any knowledge over and above those estimates, as far as intelligence was concerned?

General Marshall. I think I would say that they reflected the general state of information which I had. Whether or not I had picked up any additional points of view from my own personal reading of magic I couldn't say. I think in general [3143] that is the summation of the information I had at the time.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any case where you ever took up with General Miles magic as to your interpretation of it, that you thought that he may interpret it any other way?

General Marshall. I don't recall any, sir. I have had a great many discussions regarding magic along that line, but when they were and what they were I don't recall.

Senator Ferguson. Would you give to General Miles the intelligence, for instance, that you obtained through the Secretary of War, that he may have obtained from the Secretary of State at the War Cabinet?


Senator Ferguson. How did General Miles get the information of the War Cabinet?

General Marshall. That would be presumably only through my giving him the information myself, other than his liaison through his officers with the Department of State, but I don't think that liaison would give him information of that particular character, so he would be more or less dependent, I think, on my personally telling him what I personally had received from Mr. Stimson, or I had gathered by my presence at the conferences.

Senator Ferguson. Now, take the conference that Secretary Hull talked about, where he was at a Cabinet meeting and he [3143] called it to the attention of all of the imminence of war and Secretary Knox went out and made a speech, Secretary Welles made a speech, but he says here he didn't make it in relation to that Cabinet meeting, would that kind of intelligence, that kind of information, go to General Miles, specifically?

General Marshall. There was not a specific routing for that procedure. It would depend, I think, on my telling him personally. We had a great many meetings at that time. We had discussions before the Joint Board at which, I think, General Miles was present, and a great many in my office. But there was no direct routing routine that would have carried that message from the discussion at the White House to General Miles personally.

Senator Ferguson. Well now, if you eliminate that kind of a matter from these evaluations, what do we have from these evaluations, if we don't take all of the details from the Secretary of State's office, which was a great source of intelligence, how would we get anything from these evaluations?

General Marshall. I think, though General Miles can testify directly, I think General Miles had daily contact, through a liaison agreement, with the State Department, they have now and I assume they did then, but even that, Senator, I do not think would give them
the product of our meetings, [3144] personal meetings with the President, such as you just referred to.

Senator Ferguson. How often did this War Cabinet meet. From the 15th of November to the 1st of December, how often would they meet? I mean, to your knowledge. Was it frequent or not?

General Marshall. Well, the actual meetings with the President of the entire group were not frequent in the sense that the meetings between the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. Hull were frequent and almost daily, and the attendance of Admiral Stark and I or one other, were.

Senator Ferguson. How often would you say you saw the President between the 15th of November and the 1st of December?

General Marshall. I think the record will show that, but——

Mr. Gesell. They are shown on the exhibit.

General Marshall. Can I see that, please? Will you give me the dates again?

Senator Ferguson. The 15th of November to the 1st of December.

General Marshall. I saw the President on the 15th of November, on the 25th of November, on the 28th of November, on the 7th of December.

Senator Ferguson. Then you have no recollection, this sheet does not show any conferences between you and the President [3145] from the 28th to the 7th, 28th of November to the 7th of December?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is the conference you had with the President after the attack, at 7 o'clock?

General Marshall. That was after the attack. I think the date for that conference was set before the attack.

Senator Ferguson. But you did not see him until after the attack?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, General, about when the first matter of the breaking of the Japanese code, which was called magic, was called to your attention?

General Marshall. Do you mean, Senator, my first knowledge that there was such a thing as magic?

Senator Ferguson. Well, yes; let's have that date first, about when.

General Marshall. I don't think I was aware of it at all until I became Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson. And about the time you became Chief of Staff you had this called to your attention, that we were able to get our intelligence from a certain source?


Senator Ferguson. And that was under G-2, that was their [3146] job?


Senator Ferguson. Now, as tension grew, were you ever consulted or did you confer with anyone in G-2 about the speed on this intelligence, that it was valuable, there wasn't anything more valuable to the Government than that particular source as far as intelligence was concerned?

General Marshall. My recollection is—I will go back a ways, if I may.

[3147] When it first came to my attention, as I recall it, G-2, then Colonel McCabe, not only explained to me that my predecessor
thought it was illegal, but he was always concerned about the maintenance of secrecy and possible carelessness in the handling of the papers.

Of course, at that time there was a great deal of purely diplomatic information and no military information as I recall, at that time.

As the situation changed, of course, the military factor became more predominant at least in our minds, and our concern was, as to secrecy, most definitely that of protecting the source.

There were conversations with Colonel McCabe that I recall over the difficulty of securing the proper people to do the work, and also, I think, with General Miles as to the increasing difficulty and our fear that we were going to lose that source through the, you might say, the subversive action of at least one individual concerned with the work.

We were then discussing, as I recall it, the difficulty of securing people with the proper talents and qualities, and integrity, and also where we could house them so that they could work effectively and at the same time not be unduly conspicuous.

[3148] We continued to have frequent conversations regarding the handling of magic, particularly as to its security, and I recall that I intervened myself very directly and required that it be locked in a pouch and delivered by pouch, the pouch unlocked, and it be read by the recipient and put back in the pouch.

I have no definite recollection of discussing with General Miles their inability to keep abreast of these translations and decipherings. I do recall faintly conversations concerned with the mass of material which presumably had very little import, but which had to be culled away from the general lot, so that the important things came to us.

I might say that I have no definite recollection of pressing General Miles to expedite the deciphering and the distribution of magic.

Senator Ferguson. Did the fact, as shown by our record here, that this was received and then it would take as high as 20 days to translate, was that called to your attention during the time that you were getting these messages?


I saw, in the main, these messages that I knew, like those of the fateful days of December 7 and 8, were handled at a very high speed, it seemed to me, knowing the difficulties involved.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, it was not due to a lack of appropriation that you didn't get these messages fast—or was it due to that?

General Marshall. I would say, Senator, taking a long back sight, that it was the general combination of things relating to the entire Army, in the building up that we were going through at that time from very small groups to much larger groups.

This, you might say, is a little bit comparable to radar. We could collect men and engineers for a regiment in a comparatively short time as compared for such a complicated business such as radar. That took a long time, and there was a necessity for high selectivity.

That was very much the case in everything concerned with magic, and also we had the difficulty, at that time, of people not being in a frame of mind such as is common to almost the entire public in time of war, so that you could use then, control them, and get services out of them on quite a very much simpler basis than you could at that time.
There were a great many factors like that involved. I would not say it was lack of appropriations.

Senator Ferguson. General, did you know when the first magic was distributed to England?


Senator Ferguson. When that was taken up with England?

General Marshall. I do not know when that occurred, sir. General Miles would have to give you that.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not it was prior to any meeting on the ABC or the ABCD arrangement?

General Marshall. I don't recall that, sir. I would have to go to the records to get it.

Senator Ferguson. You have no personal knowledge?

General Marshall. No; I have no personal knowledge of that; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on whose authority could that be done if it wasn't called to your attention, about that arrangement?

General Marshall. Well, I would say that the actual exchange of such information as that prior to a state of war in which Great Britain was an ally would have, I think, undoubtedly been brought to my attention, probably that of the Secretary of War, but certainly, I think, to my attention.

Senator Ferguson. Have you any recollection of this being called to your attention, this matter of giving to the British this magic, or this means of getting the magic?

General Marshall. No, sir. It is very hard for me to [3151] put my finger on the point when this took place, when this interchange was a matter of business every day. I don't recall that.

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it true at first there was a grave question about whether or not it would be given to the British, whether or not we wouldn't keep it and get the information ourselves?

General Marshall. That would be a consideration, but I believe, Senator, what we were more concerned about was obtaining from the British the information they had, which was much more extensive than ours.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any arrangement between the British and America in relation to them giving us other intelligence that they didn't get through magic?


Senator Ferguson. And was that distributed to us?


Senator Ferguson. And did they also use magic to get intelligence and give us what they got out of magic?

General Marshall. I wouldn't attempt to answer that. I presume they did.

Senator Ferguson. That is your assumption?


Senator Ferguson. When the intelligence was coming to [3152] you, it was an over-all intelligence as far as you were concerned?

General Marshall. It was an over-all intelligence, presumably, as far as I was concerned, but I wish to make this comment, that for quite a long time we only received the British estimates. We did not receive the direct intelligence on which the evaluation was made, as the basis for the estimates.
It was a long period before they gave us the direct material, because they were very fearful of our letting them get out of the basis of secrecy.

Finally, and I think we were well into the war, a long ways into the war, before they were willing to take the hazard of giving us the direct information; which involved, of course, a knowledge of how they acquired it.

[3153] Senator Ferguson. So at first we received the estimates. Now I will ask counsel, do we have the estimates of the British? We have here given to us the estimates of our Intelligence Department, but do we have the British?

General Marshall. They were not formal estimates, I think, as a rule, of the type that I have been reading here from General Miles.

Senator Ferguson. No; they were memoranda.

General Marshall. But they were evaluations of those things that they were getting.

Senator Ferguson. Do we have, General Mitchell, the evaluations?

General Marshall. I am quite certain that would not be in your records, sir, because we have been trying to keep that quiet as much as we could.

Senator Ferguson. Now, then, General Marshall, do I understand we are not getting every bit, that certain things are being kept quiet that we are not getting?

General Marshall. No, sir; I do not mean that at all.

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you explain your answer? I must have misunderstood you.

General Marshall. My last answer was that we did not wish to disclose the fact that the British had a capacity and a method of obtaining information which I referred to in that [3154] letter of Governor Dewey’s which has now become public, not that they did not give us information.

Senator Ferguson. What I am wanting to know is——

General Marshall. And now, as I understand it, your question is addressed to the fact whether there is some of that information that bears on this question?

Senator Ferguson. On Pearl Harbor.

General Marshall. I know of none such. I know of one——

Senator Ferguson. How can the committee tell?

General Marshall. I know of one message, as I recall, that came through the State Department, I believe, on the afternoon, I think, of December 6, but I think that is in the record and that is a British estimate specifically regarding the movement of Japanese ships in the Gulf of Siam.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, do you know, General, that Admiralty was given direct information by Intelligence. Do you know that to be a fact or not?

General Marshall. I knew that they were receiving information, just as we were receiving a certain amount and that a part was coming directly from the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did your department, G-2, get the Admiralty information?

General Marshall. You will have to ask General Miles that. I could not testify anything about that.
[3155] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, General, wouldn't it be important when this intelligence came across your desk to know its source?


Senator Ferguson. Was that called to your attention, that we were getting this intelligence from Admiralty?

General Marshall. I have no distinct recollection of that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Have there been any instructions to G-2 that we were not to get all the files in relation to everything on Pearl Harbor?


Senator Ferguson. Then I do not quite understand that previous answer that that probably would not be given to us.

General Marshall. Well, I must have misled you. I was referring specifically to a method, a technique, rather than a record.

Senator Ferguson. Well, it would be an evaluation. If it was an evaluation, it would be in writing?

General Marshall. Well, Senator, if there is such it is certainly now before your group. I do not know just what the details of that are. I know that there are no instructions in the War Department to hold out any information from you gentlemen; quite the contrary.

[3156] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that prior to August 1941 Admiral Kimmel was getting certain diplomatic information?

General Marshall. No, sir; I was not aware of that that I recall.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not at the time Admiral Kimmel was getting information prior to August or sometime in August that General Short was not getting that information?

General Marshall. I was not aware of that fact, that what Admiral Kimmel got was not being made available to General Short. I am aware of what General Short was receiving.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did you know of any rule or regulation that prohibited or delayed or stopped this intelligence going to Admiral Kimmel after some time in August?

General Marshall. I am not aware of the circumstances of that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any reason, anything that happened in August that would stop that?

General Marshall. I am not aware of that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You are not aware of anything that would stop that?


Senator Ferguson. When did you first get the information [3157] that General MacArthur in the Philippines was getting this magic?

General Marshall. I could not answer that, sir. I know now what he was getting and the circumstances under which he was receiving it, and I am not able to cast my mind back to that time to know exactly what I knew then as to the degree of it.

In these headquarters, in some of them they had a basis—there was this which confuses the question in my own mind; I knew that in the Pacific from sources in Hawaii and in the Philippines and presumably, maybe, at the minor stations in Puget Sound, possibly
in Alaska and at other places, we had quite largely, the Navy had
groups who were engaged in intercepting Japanese radio messages,
but that was done largely for the purpose of locating ship move-
ments, or locating headquarters from which you might deduce what
the actual ship movement was.

Now, that was going on throughout the Pacific. That was the
naval means of following as closely as they could Japanese shipping,
possibly their submarines, certainly their larger naval craft.

There, then, is a confusion in one's mind as to how much of what
you knew was that and what you might have known that was the
elaboration of the deciphering of these messages which [3158]
constituted the basis of magic.

The messages on which the magic is based were collected through-
out the Pacific. I should imagine, though I am not the best witness
on this, that the largest portion of the collection occurred in the Phi-
ippines because of its proximity to Japan and its ease of interception,
but it sometimes occurred, as in the instance I believed the record
will show on the fateful message which gave the hour 1 p.m., Dece-
ember 7, it was intercepted in the Puget Sound region rather than out
in the Philippines or out in Hawaii.

So in my mind, in trying to reconstruct my knowledge of the data,
coming to that period just prior to December 7, there is a confusion
as to how much I knew that pertained to these radio intercepts that
located the movement of vessels, how much that I knew of arrange-
ments to intercept the Japanese messages rather than to decipher them
and how much I knew regarding the actual deciphering which I know
about now.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; but did you know in 1941, in the summer
of 1941, that General MacArthur had the means of obtaining the magic
as far as the State Department and various other agencies are con-
cerned, the so-called purple matter?

General Marshall. I do not know as I knew it then, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That he was able to get it direct [3159]
by means of cryptoanalysis in the Philippines?

General Marshall. I know that now, sir. I do not know to what
degree I knew it then.

Senator Ferguson. Well, can you place yourself back in 1941 to
know now whether or not you knew it then? I am trying to find out
what you knew here in Washington of what he knew there?

General Marshall. Yes. I am unable to say that, sir. I rather
think I know now what the naval arrangement was in the Philippines
as to deciphering through what they called the purple machine of
magic, at that source, but I do not know how much I knew about that
then.

Senator Ferguson. But that would be an important matter and
would be called to your attention in 1941, would it not?

General Marshall. If it were known by General Miles, and I am
not positive whether or not he knew it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I do not want to pass on the evidence of
General Miles.

General Marshall. I am telling you—

Senator Ferguson. As to whether or not he knew that General
MacArthur had this means.
General Marshall. Well, my reference to General Miles—

Senator Ferguson. But I would like to have you, or if someone can for you, to get General Miles' testimony on that [3160] point and show it to you, rather than have me pass on it.

General Marshall. Well, I have not read it, sir. I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. It is 12:30, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. It is 12:30, and the committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock of the same day.)

[3161]

Afternoon Session—2 P. M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Senator Ferguson will proceed.

Testimony of Gen. George C. Marshall (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. At this place, General, I would like to offer the statutory duties of the Chief of Staff into the record. I wonder whether you can read them into the record and answer questions as to what you understand to be the statutory duties?

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator, for the purpose of the record, give the source?

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me?

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator, in order to have the record correct, give the source?

Senator Ferguson. Will you look on the back of that? This is the United States Code.

Mr. Murphy. The volume, page, and section?

General Marshall. United States Code, 1940 edition, page 491, paragraph 33. Do you wish me to read this into the record, Senator Ferguson?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall (reading):

The Chief of Staff shall preside over the War Department General Staff and, under the direction of [3162] the President, or of the Secretary of War under the direction of the President, shall cause to be made, by the War Department General Staff, the necessary plans for recruiting, organizing, supplying equipment, mobilizing, training, and demobilizing the Army of the United States, and for the use of the military forces for national defense. He shall transmit to the Secretary of War the plans and recommendations prepared for that purpose by the War Department General Staff and advise him in regard thereto; upon the approval of such plans or recommendations by the Secretary of War, he shall act as the agent of the Secretary of War in carrying the same into effect.

Do you wish me to read the various references in parentheses?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; you might as well.

General Marshall (reading):


Paragraph 33-a. Further duties of Chief of Staff.

Subject to the provisions of sections 32 and 1133 of this title, the Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President, or of the Secretary of War, under the direction of the President, shall have supervision of all troops of the line and of the Inspector General's, Judge Advocate General's, Medical, and Ordnance Departments of the Quartermaster Corps, [3167] of the Corps of En-
engineers, and of the Signal Corps, and, in all matters pertaining to the command, discipline, or administration of the existing military establishment, of the Adjutant General's Department, and he shall perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by the President.

Those are the two paragraphs I see here on this page 491.

Senator Ferguson. You were familiar with the statutory duties of the Chief of Staff?


[3164] Senator Ferguson. You heard the testimony of General Gerow that he took full responsibility for the action to be taken, and not taken, on General Short's reply to the message of the 27th of November?

General Marshall. I read that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you agree that it was his full responsibility?

General Marshall. I would not say that was his full responsibility. It was his direct responsibility for each department of the General Staff, of which his was one.

Senator Ferguson. Do you, by virtue of your office, share that responsibility?


Senator Ferguson. It is the responsibility of the Chief of Staff when he asks for a reply, and the reply takes a certain form, if any further direction is necessary, it is his responsibility to give that direction?

General Marshall. That would be his responsibility, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The Chief of Staff?

General Marshall. The Chief of Staff, that is myself.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I understand. And that is the kind of a message that General Short's reply was?


[3165] Senator Ferguson. I would just like to ask a few questions, going back, on the giving to the British of the breaking of the code. That was a very important matter, was it not, General?


Senator Ferguson. To share our secrets with another country?


Senator Ferguson. Particularly so when we are at peace?


Senator Ferguson. Now would General Miles have authority, in his position, to perform that act?


Senator Ferguson. Then, can you tell us who did it in this case? As I understand it, the record now shows that it was done sometime in January of 1941.

General Marshall. I presume that he did it after consultation with me.

Senator Ferguson. No one else would be in authority to perform such an act?

General Marshall. The Secretary of War would be the only other person.

Senator Ferguson. You know of no act that the Secretary of War took with relation to this code with Britain?

Senator Ferguson. Could I ask now from counsel whether or not we have the so-called evaluation of the British? Does the committee have those instruments?

Mr. Mitchell. What do you mean by "evaluations"?

Senator Ferguson. What the General has described as evaluations.

Mr. Mitchell. We examined them. They are under that arrangement, as you know, of nothing received from a foreign country can be divulged without clearing it with that country first.

We looked over those documents, and we did not ourselves see anything pertinent in them, and therefore, we have not, up to date, asked the British Government to clear them. So they are there, and I think they are open to inspection even though they have not been cleared.

Senator Ferguson. Is there any question about their being open to the committee's inspection?

Mr. Mitchell. Not at all. Nobody has ever asked for them. We have seen thousands of documents that did not seem pertinent to us. We have not dumped material of that kind on you unless you asked for it.

[3167] Senator Ferguson. I want the record to show what we have and what we do not have.

Do you know, General, whether or not you consulted with anyone in relation to this exchange of information between the British and America?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of that now, sir. I have a very definite recollection of frequent conversations with General Strong, who succeeded or who followed General Miles. I have no recollection of such conversations with General Miles. Those conversations that I happen to recollect were after we were once engaged in war.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not, General, the Japs ever knew that we were breaking their codes?

General Marshall. I do not know one way or the other. I assume that they did not, or the procedure would have changed almost instantly.

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would refer to exhibit 2, page 122.

General Marshall. Is that at the top or the bottom of the page?

The Vice Chairman. You have the wrong book, General.

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 2. It is the yellow backed book. Now I refer you to the second from the last sentence in paragraph 3.


Senator Ferguson.

There are also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any telegrams exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple.

Do you know whether we had any other information than that particular intercept, which was the 23rd of June, 1941? Were there any other intercepts that indicated that they knew we were breaking their code?

General Marshall. I have a vague recollection of another one, but I think it was after we were engaged in the war.

Senator Ferguson. Nothing before the war?


Senator Ferguson. You indicated yesterday, General, that certain information was kept from the Roberts commission. I believe you
indicated, as I remember the testimony, there were certain parts taken out of the Roberts report.

General Marshall. Yes, sir. The intention that I wanted to convey to Governor Dewey was that the Roberts commission had the magic available to them but it had to be withdrawn out of their records in the report which was released to the public.


General Marshall. I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get your knowledge that there was a change in the Roberts report before it was issued to the public?

General Marshall. I could not tell you that, sir. Undoubtedly there were conversations in regard to the delicacy of the exposure of that material, but I do not recall the details of its control, because that would be one thing that the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, presumably, and probably even the President, would become involved in.

The board, as I recall, was under the direction of the President.

[3170] Senator Ferguson. Did you have anything to do with the personnel of that board, the Roberts board, or the Roberts commission?

General Marshall. My recollection of the matter is that the Secretary of War consulted with me as to what his recommendation might be as to the Army members of the board, and I had just brought General McNarney back to this country in connection with the proposed reorganization of the War Department, and as he was an air man, and a very able individual, I suggested to the Secretary of War that General McNarney might be a very appropriate Army member.

As to the other Army member, that was General McCoy.

Senator Ferguson. He was retired, General, was he not?

General Marshall. He was retired and an old acquaintance of the Secretary of War, and, as I recall, Mr. Stimson brought up his name as the man he thought would fit the job, and I concurred.

Senator Ferguson. Now, when did General McNarney leave the War Plans Division?

General Marshall. He never was in the War Plans. Oh, he was in the War Plans Division possibly a while back; I do not recall when, but I can find that in the records; but at the time he appeared on the Roberts board he had been in England almost a year in connection with the Air [3171] Corps.

Senator Ferguson. Was not he in War Plans sometime the first week in December, about the time some of these things occurred?

General Marshall. No, sir; he was not even on duty in the War Department then. As far as my recollection goes, I had just brought him back from a year in England for the purpose of being on the board for the reorganization of the War Department that I was just completing.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not he was familiar with the whole magic set-up?

General Marshall. I could not answer that, sir. The probability is that he did not know it.

Senator Ferguson. Did the War Plans know about the magic?

General Marshall. The head of War Plans did know about that.

Senator Ferguson. Was he ever deputy of the War Plans?
General Marshall. I will have to check it. I do not recall that he was.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the President was advised about deleting or taking parts out of the Roberts report?

General Marshall. No, sir. All I know about the Roberts [3172] commission and its operation and arrangement is the Secretary of War asking my advice as to what Army officer to put on the board, and I suggested General McNarney, who had just returned from England, and he mentioned General McCoy, retired, and I thought that was a good selection.

Other than that, I knew nothing whatever about the board except as I appeared as a witness before it.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. Murphy. As I understand, there was nothing kept out of the Roberts report; that it was all delivered to the public. There was something kept out about the magic, but it was not kept from the members of the board, and it is now delivered to the Senators.

Senator Ferguson. General, did I understand you correctly that certain parts were deleted from the Roberts report?

General Marshall. The Roberts report on Pearl Harbor, reading from my letter to Governor Dewey——

had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete.

I am referring to the public release of the board.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I have in mind.

General Marshall. That is it.

Senator Ferguson. Before that report was issued there [3173] were certain things taken out of it?

General Marshall. Before that report was made public there were certain things withdrawn.

Senator Ferguson. And it was not made public until sometime in January 1942, isn't that right?

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir. That is a matter of record.

Senator Ferguson. We are clear on that, that certain parts were taken out before it was made public?

General Marshall. That is correct. I am quite certain, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you had that information in September of 1944, because you wrote the letter at that time.

General Marshall. Oh, yes; sir.

[3174] Senator Ferguson. Might I ask counsel now if there is in existence or whether counsel for the committee has that full report?

Mr. Mitchell. We have had it for about 3 months.

Senator Ferguson. Will you furnish the part taken out according to the General's statement?

Mr. Mitchell. There never was anything taken out, if you mean extracted or hidden, or anything.

Senator Ferguson. Have I indicated that anything was hidden out of that report?

Mr. Mitchell. I should think your questions were directed to that but if I am mistaken——

Senator Ferguson. You certainly are mistaken.
The Chairman. Let counsel finish his answer to the Senator's question.

Mr. Mitchell. As I understand it now, there is no part of the Roberts report that isn't available. I don't think any question has been raised about that.

Senator Ferguson. Could counsel get the Roberts report before the deletions? The general has indicated in his letter that to his knowledge there were certain things taken out.

The Chairman. Senator, may I ask you this, when you say "taken out"—

Senator Ferguson. I am quoting the General.

The Chairman. Let's see what really happened. It might mean one thing to say certain things in a report were taken out, that is, they were eliminated altogether. It might mean another thing to say certain parts of a report were not published, but that it went to the President as originally drafted.

Senator Ferguson. May we have from the witness what his understanding was?

General Marshall. My understanding was, and I am speaking on hearsay, because I had no control over the matter, that the complete report went to the President but that the portions that referred to magic were withdrawn from the portion of the report which was released to the public.

Senator Ferguson. Have I misquoted you, General?

General Marshall. There has been so much conversation I am a little confused, but the complete report, as I understand it—and I am not an authority on that—went to the President, and the portions that were considered top secret, which were magic, were pulled out of that before a general release to the public. That is my understanding, but I am not the best authority on that. That is my understanding and it was on that that this part of the letter was based.

Senator Ferguson. From whom did you get your information?

General Marshall. I don't recall. I presume from the Secretary of the War on G-2. That would probably be where I would get it. Either one or the other.

Senator Ferguson. Have you got the Roberts report before you?

General Marshall. No, sir; I have not.

Senator Ferguson. Would counsel give the General the Roberts report?

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, you have spoken of the "report." That term has sometimes been used as applied to the findings, opinion, and sometimes the transcript.

Now, as far as the report is concerned it always has been complete. The fact is that the transcript shows that at certain stages of the proceedings they took some evidence about this secret stuff that they never transcribed and we don't know, of course, what it was. Maybe that is what you are referring to.

Senator Ferguson. My knowledge on this subject has come solely from the General, now the witness.

Mr. Mitchell. We have had the Roberts transcript, copies of it, for months, and it has been handed around; every now and then you find that transcript shows that they stopped taking evidence on the record and took some evidence off of the record. I think we have had a request to find out what the evidence off the record was and we
have never found it because there isn’t any such record, as far as I can ascertain.

[3177] Senator Ferguson. I will read from the bottom of page 2 of the letter produced by you yesterday, General:

The Roberts report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appears incomplete.

Now, have you and I been talking about the report, is that what we are talking about?

General Marshall. I was dictating in regard to the report as I understood its make-up.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Marshall. I would like to add that I have never read the report. I made this statement from my general understanding of the matter with the approval of the then G-2 of the War Department. I knew that secret matter had been testified to because I testified to a portion of it myself. I knew that that was not released to the public.

Senator Ferguson. General, do you have the report before you?


Senator Ferguson. Would someone give him the report?

Mr. Murphy. Here it is [hanging the report to the witness].

General Marshall. I have it.

Senator Ferguson. On page 8, reading from the report, [3178] down in the last paragraph:

The Navy Department sent three messages to the Commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, the first on December 3, stating that it was believed certain Japanese Consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents.

Wouldn’t that indicate that we were breaking the code because that information came through magic and as shown by the testimony of the Navy Board that was the purple code?

General Marshall. “Stating that it was believed”?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. Well, it depends, it seems to me, on the deduction you make regarding this statement “it was believed certain Japanese Consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents.”

Senator Ferguson. (Reading:)

The second one, the 2d of December 1941, instructed addressee to destroy confidential documents.

and so on.

That has nothing to do with it.

On page 9 (reading):

About noon eastern standard time, 8:30 American Honolulu time¹, December 7, an additional warning message—

that is before the attack—

indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan was dispatched to the Chief of Staff after conferences with the Chief of [3179] Naval Operations for the information of the responsible Army and Navy Commanders. Every effort was made to have the message as brief as possible but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack.

¹ See p. 1235, infra, for correction by General Marshall.
Didn't that clearly show, General, that we had intercepted the 14-part and the pilot message prior to the time of its delivery?

General Marshall. That might be, Senator. I think that is a matter of opinion. Evidently this was worded very carefully in order to convey an essential fact for the information of those reading the report and at the same time not to disclose the source of the information. That would be my estimate.

Senator Ferguson. You had never read the report, you say?

General Marshall. No, sir; I had not.

Senator Ferguson. Now then, General—were you going to say something else?

General Marshall. I might say I anticipated going through all of these documents later this month but I was not given the opportunity.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

The Chairman. Will the Senator from Michigan yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

[3180] The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Do we have the report, the original report given by the Roberts Board to the President of the United States?

Mr. Mitchell. We have never had the original. We have got a photostat copy of the transcript and we have got one mimeographed copy.

Mr. Murphy. Is it a complete report so far as your investigation reveals?

Mr. Mitchell. It is presumably the transcript of everything that they transcribed. I tried to point out that the transcript, not the findings, does show that there was some evidence taken off the record, and they never did have it transcribed.

Mr. Murphy. Is it a complete copy, of what was given to the President?

Mr. Mitchell. I so understand. I always so understood. But I will have to check again to make certain.

Senator Ferguson. Will counsel, because of this testimony, get the original that was delivered to the President, with the signatures?

Mr. Mitchell. We will get it if we can lay our hands on it. I suppose it is in existence.1

Senator Ferguson. You would expect that it would; it

[3181] is an important document.

Mr. Mitchell. It might be in the Archives Building. We will make an effort to see if we can get anything back farther than the copies furnished us 3 months ago by the War Department.

Senator Ferguson. General, you stated yesterday that there was some question of the secrecy of the magic, that you tried to get the FBI to do some work for you?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. What I think I said, and what I intended to convey was, that there had been frequent rumors, and in one case direct reports to me, of gossip here in Washington regarding the fact that we had intercepted Japanese codes. Of course, there were always other statements and conversations which were of a highly dangerous nature so far as security was concerned. I sent requests orally through G-2, orally to Mr. Hoover, to assist the War Department in trying to check this matter by the usual methods that they would follow, as related to Army officers.

1 See correspondence in Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2493-2495.
I was told in each case Mr. Hoover was very reluctant to engage his personnel in investigating any Government agency for the reason that he did not wish to be put in the position of running a sort of Gestapo. I don’t know as he used the word “Gestapo.” However, my recollection is—but the G-2 officials can corroborate this or give other testimony—the FBI did assist us in checking conversations going around Washington in the various hotels, dinners, and so forth, in an effort to find out how serious this matter was, and particularly for the purpose of my making an example of somebody which would discourage further indiscretions by Army officers.

We received no conclusive case. I think we had one that we finally could not try under some legal technicality which would have prevented a conviction. That is my recollection of that phase of the matter which I referred to yesterday.

Senator Ferguson. Was that an Army officer?

General Marshall. These were all Army officers.

Senator Ferguson. You had reason to believe that there was a leak in the Army on this magic?

General Marshall. I didn’t know whether it was in the Army or not, but it was apparently in official Washington.

The Chairman. In what?


Senator Ferguson. General, do I understand that you had some evidence on one particular officer and there was something wrong with the jurisdiction?

General Marshall. There was some complication in regard to the probability of conviction. I don’t know, Senator, as that related specifically to magic. I don’t know whether that occurred a year after this or a year before this. Presumably it would be at this time or at a later time rather than a year before. I am just giving you my recollection of my efforts to stop this indiscreet talk.

Senator Ferguson. Did the FBI give you full cooperation?

General Marshall. So far as I know.

Senator Ferguson. Were you going to make another answer?

General Marshall. I was, but I have forgotten it.

Senator Ferguson. You had full cooperation from the FBI?

General Marshall. So far as I know. I merely wanted to make plain their reluctance and the reason.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any evidence on anyone that you thought was sufficient to convict them of this crime of giving this secret out during war?

General Marshall. No case where we thought we had the basis of a conviction. We had rumors, we had conversations reported to me that it was common knowledge of this, or common knowledge of that, particularly in relation to affairs shortly after the first. I think after the first creation of the Pearl Harbor Investigating Board, not the Roberts Board, but the later.

Senator Ferguson. Can you place whether or not this matter that you took to Mr. Hoover and the FBI was prior to Pearl Harbor or subsequent?

General Marshall. I think it was subsequent, though there may have been some prior. I can’t remember, Senator; I am
sorry. There were several times that I asked G-2 to go to Mr. Hoover to help us. We were always in a state of trying to run down some leak out of the War Department.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any department to take care of that kind of a matter yourself?

General Marshall. G-2 had a number of people engaged in that.

Senator Ferguson. They had not only espionage but counter-espionage?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; specifically that. I thought, however, that in all probability the FBI was better equipped for the purpose.

Senator Ferguson. Who was really in charge of magic?

General Marshall. In charge of what?

Senator Ferguson. Magic. Who was designated by you to be in charge of this magic?

General Marshall. Up to and including this time I had never changed the original set-up, the reception, deciphering and translation, which, so far as the Army portion was concerned, was carried out by a section of the Signal Corps under General Mauborgne. The material was then passed on to the G-2 of the Army and the circulation of it occurred [3185]. Thereafter under his direction.

Senator Ferguson. Did G-2 have any instructions from you to furnish intercepted information to the Hawaiian Department during November and early December 1941?

General Marshall. I recall giving no such specific instructions.

[3186] Senator Ferguson. Were you aware that information and enemy intelligence was being withheld from G-2 in Hawaii?

General Marshall. I was not aware of that, sir. If you mean it was being withheld from G-2 in Hawaii——

Senator Ferguson. Just not being given to them.

General Marshall (continuing). By the Naval opposite, I was unaware of that. If it was being withheld from G-2 in Hawaii by the G-2 in the War Department, if you mean that, I don't think "withheld" would be quite the word we would use.

Senator Ferguson. What would we use?

General Marshall. It was a question of what portions should be given to G-2 in Hawaii. I was not aware that they were withholding from him information which was considered vital to the proper performance of duty by General Short.

Senator Ferguson. Who was responsible for the amount of intelligence from G-2 that went to Hawaii?

General Marshall. The G-2 of the War Department, General Miles.

Senator Ferguson. Did you give him any instructions on it what-ever?

General Marshall. No specific instructions that I recall.

[3187] Senator Ferguson. Did you have instructions from any one, for instance, the Secretary of War?


Senator Ferguson. The Secretary of State, did you confer with him on what ought to go and what should not go?


Senator Ferguson. Then you would say that whatever instructions G-2 had, General Miles, was given to him by you and by no one else?

Senator Ferguson. Under your authority as chief of staff?

General Marshall. He was operating under my authority.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever conferred with Secretary of War Stimson on the information that was coming to you through magic?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; with great frequency. I often called his attention to portions of it where I thought he might not have had time to read the entire folder. There was quite a mass of this material. It was a question of how much time you had for the purpose, and how quickly you could read. I recall taking my copies to him on several occasions in order to be certain that he saw them.

[3189] Senator Ferguson. Do you remember making an affidavit before General Clausen?


Senator Ferguson. Does counsel have that?

Mr. Murphy. You mean Colonel Clausen.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Clausen.

The part I would like to have you check is your affidavit of the 28th of August 1945, before Colonel Clausen, where you stated that “prior to the 7th of December”—

General Marshall. Which page is that?

Senator Ferguson. I have taken that out of the affidavit, the part reading:

Concerning intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my understanding in the period preceding the 7th of December 1941, that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was aware of and was receiving some of this information from facilities available in his command.


Senator Ferguson. Was that your understanding?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; but there is a confusion there in connection with what I was explaining this morning. They were receiving information as to intercepts, as to the locations of Japanese vessels at sea and their movements and the headquarters that were concerned in this.

[3189] The actual translation, that is, the deciphering, translation, and transmission of the magic, as such, clearly was not intended to be applied in this.

Senator Ferguson. So you would correct that now to interpret it so as to make it indicate that you were not inferring that General Short was getting this other kind of magic?

General Marshall. I said some of this information. I tried to explain what some of that was.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he was getting any of the diplomatic magic?

General Marshall. I do not think he was, except to the extent, I recall, that we broke into magic in July 1941, meaning that we took the information from magic which came as diplomatic information. The Japanese instructions regarding shipping as to the Panama Canal. Just as we again moved into the diplomatic channels of magic on December 7 regarding the 1 p.m. message and sent that direct. Those are the two occasions that I think the record shows, and that I can recall between the first of July 1941, and December 7, 1941, that the magic material was directly referred to in so many words in messages to General Short.
Senator Ferguson. Did we put through some kind of an order restricting the amount of Japanese shipping that could \[3190\] go through the Panama Canal?

General Marshall. We stopped it all but the message I am referring to, from the War Department to General Short, recited the Japanese instructions taken from magic regarding the movement of shipping into the Panama Canal during the period of some days in the middle of July.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever notify General Short that you found it impossible or that you were not furnishing him all available G-2 data for reasons of security?

General Marshall. No, sir; I have no recollection of that.

Senator Ferguson. So then he could not have any knowledge as to whether or not he was getting all that G-2 had or had not?

General Marshall. Presumably so. Here is the message I was referring to.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it?

General Marshall. It is dated Washington, D. C., July 8, 1941. It is only the later portion I refer to, but I will read it all (reading from Exhibit No. 32:)

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Nine two four seven AGMC for your information deduction from information from numerous sources is that Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is \[3191\] supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups Period. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia Period. Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval army and air bases in Indochina although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out Period. Neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated Period. They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August Period. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

Signed “Adams,” who was the Adjutant General.

I was referring specifically to the last sentence which is taken almost entirely from magic, other portions were in magic, but—that came to us in various ways—but the last sentence was from magic direct. \[3192\] Senator Ferguson. When you sent the message on the 7th, General, that is, the noon on the 7th, did you consider the question of security?

General Marshall. Do you mean, Senator, in relation to the form of the message?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; both the form and the means of sending it.

General Marshall. I only knew that it would be encoded, which is done very rapidly on a type machine and automatically. My only recollection regarding the security aspect—and it is difficult for me to state this with any assurance that I am being accurate because I am confused in back sights—was we must be sufficiently secure to prevent some claim of overt act on our part and, therefore, the telephone was ruled out.

Now, I am not at all certain that that did rule out the telephone. That might have been an afterthought after the event; I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. I want to talk to you about that for a moment. General Marshall. But I assume that this message—in fact, I had
seen that this message to which you just referred was going to be enciphered in secure code and decoded in that manner.

[§193] Senator Ferguson. Well, you felt rather sure at that particular moment that you were sending this message that something would happen somewhere at 1 o'clock, or prior to 1 o'clock?

General Marshall. Something of some serious nature was going to be synchronized with that 1 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Well, then, you were thinking about the question of security and as to whether or not you would use the telephone. Now, how could the use of that telephone to Hawaii have been an overt act of war by America against Japan in alerting Hawaii?

General Marshall. I think, Senator, that the Japanese would have grasped at most any straw to bring to such portions of our public that doubted our integrity of action that we were committing an act that forced action on their part.

I say again I am not at all clear as to what my reasons were regarding the telephone because 4 years later it is very difficult for me to tell what went on in my mind at the time. I will say this, though: It was in my mind regarding the use of transocean telephone.

Mr. Roosevelt, the President, had been in the frequent habit of talking to the Prime Minister by telephone. He also used to talk to Mr. Bullitt when he was Ambassador in Paris and my recollection is that was intercepted by the Germans.

I had a test made of induction from telephone conversations on the Atlantic cable from Gardner's Island. I found that that could be picked up by induction. I talked to the President not once but several times. I also later, after we were in the war, talked with the Prime Minister in an endeavor to have them be more careful in the use of the scrambler. I believe it is understood what that is.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. Because in our terminology that is private and not secret. A casual person listening in would not know what we were talking about. The person intent and with the facilities for breaking through in your communications can do it. It was long after we were in the war before we were able to install a scrambler system, which is now in vogue and which is quite elaborate, that was felt to be secret. Therefore, whether or not our overseas communication, overseas telephone communication, was secure or not was a question. I might go——

Senator Ferguson. Will you explain for our benefit now what a scrambler is?

General Marshall. A scrambler is a machine which takes your conversation and mixes it up into something that sounds like Chinese; that is the nearest I can give you.

Senator Ferguson. Almost like static, isn't it?

General Marshall. Well, no; it is not a roar so much as it is just a hash of sounds and if you press a certain button it comes to you in understandable English. Now, a person——

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you unscramble it.

General Marshall. Yes, sir; you unscramble it, anyone at the other end if he has the machine and presses the button.

Senator Ferguson. All along the line it is scrambled and in that machine it is unscrambled?
General Marshall. Until it gets to the other end of the line.

Now, I might illustrate a little further our telephone reactions because I undertook to try one officer for the use of the telephone from Panama, which we found all taken down here and that was furnished to me in writing by a naval intercept, where they were checking on the time and indiscretions of that nature.

I called this commander to get him up here, the officer going to Panama and the commander going the other way and then I found myself in the same difficulty with the commander in his conversation from Hawaii and then we hung up on him.

[3196] I had several conversations with the western defense commander and I hung up the phone because of the indiscretions in the excitement and argument that were being made over the phone. We were always in danger of that and we were quite aware of it, because the telephone is a very easy instrument to tap and the radio telephone, I believe, is even easier, but I want to repeat again that I have no clear recollection whatsoever as to my own reactions as to why I did not attempt to telephone at this time, but I have one conclusion that I think is quite accurate, that I certainly would have called up General MacArthur first.

Senator Ferguson. You had a scramble telephone to Hawaii and the Philippines at that time?

General Marshall. I don't know about the Philippines but I know we had it in to Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever talked to General Short on the scramble telephone?


Senator Ferguson. Did you have a line to General MacArthur?

General Marshall. We had a means of telephone communication but I do not recall whether or not we had a scrambler.

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to General MacArthur the first 7 days of December 1941?

[3197] General Marshall. No, sir; and I do not recall I ever did talk to him on the telephone.

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall that you ever talked to him?

General Marshall. Then or since.

Senator Ferguson. On the telephone?


Senator Ferguson. You mentioned about acquiring balloons and they were to be ready for Pearl Harbor in June.


Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us why they were not ready?

General Marshall. We had not been able to procure them up to that time. I don't know just what the intricacies were in the procedure in getting to the Congress through the Bureau of the Budget with the President's approval to arrange the necessary appropriations. I think that the records of the War Department can be produced before the committee to show when the War Department itself first represented to the Bureau of the Budget the desire for funds for the purpose of barrage balloons.

Senator Ferguson. Would these things, such as the barrage balloons, be taken up at these council meetings?

Senator Ferguson. Were minutes made of the council meetings?

General Marshall. Do you mean those of Mr. Hull and the secretaries?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I mean of the people who attended the War Council meetings?

General Marshall. I think the record shows in his office who were there, but there were no formal minutes that I recall ever seeing.

Senator Ferguson. Who were the people authorized to attend the council meetings?

General Marshall. I do not know, Senator, as to whether you could express it as authorized. I think it was those asked to sit in. Now, what the arrangement was between Secretary Hull, Mr. Stimson, and Colonel Knox I do not know and I am not the best witness. My dim recollection is and I believe possibly is in Mr. Stimson's testimony there, that he suggested the meetings, but that would be a matter of record.

Senator Ferguson. Well, we have some council meetings here looking like minutes in the Army.

General Marshall. Well, that is the Army.

Senator Ferguson. That is a different council?

General Marshall. That is a different council; yes, sir. I think that is a formal one for which there is a solid basis of regulation.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did you keep on holding these council meetings in the Army, as far as these council meetings are concerned, until December 7?

General Marshall. We are still holding general council meetings.

Senator Ferguson. You are still holding them?


Senator Ferguson. And so far as you know there are minutes kept of those meetings?

General Marshall. Yes; they are published in a regular book now and I think they were in that form then.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I think for the purpose of the record and just to call it to all the committee's attention, there is an important entry on page 67 of the United States News on barrage balloons saying:

Barrage balloons and smoke were also considered as means of defense but were rejected, the barrage balloons because they would interfere with the activity of U. S. aircraft, and the smoke because the strength of the prevailing winds would render it ineffective.

Senator Ferguson. Did you reject it, General?

General Marshall. No, sir. That, I believe, took place out there. I might say, Senator, we had that trouble all the time. I flew out to the west coast personally in regard to that immediately, shortly after the Pearl Harbor affair and took General Doolittle with me just as he returned, to check that, in order to straighten out the barrage balloon problem at San Diego, which was about the only fairly effective defense of that great B-24 plant there.

At that time there was naval objection by the local naval officers to having any barrage balloons any place because of its interference with
the seaplanes coming in for landings and I went there personally on a Sunday morning to the plant, got the naval officers and finally reached an agreement which permitted it in a modified way, which permitted us in a modified way to put up barrage balloons immediately.

There was always a question as to where you could use smoke to advantage or where the smoke might be to your disadvantage and, of course, part of that depended upon the efficiency of the smoke machines.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know about the decision not to use barrage balloons at Pearl Harbor?


[3201] Senator Ferguson. You do not recall it now?


Senator Ferguson. Would you say, General, now that they could have used torpedoes on these ships if we had had barrage balloons?

General Marshall. I could not answer that, sir. I would be interested to find out if they did use them afterwards, after they had plenty of balloons and plenty of time to consider it and I do not know now whether or not they did. My recollection is I never saw them there.

Senator Ferguson. You mentioned the other day about the building of the radar in the Park Service. Do you know how long it took the Park Service to allow you to put these permanent radar stations up?

General Marshall. My recollection, without referring to the record, is that we finally got the general approval about May 15.

Senator Ferguson. Were they completed at the time?

General Marshall. My understanding is that for the fixed stations they were not completed.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not your inability to get from the Park Service the right to build them delayed you in the production of those stations?

General Marshall. No, sir. I am not the best witness [3202] on that but I am told it had something to do with transportation and matériel and something to do with the engineering officer in that district and so far as I know had no relation to the Park Service, though I am not the best witness on that.

Senator Ferguson. But you have received some knowledge that you had that delay?

General Marshall. I think there was a delay to the point that the fixed stations were not working at all on December 7, or were not workable on December 7.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know anything about the Colonel Wyman case?

General Marshall. Well, that is what I had reference to when I said that I did not think it was the Park Service. I was not clear on the details of that case. They did not come to my attention until long afterwards and then only the name and the fact that it was at issue.

Senator Ferguson. So that really all you know about the Wyman case is the name "Wyman." You have no knowledge of the facts?

General Marshall. I have no detailed knowledge of the facts.

Senator Ferguson. You have no knowledge of the facts?

General Marshall. I have no knowledge of the facts; no, [3203] sir.
Senator Ferguson. In relation to exhibit 13, that is the Martin-Bellinger report—


Senator Ferguson (continuing). You are familiar with that now?


Mr. Mitchell. I think it is the Martin report.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; they call it the Martin report.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.


General Marshall. I know what you are referring to.

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with that?


Senator Ferguson. In fact you requested it?


Senator Ferguson. Do you know why nothing was done in relation to it?

General Marshall. I do not know—you say that nothing was done in relation to it, Senator. It was a question when the matériel would be available in which to carry out the desires expressed in the recommendations of that report.

I believe I stated in my testimony yesterday in relation to the principal proposal of the Board, which was for 180 [3204] four-engine bombers, that at that time the Army possessed all over the world, including the continental United States, about 148, of which I think some sixty odd were here for training of personnel, some were in Panama, 35 were in the Philippines, 12 were in Hawaii. It was a question, of course, in the first place of the availability of matériel.

Now, in the memorandum which I directed the secretary of the general staff to issue or, rather, not in the memorandum but part of the thought behind the memorandum was we were not only trying to resurvey with the later information available what appeared to be the full requirements for the proper defense of Hawaii, particularly in case the Fleet was not present there, to what extent we could manage the affair by holding certain planes on the west coast until an emergency seemed to develop, and the reason for that was we in some way had to train the people for the new bombers coming out; and unless we had these bombers for our use we could not develop the crews to handle the new product.

I had discussed with General Arnold the sending of men out to Hawaii to train out there and the question there was the over-use of the bombers they had and the interference in the air with the general activities of the Army and the Navy by training flights to that extent, so we were trying to double in brass as it were; have certain bombers ear- [3205] marked for Hawaii but available for day to day training on the west coast and that was part of the thought behind the memorandum I had issued which brought about the Martin report.

Senator Ferguson. At the time of Pearl Harbor you knew that the Army did not have long-distance reconnaissance?

General Marshall. I knew they only had 12 B-17's. I did not know just what the Navy had in their PBY's.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know what the arrangement was between the Army and the Navy as to who could or could not have long-range reconnaissance?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I was aware of that, as I believe I explained before, for the reason that the Air Corps officials in Washing-
ton brought to me an opposition to the arrangement General Short had made and I thought General Short's arrangement was a wise one under the circumstances and therefore did not accept the local War Department Air Corps officials' protest as sound.

Senator Ferguson. Had any of your reports with their predictions ever taken up the question of attack through the vacant sea as it has been described here to us? That is the part north of Hawaii.

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I understand what the vacant sea is. I suppose I am quite certain that I read the discussions that involved that in going through the plans in the War Plans Division when I was the head of that division and when it was my particu-
tar function to read in detail all the plans, which are very voluminous papers, of course, and also to participate in the discussions regarding the continual revisions of those plans.

Senator Ferguson. General, do you know what started the confer-
ences on the ABCD agreement—or, first, the ABC agreement?

General Marshall. My recollection on the thing was entirely hazy but Admiral Stark told me over the telephone, I believe, a few days ago when I questioned him in regard to it—and he, of course, is the proper witness to answer this—that he had initiated the proposal after bringing it to me and I had concurred with him, and he arranged through Admiral Ghormley in London for the procedure.

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will yield.

Senator Lucas. Do I understand from counsel that there was an ABCD agreement that was concurred in by this country?

Mr. Mitchell. The staff speaks of it as an agreement but it was a report by naval and military officers of both countries making certain recommendations. They had an agreement to report on that; that is what you mean.

General Marshall. The Army members and Navy members concurred in the report with the British representatives and the Secretary of War and I believe the Secretary of the Navy also favor-
ably expressed themselves on it, and the President, I think, never expressed himself one way or the other, not to me at least, and not in writing.

Senator Ferguson. Now, in the object—if you will just refer, Gen-
eral, to the report marked "American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, in April, 1941"?


Senator Ferguson. And refer to the "Object," on page 7. I read:

Our most important interests in the Far East are:
(a) The security of sea communications and
(b) The security of Singapore.

An important subsidiary interest is the security of Luzon in the Philippine Islands since, so long as submarine and air forces can be operated from Luzon, expeditions to threaten Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies from the East are out-flanked.

General Marshall. Yes, sir. What is the question, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why Hawaii is not in [3208] cluded in that?

General Marshall. This is a Far East survey, sir; not a Central Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. Then we will not find the Hawaiian Islands in any way connected with this ABCD agreement?

General Marshall. I do not think so, sir. Of course, that was a naval base en route to the Far East, but this conference at Singapore related to Far Eastern conditions.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, General, you were talking there about the Philippines being on the flank if they were going south.

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't Pearl Harbor also be on their flank?

General Marshall. Not in that sense, sir. Pearl Harbor is a good many thousand miles from the China Sea and the movement of the Japanese would be south through the China Sea. Pearl Harbor, of course, is about 2,400 miles west of the coast of California. It dominates the Central Pacific. It does not dominate the China Sea.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with what Mr. Churchill said on the 27th of January 1942 in relation to Pearl Harbor being on the flank?

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir.

[3209] Senator Ferguson. You do not recall such a statement. You would not consider, then, that the base and the ships that we had would be considered by a military authority as being on the flank of a movement south into Malay, Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies?

General Marshall. I think not in the sense that we ordinarily use "the flank." San Diego is on the flank in that sense as well as Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Japan ever knew of this ABCD arrangement?


Senator Ferguson. You say that Admiral Stark—you talked to him recently. Do you know whether he called that conference?

General Marshall. My understanding of what Admiral Stark told me was the proposition was brought up by Admiral Ghormley who was on duty in London and he, Admiral Stark, thought it was a wise procedure and discussed it with me and I concurred and the arrangements were then made by Admiral Stark, I believe, through Admiral Ghormley. Admiral Stark, of course, is the authoritative witness in the matter.

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 45 indicates that you had approved the plan. Is that correct?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

[3210] Senator Ferguson. And you presented it to the President?

General Marshall. I presented it, as I recall, to the Secretary of War and Admiral Stark to the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Well, the Secretary of War approved it also, did he not?


Senator Ferguson. The Secretary of the Navy approved it and Admiral Stark approved it?
General Marshall. I think that is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will yield.
Mr. Murphy. To get the record straight, you said, "You approved the plan" without specifying which one. There are three plans.
Mr. Mitchell. This memo I think relates to British conversations, not to the Singapore. I couldn't tell until I read it.
Senator Ferguson. I will strike out the exhibit. You did approve the various plans?
General Marshall. Yes, sir; that is my recollection, but the record will show, I think.
Senator Ferguson. The one with China and with the Netherlands East Indies.
General Marshall. I don't know which one you are referring to.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
The Chairman. Let General Marshall conclude his answer.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Marshall. I don't know just what one you are referring to when you say with China.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield at that point?
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will yield.
Mr. Murphy. The testimony is that the Chief of Staff approved the original ABC-1 and ABC-2, I believe. He also approved the Canadian but did not approve the Singapore.
Senator Ferguson. Would you let the General see the Singapore, the memo on whether or not he approved it? I do not think the memo applies to Singapore; but I will ask you now, did you ever approve?
Mr. Mitchell. When you say "memo" you mean that memorandum by General Gerow to General Marshall, that he has in his hand? I would like to know.
Senator Ferguson. It is dated June 2, 1941, to the President at the White House, "Dear Mr. President," signed by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War and Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy.
Attached to it is a letter, June the 9th by W. P. Scobey, and attached to that is one of August 20, 1941, and to that is one of August 29, 1941, signed "O. K." That is the part on Canada. "O. K., F. D. R." Signed, "W. P. Scobey."
General Marshall. You haven't any memorandum here in regard to the Singapore?
Mr. Gesell. No.
General Marshall. I will have to get some data on that. I do not recall just the details.
Senator Ferguson. Does counsel have any data that he can give to the general?
Mr. Murphy. You have the testimony of General Gerow on that.
Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow says he never approved it. The document he has in his hand involves ABC-1 and 2 and not the British at all and also involves the Canadian. The record memo shows that ABC-1 and 2—that Rainbow 5, I think it was, was put up to the President and he refused to approve them because ABC-1 and 2 had not been approved by the parties that were involved in it and the Canadian was the only one that was approved, as I understand it.
Mr. Murphy. The President approved the Canadian one. He did not approve the ABC-1 and 2 and neither Admiral Stark or the Chief of Staff approved the Pacific one.

Senator Ferguson. General, do you have any knowledge as to whether or not you did or did not approve the one made at Singapore?

General Marshall. I will have to go into my record, sir, and refresh my mind.

Senator Ferguson. You haven't any present knowledge about that?

General Marshall. No, sir; I haven't.

Senator Ferguson. This letter of June 9th said the President had familiarized himself with the two papers but since the report of the United States-British Staff Conversations, ABC-1, had not been approved by the British Government he would not approve the report at this time, neither would he now give approval to the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow 5 which is based upon the report of ABC-1. However, in case of war the papers would be returned to the President for his approval.

Do you know whether or not Britain ever approved this ABC-1?

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any information in the War Department as to whether or not they ever approved ABC-1?

General Marshall. I do not recall that. I imagine General Gerow can speak authoritatively from the records.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the President ever approved ABC-1?


Senator Ferguson. Did ABC-1 ever go into effect?

General Marshall. In general effect it did because it involved the policy of the main fight in the Atlantic and the defensive principle in the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. How did it go into effect if not approved? Was it approved in part and not approved in part?

General Marshall. I do not recall, Senator, just what the proceeding was. Once we got into the war we all had a common understanding of the almost imperative necessity of being on the defensive in the Pacific until we got control of the situation in the Atlantic.

We had a formal meeting of the British and American Chiefs of Staff and with the President and with the Prime Minister which began shortly after Christmas or, in other words, shortly after Pearl Harbor in December 1941, where general agreements for the combined cooperation in the conduct of the war were arrived at. There was no overt action in the way of carrying out a joint plan between December 7 and [3215] that of the date of the British-American meetings that I can recall.

Senator Ferguson. General, this plan depended upon an attack, did it not?

General Marshall. You mean ABC-1?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; in the Pacific.

General Marshall. Well, it meant that we were not going to launch a war in the Pacific but that in the event we became involved in a war in the Pacific we would be on the defensive.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will yield.
Mr. Murphy. On page 9 of General Marshall's report is the following (reading):

On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Washington to confer with the President and the American Chiefs of Staff. Out of the series of discussions which then followed resulted an agreement, not only regarding the immediate strategy for our combined conduct of the war, but also for the organization of a method for the strategical command and control of British and American military resources.

Senator Ferguson. What is the date of that, Congressman?

Senator Ferguson. General, does that refresh your memory that nothing was done prior to that about approving it?

General Marshall. I think that is the case, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did it come into effect in the Atlantic?

General Marshall. It went into effect in the Atlantic to the extent that we utilized what we then had in the Atlantic to carry out what amounted to the same plan as outlined here in ABC-1. There was no transfer at that time of ships, as I recall, from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and I do not know if there were any transferred during that period from the Atlantic to the Pacific, though there may have been.

We did not make any general operational moves except some naval moves by the vessels there in the vicinity of Hawaii, based on Pearl Harbor and those of Admiral Hart's contingent of the Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines. We were operating there for a few days under the rules of stern necessity. We met then with the British and reached a formal agreement in regard to the conduct of the war.

Senator Ferguson. General, that—

General Marshall. May I go a little further?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. This plan presented to us a basis for [3217] joint operations, for territories that one or the other would consider himself responsible, so that at the very beginning we had a fair understanding of what we had best do rather than the necessity of engaging in prolonged conversations such as were required to reach this report after we once became involved and engaged in the war.

Senator Ferguson. General, did it take an attack to put the plan into effect?


Senator Ferguson. What is your definition of an attack that would put it into effect?

General Marshall. Well, Pearl Harbor was an attack.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; no doubt about that.

General Marshall. There was no other at that particular time, though a few hours later there was an attack on the Philippines.

Senator Ferguson. I am going to read you a definition of an attack.


Senator Ferguson. (Reading):

Modern warfare has injected a new definition for that word "attack." There was a time when we could afford to say that we would not fight unless attacked and then wait until the physical attack came upon us before start- [3218] ing to shoot. Modern techniques of warfare have changed all that. An attack today is a very different thing. An attack today begins as soon as any base has
been occupied from which our security is threatened. That base may be thousands of miles away from our shores. The American Government must of necessity decide at which point any threat of attack against this hemisphere has begun and to make their stand when that point has been reached.

The Chairman. May the Chair ask the Senator what he is reading from?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I first want to ask the General whether or not he agrees with that definition of “attack”?

General Marshall. I do not find myself in any particular disagreement with it but it is a considerable discussion of a certain definition.

Senator Ferguson. I cannot hear you.

General Marshall. I say I do not find myself in specific disagreement with any part of that, but it is a considerable generalization.

Senator Ferguson. Well, would you say that that kind of an attack, defined in that paragraph that I read you, was such as to put into effect these various plans or any of them?

General Marshall. Well, if——

[3219] Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.

The Chairman. Let the General answer his question.

General Marshall. If you are referring, Senator, to some key paragraph in the agreement, in the American-British-Dutch conversations at Singapore—or is it ABC-1 you are talking about?

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about——

General Marshall. ABC-1?

Senator Ferguson (continuing): ABC-1, I will first talk about that.

General Marshall. ABC-1 To put that plan into actual effect I would say that that definition would not apply because there would be plenty of time for the Government itself to take care of consideration of whether or not it would commit itself on that basis. When you have an overt, close-striking operation which you must respond to instantly, then you have the sort of attack that compels an instant response with or without plans.

Senator Ferguson. Did the ABC-1 apply to the Pacific?

General Marshall. Senator, I must apologize for looking at these things.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I want you to look at them.

General Marshall. I haven’t read them for 4 years.

[3220] Senator Ferguson. I want to get the record clear on it.

General Marshall. And it takes me some time to catch up with it.

Senator Ferguson. What exhibit have you now, General? Will counsel put in the record what he has?

General Marshall. I have Exhibit 49.

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 49?


Senator Ferguson. Now, that is the one you say that the definition that I read would not put it into effect?

General Marshall. That would be my opinion.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, take the other plan, Exhibit 50. That is the American-Dutch-British.

General Marshall. What I am trying to do, Senator, before I answer any of your questions—you talk about a paragraph in this plan that is automatic in the event of an attack by an enemy.
Mr. Murphy. May I, Mr. Chairman, direct the witness' attention to the bottom of the second page?

Purposes of the Staff Conference:
To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

General Marshall. Where are you reading from, please?
Mr. Murphy. Page 2 of Exhibit 50, General.

General Marshall. Of Exhibit 50? Well, I have got Exhibit 49 here. That has to do with the American-Dutch-British conversations.
Mr. Murphy. The same one that you call 49 I am calling 50, General. I don't know just which. I have mine marked "50."
Mr. Gesell. It is 49.
Mr. Murphy. Page 2 of 49.

General Marshall. Now, where were you reading from, please, Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. At the bottom of the page, the purposes of the conference.

The Vice Chairman. What page?
Mr. Murphy. Second page, under paragraph 3, the purposes of the conference.

General Marshall. I have got some other paper.
Mr. Murphy. Paragraph No. 3, "Purposes of the Staff Conference."

General Marshall (reading):

Purposes of the Staff Conference.
The purposes of the Staff Conference, as set out in the instructions to the two representative bodies, were as follows:
(a) To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth, with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.
(b) To coordinate, on broad lines, plans for the employment of the forces of the Associated Powers.
(c) To reach agreements concerning the methods and nature of Military Cooperation between the two nations, including the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the major lines of the Military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme Military control, and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations.

4. The Staff Conference, interpreting the foregoing instructions in the light of the respective national positions of the two powers, has reached agreements, as set forth in this and annexed documents, concerning Military Cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth and its present Allies should the United States associate itself with them in war against Germany and her Allies. The agreements herewith submitted are subject to confirmation by:
(a) The Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the United Kingdom.
(b) The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

The Chiefs of Staff will request His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to endeavor to obtain, where necessary, the concurrence of His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions, the Government of India, and the Governments of Allied Powers to the relevant provisions of the agreements herein recorded. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff will similarly request the United States Government to endeavor to obtain, where necessary, the concurrence of the Governments of such other American Powers as may enter the war as associates of the United States.
The High Command of the United States and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategical policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war. They and their respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will similarly collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be undertaken jointly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately, the extent of collaboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed mutually when the general policy has been decided.

The term “Associated Powers” used herein is to be taken as meaning the United States and British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of either Power.

The Staff Conference assumes that when the United States becomes involved in war with Germany, it will at the same time engage in war with Italy. In these circumstances, the possibility of a state of war arising between Japan and an Association of the United States, the British Commonwealth and its Allies, including the Netherlands East Indies, must be taken into account.

The Conference assumes that the United States will continue to furnish material aid to the United Kingdom, but, for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. It is recognized that the amount and nature of the material aid which the United States affords the British Commonwealth will influence the size and character of the Military forces which will be available to the United States for use in the war.

The broad strategic objective (object) of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her Allies.

The principles of United States and British national strategic defense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must take account are:

(a) United States.

The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or Military Power.

(b) British Commonwealth.

The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities will provide for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will insure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort.

(c) Sea Communications.

The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential to the continuance of their war effort.

The strategic concept includes the following as the principal offensive policies against the Axis Powers:

(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplomatic and financial measures.

(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute to that power.

(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis.

(d) The employment of the air, land and naval forces of the Associated Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis Military strength.

(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Associates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in resistance to the Axis Powers.

(f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany.

(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive.

(13) Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will likewise be governed by the following:

(a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The prin-
Principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of the United States efforts being concentrated in the Northwestern Approaches to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary importance.

(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basins, and to prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa.

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States—

Senator Ferguson. General, may I interrupt just a moment? Are you answering Congressman Murphy’s question now?

General Marshall. I am trying to find the exact terms of this agreement to refresh my own memory and read it clear through to the end. I was reading it out loud. I can read it to myself if you prefer.

Mr. Murphy. I have no question.

General Marshall. I might say, Senator, there are thousands of pages of these and I have had 3 days in which to absorb them.

Senator Ferguson. I think you and I both have had to do that.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make this clear? I was trying to help the General in finding the answer to the question.

Senator Lucas. What was the question?

Mr. Murphy. The Senator asked what was involved in the ABC?

General Marshall. No, Murphy, I understood the Senator to say when was the plan to be put into effect and I was trying to see if it was stipulated that when an attack came this would be automatic.

Senator Ferguson. General, I refer you to Exhibit 16.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. Keefe. I realize the help that my colleague from Pennsylvania has been in this proceeding but in this particular instance his effort to help seems to have muddied the waters to the extent that there isn’t anybody that knows what we are talking about and I would like to see if we can get an answer to a question or have a question submitted so that we can follow the proceedings. And I don’t wonder that the General is disturbed because I confess as one member of the committee I have difficulty in knowing what is going on or what we are talking about and I would like to have this thing down to some basis so that one member can ask the questions and let the witness give the answers without these constant interjections which have the result of muddying the waters rather than clarifying them.

The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan will proceed.

Senator Ferguson. We will pass that question then.
The Chairman. The Chair would like to suggest, in response to the remarks of the Congressman from Wisconsin, that we had an understanding that counsel would be permitted to inquire of the witnesses without interruption, and that the members of the committee in their turn would be permitted to inquire of the witnesses without interruption and, except where it is necessary in order that a member of the committee understands an answer, does not get a word accurately, it would seem, in the interest of order, that that course be pursued.

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, may I interject at this point? General Marshall has indicated from the start that he is perfectly able to take care of himself as a witness before this committee and to understand the questions that are asked without prompting from any other member of this committee.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I hope the gentleman will take that remark out of the record. I am not attempting to prompt anybody. I am seeking the truth here. I think the record will show I have been helpful to the Senator from Michigan in getting a clarification here. I think the remarks of the gentleman from Wisconsin is letting off steam and nothing else.

[3232] The Chairman. The Senator from Michigan will proceed.

Senator Ferguson. I want the record to show I have not objected to any interruptions, because it is my interest to get the facts. The Chairman has well the right to invoke the rule. It was invoked the first day before I got two words out.

The Chairman. I do not recall that. If that is true, the record will show it, but the Chair does not happen to remember it. The Chair offers these observations in order to try to discourage unnecessary interruptions of one member of the committee by another during the examination of the witnesses.

Senator Ferguson. General, if you will now refer to Exhibit 50, I want to call certain things to your attention.

On page 13, the top of the page, it states:

It is agreed that any of the following actions by Japan would create a position in which our failure to take active military counteraction would place us at such military disadvantage, should Japan subsequently attack, that we should then advise our respective Governments to authorize such action:

Then follow specifications (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I follow that.

Senator Ferguson. In (b) it states:

The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Tha[3233]land to the west of 100° East or to the south of 10° North.


Senator Ferguson. We have a map before us, if you will just look at it, which indicates that line, and it ends up by saying:

The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands.

Do you see the line outlined on the map?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that.

Senator Ferguson. And you used a very similar description in your letter—it is not a letter, it is a memorandum for the President by you and Admiral Stark, on November 5.

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I recall that.
Senator Ferguson. You recall that?


Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 18 of that same exhibit, if you will refer to it, it says, "Japan's most probable course of action will be to," and then you have (a) and (b), and I will ask you whether or not anything is indicated in there in relation to an attack on Hawaii, or is it left out because Hawaii is not in this plan at all?

General Marshall (reading):

It is estimated that Japan's most probable course of action will be to:

(a) contain the Asiatic Fleet in Manila Bay with the object of destroying it by air and torpedo attacks and failing in this, to

(b) locate the Fleet at the earliest possible moment and endeavor to at least draw it by air, submarine or surface vessel attacks.

The question, as I understand it, is whether there is an omission of any reference to Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; was the reason that it was not covered by this plan because it was thought that that was the probable course of Japan?

General Marshall. I think, Senator, it is my recollection of the discussions that were going on in Singapore at the time that the problem of the attack on Hawaii was not what they were considering, it was the security of Singapore, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies, generally extending over north of New Guinea to the Admiralty Islands.

Senator Ferguson. Then this plan did not anticipate an attack on America?

General Marshall. This plan was to meet a probable, as we understood it, Japanese operation to the south of the China Sea.

[3234] Senator Ferguson. Well, were you familiar with the fact that Mr. Churchill made the statement sometime before the war started, as far as America was concerned December 7, that in case Japan attacked America they would be in with us in 1 or 2 hours, or whatever the time was?

General Marshall. I have a recollection of some such statement.

Senator Ferguson. Could that have been in reply to this plan then?

General Marshall. I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. Were they to come in if Hawaii alone were to be attacked?

General Marshall. I could not answer that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Or was it a one-sided plan?

General Marshall. I do not think it was one-sided.

Senator Ferguson. I just want to know what your opinion is on it.

General Marshall. It says "A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the associated powers." That is a very general statement, and can cover Hawaii also. "It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute 'a direct act of war.' It is possible for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be [3236] resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized that the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned."

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out whether this plan went into effect prior to December 7.
General Marshall. I am quite certain it did not go into effect, because it never was implemented, sir.

Senator Ferguson. On page 25, it says, at the bottom of the page—will you read that (b), the last paragraph?

General Marshall (reading):

The operating of Chinese guerilla forces armed, equipped, and directed by the associated Powers. Steps have already been taken by the British Government to organize such operations. It is recommended that the United States Government organize similar guerilla forces.

Senator Ferguson. Did we ever organize those, to put this plan into effect?

General Marshall. So far as I know, prior to December 7, 1941, we did not, as far as I can recollect.

The one action, aside from sending supplies into China, that I do have a very definite recollection of is equipping the air force, the Flying Tigers.

Senator Ferguson. The Volunteer Air Corps?

General Marshall. Yes; because I took the action to get them the planes personally.

Senator Ferguson. What was the Volunteer Air Corps?

General Marshall. The Volunteer Air Corps was a force of airmen, combat planes, P-40's, I believe, furnished by the United States, and operated by volunteer officers from the United States, I think, of the Army and Navy, and there may have been even civilians in it. I am not quite certain.

Some of them were reserve officers, and they were relieved from active duty, and released so that they might go into the employ of the Chinese Government.

The planes were obtained—is there any interest in that?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.

General Marshall. The planes were obtained on the basis of an English contract for planes, I think, with the Curtiss Co., and when that contract had been fulfilled, it was possible for the plant to turn out a certain number of planes during the next few months, if they immediately started, within 10 days, using the parts that were then available; otherwise their assembly lines would change.

Under the contract arrangement we had, which controlled the Curtiss Co.'s operations with the British, our Government, meaning the War Department in general, and Air Corps people in particular, could control the question of whether or not those planes should be manufactured beyond the contract terms.

The problem was to obtain planes immediately for the Chinese.

The planes which would have been fabricated out of this available extra material of course would not have been completed for 3 or 4 months.

We could kill that, so far as the British getting the benefit of those additional planes, or, as I used it, we could, on a trade basis, require them to make immediate delivery of completed planes that were going to them, to the Chinese, and we later would allow them to take these additional planes that were manufactured from the accumulated matériel.

[3237] I saw Mr. Sumner Welles and he took up the adjustment with the British, and they submitted to that condition, and we got 50
in January or February, and 50 more in February or March. They were all for the Flying Tigers; they were sent out to the Far East. The men that were recruited by the Chinese and we released where they happened to be reserve officers, also, proceeded to the Far East.

My next recollection of the matter is while we had obtained the planes on that basis by a twist of the British contract, we now found ourselves in the predicament of having to provide the guns and ammunition, which we did not have available, and we had a hard time arranging the planes.

That was the one definite force that I recall, prior to December 7, 1941, we organized to the extent that I have just described.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, was that an activating of this Exhibit 50 plan?

General Marshall. I do not think it was that. It came actually out of a visit here of T. V. Soong with the head of the Chinese Air. I took them out to my house for lunch and they made an impressive picture of the circumstances and the great good such action would do, and I immediately undertook the obtaining of that matériel. That was without regard to this plan, and what I was referring to here is the continuation of that.

Senator Ferguson. What I was trying to find out was whether this was an activating of this particular plan.

General Marshall. I do not think it was, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In your memo, exhibit 16, you refer to the same line which I read to you before.

Mr. Gesell. I think that is exhibit 17, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. No; 16 is the one I have reference to. You see at the top of page 4, "The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound."

Now I assume you are referring to Exhibit 50, are you not, General? General Marshall. What page was that you were reading from?

Senator Ferguson. Page 4. It is the fourth page of this document. They are not numbered. The top of the page, "Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions."

General Marshall. I see it. "The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound." Now the question?

Senator Ferguson. I wanted to know whether that referred to exhibit 50.

[3241] General Marshall. That was my understanding, sir. However, the use of the word "agreed" is not intended to imply that our Government was committed to it.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Senator, the British-American Staff conversations are ABC-1 and 2. I was afraid you are getting a confusion on the record. Exhibit 50 is the American-Dutch-British. That is a memo with reference to what?

General Marshall. It is the estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation.

The Chairman. That is a different document, isn't it?

Senator Ferguson. Does not that include the Dutch and Singapore? Does not that include Exhibit 50, which you were looking at?

Senator Ferguson. You think it does. Now in order that there be no misunderstanding about this definition of an attack that I read—do you recall what I had read to you?


Senator Ferguson. Would that kind of an attack as described in the definition that I read to you activate or bring into effect Exhibit 50, that is the one on the Far East?

General Marshall. I will say, in the first place, that no attack would have brought into effect this exhibit 50, because—

[3242] Senator Ferguson (interposing). Well, was it contemplated—

The Chairman. Just a moment. Let him complete his answer.

General Marshall. It was contemplated that our Government approve the procedure. Now your exact definition, I am not quite certain about that. But the point I am making now is we, meaning Admiral Stark and myself, as Chief of Staff, and meaning the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, would not be in a position and were not in a position to bring the terms of this argument, so far as they pertained to the United States, into effect, by reason of the document without the formal approval of the Government.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

[3244] General, I want to refer now to Exhibit 40, a dispatch between Admiral Hart and Admiral Stark. Do you have it before you?

General Marshall. I have that before me.

Senator Ferguson. Will you just read the message part? It is only one sentence.

General Marshall. “Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.”

That is a question?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. From the Commander in Chief in the Far East to Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Ferguson. Now, have you any such knowledge as that?


Senator Ferguson. That was entirely foreign and not in your mind at all, that we had any such arrangements?

General Marshall. In my mind was the clear understanding that this was a planning arrangement which had not been approved, was not to be considered as an approved document until the Government so ordered.

Mr. Mitchell. May I ask what the date of that letter is?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Will you give the date? It has been in the record.

General Marshall. It is December 1941. I do not see the day of the month.

Mr. Gesell. After the war started.

Senator Ferguson. Now, wait.

General Marshall. There is no day of the month on it.

Senator Ferguson. Is counsel testifying here or the witness?
Mr. Gesell. I was speaking to Mr. Mitchell. I would be glad to advise the committee of the information I gave to Mr. Mitchell.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask what the stenographer got.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Senator Ferguson. Do you see anything on that exhibit to show that that was shown to Admiral Hart or Admiral Stark after the war started?

General Marshall. I see merely the month, December, and the year, 1941. There may be the day of the month on here, but I do not spot it.

Senator Ferguson. Would that reference on it give you when it was?

General Marshall. I presume it would.

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at it? Do you know the Navy code there?

[3245] General Marshall. I do not know what it is. The way it reads, it is the 645th day of December, but that does not make sense to me.

The Chairman. Is there anybody here who understands what date that is?

Senator Ferguson. The first and second numerals of the serial designate the date of the month, the third and fourth numerals, the hour of the day, and the fifth and sixth, the minutes of the hour.

General Marshall. This would be the 7th day of December 1941, according to that.

Senator Ferguson. 1941?

General Marshall. The 7th day of December.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and what hour?

General Marshall. The sixth hour, and 45 minutes.

Senator Ferguson. I will read the cracking of the code here:

The third and fourth numerals the hour of the day, and the 5th and 6th the minutes of the hour.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Just a moment. Let the Senator finish.

Mr. Murphy. I want to make a protest before he does.

The Chairman. The Chairman will not recognize the member at this time, until the Senator from Michigan finishes.

[3246] Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. No, not at this time. I want to overrule the Chair.

The Chairman. The Chair is not overruled. The Chair has sustained the Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson. I was trying to give the General a way to interpret that language. Now I will read it again.

I am reading from a letter of the Navy Department, Office of the Secretary, Washington, the 6th of December 1945, and signed by John Ford Baecher, Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

The time element involved in the above-mentioned dispatches is computed in the following manner: The first and second numerals of the serial designate the day of the month, the third and fourth numerals the hour of the day, the fifth and sixth the minutes of the hour.

Now, will you give us the date of the month?

General Marshall. The 7th day of December.

Senator Ferguson. The third and fourth numerals, the hour of the day?
General Marshall. That is the sixth hour of the day, and that would be 6 a.m.

Senator Ferguson. That would be 6 a.m. The fifth and sixth, minutes of the hour?


Senator Ferguson. Then I will read you the next

All dispatches are dated Greenwich time.


Senator Ferguson. What does that mean?

General Marshall. It means just that; it is the Greenwich time. You will have to relate this over to the similar time in the Far East.

Senator Ferguson. I want to try to get it in Washington time.

General Marshall. I could not tell you just what that is. You want it in Washington time?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. I think Greenwich time is about 6 hours difference from Washington time, approximately.

Senator Ferguson. Now, reading further.

As an example, dispatch #070645 means that the dispatch originates in the Philippines area on the 7th day of the month (and as shown on the face of the dispatch in the month of December, 1941) at 6:45 a.m. Greenwich time.

Now, they are talking about Philippine time, are they not? I mean the day? Is that Greenwich time? I will give you the letter, General, and see if you can figure it [3248] out.

Mr. Mitchell. Suppose I read it into the record.

Senator Ferguson. Well, he had better look at it. I would like to have you figure out what time it was in Washington, and what day of the month.

General Marshall. What time it was where?

Senator Ferguson. In Washington, when that was sent.

General Marshall. This memo states:

"Eastern Standard time is five hours earlier than Greenwich time, therefore the dispatch originated on December 7, at 1:45 a.m. Eastern Standard time. The Philippine area is about eight hours ahead of Greenwich time, therefore the dispatch originated on December 7, 2:45 p.m. Philippine area time."

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, with the time here in Washington that was 1:45 in the morning, was it not, on the 7th? That would be an hour and 45 minutes after midnight on the morning of the 7th?

General Marshall. That would be it.

Senator Ferguson. Had the attack taken place at that time?

General Marshall. No, sir; the attack did not take place, I believe, until 1 o'clock in the middle of the day, Washington time.

Senator Ferguson. In the middle of the day.

[3249] The Chairman. May the Chair ask at this moment, it is practically 4 o'clock—whether the committee desires to sit longer today? I frankly, was hoping we might conclude with General Marshall today on account of his matters but whether we can is not within my control.

Would the committee feel justified in sitting longer if there is a chance to conclude with General Marshall or not?
Senator Ferguson. There isn't a chance, unless the committee is willing to sit well into the evening.

The Chairman. The Chair would not want to compel the Senator from Michigan to tell how long it will take.

Senator Ferguson. I do not know.

The Chairman. In view of the fact we cannot conclude with General Marshall, what is the wish of the committee as to recessing now?

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire something of General Marshall. I understand he stated yesterday his plane was waiting, ready to take him to his duties in China.

General Marshall. It will have to continue to wait. I am to be at your disposal until you have finished.

The Chairman. Under those circumstances, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

(Whereupon, the committee recessed until 10 a. m., Monday, December 10, 1945.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

MONDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1945

Congress of the United States, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Senator Ferguson, you were examining General Marshall.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a correction in the record.

On page 3178 I read from the Roberts Report. It is in the record on page 3178, the last paragraph. The record reads: "8:30 American Honolulu time." The record I read from, being the Roberts report, says: "6:30 A.M. Honolulu time."

The word "American" is not in there. So there will be two changes. The figure "8:30" is changed to "6:30" and strike out "American." 1

The Chairman. The correction will be made.

Senator Ferguson. General Marshall, about the 12th or 13th of August, 1941, you attended the Atlantic Conference meeting, did you not?

General Marshall. What sort of meeting, sir?

Senator Ferguson. The Atlantic Conference.

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I was present, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How long before you went to that meeting had you known there was to be a meeting?

[3252] General Marshall. I do not recall, Senator, but purely as a guess I would say maybe a week; I don't recall at all. Maybe some circumstances will come up that will jar my memory, but I don't recall now at all.

Senator Ferguson. Did you see any agenda before you went to the meeting?

1 See p. 1207, supra.
General Marshall. I know specifically there was no agenda for the Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conferences with the British Chiefs of Staff or military authorities, in relation to the Far East?

General Marshall. I don't recall a specific conference with the three British Chiefs of Staff regarding the Far East.

Might I explain my recollection of what occurred?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. Admiral Stark, General Arnold, and myself met with the British Chief of Staff, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the Acting Head of the Air Corps—Air Marshal Portal was not present—and Field Marshal Sir John Dill, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Our discussions were quite general, somewhat in the nature of getting acquainted and of our learning from them of the course of the war from their point of view, and of their informing us in general statements of their urgent necessities.

We proceeded thereafter most of the time on the basis of personal conversations between the respective opposite Chiefs of Staff. In my case, that would be Field Marshal Sir John Dill.

My recollection of my conversations with the Field Marshal were that he explained on his own initiative, or on my questioning, what their situation was all over the world, their approaches to the various phases of the campaigns that had then taken place, and particularly the situation in the Middle East.

My recollection is that he and I had not a great deal to say about matériel, because in the category of matériel for the ground forces we had already done for them about as much as it was possible for us to do for some time.

My understanding of the conversations between General Arnold and the First Sea Lord, on which General Arnold is the best witness—I should say with the air representative—he had a great deal of discussion regarding aircraft that the British needed. And I believe somewhat the same was the nature of the conversations between Admiral Stark and the First Sea Lord in regard to naval requirements.

However, I did not sit in on those details.

[3254] At another meeting with the three Chiefs of Staff—

Senator Ferguson. General, I was only interested in the Far East situation. I didn't care to cover the other.

General Marshall. I will confine myself to that by saying, Senator, that we only had a general discussion of the situation all over the world, and I do not remember specifically the Far Eastern part. So far as our discussions with them, I took the lead in pressing them all the time to unify their procedure and to save us from the confusion that was then existent here in Washington regarding their necessities as to matériel.

Senator Ferguson. Prior to going there or at the meeting, did you know what this country's, America's, attitude, our attitude, was in relation to Japan going any further on her aggressive steps, aggression steps in the Far East?

General Marshall. My recollection of my understanding of that phase of the matter at that time was that our policy was in every way that seemed possible and suitable to discourage any outbreak in the Pacific.
Senator Ferguson. On page 14 of exhibit 1, I wonder whether this was ever called to your attention. It was on the 7th of August, 1941, translated the 8th of August—no, translated the 15th of August. So you would be at the meeting \[3255\] at that time, would you not?


[3256] Senator Ferguson. What I wanted to call to your attention was the second paragraph on that page. It is a message from Washington Japan intercepted:

When Japan occupied French Indochina—

General Marshall. Senator, may I interrupt. What page are you on, please?

Senator Ferguson. I am on page 14.

General Marshall. I have it now.

Senator Ferguson. The second paragraph [reading from exhibit No. 1]:

When Japan occupied French Indochina, the United States retaliated with the "freezing" order and the export embargo; a joint warning by Hull and Eden was issued with regard to any ambitions in the direction of Thailand.

Did you know that?

General Marshall. I presume that I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that there was a conversation between the President and Mr. Churchill in relation to parallel action by the United States as far as Japan was concerned in case of aggression?

General Marshall. I presume that I did.

Senator Ferguson. Did you return at the same time as the President?

General Marshall. Only part of the way, sir. I left the Augusta, which was the cruiser on which we were traveling \[3257\] at sea, somewhere southeast, I believe, of Nova Scotia, took a seaplane and flew in to the Naval Base near Newport, and there transferred to a plane to Washington.

Senator Ferguson. You came back to the United States?

General Marshall. I came back directly to the United States.

Senator Ferguson. Had you learned before you came back to the United States that there had been a conversation between the President and Mr. Churchill in relation to parallel action? Was that discussed with you at the conference?

General Marshall. That was not discussed with me at the conference.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when you returned to the United States? The President—I relate the day he returned for the record—the 17th. That was on a Sunday morning.

Do you know when you returned?

General Marshall. Do I know when the President returned?

Senator Ferguson. No; when you returned to the United States?

General Marshall. I returned quite a few days ahead of him, so I must have been here then.

Senator Ferguson. Did you learn that on the 17th of August the President—that is on a Sunday morning—the President called the Japanese Ambassador to the White House \[3258\] and de-
livered to him a statement, an oral statement? In the oral statement this language was used:

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

That is the end of the paragraph and the end of the statement.

General Marshall. Your question is—

Senator Ferguson. Whether you knew that, when you learned of it.

General Marshall. My recollection is, and I believe the records of liaison meetings show, that at least the sense of that message, if not the actual message, was read in my presence in the office of the Under Secretary of State. Mr. Sumner Welles, about 2 days later, which I believe was the 19th.

Senator Ferguson. That is the first knowledge you had that such action was taken or was to be taken?

[3250] General Marshall. Yes, sir; as far as I can recall.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know that England—did you ever learn that England had taken a similar step?

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that on August 24, 4 days prior to the Jap answer to that message, which was the 28th, that the Prime Minister made a statement to the effect that in case America went to war with Japan that they, the British, would be in in a short time—2 or 3 hours?

General Marshall. I don't recall that, sir.

[3260] Senator Ferguson. What was the discussion you had with the Under Secretary in relation to the paragraph that I just read, the one that you read at the—

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir. I have not seen the minutes or the record of the meeting. I had a vague recollection of knowing something about that message at some time and I was told that it was in the record of the minutes of the liaison meeting. I believe it is a naval record of a Captain Schuirmann that Mr. Welles either told us of the message or actually read the message to us, so that I am not a very good witness on that.

Senator Ferguson. How did you interpret what was said at that meeting by Mr. Welles? What obligation did it place on you as the head of the Army, if any? How did you interpret it as Chief of Staff?

General Marshall. My interpretation now—I would have to guess at what it was then—was that the situation was growing more difficult and the implications here were largely, I believe, economic; but I do not recall exactly what my reactions were at the time. I knew this throughout the procedure then, as far as I understood the matter of the diplomatic interchanges, that they were endeavoring to find some way to avoid a rupture in the Pacific without the complete sacrifice of American policies.

[3267] Senator Ferguson. Did you take that as being from that time on the American policy so that you would have to, if necessary, implement it?
General Marshall. I would assume that I would, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did that in any way change the American policy as far as you were concerned, that is, as far as your knowledge?

General Marshall. I would assume that it did not. I have no recollection of any state of change in my mind at the time. Our procedure was more or less uniform throughout.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did that indicate that the tension was at least growing and that we had certain commitments and that it may be necessary for you to prepare for those commitments?

General Marshall. I presume so, sir. Certainly the tension was growing all the time, and particularly in the months of September, October, and November.

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Senator Lucas. What is the Senator talking about when he talks about commitments? I would like to know that.

Senator Ferguson. Does the General understand my question?


[3262] Senator Lucas. I would like to know to what the Senator is referring, what the Senator is inquiring about when he talks about our commitments. I would like to know myself what the Senator is talking about.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will ask the General, does he understand my question?

General Marshall. Well, I was not making any fine interpretation of the word "commitment," Senator. I was talking about our military obligations.

Senator Ferguson. We were talking about this particular paragraph, were we not, General?


Senator Ferguson. And you understood my questions to relate to that paragraph?


Senator Ferguson. And the fact that the Japanese had received it from the President on Sunday morning?


Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know, General, whether or not that information of the delivery of this message was sent to General Short or General MacArthur?

General Marshall. I have no—there was a message sent to General Short and to General MacArthur sometime, as I recall, during August that referred to the Japanese attitude. [3263] I do not know offhand whether or not this message was sent. My recollection would be that it was not.

Senator Ferguson. Your recollection would be that it was not sent?

General Marshall. But the record will show that, of course, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Well I have no record that it was and I wondered if you have any knowledge that it had been sent.

Had you any information of a proposed meeting between Konoye and the President of the United States?

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir, now. On that you will have to refresh my memory.

79716—46—pt. 3—18
Senator Ferguson. You never prepared any data or had prepared any data anticipating such a meeting?

General Marshall. I do not recall it, sir. It may be but I do not recall it at the moment.

Senator Ferguson. Had you any information that any meeting like that may be held in Juneau, Alaska? Would that refresh your memory? I am only asking you that to refresh your memory.

General Marshall. Well, I am sorry but it does not right now. May I say, Senator, this mass of papers and all I haven't seen for 4 years, whatever part I did see.

[3264] Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that.

General Marshall. And it is very hard for me to recall what I actually had known.

Senator Ferguson. And that is why at times I ask a question thinking it may refresh your memory on it.


Senator Ferguson. In the intercepts there is considerable information about such a meeting and in the memos from Ambassador Grew to the State Department and to the Secretary of State there is considerable in the early part of October prior to the fall of the cabinet. I think the indication is at least that the Ambassador thought the cabinet would fall, and advised them that it would fall unless such a meeting had taken place. Did you have any information?

General Marshall. If it was in magic I presume I did, sir, but just what Mr. Grew's messages were I do not recall whether I know anything about them or not.

Senator Ferguson. You don't know whether you had any information——

General Marshall. Everything of that kind I got through oral statements from Mr. Stimson who was attending these meetings frequently, more frequently than I was in the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. Well, there is considerable magic [3265] on that question of the Konoye meeting.


Senator Ferguson. Do you recall it now?

General Marshall. I have a hazy recollection now of the fact that there was quite a bit.

Senator Ferguson. But you do not know of any particular data that you may have obtained for that meeting?

General Marshall. I do not recall it now, sir. They may be able to show me a memorandum signed by me, but I do not recall it now.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I haven't got any memorandum or I would have given it to you first. I was just seeking information as to what you may have.


Mr. Gesell. We have a memorandum in the record, Senator, if I may be helpful.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, certainly.

Mr. Gesell. Exhibit 32, item 17, dated October 2, 1941, has the memorandum to the Chief of Staff from General Miles' deputy, Colonel Kroner, which discussed that problem. The memorandum was also distributed to the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Under Secretary, and other officials.
Senator Ferguson. What part of that memorandum, Mr. [3266] Gesell?

Mr. Gesell. Well, I think toward the middle there is a discussion of a meeting of leaders and the Army position is stated by G-2.

Senator Ferguson. That they will prepare data for it?

Mr. Gesell. No, that they were discussing the meeting. Item 8 at the bottom there starts and discusses the meeting and goes over onto the next page.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I am familiar with that, but I wondered whether any data had been prepared.

Mr. Gesell. Oh, I don’t know about that.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I had in mind.

General, do you know whether you advised such a meeting or advised against such a meeting? Were you consulted, in other words?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of that.

Senator Ferguson. General, had you designated anyone to negotiate or at least confer in liaison about it between the State Department and your headquarters of the Chief of Staff?

General Marshall. I think we had two mediums of that sort. One through the G-2 section of the General Staff and one probably through the War Plans Division of the General Staff. However, General Miles and General Gerow can give you an authoritative statement regarding that.

[3267] Senator Ferguson. But you had not designated any particular individual?

General Marshall. No, sir: I don’t think I ever have. I know that during the greater course of the war I had officers that would see Mr. Hull sometimes almost every day but I do not recall that I ever designated any particular individual unless it was General Hull on one occasion.

Senator Ferguson. During all of this time of all this negotiation did you understand that the Fleet was at Pearl Harbor, the main part of the Fleet?

General Marshall. I knew all the time where the Fleet was based. Its sailings in and out, though, I was not familiar with.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. But I would know absolutely when the Fleet left the West Coast, when it arrived out in Hawaii and so long as it was based in Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted any in the year 1940 or conferred with in relation to the Fleet going and basing at Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall. I am quite certain that I was involved in the discussions regarding that movement.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what your opinion was on sending it there?

[3268] General Marshall. I am sorry, Senator, I do not recall just exactly what my point of view was. I have a clear recollection, still dubious, as to what my own thoughts were regarding quite a discussion as to the reinforcement of the Atlantic Fleet from a portion of the Pacific Fleet and at that time the U. S. Fleet was in the Los Angeles-San Diego region. There was a very considerable discussion on it for quite a while over that phase of the matter and it
was the problem of the maintenance of our convoys across the Atlantic to Great Britain, which Great Britain was vitally dependent upon; and the security in the Pacific and the numbers and questions of the disposition of the vessels of the Fleet was a very important matter.

Senator Ferguson. General, you would be vitally interested in the moving of the Fleet to Pearl Harbor because that being in Pearl Harbor, based in Pearl Harbor, it became one of your tasks to protect it while it was at anchorage in Pearl Harbor, isn’t that true?

General Marshall. That is correct, Senator. I had a very vital interest, the Army had a very vital interest, in the Fleet at Pearl Harbor because the obligation to protect Pearl Harbor was an Army obligation.

Senator Ferguson. And did you have any idea as to its effect on the diplomatic negotiations? Were you consulted on [3269] that?

General Marshall. Well, my recollection is that was one of the considerations involved. Now, just whether they asked me personally or not I do not know, but I assume that I was personally involved in the discussions and, therefore, must have expressed an opinion.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know what that opinion was?


Senator Ferguson. I see in a memorandum dated the 25th of February 1941, a conference in the office of the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff being present. It is exhibit 55. I will not have to read who was present there. This language is used [reading]:

They are in the situation where they must guard against a surprise or trick attack. It is necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are particularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even a probability but they must guard against everything.

That is down about a third of the way down.


Senator Ferguson. Does that refresh your memory as to what was going on at the time?

[3270] General Marshall. Only to the extent that we were having these discussions regarding the fleet and this is a direct statement by me at that time, which is quite evidently what I thought at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when, or did you give any opinion as to when the fleet was actually prepared for war?

General Marshall. No, sir, I could not say I had any data on that. I know I have quite a clear recollection that I was very much concerned regarding their obtaining the additional vessels that I believe at that time were characterized as the fleet train. In other words, the fleet itself was very much limited in action unless it had a large supply force to keep it going; not only in oil, gas, but in munitions and in food and in all the other requirements of ships traveling at sea in long voyages.

We greatly lacked, the fleet. I believe, greatly lacked such an equipment and I became personally interested in that and I recall discussing it at the liaison meeting and I believe the record will show, though I have not checked it, that a recommendation was made by the liaison group through the medium of Mr. Sumner Welles regarding the im-
mediate establishment of an adequate fleet train. Now, the record will show that. That is my dim recollection at the time.

[3271] Senator Ferguson. General Marshall, when you sent the war warning, that would necessitate the fleet preparing for war, would it not?

General Marshall. The war warning would put the fleet on the alerted action. It was presumed at that time, at least I should say it was presumed at that time that the fleet, so far as was possible, was in a state of preparation for war but its actual alert for battle conditions was the purpose of the alert message.

Senator Ferguson. Now, wouldn't it be necessary for the fleet to go into Harbor——

General Marshall. Senator, you are asking me——

Senator Ferguson (continuing). —to prepare for war? I am just bringing that out, to see what your information was as to the——

General Marshall. I am going to ask you to please ask a Naval authority on that because I am just guessing—I don't expect the Navy men to tell you much about tanks—but I do not want to commit myself.

Senator Ferguson. General, the reason I asked that question was, as I understand it, you had charge of the protection of the fleet.

General Marshall. The Army was responsible for the defenses of Hawaii, or the Island of Oahu in particular, [3272] which included Pearl Harbor, and the coordination of all the air and defensible fires in that particular vicinity in the event of aggressive Japanese action.

Senator Ferguson. Well, that would include the actual protection of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; specifically that.

Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, if it was necessary to take the Fleet into anchorage to have it prepared for war on the war warning you would have to protect it while it was in there, that is, your Army?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Had you been consulted by anyone—well, by the Secretary of War or the President, about whether or not we were prepared for a war with Japan? That is, whether your Army was prepared?

General Marshall. I had had a number of discussions with the Secretary of War regarding that consideration and I believe I testified earlier that, along with the Secretary of War, I had notified the Secretary of State at some time in September that I thought that by December 5th that we would be in such a situation as to deter Japanese action. I was referring, of course, specifically to the Philippine Islands because we thought we had done all we could at that time to make additional provisions for the defense of Oahu.

[3273] Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether you prepared any memorandums outside of the one, Exhibit 16 and Exhibit 17—they are the joint memorandum of November the 5th and November the 27th—as to our preparedness?

General Marshall. I will have to go to the record, sir. I do not recall offhand.

Senator Ferguson. Well, would you have the records checked on this?1

1 See Mr. Gesell's statement in Hearings, Part 5, p. 2074.

Senator Ferguson. The only two that I have seem to bear those dates.

Now, I wish you would take Exhibit 16 and on the second page I ask you whether you were consulted in relation to the second paragraph on that page:

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

Was that question put to you?

General Marshall. I don't know whether that specific question was put to me but I do know that Admiral Stark and I, myself, were called on either by oral direction or otherwise to express ourselves regarding the appeal of the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for protection against what he thought were the inevitable offensive intention of the Japanese north towards Kunming, which would cut the Burma Road and this expression, as I recall and as I think itself will show, stated our views in that matter.

Senator Ferguson. Then the next sentence:

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific.


Senator Ferguson. (reading):

In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces.

Do you remember discussing that with Admiral Stark?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I don't remember the exact discussion but I know that must be almost what we discussed. I couldn't help but have discussed it. And, incidentally, I referred to that a little while ago in stating that our problem was the respective strengths of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.

Senator Ferguson. On top of page 3, at the top of the page it says, "The only existing," and then they say at the bottom of the page, after the word "existing," they say in the footnote "two preceding words struck out, and handwritten word 'current' substituted."

So it would read:

The current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies.


Senator Ferguson. What did you mean by the "current plans for war"? Were you at that time anticipating war was inevitable?

General Marshall. The date of this memorandum is November 5, 1941, and the threat of war was very evident.

Senator Ferguson. You were being consulted at that time as the highest ranking military authority on that question?

Senator Ferguson. And at that time you anticipated—on the same page—that "The U. S. Army Air Forces in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February or March, 1942"?


Senator Ferguson. And then it states down further:

[3276] By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived.


Senator Ferguson. Were you of the opinion at that time that if there was a war it would involve not only Britain with Singapore but the United States with the Philippines?


Senator Ferguson. There was not any question in your mind about that, that if war came to one of the countries, war was coming to both countries?

General Marshall. That was my impression at that time.

Senator Ferguson. And isn't it true that one of the things, at least, that Japan was claiming, their claim was they were trying to get oil and various things, which naturally would come from the south, isn't that true?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, and I think she was also getting oil from California.

Senator Ferguson. As late as—

General Marshall. I do not remember the date, but she had been receiving things from California.

Senator Ferguson. Do you think they were getting it as late as—

General Marshall. I do not think that, sir, but that is easily determined.

[3277] Mr. Keefe. As late as what?


Senator Ferguson. November 5, I am referring to, 1941.

General Marshall. Let me interpolate again. I am not saying they were getting it on November 5, but there were discussions at the time regarding it.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it now, we start out on the premise here, at least as of the 5th day of November 1941, that if there was a war coming as far as Britain was concerned in the Far East in relation to Singapore or anything else, that America would be involved in that war?

General Marshall. That was my estimate at the time, because of the situation in the Philippines, our obligations there.

[3278] Senator Ferguson. That was your opinion at the time.

I did want to take up with you page 4, if you will just turn to page 4:

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound.


Senator Ferguson. Then, as of that time there would not be any doubt in your mind that if the Japs intended to move across the line that had been designated, that would mean a war with Great Britain, and therefore we would be involved in it?
General Marshall. I cannot answer that categorically, Senator, because of this: Admiral Stark and I had recommended that if the Japanese did move east of 100 east longitude, or south of 10 degrees north, that that be regarded as an offensive act, or something of that nature.

Whether or not the Government would accept that is another matter.

Senator Ferguson. I am just getting what your reaction was.

General Marshall. I would answer that question, I think this way:

In my own opinion, the moment the Japanese moved into the Gulf of Siam, that was a definite offensive act which would result in a catastrophe for us in the Philippines, and for the British in Singapore, unless we definitely resisted it.

Senator Ferguson. And you were of the opinion at that time that military strategy was that if they went in there it would affect Singapore, it would affect the Philippines, and it would naturally affect our interests.


Senator Ferguson. And therefore crossing the so-called line would mean war, not only with the United States, but with Britain?

General Marshall. I think that is the statement that I was endeavoring to give.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, when the message came in from Ambassador Winant on the 6th, that they were across this line—


Senator Ferguson. That meant war, did it not?

General Marshall. That meant war, if the two Governments decided to make it war.

Senator Ferguson. But as far as you were concerned, as the military man, the Chief of Staff, in your opinion that meant war?

General Marshall. In my opinion that meant unless we definitely resisted that, we would be in a catastrophic situation soon thereafter.

Senator Ferguson. And you were of the opinion at that time it meant war?

General Marshall. I was of the opinion at that time that the Governments would be forced to accept a condition of hostilities, but whether the Governments would do it or not, is another matter.

Senator Ferguson. I understand that.

General Marshall. For example, I recall that somewhere near that time, I believe, the British Commander in Singapore wished to move troops north into the Kra Peninsula, which is the narrow neck of the Malay Peninsula, leading down to Singapore, to a place called Singara, and that was not, as I recall, accepted by the British Government. That was a defensive measure that he proposed. Why it was not accepted, I do not know.

It may have been because they thought he did not have sufficient men, or it may have been because they thought that would be seized by the Japanese as a definite war act by the British. I recall something of that kind happening at that time, and I also recall my own thoughts in regard to it at that time.

Admiral Stark can speak for himself, but I think he concurred with me, that the definition of the latitude and longitude that has
been referred to covering a movement that would turn the southern point there of Thailand, or Siam, and bring the Japanese into the Gulf of Siam, that meant they were on the back door of Singapore, and could have, in our opinion, only a direct hostile motive. It was still possible for them, of course, to have turned north and then east, and establish themselves by shipping on the west coast of Thailand. That was still a possibility.

However, that threat by air would have been a very complete one over the whole Malay Peninsula.

Those were my thoughts at that time; that is my understanding of the records. My own recollection is that our Governments—meaning the United States Government and the Government of Great Britain—neither one notified the Japanese that a movement south and east of the point determined would be considered in effect a hostile act.

Senator Ferguson. General, what I am trying to get is the thinking of the Chief of Staff, and his staff, the military authorities here, as to what they had in mind, and their knowledge and their information.

[3282] Now, on the 5th of November, when you wrote this message, you had certain things in mind, and that line was one of the things that you had in mind, was it not?


Senator Ferguson. Because at (b) you say, down on page 4:

War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks, or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States—

Now, there would not be any doubt as to that, that in case of any direct act of Japanese forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, it would mean war with the United States; isn't that true?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then it goes further and it says, "The British Commonwealth or the Netherlands East Indies"; in other words, at that time you had in mind that in case there was an attack, a direct act of war against the British [3282] Commonwealth or the Netherlands East Indies, that, as far as you were concerned, it would mean war with the United States, that is, as far as you preparing for war was concerned and alerting?

General Marshall. You use the expression, Senator Ferguson, that it would mean war with the United States.

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about literally.

General Marshall. Our statement was that military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one of the following contingencies, and you just read one of the contingencies.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Then, on the next page:

The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand, to the west of 100 degrees east, or south of 10 degrees north, or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.
That is the line indicated on the map.

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that.

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with that?


Senator Ferguson. Now, I refer you to Exhibit 37, page 39, and I will ask you to read that.

General Marshall. This is headed "Top secret."

2 December, 1941.

[3284] From: OPNAV
Action: CINCAF
Info: 012356

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt this dispatch. Charter three small vessels to form a "defensive information patrol." Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. men-of-war are command by a naval officer and to mount a small gun and one machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with minimum naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam. Vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel off the Indochina coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques and one vessel off Pointe de Camau. Use of Isabel authorized by President as one of the three but not other naval vessels. Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

That is the end of the message.

[3285] Senator Ferguson. Now, General, I will ask you whether or not you ever knew that message existed?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You have no recollection of any such message, is that right?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And the reading of it does not refresh your memory in any way?

General Marshall. It does not.

Senator Ferguson. Now you have the map before you. Would you locate where those three vessels would be, and tell us how far they would be from the Philippines?

General Marshall. The first vessel between Hainan and Hue?

Senator Ferguson. Between Hainan and Hue. Hue is on the China coast across the island of Hainan. Do you see that Hainan?


Senator Ferguson. Do you see Hue just across?

General Marshall. Hue is what I am hunting for.

Senator Ferguson. A little south.

General Marshall. Oh, yes, I see it now. That covers the strait between Hainan and North Central French Indochina, which would be the Japanese course for vessels sailing out of [3286] Haiphong, coming down the coast all the way from Hongkong. As to the distance from the Philippines, I would have to guess at that. I should say it was about three or four hundred miles.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon?

General Marshall. Three or four hundred miles.

Senator Ferguson. Three or four hundred miles?

General Marshall. Yes. Now the next point—
Senator Ferguson. I would just like to ask you a few questions about that. That would be for information?


Senator Ferguson. Were you attempting to get information of ships going south to Singapore? Would not that be the purpose of such a vessel being placed there?


Senator Ferguson. Yes; ships going anywhere south in the China Sea. They may go around the point, they may go around to the Kra Peninsula?

General Marshall. They may be going around the point, they may be going to Borneo, they may be going to New Guinea.

Senator Ferguson. You would not say we were looking for ships going to the Philippines at that point, would you?

General Marshall. No, sir; unless an expedition against the Philippines, by some strange quirk, would be based on the coast of Indochina, or near Haiphong. Of course an expedition against the southern Philippines might be quite far south. Presumably an expedition against the Philippines would be based more north, in Formosa.

Senator Ferguson. That is right. Now take the next ships.


Senator Ferguson. You are?


Senator Ferguson. That is down around—

General Marshall. Well, that is on the southeastern coast of French Indochina and I should imagine the distance from Manila, rather, is probably some 600 miles. I am merely guessing.

Senator Ferguson. Where would the ships be going there? Where would the lookout look for ships there?

General Marshall. The normal assumption is they would be headed for the southern tip of Indochina or the Gulf of Siam, or Borneo.

[3288] Senator Ferguson. Now, the next one is right at the Pointe, Pointe de Camau, and that is right at the most southerly point of the Peninsula. Do you see it there?

General Marshall. Yes; I see it.

Senator Ferguson. Where would that be a lookout for?

General Marshall. That would be a lookout specifically for the Gulf of Siam, I should say, and Malay Peninsula.

Senator Ferguson. That would cover ships going to the Kra Peninsula, would it not?


Senator Ferguson. General, would you be of the opinion that this was a lookout to see whether or not there was going to be a movement across the line that had been designated?

General Marshall. I would not say it was necessarily that, specifically.

Senator Ferguson. What would be the purpose of this information to be obtained?

General Marshall. A general knowledge of what the Japanese were doing in the China Sea.

Senator Ferguson. And also the Gulf of Siam?
General Marshall. Yes, sir; the China Sea and south into Malaysia. In the light of the various documents and discussions at that time, the most critical move was that [3289] which might go into the Gulf of Siam, and the southern one of these posts would very definitely relate to that. That was somewhat beyond our normal air capability of reconnaissance, although we did send some, I believe, in the general direction toward Camranh Bay at one period for three days.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, do you know why that action was not reported to you? Would not that be very material to your thinking?

General Marshall. Well, that would be material to my thinking, yes, sir; but on the other hand, I did not have brought to my attention every detail of Navy reconnaissance.

Senator Ferguson. The next states:

Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.


Senator Ferguson. This was for information of CINCAF, which would be Admiral Hart, would it not?


Senator Ferguson. Did you, prior to the 7th, get any information on his report as to what reconnaissance was [3290] being carried out, as far as the Army was concerned?


Senator Ferguson. You do not have any recollection on that?


Senator Ferguson. Now, you have given, at the end of your memorandum—it is on page 5 of Exhibit 16—you specifically make certain recommendations there.


Senator Ferguson. "That the dispatch of United States Armed Forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved."


Senator Ferguson. Of course, that does not concern the voluntary air corps.

General Marshall. No, sir, because that was under China's pay, and control.

Senator Ferguson. That was under the Chinese and not our movement, as you interpreted the other day.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain and our own forces.

That was your recommendation, was it not?


Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether we were furnishing [3291] and supplies to Borneo or any of the other islands? Did not your first report indicate that we were?

General Marshall. In that report I gave a specific example of furnishing ammunition to the Chinese Government which had been reserved for Iceland. I think it involved 7,000 rounds, and we gave them 40,000 of those, or maybe it was 3,000, one or the other. That
was to be sent by General MacArthur from Manila, and we would replace them by shipment at the same time from San Francisco.

Senator Ferguson. Was that under Lend-Lease?

General Marshall. I assume it was, sir. I was getting it out, and the details were being taken care of by someone else.

Senator Ferguson. You do not know what it was under?

General Marshall. I think it was under Lend-Lease, but my action was to get them started.

Senator Ferguson. Your report of 1941, your first report indicates bombs were also furnished.

General Marshall. I do not believe that is quite what it was, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Will you explain it?

General Marshall. It was necessary, we felt, to have the ability to hand, and gas, and arm the B-17's to the south of the Philippines, for two reasons: One was in case [3292] we had to fly them in from Hawaii by that front, and the other one was that when you are operating strategical bombing planes of that type, their capacity is greatly increased for carrying bombs, and in range if they have some place they can shuttle to, and shuttle back from.

Therefore, we directed General MacArthur to take up with the governments concerned the proposition of preparing strips that would accommodate the B-17's and that he, General MacArthur, stock those strips with gasoline and bombs.

Senator Ferguson. That was just anticipating, wasn't it, that if we got into any war, we would be using these other bases, and we would be using the ABCD plan, the Singapore plan?

General Marshall. To that extent, yes, sir. The same thing is really covered in the ABC-1 and 2 plans.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. The point here was that the B-17's would be greatly restricted in what they did from the Philippines if they had no landing points other than in the Philippine Islands, and therefore, it was essential, in my opinion—and I think I personally directed this myself—that is my recollection—that these arrangements be made at Rabaul, Port Moresby, Port Darwin, Balikpapan [3293] Borneo and Singapore.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when that material was furnished to those places?

General Marshall. The records show, and I know this, the deliveries were made and efforts to develop the strips were under way at Rabaul, at Port Moresby and Port Darwin before the outbreak of the war. My recollection is, and the records will undoubtedly show, that the ship with the gasoline and bombs for Balikpapan, for Borneo and for Singapore, was just about to sail at the outbreak of the war.

Senator Ferguson. Going back just a moment to page 39 of exhibit 37, if those lookout ships, those men-of-war, saw convoys of Jap troops moving, for instance, in the Gulf of Siam across to Kra——

General Marshall. What page, please?

Senator Ferguson. On page 39 of Exhibit 37.

General Marshall. I have it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. If you would have known that Saturday morning, the 6th, that ships were moving across the Gulf of Siam, to
the Kra Peninsula, would that change your thinking, as far as the alert of the Army was concerned, that is, as to what the Army should be doing?

General Marshall. No, sir; I do not think it would.

[3294] Senator Ferguson. You had done then everything up to that point, and that would not have changed your mind at all?

General Marshall. I do not think it would have, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You do not think it would have?

General Marshall. It is more a confirmation than anything else.

Senator Ferguson. A confirmation. Your next is, of course, the aid to the voluntary corps, and you explained that.

The next sentence is “that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.”

Had there been any ultimatum, or why did you and Admiral Stark put that terse sentence there, that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan?

General Marshall. I would assume that there had been some such discussion. I do not recall now.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whom the discussion was with?

General Marshall. My assumption would be that a discussion would be with Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Colonel Knox, and probably Admiral Stark and myself present.

Senator Ferguson. Did the President confer with you on that point of whether an ultimatum was to be delivered?

[3295] General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir. I might say here that Admiral Stark and myself were always on the side of trying to gain as much time as we possibly could, while I assume, and I am certain that Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Colonel Knox, and presumably the President only had the consideration of the great policies for which this Government stood, that were involved, as well as the military status in the way of potential power.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether you had any further discussions with Mr. Knox, Mr. Stimson, or anyone else after that in relation to an ultimatum? That is very strong language, “that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.”

General Marshall. I do not recall that specifically.

The only recollection I can go on now is these continued discussions as to what measures might be taken while upholding the dignity of the United States and at the same time fend off hostile action in the Pacific. Now as to the question of ultimatum or not, I do not recall that, although we made specific statements in regard to it, and it must have been a discussion of that specific nature.

[3296] Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that at least you had been consulted as to whether or not an ultimatum should be given?

General Marshall. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you had given a direct recommendation that no ultimatum should be given?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The next is the joint board Washington meeting. “Secret minutes of meeting, November 3, 1941.”

Major General William Bryden was there, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and Major General Arnold was there. Do you recall getting information at that meeting? It was immediately prior to your memo of the 5th.
General Marshall. Allow me to look at it.

Senator Ferguson. I think you were there.

General Marshall. Yes; I was present at the meeting, as it shows there. I am looking at the minutes to see whether I can get any reminder.

On the bottom of page 2 I find this heading: "Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China."

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have you read that and get what your reaction was as of the time that it was given in your presence on the 3d.


At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to send it more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to ask you some questions about that. Does that refresh your memory about that being [3298] brought up, about the note of the 17th?


Senator Ferguson. Was there any discussion as to whether or not that was an ultimatum or not an ultimatum?

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What is your opinion as to it?

General Marshall. I would say, in reading this and thinking while I was reading aloud, that the desire for the ultimatum was coming from China particularly, by General Magruder.

Senator Ferguson. Going up and reading the sentence, "He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression."


Senator Ferguson. Apparently that was Schuirmann's opinion, and he said he was speaking at the request of Admiral Stark.


Senator Ferguson. Now was that your opinion?

General Marshall. All I can think of at this particular moment, sir, in regard to that is we were probably discussing [3299] largely economic exactions or restrictions in order to influence Japan.

Senator Ferguson. What I am asking now, General, is, was it your opinion that we had issued an ultimatum on the 17th to Japan? That is just what Schuirmann says, and I will read it again.

General Marshall. I am familiar with that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. What I am not familiar with is the terms of the President's message. I do not know what I knew about it at that time.

Senator Ferguson. I cannot hear you.

General Marshall. What I am not familiar with was the terms of the President's message to the Japanese Government.

Senator Ferguson. I will read it to you.

General Marshall. What I do not know that I knew at the time was the exact expressions in that message. Your question is, did I think that was an ultimatum?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. I cannot answer that. I do not recall whether I knew exactly what he had said or not. I presume probably I had heard the message, but I have no accurate memory of what I thought at that minute. I received this information, and I think the record will have to speak for itself.

Senator Ferguson. In your recollection on what was being said by Schuirmann, Captain Schuirmann, did you or did you not consider that the message of the 17th was an ultimatum?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now the minutes further state:

He further stated—that is Schuirmann—that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no need to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department.

What was your answer to that?

General Marshall. I do not recall what my answer to that was, other than the joint memorandum of Admiral Stark and myself.

Senator Ferguson. And that ended by saying—

General Marshall. That no ultimatum be issued.

Senator Ferguson. That no ultimatum be issued, be delivered to Japan. Would you say then that you had advised against further warnings by the State Department?

General Marshall. I would say that at that particular time our advice was that no ultimatum be issued. Now what you mean by "further warnings" is open to considerable interpretation.

[3301] Senator Ferguson. I just have the language of the joint board.


Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out what happened at that meeting. Here is what Mr. Hull wanted to know: "Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no need to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we cannot back them up." Were we in a position at that time, in your opinion, to back up additional warnings?

General Marshall. That meeting was on what date?

Senator Ferguson. On the 3d day of November 1941.

General Marshall. We were not.

Senator Ferguson. Did you express yourself at that time, when this question was brought up, along the same line?

General Marshall. I do not recall, sir. The expressions of my views must be those of the memorandum, which followed shortly thereafter.
Senator Ferguson. That would indicate at least that you did not want an ultimatum to go to Japan.

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I next refer to paragraph a, if you want to read the next sentence. You better look at it, so if there is anything you want to bring out you may do so.

General Marshall. You mean the preceding paragraph?

[3302] Senator Ferguson. I mean the following paragraph.

General Marshall. What I was going to read was this in relation to the question of what was generating the ultimatum idea in our minds.

Captain Schurmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder—

our War Department Joint Staff representative in Chungking—

urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan.

That, to my mind, was what had precipitated this discussion.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct.

General Marshall. That is the urging of our representative there as well as the generalissimo that we take more positive measures in our communications with Japan. Do you want me to read that?

Senator Ferguson. I do not want to pass over anything that you want to use as an explanation. You did, General, did you not, go further than the mere Chiang Kai-Shek matter? Because warnings to Japan were a different matter from what he was asking. He was asking for military aid, was he not? He wanted military intervention, did he not?

[3303] General Marshall. He was asking for military aid and he was asking us to take a stronger stand in our warnings to Japan. He uses the words “to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan.”

[3304] Senator Ferguson. Then the additional warnings were general warnings; is that correct, and you discussed those?

General Marshall. Just what do you mean by that?

Senator Ferguson. I am referring to the statement:

Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can’t back them up.

General Marshall. Well, my conception of this matter that I have at this time, is that Mr. Hull’s discussion was based on this urging of the Generalissimo and of General Magruder and he felt for us to say anything further, unless we were fully prepared to back it up, got us nowhere.

Senator Ferguson. And you were of the opinion at that time, that we were in no position to back up any other warnings?

General Marshall. That was my assumption at the time, because of the slow movement of equipment and matériel and personnel to General MacArthur.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, under a it states:

The decision on the Far Eastern situation made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the U. S.-British Staff conversations report ABS-1.

79716-46—pt. 3—19
[3305] Would you say that was a fair statement?
Senator Ferguson. Of the conditions there at that time?
Senator Ferguson. Down at the bottom of page 3:

f. Assuming that the Fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilities are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless, the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present.

Was the moving of the fleet from Pearl Harbor considered at that time?

General Marshall. My recollection is, and Admiral Stark undoubtedly can give you much more direct testimony, that the British were very desirous of the United States Government basing a considerable number of naval vessels on Singapore, and we were very much opposed to any such procedure.

Their point of view, if I may estimate, was that they had very little to build up their Far Eastern forces, because they were completely employed in trying to protect the western approaches of the North Atlantic, and the movement of the vessels down around the southern end of Africa to get to the Middle East.

They, therefore, were in dire circumstances as to the availability of shipping, naval shipping specifically. Therefore, if we would station part of our fleet in the Singapore region, necessitating the base at Singapore, that would greatly strengthen the naval situation in the Far East, without a critical reduction in the British power of controlling the western approaches of the North Atlantic, and guarding the numerous convoys taking the long route around the southern tip of Africa to get to the Middle East and Far East.

That was the discussion that I have a fairly clear recollection of at that time; our opposition to such a move, or the British desire of such a move.

[3307] Senator Ferguson. Was it your duty to defend the fleet in Manila Bay?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; within the means at our disposal, which were almost nonexistent.

Senator Ferguson. Whatever we had, but that was your province, as Chief of Staff?

Senator Ferguson. The next paragraph, will you read it?

General Marshall (reading):

g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the fleet due to the lack of adequate antiaircraft protection for the anchorage.

Senator Ferguson. Before you read the next paragraph, that was considered and you would be the man responsible for the antiaircraft there?

Senator Ferguson. It was because you could not get it that it was not there?

Senator Ferguson. And you considered that at the time?

Senator Ferguson. Now, read the next paragraph.

General Marshall (reading):
This review pointed out that Japan is capable of launching an attack in five directions; viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five operations, United States' action should be: In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack. In the case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East until the augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and Army forces becomes available.

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the Fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get ready. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schirmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to ask you some questions about the two paragraphs.

There were two parts as far as we were concerned. In the first paragraph it states:

In the case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack.

That is what you gave us before, that war with one meant war with the other. An attack on one meant an attack on the other.

But not in this case:

In case of a Japanese attack against Siberia.

In that case a different set of facts existed; isn't that correct?


Senator Ferguson. There you said we should not declare war. Then, we should not declare war if they went into Thailand.


Senator Ferguson. Did you consider all parts of Thailand or just east of 100° east?

General Marshall. I couldn't tell you at this time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. "* * * or China through Yunnan." That is exactly what the generalissimo was asking you about. You said in those three cases we should not declare war.

General Marshall. Might I interrupt, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. You are saying "you." This isn't my estimate. This is a naval estimate.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will withdraw the "you."

Was it discussed there that the United States in the one case would declare war or would consider it as an act of war and in the other should not declare war and did you agree with that discussion?

General Marshall. I don't recall the terms of discussion, sir. I have stated before that my own feeling was that if the Japanese appeared in the Gulf of Siam that war was inevitable and we would be in a very critical situation if we didn't immediately take some action to try to control it.

Senator Ferguson. This memorandum went to the President, did it not, General?
General Marshall. This I thought we were reading was the minutes of a meeting.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but it is attached, and was delivered to us, attached as a memo for the President.

General Marshall. My understanding of this we were [3311] reading from were the minutes of a joint board meeting of discussions which occurred in the Office of the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the minutes were attached to the memo that went to the President? They were attached when handed to us.

General Marshall. That is the memorandum of Admiral Stark and myself to the President?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.

General Marshall. Attached to those minutes? I will have to check up.

Senator Ferguson. Will you check up and let us have that information?

General Marshall. This should show it, the actual memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. Would you not desire to give to the President the information upon which your opinion was based, and part of it is stated in this memorandum, is it not, the joint board minutes?

General Marshall. I have got the wrong paper here.

This record copy does not show that that was communicated to the President.

I might say that the purpose of the memorandum such as Admiral Stark and I signed jointly here was to give the [3312] President, in readily readable form, our views. There are many factors that go into our reaching those views. If we recited all those in each instance, and this particular item you refer to may have gone to the President, I do not know that it did, we would merely lengthen the document he would have to read.

All I can say now is that the record handed me of the joint communication from Admiral Stark and myself shows no indication that the minutes of the meeting of the joint board of that date were sent to the President.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any discussion with Admiral Ingersoll or anyone at that meeting on the 3d in relation to the State Department’s impression “that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks?”

General Marshall. It states on page 4, at the bottom of the page, the last paragraph, preceding a discussion of the situation by Admiral Ingersoll:

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated that the [3313] Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations:
I would say that that generally is probably the sense of what I said at the meeting.

Senator Ferguson. Now—

The information which he had received indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5.

What information had you and what did you anticipate would happen?

General Marshall. I don’t recall, sir. I would have to go back through all the information given me from G–2 to find out what that was. I am not conscious now of the specific thing.

[3314] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that on that date or shortly after they gave a deadline date of the 25th of November?

General Marshall. I recall most distinctly that they gave a deadline date of the 25th, which they later changed to the 29th.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Did you have intelligence information on the 5th that action was to be taken in relation to this deadline date of the 25th?

General Marshall. I would have to check up. I don’t recall, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would you check on that and let us have your best information. That would be material to this questioning.


Senator Ferguson. Now, you also spoke again, and I wish you would read what you said. “General Marshall emphasized.” I want to get your opinion there.

Just a moment, before you read that I will ask you a question in relation to the other paragraph.

Did we move along as fast as you had anticipated so that by the middle of December the Army Force in the Philippines would have impressive strength or did we fail to get the men there?

[3315] General Marshall. We were delayed materially in getting them in, but part of that delay was known at that particular time, I think, in November. The length of the delay on the west coast in flying the planes out we were not aware of at that time.

I think I was probably aware of the delay of the delivery of planes, referring to the Flying Fortresses, from the factory. I was aware of delay in obtaining certain shipping. I was not aware until some time later, as a matter of fact, I think after December 7, of the delay in arranging convoys from Hawaii to the Philippines.

Senator Ferguson. Did you advise the State Department on those items of delay?

General Marshall. I assume that I mentioned these facts in the presence of Mr. Hull because they were very pertinent to our situation.

Senator Ferguson. The next may refresh your memory. You spoke, apparently. “General Marshall emphasized the point.” Do you want to read that?

General Marshall. What page?

Senator Ferguson. Page 5.

General Marshall. Does it begin with the words “emphasized the point”?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I thought you might want to look [3316] at what you had said.

General Marshall. I thought I had just read what I had said.

Senator Ferguson. But down in the next paragraph you had something to say.
General MARSHALL (reading):

General Marshall emphasized the point that Japan could hardly take the risk of military operations with a powerful air and submarine force directly on the flank of their supply lines, and that when United States power is sufficiently developed in the Philippines, we would then have something to back up our statements. Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. It appeared that the basis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions.

Senator FERGUSON. Whose language, General, is this:

Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation?

General MARSHALL. That is not a direct quotation of my language. That is the officer's notes of the meeting, the sense of my expression.

Senator FERGUSON. That was the sense of your expression?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3317] Senator FERGUSON. You were of the opinion at that time that that was true?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And so expressed yourself.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I notice that it doesn't say whether—was the State Department present at that meeting?

General MARSHALL. No.

Senator FERGUSON. They would not be present?

General MARSHALL. They would not ordinarily be present.

Senator FERGUSON. Would they get this information?

General MARSHALL. Not necessarily.

Senator FERGUSON. Then I notice (reading):

War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following lines: * * *

Now, did that only cover the Yunnan situation, the China situation, or the whole Far East?

General MARSHALL. I will have to glance through this to see. May I read what the items were?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL (reading):

The memorandum would take the following lines:

[3318] Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.
Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.
Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. military forces in support of Chiang Kai-Shek.
Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.
Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.
Point out the effect and cost a U. S.-Japanese war in the Far East would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U. S.
Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive operation without the transfer of major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines' Army Air Forces, General Arnold explained that the military authorities were building up reserves and
were investigating reports that the Dutch East Indies were capable of supplying all United States and British requirements.

Do you wish me to go ahead?
Senator FERGUSON. No.
So it was to be a general memorandum covering the Far East?
General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3219] Senator FERGUSON. Rather than just the particular movements in China?
General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; evidently brought to a head by the generalissimo and General Magruder's appeals.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, notwithstanding what happened at this meeting, do I understand that things did grow more tense and you, as Chief of Staff, knew it from that date on?
General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you account for why it grew more tense?
General MARSHALL. My recollection on that would be that the continued Japanese movements south in the direction of Malaysia, Indonesia, the general tone of their communications, the tone of the reports that appeared in magic, a large number of details of that nature, which taken all together, gave a very serious and forbidding aspect to the situation.

Senator FERGUSON. General, I want to take you to the November 27, 1941, memorandum for the President, subject Far Eastern Situation, because it relates to the same question. It starts out by saying:

If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack.

That would indicate that, going from the 5th to the 27th, [3320] that you saw a different situation, would it not; that it was more tense?
General MARSHALL. Well, as I just said, I thought it continued to grow tense.

Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that you had expressed it there in writing—had you not?
General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. Now, in the first memo, I notice that the Hawaiian Command, or the Hawaiian Islands are not mentioned.
General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. How do you account for that?
General MARSHALL. We were discussing here offensive operations.

Senator FERGUSON. You stated "in five directions" and you didn't state any direct moving on Pearl Harbor or the Hawaiian Islands.

General MARSHALL. We were discussing general operations, a combination of naval and land aggressive moves, which would maintain themselves in the business of penetrating still further. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a slash, but not a proposed invasion at all. Similarly, we anticipated as I told you, Guam would be in trouble, and probably Wake Island. What we foresaw and what actually happened was [3321] a general offensive move south of the China Sea into Malaysia, Indonesia, and the New Guinea region, and possibly Australia.

The scope at Pearl Harbor was to lessen the possibility of our action against such a general movement. The direction of the campaign was as discussed by G-2 to the effect that the Japanese would not attack in Manchuria, but would strike south.
That is what they actually did.

Senator Ferguson. General, there you mentioned one thing, that this attack on Pearl Harbor was an attack to avoid our fleet. In effect, that is what I took from what you said.


Senator Ferguson. Avoid our fleet being used against their movement?

General Marshall. To the south.

Senator Ferguson. To the south, which you were anticipating there?


Senator Ferguson. When did the General Staff first anticipate that such a move may be made?

General Marshall. That is, the move to the south?

Senator Ferguson. No, to take our fleet off, so as to allow them to go to the south.

[3322] General Marshall. I don't know that the General Staff specifically at any moment, figured out a time when they would strike at the fleet. We did feel that if we put any of our vessels out at Singapore, aside from the difficulties of maintenance, that they would be under the hazard of Japanese air in that vicinity.

We had assumed that in Pearl Harbor we had a reasonably secure base for the fleet.

Senator Ferguson. What was the occasion for writing the memorandum on the 27th?

General Marshall. I believe the record will probably show that there was a meeting on it with the President just preceding that. Does the record show that?

Mr. Gesell. On the 24th, I think.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether this memorandum was written after the message to General Short dated the 27th or before?

General Marshall. I would assume the record from War Plans Division will show regarding which General Gerow will testify. It probably was written before because it takes a great deal of care in preparing such a memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not this November 27 memorandum for the President was a confirmation of an oral statement that you had given the President?

[3323] General Marshall. There is another memorandum from General Gerow to me dated November 27 which may answer the question, if you will give a minute.

In a memorandum to me on November 27, with the stamped notation November 28, when it was noted by the Chief of Staff and noted by the Deputy Chief of Staff, regarding the Far Eastern situation, this appears in the second paragraph, following a number of items relating to the alert messages—possibly I had better read the whole memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you some questions in relation to that.

You believe then that the one of November 27 was brought about by the memorandum signed by General Gerow?

General Marshall. No. He is stating what happened here, and I am getting my hint from what he states.

Senator Ferguson. All right.
General Marshall (reading):

1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 a.m., November 27, 1941. General Bryden was present. The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. He told me he had telephoned [3325] both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the harshest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

2. Later in the morning I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved; (copy attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President.

[3325] I am not reading from the memo now. That was the memorandum you questioned me with regard to, Senator [reading]:

The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy attached).

That is the memorandum of November 27 signed by Admiral Stark and myself. Just when I signed it I do not recall because I was not here on the 27th.

Senator Ferguson. General, do I understand that this refreshes your memory so that exhibit 17, which is the memorandum for the President, dated November the 27th, is the same memorandum that is mentioned in the second paragraph of the letter that you have just read?

General Marshall. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to ask you some questions on that particular letter. On November the 27th, apparently, this memorandum was prepared, No. 17, was it not, because [3326] it is dated that day?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. The presumption is it was probably prepared on the 26th.

Senator Ferguson. On the 26th?


Senator Ferguson. Apparently you had not seen that, your letter that you read from, until the 28th. It says:

November 28th: Noted: Chief of Staff.


Senator Ferguson. That is when you would see it?

General Marshall. Presumably that is when I signed it.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not that was prepared by someone else for you?

General Marshall. It was drafted, I am quite certain, in the War Plans Division following the discussions at the meeting of the Joint Army and Navy Board on the morning of November 26. As I left at about 1 o'clock, left Washington and did not return until the late
evening of the 27th, so the assumption would be, and General Gerow can give you direct testimony, that following our discussions, meaning mine and Admiral Stark's and the other officers, the Deputy Chief's of Staff, the Chief of the Air Corps, General Gerow, and other officers and their opposites on the Navy side, following those discussions General Gerow undertook the preparation of [3327] this memorandum and also at the same time he was preparing the drafts of the alert messages, all of those, presumably that afternoon and night of November 26 and maybe on the early morning of the 27th. As I was not in Washington on the 27th my assumption would be that I signed this message, this memorandum on the morning of the 28th.

Senator Ferguson. So certain things were taken up when you returned and on the morning of the 28th these matters were taken up with you:

First, the Secretary of War at 9:30 on the 27th—that is the previous day—had called General Gerow. "He sent for me"—meaning he sent for Gerow.


Senator Ferguson. Now, why would he send for General Gerow and not send for General Bryden? Had you left word as to who would have authority to act while you were away?

General Marshall. No, sir. That would be a matter of routine. When I am absent the Deputy Chief of Staff acts.

Senator Ferguson. Well, had you known there was to be a memorandum prepared before you left?

General Marshall. My assumption would be that I knew that such a memorandum was to be prepared just as I had discussed the preparation of the alert messages before my departure.

[3328] Senator Ferguson. Well, it says here that "The Secretary"—that is the Secretary of War—"wanted to know what warning messages had been sent to General MacArthur.


Senator Ferguson. "And what were proposed."


Senator Ferguson. Now, there is no mention there about sending any to General Short?


Senator Ferguson. But the Secretary of War was questioning General Gerow, and your Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden, as to what messages were sent to MacArthur.


Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that at that particular moment he did not know what had been sent to General MacArthur?

General Marshall. That would be correct, sir. Nothing had been sent, I do not think.

Senator Ferguson. Yes [reading]:

I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

Now, let us get that message. It is in Exhibit 37, page 32. Now, wouldn't that indicate, General, that the message—


Mr. Gesell. It is the same one.

General Marshall. It is the same one?

Mr. Gesell. It is the same message.
Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't that indicate that at that particular time when they were conferring that the message of the 27th had not been sent yet, because he said:

I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November the 24th.


Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't that indicate that?


Senator Ferguson. Or he would have also presented the other message.


Senator Ferguson. Now, let us read this message. We find first that the action and "action" there indicates who is to act on it; "information" means that it is at least for their information but not necessarily action by them, so it is the Chief of Naval Operations: "ACTION CINCAF"; that is Admiral Stark?

Mr. Gesell. Hart.

Senator Ferguson. That is Admiral Hart, is it not? That is Admiral Hart, yes.


Senator Ferguson. Now, let us read this message. We find first that the action and "action" there indicates who is to act on it; "information" means that it is at least for their information but not necessarily action by them, so it is the Chief of Naval Operations: "ACTION CINCAF"; that is Admiral Stark?

Mr. Gesell. Hart.

Senator Ferguson. That is Admiral Hart, is it not? That is Admiral Hart, yes.


Senator Ferguson. "CINCPAC"; that is Admiral Kimmel for action?


Senator Ferguson. "COMIl." Where is 11?

General Marshall. I don't know, sir. Those are the various naval districts, 11, 12, 13, 15. I presume the naval district in the Philippines, the one in Hawaii, the one on the west coast, and the one in Alaska.

Senator Ferguson. General, Hawaii is not in there.

General Marshall. Well, I——

The Chairman. Let the general answer. He did not finish his answer.

General Marshall. I was endeavoring to say what 11, 12, 13, and 15 meant.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Marshall. I mentioned Hawaii, and you say 14 is Hawaii?

Senator Ferguson. I am so informed. I find that out from the record.

General Marshall. Probably you are right, sir. I have not got it memorized.

Senator Ferguson. Counsel, would you help us on fourteen? Is that Hawaii?

Mr. Mitchell. The Fourteenth Naval District is on Oahu, the Hawaiian Islands.

Senator Ferguson. Not the Navy. I am talking about the Army.

Mr. Mitchell. These are all Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Oh, these are all Navy?

General Marshall. These are all Navy; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Fourteen is on Hawaii?

Mr. Mitchell. The "action" is Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Senator Ferguson. Later we get a notice from the Army to the Navy. Now, will you read the message?

General Marshall (reading):

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief [3332] of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, this "CINCPAC," that would be Admiral Kimmel?


Senator Ferguson. That would indicate there that the Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch?


Senator Ferguson. That would be you?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Concurs and requests action addresses to inform senior army officers their areas


Senator Ferguson. In other words, that would indicate that Admiral Kimmel should have notified General Short of this message?


Senator Ferguson. And Admiral Hart should have notified General MacArthur of the message?


[3333] Senator Ferguson. That means that it is action for all parties?

General Marshall. Within their spheres.

Senator Ferguson. Within the limitation of action as outlined?


Senator Ferguson. Now, would you know why information was sent to "SPENAVO," meaning the British?

General Marshall. Does "SPENAVO" mean the British or mean our representatives over there?

Mr. Mitchell. The naval attaché, isn't it, in London?

Mr. Gesell. That is right.

Mr. Mitchell. Our naval attaché in London.

Senator Ferguson. Is that what it means?

Mr. Mitchell. I so understand.

Senator Ferguson. All right. What does "CINCLANT" mean, do you know?

General Marshall. I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. General Mitchell, have you information on that?

Mr. Mitchell. I guess it was the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, but I am not sure. Is that right?

General Marshall. That is probably right.

Senator Ferguson. It sounds like that now when you get the words and the letters lined up with it. [3334]
So that would indicate now, reading that message, that a joint message had been sent to the Asiatic Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, to notify the Army tops of those two places, which would mean the Philippines and Hawaii and that would indicate this was written before the twenty-seventh note, would it not?


Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for the fact that they are talking about General MacArthur and what was proposed and no mention is made about General Short?

General Marshall. My reaction to that would be this, that they felt an attack on the Philippines was a very certain proposition and an attack on Guam was probably a certainty. They do not mention Wake, they do not mention Hawaii, they do not mention the Aleutians and they do not mention the West Coast of the United States.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, going back to the message that we read on page 32, Exhibit 37, the one that you had seen. Why was that message sent on the 24th?

General Marshall. Will you identify that for me again, please?

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 32.

Mr. Mitchell. The message appears in two books, General. You have the Army book; and the same message appears in the Navy. The Senator is giving you the Navy page. It is the same one you were looking at.

General Marshall. That is the same message you were referring to?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. What was the question, please, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. I want to know what was the occasion for sending the message on the 24th? What happened? Why was there a message sent [reading:]

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including—then he specifies two particular places, Philippines or Guam—is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas.

Now, what was there that caused you to alert the Army and Navy in the Philippines and not Hawaii, if we consider that an alert?

General Marshall. I will have to go back and refresh my memory from the records. I do not recall the meetings that had occurred on that day or the preceding day. I haven't the data right here.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, General, up to this particular time, on November 24, do you know of any alerts given to either the Philippines or Hawaii?

General Marshall. Not since the preceding summer.

Senator Ferguson. Not since 1940, when the alert was given to General Herron?


Senator Ferguson. So is this an alert?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I would consider it such.

Senator Ferguson. This is considered an alert?

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us what happened immediately preceding, or any time preceding, that caused you to alert the Far East, including Hawaii?

General Marshall. Well, I assume, Senator, that some information came in about that time and there may have been some meetings about that time and I do not recall that at this time. I will have to check it.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator to yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. This is not done for the purpose of interrupting, but I want to help.

Senator Ferguson. I want all the help I can get.

Mr. Murphy. The deadline on page 100 was the 25th, that was the last day the Japanese would wait, and there is a message on page 99.

Senator Ferguson. I am going to put those in later.

Mr. Murphy. There is a message on page 90. That might be the answer.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will try to refresh the General's memory. Was it because there had been a deadline set that you alerted these two places?

General Marshall. I could not say, sir. I will have to check that up.

Senator Ferguson. Could you check it over the noon hour, General?

General Marshall. I will try to do that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, we will develop next [reading]:

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

No [reading further]:

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

[3337] Was there ever an appropriate cablegram prepared to send a message, as wanted by the President, to the Philippines? If so, what is the message?

General Marshall. If the reference is to the message to the High Commissioner of the Philippines, there was one sent on the 26th of November, 1941, by the Navy, Admiral Stark's initials and name and presumably the signature is on it, for the High Commissioner of the Philippines reading as follows—

Senator Ferguson. Before you read it. Were you familiar with the instrument sent on the 26th of November, being Exhibit 45, from the President to the High Commissioner? Did you know about that?

General Marshall. I do not recall, sir, because I think that was sent—it may have been discussed at the meeting of the Joint Board that morning but it was sent after my departure.

Senator Ferguson. I am just wondering about that sentence, how that sentence could refer to the High Commissioner's message which was sent on the 26th and this meeting has not taken place until the 27th:

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.
Would you say that Admiral Stark had anything to do with the—yes, he did. It says:

From OPNAV, H. R. [3339] Stark, November 26, 1941.

That appears at the top.

Now, to go ahead a little further with this:

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

We know that on the twenty-sixth the message had gone from the President to the High Commissioner. How could that be the same paper?

Mr. Gesell. Do you have it?

General Marshall. I have it.

Senator Ferguson. Have you anyone in your office that could aid you to make it clear, to sit here with you and to aid you on some of these things you are being asked?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I will get somebody.

Mr. Mitchell. We can handle it, Senator, if we know specifically.

We can give the General the right documents if we know the particular message you are referring to specifically.

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out.

Mr. Mitchell. Are you referring to the warning sent to MacArthur on the 27th?

Senator Ferguson. No. I am trying to find this message.

Mr. Mitchell. What message?

Senator Ferguson. This memorandum dated November the [3340] 27th from Gerow to the Chief of Staff, at the end of the first paragraph, two sentences:

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. —

meaning, I take it, Gerow—

told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

Mr. Gesell. That must be the 27th.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the warning message of the 27th.

Mr. Gesell. That is the warning message of the 27th.

Senator Ferguson. All right. I am trying to get it from the General, what he knows about it.

General Marshall. This message—

Senator Ferguson. Will you give me where it is?

General Marshall. It is on page 9 of Exhibit 32.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. A telegraphic message between the War Department and Hawaii. It reads as follows:

PRIORITY NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL, U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

MANILA, P. I.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only barest possibilities that Japanese Government might come back and offer to [3341] continue Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not. repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize the successful defense of the Philippines. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures
as you deem necessary. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you
will carry out the tasks assigned in revised Rainbow Five which was delivered
to you by General Brereton. Chief of Naval Operations concurs and request
you notify Hart.

(Signed) Marshall.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then, General, that you
never saw that message before it went out?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. I was engaged in the dis-
cussions regarding the preparation of it, I think, on the morning of the
26th before my departure.

The Chairman. It is now 12 o'clock and the committee will recess
until 2.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same
day.)

Afternoon Session—2 P. M.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. The
Chairman was detained for a moment or two.

Does counsel have anything at this time before General Marshall
resumes his testimony?

Mr. Mitchell. No.

The Vice Chairman. Do you have anything before you resume
your testimony, General?


The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson will continue his inquiry.

Testimony of Gen. George C. Marshall (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. General, if you will take the letter now before
you, of November 27, from General Gerow to you, I want to ask you
some questions about that letter.

I notice in the letter, as I asked this morning, Gerow speaking:

I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

The next sentence:

I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board
meeting.

[3343] I will ask counsel, do we have a copy of that draft
message?

Mr. Mitchell. We have never been able to locate it.

Senator Ferguson. The answer is, General, they say they have
never been able to locate it.

General Marshall. It would presumably be in the files of the War
Plans Division or the present Operations Division. General Gerow
will have to testify in regard to that.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel, have we ever had the joint
board meeting, and that may tell us what was in the message.

Mr. Gesell. Yes. We have the minutes right here, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Do we have those?

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. They have been distributed?

Mr. Gesell. They don't make any reference to this, so they weren't
distributed.
(The paper referred to was handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Senator Ferguson. General, do you have the paper before you?

Mr. Mitchell. No; that is the only copy.

Senator Ferguson. I mean the letter I am speaking of. Would you show him the letter dated November 27 from General Gerow.

General Marshall. I had it here this morning, Senator, but it seems to have disappeared.

Now, I have it.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting.

Do you know when that meeting was held?

General Marshall. My recollection is that that meeting was held on the night of November 26, just prior to my departure from Washington.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what time you left here on the 26th?

General Marshall. I do not remember now, sir. I can obtain that data.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what message was he speaking about there, "a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting." What kind of a message was that?

General Marshall. My recollection of the matter is that at that Joint Board meeting we discussed the question of an alert message and that is to what General Gerow is referring.

He should be able to state positively what it is he is talking about, because he committed himself in writing on the subject.

[3345] Senator Ferguson. Normally, in peacetime, General Gerow would not have charge of this, would he?

General Marshall. What do you mean by "have charge"?

Senator Ferguson. Charge of such a message of action.

General Marshall. He would have charge of the preparation of such a message.

Senator Ferguson. In peacetime?


Senator Ferguson. What was the Operations Division?

General Marshall. The Operations Division of the General Staff, which I tried to explain the other day, labors in peacetime under a misnomer, and it does today also, I think. It is the division charged with the organizational factors in the Army and with matters that pertain to maneuvers, training operations in this country. But it had no direct connection whatsoever with matters of war and the overseas theaters.

Senator Ferguson. Did you assign any of this work to your deputy?

General Marshall. Not specifically, sir. My deputy, General Bryden, attended the meetings of the joint board. He was a member of that by virtue of the fact that he was a deputy. He was kept conversant with the various sessions.

Senator Ferguson. Did he have access to magic?

[3346] General Marshall. I don't know whether he received delivery of magic or not. That will have to be answered by General
Bryden himself. I know magic was discussed in the joint board meetings.

Senator Ferguson. How could General Bryden operate in your absence if he didn't have access to magic?

General Marshall. General Bryden sat in the discussions of what should be done, or why it should be done, or what should not be done in the meetings of the joint board. He was, therefore, aware of those sessions.

Senator Ferguson. Now, going on in this message:

Mr. Hull stated—

I don't want to leave out the next word——

Do you know why, if we have the minutes here of this meeting here, that no mention is made of this message?

General Marshall. I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It was an important matter?


[3347] Senator Ferguson. Prior to that, on the 24th, an alert had gone out as an amendment, this joint alert?


Senator Ferguson. So to discuss an amendment to that alert was a very important matter.


Senator Ferguson. You don't know why that would be left out of the minutes?

General Marshall. I don't know, sir, unless the Secretary didn't get it in. He takes longhand notes himself of what is going on. Why it should be omitted, if it was, I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. An important matter like this, do you know how the minutes were ever approved later?

General Marshall. The minutes were approved at the next meeting of the Board, presumably. Whether or not these particular minutes were approved or not the record will show.

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that the minutes are complete? Was that your understanding as you were operating along?

General Marshall. If you are referring to this particular set of minutes, and in the light of General Gerow's statement, and assuming that he states what he was referring to was the preparation of an alert message, I would say that those particular minutes were not complete.

[3348] Senator Ferguson. Was there anything done that was kept off the record of the minutes?

General Marshall. Not to my recollection, sir. I know of no reason why our minutes should have kept things off the record unless it was a definite reference to magic.

Senator Ferguson. If there was a reference to magic, that may account for it not being in the minutes of the Joint Board?

General Marshall. That might account for it, but I don't see why you couldn't refer to an alert message without necessarily commenting on magic.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not it could have been because magic was responsible for the alert that you were anticipating?
General Marshall. I don't know that.
Senator Ferguson. That that would be left out?
General Marshall. I don't know that.
Senator Ferguson. Reading on from the letter:

He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning.

That is speaking about the Secretary of War?

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

Now, is it that sentence, about an appropriate cablegram, the message that went to MacArthur on the 27th?
General Marshall. I would assume it did. General Gerow is the best witness on that.
Senator Ferguson. That would be in effect an amendment or supplement to the one of the 24th, because this reads:

I gave him a copy of the joint Army and Navy message sent November 24.

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I am aware of that.
Senator Ferguson. You indicated before that it was always dangerous—I don't think you used the word "dangerous"—

Senator Ferguson. Did you? To send a supplement or amendment to a message.

General Marshall. I think I also said it was better to send an entirely new message.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why this amendment was made, the one of the 27th, to the message of the 24th?

[3350] General Marshall. The only answer I could give was that the other was a naval message to be communicated to the Army opposite. This message that General Gerow is referring to is a direct Army message, which in its directions to General Short, particularly in Hawaii, had some special reference to which the Navy was not directly concerned.
Senator Ferguson. Didn't they also alert Admiral Kimmel on the 27th?

General Marshall. By the action of General Short in apprising his naval opposite of the contents of the alert.
Senator Ferguson. Is that the only reason why you know why there was a new alert sent on the 27th?
General Marshall. Is what the only reason?
Senator Ferguson. The only reason why you felt it had been sent originally to the Navy, therefore this one on the 27th was going to the Army on the 27th?
General Marshall. No, sir. I think that the events following a meeting with the President dictated a detailed alert to the Army officials.

Senator Ferguson. Now, later in the morning, going on, the second paragraph—

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, may I have the record show that you are referring to Exhibit 43, dated November 27, the memorandum to the Chief of Staff by General Gerow; so the record will show.

Senator Ferguson. Is that an exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 45. You spoke about a letter.

Senator Ferguson. So from now on it will be referred to as Exhibit 45.

Later on in the morning—that is on the 27th, and this is Gerow speaking—"I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed.

Now, I have the long letter as Exhibit 45. What is that?

Mr. Hannaford. It isn't an exhibit.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the Sayre message.

The Vice Chairman. If you will permit, Senator, that was read into the record and it wasn't made an exhibit.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, speaking about the memorandum from the President to the High Commissioner, that is the message that they talk about there and Mr. Sayre was discussed?


Senator Ferguson. Now, when is the first, General, that you knew that the message, the memorandum from the President to the High Commissioner of the Philippines, was discussed?

General Marshall. So far as I can tell at the present time, Senator, I first learned of that on the morning of November 28th.

Senator Ferguson. When you saw General Gerow?

General Marshall. Well, I don't know whether that would be entirely correct, to say when I saw General Gerow. These documents, I think, were brought to my attention as soon as I arrived at the office and I undoubtedly talked to General Gerow then or later regarding them.

Senator Ferguson. Take the message, the one of Sayre's and we will go over that for a moment. It says:

A copy of dispatches will be delivered to you by Admiral Hart, which, with my approval, the CSO and the SOS addressed to the Senior Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines.

What are they speaking about there, General? What dispatches would be delivered to the High Commissioner?

It says:

Copy of dispatches will be delivered to you by Admiral Hart, which, with my approval, the CSO and SOS—

that is the Chief of Staff, isn't it?


Senator Ferguson (reading):

Addressed to the Senior Army and Navy commanders in the Philippines.
General Marshall. I assume that is the alert, Army alert message to General MacArthur.

[3353] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, this is on the 26th. Is the President anticipating that a new alert message is going to be sent to General MacArthur?

General Marshall. When I announced that I thought this was the 27th. I see that it is the 26th.

Senator Ferguson. This is the 26th.


Senator Ferguson. Does this anticipate a new message to General MacArthur, because the Exhibit 45 says up there,

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines.

General Marshall. Well, reading this paragraph again that you just have read to me and looking at the message of November 24, it is possible, though the date is 2 days earlier than the President’s message, that he is referring to that particular message.

Senator Ferguson. But doesn’t it indicate in the Exhibit 45 that the President did not know about the message of the 24th, because it says this:

The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines?

General Marshall. General Gerow will have to explain that, or the Secretary of War, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What is your explanation of it? Do you know about it?


Senator Ferguson. Then going on in that letter:

In addition, you are advised that the Japanese are strongly reinforcing their garrison,

and so forth. Now, getting down to the fifth paragraph from the end:

I desire——

that is the President——

that after further informing yourself as to the situation and the general outline of naval and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur you shall in great confidence present my views to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I am relying upon the full cooperation of his government and his people. Please impress upon him the desirability of avoiding a public pronouncement or action since that might make the situation more difficult.

Now, that indicated that the President personally was asking the High Commissioner to confer with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur, is that correct?


Senator Ferguson. And to get the picture from them and then to confer with the High Commissioner?

General Marshall. Then confer with——

Senator Ferguson. With the President?

General Marshall. With the President.

[3355] Senator Ferguson. Of the Philippines?


Senator Ferguson. Well, then, when you came back on the 28th you were familiar with that message?

Senator Ferguson. What was its significance to you? How did it stand in this picture?

General Marshall. About all I can say at the present time, Senator, is that it was part and parcel of the general action of the War and the Navy Departments in regard to the situation in the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. And it was carrying out what the President felt should go to the High Commissioner and to the President of the Philippines?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, in particular, because the communications with the High Commissioner would be a matter on the Presidential level, and not on the War Department level.

Senator Ferguson. But he was to confer with the War Department and the Navy Department through Hart and MacArthur?

General Marshall. He was to confer, as I understood it, with those two officials out there.

Senator Ferguson. So that took them into the picture as well as the State Department?

[3356] General Marshall. Yes, sir. You see the background of this, as I read it at the moment, is that General MacArthur was endeavoring to bring into the best possible state of organization for mobilization and preparation for possible hostilities a Philippine army.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you think that this would convey to Admiral Hart and General MacArthur that the matter was serious when the President was personally having the High Commissioner take this up with them?

General Marshall. I would say it did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I didn't get you.

General Marshall. I would say it did.

Senator Ferguson. It did. Now, take the next sentence:

"The Secretaries were informed"—that means of War and the Navy—"of the proposed memorandum you"—meaning the Chief of Staff—"and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President."

Now, I refer you to exhibit 17 and ask whether or not that is the instrument that was referred to in that sentence?

General Marshall. Is this the sentence, "The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum"?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. That, I think, is the instrument referred to.

Senator Ferguson. That is exhibit 17. Now, General, I will ask you this: Have you been over that recently or would you rather read it before I start to ask you questions about it?

General Marshall. No, I think you might start with your questions, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, it starts out (reading):

If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

Hawaii is not mentioned. Do you know why?

General Marshall. Because we did not anticipate a general attack on Hawaii.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, are we talking only about general
attacks here?  
General Marshall. We are talking about, as I used the expression
this morning I think, general operations.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand then that an attack
such as was made on Pearl Harbor was not being considered as part
of an attack if current negotiations were to end without agreement?

General Marshall. I think from my point of view, Sen-
ator, I can probably explain it best this way: We had made our major
commitment of troops and matériel to Hawaii to make it as safe
against attack as we possibly could. We thought we had prepared
that garrison so that its defensive strength was such that there was
little likelihood that the Japanese would undertake the hazardous
operation of attacking it.

We thought at the same time that there was every indication of a
general campaign by the Japanese south through the China Sea, as
I referred to it before, and which actually was the case. We thought
that the Japanese would not go into Manchuria under the circum-
stances because it would be too hazardous for them under the condi-
tions and so far as we were concerned would not be a direct threat
against the United States or a serious threat against the British.

We felt that Hawaii, as I have just said, was organized, equipped
and prepared for a reasonable defense against an attack. I am
using the word "attack" there in the meaning of any overt act of
destruction or enemy aggression. I am not meaning it in the terms
of a general operation, which was the nature of the Japanese move-
ments we anticipated and which actually did occur down through
the China Sea.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand that we must read
this word "attack" here to have a qualified meaning, one of general
operation and not the ordinary attack?  

General Marshall. I would say yes, sir, because we anticipated
the possibility of attack almost anywhere, in the Aleutians, on the
West Coast, as I stated the other day, in Hawaii possibly, Guam,
Wake, any of those islands, but that was not the Japanese campaign
as we foresaw it. It did not mean, Senator, that if we kept on with
our Hawaii we could remove that garrison from there because there
was no danger there. The fact that it had a garrison, the fact that
it had the equipment to use, would be the best guarantee against
attack.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand then that we may
use the word "may" there as "probable," where as Hawaii, West
Coast, and so forth, were in a "possible" category?

General Marshall. That would be it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You say that would be the—

General Marshall. I think that is a reasonable interpretation.

Senator Ferguson. You say that would be a reasonable inter-
pretation to do that, that the word "may" is "probable," whereas these
were outside of the probable and in the possible?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I mean specifically that we did not
mention Alaska and the Aleutians and yet we had a hazard there of air bases being established there for the threat of the
northwest portion of the United States, but the fact that we did not find Japanese coming in there did not mean that there was not that possibility.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you have any discussions with the President that would allow him to interpret this as we now have interpreted it, that that meant general, over-all attack?

General Marshall. I think that would be the impression that we had given the President.

Senator Ferguson. That is the impression you gave him, so that he would have this language and he would understand what you were talking about?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. As I recall at the time, there was a general unanimity as to what the Japanese principal intentions were.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next that I want to call your attention to is the first large paragraph there:

Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Road, Thailand, or the Philippines cannot now be forecast.

Just what was the purpose of this memorandum and when did you have a meeting with the President and discuss it with him that you were following up by this memorandum?

[3361] Well, first, I will strike out the question as double barreled.

When was the meeting with the President that you discussed this memorandum, that you were going to give the memorandum along this line and that he would understand the language above meant attack?

General Marshall. There was a meeting with the President at 12:15 p.m. on November 25 at which the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark attended.

Senator Ferguson. November the 25th at noon?

General Marshall. 12:15 p.m.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long that meeting lasted?

General Marshall. No; I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why it was called?

General Marshall. I do not recall at the moment, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And this was one of the things that was an outgrowth, that you were to write him a memorandum on certain problems, and the problems are discussed in the memorandum?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I am thinking while you were asking the question. I think it probably had to do——— [3362] I think it was undoubtedly brought about by the information that we had received in the preceding 24 hours through magic and otherwise.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that information was?

General Marshall. I will have to get the records.

Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get on the record, General Marshall, is the detail of that so that this record may be complete. There are many things mentioned in these instruments and unless we can interpret the instruments in the light of what was going on we are not going to have the complete history of what was known in Washington, and that is the reason for this detailed examination.

Do you know what that information was that caused the meeting at the White House on the 25th?
General Marshall. I think I could probably obtain what it was if I could see Mr. Stimson's testimony.

Senator Ferguson. I am going to help you if I can.

General Marshall. Because he has a diary, which assists the memory 4 years back.

Senator Ferguson. I will take you to the testimony of Mr. Stimson on November 25, 1941, and see whether this will refresh your memory, and so that you may have a copy of it, General, as we go along, it is page 4050, 35; that is, “Secret 35, Tuesday, September 26, 1944.” Turning to the diary of the 25th I will read the sentence before (reading): “On November 24, 1941, I had a talk with General Olmsted”—this is the Secretary of War speaking, is it not?


Senator Ferguson (reading):

I had a talk with General Olmsted, whom I recently promoted to be the chief signal officer.

Did the Secretary of War do the promoting?

General Marshall. He signed the letters of nomination to the President.

Senator Ferguson. I don't know what that had to do with the situation. Did it have anything to do with it?

General Marshall. I don't think it did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now:

That was important on the subject that I will tell you later of.

Were you having trouble with the signal officer that you were going to get a new one?

General Marshall. General Maughborne's term was about to expire. I think it had expired, and we were bringing in General Olmsted as his successor.

[3364] Senator Ferguson. There is no definite term, is there, General?


Senator Ferguson. Is that definite?

General Marshall. Definite, and the man returns to his grade of colonel if he remains on the active list, from major general.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

in answer to a later question; the use of the air warning service, which, as you know, was a radar operation.

Now I will talk about November 25, 1941, and before I start I would like to ask what is the date, counsel, of the mimeographed copy of the Winant message, received here at 10:40 on the morning of December 6, 1941? Someone told me it was November instead of December, so that we should, maybe, correct this testimony. Do you know what the mimeographed copy shows?

Mr. Gesell. I think there is a misprint on the mimeographed copy but the exhibit in evidence is a photostat and shows December 7.

Senator Ferguson. So that the record may be accurate, the Winant message in relation to the movement of ships is on the 6th of December 1941, and not the 6th of November.

Now, on November 25, 1941, he is talking, General, about what is in his diary and he says:

This is a long one—
And then from the diary—

"At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow."

I am not reading from the record. I will ask you a question. Was that the so-called modus vivendi?

General Marshall. I think it was, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that I may get your knowledge on the record as to what Colonel Stimson is talking about, the Secretary of War (reading):

"It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic."

Now, he is talking about the modus vivendi, is he not?


Senator Ferguson (reading):

Then we had a long talk over the general situation there, which I remember. "We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department—

He is reading from his [3366] diary—

and I got hold of Marshall. Then at twelve o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one."

Now, the "we" in that sentence includes you, does it not, General? General Marshall. Yes; I am following you. I can check that here. Are you able to follow me?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Will you check that and see whether or not the "we" there included you for that hour and a half—nearly half past one—almost an hour and a half?

General Marshall. It does include me.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Marshall. It includes the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Stark, and the Secretary of State.

Senator Ferguson. Now, an hour and a half. (Reading:)

That's an hour and a half.

"At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday."

Do you know what day of the week that was that you were at the White House, that the President had brought up the attack as being perhaps next Monday?

[3367] General Marshall. I think Monday was the—

Senator Ferguson. It would be December 1, wouldn't it? The 7th was on a Sunday.

Senator Lucas. It was not the 7th.

Senator Ferguson. No; it was not. It would be November 25 that the meeting was.

Senator Lucas wants to know whether it was the 7th of December. It couldn't be, could it, if it as next Monday and he was speaking on the 25th?

General Marshall. No, sir. If you will just wait a second, we will get the date.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Marshall. This one thing, I think, is a fact.
Mr. Gesell. I figure it to be Thursday.

Senator Ferguson. Well, we have got a calendar now.

General Marshall. I have a calendar here of the month of November. The meeting that the Secretary of War is talking about was on November 25?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. November 25, 1941, was a Tuesday.

Senator Ferguson. Was on a Tuesday; yes.

General Marshall. Monday was November 24.

[3369] Senator Ferguson. Then it would be by the next Monday.


Senator Ferguson. "Perhaps next Monday," he said, "for the Japs are notorious"—what date was Monday? The 1st?


Mr. Gesell. The 30th is Sunday, isn't it? Monday is the 1st.

Senator Ferguson. Monday would be the 1st, would it not?

General Marshall. That is correct; December 1.

Senator Ferguson. Reading on, "for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning. The question was what we should do."

This is the President talking, as I understand it. Is that correct?

General Marshall. I assume that "we" refers to the President's statement. That is not quite clear from this.

Senator Ferguson. Does that refresh your memory, General, as to what took place in that meeting of November 25 at the White House?


Senator Ferguson. And would you say that was accurate as to what took place?

General Marshall. I have no recollection to the contrary;

[3369] I will put it that way, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Reading on:

"When I got back to the Department, I found news from G-2 that a Japanese expedition had started."

This is all out of his diary. Do you know what that news was?

General Marshall. Out of his diary, I see here, "five divisions had come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai, and there they had embarked on ships, 30, 40, or 50 ships, and had been sighted south of Formosa."

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel have that particular information of G-2?

Mr. Gesell. Yes. That is item 24 of Exhibit 33, I believe.

Senator Ferguson. General, would you look at that and identify it?

General Marshall. This is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, dated November 25, 1941, and signed by Sherman Miles, Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Shall I read it?

The CHAIRMAN. That is a part of an exhibit.

Senator Ferguson. It is part of an exhibit. I just want to get it identified in relation to this testimony.


[3370] Senator Ferguson. Would you say, General, that that was the information that they are speaking about here in G-2? See whether you can find anything there about the five divisions.

General Marshall. That is what I am looking for. I do not find a direct reference to five divisions.
Senator Ferguson. Could there be another message? Do you find any place there anything about Shantung or Shanghai or Shansi?

General Marshall. He does not use the expression "five divisions," he refers to the number of transports and their character of loading.

Senator Ferguson. Do you find anything in there about the 30, 40, or 50 ships in the G-2 message?


Senator Ferguson. Then, could it be that there is another message that we do not have?

General Marshall. I do not know, sir. That may be.

Senator Ferguson. That could be a very important message, because it may indicate they are going to cross this line that we had talked about this morning?


Senator Ferguson. So it would be an important message, would it not, General?


Senator Ferguson. This one only shows in the back "Distribution: Secretary of War, War Plans Division GHQ."

General Marshall. Yes, sir; and of course the recipient, the Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson. Could the reason we did not get all these in this book be that it was an Admiralty message, from the British Admiralty to the Navy, going to G-2?

General Marshall. I do not know about that, sir. I think General Miles could testify undoubtedly in regard to it, and possible General Gerow.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel to see whether they can locate another message that may be the one I am talking about.

Mr. Mitchell. Those in exhibit 33 are not messages at all. They are estimates.

Senator Ferguson. This does not appear to be an estimate.

Mr. Mitchell. What are you referring to?

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about this:

"When I got back to the Department, I found news from G-2 that a Japanese expedition had started."

This is the Secretary of War speaking.

Five divisions had come down from Shantung, Shansi to Shanghai, and there they had embarked on ships, 30, 40, or 50 ships, and had been sighted south of Formosa. I at one time called up Hull and told him about it, and sent copies to him and to the President of the message.

Now he is speaking about a message and not an estimate. Would not you say that is correct, General?


Senator Ferguson. It would not be an estimate. He is speaking about a message.

General Marshall. There is a message of some sort somewhere.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, he goes on, "of this message that I am speaking of from G-2 that is the end of the note on November 25."

Now, would you say, General, that that refreshes your memory, that you were at the White House with the President and the two Secretaries, and it was at that time that you were to prepare a memo-
randum, and that memorandum is exhibit 17, which is dated November 27, 1941?

General Marshall. I would think that is the probability, sir, and I would think also as the result of that conference, we probably became involved in the discussion at the meeting of the Joint Board on November 26, on that morning, following this meeting with the President.

Senator Ferguson. Then we could go on on the 26th to see whether there was anything that happened there that [3373] would be put in this message?


Senator Ferguson. Now, we will talk about Secretary Stimson— I ask counsel if he will try to locate that message there.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. The message of November 25 refers to Naval intelligence. It was based upon that. That is at the top of the sheet there.

Senator Ferguson. It says “From G-2.” That is the only thing.

Mr. Murphy. It says:

The following are extracts from cables received in the office of Naval Intelligence together with G-2 comment thereon.

Senator Ferguson. Does that explain it to you, General? He is talking about an estimate, and you and I, as I understood you, are talking about a message.

General Marshall. The Secretary of War is referring to a message here, I think. We have been discussing what was the basis of the preparations of the estimate.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now let us go on to Secretary Stimson’s diary of the 26th.

[3374] The following day, November 26—quoting from his diary—Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day.

Now, he would be talking there about the modus vivendi that you were discussing on the 25th at the White House?

General Marshall. That would be my assumption, sir.

[3375] Senator Ferguson. Going further, “That means yesterday,” the way the Colonel puts it, which would mean on the 25th, the day we talked about. Now, quoting from the diary— to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and to tell them that he had no other proposition at all. A few minutes later I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked him whether he had received the paper which I had sent him over last night, about the Japanese having started a new expedition from Shanghai down toward Indochina.

Now that refers back to that G-2 message, does it not?


Senator Ferguson. “He told me,” that is the President speaking. “that he had not yet seen it. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2, and I at once got another copy of the paper which I had sent him last night and sent it over to him by special messenger. That was on the 26th.”

Now that would indicate that on the 26th he had sent to the President this G-2 message, isn’t that correct?
General Marshall. Yes, sir; the same one that he had sent the previous afternoon or evening.

Senator Ferguson. Now does that refresh your memory as to what took place on the morning of the 26th before you went to one of the Carolinas?

[3376] General Marshall. It refreshes my memory to the extent that I connected up the meeting of the Joint Board on the morning of the 26th and the probable basis of the discussion that took place there which led, as I understand it and as I believe, to the drafting by General Gerow of the necessary alert messages.

Senator Ferguson. Now I show you the minutes again of the morning of the 26th and see whether or not—you have a copy of it there, I believe.


Senator Ferguson. Take this one.

(The document was handed to General Marshall.)

Senator Ferguson. See whether or not you find anything about that in the minutes of the meeting.

Do you want to identify that as an exhibit and give it an exhibit number, so we will know what we are talking about on the record?

Mr. Mitchell. Would you like to have it marked as an exhibit?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. We will call it Exhibit 62, and it is the Minutes of the Joint Board Meeting of November 26th.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 62.")

[3377] General Marshall. Minutes of the Meeting of November 26, 1941, of the Joint Board, Washington. There is no mention in the minutes of the meeting of November 26 of the Joint Board of the instructions to General Gerow for the preparation of a draft of an alert message.

Senator Ferguson. Can you account for that being left out, if it was taken up?


Senator Ferguson. Now, General, is it a fair statement then that as early as the 25th, and on the 26th, from the G-2 message that was mentioned on page 4051 of the record and being mentioned in Secretary Stimson's diary, that there was a possibility of a movement that would take the Japs across the line that had been designated in your previous testimony?

General Marshall. Towards the Gulf of Siam?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. Yes, sir, there was.

Senator Ferguson. This would be evidence that as early as this date there was a movement on that would cross those lines?


Senator Ferguson. That might cross those lines.

[3378] Now, reading from the testimony of Colonel Stimson:

November 27. As you know, this was a very important day.

Do you know why he described in his language as being a very important day?

General Marshall. I presume it was because of the dispatch of the alert messages.
Senator Ferguson. Then quoting from his diary:

November 27, 1941. News is coming in of a concentration and movement south by the Japanese of a large expeditionary force leaving south from Shanghai, evidently headed toward Indochina, with a possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma, or the Burma Road, or the Dutch East Indies, but probably a concentration to move over into Thailand and to hold a position from which they can attack Singapore when the moment arrives.

Was that a fair estimate?


Senator Ferguson. Of what was coming in?


Senator Ferguson. Now, the next sentence:

The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what is the finale.

General Marshall. He corrects that later.

[3379] Senator Ferguson. (reading):

what is the finale, I put it here but I meant it was his final decision.

He explains what he meant by the "finale": isn't that correct?


Senator Ferguson. You would take it from that that the Secretary of War had gotten from the Secretary of State his final decision?


Senator Ferguson. Well, what does it say?

General Marshall. You used the past tense. He says he called up to find out what it was. He may say later, I don't know, that he did find out.

Senator Ferguson. It says, "I put it here, but I meant it was his final decision," quoting from his diary, "what his final decision had been with the Japanese, whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on 2 or 3 days ago, or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off."

Now, the "2 or 3 days ago" was the modus vivendi, wasn't it?

General Marshall. That was my recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever gone over with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the President, [3380] or anybody else this modus vivendi?

General Marshall. My recollection in regard to that is it was first brought to the attention of the War Department, in General Gerow's presence, at a meeting in Mr. Hull's office where General Gerow and Admiral Stark were present, and were called upon to express an opinion.

As I recall—and this is purely hearsay—they stated it appeared to be all right, but they wished time to think it over.

Then they each prepared a statement in which the general propositions of the modus vivendi were stated by them, not to involve any objectionable military conditions, except that General Gerow said—I do not believe he wrote it—that the reference in Admiral Stark's memorandum which would imply that we would do nothing to further build up the defenses of the Philippines was not an acceptable proposition, from the Army point of view.

Now, my next recollection is—and it is rather vague—that this same document was at least a partial basis of the discussion with the President at the meeting on November 25.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then that you had approved this memorandum that General Gerow drew up in relation to the modus vivendi?

[3381] General Marshall. I had not expressed a formal approval of it, but I concurred with him in what he wrote, with the condition that he expressed orally to Admiral Stark, that the naval reply should not imply that we would be barred from the further development of the defenses in the Philippine Islands.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, if you had the right to further fortify or, let us say, implement the Army in the Philippines, the modus vivendi as drawn was perfectly all right to you?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir; it was perfectly all right to me.

[3382] Senator Ferguson. Now, quoting again from the diary (reading from the diary):

He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I wash my hands of and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy."

That is the end of his quote from his diary.

I will ask you, General Marshall, when that information came to your knowledge, the first time?

General Marshall. You mean by "that information" Mr. Hull's statement, "I wash my hands of and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy"?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.

General Marshall. I would assume that that information came to me for the first time on the morning of November 28, on my return to Washington.

Senator Ferguson. On the morning of November 28. Do you know who gave it to you?


Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to Secretary Stimson?

General Marshall. I assume that I did.

Senator Ferguson. And you assume then that you got it from him?

General Marshall. I assume he told me. He kept me pretty well informed of everything that was going on.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, where did that place [3383] the Army, that information? What did it mean to you?

General Marshall. It meant to me, certainly now, and I presume then——

Senator Ferguson. I think it is only fair to try to consider it history, if you might consider it history, in the past rather than in the future, now.

General Marshall. That is what I am trying to do, Mr. Senator.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I would like you to be able to do.

General Marshall. I assume it conveyed to me at that time the necessity for a general alert in the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. That would, on the morning of the twenty-eighth, make you feel that a general alert in the Pacific was required?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. And on the morning of the twenty-eighth I was informed, by seeing the documents, that a general alert had been given.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, did you leave town the evening of the twenty-eighth again?

Senator Ferguson. Did you go twice to the maneuvers?

General Marshall. I will have to check that.

Senator Ferguson. Would you have that checked to see whether you left on the night of the twenty-eighth?

General Marshall. I will.

Senator Ferguson. Going to the next question, No. 30, on page 4053, so that we will get the continuity (reading):

Mr. Secretary, I do not like to disturb you but I have become a little confused on dates about this telephone call. Was that on the 26th?

Mr. Stimson. That was on the 27th.

General Russell. Twenty-seventh, the day after the 26th.

Mr. Stimson. Was the day he told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it?

General Russell. Yes.

Mr. Stimson. Or whether he would break it off, and on the morning of the 27th by telephone he told me that he had decided to break it off.

That makes the record very clear that the conversation between Secretary Stimson and the Secretary of State was on the morning of the 27th.

Would not you say that is clear now, from that?


Senator Ferguson. And is that your understanding?


Senator Ferguson. To refresh your memory, General, on whether or not you left town on the night, or the afternoon of the twenty-eighth, the same testimony, taken August 7, 1944, before the Pearl Harbor Board, question No. 50:

General Russell. Do you recall giving instructions for the preparation of that message, or participate in its preparation?

General Marshall. I was away on the 27th. I left here on the afternoon of the 26th. I went down to maneuvers in North Carolina and did not return until the night of the 27th. Incidentally, I think I left immediately after that on the 28th and went back again, and I have a rather distinct recollection of comparing the effects of this statement.

Does that in any way refresh your memory?

General Marshall. No, sir. I will have to try to check up and find out. Incidentally, when I appeared in that hearing I only had about 45 minutes to prepare myself, so I did not have my data.

Senator Ferguson. Then taking question No. 33:

Mr. Stimson. Or whether he would break it off; and on the morning of the 27th, by telephone, he told me that he decided to break it off.

Quoting from his diary:

"I then called up the President and talked with him about it. General Arnold came in—"

"This is to my office.

"General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of two of our biggest planes out from San Francisco and across the Mandated Islands to Manila. There is a concentration going on by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands, and these planes can fly high over them and beyond the reach of their pursuit planes, and take photographs."

Now I ask you to turn to page No. 6 of Exhibit 32.

General Marshall. You wish me to read this?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I want you to read that message into the record, and then I will talk to you about it.

79716—46—pt. 3—21
General Marshall [reading]:  

November 26, 1941.  
RCA 881 US GOVT.  
Washington DC Nov 26 1941 1149P  
Commanding General  
Hawaiian Department Ft Shafter TH  

Four six five twenty-sixth  

Reference two B dash twenty four air airplanes for special photo mission stop  
It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photograph Truk Island in the Caroline group, Jaluit in the Marshall group stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps stop  

Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation stop  

The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing ponape while enroute Moresby stop Advise Pilots best time of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department stop Insure that both B dash twenty four air airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu  

ADAMS  

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, is that the message they are talking about here in the diary?  

General Marshall. I presume that is the message, sir  

Senator Ferguson. That was sent out on the 26th of November 1941?  

General Marshall. Yes, sir  

Senator Ferguson. When is the first that you knew such a message had been sent out?  

General Marshall. I could not say as to that, sir. I was familiar with what they were going to do, and the directions were being given about it.  

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you knew before you left on the 26th that such a mission was contemplated and going to be advised?  

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I had authorized the procedure.  

Senator Ferguson. You had authorized the procedure. Now was that discussed at the meeting of the 25th at the White House?  

General Marshall. I do not recall, sir. It probably was mentioned.  

Senator Ferguson. Probably mentioned. Well, it was a very important mission, was it not, General?  

General Marshall. Yes, sir; it was important. Or, rather, I would say it was a rather delicate mission, because that was taking us directly over the Japanese islands and we had to consider whether or not they would grasp at that as a hostile threat.  

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I want to ask you in relation to the use of the telephone as an overt act to Hawaii, compared to this action, as to how you would compare it.  

General Marshall. I would say the use of a telephone depended on what was being said on the telephone.  

Senator Ferguson. Well, to alert the Hawaiians.
General Marshall. That is a matter of judgment, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I just want your explanation of it.

General Marshall. I will go into this first, the question of the air flight. General Arnold discussed that with the Secretary of War, because we regarded it as a very delicate proposition. We could not figure any other way how to obtain this information. We thought it was very important that we should know. We thought it possible that by flying at a high altitude we might get by with the thing without more than a Japanese objection to our coming into their mandated area. However, we had to accept the possibility that they would seize upon this as an overt act.

As to the telephone message, I feel if they knew exactly what we were doing, which they would have ascertained from the telephone message, that there were two factors involved: One was the explanation of why we took that action, which was the receipt of a magic message, the only way we could [3390] obtain that, and the other was the fact we were alerting the garrisons which they could construe as a hostile act.

Now there was brought to my attention in that connection an item of my testimony on page 3109, lines 8 and 9—no, I am wrong. I will strike that all out. It does not apply to this.

That is the best answer I can give you, Senator. I will say this, though, in conclusion, that my comments about the telephone, where I explained my own state of mind in general regarding the serious aspect of the telephone, should not be read in the light of assuming that that was definitely why I did not telephone, because just exactly why I did not telephone I do not undertake to explain right now, because I am too involved in back sights to try to determine definitely what was going on in my head at that particular moment.

There was the question of time involved. The only thing I can say, I am quite certain I am right, is had I telephoned I would have telephoned to the Philippines first.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would alerting our own Army on the Philippines, from a military standpoint, be an overt act against any country?

General Marshall. I would not consider it as such.

Senator Ferguson. Would, from an Army viewpoint, the flying of these planes over this Japanese territory, the [3391] mandated islands, would that be an overt act? I am asking you first as to whether the question—-

General Marshall. Yes, I understand you are asking me, Senator. It would certainly be assumed as an indiscreet act, because the flight of our planes over any foreign territory was always supposed to be by previous arrangement, and particularly that would apply to military, to combat planes. Therefore, we were doing something quite definitely that the Japanese might seize upon as an overt act. They themselves had been doing it, but that is not the point.

[3392] Senator Ferguson. General, the last few words of the message indicate that you felt it might be considered an overt act, because we would need guns and ammunition to protect ourselves.

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon?

General Marshall. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. We were assuming that Japan would treat it as an overt act and that our military authorities felt we should arm our men in these planes, because it says "airplanes are fully equipped with guns and ammunition on departure from Honolulu."


Senator Ferguson. Who is Adams?

General Marshall. Adams is the Adjutant General of the Army.

Senator Ferguson. This was a matter of action?

General Marshall. A matter of action?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; it was a message for action, was it not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; it is a direction to do something.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; direction, and Adams had that authority.

[3393] General Marshall. Yes, sir. However, I wish to intervene here a moment.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I wish you would.

General Marshall. You used the expression that we are assuming that that was an overt act. We were taking the chance of that.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you guarded against it if they had been attacked.

General Marshall. We did not leave our crews in a helpless position. The question was whether they should chance it. We would never be able to find anything in regard to the mandated islands, and it had now become imperative, in our view, to learn something of what the state of affairs in the mandated islands was, particularly as it related to the Japanese fleet.

I was asked questions as to whether I was aware of the fact that we had lost track of where certain Japanese vessels were. On November 26, at the meeting of the Joint Board in Washington, there is this paragraph in the minutes in relation to this matter—

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would read that.

General Marshall (reading):

The Board next engaged in a discussion of the Pacific situation. The Navy had information that Japanese airplanes had been making reconnaissance and photo- [3393] graphic flights over the United States islands in the western Pacific. It was felt that in view of recent developments indicating reinforcements and activity in the construction of defense installations in the Marshall and Caroline Islands, efforts should be made on the part of the United States to photograph the more important of these islands.

General Arnold announced that two planes were already en route from Dayton to the Philippines with photographic equipment and with instructions to photograph Truk, Jaluit and other important Japanese islands as required. With reference to this mission, Admiral Turner announced that the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart, had proposed that the United States, the British, and the Dutch undertake to photograph all of the islands in the Far East, and Western Pacific, but since the Army was engaged in the stated photographic mission, the Navy would like the planes to obtain certain specific information. General Arnold proposed that the Army would assist the Navy in obtaining desired data if the Navy would furnish to him, without delay, a memorandum of exactly what was desired, so that instructions could be given to the pilots engaged on the two photographic missions.

Senator Ferguson. Is that the end of the quote?


Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that prior to the 26th these ships were already on their way in this mission?

General Marshall. Those ships were equipped and on their way to the Philippines.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering if it is not a fact that the record shows the flight was never undertaken?

Senator Ferguson. I was going to ask the General that in the next question.

You say they were on the way to the Philippines?

General Marshall. They were on their way to the Philippines with photographic equipment.

Senator Ferguson. Now; was this message to alert them to carry on that mission. the one I read here?

General Marshall. This message was to instruct them to make this photographic mission en route to the Philippines.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. They were to stop and confer with Admiral Kimmel?


Senator Ferguson. And then go on to Truk and make the various photographs?

General Marshall. On their way to the Philippines.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Now, do you know when it was decided actually to do this photographing? What day?

General Marshall. I do not know whether the records will show that. I do not remember it, and I do not know whether the records will show that. I know I discussed it with General Arnold, and also required it to be taken up with the Secretary of War, because of the dangers of involvements.

Senator Ferguson. And did you take it up with anybody else?

General Marshall. I think it came originally from the Navy to the Army in connection with these references here of Admiral Hart.

Senator Ferguson. You mentioned in your minutes some message of Admiral Hart.


Senator Ferguson. I have not had the opportunity to see those minutes before. I would ask counsel, do we have that message?

General Marshall. It states here:

With reference to this mission, Admiral Turner announced that the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart, had proposed that the United States, the British, and the Dutch undertake to photograph all of the islands in the Far East and Western Pacific, but since the Army was engaged in the stated photographic mission, the Navy would like the planes to obtain certain specific information. General Arnold proposed that the Army would assist the Navy in obtaining desired data if the Navy would furnish to him, without delay, a memorandum of exactly what was desired so that instructions could be given to the pilots engaged in the two photographic missions.

Senator Ferguson. General, do you know whether it was ever carried out?

General Marshall. I believe, sir, the planes never got away from Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. You say they never got away from Hawaii. You mean that they could not get away?

General Marshall. I believe they became involved in the attack. However, that is a matter that somebody else can give better testimony on.
Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I understand.
General, might I suggest here that you attempt to get the Hart proposal mentioned in the minutes?
Mr. MITCHELL. Would you like to get the wire from Hart if there is one?
Senator FERGUSON. Yes.
Mr. MITCHELL. Asking that this reconnaissance photographing be made?
Senator FERGUSON. Yes.
Mr. MITCHELL. I will try to get it.
Senator LUCAS. Is Admiral Hart on the list as a witness, Senator Hart?
Mr. MITCHELL. I don’t think he has been, up to date.
Senator FERGUSON. Now, going on, General, page 4054, and reading from the diary—he says first:
This is all the 27th.
Now, reading from the diary:
“Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow.”
This is a throw-in: He was the Chief of the War Plans Division at that time, corresponding to the present Chief of Operations.
Now, quoting from the diary:
“Marshall is down at the maneuvers today.”
That was the maneuvers in North Carolina.
“A draft memorandum”—
These next three lines are not from my own memorandum, but from what appears from another paper:
“A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed.”
Now, General, does that sentence refer to Exhibit 17?
General MARSHALL. I think it does, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that before you left, this instrument dated November 27, 1941, had been prepared?
General MARSHALL. It may have been, sir, but I don’t think that is the necessary deduction because I had not yet signed it, apparently.
Senator FERGUSON. Well, it had been drafted.
General MARSHALL. Whether or not we had discussed it and directed the drafting, or whether I had seen the draft and directed the changes I do not know.
Senator FERGUSON. This would indicate on the morning of the 27th at this meeting, wherever the meeting was, that Secretary Stimson put in the diary that he had before him,
A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed—indicating that that was the instrument that they were examining.
General MARSHALL. Yes.
Senator FERGUSON. Going back to Exhibit 45—I am sorry to keep switching—
General MARSHALL. I just lost the paper.
I have it now.
Senator FERGUSON (reading):
The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed be prepared for the President.
That is the same message, is it not?

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next:
The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations.

What is meant by that sentence?
General Marshall. Well, I will have to merely read it here and then attempt to construe it, but I am not the best witness.
The Secretary of War and General Gerow, it seems to me, would be. If you want me to read the sentence and then make a guess of what I think they mean, I will do that.

Senator Ferguson. Was it ever discussed with you as to what was its meaning?
General Marshall. I do not recall discussing the memorandum with the Secretary of War.

[3401] Senator Ferguson. Had you any conversation with anyone in relation to that "he request Japan to reopen the conversations"?

Senator Ferguson. Well, what is the explanation of that sentence in that memorandum, Exhibit 45?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I am going to object to that question. The gentleman has said definitely that it would be his own interpretation, that he wasn't the best witness. Why have the General give an interpretation that might be in contradiction with the witnesses who know?

The Chairman. The Chair recalls that the General said that his answer would be only a guess, and that the Secretary of War and General Gerow would be the best witnesses.

Whether the General's guess would be in conflict with the testimony, the positive testimony of the Secretary of War and General Gerow, the Chair can't say. As between a guess on the part of the General and the positive testimony on the part of the Secretary of War and General Gerow, the Chair would assume that the guess would go out of the window if there was any conflict.

Senator Ferguson. What is your answer, General?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know—and I ask for information—how long are we going to take with [3402] guesses in the course of this proceeding with a witness who tells you directly that he can't answer the question and it would be only a guess and that he is not the best witness. How long are we to continue with this type of delay?
The Chairman. The Chair can't answer that question. Of course, in any legal proceeding, in a court, the Chair imagines that a court would instruct the jury to disregard a guess if there was positive testimony on the point, but this is not, strictly speaking, a court procedure, and the Chair can't answer the question propounded by the Senator from Illinois. But it would seem advisable, in order to get at the facts, that the committee devote as little time as possible to guesses, and as much time as possible to positive evidence on the part of those who can testify.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I put upon the record my version on that matter, and reason for asking the question?
Here is a case where a memorandum was to be prepared by this witness, by General Marshall. It was to make sure that certain things would not get into that memorandum. A man who was superior in command, to a certain extent, the Secretary of War, was sending a message to the Chief of Staff that certain things would not go into the memorandum [3403] to the President.

Now, I want to question this witness as to what he understood by that, because he had to have an understanding, and it can't be a guess, as to what was meant by it, so that it could not get into this official record that was going to the President, and it was to be over his signature.

The Chairman. The witness is the best judge as to whether his answer to any question is a guess.

General Marshall. I will attempt to answer the question.

The Chairman. The Chairman is certain General Marshall will answer the question to the best of his ability.

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that.

General Marshall. In the preparation of—

Senator Ferguson. General, if your answer is going to be a guess, I don't want it.

General Marshall. I will go up to the point where I introduced the guess and let you decide whether you want it or not.

The preparation of the memorandum from Admiral Stark and myself, as the senior members of the Joint Board, that was not to be the opinion of the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of the Navy; that was to be the opinion of the [3404] Joint Board, presumably, as represented by its senior members for the Navy and the Army, Admiral Stark and General Marshall.

Of course, as a matter of fact, in my own mind, if I determined that the Secretary of War, with his vast experience in diplomatic affairs of the world, as well as the War Department, with two terms as Secretary, felt that a certain phase of the thing was highly inadvisable, I would be very much influenced by that view on his part.

The Chairman. Very much what?

General Marshall. I would be very much influenced by that view on his part. Nevertheless, the memorandum had to be Admiral Stark's and mine, representing a Joint Board of which the Secretaries of War and Navy were not members. The reports were sent through the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to the President. They could approve them, disapprove them, or comment on them.

[3405] Now, as to just what was meant by this statement of General Gerow's, as to the Secretary of War, I can only guess at what was in the mind of the Secretary of War.

Senator Ferguson. I will put another question.

Up to that point in your answer it is not a guess?

General Marshall. That is a fact.

Senator Ferguson. The next question is: What conversation did you have with General Gerow about that sentence?

General Marshall. I don't recall that I had any conference with General Gerow regarding that sentence. He is giving me here, dated November 27, which undoubtedly—it shows I noted it on the 28th, and probably the first business of the day, along with the alert messages—the statement of what had happened in the discussion with the Secretary of War. He had reached an understanding with the Secre-
tary of War without the exchange of the memorandum. I doubt if I even spoke to the Secretary of War regarding it, and I doubt if I discussed it with General Gerow. The Secretary of War had apparently been assured that the memorandum, so far as it was written, didn't do violence to his own ideas, and I was prepared to sign it the way it stood.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether you had signed the instrument prior to that discussion with Gerow?

General Marshall. I do not know, sir. It is dated November 28, and I couldn't have signed it on the 27th because I was not here, unless they brought it to me late at night, and I am quite certain they did not do that.

Senator Ferguson. So probably at the time that you had the memorandum, Exhibit 45, you had before you Exhibit 17 unsigned and you didn't sign it until after you had your conversation with Gerow about the instrument?

General Marshall. Presumably so. I may not have even had any conversation with Gerow if I had Exhibit 45 before me at the time.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have a conversation with Secretary Stimson about that particular point?

General Marshall. Not to my recollection. I had many conversations with the Secretary of War.

Senator Ferguson. No, I mean on that particular point, about reopening the conversations.

General Marshall. I have no recollection of a conversation with the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, regarding that specific point. I do have a recollection of frequent discussions with Mr. Stimson about the proceedings of the diplomatic interchange with relation to how far they should go.

Senator Ferguson. The next sentence [reading]:

It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.


Senator Ferguson. Now, was that so that it would make sure it covered that particular point and any other point?

General Marshall. I am a little confused about that particular statement, except that he may, Gerow may have, assured the Secretary of War that that memorandum would go to him en route to the President, because the proceedings of the Joint Board were, I thought, invariably sent through the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy to the President.

Senator Ferguson. Take the third paragraph:

Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War.

What message are they talking about there?

General Marshall. I presume he is referring to the alert message.

Senator Ferguson. The alert message?


Senator Ferguson [reading]:

** * * * and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum.

That would be Exhibit 17.

Senator Ferguson. "He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy attached)."

[3408] What were the changes in this memorandum made by the Secretary of War?

General Marshall. I do not know, sir. General Gerow will have to give you that.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel, do we have the original so that we can find out here? It says "copy attached." Was any copy attached to Exhibit 45?

Mr. Mitchell. The memorandum that was attached is already in evidence.

Senator Ferguson. That is Exhibit 17?

Mr. Mitchell. As part of Exhibit 17. That doesn't show any alterations. It is a fair copy.

Senator Ferguson. Has there been any attempt to get the original to show what changes were made?

Mr. Mitchell. Not at all. I have never known any reason to ask for it.

Senator Ferguson. General, have you any idea what changes were made?


Senator Ferguson. And—

General Marshall. I presume if that shows in the record, it will be shown on one of the draft copies in the record.

Senator Ferguson. As a rule are they kept?


[3409] Senator Ferguson. Now, reading from the diary, that is, from the testimony on page 4054:

That appears in the memorandum which is already in evidence, by General Getow, to General Marshall, the memorandum of November 27.

General Russell. The joint statement is in evidence, not where the Secretary suggested, but General Marshall put it in evidence. We are acquainted with the joint statement.

Now, going down to his diary:

36. Mr. Stimson. Because it governed the—it helped—explains the next sentence. Now I begin with my own record:

Quoting from the diary:

"I said that I was glad to have time, but I did not want it at the cost of humility on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing, which would show a weakness on our part."

And I go on:

Quoting from his diary:

"But the main question at this meeting"—The meeting of Knox, Stark, Gerow and myself.

"—was over the message that we shall send to MacArthur."

Now, at that time, were you talking about a message to anyone else but MacArthur?

General Marshall. At that time meaning this meeting [3410] that he is referring to?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. I don't know, sir. I wasn't present.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you take it from the diary that that is the only one they were talking about. Next he explains the alert to the others. I will read it:

"We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert;"

What is a quasi-alert?

General Marshall. That is a legal term that you gentlemen will have to interpret.

Senator Ferguson. Well——

General Marshall. He says, "or the first signal for an alert."

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and now he says—I am reading from his diary:

"We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert; and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert, namely, that he"——

Then he says:

That was the recipient.

"—should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation was."

[3411] What are they talking about there?

General Marshall. It would appear from reading his testimony he is talking at this moment about an alert to General MacArthur.

Senator Ferguson. You had already given him the 24th alert.

General Marshall. That is what he was generally referring to as a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert.

Senator Ferguson. In your opinion, as Chief of Staff, was that an all-out alert?


Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn that Secretary Stimson had talked with the President as indicated in that paragraph from his diary?

General Marshall. I don't know, sir. I assume that I may have been told by the Secretary or by General Gerow on the morning of the 28th on my return to Washington. I don't believe General Gerow tells me that in this memorandum. It must be just a presumption on my part that the Secretary or General Gerow or both of them spoke of it to me. I don't know.

Senator Ferguson. Can you recall now ever getting that information?


[3412] Senator Ferguson. That would be at least an amendment to the alert of the 24th, would it not?


Senator Ferguson (reading on):

Now, to understand what I was talking about, an earlier alert, I am not sure which one I meant, but we had sent a message which would meet with the description, on November 24th, a Joint Army and Navy message, but we had also sent warnings back as far as July 7, July 25, October 16, and October 20, which contained warnings to the members of the—commanders of the outposts as to the situation that was going on with Japan.

Do you recall those messages, those different alerts that he is talking about—or were they alerts?
General Marshall. I don't think they were alerts. They were information bearing on the increasing and critical situation. Just what they were on the specific dates I am not prepared at the moment to testify.

Senator Ferguson. Then he goes back and says:

Now I go back to my narrative:

"So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him."

General Marshall. He says:

That is, I was talking about MacArthur especially, but we were sending the messages to four people, not only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska.

Senator Ferguson. But that last part was not in the diary.

General Marshall. That is not in the diary.

Senator Ferguson. The diary only referred to the one to MacArthur; is that correct?


Senator Ferguson. Now, on the next page will you read what he says.

General Marshall (reading):

"So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully, finally got it into shape, and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was."

Senator Ferguson. Talking about this message that would be signed from you to MacArthur?


Senator Ferguson. On the 27th?

General Marshall. That is my assumption.

Senator Ferguson. Being alert, and the one that had been discussed with the President, up on the top of page 4054; is that correct?

Page 4055:

"* * * on talking with the President this morning [3414] over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert, namely—"

General Marshall. I presume that is what it is.

[3415] Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, will you read on from the testimony prepared.

General Marshall. This is not the diary (reading):

That is the situation between him and the Japanese envoys.

Now, let me have the message, that message which I have been referring to here.

The thing I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two Governments, and this part I got from Hull, as I said, by telephone, to be sure I was right. You see that message opens with these sentences:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment."

Senator Ferguson. Now, just a moment there. The message to MacArthur opened with those particular sentences that you read, with the two messages alike. Take the one to MacArthur and the one to General Short. That language is used in both, is it not?

Senator Ferguson. That part of the message.


Senator Ferguson. Now, will you read on?

General Marshall (reading):

The thing I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two Governments—

I read that.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall (reading):

That was what I was interested in getting out at the time, because that had been a decision which I had heard from the President as I have just read, and I had gotten the exact details of the situation between the State Department and the envoys from Mr. Hull; and, as I pointed out here, the purpose in my mind, as I quote my talk with the President was to send a final alert, namely, that the man should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation was here.

That was why I was in this matter. Marshall was away. I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what I, of course, normally do; to see that the message, as sent, was framed in accordance with the facts.

Senator Ferguson. Before you go further, General, does [3417] that indicate to you that there had been a message drawn up that had different language in it?

General Marshall. I think that is the case, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what the language was in the original message?

General Marshall. I don't know that. General Gerow would have that, undoubtedly.

[3418] Senator Ferguson. But that would indicate that the first paragraph, at least the first part, was changed to meet the Secretary of War's conversation with the Secretary of State.

General Marshall. My understanding was it was modified by the Secretary of War to be in accord with his conversation with Mr. Hull.

Senator Ferguson. Now, when was that first called to your attention?

General Marshall. Unless it is called to my attention in this memorandum of General Gerow's to me dated November 27, which I read for the first time on the morning of the 28th, I do not know that it was ever called to my attention.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, with the message that was being drafted by the Secretary of War, the change being made, you know that he was going from the Secretary of State and his conversation with the President, as he says at the top:

That was why I was in here. While Marshall was away I had had a decision from the President on that subject and I regarded it as my business to do what I, of course, normally do, to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance with the facts.

That is, the facts as considered by those two men and by myself.

[3419] Now, what my question is is this: Who could change the language of such a message or who could supplement it?

General Marshall. The President, the Secretary of War, and myself. The proposals could be made by the head of the War Plans Division. They might be commented upon and changes proposed by the Deputy Chief of Staff. They might in relation to the references
to the enemy’s status be commented on and different proposals made by G–2 of the Army, but in principle I would say that the only people that could directly change the message would be the President, the Secretary of War, or myself.

Senator Ferguson. And that would be true because of the language there, as I quote, from the President “that we should send the final alert, namely, that he”—that was the recipient—“should be on the qui vive for any attack and telling him how the situation was.”


Senator Ferguson. The others could advise, but the only three that could change were the ones that you have mentioned?


Senator Ferguson. Or supplement it.

General Marshall. Of course, you must understand that the original proposal would come in in written form, in the usual circumstances, from the War Plans Division where it might even be prepared by some captain. However, the responsibility for the message in going forward would be General Gerow’s, and then beyond them it would be mine; and if I am not present, the Secretary of War’s.

Senator Ferguson. Now, read on, will you please, General?

General Marshall (reading).

I speak there in the words of the message to MacArthur, but there were four messages sent out that are in evidence, and you will see the message to Hawaii carries the annotation on the back of it, which is very extraordinary, “Shown to the Secretary of War,” and after they had drafted it. And we were covering the situation in the four great outposts of the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that was not in the diary, that last part? It does not show.

General Marshall. That is a statement without regard, apparently, to the diary.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. It goes on with a question:

General Grunert. Has the Secretary finished regarding that message?

Mr. Stimson. No. I have been regarding that message, yes. I am just going over to the next, to the following day.

General Grunert. I would like to ask whether you saw the rest of that message and whether you prepared the rest of the message or approved what was in that message.

Mr. Stimson. Oh, yes: this message that I have just read a portion of to you, I went over very carefully the whole message.

General Grunert. Yes.

Mr. Stimson. Because the part that I read you was merely the part which I have consulted Mr. Hull about.

General Grunert. Yes.

Mr. Stimson. Because the part that I read you was merely the part which I have consulted Mr. Hull about.

General Grunert. We have that message in evidence.

Mr. Stimson. Yes.

General Grunert. And lots of testimony about it.

Mr. Stimson. Yes.

General Grunert. All I wanted to know was whether you were actually acquainted with the rest of the contents of that message.

Mr. Stimson. I was.

General Grunert. Yes.

[3422] Mr. Stimson. And I saw it after it was finally drawn, as was shown by the memorandum there.

General Russell. Mr. Secretary, before you go away from that message, which we have considered and are considering rather seriously: When General Gerow came to your office that morning did he have a rough draft of that message?
Mr. Stimson. I can't remember that, sir.

General Russell. In his testimony before the Roberts Commission he stated, relative to the first sentence of the message, that initially the first sentence was to the effect that negotiations had terminated; that confirming your report now, you called the Secretary of State, who suggested this other language; to all intents and purposes it had been terminated, with only a slight possibility of their being resumed.

This is General Russell's statement.

Senator Ferguson. Right there is where I want to ask you. Do you recall, or do you know, or do you have knowledge that the original draft of the message to General Short and General MacArthur was, as the sentence indicates, "that initially the first sentence was to the effect that negotiations had terminated"?

General Marshall. I do not recall that I was aware of what the original proposal was other than what the form of the final message was. It may be that the record will show that I saw both drafts. I do not recall.

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at Exhibit 37, page 36? That is the message by the Navy to CINCAF, CINCPAC, where they use the language:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased.

That is page 36, Exhibit 37. Do you have that exhibit, General?

Mr. Mitchell. Page 36 it is, of Exhibit 37.

General Marshall. It is page 36?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, page 36: "Have ceased." It is the third line down.

General Marshall. I must have some wrong paper here. Where is that?

Senator Ferguson. Page 36.

Mr. Gesell. The war warning message.

Senator Ferguson. The war warning message:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.

Exhibit 37, page 36.

Mr. Gesell. Here it is.

General Marshall. What is the question, please, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. I wanted to know whether or not the one from Navy on the same day as the one that went out from the Army did not use the language that the negotiations had ceased, just like it was stated in the testimony that you have just read here. I will read it again:

In his testimony before the Roberts Commission he stated, relative to the first sentence of the message, that initially the first sentence was to the effect that negotiations had terminated.

Then it was changed to the language used by Secretary Stimson:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, and so forth.

Now, take the Navy message that went out on the same day as an alert. There they say that they have ceased.

Would that explain that the two messages were to go out alike as far as the termination of the negotiations and that because of the con-
In paragraph 1302, there was a change in the one that went to the Army?

General Marshall. That would be my assumption of what had happened, that the original messages had been prepared in conjunction with the Navy, General Gerow and Admiral Turner, and that certain phraseology had been used. The Army message, though, through the intervention of Mr. Stimson had been changed following his conversation with Mr. Hull. The Navy message I am assuming probably had already been dispatched.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. There is an explanation by General Gerow on exactly that at page 2690 of the record.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Do you want to put it in now?

Mr. Murphy. No. It is already in on page 2690.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, General, reading those two alerts can you comment on—as a military man and as Chief of Staff—which is the stronger of those two messages as an alert as far as the ceasing of the negotiations, those two sentences?

General Marshall. The Navy message reads:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

[3426] Senator Ferguson. Now, up to that part, "negotiation."

Senator Lucas. I insist, Mr. Chairman, if you are going to construe a document or compare two documents that the witness ought to have a right to look at all parts of it. You cannot take one paragraph or one sentence of a document in construing it.

The Vice Chairman. That is correct. The General had just read the pertinent part of the Navy message and I assume he was in the act of reading the comparable part of the Army message. I think that is what Senator Ferguson was after, wasn't it?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. What I am trying to do is to get the two messages in the first sentence as they relate to termination of negotiations, and I have some other questions about the whole message.

General Marshall. The message sent by the Army on November 27 states:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

Then it goes on to say:

Japanese future action unpredictable.

The naval message, of course, is in stronger terms indicative of the termination of negotiations.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, which is the stronger there—the Navy?

General Marshall. I just attempted to state that, sir, that the naval message terms are the stronger, indicative of the termination of diplomatic relations—negotiations rather than relations.

Senator Lucas. Why don't you let the witness answer? Why should you cut him off in the middle of an answer?
Senator Ferguson. Have you been cut off, General?

Senator Lucas. You just put words in his mouth that are before you, Senator, when he was trying to answer a simple question.

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to make any explanation, General?

General Marshall. No, sir; I have nothing to say.

Senator Ferguson. Now, let us take the two messages, as has been suggested.

Senator Lucas. He is the Chief of Staff, he is a General and he ought to have the utmost respect shown him.

General Marshall. I have them both here, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Take the next sentence:

An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

Now, General, that is a sentence which indicates an expedition, a specific expedition against one of three places, is that not correct?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the possibility of a fourth?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, let us take the one to the Army, let us take the language in the one to the Army.


Senator Ferguson. "Future action unpredictable."


Senator Ferguson. Will you read it?

General Marshall (continuing):

But hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, we will just read down to what is predicted before we get to the overt sentence. Now, in that one is there any specific expedition set forth?

General Marshall. There is not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, which is the most specific message as far as that sentence is concerned?


Senator Ferguson. The Navy message because it outlines three specific movements and a possibility of a fourth, and the Army message is only unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.


Senator Ferguson. So you would say the Navy message was more specific there. Do you know why the two messages differed in relation to that sentence?

General Marshall. I could not say, sir. I imagine it was the possible views of the individuals drafting them either as to where the Japanese were going to strike or as to the desirability of indicating a particular place as against the desirability of indicating a general alert for any place.

Senator Ferguson. So one is a specific alert, the one of the Navy, and the one of the Army is general.

General Marshall. No; they are both alerts in one message, including indications of where it is thought the Japanese action might be.
Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Marshall. The degree of alert is not the point.

Senator Ferguson. Take the next sentence in the Navy [3430] message, will you read it, after the “Borneo”?

General Marshall. Yes [reading]:

Execute an appropriate defensive development preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46X. Inform District and Army authorities.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, shouldn’t the “X” after the “46” be a period?


Senator Ferguson. That is a period?


Senator Ferguson. So that is a sentence. Now, that is a specific order, is it not?


Senator Ferguson. (Reading:)

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46.

All right. Now let us take the next sentence in the Army one. Would you read it?

General Marshall. Yes, sir [reading]:

If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action [3431] you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, let us stop at that part. Is that as specific, is that as strong in the alert as the one in the Navy where he is to take and “execute an appropriate defensive development preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46”?

General Marshall. Possibly as strong except that it has a proviso regarding the overt act.

Senator Ferguson. It has a proviso in it. Let us take the next sentence:

Inform district and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Spenavo Inform British. Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Now, the “report measures taken" is not in the Navy at all. They are ordered to do certain things, are they not, and you ask in the Army one over your signature that you are to be advised as to what measures were taken. The other one says: “Take appropriate measures against sabotage,” is the last part.

Now, which is the stronger of those two, where you ask for “report measures taken” and the other one is a direct order?

[3432] General Marshall. I do not know that I would say either one was stronger than the other. It is a different approach to the same problem.

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you had close coordination between the Army and Navy with these two branches working where they had to work out in the field, would you have had the difference in these messages? They were sent on the same day.

General Marshall. I will have to reflect a little bit on that.

Senator Ferguson. I beg pardon?
General Marshall. I will have to reflect a little bit on that.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Marshall. I think that if the two agencies were side by side there is less probability of a conflict in messages. We were in the same string of buildings at that time, the Munitions Buildings, so we were not very remote one from the other, but they were separate agencies, of course, with long traditions each of its own. I think if it had been a single group there, naturally, would have been a less possibility of the contradictory messages. I do not imply that these two messages are contradictory. That is my answer, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, General, that is your explanation as to how, or as to why the exhibits are not the same.

General Marshall. I did not state that as an explanation, sir. I was giving you a view as to the possibility of what might have been if there had been a different arrangement of the two sections, the Operations section of the Navy and the War Plans Division, which is the operations section of the Army.

Senator Ferguson. Well, General, here is what I have in mind. They were to inform the Army, and the Army getting its own messages and informing the Navy. At the field the messages were to go one to the other.


Senator Ferguson. Was it not possible or probable that because of the difference in the language, one designating that it had ceased and the other one that it had terminated for all practical purposes with only the barest possibility, the one being for three specific expeditions and a possible fourth, the other being general in its nature, one calling for a report back, the other one directing that a specific plan be put into effect, that the men who received them in the field would be confused as to the meaning, and that when the report came back as to what action was taken that it then became the duty of those in Washington to catch that there was confusion and to straighten it out as of the 28th?

[3434] General Marshall. That might be, Senator, but I don't see how it could create that much of a confusion.

The Chairman. Four o'clock having arrived, the committee—

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn may I say just one word?

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas. There was an almanac—not an almanac, but a calendar, a small calendar that was used and I was just wondering whether or not that should not be marked as an exhibit. I would like to have it because we will be referring to that calendar probably 40 or 50 times between now and the time this committee meeting is over. Who has that calendar?

The Chairman. The committee will be in order. We have not recessed.

If anybody can identify that calendar and mark it as exhibit number anything.

Mr. Mitchell. The court will take judicial notice of it and you will have other copies.

The Chairman. Would it be possible to ascertain from what almanac that sheet of the calendar was taken?
Senator Lucas. I would like to know whether it is an original document, too.

The Chairman. Maybe we can straighten that out by 10 o'clock tomorrow and the committee will stand in recess until that time.

(Whereupon, at 4:03 p. m., December 10, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 o'clock a. m., Tuesday, December 11, 1945.)
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room, (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. Does counsel have anything at this point?

Mr. Mitchell. Just a little, Mr. Chairman.

A memorandum from Colonel Duncombe, our chief liaison officer in the War Department, dated today contains this statement:

At Record 3343 and 3408 request was made for drafts of the 27 November 1941 Marshall warning message and the 27 November 1941 memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President. Careful search of War Department files has disclosed no drafts of either of those documents.

By that he means preliminary drafts.

You will be advised if further search discloses any such drafts.

Paragraph 2:

At Record 3311 question was raised as to whether the minutes of the Joint Board meeting of 3 November 1941 were attached to the memorandum for the President from Admiral Stark and General Marshall dated 5 November 1941. The War Department files indicate that the Joint Board minutes were not attached to the memorandum to the President.

Then another request was made with reference to the message of December 3, 1941, sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the command in Chief of the Asiatic Force, the Pacific Force, and the commanders of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth [3438] Naval Districts which reads as follows:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Request was made that we find out the source of that highly reliable information.
I have been informed that the highly reliable information referred to the contents of intercepted Jap diplomatic messages contained in exhibit 1, which show those instructions to their various ambassadors.

The Vice Chairman. Is that all, counsel?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. General, do you have anything you want to offer at this time before you resume your testimony?


The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will continue to inquire.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. General, will you refer to page 1 of Exhibit 52? Will you read that message?


Sent June 17, 1940
Number 428. WE.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. II.

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

(Signed) Adams.

Senator Ferguson. You mentioned yesterday that you had sent an alert in 1940.


Senator Ferguson. Is that the alert?


Senator Ferguson. Now, I notice that the first part of it is that, "Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid comma."

[3440] That is a specific alert, is it not, for a defensive deployment?


Senator Ferguson. And it is specific. Do you know why such an alert was not sent on the 27th?

General Marshall. You mean similarly couched?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. No, sir; except for this particular difference: Here Hawaii was being alerted because of information from some source which aroused in our minds the possibility of a raid specifically against Hawaii. Therefore, Hawaii was alerted for that reason.

[3441] Senator Ferguson. Well, was not that the purpose of alerting then on the 27th of November?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; but the War Department alert of November 27 was directed to all Pacific stations.

Senator Ferguson. On page 8 of that same exhibit it indicates, from a message of yours, that the Navy had not been alerted.


Senator Ferguson. At that time did——
General Marshall. Just a moment, Senator. You said it appears from a message of mine that the Navy—

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. Which message are you referring to?

Senator Ferguson. The message on page 8 of Exhibit 52.

General Marshall. That is a message from General Herron.

Senator Ferguson. That is a message to you instead of from you.

General Marshall. Yes; that is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Indicating that the Navy had not been alerted.


Senator Ferguson. Did you know at that time that the Navy had not been alerted?

General Marshall. I have no distinct recollection in regard to that matter. I was under the impression that the Navy was aware of what we were doing, and I believe I heard here a communication from Admiral Richardson which would indicate that the Navy Department did know about it and informed him accordingly.

Senator Ferguson. Was not that sometime later?

General Marshall. I do not recall the date, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now I notice in this alert of June 17, 1940, you suggest maneuver basis.


Senator Ferguson. Why was that?

General Marshall. We merely suggested that in relation to that portion of the alert which said, "to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents."

Senator Ferguson. That was the purpose?

General Marshall. That was the suggestion.

Senator Ferguson. You, at the end of the message, said, "Acknowledge." That is an entirely different matter from "Report action taken."

General Marshall. I would say that was different; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. One is merely to acknowledge as to whether or not the message reaches you.

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, would this be true from an Army viewpoint, that when an overseas commander is ordered to take "such measures as he deems necessary and to report measures taken to you," is he correct in assuming that if his report is not the kind of action that you had in mind that you would thereafter inform him specifically of the difference?

General Marshall. I would assume so.

Senator Ferguson. You would assume that that is correct Army procedure?

General Marshall. I would say so.

Senator Ferguson. Now, in the message that you sent on the 27th, signed by you, you have a statement in relation to the first overt act. Would you just read that, please?

General Marshall. That is November 27?

Senator Ferguson. The message of the 27th.

General Marshall. The alert message to Hawaii?

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 7 of Exhibit 32.
The Vice Chairman. Senator, are you referring to the one to Hawaii? You know several were sent that day.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; the one to Hawaii. It reads this way, "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act."

Can you tell us anything about why that was put in the message?

[3444] General Marshall. My recollection of that, sir, is that was a direct instruction from the President.

Senator Ferguson. You received a direct instruction from the President, did you not, on that item?

General Marshall. Meaning that I received it personally?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. My recollection on that is not clear. I think I probably did receive it direct from the President.

Senator Ferguson. I will try to refresh your memory by referring to your testimony given sometime before in the Navy board.

My recollection, stimulated by this portion of the message "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act" I have a clear recollection of that. It was the instruction of the President. I also have a rather clear recollection of the following sentence, "This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense." My dimmer recollection is that I discussed that with General Gerow. He thinks I did not see the message. I might not have, but my recollection is quite clear in relation to the President's instructions because, as I recall that, they came to me personally, therefore I would have had to translate this into the message rather than General Gerow who would not have [3445] known.

Now does that refresh your memory?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; but that does not change my statement.

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you some questions now about that.


Senator Ferguson. Did you get the message personally from the President?


Senator Ferguson. Well, would you tell us when you got it?

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How long before?

General Marshall. I am specific in my recollection that the President gave a direction to this effect. I think he gave it to me. I am not certain in regard to that, but I know that he gave it.

Senator Ferguson. Did you and he discuss the purpose of that?

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir; and I do not recall his giving me this. I think he did. I know that he gave that direction, I know that it had to be put in a message. It might have been that it came from some other [3446] sources. It might have been it came from Admiral Stark, or it might have been that it came from Mr. Stimson, but my own dim recollection is that he, the President, stated that to me.

Senator Ferguson. And that is the reason then that you feel you have seen the message, or at least knew that that kind of statement was going into the message?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I was trying to reconstruct in my own mind my recollection of the preparation of this message. I knew there was this discussion as to how to include that statement about
the first overt act and not to discount the preparations for defense. I could not get clear in my own mind when those thoughts were going through my head, whether when I first read the complete message on the morning of the 28th on my return to Washington or whether they were in a discussion with General Gerow on the 26th before my departure from Washington at about 1 p.m.

Later, after making that statement, I saw Mr. Stimson's testimony and I also was told of General Gerow's testimony, and I also was reminded still further by being shown General Gerow's memorandum.

Now out of those I began to get a clear picture of what had happened. At the time when I was testifying I had not remembered Gerow's memorandum to me telling me of his meeting with the Secretary of War and the events that transpired in the preparation of this particular message.

[3447] Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether that sentence was in the original message that was drafted?

General Marshall. I do not, sir. I should imagine General Gerow might be able to tell you that.

Senator Ferguson. He might be able to?

General Marshall. Yes. He was handling the papers and making the detailed arrangements.

Senator Ferguson. Was the original message that you drafted in relation to an alert? I am talking about the one on the 27th that was drafted sometime before you went away. Was that drafted having in mind that a modus vivendi would be sent, the one you had been discussing with Secretary Hull?

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You read sometime later the message of the 26th sent by Mr. Hull?

General Marshall. I either read it or was told of its contents.

Senator Ferguson. You were either briefed on it, or told of its contents?

General Marshall. I was informed regarding it.

Senator Ferguson. At that time was it customary for you to be briefed on matters that were going on?

General Marshall. It was customary for the Secretary of War to tell me what was going on in his conversations with the President and with Mr. Hull, and with Colonel Knox. It was customary, as is indicated by General Gerow's memorandum for him to brief me as to the occurrences that were important for me to know with which he was related during my absence.

Senator Ferguson. Was it your opinion that the modus vivendi would have given you some time to prepare?

General Marshall. It was my opinion, as nearly as I can reconstruct it now, that the modus vivendi, if accepted by the Japanese, would have given us some time to prepare, but the general impression at that time was that the terms were too stiff and there was slight possibility of their acceptance.

I should have qualified that by saying I do not recall now how much of that thought has now entered my mind from reading these statements from Mr. Stimson's testimony and how much is clear recollection of today.
Senator Ferguson. After you became acquainted with the message of the 26th, was there discussion between the officials that there was more chance of having the one of the 26th accepted than there was of having the modus vivendi accepted?

General Marshall. I could not recall my reaction to that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get is if there would be a change in your message of alert.

General Marshall. I do not think there would, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Between the modus vivendi and the one of the 26th?

General Marshall. I do not think there would, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You do not think there would be a change on that.

General, I would like to have you get Exhibit 1. I want to ask you a few questions on that.

Have you ever read Secretary Knox's statement to the Jap Ambassador and his special aide at the time of the delivery of the message?

General Marshall. I do not recall whether I have or not. Maybe I can remind myself from this.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to refer you to page 787 of volume II of Foreign Relations.

Mr. Mitchell. Just a minute. Did you mean Knox in your former question?

Senator Ferguson. I wanted to say Secretary Hull's statement. Refer to page 787. I just want you to glance at it, because I want to ask you a question as to whether that would refresh your memory.

General Marshall. That is starting at the bottom of the page there, "The Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment"?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You need not read it aloud.

General Marshall. I just wanted to see if I had the right message.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It is the one where he goes on to denounce the falsehoods in this 14-part message.

General Marshall. Well, I have a recollection of what Mr. Hull says there, but I believe I read it in the press.

Senator Ferguson. Now would that indicate to you that not only the 14th part of the message, but the whole message contained these falsehoods and he was denouncing the whole message rather than just the mere end of it, the breaking off?

What I am trying to get at is the importance of this message.

General Marshall. Yes. He said, "In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a document that was so crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions." That wording would indicate he was referring to the entire message.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; he was referring to the entire message.

Did you have a reaction to the message when you first read it?

General Marshall. I did not have very much time, sir; because just as I got to the finish of it I got this 1 o'clock message.

Senator Ferguson. I wondered if you had any similar reaction to that of Secretary Hull.

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir. I will answer to this effect:
When I reached the 1 o'clock message then it was indicated to my mind that action was needed as quickly as it could be managed, and I proceeded on that basis.

The next event which followed shortly after was the announcement of the attack on Pearl Harbor. I never read the Japanese message again. I had never read it again since then until the other day when I read it through to get some idea as to how long it must have taken me to read it for the first time.

I have to admit, sir, I got three-quarters of the way through, I got somewhere about China and I lost track of what my timing was, and I never got to it again.

Senator Ferguson. On page 100 of Exhibit 1, message No. 736, will you just read that? That is a short one [3452] General.

General Marshall. This is on page 100?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, page 100, the top message No. 736.

General Marshall (reading):

SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
5 November, 1941.
#736.
(Of utmost secrecy)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

Senator Ferguson. That was translated on November 5, 1941. How soon would that be delivered to you as magic?

General Marshall. I do not know, sir. It is a Navy translation. The records would show that. I guess I would [3453] get it by the next day, maybe, or that day.

Senator Ferguson. Once before we found in your testimony, or at least in your evidence now, that you felt something was going to happen along about that time, or did happen that would make the situation very tense. Now, does that message refresh your memory that the placing of that deadline date on the 25th was the item you had in mind?

General Marshall. Well that is the item I had in mind and I think my testimony will show, and my recollection is quite clear on this, that we were endeavoring to determine what significance the date of November 25 had. That date is designated here, and the statement is made,

Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving—of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition.

I am quite certain that this was discussed with the G-2, with the head of the War Plans Division. I know there were discussions as to what the significance of November 25 was. The only thing they could put their fingers on at that time as to date was the termination of the anti-Comintern pact. That did not seem to have a significant bearing but that was the only date we could tie to.

There was also this in the message which I have just [3454] read, "saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic
condition." So we tried to determine in our own minds what the significance was of November 25, and the only coincident date—I will put it that way—that we could put our fingers on, our thoughts applied to, was the termination of the anti-Comintern pact.

Senator Ferguson. Did it expire on the 25th?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. That is my understanding.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, go to page 163 of that same Exhibit 1, message No. 812, from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 22, 1941, and translated November 22, 1941. There is this sentence in there:

There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you)—twenty-ninth;

General Marshall. I am familiar with that message.

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with that message. Do you know whether you received that about the 22d, when it was translated?

General Marshall. Well, I should assume that I received [3455] it the 22d or the 23d.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what did that mean to you? What was the significance of that message where they extended the time from the 25th, and he even wrote it out, the twenty-ninth?

General Marshall. The true significance of the message we did not determine, or we did not arrive at a conclusion as to what that might be. In that connection I refer back to the original message of the 25th, which related to saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. That was stated in the message giving the 25th as the date, and had to be considered in trying to interpret the meaning and purpose, or intent of the message which set November 29 as the limiting date.

Of course, knowing what happened, it is quite clear what the circumstances were which they had in mind in sending this information to their representatives here in Washington. Whether or not at that time they referred to the Russians, referred to the Germans, referred to the British, referred to any other things, diplomatically or otherwise, we could not tell.

[3456] Senator Ferguson. General, did you discuss this matter of the extension of time with the war council?

General Marshall. I don’t recall that, sir. Maybe the records will show.

Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about the joint board or the Army board. I am talking about the war council. Do you know what I mean by the war council?

General Marshall. One is a meeting with the President. One is a meeting in Mr. Hull’s office. Which do you refer to?

Senator Ferguson. What did you call the one that was in the White House? It is the one that would be in the White House.

General Marshall. Frankly, I don’t recall any name at the time. I was notified to be there and appeared.

Senator Ferguson. Did you hear the name used, war council? In some of the testimony they used the expression “war council.”

General Marshall. That may be. It was not a statutory arrangement.
Senator Ferguson. Oh, no; not at all.

General Marshall. It was a sort of informal procedure which had gradually evolved to the point of these almost stated meetings when Colonel Knox, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Hull, and occasionally I, made these visits to the White House.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the deadline [3457] of the 25th was discussed with the President?

General Marshall. I don’t recall that. I don’t doubt that it was. It undoubtedly was.

Senator Ferguson. The 29th.

General Marshall. I would have no doubt in the matter. It must have been.

Senator Ferguson. These two messages were very important? Very important messages?

General Marshall. Very important messages; yes.

Senator Ferguson. Going to page 173, Exhibit No. 1, a message from Tokyo to Washington, No. 823. That is a very short message:

The time limit set in my message No. 812–a is in Tokyo time.


Senator Ferguson. And that is “For both ambassadors.”


Senator Ferguson. Indicating that the 29th was Tokyo time.


Senator Ferguson. And that that would be the 28th here?


Senator Ferguson. Now, that was a very important message, was it not?


Senator Ferguson. Did you consider at that time that that kind of a message would indicate that they were actually planning an attack?


Senator Ferguson. That a deadline was set and they were giving a time and using the right date so there could be no question about it?

General Marshall. No, sir. What my reactions of the day were I cannot recall. My assumption would be that they failed to state that in the first message and that they had to state it later.

Senator Ferguson. You didn’t consider it a zero day?

General Marshall. We didn’t know what it was, Senator, for what purpose.

Senator Ferguson. I notice, if you go back to page 126 in exhibit 1 there is this expression, translated the 26th of November, received November 14:

Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire’s foreign policy as it has been decided by the Cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

a. We will completely destroy British and American [3459] power in China.

Now, if Japan attempted that, would that mean war in your opinion?

General Marshall. It did not necessarily mean war. It certainly has the implication of possible war. They were already fighting in
China, they were already completely wrecking British and American trade possibilities in China.

Senator Ferguson. On the top of page 127:

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time scale.

Now, didn't that message indicate that they had in mind an attack on America?

General Marshall (reading):

Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time scale.


Senator, I don't know. That might possibly mean exactly the opposite.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall seeing it, General?

General Marshall. I don't recall specifically this message. I probably did see it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Does it have any significance at the present time, that language?

[3460] General Marshall. I don't understand right now, in the light of all the events, what they mean by "long-time scale."

Senator Ferguson. The part about the world war.

General Marshall (reading):

Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time scale.

As I say, I don't quite understand, in the light of events, what they mean by "on a long-time scale."

Senator Ferguson. Would you consider there could be a world war as indicated there without the United States being in it?

General Marshall. If it is confined to China that was a possibility.

Senator Ferguson. Well, they had always considered that the war in China, had they not, was merely an incident, and they weren't treating it as a declared war?

General Marshall. They were not treating it as a declared war, and I believe we were not, for convenience in supplying China.

Senator Ferguson. Going to page 195, that is a message from Tokyo to Washington, November 28, 1941, No. 844, translated on the 28th.

General Marshall. No. 844. I see the message.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the part of the message I would like to have you refer to there is the part reading:

[3467] Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.

Do you know whether or not you saw that message?

General Marshall. I do not know, sir. I would assume that I did.

Senator Ferguson. And the fact that they were going to send a reply in 2 or 3 days—do you know whether that reply was to the note of the 26th?

General Marshall. I would be guessing now, sir. I don't recall.

Senator Ferguson. Didn't that indicate that when they sent that reply, in 2 or 3 days, that is, from the 28th, that is the date of the message, that the negotiations would be ruptured?

General Marshall (reading):

the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. That means "in fact ruptured."
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Isn't there even stronger language back on page 90, under date of November 2:

This will be our Government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave. When we resume negotiations, the situation makes it urgent that we [3462] reach a decision at once.

That is on November 2, page 90.
Senator Ferguson. Does that change your opinion, General, the one that was read by the Congressman, that the message here would indicate in 2 or 3 days they would break off the relations? Does that change your opinion on that language?
Senator Ferguson. On page 209, circular message No. 2444, from Tokyo to Washington, translated the 5th of December 1941.
Now, that is the message, is it not—well, would you just read it, General?
General Marshall. It is dated the 1st of December 1941.
Senator Ferguson. Read just the message part.
General Marshall (reading):

The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my circular message No. 2447, the United States (office) retains the machines and the machine codes.
Please relay to France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey from Switzerland; and to Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico from Washington.

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember seeing that message, where they were destroying the codes?
Senator Ferguson. What significance did that have, on the 1st of December?
General Marshall. It would certainly mean the anticipation of, at least, the rupture of diplomatic relations.
Senator Ferguson. General, doesn't the destruction of codes mean more than a break in diplomatic relations? Doesn't it mean that they anticipate war? If they only broke diplomatic relations does that necessarily mean that their equipment would be seized by the other governments?
Senator Ferguson. Doesn't the destruction of codes indicate that, from an Army point of view, that it means war?
General Marshall. In general that; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, on the 3d day of December 1941 were you familiar with the fact that General Miles had sent a message to destroy our code in Tokyo?
Senator Ferguson. Had that been taken up with you prior to that time?
General Marshall. I presume it had.
Senator Ferguson. A matter of that importance would be, as that would be a matter of action.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what had happened at that particular time or prior, that a message was sent to Tokyo to destroy our code machine?

General Marshall. I don't recall the exact discussion which determined that decision, but I would say now these various messages indicate that at the least they were going to sever diplomatic relations and also there was the uncertainty of how the Japanese would react under those circumstances.

Senator Ferguson. Doesn't it also indicate that there was a tension growing and growing that came to the point where we even destroyed our code in Tokyo?

General Marshall. That is exactly correct. The tension had been growing and growing daily.

Senator Ferguson. These messages that I have asked you about this morning, do they refresh your memory that that tension was growing?

General Marshall. I didn't need for my memory to be refreshed regarding the growing tension. It grew steadily from day to day during that period.

Senator Ferguson. The next message I would like to have you refer to is on page 209, No. 2443, translated 12-5-41. That is a message telling them even how to destroy the machine.

General Marshall. Page 2443?


General Marshall. I have it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It is from Tokyo to London.

General Marshall. Do you wish me to read it?

Senator Ferguson. Just to familiarize yourself with it at the present time. It is telling them how to destroy the code machine?


Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that they wanted to make sure that the actual machine was destroyed so that the people in London, the Government in London, would not get that code machine?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The next message is on page 215 that I would like to have you refer to. That is a message from Tokyo—Tojo. He was Prime Minister at that time, was he not?


Senator Ferguson. And it is to Washington, December 2.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. You said Tojo. It is Togo. T-o-g-o. There were two in the Cabinet, one T-o-j-o and the other T-o-g-o.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who this was?

Mr. Murphy. It reads T-o-g-o. One was Prime Minister, [3466] I think the other War Minister. They are set out in the back of Mr. Grew's book as to which was which. Togo was War Minister and Tojo was Prime Minister. This is Togo.

Senator Ferguson. This is Togo.

Mr. Murphy. I think he was War Minister.

Senator Ferguson. All right.
Now, in that message, General, that is the first message, is it not, that speaks about destroying the code here in Washington, the machine, and it is after we had given notice to our—at least the translation is after, it is dated the 2d but the translation is on the 4th, and it is after we gave our message from Miles to the Military Attache in Tokyo to destroy his code; is that correct?

General Marshall. As I understand you, this message came to our attention, that is, in the translated form, after the dispatch of General Miles' message to Tokyo.

Senator Ferguson. Well, the corrected form on the bottom of page 215 indicates “translated 12-4-41.”

General Marshall. I am not quite familiar with these references but I would say that the message translated on 12-3-41 might have first become available and some correction, possibly a minor correction, was made on the next day.

Mr. Mitchell. Senator, you said that it was the first one relating to the destruction of the code in Washington.

[3467] Senator Ferguson. Do you have another? I asked him if it was.

Mr. Mitchell. You said it was. You didn't ask him. On page 208 I find one of December 1st. It says:

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes get in touch * * *

Senator Ferguson. Does that contradict what I said?

Mr. Mitchell. I am not contradicting. I just say there is an earlier message relating to the destruction of codes in Washington.

Senator Ferguson. The first message on page 208—that relates to when it is necessary to destroy codes.

When is the first message about the destruction of codes in Washington?

General Marshall. I would have to go through the papers in order to answer with any accuracy. As far as I know, it is the one we have just been talking about; that is, the first one.

[3468] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that at the time the note was given on the 26th that the ambassador said to Mr. Hull that it was tantamount to meaning the end, and he asked whether we were not interested in the modus vivendi? Did you ever know that?

General Marshall. I don't recall that, sir. In all probability I had left Washington, and I didn't get back until the 28th, and that had all occurred in my absence.

Senator Ferguson. On page 249, General, we get a message—it is No. 910, from Tokyo to Washington, December 7, 1941. It is marked "Extremely urgent":

After deciphering part 14 of my #902a and also #907b, #908c and #909d, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

When did that first come to your attention?

General Marshall. I will have to check up here to see if—what is the message that had the 1 o'clock hour in it? How do I find that?

Mr. Mitchell. That is 907.

General Marshall. I see it now.

That message must have come to my attention on the morning of the 7th of December, because in my draft in longhand from which
the message was sent to the overseas theaters in the Pacific, I mentioned the fact regarding the destruction of codes.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when—put it this way: Did you know anything about the system that was kept in the decoding as far as time of decoding was concerned? Was there any way you could learn when a message was actually decoded from the system?

General Marshall. I don't believe I understand.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the system in the decoding—was there any method of putting on the instrument the actual hour of decoding, instead of just saying "12/7" or "12/6" was there an hour stamp when the message was decoded and delivered?

General Marshall. I can't testify to that right here, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, in your testimony, as I recall it, in reading the Roberts report you spoke about what happened on the 7th, and didn't relate anything about these 13 parts, the pilot message and the other messages coming in on the 6th. Were you familiar at that time with the fact that they did come in on the 6th, the 13 parts?

General Marshall. I understand what you are asking. I am just trying to think back. I don't recall just what I knew at the time I appeared before the Roberts board for the reason that I didn't go into any of that data at all from the time of the actual attack on Pearl Harbor until my appearance before the board, and I had no papers with me, as I recall, except the longhand message that I had used in dispatching the notification of the 1 o'clock and the destruction of the codes to the overseas commanders.

I recall, I think, testifying before one of these boards as to my recollection of the information that I was given on the morning of my arrival at the War Department, which was that this long message of 14 parts had been coming in during the night and that the Navy had been overloaded regarding the translation from the Japanese into English and the Army had been helping out in its section in that translation.

I don't recall that I knew anything about the actual receipt in translated form of the message on the evening of November 6, and its dispatch to the State Department other than what I have just stated. I know that up to my arrival in the War Department on the morning of the 7th, at whatever time I arrived, I knew nothing of the message whatsoever. I am rather inclined to think that I still at the time I appeared before the Roberts board was going on the recollection that they had been occupied throughout the night in translating this message which was my impression at the time.

The Vice Chairman. General, I believe you said November 6. You meant December?

General Marshall. I should have said December 6.

Senator Ferguson. General, going to page 238, the message we had been referring to as a pilot message, the first paragraph, No. 844, translated—

General Marshall. That is what page?

Senator Ferguson. Page 238, the bottom of the page.


Senator Ferguson. It is translated—the book gives it wrong. "1-26-41." They read that to mean "12-6-41."

That message, General, read the first paragraph.
General Marshall (reading):

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902b (in English).

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that the message is going to come in English and it is going to be coded, and also that it is an answer to the message of the 26th?


Senator Ferguson. Now, "this separate message" will you read further?


This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it, I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

Senator Ferguson. The date of the 6th, that is the 5th here, that is on Friday, is it not?


Senator Ferguson. Read the next sentence.

General Marshall (reading):

Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you, in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

Senator Ferguson. Now. General, doesn't that message [indicate] that there is going to be a zero time as far as the delivery of that message to the United States Government is concerned?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that being true, and having all these other messages and all this information, how do you account for the fact that that message when translated, [3473] when decoded on the 6th, was not delivered to you? The importance of that message is clear, is it not?


Senator Ferguson. How do you account for it not being delivered to you on the 6th?

General Marshall. The only way I can account for that, Senator, is that the first thirteen parts, as I have been told, and I read, as I say, hurriedly here, the other day, most of that portion did not have the critical phase of the message included, which showed in the fourteenth part, and, as I have been told, I am not the authoritative witness on this—that fourteenth part didn't come in too available, workable, or readable form, until sometime during the night, possibly was not available until the next morning.

The data will show that. Therefore, I presume the assumption was as it did not include the critical statements, that is, the first to the thirteenth part, it was not thought necessary to bring that to my immediate attention.

Senator Ferguson. General, this message is not part of the fourteen-part message. This is a separate, short, independent message, giving a zero hour or a zero date, or time of the delivery of a message. Now, as I recall, going back through these intercepts, I find no other, and I want you to correct me if you know [3474] of any
other, where a message was to be delivered at a particular time, and
there was a pilot message before, indicating that there would be a
zero time for delivery.

Mr. Murphy. Senator, you said that the message on page 238, #901, has a zero time in it?

Senator Ferguson. No, it doesn't have the time. It indicates a pilot, that there will be some time set.

Mr. Murphy. Doesn't it say——

* * * I image you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure.

Senator Ferguson.

Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message.

It says "I will wire you in a separate message."

General Marshall. That is exactly what the message said.

Senator Ferguson. Doesn't that make it an important message?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; it is an important message.

[3475] Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that that message was not delivered to you?

General Marshall. I can give you nothing further than what I have said.

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about on the day it was translated—and we haven't yet received the work sheet so far as time is concerned, except dates.


Senator Ferguson. Yes. I mean the actual hour. You were in Washington that entire day on the 6th, were you not?


Senator Ferguson. Was there anyone alerted that could have received that particular message?

General Marshall. Well, there was someone on duty in the office of the Chief of Staff, there was someone on duty in the office of the War Plans Division, there was someone on duty in the office of G—2.

Senator Ferguson. Was there anyone that could have acted?


Senator Ferguson. Who could have acted who was there that could have acted on this message if delivery had been made?

General Marshall. The delivery of the magic messages was a personal arrangement in the main between the Office of Signal Corps and this particular section and the Office of G—2. General Miles will have to testify to that. I cannot.

Senator Ferguson. No. Was there anyone——

General Marshall. The point is I did not receive the message.

Senator Ferguson. But that isn't my question, General. My question is, now, was there anyone in position outside of you in Washington on the 6th that had authority to receive this particular magic message and act?

General Marshall. Well, there are two points to your question. One is authority to receive.

Senator Ferguson. First authority to receive.

General Marshall. That has existed all the time in G—2.
Senator Ferguson. Who had authority to actually receive magic as far as the Chief of Staff was concerned? It had to come to him in a locked pouch.


Senator Ferguson. Did anyone have the key to the locked pouch other than you?


Senator Ferguson. Therefore the only one in Washington so far as the Chief of Staff was concerned was the Chief of Staff himself who had the authority to receive it?

General Marshall. That is correct.

[3477] Senator Ferguson. That is correct?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Now, was there anyone authorized to take the pouch and deliver it to you in your office?

General Marshall. In my office?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, in your office, was there anyone actually able to receive the pouch? He didn't have the key to it, but receive the pouch?

General Marshall. It would be received in the office of the Secretary of the General Staff and delivered to me. Everything came through there unless it was brought in to me directly by the Assistant Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson. Who was the Secretary on the 6th?

General Marshall. General Bedell Smith was the Secretary.

Senator Ferguson. Was he a General at that time, wasn't he a Colonel?

General Marshall. He may have been a Colonel.

Senator Ferguson. A Colonel at that time?


Senator Ferguson. He would have authority to take the actual pouch, would he not?

General Marshall. He would have authority, or anybody else on duty in his office, of taking the pouch in to me.

Senator Ferguson. Was he alerted so that if the pouch would have come to him on the day of the 6th he would have immediately got to you?

General Marshall. I don't know that any special instructions were given Colonel Smith at all.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you anticipate any messages? The message before said that there would be a reply in 2 or 3 days.


Senator Ferguson. Now, was that of sufficient importance, and these other messages, to indicate that someone should have been alerted to receive this message and get it to you?

General Marshall. Senator, these were messages to the Secretary of State, these were diplomatic messages, all of which concerned important things. The delivery to Mr. Hull was the important direct requirement of the procedure. We deduced what we could out of the particular messages but the delivery to the Secretary of State of a diplomatic message from the Japanese was the issue at the moment.

Senator Ferguson. General, was there anyone authorized—was General Bryden authorized to act on December 6 on a message?
General Marshall. There was no specific instructions that I know of that were given General Bryden regarding a special duty of his on November 6.

[3479] Senator Ferguson. Had he a picture—
Mr. Murphy. Did you say November 6?
Senator Ferguson. Did he have a picture of the whole situation at that time, had he been receiving magic?
General Marshall. I do not think that General Bryden was receiving magic. I think General Bryden was undoubtedly aware of magic because he sat in on the point board meetings.

[3480] Senator Ferguson. But he personally was not receiving magic?
General Marshall. I do not think it went to his office.
Senator Ferguson. Now, was there anybody else, under the rules, that was authorized to act if you were absent?
As I read exhibit 42:

Deputy Chief of Staff, general duties—
a. The Deputy Chief of Staff will assist the Chief of Staff and will act for him in the War Department in his absence.

Senator Ferguson. Was there anyone else authorized besides Bedell Smith?
General Marshall. His assistant if he were on duty. I believe at that time it was Colonel Deane. He would be another one. There were other assistants.
Senator Ferguson. Their only province would be, because they had no key, would be to get the pouch to you?
Senator Ferguson. Now, so that we may understand what that pouch is, or was, it was a brief case with a lock on it, was it not?
Senator Ferguson. Now, General, are you familiar with the testimony of Colonel Bratton before the Army Board?
General Marshall. I have not read it.
Senator Ferguson. Page 239. Does counsel have a copy?
Mr. Gesell. No, we don't have a copy.
Senator Ferguson. I will give the General the copy I have to read.
Mr. Mitchell. What page?
Senator Ferguson. Page 239c, "Top Secret, Colonel Bratton testifying."
Mr. Gesell. Here is another copy, Senator. I did have a copy.
Senator Ferguson. Would you just read that into the record, the top of page 239.
General Marshall (reading):

Colonel Toulmin. And what is the name of the Secretary of the Chief of Staff?
Colonel Bratton. Colonel Smith, Bedell Smith, now Lieutenant General.
Colonel Toulmin. And after this, you then went over and delivered it to the Secretary of State in the locked pouch for and on his behalf, is that right?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, to the Watch Officer in the State Department.

[3482] Colonel Toulmin. To the Watch Officer about ten or ten-thirty, on that Saturday evening, December 6.
Colonel Bratton. That is correct.
Colonel Toulmin. Now, having made these deliveries, Colonel, to these four recipients, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of G-2, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Secretary of State, did you get any reaction to that message until the following day?

Colonel Bratton. What do you mean by "reaction" Colonel?

Colonel Toulmin. Did they answer it, did they act upon it, did they mention it, did they discuss it, did they call you, did they look at it, to your knowledge?

Colonel Bratton. I had some discussions of the message as I remember, with General Miles, indicating to him that the final part was yet to come. It did not come in until the following morning. The reaction from General Marshall was a reading and a discussion of the entire communication.

[3485] Senator Ferguson. Now, General, will you go to page 242 starting out with: "Colonel Bratton: General Marshall’s secretary."

General Marshall (reading):

Colonel Bratton. General Marshall’s secretary.

General Russell. Well, he is the man to whom you gave General Marshall’s copy; was he not?

Colonel Bratton. Yes; but it was in a locked pouch, to which General Marshall had the key.

General Russell. Do you know what Bedell Smith did with it?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Colonel Toulmin. Did you tell him that it was an important document in the locked pouch?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Colonel Toulmin. And that the Chief of Staff should know about it?

Colonel Bratton. Should see it right away.

Colonel Toulmin. What was General Smith’s response—that he would get in touch with the Chief of Staff, or would not?

Colonel Bratton. It must have been, because if it had been otherwise, it would have registered on my memory.

[3487] Colonel Toulmin. And about what time in the evening was it when General Smith was told there was an important document in that locked pouch for General Marshall and that his attention should be called to it?

Colonel Bratton. I don’t remember that, sir.

Colonel Toulmin. And that was on the evening of December 6?

Colonel Bratton. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 307, General, volume D of Bratton’s testimony, beginning with the question at the bottom of page 306 so as to get the continuity.

General Marshall (reading):

General Russell. As I recall your testimony, you stated that you delivered it to this man Smith on Saturday night; is that correct?

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir, to the best of my knowledge and belief. My recollection is that I found Colonel Smith in his office. It may have been one of the other secretaries, but my recollection is that it was Colonel Smith, and that I told him that this was a very important paper, and that General Marshall should see it at once. My recollection is that he said he would send it out to the General’s quarters by courier. In any event, my mind was at rest about the Chief of Staff, I didn’t worry about him any more that night.

General Grunert. Had this occurred frequently in the past?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

General Grunert. So it was just a normal thing to say, "Here is a pouch that has got important stuff in it"?

Colonel Bratton. No. When I thought that the Chief of Staff should see it at once, I made a point of telling Smith so, and he would say, "All right, I will send it out by a special courier."

General Grunert. Did that happen very frequently?

Colonel Bratton. It happened several times; yes, sir.

General Grunert. Now, about this time, most everything was important?

Colonel Bratton. Most everything was important; and I was further urged on by the fact that if the Chief of Naval Operations ever got one of these things before General Marshall did and called him up to discuss it on the telephone with him, and the General hadn’t gotten his copy, we all caught hell.
[3486] Senator Ferguson. That is all, General. Do you agree to that last answer?


Senator Ferguson. But at least they felt they had to perform their duty efficiently.


Senator Ferguson. And that you expected them to perform it efficiently.


Senator Ferguson. And the average man when he has that in mind uses the expression that the Colonel used there.


Senator Ferguson. So that there was no disrespect or anything else in his remark. I think we understand that, do we?

General Marshall. I was not accepting it as disrespect.

The Vice Chairman. That is a rather familiar Army expression, I think.

The Chairman. Well, it is not limited to the Army.

General Marshall. Well, Senator, it usually has trimmings.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever know that the Colonel made any other statements in relation to this de-

General Marshall. I have never read any of his testimony. I was told at the time a Major Clausen came to me just, I think, the day before the Pearl Harbor report was released to the press—incidentally, that was the first time I had ever seen Major Clausen—that testimony had been taken somewhere that had—I believe he said that Colonel Bratton had revised his statement. I don't know but I can have——

Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with that?

General Marshall. I am not familiar with who the individuals concerned were at all.

Senator Ferguson. All right. I will ask you some questions later on Colonel Clausen.

Now, General, as we get the situation here on the sixth we have the only man authorized, or the only people authorized to get the pouch was Smith or someone under him in your office?


Senator Ferguson. You had the key?

General Marshall. I had the key.

Senator Ferguson. Now, whose specific responsibility was it to get it to your office, that is, to Smith or to you or to your office?

[3487] General Marshall. That was General Miles' responsibility.

Senator Ferguson. General Miles is responsible for that?


Senator Ferguson. And that same thing would be true on the day of the seventh?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You have gone over the time element on the morning of the seventh as to what time you rode and what time you got back for breakfast and what time you got to the office.

General Marshall. I ate breakfast before I rode, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Before you rode?
General Marshall. I ate breakfast on Sunday morning at 8 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General Marshall, is there any way that you can account for the fact that this message was not delivered to you at your residence on that morning? What could cause the delay in the delivery of this message?

General Marshall. Senator, as I recall my testimony and as I recall the events a message came to my quarters as I was taking a shower or getting into a shower after [3489] riding that Colonel Bratton was coming out to the house to see me with an important message and I—

Senator Ferguson. Well, then—

Mr. Gesell. Let him finish, please.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. Please go ahead and finish your answer.

General Marshall. That Colonel Bratton was coming out to the house, wished to come out to the house with an important message and I sent word that I would be out to the Department and I completed my shower and dressed and I believe I said that would probably take me about 10 minutes and then got in the car and drove down to the Department.

Senator Ferguson. Which, as I understand it, was 7 or 10 more minutes?

General Marshall. I imagine about 7 minutes; yes.

Senator Ferguson. So that would be 17 minutes—


Senator Ferguson. (Continuing.) After you knew that Bratton wanted to get in touch with you—


Senator Ferguson. (Continuing.) You received this message?

General Marshall. No, sir. I will say that is all, I think, that—well, you say "this message" meaning what, [3490] sir?

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the 14 parts.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And the 1 o'clock.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And the destruction of the codes.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. So that 17 minutes after you received notice from Bratton as far as you were concerned you received these messages?


Senator Ferguson. And that was on the Sunday morning?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; Sunday morning.

Senator Ferguson. And, now, have you ever made—personally, as I understand it, you conducted no examination or no inquiry as to why the parts were not delivered to you on Saturday that were completed and why the one message, the pilot message, was not delivered to you?

General Marshall. I had no investigation of that; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you haven't any other knowledge
[3491] than what you have given here?
Senator Ferguson. Did Bedell Smith get in touch with you Saturday night?
Senator Ferguson. You were at home Saturday night?
General Marshall. The presumption is that I was at home.
Senator Ferguson. I mean you say now that you were?
General Marshall. I have not read my testimony through but I think I saw in a paper something that may mean my testimony is not as I intended to give it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, do you want to change it? Not that you want to change your testimony, but do you want to reiterate what you said?
General Marshall. I want to repeat what I said, that I found an engagement book for the family that shows I only had one evening engagement, a dinner, between the 1st of November—the newspaper said the 1st of December—between the 1st of November and the 7th of December and that was on the night of the 3d of December.
Senator Ferguson. If you left the house, for instance, on the night of the 6th of December was there someone there to answer the telephone?
General Marshall. Yes, sir; there was an orderly there.
[3492] Senator Ferguson. An orderly?
Senator Ferguson. And he was in the Army in effect?
General Marshall. Yes, sir. I had three orderlies that rotated that duty and at that time and for about a year thereafter they stayed until 10 o'clock, until I returned if I went out to the movies. That is the only place I went to.
Senator Ferguson. And their rank was sergeant?
General Marshall. It varied. They started with private and some were technical sergeants, but they were men competent to answer the 'phone.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; they were competent to answer the 'phone.
General Marshall. And they knew where I was.
Senator Ferguson. And they would know where you were?
General Marshall. They would know where I was.
Senator Ferguson. And do I understand that when you returned the 'phone would not be shut off?
General Marshall. It would not be shut off; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So that they were answering the 'phone until you came and then who would answer the 'phone? Would you answer the 'phone or Mrs. Marshall?
General Marshall. It depends on which 'phone rang. If it was the house phone she would get it and if it was the [3493] War Department 'phone, which I think was installed at that time and was beside my bed I would answer it.
Senator Ferguson. So that if Bedell Smith desired to get you that night there wasn't any reason why he should not have been able to get you?
General Marshall. I could have been obtainable.
Senator Ferguson. And would that same thing be true with General Miles and Colonel Bratton?
General Marshall. Yes, sir; I would say it would.

Senator Ferguson. And you have no knowledge that you were out of the city, so that—

General Marshall. I checked it. I never left after I returned on the 28th until some time. I don’t know when, after December 7th.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you knew of the investigation of the Roberts Commission, did you not?

General Marshall. I was called as a witness before that Commission.

Senator Ferguson. Was any part of the Roberts’ report submitted to you for your approval? I might refresh your memory if this will help. On page 1793 and page 1794 the Roberts Commission submitted some of their proposed findings to you to correct; that, in terms, as I understood it.

Mr. Mitchell. What page is that referring to?


Mr. Mitchell. On what?

Senator Ferguson. Of the Roberts’ testimony.

Mr. Mitchell. The transcript.

Senator Lucas. Who makes the statement?

Senator Ferguson. I want to get the record. Does counsel have that.

Mr. Mitchell. We have the Roberts’ report. The Roberts’ transcript is down in the office.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will ask the question later then. I want to reserve that particular question. We do not have the testimony at this time on that, General.

That was a Presidential commission, was it not, or board?

General Marshall. That was my understanding, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And do you know of any reason why they should not receive all the testimony, all the evidence, all the facts, being a Presidential board?

General Marshall. I cannot think of any right now, sir, unless it pertained to “magic,” but I think they received “magic.” I say “I think” because I did not sit in on their hearings.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever make any statements to Gen. Carter Clarke?

General Marshall. General what?

[3495] Senator Ferguson. Could I have the affidavit of Sherman Miles, please?

Mr. Murphy. I am looking at it right here but I would like to get it back so that I can clear up some of the testimony.

Senator Ferguson. I have got a copy of an affidavit of Sherman Miles and I intend to read that.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to get it back because I want to clear up something.

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to keep it to see if my copy is correct?

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Senator Ferguson. Col. Sherman Miles made an affidavit [reading]:

Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board 8th of August 1944 as corrected by my letter 18th of August 1944 I wish to say that I
avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret source then called “Magic” or any intimation that such source existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board Brigadier General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke of G-2, War Department, transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning radio intelligence mentioned or the existence of that form of information, or intelligence in the period preceding the 7th of December 1941. Accordingly I obeyed that instruction.

I will ask you, General, whether or not you made any or gave any such instructions to Brig. Gen. Russell A. Osmun?

General Marshall. To my recollection I did not. May I recite what I understand of that?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. I ask that because most of it is hearsay.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I want you to explain in any way any of these answers.

General Marshall. All right. I sent for Colonel Clarke, I think it was three mornings ago, saw him for about 5 minutes and asked him what his idea was of these instructions to General Miles that I understood had been given regarding “magic.” He told me that at the time these witnesses were coming in several had reported and were preparing themselves as to their data for the investigation.

They wished to know in each instance whether or not they could refer to “magic.” General Clarke, then Colonel Clarke, in the absence of the then G-2, General Bissell, and in my absence from Washington saw General McNarney, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and took up the question with him.

General McNarney, according to Colonel Clarke, discussed the question with Admiral King. They came to an agreement that there would be no reference by the witnesses to “magic.” Therefore, the individuals, according to Colonel Clarke, who had come into G-2 to look into the data preliminary or preparatory to their testifying were informed that there would be no reference to “magic.”

Then, according to Colonel Clarke, at a later date the naval investigating having gotten under way, it was learned in the War Department that the magic messages were being introduced in the naval board. I do not recall that Colonel—I think the statement was made that this had resulted because of a letter from Colonel Knox to Admiral Kimmel in which he had assured him that the admission of those messages would be permitted. Therefore, instructions were then given that the magic would be made available to the Army board.

Now, further with relation to this, in the first hour of my testimony before the Army board—and I think I was one of the first witnesses—I asked them to go into executive session, and I told them about the existence of magic, what it was, what its bearing on the conduct of the war was, and its relationship to this particular incident. That was done in executive session, with nobody present except the three members of the board, and that took place in the first hour of my testifying before that group.

Now, Colonel Clarke can give you the particular evidence on that; General McNarney and, I presume, Admiral King.

Senator Ferguson. So that, as I understand it, then, General, you, as Chief of Staff, did not issue the order. The information was given
out by your Deputy Chief of Staff, General McNarney; is that correct?

General Marshall. After a discussion with Admiral King.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is what I mean, as you have explained. And that instruction was then given by Carter Clarke to General Miles?

General Marshall. And the other witnesses who knew about magic.

Senator Ferguson. And the other witnesses who knew about magic?

General Marshall. Presumably Colonel Bratton and I do not know who else was concerned.

Senator Ferguson. And they went before the board and gave their testimony and entirely eliminated——


Senator Ferguson (continuing). Any reference to magic.

General Marshall. Yes. Then at a later time magic was introduced.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And at some time later magic was introduced. Now, do you know whether Miles ever went back after they introduced magic——


Senator Ferguson (continuing). To give his testimony in relation to magic?

General Marshall. I do not know that.

Senator Ferguson. This, of course, was a congressional ordered inquiry by the Army and by the Navy?


Senator Ferguson. Do you know how it came about that the Army board that was ordered by the statute ceased to function, and then a further inquiry by Colonel Clausen began along the same or similar lines?

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

General Marshall. I am not aware of that. That was handled by the Secretary of War and by the civilian side of the War Department.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?


And not on the military side?

General Marshall. No, sir. The military side did not concern itself with the various procedures in this matter.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did the J. A. G. recommend it, do you know?

General Marshall. I could not tell you, sir. I would not have recalled it and Mr. Stimson did not consult me with regard to it, and I never knew the name of the man or heard of it until I saw the Pearl Harbor report the day before it was released, and knew nothing of it until he came to get the affidavit from me.

Senator Ferguson. So that, as far as that situation is concerned, you had no knowledge or information concerning that investigation, the result of that investigation, until the day before the report was made public?

General Marshall. That is correct. Brigadier General Handy became Deputy Chief of Staff on the departure of General McNarney for Italy on the day that the Army report was received in the office of the Secretary of War and a copy or the original report went to General Handy and General McNarney, who were both together at the time.
General Handy, after a very brief survey, I imagine, of an hour or two brought the report to me. He did not hand it [3501] to me, held it, told me of the general nature of it, told me of the strictures against me and advised me not to see the report, and he thought that because of my implication in it that the Army side of the War Department should have nothing to do with the thing whatsoever; that it should be entirely handled by the Secretary of War or his civilian assistants or whatever others he desired to call into it. So that from that time on it was entirely handled in the office of the Secretary of War, and so far as General Handy knew—he can testify as to this—nobody on the General Staff knew anything at all regarding the terms of the report or the material.

Senator Ferguson. And no one on the General Staff ordered Colonel Clausen to proceed?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You had no knowledge that he did proceed, as far as you were concerned, until the time you gave?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, getting back, General, to General McNarney—just one question as to all his instructions—to Gen. Carter Clarke and General Osmun, and then on down to the other witnesses. Were you consulted in relation to that?

General Marshall. No, sir; not to my knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. And you had no knowledge of it; is [3502] that correct?

General Marshall. I had no knowledge of that. My reaction would have been literally that of Admiral King and General McNarney.

Senator Ferguson. Now, there appears to be another investigation by Carter Clarke known as the Clarke investigation.


Senator Ferguson. Starting some time after the Clausen investigation.


Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn that there was a Carter Clarke investigation?

General Marshall. I am not quite clear. General Bissell is the best witness on that. As nearly as I recall the thing, there was nobody left in G-2 at this time who had been on duty at the time of these events in December 1941 or earlier in the fall, and General Bissell recommended that in order to get the data straightened out as to what actually happened he should have an investigation made of all of the procedure and it was so directed, presumably with my acquiescence, but General Bissell can tell you directly.

Senator Ferguson. General Bissell—

General Marshall. Is the present G-2 of the War Depart-

[3503] ment.

Senator Ferguson. I want to get the Carter Clarke investigation to get the dates. The first page of the No. 1 volume testimony of findings handled on certain top secret documents, CWC Part 1, is dated the 20th of September 1944, and the second volume, the first instrument in it is dated the 17th of August 1945. It is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff. Do you recall that, General?
General Marshall. I am quite certain I saw it. I think I have a memorandum somewhere in it of my own.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did your order create the Carter Clarke investigation?


Senator Ferguson. Your order created that?


Senator Ferguson. Now, what was the purpose? Why did you want the Carter Clarke investigation after the Clausen investigation, what was there to be investigated, and after the Army Board had made a finding under a statute which ordered them to make an investigation?

General Marshall. I asked General Bissell about 2 days ago over the telephone if he could remind me of what this was and my recollection of it is—he can testify direct on this—that there was so much confusion over the handling of the records and what the records were with regard to the times of receipt, transmission, and so forth, that he thought it was advisable to have an investigation to reduce this down to as exact a statement as they could get and, therefore, was recommended to me and I agreed to the procedure to direct Colonel Clarke to carry it out. Now, he can tell you direct what the conversations were.

[3504] Senator Ferguson. General, what would cause confusion? Were not the Army records in shape so that they could be obtained and there would not have to be any confusion? Here we have an Army board set up of generals under a statute that went into this matter. Then we had Colonel Clausen making an investigation, and after we get through with those two investigation there is such confusion about the records that a new investigation is started.

How do you account for that?

Mr. Murphy. I wonder if the Senator will yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. Murphy. It was not a new investigation, it was a continuation, and the report discusses that. The Secretary of War states that he is continuing the investigation. It is right in the report itself.

Senator Ferguson. General, do you know why it took the authority of the investigation from the original Pearl Harbor board, Army board? Why they ceased their functions and created the Carter Clarke and Clausen investigation; why did they take it away from the Army board if the Congressman is correct?

General Marshall. It is my recollection—

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have him answer first.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

[3506] General Marshall. My recollection, Senator, is it is quite possible that the Secretary of War did not know of Colonel Clarke’s investigation. I think it is probable he did, but it is quite possible he did not. The action in the Clausen affair was the Secretary of War’s.

Mr. Murphy. Now will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. I want to get his answer as to Carter Clarke’s part of it.

The Chairman. Yes, General; answer.
General Marshall. I told you the best of my recollection regarding the Carter Clarke investigation. General Bissell, who was handling the thing, can give you a definite statement in regard to it, which is much better than mine.

Senator Ferguson. General, I understand your order, as the Chief of Staff, created the Carter Clarke part of the investigation.

General Marshall. Not the investigation, sir. I did not know that I was including that in the—

Senator Ferguson. I want to know why you went into that part of the investigation. The three members of the board were still living, and it was a statutory board. Why was not this delegated to them to complete their investigation? Why was a new man designated to make this investigation?

General Marshall. Well, I suggest you call General Bissell \[3507\] and find out his recommendation to me, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Was that recommendation put in writing?

General Marshall. I do not think it was. It may be in writing, but I think it was oral.

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us your memory? Did you discuss it with him?

General Marshall. I gave you the best of my memory, Senator, after being jogged by a telephone message to General Bissell 2 or 3 days ago. I have not had a chance to talk to him directly. He told me for certain reasons he thought it was desirable this should be done. He can testify directly what that was, or I can go back and talk to him again and come back and relay what he has reminded me of, whichever you prefer.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand, General, you did not read the Army board?

General Marshall. I did not read the Army board, and I did not read, as far as I know, the Pearl Harbor board.

Senator Ferguson. You did not read the Army board. You, by your order, created a continuation, as I understand it, of this investigation by Carter Clarke.

General Marshall. I did not understand that I was creating a continuation of this investigation. I understood \[3508\] from General Bissell's recommendation that the confusion of incidents up there was such that it was better to have somebody on the magic side go into it. Now that may be held to be a part of the investigation, I don't know.

Mr. Murphy. Now will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. What did he explain as to the confusion in the magic part?

General Marshall. I remember no more than I am telling you now, but General Bissell can testify to that directly.

Senator Ferguson. Was there any question raised at that time, General, about messages not being in the files?

General Marshall. The only question I heard—and that did not come through General Bissell, and I do not know whether I heard it officially—oh. I think that Admiral Hewitt, the Navy sent Admiral Hewitt into the Pacific to look into questions of this kind, or Admiral Hewitt told me he had gotten a rumor from somewhere that I had
issued an order destroying the records, what was called the winds message. Then there was an investigation on that. I have not read the report of the investigation, and I believe it was found there was no basis for the statement.

But that, I believe, was a written investigation.

Senator Ferguson. And there is no basis for that statement?

[3509] General Marshall. Are you making the statement or are you asking me?

Senator Ferguson. I say there is no basis for that statement?

General Marshall. That is a question?

Senator Ferguson. There is no basis for any such statement?

General Marshall. So far as I am concerned, there is not.

Mr. Murphy. Now will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. So the record will be clear on that, did you know—

Senator Lucas (interposing). I submit it is not a question, it is but a declaratory sentence.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

The Chairman. The committee will be in order.

Senator Ferguson. I take it the General did not answer quite that he made any such order.

General Marshall. I had no knowledge of it whatsoever.

Senator Ferguson. But the Board also found that there was not anything in that rumor; isn't that correct?

General Marshall. I do not know whether it was the Board or the investigator that went into this particular thing.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield so I can throw a little light on this?

[3510] Senator Ferguson. I will let you lighten it up a little later.

General, on this question now of Carter Clarke's investigation, was that in any way to correct the findings of the original investigation by the Board?

General Marshall. I would not say that it was. I think it was to try to determine what the actual details of the handling of the messages were.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did not the Board go into that question of the actual details of the handling of the messages?

General Marshall. I assume that they did.

Senator Ferguson. Why should there be any question about the handling of the messages? Does not the War Department and the other departments of the Government—in the War Department do they, as a rule, function through written orders?

General Marshall. They function according to prescribed methods.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; prescribed methods. One of the prescribed methods is the keeping of proper records?


Senator Ferguson. Isn't that correct?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Why should there be any confusion over [3511] the keeping of these records that the Army board were trying to, or were getting on this question?

79716—10—pt. 3—24
General Marshall. Senator, I have given you the best answer I can, and I think General Bissell can give you the correct statement on that.

Senator Ferguson. He would probably be able to clear up the situation.

Senator Lucas. I think the General ought to be asked that question one more time.

Senator Ferguson. How is that?

Senator Lucas. I think the General ought to be asked that question one more time.

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.

Mr. Chairman——

The Chairman. The committee will proceed. Senator Ferguson will proceed with his inquiry.

Senator Ferguson. General, is there anything, any question that I have asked that you want to add anything, to any answer or subtract anything from any answer? In other words, is there any change that you want to make?

General Marshall. Not that I recall. I have some notes in my pocket. Allow me to look at them [perusing notes]. There is one, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right, will you give it to us, [3512] General?

General Marshall. You asked me yesterday regarding a statement of the Secretary of War in his diary communicating with the President when he received information regarding five divisions moving down the coast in the China Sea.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is the G-2 message that we were talking about.

General Marshall. I think that was based probably, most probably, on a statement which appears in paragraph 14 of the estimate of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 dated November 27 which résumés the information we had, and that that particular information was probably available on the 25th, and it was to that that the Secretary referred.

Senator Ferguson. May I just see that?

General Marshall. Paragraph 14 of the estimate of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 on November 27.

Senator Ferguson. Paragraph 14?


Senator Ferguson. Would you just read that into the record so we will have the record clear on that? Would there also be a message upon which this is based?

General Marshall. I have not located the message, but this is the statement from G-2. It is item 26, and is headed "Recent developments in the Far East." So it covers a period [3513] of time; it is a résumé of developments; and it states in paragraph 14:

From the foregoing it appears evident that the Japanese had completed plans for further aggressive moves in southeastern Asia. These plans will probably be put into effect soon after the armed services feel that the Kurusu mission is a definite failure. A task force of about five divisions, supported by appropriate air and naval units, has been assembled for the execution of these plans. This force is now enroute southward to an as yet undetermined rendezvous.

[3514] I think that was the basis of the Secretary of War's statement in his diary of his communication with the President.
Senator Ferguson. General, that indicates that there is a G-2 message which conveys the specific language, or similar language to what the Secretary of War used, is it not, such as the naming of towns and numbers and so forth? The Secretary of War could not take this estimate and read paragraph 14 and get into his diary the information that we read yesterday, could he?

General Marshall. I was assuming there was some message of some sort that recited the information which was included in this message. The message, whatever it was, we have not located.

Senator Ferguson. It is the message I have had in mind.


Senator Ferguson. Is there anything else you wanted to clear up?

General Marshall. I have a note here referring to page 3109 of my testimony, line 8 and 9. Beginning at line 7 on page 3109 it reads:

The messages which you have just read I had no recollection of whatever at the time.

[3515] Now, the messages we are talking about there, or I am speaking about there are the various ones that refered to Hawaii, to the Harbor of Pearl Harbor, the magic messages that came in prior to December 7, 1941. I ended with this statement:

In fact, I first read them in the two days when I was getting ready for this hearing here.

It should read, "In fact, as far as I recall, I first read them."

Senator Ferguson. General, did you get Admiralty reports also?

We have not had clearances on the Admiralty report.

Mr. Mitchell. They were cleared yesterday afternoon with the exception of four, which they wanted to paraphrase so it would not break the British code. And they should be in the room here this morning. We did not get them last night. We just have the ones that were cleared.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask the General: Did you get any information, if we were getting information, from the Admiralty?

General Marshall. My recollection is that we were getting occasional information from the Admiralty, but Admiral Stark can tell you about that specifically.

[3516] Senator Ferguson. And would those messages come directly across your desk as magic?

General Marshall. The Admiralty messages would not come across my desk as magic.

Senator Ferguson. They would not?


Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not General Miles delivered the messages to you?

General Marshall. The Admiralty messages?

Senator Ferguson. The Admiralty messages, whether you had seen them?

General Marshall. I should imagine that those might have come to me through General Miles or might have been delivered personally to me by Admiral Stark. I don’t know.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any Admiralty messages?


Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any of them in the period from the 25th of November, let us say?

Senator Ferguson. Until the 7th?

General Marshall. I have no specific recollection of any Admiralty messages.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you, General, when this [3517] message—there are two of them, one a correction, and will you hand it to him, please—first came to your attention? This is the Winant message, British Admiralty report.

General Marshall. I do not know, Senator. I assume that afternoon. I recall the message and I assume that I saw it before December 7th. I have no other recollection on the matter. There may be some record there in the War Department that would show that. I do not know about that.

Senator Ferguson. What did that convey to you? It reads:

British Admiralty reports that at 3 a.m. London time this morning, two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 carriers, 10 destroyers.

What did that convey to you? What did it mean to you? How did you evaluate it?

General Marshall. The message conveys a very serious item of information of a very definite move by the Japanese presumably toward the Kra Peninsula, and possibly land on the west coast of Thailand. I would say it was a confirmation of our fears regarding their intentions in Malaysia.

Senator Ferguson. In your opinion did that mean war?

[3518] General Marshall. I am trying now to go back to what I thought at that particular time.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. I would have said that in my opinion that did mean war, certainly in that locality and presumably it would spread from there.

Senator Ferguson. And that would be a crossing of the line and therefore would involve us, so it would mean war as far as the United States was concerned?


Senator Ferguson. What would you say?

General Marshall. I felt myself that if the Japanese became engaged in hostilities directed toward the Malay Peninsula that our situation demanded that we take action to defend our position. That, however, was my opinion, and that would have to be determined by governmental action.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ask or seek any advice on what the governmental action would be when you received this Admiralty message on the 6th?

General Marshall. I have no such recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether any action was taken by our Government on the 6th, when the Winant message came in?

[3519] General Marshall. I have no such recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Would that mean there would be any further alert in your department; this message?

General Marshall. No, sir; this is a confirmation of what we had been following through the various moves.
Senator Ferguson. A confirmation of the previous alerts. Do you know whether G-2 had the message of the 6th?

General Marshall. I do not know, sir.

[3520] Senator Ferguson. Would you get it from G-2 or would you get it directly from the State Department?

General Marshall. I think at that time I would have gotten it through G-2. I am getting now similar messages through the Operations Division. I do not know how it was at that time, but I think it was probably G-2.

Senator Ferguson. Will the reporter read that last answer?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Senator Ferguson. You were not getting them directly from the State Department at that time?

General Marshall. Not to my recollection. We had a liaison with the State Department through G-2.

Senator Ferguson. I want to look at this record of the Roberts report, to get the memorandum. Would you just take this and read pages 1793 and 1794 into the record?

Mr. Mitchell. Do you want him to read the two pages?

Senator Ferguson. Or look at them. I want to find out whether or not the Roberts report, or any part of it, was submitted to him, that is, the Roberts transcript was submitted to him and whether or not he suggested any changes, whether it was submitted to him to correct in terms as he understood it.

General Marshall. You wish me to read these two pages?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; to ascertain that information.

[3521] General Marshall. You wish me to read them or just look at them?

Senator Ferguson. It will not take but a minute to read them.

General Marshall (reading):

Colonel Brown. General Marshall is here.

The Chairman. Have the General come in.

Will you be sworn, sir?

Testimony of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C.

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The Chairman. General Marshall, we are particularly interested in ascertaining the exact facts with respect to the message you forwarded to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the morning of December 7, 1941. You stated those informally to us when you were with us before, but we took down nothing about it at that time.

General Marshall. Yes, sir. Mr. Justice, Colonel Howe handed me the other day a draft of a statement:

The Chairman. Of a finding, yes.

General Marshall. Of a finding regarding that particular matter, and asked me, as I understood it, to correct that in terms as I understood them.

[3522] The Chairman. That is right.

General Marshall. And I have done that.

The Chairman. Yes, sir.

General Marshall. Unfortunately, I have not been able to go over it personally with Admiral Stark, who was concerned with me in the matter; and we are in agreement, I understand, in our main exchanges of information, and he questioned my wording. I believe, but as he is going to appear here a little later he can take that up. So if it is agreeable to you I will read a re-draft of your finding, in the terms as I understand them, as to fact.

The Chairman. That will be splendid.

General Marshall (reading):
"At about 11:25 a.m., eastern standard time, Sunday, December 7, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations learned"—
Now, put this in parentheses, if you will, please, because I want to refer to it later.  
(Certain matter read by General Marshall is omitted from the transcript at the direction of the chairman.)

General MARSHALL (continuing reading):
"That what amounted to an ultimatum would be delivered to the United States Government by the Japanese Ambassador at 1 p.m. in Washington that day and that diplomatic relations between the two nations would probably be severed.

"The Chief of Staff communicated with the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone at once, expressed his apprehension of possible attack without warning in any area, and recommended sending an immediate additional warning message to the Commander of the Hawaiian Department (and to the Commanding Generals of the Forces in the Philippines, Panama, and on the Pacific coast). He personally drafted such a message, and at 11:45 a.m., eastern standard time, the Chief of Naval Operations requested that the various Army commanders to receive this message be instructed to communicate its contents to their naval opposites. The Chief of Staff added a sentence to that effect." Because the message had already been finished.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL (continuing reading):
"This message, in the longhand of the Chief of Staff, was personally delivered at 11:50 a.m. by a general staff officer, Colonel Bratton, to the Communications Officer stationed in the War Department."

Senator FERGUSON. That covers what I had in mind.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the finding that had been submitted to you?

General MARSHALL. My understanding of the matter, in reading this, was that they had endeavored to write from memory what I had stated before then on the previous meeting, because it involved this question of magic, so they had written it out and they wanted to know whether it was correct as written.

Senator FERGUSON. You corrected that statement?

General MARSHALL. I corrected it to read the way it reads here. That is my recollection of it.

Senator FERGUSON. That statement apparently was in writing and you corrected it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. General, now in relation to the delivery of these messages—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, it is now 12. We might suspend here to 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed to 2 p.m., of the same day.)
but in all likelihood not today. The Chair might express the hope that we may conclude with the General by the time he has to fill that engagement. Senator, will you proceed?

Senator Ferguson. I will try and do all I can to accommodate the Chairman.

The Chairman. Not the Chair.

Senator Ferguson. I mean your hopes that he will be concluded as far as I am concerned. Will you let the General see these paraphrases of messages, please?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

[3526] Senator Ferguson. Would you read them into the record, General, and then I will ask you about them?

General Marshall. The first message (reading):

Top secret dispatch from the Admiralty, dated 7 December 1941.

OPNAV (Personal for C.N.O. from First Sea Lord)

Refer your dispatch of 1710 Oct seven December X Negative, however it is expected momentarily X. If you are satisfied about it in any event Admiral Phillips has my complete confidence in any agreements he has made X. We can count on our representatives on the spot forcefully to acquit themselves, of this I am confident.

Senator Ferguson. General, I will ask you a few questions on that one. That is a paraphrase from the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty to C. N. O. here in Washington?


Senator Ferguson. Had you ever seen that before, or did you know anything about it?

General Marshall. I do not recall this message at all, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, the next one.

General Marshall. This is from the Commander in Chief China [reading]:

Top Secret Dispatch 7 December 1941.

[3527] To CINCCAF, ACNS, CZM, NZNB, ADMIRALTY, CINCEI.

Information Bad Washington

Following reported 6 December at 0316 GCT 10 DD and 6 Cruisers escorting convoy of 25 ships in Lat. —

meaning latitude —

0600N Long. —

meaning longitude I presume —

106-08 East X At 0539 GCT another convoy of ten ships with 10 DD and 2 cruisers as escort in Lat 07-00 North Long 106-20 East X. Course of both foregoing convoys 270 True X at 0442 GCT small force consisting of three vessels in Lat 07-51 North Long 105-00 East steering 310 true X. Possible indications are that destination of all forces is Kothron X. Foregoing all result of aircraft reconnaissance.

Senator Ferguson. General, that is a paraphrase of an Admiralty message to the Navy here. Had you ever seen or heard of that message?

General Marshall. I do not think I have, sir. It says "From the Commander in Chief China."

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any information on that, about that force moving prior to the attack on the 7th?
General Marshall. I do not know whether I knew from this or knew from that message from our embassy in London whether or not I knew this. I do not know where these references are, Senator, whether they are in the Gulf of Siam [3528] or not.

Senator Ferguson. Now, here is another message. It is from SPENAVO London to OPNAV. Counsel, will you let the General see that message? Would you read that? It is a very short one.

General Marshall. This is from SPENAVO London, 7th of December 1941, paraphrased by Shall. "Addressees OPNAV. Priority. 210"—

Senator Ferguson. If it is some code word or something don't read it.

General Marshall (reading):

Have been informed by Admiralty that an attempted landing is being made at Kotabharu by a force of 3 to 5 ships.

Senator Ferguson. I understand that place is on the Kra Peninsula. Had you heard of that prior to the attack, that there was a landing by the Japs on the actual peninsula?

General Marshall. I don’t recall having heard of that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You have no recollection of that whatever?


Senator Ferguson. Or of that message?


Senator Ferguson. General, has there been any action whatever or any disciplinary action against any officer for delay in the delivery of any messages to you or to any of your departments?

General Marshall. Not to my recollection and not to any of my departments to my recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that there was a message to, I think it is Commander Rochefort in Hawaii? It is on page 20, exhibit 32. Would you let the General see that message from General Miles?

General Marshall. Do you wish me to read this?

Senator Ferguson. It is to contact Rochefort. It is from the G-2 to G-2.

General Marshall. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

December 5, 1941.

Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters,

G-2 Hawaiian Department,

Honolulu Territory Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather

Miles.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that that message was sent? Did you ever know of that?


Senator Ferguson. Now, General, did you know at any time that there was talk or conversation between your officers down in G-2 of sending messages to Hawaii because there were certain restrictions at the top?

General Marshall. I don’t know to what you are referring, sir. I have no recollection of such a matter.

Senator Ferguson. I will show you page 283-D, Top Secret, Friday, October the 6th, 1944, on page 283, and ask you——

Mr. Mitchell. Would you identify it as a transcript of what?
Senator Ferguson. Transcript of the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and that answer may refresh your memory. Would you just hand him my copy? Beginning with General Russell's question and reading over to "OPD."

General Marshall. (reading):

General Russell. Colonel, I want to ask you why it came to pass that this message was sent from G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, and not from some agency of the War Department to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

Colonel Bratton. Upon receipt of the translated [3531] intercept which I have read, S. I. S. No. 25640, I took copies of this intercept to General Miles and to General Gerow and discussed it at some length with both of them. I had a feeling that further warnings or alerts should be sent out to our overseas commands. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had been sent out. General Miles felt that he couldn't go over General Gerow's decision to send no additional warning, because of a policy which was then in effect that War Department G-2 would send out no intelligence to the G-2s of tactical commands or overseas departments which might produce an operational reaction, without the complete concurrence of the War Plans Division.

I still felt uneasy about this thing and went over to the Navy where I had a conference with Commander McCullom, the head of the Far Eastern Section in O. N. I. He felt as I did, that further warnings should be sent out, and said that he was going to write one up and try to get the Chief of Naval Operations to dispatch it.

I discovered from Commander McCullom that their S. I. S. man in Honolulu, a Commander Rochefort, knew everything that we did about this, had all the information that we had, and was listening for this Japanese [3532] wind-weather broadcast. He suggested that as a way out of our difficulty I instruct our G-2 in Hawaii to go to Rochefort at once and have a talk with him, as in a short period of time Rochefort could tell Colonel Fielder, our G-2, exactly what was going on and what we knew.

I managed to get General Miles to O. K. this message to G-2 in Hawaii because he and I both thought that we could get that message out without violating any of the policies that were then in effect about getting concurrences from OPD.

Senator Ferguson. That is all I want you to read.

Now, General, did you know there was any feeling in your department there that they could not come to you to get something through that they felt should go through to Hawaii to Short so that he would get knowledge?

General Marshall. I was unaware of it up to this moment if that means what it reads.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how do you take what he said there?


Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. That they must not send anything that would produce an operational reaction.

[3533] Senator Ferguson. Therefore, to get certain knowledge out there they were going around and sending the Rochefort message which you just read, isn't that true?

General Marshall. I said that would produce an operational reaction. There was a command direction for definite operational reactions. Now, my understanding of that that I have just read there is they can send out information but if it is of a nature that is going to produce an operational reaction then there must be a concurrence with OPD.

Senator Ferguson. Why would they be discussing it with the Navy and saying, as they said here, that they wanted to get certain information out there? Why couldn't they come to you and send it out?
General Marshall. They could come to me.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why they do it in this roundabout way?

General Marshall. I don't know that. Colonel Bratton will have to explain further, General Miles and General Gerow.

The Chairman. Senator, would you mind asking the General to explain what he means by "operational reaction"?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Would you explain "operational reaction"?

General Marshall. I mean by an operational reaction [3534] that there have been command directions given which require certain dispositions and action taken by the components of the command for defense or for attack or for both.

Now, we had always to be careful, of course, that there was not a confusion of direction, so there must be a clear distinction between military intelligence as such, called general information, and command directions as such.

[3535] Senator Ferguson. Would you say that that information in that statement of Bratton indicated that the winds message, activating message was in and they wanted him to get the facts from Rochefort? That is on the second page, page 284.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. That is volume D.

General Marshall. I do not know whether this refers to it. The way I read the message here I don't know whether that means with reference to not only the weather but the preparations for monitoring, "for the possible receipt of such message from Tokyo," or whether he is talking about a message he thinks has already been received from Tokyo.

Senator Ferguson. What about his language on page 284? Does that help you to clear it up?

General Marshall (reading):

I discovered from Commander McCullom that their SIS man in Honolulu, a Commander Rochefort, knew everything that we did about this, had all the information that we had, and was listening for this Japanese winds-weather broadcast. He suggested that as a way out of our difficulty I instruct our G-2 in Hawaii to go to Rochefort at once and have a talk with him, as in a short period of time Rochefort could tell Colonel Fielder, our G-2, exactly what was going on and what we knew.

I still don't know whether he is talking about the [3536] arrangement for monitoring, for the receipt of that message, or whether he is referring to a supposed receipt of a message from Japan implementing a portion or all of the winds code.

Senator Ferguson. General, when you left for the maneuvers, did you leave a rough draft of a statement with General Gerow to tell certain things to General Short, or send in certain information, if negotiations broke down while you were away?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of that now. If there is anything on that in the record it may stimulate my memory, but I do not recall such a memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. General, this morning, as I understand, you were telling us about General Handy. What report was General Handy talking about when he came to you with the Army Board report?
General Marshall. He was talking about the full report of the Army Board headed by General Grunert.

Senator Ferguson. Both the published part and the top secret part of that report?

General Marshall. Nothing was published at that time, sir. It is the day of its receipt by the War Department from the Board.

Senator Ferguson. Did it include both the part as later published and the top secret part?


Senator Ferguson. Now at that time is it true that he asked you not to read that report?

General Marshall. I asked him, "Have you a copy of that that I can read?" I think he said that was the only copy he had, but he advised me not to read it because I was implicated in the statements of the board for various derelictions and therefore, as that would be a concern of mine and I was Chief of Staff, he thought the whole matter should be handled entirely on the Secretary of War side of the Department, the civil side, and therefore I did not take that, I did not read it.

Senator Ferguson. At that particular time was anything said about having someone continue the investigation?

General Marshall. No, sir; nothing at all of that sort.

Senator Ferguson. Nothing was said?

General Marshall. No, sir. I would have no part in that anyway.

Senator Ferguson. That would be prior to the time that Clausen was appointed, would it not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. Major Clausen I assume, I suppose he was assigned by the Secretary of War. At the moment General Handy was talking to me the Secretary never saw [3538] the report of the board, I do not think.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to offer in evidence the top secret Pearl Harbor report, the board of the Army Pearl Harbor investigation top secret report, and top secret memorandum, which would include—

The Chairman. Do you want that offered as an exhibit?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I want to be sure that all of it is going in, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I am offering the whole thing.

The Chairman. What exhibit would that be?

Mr. Mitchell. 63.

The Chairman. That will be filed with the committee as Exhibit 63. (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 63.")

Mr. Mitchell. I would like to look it over and see what it is first, so as to be sure that we know. It starts out "Memo to the Secretary of War."

Senator Ferguson. I think it is described on the flyleaf there, on the first leaf, as to what it is.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you want the whole document in, the whole book?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I want the whole book in.

[3539] Mr. Murphy. Is this the Clarke report?
Senator Ferguson. No, no. This is the Army board report. We already have the part that was published. Now this is the part that was not published, on the top secret part of it.

The Vice Chairman. Is this the Grunert board, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, this is the Grunert board. This is the Army board, under a mandate from Congress.

Mr. Murphy. May I make one inquiry, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. As to whether or not the part that the Senator has offered goes into the naming of the different codes, and the method of breaking the codes.

Senator Ferguson. No, it has nothing to do with the Clarke report.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

The Chairman. In other words, is this the unexpurgated report of the Grunert board to the Secretary of War?

Senator Ferguson. It is.

The Chairman. Part of which was published later and part of which was not published. Is that what it is?

Senator Ferguson. I do not think any part of this was published; at least not to my knowledge.

The Chairman. The Chair understands that the Grunert board, or the War Department Board of Inquiry, made a complete [3940] report to the Secretary of War.

Senator Ferguson. That is true.

The Chairman. And that later certain parts of that report were published. So if this is a complete report of the board to the Secretary of War, would it not include that part which was published as well as that part which was not published?

Senator Ferguson. This is just the part, if the Chairman please, that was not published. As I understand it from the testimony now, General Handy—was it Colonel or General Handy?


Senator Ferguson. General Handy brought to the General the Army report that included this part.

The Chairman. Let the Senator proceed while counsel examines it.

The Vice Chairman. I was going to suggest, Mr. Chairman, to save time, that the Senator go ahead and let us hold this in abeyance until the counsel familiarizes himself with it. We can act on it later as to whether or not it be accepted as an exhibit or not.

[3541] Senator Ferguson. That is all at the present time, outside of this report. I would like to have at least part of the report read, so that if the General does come back he may want to make certain replies to certain parts of that report, in order that he may know what is in this report.

The Chairman. You mean read into the testimony?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

The Chairman. How much?

Senator Ferguson. Eighteen pages.

The Chairman. You want that read into the testimony now?

Senator Ferguson. I do not ask that it be read now. After the General has left at 3 o'clock, we could read it, and then he could see that.

The Chairman. Suppose we go ahead with the witness while counsel examines this? You are through, are you, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. I am through.

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I suggest then that Congressman Keefe proceed with his inquiries, and the counsel examine this, and then let him submit it to General Marshall so he may be familiar with it in case he returns.

[3543] The Chairman. That is the idea I had, that counsel be permitted to examine it while we go ahead with the examination of the witness.

Senator Ferguson. I ask that there be read into the record 10 pages.

The Chairman. You do not ask that it be done now; do you?

Senator Ferguson. Not at this particular moment, but when the General leaves, and then we will give him a copy of it so he can have it overnight.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, before the examination proceeds, I would like to make a request, that in view of the report being offered, I would also like to offer the Clausen report which is an essential part of the record in order to understand the parts of the exhibit which were offered. I offer that in evidence.

The Chairman. Let it be offered and held and be examined by counsel before either one of them is made an exhibit.

Go ahead, Congressman Keefe, if you are ready.

Mr. Keefe. General Marshall, I have listened with a great deal of interest to the presentation of testimony, especially that which you have given, and I have been impressed with the fact that when this committee was set up the Chairman of the committee, on the floor of the United States Senate, stated that it would be the purpose of the committee to ascertain the cold, unvarnished, indisputable facts, for the purpose of fixing responsibility, among other things.

So, as I have attempted to listen to this mass of documentary detail and testimony that has come before the committee, I have been attempting to piece together the fragmentary pieces of testimony and documentary proof, in an attempt to clarify in my mind, as a member of this committee, the issues that would enable me to carry out the responsibility under which this committee was enjoined when it was set up.

Now, with that in mind, I wonder if it would be fair and a reasonable conclusion for me to state, in the first instances, that for many, many years the defenses of Hawaii and the Pacific area, or rather the defenses of the Pacific area and our west coast were tied into the defense of Hawaii, Oahu specifically? Is that a fair statement?

General Marshall. I think it is, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And that down through the years this Government has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to make of Oahu what some people have heretofore and before December 7, 1941, regarded as an impregnable fortress, to be used as the keystone [3544] to the defenses of the United States and the Pacific area? Is that a fair statement?

General Marshall. I think it is, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I gather from the testimony that has been given here that the defenses of our west coast, Panama, Alaska, and other parts of the Pacific were so tied to Hawaii in the various plans adopted over
the years, and the defenses installed, as a specific defense against Japan. Is that correct?

General Marshall. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And that all of the war plans and all of the Navy plans that have been drawn down through the years had in mind the use of that bastion of defense against any possibility that might arise in the future, involving war with Japan, fundamentally. Is that a fair conclusion for me to draw?

General Marshall. I think it is.

Mr. Keefe. And so down through the years, as we have been shown here, plans were constantly being prepared, revised, and rewritten, involving the possibility at some future time of a conflict with Japan. Is that a true statement?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; at some future time of a possible conflict with Japan.

[3545] Mr. Keefe. I say "a possible" conflict. Any first rate nation maintaining an army and navy draws such plans long in advance of preparation of possible conflict with other possible nations; is that true?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And is one of the businesses of the War Plans Division and War College, is it not?

General Marshall. Of the War Plans Division, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Of the War Plans Division of the General Staff?

General Marshall. Of the General Staff.

Mr. Keefe. So, if I am to gather anything from this mass of detail that has been presented to this committee up to date, it is that we were alerted years ago to the possibility of war with Japan, and made preparations in the Pacific with that thought in mind, and the plans were drawn with that thought in mind. Is that a correct statement?

General Marshall. I think it is, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And those plans were integrated with the plans as far out as the Philippines and intervening territory, and all over the Asiatic area, so that those plans integrated action all through that area, but tied to the keystone at Oahu; is that right?

[3546] General Marshall. The integration in the Far East, which would imply Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, first made its appearance in an attempt to plan for that in ABC-1, and other conferences at Singapore. Prior to that there had been no discussions with other nations about that.

Mr. Keefe. I am talking about our own plan.

General Marshall. Then your statement is correct.

Mr. Keefe. My statement is correct that the country has been alerted to our own plan?


Mr. Keefe. And the defense of the Philippines, and the money we spent in developing Corregidor, and so on, in the Philippines were all tied in with this general plan which used Oahu and the Hawaiian Islands as the keystone?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. For either attack or defense?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. We had an attack plan, did we not?
Mr. Keefe. As well as the defense plan?
Mr. Keefe. What was the attack plan called?
General Marshall. Well, it was one of the yellow plans. and I have forgotten what the last designation was. We got into the Rainbow estimates.
Mr. Keefe. We finally had orange, yellow, and what have you?
General Marshall. I think orange was correct.
Mr. Keefe. We finally got them put together in a Rainbow plan?
General Marshall. That is right.
Mr. Keefe. That is right, is it?
Mr. Keefe. Now, those plans had been in effect for years?
Mr. Keefe. And to implement those plans, the Army and Navy conducted maneuvers in that area, did they not?
Mr. Keefe. And with the development of aeronautics and the development of the airplane as a possible means of attack, the plans constantly changed to include defenses against air attack?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And against submarine attack?
Mr. Keefe. And against possible landing attack?
Mr. Keefe. And so these maneuvers were carried on from time to time up there by the Army and Navy for the purpose of implementing those plans, to see how they worked; isn't that true?
Mr. Keefe. And there was a grand maneuver there in 1932. Do you recall that?
General Marshall. Not specifically. There were a number of maneuvers out there that were part Army and Navy maneuvers, and there may have been some where there was a landing from the west coast.
Mr. Keefe. Before these maneuvers were carried out, they had to be planned out in Washington?
Mr. Keefe. And every detail is worked out in conjunction with the Army and Navy jointly, where it is a joint maneuver; is that true?
General Marshall. Yes. Probably most of the details are worked out there, but with us it is a mere detail.
Mr. Keefe. I had brought in here several days ago, General Marshall, the plans for the 1932 maneuvers, and of course, not being an experienced technician or military man, I was rather amazed at the voluminous details. the stack of papers and documents involving the preparations for that 1932 maneuver, about a foot high, stuff worked out here in Washington.
Now, the purpose of those maneuvers was to see if all these plans that had been worked out were workable, is that true?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
[3549] Mr. Keefe. And in 1932 there was specific emphasis laid upon the possibility of an air attack on Oahu, and judges were
appointed, umpires I believe they called them, and the umpires witnessed the attack and the defense and then made a report, and that report is here.

I don't know whether it is in evidence or not. Is it, counsel?

Mr. Mitchell. We haven't offered it.

Mr. Keeffe. A very voluminous pile of documents. Although I only had the opportunity to look casually through it, it indicated to me that the umpires at that time came to the conclusion that the attacking air forces had succeeded in wiping out Pearl Harbor and the defenders.

A plan was worked out very meticulously for the attack, very similar to the attack that took place on December 7.

Did you ever look over that plan, General?

General Marshall. I do not recall that I did, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, in any event, maneuvers continued from time to time, and the relations with Japan began to get pretty tough about 1937.

You recall the incident of the sinking of the Panay on December 1, 1937, do you not?


Mr. Keeffe. There were a lot of diplomatic representations [3551] and a lot of stuff in the press and a lot of talk, you remember, at that time?


Mr. Keeffe. And diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States became strained—I am speaking from my own recollection of the situation at that time, trying to establish some guide post so as to be able to interpret this mass of detail and testimony that has come in.

Would you say that while they may have been strained more or less part of that time, at least from 1937 on the relationship between this country and Japan gradually disintegrated, there was a continuous gradual deterioration?

General Marshall. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Until it finally culminated in the break on December 7, 1941; isn't that correct?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And as Chief of Staff you could see that gradual deterioration and were making efforts to improve the situation of our defenses and our ability to take offensive measures in the Pacific, were you not?


Mr. Keeffe. Now, this whole picture, General Marshall, had to be tied in to the European situation, to a certain extent, in order to understand it thoroughly, did it not?


Mr. Keeffe. You couldn't completely disassociate the European situation from the Pacific situation during the period of just prior to 1940, we will say?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, if I understand this, and I am asking these leading questions from you, General Marshall, to expedite this examination, which is perfectly proper, I understand, under standard rules
of procedure on cross-examination, and if at any time you feel a statement I made is correct will you so state——

The CHAIRMAN. If the Congressman will permit this suggestion, we have not looked upon the inquiry made by individual members as cross-examination but as examination on the same level as examination of counsel.

Mr. Keeffe. Be that as it may, I don't think we are proceeding strictly according to technical legal procedure——

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. Keeffe. But I normally would not ask leading questions of a witness. I am asking them on these matters merely to expedite because I want to get this background tied together in my own mind. I don't see how the public nor the country nor anybody else can get a true picture of this unless we tie certain facts together in some chronology. I confess to some confusion of thought in the matter up to date because of the isolation of various facts and I want to get a few facts pinned down.

Now, we have come to the conclusion that the relationship diplomatically between this country and Japan were in a steady progress of deterioration; is that not correct?


Mr. Keeffe. And steps were being taken by you, as Chief of Staff, to get this country ready for what might come?


Mr. Keeffe. As is the duty of any Chief of the Army?


Mr. Keeffe. It might not come, but if it did come you wanted to be ready; is that right?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. Then you are confronted with the situation necessitating sending enormous supplies to aid our Allies over in the European war; is that correct?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And you found yourself with a rapidly deteriorating set of circumstances in the Pacific, being unable to send there the things which you yourself knew were necessary, especially in the Philippines.

General Marshall. To a certain extent, yes, sir.

[3554] Mr. Keeffe. I thought I understood you to say "Poor MacArthur was out there with practically nothing," using that exact language.

General Marshall. That is correct. I said that.

Mr. Keeffe. And you were trying to get some stuff out to him?


Mr. Keeffe. Some planes, trying to reinforce his manpower and trying to get matériel?


Mr. Keeffe. I think you said he didn't have any anti-aircraft guns.


Mr. Keeffe. And those he did have were antiquated?


Mr. Keeffe. As a matter of fact, for a period of years it had been the practice, had it not, to keep most of the first-class fine material at
the forts here in the United States where the people who paid for it and the Congress who had appropriated the money could see it, and as it got obsolescent it went to Hawaii and when it was pretty well obsolescent it was shipped to the Philippines?

General Marshall. I don't believe that is quite correct. There wasn't a great deal of very fine material. There was [3555] not a material amount of fine material even to transfer from time to time.

Mr. Keeffe. Most of it was kept here, wasn't it, in the United States?

General Marshall. Well, I don't think our coast defenses had such extensive procedures. I found a great part of them even lacking adequate fire-control systems. I mean, I don't quite recall the proposition of moving them to our coast defenses and then transferring them to the Pacific. I think that what they had in Manila had been there a long time and had not been renewed for more modern matériel.

But what they had in Hawaii I think had been direct shipments and not picked up here from one place and shipped out there until we actually began to go through the procedure that I referred to here before the board in getting aircraft and other things away from units in the States.

I think your statement is generally correct but I didn't want to become involved in saying that.

Mr. Keeffe. All right.

Now, when we get down to 1940, that was a Presidential election year, wasn't it?


Mr. Keeffe. There was a lot of talking going on in this country? [3556] General Marshall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Here you were faced with the knowledge that the diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were getting quite tense; that is right, isn't it?


Mr. Keeffe. In 1940, not 1941, but 1940, and public opinion was at a rather high pitch in this country at that time, as you know, was it not?


Mr. Keeffe. The question of possible involvement in war was being discussed all over the country, was it not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; discussing the Selective Service Act; calling the National Guard into active service.

Mr. Keeffe. Selective Service didn't come until the fall.

General Marshall. I think it became effective in September.

Mr. Keeffe. September 1940.


Mr. Keeffe. My record of it shows that it was approved on September 16, 1940, and October 16 was set aside as registration day, 1940. Do you recall that?


Mr. Keeffe. And candidates for public office were making speeches over the radio, candidates for Congress and other [3557] positions, and there was continuous talk, and talk was going on in both the House and in the Senate; do you remember that?

Mr. Keeffe. All during that period starting along in May of 1940 and continuing right up until the election. And you couldn't help but have knowledge of that situation as Chief of Staff, could you?

General Marshall. I had knowledge of it.

Mr. Keeffe. You were concerned about it, too, were you not?


Mr. Keeffe. Because you at that time were intercepting the Japanese messages?


Mr. Keeffe. You had the magic all during 1940, didn't you?


Mr. Keeffe. And you knew what their intentions were over in the Pacific, at least you read the cards that were dealt?


Mr. Keeffe. To their Ambassadors and consuls.


Mr. Keeffe. And you became very much disturbed about the situation early in 1940, did you not?

General Marshall. Early in 1940?

Mr. Keeffe. Strike that question.

When did you go out to the Hawaiian Islands in 1940?

General Marshall. I went out in the spring of 1940.

Mr. Keeffe. When in the spring?

General Marshall. I don't recall now; the record will show. I can determine that for you. You may have the date there.

Mr. Keeffe. No, I haven't. That is one of the things I wanted to get from you.

Did you go out there during the alert?

General Marshall. Which alert?

Mr. Keeffe. I may be able to dig it out.

General Marshall. Which alert?

Mr. Keeffe. The Herron alert of 1940.

General Marshall. No, sir; I know specifically that I went out before that alert. The alert was in the summer and I went there in the spring.

Mr. Keeffe. The Herron alert order went out to General MacArthur on the 17th of June 1940?


Mr. Keeffe. Now, you have been out there to Hawaii before that, had you not?


Mr. Keeffe. Can you fix the time when you went there any more definitely than to say it was in the spring sometime?


Mr. Keeffe. March?


Mr. Keeffe. What was the purpose of your going out there?

General Marshall. I went out for several reasons. One was, of course, to familiarize myself with the state of the garrison, the state of the equipment, and the plans for the defenses, and the relationship with the Navy.

Another was that there was going to be a maneuver between a naval force moving from the west coast to Hawaii against a small
naval force then in Hawaii, largely, I believe, submarines and destroyers. I was anxious that our heavy bombardment should participate in that naval operation.

Mr. Keefe. General Marshall, would you object if I interrupted to ask, to save time, was that the maneuver of 1940 that brought the fleet from its base at San Diego and [3560] San Pedro out to Hawaii?

General Marshall. I think it was.

Mr. Keefe. That was the time when Admiral Richardson took the fleet out to Hawaii?

General Marshall. I think that is what it was.

Mr. Keefe. So you went out there with the idea of synchronizing the work of the Army in connection with those maneuvers in the spring of 1940?

General Marshall. The agreement had already been reached between Admiral Stark and myself for the participation of the Army heavy bombers in a maneuver the Navy was holding in connection with the arrival of the fleet. There seemed to be some complication about the matter. So that was one of the things I had in mind, to make certain that the Army bombers did participate, and they did.

Mr. Keefe. Was that maneuver set up, the plans for it, sometime prior to March of 1940?

General Marshall. I couldn't answer that, Mr. Keefe. That was a naval arrangement, and we interjected the Army bombers into it, I think, after they had laid out the basic maneuvers.

Mr. Keefe. Did you have maneuvers every year out there?

General Marshall. They had them at various times. I [3561] don't know the exact routine. This was the first time I personally had a responsibility concerned with them.

Mr. Keefe. I think the evidence shows that the orders for this maneuver and the plan for it, so far as the Navy was concerned had been made a considerable period of time prior to the fleet leaving its base.

General Marshall. Probably so. I went out to make certain they participated.

Mr. Keefe. Did you go out there at the instruction of the State Department?


Mr. Keefe. Was it intended that those maneuvers in cooperation with the fleet were to be a show of strength to Japan?

General Marshall. If it was, I had no knowledge of it.

Mr. Keefe. It was just intended to be an ordinary carrying out of maneuvers to implement the plans that were constantly being drawn up for the defense of that area?

General Marshall. Presumably so. That would be a naval question. The fleet was going out. It made a normal situation for a maneuver.

Incidentally, I had been concerned prior to that, I think in January 1940, with the largest joint Army-Navy [3562] maneuver we had had.

Mr. Keefe. At the time the maneuvers were held in March, did you have any idea at that time that conditions were getting pretty critical between this country and Japan?
General Marshall. I knew they were not agreeable. I knew that we were having trouble about scrap iron. We were having trouble about oil in connection with the Japanese actions out in the Far East, and I regarded the whole situation as fraught with very dangerous possibilities.

Mr. Keefe. Well, there was a good deal of talk going on at that time here in America intended to get the Government to ban the shipment of gasoline and oil and scrap iron to Japan, and to stop sending them supplies, but there wasn't any formal export ban early in 1940, was there?

General Marshall. I don't recall that there was.

Mr. Keefe. My record shows that the ban on export of aviation fuel to Japan didn't come until August 1, 1941.

But at least there was a lot of talk about it, sir, you know that.


Mr. Keefe. That necessarily went back to Japan and created tension; is that right?


Mr. Keefe. Now, then, General Marshall, you became concerned enough about what you learned from G-2 and Jap intercepts, and so on, that you decided that the time had come to alert the Army forces in Hawaii on the 17th of June 1940?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you sent the message that has been heretofore referred to, signed "Adams," which I shall not burden the record with reading again.

Now, I have listened carefully to the questions that were asked you with reference to that alert and I fail to recall where you have testified as to the specific facts and the specific evidence that you had in your hands at that time which prompted you to issue that alert warning. Will you now state what evidence you had in your hands at that time to indicate the possibility of a trans-Pacific raid on the 17th of June 1940.

General Marshall. I think I testified before, and if I didn't I testify now, that the information on which that alert was based came largely through some magic messages. I have not those particular messages here. They were brought to my attention by Gen. George V. Strong, who was then at the head of the War Plans Division, with the [3564] recommendation that the garrison there be alerted against the possibility of such a raid.

Mr. Keefe. I understood you to give that testimony, General, heretofore, but that doesn't answer my question.

What was the information that came to you?

General Marshall. Mr. Keefe, I will have to attempt, through General Strong, to get those messages together. I don't know what they are right now.

Mr. Keefe. It must have been something of a critical character—


Mr. Keefe. You knew that any time you took action out at Hawaii, they had a mass of spies out there that were in constant contact with their homeland and that everything that was done was reported back to Japan practically the moment it happened?

Mr. Keefe. That is conclusively shown and demonstrated, is it not?

General Marshall. I think that is a fact.

Mr. Keefe. So that when you issued this alert, and put Oahu on a practical war footing on the 17th of June 1940, did you consider that to be in the nature of an overt act against Japan?


Mr. Keefe. Well, did you have anything that you took from Magic that would indicate that the Japs might have so considered it?

General Marshall. I have not the magic message here. I will have to check back and find what it might have been, talk to General Strong and get him to advise me as to the basis of his recommendation to me for that particular message.

Mr. Keefe. So we can be clear on this, I would like to have the specific information, not the general conclusion that you came to on the 17th of June; not your conclusion, but I would like to have the specific information that General Strong gave you prompted you to issue that alert order on June 17.


Mr. Keefe. As a result of that alert order given to the Army, General Herron in command, he went on an all-out alert, did he?


Mr. Keefe. That meant that a lot of things happened immediately; ammunition was issued for all the guns?


Mr. Keefe. The guns were loaded, ready for action, their crews were at their stations?


Mr. Keefe. Reconnaissance was extended inshore and distant reconnaissance?


Mr. Keefe. Through the cooperation of the Navy?


Mr. Keefe. Searchlights were on at night, and such detection apparatus as they had was on 24 hours a day, wasn't it?

General Marshall. I don't recall the details as to searchlights or the detection.

Mr. Keefe. I recall because I have some pictures showing it here. I would be glad to show them to you.

General Marshall. I was speaking about all night.

Mr. Keefe. I don't know that they were on all night, but searchlights are used for defense, are they not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I was merely commenting on the fact you said searchlights were on all night.

Mr. Keefe. There was a lot of artillery rumbling over the islands, troops moving from one place to another, patrols out, signal wires stretching over the island, communications systems rapidly laid, just as in wartime; isn't that true?

General Marshall. That is true.

[3567] Mr. Keefe. That continued on out there in Hawaii for some time, did it not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; quite a few weeks.
Mr. Keefe. In fact, on the 18th of June, General Herron in response to your order for an alert, as appears on page 3 of these communications between the War Department and General Herron, said:

All anti-aircraft observations and security of detachments in position with live ammunition and orders to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas, and in defense of any essential installations. Some local interest in ammunition issues, but no excitement. Navy in-shore and off-shore air patrols in operation.

I suppose that if a Jap plane did come over, they would fire on it, wouldn't they?


Mr. Keefe. Would that be an act of war?


Mr. Keefe. If a Jap submarine came near the Harbor and they sunk it, would that be an act of war?

General Marshall. I assume it would be; yes, sir. Certainly for the submarine crew.

Mr. Keefe. Pardon me?

General Marshall. It would be an act of war.

[3568] Mr. Keefe. Well, would it have been considered an act of war?

General Marshall. I think it would; yes, sir.

The Chairman. It is 3 minutes to 3, Mr. Keefe.

General Marshall. May I read one paragraph from a letter to me from General Herron on June 24, 1940, in connection with your question?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

General Marshall. I won't have time for the whole letter, but I will read one paragraph apropos of what has been said:

This is to report that the Hawaiian portion of your domain is quiet this morning.

I will omit the next there to save time.

I have been highly gratified by the promptness and the precision with which the planes got off the ground every morning promptly at 4:30.

I omit again.

A week ago to-day—

That would be the 17th—

I gave the command for a surprise alert, which went off smoothly and efficiently. In view of the disturbing state of the world, I thought the command might as well get accustomed to having live ammunition, but did not realize how much this would excite the postwar portion of the Army. [3569] However, they are all quieted down now, as is the city which buzzed for a couple of days. Some of the young people thought that M-day had come, and two or three young couples that had intended to get married this month hustled around and did it once, just as in 1918.

Mr. Keefe. That is the same letter in which General Herron said to you in the last paragraph:

Your crack that "yesterday we had time but no money and that today we have money but no time" is good and has made a great hit in particular with the civilians.

General Marshall. I wasn't going to read that, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. I will suspend, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We promised to relieve General Marshall at 3 o'clock. The Chair expresses regret that we haven't been able to conclude with the General today. You have been very kind, General, to put yourself at the disposal of the committee. It looks like you will have to come back tomorrow.

General Marshall. At 10 o'clock?

The Chairman. At 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.


The Chairman. Counsel, what witness do you want now?

[3750] Mr. Mitchell. General Miles had better start back where he left off.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, before we question General Miles further, can we get this secret report in?

The Chairman. The Chair feels that inasmuch as General Marshall is not to be back until tomorrow morning, it would give more time to consider that if we waited until tomorrow before putting it in as an exhibit.

Senator Ferguson. Is there any question about the report, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. I don't know.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, I was just looking it over to see what this book contains so as to describe it in the record. I have done that.

The Chairman. What disadvantage will result in allowing this to await tomorrow?

Senator Ferguson. The only thing is if we can get it read into the record now, General Marshall will have the record, which apparently he gets, because he made corrections in it, and then he would be able to know about this and we could question him further in the morning. That was my purpose for bringing it up now.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman—if you will permit, Senator; the same purpose could be served, if counsel places [3571] the document in General Marshall's hands and so let him be familiar with it when he comes back at 10 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. Mitchell. We can do that.

Senator Ferguson. What is the objection to having it read into the record?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator: Isn't it a fact that many of the things that are in that report which you are now offering have not been gone into by the committee and are changed by the Clausen report which you do not offer?

Senator Ferguson. As I view this report, as I stated before, a board was appointed in conformity with a statute passed by Congress. That board's function was to render a report. They rendered a report. They rendered it in two parts. One part was a top secret report. The other was a report. Because the war was on part of that report was published. Part of the report was not published. That is, the 18 pages of the top secret report.

Now, before General Marshall leaves for China, it is essential that the committee be given an opportunity to examine him if they desire, and it, therefore, should become a part of the record. It is an official paper filed by a board in conformity with the statute.

[3572] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make an observation in answer to that?
The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. The gentleman from Michigan this morning talked about this being a statutory board. The fact is that the direction of the Congress was to the Secretary of War personally to make an investigation. That is the way the act reads. I have it here and we had better get it into the record at this time.

It reads:

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe.

Now, then, subsequently the Secretary of War, as a medium for obtaining information, named three generales who conducted certain hearings. They had a Major Clausen as an assistant recorder. Then the Secretary of War stated that in order to continue his investigation and in order to cover certain material which was not covered by the board, he would delegate the assistant recorder of the board to go around the world to take this testimony.

That testimony, taken by Major Clausen, was not considered by the Army Pearl Harbor board. The report is here. It explains in great detail, and, as the Senator from Michigan knows, corrects a great many errors which appear in the Army Pearl Harbor proceedings.

All we want is the ultimate truth and why put part of it in when you are not putting it all in?

Senator Ferguson. I have no objection to the Clausen report going in. In fact, I want the Clausen report in.

The Chairman. The offering of this particular report raises the question whether all of these reports, regardless of whether they are statutory or otherwise, should be offered as exhibits and become a part of the record.

The Chair sees no harm that could result by awaiting our meeting tomorrow to determine that matter, and in the meantime if counsel can show these 18 pages to General Marshall instead of taking the time to read them into the record now, the same purpose would be accomplished and he could be examined about it.

The Chair hopes that the decision on that may go over to tomorrow, because it may turn out that all of these reports might be filed as exhibits so that we have the benefit of all of them.

Mr. Keeffe. I concur in what the chairman has said; insofar as I am concerned, I am perfectly willing to have all this material go in.

So far as the Clausen report is concerned, that was a report made to the Secretary of War and consists of a lot of affidavits and some conclusions based thereon. It is a reexamination of witnesses who appeared before the Army board and testified under oath.

Now, I am perfectly willing, so far as I am concerned (and I expect, too, to examine some of these witnesses as to the changes which they made in their testimony when they testified under oath before the Army and Navy Court, and then changed their testimony when they gave an affidavit in various parts of the world to Colonel Clausen.

I am perfectly willing that the Clausen affidavits be submitted, and also that the Navy Court of Inquiry record and all connected with it, be submitted, and any other reports, the Hewitt report and the Hart
The Chair. In view of the discussion, the Chair feels we should proceed now with the examination of General Miles and let the matter of filing of any of these reports be held in suspense until we meet tomorrow.

In the meantime the Chair will suggest to counsel that he show General Marshall these parts of the report about which he may be examined.

[3575]

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)

General Miles. Mr. Chairman, on reading the transcript of my testimony on Tuesday, December 4, I find certain inferences that I think should be clarified. I request the indulgence of the committee for about 5 minutes for that.

The Chair. Proceed.

General Miles. I would like first to review the sequence of our information on December 6 and 7 in the practical light of what we then knew, not with the wisdom which hindsight confers.

On Saturday, December 6, we were at peace with Japan; we——

Mr. Keeffe. Just a moment.

Mr. Chairman, before there is any further reading of this, may I say that I understood when the General started that this was to be a correction of some implication or inferences contained in his testimony. He has gone far enough to convince me that it is a reading of a statement. I am just wondering if it is to be incorporated in the record, whether or not we are conforming to the adopted rule of the committee that statements of that character were to be submitted in advance of their being placed in the record.

[3576] I, of course, don't know all of what is in his statement, but General Miles has been a witness and if he desires to correct specific testimony given under oath I have no objection to it, but I do object to reading at this time into the record a statement which I have not seen, don't know what is in it, and which from the opening statement would appear to be in violation of the rule of this committee.

The Chair. The Chair would like to state, as he undertook to clarify that question the other day, the understanding and agreement was that when witnesses came here to read in their examination formal written statements as to their testimony, which was to be done prior to any examination of them, that those statements would be given to the committee in advance.

The Chair did not understand that rule to mean that during the course of an oral examination of a witness if he had a written memorandum that he desired to read in order that he might be accurate about something, that the rule required him to submit that statement in writing to the committee in advance.

And General Miles has not read enough of this statement yet for the Chair to determine whether it is a correction of some statement or implication or not, but under any circumstances the Chair does not feel that it comes within [3577] the rule that in advance
of the testimony of a witness who intended first to read a manuscript that he should submit it to the committee. The Chair does not understand that this is such a manuscript as was contemplated in that rule.

Therefore, the Chair is compelled to overrule the point made by the Congressman from Wisconsin.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, in this connection it should be borne in mind that the only witness who has appeared here so far with a prepared statement is Secretary Hull and copies of that prepared statement were furnished the members of the committee many days in advance of the reading of the statement.

Now, these other witnesses have not appeared with a prepared manuscript. So I think the Chair is correct in that conclusion.

The Chairman. The Chair feels that intermittent statements made during the oral examination of a witness, after days of such oral examination, in order that the witness may be accurate or thinks he is accurate, in putting on paper something about which he has testified, does not come within the rule which we announced that manuscripts which were to be read to the committee in the first instances by witnesses should be submitted to the committee in advance.

Go ahead, General.

[3578] General Miles. On Saturday, December 6, we were at peace with Japan; we were maintaining diplomatic relations with her; we were holding a diplomatic conference with her. We believed that the diplomatic conference would be broken as the result of Japanese refusal to accept our note of November 26. We also had serious reasons to fear, because of code burnings and other indications, that Japan might break diplomatic relations and go to war with the United States. But we had no proof of this.

Obviously, Japan had the option of agreeing to disagree, of breaking up the conference, of going ahead with her plans of conquest and putting it up to us to go to war in defense of the British, the Dutch or the Siamese.

[3579] Mr. Keeffe. Well, I submit, Mr. Chairman, right now, that the witness so far has indicated that his statement is a mere recitation of his conclusions and I as a member of this committee want to base my determination in this matter upon evidence and that is the very function of the committee, to draw conclusions from evidence that is submitted and not to have a witness come up and give a lot of his own conclusions as to what the evidence offered intends to show.

The Chairman. The witness can be examined by any member of the committee concerning the statement that he is reading in order to lay the basis for the accuracy of any conclusion or any statement that he makes.

Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, I have made my position clear. That is all I have to say.

The Chairman. The Chair overrules the point of order. Proceed, General.

General Miles. And that would have been a difficult thing to have done in the winter of 1941. That was another reason that we talked to the last about Thailand. That was probably one reason discussions were being held about a line beyond which Japan could not go without war.
In the meanwhile, 9 days before, our Pacific commands had been warned that hostile action by Japan was possible at any moment. They also knew that the Japanese were burning certain codes. We had nothing definite as to time or place to add to that.

There we stood on the afternoon of the 6th when the pilot message came in. That told us that a 14-part reply to our note of November 26 would come in, that it would be long, that it was to be put in nice shape for delivery but not delivered until further notice. Certainly, no indication here of anything threatening on the next day, Sunday.

Late on the night of the 6th the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply came in. It repeated their well worn arguments that it was all our fault, not theirs, and it concluded only that they could not accept our note of November 26 as a basis of negotiations. So far, so good—nothing unexpected in this. The fourteenth part would tell the story.

Some time between 8:30 and 9 on the morning of the 7th the fourteenth part came in from the Military Intelligence Division. It formally ruptured the conference but it went no further than that. Simultaneously the delivery message came in, 1 p.m. on a Sunday, a startling hour. It meant trouble somewhere, against someone, but still not necessarily against the United States. However, we knew something at last, not where or against whom, but when.

The action taken by the Chief of Staff, though unfortunately delayed, covered that situation perfectly.

Such was the information received successively on the 6th and 7th, on which decision had to be taken. We could not look into the future as we can now look into the past. We had to deal with what we then had.

It seems to me that magic has been overstressed in one important aspect or respect. It was a priceless asset but its value in bringing to our Pacific garrisons a realization of impending war can be overemphasized.

It is highly significant that General MacArthur, who had magic, could not identify as having seen any of the most important magic messages and yet stated categorically that the War Department dispatches, which were not magic, were ample and complete for the purpose of alerting his command for war. It is also significant that the war warning dispatch of November 27 was not, apparently, based primarily on magic but on our own decision of the previous day as to our position vis-a-vis the Japanese Government. Magic need not have been, and indeed was not, necessary to a true comprehension of the situation.

Lastly, I would like to touch on my inadequacy and unsatisfactory answers last Tuesday when questioned on certain papers, which I had not seen at the time, of the President, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff.

I would like to repeat that I had no part in the deliberations or decisions of the higher policy-making officials of the State, War, and Navy department as between themselves and with the President and frequently knew nothing of such matters.

I served as an assistant to a great Chief of Staff. He is a man who is quite competent to call on whomever he wishes for whatever pur-
poses he has in mind. I served him as he wanted to be served. I regret, but I make no apologies for, my ignorance of those matters in which I was not concerned.

That is all, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?
General MILES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. The chair believes that when we suspended with the examination, General Miles, that Congressman Keefe was asking you questions.

Mr. MITCHELL. Senator Ferguson.
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, was it Senator Ferguson? I thought you had concluded, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I will be glad to yield to Congressman Keefe.
The CHAIRMAN. The chair was not desirous of passing up the Senator, but thought that the Senator had concluded.

Mr. Keefe. I thought he had concluded, but if I am in error in that, why, I will wait.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, if the Senator had not concluded, why he may proceed.

Senator Ferguson. No, I had not concluded.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, we will take them in order.

Senator Ferguson. General, when did you write the statement that you brought in today and read?

General Miles. Some time between December 4 and today. I do not remember on which particular day, sir, after having read the transcript of my testimony on December 4.

Senator Ferguson. You read your testimony and then you drew up this statement, is that correct?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What is the purpose of the statement? What do you wish to convey to the committee by it?

General Miles. I wish to convey that the tenor of the questions and my answers as set forth in the transcript of my testimony on December 4 need further clarification, in my judgment, for the sake of the committee.

Senator Ferguson. Was there any suggestion that you draw such a statement at the present time to clarify the answers?

General Miles. No one made any such suggestion to me.

Senator Ferguson. I noticed that you passed upon the Clausen affidavit in relation to General MacArthur, interpreting that affidavit.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would you just read that part again, what General MacArthur said?

General Miles (reading):

It is highly significant that General MacArthur, who had some magic, could not identify as having seen any of the most important magic messages and yet stated categorically that the War Department dispatches which were not magic were ample and complete for the purpose of alerting his command for war.

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by that, that you cannot understand how he could do that?
General Miles. No, sir. I think it is extremely significant in the relative importance of magic versus the War Department dispatches that General MacArthur should have said that.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, do I understand now that you are conveying to the committee that in your opinion [3585] the messages of the War Department—and you are talking about the messages sent from here to the various commands—were more intelligent, gave more information, than if they would have had the magic, is that what you want to convey to the committee?

General Miles. Senator, I think you are straining what I am trying to say a little bit, sir.

Senator Ferguson. No, I don't want to.

General Miles. I know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I am just asking you if that is what you want to convey to the committee, that if a person in command had had magic he would not have had as clear a picture as if he only had your messages; is that what you want to convey?

General Miles. I am not saying that, Senator. I am simply pointing out one instance in which definitely magic was not, according to General MacArthur's testimony, the paramount and definitive factor which brought about his alert of his command.

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand that this message sent to the High Commissioner, which was considered; it would be from the War Department, would it not? You remember the message sent to the High Commissioner?

General Miles. I think that was a naval message.

[3356] Senator Ferguson. Beg pardon?

General Miles. I think that was a naval message.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, from the President; it was sent by Navy. Would that be considered from the War Department?

General Miles. No, sir. It was from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart, as I remember the message, if I have the right one in mind.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that had been taken up with General MacArthur and discussed with him, apparently, from the message itself.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You don't think that would add anything to his knowledge?

General Miles. I said that it did. I have not said that it did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the message that went out about the three men-of-war boats? Do you think that that message would add to his knowledge?

General Miles. To answer the first question first, I was not familiar with that message. I presume that that added to General MacArthur's knowledge in that it definitely told him that the Navy was sending out that light patrol.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any information that scouting planes from the Japs had flown over the air fields on [3587] the Philippines prior to the date of the attack?

General Miles. Scouting planes had flown over the Philippines?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, reconnaissance of the Japs had flown over the fields.

General Miles. You might refresh my memory, Senator, by telling me what you are referring to.
Senator Ferguson. No. I am asking you if you had that knowledge? General Miles. I do not recollect that I had that knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. Well, if that was a fact would that have added to General MacArthur's knowledge?

General Miles. He presumably would have known it.

Senator Ferguson. But would it have added to his alert; that he would be alert?

General Miles. I cannot say, sir, whether it would have added or not.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, General, was your department alerted?

General Miles. We were partially alerted. We were alerted to the extent of realizing the situation was critical and expecting, hourly expecting, the Japanese reply.

Senator Ferguson. When did you become partially alerted? [3588] will you give us the day that your department became partially alerted?

General Miles. Senator, are you speaking of arrangements that we had made to notify officers, or are you speaking of our mental alertness to a situation?

Senator Ferguson. Well, you used the words "partially alerted." That is your language.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What did you mean by it?

General Miles. I meant that as the situation developed and became obviously more critical, even in the daily press to say nothing of what we knew, that we were continuously increasing our mental alertness to the situation.

Senator Ferguson. Then you are talking about mental alertness, is that correct, that you were partially mentally alerted, is that what you say?

General Miles. No, sir, that was not what I meant to say anyway.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you did not mean to say that?

General Miles. I am trying to find out, Senator, what you mean. There is a difference between the actual regulations or orders which enable certain messages to circulate through my department and which enables certain officers to be found when they were needed, and so forth, between physical [3589] arrangements made, and the question of our mental alertness to the situation. If you will tell me what you mean, I can answer the question.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, let me ask you this: What did you intend by the messages you sent to Hawaii to do, mentally alert them or alert their department for war? Which did you intend?

General Miles. You refer to the war warning message of November 27, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, take that one.

General Miles. That obviously was intended to alert physically, mentally, morally, and every other way, so I understood it, that command.

Senator Ferguson. Did it alert your department in the same way? General Miles. Very definitely, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did it alert your department in the same way? General Miles. Very definitely. As soon as we knew that the alert
orders had been sent over General Marshall's signature the situation became very different.

Senator Ferguson, I am trying to get an answer to this question: If your department was alerted as you expected Hawaii to be alerted by the same message, how do you account personally for the pilot message not being delivered to General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, who was the only man under his testimony that could act, he or the President or the Secretary of War, as I understand his testimony? Now, how do you account for that pilot message that came in separately, not part of the 14 parts, that that was not delivered on the day it was translated?

General Miles. Senator, my answer is, first, that I had every reason to believe that General Marshall did receive the locked pouch which contained this message. I heard his testimony this morning. I think he is mistaken in saying that he did not receive that message on the afternoon of the 6th.

I base this largely because, if you will turn back the pages, you will see quite a number of other magic messages which were translated on the 6th. Now we know it was always the custom, always the orders, that those messages as soon as they accumulated, or in the case of any important message, immediately were transmitted by my officers to the Chief of Staff among others. That is the first answer.

In the second place, I heard your questions and General Marshall's answers regarding that pilot message. Now, I cannot concur with you, Senator, in your interpretation of that message. That is a diplomatic message.

Senator Ferguson. Just a minute. May I correct you? Don't take any question that I ask as to my interpretation. What I am trying to do is to get the facts from you witnesses that were there and knew the facts as of that time. What is your interpretation, not what you think mine is, what is your interpretation of that message?

General Miles. Very well, sir. This is a diplomatic message from Tokyo to Washington, to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington. It states that:

A separate message and a very long one in reply to the American note of November 26 will be sent. It is in fourteen parts and it may be received tomorrow—

which means Saturday, because it was sent on the 6th, which is the 5th Tokyo time, which is Friday. It was not received until last Saturday night.

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. Saturday night?

General Miles. Coming in, it was not received possibly until fairly late on Saturday, the 6th of December.

Senator Ferguson. When was the first part in, General, and then we will go back to that? As I understand it here, 902, the fourteenth part, came in pilot by the Japanese at 8 a.m., intercepted at Bainbridge Island 8:03 to 8:10 on the 6th. Is that what you have in mind?

General Miles. The first part; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And pilot message 901 came in and was filed at 6:56 a.m.; came in at Bainbridge Island, and at Washington 7:15 to 7:20 on the 6th.

General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is a.m. on the 6th of December.
General Miles. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you—
Mr. Keefe. Is that a.m.?
Senator Ferguson. That is a.m.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That is in the morning. Is that correct, General?
That is in the morning, General, is it not?
Mr. Keefe. These are dates of receipt—hours of receipts?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Miles. Yes, sir. My information, sir, and I have only the
time and the information from my own officers, is that it was the—that they began
to receive it in Military Intelligence late in the afternoon or early in
the evening on the 6th, they began to receive it, the first part of the
14-part message.
Senator Ferguson. That would mean that it was clearly translated
and ready for delivery?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. At what time was the earliest message[3593]
brought in?
General Miles. I cannot state, sir. I am told by my officers that
they received it, it began to come in in the evening of Saturday,
December 6.
General Miles. Very well.
Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will yield.
Mr. Keefe. Evening up in our country means one thing, but I notice
here they say "good evening" starting about noon. Now, when you
say it came in in the evening, I don't know what you are referring to,
6 o'clock at night or after 12 o'clock noon.
General Miles. I am referring to your evening, sir, about after 6
o'clock at night.
Mr. Keefe. So that there will be no mistake about that?
General Miles. Or five or six.
Mr. Keefe. After 6 o'clock at night?
General Miles. 5 o'clock certainly would be the beginning of eve-
ning.
Mr. Keefe. All right.
General Miles. Now, sir, this message—the recipient of this mes-
sage, and I was one of them although it was not [3594] ad-
dressed to me, knew that it might be received on Saturday, it would
be very long, that it was to be kept secret for the time being, it was
to be put into a nicely drafted form and delivered only on receipt of
a separate message.
Now, sir, if you will look back. Senator, to all the preceding pro-
cedings of the diplomatic conference, I think you will agree with
me, sir, that the Japs had been shifting and shilly shallying time
and time again. They notably set November 25 as the deadline.
They passed beyond that. They set November 29 as the deadline.
They passed over that. All through this magic you can see the ex-
change of ideas and suggestions as between those negotiators over
here and the Japanese government. So I think if you will look at this

79716—46—ot. 3—26
message as it stands, not as we know now what happened, you cannot read into it that the pilot message of itself told them that they were going to have what you called this morning, I believe, a zero hour.

Senator Ferguson. Zero time I think is better than "hour."

General Miles. Zero time. It was to be a zero time for the delivery of the other message, a diplomatic message in connection with diplomatic negotiations, but of itself it did not mean that any other action would be coordinated and made coincident with that time. It was only, Senator, when [3595] we got this 1 p. m. message and only then because of the startling hour of asking an old gentleman who was Secretary of State to receive an Ambassador at 1 p. m. on a Sunday that there was any indication that coincidentally with the delivery of that message something was apt to happen.

The pilot message that we received on Saturday, December 6, gave us no such information as that. It simply told us that this message when received would be locked up, be carefully put in nice shape; there was one message that he could not even use typist to do that, so the poor Ambassadors probably had to do it in longhand, I don't know who else they did use, or their secretaries—no indication then that the hour of delivery of that message, which we then did not know, had any particular significance other than a diplomatic exchange.

Senator Ferguson. General, had you ever had any magic or information indicating that any other diplomatic message was ever to be delivered at a time, a zero time?

General Miles. No; I think not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't that to you be very significant?

General Miles. May I finish that answer, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I think not but I can suggest to you [3596] if we are not regarding this thing from the point of view of what we know now did happen, many reasons why the Japanese Ambassador in Washington should be told to put that message in a safe and prepare it for delivery but not deliver it until a future message.

There might have been what often happens in our own country, a complete lack of concurrences as to the time of delivery of that message; there might have been other diplomatic reasons why they were not prepared at that time to deliver the message on receipt; they wanted to delay for this, that and the other diplomatic reasons.

Senator Ferguson. General, as an Army officer in Intelligence and in charge of that branch you were well familiar with the deceit of Japan, were you not?

General Miles. The deceit?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I thought them a deceitful people; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Were you familiar with the fact that at Port Arthur they had struck prior to breaking off diplomatic relations?

General Miles. I think that is incorrect, Senator. The actual attack on Port Arthur, I believe, had occurred after the Japanese Ambassador in St. Petersburg had given an ultimatum or otherwise broken diplomatic relations.
Senator Ferguson. Were communications as fast at that time as when we were attacked? Could they get messages to Port Arthur from the Russian capital as quickly as we could get them out in 1905?

General Miles. That is a difficult question to answer, sir. They had of course, the telegraph.

Senator Ferguson. You then did not see, in this zero time delivery, holding it for zero time delivery, this deceit so that the you could strike between the delivery and the time that they were sending, you did not see that, did you?

General Miles. I did not see that until it became obvious from the 1 p.m. message. The pilot message itself did not then, and does not now, indicate that any such military action would be coincident with the decision of the Japanese Government as to their particular time, for diplomatic reasons, for the delivery of their reply to us.

Senator Ferguson. But now there isn’t any doubt in your mind that this delay in the delivery was to give them time to make their attack before delivery, there is no doubt in your mind now, is there?

General Miles. Looking at it with hindsight, that seems very clear.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am saying now.

General Miles. Looking at it with hindsight. I still do not quite know, however, why, if this plan of the Japanese Government to strike Hawaii at 7 o’clock on the 7th of December, which we have heard had been made for some time, the task force having sailed forth sometime before, why the pilot message was sent. Why did not they say, “Deliver this thing at 1 o’clock on Sunday?”

Senator Ferguson. Do you assume they did not suspect that there was some chance that we may intercept some of these messages? Do you think that the Japanese had absolutely no knowledge that we may get some of these messages?

General Miles. I had no reason to believe the Japanese thought we were breaking the code.

Senator Ferguson. As far as you were concerned, you had absolutely no knowledge that the Japanese knew we were breaking the code?

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember the message that was put in the other day from South America, indicating that they were suspicious that we were breaking the code?

General Miles. I do not recall that, sir. I would like to see it.

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 122 of exhibit 2.

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield there?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Does the Senator contend that there is anything in the first 13 parts of this message that challenges the position taken by the Japs?

Senator Ferguson. I was going to ask some questions about that. I have declined, and still decline, to comment on the evidence. I haven’t had it all, and I will not make any comment on the evidence until I have it all.

Senator Lucas. I wanted to make that inquiry, because it seems to me the Senator asked as to the 13 parts of the so-called message, and I wondered if there is any disagreement on the Senator’s part with the position that General Miles put in his conclusions.
Senator Ferguson. I have no disagreement with General Miles. I am just asking the questions.
General Miles. I have that before me, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you look at that?
General Miles. I have that before me.
Senator Ferguson. Is there anything in there that would indicate they were suspicious that we were intercepting their code?
General Miles. The message is in regard to the safe delivery of certain plans and maps by official couriers, and so forth. It does contain a sentence, among several others, in a bracket, that "(There are also some suspicious that they [3600] read some of our codes.)" That was in June. Certainly subsequent to June their use of magic gave us no indication whatever that they suspected our breaking their code.

Senator Ferguson. No messages from any other country to the Tokyo station would indicate that? For instance, no messages from Germany, or any other country, indicated that we had broken their code? You had never heard of that?

General Miles. From Germany or any other country that we were breaking the Japanese code?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; that we were breaking the Japanese code.

General Miles. I have no recollection of any messages concerning the diplomatic Japanese code.

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember reading the first 13 parts of this message at Admiral Wilkinson's home?

General Miles. I am not sure, sir, whether I read the actual text or whether Commander Kramer brought a summary out. I knew the general contents of the first 13 parts of the 14-part message on the night of Saturday, December 6.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand it was customary to make summaries of these messages?

General Miles. I do not know what the Navy custom was.

Senator Ferguson. What is that?

General Miles. I do not know what the Navy custom was. [3601] I am simply saying I cannot remember whether I saw the textual message or was shown or was told a summary.

Senator Ferguson. Now would you read—have you got the fourteenth part of the message?

General Miles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Would you read the fourteenth part?

General Miles. The whole of the fourteenth part?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; just the fourteenth part.

General Miles. (Reading):

From: Tokyo.
To Washington.
7 December 1911
#902 Part 14 of 14

(Note.—In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT").

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's effort toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to
adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of
the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov-
ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, do I understand you contend that
it took that last sentence before you could really tell in this message
that they were going to break off relations? Do I understand that
is true?

General Miles. Before we could really tell; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, as an intelligence officer who evaluates
things, is it the basis that you evaluate things on, that you must be
certain, you must wait until the last word? Is that the way?

General Miles. If you are going to be absolutely positive, yes, that
is of course the best way, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have to—

General Miles. May I finish?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. Remember I had already testified that an unfavor-
able reply from Japan had been confidently expected by practically
everybody in the Government whom I knew anything about, including
myself. So the first 13 parts told me nothing that I
had not already expected, discounted, and rehashed many times. Only
the fourteenth part definitely decided what they were going to do
about it. It might have been a declaration of war, for all I knew. Until I read the fourteenth part I did not know what the final purport
of the answer was to be.

Senator Ferguson. That is just it. You say it might have been a
declaration of war?

General Miles. It might have been that.

Senator Ferguson. Would not you—

General Miles. May I finish?

Senator Ferguson. Go ahead.

General Miles. It might have been that, or on the other extreme,
it might have been simply another proposal for a continuation of the
discussions.

Senator Ferguson. General, do you have to be certain, like, as you
say, it could have been a declaration of war, before you would act on
it and see that it got to the man who could actually act on it?

General Miles. I saw no reason, and I see no reason now, Senator,
for having alerted. The Chief of Staff was a very busy man. We
did not know what was coming, and I took steps to see that we would
know as soon as possible when the fourteenth part came in.

Senator Ferguson. This sentence out of part No. 2:

While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have
strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan,
and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the
Empire,

did that have any significance?

General Mills. It would have if I had not heard the same play be-
fore in Japanese correspondence.

Senator Ferguson. Did you hear what Secretary Hull said about
this whole message?
General Miles. I heard that later, when I read it in the papers afterwards, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Could he have possibly said that in relation to the last part if it alone had been delivered? Could he have made such a strong statement if only that one part had been delivered? Did not the message before that indicate, as he said, the falsehoods and lies?

General Miles. I think not, sir. I think, Senator, the first 13 parts of that message were full of falsehoods and lies, if you ask me.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am talking about. That is exactly what my question is.

General Miles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Could he have said that from the fourteenth part alone? Do not the previous 13 parts indicate his attitude as to that message?

General Miles. But he had heard the same falsehoods and lies from the Japanese for several months, poor man.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, you heard the statement—

General Miles. May I add to that, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I am not clear, of course, in my memory as to just what the Secretary did say in his famous statement to the press.

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have you see that. It is on page 787 of part II of Foreign Relations. It has been read in by General Marshall, so I will not ask you to read it in.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, while he is reading that, I want to raise one question before this committee. A moment ago when I merely suggested to Senator Ferguson that he let General Miles answer the question, the gentleman on Senator Ferguson's right got a hearty chuckle out of it.

I would like to know just who the gentleman is and what right he has to sit alongside of the committee table and chuckle at a member of the United States Senate. I merely make an honest suggestion with respect to this hearing.

The Chairman. Well, the Chair is not in a position to answer that question, because he does not know who the gentleman is to whom the Senator from Illinois refers, or in what capacity he acts.

I think it might be stated that he is not an employee of the committee. He has not been authorized by the committee to do anything, so far as the Chair knows.

Senator Ferguson may be able to answer the Senator's question, but the Chair is not.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I do not care who he is or what his business is, but I do not propose to sit around this table and permit some individual that I do not know anything about, who is constantly in this case and constantly reminding Senators of the type and kind of questions they should ask, to give a hearty chuckle to something I might suggest in connection with this hearing.

I think it is about time that the committee find out just who he is, or what his business is.

Senator Ferguson. I would be glad to tell the Senator and the committee. His name is Percy Greaves. He is with Senator Brewster and has charge of Senator Brewster's files in this case.
Senator Lucas. How long has he been with Senator Brewster? Where was he before that?

Senator Ferguson. I do not know. Senator Brewster will [3607] have to speak for that. I understand Senator Brewster will be here tomorrow.

Senator Lucas. Was he the Republican National Committee research man in the campaign of 1944? Let him answer that.

Senator Ferguson. Is that your position?

Mr. Greaves. I was with the Republican National Committee up until the end of last year.

Senator Lucas. This is a nonpartisan hearing.

The Chairman. In view of that information, would it be out of place to inquire who has compensated Mr. Greaves for the services he has rendered to Senator Brewster or Senator Ferguson?

Senator Ferguson. He is not rendering any services for me.


Senator Ferguson. He is here with papers, but he is with Senator Brewster. You have to confer with Senator Brewster. He will be glad to tell you.

The Chairman. He has been sitting by the Senator from Michigan during these whole hearings and apparently prompting the Senator in the interrogatories he has addressed to the witnesses. Maybe that is not a service to the Senator from Michigan and the Senator will have to be the judge of that, but it has been a matter of common observation that has [3608] transpired ever since we began the hearing. I do not object to it personally. I do not care how many assistants any member of this committee may have or desire, or need, but it is not at all out of place that the committee know who it is who is compensating anybody who is assisting any Senator, in order that the whole facts may be known.

It is not only the duty of the committee, and the privilege of the committee, but I think the public would be interested in knowing whether there is any partisan compensation being paid to anybody who is employed by a member of this committee to make this investigation, in which we have all said we did not desire any partisanship to enter into it.

If the Senator from Michigan cannot give the information that the Senator from Illinois has requested, the Chair must express the hope that somebody can.

Senator Ferguson. The Senator cannot. Senator Brewster will certainly be able to, and will.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I do not appreciate the gratuitous insults that have been made a couple of times by this gentleman, and I do not propose to take it much longer.

The Chairman. Let us go ahead. We have got five more minutes of precious time. It may be that General Miles may be able to clear up something that seems to be cloudy.

[3609] Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Just a moment. The General was about to answer a question, if the gentleman will wait just a second.

Go ahead, General.

General Miles. I was about to answer with regard to Secretary Hull's violent statement, on finishing the reading of the reply of the Japanese, and particularly the reply that went to the 14 parts.
As I read it, it applies to the whole document. It was an outburst of righteous indignation by a man who sat and heard Japanese lies and falsehoods for months and months and now he received a whole package of them coincident with bombs bursting over Pearl Harbor.

[3610] The Chairman. Does that complete your answer?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.
Senator Ferguson. Congressman Keefe, do you want me to yield?
Mr. Keefe. I was about to suggest, now that we have concluded the political discussion. I thought I would like to get on with the facts in the case.
The Chairman. The Chair is attempting to cooperate with the Congressman to that end. The Chair appreciates his suggestion.
Senator Ferguson. General, I want to speak to you just a few moments on the Rochefort message.
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with that Rochefort message?
General Miles. The message sent to G-2 in Hawaii directing him to get in touch with Commander Rochefort, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did your hear the testimony of Colonel Bratton in relations to that message?
General Miles. Read into the testimony this morning? I did, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would that be a fair statement as far as you are concerned?
General Miles. No, sir, that is not.
Senator Ferguson. What is your view of that message? How do you vary from that message? Are you familiar with that message?
General Miles. Yes, sir; I am entirely familiar with that message.
Senator Ferguson. Are you also familiar with his testimony?
General Miles. I heard his testimony read into the record of the committee this morning.
Senator Ferguson. How do you differ from it? What is your view of it?
General Miles. At that time, we were anxious awaiting the receipt of the implementing broadcast of the winds code message. Colonel Bratton came to me and told me that he had learned that Commander Rochefort, who, I understood was a naval intelligence officer of the fleet in Hawaii, was familiar with the winds code, and also that they were picking up broadcasts in Hawaii. He suggested a telegram be sent therefore to our G-2 in Hawaii to get in touch with Rochefort, for the sole purpose of getting that winds implementation broadcast, if it were sent, as rapidly as possible, and for no other purpose.

[3612] I would like to repeat that, sir. I did not, as was suggested in the testimony this morning, ever have any idea of either circuiting General Gerow, or any difference with General Gerow as to the need for further alerts in Hawaii. That was not the purpose of the Rochefort message.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know of any conversation between Colonel Bratton and Commander McCullom in relation to similar information going out?
General Miles. I may have, sir. I know that Colonel Bratton was in direct communication with Captain McCullom, or Commander McCullom, as he was then I believe, in Naval Operations, as I was with Admiral Wilkinson.
Senator Ferguson. It was not quite my question. I mean in relation to sending information to the theatres.

General Miles. I remember no such discussion with Colonel Bratton on that point, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any knowledge along that line?

General Miles. Knowledge that Colonel Bratton was discussing with Commander McCullom the advisability of sending further alerts to the overseas command? Is that the question, sir?

Senator Ferguson. That is the question.

General Miles. I have no such knowledge.

[3613] Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear that Bratton, Colonel Bratton, had drawn up a paper or a memorandum, along the same line for the Navy?

General Miles. Along the same lines as what, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Along the same line, giving further information to the theaters, that was not being sent from the top?

General Miles. That was being held up by the top? No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Not held up, but not being sent. There is a distinction between being held up and not being sent.

General Miles. I know of no message drafted by Colonel Bratton proposing further alerts or warnings to the overseas departments which was not sent.

The Chairman. Four o'clock having arrived, the committee will take a recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the committee recessed to 10 a. m., of the following day, Wednesday, December 12, 1945.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1945

Congress of the United States, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

General Marshall is back, and Congressman Keefe was in process of examining General Marshall. Are you ready to proceed?

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. Keefe. Yesterday, General Marshall, during the short hearing when I had to stop questioning, we had gotten up to the alert of June 17, 1940, and I asked you to ascertain and produce here, if you would, the specific information that prompted you to issue that alert of June 17, 1940.

General Marshall. On my return to the War Department I started an investigation to obtain the data to which you have just referred. I regret to state to you that it has not yet been completed. We have brought General Strong into the matter. They told me this morning they worked on the various documents throughout the night. It involves a number of different factors, I understand, and will take some little time to get all of them together. They are in the process of doing that, Mr. Keefe, and the report will be brought in as soon as it is obtained, and General Strong also will be available as a witness. In the meantime what is already in evidence, I believe, pertaining to that specific question of yours—

Mr. Keefe. Before we get to that, General Marshall, I am quite familiar with page 13.

General Marshall. That is what I was going to read an extract from.

Mr. Keefe. I would like to approach that in just a little different way.

General Marshall. That is agreeable to me, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You anticipate that some time during the day, at least, you will be able to bring that data to the committee?
General Marshall. I do not know whether I can do it today or not, sir, because it involves newspaper articles and involves a great many different factors, they tell me.

They have been engaged in it, it seems, all night, and they have got General Strong, who has been retired from the War Department, and they have brought him in now.

I think they will do the best they can. I cannot promise you it will be here during the day. I, myself, personally, have not had the opportunity of going into it, but I have very capable people doing it.

Mr. Keefe. Whatever the circumstances were, you were [3617] convinced they were of sufficient importance to justify the issuance of the alert message to General Herron under date of June 17, 1940?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; and in that communication you were going to produce, that is very pertinent to that question—at any rate it would have been foolhardy not to take special precautions.

Mr. Keefe. Now, on the 26th of June, 1940, you wrote a memorandum to General Strong, which reads as follows, and it appears in this exhibit of communications between the War Department and General Marshall concerning the 1940 alert, on page 11:

It seems to me I should write to both Van Voorhis and Herron something of what led up to our emergency radios of the other day; that is, if you think we can trust to airmail for such a confidential message. Personally, I think it is reasonably safe.

Will you have somebody make a rough draft of what I should say.

Who is Van Voorhis?

General Marshall. He was the then commander in Panama.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

Now, in answer to that letter, or communication, General Strong wrote you on June 27, as appears on page 12 of this [3618] exhibit, and he says:

1. Reference to your memorandum of June 26, with reference to writing General Van Voorhis and General Herron in regard to the background for our emergency radios: I am inclined to think that developments of the last 10 days, as reflected in the press, have given both the background necessary.

2. Another point to be considered is that air mail may be tampered with, any reference in the matter covered in your secret code might jeopardize that code.

3. However, if you think that you should write them, I suggest that the communication go by registered mail. Drafts of suggested remarks herewith.

[3619] General Strong refers in this letter to certain developments of the last 10 days as reflected in the press. He says that he thinks that has given to Herron and Van Voorhis all the background necessary.

Is that what you referred to this morning, General Marshall, when you referred to the fact that some search had to be made of the press, and so on?


Mr. Keefe. Well, you did not order this alert by virtue of what appeared in the newspapers, did you?

General Marshall. No, sir. The second sentence of the letter which you said you would approach later says:

Briefly, the combination of information from a number of sources led to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differ-
ences in the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific raid against Oahu, following the departure of the U. S. Fleet from Hawaii.

Mr. Keeffe. In other words, General Strong wrote a proposed explanation to be sent to Van Voorhis and Herron?


Mr. Keeffe. Of what the facts were?


Mr. Keeffe. That never was sent, was it?

[3620] General Marshall. The records show that was not sent.

Mr. Keeffe. Now in this, as you have just read, appearing on page 13 of the exhibit referred to, it appears that the combination of information from a number of sources "led to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differences in the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific raid against Oahu, following the departure of the U. S. Fleet from Hawaii."

Did the Fleet depart from Hawaii in June, 1940?

General Marshall. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Were you not, as Chief of Staff, advised by the Chief of Naval Operations that he had ordered the Fleet away from Pearl Harbor in June, or on June 17, or thereabouts?

General Marshall. If that was the fact I am quite certain he would have advised me to that effect. My answer was I do not recall right now what happened then. Whether or not the Fleet was ordered away is a matter of fact, first, which can be easily determined.

Mr. Keeffe. This proposed communication to you from Herron, which was not sent, refers to the departure of the U. S. Fleet from Hawaii, does it not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I do not think I made myself clear, Mr. Keefe. I am not casting any doubt on whether the Fleet was or was not ordered from Hawaii, I am merely endeavoring to state that I do not recall at the moment just what the Fleet movements were. That, of course, is a matter of record which the Navy and which Admiral Stark can testify to.

I am assuming that I understood thoroughly what those movements were at that particular time. I might go a little further to say, Mr. Keefe, that I have not had an opportunity, since you went into this question, to go into the various factors involved in this particular thing, so it has been beyond my capability to do that. I am giving you the best answers I can as to my recollection at that time.

Mr. Keeffe. I appreciate that, General Marshall. I will reiterate I am simply seeking to get these facts, and it is very difficult at times to get them, as you find it is difficult for you to get the facts.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. I will ask counsel at this time if they will undertake a search and request the Navy to produce, during the day, the order which was issued by Admiral Stark to the Commanding Officer of the Navy, Admiral Richardson, directing that the Fleet be taken away from Pearl Harbor on or about June 18 or 19, 1940, and proceed to an unknown and secret destination or hide-out.
Will the counsel do that, please?
Mr. Mitchell. If there was such an order we will find it.

[3622] Mr. Keefe. We are advised very definitely and reliably that there was such an order issued, and that it is in the Navy Department. Now I will ask if you have that order here now?
Mr. Mitchell. We have no such order.
Mr. Keefe. Now, General Marshall, when that alert order was issued in 1940 you followed, from day to day, what was going on out there, did you not, during the period of that alert, through communications with General Herron?
General Marshall. Yes, sir. Not every day, of course.
Mr. Keefe. Did you know that the Fleet had left Pearl Harbor at that time?
General Marshall. You again have me back on something that I do not recall at the moment, sir.
Mr. Keefe. General Marshall, I call your attention, if you will, to page 8 of this exhibit. In it General Herron sends you a secret report reading as follows:

In interpreting your cable consideration is given to the fact that Navy here has nothing from Navy Department regarding alert. Navy now turning over to Army inshore aerial patrol in accordance with existing local joint agreement. Will not modify Army air and anti-air alert before Monday except on further advice from you.

On the next page, in answer to that communication, and [3623] on June 22, you wired Herron as follows:

In view of present uncertainty instructions for the Navy other than local Navy Forces have not been determined. Continue your alert in accordance with modifications directed in War Department Number 434.

Now, does that refresh your recollection of the fact that the main Fleet, except the local Fleet in Hawaii, had left Hawaiian waters?
General Marshall. Mr. Keefe, you have refreshed me more than the message that apparently it had. I don’t recall offhand myself. That would indicate some move of that sort but that, I believe, sir, is a matter of fact easily determined.
Mr. Keefe. I am simply probing, General, to find out what you know. I don’t know as much as you do about this.
General Marshall. I undoubtedly knew about it at the time. I am trying to tell you what I remember now.
Mr. Keefe. This telegram would indicate that perhaps you did know about it?
General Marshall. I assume that I knew about the movements of the Fleet at the time.
Mr. Keefe. You would naturally be in communication with your Chief of Naval Operations, wouldn’t you?

[3624] Mr. Keefe. And it is to be assumed that if the fleet was ordered out you perhaps knew of it at the time?
General Marshall. I would say it is almost certain I knew about it.
Mr. Keefe. All you mean to say is that you do not recollect?
General Marshall. I don’t recall the incident.
Mr. Keefe. I am calling your attention to this wire because it impresses me that under those circumstances it clearly indicates that you did have knowledge at that time of the fact that in view of the
present uncertainty instructions for the Navy other than local forces had not been determined.


Mr. Keefe. The local forces were perhaps kept there but the main body of the Navy was away and you are advising Herron in this telegram that instructions to the Navy other than the local forces has not been determined but he is to continue in accordance with the modifications directed in War Department No. 434.

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, I don't want to press you, General Marshall, for something that you don't know, and I don't want to get mere hearsay, that sort of thing, in the record. If you don't remember and don't know, why, I shall be not [3625] surprised, with the volume of stuff that has come through your mind since that time.

But I assume that it is a fact, from information that I have at hand, that the Navy was ordered at the time of that 1940 alert, the main body of the Navy was ordered away from Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall. It would appear that something of that sort was going on.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Do you presently have any recollection as to the events of that period which would enable you to state why it was that the fleet was ordered away at the time of the 1940 alert?

General Marshall. No, sir, I do not. There was almost a continuing discussion if not a debate regarding the placing and the movement of the fleet throughout this period.

I might add this——

Mr. Keefe. Well, General Marshall—pardon me. Go ahead.

General Marshall. I might add this, which has no bearing on the fleet, but it does have a bearing on what my recollection is as to this particular alert. The part I remember quite distinctly is my concern over the continuation of the alert because a long or protracted alert was very apt to result in a gradual laxity on the part of the many individuals concerned in it through fatigue and to the fact that nothing particular [3626] happened. But I had a still more deep concern at the time because the air, as I clearly recall, reported to me that we were wearing out the engines of these planes in these various reconnaissances. So I became quite personally concerned as to the duration of the alert, how long we would be justified in maintaining it and particularly what might be done in order to satisfy the requirements as to security and still not cause our resources, meaning particularly the engines of the reconnaissance airplanes.

Those are the things regarding which I am most clear in my mind and which I think were at the bottom of a great many of the backs and forths which occur in this correspondence.

Mr. Keefe. General Marshall, I call your attention to the letter from General Herron to you on page 21 of this same exhibit. This follows quite a number of letters back and forth appearing in this exhibit indicating the progress of the alert and what was taking place and what the effect was on the matériel and equipment and tax on the motors and how the public reacted and how the personnel of the Army reacted.
Then comes this letter dated September 6, 1940, in which General Herron says, among other things, the second paragraph:

My absolutely frank and honest opinion is that "the alert" as now carried on here does not dull the keen edge, or [3627] exhaust the morale. I think that our real power accumulates and that now that the season of individual target practice and instructions is about over, the maneuvers of numerous small units camped along the beaches will build up naturally and easily the effectiveness of the alert.

The presence of the Fleet here and its frequent putting to sea with absolute secret destinations and periods naturally eases the situation very much.

Now, you knew as a result of that letter on September 6th as it now appears that the Fleet had been putting to sea secretly and for absolutely secret destinations.

Did you know that during this period that that was what was taking place?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I must have known it.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, does that tend to refresh your recollection of the fact that the orders for the Fleet to go out to these secret destinations and leave Pearl Harbor took place about coincident with the issuance of the order for the alert on the 17th of June 1940?

General Marshall. I does not stimulate my memory, sir. I assumed that would be going on. I assumed, in any event, the Fleet would be going out and coming back right along in the way of practice if for nothing else.

Mr. Keeffe. Was it considered in your discussions with [3628] Admiral Stark that in the event of a threat to Hawaii that it was the proper thing to get that fleet out to sea?

General Marshall. I recall no such discussion, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. I will say to counsel I have been searching through these intercept messages and I do not find any intercepts in the file of 1940. Have we got those?

Mr. Mitchell. We have never printed them.

Mr. Keeffe. Those intercepts ought to show, shouldn't they, the information that came to the War and Navy Departments as to the necessity for this 1940 alert?

Mr. Mitchell. We have gone through them for that purpose and they do not sho wanything of the kind. We examined them—not always knowing exactly what the members of the committee might be interested in—but we didn't find anything of that nature. We can produce any intercepts you want for any date, I think.

General Marshall. Those are the files that are now being searched in the War Department, Mr. Keeffe.

Mr. Keeffe. I see. And is it anticipated that before you leave that material will be available, General Marshall, so that we can make some inquiry in reference to it?

General Marshall. I would assume so. I do not know, sir.


Mr. Keeffe. Until the fall of 1940.


Mr. Keeffe. And the situation out there in Hawaii resumed a normal routine?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; but, General Herron can testify to this, but I rather think some of the dispositions thereafter remained a little on the alert basis. But he can tell you that positively.
Mr. Keefe. Now, during this situation things were getting pretty critical in Europe and in the Atlantic, were they not?


Mr. Keefe. And on September 4, 1940, Congress passed the Selective Service Act, do you remember?


Mr. Keefe. And on September 27, 1940, Germany, Japan, and Italy signed the Tripartite—the treaty of Berlin, at Berlin, the 10-year military treaty, promising to help each other in the event of war with the United States.

You, of course, immediately became aware of that?


Mr. Keefe. That did not tend to ease the tension and situation between the United States and Japan, did it?

General Marshall. Quite the contrary.

Mr. Keefe. It accentuated the difficulties, did it not, General Marshall?


Mr. Keefe. And things gradually were getting more and more critical in the diplomatic situation between the two nations?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You could see in that a distinct threat to the United States?


Mr. Keefe. And on the 10th of January 1941 the lease-lend bill was introduced in the Congress; on March 11, 1941, that became law and we immediately began to give supplies under that to England and our other later allies, did we not?


Mr. Keefe. And you remember the actual aid, if you recall?

General Marshall. I do not recall the exact figures.

I remember particularly our maneuvering to get the planes for the Air Force out there operated under General Chennault.

Mr. Keefe. General Chennault was a former officer in the United States Air Corps, was he not?

General Marshall. Yes. He had resigned, I believe.

Mr. Keefe. Resigned, and went over and became Air Chief to Chiang Kai-shek.


Mr. Keefe. He recruited a good many Americans to go over to fly planes under his command?


Mr. Keefe. And planes were furnished to him by the United States Government?

General Marshall. I do not remember the arrangements as to financing, but I know that I personally initiated the procedure, and proposed details which were followed out.

Mr. Keefe. We perhaps loaned money to China and they then bought our planes. Is that what it was?
General Marshall. I would prefer not to answer that.

Mr. Keefe. I see.

Well, we began shipping lease-lend supplies to Europe.


Mr. Keefe. And the Japs instituted a submarine war which became very critical?

General Marshall. Do you mean the Japanese or the Germans?

Mr. Keefe. The Germans; and sank a lot of ships?


Mr. Keefe. We were determined that those supplies were going to get over there to aid England, were we not?


Mr. Keefe. Now, in order that the background of this thing can be properly appraised, events leading up to this period, there has been placed in evidence a memorandum of a conversation by the Counselor of the Embassy in Berlin, a Mr. Dooman, which was held or conducted on February 14, 1941, and it appears as an official state document in the volume entitled “Foreign Relations of the United States—Japan, 1931–1941,” Volume II, on page 138.

This memorandum was sent to the State Department by Ambassador Grew with his full and complete approval. The State Department incorporated it as an official state paper in the volume just referred to.

Mr. Dooman made to Mr. Ohashi, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, he stated that he had just returned from the United States, having been on furlough, and I quote:

I replied that my furlough in the United States coincided with one of the most significant and important periods in the history of our country, and that if he had time, I would be glad to tell him briefly of what I had seen and heard while at home.

I gave Mr. Ohashi a fairly long account of the trends in opinion with regard to the war in Europe as they developed during the election campaign. I dwelt on the remarkably swift crystallization of opinion at home with regard to the question of American aid to England, which I attributed in large part, first, to the disclosure on the part of the British that they were rapidly approaching the end of the resources in dollar exchange, and second, to the belief that the effects on Britain's capacity to produce aircraft and other munitions of German bombing raids had been more serious than British communiques would lead one to suppose.

Mr. Ohashi further said, and I quote:

I said that although the large majority of the American people abhorred the idea of American involvement in war, the fact was that an equally large majority of the American people believed that there was one consideration which transcends even that of avoiding involvement in the war, and that is helping England to the limit of our capacity.

I said that all this was not without direct bearing on relations between the United States and Japan. I had found that American opinion is pretty clearly opposed to the taking of action by the United States which would make war with Japan inevitable.

Now, General Marshall, from your broad experience and knowledge of the events that transpired during the summer and fall of 1940, during the period which was covered by Mr. Dooman's furlough visit to the United States, do you think that is a fair appraisal of the situation?

General Marshall. It seems to me so.
Mr. Keefe. Now, Mr. Dooman further says:

Nevertheless Mr. Ohashi could readily understand that the American people, being an eminently practical people, are quite aware that an adequate supply of airplanes and other munitions is not the only prerequisite to a British victory; the supply to England of foodstuffs and raw materials by the British dominions and colonies and the maintenance of British commerce with the outside world are equally essential to a British Victory.

Did you share that same opinion at that time and is that a fair statement?

General Marshall. I think that is a fair and correct statement.

Mr. Keefe. Then Mr. Dooman further said, and I quote:

It would be absurd to suppose that the American people, while pouring munitions into Britain, would look with complacency upon the cutting of communications between Britain and British dominions and colonies overseas. If, therefore, Japan or any other nation were to prejudice the safety of those communications, either by direct action or by placing herself in a position to menace those communications, she would have to expect to come into conflict with the United States.

Did you share that view at that time and is that a fair statement of the United States opinion and position?

General Marshall. I would say that is too broad a statement.

Mr. Keefe. I beg pardon?

General Marshall. I would say that is too broad a statement of the reactions of the American people at that particular time because he is referring to all British communications all over the globe. American opinion as I recall it at that time was centered on the movements of convoys out of the northern part of the United States into the western approaches of the British Isles. I do not recall that at that time there was an American public opinion of the nature he describes as to all portions of the globe in relation to British communications.

Mr. Keefe. Well, leaving out of consideration the question as to what American public opinion was, was he reflecting the government's opinion, the diplomatic, Army, and Navy opinion?

General Marshall. Whether he was reflecting Government opinion or the diplomatic opinion or, in other words, the high level opinion, I am not the person to testify. So far as the Army opinion, the opinion of the War Department, General Staff and myself is concerned, we viewed with great concern the severance of British communications in various portions of the world because we knew their maintenance of an adequate defense to prevent the occupation of the British Isles by the Germans depended in a very important measure on those communications.

His reference to Japan in relation to American reactions I think are broader than the state of affairs in the public mind, and he speaks of the people here, at that time.

Mr. Keefe. Of course, what concerns me, General Marshall, in reading these matters, this is an official document incorporated in the State Department's list of official documents and apparently has the approval of the State Department. There is nothing in the book that would indicate any disapproval. It certainly had the full and complete approval of our Ambassador Grew because he so states in his communication sending it and the further communications in reference to it which also appear in the same volume.
Now, I am wondering whether or not in view of the fact that this bears the seal of approval, apparently, of the State Department, whether of the higher levels in Washington, Mr. Dooman when he made that statement to Mr. Ohashi was not in fact reflecting the then current opinion of the higher levels of thought in the Government.

General Marshall. I would say that Mr. Dooman and Mr. Grew would have to testify as to that, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. All right.


Mr. Keeffe. All right. Then he further says [reading]:

[3638] There are many indications of the Japanese moving down slowly toward Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. The United States cannot but be concerned by the various initiatives taken by the Japanese in Indo-China and elsewhere, for the reason that if Japan were to occupy these strategically important British and Dutch areas, it could easily debase into the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific an extensive havoc with essential British lines of communication. The United States for its part was well aware that an alternative source of supply for Japanese purchase of petroleum and certain other products of the United States is the Netherlands East Indies, and for that reason it has been reluctant to impose embargoes on the sale to Japan of commodities of which it has a surplus, but the Japanese must clearly understand that the forbearance of the United States in this respect springs from a desire not to impel Japan to create a situation which could lead only to the most serious consequences. I recalled the axiom in geometry that two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time; however greatly Japan's security might be enhanced by occupying the Netherlands East Indies it must be realized by Japan that any such move would vitally concern the major preoccupation of the United States at this time, which is to assist England to stand against German assault.

Now, then, General Marshall, at the time this communication was had and this report by Mr. Dooman to Mr. Ohashi we had not yet entered into these so-called ABC agreements and ABCD agreements; they came later?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. There was no ABCD agreement, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. I beg your pardon?

General Marshall. There was no ABCD agreement.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, conversation.


Mr. Keeffe. Pardon me. There is a distinction.

General Marshall. There is quite a difference, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. We want to observe protocol exactly here. There was an ABC agreement which was approved?

General Marshall. There was an ABC agreement approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy and not by the President. The ABC-2 made with Canada was formally approved by the President.

Mr. Keeffe. The ABCD was merely a conversation or report?

General Marshall. They were conversations, the report of the conversations on which Admiral Stark and I in a joint [3640] memorandum distributed.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes.

General Marshall. And I was asked the other day if I could not recall what my reaction was and I thought it was in the naval memorandum signed by me and signed by Admiral Stark.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, in any event, during this time when Mr. Dooman was talking with Mr. Ohashi conversations began to take place between the British and the Dutch and the Canadians and the United States to get ready for something, to lay some plans anyway?
General Marshall. Yes, sir. I think this particular month that we had our first—January and February, in which we had our very first conversations with the British and the Canadians.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.


Mr. Keefe. Now, you as Chief of Staff were besieged and beset by the grave currents of events on both sides of the continent?


Mr. Keefe. When did we enter into this hemispheric defense plan?

General Marshall. You mean when did we become committed to boards like the one with Mexico and the one with Canada?

Mr. Keefe. Well, there was such a plan, wasn't there?

General Marshall. There was developed an agreement with the Canadians as to certain things that jointly related to us in a defensive way, there was developed an agreement, or at least the conversations, with Mexico of the same nature, and there was brought into Washington on an ascertainable date representatives from many of the Latin-American countries, their military representatives, to discuss matters in relation to our joint security in the Western Hemisphere, and I personally, I think in the fall of 1940, maybe the late summer, brought different chiefs of staff of all the Latin-American countries as my guests, entertained them, talked to them, sent them about the United States.

Mr. Keefe. Well, there was an actual war plan, L-52, was there not, a Western Hemisphere defense plan?

General Marshall. There probably was, sir, I do not remember the designation.

Mr. Keefe. You do not recall that plan specifically?

General Marshall. I know there would be a plan but I just do not recall specifically what it was.

Mr. Keefe. Well, General Marshall, the record appears to be that on March 27, 1941, a proclamation declaring an unlimited emergency was issued. That was in line with the general current of conditions as they were developing?


Mr. Keefe. Do you recall that?


Mr. Keefe. And on June 6, 1941, the President approved an act of Congress taking over foreign ships lying idle in United States ports. Do you remember that?


Mr. Keefe. So it is apparent from these actions, shipments of lease-lend material, the declaration of an unlimited emergency, legislation taking over foreign-owned ships in United States ports, that things were beginning to get more and more critical?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. On both fronts, both the Atlantic and the Pacific?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then in July 1941 we started to improve the Panama Canal defenses, did we not? Do you remember that?

General Marshall. You mean the additional series of locks?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. Congress appropriated the money to build [3643] another set of locks and that went into action down in Panama and it provided for the installation of other defenses, did it not, General Marshall?


Mr. Keefe. In an attempt to prepare the defenses of Panama. That was in, I believe, as I remember, July 1941. So we in all these actions were looking toward the possibilities that might come in the future with the gradually growing disintegration of the relations on both sides of the hemisphere, is that a fair statement?


Mr. Keefe. And then in July 1941 we seized Japanese assets in the United States and froze their assets, do you recall that?


Mr. Keefe. Were you in on the conversations that led to that action on the part of this Government?


Mr. Keefe. That was tending to further intensify the growing strain on relations, in your opinion, was it not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. Keefe. I am asking these questions to get the background for the actions which you as Chief of Staff were particularly concerned with, General Marshall, during those [3644] very trying times.

Now, these conversations were stated in the summer of 1941, as I recall, between the Japanese ambassador and Mr. Hull looking toward the possibility of some solution of this growing series of difficulties that were being encountered and the gradual disintegration of our diplomatic relations and one of the things they were complaining about was what they called the encirclement of Japan. Do you remember that?


Mr. Keefe. And they referred to this agreement which specified certain lines of latitude and longitude and certain economic pressures that were being applied to them and they were spouting off about that, weren't they?


Mr. Keefe. And then on August 4, 1941, we banned the export of aviation gasoline to them, do you remember that?


Mr. Keefe. The public were demanding it, weren't they?


Mr. Keefe. Well, I remember sitting in the halls of congress and hearing day by day almost daily speeches on the subject that were being made; pretty insistent demands.

Following this condition, through the knowledge obtained from these intercepts it indicated that Japan was getting [3645] pretty agitated; isn't that true?


Mr. Keefe. The public in Japan were being inflamed by the war lords and that was disclosed by these intercepts, was it not?


Mr. Keefe. Also in the press, yes. And on the 4th of August 1941 all shipping to the United States was suspended by Japan, do you remember that?
Mr. Keefe. Trade ceased in August of 1941 so far as commercial trade was concerned; isn’t that true?
General Marshall. I think that is approximately correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That is about the time when you left and went out to join the conference at sea with the President and Winston Churchill?
General Marshall. The latter part of August.
Mr. Keefe. August 3? I believe was the date the President left.
General Marshall. August 3? Well, I left the same time.
Mr. Keefe. You left the same time. Did you accompany the President?

[3646] General Marshall. No; I don’t think I left at the same time. He went to some other point for the week end, I believe, and I joined him somewhere in the waters around New York, near New York.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, I think the newspapers reported as of a date I have before me, as I gathered together this mass of material to get it chronologically in order.
General Marshall. Yes, sir. That is approximately correct.
Mr. Keefe. That he left New London, Conn.
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. On the warship Potomac as far as the public was concerned, on a week-end cruise, and you met him some place and you went out to sea?
General Marshall. Yes. He boarded the Augusta.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I do not intend to go into that situation, but at the time you went out there to attend this Atlantic conference conditions were certainly in a pretty strained condition so far as our relations with Japan were concerned at that time, weren’t they?
General Marshall. I think they were, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Do you recall having any discussions while you were out there about what was liable to happen, what the plans were to be, and so on, and so forth, with anybody?

[3647] General Marshall. There were no discussions with the President on the political factors, on what our plans were. There were no instructions, as I recall, of any kind from the President as to the nature of our conversations, that is, Admiral Stark, General Arnold and myself, with the British chiefs of staff. The meeting went right ahead and we were left, so far as I can recall, largely to our own judgment as to what to discuss.
Mr. Keefe. Well, in any event you came back when about the 14th of August or thereabouts?
General Marshall. Well, I do not recall, sir, but I came back on the Augusta part way down the coast and then embarked at sea on a seaplane and flew into Newport, R. I.
Mr. Keefe. Now, I note that on the 15th of September 1941 the Secretary of the Navy Knox, speaking to the American Legion convention said, and I quote:

Beginning tomorrow the American Navy will provide protection as adequate as we can make it for ships of every flag carrying these aid supplies between the American continent and the waters adjacent to Iceland. These ships are ordered to capture and destroy by every means at their disposal Axis controlled submarines or surface raiders encountered in those waters. This is [3648] our answer to Hitler’s declaration that he will try to sink every ship his vessels encounter on the route leading from the United States to British ports.
No, things were getting pretty critical at that time, were they not?
Mr. Keefe. And I assume, General Marshall, that it is a fair statement that you as Chief of Staff were very worried about the situation in the Pacific and what might happen?
Mr. Keefe. You knew at that time that we were not prepared for a war in the Pacific, didn't you?
Mr. Keefe. And you tried to make that clear, did you not, all along?
Mr. Keefe. You wanted any possibility of a war in the Pacific to be held off and stalled, I believe you used the word "stalled" in your testimony, as long as possible?
General Marshall. I probably did.
Mr. Keefe. That was your attitude, wasn't it?
Mr. Keefe. And it was the attitude of Admiral Stark, too, was it not?
[3649] General Marshall. According to statements I recollect of his, that was his attitude.
Mr. Keefe. Well, you had frequent discussions back and forth and were on terms of intimacy almost daily with him?
General Marshall. I am not saying he did not, sir, I said according to statements that he made that I heard that was his attitude.
Mr. Keefe. General Marshall, you may have had private conversations back and forth that are not reflected in statements. What I am trying to get is the actual state of mind.
General Marshall. I think I confused you, Mr. Keefe. I was merely endeavoring not to testify for Admiral Stark. What I said was that according to statements I heard him make that was his attitude.
Mr. Keefe. He made those statements to you?
General Marshall. Either to me or in my presence.
Mr. Keefe. I see. Well, then, a constant revision of war plans was going on all this time, wasn't there?
General Marshall. I would have to qualify that somewhat, sir. The war plans had been formally agreed upon so far as our own government was concerned. What we were concerned with at those times was the means for implementing the war plans.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Mr. Keefe. You had to get supplies and you were faced with the dilemma of the allocation of those supplies, were you not?
General Marshall. That was the great dilemma throughout all of this period.
Mr. Keefe. Where they should go.
General Marshall. Where they should go.
Mr. Keefe. There was an insistent demand for supplies to be sent to the Allies on the European front?
Mr. Keefe. And likewise you knew that there had to be some supplies, too, at strategic points in the Pacific?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And you were trying to take whatever available supplies there were and to make the best use of them and see that Panama and Hawaii and MacArthur out there at Manila got whatever it was possible to send them?

General Marshall. Those were the critical decisions that I had to make at that time.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, did any person influence your decision as to the distribution of these supplies?

General Marshall. Well, I could not say that, sir. [3651] Pressure was brought on to me from numerous directions, inside the Government, outside the Government and a little free-handed advice.

Mr. Keeffe. You were being hit from all sides, weren't you?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. That had been going on for about a year and a half and it reached a peak at this time. All the commanders, of course, every commander wants all that he can possibly use for his own interests in carrying out his own mission and, naturally, they were making their pressures as well as the Russian Government and the British Government and the people of the Netherlands East Indies and the Chinese Government. They were to me direct, they were to the State Department I am quite certain, they were to the President, they were to any influence they thought might achieve the results they desired.

Mr. Keeffe. You were convinced, were you not, as early as August 1941 that if the current of events continued as they had up to that time we would inevitably be drawn into a war with Japan as a matter of necessity?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. It was my reaction at that time.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. Can you state whether it was the reaction of Admiral Stark?


Mr. Keeffe. Did you ever discuss that situation with him?

General Marshall. That specific factor I do not recall. It is probable that I did.

Mr. Keeffe. Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Stimson?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I am quite certain I did.

Mr. Keeffe. Was he of the same opinion from the expressions that he gave to you?

General Marshall. I hesitate to try to recall just what his opinions were. He was deeply concerned. He regarded the situation as critical and it was a daily, almost hourly, trouble in his mind as to what was the proper course of this Government.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, General Marshall, you well knew the character of the Japanese during this whole period?


Mr. Keeffe. And the double talk that they were engaged in, did you not?

General Marshall. I assume that you have to read all diplomatic exchanges of theirs with a grain of salt.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, maybe that is a bad expression, double talk, but as I look at this correspondence I can think of nothing that more aptly describes it. You were getting their [3652A] talk from
their intercepts and then you had what they were telling Mr. Hull openly in these negotiations?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And you knew that it was double talk, did you not, at that time?

General Marshall. That was my impression except that there is one message there, in their magic. I have forgotten the particular message, it is in the latter part of November, where they go into the matter, I think, of the date, the limiting date of November 25.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. Well, we will get to that.

General Marshall. When they use the expression "to make impossible further diplomatic relations."

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. Now, the War Department and the Navy Department, I gained the impression from the conversation up to date, were called upon to implement the diplomatic representations. Did you so understand it?

General Marshall. I do not believe I would put it quite that way, sir. We were notified of the diplomatic conversations and it was left to us to find what should be done to back them up. Also, we were consulted as to whether we were prepared to back up the possible consequences of certain diplomatic moves should they be made.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, did you advise the State Department [3052B] that you were not prepared?

General Marshall. I advised Mr. Hull. I think personally, some time in September that December 5 was the earliest date that I could figure when we would be reasonably prepared, particularly in the Philippines.

Mr. Keeffe. And Admiral Stark, I believe you testified the other day, thought some time in February?

General Marshall. He mentioned along the 1st of February, I think, from the viewpoint of the Fleet.

Mr. Keeffe. And that the Fleet was not prepared at that time to meet reasonable eventualities in the Pacific?


Mr. Keeffe. And you figured if things came along as you planned you perhaps could get things out there to reasonably prepare our defenses in the Pacific by the 5th of December?

General Marshall. I thought we would have the troops, and particularly the planes.

Mr. Keeffe. And you were very concerned particularly to see that diplomatic negotiations did not cause a break before that time, so that you could be prepared?


Mr. Keeffe. Well, all this time this great mass and volume of communications as evidenced by all this mass of exhibits was taking place? [3052C] General Marshall. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. But fundamentally and reduced down to a thing that the man on the street can understand, you were concerned with getting our defenses ready in the Pacific to meet the situation which you were convinced as early as August was inevitable and you thought that if you could stall this thing along until the 5th of December you could get those defenses fairly ready to meet what you could see coming, is that a fair statement?
General Marshall. Roughly that, sir, with this addition: I had thought that if we could build up and might have been able to build up by December 5 our defenses in the Philippines it might discourage the Japanese from any hostile action because it would be too hazardous.

Mr. Keefe. Because from all the indications that you could see they were moving down south?

General Marshall. That their purpose was a southern campaign.

Mr. Keefe. And the Philippines were on their flank?

General Marshall. And the Philippines were on their flank.

Mr. Keefe. And if you could build up the defenses in the Philippines sufficiently you thought it would deter them from proceeding along down the course you thought they had been pursuing?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I thought it would deter them from any overt act.

Mr. Keefe. Did you think that the development of the defenses in the Hawaiian area would deter them?

General Marshall. I thought the existing defenses in the Hawaiian Department would deter them from an effort directed at Hawaii.

Mr. Keefe. Was it your opinion in the summer of 1941 that the very presence of the Fleet out there at Hawaii would act as a deterrent?

General Marshall. I thought that that had a deterrent effect.

Mr. Keefe. Now, as the events progressed, General Marshall, all through the summer of 1941 and in the fall of 1941 there was no evidence so far as the Japs were concerned that they were being deterred by the presence of the fleet, was there?

General Marshall. The Japs continued throughout that period to make moves which were unopposed at that time, of course, due to the inability of the Indochina people and the Eastern Thailand people to oppose them and the Chinese themselves to oppose them, so they continued definitely with their various moves throughout that period. I might add that in speaking of building up the defenses of the Philippines sufficient to cause the Japanese to hesitate, if not to give up the idea of an overt act, I still assumed that they would take as much as they could get, you might say, for nothing by their various infiltration moves that were then in progress in Indochina specifically.

Mr. Keefe. Do you know Stanley Hornbeck?


Mr. Keefe. You knew he was counsellor to the State Department?

General Marshall. I was aware of that fact, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You were in conferences in which he participated, were you not, during this period?

General Marshall. I do not specifically recall his presence. He may have been present. I do not recall any discussion with him personally myself.

Mr. Keefe. Did you ever get any confidential memorandum from him?

General Marshall. I may have. I do not recall right now, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I have before me what appears to be some memoranda prepared by Mr. Hornbeck on December 1 of 1941, which Harmon Duncombe, Lieutenant Colonel, says he understood were addressed to the Army and Navy.
[3652F] Now, I have asked, I will say, of counsel for all those communications. I have been furnished with two. Will the counsel make a further statement now if he can find the communications that passed from Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. Gesell. We are making that search and the State Department has communicated with Mr. Hornbeck in the Netherlands directly. We have furnished the committee so far with the memos that have been located.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for one question so that I may ascertain something from counsel?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Is it true, counsel, that the Army records show that there are no—or the Navy records show that there are no Hornbeck statements in their records? Is that what you said?

Mr. Gesell. They have so reported.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So that as we now understand it, the committee counsel are unable to get any of the Hornbeck statements from the Navy?

Mr. Gesell. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And from the Army other than those that have been distributed?

Mr. Gesell. That is correct.

[3653] Senator Ferguson. Have they been distributed generally?

Mr. Gesell. No. We are trying to get all of them together before we distribute them.

Senator Ferguson. They haven't been distributed then?

Mr. Gesell. I think we gave them to Mr. Keefe when they came in because it was his request and I think Mr. Keefe has the ones that have come from the Army.

Mr. Keefe. I have them before me.

Senator Ferguson. I am sorry to interrupt but I wanted to get that on the record.

Mr. Keefe. I have a letter, photostatic copy of a letter dated December 1, 1941, addressed to the Hon. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, signed by Stanley K. Hornbeck, in which it says (reading):

I send you herewith for your strict personal and strictly confidential information—but for whatever use you may care to make of the thought contained, without quotation or attribution—a copy of a memorandum of date November 5 which was made immediately after a conference the participants in which were the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, the author of this memorandum being present.

Do you recall that conversation?


Mr. Keefe. It was on November 5, 1941, General Marshall, [3654] according to Mr. Hornbeck's letter to the Secretary of War. Now, this memorandum reads as follows, and I quote:

There are two points in particular to which, in my opinion, the War Department and the Navy Department, in their estimate of the Far Eastern situation and its problems do not give sufficient consideration.

Now, to interject at this point, who was this man Hornbeck and what was his business?

General Marshall. I think you said he was the counsellor of the State Department.
Mr. Keefe. Was he giving orders to the Army and Navy?


Mr. Keefe. I recall some testimony of Admiral Richardson that he seemed to think that he was being ordered around by Hornbeck instead of the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, is that a question?

The Chairman. The chair does not know.

Mr. Keefe. If you will keep still a minute you will be able to ascertain from what I say, Mr. Murphy.

Now, General Marshall, I take it that you did not believe that Mr. Hornbeck was giving any orders to the Chief of Staff, did you?


Mr. Keefe. But he might have been giving advice, we will put it that way.


Mr. Keefe. He is presently over in the Netherlands, isn't he, the United States Minister at the Netherlands?

General Marshall. I heard that said a moment ago.

Mr. Keefe. Well, being as how you are going to be our new Ambassador to China maybe you will get acquainted with him after a while. I call your attention to him.

Now, this is what he says, continuing this quote:

First: There actually is going on in the Pacific a war: Japan and China are at war. The Chinese-Japanese war is a part of the world conflict between on the one hand powers which are engaged in aggression and on the other hand powers which are resisting aggression.

Just to interject, this is news and information that he is giving to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War. He further said:

Japan is a power which is engaged in aggression in one part of the world and is an ally of powers which are engaged in aggression in another part of the world. The Chinese are resisting Japan in one part of the world and they regard themselves as being morally and in general objective an ally of powers which are actively resisting Japan in another part of the world and are passively resisting Japan in regions adjacent to the theater of Japanese-Chinese hostilities. The Chinese would be shocked at a concept that there is at present "peace in the Pacific" and that the problem of the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific is that of seeing that there continues to be peace in that area.

Second: A termination of Japanese-Chinese hostilities in the not distant future and certainly before Germany is defeated is not inconceivable. Suppose that, either by virtue of a break-down in Chinese morale followed by a negotiated peace between Japan and China, or by virtue of a break-down in Chinese capacity to make armed resistance which might come from a closing of the Burma Road and general insufficiency of material aid from outside, Chinese resistance to Japan were to cease. Japan would then be relieved of the entanglement of her "China Incident" and would be in a position to turn her fleet and whatever else she still possesses of capacity for military adventuring into new moves either southward or northward or eastward. Should it not be a constant object of British and American political, economic and military strategy to keep China's moral and material capacity to resist Japan at a high enough point to ensure against a termination of Chinese resistance.

Did you ever see that message?


[3657] Mr. Keefe. Well, he states that this is the result of the conversations had with the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, at which he was present.

General Marshall. I understood that was his reaction following the conversations.
Mr. Keefe. That was made immediately after the conference of November 5.

Do you remember that conference at all?

General Marshall. I know there was a conference on November 5, at which I was present, but the details of it, at the moment, I cannot recall. I did not recall even that Mr. Hornbeck was present.

Mr. Keefe. Well, this profound memorandum which discloses the existence of a state of war over there between the Japs and Chinese did not impress you very much, did it, General Marshall?

General Marshall. Throughout all of this period, from the spring of 1940 straight through up to the actual entry of the United States into the war, I always found that the individual who was concerned with the particular theater or area quite naturally put the conditions of that area to the forefront, and our great problem was balancing all these frontenats, if I may put it that way, in obtaining the general picture of what was the proper thing, or what was the proper attitude for this Government.

In that particular memorandum Mr. Hornbeck is representing the critical situation of China and the effect of the collapse of China on the general situation in the Pacific.

There were many others, as I recall, but not specifically the names, who were intense in their desire to have more done for China and more consideration of the Chinese factors. We were aware of those, and our problem was to balance them against this whole plot, as to what might be the proper thing to do.

Mr. Keefe. You were perfectly aware of that situation as Chief of Staff, General Marshall?


Mr. Keefe. You were just as anxious for the Chinese in this particular war as anybody in the Government?

General Marshall. That remained our policy to the end.

Mr. Keefe. That has been the policy from the start to the finish, has it not?


Mr. Keefe. It was simply a question of how much supplies you could make available to them, and that you could deliver to them?


Mr. Keefe. Well, now, General Marshall, the evidence is replete with records of intercepts, conferences between the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the President, and the State Department, all during this period, during September and October of 1941, and we have a mountain of exhibits here dealing with the situation as it existed during that period of time.

You are aware of that, aren't you?

Mr. Murphy. May I inquire—

Mr. Keefe. No, I do not yield.

Mr. Murphy. Just as to whether the whole memorandum was read?

The Chairman. The Congressman did not yield.

Mr. Murphy. I just made an inquiry as to whether all the memorandum was read.

Mr. Keefe. Well, of course, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. Murphy. I have never seen it. I was just wondering whether it was all read.
The Chairman. The Chair cannot answer the question.
Mr. Keefe. Of course, I would not think of reading the letter into the record unless I read it all, as it has been furnished to me.

Mr. Keefe. It is not a letter to start with. It is a memorandum submitted to the Secretary of War, and I read it all, Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Mr. Keefe. For what it is worth. I did not think it was worth much myself.
Mr. Murphy. I though there was a part omitted.
Mr. Keefe. I could not conceive anybody writing such tripe as that to anybody unless there was some conclusion, or unless there was more substance in it than what appears.
The Chairman. Let us proceed.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may we have a little levity in this proceeding? Otherwise, it is too stale.
The Vice Chairman. The whole report has been furnished to you and not to the other members of this committee.
Mr. Keefe. It is right here and you can look at it.
The Chairman. If we are unable to finish with General Marshall before Mr. Hornbeck's time expires in the Netherlands, we may ask him about it.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Now, General Marshall, these wily Japs finally delivered the note to Mr. Hull, the note of the 20th of November; you remember that, do you not?

Mr. Keefe. In which they laid down certain points.
Mr. Keefe. That is the note that Mr. Hull says was the Japanese ultimatum to America. The record discloses that after that note was delivered, there was a lot of discussion between the 20th and 26th of November between Mr. Hull and the Japanese envoys, and a lot of discussion between all the upper levels in the Government, and as nearly as I can get at it, it was suggested that an answer to that Japanese note of the 20th be prepared, and the Japs in their note of the 20th had asked for some concessions. Do you recall that?
Mr. Keefe. Whether they were honest or not in it is beside the question. They asked for certain concessions and they made certain demands, and so the top level got together and talked the thing over. "Now, what are we going to do?"
Now, this is as I see it, and I want you to correct me if I am wrong, because I am not going into all this mass of detail:
As far as you and Admiral Stark were concerned, you were trying to stall these Japs along so there would not [3662] be a final break, weren't you?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So there was a discussion of a modus vivendi.
General Marshall. Yes, sir. Mr. Keefe. And that was talked over with Lord Halifax, wasn't it? He came into the discussions, did he not?
General Marshall. I believe it was, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Weren't you present at any discussions at which he was present?
General Marshall. It would be a matter of record. I do not recall it.
Mr. Keeffe. Well, I think it fairly appears that the matter was discussed by all interested parties. We were working in pretty close association at that time with the Chinese, the British, and Dutch, weren't we?
Mr. Keeffe. And any thing that was done, was considered to be a joint action at that late date, was it not?
General Marshall. I do not know as that would be the correct way to state it, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Well, it would be action taken after joint conversations; put it that way. Did you so understand it?
[3663] General Marshall. I would not say even that was a correct statement, sir.
I think there was a very general interchange of views, opinions, and desires among the representatives of these various governments. But to what extent that would have been considered binding on our Government, meaning Mr. Hull, in his dealings, as to whether or not he dared to do this, or dared to do that without a formal consultation or agreement with the British or Dutch, I do not know, sir.
[3664] Mr. Keeffe. Well, in any event, there were a lot of discussions and the President participated in them?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. And there is evidence when they came to drawing up the reply to the Japs the President wrote some memorandum and made some suggestions as to certain points that should be incorporated in that memorandum. You perhaps have not seen that, but it is here in the evidence.
Mr. Keeffe. I cannot put my hand on it immediately, but I think, Mr. Counsel, I am correct in that, that the President made a memorandum. I have forgotten the exhibit number.
Mr. Gesell. There is a memorandum contained in the modus vivendi exhibit. I think it is Exhibit 18.
Mr. Keeffe. Exhibit 18. I have it before me.
As a result of these conversations you were supplied, and so was the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, with a copy of the proposed message as it was finally drafted, or the proposed reply, and you looked it over, did you not?
General Marshall. My recollection is—I can refresh my memory here—I was not present at the discussion. General Gerow represented me. Admiral Stark may have been present, I don't know.
Mr. Keeffe. I thought you prepared a joint memorandum, [3665] that you made some suggestions.
(A document was handed to General Marshall.)
General Marshall. Are you speaking of the meeting of November 24 or November 21?
Mr. Keeffe. Well, I am speaking of what took place with respect to your knowledge and what your recommendations were with respect to this message from which the modus vivendi was finally deleted, and sent on the 26th.
General Marshall. May I read that?
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
General Marshall. This is a memorandum to me, dated November 24, 1941.

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

It is signed by General Gerow. He says:

A conference was held in the State Department at 9:45 a.m., November 21, 1941. Present: Secretary Hull, Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, Admiral Stark, and General Gerow. Secretary Hull requested the Army and Navy representatives to express their informal views from a military standpoint on a draft of a tentative outline of a basis for agreement with Japan (Tab A). He explained that the outline was in a formative stage and had not been adopted by the State Department.

Is this all right, for me to read this?

[3666] Mr. Keefe. It is all right if you want to. It identifies it in your mind; does it not?
Mr. Keefe. It answers my question.
General Marshall. This was handed to me on my return to Washington here on the 24th. Attached to it was a copy of the memorandum which I believe is called the modus vivendi.
Mr. Keefe. Did you go over it at that time?
General Marshall. I went over it at that time.
Mr. Keefe. Did you prepare or help to prepare the modus vivendi?
General Marshall. I agreed with General Gerow's statements in regard to it, that the comments of Admiral Stark and General Gerow were acceptable, but I felt that General Gerow's statement regarding the portion of Admiral Stark's memorandum that made reference to the Army Forces in provision A-1, as to restrictions that should be placed on the Army's preparations to make the Philippines secure, was not acceptable.

In other words, the modus vivendi as drawn up, from a military point of view, we interposed no objections to, except as to a statement that Admiral Stark probably indirectly became involved in in his memorandum, that implied that we could not go ahead with the further strengthening of the garrison in the Philippines, and to that I was not agreeable.

[3667] Mr. Keefe. Well, so far as the modus vivendi was concerned, you were willing to agree to that?
General Marshall. Willing to agree to that, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You think if that was submitted to the Japs it might have had the effect of stalling the negotiations along a little bit longer?
General Marshall. I found a note somewhere here, and I don't know whether I am speaking from the note or speaking from memory, that we thought the terms were too stiff and they would not accept it.
Mr. Keefe. You personally thought that the terms were too stiff and they would not accept it anyway?
General Marshall. I think that is right.
Mr. Keefe. Even with the modus vivendi?
Mr. Keefe. Let me get that straight. Do I understand after reading this over, after it was submitted to you by General Gerow on,
I believe, the 24th, on your return, you concluded that the message was too stiff even with the modus vivendi in it, and that they would not accept it?

General MARSHALL. That was my guess at it.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you talk with Admiral Stark about that?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But with the suggested changes and modifications [3665] which were contained in General Gerow's letter, from a purely Army situation you were willing that it should be sent?

General MARSHALL. Shall I read General Gerow's memorandum, in which I concurred?

Mr. KEEFE. You do not have to, as far as I am concerned.

General MARSHALL (reading):

War Plans Division has made a hasty study from a military viewpoint of your tentative "Outline of Proposed Bases for Agreement Between the United States and Japan," and perceives no objection to its use as a basis for discussion. The adoption of its provisions would attain one of our present major objectives—the avoidance of war with Japan. Even a temporary peace in the Pacific, would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British—both of which are highly important.

The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict adherence to all the conditions outlined in the proposed agreement. War Plans Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importance to the success of our war effort in Europe that we reach a modus vivendi with Japan.

War Plans Division suggests the deletion of Par. B-5. The proposal contained in that paragraph would probably be entirely unacceptable to Russia.

I will not read any further on that.

[3669] The paper has been considered as a whole. If major changes are made in its provisions, it is requested that the War Department be given an opportunity to consider the military aspects of such changes.

The Chief of Staff if out of the city and consequently this paper has not been presented for his consideration. War Plans Division believes that he would concur in the views expressed above.

Which I did.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, General Marshall, from evidence already in the statement of Secretary Hull, it appears that this proposed draft which you saw, and subject to the modifications contained in General Gerow's memorandum, which you approved, especially the modus vivendi, that was sent through Lord Halifax over to London to get their reaction.

There appears here a message from the Former Naval Person in exhibit 23 which reads:

Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter-project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai-Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about [3670] China. If they collapse our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves.

Signed "Winant."

When you went over this did it occur to you that the proposed message would provide a very thin diet for Chiang Kai-shek?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You had the same opinion, did you?
General Marshall. I had the same opinion, but we could not figure out any other method of handling the matter at the time.

Mr. Keefe. You were willing to take a chance?

General Marshall. We were forced to take a chance.

[3671] Mr. Keefe. Were you made aware of the protest which followed from Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese Ambassador?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. Keefe. They protested very vigorously against sending this message with the modus vivendi in it, did they not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; they did.

Mr. Keefe. They were not willing to concede to Japan anything, and virtually said they would get out of the war, and it would create a break-down of the Chinese morale if you sent such a message.


Mr. Keefe. That is a rough statement. Never having been in the State Department service, General Marshall, I sometimes speak a little roughly. But, generally speaking, that is the situation?


Mr. Keefe. Well, now, were you consulted by Mr. Hull, or the President, or anybody else after you got this message from Gerow and expressed your approval of it, with certain reservations, did you have any further conversations about sending this message?

General Marshall. I think there was a meeting at the White House about the time of my return. I believe it was [3672] on the 24th. I will check that in just a moment.

I participated in a meeting at the White House at 12:15 p.m. on November 25 with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Stark.

Mr. Keefe. What happened there?

General Marshall. I beg your pardon, sir?

Mr. Keefe. What happened at that conference?

General Marshall. I do not recall the details of the meeting. It is possible, and I believe it was brought up the other day, that I can find a reminder and some definite facts from Mr. Stimson's testimony based on his diary at the time.

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any present recollection as to what that conference was about?

General Marshall. No, sir. I imagine it was in regard to this message. That might or might not be exact.

Mr. Keefe. Then you do not, as I understand it, have any present recollection about that?


Mr. Keefe. As to what this conference was on the 25th at the White House?

General Marshall. No, sir. I merely got the impression, in line with all these other occurrences, that that [3673] must have been the basis of the discussion.

Mr. Keefe. Do you now have any present recollection as to what the determination was as the result of that conference?

General Marshall. I have not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Were you advised at that time, or at any time later, before this message was finally sent on the 26th, as to the deletion, or proposed deletion, of the modus vivendi?
General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir.

Mr. Keefe. When did you first learn that Mr. Hull had sent this message of the 26th, after deleting the modus vivendi proposal?

General Marshall. I assume I learned that on the 28th, on my return to Washington.

Mr. Keefe. After you came back from the maneuvers?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. My assumption is based on the fact of a recollection I think, of Mr. Stimson in his testimony where he said he did not learn until the morning of the 27th regarding exactly what had happened. But that is a matter of fact, and there is not much point in my commenting on it.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you were very much concerned when you heard that the message had been sent without the modus vivendi, weren't you?

General Marshall. I do not recall my reaction, sir.

I was busy trying to get things together in every way I could.

Mr. Keefe. Did not you send a message to the President about the 27th?

General Marshall. We sent a joint memorandum, Admiral Stark and myself, to the President on the 27th, in appreciation of the situation in the Far East, and with certain recommendations.

Mr. Keefe. When you sent that message, did you have knowledge that Secretary Hull had sent his message of the 26th?

General Marshall. My recollection is that Admiral Stark and myself made our comments regarding the preparation of such a message of the 26th. I do not know, but I gather the impression here that the War Department, at least Mr. Stimson, did not know of the dispatch of the State Department message of the 26th until the 27th. That being the case, we would not have known at the time the basis of that memorandum was prepared that the message had or had not been sent.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I would like to get this thing clear in my mind and see if we can pin it down. You had a conference at the White House on the 25th?


Mr. Keefe. You do not recall what that conference was about, but you assume that involved a discussion of this reply to the Jap message of the 20th?


Mr. Keefe. But you are unable to give us any of the details of that conversation?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Prior to that time you had discussions as to the message that was proposed embodying the modus vivendi?


Mr. Keefe. You did not learn from that meeting, as I understand your testimony, that the Secretary of State proposed to delete the modus vivendi from the message?

General Marshall. I have no such recollection.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, did you prepare, as a result of that meeting, a joint statement with Admiral Stark?

General Marshall. I was trying to find whether in the record of the Joint Board on the morning of the 26th there, [3676] was a definite statement on the preparation of this particular memorandum.
There appears to be no reference in it, so I will have to depend on my memory, which is not at all good on this particular memorandum.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, General Marshall, let's see if we can get this pinned down. You left on the afternoon of the 26th, didn't you, for maneuvers, didn't you?

General Marshall. At 1 p.m.

Mr. Keeffe. So, if you had any discussions with Admiral Stark, you must have had them after the meeting at the White House on the 25th or the morning of the 26th?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Am I correct in assuming that this memorandum for the President, which is dated November 27, 1941, and apparently is signed by Stark and Marshall, was, in fact, prepared before you left for the maneuvers on the afternoon of the 26th?

General Marshall. I do not think the expression "was in fact prepared" would be quite correct, because I rather imagine that the preparation was started at that time, the completed memorandum was ready on the 27th, and I must have signed it on the morning of the 28th.

Mr. Keeffe. You signed it on the morning of the 28th?

[3677] General Marshall. I must have signed it on the morning of the 28th.

Mr. Keeffe. You signed it on the morning of the 28th?

General Marshall. I wasn't here the 27th, and the memorandum is dated the 27th.

Mr. Keeffe: Well, would anybody else sign your name to it?

General Marshall. I don't believe so, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. The memorandum is dated the 27th?


Mr. Keeffe. What you were talking about was the proposed reply to the Japanese message of the 25th in this memorandum; isn't that true?

General Marshall (reading):

If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: The Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; The Philippines; The Russian Maritime Provinces.

Then it goes into a discussion of the various probabilities, and it ends up with the definite recommendations:

Prior to the completion of the Philippines reinforcement, military counter-action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens the United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined:

[3678] In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war;

Prior to such warning, no military opposition be undertaken;

Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

The memorandum is dated the 27th. I was absent from Washington on the 27th. I returned and was in the office early on the morning of the 28th.

Mr. Keeffe. Where is the original document? Is that here? A photostat of the original, counsel?

Mr. Gesell. The November 27th memorandum?

Mr. Keeffe. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Yes. That is downstairs in our files.
Mr. Keeffe. Can you get it, please?

Mr. Gesell. Certainly.

Mr. Keeffe. At the time this memorandum was discussed or prepared, did you know that Secretary Hull had deleted the modus vivendi, and had sent his message of the 26th?

General Marshall. I have no specific recollection. I would rather imagine I did not.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, you have told us, General Marshall, that when you read the proposed message, you were of the opinion that even with the modus vivendi in it, it was so stiff that the Japs wouldn't accept it?

General Marshall. I thought the terms were too stiff.

Mr. Keeffe. When did you first learn that the message had been sent and the modus vivendi proposals were eliminated?

General Marshall. I think that must have been on the morning of November 28th, from the Secretary of War.

Mr. Keeffe. That is when you came back?


Mr. Keeffe. Did you talk with the Secretary of State after that to ascertain why he had sent this message and eliminated the modus vivendi?

General Marshall. I recall no such discussion.

Mr. Keeffe. Did he ever tell you that the diplomatic negotiations were all over, and from now on, it is up to the Army and the Navy to run the show, or words to that effect?

General Marshall. I testified previously, and I have a very clear recollection of this specific statement by Mr. Hull to me, or to Admiral Stark and myself: "These fellows mean to fight."—

[3679] Mr. Keeffe. When was that?

General Marshall. I haven't completed the statement.

Mr. Keeffe. I beg pardon.

General Marshall. "These fellows mean to fight, you will have to watch out," or words to that effect. "These fellows mean to fight," I have a clear recollection of his using those exact words. Just what was the meeting, when was the meeting, at which he said that, I don't recall, but I think it was one of the last meetings, probably the last meeting before the actual break of December 7.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, was that the last meeting? When you say last meeting do you mean the meeting before he sent his message of the 26th?

General Marshall. I stated I don't recall at which one of these discussions he stated that. I am quite certain, though, that it was after the Japanese envoys came to Washington.

Mr. Keeffe. General Marshall, I confess that my mind is indistinct—maybe we agree on that, both of us—as to the events of the particular period, and it is very important that we try to get these facts as clearly as possible.

Now, I realize that you left here at 1 o'clock on the 26th of November. You went down to maneuvers—in North Carolina?


Mr. Keeffe. You came back when?

Mr. Keefe. When you got back to your office on the morning of the 28th you found this Gerow report to you, did you?

General Marshall. I think so; yes, sir; that is the probability.

Mr. Keefe. Now, what concerns me is the fact that here is your memorandum for the President, which is dated November 27, 1941, the time when you were down in North Carolina; you can't give us any clear recollection now as to when this memorandum was prepared?

General Marshall. No, sir; I cannot, but I imagine General Gerow can tell you specifically, as he prepared it, working with the Naval opposite.

Mr. Keefe. Did Gerow prepare this memorandum of the 27th?

General Marshall. That would be a joint matter between General Gerow and his assistants and the naval opposite and that man’s assistants.

Mr. Keefe. Then I understand you personally didn't discuss this matter with Admiral Stark?

General Marshall. No, sir; I said the preparation of [3682] the memorandum. I didn’t say the discussion.

Mr. Keefe. Well. I will pass that over. Let General Marshall look at it and see if that is his signature. I don’t know. Is that your signature on the photostatic copy of this message of November 27?

(A document was handed to General Marshall.)

General Marshall. I would say that it was, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then it is apparently signed.


Mr. Keefe. You couldn't have signed it on the 27th?


Mr. Keefe. Because you were in North Carolina. Do you have any recollection now of when you did sign it, after looking at the message?

General Marshall. No, sir. I was looking for some office mark on here to see the date of delivery but I don’t get that.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, will the Congressman yield for a question?

Mr. Keefe. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel, does this photo show that it is the original of the White House file?

Mr. Gesell. No. Just the original signed copy. It is from the White House files.

[3683] Senator Ferguson. Does is show any stamp anywhere of receipt?

Mr. Gesell. No. We have examined it for that very carefully and have not found any. I see nothing on there that shows when it was received by the President.

Mr. Keefe. What was that, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. Gesell. I see nothing on there that shows when it was received by the President.

Mr. Keefe. Is that message which has been produced, the photostat copy; is that taken from the White House files?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. I thought it said on the face of it from Navy files.

Mr. Gesell. On the corner it says “Navy folder,” which is the folder of the White House files in which it was placed.

Mr. Keefe. This is the original message that was delivered to the White House?
Mr. Gesell. This document was made available to us by Miss Grace Tully from the files of President Roosevelt. It is the original.

Mr. Gesell. I would like to call the Congressman's attention to the fact that it is on the stationery of the Navy Department, which suggests that it was actually typed [3684] at the Navy Department. We had in mind asking Admiral Stark, if he gets on the stand, or Admiral Turner, more concerning it.

Mr. Keefe. I expect to ask some questions too about it when Admiral Stark gets on the stand, but here is one of the joint signers of the document that is now on the stand. So that we may get as much information as we can as we go along is why I am asking these questions of General Marshall.

General Marshall, am I correct in the assumption that you had a meeting on the 25th of November at the White House?


Mr. Keefe. What time of day was that meeting?

General Marshall. Twelve-fifteen p.m.

Mr. Keefe. How long did it last?

General Marshall. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Keefe. In any event, you had a meeting at the White House at which Admiral Stark was present?

General Marshall. A meeting at which Admiral Stark was present, and also the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and myself.

Mr. Keefe. That must have been a fairly important meeting, with all those top-flight men there.


Mr. Keefe. Wouldn't you say so?


Mr. Keefe. But you can't tell use of any independent recollection, anything that took place at that meeting?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. I am told by assistant counsel here, that the meeting lasted an hour and a half, according to Mr. Stimson's diary.

Mr. Keefe. There is set forth in Mr. Stimson's diary what took place. If you don't have any present recollection as to what took place, I don't care for any guesses about it, General; I would be glad to have you read from Mr. Stimson's diary if that will refresh your recollection.

General Marshall (reading):

There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem.

That does not stimulate my memory other than what I have told you that undoubtedly we were talking about what should be done regarding Japan.

May I say also, Mr. Keefe, at the risk of being unduly repetitious, that you gentlemen are bringing up things to me that have been, to a large extent, rubbed out by 4 years of global war. I have not investigated these things to refresh my memory until the past few days, and so I think it is not unduly remarkable that I would not
remember the detailed conversations and the frequency of conferences at which one we discussed this, and at which one we discussed [3687] that.

At the time, of course, I would have had a lively recollection. But there are some rather great events that have intervened. I think I have a fair memory, and I am giving you the best I can under the circumstances.

Mr. Keefe. General Marshall, I don't want anything said here, or any questions I have asked to be taken as indicating that I am critical. I appreciate as well as any other citizen of this country the tremendous responsibility that you had at that time and subsequent.

But this is a very important matter to this committee to get this chain of events pinned down, if we can, some place.

Now, is it your recollection—you have no recollection of what took place. There then appears, after this memorandum signed and dated—I don't say signed, but dated the 27th of November, addressed to the President—there must have been some reason for you making that memorandum. I am trying to discover the relationship between that memorandum and the proposal of Mr. Hull to send a reply to the Japanese message without a *modus vivendi*. Can you help this committee on that subject?

General Marshall. I think of nothing other than what I have already said, sir.

[3688] Mr. Keefe. In order that I may not be misled, do I understand your testimony to be that very likely General Gerow actually prepared this memorandum of November 27 during your absence?

General Marshall. I said very likely General Gerow and his naval opposite who would have been, in that case, I believe, Admiral Turner, and their assistants, worked on the preparation of a draft to be submitted to Admiral Stark and myself. That was the usual course in such matters.

Mr. Keefe. Then, because the message delivered to the President actually bears your signature, it is apparent that it wasn't signed by you at least until the morning of the 28th?

General Marshall. That would appear to be the case, sir. My guess is that Admiral Stark signed it, it was typed on the Navy side, it was sent over to the War Department—I was not here—and I presume it was left until the morning of the 28th, when I signed it.

Mr. Keefe. That was some considerable time after Mr. Hull had decided to delete the *modus vivendi* out of his November 26th message and send that message; hand it to the Japanese envoys?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

[3689] Mr. Keefe. So, up to the time that this message was prepared, or memorandum was prepared, for the President, you cannot state that you had any knowledge that Mr. Hull was going to send his reply to the Japs without the *modus vivendi*?

General Marshall. My own knowledge of that would come through what Mr. Stimson told me at the time, and we have read his diary on those statements. He was my informant.

Mr. Keefe. You do not have an independent recollection?

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Stimson will have to speak for himself. Well, in any event, General Marshall, when you got notice that that message had gone out, you were alarmed, weren't you?

General Marshall. I don't recall that particular reaction, sir. I was in a state of great concern throughout this period, and increasing concern every day.

[3690] Mr. Keefe. Well, you have already told us that you thought the Japs couldn't possibly accept the message even with the modus vivendi in it and it would be rejected. Now, you people got busy with the idea of alerting our overseas theaters right at that time, did you not?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Was that prompted by the fact that you knew the Japs would turn this proposal down?

General Marshall. The alert message was prompted by the feeling that the diplomatic, at least diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, were trembling on the verge of rupture, with the possibility that it would mean actual war.

Mr. Keefe. So you felt that the overseas departments ought to be immediately alerted on a war basis?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That is why you sent that alert message out to MacArthur and to Panama and to the west coast and to Hawaii?


Mr. Keefe. I don't want to read that telegram into the record again. It has been read in 17 or 18 times. We are quite familiar with the terms of that message.

The Chairman. It is 12 o'clock. We will have to recess here until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, a recess was taken until 2 p.m. of the same day.)

[3691] afternoon session—2 p.m.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Congressman Keefe, are you ready to proceed?

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. Keefe. General, I understand that you have not been able to get the information which I had previously requested, namely, the reasons for the alert of June 17, 1940.

General Marshall. I was in the process of assembling that, Mr. Keefe. I asked them at the noon hour if they have completed, and they said they had not. They are doing the best they can.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, do you want the message we dug up this noon in the Navy Department?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. About the orders to Admiral Richardson to make a movement of the fleet?

Mr. Keefe. Yes; I would like to see it if you have it, please.

Mr. Mitchell. I am going to read it into the record. There is some material in it that, for secrecy reasons, are not material here. We would rather not read it.
Mr. Gesell. Mr. Mitchell refers to some code designation terms that we do not think should go into the public record, that is all. I will show them to you.

(The document was handed to Mr. Keefe.)

Mr. Keefe. This morning, General Marshall, I asked you some questions with respect to the June 17, 1940 alert, and I asked you whether you had information as to whether the fleet was maintained at Pearl Harbor during the period of that alert. My recollection is that you did not recall the circumstances with reference to the disposition of the fleet.

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. At that period.


Mr. Keefe. Do I so understand your testimony up to now?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. To refresh your recollection as to the events at that time I want to read into the record a direction from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet, entitled, "Secret. To be acknowledged." That appears in writing in the right-hand corner. It bears no date, but in the letter from the Navy transmitting it to Mr. Mitchell, the counsel, Mr. John Ford Baecher, lieutenant commander, U. S. N. R., states:

1. In response to your request that the Navy Department furnish a copy of the orders issued from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson directing the Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor and proceed to an unknown destination there is disclosed a photostatic copy of the dispatch from Opnav to Cincus designated "Secret. To be acknowledged."

2. It is noted that the dispatch is not dated, but by its position on the microfilm roll and the numerals contained in the time group number it is presumed that the dispatch originated on 19 June 1940.

Now this dispatch reads as follows:

Reliable sources persistently report any movement in force by major Fleet units toward Atlantic will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal. Army there informed and in alert status. I desire you make test on or about 24 June by having a major portion of Fleet in company put to sea without previous announcement but you arranging for leak to effect that probable destination is Canal, and this not denied by authorities Proceed toward Canal for approximately two days when return Hawaiian ports. Maintain radio silence exercising at your discretion. Anticipate ordering you to Washington for conference on your return.

Then down below on this message, in writing appears this notation:

20 June shown to General Marshall. He sent warning—

I do not know whether that is "warning" or not—well, he sent what appears to be "meg to Canal Zone."

Then below that in quotation marks:

Fleet may proceed to Atlantic. Possibility of sabotage continue about accordingly.

Now that notation on here indicates that you saw this message, General Marshall. Do you recall it?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I do not recall the specific message. I do now recall the movement order of the fleet for that purpose, as indicated in that message.

Mr. Keefe. What was the purpose of taking the fleet out of Pearl Harbor then at the time of that alert, on June 16, 1940?

General Marshall. I think that is explained in the message, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Will you look at the message and give what you conceive to be the explanation?

(The document was handed to General Marshall.)

General Marshall (reading):

Reliable sources persistently report any movement in force by major Fleet unit towards Atlantic will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal.

Mr. Keefe. Now stop right there. What report does that refer to, if you know?

General Marshall. I do not know offhand, sir.

“Army there informed”—that is the Canal—“and in alert [3695] status.” We already have that in the record. “I desire you make test”—that was the purpose of the fleet movement, I understand—on or about 24 June by having a major portion of Fleet in company put to sea without previous announcement but you arranging for leak to effect that probable destination is Canal and this not denied by authorities.

In other words, the Chief of Naval Operations desired Admiral Richardson to make a test on or about the 24th by doing what was directed in this message.

Mr. Keefe. A test of what?

General Marshall. Whether or not the enemy, the Japanese at that time, would attempt sabotage in the Canal. The Army was already alerted in the Canal.

Mr. Keefe. Was it sabotage, if you know? That the dispatch of this message and the deployment of the Fleet in that manner would encourage the Japs to commit sabotage out in the Canal? Was that the purpose of it?

General Marshall (reading):

Reliable sources persistently report any movement in force by major Fleet units toward Atlantic will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal.

That is pretty plain, it seems to me. Now the Chief of Naval Operations directed that a test be made of that, knowing at the time that the Army was already alerted in the Canal, and it would seem from this note at the bottom here in quotation marks that [3696] it probably refers to a message sent by me, I assume, to the Canal Commander of the Army at the time in connection with this message, so in addition to the alert he would also be aware of this bluff move.

[3697] Mr. Keefe. Now, would it be a fair interpretation of that message, General Marshall, to conclude that instructions were given to Admiral Richardson that if he proceeded toward the Atlantic, and that would be toward the Panama Canal, wouldn’t it?


Mr. Keefe. He might expect extensive sabotage, and for him to go away from Pearl Harbor, to hide himself where he wouldn’t be seen; isn’t that what that message tells him to do?


Reliable sources persistently report a movement in force by major fleet units toward Atlantic will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal.

Mr. Keefe. Well, it wouldn’t be expected then that he would sail the fleet toward the Canal in the face of those directions; that if he did, extensive sabotage would take place.

General Marshall. He is told to proceed toward the Canal for approximately 2 days. That is a very small portion of the distance.
Mr. Keefe. Well, in any event, General Marshall—I would like, Mr. Counsel, to have that offered as an exhibit.

Mr. Gesell. We will first have to mimeograph it.
Mr. Keefe. I have no objection to the deletion of those words which don't have anything to do with it, and are very secret code.
Mr. Mitchell. We will get a mimeographed copy with those words deleted.

Mr. Keefe. I would say, Mr. Chairman, so far as I am concerned, I concur with counsel in this matter, and I suppose it is up to the committee to say whether there shall be any deletion from that message or not.

The Chairman. The Chair will ask if there is any objection to the counsel having this message mimeographed with the omission of the code words, that have no relationship.

Mr. Keefe. That is right.

The Chairman. Without objection, that will be done and counsel will prepare mimeographed copies with those symbols eliminated.

Mr. Keefe. General Marshall, to get back to the events around the 26th and 27th of November 1941, as I understand the testimony, and if I am incorrect up to date, you correct me please—you had no part in the first preparation of the November 28 message—I understood that was prepared by General Gerow, the alert message sent on the 28th?

[3699] General Marshall. I had no part other than I may and probably did give instructions for the preparation of this message before my departure at 1 p. m. on November 26.

Mr. Keefe. I wanted to know whether I am correct in the assumption that when you learned that Mr. Hull had sent his message on the 26th to Japan that you at that time knew that war was inevitable, except as to the time of the actual strike.

General Marshall. I did not know on November 26th that Mr. Hull had sent his message.

Mr. Keefe. Did you know on the 28th?

General Marshall. I assume that the Secretary of War told me on the 28th what he had learned from Mr. Hull on the 27th.

Mr. Keefe. Well, in Mr. Stimson's testimony, to refresh your recollection, appearing in the report of the Army Board, with respect to the meeting of the 25th of November at the White House——

Mr. Gesell. What page, Congressman, please, so that we can show it to the General.

Mr. Keefe. Page 51.

Mr. Gesell. Thank you.

[3700] Mr. Keefe. This is the United States News copy that I am referring to:

The War Council met with Mr. Hull on the 25th of November, 1941.

This is the statement of the Board.

The tentative U. S. proposals to the Japanese were so drastic and harsh that Mr. Stimson testifies that when he read it his diary shows this was his contemporaneous impression of it:

"Hull showed me the proposal for a three-months truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, secured it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic."
You have testified here this morning that you were of the same opinion.
Mr. Keeffe. That is correct, is it not?
Mr. Keeffe. Then the Board says:

"Apparentlly the Secretary of War, in the light of his long experience with the Japanese, with whom he dealt extensively when he was Secretary of State to this Government, was concerned at the situation, for his diary continues: [3701] "We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall."

Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was to be precipitated by the action of the Secretary of State, Hull, necessitated his informing the Chief of Staff immediately of the threatened difficulty.

Do you recall him doing that?
General Marshall. Not specifically. He told me of practically every meeting he had. His custom was to come into my room which adjointed his.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you have any present recollection, General Marshall, of Secretary Stimson getting in touch with you after he talked with Hull, and Hull told him that he was going to send this message of the 26th?
Mr. Keeffe. You would leave that to Mr. Stimson and his diary?
Mr. Keeffe. Then the Board says:

"Next, the Secretary of War attended a meeting at the White House. His diary describes it:

"Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark and myself. There the President brought [3702] up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem."

Then the Board says:

Apparently, at that time no decision was reached and the entire matter was left for further consideration.

On the following day, November 26, 1941, the Stimson diary continues:

"Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and tell them that he had no other proposal at all."

Then the Board says:

Apparently on the 26th, in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his mind not to go through with the proposals shown the day before to the Secretary of War containing the plan for the "three-months truce."

Evidently the action "to kick the whole thing over" was accomplished by presenting to the Japanese the counter-proposal of the "ten points" which they took as an ultimatum.

Now, General Marshall, you were here the morning of the 26th, you left about 1:00 o'clock that day?
Mr. Keeffe. Did you talk with Secretary Stimson that morning of the 26th with reference to his conversation with Hull?
General Marshall. I have no recollection of it. The probability is I talked to Mr. Stimson that morning. Whether I talked with him before he went to the State Department or whether I talked after his return I don’t know, but it is quite a possibility that the Joint Board meeting lasted up until the time I left, nearly 1 o’clock.

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any present recollection of Mr. Stimson calling you and telling you that Hull was going to send this message on that day, the 26th, or hand it to the Japanese here in Washington?

General Marshall. I think I have a recollection of Mr. Stimson using that phrase “to kick the whole thing over.” That is confused with the amount I have read about it since and I don’t know whether my recollection is hindsight or of the day. I am quite certain Mr. Stimson talked to me because he talked to me every day and frequently each day during this period. I think the notes of the Joint Board will show that it was a rather lengthy meeting and there is a possibility that I left directly from the Joint Board for the plane. In that event it would have meant my seeing Mr. Stimson before the Joint Board meeting rather than the possibility that I was seeing him after the Joint Board meeting.

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Congressman, may I interpose?

Mr. Keefe. Surely.

Mr. Gesell. We made an inquiry over the lunch hour to see if we could find any telephone record of conversations held on the 26th between Secretary Stimson and General Marshall, anticipating the line of questioning which you were on before the recess.

The White House telephone records show that at 7:07 a.m. on the 26th Secretary Stimson called General Marshall. That is the only call through the White House telephone that is recorded on the 26th between Secretary Stimson and General Marshall. The other two calls involving General Marshall on that day are one at 10:30 when Admiral Stark called him but he was not there and Admiral Stark talked, I believe, to a Miss Thomas, who must have been General Marshall’s secretary, and a call at 1:25 p.m. by Admiral Stark where the record shows “M. M.” which means “never mind,” apparently again Admiral Stark being unable to reach General Marshall.

We have asked for a photostat of those records but couldn’t get it over the noon hour.

Mr. Keefe. Thank you very much for that information, Mr. Gesell. Just so that I may be correctly informed, reference has been made repeatedly to the White House telephone.

General Marshall, will you tell me just what is meant by that?

General Marshall. The White House maintains a switchboard and I believe——

Mr. Keefe. That is a switchboard in the White House?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. And I believe the lines leading up to that switchboard went through no other channel. They passed through no other switchboards.

Mr. Keefe. So if you wanted to get a quick contact with Mr. Stimson or vice versa you would call through this White House switchboard?

General Marshall. That and other reasons, too. It was supposed to be more secure because there was only one switchboard and very carefully selected operators were on the switchboard. And also they
were highly efficient and gave you very prompt service. I had one on my desk. I had one at my home. Mr. Stimson had the same.

Mr. Keefe. Now, General Marshall, if you are confused about the events of this particular period I wonder what about somebody like myself. I am utterly confused up to date. I want to try as diligently as I can to get these facts pinned down as accurately as possible.

[3706] Now, General Marshall, Secretary Stimson had a better recollection than you have about these events on the 25th and 26th because he kept a diary?


Mr. Keefe. You didn't keep a dairy?


Mr. Keefe. But if he made an entry in his diary you would believe the things he wrote about took place?


Mr. Keefe. Now, what is bothering me is this, you left for the maneuvers at 1 o'clock on the 26th. Evidently you had some conversation over the telephone with Admiral Stark or with somebody—who was it?

Mr. Gesell. Secretary Stimson; 7:07 a.m.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. That morning must have been pretty important.

7:07 he is calling you. Do you recall that telephone conversation?

General Marshall. No. He called me several times at 7 or thereabouts.

Mr. Keefe. Do you recall him calling you that morning of the 26th?


Mr. Keefe. You were getting ready to go on these maneuvers?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I probably was having breakfast at 7.

Mr. Keefe. You had some business things, I suppose, you wanted to clean up?

General Marshall. I was going to occupy myself at the War Department until 1 o'clock. Mr. Stimson called me rather frequently late in the evening or, not too frequently, early in the morning. My guess on this would be that he told me of these things that had been worrying him and that he talked to me about it later in the morning.

Mr. Keefe. General Marshall, I don't want you to testify to anything except what you recall.


Mr. Keefe. If you don't recall, that is the best answer, because otherwise it is hearsay.

Then the situation is you must have had some talk with General Gerow the morning of the 26th before you went away on the maneuvers, in order to get ready for him to prepare this message that was going out on the 28th, the alert message.

Mr. Gesell. May we have the Joint Board——

General Marshall. I think there was a meeting of the Joint Board on the morning at which General Gerow, Admiral Stark and myself, and others, were present.

Mr. Keefe. What time was that meeting held?

[3708] General Marshall. At 11:35 a.m. Members present: Admiral Stark; myself; Rear Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; General Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff; General
Arnold, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air; Rear Admiral Turner, Director, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations; General Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division; Captain Ramsey; and Colonel Scobey.

Mr. Keefe. What did you talk about at this meeting? You have it before you?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, I have it before me.

Mr. Keefe. Let me ask you first, did you discuss the question of sending an alert message to the overseas commanders?

General Marshall. It does not show in this record.

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any independent recollection that at this meeting of this Board held after 11 o'clock on the morning of the 26th of November, do you have any independent recollection that the subject of sending an alert was discussed?

General Marshall. My recollection is that the subject of sending an alert was discussed and I think General Gerow's memorandum to me later confirms that.

Mr. Keefe. Then your recollection is based on the fact that General Gerow later wrote a memorandum?

General Marshall. On the following day Gerow wrote a memorandum to me in which he stated, "I then showed him" — [3709] that is the Secretary of War — "copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting." "You" being General Marshall.

Mr. Keefe. Is that message then the alert message which was discussed?


Mr. Keefe. With that refreshing of your recollection can't you remember what the discussion was or any part of it?

General Marshall. My recollection of it is that we decided to send an alert message which Gerow was to draft, and that was where I or Admiral Stark gave, I thought I gave, the directions to the President that that message should include the statement in regard to the overt act not being on our part.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you were pretty well satisfied at this meeting, and the rest of them were, that war was perhaps inevitable at that time, weren't you?

General Marshall. We felt at that meeting that there was a great danger of a sudden outbreak of war in the Pacific.

Mr. Keefe. Did you think that the message Mr. Hull had sent to the Japanese would bring that about?

General Marshall. I could not say that I did, sir.

[3710] Mr. Keefe. Well, evidently Secretary Stimson did not know on the 26th that Hull had sent his message or delivered it to the Japs.

General Marshall. That is what I gathered from his record, from his testimony.

Mr. Keefe. Because, as appears on page 51 of this Army report, the board finds:

Apparently the Secretary of War was not advised by the Secretary of State that he had handed this so-called ultimatum to the Japanese. The diary of the Secretary of War and his actions indicate that to be a fact.

Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th of November 1941:

"The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese — whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday,
he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy."

His diary continues:

[3711] "I then called up the President and talked with him about it."

Now, at least on the 27th, from that statement in Mr. Stimson's diary, prior to the 27th he did not know that Hull had sent this final message to the Japs or handed it to them on the 26th and he got the information when he called Hull up on the morning of the 27th and that is when Hull told him that he had "washed his hands of the whole thing and it is now up to Knox and Stimson, to the Army and Navy."

Now, when you came back on the 27th, in the evening, and got to your office on the morning of the 28th, did Stimson contact you?

General Marshall. I presume that he did. I am certain that he must have. I do not recall.

Mr. Keefe. Did he tell you at that time that he had talked with Hull and Hull had told him that he had washed his hands of the whole matter it was now up to the Army and Navy?

General Marshall. I assume that he did. I have no direct recollection.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, I will ask you, General Marshall, at that time were you of the then opinion, at that time, that that was the end of the negotiations and that war was inevitable, if not imminent?

General Marshall. As to the negotiations, I am not so [3712] clear on that because I was thinking in terms of military disposals, preparations, and hazards. I must have known from my previous knowledge of the course of the negotiations and the difficulties of the situation on the side of Mr. Hull in finding a basis of dealing with the Japanese, while representing our interests, that would have some chance of stalling them off. I was aware of all the complications of that. I presume then that at this particular time in view of these statements which Mr. Stimson registers as of that day that I must have been aware of the extremely serious situation and the probability of war breaking out in the very near future in the Pacific.

Mr. Keefe. Well, nothing but the imminence of an attack would have caused you to send out the alert that was sent on the 28th of November, would it, General Marshall?

General Marshall. Nothing but the imminence of an attack? I do not believe that would quite express it because we did not see the imminence of an attack in the alert of June 17 of the previous summer.

Mr. Keefe. You did not?

General Marshall. We regarded a hazard of an attack rather than the imminence of an attack. I, for example, went through an alert in the Philippines against the Japanese in 1913. We had, as I recall, no imminence of an attack but [3713] there was the hazard of an attack. So, I believe, was the previous alert in the Philippines in 1937. I believe that that same statement possibly would hold true. There was the hazard of an attack rather than the imminence of attack.

Now, you would issue an alert order, I would feel, if you thought there was the hazard of an attack at that particular time. You would also issue an alert order, certainly, as we did then, if we regarded the imminence of an attack somewhere in the Pacific.
Mr. Keefe. Well, when you issued the alert on the 17th of June 1940 you used the language: "To deal with possible trans-Pacific raid."

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, now, then, let me put it this way without splitting words: General Marshall, on the morning of the 28th of November you had tremendously more information as to the possibility of an attack by the Japanese than you had in June 1940?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. If you had information in June 1940 as to the possibilities of a trans-Pacific raid, you had a mountain of evidence on the 27th of November, did you not, to the same effect?

General Marshall. That is correct.

[3714] Mr. Keefe. Now, when I said possibility or imminence of attack I did not limit it to Hawaii, because you have testified that you did not consider at that time that the attack would come on Hawaii.

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You thought it might come on the Philippines or it might possibly go on to Panama?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Or some other place.


Mr. Keefe. But taking what was in your mind as to the imminence of an attack some place, had you concluded definitely in your mind on the morning of the 28th that we were bound and determined at that time—not bound and determined, but we were of the opinion that negotiations were at an end and that Japan would attack some place?

General Marshall. You said the morning of the 28th and you said negotiations were at an end. I have to qualify that with the statements in the message which differed on the Army side from those in the Navy and which followed the Secretary of War's telephone communication with Mr. Hull on the morning of the 27th, where the Army message stated that—I haven't got the message here—that the question in terms of it was probably terminated—you probably have the message in [3715] front of you, I haven't—"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes."

Mr. Keefe. Yes, but the Navy message. General Marshall—

General Marshall. Yes, I referred to that. They said it terminated.

Mr. Keefe. They interpreted it that it had terminated, do you remember?

General Marshall. Yes. This, naturally, followed a telephone conversation between Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull while Mr. Stimson was checking the draft of a message for a general alert which General Georow had brought into his office.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, General Marshall, if the facts are as Mr. Stimson recorded in his diary, that Hull told him on the morning of the 27th of November 1941 he had terminated the whole matter, he had broken the whole matter off, "I have washed my hands of it, it is now in the hands of the Army and Navy," how in the name of conscience in the face of that statement and those are the facts could
anybody come to any other conclusion than the conclusion that was inserted in the Navy telegram, namely, that the negotiations had actually broken off and were finished?

General Marshall. The same conclusion was evidently come to by the decision of General Gerow in the preparation of the draft for the Army alert. However, when Mr. Stimson [3716] read it he, to use a slang expression, he double checked. He called up Mr. Hull again. Mr. Hull then qualified his statement of the previous day as I understand it, so that Mr. Stimson changed the wording in the Army message to the form I just read, "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated—appear to be terminated to all practical purposes." Gerow had written it, "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated." That is the way the Navy wrote it.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, without splitting hairs as to this language and all that sort of thing I want to ask you a plain, blunt question: You were Chief of Staff of the United States Army at that time. Whether you have a present recollection of it or not appears problematical.

Mr. Murphy. You mean that he was Chief of Staff?
Mr. Keefe. Will you please not interrupt? He was Chief of Staff.
Mr. Murphy. I am just trying to help you. Go ahead.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I don't think I need your help. It has not been evident up to date.

Will you strike that question and let me start over again?
I am asking you, General Marshall, as to your present recollection, as to your opinion, your opinion, not Stimson's, not anybody's else, but your opinion as Chief of Staff of the United States Army, on the 28th day of November, 1941 were you personally of the opinion that the thing was at an end and that war was imminent?

General Marshall. I was personally of the opinion that Japanese hostile action was apt to break out at any moment in the Pacific.

Mr. Keefe. And that would mean war, wouldn't it?
General Marshall. And that would mean war.
Mr. Keefe. Well, that would show the same thing that I said, only putting it in diplomatic language, wouldn't it?
General Marshall. Well, you were involving me, Mr. Keefe, in the question of diplomatic negotiations. I was talking from the military angle.

Mr. Keefe. No, no. I am asking you as Chief of Staff only.
General Marshall. Yes. I understood it this time but not before.
Mr. Keefe. I understand you have to guard your position between the Army position and the diplomatic position and all that.
General Marshall. It is a little more than that. I am not in the diplomatic part of it.
Mr. Keefe. I am asking you as Chief of Staff if you thought at that time—

[3718] General Marshall. I gave my answer as such.

Mr. Keefe. And your answer is that you thought the Japs were liable to attack any place, at any moment, and that meant war?
Mr. Keefe. And it was the intention of yourself and others associated with you when this message of the 28th was sent out to further implement whatever warning had been given to General Short to make certain that he went out on an all-out alert?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That was the purpose of it?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And that was your responsibility as Chief of Staff, was it not?
General Marshall. That was, sir.
Mr. Keefe. In the line of command it was your responsibility as Chief of Staff to see that these overseas Army outfits were alerted, is that true?
General Marshall. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Congressman, in order to keep the record straight, you have referred to these warning messages as dated November 28. They are dated November 27.
Mr. Keefe. I want the record corrected if I did.
[3719] Mr. Mitchell. That is the day the general was away.
Mr. Keefe. That is right, the 27th. The answers came back on the 28th from MacArthur and Short, that is how I made my error, but the message was sent the 27th.
So the chronology of the thing is Hull delivers his note on the 26th; you caused your alert message to be sent to the overseas departments on the 27th, dated the 27th at least; I don't know when they were sent. Do you know when they were sent?
General Marshall. I think the morning of the 27th.
Mr. Keefe. You did not get back until the evening of the 27th.
General Marshall. They did not hold these messages for me, sir. They used my name but they sent them immediately.
Mr. Keefe. All right.
General Marshall. They used my name so that it would not go as a routine Adjutant General message.
Mr. Keefe. Are those original messages here available? You have got these mimeographed sheets.
Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure that we have them in the room.
Mr. Gesell. I think we have them here.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. He has them and he will bring them to you.
[3720] Mr. Keefe. All right.
Well, now, so that I may understand, General Marshall, in a matter as urgent and important as this you did not personally sign the message, did you?
Mr. Keefe. The actual photostat of the message that I have before me appears to be signed by—that is, your name is typed on it but it appears to bear the signature of Van Sickler, somebody by that name. D. R. Van Sickler, S-i-c-k-l-e-r, is that what it is? Signed, "Adjutant General." Do you know anybody by that name?
Mr. Keefe. Well, let me show it to you.
General Marshall. There are a great many adjutants general.
Mr. Keefe. Maybe I have got it wrong. Does that refresh your recollection as to who that is?
General Marshall. I do not know the man. He is evidently a member of the Adjutant General's Department in charge of the record of the dispatch of messages.
Mr. Keefe. Now, that is dated November 27, 1941. So this was completed during your absence?


Mr. Keefe. And it was sent during your absence?


Mr. Keefe. I do not find anything on the message which shows what time of day on the 27th it was sent out. Would there normally be—

General Marshall. That is all there would be, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I cannot interpret these symbols, General Marshall. Will you interpret them and see if you can tell what time of day that was sent?

General Marshall. I see nothing on there indicating the time of day. There must be some other record, maybe in the message center. That is the direction from the Adjutant General's Office to the sending service, which is the message center. Now, there may be another record you can obtain.

Mr. Gesell. We can find that out if you want us to.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, this was a command order?


Mr. Keefe. With directions to reply?


Mr. Keefe. And when you stated, or when it was stated in this message, "Report measures taken," that meant that you were to get a report from the commanding general?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. A similar message went to the other commanders?


Mr. Keefe. With similar directions?


Mr. Keefe. Now, with the country on the brink of war, General Marshall, you having the then impression as you have stated it a few moments ago that Japan was liable to precipitate war by attacking any time, any place, it would be highly important to the Chief of Staff to see to it that the orders which he had given were carried out, would it not?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, when General Short's message came back the evidence indicates, somewhat inconclusively perhaps, that it was part of three or four papers, the top one being the reply of MacArthur, then Short, then a route sheet, the MacArthur message being on top and that bears your endorsement with your initials.


Mr. Keefe. Your initials do not appear on the Short message but they do show the initials of the Secretary of War and the War Plans Department. General Gerow.

Now, am I correct in the assumption from an understanding of your evidence on that point that you think you must have seen the Short message although you did not initial it, having initialed the top one?

[3723] General Marshall. That was my assumption, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, is that a mere assumption or is it a fact?

General Marshall. I stated I did not recall, sir; that I must assume that I had seen it.
Mr. Keefe. Well, if you saw that Short message, General Marshall, as Chief of Staff it imposed some responsibility upon you, did it not?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. It was addressed to you as Chief of Staff, was it not?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And the very telegram itself indicates that it is in response to the command order which you had issued to him?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And it was a message which attempted on the part of Short to convey to you as Chief of Staff the nature of the alert under which he was operating?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That was his response to your order?


Mr. Keefe. Now, I have read the various statements, General Marshall, that you have made at various times in connection with this matter. You recall that when you were before the Army board first you were somewhat confused about those things because you thought that at some time in November there had been a change in the alert numbers. Do you remember that?


Mr. Keefe. Now, it is perfectly clear now that a reading of this message indicates that there isn’t any alert number specified in Short’s wire.

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So that puts that out of the picture, doesn’t it?


Mr. Keefe. So we get down to the simple fact that here is a message from your Commanding General in the bastion of defense in the Pacific to which all of our defenses, as you have testified, were tied, in which he tells you that he is alerted to prevent sabotage; liaison with Navy.

Now, in all fairness, General Marshall, in the exercise of ordinary care as Chief of Staff ought you not to have proceeded to investigate further and give further orders to General Short when it appeared that he was only alerted against sabotage?

General Marshall. As I stated earlier, that was my opportunity to intervene and I did not do it.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, you say that was your opportunity. That was your responsibility, was it not?

General Marshall. You can put it that way, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I don’t want to put it that way. I am asking you. You used the words, “that was your opportunity.” I do not want an opportunity to arise in the future discussion of this matter to have a conflict of words and not to be able to understand just what you meant. Do I understand that your use of the word “opportunity” is synonymous with responsibility?

General Marshall. Mr. Keefe, I had an immense number of papers going over my desk every day informing me what was happening anywhere in the world. This was a matter of great importance. It had gone into the machine, it had been sent out, the acknowledgments had come back. They passed the important messages over my desk. I noted them and initialed them; those that I thought the Secretary
of War ought specifically to see I put them out for him to see, to be sure that he would see it in case he by any chance did not see the same message.

I was not passing the responsibility on to the Secretary of War. I merely wanted him to know.

Now, the same thing related to these orders of the War Department. I was responsible. I was responsible for the actions of the General Staff throughout on large matters and on the small matters. I was responsible for those, but I am not a bookkeeping machine and it is extremely difficult, it is an extremely difficult thing for me to take each thing in its turn and give it exactly the attention that it had merited.

Now, in this particular case a very tragic thing occurred, there is no question about that. There is no question in regard to my responsibility as Chief of Staff, I am not attempting to evade that at all, but I do not think it is quite characterized in the manner that you have expressed yourself.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, now, let me put it in another way. You have now stated it was your responsibility as Chief of Staff to see to it that General Short out there in Hawaii, which you have described as being our bastion of defense, to see that he was alerted, and if he misinterpreted your order to see that that order was carried out.

General Marshall. That is my responsibility, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, I have stated it correctly, haven't I?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, you have.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, you cannot classify this—

General Marshall. And I had an opportunity to intervene as I stated and I did not take it.

Mr. Keeffe. You cannot classify this response of Short's as being a trivial matter, can you, General Marshall?


Mr. Keeffe. The message which was sent on the 27th of November was about as important a message as had been sent to anybody, wasn't it?

General Marshall. It was, sir, and with reference to that reply you have there, a large number of people saw that and in every case they got the identical reaction.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, a large number of people saw it? General Gerow saw it and General Gerow testified here that when he saw it he thought first that it was in response to a telegram sent out by G-2 relating to sabotage and when his attention was called to the fact—when I asked counsel to ask him some further questions and his attention was called to the fact—that this was a direct response to your telegram No. 472 of the 27th and was addressed to the Chief of Staff, he then changed his position and said, "I as Chief of Operations or Chief of War Plans assume full responsibility."

Now, I think it is only fair, General Marshall, in the conduct of this examination in ascertaining the facts to find out whether or not, just as General Gerow testified here, whether you assume the same responsibility that he did?

[3728] General Marshall. I said earlier in this hearing, Mr. Keeffe, in relation to the very thing you are talking about, when I was questioned in regard to General Gerow's statement that I thought
there was a difference; that he had a direct responsibility and I had the full responsibility. Is that an answer to your question?

Mr. Keefe. He had a direct responsibility?

General Marshall. And I had the full responsibility.

Mr. Keefe. And you had the full responsibility. Well, just what do you mean by that?

General Marshall. His was in concern to the handling of the details of the matter and he had a responsibility there. I am responsible for what the General Staff did or did not do.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Well, now, then, the fact remains that on this most important matter, and I consider it to be one of the most, if not the most, important matter in connection with this investigation, all of this preliminary talk and all these discussions and all the conversations and all the plans finally funneled themselves down to the morning when this alert message was sent out to General Short and when you and everybody else in the exercise of ordinary care must have known that war with Japan was imminent and that they might strike any time or any place, as you have said, and yet this important message comes back from Short and through some misadventure or dereliction some place no further message went to General Short or no further investigation was made.

General Marshall. I think I stated, Mr. Keefe, that a number of people saw that and in no case did it make the impression that it is now making in the statements that you are bringing forward.

Mr. Keefe. Who were the other people that saw it?

General Marshall. Well, it was seen by Colonel Bundy who handled it immediately in General Gerow's section; presumably it was seen by General Gerow; presumably it was seen by me. It carries the initials of the Secretary of War.

There is this in regard to that particular message: We had gone through a long period beginning specifically with a letter from me about February 6th or 7th. I believe, to General Short, in which every indication that we had in all communications, our statements to General Short, his replies to us, referred specifically, almost invariably, to the hazard of an air attack and of a submarine attack, and very little at any time was said regarding sabotage because they had been figuring on that all the time there through the years.

Now, that went on continuously. I, I know, was completely imbued with the idea that the great hazard that they were worried about out there was air attack.

I had been pressed very, very heavily to provide additional planes, additional antiaircraft when we could only manage it by a very costly procedure in this country and at the expense of not being able to help anybody else. That had gone on all through the spring and into the summer.

The same thing in regard to radar. I was involved in that not only as Chief of Staff in the ordinary way but to the point of myself conducting over the telephone the negotiations with regard to procedure because of General Short's insistence that that be provided. Everything that had occurred directly in the reactions that we had received had been related to air attack and to submarine attack.
So when this message came in in this way I think everyone that had seen it was misled on what it meant or did not mean and that, I think, accounts for the main portion of the misunderstanding in the case. The fact that it was merely sabotage did not register on anybody's mind.

I testified earlier that Colonel Bundy, the officer immediately in charge of all the papers and also immediately in charge of the forwarding of them spoke to me very briefly in regard to this about an hour and a half after the attack was known by me, in which he stated in relation to this sabotage statement—

[3737] Mr. Keefe. The fellow that is dead, Colonel Bundy?

General Marshall. He lost his life shortly after that. A few days after that I sent him out to Hawaii and he was killed. He made the statement to me—he mentioned that at the time that it actually was in his own immediate records and he checked it for General Gerow and incidentally of course, for me—that his impression was that he had read it in his handling of it, of where he spoke of liaison with the Navy and he was going ahead with the general procedure as we understood it.

In other words, what was going on throughout this period had been a long series of back and forths in relation to protection against a specific thing, which was an air attack and also a submarine attack. Sabotage had practically not been mentioned. Suddenly for some reason that I still do not know because I have never discussed it with the individuals concerned, the idea of air attack appeared to be entirely brief and the idea of sabotage appeared the great and urgent matter.

Our alert did not refer to sabotage. General Gerow testified, I believe, or I was told he did—I haven't read his testimony—of his part in not including in the message any reference to sabotage, which I believe also had been the desire of the G-2 of the Army. So nobody was thinking of [3732] sabotage. All the correspondence, all the understanding that we all had in regard to General Short related to one specific thing in particular and that was an air attack. Now, under those circumstances this message came in. It did not register on Colonel Bundy, it did not register on General Gerow, it did not register on me and it carries Mr. Stimson's initials also.

Mr. Keefe. Well, then, I understand that the long statement that you have just made, General Marshall, is not to be considered except as an extenuation of the failure on the part of the General Staff to perform what you have said was your—

General Marshall. I stated that I accepted the responsibility; that I thought General Gerow had overstated it when he said he had the full responsibility. That he had a direct responsibility but that I had the full responsibility.

I understood you tossed in some of your remarks, or at least the implication seemed to me clear, that it was completely not understandable to you how such an important message at such a critical time should have been so handled. I endeavored to explain that.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you understood me all right, General Marshall, I will say that. That is what I am trying to find out exactly.

[3733] Now, I call your attention to the fact that in this message of November 27th it says: "But these measures should be carried out
so as not, comma repeat not, comma, to alarm civil population or disclose intent."

Now, I call your attention to the situation that transpired at the time of the 1940 alert and ask you whether or not it would have been possible for General Short or anybody else to go onto an all-out alert in response to this message without disclosing intent?

General Marshall. He might have used the maneuvers as a device, he might have made other arrangements in the taking up of the deployments for the alert. There were other things that could be done to adjust the thing but he was cautioned, I believe, in the massage that he was not to jeopardize his defense by reason of such arrangements.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, now, General Marshall, just so that we may have the picture before us, will you state for the purpose and benefit of the record what you conceive should have been done by General Short had he gone out on an all-out alert, differentiating between the normal activities in peacetime and his activities under an alert in the face of prospective war.

General Marshall. His planes should have been—he should have been in full contact with the Navy; the arrangements should have been made so far as he could manage them through the Navy for the conduct of over water reconnaissance, of which the Navy would have the direction; his own planes, his fighter and interceptor planes in particular, should have been ready for action. They were flying anyway. They should have been armed. Pilots sufficient for the first flight should have been ready; planes, presumably, might have been in the air in the early morning; the radar station should have run 24 hours a day as they did in Panama. The dispositions of the troops for alert would in the usual manner, if not entirely, have been carried out but I see no particular reason why there was any difficulty in relation to the restrictions that you indicate in the message towards the water reconnaissance, overwater reconnaissance, towards radar activity, towards the handling of the fighter planes, towards the manning with the ammunition ready of the antiaircraft guns.

Mr. Keeffe. Would it have been possible to send somebody out there to see that this great bastion of ours was ready for this war?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; somebody could have been sent out there. The same thing would have applied to Panama, Alaska, the West coast, and the Philippines. General Short was a lieutenant general, he was an officer of distinction and reputation and he was in command out there. Our presumption was that—

Mr. Keeffe. You understand that in asking these questions I am not doing so with the idea of holding any brief for General Short or anybody else.


Mr. Keeffe. I am simply asking for the facts.


Mr. Keeffe. We will get to General Short, I assume, after a while.

General Marshall. In the light of the present facilities, where planes are available and speed of transit, we send people very frequently to all of these various places because it is almost as easy to do that as it is to communicate by radio. In those days it was not so simple.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, could you have called him up on the telephone?
General Marshall. We avoided telephone conversations as much as we could.

Mr. Keefe. For security reasons?

General Marshall. For security reasons.

Mr. Keefe. Could you have sent a confirming letter by registered mail?

General Marshall. We could have sent it by courier; that is probably what would have happened.

Mr. Keefe. That was not done either, was it?

General Marshall. That was not done.

Mr. Keefe. In fact, as between the 27th of November and 7th of December, am I correct in the assumption that nothing was done further than this alert message of the 27th?

General Marshall. He received a command direction on the 27th. It was not modified. It was not changed or altered. Between the 27th of November and 7th of December, other information went out in naval channels to the Navy, with whom he was supposed to be in close contact, which related to various things, including the destruction of codes.

Mr. Keefe. I was just going to get to that, General Marshall. You continued to intercept messages which disclosed the fact that the Japs had issued orders to destroy certain codes, and certain orders went out to destroy some of our codes too, did not there?


Mr. Keefe. You sent the orders?

General Marshall. Orders were sent out. G-2 wrote them: I authorized them.

Mr. Keefe. When was the first order to destroy the military code sent out?

General Marshall. I do not recall, sir. The record will undoubtedly show it.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I think it was around the 3d or 4th of December. That is my recollection. You sent them out to the Naval Attaché, for instance, or the Military Attaché at Tokyo, did you not?

General Marshall. We did.

Mr. Keefe. And the Navy would have the responsibility of sending such an order to the Naval Attaché at Tokyo and other Naval establishments?

General Marshall. I do not recall whether we used the instructions for one to give the other the instructions in that case or not, but that was their responsibility, to see that their men got it.

Mr. Keefe. Do you know whether any message was sent to Short by the Army, either by you or G-2, advising him that the Japs were destroying their codes on the 3d or 4th of December?

General Marshall. I do not recall offhand. I do recall, I think, it was the Navy message to the Commander on the 3d or 4th, maybe the 5th.

Mr. Keefe. When that word came in to you through magic, you were satisfied that war was inevitable, were you not?


Mr. Keefe. Well, maybe I do not understand. I want to understand, General Marshall, but you say "it would appear so."
Is that to be a direct answer to my question?  Do I so interpret it?
General Marshall. Yes, sir. That is a direct answer to your question. There were still things the Japanese could do without completely breaking over.

Mr. Keefe. But ordinarily that is true?
General Marshall. Ordinarily, yes; you are correct.

Mr. Keefe. The destruction of codes is considered to be the immediate preliminary to war, is it not?

Mr. Keefe. And you so considered it?

Mr. Keefe. Well, in view of this situation, what was done to alert the War Department here in Washington? Were any orders issued that changed the existing situation?

General Marshall. I know of no particular orders that were issued, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I listened with a good deal of attention, General Marshall, to the testimony of General Miles with respect to the complete necessity for secrecy with respect to magic, and I want to go through that just a moment, in order to ask you a question, and my recollection \[3730\] of what that testimony was.

As I recall it at the present time there were orders in effect in both the Army and Navy that these magic intercepts were of such tremendous and vital importance, that knowledge of them was limited to a very few people.

General Marshall. The source was regarded of such tremendous importance that the knowledge of it was restricted to very few people.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I recall, General Marshall, and I think I am correct, that General Miles testified that when these intercepts came in, when they were decoded, there was a man in the room, Colonel Bratton, and his opposite in the Navy, Commander Kramer, who were designated as couriers, to transmit and deliver these intercepts to certain specified people in locked pouches, and the people who were entitled to receive them alone had the key to those pouches.

Do you recall that being the fact?

General Marshall. That is correct on the Army side. So far as the pouch and so far as the key is concerned—I do not know whether Colonel Bratton was the only one that made deliveries. He was the usual one, certainly.

Mr. Keefe. In any event, it was considered to be so secret that it was necessary to put it into what I believe \[3740\] the witnesses described as a portmanteau with a lock on it. That is a brief case, as I understand it, locked up.

General Marshall. That is right, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then I will call it a brief case.

Colonel Bratton had a key necessarily to lock it, and you had a key to unlock it, as far as you were concerned?

General Marshall. That is right, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I understood the testimony to be that under the orders that were issued, this material was considered to be of such extreme importance and secrecy, that it was the duty of Colonel Bratton, for instance, to take this message to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, originally to the White House, and then that was
changed later on, and I believe the Chief of War Plans, and it may have been somebody else.

General Marshall. The Secretary of State.

Mr. Keefe. Well, originally to the Secretary of State. It was his job to take that pouch to the person entitled to receive it, and there have that pouch unlocked, have the individual who was entitled to read it, read it, take the message back, bring it back to some place in the War Department where it was burned up, and only one copy was left, and retained for the files.

Did you so understand that to be the practice?


Mr. Keefe. And I understand that a similar practice obtained in the Navy. In other words, they would not even leave the message in the hands of the Chief of Staff. He could read it while the courier was there, give it back to the courier, take it back to the War Department and burn it up, and file one copy.

Now, am I correct in that assumption?

General Marshall. I think you are, sir.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

Now, following the delivery of the note of Mr. Hull, to the Japanese envoys on the 26th of November, you testified you did not believe they would accept it; it was too drastic; that Stimson said so in his diary. That seems to have been quite generally understood. Were you expectantly waiting to see whether the Japs would make any reply?


[3748] Mr. Keefe. And the people in G-2 in the Army, and in Intelligence in the Navy, were waiting for the Jap reply to come in. It would be quite important to see what their reply would be, if they replied at all, wouldn't it?


Mr. Keefe. You had alerted the outlying posts, you were ready for war, you thought, ready for any eventuality, getting ready as fast as you could. So you were waiting for this reply to come in. It now appears, rather inconclusively, from the evidence thus far given here but quite conclusively from the evidence given before other hearings, that some time on the afternoon of the 6th of December the pilot message came in—it might have been at 11 o'clock in the morning or it might have been in the afternoon—telling the Japanese emissaries that a long message was going to follow, to watch for it and to do certain things with it, and then the message started coming in, and some time that evening the first 13 parts, together with that pilot message, arrived, were decoded and translated in clean form ready for delivery by the couriers, Colonel Bratton and Commander Kramer.

Now, as a preliminary to the questions I am going to ask you, had you received these courier pouches in the evening at any time prior to December 6?

General Marshall. I do not recall any such receipts.

[3749] Mr. Keefe. You do not recall Bratton ever delivering one to you out at your residence at Fort Meyer?


Mr. Keefe. You do not recall ever having received one in the evening?
General Marshall. I think I might have, but I do not recall. I do not recall Colonel Bratton being out there.

Mr. Keefe. What were the orders when an important message came in? Were they to be delivered to you immediately, or were they to be delivered at the whim and caprice of the courier?

General Marshall. The orders then—and that continued throughout the war—were if anything came up at night on which I could act that night, on which it was necessary I should act that night, it should be brought to my attention immediately.

Mr. Keefe. I am referring to the specific orders, General Marshall, with respect to the delivery of the magic. Was there a written order given with respect to that?


Mr. Keefe. You did not issue an order to G-2 directing them as to the manner in which this magic was to be delivered around to the respective people?

General Marshall. I did in relation to the pouch that you spoke of, the dispatch case and locked pouch.

Mr. Keefe. Is that a written order?

General Marshall. I do not think that is a written order, but that referred to providing a locked pouch.

Mr. Keefe. To whom did you give that order?


Mr. Keefe. General Miles?


Mr. Keefe. Well, that was a command, wasn't it?

General Marshall. That would be a command; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Was he comanded and directed to deliver important messages in these locked pouches to you when they came in?

General Marshall. I said, Mr. Keefe, that I directed the G-2 to prepare these dispatch cases with a lock for the delivery of magic messages.

Mr. Keefe. Did you instruct them when and how they were to be delivered?

General Marshall. I recall giving no specific instructions of that kind.

Mr. Keefe. Did you expect that if an important message did come in, it would be delivered promptly?

General Marshall. I expected as to magic, and as to any other matter, that if an important matter came in that required my attention that night, that I could act on, that it was necessary that I should act on that night, that it should come to my attention. That was the rule. It was in force then, and was in force up to the time I ceased to be Chief of Staff.

Mr. Keefe. Now, at this point in the hearing, General Marshall, we get into the realm of some conflict.

Testimony has been read into the record here of Colonel Bratton given before the Army Board as to the delivery of this 13-part message, and the pilot message in the locked pouch which was very specific, very direct that he delivered it on the evening of the 6th to Col. Bedell Smith, Secretary to the Chief of Staff, and later on in the Clausen investigation, a different situation developed.
I understood General Miles to testify that in view of the fact that there was to be a 14th part to this message, that perhaps that was the reason that Colonel Bratton did not deliver the 13 parts, and the pilot message, that night to you.

Now, I do not know what the fact is. I am simply trying to get the facts. At least, so far as you know, General Marshall, there was no change in the orders to the Chief of G-2 by you?

General Marshall. No change by me.

[3746] Mr. Keeffe. And if an important message came in, it was the duty of G-2, and its courier, to see to it that that important message was brought to your attention immediately?

General Marshall. I would say so, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. All right.

Now, the fact is, as I think is undisputed, that you personally did not get this 13-part message on Saturday night.

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Nobody called you about it?


Mr. Keeffe. And you think you were home?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I think I was home.

Mr. Keeffe. You are not certain about that?

General Marshall. I am not certain about that. I had no formal engagement, and we practically did not go out at all, except to the movies.

Mr. Keeffe. And if you had been away, you had a watch officer at your house?

General Marshall. I had an orderly to answer the telephone, to be there until I got back.

Mr. Keeffe. Who was the orderly on duty at your house on the evening of the 6th of December?

[3747] General Marshall. I do not know, sir. There were three orderlies, and I do not know which one it was.

Mr. Keeffe. Can you give the names of the three of them?

General Marshall. There was Sergeant John Simenko, there was Sergeant William Spearman, and I do not know who the third one was. I will have to go back to try to find out, because they change quite frequently.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, so far as you are concerned, General Marshall, you went to bed that night without any knowledge that the Japs were sending in any reply at all?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And you got up in the morning without any such knowledge?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And performed your Sunday morning functions as usual?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. In entire ignorance that this message had come in to the final fourteenth part, and instructions to deliver at 1 o'clock?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. So you went out for your morning horseback ride?

Mr. Keefe. And you have indicated that you got back to your house, and during or right after your shower there was a telephone call.

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I think during the shower.
Mr. Keefe. That was from Colonel Bratton?
General Marshall. That was from Colonel Bratton as I recall, wishing to come out to see me there, and I sent in word I would be right out to the War Department.
Mr. Keefe. Have you fixed the correct time? I have listened to the testimony and I have no recollection of you fixing the correct time.
General Marshall. I have not fixed the correct time. The only thing I remember is the delivery of the message to the message center, and you have to reason it out from there. There were the two telephones from Admiral Stark on which we have time. Then, preceding that, the longhand preparation of the message, and preceding that the length of time it would require for me to read the first time the Japanese fourteen-part message, some portions of it, some paragraphs being reread the second time. That would be the only way we could estimate the time.
Mr. Keefe. Well, the evidence seems to indicate that you got in your office about 11:25.

[3749] General Marshall. I think that evidence indicates the time we were preparing this message. Prior to that I had read this fourteen-part message.
Mr. Keefe. I only go by the testimony of Colonel Bratton, whose testimony I have studied rather carefully, and I think he said 11:25.
General Marshall. I do not think that is correct. I think it is more nearly 11.
Mr. Keefe. Well, at least when you read the message, as has been indicated, it was getting pretty close to noon, wasn't it?
Mr. Keefe. You called up Stark, didn't you?
Mr. Keefe. And talked with him.
General Marshall. Yes, sir; I called him up on the telephone.
Mr. Keefe. He wanted to know if you wanted to use the Navy radio to send the message out?
General Marshall. He asked me if I wanted to use the Navy radio. I first spoke to him about sending the message. I do not think he spoke in that first telephone conversation about the Navy radio. I think it is probable that that came in the second message, the second conversation 10 [3750] minutes later.
Mr. Keefe. At any event, in one of the conversations before the message was sent to your message center, you talked to Stark and he wanted to know if you wanted to use the Navy radio?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you did not accept it?
General Marshall. I did not accept it.
Mr. Keefe. Well, when you were before the Army Board, General Marshall, there were some questions asked you at that time as to why you did not use the telephone, and you gave quite a long answer, if you recall, and in your answer you referred to the fact that, oh, it
would have required getting those fellows out of bed out there in Hawaii at that hour. Do you remember that?

General Marshall. Well, I was talking about the time involved, and I was multiplying it by the number of places involved.

Mr. Keefe. And was that one of the reasons why you decided not to use the telephone, that perhaps it would take time getting the fellows out of bed in Hawaii?

General Marshall. I think you are giving a considerable emphasis to the "bed." I was talking about the time required to get the people on the phone and giving them the communication at the hour that the message would come in.

Mr. Keefe. If I could put my hands on the testimony—

General Marshall. I am not stating I did not say that. I was talking about the emphasis regarding it.

Mr. Murphy. In all the courts of the country, the usual practice is to read the questions and the answers of the witness.

The Chairman. Let us go ahead.

Mr. Keefe. Thank you for that very valuable information. We have now gotten to the point where we are running a court here. I did not think we were proceeding according to the rules of evidence because if we were, there would be lots of this evidence thrown out the window as hearsay evidence.

The Chairman. Let us proceed with General Marshall and reserve our committee controversies until a later date.

Mr. Keefe. I rather thought, Mr. Chairman, that the member would be permitted to proceed without interruption.

The Chairman. The Chair has ruled two or three times to that effect.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

You recall that testimony, do you not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I have a recollection of seeing something like that.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Now, as a matter of fact, what sort of telephone service did you have to Hawaii at that time?

General Marshall. We had no special lines, but I think we had a scrambler. I know I had a scrambler on mine, and I think we had a scrambler on the phone.

Mr. Keefe. Did you have to use the ordinary commercial telephone service?


Mr. Keefe. Put in a call and ask to get somebody out there?

General Marshall. Well, as far as I recall, that was the situation at that particular time.

Mr. Keefe. You got a call that morning from somebody out there, and they got you out there right when the bombs were dropping?

General Marshall. I think I put in that call.

Mr. Keefe. You may have put in the call later on that morning?


Mr. Keefe. Whom did you call?

General Marshall. I called General Short, and I got his Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips.

Mr. Keefe. How long did it take you to get it?

Mr. Keefe. You got it right when the raid was in progress?

General Marshall. Yes, when the bombs fell.

Mr. Keefe. There will be testimony from Mr. Shivers, the chief of the FBI out there, calling Mr. Hoover right when this was in progress without any difficulty at all, and he talked with him a short time on the telephone.


Mr. Keefe. Were you aware of the fact that the FBI had direct radio communication with Hawaii?

General Marshall. I was not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did not the FBI let you know or tell you they had a radio communication tower over here at Bainbridge connected with San Diego and direct to Honolulu?

General Marshall. I have no doubt the War Department knew that, but I individually did not.

Mr. Keefe. Did not anybody in this conference that morning on the 7th suggest that they could get word out there quickly by using either the Navy or the FBI radio?

General Marshall. I think everyone in that conference thought the Army radio would get word out there as quickly as any other, and it did, I believe, everywhere but Hawaii.

Mr. Keefe. This message went by Western Union, did it [3754] not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, I am told it went by Western Union, then RCA, and then a boy.

Mr. Keefe. Did you have direct radio communication with Hawaii at that time, that is, the Army?

General Marshall. The reason it was sent that way at that time is they could not raise Hawaii on their radio, and they did not turn to anything else but sent it the way I described.

Mr. Keefe. Do you understand that the Army Signal Corps tried to get into contact with somebody and raise them up there at Hawaii?

General Marshall. As I understand it—and that can be testified to directly—they proceeded on the basis of a radio message to each place. They were unable to raise Hawaii. They raised the Philippines and they raised the Caribbean, but they did not raise Hawaii, and then they turned to this other method of sending the message through.

Mr. Keefe. Did anybody ever try to find out what was the matter out there that they could not raise them?

General Marshall. I do not know whether it was static or what it was, but I have been told since that the Navy radio was a more powerful set than the Army radio.

Mr. Keefe. And the message got there after the raid had [3755] started?

General Marshall. That is right, sir.

Mr. Keefe. When was General Short removed?

General Marshall. I think about ten days later.

Mr. Keefe. Is the order for removing General Short here before the committee?

General Marshall. It is obtainable, of course.

Mr. Keefe. That was by direction of the Secretary of War?
Mr. Keeffe. In the form of a formal written order?
Mr. Keeffe. Well, will you get that please, Mr. Counsel?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

[3756] Mr. Keeffe. As I indicated at the outset of this examination, General Marshall, one of the purposes of this investigation as stated by the distinguished Chairman is to determine responsibility for this tragedy at Pearl Harbor. We have had all these different investigations. The Army Board, subsequently followed by the Clausen investigation, the Navy Court of Inquiry, followed by the Hewitt and the Hart investigations, and now this one.

Do I understand, General Marshall, and is it fair to conclude from your testimony, that you fix responsibility for this disaster upon General Short so far as the Army is concerned?

General Marshall. I have never made that statement, sir.

I feel that General Short was given a command instruction to put his command on the alert against a possible hostile attack by the Japanese. The command was not so alerted.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, I will ask the same question, from a full and complete knowledge of the situation and the responsibility involved, do you assume any responsibility for this disaster at Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall. I assume the responsibility, as I already stated, in connection with Short's acknowledgment of the alert message, in not detecting that that did not indicate a full alert but rather merely a sabotage alert.

[3757] Mr. Keeffe. I ask that question, General Marshall, because, if I understand your testimony previously given, and you will correct me if I misstate it, had Hawaii been alerted and the Jap attack had been repulsed in whole or in part, it would have been a disaster for the Japs and might have changed the entire course of the war in the Pacific; is that in substance what you have said?

General Marshall. On one occasion I said in relation to surprise, surprise actions if successful usually mean success and if they fail they mean a catastrophe.

I testified, I think, in regard to a Japanese attack of the nature they carried out on Hawaii, assuming the garrison was fully alerted and was utilized to the best effect, the men and matériel available, that they could have so interfered, so disrupted the Japanese effort that it would have been limited in its effect. Rather, limited in the damage done, in the general effect.

Mr. Keeffe. And might have very definitely changed the course of the war, I understood you to say, if they had been unsuccessful at Hawaii, they perhaps wouldn't have continued this move on down through the China Sea?

General Marshall. They would be limited in their actions in going out in the China Sea and probably would have proceeded on a much more conservative basis than they did, where they [3758] went all out without any regard to the length and exposure of their communications.

Mr. Keeffe. They wouldn't have dared to do that, exposed on the flank by Hawaii, if it had not been wiped out, in your opinion?
General Marshall. They would not have dared to proceed as they did if the major portion of the United States fleet was still in effective condition.

Mr. Keefe. When was General Miles relieved as Chief of G-2?


Mr. Keefe. 1942?


Mr. Keefe. Was that the time he actually got his orders for the new command, or is that the time he was relieved?

General Marshall. I think he was relieved and assigned to the new command at the same time. I think the record will show that.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I have a few other questions, General Marshall, relating to the deployment or disposition of troops pursuant to any plan that had been made.

I want to ask you when the first troops were sent to Iceland.

General Marshall. I will have to go back in the record to get that, sir. I don't know.

It was a naval and a marine command, incidentally.

Mr. Keefe. I thought you were — —

General Marshall. They are looking for it here.

Mr. Keefe. I see.

Mr. Mitchell. We are trying to find it in the State Department book, but I am not sure we can.

(Short pause.)

General Marshall. In the State Department document on Peace and War, 1931-41, presumably volume 1, page 686, Document 216, under Department of State Bulletin, volume V, page 15, it reproduces a message of President Roosevelt to the Congress, dated July 7, 1941, in which he states:

I am transmitting herewith for the information of the Congress a message I received from the Prime Minister of Iceland on July 1st and the reply I addressed on the same day to the Prime Minister of Iceland in response to this message.

In accordance with the understanding so reached, forces of the United States Navy have today arrived in Iceland in order to supplement, and eventually to replace, the British Forces which have until now been stationed in Iceland in order to insure the adequate defense of that country.

The date of that is July 7, 1941.

Mr. Keefe. That refers to sending some ships there to replace British ships. My question is when troops were sent, I mean Army troops, not Navy men.

General Marshall. They first sent Marines and some time later the Army relieved the Marines.

Mr. Keefe. When did the Army relieve the Marines?

General Marshall. I will have to obtain that information from the War Department.¹

Mr. Keefe. Was it in 1941?

General Marshall. I imagine it was, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And was the deployment of troops to Iceland pursuant to the President's agreement with the Premier of Iceland, or was it pursuant to the ABC agreement?

General Marshall. I think the movement into Iceland was prior to the ABC agreement.

Mr. Keefe. You think it was prior to the ABC agreement?

¹The Information appears in Hearings, Part 5, p. 2075.
General Marshall. I think it was, sir. I am not certain.

Mr. Keefe. The ABC agreement was in the spring of 1940, wasn't it? This refers to the summer of 1941.

General Marshall. You are correct, sir. That was the first—this first movement was July 7, 1941, and that would mean that all took place after the ABC.

Mr. Keefe. When you sent troops into Iceland was it pursuant to the ABC agreement, or wasn't it?

[3762] General Marshall. I will have to look at the agreement and check up whether that was specifically covered in it.

Mr. Keefe. General Marshall, in your testimony reference was made to exhibit 57, as I recall it, a memorandum of a conference held on May 19, 1941, and it refers to conversations about a proposed Martinique invasion. I confess to a very hazy recollection as to what those conversations were and what was proposed. Can you explain that?

General Marshall. As I recall the matter, the situation at that time was there was in Martinique a French airplane carrier and also I think either a cruiser or a battleship. *" *" a first class cruiser ship." So it was a cruiser. And also a carrier.

The question was whether the carrier and the cruiser would become available to the Germans for use in the Atlantic hostile to our interests. The question was what was to be done in regard to the matter. This particular place was a French Colony, with a commander, a French naval officer, Admiral Gaubert, I think. And if it was used in a hostile way—it was in the Caribbean region.

There was also in Martinique certain planes that were then en route, as I recall, to be delivered to the French at the time of the fall of France and they were still in Martinique, as a possibility for use should the Germans [3762] get control of the situation.

This discussion here—I am endeavoring to read it while I am talking—related to what might have to be done in order to meet that situation.

Mr. Keefe. General Marshall, before you go on, was that in line with this plan that I referred to this morning, the Hemispheric Defense Plan, Plan 57, I think?

General Marshall. I would say that that was roughly in line with that.

Mr. Keefe. May I ask counsel if we have got a copy of that plan in the record, the Hemispheric Defense Plan?

Mr. Mitchell. The Canadian Plan, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. No, not the Canadian Plan.

General Marshall. They never reached a complete plan for hemispheric defense.

Mr. Keefe. Was there such a plan?

General Marshall. We were gradually building it up, first in relation to Canada, next in relation to Mexico, next in relation to the bulge of Brazil and Brazil generally, and later on the points of the west coast of South America.

Mr. Keefe. Was this proposed invasion of Martinique as a result of that plan that you were building up for hemispheric defense?

General Marshall. I don't believe it would be correct [3763] to say the result of that plan. It followed the fact that we had in
Martinique two vessels, one of which in particular could have been very harmful to us if it suddenly passed to the control of Germany, and could be exceedingly harmful to the British, of course. But they were right here in the Caribbean region with an uncertainty as to what their future use might be.

Mr. Keeffe. I recall at the time a great deal of discussion in the public press and in the Congress in which there was a rather insistent demand that we do something about seizing this carrier and the planes that were there which had been tendered under lease-lend for France.

General Marshall. I stated in the conference in the office of the Secretary of War on May 19, 1941, at which were present: The Secretary of War; the Under Secretary of War; the Assistant Secretary of War; the Assistant Secretary of War for Air; the Chief of Staff—myself; the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, General Bryden, General Moore, General Arnold; the Secretary, General Staff, Colonel Ward, on the subject of Martinique.

In the light of statements made in the Sunday papers with reference to Dakar and Martinique, I had the plans checked immediately. The plan provides for 2,800 marines, with the necessary landing equipment, to make the initial landing, followed by the First Division. The Marines have the necessary landing equipment for their troops. They will be opposed by 4,000 to 5,000 50-percent effective troops. * * *

Mr. Keeffe. You don’t have to read that for me, General Marshall. I think it has already been read into the record. That plan was not put into effect, of course?

General Marshall. It was not.

Mr. Keeffe. Was there a discussion of a possible taking over the Azores at the same time?

General Marshall. I don’t know about that particular time, but we had several discussions in regard to the Azores.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, I note in examination of the Army report and in the testimony that a Colonel Clausen is mentioned. Is that the same Colonel Clausen—may I ask counsel—do you know, that went out afterwards and took this subsequent examination?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. He is the same man that participated in the Army board hearings?

Mr. Gesell. I think, Mr. Congressman, he was Assistant Recorder of the Army Board and was appointed to make this examination.

Mr. Keeffe. All right.

You know General McNarney, of course?


Mr. Keeffe. Is he a lieutenant general now?

General Marshall. He is a full general.

Mr. Keeffe. A full general?


Mr. Keeffe. Well, he was a member of the Roberts Commission, wasn’t he?


Mr. Keeffe. General McNarney, prior to his appointment as a member of the Roberts Commission, was in the office of G–2, wasn’t he, of the General Staff?

General Marshall. He belonged to the War Plans Division.

Mr. Keeffe. War Plans Division.

Mr. Keeffe. So they picked him out of the War Plans Division and put him on the Roberts Commission?

General Marshall. Not that, sir. In the previous spring, sometime about April, I think, I sent General McNarney to England as an observer. He continued to be carried on the War Plans Division. He remained in England until December, sometime about the middle of December in 1941. I recalled him to the United States to head the Board for the reorganization of the War Department on which we had been working for about a year.

[3766] We had reached the time where active measures should be put into effect and a small board, of three or four men, with McNarney at the head, was picked for this purpose.

I had selected him because he not only was a very capable administrator, but also an officer of the Air Corps and a great deal of the intricacy of the reorganization was confused by the part of the air. I don't know what the date was that he was recalled back, but I imagine he probably got his notice sometime the latter part of November. Anyway, he arrived here in the middle of December.

Now —

Mr. Keeffe. General, my only purpose, in reference to General—

General Marshall. May I carry this to conclusion?

Mr. Keeffe. All right.

General Marshall. He was here, as I have said, to be the head of that Board. He was carried, and had been carried, I believe, since 1929, in the War Plans Division, although he had not been in the Division since the previous April.

On his return here, the Secretary requested me to suggest an officer of the Air Corps to be a member of this Roberts Board. I don't recall the names of those I pro— [3767] posed, but I mentioned McNarney's name. I thought he was probably the most capable one, but it was a very inconvenient thing for me to have him on the Board, because it was imperative that we reorganize the War Department as quickly as possible. So he was loaned for that purpose, went on that Board, and the minute they released him, he was made head of this committee.

As a matter of fact, I think he became active on the committee before he was released from the Roberts Board, and he carried out the final completion of the plan and the implementing of the plan and the minute the plans were completed, he became Deputy Chief of Staff. He did not serve in the Operations Section as such, or the War Plans Division as such at any time after April of that year. He was merely carried there until he became Deputy Chief of Staff.

Mr. Keeffe. April of what year?


Mr. Keeffe. Then, prior to April of 1941 was General McNarney in the War Plans Division in a position where he had access to magic?

General Marshall. I doubt if he saw magic.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you know?

General Marshall. I do not know, no.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you know whether or not he was in a position to communicate to his colleagues on the Roberts Commission the information obtained by him as to magic when he was in the War Plans Division?
General Marshall. I do not know that, sir.

The Chairman. The Chair would like to suggest that the hour of adjournment has come. Unless we can conclude with General Marshall in a few minutes, we will have to recess.

I don’t know what the chances are to conclude.

Mr. Keefe. Well, Mr. Chairman, I confess I am not quite through. The Chairman. Then we might as well recess.

I hope I will not be guilty of impropriety in suggesting that tomorrow, when General Marshall returns, that members of the committee make every effort to, consistent with their duty, to expedite the conclusion of General Marshall’s testimony for reasons which we all understand.

So we will recess at this time.

Mr. Murphy. Before we recess, Mr. Chairman, may I make one observation?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. On yesterday afternoon the gentleman from Michigan wanted read into the record the first 18 pages of the top secret report. At that time I made a statement that that was qualified subsequently by the Clausen report [3769] and that it would be essential to have the subsequent part in the record in order to understand the first part.

Now, the committee ought to have proper public relations and press relations. Some of the press of the Nation took the first 18 pages without the remainder of the report and part of that went out to the Nation. It resulted in a somewhat garbled presentation of the picture to the Nation and a number of reporters at 10 o’clock last night were still puzzled as to whether they were free to use the material after other reporters had used it.

This afternoon there is more material from the Clausen report and the papers, I think all of the reporters, ought to be treated alike. Either the Clausen report is public material and can be used, or it is not.

Let’s not do it for one reporter and have a different rule for another reporter.

It seems to me that as long as some of the reporters have used a part of the Clausen report that all ought to be made available to them.

General Marshall. May I be excused, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. General Marshall, you may be excused.

(Witness temporarily excused.)

The Chairman. The Chair will state that when that document was presented yesterday, and the request made [3770] that the 18 pages referred to be read, there was a discussion as to whether that entire document should be filed as an exhibit in relation to other exhibits and whether the entire record or the reports involved should be filed with the committee as exhibits.

The discussion resulted in suspending the whole matter until today.

Last night, after dinner out at my home various newspaper correspondents, including the Associated Press and the United Press, and the New York Times, the Chicago Daily Times, and other papers called me and stated that the Senator from Michigan had given to two newspapers the 18 pages to which he referred, and wanted to know whether it would not be advisable to release the entire release which
had been given to the papers with the understanding that it would be released today when the matter was again presented, and the Chair took the liberty of authorizing the release of the entire document to those newspapers who called me, but what happened to the others, the Chair does not know.

He felt that if any was going in, it should all go in.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson. I want to say now emphatically that I gave no amount of data or any part or parcel of the 18 [3771] pages to any press or to anyone else.

I say emphatically I had this book which the counsel now has, that was the memo that I had, and it is the only memo that I had of that, and he retain it, and I gave no part or parcel of any of this record to any press or to anyone else.

[3772] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has no information except what the press associations and newspaper correspondents called him up over the telephone and told him. Based upon that information the Chair felt that all the papers ought to get all that any other papers got, they ought to get the entire record if any was to be used.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, there is just one thing. There are only, as I understand it, two copies of the Clausen report available to the committee, one in the hands of counsel and one in the hands of the Senator from Michigan. I—

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. I do not have the Clausen report.

Mr. Murphy. You do not. Where is the other report?

Senator Ferguson. I have not had it recently.

Mr. Murphy. I see. Mr. Greaves has it, and I suppose he has it for some Senator.

Senator Ferguson. He says he has it for Senator Brewster.

Mr. Murphy. Senator Brewster has it.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be possible for any other Senator to get hold of it? The Chair has never had a chance to get hold of that, and very few other reports, because they are always in the hands of somebody else.

Mr. Keeffe. I agree, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gearhart. That is why, Mr. Chairman, I asked that [3773] the testimony be briefed.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to say, and I think the committee will agree, that, as a matter of fact, these releases concerning the contents of documents ought not to be given out until they have become a part of the record of this committee, and when they are given out they ought to be given to all newspapers and all press associations without discrimination.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, as a matter of information, I would like to see the Clausen report, and this top secret report offered by Senator Ferguson yesterday; I understood that the Chair had made some ruling to the effect that it was to be examined by counsel and there would be a future determination as to whether it would be admitted in evidence. Is it in evidence?

The CHAIRMAN. It is not in evidence yet. The question arose when the Senator from Michigan presented it—apparently counsel desired
to look through it in order to identify it, and that resulted in a discus-
sion which in turn resulted in the whole matter being suspended until
today and it has not yet been made a part of the record or identified as
an exhibit.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, in order that we may know and be
guided accordingly, may that not now be identified as a part of the
record? It appears that the newspapers have all [3774] had it.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I think counsel was about to
make some remark.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to make one other observation——
The Chairman. The Chair recognizes counsel.

Mr. Mitchell. All I wanted to say was that this Army Pearl Har-
bor investigation top secret report and top secret memoranda that
Senator Ferguson asked to have admitted yesterday, has been mimeo-
graphed, every member of the committee has a mimeographed copy,
and all the press has it, but the press were instructed not to release it
until it was offered; and then there was some question about whether
part of the press did not get a release on it and you, Mr. Chairman,
ordered the release for all of them.

The document itself has not yet been formally entered in the record
and I understand that you want the whole document in.

I just wanted to look at it yesterday to see what it was so that I
could identify it in the record.

The Chairman. Without passing on the question of whether all
these reports and all these top secret documents concerning all these
reports will be ultimately made a part of our record, is there any
objection to the filing of this particular report now in its entirety and
its identification as [3775] Exhibit No. 63?

Mr. Mitchell. It will be identified as Exhibit 63.

The Chairman. So it may now become a part of the record. It will
be so ordered.

Mr. Mitchell. If Senator Ferguson would like to have the first
18 pages transcribed into the daily transcript, perhaps that should be
done.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I had in mind.

The Chairman. I think the members of the committee ought to have
some information as to what those first 18 pages are in order to deter-
mine whether they alone should be printed as a part of the record or
the whole report printed as a part of the record.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask first of
counsel as to when these 18 pages were released to the press, when you
gave copies of it to the press. When were they given to the press?

Mr. Mitchell. Yesterday afternoon.

Mr. Gesell. 4 o'clock; 4:15.

Senator Ferguson. I understood the Chairman to say that the press
said that I had given them the papers. Now it turns out, as I under-
stand it, that counsel gave it out.

The Chairman. No. The Chair stated it accurately. The news-
men who called me said that you had given it out to two newspapers,
but they did not identify the two newspapers.

[3776] Based on that information, from members of the press,
and whom I knew personally, I assumed that you probably had.
Senator Ferguson. I want to state on the record that I did not. I had no knowledge that they had it and I did not give it out.

[3777] The Chairman. Of course, these telephone calls came in all the way up to 10 o'clock, and it was difficult at that hour to take a census of all the news offices in Washington and members of the committee, and I thought it safe.

Senator Ferguson. Is the record clear that at 4:15 yesterday, this instrument was given to the press—made public?

Mr. Mitchell. No. I have said repeatedly, it was given to the press in mimeographed form, copies were handed to the committee yesterday; you had them on your desk as did every other member.

Am I wrong about that?

Senator Ferguson. I did not see my copy until this morning.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, as I understand it, the press were given copies, mimeographed copies, of this top secret document yesterday, with the instructions that it was not released for publication until the document itself was admitted.

The Chairman. The newspapermen informed me that they had it with instructions not to use it until 10 o'clock this morning with the understanding that at 10 o'clock it would probably be offered as a part of the record; but in [3778] view of the fact that some of the papers had it, they felt it was a discrimination not to let them all have it and I took the authority to release it last night for publication in this morning's papers.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman—

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas. In view of the fact that a segment of the press violated the instructions given to them by counsel—

Mr. Mitchell. I do not say that they did. I am not saying that at all.

The Chairman. The Chair does not know what newspapers got it, and from whom. All he knows is what reputable members of the press associations and reputable news men told him over the telephone.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, it does seem to me, just as a matter of good practice, that perhaps none of these statements should be issued to the press, notwithstanding the fact that they are told they cannot be used until a release date comes later.

The Chairman. Well, the Chair feels that as a rule the press observe these restrictions in regard to getting advance copies of something to be released at a future date so that they may have it as a base for their articles.

[3779] Senator Lucas. It goes without saying that certain papers did carry this without any authorization on the part of counsel or any authorization upon the part of this committee.

The Chairman. Well, it is difficult now to know which newspapers would have carried it if I had not authorized it to be released to all of them. The Chair does not know about that, but it is the rule that when things are to be offered in evidence, and there is to be a release for the press, that the release be not given out for publication, but will be held for publication until it becomes a part of the record.

Mr. Mitchell. They have stood by that very well, the press has. The Chairman. Yes.
This was a peculiar circumstance, and the Chair had no reason to doubt, and does not doubt now that the representations made by these newspaper reporters were correct as to the fact that some newspapers had it; and as to who gave it to them, the Chair does not know.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel a question with respect to the document he has in his hands? There has been a question about the first 18 pages, and counsel has examined this document, as I understand. I should like [3780] have his opinion as to whether or not he thinks the 18 pages should go in separately, or whether the entire document should go in the record.

Mr. Mitchell. My notion is that the whole document ought to go in.

The first 18 pages is top secret report of Army Pearl Harbor board, discussing certain evidence and documents. That is a part that was withheld by the Army board and it contains a reference to some but not all of the evidence given on certain points.

Then we come to the next part, we have a memorandum of the Judge Advocate General, reviewing it.

The third item is another memorandum of the Judge Advocate General.

And item four is again a top secret memorandum of the Judge Advocate General, and I do not think—discussing additional evidence—I do not think the first 18 pages are really intelligible unless you have the full report of the Judge Advocate General.

The Chairman. It has already been ordered printed as a part of the transcript, the entire document, as I understand it, and that being so, we will now recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Exhibit No. 63, referred to, follows:)

[3781] ARMY PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION—TOP SECRET REPORT AND TOP SECRET MEMORANDA


2. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board, and recommending further investigation.

3. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14 September 1945, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board on the basis of additional evidence.


[3782] Memo: To The Secretary of War:

The following is a brief discussion of the evidence and documents in the possession of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which, for reasons of security, should not be incorporated in the General Report. The Secretary of War is entirely familiar with this type of evidence and the Board is sure concurs in its decision to treat it separately and as Top Secret.

1. General.—Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions.
This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.

The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army [3783] or Navy gave only a small fraction of this information. No direction was given the Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the "Do-Don't" message of November 27, 1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives could have been formulated to put the Department on Alert Number 3.

This was not done.

Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having [3783] selected the right alert.

The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it.

The details of this information follow:

2. Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from September to December 1941.—The record shows almost daily information as to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period.

1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese offensive military operations. (R. 80)

2. On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States. (R. 87) War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action.

3. On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87)

As Colonel Bratton summed it up:

"The picture that lay before all of our [3785] policy making and planning officials, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the Chief of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not months." (R. 243-244)

The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 286) All the information that the War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thoughts. (R. 297)

Colonel Bratton on occasions had gone to the Chief of the War Plans Division and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and stood by while they read the contents of these folders, in case they wished to question him about any of it. Colonel Bratton testifies:

"I had an arrangement with Colonel Smith, [3786] Secretary to the General Staff, how he could get me on the telephone at any time in case the Chief of Staff wished to be briefed on any of them." (R. 290)
4. When the information on December 3 came as to the Japanese destroying their codes and code machines, which was construed as certain war, Colonel Bratton took the information to General Miles and General Gerow and talked at length with both of them. General Gerow opposed sending out any further warning to the overseas command. General Miles felt he could not go over General Gerow's decision. (R. 283) Colonel Bratton then went to see Commander McCullom of the Navy, Head of the Far Eastern Section in ONI, and he concurred in Bratton's judgment that further warning should be sent out because this action of the Japanese meant war almost immediately. Colonel Bratton then returned after making arrangements with McCullom and persuaded General Miles to send a message to G-2. Hawaiian Department, instructing him to go to Commander Rochefort, Office of Naval Intelligence, with the Fleet to have him secure from Rochefort the same information which General Gerow would not permit to be sent directly in a war warning message. (R. 283–284)

All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go out to the field, with the possible exception of the general statements in occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302) G-2 was prevented as a matter of policy from giving out intelligence information of this sort to G-2 in overseas departments. The Navy also objected to any of this type of intelligence being sent by the Army without its authority.

The War Plans Division refused to act upon the recommendations of G-2. Intelligence Bulletins were distributed giving this information. When G-2 recommended, for instance, the occupation of the outer Aleutians ahead of the Japanese, the War Plans Division took no action upon the estimate and recommendation, with the result that we later had to fight two costly campaigns to regain Attu and Kiska. (R. 301–302)

Captain Safford of the Communications Security Division in Naval Operations, testified as to the type of information that was coming into the Navy during November and December.

Tokyo informed Nomura on the 22nd of November that the 25th was the last date they could permit him negotiations. (R. 121) On November 26th specific information received from the Navy indicated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States. (R. 123–124) Nomura on the 26th said he thought he had failed the Emperor and that his humiliation was complete, evidently referring to the ultimatum delivered to him by the Secretary of State.

Colonel Sadtler testified as to the information that was coming in as to Japanese intentions in the fall of 1941, saying:

"The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding the tense and strained relations between the two countries, and the number of messages about warnings of conditions that obtain in case of hostilities really reached a climax around the middle of November, to such an extent that we were of the opinion that there might be a declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday, November 30. This, as you all know, proved to be a 'duel', and on Monday, December 1 if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began coming in from Tokyo telling the Consuls to destroy their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their directive."

The Japanese Embassy in Washington was advised to destroy their codes on December 3. (R. 249–250)

3. The "Winds" Message. Colonel Sadtler said that about November 20, a message was intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission, to the effect that the Japanese were notifying nationals of possible war with the United States. The "winds" message was indicated in these instructions, which would indicate whether the war would be with the United States, Russia, or Great Britain, or any combination of them. The Federal Communications Commission was asked to listen for such information.

On the morning of December 5, 1941, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval Communications, called Colonel Sadtler at 9: 30 saying, "Sadtler, the message is in!" He did not know whether the particular message was the one that meant war with the United States, but it meant war with either the United States, Russia, or Great Britain. He immediately advised General Miles and Colonel Bratton.

Sadtler was instructed to go back to Admiral Noyes to get the precise wording used, but Admiral Noyes said that he was too busy with a conference and he would have to attend to it later. Colonel Sadtler protested that that would
be too late. (R. 251-252) He reported back to General Miles. He then went to see General Gerow, Head of the War Plans Division, and suggested a message to be sent to Hawaii. General Gerow said, "No; that they had plenty of information in Hawaii." He then went to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Smith, and made the same suggestion. When Smith learned that G-2 and the War Plans Division had been talked to, he declined to discuss it further. It was about the 5th or 6th of December that Tokyo notified the Japanese Embassy at Washington to destroy their remaining codes. It was on December 5 that Sadtler discussed this matter with General Gerow and Colonel Smith, because as Sadtler said, "I was sure war was coming, and coming very quickly." (R. 254)

Colonel Bratton arranged on behalf of G-2 for monitoring of Japanese weather broadcasts with the Federal Communications Commission. These arrangements were made through Colonel Sadtler. (R. 57, 103) Colonel Bratton testified that no information reached him as to the break in relations shown by the "winds" message prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, December 7, 1941, and he does not believe anybody else in G-2 received any such information. (R. 58-59)

He conferred with Kramer and McCullom of the Navy. The message sent to him by the Federal Communications Commission was not the message he was looking for. (R. 60). Later he learned from the Navy about their monitoring efforts in Hawaii and the Far East, and the fact that they probably secure the "winds" message sooner than he would in Washington. That is the reason why he sent the message of December 5, to Fielder, G-2, in Hawaii, to make contact with Commanding Officer Rochefort, to obtain security oral information of this sort. (R. 62-63) A copy of this message has been produced in the record showing that it was sent. Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler testified to the fact that their records showed that it was sent. (R. 69, 70, 71) But Colonel Fielder said he got no such message. (R. 68) [3791] The Navy now admits having received this "winds" activating message about December 6, but the War Department files show no copy of such a message. (R. 50, 251)

From the Naval point of view Captain Safford recites the story of the "winds" message saying that Japan announced about the 26th of November 1941 that she would state her intentions in regard to war with Russia, England, the Dutch, and the United States, by the "winds" message. On November 28, 1941, the "winds" code was given. On December 3, 1941, the Naval Attaché at Batavia gave another version of the "winds" code. All three of these messages indicated the probability of the breaking off of relations and offensive warfare by Japan against the United States or the other nations mentioned.

On December 4, 1941, information was received through the Navy Department which was sent to Captain Safford which contained the Japanese "winds" message, "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia." (R. 132) [3792] This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and cannot be found. It was in existence just after Pearl Harbor and was collected with other messages for submission to the Roberts Commission. Copies were in existence in various places but they all disappeared. (R. 133-135) [3793] Captain Safford testified:

"General Russell, Have you helped or been active at all in this search which has been made in the Naval Department to discover this original message?

"Captain Safford, I have. As a last resort I requested copies of the message repeatedly from 20G, and on the last occasion I asked the officer in charge, who was Captain Stone, to stir his people up a little harder and see if they couldn't make one more search and discover it. And when Captain Stone discovered it couldn't be found, he called for—required written statements for anybody who might have any notice of that and though the written statements disclosed a lot of destruction of other messages and things—not messages, but the intercepts; not the translations—nothing ever came to light on that message, either the carbon copy of the original incoming message, which should have been filed with the work sheet, or of the translation. And one copy of the translation

1 Captain Safford testified that the Japanese were no longer using the code employed to transmit the winds messages; that there was no reason now why they should not be discussed openly.

Colonel Rufus Bratton, on the contrary, testified that it would be dangerous to acquaint the Japanese with the fact that we intercepted the winds message, as this might result in further code changes by the Japanese.

The Board, as a matter of course, decided to follow the safe plan and treat these messages as Top Secret.
Colonel Murray, about the 15th of December, Admiral Noyes called for the assembling of all important messages into one file, to show as evidence to the Roberts Commission; and Kramer assembled them, and I checked them over for completeness and to see that we strained out the unimportant ones; and that 'winds' translation, the 'Winds execute,' was included in those. I do not recall whether that ever came back or not. So far as I know, it may even be with the original papers of the Roberts Commission. It never came back that I know of, and we have never seen it since, and that is the last I have seen of it.

"We also asked the people in the Army on several occasions if they could run it down and give us a copy. We were trying to find out the exact date of it and the exact wording of the message, to run this thing down and not make the thing a question depending upon my memory or the memory of Kramer or the memory of Murray, who do distinctly recall it."

"General Russell. Well, now, let us talk cases."

"Captain Safford. Yes, sir."

"General Russell. I want to know if over there in 20G you had a place where you had 20G files of messages, and then over here some other place you had a JD file which was separate and distinct from the one I have discussed."

"Captain Safford. Yes, sir."

"General Russell. But you had messages over there in the [3794] JD file?"

"Captain Safford. We had. Yes, sir; that is correct."

"General Russell. And they were the same as the ones in the 20G file?"

"Captain Safford. Yes, sir; but they were in a different order."

"General Russell. All right. Now, this message of December 4th, when it went to the JD file, was given the number, according to your testimony, of 7001?"

"Captain Safford. It probably was."

"General Russell. You don't know that?"

"Captain Safford. Not to know; only circumstantial evidence."

"General Russell. Well, is JD 7000 in that file now?"

"Captain Safford. JD 7000 is there, and 7002."

"General Russell. But 7001 just isn't there?"

"Captain Safford. The whole file for the month of December 1941 is present or accounted for except 7001."

"General Russell. Now let us talk about 20G, which is some other place in this office. Is this December 4th message the only one that is out of those files?"

"Captain Safford. That is the only one that we looked for that we couldn't find. It is possible that there will be others missing which we haven't looked for, but we couldn't find that serial number. We looked all through the month to make certain. That is the only one that is missing or unaccounted [3795] for." The radio station logs, showing the reception of the message have been destroyed, within the last year. Captain Safford testified that this message, and everything else they got from November 12 on, was sent to the White House by the Navy. It was a circulated copy that circulated to the White House and to the Admirals of the Navy.

It is this message which the Army witnesses testified was never received by the Army. It was a clear indication to the United States as early as December 4. The vital nature of this message can be realized.

4. Account of the Delivery of the Long 14 Part Message: the Short Implementing Message. The first 13 parts of the long reply of the Japanese finally terminating the relationships with the United States began to come in in translated form from the Navy on the afternoon of December 6, and the 13 parts were completed between 7 and 9 the evening of December 6. Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of the War Department G-2, was the designated representative for receiving and distributing to the Army and to the Secretary of State copies of messages of this character received from the Navy. The Navy undertook to deliver to the President and to its own organization copies of similar messages.
Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts [3797] between September 9 and 10:30 p.m., December 6, as follows:

To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key (R. 238). He told General Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the bag and see the contents (R. 307).

To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his presence (R. 239, 241). He stated that General Miles did nothing about it as far as he knew (R. 241). This record shows no action by General Miles.

Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Galley, General Gerow’s executive in the War Plans Division (R. 238).

He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10 and 10:30 p.m. (R. 234, 239).

Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to General Staff, to communicate with General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on the part of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation until the following morning.

In the meantime, as the testimony of Captain Safford [3798] shows, the following action was taken with the distribution of the same 13 parts of the message by the Navy which clearly indicates its importance.

Captain Safford testifies that the first 13 parts came in on the afternoon of December 6 and were translated to English and delivered to the Army to Major Doud by 9 o’clock Saturday night, December 6. This portion of the message was distributed as follows: Commander Kramer consulted with the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson, and was directed to go to the White House to deliver a copy. He then delivered a copy to Admiral Wilkinson at his house. As the President was engaged, Kramer gave a copy to the White House Aide, Admiral Beardall. When Kramer reached Admiral Wilkinson’s house he also gave a copy to Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans. He delivered the final copy by midnight to Admiral Ingersoll, who read it and initiated it. Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark, as did also Admiral Turner. Admiral Stark ordered Kramer to be at his office at 9 Sunday morning. Kramer came back to the Navy Department about 1 a.m. to see if part 14 had come in, but it had not.

When part 14 did come in it was ready for delivery to the Army in English by 7:15 a.m., December 7 (R. 158, 260, 164, 166).

The net result was that no one took any action based upon the first 13 parts until the 14th part came in and the Army took [3799] no action on that until between 11:30 and 12 on the morning of December 7, or about 13 hours after the first 13 parts came in which clearly indicated the rupture of relations with the Japanese.

Nothing more was done with this clear warning in the first 13 parts of the long message until the following events occurred.

Colonel Bratton received a naval officer courier between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. on the Sunday morning of December 7, the English translation of the 14th part of the long message and the short message of the Japanese directing the Ambassador to deliver the long message at 1 p.m. on December 7 and to destroy their codes. Colonel Bratton immediately called General Marshall’s quarters at 9 a.m. (R. 55).

General Marshall was out horseback riding and he asked that he be sent for. General Marshall called him back between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. General Marshall came into his office at 11:25 a.m., of which there is a contemporaneous written record maintained by Colonel Bratton. In the meantime, Colonel Bratton called his Chief, General Miles, and reported what he had done (R. 77). Neither General Miles nor General Gerow were in their office on Sunday morning. General Miles arrived at the same time as General Marshall at 11:25 a.m. The Chief of Staff prepared a message to General Short and called Admiral Stark, who said he was not sending any [3800] further warning but asked General Marshall to inform the Navy in Hawaii through Short.

The answer to the following question on the record has not been supplied this Board:
"Why were not the first 13 parts, which were considered important enough by the Navy to be delivered to the President and everyone of the important Admirals of the Navy, delivered by the War Department officers to the Chief of Staff, and his attention called to it so that he could have taken some sort of action upon it?" (R.—)

The only possible answer lies in the testimony that Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff was told about 9 p. m. December 6 that there was an important document and that General Marshall should see it right away (R. 242). There is no proof that Colonel Smith did so act except that from General Marshall, which shows that he was not advised of this situation until the following morning when he received a message from Colonel Bratton between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., December 7.

The record shows that subordinate officers who were entrusted with this information were so impressed with it that they strongly recommended that definite action be taken.

When subordinate officers were prevented from sending this information to the Hawaiian Department, by arrangement [3801] with their opposite numbers in the Office of Naval Intelligence, upon learning that the Navy had this information in Hawaii, an apparently innocuous telegram was dispatched by G–2 to Colonel Fielder, G–2 in Hawaii, telling him to see his opposite number in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Commander Rochefort, to secure information from him of importance.

The story of the message of November 27 takes on a whole new aspect when the facts are really known as to the background of knowledge in the War Department of Japanese intentions. At the time the Chief of Staff drafted the message of the 27th on the 26th, he knew everything that the Japanese had been proposing between themselves for a long period of time prior to that day, and knew their intentions with respect to the prospects of war. The message of the 27th which he drafted in rough and which was apparently submitted to the Joint Board of the Army and Navy, therefore could have been cast in the clearest sort of language and direction to the Hawaiian Department.

It was no surprise that the Japanese would reject the Ten Points on November 26; that course of events had been well pictured by complete information of the conversations between the Japanese Government and its representatives available to the Government of the United States.

3. Summary. Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous [3802] pieces of information came to our State, War and Navy Departments in all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack.

To clinch this extraordinary situation we have but to look at the record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final reply were completely known in detail to the War Department, completely translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7 and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G–2 of the War Department personally in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen. Smith, and Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary to the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G–2 General Miles, with whom it was discussed, and to the Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same officer personally delivered the same information to the Secretary of State’s duty officer.

General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as vital and important as it was, was not conveyed to him on that date by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows. When the final part 14 came in on the morning of December 7 and with it the short message directing the long message be delivered to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m., December 7, 1941. It was then that this same officer, Colonel Bratton of G–2, took the initiative and went direct to General Marshall, calling him at his quarter at Fort Myer and sending an orderly to find him, where he was out horseback riding. When he finally did reach him on the phone, General Marshall said he was coming to the War Department. He met him at about 11:25 a.m., after which time the message of December 7 was formulated by General Marshall in
his own handwriting. It failed to reach its destination due to sending it by commercial Western Union—RCA. It arrived several hours after the attack.

This brings us to the "winds" message. The "winds" message was one that was to be inserted in the Japanese news and weather broadcasts and repeated with a definite pattern of words, so as to indicate that war would take place either with Great Britain, Russia, or the United States, or all three.

The Federal Communications Commission was asked to be on the lookout for these key words through their monitoring stations. Such information was picked up by a monitoring station. This information was received and translated on December 3, 1941, and the contents distributed to the same high authority. The Navy received during the evening of December 3, 1941, this message, which when translated said, "War with the United States, War with Britain, including the NEL except peace with Russia." Captain Safford said he first saw the "winds" message himself about 8 a.m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. It had been received the previous evening, according to handwriting on it by Commander Kramer, who had been notified by the duty officer, Lt. (ig) Brotherhood, USNR, who was the watch officer on the receipt of this message.

It was based upon the receipt of the message that Captain Safford prepared five messages between 1200 and 1600 December 4, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers on the Asiatic stations. Captain McCullom of the Navy drafted a long message to be sent to all outlying fleets and naval stations. This was disapproved by higher naval authority. This message was confirmation to Naval Intelligence and Navy Department Communications Intelligence Units that war was definitely set.

This "winds execute" message has now disappeared from the Navy files and cannot be found despite the extensive search for it. It was last seen by Commander Safford about December 14, 1941, when he collected the papers together with Commander Kramer and turned them over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission.

[3805] There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4 and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday, December 6 and 7, was clearcut and definite.

Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States except the final message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor.

5 Nov 1944

Memorandum for the Secretary of War:
Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report.

You have referred to me for opinion the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board dated 20 October 1944 together with the testimony and exhibits. I have examined this Report with great care and submit herewith my views. The present memorandum does not cover so much of the investigation as pertains to the conduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. and related matters referred to in the Report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944.

Technical Legality of Board's Proceedings:

No question of the technical legality of the Board's proceedings is presented. As shown in the Report (Rep. 1) the Board was appointed by the Secretary of War by Letter Order AGO, 8 July 1944, (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)), as amended and supplemented, in order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944. The Board followed judicial forms, affording full opportunity to witnesses to produce any data in their possession. Interested parties such as General Short and others were likewise offered the fullest possible opportunity to appear before the Board and submit information.

Board's Conclusions in General:

The Board concludes broadly that the attack on Pearl [3807] Harbor was a surprise to all concerned: the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Department, which caught the defending forces practically unprepared to meet it and to minimize its destructiveness (Rep. 297). The extent of the disaster was due, the Board states, (a) to the failure of General Short adequately to alert his command for war; (b) to the failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type of alert taken by Short, to direct him to take an adequate alert; and (c) the failure to keep him adequately informed of the
status of the United States-Japanese negotiations, which might have caused him to change from the inadequate alert to an adequate one (Rep. 297). The Board follows these general conclusions by criticizing the conduct of the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans Division, and General Short (Rep. 297-300). The Board makes no recommendations.

It is believed that the most feasible method of examining the Report is to take up first the Report's conclusions as to General Short and the other conclusions later.

**Board's Conclusion as to General Short:**

Taking them up in their order the Board concludes that General Short failed in his duties in the following particulars:

"(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert [3803] against sabotage only. The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch.

"(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible commanders.

"(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

"(d) To replace inefficient staff officers." (Rep. 300) Short's Defenses:

General Short, as the commander of a citadel taken by surprise, is in the position of the captain of a ship which has been wrecked; it is a question of the validity of his defenses.

[3803] Within a half hour after receiving the 27 November warning radio signed "Marshall," (see p. 8, present memorandum) Short ordered Alert No. 1, which his SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from without." (Tr., Short 283, 305, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14) He did this without consulting his staff, other than his Chief of Staff, and without consulting the Navy. (Tr., Short 282, 395)

He also ordered into operation the radar air raid warning system, but only from 4 to 7 a.m., and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 297), 442)

The action of Short, which was taken in pursuance of the 27 November wire signed "Marshall," did not contemplate any outside threat. (Tr., Short 283, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14) His failure to provide for an outside threat was a serious mistake and resulted in overwhelming tactical advantages to the attackers, his being taken by surprise, the destruction of his aircraft on the ground, the severity of the damage done to the warships in Pearl Harbor and military installations. Short testified that when he ordered Alert No. 1 he did not consider there was any probability of an air attack and that in this regard "I was wrong." (Tr., Short 4440)

Numerous witnesses confirm that the failure of Short to provide against an outside threat constituted a grave error of judgment. (Tr., Allen 3113; Burgin 2618, 2655; Farthing [3870] 838-839; Gerow 4274; Hayes 268; Herron 238; King 2700; Murray 3096-3067; Phillips 1127-1128, 1151-1152; Powell 3011-3912; Throckmorton 1395-1396; Wells 2731; Wilson 1380-1381)

Short sought to excuse his error by claiming: (1) that he had assumed the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in ample time in the event of an impending attack (Short, Ex. 1, p. 55; Tr., 299, 300, 451, 452; cf. Kimmel 1769); (2) that in response to the radio signed "Marshall" of 27 November he informed the War Department of the alert against sabotage and the War Department had acquiesced therein and did not give him additional warnings after 27 November (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54; Tr., 286, 287, 308); (3) that measures to provide for threats from without would have interfered with training (Ex. 1, p. 16), and would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population (Ex. 1, p. 16-17) contrary to War Department instructions, and that the prime danger was sabotage. (Tr., Short 285, 286, 289, 428, 522; Ex. 1, p. 13-18, 54-57)

These excuses are untenable. Short's belief that the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in time cannot excuse him
for his failure to take precautions against an outside threat. In the same way he cannot be heard to justify his failure to adopt the necessary alert against an air attack because of fear of sabotage, or disclosure of possible intent, or possibility of alarming the civilian population, or interference with his training program. These latter must clearly be subordinated to the overshadowing danger of a possible air attack.

Short's testimony indicates that he felt he was not given sufficient information as to the true Japanese situation by Washington and that what information he got was at least in part misleading. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54–56; Tr., 278–281, 291–427)

The Board in its conclusion stated:

"The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected." (Rep., 300)

General Short took command 7 February 1941. That very day the Secretary of War transmitted to him a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy dated 24 January 1941 which stated:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor." (Roberts Report, p. 5) (Italics supplied)

Secretary Knox further stated that "inherent possibilities of a major disaster" warranted speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid [3812] of the character mentioned * * *." The letter proceeded:

"The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air topeedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire." (Roberts Report, p. 5)

The letter stated that the defenses against all but the first two were satisfactory, described the nature of the probable air attack and urged that the Army consider methods to repel it. It recommended revision of joint Army and Navy defense plans and special training for the forces to meet such raids. (Roberts Report, p. 5). Short admitted he received Secretary Stimson's letter inclosing Secretary Knox's letter, both of which he recalled very well. (Tr., Short 368–369)

On the same date, 7 February 1941, General Marshall wrote Short a letter containing the following statement:

"My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority." (Tr., Marshall 17) (Italics supplied)

[3813] On 5 March 1941 General Marshall wrote Short a follow-up letter saying:

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority." (Tr., Marshall 19) (Italics supplied)

Short replied by a letter, dated 15 March 1941, outlining the situation at length and stating:

"The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy airfields to the attack." (Tr., Marshall 21) (Italics supplied)

Short further stated:

"The Island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland." (Tr., Marshall 24)

On 14 April 1941 Short, reporting progress in cooperating with the Navy, sent General Marshall three agreements made with the Navy to implement the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and concluding with the remark:

"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the anti-aircraft defense." (Tr., Marshall 27) (Italics supplied)

[3814] General Marshall on 5 May 1941 complimented him for "being on the job." (Tr., Marshall 27)

On 7 July 1941, The Adjutant General sent Short a radio fully advising him of the Japanese situation. It told him that the Japanese Government had
determined upon its future policy which might involve aggressive action against Russia and that an advance against the British and Dutch could not be entirely ruled out. It further advised him that all Jap vessels had been warned by Japan to be west of the Panama Canal by 1 August, that the movement of Japanese shipping from Japan had been suspended, and that merchant vessels were being requisitioned. (Tr., Marshall 33, Fielder 2974, Stimson 4055)

Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions; Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without." It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 13 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of [3815] the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for preparation for "a surprise hostile attack." (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 64) (Italics supplied)

On 6 September, Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, advised the War Department that many of the Summaries of Information received from the War Department originated with the Office of Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District, and that he had already received them. He stated that as the cooperation between his office, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the FBI was most complete, that all such data was given him simultaneously with its dispatch to Washington and recommended that such notices from Washington to him be discontinued to avoid duplication of effort. (Tr., Bratton D. 292-293)

On 16 October, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Kimmel that the Japanese Cabinet resignation created a grave situation, that the new cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between Japan and Russia were strongly possible, and that since Japan held Britain and the United States responsible for the present situation there was also a possibility that Japan might attack these two powers. The radio concluded:

"In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute provocative action again Japan." (Tr., Short 279)

[3816] Short admits receiving this message. (Tr., Short 278)

Secretary Stimson testified the War Department had this warning sent to Short. (Tr., Stimson 4055)

On 17 October, Short's G-2 furnished Short's staff with a full estimate of the Japanese situation which stated the situation was extremely critical, that Japan would shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation which might oppose her policy, and that the major successes of the Axis afforded an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance, that probable moves included an attack upon Russia, upon British possessions in the Far East, a defense against American attack in support of the British, and a simultaneous attack upon the ABCD block "at whatever points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economical advantages." The report stated that a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers

"** cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed." (Tr. 3688)

[3817] On 18 or 20 October the War Department advised Short:

"The following War Department estimate of the Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no, repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy seems imminent."

(Tr., Short 412-413, Hain 3307, Gerow 4258, 4264)

Short's G-2 gave him a further estimate of the Japanese situation on 25 October 1941 stating that there had been no fundamental change in the situation since his warning advice of 17 October above referred to. It stated that a crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Japanese Cabinet, that actions of the new cabinet "definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States" and "forces America into a state of constant vigilance." It predicted Jap use of peace negotiations "as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies." It predicted a major move would be made
before the latter part of November "with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring." (Tr., 3659-3694)

On 5 November, the War Department G-2 wrote Short's G-2 that Hirota, head of the Buck Dragon Society, had stated that

"* * * War with the United States would best begin in December or in February. * * * The new cabinet would likely start war within sixty days. * * *" (Tr., Bratton D, 259-291)

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Asst. G-2, testified that early in November in his Weekly Intelligence Summary the statement was made that

"* * * from all information which had been gathered in our office in Hawaii it looked as though hostilities could be expected either by the end of November or, if not, then not until spring." (Tr., Bicknell 1439-1440)

Captain Edwin T. Layton, Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet, testified he believed he had informed Colonel Edwin Raley, G-2 of the Hawaiian Air Force and who had been assigned as liaison with the Navy, that Japanese troops, vessels, naval vessels, and transports were moving south. This information came from Naval observers in China, the naval attacke in Tokyo, the naval attacke in Chungking, British and other sources. This intelligence indicated that the Japanese would invade the Kra Isthmus, Jap submarines about this time had been contacted in the vicinity of Oahu. (Tr., Layton 3030, 3031, 3040-3041)

On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations radioed the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, that

"There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12, 13, 14) inform senior army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch." (Tr., Gerow 4258; cf Bloch 1503-C)

This message was presented to General Short by Captain Layton with his estimate. Not only did he deliver the message but he discussed it fully with Short. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059) Short said, "I do not think I ever got that message. * * * I might have seen it, * * * and I might have forgotten about it." (Tr., Short 414.)

On 26 November 1941, the War Department radioed Short:

"It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Carolina group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps and naval vessels including submarines * * * before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns." (Tr., Gerow, 4250)

The War Department sent Short three messages on 27 November, all of which arrived. The one signed "Marshall" read as follows:

"Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." (Tr., Gerow 4259-4260, Short 280-281)

This same day, 27 November, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's G-2 as follows:

"Advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may begin." (Tr., Gerow 4260) (Italics supplied)
The third message sent Short on 27 November 1941 was through the Navy Department, reading as follows:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Spanave informed British. Continental district Guam Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage." (Tr., Gerow 4262)

Short admits he got this message. (Tr., Short 415, 416, 469)

The following day, 28 November, The Adjutant General sent Short a long radio stating that the critical situation demanded that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Arnold 170, Short 293, Scanlon 4176) Short stated he took this as tacit consent to his alert against sabotage only (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54) and as a reply to his radio report of 27 November. (Tr., Short 422) Short sent a long reply to this message giving the various precautions taken by him against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Short 294–296) [3822]

There was a further message from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 30 November, stating that Japan was about to launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus. (Roberts Report, p. 8) Short also received Admiral Kimmel's Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situations, dated December 1, 1941, which stated that deployment of Jap naval ships southwest indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities and referred to naval and air activity in the Mandates. (Tr., Kimmel 1769–1770) An FBI or War Department report that the Jap Consuls in Honolulu were burning their codes and secret papers was given to Short's G–2 on 5 or 6 December 1941. (Tr., Fielder 2986, Bicknell 1413–1414) The Navy advised Kimmel on 3 December that Jap Consulates in Washington and London were destroying codes and burning secret documents. (Tr., Bloch 1512–1513) There were two Navy messages on 4 December 1941, the first an information copy to Kimmel of advice to certain naval commanders to destroy confidential documents (Tr., Bloch 1514), the second a similar radiogram advising "be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain." (Tr., Bloch 1514, Safford C. 187) Another Navy message of 6 December "directed that in view of the tense situation naval commanders in Western Pacific areas should be authorized to destroy confidential papers." (Tr., Safford C. 180, Bloch 1514) [3823]

In addition to all the above, G–2 of the War Department radioed Short's G–2 on 5 December 1941 to contact Commander Rochefort, in charge of naval cryptographic work in Pearl Harbor, relative to Jap weather broadcasts from Tokyo "That you cannot obtain" and stating categorically "contact him at once." This had reference to the important "Winds" intercept, to be discussed more fully later. (Tr., Bratton B. 62, D. 283) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short's G–2 staff advised Short's entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell 1413) Colonel Fielder, Short's G–2, confirmed the fact that Colonel Bicknell so reported. (Tr., Fielder 2986)

On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U. S. Military Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the Netherlands Far Eastern Command had ordered the execution of Plan A–2 based on their intelligence report of Japanese naval movements in the vicinity of Palau. (Tr., O'Dell 4506–4507) Lieutenant Robert N. O'Dell who was then Assistant Military Attache in the American Legation, Melbourne, Australia, testified that Plan A–2 was integrated into the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., O'Dell 4511–4512) The message in question was supposed to be relayed to the War Department by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for deciphering and repeat. (Tr., O'Dell 4509) The record does not show whether [3824] Short ever received this message. Other messages in the same code had been transmitted between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr., O'Dell 4510) Colonel Merle-Smith had not sent the cable in question to Washington in the first instance in order that there should be no delay.
Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short’s Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a telephone conversation between two Tr. Mori, a Japanese agent in Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo who inquired as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, and “Hibiscus” and “poinsettias,” (probably code words). This message evidently had “military significance” as Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell testified. (Tr., Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415–1416)

Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Harbor would be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility. The fact is that on 31 March 1941 he signed the Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agreement with the Navy, paragraph IV of which provided that daily patrols should be instituted to reduce the probability of “air surprise”. (Tr., Short 387–388) Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agreement (quoted in Report on page 98; Roberts Record 556–D–F) state:

[3825] “(d) * * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. * * *

“(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start * * *”

General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible surprise air attack. (Tr., Short 388)

General Hayes, Short’s Chief of Staff up to the middle of October 1941 (Tr., Hayes 242) testified that he, General Martin, Short’s air chief, and Admiral Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise air raid as the most probable enemy action and that this was the estimate of the Hawaiian Department in Short’s time and also in the time of his predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 267–268) Colonel Donegan, Short’s G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 1929), testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed “many, many times.” (Tr. Donegan 1961–1963) Short had at least one air defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr., Short 283) and he conducted an air raid drill as late as 29 November 1941. (Tr., DeLany 1727)

General Short admitted that while the 27 November message instructed him to undertake reconnaissance, this only indicated [3826] to him that “whoever wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had assumed he full responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance * * *.” (Tr., Short 4442)

Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Washington did not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It should be borne in mind that Short at no time called on Washington for clarification of any of these messages.

Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 October and that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding provocative action against Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 279–281) and that when the 27 November message was sent there was still hope in the minds of the War Department that differences might be avoided. (Tr., Short 281) He likewise interpreted the 27 November message to mean that he must avoid any action which would alarm the Japanese population, which was confirmed by The Adjutant General’s radio to him of 28 November. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 293–294)

As Short testified:

“Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *”. (Tr., Short 437)

Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of the War Department in sending the flight of B-17’s to Hawaii without ammunition for defense. The planes arrived in this condition during the attack. (Short, Ex. 1, [3827] p. 21, 22, 55; Tr., 307, 471)

As asked about “the possibility of confusion” created by the messages from Washington and whether he did not think the situation demanded vigorous action on his part, Short replied “very definitely not, from the information I had.” (Tr., Short 453)

The Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished General Short was “incomplete and confusing.” (Rep. 300)

Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short regarded as conflicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon Short to be prepared for
the most dangerous situation with which he could be confronted. This precaution on his part as the Commanding General was mandatory. Short was adequately advised of the imminent rupture in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, of the imminence of war, of the probable momentary outbreak of hostilities by Japan against the United States, and of the possibility of sabotage and espionage. The prime and unanswered question was when and where Japan would strike. As to this danger, the limitations and restrictions set forth in the messages were at all times subordinate to the principal instruction, namely that war was imminent and Short would be prepared for it. The instruction to this effect contained in the message of 27 November was as follows:

"* * * This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. * * *" (Tr., Short 280-281)

Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should not have been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he must be on the alert against threats both from within and from without.

Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." This reads:

"Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Short, Ex. 1, p. 16; Tr. 286)

As previously pointed out, Short sent this brief reply within thirty minutes after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and without consulting the Navy or the members of his staff. This decision and action by Short occurred before Short's G-2 received the message which the War Department G-2 radioed to Short on 27 November, clearly indicating that both sabotage and hostilities might commence and be concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2822) Short claims his report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a notice that he had only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to the directive to report contained in the 27 November message signed "Marshall."

He testified:

"Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action taken and there was no comment that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it." (Tr., Short 437).

When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading "liaison with the Navy" meant, he replied:

"General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing.

"General Grunekt. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?

"General Short. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff." (Tr., Short 380)

Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 pictured an emergency and called for action under the war plan. The Navy message expressly stated:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. * * * Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. * * *" (Tr., Gerow 4262)

The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512)

On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of the message. (Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he received this message. (Tr., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warning sent by the War Department was Radiogram No. 472, 27 November 1941. That message after stating "hostile action possible at any moment" goes on to say that after the outbreak of hostilities the tasks assigned in the Rainbow Plan will be carried out in so far as
they pertain to Japan. The implementation of that portion of the Plan by means of reconnaissance refers to paragraph 18 (1) of the Plan which provides that the Navy shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. (Tr., Kimmel 1745)

Short is in a dilemma in concerning that distant reconnaissance was a Navy responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377-380, 383, 393-394, 4443-4444) because it only became a Navy responsibility if and when the Joint Army and Navy Agreement was put into effect. Yet Short made no effort to put it into effect even in part. (Tr., Lawton 2675-2676, Short 4437, 4441)

General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified:

"**A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans message of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War Plans Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District." (Tr., Gerow 4283-4284)

General Gerow testified further that from Short's reply "liaison with the Navy" it was reasonable for General Gerow to assume further that "General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic Plan. * * *

Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Department not only that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also that defense measures were being taken in accordance with the basic War Plan. There is nothing in the Plan to compel its being put into effect in toto.

Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the Plan provides:

"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders." (Tr., Bellinger 1584)

It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War Plans Division should have checked up more thoroughly on the inadequacy of the brief report by Short, nevertheless Short did not inform the War Department that he had merely alerted his command against sabotage. In any event, a military commander with a great responsibility cannot entirely divest himself of that responsibility with respect to 7 December 1941 by giving the War Department on 27 November 1941 the report that he did. Furthermore, during the time which intervened from 27 November to 7 December he received other messages, heretofore quoted, which called for his re-examination of his decision.

Reconnaissance: Means Available:

Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Department of his action taken. For example, on 27 November, after receiving the message in question, he ordered the radar air raid warning service into operation but only from 4 to 7 a.m. (Tr., Short 297, 469-470) and primarily on a training basis. (Tr. Short 516, 4442) No mention of this was made in his reply. One of the most important means of reconnaissance was the radar air raid warning service. The 27 November message signed "Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake such reconnaissance and other means as you deem necessary." An added reason for twenty-four hour operations of the radar is Short's claim that the Hawaiian Department did not have sufficient aircraft for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is clear that the radar air raid warning system was capable of twenty-four hour operation since this schedule was maintained immediately following the attack. (Tr., Short 470)

Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 284, 385), but he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was not perfect. (Tr., Short 375, 384). He even failed to ascertain from the Navy, in a business-like way, just what reconnaissance was in fact being conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report, p. 18, 19) The Navy conducted reconnaissance but this was only incidental to the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for training purposes and also to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 359-360, 384; Bloch 1527; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 1,725; Kimmel 1773, 1794-1795; 1802; McMorris 2883; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16)

According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnaissance and
could run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate which had been submitted to Washington, it was clearly stated that we had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits, in order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of course we were hoping to get more planes all the time. Concerning the air force necessary for naval reconnaissance, Admiral Kimmel stated:

"* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from Oahu, around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, and this will take about 84 planes, assuming a 15 miles visibility, for one day. * * * " (Tr., Kimmel 1763) (Italics supplied)

3835 How many planes were available? From Kimmel's own testimony it appears that the Navy had 81 patrol planes:

"* * * it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any one time, augmented by such planes as the Army could supply to do that distant reconnaissance. The number of patrol planes in the fleet was 81, all told. Of those approximately between 50 and 60 were in the Island of Oahu and suitable for service in the 7th of December. * * * and they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet * * *" (Tr., Kimmel 1739; cf. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied)

Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert opinion, Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be needed for such reconnaissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494)

According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were needed for distant reconnaissance, "flying at an interval of five degrees." (Tr., Martin 1872)

"An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * * This brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180." (Tr. Martin 1873) 3836 Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have required 180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324, 374) But Short testified that he believed the naval task forces and planes from outlying islands were conducting reconnaissance equivalent to covering a 180 degree arc (Tr., Short 355; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16), and that the task force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles wide. (Tr., Short 4438) On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses would have been needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324, 374) According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., Kimmel 1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available in Oahu (Tr., Bellinger 1598; 1630; Kimmel 1739), but how many of these could have been used for reconnaissance is debatable. Some at least were needed to scout ahead of the then operating task forces. The Army had available 6 B-17's, 10 A-20's, and 54 B-18's. (Tr., Short 281, 314, 479) These B-18's were not the best type of plane, but as General Martin says:

"* * * They could be used for reconnaissance, but * * * were always recognized as not being a combat ship." (Tr., Martin 1530) (Italics supplied)

General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant reconnaissance a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent of a Navy Flying Fortress. Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of 128 planes in Oahu in late November and early December. How many of these planes were actually available for operations as distinguished from those undergoing repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear, however, from the above that a substantial number of planes were available by which reconnaissance could have been undertaken to some extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel and Short that the number of planes on hand was entirely insufficient for reconnaissance must be taken with some qualifications.

I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (paragraph XV, p. 12):

"Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan, when the plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating from Oahu to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no distant reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the island of Oahu and, in connection with such operations, carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissance of the operating areas. The sectors searched, however,
constituted but small arcs of the total arc of 360°, and rarely extended to a radius of 700 miles.

"Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded a measure of security against [3838] a surprise air attack.

'General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance, but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnaissance, if any, being conducted by the Navy.'

Information Not Received by Short; In General:

Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important information prior to the attack which should have been but was not transmitted to him and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) The Board held that under these circumstances, where vital information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is incumbent upon the War Department to assume the responsibility for specific instructions to these commanders. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) I do not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present case.

It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present record or the Roberts Report shows, the War Department possessed no information definitely pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and no advance information as to the date of an attack anywhere. This is contrary to many past and current newspaper stories. Indeed, aside from the Top Secret information which will now be considered, the Dutch-British- [3839] United States agreement for joint action, which Short said would have made him "more conscious" war was practically unavoidable, (Tr., Short 449-450), and possibly Navy messages not presented to the Board, there was no substantial information in the War Department which was not transmitted to Short. Short, as Commanding General, must be charged with having all the important information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also that Short received important information from his G-2 of which the War Department was not informed.

An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board indicates that it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which cite as a basis references to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These references in turn indicate that the testimony given by the witnesses consists largely of their conclusions or evaluations of certain intercepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses is undefined and inconclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus received by the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified out of all proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was received from day to day. This is all the more apparent when fundamental military concepts are borne in mind as to the responsibilities of the commander of the Hawaiian Department. The Board considered that the most damning indictment of the War Department was that it has possession of information which indicated war at a time certain [38/0] (Top Secret Rep., p. 3) and that this information was exclusively in the possession of the War Department and did not go to Short. (Top Secret Rep., p 4) The basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, is that the War Department was advised that the Japanese in London, Washington, and elsewhere were burning their consular records, and destroying their codes and confidential papers. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, and his Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information before 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise destroying its codes and burning its secret papers, which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. (Tr., Fielder 2855-2986; Bicknell 1413-1417) Furthermore, Colonel Fielder testified that he believed the source of his information was the War Department. (Tr., Fielder 2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed of his own G-2's information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told Short's staff he had such information and that to him this meant war. (Tr., Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, testified Short was given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242-1243) Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii had received information of the burning of codes by Japanese Consular agents in London and Washington (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513) which information, according to Short's G-2 would come to him in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Bratton D-292-293) [38/1]

The principal information of the character above described is contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", a series of forty-seven intercepted radiograms principally between Washington and Tokyo and the so-called "Winds" message. In order to compare the information Washington had and what it sent Short it is necessary briefly to recite the contents of these various messages:
24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose.

14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Giving interview with Rear Admiral Turner; Turner suggesting Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power Alliance and gradually withdraw Jap troops from China.

16 October, translated presumably 17 October. Toyoda, Foreign Minister, Tokyo to Washington. Stating war between Germany and U. S. might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations under Three-Power agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to make a success of the Japanese-American negotiations, hence Japan was warning the U. S. of the above.


5 November, translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and urging renewed effort.


15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to Honolulu stating:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week."

16 November, translated 17 November, Tokyo to Washington. Referring to impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to press negotiations with the U. S.

18 November, translated 6 December. Kita, Honolulu to Tokyo. Bringing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving course of eight destroyers entering harbor.

19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises to present "the proposal" and that "if the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off."

19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Giving three code words to be added at end of Jap intelligence broadcasts if Jap-U. S.-Russian-British relations should become dangerous.

22 November, translated 22 November. Tokyo to Washington. Extends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is absolute deadline. "After that things are automatically going to happen."

26 November, translated 23 November. Ambassador Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of United States considering the "proposal" in toto, that if situation remains tense as it is negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. "Our failure and humiliation are complete." Suggest that rupture of present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and United States but would be followed by United States and English military occupations of Netherlands Indies, which would make war inevitable.

26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating "the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long." Contains code for future telephone conversations.

26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto, Kurusu stating United States will not yield, that he could make no progress.

26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating great danger responsibility for rupture of nego [38]\textsuperscript{1} tiations will be cast upon Japan and suggesting plan to avoid this.

28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating that in spite of Ambassadors superhuman efforts, United States has "presented a humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for negotiations"; therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days after which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not to give impression negotiations are broken off.

29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will you also report even when there are no movements."
December, 1942.

Rome presented doubt complaining American visiting would taken that in proposal, that United States in collision with the allied nations "has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Stating negotiations with Washington "now stand ruptured—broken" and to give Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments; that England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, were planning to move forces into East Asia which would require countermeasures by Japan, that there was extreme danger that war might suddenly break out and that "the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." This message was to be sent to Rome and to be held "in the most absolute secrecy."

30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation between Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretching out negotiations and effect of return of President Roosevelt.

1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing destruction of code machine and to confirm this by cable.

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date set in deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly suspicious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States note will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested, but in Washington only.

1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advising when faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on hand for that purpose.

1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advising continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders then those lower down.

1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinking. Advising that it was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that British and American Consular rights would not be recognized.

2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reciting conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary Welles wherein Japs complain against pyramiding U. S. economic pressure upon Japan and expressing doubt as to whether Japan could consider again proposals of 26th. Japs convinced U. S. would like to bring about a speedy settlement which fact Foreign Office should consider in making reply to new American proposals.

2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington. (Strictly Secret.) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code machine unit and destroy all secret documents.

3 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo. Stating that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by Great Britain and U. S. with or [3847] without declaration of war was a certainty.

4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for certain members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was evacuated.

5 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reports destruction of codes and states that since negotiations are still continuing request delay in destruction of one code machine.

6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives advance notice of memorandum for U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts and to prepare to present it when directed.

6 December, translated 7 December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent. Stating that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with other Cabinet Members some of whom had dined with President and advised against Jap-American war.

7 December, translated 7 December. Tokyo to Washington, extremely urgent. Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of final memorandum, Japan to U. S. to destroy at once remaining cipher machine and all machine codes, also all secret documents.

7 December, translated 7 December. Budapest to Tokyo stating: "On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communiqué to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th."
The final message, outside the "Winds" message which will be noticed in detail later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to the United States Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 December 1941 in fourteen parts, thirteen of which arrived and were translated on 6 December and the fourteenth part the morning of 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B"; Tr., Safford C. 154.)

The Japanese note in general is a review of the Japanese-American negotiations and the Japanese position, complaining in effect of an insult and breaking off the negotiations. A radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December, translated the same day, marked "urgent, very important," instructs the Ambassador to present this note to the United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B")

[3859] The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November 1941, intercepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" a warning message would be given in the middle and the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMOIRI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)"

When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be destroyed. Exhibit "B", 19 Nov., s. I. S. 25432; Tr., Marshall A. 35; Sadtler D. 250; Safford C. 123-126.)

A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and translated 26 November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. i. s. 25432.) The Army, Navy, and Federal Communications intercept stations immediately commenced a close watch for the second or implementing "Winds" message. On 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Navy Communications, phoned Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, saying, "The message is in." Asked which one it was, Admiral Noyes stated he did not know but believed it meant war between Japan and Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251.) Sadtler immediately went to General Miles, A. C. [3859] of S., G-2, where he was joined by Colonel Bratton of G-2. Discussing Admiral Noyes' uncertainty as to which message it was, General Miles stated: "Do you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." Colonel Bratton telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and had no time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify it at that time but would telephone later. Sadtler returned to General Miles, who told him to keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252-253.) Colonel Sadtler then advised General Gerow of the message and suggested that the various overseas stations including Hawaii should be notified. General Gerow replied, "I think they have had plenty of notification," and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff, of the message and that he had talked to G-2 and War Plans, and Colonel Smith did not wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D. 253-254.)

It will be noted from the above that the activating or second "Winds" message apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Colonel Sadtler testified he told General Miles and Colonel Bratton that Admiral Noyes was positive that it did not indicate a breach in Japanese-American relations. (Tr., sadtler D. 252.) According to Colonel Bratton no one in G-2 ever received a message of this latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66-67; see also Marshall A. 36-38.) The present record fails to show whether Colonel Sadtler or Colonel [3857] Bratton ever ascertained the exact meaning of the Navy activating "Winds" message. Colonel Sadtler apparently made no further inquiry of Admiral Noyes nor did the Board examine him further on the subject. On this general subject there is the testimony of General Marshall who stated: "I find that no officer of the Navy advised General Miles or Colonel Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' code (indicating with whom relations would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy." (Tr., Marshall A. 38-39.) It seems clear that no Japanese message using the "Winds" code was intercepted by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 37.) Colonel Sadtler testified that he discussed with General Miles and Colonel Bratton the Navy activating "Winds" message, indicating to him, war with Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251-252.) Apparently, therefore, the source of the activating or second "Winds" message was the Navy.
The Navy story as to the "Winds" message is as follows: Captain Safford, head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated that on 4 December the activating "Winds" message came in and was sent to him in teletype. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, the senior language officer, wrote on the bottom of it, "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia." The message was different in wording from what had been expected but, according to Captain Safford, its meaning was clear. It was given immediately to Admiral Noyes. (Tr., Safford C. 131-132.) According to Captain Safford two copies were sent to the War Department. (Tr., Safford C. 133.) Colonel Gibson of War Department G-2 testified that there is no record that G-2 of the War Department or the Army Signal Intelligence ever received any implementing message from the Navy. (Tr., Gibson D. 273.) Neither the original nor copies of the message can now be found in the files of either the War or Navy Departments according to Captain Safford. The message was distributed to high officials of the Navy Department and copies were sent to the State Department and White House. (Tr., Safford C. 133, 130-138, 172.) The proof that it got to the White House seems to be that this was routine distribution (Tr., Safford C. 136-138); the same is true as to its getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138.)

Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty intercepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were in the possession of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (Tr., Safford C. 130-140, 152.) Whether these include the forty-seven messages submitted in evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top Secret Ex. "B") is not known as they do not appear in the present record. Captain Safford testified that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he submitted S. I. S. 25550, the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p.m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with it saying in effect, "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila." (Tr., Safford C. 167.)

[385] Captain Safford testified that coupling the "Winds" activating message with the messages instructing destruction of codes and secret papers, he became worried and telephoned Commander McLoughlin and asked him whether Naval Intelligence was doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet. McLoughlin said they were and as a result McLoughlin finally succeeded in having sent a message to the Pacific naval commanders, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese had been instructed to destroy their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182-183) Safford stated he also arranged for four additional messages to be sent out to various naval attaches in the Far East advising destruction of our own secret papers. (Tr., Safford C. 184-185) This message was sent 4 December. A message to the same effect was also sent to Guam. (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information copy to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu. (Tr., Safford C. 187) An additional message was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, covering destruction of papers on Wake Island. (Tr., Safford C. 188-190)

One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his possession a statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says "reached the Naval authorities and which it is alleged was sent over to the War Department." (Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement apparently was the testimony given by Captain Safford which was contained in a volume of the examination of various [385] witnesses conducted by Admiral Thomas C Hart, during April to June 1944, in accordance with directions of the Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford C. 120, 123, 145, 152, 168) Examining General Marshall from this document, General Russell stated:

This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that:

"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McLoughlin drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the 'Winds Message', and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent."

Now, this is on the 4th day of December:

"Admiral Wilkinson approved this message"—

which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely,

"and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it about three p.m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you think of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied, 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the

and so forth. (Tr., Russell A. 33-34)

Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that “Admiral Noyes said they had been alerted enough” and disapproved sending it. (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277)

Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December message translated 4 December, from Tokyo to Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and discussed it with them at some length. Bratton advocated sending further warnings or alerts to our overseas commanders. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had already been given. General Miles felt that he could not go over General Gerow’s decision. Bratton, however, continued to feel uneasy about the matter and went over to the Navy Department where he had a conference with Commander McCollum who felt as he did that further warnings should be sent out. McCollum stated that Command Rochefort in Honolulu had gotten the first “Winds” message and was listening for the implementing message. He suggested that as a way out of their difficulty a wire be sent to the Army G-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr., Bratton D. 283-284) Bratton stated he managed to get General Miles to OK this message which was sent 5 December to Short’s G-2 and read as follows:

[3856] “Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District, has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.” (Tr. Bratton D. 283)

In addition to the “Winds” message, the sheaf of forty-seven intercepts, Top Secret Exhibit “B”, contains a somewhat similar message from Tokyo, dated 19 November 1941, reading as follows:

“When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan U.S. relations

(2) Japan Russia relations

(3) Japan British relations: (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) ‘NISHI’”

(Top Secret Ex. “B” S. I. S. 25392)

There is a conflict as to the meaning of the “Winds” message, namely, as to whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic relations. (Tr., Bratton R. 60-71; Safford C. 126-130; Sadtler D. 270; See also Top Secret Ex. “B”, S. I. S. 25392 and 25432, both 19 November 1941) This conflict is not significant, however, as it was common knowledge that Japan might begin war prior to terminating diplomatic relations. Even Short realized this. (Tr. Short 456-457; see also Stimson 406)

[3857] There is no clear showing in the record as to what higher officers in the War Department got either the original “Winds” message, in whatever version, or the activating message, or got the brief message of 19 November as to the single code word to be inserted in the intelligence broadcasts when diplomatic relations became dangerous. (Top Secret Ex. “B”, S. I. S. 25392)

Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit “B”, a sheaf of forty-seven messages, stated:

“All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. * * * The officials to whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division.”

(Tr., Bratton D. 207)

Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony that any one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned, or if so, when. Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got to these officials, is there any showing of the form in which they received them. Such general testimony as that of Colonel Bratton’s, above quoted—replying, as it apparently does, entirely on a practice, without specific recollection of specific occasions—cannot be regarded as fairly bringing home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge of any specific intercept. This is certainly so where the record contains a specific denial, such as in the case of General Marshall [3858] of any
It is obvious that these Top Secret intercepts show a gradual deterioration in Japanese-American relations and the probability of war. Short, however, was specifically advised of the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities at any time and in this respect these intercepts are merely cumulative. Some of them, however, are very pointed; for example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9 October, from Tokyo to Honolulu, requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose; the radio of 15 November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu, requesting that the "ships in harbor" report be made twice a week in view of the critical Japan-U. S. relations; the radio of 18 November, translated 6 December, from Honolulu to Tokyo, bringing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving the course of eight destroyers entering the harbor; the radio of 24 November, translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking for a "ships in harbor" report even when there were no movements. The above appear to point to some specific action against Pearl Harbor. However, this inference is in the light of after-events; at that time these radios, to an unimaginative person, were consistent with routine Japanese effort to keep themselves advised as to our naval strength in the Pacific or possible sabotage attacks on ships in Pearl Harbor by native Jap fishing boats. Similarly, the radio of 5 November, translated the same day, from Tokyo to Washington, setting 25 November as the deadline for signing the agreement; the radio of 16 November, translated 17 November, reiterating the impossibility of changing the deadline; the radio of 22 November, translated the same day, extending the deadline from 25 November to 29 November, and stating "after that things are automatically going to happen" indicate in the light of information we now have, but which was not available prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an early attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance. As General Marshall testified, November 29 came and passed and nothing happened. (Tr., Marshall A. 4–5)

As to the "Winds" message, according to War Department witnesses this meant war between Japan and Great Britain, not war with the United States. The most significant messages were the radios of 1 December, translated the same day; 2 December, translated 3 December; 5 December, translated 6 December, directing the destruction of codes, code machines, and secret papers. There is also the reference to destroying codes in the "Winds" message. These messages to Colonel Bratton meant war. But General Short had already been warned that war was imminent and hostilities might commence at any moment. Whether, had General Short received these messages, he would have altered his view that there was no threat from without is problematic. One message clearly suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor, namely, the radio of 2 December from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the war ships there, whether there were barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor, and whether the war ships there were provided with anti-mine nets. But this message was not received until 23 December and not translated until 30 December 1941. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 27065)

It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpretation of the "Winds" message was that it meant war with the United States. Also, there is the testimony of Captain Safford that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he handed Secretary Knox S. I. S. 23850 instructing the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p. m., he sent along a note stating "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today." (Tr. Safford C. 167). Action upon this information if believed credible, was a Navy responsibility. There is no testimony it was communicated to the War Department.

The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information available in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis by the intelligence sections of either service of the over-all picture presented by these intercepts, along the line of Commander Kramer's deductions (Tr., Safford C. 167), might have led to an anticipation of the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl Harbor at or about the time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to make such an estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the light of after- [3861] occurring events and read into each message a significance which was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be borne in mind that substantially all the definite information received as to Jap naval movements pointed to activity in the Philippines or in Southeast Asia.
As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above referred to he would have made a different estimate of the situation and placed in operation a different alert, we are in the realm of conjecture. The fact that Short regarded as unimportant the information he got on 3 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu were destroying their codes and secret papers (which meant war to Short’s Asst. G-2) is very significant in postulating what Short would have done if he had gotten all the information he complained he did not get.

As I have previously stated, while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations. To the same effect was the testimony of General Marshall (Tr., Marshall A. 14-15), General Gerow (Tr., Gerow 4300, Saudler D. 233; Bratton D. 283), General Bedel Smith (Tr., Saudler D. 253), General Miles (Tr. Miles 127-128, 128-129; Saudler D. 253-254; Bratton D. 283), Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8, 14; Bratton E. 78), and Admiral Noyes (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277; Russell A. 34). This was the opinion of the Roberts Board. (Roberts Rep., pp. 18-21) [3862] Comment on Short’s Defenses:

The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can be no escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander charged with the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as he did that there were threats both from within and from without and that the most dangerous form of attack which he could expect was a surprise air attack, he cannot now be heard to say that he was led into becoming sabotage-minded to the exclusion of all else by War Department messages stressing sabotage. It is obvious that General Marshall’s radio of 27 November was not intended to change the official War Department estimate, solidly imbedded in elaborate war plans and stressed continuously from Short’s assumption of command 7 February 1941 into the fall of 1941, that a surprise air attack was a primary threat. It is equally obvious that Short’s reply to General Marshall’s radio of 27 November did not amount to a communication by Short to the War Department that he had arrived at a new and entirely different estimate of the situation which excluded a surprise air attack as a then present basic threat.

As to Short’s defense that he was not given sufficient information, or, as held by the Board, that the information which he had was “incomplete and confusing” (though the Board held it sufficient), it is clear that the information given Short continually stressed the possible outbreak of war which necessarily implied a threat from without. But, as seen, Short’s [3863] Alert No. 1 expressly excluded the idea of a threat from without. Unless it can be said that Short would have interpreted the Top Secret intercepts as indicating a specific attack on Pearl Harbor, an unreasonable assumption, they merely stress the inevitability of war. But this would not necessarily have led Short to establish Alert No. 3 bearing in mind the Navy view that there was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor and Short’s claim that in any event he could rely upon the Navy for warning in ample time of the whereabouts of the Jap fleet. Short’s defense that Alert No. 3 would have interfered with training and that Alert No. 3 would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population, is refuted by the statement in General Marshall’s radio to him of 27 November that the policy of avoiding the first overt act should not be construed as restricting him to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense. But they are also answered by the fact that Alert No. 2, at least, would not have disclosed his intent or alarmed the civilian population. It should be borne in mind that Short’s problem was twofold, both to guard against an outside attack and at the same time to do so without alarming the civilian population. This should not have been beyond the capabilities of an experienced commander.

I am of the opinion therefore that the Board’s conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for war, in the face of a war warning, appears justified except in so far as it holds the information which Short had was incomplete and confusing.

I likewise agree that the Board’s conclusion (b) that Short failed in his duties in not reaching an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii for Joint Army and Navy action under the various plans, is supported by the record. I also concur in the opinion of the Board (c) that Short failed in his duties in not informing himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

[3865] The question whether Short’s failure in the performance of these various duties constituted a neglect of duty in the sense of an offense under
military law, will be discussed later. In my opinion Short’s various failures were not so much the result of a neglect of duty as of serious errors of judgment. His first error of judgment was in the erroneous estimate of the situation which he made and which led him to the conclusion that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor from the air. His second error was in failing to realize that it was his duty to be on the alert against even what might appear to him as the highly improbable. I believe, however, that these mistakes were honest ones, not the result of any conscious fault, and, having in mind all the circumstances, do not constitute a criminal neglect of duty.

Board’s Conclusion (d) as the Short’s Failure to Replace Inefficient Staff Officers:

The Board found that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 300) This conclusion is related to the statement in the body of the Report that “Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too weak for a position of such importance.” (Rep. 74)

A careful reading of the transcript citations upon which the Board relies for its findings as to Colonel Phillips as Chief of Staff. Their replies varied from complete reluctance to answer (Tr., Donegan 1946) to positive expressions that the Colonel was unqualified. (Tr., Throckmorton 1408–1409) General Burgin considered Phillips “one of General Short’s fair-haired boys,” high-handed, not prone to confer with subordinates, not “extremely efficient, or otherwise—the average, run-of-the-mine.” (Tr., Burgin 2625–2626) General Hayes, the preceding Chief of Staff, very mildly stated that Phillips had a G-3 trend, and that he did not “feel that he had worked himself into the position of Chief of Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.” (Tr., Hayes 265) Colonel Pratt merely added that he considered that Hayes had been a stronger Chief of Staff. (Tr., Pratt 1977–1978)

These scattered opinions, unsupported by a factual examination of Phillips’ training, experience, and activities can hardly be thought to support the blanket conclusion of the Board about Short’s staff. The Board adds, however, that Phillips’ own testimony “as to his conception of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of the matter.” (Rep. 74) The testimony cited by the Board to support this finding is that Phillips and Short considered the inevitable interference with training, which would occur if Alerts 2 or 3 were ordered, that all phases of the situation were discussed, the danger of a Jap landing, of an air attack, what Phillips considered to be his duties as Chief of Staff, how Short ordered Alert No. 1 without a “specific recommendation” from Colonel Phillips, and a general discussion of activities in the Department after 27 November. (Tr. Phillips 1134–1144).

It is established, of course, that Phillips was inexperienced as a Chief of Staff, as he had not been appointed until 5 November 1941. (Tr. Phillips 1108) and that Short did not treat Phillips as a Chief of Staff, for example, in not having him present at important Navy conferences. (Rep. 74) But there is no substantial evidence that Phillips was inefficient to a degree that would require his removal by Short, or that Short’s failure to remove Phillips was in any way a proximate or concurrent cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The most that can be said is that there were indications that Short selected a man not fully qualified as Chief of Staff. These indications were not fully investigated by the Board, either as to their accuracy or as to their possible contribution to the disaster on 7 December 1941.

Aside from the above as to Colonel Phillips, there is no testimony in the record as to the efficiency or inefficiency of Short’s G-1, G-3, or G-4. Short’s G-2, Colonel Fielder, testified at length but there is no substantial testimony either from his own lips or from other witnesses from which the Board could hold Colonel Fielder inefficient. [3801] The worst that can be said against Fielder is that he failed to realize the importance of the Dr. Mori message and the fact that Japanese Consuls were destroying their codes and burning their papers. However, this viewpoint was shared by Short who was as fully informed as Fielder about these matters.

The Board also stated that “While the various assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short.” (Rep. 74)
The only testimony on this score was the testimony of Colonel Throckmorton, Short's G-1 at the time of the attack, who testified there was complete harmony when General Hayes was Chief of Staff and that "such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think was of a serious enough nature to have affected what happened on December 7." Tr. Throckmorton 1409) There is, therefore, no substantial testimony as to any significant disharmony among Short's staff.

It follows from the above that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers is not justified.

[3869] Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:

The Board concludes that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

"(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little.

"(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war.

"(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.

"(d) To investigate and determine the state [3870] of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat of war." (Rep. 298-299.)

Adequacy of General Marshall's 27 November Warning Message:
The Chief of Staff testified that the message of 27 November signed "Marshall" should be regarded as containing all the information concerning the Japanese and the instructions necessary for General Short to accomplish his mission. (Tr, Marshall A. 14, 15; C. 197.)

The Board's statement that General Marshall failed "to keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation" (Rep. 298) overlooks the fact that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" pictured the Japanese-United States situation accurately as it appeared from the information available to the War Department at that time and up until 7 December. The negotiations between the Japanese representatives in the United States and our State Department actually continued up to 7 December, and various intercepts suggest the possibility that they may have been conducted by the envoys in good faith and with evident hope of a peaceful settlement.

Thus, on 29 November Tokyo radioed its representative in Washington to make one more attempt at settlement along certain lines and "in carrying out this instruction, please be [3871] careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations." (Top Secret Ex. "B".)

Mr. Kurusu in talking to Tokyo on 30 November, spoke to Tojo's drastic statement, and urged that unless greater caution was exercised, the Japanese negotiators would be in a difficult position. Further, he stated they were doing their best and that negotiations were to continue. (Top Secret Ex. "B".)

On 1 December Tokyo radioed its representative in Washington, suggesting a possible approach for making some progress in negotiations. (Top Secret Ex. "B")

On 2 December a radio intercept from Washington to Tokyo stated:
"Judging from my interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my considerations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233." (Top Secret Ex. "B")

On 5 December a Japanese radio to Tokyo requested approval to delay destruction of one code machine as Japanese negotiations were still continuing. (Top Secret Ex. "B")

[3872] Former Ambassador Grew said with regard to the alleged inevitability of war:
"* * * If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I would have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were times when I
believed the Japanese Government was doing its best to prevent war for the reason that it realized much better than the military people did what might be the result of war.

* * * Now the question at that time was whether they would be successful or not, and, as I said, I was not in a position to answer that question definitely and finally prior to the outbreak of war." (Tr., Grew 4213-4214)

When asked when it became evident that war with Japan was inevitable, Mr. Grew replied:

"I could not put my finger on any particular date, General. My own position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible minute to prevent war; and I did everything in my power to prevent it; and, not being a defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit that war was inevitable, up to the last minute. So that I cannot mention any particular date, prior to December 7, 1941, when I felt that war was definitely inevitable." (Tr., Grew 4199)

[3873] With reference to Japan's decision to go to war, he stated that there were "two Japans." The Army and Navy were practically independent and reported directly to the Emperor over the heads of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister.

"I think it is perfectly possible that the cabinet was not informed of the plans for attacking Pearl Harbor. My belief is—well, I won't say confirmed, but it is increased by the fact that I had a conversation with Mr. Togo, the foreign minister at half past twelve, half past midnight, on December 7, 1941. That was about three hours before Pearl Harbor. And I have always been convinced from the nature of that conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that moment know that Pearl Harbor was about to break. I have other evidence, too, which convinces me personally that he didn't know. * * *" (Tr., Grew 4214-4215)

When asked about the effect of the economic sanctions in forcing action by Japan, Mr. Grew stated:

"I do not mean to say, when you say something had to be done about it, that it had to be war, because there were other things to do about it besides war. The Japanese at that time could have taken steps to meet some of our views in connection with their expansion through the Far East. [3874] They could readily have done that, and if they had done that we might, for our part, have relaxed some of the economic pressure which we were placing on them. I think that that would have been a perfectly logical thing to have happened, but it didn't happen." (Tr., Grew 4218.)

As to the 25 November deadline, later extended to 29 November, General Marshall stated that this had certain significance, but that the War Department was unable to tell just what it was. (Tr., Marshall A. 5.) It was first thought that the 25 November deadline pertained to the anti-Comintern pact. When the time was extended to 29 November that possibility was removed. (Tr., Marshall A. 4.) "November 29 arrived and passed, and we entered into December without anything happening other than the continuation of these movements, which we could follow fairly well, down the China coast and Indo-China and headed quite plainly towards Thailand and the Gulf of Siam." (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5.)

[3875] In the light of all the information possessed by the War Department at that time and the fact that the 14th part of the Japanese note breaking off negotiations, and the direction to the Japanese representatives to present the fourteen parts at 1:00 p.m. (Washington time) 7 December, was not available until that day, it is my opinion that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" was an accurate and adequate description of the Japanese situation at the time it was sent, and up until 7 December. Furthermore, this message should be read in the light of the other Army and Navy messages to Short.

General Marshall's Views on Warning:

The Chief of Staff emphasized that the so-called "Winds" message referred not to war but to the rupture of diplomatic relations and that "very remarkable things had been done under the rupture of diplomatic relations while still evading an actual act of war." (Tr., Marshall A. 43-46.) With respect to other information of the Japanese activities which reached him from secret sources and influenced his thinking as to the imminence of war, the Chief of Staff testified that while it may have been practical and feasible to have sent this information to Short, nevertheless in his opinion at that time, it would have been unwise. (Tr., Marshall A. 46.) The Chief of Staff conceded that "considering what has happened, * * * the situation might well have been helped by translating that information to them." (Tr., Marshall A. 46.) Speaking [3876] of his decision at the time, however, he stated:
"In our own view, an alert of the character, particularly the character of the two that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then the later Army alert, (messages to Short from War Department and Navy Department) were sufficient for any Commander with a great responsibility; and in addition to that you must remember that we were pouring through Hawaii, on the way to the Philippines, convoys, rushing everybody. Everything was being pushed to the last extreme. Nobody could look at that without realizing that something very critical was in the wind. Our great problem was how to do these things, energized in the way we were—the shipments, and collecting the means and getting them out, particularly to the Philippines, which passed entirely through Hawaii—without giving such notice to the Japanese that it would have an unfortunate effect in our stalling off this affair.

"Undoubtedly they did obtain that view. I think they were rushed in their decision by the fact that if they didn’t catch it, didn’t act within a certain period of time, it would be too late; we would have gained the necessary strength to make it undesirable, to make it too dangerous for them to act.

"All of that was apparent to the Commanders in the place. Only the most critical necessities would have involved us in taking over all that commercial shipping, in taxing the Pacific Fleet’s resources in providing convoys. Everything was involved there at the time, and I cannot see how—I never have quite understood how the change from a great fear, as expressed in all the previous communications, of an air assault, suddenly seemed to lapse. I don’t know what the explanation of it is, and I myself have never discussed it." (Tr., Marshall A. 46-47)

As already indicated, General Marshall had no information of any kind which indicated an immediate attack on Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 27-28)

The Chief of Staff also believed that Short had adequate weapons, ammunition, and other means for the discharge of his mission to protect Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 27) He also was under the belief in late November and early December of 1941 that Short had adequate reconnaissance agencies to carry out the desired reconnaissance. In this regard, he testified:

"We had made every conceivable effort to deploy the radar out there ahead of other places. We had done everything we could to provide the means to carry out the air functions of that command, particularly as they were determined in the final agreement between General Short and Admiral Kimmel." (Tr., Marshall A. 27)

[3878] The Chief of Staff knew that this agreement called for distant reconnaissance by the Navy. (Tr., Marshall A. 26)

The Chief of Staff further testified that Hawaii was but one of several places on the Japanese front and that “it was by far the best prepared that we had.” (Tr., Marshall A. 25) He stated:

"* * * if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and materiel was 100, Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible." (Tr., Marshall A. 23)

The Chief of Staff continued:

"I think we all knew that we were poverty stricken. * * *" (Tr., Marshall A 26)

To show the ramifications of the activities of the Chief of Staff and the overall supervision which was required of him from a global perspective, the Chief of Staff testified concerning the Panama Canal Department:

"* * * we had had very peculiar things there, and of course they could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable way in the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii." (Tr. Marshall A 13-14)

General Marshall’s 7 December message:

Concerning the Board’s conclusion (c) (Rep. 298) that the Chief of Staff should have advised Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of 7 December of an almost [3879] immediate break with Japan, the Chief of Staff testified that he did not receive the intercept which indicated such a break until about 11 o’clock on 7 December. (Tr. Marshall A. 6) He then immediately conferred with appropriate members of his Staff and wrote a draft of a message to be transmitted to Short. (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8) He gave this message when completed to Colonel Bratton for transmittal by radio to the Western Defense Command, the Panama command, the Hawaiian command, and the Philippine command. (Tr., Marshall A. 8) The Chief of Staff knew
that the time required for coding was "a very quick procedure. It is done on a machine as rapidly as the girl types." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) Colonel Bratton took the message to the Message Center and upon his return was asked by the Chief of Staff as to the procedure which would be followed and the time within which it could be expected the message would reach the recipients. The Chief of Staff did not understand the explanation by Colonel Bratton, so he with Colonel Bundy was sent back for additional information. (Tr., Marshall A. 9) Colonel Bundy was on duty in the War Plans Division of the General Staff in charge of matters pertaining to the Pacific. (Tr., Marshall A. 9–10) When Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy returned they informed the Chief of Staff in effect that the message would be in the hands of the recipients within thirty minutes from that moment. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) It being still not clear to the Chief of [3880] Staff as to what were the time elements, he sent Colonel Bratton and Colonel Bundy back for a third time to check again. When they returned their reply confirmed that the time for transmittal would be satisfactory. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)

The Chief of Staff believed that the message would reach the recipients before the one o’clock hour at which things might happen. (Tr., Marshall A. 14)

Actually, and unknown to the Chief of Staff, the Signal Corps sent the message to San Francisco by Western Union and from San Francisco to Hawaii via Radio Corporation of America. This was because the Army radio was not able to get through to Hawaii. (Tr., Marshall A. 10) A further delay, which was also unknown to the Chief of Staff was caused by the non-operation of a teletype at Honolulu on 7 December. Thus when the message was received in Honolulu it was given to a boy for delivery on a bicycle. The boy was caught in the bombing and did not deliver the message until after the attack. (Tr., Marshall A. 10)

The telephone was not considered as means of transmission because, in the nature of things, it would have been too "time consuming." (Tr., Marshall A. 13) The Chief of Staff testified:

"** * * I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have called the Panama Canal second, * * *. And from our own experience, my own experience, [3881] even now our telephone is a long-time procedure. * * * we now find we do a little bit better by teletype than we do on the telephone." (Tr., Marshall A. 13–14)

Colonel Bratton testified that when the Chief of Staff gave him the message for delivery to the Message Center:

"I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer in charge of the message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall’s desire that the message be transmitted to the addresses by the fastest possible safe means, * * *. I then returned to the Office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the addressees. I returned to the message center and talked the matter over with Colonel French, who informed me that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 11:50 a.m." (Tr., Bratton B. 79–80) (This would be 6:20 a.m., Honolulu time)

Colonel French testified that:

"Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would take to get the message transmitted, and I told him it would take about 30 to 45 minutes to transmit the message to its destination." (Tr., French 196)

[3882] Concerning the question as to whether members of the General Staff, other than the Chief of Staff, should have transmitted to Short a warning without waiting for the arrival of the Chief of Staff on the morning of 7 December, the following testimony by the Chief of Staff is pertinent:

"General Russell, Was there anyone of the General Staff other than yourself with authority to have dispatched to the overseas departmental commanders a message which would have told them of these recent developments, and including the reply of the Japanese to our message of November 20, and particularly as to the substance of this message of December 7th relative to the delivery of the ultimatum and the destruction of the code machines?

"General Marshall. That would depend, I think, entirely on the officer concerned. There is no specific regulation about who, of those in charge of principal affairs, can do what in time of a great emergency. It depends on the judgment of the individual. If the Deputy Chief of Staff was here, if the head of the War Plans Division were here, if possible the Assistant Chief of Staff G–2 were aware of this and of the possibilities of delay, they might have acted. It is very
hard to answer, because you are inevitably involved in back sight regarding a great catastrophe, and I can only answer it in that way."  (Tr., Marshall C. 211-212)

[3883]  Comment on Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall:
As to the Board's conclusion (a) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to keep Short fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation, "of which information he had an abundance and Short had little," I feel, as already indicated, that General Marshall's radio to Short of 27 November, considered along with the other messages to Short, accurately pictured the Japanese-American situation as it then existed and as it continued to exist until 7 December. Short as a military commander was required to take the information contained in this radio from his Chief of Staff as true and not in the critical spirit of awaiting further information or proof of what he was told. General Marshall was not in the position of carrying on a negotiation with a foreign plenipotentiary but was telling a subordinate what the situation was for his guidance. The Board's conclusion reduces itself to a holding that General Marshall should have given Short at length and in detail the factual basis for his succinct statement in his 27 November radio that there was only a bare possibility the Japanese might renew the negotiations, and that Japanese future action was unpredictable but hostile action was possible at any moment.

[3884]  So far as the transmission of information by the Chief of Staff to Short is concerned, mentioned in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the Board's Conclusions, clearly the radiograms of 24 and 27 November adequately pictured the emergency, the imminence of hostilities, and the necessity that Short be on the alert against threats from within and from without. The most that can be said is that the War Department did not transmit to Short the Top Secret messages, but these were cumulative. This is evident from a reading of the messages actually sent Short over a period of months, hereinafter referred to. While the War Department was possessed of more information than Short received, he did receive enough to require that he be on the qui vive. That Hawaii had already been sufficiently alerted was the opinion of Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7, 14, 15; Bratton B. 78; Gibson D. 276-277), of Admiral Noyes (Tr., D. 276-277, Russell A. 34), of General Gerow (Tr., Sadtler D. 253, Bratton D. 253), of General Miles (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), and of General Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253).

Moreover, Short received various important naval messages. General Marshall testified it was SOP that the Navy give Short these messages. (Tr., Marshall 35, 36; Kimmel 1772). The Navy messages of 24 and 27 November specifically so provided. (Tr., Marshall 35, 36, D. 306; Short 358, 363.) Captain Layton testified that he delivered to and discussed with General Short in person the message from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 24 November 1941. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059.)

[3885]  Thus, Short was fully advised of the tenseness of the Japanese situation, of the requirement that he act in accordance with the clear instructions from the Chief of Staff to prepare for both threats from within and from without, and for eventualities which could be momentarily expected.

As to the Board's conclusion (b) that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in failing to send additional instructions to Short when evidently he failed to realize the import of Short's 27 November reply, which indicated, the Board said, that Short had misunderstood General Marshall's radio and had not alerted his command for war, (Rep. 298) this statement is a non sequitur. But, in addition, there was no testimony before the Board that General Marshall ever saw Short's reply. He himself testified that he had no recollection of ever having seen it, though "the presumption would be that I had seen it."  (Tr., Marshall 38-40; cf. Top Secret Tr., Marshall C. 201.)

It is significant that Short's radiogram to the Chief of Staff, though initialed "Noted" by the Secretary of War and General Gerow, is not initialed by the Chief of Staff, although the latter initialed the corresponding radio from General MacArthur. (Tr., Marshall 39.) The reply itself was indicative that Short had taken precautions against sabotage and in stating "liaison with the Navy" was susceptible of the interpretation that Short had also ordered defense measures in accordance with the War Plan. [3886]  That plan contemplated that distant reconnaissance would be conducted by the Navy. This was well known to General Marshall. Hence, the Chief of Staff, if he saw Short's reply,
was entitled to believe that Short's use of the words "liaison with the Navy" in his reply meant the establishment of full reconnaissance. It must be remembered that Short was given a definite order in General Marshall's radio of 27 November to conduct reconnaissance. The Chief of Staff was entitled to believe that his order would be obeyed.

Short testified that "liaison with the Navy" meant to him "keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing." (Tr., Short 380) He also stated that this phrase indicated he expected the Navy to carry out its part of the agreement for long distance reconnaissance. (Tr., Short 380.) General Gerow, head of War Plans Division for the Chief of Staff, testified that the portion of the reply stating "liaison with the Navy" led to the reasonable assumption that "General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic plan. * * *" (Tr., Gerow 4289) In other words, the Chief of Staff was not definitely advised by this reply of Short that Short had made no preparations against an outside threat.

In a consideration of this point it should also be [3887] remembered that while Short had received from the Chief of Staff many communications calling his attention to the danger of a surprise air attack Short at no time, so far as the record shows, questioned this estimate by a communication to the Chief of Staff.

The very brevity of the reply by Short would also indicate to the War Department that Short had taken all necessary defense measures. It would be a most anomalous situation if a theater commander could be heard to say that because he received warnings from the Chief of Staff and had replied with a fragmentary report that ipso facto he was relieved of his responsibilities and that these responsibilities were then fastened upon the Chief of Staff.

Also, since Short received numerous messages and information after 27 November, especially the naval messages, which the Chief of Staff testified it was SOP to exchange (Tr., Marshall, 35, 36; Kimmel 1772), the silence of Short after the message of 23 November would indicate to a busy Chief of Staff that he was ready to meet all threats, both those from within and those from without.

It appears, therefore, that in his relations with the Hawaiian Department the Chief of Staff fulfilled his functions as Commander in Chief and, in point of truth, personally warned the Hawaiian Department, with prophetic accuracy, against the very type of attack which occurred.

[3888] Finally, it must be borne in mind that the functions of the Chief of Staff did not include the duty of personally directing and supervising the detailed administration of the various sections of the Office of the Chief of Staff. His primary duty was to advise the Secretary of War and the President, to plan and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of the Army, to make decisions and give advice concerning the over-all and vital problems of military strategy from the perspective of global war and the broad military problems which then confronted the United States. Moreover, it was a fundamental policy of the War Department, the wisdom of which has been demonstrated in the recent victories, not to interfere unduly with commanders in the field whose records justified the assumption of great responsibilities. Thus, the prime responsibility is on the theater commander. No duty could thus devolve upon the Chief of Staff to check personally on the Hawaiian Command other than as may be related to the stated fundamental policy. To have singled out the Hawaiian Department for any different attention would have been peculiar and repugnant to the policy and purposes of a General Staff. The very nature of an over-all supervision in preparation for a global war makes mandatory that the Chief of Staff be divorced from administrative details. In no sense, of course, does the Chief of Staff avoid his responsibility in the event his organization is ineffective. There is a distinction, [3889] however, between the personal performance of his especial duties and the performance of duties by members of his staff.

[3890] It is my opinion that the Board's conclusions (b) (Rep. 298) that General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to Short upon receipt of Short's reply, is not justified.

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that General Marshall failed to get to Short on the evening of 6 December or the early morning of 7 December the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan "though there was ample time to have accomplished this" the record makes entirely clear that General Marshall personally did not receive this information until late in the
morning of 7 December and that he did his best to get it to Short immediately but failed because of circumstances beyond his control.

As to the Board's conclusion (d) that General Marshall failed to investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between 27 November and 7 December, the record is silent as to whether this was the personal duty of the Chief of Staff. It has been already indicated that General Marshall was entitled to rely upon his subordinates, including Short, and to believe that elaborate preparations for the defense of Hawaii embodied in war plans formulated over a long period of time would be carried out by a theater commander in accordance with the traditional American military policy. General Marshall had [3891] seen General Short's tentative SOP dated 14 July 1941 which contained elaborate plans for execution in an emergency. (Tr., Marshall 29)

To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board's conclusions as to General Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the Roberts Report (Roberts Report, p. 19-20).

Board's Conclusion as to General Gerow:

As to General Gerow the Board concluded that he failed in his duties as follows:

"(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department adequately informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the substance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,

"(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary he approved the message of November 27, 1941 (472) which contained confusing statements.

"(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he failed to take corrective action.

"(d) To take the required steps to implement the [3893] existing joint plans and agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of the two services in the manner contemplated." (Rep 259)

General Gerow was recalled from France where he was Commanding General of the Fifth Corps which had fought its way from the Normandy beach-head to the Siegfried Line. He testified concerning his activities as Chief or Acting Chief of the War Plans Division under the Chief of Staff during the time in question. (Tr., Gerow 4225) This division of the General Staff was charged with war plans and operations, and was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff.

From what has been hereinbefore stated it is apparent that General Short was given adequate information as to the rupture of diplomatic relations and the situation with the Japanese, the unpredictable nature of Japanese future action, the imminence of hostilities, and that under no circumstances should any limitations or qualifications expressed in the messages jeopardize his defense. He was also ordered to establish reconnaissance.

But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently, fully alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had received substantial information from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the Board argues that had this additional information been trans- [3893]mitted to Short it might have convinced him not only that war was imminent but that there was a real possibility of a surprise air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is difficult to perceive any substantial reason for not sending Short this additional information or, in the alternative, checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to the danger. General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed a lack of imagination in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information been sent to Short it could not have had any other than a beneficial effect. General Gerow also showed lack of imagination in failing to make the proper deductions from the Japanese intercepts. For instance the message of 24 September from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose coupled with the message of 15 November to Honolulu to make "the ships in harbor report" irregular, and the further message of 29 November to Honolulu asking for reports even when there were no ship movements (Top Secret Ex. "B") might readily have suggested to an imaginative person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Failure to appreciate the significance of such messages shows a lack of the type of skill in anticipating and preparing against eventualities which we have a right to expect in an officer at the heat of the War Plans
Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the advisability of General Gerow transmitting the 'Top Secret' information to Short.

The Board concludes (b) that General Gerow failed in his duty in sending Short the 27 November radiogram, which the Board held was not a clear and concise directive. In various places in the Report, the Board refers to this radiogram as containing confusing and conflicting statements. In my opinion this is an erroneous characterization of the message. It fails to take into account the very essence of the situation which then presented itself. Those in authority in Washington, from the President down, were confronted at that moment with a most difficult and delicate situation. The diplomatic negotiations which had been taking place between the Secretary of State and the Japanese emissaries had practically reached the breaking point. They knew that the Japanese might resort to war at any moment. On the other hand, they knew that the United States was not prepared for war and that every week or month of delay would help the situation. In a memorandum dated that very day—27 November 1941—the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Operations of the Navy addressed a joint memorandum to the President of the United States, urging him to postpone any action that might precipitate war as long as possible because we were not ready. Confronted with this situation, those in authority in the War Department, including the Secretary of War, participated in the preparation of this radiogram and similar ones (Tr., Stimson 4055, 4056), which were sent to other department commanders, and undertook to express as accurately as possible the essential elements of this delicate situation, warning of the possibility of an attack at any moment and that nothing must be omitted to jeopardize our defense. At the same time they warned them of the importance of not doing anything that would precipitate war on our part. This naturally presented a delicate problem, but it was delicate because of the very nature of the facts and not because of any confusion of thought which was translated into the language. There was no other course except to present this problem just as it was to the responsible theater commander. In any delicate situation, conflicting factors are bound to exist. It is because it requires wisdom and judgment to deal with them that only men supposedly qualified are given posts of such responsibility. In any event, the Board overlooks the Navy radio of 27 November, beginning "This is a war warning," which General Gerow knew was being sent. (Tr., Gerow 4261–4262).

As to the Board’s conclusion (c) that General Gerow failed to note Short’s reply and to take corrective action, the Board is on firmer ground. General Gerow admitted that while it was physically impossible for him to check every message (Tr., Gerow 4288) and that he considered the War Department gave Short adequate warning (Tr., Gerow 4300), nevertheless he had erred by assuming that the reply of Short was to the sabotage radiogram from The Adjutant General of 27 November (Tr., Gerow 4290–4291). This being so, it follows that he failed also to follow up on the demand in the radiogram of 27 November signed “Marshall,” for a report from Short. As to this, General Gerow testified:

"The thought that he had not replied never occurred to me between the interval of November 27 and December 7. As I say, there were many other important problems coming up at the time, and I expected my staff to follow through." (Tr., Gerow 4290.)

In fairness to General Gerow it should also be mentioned that Colonel Bunuy, now deceased, was directly under General Gerow in charge of the Planning and Operational Group and had been handling the Pacific matters. (Tr., Gerow 4288, 4291.)

General Gerow, as head of the Division, must be held accountable for the failure of his Division to function with the efficiency that would have made impossible such an oversight. This is so even though the War Plans Division is concerned with the operation of many theaters and although its functions are not comparable to those of a commander of a theater who, like a sentinel on post, is charged with specific responsibilities.

As to the conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required steps to insure the functioning of the two services in Hawaii pursuant to their joint agreements, it has already been seen that these agreements for joint defensive action could be put into effect by the two commanders in Hawaii when they deemed it advisable. (Tr., Gerow 4284, Kimmel 1759–1760, Short 4440.) General Gerow assumed and had the right to assume that, warned by the threat of hostile attack contained in the 27 November message, the two commanders...
would put into effect the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Tr., Gerow 4289) or at least such portions thereof as would assure adequate reconnaissance.

On the whole, I feel that the Board’s criticism (a) of General Gerow in failing to send Short the substance of the data delivered to him by G–2 is, in the light of after-events, to a degree justified. (Rep. 299) At least it was a precautionary measure which General Gerow could well have taken. I agree too with the Board’s conclusion (c) in so far as it holds that General Gerow was culpable in failing to check on Short’s reply to the November 27 message signed “Marshall.” I disagree with the Board in its conclusion (b) that General Gerow in approving the [3898] 27 November message to Short failed to send a clear, concise directive. As already indicated, I feel that this radiogram accurately and adequately pictures the situation as it existed and gave definite instructions. I also disagree with the Board’s conclusion (d) that General Gerow failed to take the required steps to implement the existing Joint Army and Navy War Plan. General Gerow was entitled to believe that, warned as they were, the two commanders would themselves put these plans into effect.

Miscellaneous Statements of Board:

Certain conclusions of the Board, such as those relating to Secretary Hull, are not in my opinion relevant to the Board’s inquiry. My failure to discuss such matters should not be regarded as indicating my agreement with these conclusions. Nor has it been necessary to consider such irrelevant matters in arriving to my conclusions.

[3899] Unexplored Leads:

In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored. I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.

In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these matters in detail with the officer selected by you.

Recommendations:

As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that the conclusions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous.

As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclusion of the Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more information than he did, and (c) in not checking on Short’s reply to the 27 November message signed “Marshall.” In my opinion these errors do not warrant disciplinary action against General Gerow. General Gerow admitted the error of his division in not checking Short’s reply, for which he frankly took the blame. The nature of the errors and the [3900] fact that he has since demonstrated his great qualifications for field command indicate that his case is now far removed from disciplinary action.

As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only; (b) in failing to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy Plans for defense into operation; and (c) to inform himself on the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy. As to whether Short’s culpability in the above respects is of the type which constitutes a military offense suggesting trial by court-martial, I have already indicated as to (a) above that Short in failing to put into operation the proper alert was not so much guilty of a neglect of duty as of a serious error of judgment. It is difficult to visualize his mistake in the form of a neglect of duty when the evidence shows that he considered the various alternatives and came to the conclusion that Alert No. 1 was the proper alert. The fact that in arriving at this conclusion he failed to take into consideration certain factors such as that a surprise air attack was the primary threat, or that he failed to subordinate certain other factors such as possible alarm of the civil population does not [3901] remove the case from the category of a mistake of judgment. These mistakes simply led up to the error of judgment in establishing the wrong alert. The fact also that he communicated to the War Department
his decision to establish what was tantamount to Alert No. 1 is likewise inconsistent with the concept of a neglect of duty.

As to whether (b) Short's failure to reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii to put the Joint Army and Navy Defense Plans into operation is a neglect of duty in the nature of being a triable offense, I am of the opinion that, on the testimony now of record, this question is answered by what has been said above. Short's failure stemmed from a mistake of judgment on his part.

As to the Board's conclusion (c) that Short failed in his duties in failing to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy, Short's defense would be, as he indicated in the present proceedings, that such reconnaissance was a Navy function. Whether he was entitled to rely upon the fact that the Navy was conducting, to the best of its ability, such reconnaissance as it had means to conduct, seems doubtful. I do not feel that it can be made the basis of charges against General Short. I believe the truer picture to be that General Short had adopted wholeheartedly what was apparently the viewpoint [3902] of the Navy, namely, that there was literally no chance of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor.

Considering the matter of General Short's possible trial by court-martial at the present time, I have been informed that the Japanese are still using some of the code systems in which various intercepted messages were sent and that information of great military value continues to be obtained from present day intercepts sent in these code systems. A present trial would undoubtedly result in disclosing these facts. There is also the difficulty of assembling the necessary court of high ranking officers and securing the attendance of numerous witnesses who would be recalled from their various war-time duties all over the world. I feel therefore that trial of General Short in time of war is out of the question.

As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the Court would adjudge. As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of duty, or of his various duties, General Short would have the formidable defense that he responded to the request to report measures he had taken with a message, incomplete and ambiguous it may be, but which should have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the action taken. My experience with courts-martial leads me to the belief that a court would be [3903] reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in a case of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a claim that others were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report, Conclusion 18, p. 21.) There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President Lincoln's refusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon Cameron for a gross error of judgment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p. 125-130.) I am therefore forced to conclude that if General Short is tried and if such trial should result in his conviction there is considerable likelihood the Court would adjudge a sentence less than dismissal and well adjudge nothing beyond a reprimand.

As, on the whole, there is doubt whether a court would convict or if it convicted would adjudge a sentence in excess of reprimand, I am inclined to feel that some disposition of the matter other than by a trial should be made rather than to permit the case to linger on as a recurrent public irritation. I suggest therefore that a public statement be made by you giving a brief review of the Board's proceedings and pointing out that General Short was guilty of errors of judgment for which he was properly removed from command, and that this constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event further investigation should disclose a different situation the matter could later be reexamined in the light of such additional evidence.

Myron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

14 September 1945

Memorandum for the Secretary of War.
Subject: Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

The Army Pearl Harbor Board made two separate reports. One was classified as secret and consisted of two volumes. The other was classified as top secret and consisted of one volume.

I have examined the latter Top Secret Report in the light of evidence obtained by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, in his investigation and feel that
as a result thereof certain statements of fact contained in the Top Secret Report require modification.

In its top secret report, the Board stated on pages 1 and 2 and on page 16:

"Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United States. [3905] Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions.

"This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.

"The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the 'Do-Don't' message of November 27, 1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives could have been formulated to put the Department on Alert No. 3.

"This was not done.

"Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable [3906] policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

"Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the right alert.

"The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it." (Pp 1 & 2)

"Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War and Navy Departments in all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack." (P 16)

The Board then set forth what it called "the details of this information." I have analyzed these details and con- [3907] elusions of the Board in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation and find that they should be revised in accordance with the new and additional evidence. These revisions include the following:

As to information available to the War Department, the Board set forth on page 2:

"Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from September to December 1941. The record shows almost daily information as to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period.

"1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the governing date for Japanese offensive military operations. (R. 86)"

The reference "(R. 86)" is to Page 86 of the Top Secret transcripts of the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. These consist of volumes A to D. Examination of Page 86 shows, as a basis for the record reference in its report, a quotation by General Russell from a document as follows:

"On the 24th of November we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that [3908] time, Hawaii was out of our minds."

The document from which General Russell quoted was the record of the Examination conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart from April to June, 1944, for the
Secretary of the Navy. The testimony read by General Russell was an excerpt of that given by Captain L. F. Safford, USN. A more detailed examination of this testimony shows that it was in reality the interpretation by Captain Safford of a Japanese intercept message which was translated on 22 November 1941, being a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. This message authorized the Japanese envoys to extend the time for signing an agreement with the United States from 25 November to 29 November and it stated that the latter time was the absolute deadline and “after that, things are automatically going to happen.”

The War Department did not send this specific information to the Hawaiian Department.

It will be observed that the Board did not set forth the additional testimony of Captain Safford to the effect that “Hawaii was out of our minds.”

The Board further found:

“On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese’ intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States (R. 87)” (P 2)

[* * * On November 26th specific information received [3909] from the Navy indicated that Japan intended to wage offensive war against the United States. (R. 123-124) * * *” (P 5)

This finding of the Board was based on the same reference by General Russell to the testimony of Captain Safford. The reference “(R. 123-124)” is to the testimony of Captain Safford before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. He was asked by a member of the Board as to the source of the information which he mentioned in his testimony to Admiral Hart. He stated that he could not then recollect the source. He further stated that on 26 November the Navy had information that Japan contemplated offensive action against England and the United States and probably against Russia. He gave as a basis for this information his interpretation of an intercept, SIS No. 23302, which was a circular message from Tokyo on 10 November 1941. Reference to additional testimony of Captain Safford set forth on page 125 shows that what he had in mind was the so-called Japanese “Winds Code” message.

[3910] Colonel Clausen’s investigation shows that this information reached Colonel Bicknell, Short’s Assistant G-2, the latter part of November 1941.

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, testified before Colonel Clausen that in the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded this Japanese “Winds Code.” He took immediate action to monitor in Hawaii for the execute message. He further testified that his attention was again called to the “Winds Code” when he saw on the desk of General Fielder a warning message from G-2, War Department, dated 5 December, 1941, asking that the G-2, Hawaiian Department, communicate with Commander Rochefort immediately regarding weather broadcasts from Tokyo. This obviously refers to the “Winds Code.” Colonel Bicknell further testified that he also received information of the “Winds Code” broadcasts from Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, and information that Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Unit, Pearl Harbor, was also monitoring for the execute message.

Commanding Rochefort testified before Colonel Clausen that he and General Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, had established and maintained liaison pertaining to their respective functions, and that he gave General [3911] Fielder such information as he had received concerning intercepts and Japanese diplomatic messages, and concerning other information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested, and which came to his knowledge in the course of his duties. The information thus given to General Fielder during the latter part of November, 1941, included the substance of the “Winds Code” intercept.

The Board found:

“* * * War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action.” (Pp. 2 & 3)

The basis for this conclusion was testimony of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton as he read from a summary called “A Summary of Far Eastern Documents” which he prepared in the fall of 1943. The pertinent portion reads as follows:

“G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. reported a concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after moving from Japanese home waters southward towards Formosa and that air and submarine activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands.” (P 87)
This information was available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December 1941.

[3912] Testimony given before Colonel Clausen by Captain Layton, Captain Rochefort, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins and Commander Holtwick, of the Navy, in the additional investigation indicates the probability that General Short was advised of the presence of Japanese navy task forces in the Marshalls. The Fleet Intelligence Officer had an established liaison relationship with the G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. In the two months preceding 7 December the Fleet Intelligence Officer gave to G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, pertinent information of the increasing Japanese naval activity in the Marshalls. The Navy Combat Intelligence Officer supervised a unit at Pearl Harbor primarily engaged in intercepting, decrypting and analyzing radio traffic of the Japanese navy. The Daily Radio Intelligence Summaries distributed by the Combat Intelligence Officer, during November and continuing down to 7 December, indicated considerable Japanese military activity in the Mandates and concentrations of Japanese naval forces in the Marshalls. (See documentary evidence attached to Col. Clausen's Report.)

The Board found:

"On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87)" (P 3)

This, again, was based on the testimony of Captain Safford [3913] in the Admiral Hart Examination. General Russell read from this while questioning Captain Bratton, as follows:

"General RUSSELL. Yes. I will identity the questions. That is the December 1st message, Colonel.

"Colonel BRATTON. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General. * * *" (P 85)

Colonel Clausen's investigation has shown that the basis for this statement of Captain Safford was his interpretation of messages that the Navy received, i. e., the Navy Department intercept of the "Winds Code" message and a message from Colonel Thorpe, Batavia, giving the substance of the "Winds Code" intercept and stating that by this means Japan would notify her consuls of war decision, and another message to the same general effect from Mr. Foote, Consul General at Batavia, to the State Department. Mr. Foote also stated: "I attached little or no importance to it and viewed it with some suspicion. Such have been coming since 1936."

As shown above, the "Winds Code" information was available in the Hawaiian Department. But the "Winds Code" in itself was not definite information that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States.

[3914] The Board stated:

"The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was constructed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280) * * *" (P 3)

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that he learned from Navy sources on about 3 December 1941 that Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila and elsewhere, had been instructed to destroy their codes and papers, and that he was shown a wire from the Navy Department, dated 3 December 1941, reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and burn all other important confidential and secret documents."

Colonel Clausen's investigation further discloses that at about the time Colonel Bicknell received this information it was discussed with Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, in charge of the Navy Combat Intelligence Unit in Honolulu; and that Mr. Shivers told him that the FBI in Honolulu had intercepted [3915] a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General there was burning his papers. The additional evidence also shows that on the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual Staff Conference conducted by General Short's Chief of Staff, those assembled were given this information. General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen that he was present at the Staff Conference and that on 6 December 1941 he gave to General Short the information that the Japanese Consul at Honolulu had destroyed his codes and papers. (Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, also gave this infor-
mation to Short,) General Fielder further testified that he gave General Short any pertinent information that came to his attention.

The Board further stated:

"As Colonel Bratton summed it up:

'The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War down to the Chief of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not months.' (R. 243-244)" (P 3)

"** * ** All the information that the War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of War, [3916] Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297)" (P 3)

The basis for this conclusion of the Board was the testimony given by Colonel Bratton. When testifying before Colonel Clausen, however, Colonel Bratton corrected his previous testimony and asked that his prior testimony be modified in accordance with his testimony to Colonel Clausen. He stated that his testimony to Colonel Clausen represented a better recollection than when he previously testified. He had previously testified that the intercepts, of the character mentioned and which were contained in the 'Top Secret Exhibit "B"' before the Board, had been delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. But in testifying before Colonel Clausen, he stated that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy what material was delivered to whom during the period in question, and that there were no records to show who delivered or who received the material. He had also previously testified that he personally delivered these intercepts to the officials mentioned. But in his testimony to Colonel Clausen, he stated that, as to such deliveries as [3917] were made, the deliveries were made not only by himself, but also by then Lieutenant Colonel or Major Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.

The basis for the last-mentioned conclusion of the Board, therefore, must be revised in accordance with the corrected testimony of Colonel Bratton. Similarly, the conclusion of the Board on page 4:

"All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go out to the field, with the possible exception of the general statements in occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302)"

The reference "(R. 302)" is also to testimony of Colonel Bratton which hence must be revised in accordance with his corrected testimony given to Colonel Clausen, and in accordance with the new evidence uncovered by Colonel Clausen as to the information sent to General Short and available in the Hawaiian Department before 7 December.

The Board found, pages 4 and 5, other testimony of Colonel Bratton to the effect that on 3 December, when he was informed that the Japanese were under instructions to destroy their codes and code machines, he asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders and that [3918] General Gerow replied, "Sufficient had been sent." Following this, according to the testimony of Colonel Bratton, he conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent, on 5 December 1941, a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."

General Gerow testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not recall the incident, and that if a representative of G-2 thought his action inadequate, he could quite properly have reported the facts to his superior who had direct access to General Gerow and to the Chief of Staff, in a matter of such importance.

The Board set forth, on pages 5 and 6, the general type of information which, according to Captain Safford, came to the Navy at Washington during November and December 1941. This included the information already mentioned that Tokyo, on 22 November, informed the Washington Japanese Embassy that the deadline for signing an agreement, first fixed for 25 November, was extended to 29 November; and also information available at Washington on 28 November in the form of an intercept of a message by Nomura and Kurosu to Tokyo, advising that there was hardly any possibility of the United States considering the "proposal" in toto, and that if the situation remained as tense as it then was, nego-
tations would inevitably be ruptured, if, indeed, they might not already be called so, [3919] and that "our failure and humiliation are complete" and suggesting that the rupture of the present negotiations did not necessarily mean war between the Japanese and the United States but would be followed by military occupation of the Netherland's Indies by the United States and the English which would make war inevitable. The proposal referred to was the reply given the Japanese envoys on 26 November 1941 by the Secretary of State. The Board further referred to information available to the War Department on 5 December, as related by Colonel Sadtler, relative to the "false alarm" execute message to the "Winds Code."

None of the above information was given to General Short before 7 December. However, the Secretary of War has, in his public statement of 29 August 1945, analyzed and shown the substantial nature of the information which the War Department sent to General Short.

Colonel Clausen's investigation also shows that a great deal of additional information was available initially to General Short in the Hawaiian Department, which was not given to the War Department, on the general subject of the tense and strained relations between Japan and the United States and warnings of war. [3920] The British Intelligence Service gave Colonel Bicknell, Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers information in the form of many intelligence reports. Colonel Clausen has collected these as documentary evidence which is mentioned in his report to the Secretary of War. One such dispatch from Manila, given to these three persons in Honolulu on 4 December, 1941, set forth prophetically:

"Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South."

The source of this intelligence was a British intercept of a Japanese diplomatic radio message which could have been based upon a Japanese execute message to the "Winds Code," or some equivalent message.

In addition, the three persons mentioned had available over a long period of time intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and related places. Copies of some of these are included in the documentary evidence attached to Colonel Clausen's report.

Also, the Navy had derived some information from commercial radio traffic out of the Japanese Consulate.

Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the files of the Hawaiian Department G-2 contained much material [3921] gathered from observers, travelers, and Washington sources, which, together with the other intelligence and information mentioned, was evaluated and disseminated by the G-2 sections of the Hawaiian Department. These are mentioned by Colonel Clausen in his report to the Secretary of War. Some are initiated by General Short.

Attention is invited to estimates by Colonel Bicknell disseminated on 17 and 25 October 1941 which set forth, again with prophetic accuracy, the probable moves of Japan.

General Short's G-2 asked, on 6 September 1941, that the War Department cease sending certain G-2 summaries of information for the reason that they were duplicates of information made available to him in Hawaii, and that his cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the FBI was most complete. (See Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 6.)

General Fielder testified before Colonel Clausen, in the additional investigation, "it was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent."

Hence, while the War Department did not send to General Short the specific intercepts mentioned, there was available to him or his Hawaiian command similar information. The reasons why the War Department did not send the actual intercepts were, according to witnesses before Colonel Clausen that this type of information and its source, of necessity, [3922] had to be guarded most carefully, and that its dissemination to the overseas commanders would have included not only General Short but also the overseas commanders and that this, in itself, would be dangerous from a security standpoint since it would spread the information into too many hands. There has been considerable evidence given Colonel Clausen to the effect, as General Marshall testified before Colonel Clausen.

"** Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would have been seriously limited if the sources of intelligence mentioned had been so compromised."
The former Commanding General of the Philippine Department, General Douglas MacArthur, who had received the same general War Department information as General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen.

"Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941."

The Board did not conclude that the War Department had advance information that Pearl Harbor was a specific attack target. It should be observed, however, that in addition to the intercepts received by the War Department, which are contained in Top Secret Exhibit "E" before the Board, there were others which, in retrospect and with the benefit of hindsight, indicated a possible attack on Pearl Harbor. These intercepts were radio messages exchanged between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, concerning reports to Tokyo of ship movements in Pearl Harbor according to a pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor. The requests of Tokyo increased and the reports by Honolulu were made with more frequency and in greater detail as 7 December approached. Two intercepts, which were not decrypted and translated until 8 December, were part of the series mentioned. These were not included in the Top Secret Exhibit given the Board. They were sent 6 December by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, Japanese Numbers 253 and 254. The two in question Nos. 253 and 254, are attached to Colonel Clausen's report to the Secretary of War. These latter, Colonel Clausen's investigation shows, were apparently intercepted at San Francisco and transmitted to Washington by teletype on 6 or 7 December. They were not in the code which had the highest priority for immediate attention, and the teletype between San Francisco and Washington was not in operation until the night of 6 December or the morning of 7 December. Even so, time elapsing between receipt at Washington and dissemination in readable English form (2 days) was less than the normal time required of 3.5 days.

There was available to General Short, at Hawaii, information from which he could have inferred that Pearl Harbor [3924] would be the attack target in the event of war with Japan. Colonel Clausen's investigation shows that the Navy at Honolulu arranged to obtain information from commercial traffic sources shortly before 7 December. These arrangements included an opportunity to the Navy for obtaining the commercial cable traffic of the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu. Some of this traffic included the same types of reports as were intercepted and forwarded to Washington concerning ship movements in Pearl Harbor. It is not entirely clear just what commercial traffic was decrypted and translated by the Navy at Honolulu before 7 December. While similar reports were being made to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other places as we, in like manner, attempted to keep track of Japanese ships, still the types of reports from Honolulu were more suspicious, since they were requested by Tokyo and made by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu with increasing frequency as 7 December approached, and were made according to the pre-arranged division of Pearl Harbor.

The Board set forth the findings concerning the Japanese "Winds Code" at pages 6 and 17. On page 6, the Board referred to testimony of Colonel Sadlter that, on 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval Communications, called him and stated the execute message had been intercepted. Colonel Sadlter then conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton. From Colonel Clausen's investigation it appears that Admiral Noyes, in his testimony before Admiral Hewitt [3925] who conducted for the Secretary of the Navy the same type of investigation Colonel Clausen conducted for the Secretary of War, stated that he did not recall having so informed Colonel Sadlter. Colonel Sadlter testified before Colonel Clausen that he did not follow up the information given by Admiral Noyes on 5 December and that to his knowledge this was not done by anyone else at the time. He assumed that the Navy would send to the Army the actual intercept which was before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned.

Captain Stafford had testified before the Board that on 4 December he saw a Navy intercept which contained the execute message to the Japanese "Winds Code", and that two copies were sent to the Army. Colonel Clausen's investigation discloses no evidence that the Army ever received any such copies and I understand the testimony of Captain Safford has been qualified considerably by testimony of himself and other Navy personnel before Admiral Hewitt.

Colonel Clausen has uncovered what amounts to a possible inference that the Japanese did broadcast an execute message to the "Winds Code" or some equivalent warning code, and that this was intercepted by the British Intelligence
Service and formed the basis for the dispatch from London to Manila and, in turn, from Manila to Honolulu mentioned above. This dispatch was disseminated to the British Intelligence Service sub-agent in Honolulu on 4 December. A complete [3926] file of the dispatches from the British Intelligence Service, and available to the Hawaiian Department at Honolulu, and the British response to Colonel Clausen's query as to the basis for the dispatch of 4 December, are contained in the documentary evidence collected by Colonel Clausen and attached to his report.

[3927] Attention is invited to the testimony of General Gerow and General Smith before Colonel Clausen concerning the findings by the Board based on the testimony of Colonel Saddler that he asked General Gerow and General Smith to send more warning to the overseas commanders. Colonel Saddler also testified before Colonel Clausen, as follows:

"I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this subject:

"General Gerow:—'I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Saddler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps Officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Saddler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened.'"

"General Smith.—'I do not recall Colonel Saddler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Saddler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of my rather minor province.'" (P. 2—Affidavit of Colonel O. K. Saddler)

From page 7 of the Board's Top Secret Report it may be inferred that the Board meant to find that Colonel Bratton sent the G-2 War Department Rochefort message of 5 December to G-2 Hawaiian Department, because of receipt of an execute message to the "Winds Code." But Colonel Bratton has testified that the reason which prompted him to recommend this warning was information derived from other intercepts to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their codes and important papers. The Board, also on page 7, referring to the G-2 warning message of 5 December, set forth the contention of General Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, that he got no such message. In his testimony before Colonel Clausen, however, General Fielder stated:

"* * * I have no recollections of having received the War Department radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt. Col. Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer; particularly since the way [3930] the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. * * *"

Colonel Bicknell testified before Colonel Clausen that on about 5 December he saw the War Department message on the desk of General Fielder and that he then communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information and was advised that Commander Rochefort was also monitoring for the execute message of the "Winds Code."
It should be borne in mind that the execute message to the "Winds Code" was to notify the Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives of a crisis with the United States, Great Britain or Russia and to instruct the Japanese representatives to burn their codes and secret papers. The Japanese later sent the same information to their diplomatic and consular representatives by other and more direct means. This latter information, it appears from Colonel Clausen's investigation, was available in the Hawaiian Department prior to 7 December 1941.

On page 11 of the Top Secret Report, the Board sets forth several findings concerning the delivery of a 14-part intercept of a Japanese message from Tokyo to the envoys in Washington. The Board concludes:

"Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9:00 and 10:30 p.m., [3931] December 6, as follows:

"To Colonel Smith, (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238) He told General Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the bag and see the contents. (R. 307)

"To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his presence. (R. 239–241) He stated that General Miles did nothing about it as far as he knows. (R. 241) This record shows no action by General Miles.

"Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow's executive in the War Plans Division. (R. 238)

"He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. (R. 234, 239)

"Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had urged Colonel [3932] Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, to communicate with General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with General Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on the part of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation until the following morning." (Pp. 11, 12)

"To clinch this extraordinary situation, we have to look at the record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final reply were completely known in detail to the War Department, completely translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7 and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G–2 of the War Department personally in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, and Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary to the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G–2 General Miles, with whom it was discussed and to the Executive, Colonel Gailey, of [3933] the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same officer personally delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's duty officer.

"General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows." (P 16)

These conclusions must be completely revised in view of the new evidence. The basis for these conclusions is the testimony of Colonel Bratton. In testifying before Colonel Clausen, he admitted that he gave the Board incorrect testimony; that the only set of the 13 parts he delivered on the night of 6 December was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secretary of War, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, were not delivered the night of 6 December; that these sets were not given the night of 6 December to General Gerow, General Smith or General Miles; that he could not recall having discussed the message with General Miles on 6 December; and that he did not know how [3934] the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession the morning of 7 December. Colonel Bratton claimed that on the night of 6 December he had asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set to the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that he received the messages the night of 6 December but did not deliver any until after 9:00 a.m. on the morning of 7
December. Colonel Dusenbury stated Colonel Bratton went home before the 13 parts were entirely received.

On the subject of the delivery of the 13 parts, attention is also invited to the testimony given Colonel Clausen by General Gerow, General Smith and General Miles. From Colonel Clausen's investigation, it appears that General Gerow and General Smith did not receive any of the 13 parts before the morning of 7 December. General Miles testified that he became aware accidentally of the general contents of the 13 parts the evening of 6 December. He was dining at the home of his opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Beardall, the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to General Miles.

The Board, on page 14 and again on page 17, finds that Colonel Bratton telephoned General Marshall's quarters at 9:00 a.m. the morning of 7 December to give him the 14th part of the 14-part message and the Japanese messages directing the Ambassador to deliver the 14-part message at 1:00 p.m., 7 December, and to destroy their code machines. The Board further finds that General Marshall did not come into his office until 11:25 a.m.

These times so found by the Board are subject to qualification in light of additional evidence given Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified before Colonel Clausen that he gave the actual intercepts to the Chief of Staff, which would be in the office of the Chief of Staff "between 10:30 and 11:30 that morning." Major General John R. Deane testified before Colonel Clausen that on the morning of 7 December he and Colonel Bratton did not arrive at the Munitions Building until between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. General Miles testified before Colonel Clausen that he conferred with General Marshall the morning of 7 December in his office at about 11:00 a.m. Colonel Dusenbury testified before Colonel Clausen that the intercepts were delivered to the United States at 1:00 p.m. 7 December, was not received by Colonel Bratton until "after he arrived that morning, between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m."

The Board further found:

"There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4 and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday, December 6 and 7, was clear-cut and definite." (P. 15)

The evidence does not seem to justify any such conclusion. There was not received between the dates of 4 December and 6 December any information which indicated that war would take place on Saturday or Sunday, 6 and 7 December. It is true that on the night of 6 December the War Department received the intercepted text of thirteen parts of the fourteen-part reply of the Japanese Government to the proposal of the United States, but this at most suggested a possible breach of diplomatic relations at some time in the near future, which may or may not have been followed by war. The only other information that was received between 4 and 6 December of significance, in addition to what had already been transmitted to General Short, was information received on 4 December that certain Japanese diplomatic and consular posts had been instructed to destroy certain codes. As I have heretofore pointed out, this information was fully available to General Short from his own sources in Hawaii. The intercept which indicated that the Japanese reply was to be delivered at 1:00 p.m., Washington Time on 7 December was, as heretofore pointed out, not received until the morning of 7 December and it itself was not a "clear-cut and definite" indication that war would occur at that time.

The Board further found:

"Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States except the final message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor." (P. 18)

This statement is ambiguous but if it implies that it was known that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, this is not the fact. There is no justification in the evidence for such a statement.

This conclusion, as well as the other conclusions of the Board in the Top Secret Report, should be considered in the light of what General Short has since testified was information he should have received. General Short testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry concerning the message which General Marshall attempted to send to him the morning of 7 December, referred to by the Board on page 17. He testified that he would have gone into a different alert if General Marshall...
had given him this message by telephone. General Short testified in response to a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert:

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction [3938] of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made much of an impression on me." [Italics supplied.]

As I have already pointed out, there was available to General Short from his own sources in Hawai to 7 December 1941 information that the Japanese Government had sent orders to various diplomatic and consular posts to destroy a certain of its codes and important papers.

The "other matter" referred to was the information which General Marshall included in his message which read as follows:

"Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

My Conclusion:
The view expressed by me in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon the evidence then collected by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and its reports, should be considered modified in accordance with the views expressed herein.

MYRON C. CRAMER,  
Major General,  
The Judge Advocate General.

[3939]
Memorandum for the Secretary of War
Subject: Supplemental Pearl Harbor Investigation

This will confirm my views heretofore expressed to you orally.

Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, appointed by you pursuant to your public statement, dated 1 December 1944, to continue the Army Pearl Harbor Investigation, has submitted the affidavits obtained by him in the course of his further investigation. The present memorandum is my opinion as to whether my original memorandum to you, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944, requires modification either in respect of the conclusions reached or the statements of fact contained therein drawn from the Army Pearl Harbor Board report. In my opinion, the conclusions therein are in no way affected by the additional data obtained by Colonel Clausen's investigation. Certain statements of fact, however, made by me in my prior memorandum, which statements I made as a result of my examination of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, require clarification in some respects.

The "Winds" Message:

On pages 24-28 of my memorandum I discussed as part of the information the War Department possessed and which Short claimed he did not receive, the so-called "Winds Code" message [3940] of 20 November 1941 from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives. This was to the effect that

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), a warning message would be given in the middle and at the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows:

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)"

"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)"

"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)"

When this signal was heard, all codes and ciphers were to be destroyed.

It is admitted by all that this first "Winds" message, setting up a code or signal to be given later, was received by the War Department around 20 November 1941. However, the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board left in doubt whether a second or activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received and if so by whom. The testimony of Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, (my Memo., p. 24) that an activating "Winds" message indicating a breach in Japanese-British diplomatic relations had been received was not entirely satis-
factory. This is likewise true of the [3941] testimony of Captain Safford, head of the Navy's Security Division, to the same effect (my Memo. P. 25).

Colonel Clausen's subsequent investigation fails to disclose any testimony that an activating or implementing "Winds" message indicating breach of Japanese relations with either Great Britain, Russia or the United States was ever received by the War Department. Thus, Colonel Harold Doud, in charge of B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section, in November and December 1941, stated:

"I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department." (Affid., Col. Harold Doud)

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, testified no such message was ever received at Pearl Harbor (affid., Capt. Edwin T. Layton, p. 2). A statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Commander Rochefort's assistant at Pearl Harbor, was to the same effect. (Memorandum of Comdr. J. S. Holtwick)

Colonel Rex W. Minckler, Signal Corps, in charge of Signal Intelligence Service at the time, stated:

"I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent." [39/2] (Affid., Col. Rex. W. Minckler)

He said there were "one or two 'false alarms'", which he discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy. His opposite number in the Navy was Captain L. F. Safford.

Major General Sherman Miles, in charge of G-2 at the time did not recall meeting Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadler on 5 December 1941, at which meeting Colonel Sadler is supposed to have advised him of Admiral Noyes' telephone call that "The message is in." (See Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 24) General Miles stated: "To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities." (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2) General Miles stated that the Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for the activating "Winds" message which was regarded as of vital concern. He stated there were several messages intercepted which were thought at first to be the execute message but which turned out not to be authentic. He thought that if there was any meeting with Colonel Sadler on 5 December 1941, it concerned an unauthentic message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, p. 2.)

Colonel Otis K. Sadler, Signal Corps, in charge of military codes and ciphers in the Chief Signal Office, in November and December 1941, stated that when he got word from Admiral Noyes that "The message is in" (See Vol. D., Top Secret [39/3] testimony, p. 251), he did nothing further to ascertain from Admiral Noyes or other persons the exact wording of the intercept as he assumed that according to standard practice, it would be transmitted without delay to G-2 (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadler). In his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen, Colonel Sadler stated that after talking to General Miles and Colonel Bratton about Admiral Noyes' message he went to his office and typed a proposed warning as follows:

"C. G.-P. L., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."

However he did not show this message to anyone or make a copy of it and he quoted it only from memory. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadler) According to his original testimony he conferred with General Gerow and General Bedell Smith about Admiral Noyes' message. He did not show them the above-quoted draft but stated he did suggest that a warning message be sent the overseas commanders as he testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (Vol. D, Top Secret testimony, p. 253). He reiterated this testimony before Colonel Clausen (Affid., Col. Otis K. Sadler, p. 1). Neither General Gerow nor General Smith had any recollection of any such conference with Colonel Sadler or any such recommendation by him. General Gerow pointed out quite appositely that Colonel Sadler was "purely a Signal [39/44] Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination and interpretation of "Magic" messages (Affid., Gen. Leonard Gerow). General Smith likewise has no recollection of Colonel Sadler discussing the matter with him. General Smith stated that he was not on the very restricted list of officers with whom top secret matters of the "Magic" type could be discussed, and thus it would have been impossible
for Colonel Saddler to have discussed the matter with him. (Affid., Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith)

[3945] Colonel Saddler in his affidavit given to Colonel Clausen stated that other than his testimony relative to the Admiral Noyes message (probably a "false alarm"), he had never seen any execute message to the "Winds Code" and, so far as he knew, no such execute message was received in the War Department. He at no time urged General Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2 to send a warning message to overseas commanders. (Affid., Col. Otis K. Saddler, p. 3)

I have been informed that Admiral Noyes and other witnesses appearing before Admiral Hewitt in the Navy inquiry into Pearl Harbor matter, denied the receipt of an authentic execute "Winds" message.

Colonel Rufus W. Bratton, in charge of the Far Eastern Section, G-2, in 1941, recalled a meeting 5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel Saddler at which Colonel Saddler presented the information he had received from Admiral Noyes. Colonel Saddler was instructed to get the exact text from Admiral Noyes, as there had been several "false alarm" reports to the same effect. So far as he knew, Colonel Saddler never returned to G-2 with the text or any additional information. Colonel Bratton had no information about any alleged visit of Colonel Saddler to General Gerow or General Bedell Smith. Colonel Bratton never brought Colonel Saddler's report to the attention of the Chief of Staff. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton, p. 2)

Colonel Bratton stated that at no time prior to 7 December 1941 did he ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the "Winds Code." As to the testimony of Captain Safford of the Navy to the effect that two copies of such a message were sent to the Army, Colonel Bratton pointed out that not two but six copies of any such message were required to be sent by the Navy to the Army, the inference being that no copies at all were sent. Prior to 7 December 1941, representatives of the Navy had discussed with him several "false alarms" relative to the "Winds" message but no one in the Navy or in G-2 ever discussed with him the message supposed to have been sent to the Army according to Captain Safford's testimony. (Affid., Col. Rufus W. Bratton)

Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, Signal Corps, in charge of radio interception for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, prior to 7 December 1941, testified that on receipt of the original "Winds" message, he directed the San Francisco interception station to be on the watch for an activating message and to send it to him. To the best of his knowledge, no execute message was ever picked up. (Affid., Col. Robert E. Schukraft)

General Gerow's and General Bedell Smith's comment on Colonel Saddler's testimony relative to the alleged execute "Winds" message received from Admiral Noyes has already been discussed (See Affidavits, Gen. Gerow, p. 2; Gen. W. Bedell Smith, p. 3).

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, the 1941 Executive [3947] Assistant to the Chief, Intelligence Branch, MID, General Staff, testified to Colonel Clausen that the source of his information on all "Ultra" (or "Magic") messages concerning Japan was Colonel Bratton and Major Dunsebury, Colonel Bratton's assistant. He inquired of Colonel Bratton on several occasions as to whether any execute message had come in under the "Winds Code." He did not recall receiving any such information from Colonel Bratton and stated that if he had received it, he would have remembered it. No other person informed him of any such execute "Winds" message prior to 7 December 1941 (Affid., Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts).

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur testified to Colonel Clausen that he had no recollection of having received any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B (see my first memorandum of 25 November 1944, pp. 19-23). He never got the "Winds Code" nor any activating or implementing message. He believed he had seen every "Ultra" message delivered to his headquarters. (Affid., Gen. Douglas MacArthur) His Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, testified to the same effect. (Affid., Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland) Major General C. A. Willoughby, assistant Chief of Staff, Southwest Pacific Area, stated he had never seen any of the messages in Top Secret Exhibit B except isolated fragments of the Kurusu series. Neither he nor anyone else in the USAFFE to his knowledge were advised of the "Winds Code" or of any execute message. (Affid., Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby)

[3948] Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Rowlett testified to Colonel Clausen that immediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack he was a civilian technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytic Unit, Signal Intelligence

My conclusion, from the above testimony, read in connection with the testimony in the Pearl Harbor Report as to the "Winds" message, discussed by me in my memorandum dated 25 November 1944, is that the most diligent search fails to reveal that any activating or execute "Winds" message was ever received by the War Department. In this connection, General Marshall's testimony will be recalled, "I find that no officer of the Navy advised Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton that any message implementing the Winds' Code had been received by the Navy." (Vol. A. Top Secret Tr., Marshall, p. 38)

The Rochefort Message:

In my original memorandum (p. 27), I referred to Colonel Bratton's testimony that on receipt of the 2 December message, translated 4 December, from Tokyo to the Embassy at Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and after discussing it, recommended a further warning or alert to our overseas commanders. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had already been given and General Miles stated he was in no position to overrule him. Colonel Bratton, however, still feeling uneasy about the matter, went to the Navy, where he discussed it with Commander McCollum, who felt as he did. McCollum stated that as Commander Rochefort, the Naval Combat Intelligence Officer with the Fourteenth Naval District in Honolulu, had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listening for the second or implementing message, a radiogram he sent to General Short's G-2 in Hawaii to see Commander Rochefort at once. Colonel Bratton thereupon drafted a radiogram, signed "Miles," which was sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, on 5 December 1941, reading as follows:

"Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather."

No testimony is contained in the original Army Pearl Harbor Board Report or in the Top Secret report as to whether Short was informed of the above message. However, realizing its importance, Colonel Clausen in his subsequent investigation examined General Fielder, Short's G-2 and Colonel Bicknell, his Assistant G-2, as to whether this radiogram was received and what action was taken. General Fielder testified he had no recollection of ever having seen this radiogram (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 2). [3950] As to likelihood of the "Winds" information being sent to him by the Navy, independently of the so-called Rochefort message, General Fielder testified:

"My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii." (Affid., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, par. 6, p. 2.)

General Fielder further said:

"No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local of Territorial problems. I believe the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which I needed to know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been given. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source. [3952] but in fact, would have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of the 7th AF, Lt. Col. Raley, was in liaison with and received some information from Com-
General Fielder had no recollection of ever having seen any of the Japanese messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit B which included the "Winds" message (referred to in my original memorandum, pp. 19-23) (Affid., Brig. Gen. Fielder, par. 11, p. 3).

Colonel George W. Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, in charge of the Contact Office in downtown Honolulu, stated that he maintained very close liaison with Commander Rochefort [3953] and knew prior to Pearl Harbor Day that the latter was engaged in intercepting and decrypting Japanese messages. During the latter part of November, 1941, he learned that the Navy had intercepted the Japanese message containing the "Winds Code." He took immediate action to have the local Federal Communications Commission agency monitor for the execute message, which was not received (Affid., Col. George W. Bickell, p. 1). His attention was again called to the "Winds Code" when on 5 December 1941 he saw on General (then Colonel Field's desk the radiogram from General Miles to contact Commander Rochefort. (This directly conflicts with General Fielder's testimony that he never saw the Rochefort radiogram.) Colonel Bicknell that day communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information and was told that Commander Rochefort was monitoring for the execute message. This information was also given to Mr. Robert L. Shivers, in charge of the FBI in Honolulu.

The affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, Executive Officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, who assisted in sending the Rochefort message, contains hearsay statements to the effect that "Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Washington had" (including the "Winds message"), the source of which was Navy personnel whose identity he could not recall. His undisclosed Navy sources were also authority for his statement that Commander [3954] Rochefort's crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii were monitoring for intercepts, breaking and translating the codes and that the Army in Hawaii would receive all this information. He said he sent the Rochefort message on 5 December merely as a precautionary measure. (Affid., Col. Moses W. Pettigrew).

Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu at the time, does not mention the "Winds" message as such in his affidavit. Apparently, however, the Navy had guardedly advised him of this message or its equivalent prior to 7 December. Thus, he said Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, told him he was aware of the code the Japanese would use to announce a break in Japanese relations. Mayfield gave Shivers a code by which he would inform Shivers of Japanese activities in this line and Shivers passed this information on the Colonel Bicknell. Mayfield never gave him the code signal (Affid., Robert L. Shivers).

Mr. Shivers testified:

(General Fielder did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7 December.)

(Affid., Robert L. Shivers.)

There is a conflict in this respect between Mr. Shivers and Colonel Bicknell. [3955] General Fielder, when presented with Commander Rochefort's affidavit indicating the "Winds Code" message was given to him, specifically denied that he received it. General Fielder stated:

"I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt. Col. Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt. Col. Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to me direct." (Affid., Gen. Fielder, par. 10, p. 3)

General Short was not specifically examined as to whether he received the "Winds Code" message. Impliedly it is covered by his general denial of the receipt of information other than that he admitted he received.

In my opinion, the state of the present record fails to show conclusively that the "Winds Code" message as such reached General Short personally either through the medium of liaison between the Navy and the Army Intelligence Sections in Hawaii or as a result of the Rochefort message. Whether Short received equivalent information will not be considered.
Other Information Possessed by General Short:

I have been informed that Short, when he appeared before the Navy Board, testified that he had gotten General Marshall's 7 December radiogram prior to the attack, it might have been a different story. In answer to a question as to whether he would then have gone on a different alert, he said:

"I think I would because one thing struck me forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made much of an impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also: I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, the destruction of the code machine would have been very significant to me. I would have been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter. * * * I would have taken the destruction of the code machines very seriously." (Italics supplied.)

It is a fair inference that long prior to Pearl Harbor Day, Short obtained equivalent information from Colonel Bicknell and possibly others. In my memorandum of 25 November 1944 (p. 10, 19, 30), I referred to General Fielder's and Colonel Bicknell's testimony that they had information prior to 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was "destroying its codes and burning its secret paper," which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. This information Colonel Bicknell brought to the attention of General Short's staff conference on the morning of 6 December, a conference presided over by General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips (Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 10, 19). Colonel Phillips stated he brought it to the attention of General Short (Memo. 25 November 1944, p. 19).

The above testimony was amplified by further testimony by Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge in Honolulu. Mr. Shivers testified that on 3 December 1941 Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer for the Navy, called him, asking him if he could verify information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. About two hours later the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate and a Japanese in Honolulu, during which the cook stated that the Consul General was "burning and destroying all his important papers." Shivers immediately gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. Shivers likewise telegraphed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers." Worthy of note also is Mr. Shivers' statement that on 28 November 1941 he received a radiogram from Mr. Hoover to the effect that peace negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as anything was liable to happen. Shivers gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell, who stated they had already received similar information from their respective heads in Washington. (Affid., Robert L. Shivers.)

General Fielder confirmed Colonel Bicknell's testimony that the destruction by the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu of "codes and papers" was related by Colonel Bicknell at the staff conference on 6 December 1941. General Fielder testified, "I gave this latter information to General Short the same day." (Affld., Brig. Gen. Kendal J. Fielder, p. 3.)

Colonel Bicknell testified that about 3 December 1941 he learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. This apparently was radio OPNAV No. 031580, dated 3 December 1941, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Commandant, 14th Naval District, Commandant, 16th Naval District, reading as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents." (Top Secret Vol. C, Safford, p. 183.)

Colonel Bicknell saw the above radiogram. (Affld., Col. Bicknell, p. 2.)

About this time he got the information above referred to from Mr. Shivers, and told the staff conference "what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese consuls." (Affld., Col. Bicknell, p. 2.)
He also informed the conference that because of this and subsequent information which he had from reliable sources, the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something war like by Japan was about to happen somewhere. He had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates given to the Chief of Staff to the same effect. (Vol. 30, Army Pearl Harbor Board Transcript, p. 3864-3865.) Colonel Bicknell also testified further relative to giving General Fielder and General Short the Dr. Mori message intercepted by the FBI on 6 December 1941 (referred to in Memo., 25 November 1944, p. 11). Their reaction was as follows, according to Colonel Bicknell:

"Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too 'intelligence conscious' and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes.

"Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short [3960] while waiting to testify before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words to the effect, 'Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you were right and I was wrong.'" (Affld., Col. George W. Bicknell, p. 3.)

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not advised prior to Pearl Harbor Day by General Fielder, Colonel Phillips, Colonel Bicknell, or all three, of current intelligence reports and, in particular, that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was burning its papers. In the interest of strict accuracy, however, I must mention statements made by me on pages 10, 19 and 30 of my prior memorandum, based on the Army Pearl Harbor Board record, that Short's G-2 and Assistant G-2 had information that the Jap Consulate in Honolulu was destroying its codes and secret papers. Mr. Shivers, the source of this information, does not mention "codes" in his affidavit but simply states the Consul General was "burning and destroying all his important papers." To most people, this would mean codes, since it is well known Consulates possess codes, which are in paper form. Colonel Bicknell evidently so interpreted it, judging from his statement that he evaluated the Dr. Mori message (See Memo, 25 November 1944, p. 11) in the light of the information he had received concerning the destruction by Jap Consuls of their "codes and papers." This is confirmed by General Fielder's testimony that Colonel Bick- [3961] neill told the Staff Conference 6 December 1941 that the Jap Consul was burning his "codes and papers." (Affld., Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, p. 3.)

Without, however, bringing home to General Short in strict accuracy the information that the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu was destroying his codes, as distinguished from other papers, the fact that he was destroying his secret papers and not some but all such papers at that juncture of world affairs is entitled to great weight in considering whether General Short had adequate knowledge of the true Japanese-American situation. While it may be said that codes are technically different from secret papers, or "papers," of the Jap Consulate, and Colonel Bicknell or other Hawaiian contacts are quite different as sources of information from the Chief of Staff, the fact remains that to an alert commander information, from whatever source, of the destruction of either codes, secret papers, or merely "all important papers" by the Jap Consulate in Honolulu at that time should have had extreme significance.

The Manila Warning Message:

This was an urgent cablegram dispatched 3 December 1941 by Colonel G. H. Wilkinson, the British representative of Theodore H. Davies & Co., Honolulu, one of the Big Five, to Mr. Harry L. Dawson, an employee of the Davies Company, and the British Consul in Honolulu. Colonel Wilkinson was a member [3962] by marriage of the Davies family and was secretly working for the British Government as a secret agent in Manila. The cablegram received by the Davies Company in Honolulu the night of 3 December read as follows:

"We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:


"2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).

"B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington No. 21 by American Military Intelligence here."
"C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan inquisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

"You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu."

[3965] Immediately upon receipt of it, Mr. John E. Russell, President of Theodore H. Davies & Company, cancelled a considerable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines. A copy of the cablegram was given to Colonel Bickness, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers, head of the FBI in Honolulu, and Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy. (Statement of Mr. John E. Russell and exhibit.)

Mr. Shivers has already been informed by Colonel Wilkinson of his undercover activities and of his connection with Mr. Harry Dawson, the British Vice Consul in Honolulu, likewise an employee of the Davies Company. Colonel Wilkinson arranged with him in July of 1941 to give him information through Mr. Dawson. Mr. Shivers said his files indicated his receipt of the cablegram of 3 December 1941 from Colonel Wilkinson. Major General C. A. Willoughby, at that time G-2 of the Philippine Department, knew of Wilkinson and of his activities.

Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2 admitted receipt of the Manila cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson. He stated he gave the information contained in it to General Short. (Amendment to affidavit of Col. George W. Bicknell.)

In addition to the cablegram above referred to, Colonel Bicknell stated he obtained a mass of information from the British SIS, through Colonel Wilkinson, which he brought to the attention of General Short, in one form or another. (Amend. [3967] affd., Col. George W. Bicknell.) A file of this information is attached to Colonel Clausen's report. General Fielder was shown this file. Some few items struck a responsive chord in his memory, but he could not remember if they were brought to his attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to his attention, according to General Fielder. (Affid., Gen. Fielder, p. 3.)

It is difficult to believe that General Short was not made aware of the highly important information contained in the 3 December cablegram from Manila. The same comment is applicable to the 27 November cablegram from Colonel Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, the British Vice Consul, which stated:

"Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on Dec. 1 repeat Dec. 1, without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view to getting between Bangkok and Singapore."

A copy of this cablegram also went to Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers, and Captain Mayfield. Colonel Bicknell said this was part of the information he gave to Short "in one form or another." (Amend. Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell.)

British SIS Reports Furnished Colonel Bicknell:

These reports, referred to above, which were transmitted in triplicate by Colonel Wilkinson at Manila, through the British Vice Consul at Honolulu, Mr. Dawson, to Colonel Bicknell, Short's Assistant G-2, Mr. Shivers of the FBI, and [3965] Captain Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer of the Navy, are too voluminous to be discussed in detail. In the aggregate, these reports make an impressive showing of growing tension in the Far East. Much of the data contained in these reports found its way into Colonel Bicknell's estimates of the Japanese Situation, which he testified he furnished General Short. (Amend. Affid., Col. George W. Bicknell.)

Information Received By Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN:

Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, was, for a year prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He testified to Colonel Clausen that about three months prior to 7 December 1941 the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Edward W. Raley, came to him and requested various items of intelligence. About ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, Captain Layton gave Colonel Raley certain top secret intelligence, without, however, disclosing its origin, which included the "Winds Code" message and information tending to show a general movement of Japanese naval forces to the South. When the Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of the Japanese mandated islands in November, 1941, he held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley about the matter. From time to time when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, he was called to present the intelligence picture to
Comment on Information Which Reached General Short:

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, after discussing the information as to Japanese activities which admittedly reached Short and additional information possessed by the War Department which was not sent him, I said:

"* * * while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations." (P. 30.)

Colonel Clausen's investigation has fortified me in my conclusions above stated. Reference is made to my memorandum to you of even date, subject "Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board," for a further discussion on this subject.

Short's SOP Against Attack:

In my memorandum of 25 November 1944, I stated:

"Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, [3967] dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions; Alert No. 2 being applicable to condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprising within the Islands 'with no particular threat from without.' It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 14 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for preparation for 'a surprise hostile attack.'" (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5, 61.) (Italics supplied.)

As stated in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, Short on receipt of the radiogram from General Marshall, dated 27 November 1941, within half an hour ordered Alert No. 1, which is SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from without." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 2). In response to so much of General Marshall's radiogram as ordered him to "report measures taken," he sent the short reply "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." (Memo., 25 Nov. 1944, p. 13) Short testified that his SOP of 5 November 1941 was sent to the War Department on that date or about that time (Tr., Short, p. 431, [3968] Vol. 5). Under this SOP, Alert No. 1 was against sabotage only. Apparently Short's present contention is that in advising the War Department by radiogram that the Department was alerted against sabotage, he brought home to the War Department that only Alert No. 1 under his SOP of 5 November 1941 was being put into effect. (Tr., Short, p. 431)

Colonel Clausen's investigation fails to disclose any evidence that Short transmitted his SOP of 5 November 1941 to the War Department on or around that date. The best evidence indicates that it was not received in the War Department until March of 1942. Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, A. C., was specially deputized to make a careful investigation to ascertain the date of receipt by the War Department of this document. He searched in the files of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division, and the Army Air Forces, and made specific inquiries of those likely to have any knowledge of the matter. His search indicated that no such SOP was received by the War Department until March 1942. A letter from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Lt. Gen. Emmons), dated 29 January 1942, transmitting the SOP to the War Department bears a receipt dated 10 March 1942. (Affid., Col. Clarence G. Jensen)

Receipt and Distribution of the 13 Parts and the 14th Part of the Japanese Interception of 6–7 December 1941:

Attached hereto is a copy of a separate memorandum by [3969] me to you of even date which sufficiently discusses Colonel Clausen's investigation of the above matter. No further comment is deemed necessary in this place.

Conclusion:

My conclusions contained in my memorandum of 25 November 1944 relative to the Board's findings as to General Short, General Marshall, General Gerow
and Secretary Hull have been reexamined by me in the light of Colonel Clausen's investigation. I find nothing in Colonel's Clausen's investigation which leads me to modify these conclusions. The statements of fact made in my memorandum of 25 November 1944, based upon the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and that Board's report, are clarified and modified in accordance with the present memorandum.

MYRON C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

1 Incl.
Copy memo from TJAG

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m. the committee recessed until 10:00 a.m., of the following day, Thursday, December 13, 1945.)
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1945

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:00 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe, I believe, was in the process of examining General Marshall. He will now proceed. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL (Resumed)

Mr. Keefe. General Marshall, when did you first learn of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the 7th day of December 1941, at what time?

General Marshall. I don't remember the exact time, sir. It was very closely after the attack started. The message came in and—

Mr. Keefe. Were you at your office?

General Marshall. I don't know that. General Deane, who was one of the secretaries of the General Staff, states that I was home at lunch, and my orderly states I was at the office. I am in between the two.

Mr. Keefe. Do I understand you put in a call for Hawaii then?

General Marshall. At some time, yes. My dim recollection of the situation is that some—in the first place, they opened the direct line and kept it open for quite a while and some word came in, that is my dim recollection, that the Japanese were attempting a landing near Barbers Point, I have a recollection of some such assertion at the time, and I think it was in connection with that that I called up and endeavored to speak to General Short, and I am not certain whether the Barbers Point incident provoked the telephone message or not.

Mr. Keefe. Would there be a record of that telephone call?

General Marshall. I assume there would be. My dim recollection is that the phone was kept open.

Mr. Keefe. But you cannot associate that call with the actual placing of it?
General Marshall. No, sir. It was after we knew about the attack, I think possibly during the second run the Japanese made. I am guessing at that.

Mr. Keefe. I can well appreciate that in the excitement incident to that moment that might easily be overlooked, General.

Now, in my examination of you heretofore I discussed the 1940 alert. I wonder if you have this morning the material which you have been seeking which furnishes the basis for that 1940 alert?

General Marshall. I have not. I was informed this morning that they had exhausted the search, they think, of the files in the War Department, of magic and other sources, and that did not bring up the papers which, the information which General Strong felt had animated his recommendations for the alert. He, incidentally, is in New York, and they didn't [3975] get a hold of him until after 11:00 o'clock last night. I think that is it. We had the information in the War Department regarding diplomatic affairs and regarding Japanese Army affairs. General Strong thinks that the information pertained to the Japanese Fleet and they are now moving over to go through the naval files and the State Department files to see if they can obtain it.

I might add that there has been a very extensive search of all files and a collation of information regarding Pearl Harbor, but there has been no previous search and collation and quite a number of people are involved.

Mr. Keefe. I am especially interested in that subject, General Marshall, because of the testimony of Admiral Richardson, which seemed to give credence to the fact that the Navy was not alerted at that time—it was just an Army alert—and I am rather interested to find out, if I can, what there was in the picture that caused an all-out alert on the part of the Army and no corresponding alert on the part of the Navy.

There doesn't appear to be any message from the Navy alerting Admiral Richardson and his fleet. Can you give us any information on that?

General Marshall. No, sir; I cannot. I think some of the data that has come up shows the Navy Department and the Chief of Naval Operations was aware of the matter. I believe [3975] Admiral Richardson's own testimony shows that he received communications from them. I believe also the record shows the naval shore—that is, the shore installations—were cooperating with the Army in the alert. I do not recall the reason why there was not a naval message sent for the alert or there were not some specific instructions to the fleet.

Mr. Keefe. What aroused my interest was the fact that in 1941 there was a specific order for an alert issued by the Navy and a specific order for an alert ordered by the Army. There were two separate alert messages that went out.


Mr. Keefe. I haven't been able to identify any such procedure as that in the 1940 alert.

General Marshall. I do not think in the record there is any Navy alert as such.

Mr. Keefe. Now, in discussing that matter with you the other day, General Marshall, there was read into the record the message from you
to General Herron, which was rather brief and to the point. That message which you sent to Herron in 1940 produced the result which you expected, namely, an all-out alert, did it not?


Mr. Keefe. There was no other alert ordered at Hawaii prior to the 1940 alert that you know of, was there?


Mr. Keefe. During your tenure as Chief of Staff. So, so far as you know, during your tenure as Chief of Staff the first all-out alert order was the one that was sent on the 17th of June 1940 to General Herron?

General Marshall. That is my recollection, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And as a result of that message to General Herron in 1940 an all-out alert resulted promptly and he reported immediately as to what had taken place; was that not true?


Mr. Keefe. When the subject of an all-out alert or further alert came up in 1941, why didn't you use the same language that was used to produce the alert on the 17th of June 1940?

Why was all the additional language put in the alert order?

General Marshall. Because it was felt necessary—in the first place you had to include instructions of the President regarding overt acts.

[3976] Mr. Keefe. If you will pardon me just a moment, General. There was in the alert order of June 17, 1940, no such provision?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You had no order at that time from the President that the first overt act must be committed by Japan?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. But when you came to issue the alert order in November 1941 you were faced with a direction from the President that Japan must commit the first overt act?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So you had to include that in the telegram?


Mr. Keefe. Now, General Marshall, I asked you the other day—I have forgotten whether it was yesterday or the day before yesterday—a question which you answered in substance that if an enemy plane, or a foreign plane or a Jap plane had flown over this area, under the alert that was in force on the 17th of June and thereafter, that plane would have been fired upon and shot down, if possible?


[3977] Mr. Keefe. And I asked you the question as to whether or not firing upon a plane of another country under those circumstances would constitute an overt act on our part.

My recollection is that you stated that it would be an overt act.

General Marshall. I would say it would be an overt act. The Japanese, of course, had fired on a gunboat of ours, and sank it.

Mr. Keefe. Pardon me?

General Marshall. Had fired or bombed a gunboat of ours and sank it. That was an overt act.

Mr. Keefe. Yes; that was in 1937.

Mr. Keeffe. It was an act that might have been considered an act of war?

General Marshall. Depending upon the tension and public policy at the time.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. It did not result in war; they paid some indemnity, and it was sort of forgotten for the time being. You are referring to the sinking of the Panay?


[3978] Mr. Keeffe. But, I want to be certain, if Jap planes had come over in 1940, merely flown over the island under that alert, they would have been subject to being shot down, under the order that was given?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, then, when you gave this alert order in 1941 which contained the language that Japan was to commit the first overt act, suppose, General Marshall, that your commanders, Naval and Army, out there at Hawaii had had a patrol out and actually found a concentration of four or five carriers, 400 miles away from Hawaii, and they knew they were there. Would you have been able to bomb those carriers under that alert, unless Japan had done something that could be considered to be an overt act?

General Marshall. I will read this alert and then try to analyze the situation.

[3979] Mr. Keeffe. I want to get your judgment on that question.

General Marshall (reading):

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance, and so forth.

This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

If, as you suggest, our reconnaissance had developed the Japanese carriers, then the question is was that an overt act and were those planes under this alert justified and required, in effect, to bomb those carriers?

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. Now, General Marshall, right on that point so that there can be no misunderstanding about it. There has been a reference to an order issued by the President creating certain restricted waters. Do you recall how far that ran the line around the Hawaiian Islands?


Mr. Keeffe. Was it 300 miles, do you remember, Mr. Counsel, so that we may have it in the record?

Mr. Mitchell. We will get it for you.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes.

[3980] General Marshall. I do not recall just what it was.

Mr. Keeffe. But you know that there was an order issued by the President along some time prior to this setting up certain restricted waters?

General Marshall. Well, I lost track of it and you have reminded me of it. I recall it now.
Mr. Keefe. And in my question I intended to locate the rendezvous of these carriers beyond and outside of the area of the so-called restricted waters.


Mr. Keefe. And then I want your opinion as to that.

General Marshall. Yes, sir. Well, that is all right. Let us assume that it was beyond but within reach of our particular over-water reconnaissance range of our planes.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

General Marshall. That presents, of course, a very difficult proposition for the officers in command of those planes. My own reaction would be the sudden unannounced appearance of a Japanese carrier group in that portion of the Pacific would have been an overt act and they would have been justified in bombing and they would have been backed up by the country in that bombing.

Mr. Keefe. I don't think there would have been any question about their being backed by the country, but I was wondering—

General Marshall. That presents a very technical question and it is very difficult for the man in the air at the flash moment to decide. He would have to make the decision right then. I think if he had decided to bomb he would have been doing the right thing.

Mr. Keefe. Well, then, supposing a flight of planes just came over the islands, just flew over, did not drop any bombs or anything, would the mere flight of the planes be considered an overt act justifying—

General Marshall. I think clearly so, sir, because this states,

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

It certainly, in my opinion, would jeopardize his defense to have Japanese planes fly over that island under the circumstances of this time of this alert message. What they were going to do might still, you say—no, it remains to be determined but it is too late after they have done it. Therefore, they would be fully justified; they would be required to take hostile action against those planes.

Mr. Keefe. Well, then the mere flight of planes, whether they were Jap planes or any other planes other than our own, under your interpretation without actually implementing beyond flying over the islands that would be a sufficient overt act, in your opinion, to have justified bombing them out of the air?


Mr. Keefe. In relation to Japan?

General Marshall. Because at that time a German plane appearing in the same place, though this order relates to Japan, would have probably been treated in the same fashion.

Mr. Keefe. That put a pretty heavy responsibility upon the commander, did it not, to determine at just what point you are going to say that an overt act is committed?

General Marshall. He always has that responsibility but in this particular case it would put a very heavy responsibility upon the junior officer.

Mr. Keefe. The fellow that is out there manning a gun?
General Marshall. He has to make the decision on it at the moment. He cannot consult anybody.

Mr. Keefe. He is on a patrol plane or bomber.

General Marshall. Yes. He cannot go to court for his determination. He has got to act.

Mr. Keefe. Well, there was no such situation as that involved in the 1940 alert, was there?


Mr. Keefe. Now, yesterday there was introduced in evidence an order to Admiral Richardson with respect to the disposition of his fleet. You recall that, General Marshall?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I recall that.

Mr. Keefe. And there was some reference to sabotage in Panama?


Mr. Keefe. Now, just so that the record may be clear may I say I have tried to make some independent investigation of that situation since yesterday and I am wondering if I am correct in the assumption that at that particular time the Army had Panama alerted?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; this was a simultaneous alert of both Hawaii and Panama.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Panama was already——

General Marshall. As a matter of fact—this is hearsay—I understand from General Short, but I have not seen that, that he made the statement that he was more fearful then regarding Panama than he was regarding Hawaii at the time of the 1940 alert.

Mr. Keefe. The Army through its Intelligence had some information, did it not, that extensive sabotage was threatened of the Canal in the event we tried to move any part of the fleet through the Canal?


Mr. Keefe. And this order was sent out to have the fleet moved out of Pearl Harbor at that time and give the Japs the idea that they were going to move through the Canal into the Atlantic.


Mr. Keefe. And it was then the thought that if these saboteurs or Jap spies down on Panama got that information they might spring into action and Panama being on an all-out alert, looking for them, they could gather them in and arrest them?

General Marshall. They would expose their hand and their method, their technique.

Mr. Keefe. Now, wasn't that the exact reason for the order as you now understand it?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; that is my understanding and that is my recollection of it.

Mr. Keefe. It was merely done for the purpose of confusing the Japs and trying to get the Jap agents and saboteurs to expose their hand?

General Marshall. If they had any such plan up to meet that plan at a time we were ready for it, so that we could learn what it was and be able to throw the thing off center.

Mr. Keefe. That was in 1940?


Mr. Keefe. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Are you through, Mr. Keefe?
General Marshall, in view of a good many conflicting and distorted stories that have been issued by various individuals and printed in certain segments of the press and that are being used by some radio commentators I want to ask just a few direct and simple questions near the close of this hearing.

Did you as Chief of Staff possess any information prior to December the 7th definitely pointing to an attack upon Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall. Not to my knowledge, sir; none that I so construed.

Senator Lucas. In your opinion did General Miles, your G-2 officer, or General Gerow, or the War Plans Division possess any information prior to December the 7th definitely [3986] pointing to an attack upon Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall. In my recollection they made no reports to me which would indicate that they did possess information that convinced them of the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator Lucas. And it was their duty to so do if they did have such information?


Senator Lucas. Did you have any specific and advance information as to the precise hour or day that Japan would attack this country or the British or the Dutch?

General Marshall. Only in so far as the message of December 7th from the Japanese Government directing the delivery of the fourteen-part statement at a specific hour on a Sunday afternoon to the Secretary of State. The implications in that is the only thing we had.

Senator Lucas. Well, that message, the fourteenth part of that message was an implication that something serious was going to happen at 1 o'clock that day?


Senator Lucas. Somewhere. But even the fourteenth part of that message did not give you or to any other official of this Government any precise point or any precise place where they were going to attack at 1 o'clock.

[3987] General Marshall. I do not think it did, sir. As I testified the other day, I have never read the complete message except on that day. I got about three-fourths of the way through it the other day but I did not get finished, so I am not quite clear on the reaction of the fourteenth part on my mind because immediately thereafter I came to hand with the 1 o'clock message.

Senator Lucas. Now, General Marshall, all the information that you obtained through G-2 and through the War Plans Division upon any and all important matters dealing with this critical situation at that time was discussed, I take it, with the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson?

General Marshall. Did you say any and all information?

Senator Lucas. Well, practically any and all information of importance dealing with this situation I presume you discussed.
General Marshall. I think that that would be correct. I know I followed this practice, that in particular in connection with magic, that where I thought a particular paper had some special importance, specially important significance or information of great importance I would bring that myself to the Secretary’s attention to make certain that he had read it because there was a great deal of magic and there was always the possibility that he would not read the par-

icular paper that I had in mind, so we had that procedure at that time. I think I discussed with him the important information that came up from time to time, I am quite certain that I did, and I know on his side that he did that with me because we were talking together very frequently during practically each day.

Senator Lucas. In other words, any important problem that arose during this crisis was mutually discussed between you and the Secretary of War?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, with this qualification, that I did not usually discuss with him the technique of implementing this or that as carried out in a military way.

Senator Lucas. I understand. Now, what is true with the Secretary of War insofar as these important conversations are concerned I take it is also true with the President of the United States at that time. In other words, he knew—the Secretary of War and the President of the United States knew what you knew so far as any real matters of importance were concerned involving this critical period?

General Marshall. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. General Marshall, I desire to ask just a question or two with respect to the much discussed “winds” message. I have had an opportunity over night to take a look at it for the first time and I want to get your interpreta-

[3989] position of it, if I may. I take it you have seen the Jap winds message?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I have seen it.

Senator Lucas. The Federal Communications Commission around the 20th of November 1941 intercepted a message from Tokyo to their Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that:

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.

East wind rain.

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.

North wind cloudy.

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.

West wind clear.

Now, did you understand that in the event that a winds message of that character had been transmitted from Tokyo to the Ambassador in this country or any other place, that such a message meant war under the interpretation of that language?

General Marshall. Not necessarily. It refers to rela-

[3990] tions.

Senator Lucas. It refers definitely to the cutting off of diplomatic relations?
General Marshall. We terminated diplomatic relations, as I recall, in the last war with Germany an appreciable period of time before a declaration of war followed.

Senator Lucas. And in this case diplomatic relations were not broken off until practically at noon December 7, just a short while before the bombs struck, isn't that true?

General Marshall. I am not aware of just how they were terminated unless it was the presentation——

Senator Lucas. I guess they were not terminated until afterward probably. In other words, the envoys that were sent here by Japan were discussing peace terms with the Secretary of State at the very time, as I understand it, that the bombs fell.

General Marshall. They were having a diplomatic discussion, sir.

Senator Lucas. Yes. General Marshall, did you ever obtain or see any message following this one that was sent on November the 20th implementing this Winds code message which had been received by the Navy?


Senator Lucas. In other words, if there was a message of that character did come through and was picked up by the Navy, decoded and translated by them, it was never brought to your attention prior to the attack on December the 7th 1941?

General Marshall. Not to my knowledge then or later.

Senator Lucas. General Marshall, who was in command of the forces in the Philippines at the time of this attack?


Senator Lucas. General Marshall, now referring again to exhibit 32 on page 9, which is a copy of the message that was sent by you on November 27 to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, and then on November 28, 1941, you received this reply from General MacArthur, which says:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four Air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy Stop Ground security measures have been taken Stop Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense Stop Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

General Marshall, do you know what time the Japs struck the Philippine Islands?

General Marshall. I do not recall right now, sir. I know that shortly after the announcement of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was a communication by General MacArthur by telephone—and I think this can be testified to by General Gerow—that in that discussion he made some reference to Japanese planes having made reconnaissance. However, General Gerow can give you that.

Senator Lucas. Then, at a later time—and I believe in the Philippines, it was afternoon—a very heavy air attack was made on Clark Field.

Senator Lucas. In other words, immediately following the attack at Pearl Harbor, you had a conversation with General MacArthur over the telephone?

General Marshall. I did not, sir; General Gerow did.

Senator Lucas. General Gerow, and he reported at that time that planes were over the island.
General Marshall. I do not remember precisely what he said, but my recollection is that he reported Japanese planes coming in and being fended off—but General Gerow can testify to that directly.

Senator Lucas. Thank you, sir.

Do you know how many planes he had in the Philippines at that time?

General Marshall. I recall specifically how many four-engine flying fortresses we had, which is 35. I will have to get you the figures on the interceptors, or fighter planes. I have forgotten just what it was. I think it was something toward 100.

Senator Lucas. And how many air fields did we have there at that time?

General Marshall. I cannot tell you how many at the time. The main field, of course, was Clark Field. I do not know how many subsidiary fields in that particular section had been developed.

The next field to the south was Nichols Field on the outskirts of Manila. There were certain fields in the islands, and particularly on the plateau of Mindanao. That data can be obtained.

The actual situation was we were just coming out of the wet season and the difficulties of building air strips capable of supporting a four-engine bomber were very great during the rainy season. We were just coming out of the rainy season at the time this event occurred. However, the data on that is easily obtainable.

Senator Lucas. We will get all of that through General Gerow, I take it.

General Marshall. Yes, sir, and he can obtain it from the War Department.

Senator Lucas. General Marshall, do you know how many bombers were on Clark Field at the time the Japs struck there the following afternoon?


Senator Lucas. Can General Gerow give us that information also?

General Marshall. He can obtain it, I am quite certain.1

Senator Lucas. Where was Admiral Hart’s fleet at the time of the attack, if you know that? I will just withdraw that. It is not important. I will get it from somebody else.

General Marshall. I assume a portion of it at least was in Manila Bay, probably in the vicinity of Cavite. I know it had been our endeavor to obtain the antiaircraft guns for the defense of the Cavite anchorages, particularly the accumulation there of long-range submarines which had reinforced Admiral Hart’s fleet shortly before this attack.

Senator Lucas. General Marshall, has there ever any report been made to the War Department as to why these bombers that had been destroyed on Clark Field on the following afternoon were still on the ground?

General Marshall. I do not think there has been, sir.

Senator Lucas. I think that is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. I want to put this question first to counsel. Do we have available page 85 of the Army hearings, the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings?

1 See information supplied by the War Department in Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2073-2074.
Mr. Gesell. The transcript?
Mr. Murphy. Page 85.
Mr. Gesell. Do you mean the top secret part?
[3996] Mr. Murphy. I mean the testimony of Colonel Bratton, the regular Army report.
(The document was handed to Mr. Murphy.)
Mr. Murphy. General Marshall, there is just one thing I want to clear up in the top secret report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. There is a statement on page 13 of exhibit 63, reading as follows:
Colonel Bratton immediately called General Marshall's quarters at 9 a.m. Do you have any knowledge of any call having been placed at 9 a.m., to your quarters?
General Marshall. My only knowledge in the matter is, I think I was taking a shower, or going into a shower at the time I received notification that Colonel Bratton had telephoned, that he wished to come out to Fort Myer and see me, and I told them to reply not to come out, that I was going to the War Department immediately.
[3997] Mr. Murphy. Do you know, or did you learn from anyone as to whether or not prior to the time that you got the message about Colonel Bratton liking to come out, or wanting to come out, if he had tried to contact you at your home or your quarters before that, that morning?
General Marshall. I have no knowledge of that, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Do you have any knowledge as to whether or not Colonel Bratton requested that one of your orderlies be sent out to find you while you were horseback riding?
General Marshall. I have not heard of that, sir.
Mr. Murphy. General Marshall, I would like to ask this one last question. During the month of August or September of 1941 there was before the Congress of the United States the question of continuance of the Selective Service Act and it passed the Congress by but 1 vote—or it passed the House by but 1 vote. I would like to ask what, in your opinion, would have been the effect on the United States Armed Services if that one vote had been otherwise and that Act was not continued?
General Marshall. Existing law at that time was such that the National Guard would have had to have been recalled from its various stations so that it could have been released from active service within 1 year of the time it had been inducted. That varied for the various units. Also the [3998] individuals who had been inducted under Selective Service, who were in various National Guard and Regular Army units, would have had to have been released from those units, from the service at the end of 1 year.
The National Guard, of course, and Selective Service men composed the larger portion of the military forces.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I want to reserve until a later time in the hearing going into this question of what happened on the alert.
The Chairman. Is that all now?
Mr. Murphy. That is all.
The Chairman. Are there any other questions?
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. In view of the statement of General Marshall about the continuance of the Selective Service Act, I am glad that I cast that 1 vote in favor of continuance of the program.

In conclusion, General, I would like to propound to you a suppositional situation and ask your opinion upon it.

Preliminarily, though, to illustrate the importance of the question, I might ask you is it not true that when Washington authorities have in their possession very important information, they should transmit that information to the [3999] commanders in the field that that might affect, if that information can be transmitted without affecting adversely the security of the country?

General Marshall. Not necessarily so, sir, unless we undertake to set up in the headquarters of each commander in the field a complete service to evaluate the composition of all these various items of information, diplomatic, military, FBI, we will say, and so on.

Mr. Gearhart. But if you had in your possession specific information which was important for a commander of an outlying force to know, is it not the duty of the Washington authorities, or any others in the Army and Navy, to transmit that information to the commander of an outlying post, information which is important to him, if you can transmit it without affecting adversely the security of the country?

General Marshall. That information, as you say, which is important for him to know, the answer is "Yes, sir."

[4000] Mr. Gearhart. And if that kind of information, important to the commander of an outlying post or station cannot be transmitted without endangering the national security, in that event what responsibility devolved on the shoulders of the one having that important information?

General Marshall. That he should be given such information as is possible under the circumstances.

Mr. Gearhart. And if it is not possible to transmit any information a directive should be sent; is that not correct?

General Marshall. I think that is approximately correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, my suppositional situation is this: If you had informed General Short and Admiral Kimmel immediately after the 9th day of October 1941, the day which the intercept was translated, that Tokyo, in an intercept, had divided Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian waters into five areas and had requested reports in respect to those areas and in accordance with that allocation of the territory and waters of Hawaii into areas, in respect to where ships were docked, where they were anchored, and in respect to other dispositions of our fighting forces, with especial reference with regard to warships and airplane [4001] carriers; if you had advised General Short and Admiral Kimmel on the 10th day of October 1941, which was the date of the translation of an intercept that Honolulu had reported to Tokyo:

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard—

That certain codes be used in reporting upon repair docks in Navy Yard, the Navy dock in the Navy Yard, moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island, alongside in Ford Island, and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively, and so on; if you had reported
promptly on December 3, 1941, to General Short and Admiral Kimmel that the Japanese, in a message from Tokyo to Honolulu had directed:

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you are already no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy; assuming further that you have reported on the 6th day of December, 1941, which was the date of translation of an intercept from Honolulu to Tokyo, the following message had been received from Washington:

The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219 on that day.

Area A—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

 Área C—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor; an intercept which also contained this information:

On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". Four merchant vessels were at anchor in area D.

At ten a.m., on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the harbor. Their course was as follows: in a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart, at a speed of 3 knots per hour; they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the harbor through area B to the buoys in area C to which they were moored, they changed course five times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered area A after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side.

And if you had transmitted the information to General Short and Admiral Kimmel that an intercepted message came from Tokyo which was translated on the 5th day of December, 1941, to Honolulu, as follows:

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay—and in longhand "Honolulu,"—and the areas adjacent thereto.

Suppose you had reported to General Short and Admiral Kimmel that you had intercepted a message from Tokyo on the fourth day of December, translated on that day which was marked "strictly secret," and read as follows:

Please investigate comprehensively the Fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian Military Reservation.

Suppose you had reported to Admiral Kimmel and to General Short that you had intercepted and translated on December 5, 1941, a message from Tokyo which read as follows:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

Now, assuming that promptly upon receipt and translation of those intercepted messages which I have adverted to, that you had promptly advised the commanders in the Hawaiian area, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, of their substance and effect, do you think that the Fleet would have been lined up in the harbor like sitting ducks, with their fighting capacity greatly reduced by various types of inspection, or do you believe they would have been out to sea in fighting trim and order?

General MARSHALL. It may be that if all of the messages you recited, or a portion of them even, had been communicated to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, that their—or at least General Short’s reaction to a command to alert his command might possibly have been different.

All of those messages, and many more of somewhat similar character were coming in regarding American war vessels all over the world. It
certainly must have been evident to both Admiral Kimmel and to General Short that the Japanese, who could see every portion of Pearl Harbor and had the free use of the cable and the telephone, which we were forbidden to tap, and they could have reported every move that was going on, it would have been assumed, I think, by both of them under those circumstances, it would be a normal procedure, something which we would have given a great deal to be able to do regarding the Japanese ships, something which we could not manage at all.

When you consider the messages came from all portions of the world, relating to naval shipping, it is a question of how much involves a check on where our ships are, and how much involves a plan for a specific operation at a certain place. That is a matter of opinion.

Mr. Gearhart. But you, as Chief of Staff, and Admiral Kimmel, as Chief of Naval Operations—


[4005] Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations, had this information on your desks, did you not?

General Marshall. That is the presumption that I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And don't you think that Admiral Kimmel and General Short would have been better informed in respect to the responsibility that was theirs, if you had transmitted promptly the information which you had, and which Admiral Stark had at the time you received it?

General Marshall. I am not at all certain as to that, sir. It depends on the mass of information we gave them. They were given general summaries, and they were given—I say "they"—I mean General Short was given a definite direction.

Mr. Gearhart. He was given a definite direction which was in the nature of a circular letter that was sent to all of our outlying posts, and stations; is that correct?

General Marshall. He was given an alert order.

Mr. Gearhart. Exactly the same kind of an alert order that was sent to all of the others, with one exception, that they were cautioned not to do anything which would alarm the people or reveal the intent?

General Marshall. I think the same proviso was in the [4006] alert message to the west coast commander, which included Alaska.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. And in all of the messages that were sent from G-2 to Hawaii never was there any special warning of any special interest which the Japanese were displaying in the Hawaiian Islands, was there?

General Marshall. I do not recall the details of all the messages. I do not remember such a message.

Mr. Gearhart. But you have been reminded, since you have been in this room, by the questions that have been propounded that there were seven or eight specific intercepts which were placed on your desk in accordance with your order by G-2, and by the Planning Division, which pointed directly to Hawaii, and revealed an inordinate interest by the Japanese in the situation which existed in the Hawaiian Islands?

General Marshall. That is your view, sir; I take it.

Mr. Gearhart. Well now, do you think that is my view?

General Marshall. I say that is your view, sir; I take it.

Mr. Gearhart. I ask you, is that your view?
General Marshall. I stated my view, sir, that this information was being collected by the Japanese all over the world, regarding all shipping; that we were aware, and certainly it was the assumption that every move made by our shipping in Hawaii was under observation by the Japanese, and they had a perfectly free method of communicating that to their own war office, or naval headquarters in Japan. That was the most ordinary assumption of the condition and that was the great embarrassment under which we were working everywhere, in the Philippines, in Hawaii, and in Panama at that time.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, directing your attention to the message you sent on December 7, but which did not arrive there until it was too late, in that message you told Admiral Kimmel and General Short that the Japanese were going to deliver a message at 1 o'clock which amounted to an ultimatum. That was the information that you gave them or sought to give them in that belated message, is that true?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I have the message here, if you wish me to read it. "What amounts to an ultimatum."

[4007] Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now that was information that you were conveying in that message, was it not?


Mr. Gearhart. And you also went one step further and conveyed, or sought to convey still more information, and that was in reference to the significance of the 1 o'clock reference in the intercepted Japanese message?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You indicated that that had caused some comment and some speculation among the high authorities in military and naval circles in Washington, and you relayed the situation on and directed them to fasten their attention to what the significance of the 1 o'clock message might mean, did you not?


Mr. Gearhart. Why did you send that message?

General Marshall. Because this, to my mind, was a very significant message of theirs, relating to a specific hour for some specific act somewhere. Apropos of that, we sent another message in early July of somewhat the same nature that related to the Panama Canal, in which we gave specific information from magic regarding shipping in the Panama Canal. It was felt that that was necessary to do at that particular time, to put that into a direct message of this character.

[4009] Here the thing came again when it seemed clear to me, and to the others concerned, that this had some very special, definite significance, relating to that hour, and I therefore endeavored to send it, and I did as quickly as I became aware of it.

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you think the specific inquiry from Tokyo in reference to ship movements in Honolulu and in Pearl Harbor was not sufficiently important to convey to the commanders in Hawaii?

General Marshall. I can only answer that, Mr. Gearhart, by repeating again what I am saying, that this information was coming in regarding many points in the world. It is very significant in the light of the knowledge of what the Japs actually did, it is very significant as to that, but at the time there were a great many messages about a great many places, and there were a great many people involved in
evaluating those messages. Certainly none of them, certainly no one of them, was endeavoring to avoid an evident indication of just where the Japanese were going to strike, if they were going to strike. That did not so register; that did not so register.

Mr. Gearhart. General, you do not justify yourself for not sending specific information to Admiral Kimmel and General Short to which they were entitled simply because you [4009A] failed to send to other commanders and other generals in other areas information to which they were entitled?

General Marshall. Will you repeat that, please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

General Marshall. No, sir. I am speaking about the evaluation of that, as to what it meant, what its significance was at the time the messages came in.

[4010] Mr. Gearhart. If there had been a specific inquiry from Tokyo intercepted by us in respect to ship dispositions in Panama, would it not have been your duty, as the possessor of that information to advise the commanders of Panama that the Japanese were showing an inordinate interest in the situation there, and tell them what that interest reflected?

General Marshall. If it did not seem to be a portion of their routine inquiries regarding our shipping and our fleet, wherever the shipping was, or wherever the fleet was.

Mr. Gearhart. In the light of the fact that Hawaii had been bombed, with a terrific result, don't you think now, that you should have sent the information in these seven intercepts in respect to Japan's inquiry into the shipping arrangements at Hawaii?

General Marshall. That is asking a very definite hindsight. I do not necessarily think so. I am still in the position of feeling that when you give a command to a high officer you expect to have it executed.

Mr. Gearhart. But don't you think that you were withholding vital information from Admiral Kimmel and General Short when you did not advise them of these particular seven messages?

[4011] General Marshall. It did not appear vital at that time. It appeared to be a portion of a general resume by the Japanese doing what we eventually thought they would do all over the world.

Mr. Gearhart. Will you tell us now, General, why, at that time that information did not impress you as vital?

General Marshall. I could not answer that, sir. As a matter of fact, I testified that I did not have a definite recollection of these particular messages. I must assume that I saw them. They did not register on my mind according to your reaction as stated here by you.

Just what their reaction was I do not know. There was no evaluation of them brought to me by G-2 of the character that you have indicated.

Mr. Gearhart. But you had already directed G-2 to bring you the original material by direct order, had you not?

General Marshall. That was during the summer, from that time on, but that did not in any way cancel the question of the evaluation of the information they obtained, because I never saw all the magic.

Mr. Gearhart. After you had directed, in August, G-2 and War Plans to bring you the original material, that imposed on you by
voluntary assumption of the responsibility, the duty to read, to understand, to evaluate, and to act upon the messages that were laid before you; is that not true?

General Marshall. No, sir. That direction did not terminate at all the evaluation of information for me by G–2, which is the function, one of the main functions of that section of the General Staff. That direction gave me the opportunity to see for myself, so far as I found the opportunity to see what the actual messages were, as a check against what G–2 was doing, and as additional information for me. It was just exactly the same thing as from time to time I inspected the various installations of the Army. They had orders to do certain things and I went there to see, myself, from time to time, when opportunity presented itself.

In this case, these messages were coming in, and I thought it was better that I saw the entire message, in the case of the important ones, and not merely trust the evaluation.

Mr. Gearhart. That is quite correct. That gave you the benefit of other men’s views in respect to what the messages indicated, but it did not relieve you of the final responsibility.


Mr. Gearhart. The responsibility of reading, of understanding, or evaluating and acting upon those messages.

General Marshall. I would not say that is correct, Mr. Gearhart. If I am supposed to have the final responsibility of the reading of all magic, I would have ceased to be Chief of Staff in practically every other respect, so that was an absolutely impractical proposition. It was very difficult for me to read magic sufficiently, even at it was. There was a great deal to it. It occupied the entire time of a certain group of officers. I could not give all of my time to one activity.

As I say, if I had complete responsibility for reading all the magic I would have had to cease to function as Chief of Staff, except in that one particular division.

Mr. Gearhart. Let me point out, General, I am not expressing any criticism at all. I am asking you for your opinions.

General Marshall. Well, I am giving them, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, is not magic one of the objects of special interest in the office of the Chief of Staff?

General Marshall. It was a subject of very special interest.

Mr. Gearhart. And wasn’t it to you?

General Marshall. It was to me, and that was the reason that I directed that they bring me the originals of these messages that they were evaluating where they felt they were particularly important.

Mr. Gearhart. Then your answer is as you gave it first, that if these seven messages had been transmitted to General Short and Admiral Kimmel at the time they were received, things might have been different at Hawaii?

General Marshall. Things might have been different. The same instructions, however, were sent literally to the Philippines, and they were sent also to Panama, and the alerts were executed, and the additional information was not sent.

Mr. Gearhart. And if the alert messages that related to Panama, and related to Manila had been transmitted, and an attack had occurred there first, things might have been different in those areas?
General Marshall. What was the first part of the question?

Mr. Gearhart. I am just enlarging the question that I asked you. I am asking you about the other areas.

General Marshall. What I was stating was that the alert messages were given to Panama and were given to the Philippines.

Take Panama, for example. These various communications were not sent there, and the command was alerted.

Mr. Gearhart. Assuming that the first attack came at Panama, and you had a lot of intercepts showing a special interest of the Japanese in Panama, don't you think the commanders in Panama would be in a better position to defend their posts and appreciate the danger they were in, if those intercepts had been transmitted to them for their inspection, for their consideration, and for their evaluation?

General Marshall. I assume the lieutenant general in Panama was aware of the Japanese interest in that canal.

Mr. Gearhart. But if you had information, did you have the right to withhold that information from them, assuming that they would know what the substance of that information was?

General Marshall. It depends entirely on the circumstances, the information, the evaluation, and the procedure generally.

Mr. Gearhart. Then your answer is you do not think there was any obligation to keep your outlying commanders in the field informed in respect to all of the information you had that was of benefit to them?

General Marshall. Well, if you qualify that at the end of your question by saying "of benefit to them," of course that is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. Would you say it would not have been of benefit to Admiral Kimmel, and it would not have been of benefit to General Short to know that the Japanese had charted the area, divided it into areas, and were asking for ship reports, and for every movement that occurred, even for reports where no movement occurred, would you say that was of interest to your outlying commanders?

General Marshall. Yes, sir, I would say it was of interest to them, but the assumption must have been, except for subdivisions of the harbor, that the report of the movement of that fleet was made direct to Japan by ordinary cable, or by radio.

Mr. Gearhart. And yet the fact still remains that that information was not transmitted; that is correct, isn't it?

General Marshall. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That is all.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman,

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Senator Ferguson. Is it my turn?

The Vice Chairman. Have you finished, Senator Lucas?


The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson will again inquire.

Senator Ferguson. General, you have had experience as Chief of Staff with investigating boards in the Army?


Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any conversation you had with anyone about this board—I am talking about the Grunert Board—shortly after it was appointed, about its make-up?
General Marshall. No, sir, I do not recall. I recall very distinctly General McNarney, who was then Deputy Chief of Staff, who was handling the matter, I believe, for the Secretary of War, speaking to me about the time limit that had to be imposed upon the Board in order that its report would be available to the Secretary of War with sufficient time for him to survey it and still make his report required, I believe, by Congress, on a certain date. I have a distinct recollection of that.

[4018] Senator Ferguson. Do you have a recollection that the Secretary of War had to make a report to Congress?

General Marshall. That was my impression. There was some limiting date. Whether it was December 7 or not I don’t know. But I know General McNarney consulted with me as to how much time there would be, and he was speaking of the length of time required to go out to Hawaii, the number of witnesses. That is a definite recollection. Something of that sort.

Senator Ferguson. Counsel, do you have the order that created the Board?

Mr. Murphy. It is in the Clausen report. Mr. Greaves has it.

Senator Ferguson. Can the Congressman tell me about where it is in the Clausen report?

Mr. Murphy. Yes. It is right in the beginning, about the third or fourth page. Right in the front part. You will find it in the index.

Senator Ferguson. I want to read that to you, General.

That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punishment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the extension provided for in Public Law 208, 78th Congress.

Now, section 2. That is the statute limitations part. I will read section 2.

Section 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify.

Approved June 13, 1944.

Now, the statute of limitations would expire, the 6-month period, on the 7th of December 1944.

Do you know when the Board completed its findings?

General Marshall. No, sir; I do not. That is a matter of record, though.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when they filed their top secret and other report?

[4020] General Marshall. No, sir; I do not know offhand. I believe I testified, I am sure I did, the other day that General Handy, the day he became Deputy Chief of Staff, received a copy of that on its first delivery, I believe, to the War Department, and came to me in regard to it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you recall then only one conversation with General McNarney about the time limit?
General Marshall. The Board, I presume, must have received a directive from the War Department by direction of the Secretary of War as to its procedure and as to the time in which it would file its report and that is what I have a definite recollection of General McNarney consulting me in regard to.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any other conversation with anyone in relation to the Board, the make-up of the Board?

General Marshall. I don't recall, sir. I have a vague recollection, Senator, now that you have asked me that question, I have a vague recollection of saying something about having them all officers on the active list, but I am not quite certain of that.

Senator Ferguson. After they were named did you confer with anyone in relation to the make-up of the Board?


Senator Ferguson. Where you consulted as to the members on that Board?

General Marshall. I don't recall that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, is it customary or do you know of any other case where a Board had been appointed and failed to consider all matters pertinent to the investigation, that the matter was taken away from them and given, for instance, to a major like Major Clausen, in this case, to make an investigation, had that ever happened in the War Department before?

General Marshall. I don't recall a similar situation to that before. I do recall, however, in connection with this, and this is purely hearsay, hearing the Secretary of War comment, I think at the time of the release of the Pearl Harbor report to the press, whenever that was, I have a recollection, I think, of the Secretary of War stating, either to me directly or to people in his office, of whom I was one, that he was, that he felt that the message of effecting the release was not correct, in that the Congress had imposed upon him an obligation to do a certain thing and it was his report and the Board was his, one of his methods of obtaining the information.

Now I am indulging in pure hearsay.

Senator Ferguson. General, here is a board that is appointed in 1944, the statute is passed in 1944, the 6-months statute of limitations is up in December of 1944, and then extended at that time, again extended in 1945, but the report is not made public until August the 28th or 29th, 1945, this year.

General Marshall. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. So, there was nothing done, no report made to Congress, or no report to the public within any 6 months period, but made after the close of the war.

You understood that?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I understood that.

Senator Ferguson. Now, we have this case where the board hasn't filed its report so far as the public is concerned, and a major is sent out to complete the work of the board.

What I want to get from you, as Chief of Staff, did you ever know of a similar position, similar case, let's say?

General Marshall. I don't recall such a case, and I think I testified a little earlier in this hearing that I did not know of Major Clausen, I never saw him until, I think the day before the public
release of the report. I believe the affidavit he came to get from me was not, had not been submitted to the Secretary of War at the time the [4023] report of the board was released to the public.

That was my first knowledge of Major Clausen as an individual, sir. Senator Ferguson. General, is it the custom in the War Department to follow the old idea of a jury of your peers, to have officers of equal rank investigate officers?

General Marshall. We generally make an effort, if it is practicable of arrangement, to have a senior officer do it, but in the Inspector General's Department that very often is not practical.

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it the old idea of having a jury of their peers, that you have superior officers, or at least of equal rank on the board that is doing the investigation?

General Marshall. I do not say specifically just what the basic reason is. My own reaction is that that is very embarrassing for a junior officer to be inspecting a senior officer because he doesn't know what day he will be under the senior officer.

Senator Ferguson. We have the case of a major completing an investigation against all senior officers; I mean many men who were senior. There isn't any question that your department was being investigated, is there?

General Marshall. No, sir. [4024] Senator Ferguson. And you were a senior officer?


Senator Ferguson. General officer. There isn't any doubt that General Short was a senior officer to a major or a lieutenant colonel?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know of a case where you ever completed an investigation by an officer of this many grades lower in rank, where there had been a board set up of equal or senior officers to make an investigation?

General Marshall. I do not recall a similar case.

Senator Ferguson. General, you mentioned the other day in relation to some material being furnished to Borneo, Port Moresby, and some others. Did we build airports there prior to December 7?

General Marshall. We endeavored to have the existing strips sufficiently improved to make them, make it possible to land and take off with a B-17.

Senator Ferguson. Was that upon your order, or where did that order come from?

General Marshall. That was upon my order to General MacArthur.

Senator Ferguson. Had you conferred with anyone in relation to that prior thereto?

[4025] General Marshall. I certainly must have because while that was my desire, to have it done, I would have felt, I am quite certain that I should get the o. k. of the higher government officials because I was involving contacts with other governments.

Senator Ferguson. And who would those higher government officials be?

General Marshall. Oh, it would be the Secretary of State—first the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and the President.
Whether one or all, I don't know. I should imagine the most normal thing would have been the Secretary of State.

Senator Ferguson. And prior to sending any material, that is, I am talking about bombs and ammunition——


Senator Ferguson. You would confer with the Secretary of State or the President, or Secretary of War?

General Marshall. My assumption would certainly be that I would not have given those instructions to General MacArthur unless I had gotten a clearance at least from the Secretary of War, but more probably from the Secretary of State, and I may have gotten a direction from the President, I don't recall.

Senator Ferguson. General, do you recall of any report [4026] submitted to the War Department which came to your attention in December of 1940, and revised in April of 1941?

To refresh your memory, I hand you some papers. You needn't read them aloud. I just want you to go through them enough to be able to say whether or not you ever saw such a report.

It involves the oil in the Netherlands Islands.

[4027] Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Is that an exhibit?

Senator Ferguson. No.

Senator Lucas. What report is it in?

Senator Ferguson. I am asking the General about it. Do you want to see it, Senator, first?

Senator Lucas. No. I was just interested in knowing whether it was an exhibit. Who makes the report?

Senator Ferguson. The report is not signed.

General Marshall. Also has no heading on the paper where it came from.

Senator Lucas. It seems to me a little unusual to refresh someone's recollection upon an anonymous report.

Senator Ferguson. If the Senator will look at it, it purports to be a copy of a report filed with restricted offices, and the Army is one of the offices.

General Marshall. What was the question, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. After looking that over, had that ever been called to your attention?

General Marshall. I don't recall specifically that it had. I know that we were very much interested in what the Japanese, what the resources were for Japan in that region, and to what degree they would be destroyed.

[4028] Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that one of the things, at least, that we considered Japan wanted to go into the Netherlands Islands for, was to get oil for war purposes, there had been questions up before you and the various officials about oil, whether an embargo on oil would defeat them?


Senator Ferguson. Now, was there anything brought to your attention that there was one way to keep them from moving into these islands to get oil and that was to prepare so that those oil wells should be destroyed either prior to them going down or at the time they were
coming, full preparation being made, and they being advised on that point, did you ever hear of that before?

General Marshall. Will you please read the first part of the question?

(First part of the question read.)

General Marshall. That is sufficient.

It was brought to my attention a number of times the factor of oil as it affected the Japanese in their capacity to make war, as it might affect the Japanese by our strictures on the supply of oil for the United States, and as it would affect the Japanese in making war if they had available Borneo and other Indonesian fields, and as it would affect them if we were able to destroy those fields so that the oil would not be usable for a considerable period of time. All those facts were discussed, were brought to my attention, and I think I asked a number of questions regarding them.

Senator Ferguson. General Bundy was in your department?

General Marshall. Mr. Bundy was a special assistant to the Secretary of War.

Senator Ferguson. A special assistant?

General Marshall. He was a civilian and a lawyer from Boston.

Senator Ferguson. General, were you familiar with the capacity to manufacture refinery equipment machinery by the Japs?


Senator Ferguson. Was that taken up with you?

General Marshall. I think I saw some statements of that nature because the whole oil thing was examined fore and aft, the whole oil question was examined fore and aft.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know a Lt. Col. John H. Levell?


Senator Ferguson. Was Mr. Bundy a civilian or was he an officer?

General Marshall. He was a civilian, as I say, a lawyer from Boston, who had been, I believe, at one time assistant Secretary of State, when Mr. Stimson was Secretary of State, and he came into the War Department, I believe, at the same time Mr. Stimson did, and remained in the War Department until Mr. Stimson resigned as Secretary of War, and then he, Mr. Bundy, left shortly thereafter.

Senator Ferguson. As of April 29, 1941, would this refresh your memory as to whether or not you have even seen this before:

It is interesting to note that of the $560,000 worth of drilling equipment which were shipped to Japan all but $16,000 of this was exported after my report was sent to the Department.

General Marshall. I don't recall that.

Senator Ferguson. Had that ever been called to your attention?

General Marshall. Not to my specific knowledge. Could you tell me where that paper came from? I mean this, where Mr. Stimson received some report, and that evidently is one to him, he usually initialled it over to me to look at. There is no such initialling there, is there?

Senator Ferguson. Pardon?

General Marshall. He usually initialled the report over to me to look at. I didn't see any initials of that character on that report. Did this come to his office?
[4031] Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel—I thought if you could identify it it could be used—I will give it to counsel and I will ask counsel if he will look up and see whether or not we can locate in any official files this report and as to whether or not he can ascertain to what departments it was delivered.

Mr. Gesell. You mean official files of all Departments of the Government, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. I mean first the War Department.

Mr. Gesell. What other Departments of the Government do you want us to search?

Senator Ferguson. Let me see the paper.

The War Department, Navy Department, State Department, Lend-Lease.¹

They are on the top of the memorandum.

General, you have read, have you, the top secret report of the Army?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I read that night before last.

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to make any comments on it whatever?

General Marshall. No, sir; I have no comments to make.

Senator Ferguson. Was there any contention in the War Department that we were trying to solve our problems by committees and not allowing men who had the responsibility [4032] for decisions to make their decisions, that committees made decisions rather than individuals? I am talking about prior to December 7.

General Marshall. I don't recall any such controversy, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You have no recollection then of any controversy or ideas in the Department that that was interfering with the decisions by particular men because it was necessary to go to committees and not formal committees but merely a group of individuals to decide cases?

General Marshall. I don't recall anything specific on that, sir. There was always this, of course, in the War Department, any act you took affected other interests and it was necessary to get clearances, and the individual who was trying to put his particular purpose through the machine was always impatient of the length of time it took to obtain the clearances from the other sections, we will say, of the General Staff, or maybe, though this would not come to my attention, the other groups of subdivisions within a particular activity. That has always been the case. That still remains the case.

Senator Ferguson. General, isn't it true that in effect these alerts were drawn by committee action, isn't that true?

General Marshall. The alerts, where they were both Army [4033] and Navy, involved both Army and Navy, were drawn by a committee that might only consist of two men, or it might consist of more, but it would be the Army planning responsible agent or the one designated to represent him and the naval opposite.

I had such a paper this morning where the two had to get together. That comes all the time.

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it true in relation to the alert to General Short that the President had said that one provision had to be in it, in relation to the first overt act?


Senator Ferguson. The Secretary of War had called the Secretary of State and the first provision, about diplomatic relations being broken

¹See Mr. Masten's statement in Hearings, Part 10, p. 5133.
off or not, had to be changed. So that in effect it was not the idea of one man who was responsible for the alert, which would be you, isn't that true?

General Marshall. That is true, sir, but there are very few documents that go through the War Department that are—

Senator Lucas. A little louder, General.

General Marshall. That is true, but there are very few documents of importance that come out of the War Department that are wholly and completely the act of one man. It is his responsibility but as a rule a number of different [4034] interests are involved and they are represented and he makes the decision. That is what happens.

I might illustrate in this day. I am asked a question or I have a desire, in either case I see that that goes to the several agencies of the War Department concerned and they give me their views. Then I decide what I am going to do, having heard the various implications that are involved.

In this particular case that alert message—and General Gerow can testify to this—on the Army side was probably first drafted in the section headed by Colonel Bundy, it was then brought, I presume, to General Gerow, and he went over it. He may or may not—he can testify to that—have taken it up with his naval opposite to see if they had any comments in regard to it, to make certain they didn't get off on the wrong foot with regard to the other, and then the Secretary of War, because of conversations with the President, sent for General Gerow, who I think brought him in a draft.

I don't think there is anything abnormal in that procedure, sir.

[4035] Senator Ferguson. General, up to that date had there been the custom in an alert?

General Marshall. There are very few alerts here. The only other alert was the one of the previous year and I do not know what the procedure there was but in all probability the proposal for the alert was either discussed with me first by General Strong of the War Plans Division, or he may have brought me the actual proposal in writing, in which case I would have gone over that to see if it was acceptable in the form in which he had it.

Now, in relation to the actual message that we endeavored to get to General Short regarding the 1 p.m. delivery of the 14-part message, there I wrote the message myself before anyone knew of just what I might say. Then I read it aloud and got their reactions.

Senator Ferguson. But in this 14-part message, let us say the one that went out at noon on Sunday the 7th of December, you did not confer with the State Department about that alert message?

General Marshall. No, sir; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. You did not confer with the President about it?


Senator Ferguson. The only one that you conferred with were the officers of the Army plus Admiral Stark of the Navy Department?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, that was an alert and it did not include the President's directive about the first overt act, did it?

General Marshall. You say that was an alert?

Senator Ferguson. Was it an alert? I will put it that way.
General Marshall. It was not a command message except that he was to be—

Senator Ferguson. This is on page 21, General, of exhibit 32.

General Marshall. (reading):

But be on alert accordingly.

That is with relation to 1 p.m.

Now, there, of course, there was no opportunity for ordinary procedure. I recall very distinctly that my writing is not very impressive looking and I did this on rough scratch pad and when I read it aloud General Gerow said, "I will have it typed," and I told him no, there wouldn't be time, it would go in this form to the message center. So there was an informality and an immediacy in procedure that was undoubtedly not the case at all in the alert of the previous summer. Those were the only two alerts in which, I recall, I participated in the War Department while I was Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson. But on the 27th it was necessary to confer with the Secretary of State as to whether or not there was a breaking off of relations, but you personally found on the 7th at noon that an ultimatum was delivered.

Now, how do you account for in the one case you had to confer with the Secretary of State; in the other case you personally determined that what amounts to an ultimatum?

General Marshall. Time was the deciding factor here, very much so. This was my interpretation of the moment. There was no opportunity to discuss this with anybody else and it was quite evident if it was to be of any profit it had to be dispatched immediately. Therefore, I took the responsibility of stating that and of sending that message immediately. I checked with Admiral Stark in regard to it and my decision had already been made that I was going to send it.

Senator Ferguson. General, in the letter of the 27th, exhibit 17, I just want to ask you a few questions about that, the second paragraph from the top. [Reading:]

"After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands."

Now, that is a definite statement, is it not, to the President—


Senator Ferguson (continuing). That we had agreed that that action would be taken?

General Marshall. Your use of the word "we" I do not think is correct, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, the United States?


Senator Ferguson. Who does it mean, "we"?

General Marshall. It says: "After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed."

Senator Ferguson. United States military authorities?

Senator Ferguson. Had agreed?
General Marshall. They had no authority to commit the government.

Senator Ferguson. Now, in the next to the last paragraph (reading):

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand.

Well, going back to the other paragraph. Now, the military authorities having agreed in that particular paragraph that I read, the information that you obtained from Winant at 10:40, it came in to the Secretary of State, on the 7th of December 1941, indicated that there was going to be an invasion similar to the lines stated there because they would go into the Kra Peninsula, would they not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. They would go into the Gulf of Siam.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So that at that time we knew under this agreement that at least the military authorities, that the Japanese were violating that?

General Marshall. I do not believe I quite understand the question. I will endeavor to explain my view of this particular matter.

General MacArthur sent an officer at our direction to Singapore. We already had a liaison officer at Singapore. They were directed to confer with the British and the Dutch in regard to the situation in the Far East and what might be a workable basis for the three different countries in the event that the Japanese broke the peace in the Pacific.

They made their report. They agreed, those individuals, on that report. It was submitted. Now, I stated, I am certain, in the hearing the other day that I could not recall just what my own individual action in regard to that report was. After that I checked it in the War Department and I found what it was. In a joint memorandum signed by Admiral Stark and myself, of which I will read the first three paragraphs to indicate the general tenor of the reaction to this report of these individual Army and Naval officers who among themselves agreed as to what should be the proper course—this memorandum from Admiral Stark and myself is dated July 3, 1941. It is from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army (reading):

To: The Special Naval Observer, London.
The Special Army Observer, London.

Subject: Comment on the report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941. (Short title "A. D. B."")

References: (a) United States—British Staff Conversations, ABC-1.

1. You are directed to advise the British Chiefs of Staff that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff regret that they are unable to approve the subject report, because in several major, as well as numerous minor, particulars, it is at variance with reference (a)—which is the United States-British Staff Conversations, ABC-1.

(2) The major differences between the two reports may be summarized as follows:

(a) The Singapore report contains political matters which must be omitted from this military agreement. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are unable to recommend approval, as being beyond the scope of their authority, such political proposals as are contained in paragraphs 6, 8, 25, 26, 27, and 78. These should be taken up by the political departments of the governments, should these departments deem it possible to arrive at definite agreements.

(b) The scope of the naval strategic matters discussed is too broad. The
Singapore report aims to set up a new intermediate command not envisaged by ABC-1. The "Eastern Theater," and the "Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Fleet," though not mentioned in ABC-1, form the basis for the naval strategic concept in the ADB Report. Under ABC-1, the United States proposed to commit its naval forces in the Far Eastern Area, except such forces as were operating in the defense of the Philippines, to British naval strategic direction only for employment in the Far Eastern area. The United States has not agreed, and does not at this time propose to agree, to enter into any commitment for the employment of the naval forces of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet in areas outside of the Far Eastern Area, except as to limited operations having a direct relation to those in the Far Eastern Area. Should it become necessary in the future to retire from that area, further plans may then be concerted. This subject is discussed in detail in a subsequent paragraph.

It is a rather lengthy memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. Well, General, I will ask you then in the light of that instrument—first, was that delivered to the President?

General Marshall. The distribution list on it shows it went to Cincaf, Cinpac, Commanding General Philippine Department, the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, to the CNO for dispatch. That is all, sir. It evidently did not go to the President.

Senator Ferguson. In the light of that statement that you have read, General, why would you put the paragraph in this report to the President on the late date of the 27th?

General Marshall. That was a statement of fact. "After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed."

In other words, they had a meeting of the minds on that particular date. (Reading):

That joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

That informed the President of what the view was by those joint meetings of British, American, and Dutch officials of the military hierarchy in Singapore. Later on in the document we give our, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, specific recommendations.

Senator Ferguson. And you disagreed with it?

General Marshall. We disagreed with it in part. We agreed with it to this extent. (Reading):

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken.

Now, that is more or less in agreement with the proposals of this group.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have a map before you, General?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I know where the places are.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on this map, you said in the next to the last paragraph:

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken.
Now, that was not said in relation to the Kra Peninsula or Singapore or the East Indies, the Netherlands East Indies. That was only said as to part of Thailand, the great part of which was west of the line 100 east, isn't that true?

General Marshall. Yes, that is true.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct?

General Marshall. I think that is correct.

Senator Ferguson. So that if they went into the Kra Peninsula no warning was to be given, action was recommended on that, but if they went into Thailand, a great part of which was west of 100 degrees east—in fact, one of the reports recommended at one time to let them go in there and they would\[4045\] eat up their resources, and so forth, did it not?

General Marshall. I do not recall that.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon?

General Marshall. I do not recall that at the moment.

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall that?


Senator Ferguson. But only in the one case was a notice to be given. In the other cases you did not recommend notice, isn't that correct? Isn't that a fair interpretation of that letter to the President?

General Marshall. In the other cases, Senator, meaning what?

Senator Ferguson. Meaning down into the Kra Peninsula and into Singapore, no notice was to be given by the governments in that case?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, do you know whether or not the President ever saw the Winant message about the ships going into the—


Senator Ferguson. You never had any discussion with him on that?

General Marshall. No, sir, not to my recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, General, when Singapore\[4046\] was alerted as far as the British were concerned?

General Marshall. I do not know that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether it was printed in the papers here, in New York at least, that Singapore on Saturday was alerted, it was announced in the Saturday papers that they were alerted, full alert and they sent trucks out to get them?


Senator Ferguson. You cannot recall any information on that?

General Marshall. I cannot recall. Your comment on that now is the first time I have heard it mentioned in the last year.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, on a sabotage alert wouldn't the airplanes on the field be in an entirely different position than a full alert for action?

General Marshall. I would presume so, sir.

Senator Ferguson. On an alert of sabotage?

General Marshall. I said I would presume so, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't it true that on such an alert the planes would be massed so that the men could guard from action immediately in the vicinity, like the throwing of bombs across the fence?
General Marshall. Well, that is what was done. That varies, of course, according to the place and conditions.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. But that was quite evidently the means taken there to alert against sabotage.

Senator Ferguson. Well, normally an alert of sabotage would make your air fields, as far as the planes are concerned and ammunition in them and the bombs in them entirely different than you would if you were on a full alert to go out to the enemy?

General Marshall. Certainly. If there was no indication of any other form of alert except against sabotage that would be, roughly, the case.

Senator Ferguson. Because if you put the bombs in and then you had some sabotage you may cause great damage to your own field?

General Marshall. Yes, sir. We have had that accident occur in our experience.

Senator Ferguson. General, were you consulted by the Secretary of War in relation to the removal of General Short?


Senator Ferguson. He was the only officer removed.

General Marshall. Yes, sir, I was consulted by the Secretary of War. I think, after the return of Colonel Knox from Hawaii.

[4048] Senator Ferguson. Did you confer with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy?

General Marshall. I don't know whether the Secretary of the Navy was present but I am quite certain, I am absolutely certain that Mr. Stimson discussed the matter with me after Colonel Knox returned.

Senator Ferguson. What kind of a release was he given?

General Marshall. He was relieved from command and ordered to the United States and I do not remember just what the terms of the order were as to his further duties but he was relieved from command in Hawaii on the arrival of his successor, General Emmons, and to report to the United States and, I presume, to the War Department. The order will show that, of course.

Senator Ferguson. I notice he is here in civilian clothes. When you say removed from command, does that mean that he is out of the Army?

General Marshall. No, sir; and I think General Short——

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would explain that on the record.

General Marshall. I think General Short’s status now is a retired officer.

Senator Ferguson. Do you retire on full pay or half pay, or what is it?


Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not he is on full pay, or had been for any length of time?

General Marshall. I do not know what his status is here, whether he was ordered in and re-ordered giving him active duty or not, but that is a matter that can be easily determined.

Senator Ferguson. I just want your knowledge of it.

General Marshall. But unless he was ordered on active duty to report to your committee here his pay would continue at three-quarters pay. General Short can tell you that in a moment.
Senator Ferguson. When did he become a retired officer? What was the Secretary of War's order that you spoke about?

General Marshall. The Secretary of War's order that I spoke about—

Senator Ferguson. What did the Secretary of War’s order that you spoke about do?

General Marshall. The Secretary of War's order that I spoke about brought General Short back from Hawaii, relieved him from all responsibility of command in Hawaii, directed him to report to some point in the United States, we will have to look at the order to see just what it was. Thereafter the question was whether he would be given another assignment or, [4050] as actually developed, his retirement, which I believe was at his request; I do not recall that.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted on that, as to whether or not he would be given another assignment?

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman?


Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. Keefe. Yesterday when I examined General Marshall I requested counsel to present the order with reference to General Short and I wonder whether that is here today, whether we have received it.

Mr. Mitchell. It has not been handed to us yet by the War Department.

General Marshall. The procedure in General Short's case was handled by the Secretary of War.

Mr. Mitchell. The War Department just handed me some documents.1

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to see it, General?

Mr. Mitchell. No, I have no interest in them.

Senator Ferguson. They have got more than one copy.

Would this refresh your memory, General? [Reading:]

For General Short only. By direction of the President, you will stand relieved from command of the Hawaiian [4051] Department upon the arrival there of Lieutenant General Emmons who has been directed to assume command of the Department. Acknowledge.

MARSHALL
OFFICIAL: SECRET
(Sgd) R. G. Hersey,
Adjutant General.

It is dated December 16, 1941.

Does that refresh your memory that you signed such an order?

General Marshall. Well, I know such an order was sent and I assume also that there is another order which directs his return to the United States, which followed that.

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel have any other order?

General Marshall. You see, that does not involve any travel in the requirements of that. That is just the notification to him of what is going to happen, that he will stand relieved when General Emmons arrives. Now, there would have to be a formal order bringing him back to the United States and that is what I was referring to.

Senator Ferguson. This is signed by you?


1 See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2076, for copies of cables relating to Gen. Short’s relief of command.
Senator Ferguson. Did you confer with the President on this action?

General Marshall. I do not recall that I did.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other order where a man was removed that you signed an order on the direction of the President to remove a man?

General Marshall. I will have to check on that, sir. Using that "By direction of the President" is a technical procedure because of the rank given to the commander in that particular place. I will have to check up on that. You see, the command in Hawaii carried a certain rank with it. The termination of the command terminated that rank. Now, it may be—but that is readily ascertainable—that the expression "By direction of the President" was necessary in order to meet that particular involvement, because that is used very frequently. I think in the promotion of all temporary officers up to the grade of Colonel, that is, where no confirmation is necessary, the technical requirement is it must state "By direction of the President." Now, there may be some such involvement there. If not it would mean that the President himself personally had directed him relieved. I do not know which it is, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. But at least you do not recall that [4053] he personally directed you to?

General Marshall. I do not recall that he personally directed me to, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, can you tell us as near as possible the conversation that you had with the Secretary of War as to why this was issued, why he was relieved of that command? What was the reason?

General Marshall. I do not recall the conversation. My recollection of the incident is that on the return of Colonel Knox, who had gone out personally to Pearl Harbor to view the conditions and what had happened and what the existing situation was, that after his return to Washington he and the Secretary of War conferred—the Secretary's testimony will be, certainly, the best evidence on this, and as a result a decision was reached for the relief of both Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Now, that is just my recollection of the conditions at the time. I think probably Mr. Stimson's diary would tell us more directly just what happened. Now, what conversation they had with the President or if they had a meeting with the President I do not know.

I had directed a Major General of the Air Corps and Colonel Bundy, the officer in charge of Far Eastern affairs, to Hawaii by air as rapidly as possible in order to personal—[4054] ly report to me what the conditions were and what in their opinion the requirements were. Those two officers were killed on that flight, so they did not arrive there. Colonel Knox did arrive there and then returned, the first person to come back to Washington who had actually been present after the attack.

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall then any conversation with Secretary Knox?

General Marshall. I do not recall talking to Colonel Knox on the subject at all.

Senator Ferguson. But you and the Secretary of War did have a conversation?

Senator Ferguson. Now, were there any specific reasons stated for his removal? What was the cause of his removal?

General Marshall. I do not recall the specific statement of the reasons. I will have to enter into almost a guess as to what they probably were. I have no clear recollection at this time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was it disobedience to the alert order of the 27th?

General Marshall. I could not say that, sir. It was the general status of affairs in Hawaii as viewed, presumably, by Colonel Knox following his trip.

[4055] Senator Ferguson. You then have reasons to believe that the cause of removal was brought back by Colonel Knox?

General Marshall. That is my vague recollection of what occurred, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Marshall. I had sent two officers to go out and determine for me what they believed was the situation and the requirements of the situation from a number of points of view. They were to get at what we were to do to reconstitute the defenses and all other matters in connection with the future security of Hawaii and they did not reach there.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I understand, General, that you did not base this order upon any of your own findings. You based it upon what somebody else found.

General Marshall. I based that order on the direction of the Secretary of War.

Senator Ferguson. That is right; on his direction rather than on your own findings of facts.

General Marshall. Yes. I did not obtain any findings because my people never reached there.

Senator Ferguson. And did Colonel Stimson at the time that he asked you for this order or directed it, whatever the fact is, did he state his reasons for relieving Short from command?

[4056] General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir. I mean he undoubtedly did, and undoubtedly I gave him an opinion and probably his diary might show exactly what occurred.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you recall that you did give him an opinion?

General Marshall. Well, I would assume that he would ask me.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, he would tell you, would he not, the facts he had upon which you were basing an opinion?


Senator Ferguson. Can you give any of those facts? Can you recall any of those facts—


Senator Ferguson (continuing). As to the reasons for his action?


Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand the reason that you could send out the alert on sabotage without consultation with anyone, or one of the reasons, at least, was that it was such an emergency but in case that you wanted to amend the order in relation to the alert on the 27th which had the provision in there from the Secretary of State and
the one from the President, that you would have to confer at least with the President and the Secretary of State before they would be amended?

General Marshall. I do not want to confuse the issue, Senator, but I regarded the message that was intercepted from the Japanese regarding the 1 o'clock as of great significance. It was therefore my responsibility, in my opinion, to get that hour into all the various commanders in the Pacific as quickly as possible. I doubt if I even considered questioning anybody else, the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State. The issue in my mind was clear. It was a very important message and time did not admit of any discussion. I took time, however, which absorbed very little time, to make a quick contact by telephone with Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, General, whose language, or the reason for the insertion of the last few words of that message about alerting all essential officers? I want to get the exact words.

General Marshall. It is page 21, I think, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. "Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." Whose language is that, or whose order? It is your order because you signed it.

General Marshall. What page are you on now?

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 7 of Exhibit 32. It is on that page, General.

Mr. Mitchell. Is that the one you are referring to, the 1 o'clock and the warning message?

Senator Ferguson. No; I am not talking about the 1 o'clock.

General Marshall. I have got it straight now. It is on page 7.

Senator Ferguson. "Information to minimum essential officers."

General Marshall. Now, the question?

Senator Ferguson. Whose order is that? That is a directive that he is to only give this to the minimum essential officers. Whose directive was that? Was that on your own or was that in consultation with somebody else?

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir. Of course, I was not present during the final form of this message. I think that is on there to maintain the secrecy of the magic. I do not know whether that would have been suggested by—would have been included automatically by General Gerow or his assistants or whether that would have been on the recommendation of General Miles, the G-2, but it is quite evidently for the purpose of protecting the sources of the information.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, that being in the message and General Short being responsible for some reconnaissance, at least jointly with the Navy, would this information about the overt act go to the pilots in the planes if it was restricted to the minimum essential officers, that no overt act was to be done upon our part but the first one upon the part of the Japanese?

General Marshall. Reading the sentence as it is written here, "Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers," it may be that that includes the portion of the message which refers to the overt act. I am quite certain the intention was to limit the dissemination of this highly secret information, they are talking about the information and not the protection.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I am trying to see what an ordinarily prudent officer under the circumstances, how he would interpret that. Would he interpret it as to the whole instrument and, therefore, only give it to minimum essential officers, and that would not include anyone who had anything to do with the reconnaissance, probably, below General Martin?

General Marshall. That is a question, sir. I would say that in sending out the various forces that the senior would have to know this portion of the message that refers to the overt act. He would not necessarily have to know about  [4060] “negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes.”

Senator Ferguson. But he certainly would have to know about the overt act part?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; he would have to know about that.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did you think at the time that it was a restriction upon Short in his command, as far as giving this to all officers in case he was on a real alert?

General Marshall. That did not occur to me, sir. I might say in connection with that that when we put out any operation almost invariably we are involved in restricting the knowledge of the operation to a very few people. We have to do that practically every time. That is always an embarrassment to the officers that are carrying out the operation.

I can go clear back to the St. Mihiel operation, for example, to the pleadings of various corps commanders and particularly the chiefs of staff, to permit a wider dissemination of the knowledge preliminary to the launching of the operation, which General Pershing was unwilling to have disseminated. The same thing occurred in the Normandy operation, the same thing occurred in connection with the African operation.

[4061] It would be a much simpler thing from the point of view of the military authorities if everyone knew exactly what was planned, but in almost all those cases it is not a practical procedure or else you will certainly leak information.

So that that restriction would not impress me as imposing any insuperable difficulties as to the carrying out of the order.

Senator Ferguson. Now, we are trying to find out, General, and I would like to have your help on it, one question, of what an ordinarily prudent officer would do under the same or similar circumstances having the knowledge that he had.


Senator Ferguson. And how any confusion could be had upon that message and no confusion could be had upon the one that came back that he was alerted only to sabotage. Do you understand what I have in mind? Here.

Well, counsel is shaking his head that you do not understand, that is, Mr. Gessell.

Mr. Gessell. I am shaking my head that I do not understand.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I wasn’t asking you the question. I want to ask the General the question again.

You have said that there apparently was confusion on  [4062] this order, on this one order that went out there. Now, what caused
the confusion, in your opinion? Was it the wording of the order or
the information that he had?

General Marshall. I do not know, sir. I have testified to this in
relation to this apparent confusion, evident confusion, that I have
never known just why that up to a certain point the interest was
against air attack, against submarine attack, with almost no mentions
of sabotage and suddenly that became the significant expression in the
light of this particular order which dealt with reconnaissance, which
dealt with defensive measures, and which indicated the probability
of a state of war.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, how could anyone, any ordinarily
prudent officer be confused about his reply?

General Marshall. The fact remains a number of people were
confused by his reply.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I want to know the reason why?

General Marshall. And I think those individuals are prudent
officers.

Senator Ferguson. Have you anything to say from the instrument
itself as to how an ordinarily prudent officer of the rank that would
be handling that message could be confused as to Short's interpreta-
tion of the alert?

General Marshall. The fact remains, Senator, they were [4063]
confused and I consider the officers prudent officers.

Senator Ferguson. I am just asking if you have any reasons that
you can state.

General Marshall. I thought I had already stated the reasons,
sir, in my previous testimony, that nothing had been suggested at all
as there being foremost in the mind of the commander of the Army
forces in Hawaii the great consideration, the primary consideration
of the matter of sabotage. All of his communications had devoted
themselves almost exclusively to other matters and in particular to the
type of attack which actually occurred and which had been referred
to by me in my letters to him and in the previous plan of maneuvers of
the Department.

A command directive was sent to him in the form of an alert, which
in the opinion of the people who drafted it, responsible individuals,
men of considerable reputation, certainly men with considerable expe-
rience, was sufficient to alert that command. I have never understood
why it did not alert the command to any greater extent in the light of
the interchange of all that had taken place before this time, in the light
of the characer of this particular order and in the light of certain pro-
visions that he had made for liaison with the Navy, that there was the
confusion which undoubtedly occurred. Beyond that I cannot explain
the circumstances at all.

[4064] Senator Ferguson. General, my question really was how
they could confuse his reply.

General Marshall. And that is what I am talking about. I am ex-
plaining the state of mind of the officer reading the reply, in the light
of all that occurred at that time.

Senator Ferguson. That a man reading the reply, having that in
mind, would misinterpret the reply?

General Marshall. The fact is he did misinterpret the reply; he and
those that dealt with it.
Senator Ferguson. Who would you say misinterpreted the reply?

General Marshall. I would say Colonel Bundy and whoever his assistants were that handled it, General Gerow, myself, and presumably the Secretary of War.

Senator Ferguson. General, in one question on the winds message. Were you familiar with the Dutch reply, or the Dutch information that we had about the winds message?

General Marshall. I do not know what I was, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In volume 5, Top Secret, Navy—Mr. Murphy. Is this the one from Batavia?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; the one from Batavia.

General Marshall. Do you wish me to read it?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; and then I will ask you later to refresh your memory.

General Marshall. "Addressees for action OPNAV; date CRO 222. From Thorpe, for Miles. War Department.

Code intercept: Japan will notify her Consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcast as weather report at end East Wind rain United States: North Wind cloudy Russia; West Wind clear England with attack on Thailand and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

Then there is a paragraph not in the message.

Senator Ferguson. That is not part of the message, and I understood you have read the whole message, haven't you?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I have read the whole message.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, the Dutch had interpreted the so-called winds message that if it came it was to be a war decision?


Senator Ferguson. Yes. Was that ever called to your attention? It apparently came to Miles. Would you say he was the man in the first sentence?

General Marshall. Yes; I presume so.

Senator Ferguson. Was that ever called to your attention?


Senator Ferguson. What is the date of it?

General Marshall. It is "CRO 222." I haven't the key to interpret it, and I do not know what it is.

Senator Ferguson. Is there anything on it indicating that it came in on the 5th?

General Marshall. It says "Date time group CRO 222."

Senator Ferguson. I will try to find that out from another witness, as to the time. If it came on the 5th should it have come to you as information?

General Marshall. I presume it probably would have.

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have.

The Chairman. Does counsel wish to ask any questions?

Mr. Mitchell. I think not.

The Chairman. General, I wish to ask you just one or two questions. In military circles, and especially in high ranking military circles, is there such identity of meaning between the word "sabotage" and an order to engage in general reconnaissance as would lead an officer to misinterpret or confuse the meaning of those two terms?

The Chairman. In this photostat that was read yesterday, which seems to be undated, but must have been prior to June 24, 1940, in which the Chief of Naval Operations advised the Commander in Chief United States Fleet, who was Admiral Richardson at that time, that "reliable sources persistently report any movement in force by major Fleet unit toward Atlantic will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal," that would mean that any movement of large portions of the fleet through the Panama Canal?


The Chairman. And in order to test that Admiral Richardson was ordered to pretend that he was starting towards the Panama Canal and let it be known that he was, and that that leak or rumor would not be denied by high authorities, and presumably he did go on out for 2 days as if he was headed for Panama and then turned back. Do you know whether, as the result of that, there was any sabotage in Panama?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of any sabotage. Incidentally, I do not think it appeared in the record yesterday—

The Chairman. How is that?

General Marshall. Incidentally, with regard to that message, I do not believe it appeared in the record yesterday that the note at the bottom, when carefully translated, dated the 20th of June, states "Shown to General Marshall. He sent msg. to Canal Zone." This is the message from me to [4063] the Canal Zone: "Fleet may proceed to Atlantic possibility sabotage continue alert accordingly."

The Chairman. In the message intercepted, on page 154 of this Exhibit 1, which is the message from Tojo to Washington, to the Japanese Ambassador, this language is used:

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

That is cutting off any sort of communications, private or otherwise, by any means?


The Chairman. In the case of those conditions, this winds message would come, "East Wind rain," and so forth, were the conditions under which that message was to be implemented ever fulfilled by the breaking off of diplomatic relations or severing communications up until the attack?


Mr. Mitchell. Just a moment, please. I said I had no more questions, but I remember that one of the interested officers has asked to have five questions submitted to the General. I think I ought to take the time to ask them. Have you seen this request?

General Marshall. What is that, sir?

[4063] Mr. Mitchell. I will hand it to you.

General Marshall. Do you wish me to proceed with it?

Mr. Mitchell. Read the first question there, General.

General Marshall. This is:

Memo for Mr. Mitchell.
Subject: General Marshall.

In addition to the matters mentioned in my previous memo dated 3 December 1945, I suggest the following questions for General Marshall. I believe that point 1 and 10 of the previous memo have been sufficiently covered.
1. The tentative SOP of 14 July, 1941, copy of which I handed you yesterday, to show 3-alert system was known in War Department.

I assume that is a question to me: Was it known in the War Department.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Before you answer it, I will have marked as "Exhibit 64," the Standing Operating Procedure that General Short had submitted under date of July 14, 1941.

I might shorten the matter by explaining that that was not the one that was in effect on December 7.

General Marshall. That particular paper SOP of the 14th of July, came to my attention not through the operations section, and I do not know whether they ever received a copy or not, but from General Arnold, the Chief of the Air Force, who took exception to a portion of the Standing Operating Procedure as to the employment of numbers of the ground forces in the Air Corps in connection with the operating procedure in case the command was put on the alert.

He states:

This memorandum provides, page 4, paragraph 14d (8) and (9) as follows:

"(8) Release to Department Provost Marshal a provisional battalion of four companies totalling 500 men, to assist Auxiliary Police Force when necessary."

I have knowledge of that, and it is shown in my letters to General Short on the subject. I wrote to him in regard to that, at the request of General Arnold, and got his views as to the use of these men, and then replied as to my final views. That is the extent of my recollection of the alert message, but General Arnold transmitted to me the entire message, the Standing Operating Procedure.

Mr. Mitchell. That consideration of exhibit 64 came up in connection with the question of using air force men for guard duty that you testified to before?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; and it is covered in my correspondence to General Short.

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to the fact that in that document, on page 3, there is Alert No. 1, which he proposed to establish.

General Marshall (reading):

Alert No. 1.
Alert No. 1 requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Alert No. 1 was an all-out alert?

General Marshall. That is not quite all.

b. The Hawaiian Division(s) (less detachments) attached 298th Infantry will:

(1) defend Oahu;

(2) be responsible for all military traffic regulations except in the area

and so forth.

Mr. Mitchell. That is an all-out alert?


Mr. Mitchell. It was there in that document, Alert No. 1?


Mr. Mitchell. Will you please turn to page 5, I think it is, and find what Alert No. 2 is at the bottom of the page? Maybe I got the page wrong, not having it before me.
General Marshall (reading):

Alert No. 2.

a. Alert No. 2 is applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1, but does require the availability at all times of 50 percent of all troops, either in garrison or in the field, and the guarding of important installations.

[4073] Mr. Mitchell. Will you stop there, General. Does guarding of port and installations include a sabotage protection?
General Marshall. I would assume so.
Mr. Mitchell. Then turn to the bottom of page 5 and you have Alert No. 3.

General Marshall (reading):

Alert No. 3 is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands, with no particular threat from without.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, General Gerow has testified that the operating order that was in force on December 7, 1941, was an order made November 5, 1941, which is in evidence as part of Exhibit 44, and that exhibit has the numbers of the alerts reversed. That is to say, with the No. 1 alert, which is the all-out alert, in the document you saw, becoming No. 3 alert under the new system. And General Gerow has explained that that final order of November 5 never reached the War Department until after the 1st of January 1942.

Does that conform with your recollection as to the second document or have you anything on that?

General Marshall. That was what I was told, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. If the report from General Short had said alert No. 1 or No. 3 without having the existing order number of the alert before you, you couldn't have told what he referred to or if you had gone back to exhibit 44 you would [4074] have had the wrong number, would you not?

General Marshall. That evidently would have been the case.

Mr. Mitchell. If the report of November 5, the operating order of November 5, had been in the War Department, had been transmitted to the War Department by General Short, and you had had before you his existing numbers to identify his alerts, and the report had said, "I put in alert No. 1," "Alert No. 3," you would have had a definite way of ascertaining just what he did, would you not?


Mr. Mitchell. Will you please read the second question here?

General Marshall (reading):

What were the instructions of the Staff Duty Officer in the Office of the Chief of Staff, 27 November to 6 December 1941, and how much did he known about the alarm status overseas and the importance of incoming messages?

Mr. Mitchell. How would you answer that?

General Marshall. I would say that any instructions were to the Secretary of the General Staff to see that there was someone on duty there who could get in touch with the proper people in case of anything of importance and to see that I was informed of anything of sufficient importance to [4075] come to my attention. What the exact arrangements were I never went into because I had confidence in Colonel, now General, Smith and his assistants, particularly Colonel, now General, Deane, who were the secretary and the first
assistant secretary of the general staff. Just what their detailed arrangements were I do not know.

Mr. MITCHELL. Was there a 24-hour service there?

General MARSHALL. There was.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is the third question?

General MARSHALL (reading):

Could not a message similar to that of June 17, 1940, have been told to Short over the scrambler phone on December 7, without stating anything that would compromise our crypt analytical system?

Possibly that might have been done. I would have to analyze that. Possibly it could have been done.

Mr. MITCHELL. The fourth question.

General MARSHALL. I might say that the message that we endeavored to send was a very clear statement of the case.

Mr. MITCHELL. I think the fourth question, about General McNarney, has already been answered.

General MARSHALL (reading):

Was not General McNarney assigned to War Plans Division on his return to Washington on December 15, 1941, * * *

He was already a member and had been since 1939, though [4076] he had been in England since the previous April.

* * * and during the time that he was sitting with the Roberts Commission supposedly investigating the Pearl Harbor attack and the question of responsibility both in Washington and Hawaii?

And I think I am accurate, did not sit in the War Plans Division after he proceeded to England in April 1941, and on his return he was merely carried that way. There was no change until he was made Deputy Chief of Staff.

I testified he was brought back for a specific purpose, borrowed by the Pearl Harbor board and returned to that service, which was itself an independent agency, directly under me, for the entire reorganization of the War Department.

[4077] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I do not think the record shows who is asking those questions.

Mr. MITCHELL. It was the counsel for General Short that asked me to submit those questions to General Marshall. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes, on behalf of the committee, to thank you, General Marshall, for your patient cooperation in attempting, so far as you have been able, to reveal the facts involved in this investigation.

I am sure the committee wishes for you, on your new mission, as high a degree of success as you have received in other fields. We wish for you a safe journey, and as prompt return as possible, and the greatest possible success.

The Chair would like to say personally that if after you get to China, you discover that you cannot successfully cultivate your Leesburg farm from Chungking and need a good farmhand, the Chairman of the committee feels that by spring he will be available.

[Laughter.]

General MARSHALL. Thank you very much.

Mr. KEFE. Mr. Chairman, might I ask about two questions of General Marshall, before concluding?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.
Mr. Keefe. General Marshall, in the testimony which you [4078] gave in the secret report under date of Monday, August 17, 1944, on page 18, General Russell asked you this question:

In this letter of February 7, General, the statement is made by you to General Short that "the risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation."

Did anything that occurred between the date of this letter of February 7, 1941, and the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, cause you to change in any way that estimate of the situation in Hawaii?


General Marshall. That is correct. That is still my view.

Mr. Keefe. Now, this morning and yesterday, you testified that sabotage was practically never mentioned in regard to Hawaii in 1941, and that the whole emphasis was on air attack. Did I so understand you?


Mr. Keefe. My question then is, if the whole emphasis was on air attack, would not the reply of General Short to your alert message, where he says "Department alerted against sabotage," certainly tend to challenge the attention of anybody in the department?


Mr. Keefe. Now, when you say that sabotage was practically unmentioned during the year 1941, I have read the exchange of letters between Secretary Stimson and Knox, and your letter which I have quoted from of February 7, 1941, Exhibit 53, and then in Exhibit 59, in this paper that is entitled "Aide Memoire,"—


Mr. Keefe. You stated specifically, or it is stated specifically:

In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East.


Mr. Keefe. Then you are familiar with the fact that the joint Army-Navy agreement out at Pearl Harbor or at Hawaii had allocated the antisabotage defense to the Army?

General Marshall. I am familiar with that.

Mr. Keefe. That is true, is it not?

General Marshall. That is true.

Mr. Keefe. That was in 1941, wasn't it?


Mr. Keefe. And that the Army and the Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation had made extensive arrangements apportioning the responsibility as to sabotage and subversive activities all through 1941?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you are familiar with the fact that on November 27 and 28, 1941, the War Department, through its various agencies, sent three separate warnings to Hawaii emphasizing the danger from sabotage and subversive activities, all of which came to Short's at-
attention after he had sent his message "Department alerted to prevent sabotage"?

General Marshall. I am aware of that, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then there was a flow of information coming to Short during 1941, and especially in the latter part of November 1941, other than from you as Chief of Staff, advising him as to the necessity for alert against sabotage, was there not?

General Marshall. Prior to November 27 or 28, I think the correspondence between myself and General Short gives the emphasis I indicated on air and submarine attacks. He was not appealing to me about sabotage. He was appealing to me to help him in this, and emphasizing the necessity [4081] for assistance relating specifically to the defense against air attack.

Mr. Keefe. I wanted to get this in the record, and call attention to those specific exhibits.

General Marshall. Those are correct.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

Senator Lucas. Just one statement, Mr. Chairman, before we recess. General, I want to concur in what the able Chairman of this committee has said, with the exception that I hope General Marshall does not take his bid to go on the farm too seriously, because we can ill-afford to lose him here in the Senate.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused temporarily.)

The Chairman. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 2:00 o'clock p. m., of the same day.)

[4082] afternoon session—2 p. m.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES (Resumed)²

The Chairman. The Chair thinks that Senator Ferguson was examining General Miles when we suspended with him yesterday and, therefore, the Senator may proceed.

Mr. Mitchell. I would like, in closing up General Marshall's testimony, to verify the fact that several exhibits are in evidence.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Mitchell. There was a joint memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, to the Special Naval Observer, London, and the Special Army Observer, London, on the subject, "Comment on the report of the American-Dutch-British conversations."

General Marshall read a part of it. I suggest handing it to the reporter and letting the whole document be transcribed in the daily transcript.

The Chairman. That will be done.

---

¹ Gen. Marshall's testimony is resumed and concluded in Hearings, Part 11.
From: The Chief of Naval Operations, and The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
To: The Special Naval Observer, London.
The Special Army Observer, London.
Subject: Comment on the report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April 1941. (Short title "A. D. B.")
Reference: (a) United States-British Staff Conversations, ABC-1.
1. You are directed to advise the British Chiefs of Staff that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff regret that they are unable to approve the subject report, because in several major, as well as numerous minor, particulars, it is at variance with reference (a).
2. The major differences between the two reports may be summarized as follows:
(a) The Singapore report contains political matters which must be omitted from this military agreement. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are unable to recommend approval, as being beyond the scope of their authority, such political proposals as are contained in paragraphs 6, 8, 25, 26, 27, and 78. These should be taken up by the political departments of the governments, should these departments deem it possible to arrive at definite agreements.
(b) The scope of the naval strategic matters discussed is too broad. The Singapore report aims to set up a new intermediate command not envisaged by ABC-1. The "Eastern Theater," and the "Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Fleet," though not mentioned in ABC-1, form the basis for the naval strategic concept in the ADB Report. Under ABC-1, the United States proposed to commit its naval forces in the Far Eastern Area, except such forces as were operating in the defense of the Philippines, to British naval strategic direction only for employment in the Far Eastern Area. The United States has not agreed, and does not at this time propose to agree, to enter into any commitment for the employment of the naval forces of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet in areas outside of the Far Eastern Area, except as to limited operations having a direct relation to those in the Far Eastern Area. Should it become necessary in the future to retire from that area, further plans may then be concerted. This subject is discussed in detail in a subsequent paragraph.
(c) There is apparent a failure by the Delegates to appreciate the great strategic importance of holding the Netherlands East Indies, and particularly Sumatra and Java, and preventing enemy use of and Lombok Straits. It will be impossible to hold Singapore and if these Dutch Islands are captured by Japan.
(d) At British insistence during the ABC conversations the following was inserted in paragraph 11 (b) of the Report:
"A permanent feature of British strategic Policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will insure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort."
In further exchanges during the ABC conversations the British Delegates emphasized repeatedly their view that the retention of the general line of the Malay Barrier was vital to the continued security of the United Kingdom itself. Nevertheless, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff note in Appendix 1 of the ADB Report that, of forty-eight British naval vessels available in the "Eastern Theater," only three British vessels are to operate in the vicinity of the Malay Barrier. No British vessels whatsoever are committed to the naval defense of the Barrier against Japanese naval forces advancing southward, nor to offensive operations designed to close the passages of the Barrier to the passage of Japanese raiders. All British naval forces are assigned to escort and patrol work, most of them at great distances from the position which the British Chiefs of Staff have asserted to be "vital". It may be pointed out that the naval defense of this position is entrusted, by the ADB Report, solely to United States and Dutch forces. Even the British Force II would not be placed in a position to operate offensively. It would only be during Phase II, which con-
templates sending a strong British Fleet to the Far East, that British naval forces would be employed in a manner which might support the defense of the Malay Barrier. Since the eventual despatch of a strong British Fleet to the Far East is considered problematical, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff advise you that, until such time as a plan is evolved whereby British naval forces take a predominant part in the defense of the British position in the Far East Area, they will be constrained to withdraw their agreement to permit the United States Asiatic Fleet to operate under British strategic direction in that Area.

(e) The ABD Report contravenes the agreement set forth in paragraph 14 (f) of the reference. The Chief of Naval Operations cannot agree to permit aviation forces of the United States Navy to operate for other than naval purposes, or to be placed under other than naval command. It is particularly important, in the case of a naval force of inferior strength, to have available naval aviation units which are well trained in naval operations.

(f) After conclusion of the ABC conversations the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff advised the British Chiefs of Staff of their desire that, as soon as practicable, delegates be assembled in Singapore for the purpose of drawing up a practical operating plan for the Far East Area in accordance with the ABC agreements. Their view was that a plan should be gotten ready for immediate use in case of eventualities. The report of ABD conversations cannot be considered as a practical operating plan. In it, proposed United States operations in the Philippines are clearly outlined. Dutch plans are fairly definite. British plans may be approximately deduced only from the deployment proposed in Appendix 1. There is no strategic operating plan set forth for operations in common by the three Powers involved. The ABD Report cannot take the place of such a plan, and the opinion is entertained that, until such a plan is drawn up, the operative effort of the Associated Powers in the Far East Area will be largely ineffective.

3. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff can see no particular advantage in establishing the “Eastern Theater,” and appointing a new British Commander termed the “Commander in Chief, FAR EASTERN FLEET.” It is suggested that the same purposes could be served by giving appropriate authority to the British Commander in Chief, China, and have that officer, familiar with the general situation, continue to exercise direction even after the arrival on that station of additional British naval forces. It is agreed that there is no objection to giving this officer general strategic control of the various British naval stations in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea, but the establishment of an officer in a superior echelon, in command of all is considered of questionable value. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are disposed to discuss this matter further, if so requested by the British Chiefs of Staff, but question the present utility of such discussion, in view of the length of time before it would be practicable to establish such an office.

4. Details of the subject report which either vary from ABC-1, or appear to be unacceptable for other reasons, are indicated below. The numbers referred to are the paragraph numbers of the report.

3. (a): The operating plan should be confined to the plan for the Far East Area, rather than for the “Eastern Theater.”

4: This paragraph does not give sufficient emphasis to the security of the Dutch position, nor to the necessity for the greatest possible degree of offensive operations. Attention in this connection is invited to the naval task set forth in paragraph 35, Annex 3, ABC-1. It is not agreed that Japanese expeditions against the Netherlands East Indies can be outflanked from Luzon if such expeditions go south via the protected line of the Pelewos. This latter remark applies also to paragraph 13.

13: As indicated in previous correspondence, the usefulness of Hong Kong depends on its ability to contain Japanese blockade forces, as that base is unlikely to be usable for naval base purposes.

17: The opinion is held that, if the Pelewos line of southward movement is taken by the Japanese, the early capture of Borneo and the northern line of the Dutch Islands is essential to a serious Japanese attempt against Java.

29: With respect to strengthening the defenses of Luzon, the conference apparently failed to give appropriate importance to paragraph 13 (d) of reference (a). Because of the greater needs of other strategic areas, the United States is not now able to provide any considerable additional reinforcement to the Philippines. Under present world conditions, it is not considered possible to hope to launch a strong offensive from the Philippines.
The United States is taking steps to strengthen the defenses of the Philippines through improving the quality of native troops, and by providing additional modern material.

32: This subject was discussed during the ABC conversations, and decision reached to forego inclusion of it in the report, as the right is sovereign. Reference to it should be omitted from the ABD Report.

33: (Last subparagraph) — The establishment of a combined staff, (presumably for all Services and all Powers), in Singapore is not considered advisable, there being no agreement, nor possibility of agreement, for a single commander of all of the military forces of the Associated Powers. Appropriate liaison should, of course, be established. Existing liaison for the purposes indicated is considered adequate, so far as the United States is concerned.

38 and 39: These paragraphs cannot be accepted as to United States naval aircraft, for the reason given previously.

41: This paragraph should be omitted as it has already been covered by reference (a). It differs in certain respects from that reference. The United States does not agree that the United States Pacific Fleet must under all circumstances be equal in strength to the Japanese Fleet.

42: The matter of cooperation in the Tasman Sea between the United States Pacific Fleet and the British Naval Forces has been clarified in other correspondence.

45 and 46: This is not in accord with ABC-1, which requires that the Associated Powers, except in an emergency, will exercise command over their own forces. United States Naval Forces would not be "released" to British operation, in the sense in which paragraph 46 is construed, but would be assigned appropriate strategic tasks, derived from those listed in ABC-1, under the strategic direction of the British Commander in Chief, China.

47: As previously indicated, the small part which is proposed for British Naval Forces in the Far East Area is not acceptable. This and succeeding paragraphs should be clarified.

53, 54 and 55: Since this plan should apply particularly to the Far East Area, the details listed in these three paragraphs cover too wide a scope.

57: This paragraph seems rather indefinite.

61, 62, 63, and 64: It is suggested that reference to Phase II might be omitted from the present consideration, since plans as to operations in that Phase must necessarily be highly speculative at this time.

Appendix II: United States naval aircraft should be listed under the United States Asiatic Fleet.

Subparagraph (d) is not acceptable as regards United States naval aviation.

5. If further conferences are to be held in Singapore for drawing up an operating plan for the Associated Powers, it is suggested that the conference would have its work simplified were its deliberations to be guided by an agenda which had been agreed upon in advance between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Government of the Netherlands East Indies. Therefore, you will inform the British Chiefs of Staff that, after they have had sufficient opportunity to give further study to this matter, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff will be pleased to entertain suggestions which they may have to offer with respect to such an agenda.

(Sgd.) H. R. STARK  
Chief of Naval Operations.

Copy to:

Comdg. Gen., Philippine Dept. Reg. No. 900051, 7-26-41
British Jr. Staff Mission in Washington

2 Copies to C. N. O.—Rm. 2055
1 Carbn cy accompanied

original to S. P. O. B. (checked him)

7-26-41 acew-rle

[Sgd.] G. C. MARSHALL  
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

Jul 25 1941
Out OCS

[4003] Mr. Mitchell. Then we have another document, which the reporter has—I don’t have it right now, which we marked "Exhibit 64," and which is a draft of a proposed standing operating procedural order made by General Short and transmitted to the War Department, and which General Marshall saw.
The Chairman. Wasn't that referred to before we recessed?
Mr. Mitchell. Yes; just before, and I didn't formally offer it, and would like to have the record show that it is received.

The Chairman. It is now offered and made Exhibit 64. That will be ordered.

(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 64.”)

Mr. Mitchell. There is one other thing while we are on it.

Exhibit 13 is General Martin's study on the air defenses in Pearl Harbor dated August 20, 1941. You remember that is the report in which he estimated the manner of the attack as being by carriers coming in to a distance of two-hundred-and-thirty-three-odd miles and making a dawn attack.

As part of this exhibit there should have been added to it the endorsement by General Short, which we didn't get [4004] and I would like to have this endorsement made part of that exhibit, and I will read it into the record so it won't be lost again [reading]:

CONFIDENTIAL

321.1 Hawaii
8/20/41

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., August 1941.

To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

I concur in this study.

(Signed) Walter C. Short

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

3 incls (dup).
[Stamped:] X 381 General & Hawaii.
Sept. 8, 1941 To AWPD.
Jan. 30, 1942. Recvd. back from AWPD for file in Air AGO.
11 March 44. To Classified Files for file
(*) 321.1 Hawaii

(*) (Illegible)
[4005] The Chairman. It has been read into the transcript and is made a part of exhibit—what exhibit is that?

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 13.
The Chairman. Exhibit 13.
All right, Senator Ferguson.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether the minutes of the joint board, about which so many questions were asked, was made an exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. What number is it? I can get it later.

Mr. Hannaford. Exhibit 62, Mr. Murphy.
The Chairman. That is all?
Mr. Mitchell. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. General Miles, did you hear all of General Marshall's testimony? Were you here during his testimony?

General Miles. I was present during General Marshall's testimony; I heard most of it.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the fact that the code had been broken in Portugal, it had been deciphered there, and the Japs got on to the idea that we had broken their code, were you familiar with that fact?

General Miles. No, sir. The first time I knew of that was when I heard it in this room, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Of course, weren't with the services at that time?

General Miles. I was not what?

Senator Ferguson. Were you with the Intelligence Department?

General Miles. I believe that was after I was relieved of G-2.

Senator Ferguson. Did you consider that the War Department was responsible for breaking the code, that this country was able to get magic——

Mr. Keeffe. Before he answers, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Keeffe. Just so that I might be clear, in response to the question asked with respect to breaking the code in Portugal, I understand the testimony was there had been a raid by the Office of Strategic Services, or somebody under some other Intelligence Service, and that they obtained certain codes over there in Portugal, but that there was no evidence of an actual breaking of the code; am I right?

Senator Ferguson. That would give us the information by which we could break it.

Mr. Mitchell. No.

Senator Ferguson. That particular code.

Mr. Mitchell. The record shows, it is in the letter from General Marshall to Governor Dewey, where General Marshall states that the OSS had broken into the Japanese Legation in Portugal and had there gotten hold of the Japanese military attaché's code.

When the Japs found out that we had seized their attaché code, they stopped using it, and the new attaché code hadn't yet been deciphered. That is the exact state of the evidence.

Senator Ferguson. You mean we were never able, General, to decipher the new code?

Mr. Mitchell. The letter that General Marshall wrote, which is the only evidence on the subject, is that for at least a year after that incident, the United States was not able to crack the Jap military attaché code. He said so in his letter. There has been no proof as to when we subsequently succeeded.

Senator Ferguson. At least, General Miles, you have no knowledge on that subject?

General Miles. I had no knowledge on that subject.

Senator Ferguson. Who was responsible and in what department was he for actually breaking the code, the Japanese code?

General Miles. The Signal Corps, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Who should get credit for that?

General Miles. General Mauborgne, chief signal officer, up to, I think, the summer of 1941, was intensely interested in it. He directed all of the operations. His interest stimulated his men. I think he should have great credit for it.

Of course, he was not himself a cryptographic expert.
Senator Ferguson. Is there any cryptographic expert who should get credit for breaking it? Is there any particular individual that should be credited with breaking this code?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to know whether that has anything to do with the inquiry, and whether it should be spread on the record.

The Chairman. The Chair can't answer that question. He doesn't know the answer.

General Miles. I do not know. I wouldn't be able to give you that information.

Senator Ferguson. It was the War Department that actually was responsible and should get credit for doing it?

General Miles. It was a joint operation, War and Navy Departments. Senator, I am only speaking for the War Department side.

[4099] Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see the message that came from Batavia in relation to the wind code message?

General Miles. May I see it, sir? I think it was on the table this morning.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Mitchell, do you have it?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Greaves has it.

[4100] Senator Ferguson. It is in secret Navy testimony and I think the date would be on the previous page, General.

General Miles. I do not recall at this time having seen that message, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that is a different interpretation than what you had placed on the original two messages. This was a severance of relations, was it, or what was your interpretation? It is in exhibit 1.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Page 154.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the translator's interpretation. I don't know as it is the General's.

General Miles. I do not know that we put any particular interpretation on it other than the ordinary English language, Senator. We had these two messages which were translated. I had no doubt as to the accuracy of the translations and gave them the interpretation which the English words would convey.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, one of them says, "When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous." The other one reads, "In case of emergency", but the interpretation given by the Dutch was, "Decision of War."

General Miles. Yes, sir; I noticed that.

Senator Ferguson. Do they mean the same things, our translation and theirs?

General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you look on the page before and see whether that refreshes your memory as to when you got that message? It is addressed to you, is it not?

General Miles. Yes, sir; from Thorpe to Miles.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I cannot find here any indication as to when it was received.

Senator Ferguson. Well, when was it sent?

General Miles. But the time "Group CRO"—
Senator Ferguson. You do not have to use the words. Just interpret them. When was it received?

General Miles. I cannot interpret that, Senator. I do not know what "CRO 222" means.

Senator Ferguson. Will you be able to find out when that message was received in your department, when it came to your attention?

General Miles. I will endeavor to find that out, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall whether it came before you sent the message to Rochefort in Hawaii?

General Miles. I do not recall ever seeing this message.

Senator Ferguson. Not to Rochefort. The message to the [4102] G-2 of Hawaii to see Rochefort. You know who I am talking about.

General Miles. This message from Thorpe, did it reach me before that?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I do not recall ever seeing the message from Thorpe, Senator, so, therefore, I cannot place it. I may have seen it but I do not recall.

Senator Ferguson. This is a very important message, isn't it? It indicates that war would be declared upon a certain code message?

General Miles. Yes, if accurate; but we had two messages which were of entirely different import to the wind code.

Senator Ferguson. So, then, this message did not impress you at all. I mean to remember it?

General Miles. Senator, I do not recall seeing it.

Senator Ferguson. It has not impressed you so as to remember it?

General Miles. If I saw it, it has not left a lasting impression on my mind, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when the British at Singapore as far as their army was concerned was alerted? Did you get any information on that?

[4103] General Miles. I do not now recall getting that information.

Senator Ferguson. You had not heard then, or at least your memory is not refreshed now, that they were fully alerted on the 6th?

General Miles. I may have, sir. I very probably did because I was in pretty close communication with the British. I had a special section in my department for interchange of information with the British but I do not now recall it.

Senator Ferguson. Would you find out whether the British ever notified us so that it came to your attention, that they were fully alerted—

General Miles. I will try to find that out.

Senator Ferguson (continuing). Some time prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. I will attempt to find that out, sir.¹

Senator Ferguson. Did you know about when the first bomb was dropped on the Philippines?

General Miles. Did I know at the time?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I think that I heard of it very shortly afterwards.

Senator Ferguson. How long after Pearl Harbor was it, after they dropped them on Pearl Harbor?

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2070-2072, for documents relating to the alert of the British at Singapore.
General Miles. My recollection is now, sir, that it was a matter of 10 or 12 hours.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you understand that the planes at Pearl Harbor were bombed on the ground and had not been up at all, or was it when they came back to re-fuel that they were bombed? Had you ever heard any information on that?

General Miles. I have heard since that the planes were bombed and machine gunned—our planes were bombed and machine gunned by the Japanese while they were on the ground and before they had a chance to take the air.

Senator Ferguson. Before they even had a chance to take the air?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is, they had not been up, came back to refuel, you never heard that, and were then bombed on the ground?

General Miles. There may have been some of them that had been up and came back to refuel but as I understand it, though, the large majority were attacked while they were on the field and before they had been up in the air.

Senator Ferguson. Before they got up in the air. Now, did you give any message of alert after Pearl Harbor to General MacArthur, after you knew and, as you say, it was about 10 or 12 hours before they attacked the Philippines, did you give another alert?

General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was any other alert given?

General Miles. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Other than the one that was sent out about 12 o'clock. There was a message sent, you remember that message, the one that was sent out on Sunday?

General Miles. On the 7th of December?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. Yes, sir; but that was before the attack.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, that was before the attack.

General Miles. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. But no message was sent out after the Pearl Harbor attack again warning General MacArthur that there had been an attack at Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. None was sent out by G-2. I knew at the time, I am pretty sure, that the chief of staff or war plans division were in contact with Hawaii and Philippines and Panama.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. Keefe. I am very much confused on this examination and I would like to ascertain whether or not the questions that were directed to General Miles referred to the planes that were on the ground at Manila or the planes that were on the ground at Honolulu.

The answer that he gave would give the impression that he thought you were talking about Honolulu, but your questions might have been interpreted to mean the planes that had been on reconnaissance and came back to refuel, as I understand it, out there at Manila.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I would like to get the record clear as to what he was talking about.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will ask him.
You and I were talking about the Philippines, were we not?

General Miles. I beg your pardon. I thought you were asking me about Hawaii.

Mr. Keeffe. That is what I thought.

Senator Ferguson. Let us go to the Philippines. Did you get any report on the bombing at the Philippines—away from Hawaii entirely—the bombing of the airplanes in the Philippines?

General Miles. Yes, sir, information came in to the War Department that the Philippines, that Clark Field, I think it was, first was attacked. Now, when that came in I do not remember, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How long after the attack at Pearl Harbor was the attack at the Philippines?

General Miles. To the best of my knowledge, now, sir, it was in the neighborhood of 10 or 12 hours.

Senator Ferguson. Now do you know whether or not the planes that were damaged at the Philippines were planes that had not been in the air that morning? Do you know that?

General Miles. I do not know that, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Have you any knowledge on that question? Have you heard that the planes had been up, ran out of fuel and came back and were attacked while they were refueling?

General Miles. I read in the public press descriptions of the attack on our airfields in the Philippines, Senator, but beyond that I have no knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. You had no intelligence information on that?

General Miles. None that I can now recall, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the question is during this lapse of 10 or 12 hours did G-2 send any messages to General MacArthur after the Pearl Harbor attack, during the next 10 or 12 hours?

General Miles. We sent no messages that I can recall to the Philippines immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor. If your question implies that we had knowledge of how the planes in Hawaii were disposed and, therefore, could have warned General MacArthur, I think I am correct in saying that we did not. I remember very vividly the afternoon and evening of December 7, and it was hours before we could determine what in heaven's name had happened in Hawaii. I do not believe that I knew that those planes were lined up on the fields in Hawaii and were attacked there before they got in the air, for some time after the attack.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that an alert against sabotage would place the planes together, bunching them, did you know that? That anyone who wanted to put an alert in against sabotage would naturally put his planes together so they would be able to protect them from sabotage, and they would not have ammunition in them? Did you know that?

General Miles. I did not, sir; and I do not now know that.

Senator Ferguson. I see.

General Miles. There are two schools of thought on that, sir. I agree perfectly that if you want to protect your planes against sabotage alone, you do not arm them because the very presence of ammunition is a danger, but if you line up your planes on a field it is true that you can guard them with fewer men than if you disperse them and have one man guarding each plane, but it is also
true that on certain forms of sabotage, like, for instance, getting a vehicle in there with gasoline or something like that into the field, you can do a very much handsomer job if you have got the planes all lined up there together.

Senator Ferguson. I believe you have already testified that you did not see the reply message of the 28th of Short to the General Marshall message alerting?

General Miles. That is correct, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. And that would not come back to you as an Intelligence officer?

General Miles. No, sir; I never saw that message.

Senator Ferguson. Now, was it your sole responsibility for the distribution of the magic messages, actual distribution?

General Miles. That was my responsibility within the War Department and for the Secretary of State that those messages in their locked boxes were made available to the officers on that list.

Senator Ferguson. That was your sole responsibility?

General Miles. That was my responsibility. I personally did not carry that out. I carried it out through my officers.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but a superior officer has the sole responsibility and he delegates the work to be done by another officer?

General Miles. Yes, sir. It was my responsibility and mine alone that that work should be properly done.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, who was the man that had the sole responsibility of the actual delivery of those messages as far as the War Department was concerned?

General Miles. That duty I delegated to Colonel Bratton and his assistant, Colonel Dusenbury. They were sometimes not able to deliver the locked pouch to the actual person who had the key. It very frequently happened with the Secretary of State and by special arrangement a certain secretary or I think two secretaries of the Secretary of State were authorized to receive the pouch for him. It also sometimes happened in the case of the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War.

Senator Ferguson. Now, who was the man that was responsible for the delivery? You say Dusenbury and Bratton, both Colonels?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were they both responsible for that task?

General Miles. Colonel Bratton was the head of the section.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, he had the responsibility for that?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When the Winant message came in at 10:40 to the Secretary of State about the movement of the ships, do you remember seeing that?

General Miles. Could I see that message, sir, that you are referring to?

Senator Ferguson. I will try and find it. Does counsel have it? It is the one Winant made on the 6th of December. I am showing it to you. There are two of them.

General Miles. Yes, sir; I have them before me.
Senator Ferguson. Have you gone over it now, General?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know when the first of those messages came to you?
General Miles. I do not now recall when they first came to me. According to the stamps, the State Department stamps on them, it would certainly indicate that we did not see them until the 8th or 9th of December. You notice that the first one was received in the office of the Secretary of State on December 6th, and the advisor of political relations on the same day, but not to the Division of Far Eastern Affairs until December 8th.

[4112] Senator Ferguson. Now, does that mean that you would not get this important message, although it was received at 10:40 a.m. on December the 6th, about the movement of these ships to the Kra Peninsula?
General Miles. I doubt very much if I would, sir. Our liaison with the State Department consisted, as I have already testified, of an officer from the Military Intelligence Division that went there every day to get this information. I have also testified that I finally got through a plan or a policy of interdepartmental liaison so that there was one officer, in the case of the State Department, Mr. Gordon, who was charged with seeing that important messages, important to other departments, got out to them, but these matters all took some time. That dispatch on its face would not be given to us in toto until it had been paraphrased.
If it were in Mr. Gordon's office or in any office to whom my liaison officer, at that time Colonel Montague—no, Colonel Sands—visited, he would probably have been allowed to read that message but not take it with him, but I have no recollection at this moment of when that message reached the Military Intelligence Division.

[4113] Senator Ferguson. Now, if your colonel in the State Department was allowed to read that message and not take it with him, what would be his duty?
General Miles. He would make a note of it, and bring it back as soon as possible, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Bring it to your department?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, would that be the kind of a message that, in the reverse, coming from the State Department to you, that you would just be permitted to read it and then it would be destroyed and sent back?
General Miles. No, sir. If it were sent by the State Department through this interdepartmental liaison that we established, it would be sent over in paraphrase form.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have a system whereby then that paper would be stamped by an hour and day stamp so anyone getting it later would know exactly when it was received in your department?
General Miles. That was the system that was in vogue at the time.
Senator Ferguson. Then, we should be able to find in your department the paraphrased copy, or the copy delivered to the War Department from the State Department if it has a stamp on it?

[4114] General Miles. If it was sent over to our department it should have a time stamp over it; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to ask counsel if it is possible to get that from the Army so we might tell when it was delivered.

Now, at the time, on the 6th, were you familiar with Exhibit 17? Do you know what Exhibit 17 is? It is the memorandum for the President.

General Miles. At the time was I familiar with it?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; on the 6th.

General Miles. On the 6th of December, 1941, I did not know of the existence of this memorandum, as far as I can remember.

Senator Ferguson. What information had you in your department up until 12 o'clock on the 7th of December, 1941, indicating that there was a movement of the Japs to the south, that the ships were on the move, the troop ships were on the move? What information have you in your office?

General Miles. I had quite a lot of information, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Would you collect it? I will not take the time now. Will you collect it and bring it back sometime later in a collected form? I want to try to cover the same subject as far as the movement of any other troop ships is concerned, the information that you had in your office. I am talking about this being the one that Winant wired us.

General Miles. Beginning at what time, sir?

Senator Ferguson. From the 26th.

General Miles. From the 26th of November to the 7th of December?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, to the 7th of December. You can bring that in sometime later.\(^1\)

Do you recall being present with Commander McCollum or anyone else on Saturday morning, that is the day before the 7th, where you discussed a desire—not you personally, but there was discussed a desire to get more information to the theaters, various theaters, or any of the theaters?

General Miles. Get more information?

Senator Ferguson. More information to the theaters. That means to Hawaii, to the Philippines, Panama, or anywhere. Were you present at any meeting where Colonel McCollum was present where that was discussed?

General Miles. I have no recollection of any such discussion on the 6th of December, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember any discussion at any time on that subject prior to the attack?

General Miles. Only that I knew and thoroughly approved of the Navy messages going out with regard to our information on the Japs burning codes. They are the only ones. That is the only case in which I can remember of any discussion about further information being sent to the overseas theaters.

[4116] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that someone in your department had prepared a statement to send with information in it?

General Miles. Other than what was sent; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know McCollum, did you ever hear that McCollum had prepared a document or memorandum to send to the theaters?

General Miles. Not at that time; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When did you learn that? Later?

---

\(^1\) See a memorandum from the War Department in Hearings, Part 5, p. 2078.
General Miles. I think I read it in top secret Army report, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is the first that you recall knowing anything about it?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you had close liaison between the two departments, how do you account for the fact that you did not know about that during that period?

General Miles. Well, Senator, I did not know, and I do not know that it is a fact now, sir. I understand Captain McCollum later questioned it. But our liaison was very close personally with Admiral Wilkinson, and my Far Eastern man, Colonel Bratton, with his Far Eastern man, I believe it was Commander, now Captain McCollum.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that you, after [4118] seeing the 14-part message and the other messages, that you were responsible for getting them to General Marshall at the time they were actually delivered, sometime on Sunday?

General Miles. I was responsible for getting messages to the Chief of Staff, among others, the magic messages. I used my own discretion and judgment as to what messages had to be sent to him at out-of-office hours.

Senator Ferguson. And did you exercise that judgment on the night or afternoon of the 6th, so that he did not get these messages, the 13 parts, or the 1:00 o'clock message, or the breaking of the code—there were three messages there, and I think it was Sunday morning that two of them were ready, but I am referring particularly to the 13 parts.

General Miles. The 13-part message?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I had a conversation, on my return from Admiral Wilkinson's house, as I testified, with Colonel Bratton. I take full responsibility for that 13-part not going to the Chief of Staff that night.

Senator Ferguson. You knew he had an officer on duty that night?

General Miles. He had an officer on duty every night; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And had you read this 13-part message, [4119] or these 13 parts very carefully?

General Miles. I testified, sir, that I am not sure whether I saw the text or a summary, or whether I was told a summary of it.

Senator Ferguson. And with that much knowledge you decided that that should not be delivered on the night of the 6th?

General Miles. I returned to my house and telephoned Colonel Bratton, and my recollection is that he said the message was not complete. I knew its substance. I did not consider that it was necessary to arouse the Chief of Staff at that time of night for that message.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know what time the Chief of Staff got up the next morning? I mean what time he arose on Sunday morning.

General Miles. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What did you do about having it go to him early the next morning, the 13-parts?

General Miles. I refer now to my records only because I want to make my testimony the same as before. I testified, sir, that I therefore contented myself that night, that is the Saturday night, by calling Colonel Bratton at his house about 11:30 p.m. on my return and assur-
ing myself that the full reply would be disseminated the next Sunday
morning and [4120] he and I would be in our offices then.
Early on the morning of the 7th, Colonel Bratton called me at my
house and told me that important information was in and he was try-
ing to get in touch with General Marshall.
I asked Colonel Bratton to tell General Marshall that I would come
out to Fort Myer to see him if he desired, and so forth.
Senator Ferguson. Now you say you had a conversation with
Colonel Bratton Sunday morning on the telephone at your home.
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you knew the pilot message—and you
know what I mean by the "pilot message"—was in on the 6th?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any reason why that was not deliv-
ered to General Marshall?
General Miles. I testified, sir, to the best of my knowledge and
belief it was in the Saturday afternoon locked pouch among several
other messages, which you will find were translated on that day, and
that it did go to General Marshall. He does not remember seeing it.
Senator Ferguson. What messages would you say were in that
pouch? Would you identify them for the record from [4121]
exhibit 1, the messages that were in the pouch that carried the pilot
message?
General Miles. On page 226, the message translated on the 6th of
December, the middle of the page.
Senator Ferguson. What page again, please, General?
General Miles. Page 226, sir. Then also on pages 228 and 229.
Senator Ferguson. Which one of the messages on page 226? There
are two of them there.
General Miles. The small one in the middle of the page, sir, from
Tokyo to (circular), 3 December 1941.
Senator Ferguson. [reading]:

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE) (including those in connection with
broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance you have already de-
stroyed them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify us of this fact
immediately.

This message is a precaution.

General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Is that the one?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What about the one under it?
General Miles. Well, according to the record, that was not trans-
lated until the 24th of December.
Senator Ferguson. So the one that was translated on [4122]
the 6th was received on the 3d went with the pilot message. Any
others?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Which one?
General Miles. On pages 228 and 229, the long message from Rome
to Tokyo, translated on December 6th.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. You said received on the 6th, or translated on the 6th
and received on the 3d?
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
Mr. Murphy. All right.
Senator Ferguson. What is the page there?
General Miles. Pages 228 and 229, sir. I do not know, Senator, whether you want them one by one, but I have every reason to believe that all of these messages translated on the 6th were in the pouch on the 6th.
Senator Ferguson. Except the 13th part?
General Miles. The last of the 13 parts was not in until late on the night of the 6th.
Senator Ferguson. All right. We are talking about the 13 parts out of the 14-part message. Is there any doubt in your mind that 13 parts of the 14-part message were in and translated on the day of the 6th? [4123] General Miles. On the night of the 6th, I think, sir.
Senator Ferguson. During that day on the 6th?
General Miles. I think, Senator, you asked me about the pilot message and what other messages I would assume were in the pouch with the pilot message.
Senator Ferguson. Now the pilot message indicated that there would be 14 parts in this message, did it not?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It also indicated that they would get a separate message giving them the time of delivery?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So, as I understand it now, you say that all messages except the 13 parts translated on the 6th were delivered to General Marshall, the Secretary of State, General Gerow—who else would get them outside of those three—the Secretary of War?
General Miles. The Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of War Plans Division, and G-2.
Senator Ferguson. And G-2. So they would all have every message translated on the 6th except the 13 parts?
General Miles. That came in on the night of the 6th, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. We are talking about the night of the 6th. That is up to midnight, so there can be no question [4124] about it?
General Miles. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
Mr. Murphy. Before the gentleman suspends I want to make one suggestion, and he may want to cover it.
It is an angle that has not been developed so far in this case.
On page 33 of General Arnold’s report of January 4, 1944, there is a statement at the bottom of the page to this effect:

On Luzon it must be said we had maintained an air alert since November 15

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that, General? Did you know there had been an air alert on Luzon in the Philippines from the 15th of November?
General Miles. I do not recall having any such knowledge at the time, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Had you any information in your intelligence branch that the Japs were scouting over the Philippines prior to the 7th?
General Miles. I do not recall having that information at the time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any reason why that would be kept from you? That would be essential to your department, would it not?

[4125] General Miles. Yes, and no, Senator. Information coming in about our own troops was not ordinarily sent to the intelligence department, unless it pertained particularly to that.

Senator Ferguson. This was Jap scouting planes over the Philippines.

General Miles. I thought you were referring to the air alert.

Senator Ferguson. Jap reconnaissance, photographing planes.

General Miles. Oh, yes, sir; that should have come to me.

Senator Ferguson. And if they went over the Philippines you know of no reason why you should not obtain that information?

General Miles. That should have been sent by the G-2 of the Philippines to me.

[4126] Senator Ferguson. Now, on whose authority did you send the message to destroy our code in Tokyo?

General Miles. On the authority of the Chief of Staff. Now whether I got that directly from him or from General Bryden, I do not know. I have been trying to remember. General Marshall says he authorized it. I am sure it was authorized in his name, but exactly how it was done, I do not now remember.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a talk with the general, if you recall? It is an important message, isn't it?

General Miles. Yes, it was important. We were destroying our own military attaché codes in those particular places.

Senator Ferguson. Did General Bryden have access to magic?

General Miles. Not that I know of, sir. He certainly did not have a locked pouch delivered to him.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore he would have to read it at the behest of General Marshall, or come to your office to read it?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Because the general would open the pouch, read it, and put it back in?


Senator Ferguson. Were you of equal rank with General Gerow? Were your departments of equal rank?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe is next. Would it be agreeable for Senator Lucas to ask questions, Mr. Keefe?

Senator Lucas. I do not care to. I thought this was the end of the testimony.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire.

Mr. Keefe. General Miles, as a result of the interruption of your testimony, I confess to some confusion of thoughts on what I conceive to be rather material matters in connection with this inquiry, and I want to direct my attention to a few of those things, if I can, to see if I can understand the testimony that you have heretofore given.
Now, you were the chief of G-2?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Am I correct in the assumption that that was at least the top intelligence section in the Army?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Then I also understand that there is another section called SIS, Signal Intelligence [4128] Service; is that right?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That was not under your direction?

General Miles. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That was under the direction of whom?

General Miles. The chief signal officer of the Army, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then I understand there was another branch called the Signal Corps; is that right?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Which included the SIS, so we have the G-2, and then the Signal Corps, which included the SIS——

General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And the SIS and Signal Corps were under the direction of one man?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Who was that man during this period?

General Miles. Colonel, or General Mauborgne was chief signal officer until sometime, I think, in the summer of 1941, and he was relieved by General Olmstead.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

Now, I got the impression from your testimony—and I listened to it very carefully, and took rather extensive notes—that this magic business was considered to be of [4129] extreme secrecy.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So secret, in fact, as I gathered from you, that its dissemination was limited, on the Army side, to certain specific individuals, namely, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the White House in the beginning, General Watson, General Gerow, Chief of War Plans, and yourself as chief of G-2; is that correct?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And I gathered from your testimony that efforts were being made to keep these magic messages so secret that when they were delivered the Army had a special, trusted courier in the person of Colonel Bratton to make the deliveries; is that right?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And that the custom and orders were to take these magic messages that were to be delivered to the persons I have designated, lock them in a locked pouch, to which only these people designated had the key; is that right?

General Miles. To take them to those individuals, Congressman, if they could be reached. Obviously, if the Secretary of War was in conference and could not be reached, the message had to be delivered to an aide or to some [4130] designed person, and similarly for the Secretary of State.

Mr. Keefe. That is the point I wanted to get, right there. I understood your testimony to be that it was the order to this courier,
Colonel Bratton, that he was to deliver this magic to the individual entitled to see it, and then to stay there while it was read, and then put the magic message back in the pouch and take it back to the G-2 headquarters where it was burned, and one copy kept for the files.

Did I understand you?

General Miles. I do not think that I testified to all of that, sir. Colonel Bratton, or his assistant, was to take this locked pouch to the office indicated, and if possible see the officer, say the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff and give him the locked pouch.

He was not required to stand over this individual while he read it. It could not be done with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, or the Chief of Staff. He was, however, to see that that locked pouch got back to his office. He was then to unlock it and burn the contents.

Mr. Keeffe. When was he to see that the pouch got back?

General Miles. That day, if possible. Certainly the next day early.

[4131] Mr. Keeffe. Did that practice continue right through until the 7th of December?

General Miles. That practice had been going on for many months before the 7th of December, and continued through until that date.

Mr. Keeffe. Do I understand then when these raw messages, as they were called, were delivered to General Marshall for his inspection, that that procedure was indulged in, that they would go to him in this locked pouch, with instructions to Colonel Bratton to see to it that those messages, after General Marshall saw them, were returned to G-2 to be burned?

General Miles. Yes, sir. That was the custom, the orders, and they had been carried out both before and after we, on the orders of the Chief of Staff, sent what we called the raw messages.

Mr. Keeffe. I understand your testimony to be to the effect that the decoding of these intercepts took place only at Washington. Is that right?

General Miles. It was my understanding. I now know sir, that there was a very secret Navy cryptographic section in Manila, established there—

Mr. Keeffe. Now, General Miles, every time we go along, we get—

[4132] General Miles. May I finish my answer, sir?

Mr. Keeffe. All right. Go ahead.

General Miles. Established in Manila. It was put there to serve the Asiatic Fleet. I knew nothing about it. I cannot remember knowing anything about it at that time. It actually operated, so I am told now, in a secret part of the tunnel on Corregidor.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, then, the testimony which you first gave is subject to correction to the extent that you now find, from some source, or other, that the Navy, in the Asiatic section, had the facilities for decoding these Jap intercepts; is that right?

General Miles. I am still not sure what Japanese code they were able to break in the Philippines.

Mr. Keeffe. Who would know, if you would not?

General Miles. Oh, your naval witnesses will be able to tell you that, undoubtedly, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. That is on the naval side?

General Miles. That is on the naval side. That is why I did not know anything about it.
Mr. Keefe. I see.

General Miles. It was a secret Navy cryptographic section for the service of their fleet.

Mr. Keefe. It also appears now, by other testimony that the ability to decode these intercepts was given to the British.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you know that?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You knew that all the time?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So that outside of Washington it now develops that the British had the facilities given to them to decode these intercepts, and on the Navy side, the Navy made the facilities available to Admiral Hart out in the Asiatic Fleet at Manila in some recess at Corregidor; is that right?

General Miles. I believe that is correct, sir.

I would like to say, Mr. Congressman, that I am not correcting my testimony, as I understand it, with regard to the British having this facility. I was never asked before directly about the British. I think my previous testimony was solely concerned with our American crypt analysis of the messages.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I am very happy to have that explanation, General Miles, and accept it as such. There have been so many changes of testimony relative to this matter, produced by the Clausen report, and testimony under oath in the Army and Navy reports, and so on, that I am having difficulty finding out what the fact is.

Mr. Murphy. The gentleman is testifying.

Mr. Keefe. I ask, Mr. Chairman—

The Chairman. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Keefe. I would like to go ahead without interruption, please.

Mr. Murphy. Well, go ahead.

Mr. Keefe. Those are the familiar tactics of a lawyer in the trial of a small police court, to interrupt the counsel who is examining the witness, to throw him off his chain of thought. I had that experience for 35 years. There is nothing new about that.

What record was kept of the burning of these intercepts, if any?

General Miles. Checks were made. I am not able, however, to give you any detailed testimony on that, sir. Colonel Bratton, I understand, will appear as a witness and he had that directly in his charge.

Mr. Keefe. Did not you have it directly in your charge?

General Miles. Yes, sir; but I did not personally attend to the burning of those intercepts.

Mr. Keefe. Was not that an important matter, the burning of the messages, and was not it important to see that there was a record kept, so that nobody saw them outside of these few people?

General Miles. I knew at the time that there was available a record which was kept.

Mr. Keefe. Do you know what that was?

General Miles. It can be produced for you. The man who kept the record will appear before you, and I think I am not the proper witness in that case.

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any present knowledge of the fact that there is such a record?
General Miles. I am sure there was such a record kept.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I will ask the counsel to have that record, if there was such a record, at the time Colonel Bratton appears before us, so when we ask him questions we can have that record before us.

Mr. Gesell. May I understand what we are talking about? Is it the record of the messages that were burned?

Mr. Keefe. Yes; that is it. When they were destroyed, there would be a record made of the destruction.

[4136] That is as I understand you, General Miles.

General Miles. As I understand, they were checked off from a list of the records received.

Mr. Keefe. Now I am a little confused about the handling of this decoding thing. I do not want to go into any details as to how it was done, or anything of that kind, but I know the testimony shows that Commander Kramer was the opposite in the Navy of Colonel Bratton. Is that right? Did you know Commander Kramer?

General Miles. I know Commander Kramer; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, he was the courier that delivered these messages around on the Navy side, was he not?

General Miles. At Pearl Harbor time I understand that he was the naval officer who did that work.

Mr. Keefe. Did you understand he was the naval officer that did it prior to Pearl Harbor time?

General Miles. I do not remember how long prior to Pearl Harbor this officer, who was not in any way under my command, did that work, sir.

[4137] Mr. Keefe. Well, now, am I correct in the assumption that when the Jap message came in for decoding, that that was a sort of a joint action between the Army and Navy?

General Miles. So I understand, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You were not separated there. You had a unity of command there that day, did you not?

General Miles. I understand that there was a joint operation of the Navy communication, and Signal Intelligence Service of the Army.

Mr. Keefe. And you named another officer besides Colonel Bratton; what was that man's name?

General Miles. Colonel Dusenbury.

Mr. Keefe. So Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenbury were the two officers that were assigned to this task of watching these intercepts on the Army side?

General Miles. The intercepts were directly under the charge of the Far Eastern section of the military intelligence division, which was under Colonel Bratton. Colonel Dusenbury was one of his assistants. He had others.

Mr. Keefe. Who was the person, or who were the persons that actually did the decoding? Were they Army men or Navy men?

General Miles. I understand that they were both Army and Navy men, sir, employees of the War and Navy Departments. [4138] I would not say they were enlisted men, or officers of the Army and Navy.

Mr. Keefe. They must have had a highly secret place in which they worked, did they not?
General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The Army and Navy people worked in that same place together, did they?

General Miles. I do not know, sir. I believe there was some separation there. I know of no place in the Munitions Building where they could have all been together.

Mr. Keefe. Well, was one intercept first assigned to the Army to decode and one intercept assigned to the Navy or how did it work?

General Miles. I am told that their operation was joint in the sense that when one got a backlog of work he would transfer it to the other. I am not a good witness on the details of the Signal Intelligence Service, because I deliberately never looked into them. Other officers will come up and you can ask them what questions you want.

Mr. Keefe. You mean Signal Intelligence Service? Is that their job?

General Miles. The Signal Intelligence Service.

Mr. Keefe. Were they the ones that were doing the decoding?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

[4139] Mr. Keefe. Then, Bratton was with Signal Intelligence Service?

General Miles. No, sir. I think I could explain it to you, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe. I wish you would. The further we go the more confused this thing gets to me.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order.

General Miles. The decoding, deciphering, translating from Japanese, decoding, deciphering Japanese into English was done by two services of the Army and Navy, the Army Signal Intelligence Service, which is part of the Signal Corps, and the Navy Naval Communications Service.

Now, those were highly specialized services. They served the intelligence of the two services, Army and Navy.

Mr. Keefe. I see.

General Miles. It became our paper only when delivered to us in typed English. We had nothing whatever to do with the deciphering, decoding, or translating of that document.

Mr. Keefe. Well, where were these messages filed, the ones that were actually filed in your department?

General Miles. The retained messages were filed in the Far Eastern Section of my department.

Mr. Keefe. What is that?

General Miles. The retained messages were filed in Colonel Bratton's office, the Far Eastern Section of my department.

Mr. Keefe. And how were they filed? Were they filed consecutively by number?

General Miles. That is a detail that I do not remember, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe. Who would remember that?

General Miles. Colonel Bratton undoubtedly would remember it.

Mr. Keefe. I see. I am advised by the Chairman that a good deal of this material was gone into on a Monday that I was compelled to be absent, and when you were a witness, General Miles, and that is why I am going through my notes so I will not be covering this ground again.
The Vice Chairman. That was my recollection about it.

Mr. Keefe. I can perhaps read it all, that is, if it has been covered, and you give me that assurance. I will get his full testimony and read it.

The Vice Chairman. I believe General Miles was a witness on Monday, was he not?

Mr. Gesell. Last Monday.

Mr. Keefe. A week ago?

The Vice Chairman. Monday a week ago.

Mr. Murphy. He started on the 29th, November 29.


Mr. Murphy. And he testified on November 30.

The Vice Chairman. Monday a week ago?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. That was my recollection.

General Miles. And Tuesday.

Mr. Keefe. This is a matter that I want to ask you a few questions about, General Miles, if you can answer them.

From an examination of the intercepts that were coming in, there was an effort being made to keep track of the movement of the Jap fleets, and that had been going on for some time. My reading of the record of the testimony in this case indicates that sometime prior, a short time prior to the 7th of December, there was a certain Jap task force that went into radio silence. Do you recall that?

General Miles. I recall hearing such a report; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And evidence given before the Army and Navy board indicated that there was some concern expressed over the fact that this fleet had gone apparently into radio silence, and wonder was expressed as to where it was. Do you recall that situation?

General Miles. I recall that a certain number of Japanese ships could not be located by our Naval Intelligence.

Mr. Keefe. Those ships were carriers were they not?

General Miles. I do not remember what class of ships they were, sir.

[4142] Mr. Keefe. Well, how long did that radio silence continue so far as this fleet was concerned; do you recall?

General Miles. No, sir; I do not recall. You understand, of course—

Mr. Keefe. That would have been a Navy matter, would it?

General Miles. Pardon me. You understand, of course, that all of this work of tracking the Japanese ships was Naval Intelligence, and I got my information from them.

Mr. Keefe. All right, we will try and get it from the Navy then. But I understood that you were working in such close liaison in a matter of this character that you perhaps as head of G-2 would know something about that also.

General Miles. I think I did know at the time the important items, such as the fact that they could not locate certain of the Japanese ships.

Mr. Keefe. That would be a pretty important matter, wouldn't it, in view of the tension that existed at that time?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. To know where that fleet was and what it was doing, it was a very important matter, wasn't it?
General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you make any report to anybody, in your analysis of those intercepts, or the lack of them, when you [4143] were making your report to the Army Chief of Staff, did you make any comment upon the sudden blackout of these radio messages from this fleet?

General Miles. I do not believe that I made any such report, sir. I do not know, Mr. Congressman, that that was anything extraordinary at the time. I remember that such things occurred but, of course, it was fairly normal that Naval Intelligence, good as they were, were not able to place certain Japanese ships.

Mr. Gesell. May I intervene, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. Keefe. Yes, surely.

Mr. Gesell. On the direct examination by counsel of General Miles item 25 of exhibit 33 was reviewed, a memorandum by him of November 26, 1941 to the Chief of Staff, concerning the location of the Japanese fleet, in which he commented that "present location other units of this task force are not known."

Mr. Keefe. I had a recollection of that, Mr. Gesell, but in the mountain of things here some of these details are liable to escape, and I can't wonder that some of the witnesses can't recall everything that transpired.

Does that refresh your recollection?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You did comment on it, according to counsel. [4144]

Do you recall that now?

General Miles. I recall it now, sir.

Mr. Keefe. In view of the tension that existed on the 26th of November and the fact that the evidence shows here that almost everybody in the top echelons of command felt that the Japs might strike any place at any time that was an important fact?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The fact they had lost contact with one of the Japanese fleets, that was quite important, wasn't it?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Was that followed through from day to day from that time on to try to find out what had happened, so far as radio was concerned, and did this black-out continue right up to the attack?

General Miles. I am sure it was, by Naval Intelligence, and I feel reasonably certain that I kept in touch with it, sir, but, as you see, my memory of what I knew 4 years ago is sometimes quite defective.

Mr. Keefe. Yes, I have observed that.

Well, now, as head of G-2, you were supposed to keep pretty well posted to give information to the Chief of Staff on what was going on, that was your job, in plain English, wasn't it?[4145] General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, we had the Navy Intelligence, we had the FBI, and other sources, did we not, that were working in more or less close liaison?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And furnishing information back and forth between these various intelligence services; is that true?

General Miles. Yes, sir, that is true.
Mr. Keefe. And what was going on out in Hawaii was of some importance during 1940 and 1941, wasn’t it?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And it was very important because of the fact that after the so-called China incident started in 1937 the overwhelming alien Japanese population and Americanized Japanese population was very tremendous in Hawaii; was it not?

General Miles. It was a very considerable part of the population; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you had means through your G-2 office in Hawaii of getting information as to what was going on there in Hawaii, did you not?

General Miles. Among the Japanese population?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

General Miles. We were always striving to do that, sir, and got a good deal of information.

Mr. Keefe. The threat of possible sabotage was always present there, wasn’t it?

General Miles. The threat of possible sabotage was always present, or subversive activity of some sort.

Mr. Keefe. In fact, that had been so impressed upon your mind as chief of G-2 that you actually sent a message out to Short on the 27th warning him against sabotage?

General Miles. Among other things. I also warned against war itself.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now—

General Miles. But that message was not directed solely to Hawaii.

Mr. Keefe. Did you have the benefit of the investigation that was conducted by the SEC out in Hawaii as to the illegal sale of Japanese war bonds in Hawaii and on the West Coast of the United States and the prosecution in court of those people responsible for it, did you have, as head of G-2, the benefit of that investigation?

General Miles. I do not recall it, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Do you know anything about it?

General Miles. No, sir, I do not now know anything about it.

Mr. Keefe. You have no present recollection that it ever came to your attention as head of G-2?

General Miles. I do not recall it, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you have any knowledge of the fact that the Navy had tapped a telephone wire of the Japanese consul at Hawaii prior to the 26th day of November, 1941?

General Miles. Mr. Congressman, I presume I did if it were done, if it were known to my naval colleagues, but it was one of those things I would have been very careful to forget as soon as I knew it or shortly thereafter.

Mr. Keefe. I am asking you a simple question. General Miles. I understand the reasons for your answer, but I am asking you a simple question.

You were the head of G-2. Now, as head of G-2 did you know that the Navy had tapped the telephone wires of the Japanese consul prior to the 27th of November 1941?

General Miles. I am not sure that I knew that. sir. I have not a definite recollection now of knowing that specific item of information.
Mr. Keefe. Did any information come to you that you now recall, through your liaison with the Navy, as to the contents of any intercepts obtained by the Navy through tapping the wires of the Japanese consul at Hawaii?

General Miles. I do not recall any, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Do you know that the FBI had tapped the [4148] telephone in the house of the Jap consul and maintained that tap right up until the 7th of December, 1941.

General Miles. I may have, sir, but I do not now recall. What I do recall, Mr. Congressman, is many discussions with FBI and ONI regarding the tapping of telephones. You may remember there was a law passed by Congress—

Mr. Keefe. Yes; they had to get authority to do it.

General Miles. May I finish?

We had weekly meetings, the head of FBI, ONI, and MID, and I remember that that was a very serious question at that time, the months preceding Pearl Harbor. Whether I knew that my colleagues were tapping the wires of the Japanese consul in Hawaii I do not now recall.

Mr. Keefe. Well, the only purpose of it would be to get vital information, isn’t that true?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. If any vital information was secured through that source, did it come to your attention?

General Miles. I do not now recall any vital information that came to me from that source.

Mr. Keefe. Do you recall any information that came from that source, vital or otherwise?

General Miles. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. In fact, you have no present recollection of [4149] anything connected with the incident?

General Miles. With the tapping of the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul, I do not recall.

Mr. Keefe. Were you familiar with the fact that the President had issued an order restricting certain areas for defensive purposes around the Hawaiian Islands?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You were going to get that, Mr. Gesell. Did you get it?

Mr. Gesell. I did, Congressman. I had it in front of me and the question didn’t come up again. It is item 3 of the Navy exhibit which was introduced on the first day of the hearing and the actual demarcations of those various areas are plotted on a chart. Item 3.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you were familiar with this order, whatever it was?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And do you know how extensive it was, as to how many miles of water it included around the Islands?

General Miles. No, sir; I cannot now recall.

Mr. Keefe. And do you recall its terms at all, as to what it prohibited?

General Miles. It was a defensive sea area, as I remember it, and prohibited, I think, ships without special permission [4150] from passing through those waters.
Mr. Keeffe. Well, there were a lot of Japanese fishing boats operating around the Hawaiian Islands in the period of 1941, were there not? General Miles. There was, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. You knew about that?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Did you know that there were a large number of arrests of Jap operators of boats and convictions had for violation of the terms of this order, in the United States court out there in Hawaii in the year 1941?

General Miles. I don't remember knowing of how many arrests or what arrests were made. I do have a definite recollection of coming here before a committee of Congress in the summer of 1941, advocating very strongly a bill still further limiting the Japanese fishermen, particularly on the west coast, and in Hawaiian waters.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, Jap fishermen during 1941 were fishing right in Pearl Harbor itself. That would be a matter of some interest, wouldn't it?

General Miles. It was a matter of great interest. The trouble was they were American citizens, very largely; couldn't get them.

Mr. Keeffe. Then you do know about the incident?

General Miles. I remember well we were very much worried about the Japanese fishermen in Hawaii and on the west coast waters, both the Army and Navy made strong representations to tighten the laws in that regard.

Mr. Keeffe. Did you know that starting in early 1941 alien Japs in Hawaii converted their assets, put all assets out of their hands, and it was well known out there. Did you know it?

General Miles. I do not now recall that instance, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Would such a matter as that, if it had been called to your attention, have been considered to be of any importance?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, weren't you furnished with that information by your intelligence out there in Hawaii?

General Miles. I presume I was, sir, but I do not now recall it.

Mr. Congressman, there is before this committee exhibit A to the Army Pearl Harbor Board which is a document called Secret Summary of Far Eastern Documents, Military Intelligence Division. It is quite voluminous. It is, as a matter of fact, supported by some 15 or 16 volumes of photostats of documents.

Now, a great many of those things, all of these things of any importance, passed over my desk during during the quite considerable time that I was G-2. I regret to have to say that I do not recall an incident now, but I am trying to tell you, to give you the reason that I do not recall a great many things that undoubtedly I saw or knew at the time.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, did you know that early in 1941, the civilian community out there in Hawaii formed special antisabotage squads, at the request of the commander of the local National Guard, and set up a complete system in Hawaii among the civilians to aid in the prevention of sabotage. Did you know that?

General Miles. That is one of those things that I do not now recall, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Did you know that early in 1941 under the auspices of local people in Hawaii they started a system of blood banks and that it was those blood banks which saved the lives of many, many people in this disaster on December 7? Did you ever hear of that as head of G-2?

General Miles. I may have, sir, but I do not now recall it.

Mr. Keeffe. Did you know that the Japs were using the radio out there in 1941 to broadcast certain innocent appeals for help or offers to sell this or that, over the radio, which, it later turned out, were coded messages being sent out over the commercial radio?

General Miles. I knew that there was commercial radio in Hawaii, and I knew some of it was in the Japanese language. I had heard it while out there.

[4154] Mr. Keeffe. Did your intelligence services report what I have stated to you?

General Miles. That radio broadcasts were made in Japanese?

Mr. Keeffe. No, not necessarily, but innocent broadcasts of—like a want-ad, in which these people were using a code to get information out over the radio that could be interpreted by the Japs? Did you know that?

General Miles. I do not now recall that any specific case of code being used in radio broadcasts in Hawaii was brought to my attention.

Mr. Keeffe. Who was the head of your G-2 in Hawaii in 1941?

General Miles. Colonel Fielder was G-2 of General Short's command in Hawaii.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you know a Colonel George C. Bicknell?

General Miles. He was assistant to Colonel Fielder.

Mr. Keeffe. Where did he come from?

General Miles. Where did he come from, sir?

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. What were his qualifications for that job?

General Miles. I don't know, sir. He was selected by the Commanding General, undoubtedly, or by the Commanding General, G-2.

The overseas staffs, all the staffs of major [4155] units of the Army, were selected by their own commanding generals, not by the War Department.

Mr. Keeffe. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire.

Mr. Gearhart. General Miles, a great many questions have been asked you about intercepts and matters of that kind.

As a matter, you had under your jurisdiction the whole case of intelligence, didn't you?

General Miles. Yes, sir, as prescribed by our Army regulations.

Mr. Gearhart. Then the handling of intercepts was just one of your responsibilities?

General Miles. Yes, sir, one of numerous responsibilities.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you, for the purpose of getting clues that might lead to important evidence, cause the newspapers of the country to be followed from day to day?

General Miles. Yes, sir, that was a regular routine duty of the military attachés of the countries to which they were attached, or military observers.

Mr. Gearhart. And if you obtained what you thought was important information from that source, that was reported to [4156]
the Chief of Staff just the same as any other evidence that you thought was—well, the same as the magic evidence?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Whether information was brought to the Chief of Staff depended solely on the value of that information, not its source.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, in the first place, you would evaluate it, and if you reached the conclusion that it was of importance, or might lead to something of importance, you brought it to the attention of the Chief of Staff?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, I notice in the Army report, on page 51 of the United States News printing of that report, there is a quotation from the diary of Secretary Stimson as follows:

Then, at 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark and myself. There the President brought up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem.

[4157] Now, that Monday would have been December 1, wouldn't it?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That was 1 week before Pearl Harbor.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Was there a rumor or a belief running through naval and military circles to the effect that there probably would be an attack a week ahead of the time that it occurred?

General Miles. I never heard that. I can't remember any rumor running through military and naval circles of a probability of attack on Pearl Harbor or Hawaii at any particular day.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I don't mean at Pearl Harbor, I mean any place an attack upon the United States by the Japanese.

General Miles. On that particular day, no, sir; I do not remember.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you read in the newspapers of December 1 that President Roosevelt rushed back to the Capital from Warm Springs, because of a crisis in the Far East, didn't you read that?

General Miles. I am sure that I read that, sir. I read my papers every day.

[4158] Mr. Gearhart. And did you not observe during that first week in the papers that the Japanese embassy was advertising and selling their automobiles for cash only?

General Miles I do not now recall that that particular point was brought to my attention.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, do you remember this headline appearing in the Washington News at page 6 on December 3:

Japanese embassy sells four automobiles, demands cash—sign of the times—Japanese embassy is selling its cars?

General Miles No, Congressman Gearhart, I am afraid I cannot remember that particular item. It was a week of growing crisis and many, many bits of information came to my attention but I do not recall that particular one.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, in view of the fact that they were demanding cash for their automobiles ought to be significant in view of the fact
that the times were becoming very tense and war was considered to be imminent. Did you follow those kinds of things closely?

General Miles. Yes, sir, but I think we had even better information from their own words in magic.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you observe the article which appeared in the papers on Saturday, November 29, an article [4159] which quoted Prime Minister Tojo of Japan, in which he was quoted as saying that he intended to purge the United States and Britain out of the Orient?

General Miles. I feel very sure that I read that at the time, sir. That speech created, as you know, quite a stir.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. To quote the article or his statement, rather, in order that the significance may appear in the record, it is:

Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of American and British communism because the United States and Britain desire to fish in troubled waters, throwing the Asiatic peoples against each other. This is the stock in trade of Britain and the United States and, therefore, we must purge this sort of action with a vengeance.

Now, did a speech by the Premier of Japan, who is supposed to lead the public in Japan, have any special impression upon your mind or cause you to do anything or to say anything which you would not otherwise have done or said?

General Miles. Congressman Gearhart, that speech made a great stir in this country. It, of course, was well known to the Chief of Staff as well as to me through reading it in the papers. I remember also that the Japanese then began to back water on it and say that it had not been reported accurately from the vernacular, and so forth, and there was a [4160] good deal about it in magic, all of which was known to higher authorities in the United States government.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, did you ascertain through your Intelligence system that the Japanese embassy in Washington was writing letters, sending them around the United States, calling upon people to whom the embassy or Japanese nationals were indebted to get their bills in before December 7th at the latest?

General Miles. That is an item that I do not now recall that came to my attention.

Mr. Gearhart. I have here the photo-stat of a letter that was furnished me by the State Department as long ago as April 9th, which I think ought to be spread upon the record and I will read it. (Reading):

JAPANESE EMBASSY
Washington November 25, 1941.

DEAR SIR:

Referring to the booklet which you were so kind as to send to me at my request, I wish to have the articles of the annexed list delivered to me. I should like to have them before December 7th at the latest. As regards the payment, I will be much obliged if you will designate an agent in Washington, D. C. (or in New York) to whom I [4161] may be able to pay in cash; this may save me from encountering many technical difficulties of transfer of funds under the freezing order.

"I may add that the delivery of the commodities to me will be effected duty free at the American border. I must, however, notify the State Department beforehand and for that purpose I ask you to inform me of the approximate date of the passage of the goods.

Yours sincerely,

KOTO MATSUDAIRA.
First Secretary.
In the lower left hand corner is the name of the addressee:

Mr. Herbert S. Mills
Hamilton (Ontario) Canada.

Did your Intelligence Service encounter any other letters of that type?

General Miles. I do not remember ever to have heard of that instance. May I ask when that letter was intercepted?

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I do not know when it was intercepted but it bears the date of November 25, 1941.

General Miles. That is when it was sent.

Mr. Gearhart. That is the date the letter bears.

Now, did any of your men read the various magazines and try to keep abreast with what was happening which might throw light on the work which was yours?

General Miles. Yes, sir; I think there was a good deal of magazine reading in the department.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you or any of your men read The New Yorker of November 1941?

General Miles. I subscribe for The New Yorker, sir. I think I read it.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you encounter or did any of your men encounter and report to you an advertisement which appeared on several pages of one of those November issues. I have forgotten the exact date, which contained the word “warning” in German, in English and Italian and a picture of a dice, upon one side of which appeared “12” and on the other side “7”?

General Miles. No sir; I have no recollection of that incident of seeing that advertisement.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, it was all right to miss that one because that turned out to be a clever advertising scheme, but what I wanted to ask you about —

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to the spelling of the word “dice”? Was it “d-i-e-s” or “d-i-c-e”?

Mr. Gearhart. I am not referring to the Dies Committee. I am referring to dice that you throw to hook that number 7.

Mr. Murphy. I wondered how you got a 12 on it?

Mr. Gearhart. These were special dice.

[4168] The Chairman. The Chair hopes the committee will not get too much information on it.

Mr. Gearhart. The gentleman from Pennsylvania indicated a considerable knowledge of such things.

Mr. Murphy. I heard about it.

Mr. Gearhart. The point is that the advertisement was strikingly conspicuous and strikingly significant, apparently, but it was not observed by your Intelligence Service or reported to you?

General Miles. I do not remember it as having been reported to me, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, it threw the FBI into a dither. They sent out a thousand agents to find out what it meant but they finally ascertained that it was just good advertising.

General Miles. That occurred, I presume, after the attack.

Mr. Gearhart. I think so. Now, during the closing moments of the gentleman from Wisconsin’s examination of you, or I think it was during the course of the examination by the Senator from Mich-

1 Issue of Nov. 22, 1941.
igan, it was brought out that there had been an air alert in the Philippines for some time prior to December 7.

I will ask you if anything went over your desk or was brought to your attention which indicated there had been an [4164] air alert just prior to December 7 on Oahu, on Hawaii?

General Miles. I remember no such report, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, wasn’t there an air alert ordered at Hickam Field on December 1 and continued throughout the week and called off on the afternoon of December 6, 1941?

General Miles. Not that I remember knowing of at the time, sir, or having heard of since.

Mr. Gearhart. You do not know of any reason why air alerts were called or staged as drills or as actual war exercises prior to December 7?

General Miles. Well, I, like all other officials of the War Department, supposed that they were on the alert. Anyway, it would be perfectly normal to have what I think you mean by air alerts; in other words, unexpected drills or calls on the Air Force as a matter of training and practice.

Mr. Gearhart. I will ask counsel to investigate and ascertain for me if in fact there was not an all-out air alert at Hickam Field that began on December 1 and ended on December 6, a full all-out air alert which required the manning of antiaircraft guns constantly for 24 hours a day, the wearing of steel helmets and side arms or rifles. In other words, a complete air alert for that 1 week.

I have a letter on my desk from a boy who went through [4165] it and went through the attack and he tells me that is the case and that is the source of my information. I would like to have it verified. That is all.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one or two questions.

Mr. Gearhart. And my inquiry, of course, would include the orders for the alert and the orders calling off the alert, the inspiration for those orders as far as they can be ascertained.

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe has another question.

The Vice Chairman. I have one I want to ask some time also.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

General, I have been making a little research to try to get myself adjusted to conditions out at Hawaii prior to this attack and, among other things, I show you an advertisement taken from the Honolulu Advertiser on August 24, 1941 which reads:

An important announcement concerning war risk and bombardment insurance. It is not too late to secure Lloyd’s coverage for your property and home. Our connections are accepting individual commitments not in excess of one-quarter million dollars provided orders are placed on or before August 26th at 12 o’clock noon.

[4166] Did you ever see through your intelligence that type of advertising that was going on out in Hawaii in August of 1941?

General Miles. I do not recall having done so, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Would it have excited your attention had you seen it, to learn that Lloyd’s of London were offering a quick response for the sale of war-risk and bombardment insurance to the people in Honolulu not later than August 26, 1941?

General Miles. I think it would have excited some interest, sir. Lloyd’s were pretty sure that they were not going to be bombed.

1 See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2490 et seq.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I agree with you, General Miles; they are pretty smart operators. And would it have excited your interest had you read in the newspaper of August 13, 1944, the same newspaper, a statement of the local manager of Lloyd's as to the reason that they were offering this war-risk and bombardment insurance to the citizens of Honolulu at that time?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I cannot hear the gentleman. The voice is going to the back and I would like to hear the voice so that I can hear the questions.

The Chairman. The Chair did not think it made any difference which way the Congressman's voice went; it can be heard.

[4167] Mr. Keefe. Well, I tried to raise it so that there would be no question about it, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. All right, go ahead.

Mr. Keefe. I am showing you this, General Miles, so that you can see from what I am about to quote.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, on August 13, 1944, this article appeared in the Honolulu Advertiser. I will read a portion of it [reading]:

Twelve million dollars of war bombardment insurance has been sold in Hawaii, but the insurance was written not because of the fear of war but for possible sabotage, W. P. Brandt, Pacific Coast representative for Lloyd's of London, told the Star Bulletin today.

Would that have indicated to you as Chief of G-2, that action upon the part of Lloyd's of London, that they expected to excite some interest in the sale of their insurance because of the possibility that existed of sabotage out there?

General Miles. Yes, sir; but I would have wondered slightly how they could persuade anybody that that would be sabotage by bombardment.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I wondered exactly the same thing, because it is war-risk and bombardment insurance, that is the ad that they put in the paper August 24. If you had seen that [4168] would it have been significant to you at all as to what was going on out in Hawaii at this time?

General Miles. I do not think it would have told me anything that we did not already know, sir. Hawaii was a great outpost in the Pacific, as you have so ably stated before the committee, and in my years out there there were many times that we were fearing that war might come; they were constantly worried, the American population, particularly the military, about the possibilities of Japanese subversive activities of all kinds. I am afraid that it would not have excited very much curiosity on my part to know that Lloyd's was trying to sell some of its goods out there under war risk.

Mr. Keefe. Well, as head of the G-2 did there ever come to your attention the so-called M-Day plan of the Yokohama Specie Bank on literature that was distributed to all your agents throughout the United States and the Hawaiian Islands?

General Miles. I do not recall that plan, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you ever hear that?

General Miles. I do not recall now hearing of it.

Mr. Keefe. As head of G-2 did you ever see the M-Day plan that was circulated throughout the United States to the agents of this Mitsubishi outfit that was the big purchasing agent for Japan? I
don't know whether that is the right name or not; that is as near as I can get to it, Mitsubishi, or [4169] words to that effect.

General Miles. I do not recall, Congressman Keefe, having seen that.

Mr. KEFFE. Did you know that there was such an agency here in the United States, operating here?

General Miles. I have heard that name Mitsubishi many times, yes, sir.

Mr. KEFFE. You knew that they were purchasing airplanes and machine tools and everything else for Japan?

General Miles. We have all known that Japan was buying everything she could in this country.

Mr. KEFFE. And that this outfit was one of the leading purchasing agents; you knew that, didn't you?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEFFE. Did it ever come to your attention that instructions had come to all of their agents here in the United States setting up a Japanese M-day plan for the destruction of all of their correspondence, codes, and all material in 1941?

General Miles. No, sir; I have no recollection of ever having seen such a plan.

Mr. KEFFE. And that the same M-day order directed from the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., to all of their agents in America, spoke about a full and complete detailed plan for [4170] the destruction of all their codes and the conversion of everything into cash? Did you ever hear of that as G-2?

General Miles. I have no recollection of ever having heard of that plan, sir.

Mr. KEFFE. You never had any such information given to you by the FBI or the SEC or any other agency of Government?

General Miles. I hesitated there because I do so clearly remember many talks with Mr. Hoover in our weekly meetings about the Japanese. I remember all of the joint operations that we went through, particularly in southern California, on the Japanese question, but I do not recall having been told by the FBI of any such plan.

Mr. KEFFE. Very well, we will try to get to it later by another witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper, I believe, has some questions.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. General Miles, I would like to ask you one question, if I may, please, with respect to magic or the intercepted Japanese messages.

As I recall, General Marshall testified we had finally reached a point during the war that about 10,000 people in this country and about 30,000 people in England were required in the decrypting, decoding, and translation of these messages. Did you happen to hear General [4171] Marshall's statement on that point?

General Miles. I did, sir.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Is that about in line with your recollection of that?

General Miles. Well, I had no recollection, Congressman Cooper. He was speaking of what happened at the very end of the war when I was not in any way in contact with the SIS or the naval communications.
The Vice Chairman. You would not have any further information to give us on that point?

General Miles. No, sir. As to the growth of that activity I have no further information to give.

The Vice Chairman. That was my recollection, that he stated about 10,000 people in this country and about 30,000 in England were at one time during the war required to handle this decoding and translating process of these intercepted Japanese messages and that is about your understanding?

General Miles. That is my recollection of what the General testified.

The Vice Chairman. Thank you.

The Chairman. It is 4 o'clock and I don't know how much longer it will require to conclude with General Miles, but if we could stay a few minutes longer and conclude with [417?2] him it might be desirable to do so. Is the committee willing?

The Vice Chairman. I think Senator Lucas has some questions, too.

Senator Ferguson. I have some, too.

The Chairman. What is the wish of the committee, to conclude with General Miles? Well, without objection we will go on for a few minutes. Go ahead, Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. General Miles, I became rather curious about that pouch that the Congressman from Wisconsin was talking about a little while ago.

Have you got one of those pouches left down there in the Department where you sealed up these magic messages?

General Miles. I have not seen one for many years, sir, but I think they still have them.

Senator Lucas. What kind of a pouch was that? I would like to get a little more information on it. There seems to be a very much mooted question around here about the pouch. Just describe it to me if you can.

General Miles. Why, it was a brief case very similar to that, that we had made by Becker & Co., I think, here in Washington.


General Miles. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Where do Becker & Co. live, or where [417?3] do they produce this, what city?

General Miles. They are a leather shop on Connecticut Avenue.

Senator Lucas. Right here in Washington?

The Chairman. They are on F Street.

Senator Lucas. Are you sure now that we are not on F Street?

It is very important to find out just where Becker & Co. is.

The Chairman. Camalier & Buckley are on Connecticut but Becker is on F Street.

Senator Lucas. What kind of a key did that pouch have, General Miles?

General Miles. What, sir?

Senator Lucas. What kind of a key did this pouch have?

General Miles. Well, the point was to get two keys which were quite separate from any other two keys for each pouch. That was the only point about insuring that they had the proper pouches.
Senator Lucas. Do you still think you could find one of those things, one of those keys and one of those pouches and bring them up here before the committee so that we can inspect them?

General Miles. I will try to do so, sir.

Senator Lucas. I think it is very important to the determination of this Pearl Harbor hearing and investigation, the type of pouch and the type of key you had at that particular time and as one member of the committee I would like to have you bring it in if you can find it. I want to inspect it thoroughly because it will have a great deal to do with my final judgment, what kind of pouch and key you had at that particular time.

Now, General Miles, one more question or two that I want to ask you. As G-2 you had under your control all of the magic messages that came in and all other information of every type and character, irrespective of where it might come from, with respect to what was going on at that particular time in our relations in the Far East.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, I want to ask you this question based upon all of that information that you had: Did you as Chief of Staff possess any information prior to December the 7th definitely pointing to an attack upon Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Murphy. The gentleman described the witness as Chief of Staff.

Senator Lucas. I mean as G-2.

General Miles. I did not, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you have any specific and advance information as to the precise hour or day that Japan would attack this country or the British or the Dutch prior to the time that it happened?

General Miles. Only as what one might infer from the 1 o'clock message that we received on the 7th of December.

Senator Lucas. I am not asking for your inferences or your implications. I am asking you whether you had any specific and direct information?

General Miles. The answer is no, sir.

Senator Lucas. And what information that you obtained as head of G-2, which was practically all the intelligence information of the country, was transmitted to—not all of it, but the principal parts of it, or anything that you deemed important was transmitted on to the Chief of Staff?

General Miles. What is the question, sir?

Senator Lucas. I say any information that you obtained as head of the Intelligence Department of the War Department at that time, if you believed that it was important enough you saw that the Chief of Staff got that information?

General Miles. I did, sir.

Senator Lucas. And in turn the Chief of Staff saw that the Secretary of State or the President of the United States obtained that information?

General Miles. Presumably so.

Senator Lucas. And the Secretary of War as well?

General Miles. Presumably so.

Senator Lucas. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. General Miles, this may refresh your memory about this insurance. You were not able to see the Honolulu papers. Did you take the New York Times?

General Miles. Yes, sir; I personally took the New York Times. It was also taken by my division.

Senator Ferguson. Well, on August the 25th, 1941, on page 8 of the New York Times the headline is:

Lloyd's stop writing Hawaiian bomb insurance policy, by the Associated Press.
Honolulu, August 24th. Lloyd's of London has discontinued writing bomb insurance for this outpost of the United States Pacific defense. W. B. Brandt of San Francisco, Lloyd's Pacific Coast representative, said new insurance was being refused "not because of fear of war but because of possible sabotage. Rates on bomb insurance here have risen from 10 to 50 cents for a hundred dollars protection. Policies total more than ten million dollars," Mr. Brandt said.

Now, if you would have seen that and you knew that a note was delivered after the President returned from the Atlantic conference parallel with England's note, would that have been of any significance, that Lloyd's of London had stopped writing bomb insurance on Hawaii?

General Miles. Well, Senator, I knew, of course, which was common public knowledge, that in those years, particularly after the first blitz of London, there was a lot of insurance business done in war risk and bombing of all sorts.

That Lloyd's had offered bombardment insurance in Hawaii and then had withdrawn the offer would not of itself have been particularly significant, only that they found certain people out there that would take up their bet and then when they recovered enough money they withdrew. I would certainly not have connected it with the rather secret message which the President of the United States had given on his return from Argentia to the Japanese admiral. I would certainly not have assumed that that was known to Lloyd's.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know at that time that the British Government was very close to Lloyd's and this was at a time that Mr. Churchill had returned from the conference?

General Miles. I had heard that the British Government was pretty close to Lloyd's, yes, sir; but I did not know of my own knowledge and I do not remember ever suspecting that the British Government turned over their rather important secrets about the results of a meeting with the President of the United States to Lloyd's. I certainly would not have assumed it without some definite knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. Well, as I understand it, you had no knowledge whatever about this Lloyd's stopped writing, as the headline says, Hawaii bomb policies.

General Miles. I do not recall that at all.

Senator Ferguson. I think you ought to see this. I think it will just refresh your memory if you come and see it, the way it is written, right under the picture.

Does that refresh your memory in any way? It is in right under the picture that has, "Keeping the Soviet soldiers in touch with events."

General Miles. No, sir; I do not now recall either the picture or that particular article.

Senator Ferguson. Just one more question about the winds message. Was that in the purple code or the secret code messages, or was...
that in the so-called embassy code which was, as a remark has been made in the record, "even the Dutch could break." Did you ever hear that expression before, "Even the Dutch could break it"?

General Miles. I think I have, Senator. I do not remember, sir. I would have to look that up, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, would you do that and find out on that? [4179] General Miles. That is the wind code message?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. The two of them?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.1 Do you know whether or not there was any sabotage at all at or after the attack in the Hawaiian Islands?

General Miles. After or before?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Miles. I believe that there was very little sabotage. I might note, however, that Senator, from my point of view I was not talking only of sabotage. You will notice that in my G-2 message I spoke of subversive activities which include sabotage and espionage.

Senator Ferguson. Is that all you included under that?

General Miles. Well, propaganda to destroy the loyalty or morale of our troops, any other subversive activity but principally sabotage and espionage.

Senator Ferguson. Did you spend more time on that than you did on the other magic, and so forth, your department? Did they spend more time on espionage and counterespionage, and so forth, rather than on the magic?

General Miles. Well, magic, Senator, as, of course, you know, was only one part of our intelligence branch, the branch that was charged with getting information and collat- [4180] ing information, analyzing it and distributing it.

The other big branch of the Military Intelligence Division was counterintelligence. I think we spent more time, however, and devoted more effort on the getting of information and its final distribution than on the counterintelligence as we call it; in other words, the prevention of subversive activities of all kinds against the United States.

[4181] Senator Ferguson. How many people had you in the magic department at the time of Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. I cannot tell you accurately, sir. Colonel Bratton undoubtedly can when he comes to the stand.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have any further questions?

Mr. Gesell. Just a few questions, Mr. Chairman, to straighten one or two matters in the record.

You have been asked, General Miles, whether the reference to sabotage in General Short's reply to General Marshall's message would have resulted if that message had been routed to you as a matter of course.

You recall that message says, "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage." Would not that reply be routed to you?

General Miles. The reply was not routed to me. The reply was routed, undoubtedly, by whoever handled it, which I never knew, by number.

In other words, it was a reply to a numbered telegram of the War

1 In Hearings, Part 5, p. 2074, Mr. Gesell makes the statement that "both messages—818 Nos. 20432 and 23392—were sent not in the 'purple' code, but in the code known as 'J-19.'"
Department and the reply was sent to that division of the General Staff, in this case the Chief of Staff, who had signed the original message.

Mr. Gesell. Now with respect to sabotage, do you know of any acts of sabotage that were committed at Hawaii before or during the attack by any Japanese-American or Japanese [4182] aliens on the Island?

General Miles. I do not, sir.

Mr. Gesell. With respect to the question of whether or not you were ordered by General Marshall not to send magic to the field, there is a contradiction, I believe, in the testimony between you and General Marshall. I understood you to say General Marshall ordered you not to send magic to the field, and I understand General Marshall to say you were authorized to send magic to the field as long as you did not send it in the form of a directive command.

What is the fact in regard to that?

General Miles. I do not think, sir, that I did testify that I was ever ordered by General Marshall not to send magic to the field. If I did, I was certainly wrong.

Mr. Gesell. I may have misunderstood you.

General Miles. What I did testify to was General Marshall’s very keen interest, as well as my own, to preserve the secret of magic, and I felt sure he wanted it limited to as few people as possible, that really had to get the information that magic was conveying.

Mr. Gesell. So that we understand it clearly, there was no order of General Marshall, or anyone superior to you, written or oral, which prevented you from sending the summary or gist of the magic message to the field?

[4183] General Miles. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now one other matter I think we should clarify.

You have been questioned at some length as to whether or not you knew of certain messages which President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull handed to the Japanese Ambassadors. It is a fact, is it not, that those messages, the formal messages that appeared in the various publications we have here, when they were transmitted by Secretary Hull or President Roosevelt to the Japanese, were in turn submitted by the Japanese to their government through magic?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. And that as a result of reading magic you knew at that time of every message that was handed by Secretary Hull or President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassadors?

General Miles. There again, sir, I question whether I have ever testified that I did not know of diplomatic exchanges between the United States Government and the Japanese Government or the Japanese Ambassadors here. If I have given that impression I certainly regret it.

I did know it through my liaison with the State Department in general terms. I did know it on the Japanese side through magic.

What I did testify to, counsel, was that I was not in [4184] the group or called in for consultation or discussion by the group of higher policy-making individuals of the Government as between themselves and with the President of the United States.

Mr. Gesell. I was not referring to that testimony. I recall specifically your testimony in response to a question by Senator Ferguson that you did not know of the oral message handed by President
Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador in August of 1941, referred to sometimes here as the parallel action.

That was reported, was it not, in magic at the time by the Japanese Ambassador to his Government in Tokyo?

General Miles. That was, sir.

Mr. Gesell. And is it not a fact, General Miles, that all persons who were on the list to read magic, through that source saw all of the diplomatic exchanges, the formal diplomatic exchanges between this Government and Japan that were doing on during these negotiations?

General Miles. It is a fact that we saw all the exchanges as viewed in the Japanese eyes. Those messages which the Japanese repeated verbatim to their Government we read verbatim in magic.

Mr. Gesell. That is my point.

General Miles. Exactly.

[4185] Mr. Gesell. In other words, that formal communication was handed to the Japanese by our Government and they sent it verbatim to Tokyo and you, and others who read magic, read that message?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now with respect to the question of intercepting Japanese messages at Manila, do I understand your testimony to be this, that you now know there were, with the Navy at the Philippines, facilities for reading Japanese intercepts, but that at Manila, as far as you now understand it, Manila was able to decode only those messages which Manila itself intercepted. Is that a correct statement?

General Miles. That I do not know, sir, whether they were confined to only the messages which they themselves had intercepted. I testified originally that so far as I know, or perhaps I made it positive because I wanted to be positive whenever I could, the only decoding, decrypting facilities that we, the Army, had, or the Navy had, were in Washington. Then when I was confronted by General MacArthur’s affidavit to Colonel Clausen, which I had never seen before, in which he said he was receiving magic, I thereupon asked my ex-naval colleague at that time, the head of Office of Naval Intelligence, “how about this?” He told me that was true, that they had a secret naval cryptographic section for the service of the Fleet and it was [4186] lodged in Corregidor. I did not go into the question of what codes they could break, or what messages they could break.

Mr. Gesell. For the information of the committee, Commander Leitweiler, or Captain Leitweiler—I forget what his rank was—is on our list of witnesses. He was in charge of that unit in the Philippines, and I think he can give the information to the committee that you are seeking on that point.

With respect to the question of Japanese ship movement, I think Congressman Keefe inadvertently referred to the fact that you obtained information concerning Japanese ship movements from magic.

That is not true, is it? The information concerning Japanese ship movements came from special radio direction finders that the Navy had, which was distinct from magic? Is that not a fact?

General Miles. That is true, sir. There may have been some reference to ship movements in magic, but the great mass of information which naval intelligence was accumulating on the Japanese Navy and on Japanese merchant ships came from radio intercepts.
Mr. Gesell. Now, on page 2470 of the record you were asked a question by Senator Ferguson to this effect: "You knew that the Navy had a high-powered radio that you could have reached Hawaii with," referring to the event I believe, of the 7th, and you said, "I think I did, yes, sir."

Did you have any knowledge as to whether or not that radio was in fact able to communicate with Hawaii on the morning of the 7th, or did you mean only to testify that you knew the Navy had the radio station?

General Miles. The latter sir. I think that is the question.

Mr. Gesell. Now, at page 2437 of the record, referring to the 14th part, you said, "It has been delivered to the recipients about coincidentally with its delivery to me."

Do you know that as a fact of your own knowledge, that the 14th part was delivered to the recipients at the same time it was delivered to you?

General Miles. Not of my own knowledge, sir, because I did not deliver it to the other recipients, or see it delivered to the other recipients.

Mr. Gesell. When did Colonel Bratton tell you that he had called General Marshall on the morning of the 7th?

General Miles. I cannot place that hour, except it was fairly early on the morning of the 7th.

Mr. Gesell. Did he tell you when he had called, what time he called?

General Miles. I do not remember that he told me what time he called.

Mr. Gesell. That is all.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson?

Senator Ferguson. I would like to clear up something. Would you show us the magic in the book, exhibit 1, that sent the message of the 17th of August?

Mr. Gesell. That is not in the book, Senator Ferguson. You will recall when that exhibit was introduced, we called the committee's attention to the fact that we had not reproduced the formal documents that had been exchanged between the Government, inasmuch as they were printed in the official publications of the Department of State.

Senator Ferguson. General Miles, did not you say that you got the interpretation of the Ambassador to the message that was delivered to him on the 17th of August 1941, from magic, in the last questions here from Mr. Gesell?

General Miles. I think not, Senator. What I did say was that whenever the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington transmitted notes or conversations or documents received from the American Government to Japan through magic that I saw it in magic.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, what I want to know is where is that magic that transmitted the message of the 17th? There were two messages on that day, the 17th of August 1941. You were asked here by Mr. Gesell whether or not those messages did not come to your attention, and the interpretation of them, through magic, and you answered "yes."
Now, I show you exhibit 1, and ask you where that information is.

General Miles. I would have to look that up. I have just been told by Mr. Gesell that it has not been published in Exhibit No. 1, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then how could you answer his question that you did get it by magic? Do you have a special recollection that you got those messages by magic?

General Miles. Not at all, sir. I believe I testified, and I believe Mr. Gesell's question was to the effect: Did I receive, from my reading of magic, information that the Japanese were transmitting, as they were being sent by the Japanese ambassadors to the Japanese Government. That was the general question, and not specific as to the message on August 17. Was that not your question?

[4190] Mr. Gesell. That is exactly right.

Senator Ferguson. Will you bring in tomorrow morning the magic that went out covering those two messages delivered on the 17th of August 1941?

I will ask you this question in relation to Colonel Bratton and the Navy radio. Did you hear General Marshall in a statement saying something to the effect that that radio had been offered on that day, and declined; that the Navy radio was offered and declined?

General Miles. I heard General Marshall's testimony to that effect; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know that?

General Miles. I do not remember ever to have known it. I heard one side of the telephone conversation between General Marshall and Admiral Stark. I know nothing of what Admiral Stark said to General Marshall, except what General Marshall told us at the time Admiral Stark had told him.

Senator Ferguson. Did he mention that he had been offered the Navy radio and declined it?

General Miles. I am very sure that he did not.

Senator Ferguson. Then you haven't any knowledge as to why the radio station of the Navy, which was a higher-powered station than yours, was not used?

[4191] General Miles. I have no knowledge of that fact, sir, at all.

Senator Ferguson. Is there anything in the Army's record to show why you could not raise the Army radio that morning?

General Miles. I do not know, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Will you look it up and bring in that information?

Mr. Gesell. Colonel French is going to testify to that, Senator. He is with the Communications Office.

Senator Ferguson. I want to know if there are any records. You will look and see and bring that in if there are any?

General Miles. They would be in the Signal Corps, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Cannot we wait until we get some Signal Corps witnesses?

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have the magic on the 17th.

Mr. Gesell. We will bring it in for you.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Chairman. General, is there any other information in your knowledge pertinent to this inquiry about Pearl Harbor that has not been elicited by the questions asked of you at \[4193\] this inquiry that you would like to give to the committee?

General Miles. Senator, at the risk of taking up too much of the committee's time, I was asked by a Senator, or a member of the committee, if I had been investigated by any agent of the Secretary of War, or the Chief of Staff. I would like to answer that question very definitely, "no."

Also questions were asked me as to my relief as G-2 in connection with Pearl Harbor. I am perfectly willing to rest that matter on the testimony of the Chief of Staff, adding solely that I did have the honor and pleasure of serving as an assistant chief of staff to General Marshall something between two and three times as long as any other officer served as head of one of the general staff's departments while I was there.

\[4193\] The Chairman. Anything further?

General Miles. Nothing further, sir.

The Chairman. Well, the committee thanks you, General, for your very cooperative effort to bring out the information which the committee seeks, and the committee appreciates it very much.

On behalf of the committee, I thank you.

General Miles. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Before we recess, the Chair has obtained, through the courtesy of Senator Walsh, Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, two volumes of information called, "A Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigation," consisting of volumes 1 and 2. This narrative was prepared at the suggestion of the Committee on Naval Affairs for its benefit. Senator Walsh has been kind enough to furnish enough of these to provide each member of the committee with one, that is, one set of two volumes each. They are marked "Confidential," but they are not confidential; and therefore they are public property now.

The Chair asks that they be distributed to each member of the committee at this time, so that they may have the benefit of them for their perusal. I think there may be two or three sets in my office that the press might use, if they wish.

\[4194\] The committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed until 10 o'clock a.m. of the following day, Friday, December 14, 1945.)

Part 4—December 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945—follows.

×