PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
Pursuant to
S. Con. Res. 27
(79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THEREETO

PART 4
DECEMBER 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1945

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
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The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Chairman, before General Gerow's examination continues I have a statement to present to the committee about the situation of the legal staff, if I may do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; the chair will recognize counsel for that purpose.

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Chairman, the point we have reached in the hearings makes it evident that a complete replacement of the committee's legal staff is necessary.

The committee began its hearings November 15 and has been sitting regularly for a month, including all Saturdays but one. During that period only 8 witnesses have been completely examined and we estimate that as the field of inquiry by committee members has widened out and new witnesses have been added to the list, there remain at least 60 witnesses to be examined. Many of these witnesses are quite as crucial as those who have testified. At the rate of progress during the past month, it seems certain that several more months of hearings will be required.

When I undertook to serve the committee as chief counsel, I believed that my services would not be needed beyond early January. This resulted from several factors:

I had and still have a definite conviction that the real purpose of this committee was to present facts which would permit a final answer to this basic question: Who was responsible for the failure of our forces at Hawaii to be on the alert and for the admitted failure to use to the best advantage such defense facilities as were available at Pearl Harbor?

The joint resolution of the Congress under which the committee is acting requires a final report of the committee to be made not later than January 3, 1946. I assumed that time limit meant what it said.

1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.
I had every reason to feel that the essential facts bearing on this basic question could be presented thoroughly within the time set. There had already been six inquiries into this question. As a result we had as a starting point the testimony of most of the principal participants and a substantial amount of documentary material previously assembled. At the beginning of my employment, as I then informed the committee, I undertook with my staff to spend approximately 6 weeks in the preparation of evidence and I stated to the committee that commencing on or about November 15 we would be in a position to present in an organized and orderly fashion the evidence which we had assembled.

I have never had the idea, nor do I have it today, that counsel should be the sole judge as to what evidence should be presented to the committee or what avenues of inquiry the committee should follow. I thought that there are certain essential facts, as to which there could be no doubt as to pertinence or relevance, which counsel should present at the outset in order to lay out the basic groundwork. I thought and so stated to the committee that at the conclusion of this presentation, which we had every reason to feel could be completed well within the time limit set, the committee would then be in a position to appraise the case as a whole and determine what additional evidence was required or whether any other witnesses should be called.

Since the start of the hearing it has become increasingly apparent that some members of the committee have a different view than that entertained by counsel, either as to the scope of the inquiry or as to what is pertinent evidence. This has been reflected in extensive examination by some members of the committee far beyond what the legal staff anticipated.

This unexpected development during the last month has made it clear to me and all of my staff that it is not possible to complete the hearings within anything approximating the time I originally anticipated, and, accordingly, I am certain of my own inability, and that of my staff, to see the job through to the end. All of my staff accepted their places on my expectation and assurances that they would not be held for any considerable time after January 1st. My own obligations and responsibilities put me in the same position.

This outcome is a source of deep concern and regret to me and to the other members of my staff. I did not want the place as counsel, but under the circumstances I felt I could not refuse it. I had hoped to perform a useful public service in aiding to present publicly all the pertinent facts which would permit the committee, the Congress, and the public to answer the questions in their minds. Our entire staff has worked days, nights, and Sundays for 2 months and a half. We have produced, or prepared for introduction, much pertinent evidence that has never been produced at any previous inquiry about Pearl Harbor. We are all depressed that because of the course of the proceedings we have not been able to present it.

It is necessary for me to ask the committee to arrange for other counsel to carry on. If that is done with reasonable promptness there should be no serious break in the hearings. We have already done a large part of the work in digging out and organizing basic material and documents, and arranging for the witnesses.

I want to make it clear that there has been no restriction placed upon counsel by any member of the committee or by any agency
of the Government as far as presenting pertinent evidence is concerned. We have had access to all pertinent records and have received complete cooperation from all Government departments concerned. I feel sure that this same condition will continue. We will make every effort to aid the new counsel in preparing for their work and, during that process, we can, if the committee desires, continue, for the rest of December and for a short time in January, presenting evidence to the committee so that the new legal staff can pick up the case and carry on.

The Chairman. The Chair would like to state, in connection with that statement of our chief counsel, that in his opinion the development as outlined there is, as far as this committee is concerned and the Congress, the country I think, tragic.

I would like to say for the record that when this committee was appointed—I will go back of that, when the reports that were released of the War Inquiry Board and Navy Board of Inquiry, I think in August, there was a general feeling, in which I shared and so stated on the floor of the Senate, that the confusion growing out of the various investigations and reports was such that, in my judgment, it required a congressional investigation. I felt that it was a responsibility of the majority party in Congress to make that investigation and accept the responsibility and whatever the consequences might be, and believing that I introduced the resolution under which we have been acting since the 6th of September, I think, or since its adoption by the House.

One of the first tasks to be performed was the selection of counsel. That was not an easy task. We had a number of applications for appointment of chief counsel by able lawyers. I think the committee felt we would have to draft somebody, some outstanding man whose character and whose record for ability, integrity, and experience in legal matters, and especially in the Governmental setups, would insure a thorough and nonpartisan examination into this question.

The first name suggested, or that occurred to me and to other members of the committee, and I think generally, was Hon. William D. Mitchell, who had been Solicitor General 4 years in the Coolidge Administration, and had been Attorney General for 4 years in the Hoover Administration.

I called Mr. Mitchell over the telephone in New York and told him that I had been authorized to consult him as to the availability of his services, and he said that he had a busy law practice and he was not seeking any additional assignments, but if the committee felt that he was the man desired to conduct this investigation from a legal standpoint, he would accept.

I asked him to come down to Washington to sit with the committee and discuss it, which he did. He was unanimously selected, and the press generally, and the country, reacted most favorably to that selection, and I think both Houses of Congress did also.

The committee authorized him to select his own staff, because if he were to be responsible for the conduct of the investigation from the standpoint of the counsel, obviously it was necessary for him to select men with whom he could work and in whom he had confidence, and so he set about to make the selection of his assistants. No
injunction or suggestion was made to him, as far as I know, certainly not in the committee, and if anybody individually made any such suggestion I am not aware of it, that there should be any politics or any partisanship in the selection of counsel.

The chairman of this committee does not know now and has never inquired whether any member of this legal staff were Democrats or Republicans.

Mr. Mitchell came down and began to organize his staff and to look into the mass of records involved in this investigation. It was a herculean task, involving the State, War and Navy Departments, and other agencies of the Government, and, as Mr. Mitchell has said, they have worked day and night and Sundays in making available to the committee everything that appeared to be pertinent to the inquiry without restriction and immediately.

I, as chairman of the committee, asked all the departments, from the President down, to make available to the counsel every bit of pertinent record or testimony that might bear upon this investigation.

The chairman of the committee has been, of course, as chairman, in touch with counsel. It was necessary to confer with him day by day over details that it was unnecessary and impossible for the committee to do as a whole. That is one of the functions of the chairman. The chairman is able to say, without reservation, that Mr. Mitchell, and his entire staff, have devoted themselves conscientiously, without sparing themselves in any way, in undertaking to develop the evidence that the committee might want or might feel that it needed in order to make an investigation available to the public and held in public, so that the people themselves would know every word of testimony produced here and make up their own minds about the responsibility of anybody in the Government for the disaster at Pearl Harbor, regardless of the opinion of any member of the committee, or of the committee as a whole.

The chairman feels like saying to Mr. Mitchell, and to his entire staff, that in his experience as a legislator covering 33 years, and a longer experience in public life and in the practice of law, he does not recall a more diligent, earnest, painstaking, unselfish effort made by a lawyer or group of lawyers to perform their services as a public duty.

When Mr. Mitchell was asked to come down here he insisted that he did not want to consider any question of compensation, that what he did would be a matter of public duty.

One or two members of his staff have insisted likewise, that they were not interested in any compensation that the committee or Congress might pay them. They have sacrificed their time and income in order to serve this committee and, as they felt, serve the country and do a constructive job in presenting this case, in presenting the evidence and in digging it out, which the committee could not do as a committee.

Late yesterday afternoon Mr. Mitchell called me, as chairman of this committee, into the office where he and his staff had been engaged in work and advised me that they would be compelled, under the circumstances, to take the step which they have now taken. I attempted to dissuade them from that decision and asked them to consider it overnight, in the hope that they might reach a different conclusion. They have not reached a different conclusion.
Now it is a tragedy that we are to lose the services of these gentlemen. To select new counsel at this time, or within the next week or two, involves a difficulty the result and solution of which I cannot now foresee. I do not know to what extent any lawyer, or any group of lawyers, who are engaged in their own practice, who have a reputation and standing as lawyers and as citizens that would justify their selection by this committee, would be available.

The chairman does not know whether it would be possible at all under the circumstances to substitute counsel who would be in a position to undertake the onerous task which would devolve upon such counsel, notwithstanding the groundwork which has been laid by the counsel and his assistants.

[4206] The Chair expresses his profound regret that the situation, as it has developed up to now, has required the action taken by General Mitchell and his assistant counsel. I cannot make any prediction. I have no idea who might be willing to take over the job. I have no idea how much longer these hearings will last.

When I introduced the resolution and fixed the 3d of January as the date for making the report I honestly believed that we could, within 4 months from that date, bring about the development of this evidence publicly and make our report on the 3d day of January. On account of the mass of detailed information and documents that had to be gone into by the counsel, it took some time to arrange all that and to get it available, and there was a little more delay in the beginning of the hearings than I, at the time of the introduction of the resolution, anticipated.

[4207] On the whole, I think that was a timesaver in this respect: that it gathered and selected and made available the information from the standpoint of the presentation of the case, and that that delay which was necessary as it turned out did not in any way cause any undue postponement of the beginning of the hearing.

It is obvious now to all of us that the hearings cannot be concluded and the report made by the 3d of January, and that an extension of time must be requested of the Senate and House. How much more time will be required, the Chair would not even prophesy.

We have had, as General Mitchell has said, 10 witnesses up to now, only 8 of whom have been concluded, as far as the examination is concerned, with 2 more still on the stand and uncompleted, and at the rate of progress made in the examination of these witnesses, it would be difficult to prophesy how many months it would require to conclude this testimony.

The chairman wishes to say that he not only did not seek appointment to this committee, notwithstanding the fact that he introduced the resolution, he did not seek appointment to this committee, but protested against his appointment and argued with the President of the Senate for days, seeking to persuade him not to appoint the chairman as a member of the committee.

As majority leader of the Senate I had all that any ordinary human being could be expected to do, and I realized that in order to give this position the service and to do the justice to which it was entitled, I would have to abandon my duties temporarily as Majority Leader, and almost as a Senator.

I must, in my own mind, decide whether I have any further duty in regard to this investigation, and whether, if I have any duty, it
outweighs my duty on the floor of the Senate in the capacity in which I have been chosen by that body, and in which I served for more than 8 years.

I must say in good conscience, and say it publicly, and I think the committee is entitled to have me say that during the next few days I will weigh my relative objections as a member of this committee alongside of my obligations as a member of the Senate and as Majority Leader, and if I conclude in my own mind that I must make the decision that my duties in the Senate over the next 3 or 4 or 6 months, whatever the time may be outweigh my duties as a member of this committee I shall thereupon surrender my chairmanship of this committee and resign as a member of the committee.

If I conclude in my own mind—and I must again say [4200] I must reach the decision myself—that I can render any additional service as a member of this committee over a period of months, and that that service and that obligation may outweigh my obligation on the floor of the Senate, I shall decide accordingly. But I feel that, in view of the whole situation as we all understand it here, I must within the next few days reach a conclusion as to what my course will be.

Whatever my course will be, I want chief counsel and all his assistants to know that I have appreciated their contribution to this development in this public hearing, and to the evaluation of the testimony, and the service which all of us have assumed they would and that they have rendered.

I have never in so brief a time been associated with men in the legal profession or in legislation for whom I have a more profound respect and in whom I have greater confidence, and I want them to know that as far as I am concerned, and I think I speak for the committee in that respect.

That is all I feel like saying. I cannot but feel depressed, immeasurably depressed over this development and I don’t think I need say anything more at the moment.

Senator George. Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted to [4210] make a very brief statement?

The Chairman. Senator George.

Senator George. I think the Chairman of the committee knows, and I know the President of the Senate well understands, I have remained on the committee because I felt we were fortunate in securing the assistance and aid of General Mitchell.

I have been perfectly willing from the outset to allow General Mitchell and his staff, in whom I have complete confidence, to organize and lay out this inquiry. I have believed that there was not but one way to ascertain the truth and answer the question, which, under the Senate resolution we were called upon to consider, and that was to get a complete view of the pertinent, relevant, and material facts that could be developed only through the conscientious work and skill of counsel.

Of course, I recognize the right of all members of the committee to cross-examine witnesses at any length, but I have wondered whether or not we were confusing the issue rather than arriving at any answer in which the public could have any confidence. I still feel that way about it.
I deeply regret General Mitchell's decision and the decision of the other members of his staff. I appreciate [4211] the facts stated by General Mitchell to this committee this morning, and I think it is only fair to say that all members of the committee understood that General Mitchell hoped to conclude the inquiry by or very soon after the turn of the year, as he has already stated to us.

I merely wish to say that I deeply regret the decision which General Mitchell and his staff have been forced to make in the circumstances, in view of the now clearly indicated length of this inquiry, and I know that their separation from service here with this committee is a loss to the committee, to the Congress as a whole, and I think to the country.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I say just a word?

The Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I desire to concur in what the able Senator from Georgia, and the able Senator from Kentucky have said with respect to this announcement of General Mitchell this morning. It is a source of deep regret to me that General Mitchell and his staff feel it necessary to leave this extremely important national assignment, and I say without fear of contradiction that it is a great loss to the American people, in view of the magnificent job that they have done up to date.

I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, that General Mitchell [4212] and his staff will continue through this month, and that these hearings may continue from day to day just as we have planned them.

It may be that by January 3, we will have a better opportunity to assess the time necessary to conclude the hearings. Of course, in the meantime we can be arranging for counsel to take over should the contingency arise that it will be necessary to extend this hearing.

I want to say in conclusion, as one member of the committee, I had never met any of these gentlemen before beginning my service with the committee.

I had frequently read and heard about General Mitchell. The first time I ever met him or saw him was when he appeared before our committee for the first time. I was deeply impressed with his frank, opening statement. I concurred in what he wanted to do. That was to bring in every shred of evidence that they could possibly find that would throw any light upon this Pearl Harbor disaster. Counsel selected to aid him in this cause have been more than diligent in the preparation of this case.

I again reiterate that it is a tremendous loss to this committee and to the country that these fine men feel it necessary to remove themselves from their assignment.

The Chairman. The Chairman would like to say that [4213] General Mitchell and his staff have assured him that they will continue until the committee takes its recess for the Christmas holidays. It has been my thought that we would recess for the Christmas holidays probably Saturday, the 22nd, but it may be more convenient for some members to recess the 21st. Under the circumstances, it doesn't make much difference, apparently. So that we will have the services of General Mitchell and his staff until such time as the committee recesses for the holidays, and in the meantime we may be able to assess the situation more accurately.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Cooper.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to detain the committee longer than to concur with the Chairman, the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Illinois in the remarks they have made.
It had not been my privilege to know General Mitchell or any of the members of his staff prior to the time they were selected for work with this committee.
I have been most favorably impressed by all of them. I think they have done an outstanding job, and have rendered an outstanding public service. As a member of the committee I regret exceedingly that the situation has developed so [4214] that they feel they must not continue longer than the end of this month in the excellent service that they have rendered the committee.
It is a matter of very great regret that the situation could not have developed so that we could have gone on with this investigation as was originally planned, outlined, and understood, and under the able guidance of General Mitchell and his staff.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman —
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. I want to state on the record that in my judgment, Mr. Mitchell has held positions of great honor in this country; he has an outstanding reputation as a lawyer; he and his staff have been able, conscientious, sincere, thorough, and have thus far made a clear presentation of the facts in this inquiry.
I regret that it has been necessary for him and his staff, in view of the developments, to come to the conclusion they have.
[4215] The Chairman. General Gerow, I believe, is now here and ready to proceed. I have forgotten who was examining.
The Vice Chairman. Counsel was examining.
The Chairman. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW (Resumed)

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, I understand you have in mind asking for some corrections in the transcript of your testimony?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you like to present them now?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
In reviewing my testimony given before this committee on 5 December 1945, I have found several statements made by me which for purposes of the record should be clarified:
(a) On page 2643, lines 24 and 25, and page 2644, lines 2 and 8, committee counsel stated as follows:

Go to the third item in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5; please look at that and give us the date of that and briefly just what the scope of that plan is, or was?

The bound folder which was handed me contained two documents, i.e., Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 and a revision thereof dated November 19, 1941. I apparently read from the revision rather than the original [4216] document. Since
the War Department Operations Plan, Rainbow No. 5 was based on
the original joint plan and not on the revision thereof and since it is
therefore my belief that I should have identified and quoted from the
original plan, my statement as it appears on page 2643, lines 24 and
25, and page 2644, lines 2 and 3, should have been as follows:

There are two plans in this folder: Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—
Rainbow No. 5 and a revision thereof. The original plan was approved by the
Secretary of the Navy on 28 May 1941 and by the Secretary of War on 2 June
1941. It was never approved by the President. The revision of the plan was
approved by the Joint Board on 19 November 1941.

I can best describe this plan by quoting the general assumptions as stated in
the original Rainbow No. 5 plan.

"Section III. General Assumptions. That the Associated Powers, comprising
initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Nether-
lands East Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the
"Free French" are at war against the Axis Powers, comprising either:

"a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, or

"b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

"That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in [4217] accord
with ABC-1 and ABC-22.

"That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility
of their intervention must be taken into account.

"That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be
able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical
materials, from sources in that general region.

"That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive
elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct
direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics
will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense."

Again:

(b) On page 2646, lines 11, 12, and 13 in commenting on the fact
that the War Department Operations Plan which you handed me bore
no date, I stated:

I know it was sent to Hawaii in August, 1941, and the receipt was received
back from the War Department on September 3, 1941.

This would have been more accurately stated as follows:

This plan was approved by the Chief of Staff and sent to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department in August, 1941. [4218] The records of
the War Department show that a receipt for this document, dated 3 September
1941, from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was received in the
War Department on 15 September 1941.

Again:

(c) On page 2646, lines 14, 15, and 16, the committee counsel stated
as follows:

The next item here is extracts from Hawaiian Defense Projects, Revision 1940.
Will you look at that and tell me the scope and nature of that document and
the date.

My answer to that should have been as follows:

Yes, sir. This document was prepared in Hawaii. It is a local plan or rather
defense project based on Joint Army and Navy War Plan (Orange) 1938.

Again:

(d) On page 2647, lines 14 to 17, the committee Chairman stated:

May I ask of the General: You say this was in 1940, and based on that previous
item which you have just discussed which seems to have been approved in
August, 1941. Is not there some divergence as to dates?
I see that my answer to that question was not quite clear. It would have been better answered as follows:

This defense project was not based on War Department [4219] Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5 approved in August, 1941. This document is a compilation of approved projects for personnel, armament, matériel and funds. It was compiled by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as of December 1, 1940.

This document was referred to the War Department where the separate projects contained therein were reviewed to determine that they were in accordance with approved War Department directives. When new separate projects, submitted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, were approved by the War Department the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was notified by letter or radio that these projects were then included in the next compilation of this document.

The 1940 edition of the Hawaiian Defense Project is based on the Army mission as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic Plan Orange 1938, which is substantially the same as that contained in War Department Operations Plan—Rainbow #5, August 1941.

Again:

(c) On page 2647, line 25, and page 2648, line 2, committee counsel asked the following question:

The next item is joint coastal defense plan, Hawaii. What is that?

My answer would have been more clearly stated as follows:

[4220] This is a joint plan that was prepared by the local Commanders in Hawaii, Army and Navy. It is based on the joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans and the Army and Navy plans furnished by the War and Navy Departments.

(f) On page 2650, lines 23 and 24, committee counsel in questioning me regarding the "5 November, 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department," asked:

Did you see that document before December 6, 1941?

to which I replied:

I don't recall ever having seen it before December 7. I think the records of the War Department show it came in later in 1942.

I have since had the War Department records checked and find that that document was received in the War Department on March 7, 1942.

The purpose of most of those corrections, sir, is to correct the dates, that I did not have with me at the time, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, I want to direct your attention to the events of December 6 and 7, 1941, and particularly in relation to this so-called 14-part message that was intercepted, the message from the Japanese Government to their Ambassadors in Washington, of which 13 parts were translated before midnight and the 14th part and the 1 p.m. part on the morning of the 7th.

[4227] You have that in mind, have you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you tell us, if you remember, what your movements were on the afternoon and the evening of December 6. Have you any recollection of that?

General Gerow. No, sir; I have no clear recollection of where I was on the afternoon of the 6th.

Mr. Mitchell. I am more interested in the evening of the 6th, after the dinner hour. Do you remember that?

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not recall. I believe though, sir, that I was at home.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, if this 13th part of this message had been translated, decoded and translated, by the Signal Corps, Signal Intelligence Service, it was their custom to deliver the decoded message, or exhibit the decoded message, to you in your office, was that the practice?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; that was the practice.

Mr. Mitchell. In case of your absence from the office, for instance, on the evening of the 6th, was there anybody there in War Plans Division whose function it was to receive the copy of the decoded message or make any effort to reach you?

General Gerow. No, sir; there was no one actually in the office. The procedure, sir, was to designate what we [4222] call a duty officer for each day. The responsibility of that duty officer was to remain—he could go home—but he remained at his telephone so he could be reached at any time by the Adjutant General or the Office of the Chief of Staff. He could get in touch with me and inform me of any important messages that might be intended for me, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. If the Signal Intelligence Service people translated a message of that type on the evening of the 6th, what would be the practice that they would follow in endeavoring to have copies of it delivered to the War Plans Division or to you or to a duty officer, how does that work?

General Gerow. I think, sir, if they had an important message to deliver to me that Colonel Bratton, who usually delivered those messages, would have telephoned me at my home, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. In other words, the message would go from the Signal Corps, Signal Intelligence Service, to G-2, would it, and then to you, or would it come direct to your office?

General Gerow. It was delivered to my office by a representative of G-2.

Mr. Mitchell. G-2. So that in order to reach you personally a decoded copy of such a message would pass first through G-2 and then to your office or your duty officer?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; that would be the procedure, sir.

[4223] Mr. Mitchell. So that on the evening of the 6th if G-2 wanted to place a copy of such message in your hands, their arrangement would have been that they would have to call your duty officer, locate you through him?

General Gerow. No, sir. My telephone number was on record in the War Department and I believe the representative of G-2 would have called me directly rather than calling the duty officer.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you on the night of the 6th receive any copy or learn of any such message as the 13-part message?

General Gerow. To the best of my knowledge and belief I did not, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. There was a pilot message which came in earlier and which was an announcement by the Japs to their Ambassadors to look out for the long message which was to follow. It is found on page 238 of exhibit 1.

Will you look at it and see whether you ever on the 6th were informed of the receipt of that message, or if you have any recollection about it?

General Gerow. I do not recall having received that message, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. What is your recollection about going to your office or to the War Department on the morning of Sunday, December 7.
1941? Do you remember your movements on that morning?

General Gerow. I remember, sir, that I went to the office that morning. I believe I arrived there shortly before 10 o'clock. There was some unfinished business that I had to take care of with some of my senior officers and we met there on Sunday morning and were there. I think, prior to 10 o'clock, sir.

[4225] Mr. Mitchell. Did you see or learn of this fourteenth part and 1 p. m. decoded series of messages on the morning of the 7th at any time?

General Gerow. The first time I saw them, sir, was in the office of the Chief of Staff about 11:30, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you state what occurred there?

General Gerow. May I refresh my memory? I submitted a memorandum on that shortly after the event.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you produce that memorandum? It is in evidence as exhibit 39, and it has already been read to the committee, but will you please look at it?

General Gerow. Shall I read it, sir?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I think it would be well to do so, and bring out the contents again.

General Gerow. It would be much more accurate than my memory, sir, at the present time.

This is a memorandum for record, dated December 15, 1941:

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 a. m., e. s. t., General Marshall called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 p. m., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Govern-

[4226] ment instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The penciled draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East; CG, Caribbean Defense Command; CG, Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army was read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed to take the penciled draft of the message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes, and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach destinations in about 30 minutes. The penciled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.

Signed, "L. T. Gerow, Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff."

Mr. Mitchell. Do you remember anything more about that incident than is stated in your memorandum?

General Gerow. No, sir; I cannot recall anything that is not stated in this memorandum, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Before you went to General Marshall's office at his request, had you heard from anyone of the receipt and decoding of that message?

General Gerow. I had not, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Had you seen or talked with Colonel [4227]Bratton about it?

General Gerow. To the best of my knowledge and belief I had not, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Had General Miles had any conversations with you about it before you went to General Marshall's office?
General Gerow. I do not recall having seen General Miles that morning until I saw him in the office of the Chief of Staff at 11:30, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Referring back to the period from November 27 on, after the so-called alert messages were sent out to the commanders of the overseas stations, do you recall that after that warning of the 27th, which you sent over General Marshall's signature to the commander at Hawaii, and to others, any discussion took place that you participated in, or knew about as to sending any additional warnings?

General Gerow. No, sir. I do not recall any discussions on that point.

Mr. Mitchell. I think, if the committee please, that that is all I have at the present from General Gerow. I suggest the committee inquire from him.

The Vice Chairman. General Gerow, you were head of War Plans Division at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as you have testified?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You participated in the drafting of the message of November 27 to the commanding general of the Hawaiian department, and the other commanders to whom that message was sent?

General Gerow. I did, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Did you regard that message to the commanding general of the Hawaiian department as adequate and sufficient as an alert message?

General Gerow. I did, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Senator George.

Senator George. I have no questions at this time.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that someone else will ask every question that I could possibly think of, so I defer any questioning.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. I have no questions.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire.

Mr. Murphy. General Gerow, there has been some testimony in the several hearings, by Colonel Bratton, about some attempt to get in touch with someone in your office, as I recall it, to deliver the 13-part message. Have you made any inquiry as to whether or not any attempt was made to deliver that by actually making contact with someone on your staff on the night of December 6, 1941?

General Gerow. I have made no such inquiry, sir. I think if any of my officers had been contacted on that important message, they would have informed me, sir.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you did not, as you presently recollect have any notice whatsoever of the 13-part message until you arrived in General Marshall's office on the morning of the 7th?

General Gerow. That is the first time I recall having seen that message.

Mr. Murphy. There has been some testimony in the previous hearings about a pouch that was delivered on the night of the 6th. There has been some doubt as to what actual papers were in that pouch,
whether it was the 13-part message or the so-called pilot message, and other papers of the afternoon of the 6th. Do you know whether you ever received the pilot message prior to your going to General Marshall's office?

General Gerow. I do not recall having seen this message, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Do you know what the pilot message as [4230] referred to here, is?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, do you recall having been in General Marshall's office when Colonel Bratton was sent to the Signal Corps end of the War Department to inquire as to how long it would take to dispatch the message of December 7 to the Pacific theaters?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I was in his office at the time and I recall that, sir.

Mr. Murphy. After Colonel Bratton was sent, or directed by General Marshall to make that inquiry, do you recall his returning to General Marshall's office?

General Gerow. I can recall that he came back and reported that it would take about 30 minutes.

Mr. Murphy. Was that to send it to all of the Pacific theaters, the Panama Canal, the Hawaiian Department, the Philippine Department, and possibly Alaska?

General Gerow. I don't recall that that question came up at the time, sir.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the message had been directed to be sent to the several Pacific theaters?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, after the message of the 27th was sent, you said the other day that it was your impression [4231] when the Short reply arrived that it was in answer to the other messages sent as to sabotage, rather than in answer to the command for an alert from General Marshall. At that time the gentleman from Wisconsin suggested that you be asked about the fact that it was signed "Marshall," that is, the message going out. And the answer was directed to "Marshall." Do you recall that?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Of course, the Short message did say that it was in reply to 472. You would not know then what 472 was; is that right?

General Gerow. I would not know at that time; no, sir, because that is a number put on to the message by the Signal Corps, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, the war plans, in effect at Hawaii between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, called for cooperation and liaison in regard to reconnaissance, and in regard to the use of the equipment there in the event of an emergency, did it not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. It was the standing rule over the years for the War Department at Hawaii, and the Navy Department to have liaison, was it not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

[4232] Mr. Murphy. So that when General Short sent the message in reply to General Marshall's message of the 27th, and said "Liaison with Navy," did you think that General Short would send a message in answer to a war direction or an alert message that would
merely say they had been doing what they had been doing over the years, having ordinary liaison with the Navy? Do you understand my question?

General Gerow. I don't quite understand it, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Well, for years, and always, as I understand it, there was supposed to be liaison at any outlying theater between the Army and the Navy. That is a fact, is it not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, the message of the 27th was a war alert, as I understand it, and then the reply of General Short was to the effect, "Liaison with the Navy."

Would you, as head of the War Plans Division, expect that a lieutenant general at Hawaii would take the time to send a telegram merely saying to General Marshall that he was maintaining the same liaison with the Navy that he had been over the months prior to receiving an alert message?

General Gerow. No, sir. I think in that case, that [4233] that phrase would have a different meaning.

Mr. Murphy. Would it not be fair to assume that in view of the message of General Marshall, that the reply of General Short, "Liaison with the Navy," meant that there had been an actual conference with the Navy, a discussion of plans to meet the war warning message from the Navy and the war warning message from General Marshall, and that the necessary steps had been taken to put into effect the plan which they had already prepared to have proper liaison, proper cooperation, and an all-out alert, or the necessary alert to meet the impending danger?

General Gerow. The message was susceptible of the interpretation that you have outlined, sir.

[4234] Mr. Murphy. At any rate Colonel Bundy saw the message, did he not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And Colonel Bundy was the man on your staff whose duty it was to follow up on messages of that kind and to see whether or not they were responsive to the Marshall message of the 27th; is that right?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Then, as I understand it, Colonel Bundy unfortunately met his death on the way to Hawaii immediately after Pearl Harbor?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did Colonel Bundy leave any kind of a memorandum in the War Department files which would explain his reaction to the General Short telegram of the 28th?

General Gerow. I have had the records searched very carefully and I can find no such record and I don't recall of my own knowledge having talked to Colonel Bundy about that after December 7.

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions.

The Chairman. Senator Brewster is still absent. Therefore Congressman Gearhart may inquire.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I just clarify the record on one point?
[4235] Will you give Colonel Bundy's initials, will you furnish them? 1

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I know his first initial was "C," but I don't know what his middle initial was.

Mr. Murphy. There has been reference by General Marshall to a Mr. Bundy who was an assistant, as I understand it, a civilian assistant to Secretary of War Stimson.

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Was he a separate and distinctly different person from the Colonel Bundy in the War Plans Division?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. Mr. Bundy in the Secretary's office was a civilian. Colonel Bundy was an officer of the Regular Army. His first name was Charles. I don't recall his middle initial.

Mr. Murphy. If there had been liaison with the Navy in accordance with the war plan already drafted and ready for execution at Hawaii, in your judgment would we have had the same result on December 7 which we actually had?

General Gerow. No, sir. I think if the means on hand had been properly alerted and properly used that the damage that the Japs did at Pearl Harbor would have been considerably less.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Kimmel had a message commencing with the words, "This is a war warning." General Short had  [4236] a message putting him on warning that hostilities might commence at any moment. If there had been a conference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short and a discussion of the plans necessary to meet that situation and a putting into effect the kind of plan they already had, you say there would have been a different result on December 7?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I believe the damage would not have been so great.

Mr. Murphy. That is all.

The Chairman. Congressman Gearhart is now recognized.

Mr. Gearhart. General Gerow, you have been present in the hearing room during the examination of General Marshall, have you not?

General Gerow. Only one afternoon, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Were you here when I, on two different occasions, referred to the seven intercepted Japanese messages, messages which either asked for information or supplied information with reference to ship movements in the Hawaiian area?

General Gerow. I don't believe, sir, I was present when you asked those questions. May I see the messages, sir?

Mr. Gesell. You are referring to the ones in exhibit 2, are you?

The Chairman. May the Chair ask the photographers not to interfere with the examination of the witness.

[4237]. Mr. Gearhart. I am referring to the intercepted messages which appear on pages 12, 13, 14, and 15, seven messages in all.

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I have those; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, those messages, each one of them, refer specifically, do they not, to the Hawaiian area?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. They are from Tokyo to Honolulu and Honolulu to Tokyo. Now, the first of these messages divides the Hawaiian area, the island with the name of Oahu, they divide this island into seven areas for purposes of subsequent exchanges of intelligence between Honolulu and Tokyo, do they not?

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1 Col. Charles W. Bundy.
General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Then the other messages either called for reports of ship movements in that area, or render reports on ship movements in that area, do they not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And there is one of the messages which reveals a little impatience on the part of Tokyo in respect to the information they were getting, asking for reports not only when ship movements occur but when they do not occur, is that not correct?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, in your opinion, after reviewing those seven messages will you not say that they reveal an inordinate interest in our Navy's operations in the Hawaiian area on the part of the Japanese?

General Gerow. They certainly indicate interest in those movements, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, none of those messages were called to the attention of General Short or Admiral Kimmel so far as you know?

General Gerow. No, sir; not so far as I know.

Mr. Gearhart. Why were they not called to their attention?

General Gerow. I believe, sir, that G-2 can testify to that better than I can, sir. They are not messages on which the War Plans Division would normally be called upon to direct special operations.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, the War Plans Division of which you were the head makes plans for warfare and for defense, doesn't it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Then aren't you charged with an interest in plans I have described that are being made—

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). By a nation that might be an enemy of ours?

General Gerow. I had a very decided interest in it, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, do not these seven messages react on your mind as possible evidence of war plans that were being perfected by Japan?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; they do so react but at the moment, sir, these messages were brought to me in a locked despatch case. I cannot recall now whether they all came together or not. I cannot recall whether I saw all of them or not. They were taken out of the despatch case and read by me and handed back to the officer. I did not attempt to evaluate the magic messages that came to me, sir. If there were any that struck me at the moment that they were especially important I would usually contact G-2 and discuss those particular messages with him.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if it is not your precise duty to read the intercepts that are brought to you and very material, to read, to understand, to evaluate and to recommend action, what was your function in reading them? Why were they submitted to you?

General Gerow. They were submitted to me, sir, as a matter of information, to keep me informed as to the general situation. As I stated before, if there had been a message in the intercepts that conveyed to me the idea that Japan was probably going to attack any place in the globe I would consider that it required action on our part, sir, and to draft a warning message and take it
up to the Chief of Staff. I did not so interpret those messages at that time, sir, as I now recall.

Mr. Gearhart. You knew that relations with Japan were very rapidly deteriorating, did you not?

General Gerow. I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You were being advised of that by other Army and Navy high responsible officers, weren't you, from time to time?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And even though you knew our relations with Japan were rapidly deteriorating, knowing also that, I believe, the American Navy was, ship for ship, very much inferior to the Japanese Navy in the Pacific, the fact that Japan was asking for definite information concerning our Navy over and over again and dividing the Island of Oahu into areas did not impress you as important information?

General Gerow. I do not recall, sir, having seen these particular messages. I presume that I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It was your duty not only to see them but to read them, to understand them, to evaluate them and [4241] recommend action upon them, wasn't it?

General Gerow. No, sir; it was not my duty to evaluate all the magic that came to my office, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It ceased to be your duty to evaluate them in August of 1941, did it not?

General Gerow. I did not understand the question, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It was your duty to evaluate them, prepare action upon them with recommendations to the Chief of Staff prior to August of 1941, was it?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Didn't you receive a directive from General Marshall in August of 1941 to thereafter not merely evaluate and send your recommendations in but to send the original material itself to his desk, is that not correct?

General Gerow. No, sir; I had no such directive.

Mr. Gearhart. That was not issued to you?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did General Miles ever tell you that he had such a message or directive from General Marshall affecting his department?

General Gerow. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, did you not as a matter of practice evaluate intercepts that came to you and to send those intercepts to General Marshall?

[4242] General Gerow. No, sir; I had nothing to do with the distribution of intercepts, sir. He received the same intercepts I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, when you read an intercept that struck you as important and calling for action, didn't you take that intercept before you returned it to the courier and discuss it with General Marshall?

General Gerow. No, sir. If I thought that an intercept required action I would prepare a draft of a message, sir, for General Marshall's signature and take it up and suggest that he send it. I did not take the intercepts up to him, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. You did not take it because you knew General Marshall had the same intercepts which you read as he was on the list of persons to whom the intercepts were to be delivered, is that correct?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, I will ask you as a military expert, asking you for the moment to put yourself in the position of Admiral Kimmel and General Short, I will ask you if you think that the tragic happening of December 7, 1941, would have occurred just as it did if Admiral Kimmel and General Short had been warned of those seven messages to which I have just called your attention?

[4242] General Gerow. Sir, I do not believe I can put myself in the position of the commanders in Hawaii. There was so much background, so many things happening. The mental attitude of those commanders, I cannot translate now, sir, in an expression of opinion.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if you were the commander of either the Army or the Navy over there and you received seven definite intercepts called to your attention that the Japanese have divided the area into seven areas and were calling impatiently for reports upon the ship dispositions there, do you think that in the face of the message of November 27, in the face of other circular circular messages that were being sent around the world, one of which was delivered in Hawaii, do you think that eight of our battleships should be lined up like sitting ducks inside of that harbor, with voids open, with ammunition boxed, in a condition in which they could fight very, very inefficiently if they were called upon to fight at all, do you think that would be the situation in the face of those messages being before the eyes and upon the desks and in the minds of those commanders?

General Gerow. Again, sir, I do not believe that I can state what I would have done under those circumstances without having been in command over there, sir, at the time.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, in justice to them don't you [4244] think now as you look back that they should have had that information then?

General Gerow. I think when the War Department took the responsibility of sending the message of November 27 and stated that hostile action was possible at any moment, that these messages would not have added anything to the strength of the directive that was contained in the November 27 message.

Mr. Gearhart. Did any of those messages, those circular letters that were sent around, contain any information as to where hostile action was expected?

General Gerow. I did not understand the "circular letter," sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, these messages are circular, aren't they, in nature? They are sent to Hawaii, they are sent to Panama, they are sent to San Francisco, they are sent to San Diego, they are sent to all of the commandants in all of the naval districts. Now, did any of them say where the war was expected to break out?

General Gerow. No, sir. The one of November 27, as I recall, distinctly stated that Japanese action was unpredictable but hostile action——

Mr. Gearhart. There were other messages circulated around that an attack was expected in the Philippines, in the [4245] Kra
Peninsula, in Indochina and possibly at Guam and Borneo, menacing Singapore. That was what was contained in the messages that were being circulated by the Chief of Staff, is that not correct?

General Gerow. I should like to look over those messages, sir, to see specifically what they stated.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know of the memorandum that General Marshall and Admiral Stark sent to the President on the 27th?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. They discussed that very subject?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Named those very places that I have picked out?

General Gerow. Some of them, yes, sir, I recall.

Mr. Gearhart. And in that message there is not even the slightest suggestion or intimation that any trouble is expected in the Hawaiian area.

General Gerow. No, sir. I think the reason for that was that that memorandum was directed specifically to the Far Eastern area, to a special area, not to the whole area of the Pacific.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, as a matter of fact all you big [4246] ranking Army and Navy officers considered Hawaii as an impregnable fortress, did you not?

General Gerow. No, sir. No fortress is impregnable, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you have seen the characterization of Pearl Harbor that was made by General Herron, didn’t you, in his something from memory? It is a French word.

Mr. Murphy. Aide de memoir.

Mr. Gearhart. I have got to apply to my learned friend Murphy for my French.

You have the document in hand, don’t you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Read the first paragraph.

General Gerow [reading]:

The Island of Oahu, due to its fortifications, its garrison and its physical characteristics is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world.

Mr. Gearhart. And you know that General Herron when he was commander of the Hawaiian area issued a similar statement to the press that was given wide circulation everywhere, don’t you?

General Gerow. I do not recall that message.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you got the volume of that book on Hawaii?

The Chairman. Which book is it?

[4247] Mr. Gearhart. The young lady sitting there has it.

Senator Ferguson. Which is it?

Mr. Gearhart. It is a novel.

The Chairman. A novel?

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I don’t know. It was a book about Hawaii and it had a large circulation. However, I will pass it.

I will ask you do you you know of any message of any kind that was ever sent to General Short or Admiral Kimmel in which they were told that Hawaii itself would probably be attacked?

General Gerow. I do not recall such a message.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, how do you account for the fact that there is a warning in that warning notice of November 27 which was not
contained in the one sent to the Philippine Islands, an affirmative direction not to do anything which would alarm the people or reveal intent? Why was that specially put in the Hawaiian and the San Francisco versions and left out of the one sent to Manila?

General Gerow. Well, the conditions in Hawaii and in the Philippines were quite different at that time. In Hawaii we had a big Japanese population. We felt that the installations there were very close to the population; that if the civilian population happened to be alarmed there would prob-\[4249\]ably be headlines in the press. Those headlines would be quickly transmitted to Japan and would probably precipitate the very thing we were trying to avoid.

Mr. Gearhart. And everything you have said, every reason that you have given is equally true of the Philippines, isn’t it?

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not believe so, sir. The Philippines did not have the large Japanese population. The Philippines at that time had been more or less, I will not say alerted but we were organizing and training a Philippine army at that time and there was a great deal of military activity going on in the Philippines that was not going on in Hawaii, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, as a matter of fact you do not want to stand on the assertion that there wasn’t a large Japanese population in the Philippine Islands prior to December 7, 1941? As a matter of fact, the island was full of Japanese and most of them were Japanese agents, were they not?

General Gerow. I do not know that.

Mr. Gearhart. They had probably more observers in percentage to the population of the Philippines than they had in all the rest of the world put together, is that not correct?

General Gerow. I do not know, sir.

[4249] Mr. Gearhart. And if they only had one Japanese spy there an alert in the Philippines would cause the same alarm to be reported to Japanese headquarters in Tokyo as if there were 50,000 there, wouldn’t it?

General Gerow. I do not know, sir, how the Japanese would have reacted to it.

I should like to invite the attention, sir, in that message to which you have just referred, however, that it contains this statement: “That this policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.”

Mr. Gearhart. That is correct, but after a message which from beginning to end warns specifically against doing certain things that was put in the message for the purpose of conveying the idea to the commanders in Hawaii, wasn’t it?

General Gerow. Which sentence now are you referring to, sir?

Mr. Gearhart. Directing them to avoid the doing of anything which might create alarm among the people or reveal intent.

General Gerow. Sir, I do not understand your question.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, when you put a specific direction in a letter not to do certain things and then say you can do something else if you have to, you are going to expect \[4250\] the recipient of that notice to try to avoid doing the things which you say you do not want done, is that not correct?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, you would expect the commanders in Hawaii to avoid the doing of anything which would alarm the people or reveal an intent to them, wouldn't you?

General Gerow. Yes, sir, so long as it did not jeopardize his defense.

Mr. Gearhart. I have the book which I designated a novel to the inquiry of the chairman.

The Chairman. Did it end all right?

Mr. Gearhart. The volume is entitled, "Hawaii—Restless Rampion," and the book was written by Joseph Barber, Jr. I will read you from page 213.

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. Gearhart. What did you say?

The Chairman. Will you yield to the Senator from Illinois?

Senator Lucas. Who did you say wrote this book?

Mr. Gearhart. Joseph Barber, Jr. I don't know anything about him, about who he is. It is a book which has had quite a large sale, it is a popular edition, but what I am going to read there is in quotation marks so that it will not rest on the responsibility of Mr. Barber but, rather, on the responsibility of General Herron. This is the author's introduction. (Reading:)

Prior to the maneuvers, however, Major General (now Lieutenant General) Charles D. Herron, commanding the Hawaiian Department, issued this statement, intended to reassure nervous residents: "Oahu will never be exposed to a blitzkrieg attack. This is why: We are more than 2,000 miles away from land whichever way you look, which is a long way for an enemy force to steam, and besides it would have to smash through our navy.

"But we plan for the worst possible situation, which means we assume that the navy might be too busy elsewhere to help us.

"So we have developed a potent air defense. Our reconnaissance bombers are going farther and farther to sea. Our air bases here could be reinforced overnight from California bases. The potency of this striking power which would engage an enemy long before he sighted Oahu means that to land on Oahu the enemy must first win mastery of the air above it.

"Assuming that happened, enemy transports then would have to anchor offshore, making them fine targets for our coastal artillery. High speed, mobile forces can be rushed within an hour to any point on Oahu. They pack devastating power.

"As international tensions increase in the Pacific, the war of nerves comes closer to Hawaii. So we double our vigilance, our intensive training. We don't let up until the future is perfectly safe."

The 1940 war problem assumed that Hawaii was threatened with a sudden thrust by an invading enemy. The enemy fleet had a well-balanced force, with adequate aviation and highly trained personnel. In addition, its merchant marine was capable of transporting an extremely large army for initial overseas operations.

The "war situation" at this point was outlined by headquarters as follows: "It is assumed that an outside enemy has succeeded, by stealth, in landing from boats and dropping by parachutes numerous well-armed nationals at night on the island of Oahu."

Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. Gearhart. I would rather wait and yield at the conclusion of this quotation.

Mr. Clark. I was wondering when it was going to conclude. That is what is troubling me.

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you find it interesting? Every- [4253] body else does.

The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Gearhart. You are not very helpful, Mr. Clark.
The Chairman. That is not a matter upon which the committee has to pass.

Mr. Gearhart. I will proceed [reading]:

"The enemies have mixed with the population as strangers, but are believed to be secretly assembling at various points on the island with the intentions, it is feared, of disrupting both civil and military life by destroying or contaminating water supplies, food, communications, electric power, and other necessities, and democratic institutions with the object of liquidating the present population to eventually make room for their own people.

"These activities are believed to be in preparation for reducing our strength and our military resistance against a hostile landing force assumed to be approaching the island.

"All civil police, national guard, other civil organizations, and the entire civil population, in accordance with a proclamation that it is assumed was issued by the governor, are closely working with the military to apprehend the invaders and to protect our families, homes, and institutions from destruction."

[4254] The Chairman. Would the Congressman let the Chairman ask him: What does this book show as to where this statement was made, whether it was a newspaper interview or an official statement? What does it say about that?

Mr. Gearhart. That was the document, as I understand, that was issued by General Herron, just prior to the alert of 1940.

The Chairman. I suppose the General can testify about it, if he did it.

Mr. Gearhart. That clearly evidences, does it not, that the highest ranking army officers in the Hawaiian Islands had the same opinion in 1940 that General Marshall had, that he reflected in his paper? You had just read the first paragraph of it. Is that not correct?

General Gerow. I think everyone of us in the War Department felt that Oahu was our best prepared outpost.

Mr. Gearhart. And they both, in these two great statements, issued to the people, stated that they considered it in effect an impregnable fortress?

General Gerow. The two statements, sir?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, in each of them.

General Gerow. I did not understand that this Aide Memoire—

Mr. Gearhart. I will read the first paragraph again.

[4255] General Gerow. I did not understand, sir, that that was a public statement to the people, sir. I think that is a paper that I understood he took to the White House with him, or somewhere else, on which he would talk.

Mr. Gearhart. Then it is still more important, isn't it? It is a paper circulated for the eyes of military experts only?

General Gerow. I am not so sure, sir, that this paper was ever circulated. I do not know what General Marshall's testimony was, as to why it was prepared.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you admit, do you not, that it represents General Marshall's viewpoint at that time? He would not put his signature to something he did not believe, for the purpose of deceiving anyone, would he?

General Gerow. No, sir; but he did not sign this paper.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, he admitted that he wrote it.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? That is not so.
Mr. Gearhart. Would that make any difference, that he did not sign it?

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?
The Chairman. Will the gentleman yield to his colleague?

Mr. Gearhart. I yield.

Mr. Murphy. General Marshall said he was called to the White House, he was going over there immediately, and someone in the Department prepared that memorandum. He did not prepare it, and did not sign it.

Mr. Gearhart. He read it and presented it, with all of the influence and high position behind it of the Chief of Staff of the Armies of the United States. If he did not believe it, he would not have presented it, would he, in your opinion?

General Gerow. General Marshall will have to testify to that, sir. I do not know whether he used this paper or not.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the testimony will speak for itself.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Will the Congressman yield to Senator Ferguson?

Senator Ferguson. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. We would like to find out from counsel where this paper was obtained.

Mr. Gesell. The paper was obtained, as we stated when we introduced it, from the files of President Roosevelt.

Mr. Gearhart. So it was left with President Roosevelt, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, by the Chief of Staff of the Army of the United States. That is correct, isn’t it?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, how could this gentleman know anything of that kind? I do not understand that.

The Chairman. If the witness does not know it, he may say so.

General Gerow. I am a bit confused.

Mr. Gearhart. I have more interruptions than anybody else has had on my line of questions up to now.

The Chairman. If the Congressman does not want to yield, he certainly does not have to.

Mr. Gearhart. I would like to proceed a little more orderly and with greater continuity of thought, if I am not constantly interrupted. I am developing a condition of mind that was existing in the high ranking military of the United States as an explanation plainly of why no specific warnings were sent to Hawaii.

You admit that no specific warnings were sent to Hawaii, specifically designating that Hawaii was the place that the Japanese were going to attack; no, sir.

General Gerow. No specific warnings were sent to Hawaii, specifically designating that Hawaii was the place that the Japanese were going to attack; no, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Whenever a specific place was discussed, it was always an attack on the Kra Peninsula, the Philippines, Siam, possibly Guam, and possibly Borneo; is that correct, that permeated all of the military literature to the commanders of the United States?

General Gerow. I believe it was a belief at that time, sir, that the Japanese would make their main effort in that area, and I believe the
belief was borne out by subsequent events that they did, that their attack on Hawaii was in the nature of a diversionary attack, and put on our flank to lay us back on our heels so they could go ahead with their main effort.

Mr. Gearhart. I will ask you, General Gerow, if you had thought during those days prior to December 7, 1941, that there was a possibility of attacking Hawaii, and if that were the general opinion of the high ranking military and naval people with whom you were in daily association, would you not have interpreted those seven messages, those seven intercepted Japanese messages, were important, would you not have attached to them greater significance than you did?

General Gerow. I think we all realized, sir, that there was a possibility of an attack on Hawaii.

Mr. Gearhart. Then why did not you send copies of those intercepts to the two commanders that were charged with the defense of those islands?

General Gerow. Sir, I cannot answer that question. As I say, these messages came to me maybe one at a time, or maybe in a group of 15 or 20, and I had no opportunity to sit down and analyze them. They came in along with other messages from Panama and the Philippines, and many of the messages from Panama were quite significant. They indicated an intense interest in where our air forces were, where the fields were, which would be the very thing that an enemy would want to do, information that he would want in case he intended to attack Panama, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you send any special warning messages to Panama when you saw the Japs were making definite inquiries with reference to the defenses there?

General Gerow. I do not know whether G-2 sent any informational messages to Panama with regard to those particular intercepts or not, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Will you not say, as the head of War Plans that the commanders of Panama were entitled to that information in the event that any such information had reached Washington authorities?

General Gerow. Sir, that is a question of opinion, as to how much information you give commanders in the field.

Mr. Gearhart. Isn't it the rule that when high authority in Washington obtains information that is important to any particular commander in the field, that Washington should transmit that information, or if reasons of security did not permit it, that they shall issue directives in the light of that information?

General Gerow. If the intercept is one that the War Department feels is important that the commander have, I think it should send it to him. The War Department, in the case of the November 27 message, interpreted all of the facts it had before it, and decided that the Japanese were going to take some action, hostile action, and assumed responsibility for telling the commander that there was a great possibility of an attack.

Mr. Gearhart. Again directing your attention to the somewhat protracted or extended statement of General Herron that I just read, that statement manifestly was issued to allay any fear that might be aroused because of the alert of 1940 by the activities of the Army and Navy, was it not?
General Gerow. Sir, I do not know whether the statement was made prior to or after that alert. I was not present in Washington at the time the alert was put on, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now it would be necessary, if you were going to take steps not to alarm the people, to issue a warning well in advance of the event, is that not correct?

General Gerow. No, sir, that would not be necessary.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you think that it would have been possible to have alerted Hawaii, both its Naval activities and its Army activities, to a No. 3 Army alert and No. 1 Naval Operations alert, overnight without alarming the people?

General Gerow. A lot would depend on how the commander did it.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the order that he was to alert his island was put-up instantly upon the receipt of the November 27 notice, wasn't it? If he was to do anything at all under that order it was to do it right then?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And because you could not do it right now [4262] without alarming the people and revealing the intent General Short reached the right decision which he reported on the 28th day of November, did he not?

General Gerow. That is your conclusion, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Gearhart. I am not drawing any conclusion at all. I am asking you questions. I want your conclusions; mine are unimportant.

General Gerow. May I have the question, sir?

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

The Chairman. The member asked not to be interrupted and the Chair feels like protecting him in that request. Go ahead.

General Gerow. May I have the question again?

Mr. Gearhart. Will you read the question, Mr. Reporter?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not think he reached the right conclusion.

Mr. Gearhart. In order to reach the conclusion that you have just reached you have to delete then from the November 27 message the positive directive not to alarm the people and not to reveal the intent?

General Gerow. I believe that is correct, sir. He was told he was authorized to take any course of action he might [4263] necessarily have to take to prevent jeopardizing his defense.

Mr. Gearhart. The record speaks for itself. Now yesterday the gentleman from Pennsylvania opened the report of General Hap Arnold and read to us that the Air Forces in the Philippines had been alerted prior to December 7, 1941. Were you here when he read that from his report?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Has the gentleman from Pennsylvania that report?

Mr. Murphy. Do you have that report from General Arnold?

Senator Lucas. I do not know where it is.

Mr. Gearhart. Assuming that General Arnold's report does contain that information, can you give us any information about the alerting of the Air Force in the Philippines?

General Gerow. At what period of time?
Mr. Gearhart. Just prior to December 7, 1941.

General Gerow. May I refer to the message from General MacArthur, sir?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

General Gerow. This is a message from General MacArthur to General Marshall, dated November 28:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the navy stop ground security measures [4264] have been taken stop within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense stop intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between army and navy.

(Signed) MacArthur.

Mr. Gearhart. Does that report indicate to your mind an all-out air alert?

General Gerow. He states, "Reconnaissance has been extended and intensified." I do not know just what he was doing prior to the extending of it.

Mr. Gearhart. Were you in the conference that they had with General Arnold just about the time the November 27 warning messages were sent out, a conference in which General Arnold said that he had information that there was sabotage going on at certain air stations and he wanted a special warning sent to all of his outlying commands?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I was present at one conference on a sabotage message of that kind, I think on the 28th of November, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. General Arnold wanted to send a special message over his own signature to his commands, did he not?

General Gerow. I do not recall that conference, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Was not that one of the main things [4265] discussed?

General Gerow. I do not remember, sir, whether that was discussed at that particular conference or not. I remember General Arnold’s insistence, or at least the insistence of his G-2, General Scanlon, that warning messages go to all the air stations.

Mr. Gearhart. And wasn’t it finally decided in that conference that General Arnold should not send it out over his signature, but that it would go out over General Marshall’s signature, with a special reference in the notice to the air services?

General Gerow. I do not recall such a decision, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you have no special information to convey to the committee now as to why the Air Command in the Philippines went on an all-out alert in the Philippine Islands?

General Gerow. The only information I have, sir, as to why they went on the alert is because they received this message from General Marshall directing the alert which was sent out on the 27th of November.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you any information as to what the Air Command did in Hawaii, after receipt in Hawaii of the warning message of November 27, 1941?

General Gerow. No, sir; I have no such information. [4266]

Mr. Gearhart. And if the Air Command in Hawaii went on an all-out alert on December 1 and remained on it until December 6, you know of no special reason from Washington for their having done it,
other than the information that was contained in the warning message of November 27?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. I believe that is all.

The Chairman. Twelve o'clock having arrived, the committee will recess to 2 o'clock p.m.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P.M.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW (Resumed)

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

I believe that Congressman Gearhart had concluded his examination of General Gerow and Senator Ferguson will now be recognized.

Senator Ferguson. General Gerow, you were in what is known as the War Plans Section. Now, at the time was that the operational section?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about prior to the 7th of December.

General Gerow. No, sir. The G-3 section was normally known as the operational section, but the section that I was in was known as the War Plans Division, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, we had an exhibit here that gave your duties.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Could I have a copy of that? Does counsel have it? Do you have your copy?

Mr. Mitchell. It is the War Department order of the General Staff setup.

General Gerow. I think I have it.

Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 42.

General Gerow. I think I have a copy of the Army regulations here that cover that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I have it; it is Exhibit 42.

Your duties are in paragraph 12?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you give me the specific section in that, during peacetime, that would have you function in writing messages?

General Gerow. I think the first paragraph, sir, paragraph "a" would cover that. I shall read it.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it?

General Gerow (reading):

The War Plans Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to the formulation of plans for use in the theater of war of the military forces, separately or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the national defense.

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't that only the formulation of the plans, the actual drafting of the plans, the war plans?
General Gerow. It includes that, sir, but it also states:
is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff
which relate to the formulation of plans.
The writing of an operational order, the operational orders such
as was written on November the 27th I think, sir. [4269] would
be included in that wording.
Senator Ferguson. Prior to that had you ever taken any part in
the writing of messages?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The writing of alerts?
General Gerow. Some of the warning messages that were sent, sir.
I participated in their preparation.
Senator Ferguson. Did you participate in the one on the 24th, the
joint one?
General Gerow. May I refer to that, sir? Either myself, sir, or
some of my officers in War Plans Division I believe did participate in
this apparently joint message. We worked with the Navy in the
preparation of that message.
Senator Ferguson. You knew General Bryden?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. He was Deputy Chief of Staff?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Under this he was to act, was he not, when the
Chief of Staff was absent?
General Gerow. I believe it so states.
Senator Ferguson (reading).
The Deputy Chief of Staff,
on page 2—
will assist the Chief of Staff and will act for him in the War Department in his
absence.
Would you say that you had been specifically designated [4270]
to act for the Chief of Staff during his absence in the sending of the
message of the 27th?
General Gerow. No, sir; I had not been specifically designated but
as the staff officer concerned with the preparation of plans and the
issuance of operational orders in connection therewith I believe, sir, I would have assumed that responsibility if necessary in General
Marshall’s absence.
Senator Ferguson. Did General Bryden, who was the duly author-
ized officer to act in the absence of the General, did he act in relation
to that message?
General Gerow. I believe he did, sir. If I recall correctly, the mes-
 sage was taken in to him and he O. K.’d it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, can you show us on the original message
that we have here, his O. K.?
General Gerow. I will try to find it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you try to find that?
General Gerow. I have, sir, here is a photostatic copy of the message
of November the 27th. It shows on the bottom, sir, “Noted: Deputy
Chief of Staff,” with the initial “B”.
Senator Ferguson. That was for Bryden?
General Gerow. I think it must have been for Bryden; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did he go into this with you and help
draft it, or did he just approve it after it was drafted?
[4271] General Gerow. As I recall, sir, he went in with me to the office of the Secretary of War on my first visit in the Secretary of War's office on the morning of the 27th. I do not believe that he was in there at the second conference and I do not believe, sir, that he actually participated in the drafting of the message.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever attend the Army Staff College?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How long a time did you spend in the college?

General Gerow. I spent the usual 9 months as a student, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was there any course or any information as to how to draft plans taken up by you—or I mean messages?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; but that was normally taught at the Commanding General Staff School at Leavenworth. I thought you had reference, sir, to the War College.

Senator Ferguson. Where was that taught?

General Gerow. That was taught at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., sir, and also at the infantry school.

Senator Ferguson. And did you take that course?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

[4272] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, tell me the elements, the things to be done in the writing of a message as far as the War Department or Army was concerned?

General Gerow. We had a system of writing what we called the five paragraph operational order. The first paragraph contained information of the enemy and information regarding your own forces. The second paragraph contained a general mission.

Senator Ferguson. Wait until I get this first one. First was what information? The first was all the information that you had about the enemy?

General Gerow. It contained enemy information and information about our own troops.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Gerow. Paragraph 2 contained a general statement of the mission, to attack or defend.

Senator Ferguson. The mission, yes.

General Gerow. The third paragraph was broken down into a number of subparagraphs and gave specific missions and the major units involved.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Gerow. Paragraph 4—I have been away from that school so long I cannot remember definitely paragraph 4. Paragraph 5 I think prescribed the command post and I believe [4273] pertained to communications. I have forgotten now definitely what paragraph 4 included, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You wouldn't say that the first paragraph was your mission?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That the proper way to draft an order was to put the mission in the first paragraph?

General Gerow. No, sir. Your first paragraph would contain enemy information and the information regarding your own troops.

Senator Ferguson. And that the second one was to give full information as to the enemy, its strength, its capacity and its intentions?
General Gerow. I am afraid I did not make myself clear, Senator. In the first paragraph it contains the enemy information and information of our own troops. That is ordinarily broken down into two paragraphs, paragraph A and paragraph B.

Paragraph A contains the information concerning the enemy. Paragraph B contains the information concerning our own troops that are pertinent to that particular order.

Senator Ferguson. Well, should that information, whether it is one or two, should the information be full as to the enemy, that is, as to its strength, its intention, and its capacity?

General Gerow. No, sir; that is normally included in an entirely separate document which is known as an estimate of the situation, which is prepared sometimes by G-2, and sometimes by G-3.

There are two types of estimates: One is a G-2, which arrives at some conclusions as to what the enemy is going to do. There is a second type of estimate of the situation which covers not only what the enemy's capabilities are and his probable intentions but also includes your own capabilities and the plans that are open to you and from that you decide what the enemy, you think the enemy is going to do and decide what you shall do to counter that action.

Senator Ferguson. Now, have you got with you any booklet or paper or information that would tell us what should be in an order and how it should be written, or could you get that for us?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I will be glad to get that for you, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When I take up the message of the 27th I will refer further to that and you may have it by that time.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have any aide here with you that could go and get it for you?

General Gerow. I think so, sir.

[4275] Senator Ferguson. Normally in peacetime is the War Plans concerned with the diplomatic messages of the United States?

General Gerow. We are interested in them, yes, sir. Anything that might possibly affect military operations we are interested in, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And how do they come to you? How does that information come to your Department?

General Gerow. It comes through various sources, sir. As far as the War Plans Division is concerned, I would get information from the Chief of Staff, very occasionally from the Secretary of War, and also from the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, and from some of my officers who had contacted their opposite members in the State Department, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Who was your opposite in the State Department that you would get your information from?

General Gerow. That depended on the type of information you were after, sir. If it happened to be the far eastern situation you would go to the Far Eastern Division. If it was Latin American, you would go to the Latin American section, and if it was European, you would go to the European section.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first get the messages that were delivered by the President on the 17th of August, 1941?

[4276] General Gerow. I do not recall, sir, that I ever had copies of those messages, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I will describe them as they were described in 1943 by Peace and War, on page 129. It may refresh your memory:

During the August 1941 conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain the situation in the Far East was discussed, and it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression. It was agreed also that the United States should continue its conversations with the Japanese Government and by such means offer Japan a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which that country was embarked.

Does that refresh your memory?

General Gerow. I do not remember, sir, seeing that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I will read the part of the message that gave that, or that gave, as far as America was concerned, its parallel action.

On the bottom of page 556, volume II, Foreign Relations, this was handed to the Jap Ambassador, among others:

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American Nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Now does that refresh your memory as to whether or not you ever saw that or heard of it?

General Gerow. I do not recall having seen it, sir. I believe if the Chief of Staff had known about it he would have informed me, sir, that such a declaration had been made.

Senator Ferguson. Now was that of concern to the War Plans Department?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; it would have been of concern to the War Plans Division.

Senator Ferguson. In fact it was vital information to the War Plans Department, was it not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now how do you account for never having heard of that?

General Gerow. Sir, I cannot testify at this late date that I never heard of it, sir. I do not believe that I ever actually saw the document. I believe if the Chief of Staff knew about it, sir, that he did inform me of such a declaration.

[4278] Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know of that before you heard of it here in this caucus room?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When did you hear about it?

General Gerow. Since I have been back here, sir, in Washington, to appear before this committee, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So since you have been back and after the 7th of December, you heard about it?

General Gerow. I cannot recall, sir, whether I heard it before or not, sir. I definitely remember since I have been here this time to appear before the committee, of reading that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was that kind of information of value to you, and if so, did you act upon it?
General Gerow. It was of value, yes, sir. My instructions to act upon it would probably have come, sir, from the Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have any information or orders upon which you did act upon that information, and if so what action did you take?

General Gerow. Sir, I cannot recall at this time, my conversations with the Chief of Staff, if I had such conversations on that subject, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember receiving word at [4270] all that came from Ambassador Winant on the morning of the 6th, about the movement of troops, that went into the State Department at 10:40 on the 6th of December 1941?

General Gerow. May I see that message, sir, to refresh my memory?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

(The document was handed to General Gerow.)

General Gerow. I do not believe, sir, that I ever saw that message.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you had known what I read to you here, what I read from these two books, and you would have seen that message, what would that message have meant to you?

General Gerow. It would have only meant to me, sir, reading this message now that certain troop movements were being made by the Japanese, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would it have meant anything more than that?

General Gerow. Not that I know of now, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Where is that troop movement to, according to that message?

General Gerow. That states "sailing slowly westward toward Kra."

Senator Ferguson. How many hours distant?


Senator Ferguson. Where would they have struck?

General Gerow. The Kra Peninsula, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That 14 hours distant, they would have struck in 14 hours, would they not?

General Gerow. In 14 hours, yes, sir; if they had continued on that course to Kra.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would that mean anything in relation to this parallel action that we had taken about any further aggressive movement? Here is what the message said:

The Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan, that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination or force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary towards safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Would that not have been a violation of this order, or of this rule?

General Gerow. I do not believe, taking this message [4281] by itself, it says enough to definitely state what the Japs were planning to do, sir, from my interpretation of the message.

Senator Ferguson. So, if you had received that, it would not have meant a thing to you?

General Gerow. Well, I would like to plot this on a map, sir, and see. There were, in those staff conversations in the Singapore—

Senator Ferguson. I have got a map here.

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General Gerow. I think I have got a copy of that same one, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. You have got a copy of it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. This map has no scale on it, Senator, so it is rather difficult for me to say exactly where they would be in 14 hours, but it would indicate—

Senator Ferguson. It would indicate that they were 14 hours from Kra?

General Gerow. Yes, but as to where that would place them on the map, I do not know where their position would be actually on this map. It would indicate, sir, that they were proceeding to go south of the line 10° north, sir.

Senator Ferguson. They would go south of 10° north, and they would also be east of 100° east, wouldn't they?

General Gerow. They would be east of 100° east, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar with the fact that on the 2d of December, the President made a directive in that the President directed three men-of-war to be established in the Pacific. Were you familiar with that?

General Gerow. Not at the time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear of that?

General Gerow. Not until I heard it brought out before this committee, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I have tried to mark on my map with ink there where these ships would be, or the area. It may help you some, because the name are small and hard to see. The first one is between Hainan and Hue. Do you see that one?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the next one is between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques; and the next one is off Ponte de Camau. Do you see those three?

General Gerow. I have those located, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you think those three men-of-war, would be out in a position so they could execute and see whether or not the Japs were violating what I read to you from the message of the 17th of August—not the message, but the note?

General Gerow. You refer now, sir, to this Admiralty note?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir, and the note from the President. Will you let him see page 39 of exhibit 37?

(The document was handed to General Gerow.)

Senator Ferguson. Have you looked at it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would they not be in a position to execute, to see whether or not there were violations of the note of the 17th of August 1941?

General Gerow. I would say the one, sir, around Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques, and the one on Ponte de Camau, yes, sir, they would be in a position.

Senator Ferguson. They would be?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would not it be material to you, being in the War Plans Division where you were going to give, and it was your duty, as you say, to give orders of action to our troops, if you were
going to put the position of the enemy which you said a message should contain, would not it be essential to have the information. \[4^84\] in the note of the 17th and also the message of the President to the Asiatic Fleet? Would not it be essential for you to have them?

General Gerow. It would be helpful to me to have them.

Senator Ferguson. Not only helpful; it would be essential, would it not?

General Gerow. Only in the failure of G-2 to keep me posted, sir, as to any information.

Senator Ferguson. Were you posted as to that information?

General Gerow. I was not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How could you have acted on the 6th of December 1941, then, without that information?

General Gerow. With regard to these ships?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, with regard to these ships.

General Gerow. Or with regard to the movements?

Senator Ferguson. The movement of the troops, movement of those ships; how could you give orders if you did not have the information?

General Gerow. Well, it depended, sir, on whom I wanted to give orders to. There was nothing that the Army could do to stop that movement south. That was a naval matter and only ships or aircraft posted down there could do anything about that, sir.

[4^85] Senator Ferguson. Did it indicate to you, or would it have indicated to you that such a movement meant war with the United States?

General Gerow. Not unless our Government decided to go to war, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What about if they struck the first overt act? Would not it be necessary that you give an order to defend yourself?

General Gerow. Well, sir, if the Japs had attacked some of our positions, then they would automatically defend themselves under the existing war plans, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did not I understand you to say, sir, the reason they struck at Hawaii was that that was our strongest fortification and it was on their flank?

General Gerow. I stated, sir, that it was on our flank.

Senator Ferguson. On whose flank?


Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Gerow. On the advance to the south.

Senator Ferguson. But if they struck and it meant war, because of this message and our stand, and let us say that it was a correct stand, was not it then the duty of your department to know those things so that you could give orders, so that we could have a defense to any action they may take \[4^86\] on their flank?

General Gerow. Sir, I believe we would have known very quickly had the Japanese attacked any of our positions.

Senator Ferguson. They did on the 7th, so what is the use of knowing afterward. That is why we are here today, because in Washington they did not know and did not anticipate. Isn't that true?

General Gerow. No, sir. I think when we sent that message of November 27 out we distinctly stated that we anticipated hostile action against each of our possessions that bordered on the Pacific. We did
not know which one. The Japanese action was unpredictable, and I saw no information that indicated to me at any time at which particular place they would attack.

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand this, that no matter what information you received after the 27th you would not have sent it to the theater in Hawaii?

General Gerow. No, sir, Senator; I do not think I stated that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, isn’t that a fair answer?

General Gerow. No, sir. I would like to elaborate a bit on that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Can we get a recess long enough for me to vote?

[4287] The Vice Chairman. If you desire it, Senator. We will naturally conform to your wishes.

Senator Ferguson. I would like, if we could take that long.

Mr. Murphy. Why not let Mr. Keefe take it up and then have you continue later?

Senator Ferguson. It will only take me 5 minutes, and then we will not have to break the continuity here.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, we will take a recess—

Mr. Clark. I do not object, Senator, but I am calling attention to the fact that the House Members do not get an opportunity to vote. I am not objecting—

Senator Ferguson. I will continue.

General Gerow. Shall I proceed, Senator?

Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to finish my statement.

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Clark. I was going on to say if we are going to be here a good long while I thought we would have to have a definite policy in that respect.

Senator Ferguson. That is perfectly all right.

Mr. Murphy. May I state for the record that there is a resolution that was adopted by both Houses excusing the members [4288] of the Pearl Harbor committee from voting during the sessions of the committee.

Senator Ferguson. Has the interruption taken you from the question that I have given?

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not think so, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Gerow. This is an operational message. It contains certain sentences in it that I would like to read:

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow 5.

Those are all directives. There was nothing that occurred, subsequent to the sending of that message, no information that I received, that would have influenced me to change the actions directed in that message.

[4288] Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, as a matter of fact really no information came to you between that date on the 27th and at 11:25 when you walked into General Marshall’s office on the day of the 7th at noon. You had not had the pilot message, you had not had the destruction of the codes message, you had not had
the 14-part, or the 13th part of the message, you had not had the destruction of the Japanese code messages, you did not have the message coming from Winant, you did not have the President’s directive to CINCAF which was the Asiatic Fleet; isn’t that correct?

General Gerow. The information that came in with regard to magic between the 27th and the 6th and that was distributed by G-2 I did see and that contained certain information.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you what information you received out of magic between the 27th and the 6th and the 7th?

General Gerow. Sir, I would have to check the documents showing the messages that were received during that time, and I may be able to identify that I saw some of them. I must presume I saw all of these messages that were distributed by G-2, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Let’s take the Winant message. You didn’t see that?

General Gerow. No, sir. [4290] Senator Ferguson. The President’s message to CINCAF to put out the three men of war, you didn’t see that?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The President’s message to the High Commissioner, did you see that one?

General Gerow. I believe I saw that one, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When?

General Gerow. I am reasonably certain, sir, that I saw it on the morning of the 27th. I think my memorandum to the Chief of Staff states that I saw that.

Senator Ferguson. That was on the 26th, so you saw it on the 27th?

General Gerow. I saw it on the 27th.

Senator Ferguson. You didn’t see the pilot message?

General Gerow. I don’t recall having seen it.

Senator Ferguson. You didn’t see the 1 o’clock message, that is, giving the day of delivery, and the destruction of the last code?

General Gerow. That is the 1 o’clock message that indicated they were going to deliver something at 1 o’clock. No, sir; I didn’t see that until 11:30 on the morning of the 7th.

Senator Ferguson. You didn’t see any part of the 13-part message?


Senator Ferguson. Until you went in there.

General Gerow. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Then you heard, read, or saw the whole message, you saw it laying on General Marshall’s desk?

General Gerow. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for that information not being given to you as a general in War Plans who had the duty to act on it?

General Gerow. Sir, I cannot recall whether General Marshall discussed any of those messages with me or not. If he was informed of them I believe he would have. I don’t know what his testimony was with respect to them. I cannot account for why they were not delivered to me, sir.

Senator Ferguson. General Gerow, on the 15th you drew up a statement, did you—didn’t you have a statement here, exhibit 39?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Drawn up on the 15th of December.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that that doesn’t consider any facts except what took place really in the general’s office at 11:25, and didn’t consider anything that happened on the day of the 6th or up until that time?

General Gerow. I don’t recall the instructions that required me to prepare this memorandum. I rather imagine that the Chief of Staff was not clear in his own mind as to what happened during that period in his office and asked those present to give him our views as to what had happened, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was the crucial thing what happened in his office or was it what happened prior? You were only in there a half hour, were you not, between 11:25 and when the message went out, at the latest, 12:17?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was that the crucial part of this occasion, that short period?

General Gerow. I think that was a very crucial period, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was it as crucial as Saturday and early Sunday morning?

General Gerow. Sir, I am not certain how you use “crucial.” It was vital, the distribution of magic on the 6th was of vital importance, if that is the point, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of a more serious time in the history of this Nation than between early morning on the 6th and 1 o’clock on the 7th? Have you ever heard, in history, of a more crucial period than that?

General Gerow. Well, sir, I don’t know whether I can compare that period with some of the other crucial highlights in our history and say whether one was more crucial than the other.

I think such things that happened at Gettysburg, I think certain things that happened at Valley Forge, certainly certain things that happened in Germany in the last war, and certain things that happened in the Pacific, probably would be just as crucial in the history of this Nation.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General Gerow, as I understand it you prepared a memorandum, and it would be for history’s sake, and out of that entire period you took 52 minutes and that was the period between 11:25 and 12:17.

Now, you have no recollection, as I understand it—

Mr. Murphy. I think that the witness should be allowed to answer. This man is a general who fought in France, on the beaches of Normandy, and he ought to be shown every courtesy. He ought to be given an opportunity to answer.

Senator Ferguson. I haven’t finished the question.

Will you read it?

(The question referred to, as recorded above, was read by the reporter.)

Senator Ferguson (continuing). Of what took place in the other part of the period from Saturday morning. Can you tell us anything as to the other part of the period from Saturday morning up until 11:25?
General Gerow. Senator, I think I stated before, this memorandum was prepared, I believe, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, to cover the period that we were assembled in his office. He did not direct me, as I recall, to prepare a statement covering the period of the days of the 6th and the 7th. I did not prepare such a memorandum, so, consequently, my memory is not as clear as to what 

[4295] happened on the 6th as it is as to what happened that particular morning in General Marshall's office. I do not recall anything eventful, as far as I am personally concerned that occurred to me on December 6.

Senator Ferguson. And on the 7th?

General Gerow. On the morning of the 7th, no, sir, until I was called to General Marshall's office, and after that the news of the Pearl Harbor attack came in and other things happened.

Senator Ferguson. General, do you know, or did you know, Major Clausen?

General Gerow. I met Major Clausen when I appeared before the Army Pearl Harbor board, and I saw him later on, sir, in Europe.

Senator Ferguson. He was making an investigation, was he not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. He approached me with a letter, as I recall, signed by the Secretary of War, directing him to make an investigation concerning certain matters in connection with Pearl Harbor, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you give your full testimony before the Pearl Harbor board?

General Gerow. I tried to answer all the questions they asked me, sir. I don't believe that the magic phase 

[4296] came into it. And after I appeared before the Pearl Harbor committee, I understand that a number of other witnesses appeared and made certain statements regarding deliveries of certain papers to me, and I had no opportunity to answer those statements.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any instructions when you went to the Army Pearl Harbor board not to bring magic in?

General Gerow. I am under the impression that I did receive some such instructions, because in giving my testimony after reading it, I find I hesitated in the middle of a statement, and I said that I might be disclosing something of ultra secrecy and I said I did not want to state that without the approval of the War Department.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who you got that instruction from?

General Gerow. I cannot recall definitely at this time sir.

Senator Ferguson. Who would have authority to give it to you?

General Gerow. Any of the officers in the War Department would have the authority to pass it on to me as an order from the Chief of Staff, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It would have to be an order of the 

[4297] Chief of Staff or his deputy because—you were a Deputy Chief of Staff?

General Gerow. No, sir; I was not. When I appeared before the Board I was not. I came back from Europe to appear before that board.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

General Gerow. I had no status in the War Department at that time.

Senator Ferguson. You were not in the Chief of Staff at that time?

General Gerow. No, sir; I was not on duty there.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I just want to have the record correct. Who would have authority to give you that order?

General Gerow. I should say the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, or any officer designated by the Chief of Staff to transmit such an order to me.

Senator Ferguson. Can you recall it at all now?

General Gerow. I am very uncertain in my mind, sir. I think, and this, Senator, is—I cannot testify to this, my memory is not clear on it—I believe it was either Colonel Clarke or General Noyes, and I am not positive as to which one or whether it was either one.

[4298] Senator Ferguson. Both of those gentlemen would be in a position to have given you that message; as I understand it, you carried it out and didn’t give secret magic before the Pearl Harbor board?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When Lieutenant Colonel Clausen came to you did he ask you to make certain statements to contradict other witnesses?

General Gerow. I submitted an affidavit, sir, and I think that affidavit is of record. I believe I have a copy with me. I would prefer to answer from that, if I may.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Let’s take your affidavit then.

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I have a copy of it. Do you wish me to read it?

Senator Ferguson. No, I will ask you some questions about it—unless you want to read it first.

General Gerow. I think that gives the whole story, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Suppose you read it into the record and that will save time.

Mr. Murphy. May I have a copy of the Clausen report. Do you have it, Counsel? May I have it, Mr. Greaves, please.

(The document referred to was handed to Mr. Murphy.)

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, General.

[4299] General Gerow (reading):


Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow, presently Commanding General, 15th Army, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, as Chief, War Plans Division, War Department, I received and reviewed at Washington, D. C., some of the highly secret intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, then known as “Magic.” These were delivered in the “raw” (unevaluated form) to me or to my Executive Officer by representatives of G-2, War Department. Copies were not retained by me. Those which I received were returned the same day to representatives of G-2. No receipts were given by or requested of me. When these messages were handed me, no evaluations were made of them by G-2, other than occasional comments by Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. I placed the highest degree of reliance on this form of intelligence.

Colonel Clausen has shown me the file of some intercepts of this type, designated Top Secret Exhibit “B.” I recall the general substance of some of these messages and presume that they were all presented to me on the approximate dates [4300] of the translations. I specifically recall the two numbered 23570 and 23859. I knew that the intercepts in the exhibit mentioned, which pertain to reports to Tokyo on ship movements in Pearl Harbor, were going also to and coming from the Navy Department. Since these related especially to
the Navy, I assumed that the Navy was fully cognizant, and would interpret this information in connection with Navy studies and estimates, and in co-

ordination with other information available to the Navy and not given to me. My recollection is that there were reports similar in nature which had also been intercepted and disseminated, which showed that Japanese consuls at ports such as Manila and Seattle were giving Tokio information as to ship movements at these places.

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect:

(1) On 4 December 1941, Colonel Bratton of G-2 called General Gerow's attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese consuls to destroy their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokio, and then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders. General Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent. Following this, Colonel Bratton conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent on 5 December 1941 a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort, USN, concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."

(2) On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis K. Saddler, SC, informed General Gerow that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain, and asked that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, be notified. General Gerow replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent.

(3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14-part Japanese intercept number 25843.

My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows:

(1) I do not recall the incident. In this connection I wish to state that if a representative of G-2 thought my action inadequate he could quite properly report the facts to his superior, General Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who had direct access to me and to the Chief of Staff in a matter of such importance. The proper and usual manner was to confer and if the matter still remained unsettled, to present the problem to the Chief of Staff. I believe the Chief of Staff was then available for that purpose.

(2) I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Saddler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code."

If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Saddler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened.

(3) I did not receive or see any parts of the message mentioned until the morning of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6 December 1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was always open to me.

In the months immediately before 7 December 1941, I did not receive any written or oral reports from G-2, properly vouched for, which pointed to Pearl Harbor specifically as the attack target at the opening of hostilities with Japan or the other Axis powers. During this period, however, I did on several occasions receive reports from G-2, some of which were not borne out by subsequent events, and which were to the effect that hostilities with one or more of the Axis powers would open with attacks on almost any of many strategic points of United States or British territory in the Pacific areas. Myself and the members of my staff were constantly concerned with global problems and considerations, involving possibilities of hostile land, sea and air action against the United States by the Axis powers.
I wish to state that in my opinion the War Department had sent ample warnings to the overseas commanders, including General Short, to alert their respective commands for war. General Short did not send at any time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack of the kind which occurred, with the means available to him. The War Department had given him estimates and basic war plans which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan. These pre-battle and battle plans and estimates with which I was very much concerned, were prepared, reduced to writing and given to General Short and other officers involved after a great deal of mature consideration by the best military brains available to us for that purpose. They represented the consensus of the belief and expert military opinions of the War and Navy Departments and the Hawaiian Department. Since I was aware of this and knew that General Short similarly was fully cognizant thereof, I assumed that these fundamental concepts of primary threats from a surprise attack by Japan would govern General Short in his thinking and preparations in light of the warnings of imminent war. No notice ever reached me that he would disregard these estimates, or that he would omit preparations against an outside threat. General Short at no time informed the War Department that he was not in full agreement with War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu. If he was not in accord with these estimates and plans, then it would have been quite reasonable to assume that he would have informed the War Department, in accordance with established military practice. [4305] I assumed also that General Short's liaison with the Navy was such that he received all information of use to him and available to the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It was inadvisable for the War and Navy Departments to send identical or nearly identical messages to the respective commanders at Hawaii, for fear of compromising our codes. Hence, it was understood that information sent by either Department which would be of use to the other service would be exchanged between the two commanders at Hawaii.

So far as General Short is concerned, the message to him on 27 November 1941, signed "Marshall" should be considered in the light of all the Army and Navy messages which were sent to Hawaii before and after that date, as well as with whatever other information was available to him. It was my understanding that G-2, War Department, in carrying out his normal responsibilities, was transmitting periodically to the overseas commanders, information, reports and estimates bearing on the current situation. For this purpose, G-2 had available all the intercepts mentioned, as well as many others which are not included in Top Secret Exhibit "R."

Concerning the "Magic" messages, it was necessary to guard most carefully against compromising the source of this extremely valuable intelligence. Only a very few persons knew the details. For example, I did not know fully how it was obtained. Under this necessity, therefore, it was not [4306] the policy of the War Department to send these messages to overseas commanders. The wisdom of this policy has been proved by our recent victories. If more detailed information, or if the actual intercepts, had been sent to Hawaii, then the same procedure would have been followed with respect to the other overseas commanders, some of whom were at places of greater vulnerability than Hawaii. This would have led to great danger of compromise. The spreading of this highly secret information at that time into so many hands might have lost us for the present war the source of this form of the best evidence of the enemy's intentions. This loss would have been a great disaster, resulting in prolongation of the war, increased bloodshed, uncertainty and expense, and possible defeats.


Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June, 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
(Signed) Henry C. Clausen, Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD, at Cannes, France
[4307] Senator Ferguson. Now, General, do you know what—put it this way: Did Major Clausen at this time, or Lieutenant Colonel—was he Lieutenant Colonel?

General Gerow. Lieutenant Colonel.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Clausen, at that time, did he ask you these questions so that you would write out this 3-page affidavit? How did you know at that time what you wanted to put in the affidavit—what he wanted?

General Gerow. He visited me first at my headquarters at Bad Nauheim. We had a short conversation at that time and he told me what the scope of his investigation was going to be. He left, and, as I recall, went up to interview other officers on this Pearl Harbor affair. I then left, I think the day after he was at my headquarters, and went to the Riviera, for the first leave I had had in four years. He followed me down there and came out to my house and questioned me in a very full and very formal way.

I drafted notes. I had no typist or stenographer. He took them to his hotel and typed it and brought it back, the substance of what I told him, and I didn't agree with some of the things he had written, and so I scratched them out and rewrote them myself, and he finally typed them.

Does that cover your question, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

[4308] Now, what did he tell you he was trying to prove; did he tell you he was trying to prove something?

General Gerow. No, sir. He merely came to me and presented this letter from the Secretary of War authorizing him to make this investigation and he stated, as I recall now, that testimony had been submitted before the Pearl Harbor Board after my testimony and he was trying to clear up that testimony, to see whether the statements made concerning certain acts that I was involved in were correct, what my testimony would be in answer to it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, first:

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board to the following effect: * * *

Did he tell you that it was testimony that had been sworn to?

General Gerow. He has it here “on what is stated to have been testimony.”

Senator Ferguson. Was there some doubt about this being testimony?

General Gerow. Well, there wasn't in my mind, sir. I interpreted the statement he made to me that it was testimony given before the Pearl Harbor Board.

Senator Ferguson. Apparently he told you Bratton had [4309] testified to this:

On 4 December 1941 Colonel Bratton of G–2 called General Gerow's attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese Consuls to destroy their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokyo, and then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders.

Up to there it would indicate that Bratton wanted to send more warnings to the overseas commanders. The warning then in effect was that of the 27th, was it not? This is on the 4th of December.
General Gerow. Yes, sir. The operational message was sent on November 27, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That would be the one he was talking about.

He asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders.

You would be the man he would come to, would you not? You have told us you were the authorized officer outside of the Chief of Staff to send this.

General Gerow. That is right. If it was an operational message. If it was an informational message it would be sent out by G-2.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that kind of a message, to send more warnings to the overseas commanders, that would be \[4310\] operational, would it not?

General Gerow. Not, sir, if you take it in connection with the sentence above, "called General Gerow's attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese Consuls to destroy their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokyo." That would only bear out what the Operational message already said.

Senator Ferguson. What did the destruction of codes mean to you?

General Gerow. It means that the people destroying were anticipating war, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And then you didn't disturb or want to disturb, if you got that information you didn't want to disturb your warning of the 27th; is that correct?

General Gerow. No, sir; I don't think the statement in the Operational message, the instructions to the commander out there, needed any changing because of the fact that the Japanese were destroying their codes. We had already stated, the War Department had taken the position that war was imminent, hostilities might occur at any moment. The mere fact that they had destroyed their codes wouldn't change it.

Senator Ferguson. Then the fact that you had received information about the destruction of the Japanese codes subsequent to the 27th wouldn't cause you, would not have \[4312\] caused you to act?

General Gerow. Would not have caused me to send another Operational action message, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then—

General Gerow. I would like to elaborate, if I may. I think my response to that one should also be read.

Senator Ferguson. I want you to answer fully. I don't want you to feel that you are not given an opportunity to answer fully.

General Gerow. I would like to, since part of that paragraph 1 has been brought into the picture, I think the answer should be given at the same time.

I do not recall the incident.

Senator Ferguson. That is what you said, "I do not recall the incident," but I am trying to ask you questions to see whether or not it would be your duty if you did get the information to act.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

\[4312\] Senator Ferguson. That is what I am trying to say.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And, as you remember now, if you had received that information knowing that the warning of the 27th went out, that you would not have thought that the information about breaking the codes would not have led you to give them more warning. Now go ahead and make any further explanation that you want.

Mr. Mitchell. He did not say that. He said it would not require an operational order. He said it two or three times. This man had operational orders to give and G-2 had warnings to give and I think there ought to be a distinction made between an operational order and information in every question that is asked him.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the statement by counsel does that help refresh your memory? Has he enlightened you?

General Gerow. Will you ask your question again, sir, and I will reply to it again, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Here is the language in the affidavit: “And then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders.”

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, we are talking about warning of action, that is, a directive of action not such as G-2 would send but such as you would send.

Now, to get this straight, the warning on the 27th was a message that you could send but not G-2, isn’t that correct?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Gerow. And I would only send it in the name of General Marshall if he would approve it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. Now, you answered my question when I asked you that, that you did not think that the destruction of codes would have caused you to send any further message of action or warning.

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I said that destruction of codes was not—the information was not of such a nature that would have caused me to change the operational instructions, the directives that were contained in the message of November the 27th.

Senator Ferguson. I understand.

General Gerow. And, sir, the use of that word “warnings” in here I think is a bit confusing. If Colonel Bratton did what he said that he did he was merely telling me that he wanted me to send a message to Hawaii to the effect that the Japanese were destroying their codes. Now, that is apparently what the paragraph means, sir, and that was a message that was purely informational that could have been sent by G-2 and not by me, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, if he had in mind the other kind of a message, “General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders,” not information, warnings—and we have been talking here with the other officers that the message of the 27th was a warning, the one of the 24th was even called a war warning right in it.

General Gerow. That is right, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if he had in mind that kind of a message, “General Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent.” Now, you are
still of the opinion that that would be a correct answer to Bratton, are you not, if you were of the opinion then that sufficient had been sent?

General Gerow. I was of the opinion that a very positive and clear-cut directive had been sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department for definite action and that the fact that the Japanese were destroying their code did not indicate to me that I should change that directive that was still in effect on December the 7th.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; all right. Now, on the 5th of December, the next thing: "Colonel Otis E. Sadtler, S. C."—what does the "S. C." mean after that?

General Gerow. Signal Corps.

Senator Ferguson (reading): Informed General Gerow [4315] that the Japanese wind code had been implemented to signal breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain and asked that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department be notified. General Gerow replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent.

Now, at that time, General, taking as of December the 5th, did you know that Batavia, Netherlands East Indies, had notified General Miles by a message that there was a wind code, not an activating of a wind code, but a wind code which it interpreted as a war decision would be sent by weather broadcast? Did you know that?

General Gerow. I would like to see that message, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would counsel show him the Batavian message?

Mr. Gesell. You have got it, Senator. It is in volume 5 of the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Volume 5 of the Navy.

Mr. Gesell. It is the one you had yesterday.

Senator Ferguson. That is the original.

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Senator Lucas. May I ask counsel whether or not the Clausen report has been introduced in evidence as yet?

Mr. Gesell. No; it has not been introduced in evidence [4316] as yet.

Senator Lucas. How many reports are there, may I ask, Clausen reports? Just one?

Mr. Gesell. Well, the Clausen report is a series of affidavits primarily.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you mean how many copies?

Senator Lucas. Yes; how many copies.

Mr. Mitchell. We have 2 copies.

Mr. Gesell. There are 2 copies available to us.

Senator Lucas. When could the Senator from Illinois get ahold of the Clausen report?

Mr. Gesell. I will be glad to let you have our copy tonight.

Senator Lucas. No; I am not going to take the copy away from counsel because he needs it. I am asking about the other one. Who has it now?

Mr. Mitchell. I am not clear whether it is Senator Brewster or who it is.

Mr. Gesell. Congressman Murphy I think has the other. Both of them are out of our hands now.
Senator Ferguson. I will undertake, Senator, to give you Senator Brewster's copy.

Senator Lucas. I will be delighted to have it.

Senator Ferguson. All right, sir.


Senator Ferguson. I do not find it. Does counsel recall the page? I have it now. It is on page 726, so the record will show.

Mr. Mitchell. Of volume 5.

Senator Ferguson. All right, General.

General Gerow. I think, Senator, when you asked me the question you read what Colonel Sadtler was reported to have said.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Gerow. And I would like to go back to my answer on that for the purpose of the record and state that I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken.

In answer to your question, sir, I have never seen this message.

Senator Ferguson. You had never seen the Batavia message?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Which indicated it would not be a message on breaking up relations; it would be a war decision message. You see that language in there?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I do not recall ever seeing that message.

[4318] Senator Ferguson. And that is quite an important message, is it not, and you would recall it now?

General Gerow. I think I would; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it you say that you do not remember that incident. It could have happened but you do not remember.

General Gerow. It could have happened, sir, but I do not recall it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I am trying to get what your mental attitude would have been at that time.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. If Sadtler had come to you telling you this, were you of the opinion that they had sufficient information, and, therefore, you would not have sent it?

General Gerow. I think that is a little different message, Senator. If I had been sure that the Japs had announced that war with the United States was going to occur at a certain time, I would have most certainly written a message as quickly as possible and sent it on my own responsibility if General Marshall had not been there. That would have been an operational message.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, an operational message.

General Gerow. And warning them that a certain thing would happen at a certain time.

[4319] Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, as I understand it, if you had seen the Batavia message and knew it was activating, then you would have felt that it was your duty to send a new action message to Hawaii?


Senator Ferguson. Well, what would it be?

General Gerow. One quite similar to the one General Marshall sent on the morning of December the 7th. There was something that rather
fixed a date as immediate, that something was going to happen. If they had said, "We have definitely decided to go to war with the United States," I think we most certainly—that is, if I may correct that, that if Japan had decided and had stated that she was going to go to war with the United States definitely on a certain day—would inform our commanders all over the world to that effect.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next one:

On the night of the 6th of December 1941 Colonel Bratton or another delivered to General Gerow thirteen parts of the fourteen part Japanese intercept 25843.

That is the 13 parts of the so-called 14-part message. Now, did he give you that information on the 6th, that is, on Saturday?

General Gerow. I do not recall, sir, that he did. I have seen testimony somewhere that he stated that it was given [4320] to my executive officer, Colonel Gailey, and I haven't talked to Colonel Gailey, sir, and I do not know what his answer would be.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have an executive officer by the name of Colonel Gately or Gailey?

General Gerow. Gailey; yes, sir. I had such an executive officer, C. K. Gailey, a colonel.

Senator Ferguson. Now, at that time on Saturday was your office, the War Plans, alerted to war?

General Gerow. That depends, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. To expect war that day?

General Gerow. It just depends, Senator, on what you mean by the term "alerted." I was, and most of my officers were, working down there quite late every night and practically all day Sunday and on holidays. As I stated, I believe, this morning, we had an arrangement whereby a duty officer was designated each day for a 24-hour period. That duty officer after the office was closed up was permitted to go to his home. He remained within calling distance of a telephone during his entire period of duty, except when he was at the office. He knew where to reach me, sir, and the Adjutant General and the Secretary of the General Staff knew where to reach him, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would your records show—should [4321] they show what officers were on duty after 6 o'clock Saturday night in your department?

General Gerow. Senator, I have had a search made in the War Department to try to find that duty roster, sir, and I have been unable to locate it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. There was one at that time, there was a roster?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you have made a search and you have been unable to locate it?

General Gerow. I have asked the Operations Division, which took over and superseded the War Plans Division, to make a search of their records and to search the Adjutant General's records and they have been unable, sir, to find the record or the roster for that period, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you are unable to tell us who was on duty that night?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I regret to say I am, sir. I think that I was down at the office myself until 6 or 7 or 8 o'clock. Of course, that was a very busy time and we had a lot of unfinished business. As a matter of fact, we went down the next morning, a number of us, Sun-
day morning, in order to clean up some of this business that had accu-
2
mulated and we could do it better on Sunday morning because you did not have a lot of people bothering you.

Senator Ferguson. But you were not going down Sunday—or you were not down Saturday night, I mean your force, because your office was closed. All right.

General Gerow. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you say here:

I do not recall the incident.

You were replying back to one. And then you said that—

General Sherman Miles, Assistant of G-2, had direct access to me and to the Chief of Staff in a matter of such importance.

You meant there that if it was only information he could have given it alone, but if he wanted to get any action message then he would have to come to you or General Marshall?

General Gerow. Yes. If he wanted to give out information he could send it without consulting me. He normally did consult me, however, but he had no authority, sir, to direct operations without consulting me, sir. If he felt that operations should be conducted, he was absolutely free to come to me and suggest that such a message be sent and if we did not agree I think the custom would have been for General Miles and myself both to go to the Chief of Staff and express our differing views and have him make the decision.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to go to paragraph 3 on the next page [reading]:

[4323] I did not receive or see any part of the message mentioned until the morning of the 7th of December 1941 when a conference was held with the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of the 6th

Now, I assume there that you are talking about the 13 parts that were in.

General Gerow. I think probably I was covering the whole message, sir, at that time because—

Senator Ferguson. You do not say that in your affidavit do you?

General Gerow. No, sir; but I did not have these messages in front of me at that time, sir, to show when they came into the War Department and the time they were translated.

Senator Ferguson. But he must have told you that 13 were in because you say, "If I had received parts of the message on the 6th of December 1941." Now, here is what you say in your affidavit that you would have done:

I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff.

In other words, you thought that the 13 parts of the message, plus the pilot message, which I understand you did not see—

General Gerow. No, sir.

[4324] Senator Ferguson (continuing). Would have been sufficient for you to immediately have realerted or at least have alerted the commanders across the sea?

General Gerow. I think possibly, Senator, there may not have been a meeting of minds with regard to that particular sentence between myself and Colonel Clausen. I did not have those messages with me, I did not recall all their contents. As a matter of fact, as I have testi-
fied, I saw them first on the morning in the office of the Chief of Staff at 11:30 and I think I read it very casually that morning, sir, and had not seen them since. I did not see them when I testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Senator FERGUSON. Are you through?

General Gerow. I am sure what I meant in that was if they necessitated operational orders to the commanders overseas I would have sent such orders.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that is not what it says, is it?

General Gerow. No, sir; and I say now I feel that there must not have been a meeting of minds because I would not have acted on an order that was unimportant, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, do I understand that you feel that up until the night of the 6th, which includes the 13 parts, that they were not important?

General Gerow. No, sir.

[4326] Senator FERGUSON. The Winant message, the pilot message, the breaking of the codes message and the 13-part message, the various other messages that were in here that I reviewed with General Marshall the other day, that they were not of such importance that you would have given an alert?

General Gerow. No, sir; I did not mean, sir, to convey that answer. The sentence reads: "If I had received parts of the message." I might have received maybe the first part of 14 parts and there may not have been anything in that one part of that message that would have caused me to send an operational message. Do I make myself clear, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Did you read the 13 parts of that message? Have you ever read it?

General Gerow. I read it, sir, I think on the morning or the afternoon of December the 7th, sir, rather casually. That was something which happened, that was in the past. We were trying to see that nothing like that happened in the future.

Senator FERGUSON. Then as far as you were concerned, General, you really never read those 13 parts or heard it read prior to the 7th, the time of the attack on the 7th?

General Gerow. No, sir; I saw it first at 11:30 in the Chief of Staff's office.

Senator FERGUSON. But you did not read it and he did not read it aloud?

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not believe that he did, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Therefore you hadn't any knowledge of it, I mean what was in it?

General Gerow. Well, sir, the Chief of Staff told me in general what was in it when I went in there, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, had he already read it when you got in there?

General Gerow. I think he did, sir. He had the papers on his desk in front of him.

Senator FERGUSON. General, how did you get to the General's office? Did you drive there or were you in the same building?

General Gerow. No, sir; we were in the same building, on the same floor just a very short distance away.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you go there by a telephone call?
General Gerow. As I recall, sir, the Chief of Staff had a buzzer on his desk, a telephone buzzer and he buzzed that and said, "Come up to my office at once."

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, how long had you been in your office prior to the buzz from the Chief of Staff to come to his office?

General Gerow. To the best of my recollection and belief I arrived in my office some time before 10 o'clock, sir.

[4327] Senator Ferguson. Well, have you any nearer idea? 9:30?

General Gerow. No, sir; I cannot testify as to the exact time.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you would be an hour and twenty-some minutes in your office.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Prior to going to General Marshall's office.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And during that period you had no idea that there was a pilot message, that there was an Admiralty message about the movement of ships, the Winant message, the 13-part message, the 14th part, or the 1 o'clock delivery, and the destruction of the code. You were in your office an hour and twenty-one minutes, and that never came to your attention?

General Gerow. I do not believe, sir, it was ever brought to my office.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I asked you.

General Gerow. Sir?

Senator Ferguson. That is what I asked you.


[4328] Mr. Mitchell. He is talking about several messages, not only the 13 parts or 14th part, but the one from Winant.

General Gerow. I think I testified I did not——

Mr. Mitchell. Your answer only relates to one of them?

General Gerow. I do not recall, as I think I stated before, having seen the Winant message at all, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I say. You never saw it at all.

General Gerow. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You did not see the pilot message prior to being with General Marshall in his office on the morning of the 7th?

General Gerow. To the best of my recollection I believe I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You had not seen the 13th part of the message, or the 14th part, is that right?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You had not seen the 1 o'clock delivery message and the destruction of their code machine, had you, prior to 11:25?

General Gerow. The destruction of the code machine, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It is in the 1 o'clock delivery message. Would you just let him see that message?

(The document was handed to General Gerow.)

[4329] Mr. Mitchell. What is the message you asked him about?

Senator Ferguson. It is the 1 o'clock delivery message. Is not there in that same message a provision about destroying the code?
Mr. Gesell. No; it is a separate message. That is on the other page, right across from it.

Senator Ferguson. It is across on the other page, the one as to the destruction of the code.

General Gerow. That is the one, sir, No. 910, that you refer to, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Wait until I get my copy.


Senator Ferguson. On page 248, the one at the top, General, first.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. "Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government, if possible to the Secretary of State, our reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on the 7th your time." That would be on Sunday at 1 o'clock, would it not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. As I recall now, sir, I did not see that message until I went into the office of General Marshall.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I understand. Now, on page 249, at the top of the page:

After deciphering part 14 of my 902, also my 907, 908 and 909, please destroy at once the remaining deciphering machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

General Gerow. I do not recall having seen that message until I went into the office of the Chief of Staff at 11:30 on December 7, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I understand. And you do not recall anyone calling you at your home to give you any of those messages or information on those messages?

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not recall any telephone calls, sir, with regard to that.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Colonel Gailey was in your office on Sunday morning?

General Gerow. I do not recall, sir, specifically that he was there, Senator. I remember the names of several other officers who were there at the time.

Senator Ferguson. Now, was there any officer other than you below General Marshall that could have acted on Saturday, or Sunday up until the time you saw General Marshall in his office, on this information and given another alert to Hawaii? Did you understand my question?

General Gerow. No, sir; I am not quite clear, sir.

[4331] Senator Ferguson. Were you the only officer with authority to act under General Marshall—I think he was the Chief of Staff—

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you the only officer that had authority to act, to give a further alert or action message similar—I say "similar" only because it would have an effect—as the one of the 27th, an action message? Were you the only one under General Marshall capable of doing that?

General Gerow. Senator, I had no specific authority to act for General Marshall; I would have assumed that authority if I thought the situation demanded it.

Senator Ferguson. But, as I understand it then you did not have that authority, but you now say that you would have assumed it; is that correct?
General Gerow. That is correct, sir. I had no specific authority to act in General Marshall's name. I had authority to sign papers with his name, sir, but in a matter of that kind, I would have, if the situation warranted, I would have assumed the responsibility for sending the message.

Senator Ferguson. Now, suppose, General, that you had known at 10 o'clock in your office all that you knew at 12 o'clock after being in General Marshall's office would you have sent a message to Short?

General Gerow. I would have certainly drafted such a message, and if I could have gotten in touch quickly with General Marshall, I would have put the question up to him. If I could not have gotten in touch with him, sir, I would have probably gotten in touch with the Secretary of War and told him what I was doing, and gotten the message on the line as quickly as possible, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, you figure that that information was such that it should have had action on it?

General Gerow. You mean the document that I saw at 11:30 in the Chief of Staff's office the next morning?

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

General Gerow. Yes, sir; they did warrant action.

Senator Ferguson. Now, down at the bottom of the page in your affidavit, "General Short,"—so we are talking about the same thing.

General Short did not send at any time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack of the kind that occurred with the means available to him.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want you to look at Exhibit 32, page 10, and ask you when you made that affidavit with Clausen, whether you are familiar with the message on page 10?

General Gerow. The message on page 10?

Senator Ferguson. Page 10 of Exhibit 32.

General Gerow. May I read that message to see if we have the same one?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Gerow (reading):

Japanese negotiations have come to a practical stalemate.

Senator Ferguson. That is wrong.

General Gerow. That is the one on page 10, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 12. The question is when you made the affidavit in Paris—no, in Cannes, France, the 20th of June, 1945, were you familiar with the message on page 12 of Exhibit 32, reading:

"Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy REURAD four seven two twenty-seventh," and signed "Short."

General Gerow. I did not have the message in front of me, sir, at the time I testified. I did know about it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How could you make that affidavit, the Clausen affidavit and put that sentence in it, and have in mind at the same time Short's reply?

[4332] General Gerow. Well, sir. I think the reply from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is subject to sev-
eral interpretations, sir. I think the phrase "liaison with the Navy" could be interpreted to mean that he was taking steps to conduct reconnaissance, and carry out other defensive measures.

Senator Ferguson. Is there any reason why you would misinterpret the first part, "Report Department alerted"? That was in reply to the 27th, wasn't it? Let me get the language of the one of the 27th.

Report measures taken.
Then his message came in on the 28th:
Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period.
That is the end of the sentence?
General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, could that be misconstrued?
General Gerow. It could be construed that he was taking steps to prevent sabotage and also these other things. The entire message could be construed that way.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first see the message on page 12?
General Gerow. I think I saw it first, sir, on the morning of the 28th of November, 1941. I have testified, I believe, sir, to that effect.

[4335] Senator Ferguson. And the interpretation that you now get from it is to the effect that that sentence "Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage" meant to you that he was alerted to the other, and he was also alerted to sabotage?

General Gerow. Senator, I did not testify to that, sir, on my previous testimony.
Senator Ferguson. I am asking you now.
General Gerow. I say now, that the message could be interpreted to mean that he was alerted to prevent sabotage and that he was also prepared to conduct reconnaissance and other defensive missions.
Senator Ferguson. It could be?
General Gerow. It could be.
Senator Ferguson. How did you interpret it on the 28th when you got it?
General Gerow. Well, sir——
Senator Ferguson. You acted on it?
General Gerow. No, sir; that is the trouble. I did not act on it.
Senator Ferguson. Even filing it away is acting on it, or passing it off is acting on it.
General Gerow. I testified, Senator, at considerable length to my part in the affair. I will repeat the testi- [4336] mony, if necessary.
Senator Ferguson. I want you to answer my question first.
General Gerow. Will you repeat the question, sir?
Senator Ferguson. What interpretation, what evaluation did you give it on the 28th?
General Gerow. I stated, sir, that I testified before the Roberts board to the effect that when that message passed over my desk, I thought it was an answer to the G-2 message sent out by General Miles. Consequently if I did have that thought on the morning of the 28th when the message passed over my desk—and I cannot recall now what my thoughts were at that time, but if I did have that thought, then there was no occasion for me to make any interpretation of the rest of the message, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you want to say that that was your thought, to the best of your knowledge now?

General Gerow. Senator, I would like my testimony to stand, sir, as I have stated it, that I testified before the Roberts Commission, or Committee, that when that message passed over my desk I assumed it to be an answer to the G-2 message sent by General Miles, and the reason for that assumption was that the G-2 message was discussed greatly at length the evening before.

[4337] Senator FERGUSON. I want to get down to what you said in the affidavit:

General Short did not send at any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack at the time it occurred with the means available to him.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I ask you again, did you have in mind this reply to Short’s on page 12 when you made that affidavit?

General Gerow. I told you, sir, that I did not have that message in front of me. I did know, and was familiar with the message, sir, and I did have it in mind at the time I made that affidavit, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you not think that at least that message would indicate that he was not fully alerted?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I submit the witness has answered that question at least a half dozen times in the examination. I just cannot understand the repetition of these questions over and over again. I may be wrong, and I certainly am not attempting to foreclose any member of the committee from asking any questions, but I cannot for the life of me understand the repetitious questions. I may be wrong.

[4338] The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would suggest that the members of the committee avoid repetition as much as possible, in order to expedite the hearing, but we will let General Gerow answer this question once more.

Senator Lucas. I do not object, but I should like to ask this question:

Should I be permitted, and every member of this committee be permitted to go through the same kind of examination and ask the same type and character of questions over and over again?

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I did not yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair answer that question, or that interrogatory, which he thinks is a proper one. This is not a court procedure in which the presiding judge, or the presiding officer, has any control over the inquiries made by members of the committee.

The Chair does not understand that he can, arbitrarily, or without arbitrary action, control the interrogatories propounded by members of the committee. Even though they repeat over and over again, the Chair, however, cannot control that. If any member of the committee desires to ask the same question or a similar question over and over again, the Chair does not know how he can control that process of inquiry by any member of the committee. But the [4339] Chair would like to caution the members, as far as possible, that there be no repetition of the same question, in view of similar answers that may have been given by the witness in any case.

So the Senator will proceed.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, this affidavit was not covered, as I recall it, by the General, in his testimony. These questions are new. They were not covered. This sentence that I was reading and trying to get an answer to had not been covered.

I want to know how it is possible to have that sentence in the affidavit, having in mind page 12. Now, do you understand my question?

The Chairman. The Chair does not recall whether General Gerow was asked about that matter when he was on the stand before.

Senator Ferguson. Did you cover that before, General?

The Chairman. The Chair may say also—

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me.

The Chairman. The Chair might also as far as the Chair is concerned, as a member of the committee, he understands the General's answer, and if other members do not, then they can pursue that matter, I suppose, until they do understand it.

[4340] General Gerow. My only desire sir, is to explain all I know about the Pearl Harbor affair to the committee. I am willing to answer any questions freely.

Senator Ferguson. That is all I am trying to find out, is what you do know.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, can you answer the question? I wish you would look at that sentence. I want to know how it is possible to write that sentence in an affidavit and at the same time have in mind General Short's reply on page 12 of exhibit 32.

General Gerow. Well, Senator, as I stated before, this affidavit was made, as I believe, in June 1945. That was when this affidavit was made. This message was received on November 28, 1941. A lot had happened between 1941 and 1945. I stated that I had not attempted to interpret this message when it passed over my desk on the morning on November 28, because of the incorrect assumption I had made that it was a reply to the sabotage message sent by General Miles.

If you ask me now, sir, to interpret whether this message could be interpreted as meaning that General Short did not send at any time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an [4341] attack of the kind which occurred with the means available to him, I think I can state now, sir, that this message could be interpreted as meaning that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had prepared for an attack of the kind that was actually made.

Senator Ferguson. That is your answer to the question?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. It is now 4 o'clock.

It is obvious we cannot finish with General Gerow, so we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 10 o'clock a. m., of the following day, Saturday, December 15, 1945.)
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, if we may do so, there are one or two matters that have come up that may be of aid to the committee in connection with the further examination of General Gerow, and if we could intervene for a moment, with Senator Ferguson's permission.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield.

The Chairman. All right, go ahead.

Mr. Gesell. The first has to do with Exhibit 21, the Winant dispatch of December 6 concerning the movement of Japanese vessels towards the Kra Peninsula. We wish to call the committee's attention to two additional messages on that subject.

The first is a message dated December 6, 1941, from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, signed by R. E. Schuirmann—a memorandum for the State Department, dated December 6, 1941. This memorandum reads as follows:

Following report has been received from the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet dated December 6:

"British Commander in Chief China reports a 25-ship convoy escorted by 6 cruisers and 10 destroyers in latitude 08-00 North longitude 106-00 East at 0316 Greenwich time today. A convoy of 10 ships with 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers were in latitude 07-40 North longitude 106-20 East 2 hours later. All on course West. Three additional ships in latitude 07-50 North longitude 105-00 East at 0442 course 310°. This indicates all forces will make for Kohtron in latitude 10-01 North longitude 104 East.

"Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Admiral Hart’s scouting force has sighted 30 ships and 1 large cruiser anchored in Camrunh Bay."

There is also attached to this memorandum which I have just read the text of the message from the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic forces dated December 6, 1941, addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations,
which forms the basis of the Schuirmann note to the State Department. This is dated December 6, 1941, and contains the same information and shows on its face that the dispatch was also sent for the information of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Com. 16 and Com. 14. The time group on the dispatch indicates that it was sent December 6th Greenwich time, at 12: 35 p. m., which would be 7: 55 a. m. Eastern Standard time, or 2: 55 p. m. Philippine time.

I would like to have these two documents designated Exhibit 66.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 66.")

Mr. GESSELL. Now the question also arose I believe in [4346] connection with the examination of General Miles, but it is pertinent perhaps to the examination of General Gerow as well, at page 4190 of the transcript, as to whether the so-called parallel action messages which were delivered to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941 by President Roosevelt were contained in magic.

We have obtained the magic messages which show that the texts of those notes were in magic, as well as the message from Tokyo to Washington dated August 17, 1941, transmitting the messages, and I think that should be marked as an exhibit. I suggest that the next exhibit number be Exhibit 67.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 67.")

[4346] Senator FERGUSON. Could I just see them?

Mr. GESSELL. Certainly.

(Exhibits Nos. 66 and 67 were handed to Senator Ferguson.)

Mr. GESSELL. We have not reproduced the latter because it is the text of notes which are already in volume 2 of Foreign Relations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator FERGUSON. May I inquire from counsel whether or not we have all of the intercepts now between the 16th and the 28th of August 1941, in relation to this instrument both ways?

Mr. GESSELL. I cannot answer that question. We will inquire and see. I thought the question in the transcript was for the texts of these specific messages.

Senator FERGUSON. What I would like to have now in relation to these is all of the messages in relation to them both ways. This is the one transmitted—

Mr. GESSELL. Between what dates, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Between the 16th of August and 20th. The 28th is when the reply came in.

Mr. GESSELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEFFEE. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel whether or not we will receive the material which I requested of General Marshall, namely the reasons for the 1940 alert?

[4347] Mr. GESSELL. No, Congressman Keefe, we have not received that information. We understand it is expected either later today or Monday.

Mr. KEFFEE. Have you received the action report on the log of the U. S. S. Enterprise which I asked for some time ago?

Mr. GESSELL. The situation with respect to the ship logs is as follows, according to my understanding: A large number of ship logs were requested by the different members of the committee at different times.

1 Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 124.
The Navy Department has set aside a large room, and filled it with these various logs that had been requested. It is a rather difficult matter to reproduce them all, and the Navy has suggested that those logs will be there for the inspection of anyone authorized by the committee to examine them. We wrote a letter in that connection for Senator Brewster, who had asked for quite a number. We have gotten the log of the Boise, which the committee had expressed a special interest in, and we were going to make a report on that, and some of the other requests later on today.

Mr. Keeffe. I was especially interested in the log of the Enterprise.

Mr. Gesell. I am sure that will be in the room along with the other material.

Mr. Keeffe. If I am permitted to go down to this room and see it, in company with somebody, if the committee would authorize me to, I will be glad to go down there and look at it.

Mr. Gesell. We will try to get the Enterprise log for you, Mr. Congressman. I am sure it can be made available. I think so many logs were requested, however, that unless there is a special interest in a particular log, it might be more convenient to leave them in this room, which has been especially supplied with them.

The Vice Chairman. I recall a special interest has been indicated in the Enterprise and Boise.

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. I was wondering if those two could be brought up here, and if any special ones are needed, they can be examined in the room.

Mr. Murphy. If any members of the committee are going to look at the logs, I want to see them, too. I want to know what they are looking at.

Mr. Gesell. They are being used by the Navy, also. We will get the Enterprise and the Boise logs.

Mr. Keeffe. Does that also include the action report?

Mr. Gesell. Yes; we will get that also.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, I also ask for the series of memoranda written by Hornbeck. I have been furnished with what purport to be two. I understand there are quite a series.

Mr. Gesell. We were advised this morning, Congressman Keefe, that the Navy had just located the file of the Hornbeck memoranda, and we expect to be able to meet your request completely, and more, by next week. I think I reported to the committee earlier that the Navy had not been able to find the memoranda, but they reported this morning that they at last were located. We will have them reproduced and make them available to the members of the committee.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

The Chairman. Proceed with the examination of the General.

**TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LEONARD TOWNSEND GEROW (Resumed)**

Senator Ferguson. General Gerow, you heard read this message from Commander Schuirmann to the Secretary of State, a memorandum for the State Department, December 6, 1941, based upon the message from Admiral Hart to the Chief of Naval Operations.
Had you ever heard of that before? Had that been called to your attention?

General Gerow. I do not recall now, sir, if the Navy [4350] sent a copy over to the War Department, as they usually do, and if they had sent some document of that nature I would have seen it, or one of my subordinates in the War Plans Division would have seen it.

Mr. Gesell. I should have stated the Navy record indicated that the Navy message was sent to the War Department. The War Department, however, has been unable to locate the message as yet, and is still searching for it.

General Gerow. I do not know, Senator, whether it would have come directly to War Plans or to G-2, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would that come to G-2 or would it come to you, your department?

General Gerow. I do not know, sir, how that message was sent. It may come directly to War Plans Division, or it may go to G-2 first, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That was very important information if it came in on the morning of the 6th?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that now?

General Gerow. I do not recall that particular message, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that information around the 6th?

General Gerow. I have a hazy recollection, Senator, of [4351] a number of troop movements being made by the Japs around the Camranh Bay area, but I do not remember the details of where I received that information, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You stated yesterday that there was some information put in the original affidavit by Colonel Clausen that you refused to sign and had him take it out and prepare a new affidavit; do you recall that?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what was the information that he put in that you had him strike out?

General Gerow. I don't recall that it was information, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was it?

General Gerow. He misunderstood, I think, some of the statements. There was no stenographer there and he tried to take it down in long-hand and he misunderstood, I believe, some of the statements that I made.

Senator Ferguson. You don't recall what that information was?

General Gerow. I cannot recall now; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you get the regulations, over the evening, as to the drafting of messages?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I have searched two or three regulations and in that connection, sir, I would like to state [4352] that—

I believe you asked me about what they taught at our schools with regard to certain operational messages and my reply was directed to the 5-paragraph order which is normally an order issued to, you might say, subordinate units, such as a division.

The type of order that may be issued to a theater commander in one of the larger units does not necessarily follow that detailed form. It may be included in a letter of instructions. It may be a telegram
sent out by the Chief of Staff. It may be very brief or it may be very long, depending on the person that is writing it and the desire or instruction he wishes to convey.

Senator Ferguson. Does the rule itself, in the book, give an exception when it goes to a theater commander?

General Gerow. I would like to read the Field Service Regulations regarding larger units.

Senator Ferguson. What are you reading from?

General Gerow. I am reading——

Senator Ferguson. War Department Staff Officers Field Manual?

General Gerow. No, sir. That is a book that pertains primarily to the details of these subordinate orders rather than to the orders issued to the large units. I shall be very glad to have you look at this or I will read the paragraph.

[4353] Senator Ferguson. Suppose you read the paragraph.

General Gerow. This document is entitled "Field Manual 100-15, War Department, Field Service Regulations," dated June 29, 1942.

On page 6, paragraph 15 reads:

The mission of the theater commander may be prescribed in an approved war plan or it may be stated in a letter of instructions or other orders from the President or the War Department. The mission assigned will usually be general in character and leave great discretion to the theater commander. Ordinarily, he is consulted prior to the promulgation of the plans. He may be called upon to prepare such plans.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you claim that your order of the 27th followed that?

General Gerow. I don't believe, sir, that it was necessary that it should follow that manual.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, you don't claim it did follow that manual?

General Gerow. No, sir, I didn't make that statement. I would have to analyze the message to see whether it followed it exactly or not.

Senator Ferguson. Are there any other memoranda in that book?

General Gerow. Yes, sir, the book——

[4354] Senator Ferguson. I mean in relation to the order.

General Gerow. That is the pertinent paragraph, I believe, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with the Staff Officers' Field Manual? For instance, on page 31, "Command Responsibility":

a. The commander alone is responsible to his superior for all that his unit does or fails to do. He cannot shift this responsibility to his staff or to subordinate commanders.

Then under "Liaison":

Liaison is the connection between units or other elements, established by a representative—usually an officer—of one unit who visits or remains with another unit. Its purpose is to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by personal contact.

General Gerow. May I have a reference to the page you are reading from, sir?

Senator Ferguson. I didn't know you had the same book.

General Gerow. I think I have the same book, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Page 31, paragraph 47.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when General Short used in his message the word "liaison," with the Navy, wouldn't that be what he meant in Army language?

General Gerow. No, sir, I don't think so, sir. The [4355] liaison referred to is when a commander, such as an Army commander, sends an officer from his staff down to a corps commander's headquarters. That officer is his particular representative there at the moment. He keeps him advised of the operations of that corps. He reports back periodically to his higher commander.

This liaison with the Navy, as it is used in, I think in Hawaii, was meant the close association between the two commanders themselves, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, what is this definition that I read, where is the definition that you are giving?

General Gerow. May I read the paragraph again, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, read it aloud.

General Gerow (reading):

Liaison is the connection between units or other elements, established by a representative—usually an officer—of one unit who visits or remains with another unit. Its purpose is to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by personal contact.

Now, as I understand General Short's relations to Admiral Kimmel, he did not visit at headquarters and remain with that headquarters, but he was in constant touch with that particular command headquarters and exchanged views, they exchanged views between themselves.

[4356] Senator Ferguson. Does this liaison definition apply only in the Army itself? Have you any definition in any of the books that would show what liaison with another branch, the Navy, would mean?

General Gerow. There may be a definition in some field manual, I don't recall, but it would be customary, and it was customary in my operations, when operating with the Navy, I would send one of my staff officers to the admiral commanding the fleet operating with me. He was my personal representative with that Navy commander, and he reported back to me the information he thought I should have.

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to get what the manuals or regulations show. Will you look at page 30, at the bottom of the page, under paragraph 46, "Reports."

General Gerow. Subparagraph b.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Gerow. Do you wish me to read that?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Gerow (reading):

The merit of a report is not measured by its length. A concise presentation of important points usually is all that is required.

Senator Ferguson. Would General Short's reply comply with that regulation?


Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 39, number 63, will you read that?
General Gerow. What is the number of the paragraph?


General Gerow. (reading):

Supervision of Execution. The responsibilities of the commander and his staff do not end with the issue of the necessary orders. They must insure receipt of the orders by the proper commanders, make certain they are understood, and enforce their effective execution.

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn’t there a special provision in there that when the message of the 27th was sent—it says they must “insure,” that would be the General Staff, “receipt of the orders,” that is the first thing, “by the proper commanders, make certain they are understood”—so when they report back isn’t the burden on the one giving the order to ascertain if the order was understood by the one that it was sent to?

Isn’t that what that provision says?

General Gerow. Yes, sir, that is what it states.

Senator Ferguson. Then:

* * * and enforce their effective execution.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

[4358] Senator Ferguson. That is a clear understanding.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would the man in the field then be able to rely upon that, that having sent back his order, that it was understood here in Washington, because the burden was, under the rule, on the people in Washington to know what was being done there, how it was understood; isn’t that the way the order reads?

General Gerow. Senator, may I have that question again?

Senator Ferguson. I will reframe it. Strike the last question.

Under this rule, where the burden is on the one who sends the order to make certain that it is understood, wouldn’t the field officer, General Short, have a right to rely upon the fact, having sent what he had, that the interpretation was proper, having sent the order?

General Gerow. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct, isn’t it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Not having heard anything for the number of days between the 28th and the 7th, he would have a right to rely upon that fact, that they had understood his order, and that he had properly interpreted the order of the 27th?

[4359] General Gerow. I think that is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean understood his report.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Let’s go to page—

General Gerow. But, of course—I haven’t studied these books—but I think you will find in some of these pamphlets that the commander on the ground that is responsible, if there is any doubt in his mind as to what the commander wants him to do, it is perfectly proper for him to come back to that commander and ask for a clarification of those instructions. If he is in doubt as to whether the action he has taken is proper he is perfectly within his rights to come back and request confirmation on his action.
Senator Ferguson. I am going to ask you, General, when we get through with the ones that I have, if you look over this and find something else that you want to bring to our attention, you may do so.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. On page 49, under paragraph 71, I wish you would read “a”, and “b”, under that.

General Gerow. “a” and “b” under paragraph 71?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, on page 49.

eGeneral Gerow [reading]:

Technique of Orders. a. Purpose. The purpose of a uniform technique throughout the service in the preparation of orders is to promote clarity and to prevent misunderstanding. The points of technique discussed in the following subparagraphs have been found helpful.

b. Amount of Detail. Orders should be concise. Those giving missions for subordinate units should prescribe only such details or methods of execution as are necessary to insure that the actions of the subordinate unit concerned will conform to the plan of operation for the force as a whole. In many cases, brevity is governed by the state of training of the troops for whom the order is intended; for a newly organized or poorly trained unit, the orders of necessity must be more detailed than for the well-trained organization.

Senator Ferguson. Was that in effect at the time, on the 7th?

General Gerow. I will have to check up to see what date this document is.

Senator Ferguson. August 19, mine is dated.

General Gerow. Yes, sir. It shows the date of August 19, 1940.

Senator Ferguson. It would be in effect?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 51, number i on that page, “Affirmative.” Will you read that?

[4361] General Gerow. (reading): Paragraph i:

Affirmative. In the interests of simplicity and clarity, the affirmative form of expression should be used. Such an order as “The trains will not accompany the regiment” is defective because the gist of the order depends upon the single word “not.” A better form is “The trains will remain at Leavenworth.” No doubt arises in the latter case.

Senator Ferguson. Now, down under “k”, I think you might read it all.

General Gerow. (reading):

k. Avoidance of Highly Technical Language. The military profession like all other professions has developed a technical vocabulary. This vocabulary is convenient and aids in the clear and rapid transference of ideas between military persons. The use of this vocabulary in texts and instructions is natural. In combat orders it is essential that there be no opportunity for misunderstanding by any subordinate of the exact intended meaning of all terms used. With poorly trained troops and staffs the use of technical military language may afford opportunities for such misunderstandings. Therefore the use in combat orders of technical expressions should be avoided if there is any danger of misunderstanding. In such cases, words of common understanding should be substituted, even at the sacrifice of brevity.

[4362] Senator Ferguson. Were you here when General Marshall spoke about the meaning of the first overt act?

General Gerow. No, sir; I was not present at the hearing, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that that was an expression that could be easily interpreted?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when you only gave the message to—the message of the 27th, it is on page 7 of exhibit 32—to “minimum essential officers”—who would you say should have gotten that information about the first overt act?

General Gerow. I would have given it to every officer that I thought should have that information in order to carry out his mission. I may have given that information to some second lieutenant if I thought it was necessary. That is left to the commander’s discretion, as to the people that he should disseminate that information to.

Senator Ferguson. It says:

In combat orders it is essential that there be no opportunity for misunderstanding by any subordinate of the exact intended meaning of all terms used.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, have you got FM-100-5, May 22, 1941, Field Service Regulations, War Department, Operations?

General Gerow. No, sir; I failed to bring that document with me, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I am going to pass it to you and ask you to read: On page 30, number 149; on page 31, 149 and 150; on page 31, 154; on page 32, 156; and the first two sentences of 157. I will indicate them for you.

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I didn’t get all those numbers.

Senator Ferguson. They are marked.

(The pamphlet referred to was handed to General Gerow.)

General Gerow. Paragraph 156.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Gerow (reading):

As a rule it is desirable to keep contemplated operations secret as long as possible and to confine knowledge thereof to a few staff officers and senior commanders. However, upon entry into action no unit should be in doubt as to what the commander wants it to do. Whenever knowledge of his intentions is necessary to insure the cooperation of the units engaged, a commander does not hesitate to disclose them to all concerned. Ignorance of his intentions may often lead to inactivity on the part of subordinates.

Paragraph 157. (Reading:)

It is impossible to prescribe detailed forms of orders to fit every tactical situation. To attempt to do so would result in a rigid form and a routine style of expression which would not be in accord with the tactical requirements sented by the diverse situations that arise in war. To the extent practicable, however, it has been found efficient and convenient to classify combat orders according to their purpose and scope and, for some of these, to adopt a standard sequence of composition. This makes for ease of understanding, the avoidance of omissions, and ready reference. Moreover, experience has shown that an order which can be misunderstood will be misunderstood and that, to obviate this danger, it is necessary to follow certain rules relating to the designations of boundaries, details of time and place, military terminology, abbreviations, designations of units, and the like. For details relating to these matters, see FM 101-5.

Did you have something—

Senator Ferguson. I gave you a sheet there with the page numbers on it. Then I drew a line down to the paragraph.

General Gerow. Oh, yes.

Senator Ferguson. Can you make it out?
General Gerow. I am trying to find it now. Paragraph 149 on page 30. [Reading:]

The authority to issue orders is an inherent function of command. Orders are normally issued to next subordinate commanders. Bypassing the normal channels of command is resorted to only in urgent situations; in such cases both the commander issuing and the commander receiving the order should notify intermediate commanders of its purport as soon as possible.

Senator Ferguson. Is that on page 31?

General Gerow. That is page 30, sir.

[4366] Senator Ferguson. Page 30?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I am reading now paragraph 150 on page 30, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

General Gerow. (reading):

Orders may be either complete or fragmentary.

The order is complete when it covers all essential aspects and phases of the operation. Complete orders include missions to all subordinate units charged with the execution of tactical operations in carrying out the commander's plan.

Fragmentary orders are used when speed in delivery and execution is imperative. Fragmentary orders are issued successively as the situation develops and decisions are made, and consist of separate instructions to one or more subordinate units prescribing the part each is to play in the operation or in the separate phases thereof. This procedure will be usual in divisions and smaller units. Fragmentary orders may be either oral or written. They are concise but not at the expense of clarity and omission of essential information. Instructions issued in fragmentary orders may be repeated in a complete field order or in an annex if considered desirable.


General Gerow (reading):

Orders must be clear and explicit and as brief as is consistent with clarity; short sentences are easily understood. Clarity is more important than technique. The more urgent the situation, the greater the need for conciseness in the order. Any statement of reasons for measures adopted should be limited to what is necessary to obtain intelligent cooperation from subordinates. Detailed instructions for a variety of contingencies, or prescriptions that are a matter of training, do not inspire confidence and have no place in an order. Trivial and meaningless expressions divide responsibility and lead to the adoption of half measures by subordinates. Exaggerated and bombastic phrases invite ridicule and weaken the force of an order. Expressions such as "attack vigorously," if used in orders, are not only verbose and meaningless, but tend to weaken the force of subsequent orders in which such expressions do not appear.

[4368] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the Army Board classified or described the order of November 27 from General Marshall to General Short, on page 7 of Exhibit 32, as a "do-don't" order?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I know they classified it as such, but I do not know the reasons therefor.

Senator Ferguson. But under the instructions that you have just read would you classify it as a "do-don't" order?

General Gerow. No, sir; I would not, sir. I do not think we find in this message any definite don'ts. May I—

Senator Ferguson. Well, what about the——

Mr. Murphy. May the witness finish his answer?

The Vice Chairman. Let the General finish his answer, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. Go ahead, General.
General Gerow. The first sentence I would like to read with reference to that is as follows (reading from page 7 of Exhibit 32):

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. That is a desire.

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

That sentence gives him the right to do anything that he considers necessary in his discretion to safeguard the Island of Oahu and carry out his mission.

There is another sentence, sir, which I would also like to read, if I may, sir:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent.

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't that a do-don't, do something at first but don't do the other? Don't you think they were correct when they described it that way?

General Gerow. The message does not state, sir, that "you will definitely not alarm the civil population."

Senator Ferguson. Under the first one that you read you have got this word "unpredictable." That is not a very definite term, is it?

General Gerow. I did not read that sentence, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. No. I want you to read it.

General Gerow. All right, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I will read it and pick out the word that I want and ask you about the word.

General Gerow. All right, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated.

[4870] You helped to draft this order, did you not, General?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get the word "appear" from? You had already sent a message on the 24th, the joint message that they were broken off.

General Gerow. What date is that message you refer, to, sir?

Senator Ferguson. I think it is the 24th.

Mr. Mitchell. Page 5 of Exhibit 32.

General Gerow. Page 5?

Senator Ferguson. That does not use the language I had in mind. It was another message. "Chances of favorable outcome" is the language of that.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement ** * *

Do you know whether or not this language of "appear"—

General Gerow. I did not understand you.
Senator Ferguson (continuing). Was used because the Secretary of War had talked with the Secretary of State?

[4372] General Gerow. Yes, sir. I think I testified previously, as I recall my testimony, I was called to the office of the Secretary of War about 9:30 on the morning of November the 27th. I went up there for a second conference with him later on in the morning. During that conference it is my recollection now that the Secretary of War talked to the Secretary of State on the telephone with regard to the question as to whether or not negotiations with Japan had actually terminated. As a result of that conversation the Secretary of War directed that the sentence as written in this message cover the statement as to the status of negotiations with Japan at that time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then it was in your first draft of this message that you had a definite term that they were broken off?

General Gerow. I cannot recall exactly that message, sir, but it is my impression now that I took a message in, sir, which stated “negotiations are terminated.”

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Instead of doing it—or instead of being in the joint message—it was in your original message?

General Gerow. I believe it was, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Gerow. I have tried to find a copy of that [4372] message, sir, and I cannot locate it and I am relying now on memory 4 years old.

Senator Ferguson. That is a long time.

General Gerow. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Then the next words are, “barest possibilities.” That is pretty indefinite, isn’t it?

General Gerow. Well, sir, I would not say it was pretty indefinite. I think it means exactly what it says, that there is the barest possibility of it being resumed. It is perfectly clear to me, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then the words “Japanese Government might come back.”

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And then this “unpredictable, but hostile action possible.”


Just what that action would be and where it would be was not clear to any of us at that time, sir, but we felt that hostile action was possible at any moment and particularly against our possessions in the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first think or come to the conclusion that hostile action would be directed against Hawaii?

[4373] General Gerow. Senator, I participated in the preparation of this message and I state in that message, sir, or it is stated in the Chief of Staff’s message, that “Japanese future action is unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.”

I do not think I ever came to the conclusion, sir, that the Japs were going to attack Hawaii and no other place. I felt that they would attack any one of our possessions bordering on the Pacific. That was a possibility, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever have a mental conclusion, then, prior to actual notice of the attack that Japan would attack Hawaii? Did you ever think that they would attack Hawaii? Was that within your thoughts?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I considered it as one of the possibilities in the event war occurred with Japan.

Senator Ferguson. Now, “possibility” is a very weak expression, isn’t it, in the possibilities?

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not think it is weak under the circumstances, Senator. There were several possibilities there.

Senator Ferguson. You did not even say it was a probability. You say it was only a possibility.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that what I understand?

[4374] General Gerow. It was a possibility that they might attack any one of our possessions in the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. But it did not get the dignity of a probability in your opinion?

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

General Gerow. Well, I think, Senator, I would say it was probable that they might attack any one of our four major areas bordering on the Pacific, sir.

Senator Ferguson. General, one of your duties, as I understand you, was to send out messages for action, keeping the field informed.

General Gerow. Yes, sir; Senator. I think I stated, sir; that my responsibility was to prepare messages and submit them to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War for their approval. In any emergency, if the Chief of Staff was not there, I would assume the responsibility for sending them and accept the consequences if I made a mistake.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, one of your duties, then, was to prepare messages and submit them to the Chief of Staff?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And those messages would be what is known as action messages, not information but action?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

[4375] Senator Ferguson. Therefore, it would be necessary for you to determine the time when such a message ought to go?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Isn’t that correct?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you at any time make up your mind that there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor so that you could have determined to prepare a message?

General Gerow. Senator, I think I testified here before, sir, that I never made up my mind that Hawaii was the only place that the Japs might attack. My thinking was that we had certain possessions in the Pacific; that if war with Japan occurred that Japan might attack any one or all of those possessions.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I am not including the words “or others.” I want to know just about Hawaii, that, Pearl Harbor.

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I concluded that an attack on Pearl Harbor, among others, was possible or probable.
Senator Ferguson. Now, can you answer it without "and others"?
General Gerow. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I want to know just whether or not—
General Gerow. No, sir; I cannot.

[4376] Senator Ferguson. All right.
General Gerow. I tried to be as positive as I can on it.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
General Gerow. I tried to picture my thoughts at the time, which
was that Japan might attack any one of our possession in the Pacific.
I did not pick out any one of them and give it first priority.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. The next question is—
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. No, not at this time.
The Chairman. All right, proceed.
Senator Ferguson. The next question is, General Bryden, did he
confer with you on any of these messages?
General Gerow. General Bryden accompanied me when I went in
to the office of the Secretary of War on the morning of November the
27th. Later on the messages that had been prepared were presented
to him for his approval and I think he initialed them, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Where is General Bryden now? Is he in Wash-
ington?
General Gerow. I believe he is retired, sir. I do not know where he
is living.
Senator Ferguson. Did you help to prepare the memo to
[4377] the President of the 5th of November? I think it is exhibit 16.
General Gerow. As I recall now, sir; the War Plans Division of
the Army and the War Plans Division of the Navy cooperated in the
preparation of that message, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you personally help to prepare it?
General Gerow. The original drafts were perhaps prepared by the
committees that worked under my supervision and these were then
presented to me for my approval or change.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that there was an ABCD, the
basic military policies on strategy agreed to in the United States-
British staff conversations, did you know about that?
General Gerow. You are referring now, sir, to the ADB Singapore
conference?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Gerow. Yes, sir; I knew about that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And did you know that there was a certain
line fixed as indicated on pages 4 and 5 (reading from Exhibit 16).

Until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose secu-

rity to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against
Japan should be undertaken only in one or more
[4378] of the following
contingencies.

General Gerow. May I ask, Senator, where you are reading from,
sir?
General Gerow. And the paragraph?
Senator Ferguson. (b)
General Gerow. Paragraph (b). May I take a moment to read that?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I want you to take a moment.

General Gerow. May I have the question again, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to know whether you were familiar with the terms of that agreement. It says:

Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies,

not in that agreement, but under those contingencies. Were you familiar with that?

General Gerow. I was familiar, yes, sir; with the staff conversations in Singapore and the recommendations of the members who participated in that conference, as to what they considered should be done in the event the Japanese did certain things, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were they in effect on the 5th of November 1941?

[4379] General Gerow. In effect, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Gerow. They could not be put into——

Senator Ferguson. So far as you knew.

General Gerow. They could not be put into effect without the approval of our respective governments. They were purely staff conversations between military personnel.

Senator Ferguson. All right. As far as you knew, then, they were not in effect, is that correct?

General Gerow. They had never been approved by our Government, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I wanted to find out.

General Gerow. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. That is what you knew.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you at the meeting—in the minutes of the meeting of November 3, 1941, that were attached to that? I do not see your name on it.

General Gerow. I do not know what the document is, what meeting you refer to, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you show him the first page?

General Gerow. What date is that, sir?

Senator Ferguson. This is on November 3, 1941.

General Gerow. Yes, sir; my name is on the list as being present, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is it? Oh, yes, it is, "Acting Chief of Staff, War Plans Division."

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I think you stated, Senator, that this document was attached to the memorandum that went to the President.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you straighten it out?

General Gerow. As far as I know it was not attached, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You know it was not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. On the bottom of page 2, then, did you hear Captain Schuirmann give that statement to the board meeting?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, at that time he pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. You heard that?

General Gerow. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you understand it?


Senator Ferguson. Did you agree with it?

General Gerow. I was not asked to agree with it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon?

General Gerow. I was not asked to agree with it.

Senator Ferguson. I ask you now did you agree to it?

General Gerow. I cannot recall now that I agreed to it at the time or made any statement regarding it.

Senator Ferguson. Was it a fact or not a fact?

General Gerow. I cannot testify as to whether it was a fact or not a fact. Captain Schuirmann is, as I understand, presenting his views as to what happened at a State Department meeting at which I was not present.

Senator Ferguson. No, I am asking you whether or not you were of the same opinion at that time?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I submit that question is not a fair question.

General Gerow. I do not quite understand——

Mr. Murphy. I would like to state my reasons for it.

General Gerow. I cannot quite understand the question, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I will put it this way: Were you of the opinion that when the President returned from a meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression? Now, I have read what Schuirmann said.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you of that opinion?

General Gerow. I have no first-hand knowledge, sir, if the President issued such a statement, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then you did not even know at that time that the President had issued such a statement?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Or any statement?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Gerow. I do not say that. I stated I had no first-hand knowledge that came to my memory that the President had issued it. I had seen, I believe, information concerning it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, what was your mental reaction on what you had seen? What conclusion did you draw? Schuirmann tells us here what he drew. What did you draw?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I am just wondering. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. I decline to yield.
The Chairman. I think there is a parliamentary question here and the Chair ought to hear it.

Senator Lucas. Well, I withdraw it.

The Chairman. All right. Go ahead, if you please.

General Gerow. Will you repeat that question again, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Will you read the question, please?

Senator Lucas. You are trying to trap a great General in these inconsistencies.

(Whereupon the question was read by the reporter as follows: “Well, what was your mental reaction on what you had seen? What conclusion did you draw? Schuirmann tells us here what he drew. What did you draw?”)

Senator Ferguson. Do you understand my question?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; but a conclusion as to what, sir—as to whether the President had issued an ultimatum or as to whether we should go to war in case of further aggression?

Senator Ferguson. Whether or not he had issued an ultimatum.

General Gerow. Well, I have stated, Senator, that to my own knowledge, to my own personal knowledge, I do not know that he issued an ultimatum.

Senator Ferguson. All right, that is all I wanted to know. Now, the next question: On the 27th—that is Exhibit 17—did you help to prepare that?

General Gerow. I believe this document was prepared, sir, by the War Plans Division of the Army and the War Plans Division of the Navy working together.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversations in relation to the modus vivendi?

General Gerow. As I recall, sir, I attended a conference in the State Department on November the 21st in which a paper setting out tentative proposals to Japan were discussed. I do not know whether that was known as a modus vivendi or what name the State Department gave it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know whether when the State Department had decided to send their message, which changed his meaning of the message to try to get Jap consent, whether you remember that term “modus vivendi” in it?

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not recall definitely where I received that information or if I did. If the Chief of Staff had it he probably informed me of that fact, sir, but I cannot recall at this time just when he did or if he did.

Senator Ferguson. You do not have that in mind?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know upon whose orders the words were put in the message of the 27th about the first overt act? Did you have any knowledge of that?

General Gerow. I think I received instructions from General Marshall to include a statement of that sort in the message.

Senator Ferguson. Did he advise you where he had received anything about it?
General Gerow. I do not recall definitely at this time, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You do not recall?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you take Exhibit 45? That is a letter or memorandum to General Marshall on the 27th, your memorandum. General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You say there that: “The Secretary of War sent for me at 9:30” on that morning and “he wanted to know”—the Secretary wanted to know—“what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed.”

Do you remember that conversation?


Senator Ferguson. Was there at that time anything said about sending one to General Short?

General Gerow. Not at that particular time. I think later on in my second conference with the Secretary of War that sending messages to all of our overseas possessions in the Pacific were discussed.

Senator Ferguson. Well, isn’t this a memo of your conversation with the Secretary of War?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; and may I go on to paragraph 2? There is a statement in paragraph 2 which reads: “The various messages to the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed.”

Senator Ferguson. You recall those?

General Gerow. I wrote this, sir, on the day that it happened. I think this is more accurate than my memory, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And does that refresh your memory, though, as to whether or not any message to General Short was discussed, the fact that a warning message for General MacArthur—no: “The various messages to the Army and Navy commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed.”

General Gerow. Yes, that indicated to me that they were discussed.

Senator Ferguson. It indicates definitely that there was something said about sending one to General Short.

General Gerow. To all of our Pacific commanders.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I will come down to the language: “The Secretary of War”—in the same exhibit—“wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations.”

Do you remember that?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get that language? Did the Secretary of War actually tell you that?

General Gerow. I imagine he did, sir, because I wrote it.

Senator Ferguson. You wrote it right in here?

General Gerow. I wrote it on the 27th and that is the only place I could have gotten it was to have the Secretary tell me, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss it with the Secretary of War as to why that was in there?

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not recall any such discussion.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what your conversation with General Marshall on that point was?
General Gerow. I do not believe I had a conversation with General Marshall on that. This memorandum went in to him on the evening of the 27th and I believe that he read it when he returned to the office on the morning of the 28th. I can not recall whether he sent for me on that morning and discussed it with me or not. I was in and out of his office daily, sometimes once, sometimes four or five times during the day, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You prepared the statement on the 27th for General Marshall or did someone else prepare it?

General Gerow. Which statement now are you referring to?

Senator Ferguson. The one of November 27. It is Exhibit 17. Is that the instrument that they were talking about that was not to contain a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations?

General Gerow. I think I stated, sir, that this document was prepared by the War Plans Division of the Army and the War Plans Division of the Navy working together, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you check it for that item, do you know, as to whether or not it did contain or did not contain any request to Japan?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You checked it for that?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Gerow. And I think the statement in my memorandum is to the effect that I reassured the Secretary on that point, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You reassured him later?

General Gerow. That is in the memorandum, sir. There is a sentence which I would like to read from that memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

General Gerow. That said: "He"—meaning the Secretary—"was reassured on that point."

Senator Ferguson. You reassured him?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. After you had checked the memorandum?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. I had the memorandum with me, sir, I believe, at the time.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that there were Jap scouting planes over the Philippines, over Clark Field and the other fields, prior to the time of the attack at Pearl Harbor? Did you get any word on that?

General Gerow. I have a very hazy recollection of hearing someone state that the Japanese had sent planes over some of our areas. I cannot recall definitely, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you of the opinion that if a proper alerted condition existed at Pearl Harbor that the Japanese should have been defeated in their attack?

General Gerow. I think our losses out there, sir, would have been much less had the command been completely alerted.

Senator Ferguson. That is the only answer you want to make?

General Gerow. I cannot quite interpret what you mean, sir, by "defeated." There are all degrees of defeat, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, how much of a defeat, or what qualification?

General Gerow. Well, they would have lost some planes. They may have lost some carriers, they may have lost some of their other major vessels.

Senator Ferguson. Did you hear what General Marshall had said on that same question?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Or similar question?

General Gerow. Sir?

Senator Ferguson. A question along that same line?

General Gerow. No, sir. I was not here when he testified, only one afternoon, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You never came to any conclusion as to what would have happened there if we had been properly alerted?

General Gerow. You say I never came to any conclusion?

Senator Ferguson. I say, have you?

[4391] General Gerow. Yes, sir. I just stated if we had been properly alerted that our losses there would probably have been much less.

Senator Ferguson. What about their losses?

General Gerow. Their losses would have been much greater, the Japanese losses.

Senator Ferguson. But you would not want to classify it as to whether or not they would be defeated in that encounter or not?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I submit that question has been answered twice in the last five minutes.

General Gerow. Well, sir, I—

The Chairman. The Chair sustains the point of order.

Senator Ferguson. Do you claim, General, that you have answered that question?

Mr. Murphy. All right, go ahead.

General Gerow. I think I answered it, Senator. I will be very glad, sir, to have the question repeated and attempt to answer it again, sir.

Senator Ferguson. No, I just want to know whether or not you feel that you did answer it?

General Gerow. I thought I did, sir, but if I did not make myself clear I would like to have the opportunity of making myself clear, sir.

[4392] Senator Ferguson. It was not clear to me, General, or I would not be asking the question again.

General Gerow. All right. I am here, sir, to clear up any points that I can. I have no desire to be vague on anything that I am certain of.

Senator Ferguson. I realize that. It has been a long time since this happened.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that is the reason I have asked you the number of questions that I have, to let you have time to think about them and to see whether or not we could get what was known at that time.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And what was not known, that is all.
General Gerow. If I can clarify anything, Senator, if you will ask me the question I will do my best to, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. No, that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Keefe?

Mr. Keefe. General Gerow, I shall not detain you very long.

General Gerow. Thank you, sir. I am very grateful.

Mr. Keefe. I think you are a great officer, that is all I can say.

General Gerow. Thank you again, sir.

[4293] Mr. Keefe. There are just one or two things that I am not clear on.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You testified before the Army board under oath?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you told them what you knew about this whole situation?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then Major Clausen came over to France some time in 1945, as I recall, where you were stationed?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And talked to you about the testimony you had given before the Army Board?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Is that right?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And I presume before the affidavit that you signed finally was drawn, you had considerable discussions with Major Clausen about your testimony?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And the testimony of others that had testified before that Board?

General Gerow. Primarily directed toward two or three people. I think Colonel Bratton’s testimony and Colonel Sadtler’s testimony.

I don’t think we went into the details of the others, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And I presume you had a considerable talk with Colonel Clausen before an affidavit was finally drawn?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. He made some longhand notes, did he, and then went some place and prepared an affidavit?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And asked you to sign it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. He took down the penciled notes. I gave him my testimony rather formally. He made the notes and I had no office facilities there, I was living in a sort of villa place and I had no typist or anything, so he took the notes of the testimony, sir, and typed them himself.

Mr. Keefe. And then when he brought the typed affidavit back you read it over?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You found some things in it that you did not think you had stated, or that he had misunderstood?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you decided that you would draw your own affidavit?

General Gerow. Yes. I went over it fully, sir, and revised it and cut out things and added things.

Mr. Keefe. Did you draw the new affidavit yourself or did Colonel Clausen re-draft it under your instructions?

General Gerow. No, sir. I sat there and took the draft that he had there and went through it and changed it and scratched things out and put in in pencil the things that I thought should go in there as presenting the facts.

Mr. Keefe. And then it was re-drawn?

General Gerow. It was re-typed.

Mr. Keefe. And you signed it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And he swore you to it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you know the purpose for which he was asking you to make this affidavit? Did he disclose that to you?

General Gerow. I think he stated sir, that after I had made my testimony there was other testimony which I did not have an opportunity to reply to and that involved me and that he was trying to get my testimony on those particular points, particularly, as I say, that had reference to Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtlr's testimony.

[4395] Mr. Keefe. Did he call your attention to the testimony that Colonel Bratton had given before the Army board?

General Gerow. Yes, sir, I think he gave it to me in a brief summary form. I do not believe, sir, that he had a transcript of the testimony. I do not believe I have ever seen that, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did he tell you also what Sadtlr testified to before the Army Board?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And did he indicate that their testimony was in conflict with the testimony that you had given before the Board?

General Gerow. No, sir, he did not indicate that. As I recall now, it was testimony that had come out subsequently that was not in conflict, as I now understand, with anything I had stated but I did not cover magic.

Mr. Keefe. I see.

General Gerow. In my first statement before the Army board, or in my only statement before the Army board, because I never had an opportunity to appear before it again.

Mr. Keefe. Now, when you were in before the Army board, or after you testified, were you furnished a copy of your transcript of your testimony and given an opportunity to correct it?

[4397] General Gerow. Yes, sir; I was furnished a transcript and I read it over and turned it in to the board, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And whatever corrections you had to make in your testimony that you gave before the Army board were made before it was finally accepted by the board?

General Gerow. I imagine they were, sir. I never saw a copy of that board's report until I came back here for this committee hearing, sir. I was never furnished a copy and I never saw it until I—
Mr. Keeffe. Pardon me, but in your testimony before the Army board, of course, you made no reference whatever to magic?

General Gerow. No, sir. In my testimony, I think I stated yesterday, that I began to get on magic and I realized that I should not talk about it and I stopped myself and they allowed me to paraphrase. That is the only time we got into it at all, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, one other thing I would like to get clear in my mind. I will admit some confusion still exists in the face of all you said about his message of the 27th.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. General Marshall testified that he left at 1 o'clock on the 26th and went down to the maneuvers.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And did you not come back until the evening of the 27th?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Isn't that correct, he was not here on the afternoon of the 26th nor all day of the 27th?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, any conversations that you had with General Marshall in respect to this message of the 27th, therefore, must have been had before 1 o'clock on the 26th?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. That is true?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And any instructions that General Marshall had given you as to the language in the proposed alert message to go to the Pacific outposts must have been had on the morning of the 26th?

General Gerow. Either on the 25th or the 26th, the morning of the 26th.

Mr. Keeffe. The 25th or the 26th?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. So when it came to actually drafting the message, when was it actually drafted, the first drafting, the afternoon of the 26th or morning of the 27th, or when?

General Gerow. Sir, I tried to remember exactly what happened on that morning. I notice in my memorandum here it stated—I state here, sir, "I then showed him a copy of the draft message discussed at the Joint Board meeting."

This is a memorandum of November 27, sir, that I sent in to the chief of staff. I think, in making that statement, I was trying to fix in General Marshall's mind he place that he had discussed this message with me. I did not intend to state positively that that message was actually discussed formally at the Joint Board meeting. I have a very hazy recollection, sir, that General Marshall was in a hurry to get away, that the Joint Board meeting had been quite a long one, that he had told me earlier on the morning of the 26th about the message prepared for him, and perhaps to finish up this memorandum that was to go to the President.

I had, I believe, Colonel Bundy and one or two of my best officers working on it. I think when the Joint Board meeting was over, had been formally concluded, General Marshall turned to me and said
with respect to this message and memorandum, we went from the 
Joint Board room into my office, which was quite close there, and 
Colonel Bundy came to the door [4400] of the Joint Board 
room with this message, and General Marshall scanned it very quickly 
and either told me it was all right, or all wrong, or to do something 
else with it.

I walked down the hall, as I recall now, and he was in quite a con-
siderable hurry, and I believe he read either the memorandum or the 
message as I walked down the hall with him to his office and finished 
it before he got there. That was on the morning of the 26th, sir, 
before he left at 1 o'clock.

Mr. Keefe. In that conversation, as he walked down the hall, did 
he suggest some changes in the message?

General Gerow. I cannot recall that, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did the original draft of the message contain the 
provision as to Japan committing the first overt act?

General Gerow. I have tried to find that message, Mr. Congress-
man. I cannot locate it, and I cannot say positively that it did. I 
believe that General Marshall had told me to prepare that message 
and I think he probably told me about including the overt act at the 
same time, and that I had prepared with those instructions in that 
first draft of the message, which I cannot locate, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now on the afternoon of the 26th was it discussed 
with anybody else, or was it redrafted?

General Gerow. Not to my recollection. I imagine I sat down 
with Colonel Bundy and these other officers and between [4401] 
us we worked out the message, sir.

Mr. Keefe. It was dated the 27th, the next day?

General Gerow. The next morning, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. It was sent on the 27th?

General Gerow. It was sent on the 27th, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. When you sat down with Colonel Bundy, or any of these 
other people, did you have the Navy message before you as to what 
they proposed to send?

General Gerow. I tried to remember that, sir. From my memory 
I cannot definitely say I did, but Admiral Turner, whom I haven't 
ahad a chance to talk to, can state whether we did or not. I just cannot say 
when the Navy message was prepared.

I regret I cannot remember more than that, sir, but I just simply 
cannot.

Mr. Keefe. General Gerow, may I say to you, sir, for anybody that 
has been through the service that you have and rendered the magnifi-
cent service that you have during the war, I, for one, can well appre-
ciate that there are a lot of these details that you cannot remember.

I thank you, sir.

[4402] The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask one ques-
tion. In regard to your statement a while ago, General, that it is your 
opinion that if the forces had been alerted in Hawaii, or at Pearl 
Harbor, that the degree of success by the Japanese would have been 
lessened. That is the effect of what you have stated?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. You could not, of course, tell what Japanese ship or 
plane might have been destroyed, if our forces had been alerted, nor 
what ship or plane we might have saved.
General Gerow. No, sir.

The Chairman. But taking the whole situation into consideration, your opinion is that if that had happened, if that had been the status of affairs, the degree of Japanese success against our matériel, our forces and men, would have been considerably less; is that correct?

General Gerow. Yes, sir, that is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. General Gerow, as the head of the War Plans Division, I take it you were familiar with the plans for the defense of the Philippine Islands.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

[4403] Senator Lucas. Do you know at what time the Japs struck the Philippine Islands?

General Gerow. I should think it was probably 10 or 12 hours after they struck Hawaii. I state that because I telephoned to the Philippines shortly after the attack on Hawaii, and the Philippines had not been attacked at that time, sir.

Senator Lucas. To whom did you talk in the Philippines?

General Gerow. I talked to General MacArthur, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you recall what time it was on Sunday, December 7, that you talked to General MacArthur?

General Gerow. No, sir. I think probably the telephone log will show that, sir. It was in the afternoon, sir, and I recall the conversation quite distinctly, sir.


General Gerow. I told General MacArthur, sir, that Hawaii had been attacked by the Japs, and he asked me what damage had been done, and told him, sir, that the telephone was not secret, and I could not divulge that information to him, and I asked him if anything had happened out in his area, and he said "no," but there were a group of planes approaching the Philippines at that time that had not been identified, and he was sending up his planes [4404] to meet them. Then he asked me to convey to General Marshall the statement that they were on the alert out there, and ready to meet any emergency. That is in substance the conversation as I now recall it, sir.

Senator Lucas. How many air fields did they have in the Philippines, do you recall?

General Gerow. Sir, I remember Clark Field, and Nichols Field, and I think there was one at a place called Eba. I do not remember how many more they had, sir.

Senator Lucas. Can you give to the committee the number of airplanes that were in the Philippines at that time?

General Gerow. I do not have those figures with me, sir. The War Department, I am sure, will be very glad to give that to you, sir.

Senator Lucas. Will you get that for us? 1

General Gerow. I will see that they are given to the committee.

Senator Lucas. Do you recall getting any information from the Philippines as to what happened to our bombers on Clark Field the following day, after the war started?

General Gerow. I do not know, sir, whether we ever received an operations report from the Philippines or not, with regard to that, sir. I cannot recall at this time.

1 See footnote on following page.

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Senator Lucas. Will you look for that also for me and see whether or not any report was made from the Philippines with respect to the number of bombers that were lost on Clark Field the following day, after the Japs struck, or that afternoon?  

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. General Gerow, a lot of information has come to this committee during this hearing about the messages that were intercepted and decoded and translated. You are, of course, familiar with all that.

You were one of the high officers in the military branch of the Government who saw these magic messages from day to day?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. General Marshall testified that it was through magic that we really won the Battle of Midway, and the Coral Sea, and he also testified it was magic that caused the damage to Yamamoto, I believe.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Those are just a few examples that he gave to us of what magic had done in the way of security and information to this nation.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. You are familiar with all of those, of course.

General Gerow. I was not in Washington at that time. I left, you see, in February of 1942. I have heard that statement made, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, I take it that you agree that the keeping of magic secret was a high and top military secret all through that war.

General Gerow. Yes, sir; I think it was vital that we preserve that secrecy, sir.

Senator Lucas. There were only a few men in Washington that knew anything about magic at that time, isn’t that true?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. For the sake of the record, can you give to this committee now, the number of officers in Washington who knew the secret of magic, who knew of the breaking of this Japanese code?

General Gerow. No, sir. I think I can speak only for the War Department, sir, at the time I was here, and G–2 will know better than I know whom they delivered them to, but my recollection is they were given to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff G–2, and Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, and I got permission at some time during 1941 from General Marshall to show it to my No. 1 assistant, Colonel Bundy, so in the event that anything happened to me there would be continuity in the War Department in the War Plans Division, sir.

Senator Lucas. Was Colonel Bundy the only officer in the War Plans Division outside of yourself who knew the secret of magic?

General Gerow. He was the only one, sir, to whom magic was shown. Now, some of the others may have guessed that we were doing something of the kind, sir, but I do not know that fact.

Senator Lucas. He was the only officer that possessed actual knowledge of it?

General Gerow. Who actually saw the magic; yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Now, General Gerow, there was quite a little speculation in the autumn of 1944 about a leak in magic from somewhere. Do you recall at that time—Oh, you were not here at that time?

General Gerow. No, sir; I was overseas in 1944, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, what would have been the military course that would have been pursued against an individual who knew the secret of magic, had that individual given that secrecy to the public—what would have been the course pursued by the military under those circumstances?

[4408] General Gerow. I think he would have been court martialed, sir, and if the evidence was sufficient, if they found him guilty, he would probably—I do not know what the penalty would have been—dismissal or confinement.

Senator Lucas. Here is one of the top secrets that involved our national defense and our security. Just assuming now that one of these officers would have given me, for instance, that top secret, and it would have become thereafter a matter of public property, everybody would have known it, do you care to hazard a guess as to the penalty that might have been attached to the officer that had given away the highest top military secret in the Nation?

General Gerow. Well, sir, of course I do not know what the officers of a court would decide. I can give you my own personal opinion, sir.

Senator Lucas. That is what I want, sir. I would like to ask you, before you give your personal opinion, one more question. Can you give to the committee, from your knowledge of military life, what the officer would have been charged with in the first instance had he given away a top secret of that character? Maybe that is a legal question.

[4409] General Gerow. There are quite a lot of articles of war that we operate under, and there are general articles, such as conduct prejudicial to the good order and interest of the United States.

If he deliberately gave it away, he might be tried for treason. There are probably any number of articles of war under which he could be tried, sir. There would be no question about an article of war that would fit it, sir.

Senator Lucas. You started to answer another question, that was as to what was your opinion.

General Gerow. Well, sir, if the evidence showed that that officer had deliberately given out that information, with full knowledge of what it meant and its effect, I, as a member of the court, would have voted the death penalty, sir.

Senator Lucas. I think that is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just one question.

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. General Gerow, in the message of the 27th, there is the language, "Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment."

As I understand you, when you sent that to the Pacific theaters, you wanted to put all of the Pacific theaters on the alert, because the action of the Japanese was unpredictable. That is correct, isn't it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. As far as General Short at Hawaii was concerned, when he got that message, he did not have to concern himself with other matters but only with the defense of Hawaii?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. Does counsel have any further questions?

Mr. Mitchell. General Gerow, I would like to clear up one thing, and that has to do with the responsibilities and powers of the Commander in the field.

The record shows here that in Washington, on the basis of all of the accumulated information they had, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, and in part, the President, along with officers like yourself, had evaluated the information they had, and their conclusion was that war might come at any moment, that action was unpredictable, but hostile action in any direction might be expected. That was the conclusion.

Then, they put that evaluation in the form of a dispatch to a field commander. Now, there has been a great deal of [4411] inquiry as to whether this and that bit of information was or was not sent out to the commanders in Hawaii to make their own evaluation, and the inference I get from it is the commanders in the field were in a position and were entitled, when they got an evaluation like that from Washington by their superiors, before they accepted it and acted on it, they had a right to demand that the original source of material which had been acted on here, should be given to them, so that they could form their own judgment as to whether the people in Washington knew what they were doing.

Now, is that a permissible practice in the Army?

General Gerow. No, sir. The commanders did not have that right to demand the information on which the Chief of Staff based a decision. I think if the officer insisted on demanding that information, he would have probably been relieved from that command.

Mr. Mitchell. At the time this warning message was sent on November 27, 1941, did you have any Army posts in areas other than the Pacific?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; we had garrisons on some of our Atlantic bases, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. What were they?

General Gerow. I think we had troops in Iceland at [4412] the time. We had some, probably, on Bermuda, and some on the other Caribbean Islands. I do not remember the exact bases we had in the Atlantic at that time.

Mr. Mitchell. When you formed the judgment about the imminence of war with Japan, did you send warning messages to Iceland and these other posts in the Atlantic that you mentioned?

General Gerow. No, sir; I do not believe such messages were sent. Our thinking was about Japan at the time and we did not anticipate that Japan would operate in the Atlantic Ocean right away, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Then you did come to the conclusion that Iceland was not a possibility for an attack?

General Gerow. Not for an attack by Japan.

Mr. Mitchell. That is what I mean.

General Gerow. No, sir; that was not a possibility.
Mr. Mitchell. Then do I understand you to say, in sending the message, your state of mind was to send a warning to any post that was within the possibility of an attack from Japan?

General Gerow. That was the purpose, sir, to send warning messages to those areas that Japan would be in a position to attack.

Mr. Mitchell. Suppose you had been convinced at that time that there was not a shade of possibility of any Japanese attack on Panama, or call it the Pacific coast command, at Seattle, or wherever it was, if you had been in that state of mind and felt there was no possible chance of anything being done on the Pacific coast, to the bases there, would you have sent them a warning message?

General Gerow. I do not believe, sir, I could quite get in that frame of mind.

Mr. Mitchell. I know it was something you did not do, but I am trying to get your distinction, your state of mind as to your judgment at the time, as to whether there was a chance or a possibility of an attack, and you told me you did not think there was, in Iceland.

General Gerow. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. I am asking you if—that is not the case, of course—but if you had supposed that the Pacific coast was totally out of reach of Japan, that it was a waste of time to put them on the alert, would you have sent them a message?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Then, the gist of it is, as I understand it, that you picked out the spots that you thought Japan might reach?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, I notice that the alert that you sent to Hawaii was in identical terms with the one you sent to the commander of the Pacific coast.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Not a word of difference. The Pacific coast was 2,000 miles or more further away from Japan than Hawaii?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Then I notice that your message to MacArthur, who was right under the main islands of Japan, differs in no respect from the one you sent to Hawaii, except in one or two immaterial respects, about disturbing the population.

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You did not make any distinction in the nature of your warning to any one of them; did you?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That was deliberate on your part?

General Gerow. Yes, sir, because we did not know which one of them would be attacked.

Mr. Mitchell. There has been something said here and you have been asked about impregnable fortresses, and whether Pearl Harbor was the greatest fortress in the world.

In forming your judgment as to whether a fortress was supposed to be immune to attack, or completely capable of defense, or impregnable, whatever you want to call it, is that judgment formed on the assumption that the fortress will be attacked when she is asleep, and her command is not alert?
General Gerow. No, sir; it could still be alerted and would not be impregnable, I do not believe, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You haven't got my question. What I meant was, in judging whether a fortress is safe from attack, do you assume, in judging her safety, that her garrison is going to be prepared and ready, alerted to meet an attack that comes to it?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Is any fort impregnable, or safe from attack, however powerful it is, if the garrison is asleep at the switch?

General Gerow. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I think Fort Ticonderoga in the American Revolution was considered the next largest or strongest fortress in the country.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. She was captured in the nighttime by a crowd of ragged militiamen without firing a shot.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. The commander, as I remember it, was caught in bed. Is that an illustration of a case where an impregnable fortress is captured because the garrison is not prepared?

General Gerow. I think that is a very good illustration, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I think he even had his trousers in his hands.

The Chairman. Was he about to put them on, or take them off?

[Laughter.]

Mr. Mitchell. Now, on this question of judgment as to the likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor, you have been asked a good deal about that, as to whether your judgment was that it was possible or likely, and so forth.

Now, there was great risk to the Japs in that expedition. It had considerable hazards, did it not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And the hazards had to be measured against the importance of the objective?

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I assume in measuring the hazards and chances of success, the fact that the Japs knew our state of alertness, or lack of it, would be an important factor, would it not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; that would greatly lessen the hazard.

Mr. Mitchell. It is a matter of record here that the Japs knew from day to day everything we were doing and not doing in Pearl Harbor and that information was transmitted from day to day by their spies in Honolulu to the Government in Japan, so if we had been on the alert on November 27 to the 7th of December, the Japs would have known it, would they not?

General Gerow. I believe they would have known it, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And although it was an impregnable fortress, if we were not on the alert in that period and the Japs knew that, it would be a great factor in their decision as to whether the attack was worth while?

General Gerow. I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You knew here in Washington—I think the record fairly shows—that they did have a spy system, that these reports were going out almost daily from their spies. You were intercepting them, you knew that the Japs had every means open to the public to communicate with their Government, so you were aware here,
at least, that the Japs knew everything that was going on in Hawaii?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. The next question is whether you had a clear idea as to whether we were alerted out there. The people on the ground had this advantage over you, did they not, that they knew whether they were alerted or not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. It never occurred to me that they were not on the alert, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. The commander in the field, under those circumstances, at that place, had at least this advantage over the Washington end, that is, they knew the same things you did, but that the Japs knew everything they were doing and not doing—both ends knew that?


Mr. Mitchell. The people in Hawaii were in a better position to know the extent of their preparations, to know whether or not the Japs knew that they were not taking any steps against an air attack.

General Gerow. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. So the judgment of the people here, and it seems rather clear that there is a great deal of evidence here, that at least officers in Washington did not expect an attack, their judgment was necessarily formed with a less and certainly a hazier picture of whether there was a different alert necessary out there than the local commanders had?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, there has been a good deal of discussion about the order in your command of November 27 to Hawaii and other points as to an overt act. It may be irrelevant because nobody was ever called upon to make a decision as to what an overt act was until the Japs appeared over Pearl Harbor and commenced to drop bombs. But as a matter of discussion of the sufficiency of the order, when it says we want the Japs to commit the first overt act but do not let this induce you to fail to take measures or jeopardize your defense, let me ask you, if the Jap carrier fleet had been spotted at sea the night of the 6th or the morning of [4420] the 7th driving toward Honolulu with six carriers in the fleet, and the question had arisen whether that was an overt act under your message or whether it would jeopardize the defense to wait until they got to Pearl Harbor and commenced to drop bombs, what was your idea about that?

General Gerow. I think the commander would have attacked that Japanese force and I think he should have done so, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. If he had seen the Jap carriers 300 miles at sea and had done nothing but sail around in the air until they commenced to drop bombs, what would have happened to him under this order?

General Gerow. It would have jeopardized his defense to permit that outfit to approach any closer.

Mr. Mitchell. That would amount to a disobeyance of the order, would it not?

General Gerow. Yes, sir; or a failure to obey the order.

Mr. Mitchell. You draw a distinction there?

General Gerow. Yes, sir. Direct disobedience of an order is something that is intentional. Failure to obey may be due to any number of causes, error of judgment, or absence, or something else.
Mr. Mitchell. I have just one more question. It is submitted by counsel, Captain Ford, for General Short. I am asked to put this question to you:

[4421] How should General Short have worded his reply on the 27th of November 1941, his reply to your message of the 27th, to make clear to you and to your staff that his alert was to prevent sabotage only?

General Gerow. Well, I think, sir, if the message had read simply "alerted against sabotage only," it would have been perfectly clear.

Mr. Mitchell. I notice that in these war plans, exhibit 44, the operational order of November 5 which you have testified did not arrive in the War Department—

General Gerow. May I get the page of that, sir?

Mr. Mitchell. It is tab 9.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. General Short on November 5 put into effect an operational order out there which had these three alerts. No. 1 alert was this:

This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands with no threat from without.

Now, you never say that in fact until after the 1st of January 1942, you testified?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. But you did see this preliminary draft he had sent in the previous year, did you not?

General Gerow. I don't recall having seen that preliminary [4422] draft either.

Mr. Mitchell. That had substantially the same alert, the alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands with no particular threat from without, the way that read that was alert No. 3, according to his then system. This later became alert No. 1.

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, if General Short had this on file in the War Department on November 27, this operational order of November 5, so that you could have known what alert No. 1 was, and he reported alerted against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands with no threat from without, that would have made it clear to you what he was doing?

General Gerow. Yes, it would have made it quite clear.

Mr. Mitchell. And if he hadn't this on file, as he didn't, and couldn't use the specific reference to alert No. 1, which would have meant nothing to you at that time, if he had used the same expression in his report that he did in phrasing his alert, defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands with no threat from without, that would have been clear?

General Gerow. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Take the message as he put it, if he had said alerted against sabotage and left out the words "liaison [4423] with the Navy," do you think that would have made you aware of his being alerted for sabotage only? It is asking a good deal of you, but it would certainly be likely.

General Gerow. Yes, sir, it would be likely. I didn't have to make the decision, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. I know you didn't. If's, and's, and but's aren't worth much.

I think that is all.

The Chairman. General, is there any further information within your knowledge which is pertinent to this inquiry which you have that you could submit to the committee that has not been drawn out by the interrogation of you as a witness?

General Gerow. No, sir, I have nothing.

The Chairman. Well, the committee thanks you, General, for your forthright cooperation in trying to develop the facts in this inquiry. You have demeaned yourself before this committee in a manner befitting your record in the Army. You have the grateful appreciation of this committee for your services in that connection.

Thank you very much.

General Gerow. Thank you, sir, and I wish to thank the committee.

The Chairman. You may be excused.

(The witness was excused.)

[4424] The Chairman. The Chair understands counsel have some documents that they wish at this time to put in which have been received in response to request of various members of the committee.

Mr. Gesell. Yes, Mr. Chairman. If the committee will indulge us for a few minutes past 12 o'clock I think we can put into the record with some dispatch the material in response to certain requests and that would permit us to avoid any session this afternoon.

The Chairman. The Chair might announce that Admiral Wilkinson is the next witness, but he will not be before us until 10 o'clock on Monday.

Mr. Gesell. The first item that we wish to present has to do with the United States ship Boise.

The committee will recall that Congressman Gearhart at pages 274 and 560 of the record asked for the log of the Boise and indicated that he had knowledge or information to the effect that the cruiser had sighted the Japanese task force on its way to attack Pearl Harbor.

I have here in my hand a photostatic copy of the entries in the log of the United States ship Boise for the period November 25, 1941 to December 7, 1941, inclusive.

This log shows that on two occasion during that period the Boise sighted a strange ship. The first occasion was on [4425] November 27 and I will read into the record the brief entry concerning that. On November 27, 1941, during the 18 to 20 watch, according to an entry of F. G. Dierman, lieutenant (jg), United States Navy, there was the following that occurred:

Steamng as before, 1840 sighted darkened ship, bearing 240° T. estimated range 16,000 yards. Went to general quarters. 1845 set material condition a firm. 1851 challenged ship. Received no reply. 1852 changed speed to 20 knots. 1854 changed speed to 14 knots.

[4426] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman——

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas:

Senator Lucas. May I inquire what time of day that was?

Mr. Gesell. 18 to 20. That would be between 6 and 8 p.m., I take it, and 1840 was when they sighted the ship. That would be 6:40 p.m.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman——

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire whether the log shows where the Boise was at that time?
Mr. Gesell. I am coming to that, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me.

Mr. Gesell. I wanted to develop this so that the committee has all of the information.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. On the 28th of November 1941, there is an entry by D. S. Edwards, lieutenant, United States Navy, in the 16 to 20 watch, that is Friday, November 28, 1941:

Steaming as before, on various courses at various speeds. * * * 1733 darkened ship. 1743 sighted ship bearing 325 t. hull down. Changed course to 260 degrees t, changed speed to 15 knots. Manned battle stations. 1750 cut in boilers No. 3 and No. 4 on main steam line. 1752 [4427] set condition affirm. On various courses at various speeds keeping between ship sighted at 1743 and convoy. Ship appeared to be H. I. J. S. “ATAGO” type, steaming darkened at 14 knots on various courses toward convoy. 1800 ship turned to course about 000 degrees t. 1804 on various courses closing convoy. 1835 unset condition affirm.

Now, from the information presented by Admiral English, it appears that there were no cruisers of the Atago type in the Japanese striking force.

The Navy has plotted on the basis of the log, the positions of the U. S. S. Boise at the various times mentioned in the log.

With respect to the entries on November 27, 1941, the Boise at 1840 was at latitude 16°46’0.5” N., longitude 153°55’ E. 1851 on November 27, 1941, latitude 16°45’0.5” N., longitude 153°52’0.5” E——

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman——

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel know where that would be on the map?

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir, I am coming to that, if I may present this, please, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me.

[4428] Mr. Gesell. (continuing) On November 27, 1941 at 1927, it was latitude 16°43’ N., longitude 143°44’0.5” E. 1743 28 November 1941, latitude 14°56’0.5” N., longitude 145°48’ E., 1920, 28 November 1941, latitude 14°49’ N., longitude 148°26’ E.

We asked the Navy to state in simple terms what that meant in terms of the position of the Boise in relation to the Japanese force, and were advised as follows:

The position of the U. S. S. Boise with relation to the track of the Japanese striking force on the 27th and 28th of November, 1941, from the best information available appears, that the U. S. S. Boise on those dates was not less than 1,400 miles from the Japanese striking force.

Now, in this connection the committee has also asked to have the log of the S. S. American Leader——

Senator Lucas. Before you proceed, the S. S. American Leader was in the convoy with the Boise?

Mr. Gesell. The Navy reports as follows with respect to the American Leader:

With further reference to your request dated 17 November 1945 for the log of S. S. American Leader, the S. S. American [4429] Leader was one of the ships in the convoy which the U. S. S. Boise escorted to the Philippines November 7, 1941.

The log of the S. S. American Leader is not immediately available to the Navy Department since this ship was in the U. S. Maritime Service.
I think, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, to conclude this matter on the Boise we should ask to have the log for the periods indicated designated as an exhibit. It would be Exhibit 68.

We also would like to accompany it, as part of the same exhibit, a map on which the plot of the Japanese task force appears and the position of the Boise on the dates when it sighted the darkened ships also appears.

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement about the Boise and the American Leader?

Mr. Gesell. That concludes the matter on the Boise.

The Vice Chairman. Exhibit 68 will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 68.")

The Vice Chairman. Are there any questions about the Boise and American Leader?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I ask just one question.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Does the plot show just about how far the Boise was from the Hawaiian Islands when this first ship was sighted?

Mr. Gesell. It was near Guam. It appears on the map just where it was.

Senator Lucas. I see.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel know where this convoy had been picked up by the Boise? That is not shown on the log.

Mr. Gesell. I don't think on these days, but I believe that was covered by the testimony of Admiral Inglis. My recollection is it was a convoy proceeding to the Philippines. Where it started I don't know.

Senator Ferguson. You don't know whether it was from Hawaii or not. What I am trying to find out is whether or not the commanders at Hawaii knew they were convoying.

Mr. Gesell. I guess there is no question about that. My recollection is that Admiral Inglis said this convoy did start in the Hawaiian area, but I am not certain of that.

The Vice Chairman. You are referring to a United States convoy?

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

The Vice Chairman. Did you start to say something, General Mitchell?

Mr. Mitchell. No.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry?

The Vice Chairman. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Do the records with respect to the Boise show the action orders or the action report of what orders they were sailing under? I notice that that says that the ship was cleared for action and battle stations manned, and so on. Does it disclose what the orders were to this ship escorting this convoy to the Philippines on the 27th of November?

Mr. Gesell. No, sir. The request was based upon a statement by Congressman Gearhart that he had information that the Boise had sighted the Japanese task force. We were attempting to answer that question. It appears now that the Boise was 1400 miles from the task force. So I guess it didn't sight it.

Now, if the Congressman wants information as to the orders under which the convoy was proceeding, where it started from and where it
was going, that would be a separate request and we would have to get that information separately.

Mr. Kemp. Could you get that information?
Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir. We will ask the Navy Department for it.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. At the time the request was made for the log of the Boise, in order to be prepared to discuss the matter in the event that it were pertinent, I requested that we have present the commanding officer of the Boise. I now cancel that request in view of the information supplied.

The Vice Chairman. Are there any other questions about the Boise? [4433] All right, you may proceed, Mr. Gesell.

Mr. Gesell. A request was made to show the dates of arrival of the vessels that were in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack on the 7th of December 1941.

I have in my hand a schedule showing the arrival of all the vessels, the dates they came in, and I think the most appropriate means of handling this would be to ask the reporter to spread this two-page schedule on the daily transcript.

The Vice Chairman. That may be done. Do you desire to read it? Mr. Gesell. I don't see any need of that. It shows they came in at different times.

The Vice Chairman. Is there any request that it be read? If not, it will be spread in full in the record at this point.

(The schedule above referred to follows:)

Arrivals of vessels in port (Pearl Harbor) just prior to 7 December 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battleships:</th>
<th>DESTROYERS-CON.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Breese 4 Dec. 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Orydock 5 Dec. 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>28 Nov. 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[4434] Heavy Cruisers:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Prior to 1 Dec. 1941, exact time not known.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Cruisers:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honolulu</td>
<td>23 Nov. 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>5 Dec. 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raleigh</td>
<td>23 Nov. 1941.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>23 Nov. 1941.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helena</td>
<td>25 Nov. 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>25 Nov. 1941.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destoyer:</td>
<td>Patterson 5 Dec. 1941.</td>
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<td>12cm.</td>
<td>Do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bagley</td>
<td>4 Dec. 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarvis</td>
<td>Do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macford</td>
<td>Do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramsay</td>
<td>Do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Auxiliaries:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neosho</td>
<td>6 Dec. 1941.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ramapo</td>
<td>5 Dec. 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtiss</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.—Tenders remained in harbor to carry out repair schedules.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. In connection with that, I understand that in the two documents we have been furnished of the Navy story that there is a discussion as to how the fleet got into Pearl Harbor and how the ships got there, and the periodic orders from time to time covering matters of that nature.

Mr. Gesell. This is in response only to the request as to the dates when they entered the Harbor.

The Vice Chairman. Are there any other questions on that point? If not, you may proceed, Mr. Gesell.

Mr. Gesell. We have been asked also to furnish information concerning the condition of watertight integrity of the major vessels that were in the Harbor. Under date of December 11, we received from the Navy a table showing scheduled inspection of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November, and December, and I am going to ask that that schedule be inserted in the record.

It will be noted from the table that it does not contain all the ships which were in Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December. The explanation for that is that ships which are not shown on this schedule, the Navy advises, were not scheduled for inspection during the period October-December, 1941.

The Vice Chairman. That will be admitted, and spread on the record.

Mr. Gesell. I think that should be made an exhibit, and perhaps the reporter can arrange to have photostats accompany the transcript for the information of the members of the committee. That will be Exhibit 69.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 69" and follows herewith.)

See also Hearings, Part 11, p. 5347 et seq., for correspondence concerning this subject.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>October 1941</th>
<th>November 1941</th>
<th>December 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maryland (BB)</td>
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<td>Tennessee (BB)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pensacola (BB)</td>
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<td>Saratoga (CV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oklahoma (BB)</td>
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<td>Honolulu (CL)</td>
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<td>St. Louis (CL)</td>
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<td>Helena (CL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phoenix (CL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northampton (CA)</td>
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<td>Chester (CA)</td>
<td>M.I.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pensacola (CA)</td>
<td>M.I.</td>
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<td>Louisville (CA)</td>
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<td>Indianapolis (CA)</td>
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<td>Minneapolis (CA)</td>
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<td>Astoria (CA)</td>
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<td>San Francisco (CA)</td>
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<td>Hopkins (DMS)</td>
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<td>Perry (DMS)</td>
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<td>Trever (DMS)</td>
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<td>Wasmuth (DMS)</td>
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<td>Zane (DMS)</td>
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<td>Southard (DMS)</td>
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<td>Long (DMS)</td>
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<td>Chandler (DMS)</td>
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<td>Hovey (DMS)</td>
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<td>Lamberton (DMS)</td>
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<td>Boggs (DMS)</td>
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<td>Hulbert</td>
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<td>Curtis</td>
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<td>McFarland</td>
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<td>Swan</td>
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<td>Tangier</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teal</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Key to symbols: A. M. I.—Annual military inspection.  
D. C. P.—Damage control practice.  
B. I. S.—Board of Inspection of survey.  
M. I.—Material inspection.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman—
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. In that connection, I would like to inquire whether or not the exhibit in question shows if voids were open on the ships? The gentleman from California had referred to the voids apparently being open on all the ships. Does the exhibit show whether they were or were not?

Mr. Mitchell. I think the exhibit is not complete enough to satisfy counsel and I called upon the Navy—and Mr. Gesell didn’t know that—to supplement this, to give direct information as to each vessel, and if they didn’t have it on an inspection record to have officers from the vessels who were on them to give testimony.

We have called for, really, additional material on that.

Mr. Murphy. I see.

Mr. Gesell. This document goes solely to the limited question as to whether or not there was some major inspection of all vessels scheduled for that week end. It does not describe the condition of the various vessels which were subject to inspection.

The Vice Chairman. You may proceed.

Mr. Gesell. Now, a request was also made by one of the members of the committee for a report of the recall of United States merchant ships on the west coast, after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Navy has submitted the order issued recalling the merchant vessels after the Pearl Harbor attack, the names of the ships, the dates they sailed, and the dates they returned. I suggest that that information be spread upon the record.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.

Senator Ferguson. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson. Are you going to furnish each member of the committee with copies of these exhibits?

Mr. Gesell. In saying “spread” on the record, Senator Ferguson, it was my thought that in that fashion it would come to all members of the committee.

The Vice Chairman. That brings it to us in the daily blue covered copy of the transcript.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct.

Mr. Gesell. This is a memorandum from the Navy to us, and we thought if it were copied into the transcript that would be enough. We can get the actual record.

Senator Ferguson. No. Does that report show whether those ships were in convoy or not?

Mr. Gesell. It doesn’t relate to the question of convoy. It relates to when merchant ships were recalled.

Senator Ferguson. It doesn’t designate when they were in convoy?

Mr. Gesell. No; it does not.

——Hearings, Part 1, p. 78.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(The memorandum and accompanying copy of dispatch follow:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, 13 December 1945.

Memorandum
To: Mr. William D. Mitchell

1. In regard to your request for report of the recall of U.S. Merchant ships to the West Coast after the attack on Pearl Harbor, we have the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of ship</th>
<th>Sailed from—</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Date returned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAT Tasker H. Bliss</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>6 Dec.</td>
<td>10 Dec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Miller</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>7 Dec.</td>
<td>10 Dec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etoh</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>5 Dec.</td>
<td>10 Dec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[4444]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. A. Moffett</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>7 and 16 Dec.</td>
<td>(7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul M. Gregg</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>6 Dec.</td>
<td>8 Dec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Garfield</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>8 Dec.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Johnson</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>9 Dec.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wainio</td>
<td>Portland, Ore</td>
<td>do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. These ships apparently put back in compliance with the attached dispatch instructions issued by CinCPac on 7 December 1941. No evidence has been found that other ships in addition to those listed put back to West Coast ports after the Pearl Harbor attack.

(Signed) JOHN FORD Bakeer,
Lieut. Comdr. USNR.

Naval Message

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phone Extension Number</th>
<th>Addressees</th>
<th>Message Precedence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Radio Honolulu</td>
<td></td>
<td>Urgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Released by</td>
<td></td>
<td>Priority Routine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date 7 December 1941</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Action</td>
<td>Radio SanFran</td>
<td>Routine Deferred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio Washn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Coderoom</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decoded by</td>
<td></td>
<td>Priority Routine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraphrased by</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deferred</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[4444] Indicate by asterisk addressees for which mail delivery is satisfactory.

972292 9538

Unless otherwise indicated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME:

War exists between United States and Japan XX Proceed closest U. S. or friendly port immediately.

Distribution:
350. (*) ACTION
19A11. (*) 3SS. (*) 3SW (*) OPDC (*) FILE .

(*) Initials illegible.
[4444] Mr. Gesell. Congressman Keefe requested various Executive Orders establishing defensive sea areas around Pearl Harbor, and other areas. We have the text of these orders and suggest that they be spread upon the record.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.

(The Executive orders referred to follow:)

General Order No. 118

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 14, 1939.

ESTABLISHING A DEFENSIVE SEA AREA IN AND ABOUT PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII

1. The following Executive Order is quoted:

EXECUTIVE ORDER

By virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 18, Sec. 96), the area of water in Pearl Harbor, Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, lying between extreme high-water mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel to said harbor, within an area bounded by the extreme high-water mark, a line bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the Pearl Harbor Reservation, a line bearing south true from Ahu Point Lighthouse, and a line bearing west true from a point three nautical miles due south true from Ahu Point Lighthouse, is hereby established as a [4445] defensive sea area for purposes of national defense.

At no time shall any person (other than persons on public vessels of the United States) enter the defensive sea area above defined, nor shall any vessels or other craft (other than public vessels of the United States) be navigated within said defensive sea area, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

Any person violating the provisions of this order shall be subject to the penalties provided by law.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

May 26, 1939.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY, Acting Secretary of the Navy.

General Order No. 144

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 29, 1941.

ESTABLISHING KODIAK ISLAND AND SUBIC BAY NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS AND SUBIC BAY NAVAL AIRSPACE RESERVATION

1. The following Executive orders are quoted:

EXECUTIVE ORDER

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), the territorial waters between extreme high-water [4446] mark and the three-mile marine boundary adjacent to the easterm portion of Kodiak Island, Alaska, in and about Women's Bay to the westward within a line bearing true north and south tangent to the eastern extremity of High Island, are hereby set apart and reserved.

79716—46—pt. 4—8
as a naval defensive sea area for purposes of the national defense, such area to
be known as "Kodiak Island Naval Defensive Sea Area."

At no time shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the
United States, be navigated into Kodiak Island Naval Defensive Sea Area,
unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall be enforced by the Secretary
of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the
United States and of the Territory of Alaska; and the Secretary of the Navy
is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out such provisions.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order shall be subject to
the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C.,
title 18, sec. 96).

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 22, 1941.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

[4447]

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING SUBIC BAY NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREA AND SUBIC BAY NAVAL AIRSPACE
RESERVATION, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the
Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air
the territorial waters within Subic Bay, Philippine Islands, between extreme
high-water mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel within a
line bearing true south from Panabatujan Point, a line bearing true southwest extending three nautical miles from Sanpaloc Point, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the above two bearing lines,
are hereby set apart and reserved as a naval defensive sea area for purposes of
the national defense, such area to be known as "Subic Bay Naval Defensive Sea
Area"; and the airspace over the said territorial waters and over the Subic Bay
Naval Reservation, Olongapo, Philippine Islands, is hereby set apart and reserved
as a naval airspace reservation to be known as "Subic Bay Naval Airspace
Reservation."

At no time shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the
United States, be navigated into Subic Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area, unless
authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

[4448] At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the
United States, be navigated into Subic Bay Naval Airspace Reservation, unless
authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary
of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the
United States; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Subic Bay
Naval Defensive Sea Area shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44
of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person
violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Subic Bay Naval Airspace
Reservation shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 22, 1941.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

(No. 8718)

(F. R. Doc. 41-2165; Filed, March 24, 1941; 1:14 p. m.)

JAMES FORRESTAL,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.
General Order No. 146

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., April 7, 1941.

NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS AND AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS

1. The President, on February 14, 1941, signed Executive Orders Nos. 8680, 8681, 8683, and 8684. They are quoted:

EXECUTIVE ORDER

Establishing Naval Defensive Sea Areas Around and Naval Airspace Reservations Over the Islands of Kiska and Unalaska, Alaska.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C., title 49, sec. 174), the territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and the three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of Kiska and Unalaska, are hereby established and reserved as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national defense, such areas to be known, respectively, as “Kiska Island Naval Defensive Sea Area”, and “Unalaska Island Naval Defensive Area”; and the airspaces over the said territorial waters and islands are hereby set apart and reserved as naval airspace reservations for purposes of national defense, such reservations to be known, respectively, as “Kiska Island Naval Airspace Reservation”, and “Unalaska Island Naval Airspace Reservation.”

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the United States, enter either of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into either of said areas, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into either of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States and of the Territory of Alaska; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 14, 1941.

(No. 8680)

(F. R. Doc. 41-1136; Filed, February 15, 1941; 11:50 a.m.)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING KANEOHE BAY NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREA AND KANEOHE BAY NAVAL AIRSPACE RESERVATION, HAWAII

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C., title 49, sec. 174), the territorial waters within Kaneohe Bay between extreme high-water mark and the sea and in and about the entrance channel within a line bearing northeast true extending four nautical miles from Kapoho Point, and a line joining the seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines, are hereby established and reserved as a naval defensive sea area for purposes of national defense, such area to be known as “Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area”; and the airspace over the said territorial waters is hereby set apart and reserved as a naval
airspace reservation for purposes of national defense, such reservation to be known as "Kaneohe Bay Naval Airspace Reservation."

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the United States, enter Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into said area, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into Kaneohe Bay Naval Airspace Reservation, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States and of the Territory of Hawaii; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Kaneohe Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to Kaneohe Bay Naval Airspace Reservation shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

[4452]

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 14, 1941.

(No. 8681)

(F. R. Doc. 41-1137; Filed, February 15, 1941; 11:50 a. m.)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS AROUND AND NAVAL AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS OVER THE ISLANDS OF PALMYRA, JOHNSTON, MIDWAY, WAKE, AND KINGMAN REEF, PACIFIC OCEAN

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C., title 49, sec. 174), the territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and the three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake, and Kingman Reef, in the Pacific Ocean, are hereby established and reserved as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national defense, such areas to be known, respectively, as "Palmyra Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," "Johnston Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," "Midway Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," "Wake Island Naval Defensive Sea Area," and "Kingman Reef Naval Defensive Sea Area" [4454] Area; and the airspaces over the said territorial waters and islands are hereby set apart and reserved as naval airspace reservations for purposes of national defense, such reservations to be known, respectively, as "Palmyra Island Naval Airspace Reservation," "Johnston Island Naval Airspace Reservation," "Midway Island Naval Airspace Reservation," "Wake Island Naval Airspace Reservation," and "Kingman Reef Naval Airspace Reservation."

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the United States, enter any of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into any of said areas, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into any of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the
United States and of the Territory of Hawaii; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 14, 1941.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
(No. 8682)

(F. R. Doc. 41-1139; Filed, February 15, 1941: 11:51 a. m.)

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREAS AROUND AND NAVAL AIRSPACE RESERVATIONS OVER THE ISLANDS OF ROSE, TUTUILA, AND GUAM, PACIFIC OCEAN

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and section 4 of the Air Commerce Act approved May 20, 1926 (44 Stat. 570, U. S. C., title 49, sec. 174), the territorial waters between the extreme high-water marks and the three-mile marine boundaries surrounding the islands of [4456] Rose, Tutuila, and Guam, in the Pacific Ocean, are hereby established and reserved as naval defensive sea areas for purposes of national defense, such areas to be known, respectively, as “Rose Island Naval Defensive Sea Area,” “Tutuila Island Naval Defensive Sea Area,” and “Guam Island Naval Defensive Sea Area”; and the airspaces over the said territorial waters and islands are hereby set apart and reserved as naval airspace reservations for purposes of national defense, such reservations to be known, respectively, as “Rose Island Naval Airspace Reservation,” “Tutuila Island Naval Airspace Reservation,” and “Guam Island Naval Airspace Reservation.”

At no time shall any person, other than persons on public vessels of the United States, enter any of the naval defensive sea areas herein set apart and reserved, nor shall any vessel or other craft, other than public vessels of the United States, be navigated into any of said areas, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

At no time shall any aircraft, other than public aircraft of the United States, be navigated into any of the naval airspace reservations herein set apart and reserved, unless authorized by the Secretary of the Navy.

The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall be enforced by the Secretary of the Navy, with the cooperation of the local law enforcement officers of the United States; and the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to prescribe [4457] such regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval defensive sea areas shall be subject to the penalties provided by section 44 of the Criminal Code as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96), and any person violating any of the provisions of this order relating to the above-named naval airspace reservations shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 Stat. 973).

This order shall take effect ninety days after date hereof.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 14, 1941.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
(No. 8683)

(F. R. Doc. 41-1140; Filed, February 15, 1941: 11:51 a. m.)
GENERAL ORDER
No. 153
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., September 8, 1941.

ESTABLISHING MANILA BAY DEFENSIVE SEA AREA

1. The President, on August 16, 1941, signed Executive Order No. 8883, quoted below:

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING MANILA BAY DEFENSIVE SEA AREA, [4458] PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
The following-described area is hereby established and reserved, for purposes of national defense, as a naval defensive sea area, to be known as “Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area”:
All territorial waters of Manila Bay, Philippine Islands, and its approaches and tributaries from the contour line of extreme high water as shown on the latest U. S. C. and G. S. charts, to:
A line running southwest true from Luzon Point, in approximate position, Latitude 14°27'40" North, Longitude 120°23'13" East to the seaward limit of territorial waters, thence southeasterly along the seaward limit of territorial waters, to the parallel of Latitude 14°10'15" North, thence east along that parallel of Latitude to meet the shore at Hamilo Point in approximate Latitude 14°10'15" North, Longitude 120°34'24" East.
A vessel not proceeding under United States Naval or other United States authorized supervision, shall not enter or navigate the waters of Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area except during daylight, when good visibility conditions prevail, and then only after specific permission has been obtained. Advance arrangements for entry into or navigation through or within the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area must be made, preferably by [4459] application at a United States Naval District Headquarters in advance of sailing, or by radio or visual communication on approaching the seaward limits of the area. If radio telegraphy is used, the call “NQO” shall be made on a frequency of 500 kcs. and permission to enter the port shall be requested. The name of the vessel, purpose of entry, and name of the master must be given in the request. If visual communications are used, the procedure shall be essentially the same.
A vessel entering or navigating the waters of Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area does so at its own risk.
Even though permission has been obtained, it is incumbent upon a vessel entering the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area to obey any further instructions received from the United States Navy, or other United States authority.
A vessel may expect supervision of its movements within the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area, either through surface craft or aircraft. Such controlling surface craft and aircraft will be identified by a prominent display of the Union Jack.
These regulations are subject to amplification by the local United States Naval authority as necessary to meet local circumstances and conditions.
When a United States Maritime Control Area is established adjacent to or abutting upon the above-established defensive sea area, it shall be assumed that permission to enter, and [4460] other instructions issued by proper authority, shall apply to any one continuous passage through or within both areas.
Any master of a vessel or other person within the Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area who shall disregard these regulations, or shall fail to obey an order of United States Naval authority to stop or heave to, or shall perform any act threatening the efficiency of mine or other defenses or the safety of navigation, or shall take any action iminal to the interests of the United States, may be detained therein by force of arms and shall be liable to attack by United States armed forces, and liable to prosecution as provided for in section 44 of the Criminal Code, as amended (U. S. C., title 18, sec. 96).
All United States Government authorities shall place at the disposal of the Naval authorities their facilities for aiding in the enforcement of these regulations.
The Secretary of the Navy will be charged with the publication and enforcement of these regulations.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 16, 1941.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
MEMORANDUM:

To: Mr. William D. Mitchell.

1. In response to the questions asked on the record by Senator Lucas, I am forwarding as you requested the necessary information in compliance therewith.

2. Exhibits A and B outline in detail the information concerning the number of Naval planes, and their types, attached to the Pacific Fleet when Admiral Richardson assumed command on 6 January 1940 and when he was relieved of command on 1 February 1941.

3. The number of Naval planes attached to the Pacific Fleet during the period 6 January 1940 and 1 February 1941 that were capable of running a long distance reconnaissance over the sea are indicated on Exhibits A and B as “VPB” planes of “Patwing 2 (Pearl Harbor)” or a total of 67 on 1 January 1940 and 63 on 1 February 1941. It is also possible that some “VJ” planes were capable of such use in case of necessity and in fact such planes were so used on 7 December 1941 after the attack.

4. The number of Naval planes that were assigned and performed daily reconnaissance duty, in pursuance of the order issued by Admiral Richardson on approximately 17 June 1940, is indicated in the attachments to the “Search Plan”, (Exhibit E).

5. The exact sectors and distances from Oahu covered in the reconnaissance ordered by Admiral Richardson are also indicated in detail on the “Search Plan” (Exhibit E).

(S) John Ford Baecher,

J oh n F o rd B aecher,

Lt. Comdr., NSNR.
**Enclosure (A)**

**Naval aircraft assigned to the U. S. Fleet (Pacific) on 1 January 1940**

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Enclosure (B)

Naval aircraft assigned to the Pacific Fleet 1 February 1941

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Enclosure (E)

SEARCH PLAN

Security Patrol from Barbers Pt.

(as of 30 June 1940)

300 Mile Circle

Barbers Point

20 Mile Visibility
### Fleet security patrol from Barbers Point, Oahu

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Total distance for each plane 922 miles.

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Mr. Gesell. Congressman Gearhart made a request for a copy of the order fixing the time of operation of the radar stations in the period immediately before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Pursuant to that request the Army communicated with the Commanding General in Hawaii and a search was made of the files there to find out if there was any written record establishing those times. A negative report has come back stating that an exhaustive search of the files does not disclose the publication of official orders of any kind in connection with the time schedule for training or the operation of the radar stations on Oahu during the period in question. That answer suggests that those orders were orally established and, of course, we will have the responsible officers who were not only in command but particularly concerned with radar before the committee and they can give the information at that time.

The Vice Chairman. Do you want to put anything in the record on that?

Mr. Gesell. I think there is no need of simply documenting this negative fact. We will have to get the information by witnesses.

The Vice Chairman. All right. You may proceed.

Mr. Gesell. We have a substantial number of requests relating to the Department of State:

[4669] There were placed before the committee this morning two mimeographed documents. These are submitted by counsel. The first is dated November 25, 1941, and represents the Dutch Government's views on the matter of the type of reply which should be given to the Japanese.

This is offered for the purpose of completing the record.

I might say that we had requested it earlier. We were unable to submit it to the committee because we were awaiting the approval of the Dutch Government for its release, which has now been obtained.

I would like to have the text of that document, as well as the text of the other document, the document of November 27, 1941, covering Secretary Hull's negotiations, discussions with the Netherlands Minister on that date, concerning the threatened Japanese invasion of French Indochina, spread upon the record.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.

Senator Lucas. May I ask one question of counsel on that point?

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Does the record contain at this point now all of the so-called tentative proposals by the various governments on this question?

Mr. Gesell. Yes, I think we have now had released all of the documents which we requested be released.

[4770] Senator Lucas. That was my understanding.

(The documents referred to above, dated November 25, 1941 and November 27, 1941, respectively, follow herewith:)


My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have the honor to transmit herewith in form of a memorandum the comments of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the tentative proposals of Mr. Kusuru which you were kind enough to communicate to me last Saturday.

Believe me, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Yours sincerely,

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

[8] A. Loudon
Memorandum

As it seems impossible to discuss at present a final and general agreement, it is necessary that for the reasons expressed by the Secretary of State, it should be endeavored to arrive at a limited and temporary agreement.

In view of the fact that before the occupation of Indochina by Japan no sanctions were applied against the latter, it seems reasonable that if Japan gradually withdraws from Indochina proportionately, sanctions may be lifted to a certain extent, provided, however, that the withdrawal of the Japanese from Indochina goes so far that the remaining [4472] Japanese forces cannot be considered a direct threat of the Netherlands Indies, Malakka, the Philippine Islands and the Burma road.

But even in that event, according to the opinion of the Netherlands Government, sanctions should not be lifted to such an extent that this would constitute an increase of Japan's war potential. For instance no delivery of high octane gasoline should be allowed, but rice and if necessary low grade oils could be furnished.

The Netherlands Government will be glad to follow the same policy concerning oil deliveries to Japan as applied by the United States. It goes without saying that the license system will remain in operation.

The first point at issue of the Japanese proposals is aiming farther than the above. The Netherlands Government wonders whether it might not be possible to give the following reply:

1. If it is the intention of Japan to militarily withdraw from China, then there are no objections; if Japan is not willing to do so, then the right to continue to give assistance to China, should be reserved.

2. It should be proposed that North East Asia (Russia) be also included in the regions enumerated in point 1 of the Japanese proposal in which regions the powers should agree that no armed advance should take place.

[4473] Point 2 of the Japanese proposal has been answered by the above observations.

Add point 3 of the Japanese proposals. The Netherlands are prepared to treat all countries on the same favored footing provided that no foreign power tries to obtain a preponderant position in the Netherlands Indies to the detriment of other nations and provided that defense requirements be taken into account.

Point 4 and 5 of the Japanese proposals have already been dealt with in the above observations.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is of the opinion that the above gives at least room for discussions with which we fully entrust the Secretary of State especially now that we have been so fully informed by him and since we have been given the opportunity to inform him of our point of view.

As far as the possible reduction of economic pressure on Japan is concerned, consultations with Governor General Starkenborgh and Economic Warfare will be necessary in view of the fact that deliveries of tin and rubber which were originally destined for Japan are now being shipped to the United States.

In general it will not be possible to go further than the final proposals of the Batavia Conference as proposed before the Netherlands—Japanese discussions had been broken off. Moreover as a result of Russian and American purchases, [4474] the amounts of tin and rubber offered in the final proposals are no more available.

November 25th, 1941.

[4475]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Dated: November 27, 1941.

Subject: Threatened Japanese Invasion of French Indochina area.
Participants: Secretary of State Hull and the Netherlands Minister, Dr. A. Loudon.

Copies to:
The Netherlands Minister called at his request to inquire what reactions I had from the Japanese situation. I proceeded to hand him three cables from
Saigon and other localities in the French Indochina area indicating that tens of thousands of Japanese troops with equipment, vessels, transports, etc., were proceeding to that area from the north. He examined the cables carefully and appeared much disturbed about the Japanese troop movements. The Minister stated that this presented a very serious situation.

The Minister wanted to make clear that he had supported me unequivocally in connection with the proposed *modus vivendi* arrangement which I abandoned on Tuesday evening, November twenty-fifth, or practically abandoned when the Chinese had exploded without knowing half the true facts or waiting to ascertain them. I said that I had determined early Wednesday morning, November twenty-sixth, to present to the Japanese later in the day the document containing a proposed draft of an agreement which set forth all of the basic principles for which this Government stands and has stood for, for many years, especially including the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China. I reminded the Minister that the central point in our plan was the continuance of the conversations with Japan looking toward the working out of a general agreement for a complete peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and that the so-called *modus vivendi* was really a part and parcel of these conversations and their objectives, intended to facilitate and keep them alive and that, of course, there was nothing that in any way could be construed as a departure from the basic principles which were intended to go into the general peace agreement. The Minister said he understood the situation.

S CH:MA

[477] The Vice Chairman. You may proceed, Mr. Gesell.

Mr. Gesell. At page 1265 Senator Ferguson requested the notes made by Mr. Welles regarding conferences with President Roosevelt in connection with the Atlantic Conference, discussions concerning a parallel declaration to Japan.

The State Department advises that to date it has not found any such notes. The State Department has, however, found a draft dated August 16, 1941, which appears to be a revision of a draft dated August 15, 1941. The committee will recall that the August 15 draft was part of Exhibit 22 and was submitted by us in the presentation.

The State Department now has a draft dated August 16, which we are glad to furnish for the record. It has to be photostated and is not yet here.

Senator Ferguson. Could you make that Exhibit 22-A so it will be with Exhibit 22?

Mr. Gesell. We will make it 22-A.¹

That draft, which is a day later than August 15, I understand already shows the watering down of the crucial paragraph at the end.

[478] Mr. Gesell. We have also obtained a message dated August 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill advising Prime Minister Churchill of the statement made to the Japs on August 17, 1941. I would like to read that into the record. This is dated August 18, 1941 (reading):

Amembassy,
London (England).
Triple Priority.

SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR CHURCHILL

Quote. With reference to our discussions in regard to the situation in the Far East, upon my return to Washington I learned that the Japanese Ambassador had on August 16 approached the Secretary of State with a request for a resumption of the informal conversations which the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been holding directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a

¹ See Hearings, Part 5, p. 2065.
basis for negotiations in regard to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area and that the Secretary of State had in reply confined himself to repeating what he had previously said in regard to the developments in Japan's course of conquest which had led to the cessation of those conversations.

On August 17 I sent for the Japanese Ambassador, and the Secretary of State and I received him. I made to him a statement covering the position of this Government with [4479] respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed.

The Ambassador renewed the request made by him to the Secretary of State in regard to the resumption of conversations. I replied by reviewing the Japanese Government's action in actively pursuing a course of conquest and in inspiring the Japanese press to attack this Government. I dwelt on the principles of peaceful, lawful and just international relations which this Government has emphasized and I suggested that if the Japanese Government is prepared to readjust its position and embark upon a peaceful program this Government would be prepared to resume the exploratory conversations and that before undertaking the resumption of those conversations we felt that it would be helpful to have a clear statement of the Japanese Government's attitude and plans.

The Japanese Ambassador said that he would communicate what I had told him to his Government.

Roosevelt.

I would like to have this marked as Exhibit 70.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.

[4480] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 70.")

Mr. Gesell. At page 127 of the transcript a request was made by Senator Ferguson for any record that Great Britain took parallel action in accordance with the Atlantic Conference agreement. That request was also made at page 1804 of the transcript.

No record of any such action has been found by the State Department in its files. However, on August 25, 1941, the State Department telegraphed to Ambassador Grew for his information an extract from Prime Minister Churchill's radio address on August 24, 1941. We have that telegram as No. 535 to Tokyo and I would like to read it into the record since it does indicate information, perhaps, of a kind that Senator Ferguson was inquiring about as to whether it is available.

The Vice Chairman. Proceed.

Mr. Gesell. It is dated August 25, 1941. It is addressed to the Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, via Shanghai, China, and Naval Radio, and it reads as follows [reading]:

There follows for your information extract from the Associated Press text from London of Prime Minister Churchill's radio address of August 24.

This is the quote, I take it, from the press:

But Europe is not the only continent to be menaced [4481] and devastated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as if it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about that vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They snatch Indochina from the wretched Vichy French. They menace by their movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and menace the Philippine Islands under the protection of the United States.
It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.

I would like to have that telegram marked as Exhibit 71.

The CHAIRMAN. So ordered.

[4482] (The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 71.”)

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Now, that is a quotation from Mr. Churchill’s speech in London?

Mr. GESELL. Right, sent by Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. May I just inquire as to where counsel obtained exhibits 70 and 71, whether they were both in the State Department files?

Mr. GESELL. Yes; we obtained them from the State Department files.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I mean, the State Department files.

Mr. GESELL. Yes.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Mr. GESELL. At transcript page 1285 there is a request by Senator Ferguson for any messages to Ambassador Grew regarding alleged parallel action taken by him in Japan on August 12, 1941, with Sir Robert Craigie relating Thailand.

We would like to point out that at page 1649–1652 of the transcript Ambassador Grew testified that he took no such parallel action.¹

We have some documents from the files of the Department [4483] of State which bear on this subject and I will designate them all as the next exhibit and describe them. That will be Exhibit 72.

(The documents referred to were marked “Exhibit No. 72.”)

Mr. GESELL. The first is a telegram, No. 452, from the State Department to Ambassador Grew, reporting statements made by Sumner Welles to the Japanese Ambassador August 1, 1941, and requested Grew to report these statements to the Japanese Foreign Minister.

Second, telegram No. 1153, from Ambassador Grew to the State Department, reporting that he has taken action in accordance with the instructions.

And, third, a State Department radio bulletin of August 6, 1941, reporting a press conference of Secretary Hull on that date at which Secretary Hull commented on Thailand.

We believe this whole document would in the normal course of the State Department procedure have been sent to Ambassador Grew. Perhaps all three of these documents should be spread on the record so that the committee will have it for their information.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that the last one, there is no knowledge that it was sent to the Ambassador?

Mr. Gesell. Well, it is a Department radio bulletin, which we understand were sent generally to all of our ambassadors and representatives and, therefore, the presumption is very strong that it went to Ambassador Grew.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I want to know.

Mr. Gesell. Yes. He had the facilities to receive it and he was one of the logical people to be looking for it.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

(The documents comprising Exhibit 72 follow herewith.)

[4485]  

Telegram sent

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, August 1, 1941. Noon

CONFIDENTIAL TO THE AMBASSADOR

Reference my 783 94 451 August 1, 11 a.m.

One. After the Japanese Ambassador had delivered his Government's message in regard to the bombing incident at Chungking and I had expressed appreciation, I took occasion to say to the Ambassador that we have heard from authoritative sources that the Japanese are bringing or are about to bring pressure on the Government of Thailand similar to that which they have recently exerted against the French Government and the Indochina authorities; that we, of course, regard such reports with very serious apprehension; and that, speaking under instructions from the President, I wished to state that the proposal which the President made recently in relation to Japan's contemplated procedure in and regarding Indochina would also extend to and cover any such contemplated procedure in and regarding Thailand. I requested that the Ambassador immediately inform his Government of this. The Ambassador replied that he would do so.

Two. The President and I desire that you at the earliest possible moment inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the above.

Acting (Signed) Welles

[4486]  

Telegram received

Tokyo.  

From: EJ

Dated August 2, 1941
Rec'd 7:47 a.m.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

[Stamped:] Secretary of State, Aug. 5, 1941. Noted

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

Rush
1153, August 2. 3 p.m. (Section One)
Confidential for the Acting Secretary.
Department's 452, August 1, noon.

One. In the absence from the Foreign Office today of the Foreign Minister, who is leaving tonight to worship at the Ise Shrines, counselor called this afternoon on the Acting Vice Minister and communicated to him the substance of the first paragraph of the Department's telegram under reference, at the same time conveying my request that the information be transmitted promptly to the Minister. Mr. Yamamoto replied that a report along precisely similar lines had already been received from Ambassador Nomura, but that he would immediately inform the Minister of the information received through us.
[Telegram received]

[4487] From: Dated August 2, 1941

Rec'd 7:48 a.m.

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.
Rush.
1158, August 2, 3 p.m. (Section Two).

Two. In reply to my request for an interview with the Foreign Minister on Monday afternoon after his return from Ise, Mr. Yamamoto said that he would of course arrange for the interview if I desired to communicate further views or information with regard to the American Government’s proposition, but that if the purpose of the interview were to receive some indication of the Japanese Government’s considered views with regard to the proposition he believed that the interview might be usefully deferred for a few days. He said that the proposition was being carefully studied by the Japanese Government with every desire to find a solution. He added that a telegram in the sense of the preceding sentence had already been sent to Ambassador Nomura.

(Signed) Grew.

HPD

[4488] DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION.
August 6, 1941.

NOTE. This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and is in no way an expression of official opinion.

STATE DEPARTMENT

Press Conference. Questioned again today whether any credence could be placed in reports of a possible meeting between the President and Prime Minister Churchill, the Secretary said that he had nothing more to say than he had said yesterday morning.

A correspondent asked whether the Secretary could say what Mr. Duff-Cooper’s mission to the United States was about. The Secretary replied that as far as he knew Mr. Duff-Cooper had not as yet landed. He added that he had heard a report, which he could not vouch for, that during the next few days Mr. Duff-Cooper might pass through this country on his way to the Far East. Asked if he expected to see him, the Secretary said that if he came by and proposed to call, he supposed he would see him as he did other important and prominent people who come to this country.

A correspondent mentioned that there were increasing indications that Japan was making demands on Thailand and he referred to Mr. Eden’s speech in the House of Commons to the effect that anything that threatened the security and integrity of Thailand was of immediate interest to Britain, and he wondered whether the Secretary would care to say anything on the situation in regard to our own policy. The Secretary said that he thought that we had many times discussed the question of conquest by force on the part of certain countries, and that it included the Pacific area. He said that we had made very clear our concern and our interest in steps carrying out that sort of policy. He pointed out that Mr. Welles just a few days ago had occasion to give the correspondents a statement on that general question as it related to the Pacific area.

Asked if he could say whether this Government had had occasion to express any views to the Government of Thailand concerning the present crisis out there, Mr. Hull said he could not go into details now because it was not at a stage where he could be very definite. A correspondent pointed out that certain steps followed the occupation by Japan of Indochina and he inquired whether it was fair to assume that certain other steps would follow the occupation or attempted occupation of Thailand by Japan. The Secretary replied that it was fair to have increasing concern about a movement that would include the step to which the correspondent referred.
Asked if the correspondents could infer that this Government has increasing concern about events over there, the Secretary said that that was what he was trying to say. He added that anything that Mr. Welles had said regarding the Pacific area and Indochina would have especial application to Thailand and the present situation.

A correspondent mentioned that the Japanese had also made some demands upon the Ecuadorians, and he asked whether we were going to do anything about that. The Secretary said that we had nothing on that subject except what appeared in the newspapers. He added that he had not heard from Ecuador nor from our representatives.

A correspondent asked whether there had been some indications that Thailand had been offered what amounted to a protectorate over Malaya as well as Indochina so that the Japanese would have a protectorate similar to that of the British Commonwealth of Nations over Canada, of which Canada is a part. The Secretary said that he had not been advised on that subject. He mentioned the multiplicity of rumors and reports coming from that area lately and said that we were observing all of these as closely as possible.

A correspondent, with reference to an article in a Netherlands Indies paper that there was no question that the United States was behind the Netherlands Indies but the question was how far behind, asked whether we had any indications of a weakening of their attitude towards Japan out there. The Secretary said that he had nothing new on that subject.

To a question of whether the United States had had any change in relations with Finland, the Secretary said that there had been nothing especially new on that recently.

Asked whether he had any report or definite assurance from Vichy on Admiral Leahy's conversations, the Secretary said that he had not yet heard from him.

A correspondent asked whether there was any development on the question of evacuating Americans out of Japan. The Secretary said that there was nothing especially new. He said that we had not had any communications yet from any of the persons who were refugees if we might call them that or from our consuls. He added that at the same time we are giving every attention to the whole problem.

A correspondent mentioned that there was a private group, including several Republican leaders, who issued an appeal last night to Congress (see below) to put a stop to the step-by-step projection of the United States toward an undeclared war and he asked for the Secretary's comment on that. Mr. Hull said that he would repeat his statement to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives in January in support of the Lend-Lease Bill in which he sought to state the issues confronting us in the international situation.

Paraguay. The Department of State today made public a translation of a letter dated July 28 to the Acting Secretary of State from the Minister of Paraguay expressing the appreciation of the President of Paraguay and Sonora de Morinigo for the courtesies shown in the United States to Senora de Morinigo and their son. The letter said that the general health of the child has improved notably and that the difficulties have begun to give way with the treatment applied. (See Radio Bulletin No. 172 of July 21.)

Chile. Senorita Magdalena Petit, distinguished authoress and musician from Chile, will arrive in New York on August 11 on an invitation extended by the Department of State to visit the United States.

Max W. Thornburg. The Department has announced the appointment of Max W. Thornburg as a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, to act as consultant to the State Department on international petroleum matters. Mr. Thornburg has been assigned to the Office of the Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

CONGRESS

Defense Seizure. The House yesterday voted 241 to 136 to adopt the Property Requisitioning Bill. The House added three amendments to the measure as passed by the Senate, thus necessitating its going to conference to iron out the differences. (See Radio Bulletin No. 173 of July 22.)

Highway Defense Program. The Senate today over-rode by 57 to 19 the President's veto of the $320,000,000 highway defense bill.

The measure will now go to the House for consideration. (See Radio Bulletin No. 185 of July 5.)
DEFENSE

Naval Bases. The Navy Department will establish six additional section bases for refueling and minor repairs for small ships at Key West, Fla.; Mobile, Ala.; Corpus Christi, Tex.; [4493] Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; Monterey, Calif.; and Norfolk Bay, Wash., as soon as funds are available. The Department said that additional section bases would also be established in Alaska.

Airplane Deliveries. The OPM reported that its Director General Knudsen, Rear Admiral John H. Towers, and Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal would leave tomorrow on a three-day tour to inspect East Coast Airplane factories with a view to possible speeding up of deliveries to the Army, Navy and the British.

Naval and Aircraft Equipment. Federal Loan Administrator Jones announced that the Defense Plant Corp., at the request of the Navy Department, had authorized a lease agreement with Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., N. Y. C., to construct and equip a plant at Baltimore, Md., costing $3,100,000, to be used for naval equipment production.

The Defense Plant Corporation also authorized a lease agreement with Bell Aircraft Corporation, Buffalo, to construct and equip a plant at Niagara Falls Airport.

[4494] Mr. Gesell. At transcript pages 1300, 1305, and 1316 a request was made by Senator Ferguson for messages transmitted by Sumner Welles to Lord Halifax referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram dated December 6, 1941.

We cannot find any further record and call attention to the testimony of Secretary Welles at transcript pages 1337 and 1338 where he gave his explanation of what he thought that information was. We are unable to find any further record.

At transcript page 1399 a request by Congressman Keefe for drafts prior to October 17, 1941, of messages to Emperor Hirohito: There are two State Department drafts of October 16, 1941, prior to the receipt of what is referred to as a draft from the White House, and one State Department draft of October 16, apparently following the receipt of the White House draft. We are not clear. Those drafts we have marked as Exhibit 73 and if the Congressman wishes we can have them spread upon the record.

The so-called White House draft which came between these two drafts has not yet been found. Further search is being conducted for the White House draft.

The Vice Chairman. The exhibit will be received.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 73.")

[4495] Draft Telegram October 16, 1941.

(Draft No. 2)

His Imperial Majesty Hirohito,

Emperor of Japan.

I have just been informed that the Cabinet of Prince Konoye has tendered its resignation. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, discussions have been carried on during the past few weeks between high officials of the Government of the United States and high officials of the Government of Japan directed toward working out a basis in principle for a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself which we both hoped would be contributory to maintenance and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages I received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were very gratifying. Unfortunately, the concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese Government seemed to present a narrower concept than I had anticipated. The Secretary of State therefore on October 2 suggested to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return to the original concepts and endeavor through re-examination

1 Hearings, Part 2, p. 508.
of those concepts to evolve general lines of action which would be clear manifesta-
tions of the high purposes we have in mind and thus might be expected to establish a durable [4496] and fundamental peace in the Pacific area.

The procedure which the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have been following during these past weeks has not produced the results hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials of your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses, I suggest to Your Imperial Majesty that there be a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself and the Chairman of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of China, General Chiang Kai-shek. I believe that such a meeting, to be held as soon as arrangements therefor can be completed, furnishes in present circumstances the best hope of maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area.

I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek in regard to this, but I shall be pleased to do so immediately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply.

FE: MMH: HES

(Handwritten note: Tentative draft which was discarded upon receipt of a draft from the White House.)

DRAFT TELEGRAm

October 16, 1941

His Imperial Majesty Hirohito,
Emperor of Japan.

I have just been informed through news reports that [4497] the Cabinet of Prince Konoe has tendered its resignation to you. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, discussions have been carried on during the past few weeks between high officials of the Government of the United States and high officials of the Government of Japan directed toward working out a basis in principle for a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself which we had both hoped would be contributory to maintenance and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages I received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were very gratifying. Unfortunately, it seems to me that the concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese Government seemed to present a more narrow concept than I had anticipated (than that conveyed by the Premier’s message). The Secretary of State therefore on October 2 suggested to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return to the original concept and endeavor through reexamination of that concept to evolve general lines of action which would be clear manifestations (of the lofty concepts) of our original concepts and thus might be expected to establish a durable and fundamental peace in the Pacific area.

The procedure which the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have been following during these past weeks has not produced the results [4498] hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials of your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses, I suggest that Your Imperial Majesty signify approval of a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself and the Premier of China. I believe that such a meeting to be held as soon as arrangements therefore can be completed furnishes in present circumstances the best hope of maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific area.

I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek, the Premier of China, in regard to this, but I shall be pleased to do so immediately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply.

FE: MMH: HES

October 16, 1941.

Draft of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan—superseded by a later draft dated October 17, 1941.

This draft was not used.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS,  
October 16, 1941.

Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Hamilton does not recommend taking the proposed [4499] action. Mr. Ballantine feels that it is premature to come to any decision on the matter. I feel strongly that this proposed message in the form in which it stands should not at this time be sent.
A redraft is submitted here attached. The important paragraphs are, of course, the last two. We all feel that great care should be exercised to avoid making any too broad commitment or any too emphatic threat. I myself feel that we should avoid anything that implies countenancing of the Japanese operations in China.

PA/II: SKH: EGT

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

Only once and in person and on an emergency situation have I addressed Your Imperial Majesty. I feel I should again address Your Imperial Majesty because of the deeper and more far-reaching emergency in the process of formation. As Your Imperial Majesty knows, conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two governments for many months for the purpose of keeping armed conflict from any extension in the Pacific area. That has been our great purpose as I think it has equally been the real purpose of Your Imperial Majesty.

I personally would have been happy even to travel thousands of miles to meet with your Prime Minister, if in advance one or two basic accords could have been realized so that the success of such a conference would have been assured. I hoped that these accords would be reached. The first related to the integrity of China and the second related to an assurance that neither Japan or the United States would wage war in or adjacent to the Pacific area.

If persistent reports are true that the Japanese Government is considering armed attacks against Russia or against France or Great Britain or the Dutch or independent territory in the South, the obvious result would, of necessity, be an extension of the Atlantic and European and Near East theatres of war to the whole of the Pacific area. Such attacks would necessarily involve American interests.

The United States opposes any procedure of conquest. It would like to see peace between Japan and China. It would like to see freedom of the seas and trade conducted on a fair basis. If Japan could join with us to preserve peace in the Pacific we would be only too happy to resume normal commercial relations, with the sole exception of certain articles which we must keep at home for our own defense and that of all of the Americans against possible aggression from abroad.

If on the other hand Japan were to start new military operations, the United States, in accordance with her policy of peace, would be very seriously concerned.

Mr. Gesell. At pages 1419 and 1420 of the transcript a question was raised by Congressman Keefe as to the time when President Roosevelt's message of December 6, 1941, to Emperor Hirohito was released to the press.

The State Department has advised us as follows: That at 7:40 p.m., December 6, correspondents were informed orally at the State Department that the President had sent a personal message direct to Emperor Hirohito of Japan. It is my understanding—

Mr. Keefe. Was that, do I understand you, at 7:40 p. m.?

Mr. Gesell. At 7:40 p.m., December 6.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. It is my understanding that the text of the message was not released at that time.

We have a release of the State Department dated December 7, 1941, for the press—or rather from the White House, but it comes from the State Department files—releasing the text of the message to the Emperor. We haven't yet been able to ascertain whether this release was handed to the press before the Pearl Harbor attack or after and we are continuing on that matter, but it looks as though the text of the message was released on December 7.

1 Hearings, Part 2, p. 538.
At page 1410 of the transcript a question by Congressman Keefe was raised as to the issuance by the State Department [4503] of official notices advising American nationals to leave the Orient.1

Now there are quite a number of those warnings, as the Congressman himself indicated.

The major warnings to Tokyo are three:

No. 381, to Tokyo, dated October 6, 1940;
No. 100 to Tokyo, dated February 11, 1941; and
No. 765 to Tokyo, dated November 19, 1941.

We feel that these, particularly because they refer to prior orders and because they show they also went to other embassies in the Pacific area, will give the Congressman the information he wants and perhaps the three of them should be designated as the next exhibit, No. 74

The Vice Chairman. They will be received and made an exhibit.

Mr. Gesell. I do not suppose you want those in the record, do you, Congressman, or do you?

Mr. Keefe. Can they be put into the record some way?

Mr. Gesell. All right, we will have them copied into the transcript.

The Vice Chairman. It is so ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 74" and follow herewith:)

[4503] Telegram Sent

AC October 6, 1940—2 p. m.
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

Amembassy,
Tokyo (Japan) via Shanghai (China).
Info: Amembassy, Chungking (China)
Amembassy, Peiping (China)
American Consul, Hong Kong

381.
The continuance of an abnormal situation in the Far East which has in widespread areas disturbed and interfered with the legitimate commercial, cultural, and philanthropic activities of American citizens and which has adversely affected conditions of order and general living conditions has impelled the Department to the conclusion that the time has come for it to adopt with reference to China (including Manchuria), to Japan (including Kwantung Leased Territory, Korea, and Formosa), to Hong Kong, and to French Indochina an attitude toward passport control and withdrawal of American citizens therefrom similar to that which has been adopted for some time toward these questions with reference to disturbed areas of Europe. The Department accordingly desires that its diplomatic and consular officers in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in French Indo-China quietly repeat quietly inform American citizens in their respective districts of the substance of the preceding sentence and suggest withdrawals insofar as is practicable from the areas in question to the United States. This applies especially in regard to women and children and to men whose continued presence in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in French Indo-China is not repeat not considered urgently or essentially needed. There should be pointed out to American citizens the advisability of their taking advantage of transportation facilities while such facilities are available, as it goes without saying that no one can guarantee that such facilities will remain available indefinitely.

In order that this instruction be not repeat not misconstrued in any quarter, it is desired that effort be made to avoid publicity in regard thereto and that endeavor be made to preclude the reading into it of sensational implications.

The Department would appreciate receiving from you and from Peiping, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Saigon, and other interested offices an estimate of the number of Americans who will be inclined to heed these suggestions. Tokyo should instruct consuls in Japanese territory and Peiping should instruct those in China.

1 Hearings, Part 2, p. 534.
The Department will expect shortly to issue further [4506] instructions embodying various administrative considerations.

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Peiping, Chungking, and Hong Kong. Hong Kong repeat to Saigon.

HULL

FE: GA: HES FE PA/H

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Telegram Sent

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 11, 1941—7 p.m.

This cable was sent in confidential Code. It should be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Br)

AMEMBASSY,
Tokyo (Japan).

100 URGENT.

Department’s 381, October 6, 2 p.m., withdrawal of American citizens.

It is desired that the Embassy at once instruct American consulates in Japanese territory to renew, immediately and quietly and with effort to avoid any sensational publicity, to American citizens, especially to women and children and to men whose continued presence in Japan is not highly essential, this Government’s suggestions that they withdraw to the United States. In so doing, the [4507] Embassy and the consulates are to understand and should explain to American inquirers that this Government is making no repeat no assumption that a situation of acute physical danger to American nationals is imminent, but that this Government, in the light of obvious trends in the Far Eastern situation, desires to reduce the risks to which American nationals and their interests are exposed by virtue of uncertainties and, through the process of withdrawal of unessential personnel, to improve its position in relation to problems which may at any time be presented of affording maximum appropriate protection to those persons who are not in position to withdraw, those interests which cannot be abandoned, and those principles and those rights to which it is the duty of the American Government to give all appropriate support at all times. This instruction and the advice to be given under it is not repeat not meant to be alarmist, but is a further and necessary precautionary measure. We do not repeat not wish to impose unnecessary hardships upon any American nationals, but we ask that those whom you address shall realize that there are real risks, that we wish to reduce these risks, and that this advice is being given in the interest both of the safety and convenience of the American nationals addressed and in the interest of national security.

The Department is sending similar instructions [4508] to Peiping, Hong Kong, and Indochina.

The Department does not repeat not contemplate sending a special vessel or special vessels to assist in the withdrawal and American nationals who make inquiry in this particular connection should be advised to take advantage of such transportation facilities as may be currently available.

(Hull)

PA/H: SKH: ZMK/HNS FE PA/H

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Telegram Sent

DEPARTMENT OF STATE "Br"
NAVAL RADIO,
Washington, November 19, 1941—3 p.m.

AMEMBASSY,
Tokyo (Japan) via Shanghai (China).
Info: Amembassy, Chungking (China).
Amembassy, Peiping (China).
American Consul, Hong Kong.

Reference Department’s 100, February 11, 7 p.m. and previous telegrams in regard to withdrawal of American citizens.

The Department desires that the American diplo- [4509] matic and consular officers concerned call to the attention of American citizens in the
Japanese Empire, Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and French Indochina the advice previously given in regard to withdrawal and in so doing emphasize that the shipping problem in the Pacific is very difficult and that because of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance that it will be possible to retain in the Pacific even the present facilities.

Sent to Tokyo via Shanghai. Repeated to Chungking, Peiping and Hong Kong. Tokyo please repeat to all consular offices in the Japanese Empire and to Dalen. Peiping please repeat to all consular offices in Japanese-occupied areas of China, and in Manchuria. Hong Kong please repeat to Saigon and Hanoi.

FE:WAA:NHS/MHP FE PA/H SD A-L S

[4510] Mr. GESSELL. On transcript page 1436 a question was raised by Senator Ferguson as to whether the State Department has a record of a statement by Senator Pepper on November 24, 1941, which he made in Boston in a speech. The answer from the State Department is that there is no record of any such statement found in the State Department files.

On transcript page 1437 a question was asked by Senator Ferguson as to whether the declaration suggested by Prime Minister Churchill in the message to President Roosevelt on November 30, 1941, was ever made. You will recall that was a message from Prime Minister Churchill in which he asked for a warning to be made by the United State and referred to his appreciation of President Roosevelt's constitutional difficulties. The answer is that no record was found by the State Department in its file that any warning or declaration was ever issued to Japan pursuant to that suggestion. We would like to call attention to volume 2 of the Foreign Relations papers which is in evidence here, to page 771, an inquiry by President Roosevelt which was handed by Sumner Welles to the Japanese Ambassadors, as to their intentions with respect to going into Indochina.

Now, here is a question raised by myself at page 1499 of the transcript, as to whether the Japanese Government gave [4511] any publicity to their proposal of November 20, 1941, which has been referred to as the Japanese ultimatum. The answer was that no answer was found by the State Department in its files that the Japanese ever gave publicity to their note. The further information is furnished that the Japanese proposal was published in the United States on December 15, 1941, as annex 11 to House Document No. 458 of the Seventy-seventh Congress, first session, which was President Roosevelt's message to Congress of December 15, 1941.

At page 1505 of the transcript a question by Senator Barkley as to when Ambassador Grew received word of the delivery of the United States note of November 26. I believe that question was also raised by Senator Ferguson at transcript 1820 and 1821. We have here a series of dispatches to Ambassador Grew from the Department of State, Numbers 783, 784 and 787; the first is dated 8 p. m., November 26, 1941; the second dated 9 p. m., November 26, 1941; and the third dated November 27, 1941. These dispatches show that Ambassador Grew was immediately advised that a proposal had been received and subsequently the actual text of the note was sent there, a summary of it, at 9 p. m. I think all three of those documents should be spread upon the record and designated Exhibit No. 75.

[4512] The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 75" and follow herewith.)
AmEmbassy, Tokyo, 783 Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the Counselor only

I called in the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in the afternoon of November 26 and gave them two documents—an oral statement and draft outline of a proposed basis for a broad agreement covering the entire Pacific area. A summary of these documents follows in a subsequent telegram. (Hull.)

FE: MWS: MJF: FE

AmEmbassy, Tokyo. 784 Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and Counselor only

The Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu called at my request November 26. I handed the Japanese Ambassador an oral statement substantially as follows:

It is believed that some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which we have been discussing for the past several months in informal and exploratory conversations in an effort to reach a settlement of problems of the entire Pacific area. Included among those principles are the principles of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation to improve world conditions through peaceful ways and means and to prevent and solve controversies, inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty, no interference in internal affairs of other nations and the principle of equality. Mention is made of the proposals of the Japanese Government received on November 20 and recent statements of the Japanese Ambassador that his Government desires to continue these conversations and that a modus vivendi would be helpful toward creating a propitious atmosphere.

This Government most earnestly desires to further the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to provide full opportunity to continue discussions with the Japanese Government looking to the working out of a broad program of peace. In the opinion of this Government the Japanese proposals of November 20 in some ways conflict with the fundamental principles to which each Government has committed itself and would not be likely to further our ultimate objectives. It is suggested that further efforts toward resolving divergences of views on the practical application of those principles be made. There is therefore offered the Japanese Government a draft plan as one practical manifestation of the sort of program this Government has in mind to be worked out during further discussions. The hope is expressed that there thus may be expedited progress toward a meeting of minds.

The draft proposal for a broad-gage settlement was substantially as follows: [4515] “The first section contained a draft mutual declaration in which there was embodied an affirmation by both Governments that their national policies have as their objectives extensive and enduring peace throughout the
Pacific area, that both Governments are without territorial designs, that both have no intention to threaten other nations or to use aggressively military force and that accordingly they will give active support and practical application to certain fundamental principles. (There are then listed the four principles which are mentioned above in the oral statement.)

Both Governments agree practically to apply actively support five economic principles in a program to eliminate and to prevent recurrent political instability, economic collapse and to provide a basis for peace. Those principles call for (a) the establishment of international financial institutions and arrangements designed to aid essential enterprises and continuous development of all nations and to utilize processes of trade to permit payments consonant with the welfare of all nations; (b) nondiscrimination in commercial relations between nations; (c) nondiscriminatory access to raw materials; (d) abolition of expressions of extreme nationalism such as excessive trade restrictions and promotion of international economic cooperation; (e) full protection of consuming countries' and populations' interests as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

The second section of the draft proposal calls for ten steps to be taken:

1. Both Governments to exert their influence toward bring about other governments' adherence to and practical application of the basic political and economic principles set forth.

2. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of a multilateral non-aggression pact among Thailand, China, the British Empire, the Netherlands, Japan, the Soviet Union and United States.

3. Both Governments to agree that no agreement already concluded by either with any third power or powers will be interpreted so as to conflict with this agreement's fundamental purpose—establishment and preservation of peace in the entire Pacific.

4. Both Governments to seek the conclusion of an agreement among the Netherlands, Thai, American, British, Chinese, and Japanese Governments calling for pledges on the part of each Government to respect Indochina's territorial integrity and should a threat to that integrity develop to embark upon immediate consultation with regard to that threat; in order that measures necessary and advisable meet that threat may be taken, such agreement to provide also that each signatory (y) signatory would not repeat not accept or seek preferential economic or commercial treatment in Indochina and each signatory would exert its influence toward obtaining for all signatories equality of treatment in those matters.

5. Japan to withdraw from China and Indochina all police, air, naval, and military forces.

6. Both Governments to give up all extraterritorial rights in China and rights and interests in and with regard to concessions, international settlements and rights under the Boxer Protocol; both Governments to seek to obtain from other governments, including the British, an agreement to give up all similar rights in China.

7. Both Governments to undertake negotiations toward conclusion of an American-Japanese trade agreement on the basis of mutual reductions of tariffs, including an American undertaking to bind raw silk on the free list, and of reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment.

8. Both Governments to remove their freezing restrictions on each other's funds.

9. Both Governments to agree upon a dollar yen rate stabilization plan, each allocating one-half of the funds adequate for that purpose.

10. Both Governments not repeat not to support—economically, politically, militarily—any government or regime in China except the National Government located temporarily at Chungking.

An account of the conversation will be sent you in a later telegram.

HULL.

FE: MWS: MBW FE
Telegram sent

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, November 27, 1941, 7 p. m.

AmEmbassy Tokyo (Japan). 787 Strictly confidential for the Ambassador and the Counselor only.

Reference Department's 784, November 26, 9 p. m.

After reading the documents summarized in the Department's telegram under reference Mr. Kurusu asked whether those documents represented the reply of this Government to the Japanese proposals. The Secretary said that just as Japan had to deal with a domestic political situation this Government also had its internal political problems and that the suggestion contained in the documents he had given the Ambassador represented all that we could do at this time in the light of the Japanese proposals. The Secretary went on to mention that the proposal he had just given the Japanese would make possible certain international financial arrangements which were not actually outlined in the documents.

Mr. Kurusu offered various depreciatory comments in regard to the arrangement suggested in the documents which he had just received. He mentioned Japan's bitter experience with international organizations as the basis for his objection to the proposed multilateral nonaggression pacts. He added that China had received the wrong impression from the Washington treaties, and had used them advantageously to flaunt Japan's rights. He said that if this proposal represented the ideas of the American Government he did not see the possibility of any agreement and added that he did not see how the Japanese Government could consider the proposal that Japan withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and withdraw all support from regimes or governments in China except that of Chiang Kai-shek.

The Secretary inquired whether we could not work out these questions.

Mr. Kurusu suggested that as his Government would be likely to throw up its hands at our proposal and as the document was marked tentative and without commitment, it might be the wiser course further to discuss it informally before sending it to the Japanese Government.

The Secretary suggested the Japanese might want carefully to study the documents before further discussion. The Secretary said that with the public having lost its perspective it was necessary to present a complete picture of our position. He mentioned the acute public feeling on the oil question and reminded the Japanese of the great injury being done to us by Japan's immobilizing large forces of democratic countries in territories near Indochina and indicated that should Japan pour troops into Indochina the American people would have misgivings as to the possible menace in countries south and west of Indochina and to our direct interests.

Mr. Kurusu offered specious and unconvincing arguments on Japan's difficulty in renouncing support of Wang Ching-wai and observed that the standing of the Nanking regime was a matter of opinion.

The Japanese clearly indicated their disappointment over our response to their proposal and their feeling that we had reached an end. They asked whether we were not interested in a modus vivendi, whether any other arrangement was not possible and whether they could see the President.

The Secretary replied that we had explored the question of a modus vivendi and, in response to a further inquiry as to whether our inability to consider a modus vivendi was because of the attitude of other powers, he added that he had done his best. He said that the President would undoubtedly be glad to see the Japanese (an appointment for such a meeting has been arranged for November 27).

FE: MWS: HNS/HES FE PA/H

HULL

[4523] Mr. GeSell. At page 1510 of the transcript a request was made by Congressman Murphy for a copy of the official German report on discussions between Adolf Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on April 4, 1941, as introduced at the
Nuernberg trial on November 23, 1945. We have the complete text, which we will simply keep in our files, and the full translation of the document relating to this subject, which was introduced in the Nuernberg trial, I suggest be spread on the record at this point. Perhaps we should also designate that as Exhibit 76.

The Vice Chairman. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 76," and follows herewith)

Translation of Document 1881-PS, Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel

Notes Fuehr 20/41

NOTES regarding the discussion between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and of the Minister of State Meiissner in Berlin on the 4th of April 1941.

[Matsuoka] Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavours for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal Casapari.

Furthermore he had endeavoured to convince the Pope, that the United States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong one had to state the fact, that they prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China he tried to convince the Pope, that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire Far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.

The Fuehrer interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bolshevism.

MATSUOKA then also expressed the request, and the Fuehrer should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-minded as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States.

In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.

To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so, that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the German soldiers naturally ranks high above the American.

1 Hearings, Part 2, p. 573.
In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joined action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to walk along per present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.

The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed forces). 

He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignments rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.

The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to
oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince KONOYE and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.

Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.

Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

Signed: SCHMIDT.

Certificate of Translation of Document No. 1881-PS

[4531] 4 April 1941.

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc. 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1881-PS.

ERNST COHN,
Pfc.

[4532] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. At that point, the papers in this country this week contained a notation to the effect that an entry was made in the trial at Nuernberg of a conversation between Von Ribbentrop and the Japanese representative, asking them in February 1941 to have a surprise attack on the United States. I will get the specific reference.

Mr. Gesell. I am familiar with that. We have asked for those documents.1

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Mr. Gesell. I might say to the committee we have also been working this process in reverse and making available to Justice Jackson and Mr. Keenan the intercepted Jap messages, which have proved to be of great interest to them, and we think they will be of value in both of those trials.

On transcript pages 1537, 1586, and 1968 questions were raised by Senator Brewster as to whether Ambassador Grew was consulted when the fleet was based at Pearl Harbor in 1940. No record can be found by the State Department, in its files, that such was the case. In other words, there is no documentary evidence found that he was consulted one way or the other, which appears to confirm his own testimony concerning it.

1 Subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 165.
[4535] At transcript pages 1544 and 1586 are questions by Senator Brewster as to whether Ambassador Grew ever expressed an opinion regarding the effect of basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor. The answer is again the same, that there is no record which can be found in the State Department files, except the statement on page 69 of volume II of Foreign Relations, that the presence of the fleet at Pearl Harbor did not constitute a threat to Japan.¹

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think that has already been read into the record.

Mr. Gesell. That has already been read so we will not pursue that further.

At transcript 1641, a request by Senator Ferguson for Ambassador Grew's so-called green light telegram dated September 12, 1940, to the State Department.

We simply want to note that that was offered as Exhibit 26 and read into the record by Mr. Grew at pages 1668 to 1679 of the transcript.²

[4534] At transcript 1652, a request by Senator Ferguson for information received by Ambassador Grew from the State Department in August 1941, as to the United States attitude regarding the independence of Thailand. That is covered by the previous discussion of the Thailand documents at transcript page 1285.

At transcript 1669, a request by Senator Ferguson for telegram No. 300 from Peiping to the State Department referred to in Ambassador Grew's so-called green light telegram. We have this, and I will not bother to read it. It is a rather lengthy document. We will offer it as the next exhibit, No. 77, and have it spread on the transcript.

The Vice Chairman. So ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 77" and follows herewith.)

[4535]

Telegram Received

MG

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N. R.
Dated: August 31, 1940.
Rec'd 9:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p. m.

Mr. A. T. Steel, Far Eastern correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, returned last week from home leave in the United States spending some days in Japan and Manchuria before coming here. As Mr. Steel is an experienced and able observer the Embassy asked him to prepare a statement of his impressions and a summary thereof is respectfully submitted below as of interest to the Department.

(Begin summary) Returning to Japan and Manchuria after an absence of four months I noticed many striking changes. Japan is moving toward totalitarianism at a faster pace than at any time since the commencement of the China hostilities. The Yonai Government which was a neatly balanced arrangement of pro-Anglo-American and pro-Nazi influences has been followed by a regime based on the expectation and hope of an early German victory over Great Britain. (End of Section One)

¹ Hearings, Part 2, pp. 586 and 603.
² Ibid., p. 634 et seq.
Telegram Received

MG

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N. R.
Dated: August 31, 1940.
Rec'd 11:50 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE.
Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p.m. (Section Two)

This* has made no secret of its intentions to profit in every possible way from that victory, if it comes. Four months ago Japanese agricultural interests, businessmen and liberals were still acting as a brake against precipitate acts of aggression and opportunism, but these elements have been momentarily submerged under the current wave of pro-Axis enthusiasm. Japan has gone frankly and starkly "realistic".

Germans in Tokyo, and they are numerous, are nevertheless not entirely satisfied with the pace at which Japan is turning toward the Axis, rapid though it seems to outsiders. German newspaper men with whom I have talked complain that the Japanese seem prone to delay decision until they are quite certain of ultimate German success. They claim that German diplomats have pointed out to the Japanese that the quicker they make some kind of a deal, the more generous the Germans will be [4537] in the final reckoning.

I was not able to learn whether the Germans want the Japanese as active allies in the European conflict or whether they are simply seeking some kind of a diplomatic alignment which would give the Japanese a free but independent hand against the British in the Far East.

(End Section Two)

Smyth.

* Apparent omission.

EMB

[Telegram received]

MG

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N. R.
Dated August 31, 1940.
Rec'd 1:45 a. m. Sep. 1.

SECRETARY OF STATE.
Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p.m. (Section Three)

In any possible arrangement between Germany and Japan would be: (one) definite assurances concerning the future German stake in the China market which Germany regards as of great importance; (two) some satisfactory solution of the East Indies and other South Sea problems in which Germany has a deep interest especially economically; and (three) utilization [4538] of the Japanese as a means of keeping the United States constantly worried and preoccupied with Pacific problems so that Germany would have a freer hand in Europe.

Very few of the Germans with whom I have talked are pro-Japanese at heart and some are doubtful of the extent to which the Japanese could help them. Most of them however, recognize that at worst the Japanese would have a certain nuisance value and Germany would therefore like to make allies of them. The Germans foresee of course that Japan’s exclusionist policy in the Orient will be applied to all white people including themselves in the long run

(End Section Three)

EMB

Smyth

79716—46—pt. 4—10
MN

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N. R.
Dated August 31, 1940.
Rec’d 5:30 a.m. Sept. 1.
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p.m. (Section Four.)

I believe that a considerable part of the Japanese army including War Minister Tojo is in favor of a closer [4539] alignment with Germany. They are being stalled off for the moment by other pro-Axis but cautious elements in the Government who wish to be sure that they are on the winning side. The reasons why Japan is hesitant to plunge boldly forward on her policy of southward expansion are in order of importance: (one) she wants to be sure which way the war in Europe will go; (two) she wants to be sure that the United States has no intention of taking up arms against her; (three) she wants to be sure of at least a temporary respite along the Soviet Manchurian frontier which is the Achilles Heel of the Japanese Empire; and (four) failure to wind up the China incident.

Meanwhile as Japan struggles to make up her mind she may be expected to continue the nibbling policy she has pursued ever since the Manchurian outbreak. She has learned from experience that aggression by easy stages is the easier way. She has discovered that many little bites add up to the same thing as one big one and that the victims seem to make much less noise about it.

(End of Section Four)

Smyth

[4540]

MG

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (BR)

From: Peiping via N. R.
Dated August 31, 1940.
Rec’d 5:50 a.m. Sept. 1
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p.m. (Section five)

In view of Japan’s extremely difficult position I believe that she is in no position at the present time to wage a successful war alone against the United States or Russian although with allies her position would be of course changed. I feel sure, however, that the majority in Japan are extremely desirous of avoiding a conflict with the United States. I might add that on my recent visit to the United States I was struck with the number of people who mistakenly believe that any strong show of strength by the United States would automatically plunge the United States into war. The trouble is that the Japanese know we feel this way and are making the most of it by flourishing the war scare in our faces. Actually I believe the Japanese have no intention of fighting us except as a last resort; in the face of this attitude I believe that firmness is the soundest and safest American Naval policy. The risks involved much less than is commonly supposed in the United States. Of [4541] course if Great Britain is defeated then we can expect the Japanese to become more belligerent.

(End section five)

Smyth
MG

[Telegram received]

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any-one. (BR)
From: Peiping via N. R.
Dated August 31, 1940.
Rec’d 5:45 a. m. Sept. 1
Secretary of State,
Washington.

300, August 31, 3 p. m. (Section Six)
The Japanese appear to be so confident of a German victory and are so hopeful
that such a victory would permit them to realize their ambitions in Asia that it
appears quite useless for the United States at the present time to suggest any
halfway measures of appeasement or friendship. In fact the reception that
has been accorded such ideas recently by the Japanese press shows that the
tendency is to interpret them as signs of fear and weakness. No form of appease-
ment short of American recognition of the Japanese created new order in the
Far East would satisfy the Japanese at this time. It is obviously pointless to
try to reason with the Japanese until [4542] the course of events
in Europe becomes clear. If Great Britain holds out against Germany contrary
to present Japanese expectations Japan will then have to reconsider her whole
policy for Japan today is a nation whose policy is dictated solely to expediency.
(End Summary)
(End of message)
Sent to Department. Repeated to Chungking, Shanghai. Code text by air mail
to Tokyo.

Smyth

EMB

[4543] Mr. Gesell. At transcript pages 1750 and 1751, a request
by Senator Ferguson for any information sent by the State Depart-
ment to Ambassador Grew regarding parallel action with Britain in
August 1941. This information was handed to Senator Ferguson at
page 1883 of the transcript. At transcript 1752, a request by Senator
Ferguson for any information received by Ambassador Grew from
the State Department regarding the American Volunteer Group. No
record has been found in the State Department files that any such
information was ever received from Ambassador Grew, or sent to
him.

At transcript 1781, a request by Senator Ferguson for any answer
Ambassador Grew may have received from the State Department
in reply to Grew’s telegram on page 143 of volume II of Foreign
Relations. No record of any reply found by the State Department in
its files.

Now, the committee understands that this is only a partial report
on some of the requests. We have held this group up so that General
Marshall could finish his testimony. We did not want to interrupt
at that time.

We are just making this interim report, and we will do the best we
can in any remaining time on any other [4544] requests pend-
ing, so the transcript will tie together.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. I understand counsel has gone through the tran-
script and got all these requests, and he is now just taking up a part
of these requests, and he will reply sometime later on any others.

Mr. Gesell. We are replying to the ones we have ready, and as the
other ones come in we will take care of them, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. These only apply to the transcript, so the transcript will be tied together, to see what happens to a request?

Mr. Gesell. That is right.

We felt we should not have a number of loose ends in the transcript on the various questions.

There is one further request that has just been brought to my attention.

Senator Ferguson, on page 2510 of the transcript, requested any Japanese intercepts between the numbers 836 at page 178 of Exhibit 1, and 841 at page 185 of Exhibit 1.

We have the reply of the War Department giving the additional intercepts that fall in those numbers to the extent that they are available, and I would like to ask [4545] that the memorandum from the War Department, and the intercepts be spread upon the record, and with the permission of the committee we will strike from the intercepts the code information, which we have been striking in the past.

The Vice Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)

Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.

At p. 2510 of the transcript Senator Ferguson requested the four Japanese messages from Tokyo to Washington between No. 836 (p. 178 of Exhibit 1) and No. 841 (p. 185 of Exhibit 1).

Copies of Nos. 837 and 838 are inclosed herewith.

No. 840 was not intercepted.

The records of Signal Intelligence Service indicate that No. 839, dated 26 November 1941, was not decoded until about 13 December 1941. When it was decoded, the following summary of the message was prepared:

"Representations made to American Embassy here. Your instructions follow. Evacuation from Panama according to #322 from Panama. Please negotiate for assistance from Canal Officials as well as for supplies, water, fuel, oil, and wharf facilities at Balboa. Negotiate for granting of funds to return to Japan as quickly as possible. Transmit to each office concerned. Sent to U. S. and Panama."

10 December 1945.

SECRET

From: Panama (Akiyama).
To: Havana.

Circular #34. Message from Tokyo to Washington #837.

Re my message #819.

The schedule for the Tatsuta Maru, as given in my #838, is to leave Balboa on the 26th arriving in Yokohama January 15th. On the basis of conditions at the time, it may stop at Los Angeles again on the way home, but try to have the passengers from the United States board it on the outward trip. As far as possible, have all those who wish to sail from South America come on the Tatsuta.

Transmit this message and my caption telegram to all offices in the United States, as well as Canada, Vancouver and Panama. From Panama send it to all Central and South American ministers and—

—See S. I. S. #26217.

—See S. I. S. #26216.

Army 26218 (Japanese) Trans. 12/13/41 (BR).
From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Washington.

November 26, 1941.

#838
Tatsuta Maru Schedule:
Yokohama December 2.
Balboa arrive December 24.
Army 26216 (Japanese) Trans. 12/13/41 (S).

The Vice Chairman. Anything further from counsel?
Mr. Gesell. That is all we have today, Mr. Congressman.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will stand adjourned until
10 o'clock Monday morning, at which time Admiral Wilkinson will appear as a witness.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 o'clock p.m., December 16, 1945, the committee recessed until 10 o'clock a.m., Monday, December 17, 1945.)
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson, Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

The Chairman was called to the White House this morning and is detained for a few moments. We will proceed.

Will counsel announce the first witness.

Mr. Gesell, Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. I would like to make a brief statement about a matter that came up during my absence in connection with my assistant here, Mr. Greaves.

I am sorry I had to be absent, and am very sorry there was anything which seemed disturbing to the committee. It was not a matter about which there need be any mystery.

Some weeks ago, at what I thought was a full press conference—certainly a dozen or 15 were in my office—I stated that I had secured Mr. Greaves as my assistant and thought it would be very necessary, as far as I was concerned, to have an assistant of this character.

I was sorry that the committee hadn't found it practicable to allow the minority some assistance, but thought that under the circumstances I would do the best I could.

I secured Mr. Greaves. I want to make it clear that he has not had for many months any connection whatsoever with the Republican National Committee. I think he is a very competent man.

In connection with the episode concerned with Senator Lucas, I have here a memorandum from Mr. Greaves which I would like to put in the record. Mr. Greaves is my assistant and is being paid by me.
The Vice Chairman. Being paid by you, did you say, Senator?
Senator Brewster. Yes, sir; being paid by me.
I have this memorandum which I would like to put in the record,
in justice to everybody concerned. It is signed by Percy L. Greaves,
Jr.:

Regarding the recent unpleasantness during your absence (pp. 3605–3608),
I should like to say that there never was any intention on my part to insult
or reflect on any Members of the United States Senate by thought, word, or
action. I have great respect for Members of both Houses of Congress. I am
sure that the Senator from Illinois misconstrued an unconscious and which I
thought was a silent smile that went unnoticed by anyone else.
I am a registered Republican, but as you know I receive no compensation
from Republican Party sources and had not for many months before I entered
your service. My activities with you have not been of a partisan or a political
nature.

I sincerely hope that my conduct has not caused you any em-
barrassment and that my services meet with your satisfaction.

I want to add my personal word, that if there had been any ground
for any feeling, I very much regret it.

I thought the position of Mr. Greaves had been very clear through-
out. He has been here as my assistant. I hope he may continue.

I certainly do not want him, or myself to do anything which would
in any way impair the proper conduct of this very important investi-
gation.

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement?
Senator Brewster. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, at the proper time, in executive
committee meeting I propose again to raise this question. I am not
going to take the valuable time of the committee now to argue this
question here this morning.

Not only do I propose in executive session to find out more about
Mr. Greaves than has been told by the Senator from Maine, but
there are two other gentlemen that I propose to find out something
about also, who have sat here constantly at these hearings, and have,
according to my [4552] best information, given considerable
information to members of this committee.

I think this committee is entitled to know who every individual
is, what his background is, what his motives and purposes are, how
much he is being paid, and by whom.

If I had two or three people working for me, I would have told
the committee all of these things long before this.

This is all that I care to say at this time.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. In connection with that comment, if the usual
consideration accorded by other committees, particularly by some of
the standing committees of the Senate, and the committee which more
than any other has established a record for investigation in the past
4 years, if the practice prevailing in those committees has been
followed, I am sure the occasion for the comment of the Senator
from Illinois would not have occurred.

Under the circumstances, other steps have been necessary.
If there is to be an investigation, as he suggests, there may also be an investigation of the associations and connections of those more actively identified with the committee; but I am sure we will be embarking on something that will carry us a rather long way.


Senator Brewster. There are a good many things that have occurred which have not impressed the minority. They are matters of record. If we are going to start on that we will make a complete job of it.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman—
The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Illinois.

Senator Lucas. One more word. There is no precedent from any special committee such as the Senator from Maine suggests. There is precedent on standing committees and those committees are presumed to be composed of Republicans and Democrats who look after partisan matters and look after the principles on which the parties operate.

This was presumed to be a nonpartisan investigation.

Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator Lucas. Just a moment.

This was presumed to be a nonpartisan investigation and there is no precedent, according to my informants, where a special committee of this kind has had any minority representation, and that is especially true in view of the fact that everyone in the first instance agreed that General Mitchell should act as counsel here in this case for us all.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield?

[4554] Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman—
The Vice Chairman. I hope we can proceed soon, Senator.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

I will be a little more specific in the comment which I made. Aside from the standing committees I did have reference to the special committee investigating the defense establishment which has been functioning throughout the past 4 years and which I thought had accumulated considerable reputation, and which has always had minority assistants as members of its staff.

And, I might add, that it is a very significant, and I think of a very nonpartisan character, in the whole 4 years of its history it has never had a minority report of any character or a divided report, and it never had any such difficulties as this committee has faced. That is what has reinforced my impression that if well-established practices of the Truman Committee had been followed much of the difficulty here would have been avoided. I say that in all kindliness.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman—
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, we have an admiral of the Navy waiting, have had for 10 minutes, while we have been discussing Mr. Greaves. I hope that we can proceed.

[4555] The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe, did you want recognition?

Mr. Keefe. I was going to make the same suggestion that Mr. Murphy has made, but in view of the statement of the Senator from Illinois as to the purposes of his investigation, I simply wanted to say
that I was very much impressed with the long newspaper account in the newspapers yesterday where the Senator from Illinois proposed to investigate the Dewey incident to its ultimate conclusion.

I wonder if that is prompted by a nonpartisan attitude. I wonder whether we are investigating Pearl Harbor or Mr. Dewey. Are we going to go off on a lot of other matters?

The Vice Chairman. I hope that we don't get into a discussion of every newspaper article.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. The Dewey letters were placed in the record here by General Marshall and they were thought to be pertinent and material to this investigation by counsel, at least certain portions of them were thought to be material and pertinent, and the thing that I want to find out in connection with Mr. Dewey, and the only thing I want to find out, if it can be found out, is who gave him this top secret, if it was given to him, and I think the country and this committee is entitled to know.

[4556] Mr. Keefe. What has that to do with Pearl Harbor?

Senator Lucas. It has plenty to do with Pearl Harbor, if somebody is giving away top secrets that are the highest ever considered by this Nation; much more than about 90 percent of the questions that have been asked by the Congressman from Wisconsin have to do with Pearl Harbor.

The Vice Chairman. Obviously that would not be a proper matter to go into at this time. The Chair hopes that we may proceed with the witness before us.

Anyone else?

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Michigan.

Senator Ferguson. I just want to place on the record the comment that my silence does not mean that I agree with what has been said here by Senator Lucas this morning; and I think it would be of interest to go into the past employment of each of the employees of the committee and their present salary on the committee; but that we may proceed with Pearl Harbor I am not going into that this morning.

The Vice Chairman. Of course, the Chair feels constrained to make this statement in connection with the remarks of the Senator from Michigan. Every employee of this committee, so far as the Chair knows, was selected by unanimous action of the committee.

[4557] Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I am sure you do not mean to put that in the record as a fact. The facts are that Senator Barkley and the Congressman now presiding and myself were members of a subcommittee which did have certain alleged powers, but aside from Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell, the selection of the other two members of the counsellor staff was not known even to me as a member of the subcommittee.

I do not mean to be intimating a challenge of their capacity but I never knew anything directly regarding their terms of employment, their salary and, as a matter of fact, I know even little at the present time.

The Vice Chairman. Well, I think the statement I made is accurate and correct and certainly in no executive session of this committee has
any member of the committee raised any question or intimated any objection to any member of the staff. I am confident that statement is absolutely and technically accurate.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, it was conceded that there was a subcommittee named consisting of Senator Barkley, Congressman Cooper and the Senator from Maine, and the Senator from Maine had the responsibility as one member of that committee with regard to hiring our staff.

I hope we will go on with Pearl Harbor now. There is an Admiral waiting.

The Vice Chairman. Of course, it was the purpose of [4558] the committee to try to conduct a non-partisan, non-political investigation and all employes of the committee are employes of the whole committee and, as far as the Chair is advised and knows, every employe of the committee has endeavored to fully cooperate with every member of the committee.

It is my privilege to be a member of several joint committees. I am a member of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. There is no minority or majority employs. The staff is for the whole Joint Committee.

I am a member of the Joint Committee of the Reduction of non-essential Federal expenditures headed by Senator Byrd. So far as I know there has never been any minority or majority employs. They are employes of the Joint Committee.

I am a member of the committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning of the House and there has never been any minority or majority employes. All employes serve the full committee.

Now, Admiral, will you please be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON, UNITED STATES NAVY

Mr. Gesell. At the outset I think perhaps we can direct attention to the principal exhibits which will be covered in Admiral Wilkinson's testimony.

The first, of course, is Exhibit 37, which is already [4559] in evidence, the basic exhibit of Navy dispatches.

I would like to call attention to two matters in connection with that exhibit at this time. When the exhibit was prepared, for reasons of security as to which the committee is fully informed the word "purple" was eliminated from two dispatches. In view of developments since that date the word "purple" no longer has any security significance and for that reason we would like to amend the dispatches merely to put that word in at the appropriate place. It first appears at page 12 of the exhibit.

The Vice Chairman. This is exhibit number what?

Mr. Gesell. 37, basic Navy dispatches. At page 12, the first line of the dispatch should read, "Tokyo to Vichy No. 295." Insert "purple" before "of 19th." So the word "purple" will appear in that dispatch.

More important, perhaps, from the point of view of the hearing is the insertion of the word "purple" in two places on the dispatch which appears at page 41. That is the dispatch of December 2nd from OPNAV to CINCAF and others concerning code destruction. The

1 See p. 2485, infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Admiral Wilkinson.
word “purple” should appear after the word “destroy” in the second line and again after the word “destroy” in the fourth line.

Also at page 10 the first word of the dispatch should be “purple.”

[4560] We would like to introduce other exhibits at this time which have been in the hands of the committee now for several weeks.

The first, as Exhibit 78, a folder designated “Dispatches on Kra Peninsula alert.”

As Exhibit 79, a folder designated, “Dispatches on Dutch alert.”

As Exhibit 80, a series of photostated documents designated “Fortnightly Summaries on Current National Situations.”

And as Exhibit 81, a folder containing various special estimates made by the Office of Naval Intelligence on the Far Eastern situation in the period preceding Pearl Harbor attack, commencing with a special estimate dated February 15, 1941, and going up to December 6, 1941.

I might say these latter two exhibits, 80 and 81, comprise data comparable to that contained in the basic exhibit of estimates which was introduced in connection with General Miles’ testimony as Exhibit 83.

Senator Brewster. Do I understand whether we have been given copies of these yet?

Mr. Gesell. Yes, I think several weeks ago, Senator.

The Vice Chairman. The exhibits will be admitted as indicated by counsel.

[4567] (The documents referred to were marked “Exhibits Nos. 78, 79, 80 and 81,” respectively)

Mr. Gesell. Admiral, will you please state your name, your rank and present duty for the record, please, sir?

Admiral Wilkinson. Theodore Stark Wilkinson, Vice-Admiral U. S. Navy, recently commander of the Third Amphibious Force of the Pacific Fleet and now awaiting the pleasure of the committee, subsequently to join the Navy Department for duty.

Mr. Gesell. During what period of time were you Chief of the ONI?

Admiral Wilkinson. From October the 15th, 1941, until, as I recall, July the 20th, 1942. I will, of course, however, be glad to speak of anything within my knowledge of events before October 15th.

Mr. Gesell. What had been your duty immediately prior to your connection with ONI?

Admiral Wilkinson. I had been commanding officer of the battleship Mississippi for some 9 months and before that a year and a half Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral Andrews, commander of the scouting force and of the Hawaiian detachment.

Mr. Gesell. How long have you been in the Navy, Admiral?

[4563] Admiral Wilkinson. Forty years and a half.

Mr. Gesell. During that time you had duty at Hawaii, have you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Intermittently. My last and only tour of some length was with Admiral Andrews for about a year and a half in Hawaii and then subsequently on the Mississippi for 6 months additional.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, that would leave you at Hawaii during what period of time?

Admiral Wilkinson. From October 1939 until May 1941.

Mr. Gesell. Were you stationed at Hawaii your whole time from October 1939 on, or did you go out there when the fleet went out there?
Admiral Wilkinson. I was with the so-called Hawaiian detachment, which was a force of vessels, and my duties were entirely at sea. We operated off Hawaii and from time to time went in port. At no time was I on shore duty there, nor have been.

Mr. Gesell. Prior to joining the ONI on October 15, 1941 had you had any experience in the field of naval intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson. None other than attendance at two international conferences for limitation of armaments in 1933 and 1934.

[4563] Mr. Gesell. Had you ever had any experience in the Navy's field of activities comparable to what the Army calls their War Plans Division?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. At sea, as Chief of Staff to Admiral Andrews and again as gunnery officer and assistant officer to Admiral Willard some 10 years before, but not on shore.

Mr. Gesell. The precise title which you held in ONI was Director of Naval Intelligence, is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Do I understand that that was in the nature of a position comparable to that occupied by General Miles of the Army? That is to say, that you were a member of the immediate staff of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Wilkinson. Comparable but not entirely similar in that the Chief of Naval Operations had under him not a general staff but an office composed of a number of divisions. His responsibilities were somewhat different from the Chief of Staff of the Army and the responsibilities of his several divisions were quite different from those of the General Staff of the Army.

Mr. Gesell. But the immediate advisers to the Chief of Naval Operations would be the various directors of the principal divisions?


Mr. Gesell. Now, can you indicate for us what the other principal divisions of the Navy organization are in addition to the Office of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson. The Chief of Operations was by law charged with the operations of the fleet and the preparation and readiness of plans for use in war. By regulations he was charged with the coordination of efforts of all bureaus of the Department to maintain and make ready the fleet. He had to assist him in these duties several divisions, as you asked: The War Plans Division, the Central Division, the Communications Division, Ship Movements, Fleet Maintenance, Fleet Training, Naval Intelligence, and possibly one or two others.

Mr. Gesell. Can you tell us who were during the period immediately preceding Pearl Harbor responsible as directors of those respective divisions?

Admiral Wilkinson. War Plans, Rear Admiral Turner; Central Division, Captain Schuirman; Communications, Rear Admiral Noyes; Ship Movements, Rear Admiral Brainard; Fleet Maintenance, I believe Rear Admiral Farber; Fleet Training I forget at the moment; and Naval Intelligence myself.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, will you give us some idea of what the responsibilities and functions and organization of Naval Intelligence were?
Admiral Wilkinson. Naval Intelligence had three principal branches, the administrative, Domestic Intelligence, and Foreign Intelligence.

The Administrative carried out its routine duties with regard to personnel, and procurement and assignment of duty of personnel, finances, mail, the issue and forwarding of all reports, reproduction, printing, and general files, a normal administrative office.

The Domestic division carried on the investigation of espionage and conspiratorial organizations and individuals, looked after coastal intelligence along the coast of the United States with respect to information that could be picked up from boats and otherwise, plant inspections to make sure that the plants in which the Navy was involved were safe both from a mechanical viewpoint as to fire and other hazards and safe from a security viewpoint as to national secrets; that is the plants, I am speaking of, in which confidential work was going on. This Domestic branch also investigated candidates for confidential Navy Department employment and candidates for employment with the Naval Intelligence Service itself. It organized and conducted, in general, schools for officers and men to be assigned to intelligence. Its principal duties were those I first mentioned, the investigation of espionage and conspiratorial or subversive organizations and individuals. They conducted a survey of the country in connection with FBI and Military Intelligence and marked down such suspects as were known by the contacts, by the large number of contacts we had. It was this work that enabled us to run in, as you might say, to get taken into custody immediately after the war, some 8,000 suspects of various Axis nations and I think in large part contributed to the fact that at no time during the last war was there any serious sabotage in this country.

The Foreign Intelligence comprised a number of geographic sections, such as the British Empire, the Far East, Western Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Near East, American Republics, and then certain other sections such as foreign trade in merchant vessels, statistics in connection with foreign navies and matters of trade and two sections known as Special Intelligence and Strategic Information.

The duties of the office as a whole and of the foreign branch in particular and of each geographic section was to collect, evaluate and forward to interested agencies intelligence received from abroad or picked up from newspapers or otherwise with relation to the several foreign countries under each geographic section. The evaluation would consist of considering the source, considering the reliability of the information which we had obtained and its consistency with other proven information that we had.

[4567] In addition to those main sections there was a small section of Records and Library, Historical Section, and one of Censorship, which was held in the nucleus, ready to go into action when the national censorship was declared. That, of course, could not be declared before the war situation and there was no censorship in the United States prior to that time. That was the main office.

Mr. Gesell. Before you leave the main office, was there also a branch known as Fleet Intelligence?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. Upon the institution of Admiral King's Commander in Chief Office, he set up a Fleet Intelligence which was directly under his office and was related to the Office of Naval Intelligence, but at the time that we were operating before Admiral King came in—in I believe January or February of 1942—there was no specific office of Fleet Intelligence, as I recall.

Mr. Gesell. Did the Office of Naval Intelligence do the work with respect to keeping track of the movements of the Japanese and other potential enemy nation vessels?

Admiral Wilkinson. Very definitely.

Mr. Gesell. Where was that work done in this organizational scheme?

Admiral Wilkinson. In each of the foreign sections.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, the Far Eastern branch of the Foreign Intelligence Section would keep track of the movements of the Japanese vessels?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. May I continue with the field?

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir.

Admiral Wilkinson. That was the office. The personnel at the time of December 1 were 230 officers and 175 enlisted men and 300 civilians in the main office, including the branches I have spoken of, and the school which took a number. In the naval districts there were about 1,000. I have the figures for November 15 and December 15, and I am interpolating between the two. There were about 135 agents who were civilian employees of considerable detective and analytical skill; 900 enlisted men and 100 civilians. These were the naval districts throughout the country and in Hawaii, Panama, and the Philippines.

In the foreign posts there were 133 officers and 200 enlisted men, and no civilians. In the foreign posts there were naval attachés and naval observers throughout the world. The naval attachés were at the capitals, and naval observers, a naval equivalent of a consul, at a number of ports. We were obtaining our information in large part from these naval attachés in the foreign nations, from the naval attachés and observers in these ports, and in part from the State Department officials and in part radio intercepts which we received from the Radio Communications Office.

Mr. Gesell. Going back to your organization for a moment more, there was an assistant director of the division, was there not?

Admiral Wilkinson. There was an assistant director who at the time was awaiting relief, as the Director of the Domestic Branch. He was doubling at the time and subsequently became relieved, and became full-time assistant director.

Mr. Gesell. What was his name?

Admiral Wilkinson. That was Captain, now Rear Admiral Howard Kingman.

Mr. Gesell. Who was in charge of the Foreign Intelligence Branch?


Mr. Gesell. Who was specifically responsible for the Far Eastern section of that branch?

Admiral Wilkinson. Commander, now Captain McCollum.
[4570] Mr. Gesell. Admiral, I have in my hand a three-sheet mimeographed document entitled "Intelligence Division (OP 16). Duties."

Does that document correctly summarize the duties of the Intelligence Division as it was set up and operating immediately prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. In general, yes. You will note on page 2, subparagraph (c), they speak of duties of the public relations branch. That had been a part of the Office of Naval Intelligence, but in the middle of the year 1941, I believe, it was detached and placed directly under the Secretary's office, and in consequence that entire subparagraph was no longer effective.

Mr. Gesell. Does that document correctly state the duties of the Foreign Intelligence Branch?

Admiral Wilkinson. In general, yes. In item (a) (2), thereof, "Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable," the definition of "evaluation" which has been advanced in connection with General Miles' testimony is somewhat in conflict with that in the Navy in that in G-2 evaluation of information included the determination of the probable or prospective intentions of the enemy.

That, however, was not one of the duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

[4571] Mr. Gesell. I want to return to that in a moment.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. I would like to offer this three-page statement of the duties of the Intelligence Division as the next exhibit, Exhibit 82.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 82.")

Mr. Gesell. I ask you, Admiral, to read the duties of the Foreign Intelligence Branch.

Admiral Wilkinson (reading):

The Foreign Intelligence Branch will:

(1) Secure all classes of pertinent information concerning foreign countries, especially that affecting naval and maritime matters, with particular attention to the strength, disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces.

(2) Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable.

(3) Direct the activities of U. S. Naval Attachés.

(4) Maintain liaison with naval missions.

Naval missions were special bodies sent to various countries on their request in order to train their navy.

[4572] (5) Maintain liaison with foreign naval attachés accredited to the United States.

(6) Maintain liaison with other Government departments for the exchange of foreign information.

Mr. Gesell. Now, under item (a) (1), it is clear that one of the duties of the ONI was to secure or collect information concerning the disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces, was it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. We were to secure everything we could which was factual, and which would be of value in determining those intentions.

Mr. Gesell. Now, is it also clear that under item (2) ONI had the responsibility of disseminating such information to all concerned?

Admiral Wilkinson. You will note that term "as advisable," which means as may have been directed from time to time. There were directions which we had received in that connection.
Mr. Gesell. I want to be sure I understand you. I understand you to testify on that point thus far, as follows, that it was the responsibility of ONI to assemble the information as to the disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces.

Admiral Wilkinson. Entirely.

[4573] Mr. Gesell. That the responsibility of evaluating such information was not the responsibility of ONI.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. With respect to its accuracy, very definitely. With respect to the determination of probable intentions of itself, it was not.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, ONI simply indicated, when it had collected the information, whether it considered it reliable or not, and if so, what degree of reliability it attached to the information.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and to the best of our guess we would advise the Office of Chief of Naval Operations what we thought it meant.

Mr. Gesell. But you did not have, as one of your functions, the responsibility of determining what the probable intentions of the foreign naval forces would be?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. I was advised by my predecessor that he had been told by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief, and Director of War Plans, that the Office of Naval Intelligence would not prepare the estimate or probable intentions of the enemy, as had been done in the War Department, but that War Plans would assume that duty.

I have subsequently consulted Admiral Ingersoll on that same subject, and I stated that I felt we had considerable [4574] talent in the office that might be prepared to do that, but that I understood this from my predecessor, and Admiral Ingersoll confirmed it.

Mr. Gesell. These duties that I have just introduced as Exhibit 82, were established by the order of the Chief of Naval Operations on October 23, 1940, were they not?

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe so.

Mr. Gesell. Do you know of any formal written amendment of those duties, Admiral?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. For instance, I know of no amendment that removed the Public Relations Branch from that office, but perhaps that has been overlooked in the general corrections.

Mr. Gesell. So that by word of mouth, and discussion, the responsibilities of ONI under this general statement of its duties were qualified and amended; is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would not say amended. I would say, qualified, because there is nothing in the specific text that would require us to disseminate the probable intentions of the enemy, as I read it.

Mr. Gesell. Are we clear thus far, that it was your duty to assemble the information; it was your duty to determine its degree of reliability; and it was the duty of someone else to determine what the probable intentions of [4575] the enemy would be?

Admiral Wilkinson. That was my understanding, except, of course, I was willing and anxious that the efforts and abilities of our office should contribute our view of the enemy intention to the Office of Naval Operations.
Mr. Gesell. I am talking, you understand, though, Admiral, as to your duties, as to your responsibilities.

Admiral Wilkinson. Quite right.

Mr. Gesell. It was not your responsibility or duty to determine the probable intentions of the enemy?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not so understand, and I have the information, as I said, from my predecessor, my discussion with Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Operations, and just this morning from Admiral Kirk, also my predecessor.

Mr. Gesell. You recall a conversation with Admiral Kirk to that effect?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. I understand he talked about the matter with Admiral Ingersoll and he also advised you.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Did you ever discuss the matter with Admiral Stark?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

[4576] Mr. Gesell. Now, with respect to the responsibility for dissemination, I understood you to testify that your responsibility for dissemination was qualified by the words "as advisable," and that you had orders instructing you as to what type of information should be disseminated. Is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. I said that the text of the regulations which you introduced read "Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable."

I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate and spread abroad all types of basic information, what General Miles had termed static information, such as the defenses of the country, its economics, the diplomatic relations, the characters and activities and previous careers of its military and naval men, the location of its fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and everything other than the enemy probable intentions, and such specific information as in itself might give rise or might require action by our fleet, or by our naval forces.

In the latter case before dissemination I would consult higher authority, either the Assistant Chief, the Chief of Naval Operations, or my colleague, Chief of War Plans, in order that this information which I sent out would not be in conflict with his understanding of the naval situation, and the operations for which he was responsible.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, you had the responsibility to disseminate, but where you reached a situation which led you to feel that the information disseminated might approach the area of a directive, or an order to take some specific action to the recipient, then you felt you were required to consult War Plans, or the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly.

[4577] Mr. Gesell. I have just been handed, at the opening of this hearing, Admiral Wilkinson, a memorandum which I wanted to read to you and ask you if you are familiar with this memorandum or have ever seen it. It is:

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1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5361 et seq. for material in connection with the testimony of Admiral Wilkinson, now deceased, included in the record at the request of Mrs. Wilkinson.
Confidential Memorandum, December 12, 1940.
From the Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Director, Naval Intelligence Division.
Subject: Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations.
Enclosure: (A) Distribution List.
1. In view of present world conditions, the Chief of Naval Operations believes that there is a need for keeping responsible Fleet and Force Commanders, and important Navy Department executive agencies, in closer touch with important aspects of the situation which may affect decisions on the nature and direction of initial war operations of the Naval Forces. It is, therefore, requested, that the Director of Naval Intelligence prepare fortnightly for limited distribution a confidential and condensed summary of the current situation under headings as follows:
   A. The diplomatic situation.
   Japanese, German, Italian, French, Russian, Latin American.
   B. The Japanese military situation.
   C. The Japanese naval situation.
   D. The Chinese military situation.
   E. The German military, naval, and air situations.
   F. The Italian naval and air situations.
2. Under each general heading a condensed and broad view of the situation should be summarized, with paragraphs following in necessary detail to give recent diplomatic, military, or naval trends.
3. It is desired that no information be included pertaining to the United States, British or Dutch military or naval disposition and strengths; nor should reference be made to United States war plans or secret diplomatic conversations.

Signed, “H. R. Stark.”

The distribution list shows substantial distribution both in the field and within the Navy Department, including the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

Do you remember having seen that memorandum of December 12, 1940?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not see it until this morning, but I was fully aware of its terms as conveyed to me, and I was issuing, or my office was issuing such a fortnightly bulletin throughout my tenure of office.

As you will note, the operations of the anti-Axis nations were not to be included in it, and when Russia came into the war that was also added to the list of operations we should not discuss, and also our own operations were not included.

The distribution was materially expanded. The original sheet there shows distribution of something less than 20, I believe. Eventually, at the time of the first of December, that distribution list was up around 120, going to all flag officers, or the commands of all flag officers in the field, in the naval districts and in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. Gesell. Now we have introduced some of these fortnightly summaries, the ones immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, and they are contained in Exhibit 80.

What I am particularly concerned with now, Admiral, is the instruction from Admiral Stark that these fortnightly summaries should not contain information concerning secret diplomatic conversations. Did you understand that you were, under orders from Admiral Stark, not authorized to send to the field information concerning secret diplomatic conversations?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, because of the general security attached to the code-breaking activities.
Mr. Gesell. Do you know whether the recipients of these fort-nightly summaries had ever been apprised or advised that you were not going to submit to them information concerning [4581] secret diplomatic conversations?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know. Of course in each bulletin there was a diplomatic section, and everything that could be obtained outside of the secret material was in there, and possibly some reflection, in guarded terms, on the secret material and its bearing in the diplomatic sections of this bulletin.

Mr. Gesell. That is just what concerns me. You have a diplomatic section in your fortnightly summary and you have instructions limiting the nature of the information you can place in that section.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Just what is secret diplomatic information or what are secret diplomatic conversations? What did you understand that to exclude.

Admiral Wilkinson. As I say, I had not seen the text of that bulletin, but I found it a going concern and my general instructions were I was not to put anything in there, anything derived from what was known as "ultra" or "magic." We thought the general trend of the diplomatic conversations which might be indicated in magic as being adverse would be so indicated in the bulletin, but specific quotations, or specific facts known only to the diplomatic magic were not to be placed in there.

[4582] Mr. Gesell. In other words, it referred to conversations at least in which our Government was participating, did it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Information which we might obtain from our naval attaches or other sources, so long as it was not the product of code-breaking activity. We got a great deal of information from State Department dispatches which we were privileged to examine, and we got quite a little from our attaches and naval observers from abroad.

Mr. Gesell. Your functions with respect to the dissemination of information, which we have been discussing here, remained the same under the various war plans, did they not? That is, the Naval Intelligence had, under the different war plans, the similar responsibility of collecting and disseminating information, if advisable?

Admiral Wilkinson. I should say so. I do not recall any mention of Naval Intelligence specifically in any of the war plans.

Mr. Gesell. I notice in War Plan 46, and in War Plan 52, in each instance a chapter and section under the Assignment of Tasks, which specifies that the Office of Naval Intelligence, either alone or in cooperation with the other participating governments, would secure and disseminate as advisable whatever information was necessary in carrying out the plan.

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that specifically. [4583] but I take it as a routine entry.

Mr. Gesell. I want to turn to a discussion of Japanese intercepts with you at this point, Admiral, and see if we can get a clear understanding of what the functions of O. N. I. were in respect of the Japanese intercepts.

Who, or what department in the Navy, was responsible for intercepting the Japanese messages?
Admiral Wilkinson. The Division of Naval Communications arranged for interception and for decryption.

Mr. Gesell. Now the Division of Naval Communications you stated was under Admiral Noyes, did you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. That was not a division which went through your chain of command?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, it was a parallel division in our operations.

Mr. Gesell. Did that division also have the responsibility for decoding and translating messages?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, except we furnished them, as best we could, translators whom we had scoured the country for, and in finding an inadequate number we had actually started, on the first of October, two schools for Japanese translators, one in California and one in Harvard.

Mr. Gesell. But the responsibility for interception, responsibility for decoding and responsibility for translation all rested in the Division of Communications?

Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly intercepting and certainly decoding. I am not quite clear in my mind about translation. I think the translation was done under that same central office by translators who were assigned to that duty and who had been found by us and in part were paid by us but were told to report to that office.

Mr. Gesell. You understand I am again talking now in terms of chain of command—

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Rather than whether or not you had cooperated by helping them through the loan of personnel, and so forth.

Admiral Wilkinson. I think the translation itself was in that chain of command, but of course the cooperation between Admiral Noyes and myself and our officers was, I think, quite complete, and certainly very friendly.

Mr. Gesell. Did you then receive the message for the first time, any particular message, after it had been intercepted, decoded and translated and was in an English text form?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Now who in the Navy received the intercepted Japanese messages during the period that you were director of O. N. E. preceding Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. In the finished form that you just mentioned?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. They were sent according to their application to the foreign section to which attributable. Speaking specifically of the Far Eastern matters which we are now concerned with, they went to the Far Eastern section, Captain McCollum.

Mr. Gesell. Now was it his responsibility to distribute them to certain officers in the Navy Department?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, it was his responsibility only to arrange for such distribution, but it was my over-all responsibility to see that it was done, and we had Commander, now Captain Kramer, who was charged with the distribution.

Mr. Gesell. With the physical distribution?

Admiral Wilkinson. The physical distribution.
Mr. Gesell. Now who, in the Navy Department, was on the distribution list?

Admiral Wilkinson. The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Director of War Plans, and myself.

Mr. Gesell. Can you give us the names of those officers at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, Rear Admiral Ingersoll, Rear Admiral Turner, and myself.

Mr. Gesell. Did Admiral Noyes, the Chief of the Division which was intercepting, decoding, and translating them, get them?

Admiral Wilkinson. He got them before they came to me, or to my secretary.

Mr. Gesell. Then he was on the list, was he not?

Admiral Wilkinson. He was not on the formal distribution list, but he passed on them before they were sent to me.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, he passed on them as part of his administrative responsibilities?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. He may or may not have actually seen each one. He may have delegated that authority at times when he was not in his office, but in general he sighted them all, I believe.

Mr. Gesell. Did the Navy make any distribution outside of the Navy Department of the texts of these intercepted messages?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, to the White House.

Mr. Gesell. To any place else?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge. Some months before it had gone to the State Department intermittently with the Army, but more recently the Navy took the White House direct and the Army took the State Department direct.

Mr. Gesell. Now, as I understand it, the interception and translation and decoding of these messages was worked out between the Army and Navy, so if the Navy intercepted and translated and decoded, it gave a copy to the Army, and if the Army intercepted and translated and decoded, it gave a copy to the Navy?

Admiral Wilkinson. Both services were supposed to have a full file of the intercepts made by either or both together.

Mr. Gesell. Did you personally see all of the messages intercepted?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. A number of them were excluded in the Office of Communications from further transmission, if they were purely trivial, such as ordering a dozen pair of trousers, or something of that sort, for instance, but those which were of any importance were sent to the Naval Intelligence, and were then placed in a book, and I saw all of those.

I might not have read those to which my attention was not called, because sometimes they were very bulky, but they were available there for me to see.

Mr. Gesell. Did anyone in the Office of Naval Intelligence make any selection from that complete file of the messages which were to be sent to the other officers on the distribution list?

Admiral Wilkinson. Captain Kramer, who was primarily in our chain of command, but had additional duties with Communications, usually I believe saw them all, even those of the trivial nature which he excluded.
Those which were then placed in the book and brought to us, he usually marked them as more important, with clips or otherwise. That marking was checked afterwards by Captain McCullom and myself, and we both scanned through the book.

Mr. Gesell. By the time it had gotten to you, the book had on it, by a clip or other designation, some means of calling particular attention to the more important messages?

[4589] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. Furthermore, when matters were particularly interesting, or the messages were particularly interesting, Captain Kramer would point out to the recipient by his finger, or by turning to the page, particularly what he thought they would be interested in.

Mr. Gesell. I gather you used a system of a book rather than a locked pouch, such as they had in the Army, is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Will you explain just how that was done? Was there one book which contained these messages which went to the various people on the list, or did each receive a list of the messages that he should examine?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure which went to the White House. I am sure they had a separate copy which went to the naval aide, and he used that, and prepared his own brief of that for the President, but as to the addressees in the Navy Department, it was all in the same book.

Mr. Gesell. And when that book had been distributed around through the various Navy Department recipients, it went back to the officers who originally initiated and prepared the book, did it not?

[4590] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, except one copy, I believe, was retained in the geographical section concerned, and in this case it was the Far Eastern section. In fact, the book would have in there matters concerning the German or whatever foreign intercept was broken down, and proved to be interesting.

Upon its return those appertaining to those other geographic sections would be taken out and filed in their respective sections, and the Far Eastern intercepts filed in the Far Eastern section.

Mr. Gesell. But you, or Admiral Stark, or Admiral Ingersoll, and the other recipients did not have any means of keeping your own files of those intercepts?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. You examined the book and returned it?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. What opportunity was given to those officers to study and appraise, and read over more than once, if you will, the various messages in the book?

Admiral Wilkinson. They might hold the book as long as they wished, or send for it to come back again, but in the interest of security, we did not like to send out individual copies for retention.

Mr. Gesell. Under your system, if one of the officers [4591] chose to hold the book he delayed the other officers from receiving this important information?

Admiral Wilkinson. They did, but the bearer of the book was waiting outside and might remind them to return it.
Mr. Gesell. So as a matter of general practice, I take it, the book went rapidly to the officers permitted to read it, who then leafed through the pages, reading matters of particular interest?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would not say so. I know Captain Kramer often said he was busy pretty nearly all day long carrying the book around at times. So they took time to read the messages, they did not scan them too hastily.

[4592] Mr. Gesell. Are you familiar with Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 in this proceeding, the diplomatic and military Japanese intercepts?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Can you tell us whether or not you personally saw all of the messages contained in those two exhibits?

Admiral Wilkinson. I naturally cannot, of my own recollection, speak for all of them and of course those sent just before October 15 I had on opportunity to see, but I should say roughly that presumably I did see them all.

Mr. Gesell. All translated subsequent to the 15th of October?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. I was going to ask you whether you made any effort to examine any intercepts which were in the file for the period prior to your becoming Director of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not, except as occasion to refer to them might come up, in which case I would ask Captain Kramer to please give me the references.

Mr. Gesell. Of course, as the evidence here shows, the situation was becoming quite tense by October 15, 1941, when you took over the job, and I was wondering what means were taken to acquaint you with what had been taking place?

[4593] Admiral Wilkinson. I spent several hours, perhaps a whole day, in the Far Eastern section before I took over the office, getting the picture from their point of view, and talking to the officers there, and Captain McCullom particularly, and then Admiral Kirk as well told me something of it. So I was informed by word of mouth rather than the examination of many documents.

Mr. Gesell. Well, when you became Director of Naval Intelligence did you give instructions to send the texts of these messages, or the list of the messages to the various commanders in the field?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge. I carried out the existing system, and I know there was every emphasis on the importance of security because of the value of this method of intelligence.

Mr. Gesell. What do you mean by the “existing system”? In this Exhibit 37, which the committee has before it, there are a substantial number of dispatches sent to Hawaii prior to October 15, 1941, which are directly based upon magic, and in fact some of the dispatches actually quote the text of the intercepted message verbatim, and as I think we pointed out in the beginning this morning, some of them refer even to the purple code. I have in mind particularly the messages on pages 4 to 12 which were sent out almost [4594] in the month of July 1941 to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Forces, and to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific forces.

Now what do you mean by “practice”? It looks as though there had been a practice of sending out these messages to the theaters concerned.
Admiral Wilkinson. I was told, and understood, that such messages were not to be sent. I believe, although I am not at all sure, that the messages you speak of as examples were in July and none subsequent until we come to that critical message with respect to burning the codes.

Mr. Gesell. I think that is a fair statement, Admiral, that most of them were in July, until the code burning messages which you sent out in the very last days.

Admiral Wilkinson. I think it is a question, too, of the overlapping responsibilities of Naval Intelligence and Communications. If I may dwell on that a moment, the Navy had established in Pearl Harbor and in Corregidor subunits for the collection of radio information and for the breaking of such codes as, with the limited personnel and limited facilities they had, they might be able to do.

In connection with the work back and forth between those agencies and the Washington Office of Communications there were certain messages sometimes interchanged with relation [4595] to codes, and I believe, although this again is information that was told me, that these messages of July were more or less of that nature. They had a trick name known as “Jonab.” I think that those were more a discussion of that, in a way, and then again they were messages or information of what they had learned from the codes.

Mr. Gesell. You say that you were told not to send such messages to the field. Who told you that?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall the specific informant. I think it was my predecessor. It may have been Captain McCullom.

Mr. Gesell. Either Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom?

Admiral Wilkinson. Either Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom.

Mr. Gesell. Now I have been talking about the actual texts of the intercepted messages.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. What was the situation with respect to sending out a gist or summary of the intercepted messages?

Admiral Wilkinson. There was always the danger that the action that we took might have come from no other source than code-breaking, and in consequence—if I might diverge a little, in the South Pacific we received one time, when Admiral Halsey was in Australia and I was his deputy commander, we received a message from Admiral [4596] Nimitz that Admiral Yamamoto would be coming down to Buin and would be following a very definite schedule, and in Admiral Halsey’s stead I arranged for an interception. Of course that story is now well-known. There being 2 days to spare, I sent word back to Admiral Nimitz that we were doing this, but I invited attention to the fact that this would give suspicion that we had broken the code and we knew what the schedule was. In this instance Admiral Nimitz sent down his best wishes and said, “Go to it,” that he would take a chance on the inferences to be drawn from that. That is an example of acting upon a code-breaking activity even without repeating the text of the message.

Mr. Gesell. Well, then, from what you have said so far, you were concerned about the question of security, which we have discussed in the hearings. My question was, however, first, whether or not you were under any instructions which in any way limited your sending out to the commanders in the field gists or summaries of the messages; not why you didn’t do it.
Admiral Wilkinson. No, I don’t recall any specific instructions to that effect.

Mr. Gesell. When you took over you didn’t get from Admiral Kirk or Captain McCullom, or from the Chief of Naval Operations, or anybody else, instructions that you were not to summarize this information from the intercepts and send it to the theater commanders?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don’t recall any specific instructions except the general preservation of security.

Mr. Gesell. You came to the conclusion, I gather, that you would not do so for reasons of security?

Admiral Wilkinson. I either came to that conclusion myself or found that that was the practice in other divisions of operation.

Mr. Gesell. You see, I am anxious to know which it was. Was it because you found there were some orders in effect and you complied with them, or because you yourself made the decision, for the reasons you have indicated, not to do it?

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, I think it was, as I think I earlier said, an existing practice, and that I continued it in the interest of security. I do not know that I had any specific instructions. I would have acted similarly with or without instructions.

Mr. Gesell. Did you know these messages had gone out in July, for example?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. Did you ever discuss this matter with any other officers, Admiral Stark or the chiefs of other divisions concerned, as to whether you should or should not send out summaries or gists of intercepted messages?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, I don’t recall specifically any instances.

Mr. Gesell. You don’t recall any discussion of that matter with anyone?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Not with respect to my own sending out. I may have had, and I think I did have from time to time, discussions as to information we had, as to whether that information should be further sent out. I remember a discussion on the first of December with respect to the evident Japanese moves in the South China Sea. I do not believe, however, that that was concerned largely with code breaking activities.

Mr. Gesell. I am limiting my questions now to the sending out of information obtained from the intercepted messages.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. I understand you to say that you don’t recall any discussions with any officers concerning whether or not summaries or gists of the messages should be sent out?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not so recall, no.

Mr. Gesell. Had you ever heard that any particular commander in the field, at Hawaii or any other place, had requested such information be sent him?

[4599] Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I now know, but I did not know then.

Mr. Gesell. What do you mean you now know?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I have seen a transcript of a letter from the commanding chief, Pacific Fleet, requesting that he be kept advised of diplomatic activities.
Mr. Gesell. You are referring to Admiral Kimmel’s request to Admiral Stark that he be advised concerning diplomatic matters?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I did not know of it then and only recently in connection with this hearing have I seen it.

Mr. Gesell. You recall no discussion concerning that letter with anyone?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall ever having discussed the matter with Admiral Kirk at the time you took over your duties?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I am not sure he was aware of it.

Mr. Gesell. I have in my hand, Admiral, a memorandum by Admiral Kirk dated March 11, 1941, Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, written on the stationary of the Office of Naval Intelligence, referring to Admiral Kimmel’s [4600] letter, which contains this paragraph, paragraph 4:

The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of this division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States.

I want to show you that memorandum and ask you if you have ever seen it?

Admiral Wilkinson. Very recently I have seen it, but I think that is a general statement of the duties of the Naval Intelligence and it does not refer specifically to the inquiry which you asked me, which was diplomatic activities, as I recall.

Mr. Gesell. So far as you were aware, you had no specific responsibilities toward Admiral Kimmel or any or any other commander in the field to apprise him or them of diplomatic material obtained from intercepted Japanese messages?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, and my understanding was that the material from intercepted messages would in general be kept highly secret.

Mr. Gesell. Well now, whose responsibility was it in the Navy Department to advise Admiral Kimmel or other commanders of information which came from the intercepted messages?

Admiral Wilkinson. If it was purely a question of diplomatic activities, I am not sure that there was any responsibility to so advise him.

Mr. Gesell. On the part of anyone, you mean?

Admiral Wilkinson. On the part of anyone. When it came to the question of enemy intentions, derived from diplomatic activities, I would say that it was that of the Office of War Plans, but I do not know whose responsibility it was to keep him advised of diplomatic negotiations of themselves.

Mr. Gesell. I understand you to say that as far as sending out such information as a matter of information, to Admiral Kimmel and others, you recall no discussion of [4602] it, you recall no instructions concerning it, and you recall no requests from him concerning it?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know of the requests. I don’t recall as to the discussion. I do know that in our foreign fortnightly summary that we had a section on diplomatic activities, and we endeavored to place in there everything that we could without compromising the intercepted messages, and to that extent it was the
the responsibility of my office to place in there everything with regard to diplomatic activities.

With regard to the intercepted messages, there was a conflict of security versus the dissemination and I would say that there was no responsibility to furnish the intercepted messages unless they were directly related, or from them could be derived intentions of the enemy with respect to activities prejudicial to our fleet.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, if the intercepted messages reached the point that it was apparent that some directive or order was necessary, then there was a responsibility, and you say that responsibility, in your opinion, rested in the War Plans Division under Admiral Turner?

Admiral Wilkinson. It was my responsibility to call his attention to it, but his responsibility to send it out because of the directive phase of it as you mention.

Mr. Gesell. Did you ever have any discussions with the Army concerning their practice in sending out summaries or gists of those intercepted messages?

Admiral Wilkinson. I was in very close touch with General Miles, and had frequent conferences and meetings with him informally in his office and mine; we had weekly meetings with the FBI, Mr. Hoover, and General Miles and myself, on the Presidentially inspired committee set up by the President, we talked over secret matters of this sort, and both General Miles and I, I believe, were very anxious to guard the code-breaking activities to the greatest degree.

I do not recall specifically any conversation with him specifically on the question of sending out messages, except that we, from time to time discussed the matters that had turned up in magic.

Mr. Gesell. You mean as to what the information meant, but not what should be done with it?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, I would like to take up with you the question of what the commanders in the field may have known concerning the interception of those messages.

Let's take first of all Admiral Hart at Manila.

General Miles testified, and I believe there has been some other reference to it, perhaps in your testimony, that there were certain facilities at some point in the Philippines, under naval command and direction, which permitted the interception, translation, and the decoding of those Japanese messages; is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. There were two radio intelligence stations, one at Pearl Harbor and one at Corregidor. They were primarily set up to intercept all of the information they could get and to study out from the ship calls that were used by the Japanese, and the types of messages and the frequency of the traffic, and so on, to figure out what they could from those rather than the code breaking proper.

It became desirable, however, that Admiral Hart—indeed it became desirable—I am speaking from hearsay—that Admiral Hart be able to do his own breaking down without the necessity of referring back to Washington and so on, and his section was enlarged somewhat and some of the facilities, which I would prefer not to describe, with
relation to code breaking, were sent to him. So that he had out there facilities for breaking some codes, including, I believe, the diplomatic code.

[4605] Mr. Gesell. If I may interrupt——

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. That meant that Admiral Hart had at Corregidor facilities for intercepting, translating, and decoding messages of the type which appear in exhibit 1, and exhibit 2 here?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say partial facilities. I don’t think he was as well equipped as we were here.

Mr. Gesell. You mean he wasn’t as well equipped in terms of manpower?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and experienced manpower.

Mr. Gesell. Experienced manpower, or, I suppose, the ability to intercept as many messages, because he hadn’t so many intercepting-stations under his control, fewer of these stations?

Admiral Wilkinson. He had a very limited number.

Mr. Gesell. But he was in a position to translate and decode any messages which he himself intercepted; is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. In many codes, he couldn’t touch them, but in the so-called purple code he was to a degree enabled to translate. In fact, there were many codes we never got into ourselves here in Washington.

Mr. Gesell. But the purple code was the code in which—— [4606] many of these messages which we have in exhibits 1 and 2 were sent?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think practically all of exhibit 1 and some few in exhibit 2. I am not certain.

Mr. Gesell. Was he in a position to decode messages sent in other codes of the type contained in exhibit 2?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure. Again, I have been speaking entirely from hearsay and would prefer that the specific degree of his ability be answered by a communications officer.

Mr. Gesell. You were about to discuss the situation at Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. I am sorry I interrupted.

Admiral Wilkinson. Similarly in May of 1941, an agency of the same type was set up in Hawaii. Captain Rochefort, then Commander, was sent out, and half a dozen former language students who had recently been evacuated from Japan because of the growing crisis were sent to join him, and he head perhaps 20 or 30 enlisted men. They were working mainly on the radio intelligence proper. That is, the calls and the traffic analysis that I have just described.

Mr. Gesell. Ship locations?

[4607] Admiral Wilkinson. Ship locations, and so on. And he did not have the facilities for the purple code, nor originally facilities for any code. Later he was asked by the department to specialize on one or two codes, and what success he had, I am not sure.

Mr. Gesell. He was in a position at Hawaii to intercept but he was not in a position to decode and hence to translate messages that were sent in the purple code?

Admiral Wilkinson. Correct. There was a certain amount of interchange between Corregidor, Hawaii, and Washington, particularly on ship movements. In fact Corregidor become our control and authority
on ship movements, but there was not much, as I understand, and I again defer to the Communications witness, there was not much transfer through Hawaii of the purple code messages translated in Washington and at Manila.

Mr. Gesell. Well, as far as you were aware, they had not then facilities at Hawaii for intercepting, translating, and decoding those messages there through which Admiral Kimmel or any other officer could have gotten the information?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. Were summaries prepared in the Navy Department of the intercepted messages, daily summaries of [4608] [that] kind?

Admiral Wilkinson. In the morning, I forget whether it was 9 or 9:30, the Secretary of the Navy had a conference at which the Director of Naval Intelligence would discuss the news from all over the world, chiefly, of course, the naval activity, the progress of the war. At that time special items in connection with it which might have been dug out of a code word were sometimes mentioned. But in view of the size of that conference, there were about 20 officers in it, the references to the intercepted messages were rather few and far between.

Mr. Baecher has just invited my attention to this——

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, while we are waiting, I might direct counsel's attention to the fact that on page 31 of the volume 1 of the Naval Narrative, there is a difference between that and the admiral's testimony.

Senator Ferguson. I can't hear the Congressman.

Mr. Murphy. I might direct counsel's attention that on page 31 of the Naval Narrative, there is a difference. It may be that it could be cleared up now and we would save time later.

[4609] Mr. Gesell. I don't even have a copy of that narrative.

Admiral Wilkinson. Here you are.

(Document handed to counsel.)

Admiral Wilkinson. My attention has been invited to a summary as of the 10th of October listing the number of approximately 12 dispatches which are briefed, but I don't recall ever having made any of those in my time or seeing them, and I am not sure who made this particular one. I did have, initially, a little summary, daily summary of the Japanese situation, which contained information as to what activities were apparent as to Japan, from all sources, including intercepts, and I thought that was continued through Pearl Harbor Day, but I have since been informed that it was discontinued on the 24th of October, 9 days after I came in. I don't recall why it was discontinued. In fact, my recollection was that I had continued it.

Mr. Gesell. We had been addressing our inquiries to those summaries and the daily analysis to the Navy Department, Admiral, particularly from the point of view of seeing whether either the daily summary or the daily situation reports, as they were sometimes called, were continued after you became Director of Naval Intelligence, and we could find none beyond October 24.

Admiral Wilkinson. The 24th is what I have been informed. [4610] I don't recall having stopped them or why they were stopped. In fact, my recollection, when I was at sea and somebody asked about it, was that we had continued to use them.
Mr. Gesell. Is it your present information that those summaries were not used beyond October?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, and Captain McCullom so advises me, as well as the information you have.

Mr. Gesell. Those summaries did contain information from Japanese intercepts, as I understand it.

Admiral Wilkinson. Not in the form of quoting the intercept, I don't think, but just mentioning the fact that the negotiations are continuing, and that some objection, apparently, was made by Tokyo to some terms, or something of that sort.

Mr. Gesell. Were those daily summaries prior to October sent out to the field at all, to the theater commanders?

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe not. They were purely for internal consumption. Very small. Only two or three paragraphs a day.

Mr. Gesell. Do you feel that the information that was available to Commander Rochefort and others concerned with Naval Intelligence at Hawaii was sufficient for them to know at least in a general way that we were in a position not only to intercept but to translate and decode these Japanese [4611] messages in the purple and other high codes?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say so, particularly as Captain Rochefort was an expert in that line, and was familiar with the latest developments up to the time that he left in May. Then also we had three intelligence agencies out there—we had two. Captain Rochefort, who belonged to the Communications Division of operations, and was assigned to duty with the 14th Naval District, but was available to the Commander in Chief, and we had directly under Naval Intelligence the District Intelligence Officer at Honolulu, and he was given information at times with respect to individuals that might have appeared in codes intercepted in South America, or even in these codes here, but it was carefully guarded at the time.

Mr. Gesell. Was either the District Intelligence Officer or Commander Rochefort under any restriction or inhibition which would have prevented them from advising Admiral Kimmel that these messages in these high codes were in fact being decoded and translated in Washington?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't think so. They were in close contact with his Intelligence Officer, which was the third agency I spoke of, Captain Layton, who was Intelligence Officer on his staff. He was in full contact continually with Captain Rochefort and frequently, I believe, with Captain Mayfield of the District Intelligence Office.

[4612] Mr. Gesell. Did Captain Layton himself have the information that we were decoding and translating these messages?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know. I think probably he did.

Mr. Gesell. What precisely was the relationship that existed between the Office of Naval Intelligence here in Washington and these various Naval Intelligence agencies in Hawaii? Could you describe the organization to us so we understand?

[4613] Admiral Wilkinson. The Navy Department does not deal in general with any subordinate forces in the fleet or a unit. In other words, there was no relation between the fleet intelligence officer and the Office of Naval Intelligence. The matters went direct
to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet and were handled there or he could handle it with his intelligence officer or his gunnery officer or whoever he saw fit, but we did not have the direct chain between fleet and office that was existent in the Army between the head of G-2 and the G-2 of the division. So much for the fleet.

Mr. Gesell. That means that ONI communicated directly with the commander of the fleet on all intelligence matters?

Admiral Wilkinson. Either with our division of communications or in more important matters either directly with Admiral Stark or Admiral Ingersoll, his assistant.

Mr. Gesell. And always directly to the commander of the fleet?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. With respect to all of the other agencies the intelligence officer was under the command of the district officer, Admiral Bloch. Administratively he checked in with us, or we would send him such information as we had and such requests that we might have to make, but we had [4614] no authority to order him to do anything and he was directly on the staff of the commandant of the district.

The same thing I would say would apply to Captain Rochefort except that his administrative parent in Washington was not ourselves, ONI, but rather the Communications Division, but he likewise was on the staff of Admiral Bloch and primarily his officer and under his command and only related to communications, as Mayfield was to use for matters of administration, finance, general technique; technical matters largely.

Mr. Gesell. But matters of intelligence and information of importance to Admiral Bloch in his command, that went in through either Mayfield or Rochefort through to Admiral Bloch himself?

Admiral Wilkinson. Most any—

Mr. Gesell. I say from you or from Admiral Stark. I am talking about nonadministrative matters.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I was just thinking. The District Intelligence Officer, as you recall, was a member of the Domestic Intelligence side, which had to do with suspects and there was an unending chain of information being exchanged about Jim Smith or Hashihaha Tadikama or whatever you like. That sort of information that intelligence went directly from the District Intelligence Officer to our domestic branch. [4615] For any major matters we would be likely to communicate direct to the fleet rather than to the district fellow, because the district fellow's activities were on the domestic side and not on the foreign side. He had nothing to do with Japan as a nation or with the Japanese Fleet.

Mr. Gesell. So that means, in effect, to wind it all up, that all communications concerning diplomatic matters or major Japanese developments would be communicated to Hawaii directly through the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, you referred a moment ago to this question of the translation of the intercepted messages. I understood you to testify that you made available certain of the personnel and may have paid part of their salaries, to assist in the translation.

You were aware, were you not, that there was a very substantial delay, sometimes as much as 28 days, sometimes quite a bit less than
that, between the date of interception and the date of translation of these Japanese messages?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall the specific delays but I knew that for various reasons there were at times delays of some periods. Those reasons might, of course, be transmission times, they might be due to the necessity of breaking a new code, they might be the difficulties in breaking the cipher. I am not too familiar with the mechanics, but I think most of us understand that you have to have certain material, a certain amount of material in the code before you can begin to break it. Now, if somebody sends in a ten-word message, that might lay aside for some time before a longer message and two or three others would come in to give you enough material to attack it, but—coming back to your question—yes, I was aware that there were delays.

Mr. Gesell. Precisely. Looking at these messages, just as any of us from day to day, you can see that the translation date was frequently later than the date the message was sent.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I just wanted to mention what I did because I think General Miles has emphasized the delays in translation and transmission of the intercept to the head office, but he has not mentioned the mechanical delays which were inherent there even if there had been as much personnel as we would have liked. There wasn't much we could do about it. Both Admiral Noyes and I were concerned about it because I think we were trying to pick up all the Japanese- and English-speaking people we could find in the country.

Mr. Gesell. That is what I wanted to get at. Conscious as you must have been, of some of these delays, some of which might have been of a nature which you could cure by manpower and steps of that nature, what did you do to encourage or speed up translation, if anything?

Admiral Wilkinson. Admiral Noyes and I were both concerned about it. His primary difficulty was in getting people actually to work on the mechanics of it, and I endeavored to assist him by procuring translators, and we found, I think, some half a dozen translators that we could produce and we scoured the country for more and finally started a school to make more, because there were none in the country that either could or would take the job with us.

Then, also, we endeavored to expedite and speed our investigations of the personnel that Admiral Noyes wanted to have employed because, obviously, we could not go blind and have somebody in there without knowledge of who he was because the whole thing might be blown sky-high, so we investigated all the applicants for the code-breaking work and part of my efforts, as you asked, was to expedite those investigations. That was done through the domestic branch.

Mr. Gesell. Now, there is one question that was asked of the Army side in that connection and perhaps we ought to have the corresponding Navy figure if we can. How many people, if you know, were actually engaged at this time in the business of intercepting and translating and decoding these messages and messages of a similar type?

Admiral Wilkinson. I have no real knowledge about that. I know it grew into very large numbers and I would say offhand at that time it was somewhere between three and five hundred, but I would defer to the testimony of the communicator.
Mr. Gesell. Well, perhaps before you leave the stand you can get some check made and get that figure for us, Admiral.

Admiral Wilkinson. Surely.

Mr. Gesell. I am sure, also, I did not ask you one other question concerning the transmission of these intercepted messages or their text to the theaters. I have been discussing with you Hawaii. Did you send information concerning the intercepted messages to Admiral Hart, or to any other commander overseas, which was more detailed in any respect than the information you sent Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge. There may have been some interchange between the communication officers in attempting to straighten out their respective translations of certain intercepts, but there was nothing from my office.

Mr. Gesell. You did not undertake, for example, to supply Admiral Hart with the text of intercepted messages which he had not himself intercepted but which you had picked up here through your facilities in Washington?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not from my office. That might have been done in the communications office in an endeavor to straighten out their code work.

Mr. Gesell. Would you know whether or not that was done? Do you have any information on that?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not.

Mr. Gesell. Admiral, we have had a great deal of discussion here concerning some of these messages which are contained in exhibit 2. They are the so-called military installations and ship movement intercepts. I first want to get straight concerning the message that appears at page 12, which sometimes has been referred to here as the bombing plot message, or something of that sort.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Now, that was sent prior to your becoming Director of Naval Intelligence, since it is dated September 24, 1941 and it was translated October 9, 1941. I understood you to testify that you assumed your post on October 15, 1941.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. But I gather that you had been at least around the Division a bit beforehand before you formally took over the job to find out what it was all about?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

[4620] Mr Gesell. I want to ask you when this message first came to your attention?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don’t recall whether it came to my attention before or on my taking over, or when a later message may have come in referring back to it, but I was aware of it at some time during the fall.

Mr. Gesell. You were aware of it prior to the attack?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. And were you similarly aware of various messages which other witnesses have had called specifically to their attention, I think sometimes when you have been sitting here in the room, you might say implementing this message, i. e., giving reports of ships broken down by areas and asking for later detailed reports or asking for reports when ships were not moving, were not making any movements and other messages of that concern?
Admiral Wilkinson. I was aware of most but not all of them. I couldn't say positively all.

Mr. Gesell. What evaluation did you give to those messages at the time as far as their tending to indicate in any way the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. The Japanese for many years had the reputation, and the facts bore out that reputation, of being meticulous seekers for every scrap of information, whether by photography or by written report or otherwise.

We had recently, as reported to me, apprehended two and I think three Japanese naval officers on the west coast making investigations of Seattle, Bremerton, Long Beach, and San Diego. In the reports that we had gotten from them there had been indications of movements and locations of ships; in the papers that they had there were instructions for them to find out the movements and locations of ships except in Hawaii and the Philippines, the inference being that these fellows that were planted in America, these naval officers, were not to be responsible for movements in Hawaii and the Philippines because there were agencies finding that information there.

My general impression of adding all this reputation and this fact and these data together was that these dispatches were part of the general information system established by the Japanese. We knew also that certain information had been sought in Panama and again in Manila. I did not, I regret now, of course attribute to them the bombing target significance which now appears.

Mr. Gesell. These officers of the Japanese Navy who were apprehended on the west coast you said were getting information concerning the movement and location of ships?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

[4622] Mr. Gesell. Do you mean to tell us that those officers had instructions to break down the harbors at Seattle and other points on the coast by areas and to designate the location of ships in those areas with particular reference to which were at wharves and which were tied to buoys?

Admiral Wilkinson. No; because there are no wharves, as I recall, in San Pedro except for one or two used by naval vessels, at San Diego, and Bremerton to a limited extent. I do recall, or have been informed, that one of the reports of Lieutenant Commander Racarda with reference to Bremerton specified what ships were at anchor and which ships were alongside of a dock.

Mr. Gesell. Could we see that report?

Admiral Wilkinson. I will endeavor to find it.

Mr. Gesell. Generally, those fellows were simply getting ship movement reports, weren't they, what ships came into the harbor and which ones went out and what their destination was and whether or not they were moving in convoy and the type of general ship movement information that is spread throughout this exhibit 2?

Admiral Wilkinson. In general, yes, but the location of the ship, whether it was alongside of a dock or elsewhere, did give an inference of work going on aboard her which would be of value to the question of when she might be moved, what [4623] her state of readiness was and the inference that we drew from this was that they wanted
to know everything they could not only about the movement of the ships and those that were present and, therefore, accounted for and not a threat to them in some other waters, but also with reference to those that were present where they were located with reference to state of repair. For instance, the ships that were particularly in Pearl Harbor might be in repair and not ready to go to sea, whereas those at anchor in the stream would be ready, or would be so on short notice. Those at double-banked piers might not be, particularly the inside one might take some time to go out.

Mr. Gesell. Well, you recognize, don't you, that that is not the type of information that this message was designed to get. Looking at the message now in the cold light of the hearing room it is apparent that they were trying to spot the vessels there so as to determine their state of repair or readiness for battle at sea.

Admiral Wilkinson. It would seem so now since the locations might be of value not only as a bombing target but also for submarine attack or midget submarine attack.

Mr. Gesell. In an attack made from either above or under the water. Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. And it is quite apparent that this message [4624] was not designed to get information concerning the likelihood of certain vessels departing from the harbor or the state of their repair or ordinary ship movement information. It is just what we have been calling it, is it not, Admiral?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. A bombing plot message.

Admiral Wilkinson. In general, yes. There are other things of conceivable technical matters and interest. The ships that are in various harbors at the time might be an indication of what the capacity of this section of the harbor was with respect to taking a large fleet in, but those are technical interpretations which are hardly germane to the purposes as we now see it.

Mr. Gesell. Well, they are not the technical interpretations that you gave the message at the time either, are they?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know that we did.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall discussing this message with anyone in the Navy Department at the time prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; I think I mentioned to one or more officers that the Japs seemed quite curious as to the lay-out in Pearl Harbor and at the time I thought that that was an evidence of their nicety of intelligence.

[4625] Mr. Gesell. Now, who do you recall discussing that with?

Admiral Wilkinson. Captain McColllum particularly, possibly with Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Turner. I cannot say specifically who.

The Chairman. It is now 12 o'clock and the committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)
Testimony of Rear Admiral Theodore Stark Wilkinson (Resumed)

Mr. Gesell. Just as we were recessing, Admiral Wilkinson, you said you had talked to Admiral Turner, you thought, and to Captain McCullom, concerning this plat dispatch of September 24 we have been discussing. Do you recall your conversation with them?

Admiral Wilkinson. Only, as I think I said, that I mentioned it showed as an illustration of the nicety of detail of intelligence the Japanese were capable of seeking and getting.

Mr. Gesell. What did they say to you?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall—

Mr. Gesell. Did they agree with you?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall an agreement of that sort. Of course, it must be remembered that all during this year, 1941, there was some exchange of letters to and from Pearl Harbor and Hawaii on both the Army and Navy side emphasizing the fact that the first priority of risk or hazard to Pearl Harbor was a bombing attack, next an air torpedo attack and third a submarine attack. This information they were getting there, while substantiating that fear, was being obtained, in some degree at least, everywhere that we knew of—Panama, the West Coast, Manila.

Mr. Gesell. You are in agreement with General Miles that there is not another message like this one that appears in this document or which was intercepted prior to Pearl Harbor, is there?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection. I explained that the other harbors were, perhaps, smaller and need not have so much of a differentiation.

Mr. Gesell. When you pointed this out to Admiral Turner and Captain McCullom as an example of the nicety of Japanese espionage, you don't recall what they said?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall except, perhaps, to agree with me. I am not even sure in recollection that I pointed it out to Admiral Turner.

Mr. Gesell. What evaluation did you place upon the document? Did you think it had some significance that required your bringing it to their attention?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not particularly.

Mr. Gesell. Did you recommend that it be sent to the field?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. Was there a discussion of whether it should or should not be sent to the field?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.

Mr. Gesell. So that your testimony amounts to, if I understand it, a statement that you somewhat casually pointed this out and said this was an example of the nicety of their espionage?

Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly.

Mr. Gesell. I would like to discuss with you now, Admiral, for a few moments some of the alert or warning messages which were sent by the Navy Department, at the first at page 18 of Exhibit 37, the basic dispatch, dated October 16, 1941.
The Vice Chairman. What page?
Mr. Gesell. Page 18.
I will read it:

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the United States and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments [4629] as will not disclose strategic intentions nor constitute provocative actions against Japan. Second and third addees inform appropriate Army and Naval district authorities. Acknowledge.

That is addressed to the Commander in Chief in the Atlantic and the Pacific and the Asiatic Fleet. That appears to have been sent the day after you took over as Director of Intelligence.

Were you consulted concerning it?
Mr. Gesell. You do not recall having participated in any discussions concerning it?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Gesell. Did you have knowledge that it was sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not until after it was sent.
Mr. Gesell. How soon after?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don’t recall. Perhaps the next day.
Mr. Gesell. Was it the practice for messages, when you were not in on their drafting and transmission, for them to be sent to you afterwards for your information?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not as a frequent practice. Occasionally, yes. Occasionally I would hear of them in conversation and look them up.

Mr. Gesell. If they weren’t sent to you, how would you [4630] be in a position to know whether the information you had been obtaining as Director of Naval Intelligence was being properly evaluated?

Admiral Wilkinson. I had confidence in the officers comprising the War Plans Divisions. But there was no back check in their consultation with me to see if I thought it was properly evaluated.

Mr. Gesell. That confidence, I can see, might give you a degree of personal assurance, but it didn’t give you any information, did it, as to precisely what evaluation was being made. Without having that information, how could you properly conduct your office?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don’t know that it affected the conduct of my office, because I would give the information that we collected, and frequently advised on what my own inferences were from it, but what action was taken as a result, I do not think was necessarily involved in the conduct of my office.

Mr. Gesell. I understand your testimony to be that you recommended evaluations from time to time in transmitting this information to War Plans and to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Wilkinson. In discussion, yes. Sometimes in writing, but seldom.

Mr. Gesell. But they didn’t inform you of what action they took?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not as a matter of routine, no.
Mr. Gesell. You might find it out from talking to somebody, and then you would look it up?

Admiral Wilkinson. They might tell me, as a matter of interest, but I was not an information addressee, as it [4632] were. It was not a matter of established routine.

Mr. Gesell. How did you know what information to send out to the theater commanders if you didn’t know what evaluation had been placed upon the information you had already transmitted?

Admiral Wilkinson. The information I sent to the theater commanders was of a static nature. There was a fortnightly summary, of which you speak, which was partly action, partly static. There were in the course of the year 1941, for instance, some 62 or 70 so-called Far Eastern serials, two- and three-page discussions of specific items, which might range from a new type of torpedo to Japanese aircraft production, things of that matter.

We also supplied to the fleet a so-called Japanese monograph, O. N. I. 49, a full description of all the information we had been able to obtain concerning Japan.

Mr. Gesell. My question was whether it would not have aided you in pointing up the information to know what evaluation was being placed on the information you were sending.

Admiral Wilkinson. I am mentioning the types of information I sent which, of itself, was not the type that was involved with the evaluation of the current situation. As I have earlier mentioned, the matters concerning operations [4633] I did not send to the fleet except on reference to the Operations Office or War Plans of themselves.

The Chairman. Will counsel suspend for a moment?

I am compelled to leave because since last Saturday I have been suffering with a very high temperature, and with what looks like a severe case of the flu, and I am out against the advice of the doctor, and am compelled to leave now and do what he told me to do.

I had intended to have an executive session this afternoon, but that is impossible. Therefore, I ask to be excused for the rest of the day. I hope to be back tomorrow.

Mr. Gesell. We are sorry you are ill, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The Vice Chairman will preside.

Mr. Gesell. The next warning message which I wish to inquire concerning is that appearing at page 32, the message of November 24, 1941, addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic, Pacific and certain other districts, 11, 12, 13, and 15, reading as follows:

CHANCES OF FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN VERY DOUBTFUL. THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH STATEMENTS OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MOVEMENTS OF THEIR NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES INDICATE IN OUR OPINION THAT A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN ANY DIRECTION INCLUDING ATTACK ON PHILIPPINES OR GUAM IS A POSSIBILITY. CHIEF OF STAFF HAS SEEN THIS DISPATCH CONCURS AND REQUESTS ACTION. ADDRESSES TO INFORM SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS THEIR AREAS. UTMOST SECRECY NECESSARY IN ORDER NOT TO COMPlicate AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION OR PREcipitate JAPANESE ACTION. GUAM WILL BE INFORMED SEPARATELY.

Did you have anything to do with the sending of that message?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

The Vice Chairman. What page is that?
Mr. Gesell. Page 32. Did you know it was sent at the time?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not until after it was sent.

[4635] Mr. Gesell. How long after did you know about it?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure; a day or two.

Mr. Gesell. You were not consulted concerning this, concerning
its wording or whether or not it should be sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. The next message of a warning nature appears on page
36 and is the message of November 27, 1941. It is the message sent
at the same time as the Army warning message of that date, from the
Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific
and Asiatic Fleets, reading as follows:

This despatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased on an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra
Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46. Inform District and
Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Spenavo
Inform British. Continental Districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate
measures [4636] against sabotage.

Were you consulted in connection with the sending of that message?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. When did you first know it had been sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think two days later, perhaps three. I
might explain, of course, that these were highly secret messages and
the Chief of Naval Operations was anxious to confine the knowledge
of them to the minimum and since I was not directly concerned in
them, once I had preferred the information upon which they were
based, that he thought that neither he nor his instructions carried the
necessity of advising me about it. I do not feel, in other words, that I
was neglected by not being consulted because I had preferred the
giving of the information and I am sure that it was well used.

Mr. Gesell. And when you say you learned of these messages you
meant that you learned it informally by hearing of them rather than
hearing of them in a direct way as a matter of office organization?

Admiral Wilkinson. As I recall them.

Mr. Gesell. Is that your testimony with respect to the message on
page 38 transmitting the Army warning message of November 27 and
containing instructions concerning overt [4637] acts?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. That takes us up to November 27, Admiral. Now,
from the period from November 27, 1941 to December 7, 1941 the only
other messages of a warning nature that one finds here directed to
Hawaii were the messages concerning the destruction of codes. Did
you have anything to do with those messages?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, we initiated those after a conference with
the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Gesell. You are referring to the messages that appear at 40
and 41?

Admiral Wilkinson. Forty particularly. Forty-one I believe was
initiated by the communications officer.

Mr. Gesell. You initiated the message on page 40?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is my recollection.
Mr. Gesell. Will you read that, please, sir?

Admiral Wilkinson (reading):

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong Singapore Batavia Manila Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

[4638] Mr. Gesell. That was addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleet, to Com 14 and to Com 16?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. You say you initiated that dispatch. Will you tell us—

Admiral Wilkinson. That is, to my recollection. Let me check one moment, sir. Yes, I believe that to be the case.

Mr. Gesell. Well, will you state for the committee, please, what the circumstances were as you recall them under which that message was sent?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think Captain McCollum advised me that intelligence had been received through the magic source as to this and I think there had been other confirmatory evidences by reports by cable as to signs of burning. I am not sure of that last. I know there were such reports but whether they occurred before this dispatch was sent or not I do not know, but the primary basis I think was the magic. Captain McCollum recommended its being sent and I agreed, of course, and after consultation with either the Chief or the Assistant Chief of Operations it was so sent.

Mr. Gesell. Did you approve the dispatch then? I mean did you draft the plan then?

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe Captain McCollum drafted [4639] it.

Mr. Gesell. And then after it was drafted you approved it or initialed it before it went out?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I probably presented that in person to Admiral Ingersoll. I may have actually released it. The record may show.

Mr. Gesell. I have here what purports to be a photostatic copy of the original message, which shows it was released by you and an initial which appears to be Admiral Ingersoll’s initials after your name.

Admiral Wilkinson. That would seem to bear out my statement.

Mr. Gesell. You have seen that photostatic copy of the dispatch, have you?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. I want to show it to you and call your attention to the following words which appear on the dispatch as stricken following the words at the end of the message, “Secret document”:

From foregoing infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia.

Do you recall that?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not but if it occurs in the original dispatch it was doubtless so drafted by Captain [4640] McCollum and approved by me. Whether I struck it out or whether Admiral Ingersoll struck it out, I cannot recall.
Mr. Gesell. You cannot recall which of you struck it out?
Admiral Wilkinson. I have no recollection which.

Mr. Gesell. I would like to have this dispatch marked as an exhibit. It will be Exhibit 83, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so received.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 83").

Admiral Wilkinson. I may state that we had every inference and evidence for the preceding two weeks that Orange was contemplating action in southeast Asia and did in fact so act.

Mr. Gesell. Well, will you state to us at this time, Admiral, what was the considered conclusion and evaluation reached by you and your staff in the Office of Naval Intelligence, prior to the receipt of the one o'clock message, as to where and when the Japanese would attack?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think our conclusion was that every evidence indicated an attack in the South China Sea on either Siam or the Kra Peninsula. Those evidences were almost indisputable. There were possibilities of attack elsewhere ranging, in fact, from Panama on the Pacific Coast \[4641\] to Hawaii, Guam, Wake and the Philippines. The nearer each of these objectives was to Japan, to our mind the greater the probability of their attack. As it happened we all know that they attacked all of those on the far side of the Pacific Coast, Hawaii, Wake, Guam and the Philippines.

Mr. Gesell. Well, did you have any information, written or oral, prior to the actual attack which specified Hawaii as a point of attack?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not the slightest.

Mr. Gesell. You say there were indications that they might attack Hawaii and other points in the Pacific. What were those indications?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't think I said "indications." I said possibilities.

Mr. Gesell. I beg your pardon.
Admiral Wilkinson. That was within the range of practicability that they should so attack.

Mr. Gesell. Well, my question was directed as to what information and evidence you had on that point. Did you have any evidence or information to show that Hawaii was a possible point of attack or a probable point of attack?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not that it was a probable point. There was every possibility that it was a possible point of attack in that the Japanese Navy's steaming radius and their \[4642\] capabilities, as the Intelligence people say, and I am learning to say, and their probable capabilities indicated that they could come there. It was possible. So in fact was Seattle possible.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, I would like to review with you for a moment some of the information you had of a naval nature to see whether we can get, perhaps, a more specific understanding of what you had before you.

You knew, did you not, for example, on the 25th of September that the combined home fleet of the Japanese had undergone extensive personnel changes and that that personnel reorganization, which was not normal for that time of year, was interpreted by your people to mean that preparations were being made for an emergency?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. You also knew, did you not, on the 1st of November that the Japanese Navy, according to statements made by its own people, was ready for any immediate eventuality; that mobilization plans had been carried out, including not only changes in commands but increase in ship crews to full war complement?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; the ships had been docked as well.

Mr. Keefe. Right there may I ask what was the date of the first statement?

Mr. Murphy. September 25.

Senator Ferguson. A little louder, please.

Mr. Murphy. September 25, that was the first and the second one was November 1.

Mr. Gesell. September 25 was the first. The second I have given as November 1.

Mr. Keefe. All right. I wanted to get those dates in mind.

Mr. Gesell. Now, on November 15—

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I could not hear the first part of the Congressman's remark.

The Vice Chairman. He just wanted a repetition of those dates. One was September 25 and the other one was November 1.

Senator Ferguson. Thank you. That is 1941?

Mr. Gesell. Yes; I am talking about 1941.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Mr. Gesell. You knew on November 15 that the Japanese had requisitioned an increasing number of merchant ships and armed those ships, many of them, with antiaircraft guns, did you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. I have full knowledge and recollection of these various events that you are speaking of. I cannot from my own recollection check those particular dates.

Mr. Gesell. This is coming from those exhibits that we have put in this morning.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. Those were dates that we registered that those happened on the preceding 2 weeks because this was a fortnightly review.

Mr. Gesell. You knew on or about December 1, similarly, that Japanese ships had been recalled for quick docking and repair, did you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. You also knew, and this is specifically on December 1, that on that date the Japanese had changed all of the service calls for their forces afloat at 0000 on December 1, did you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know that I knew specifically it was a change of service calls. I knew that there had been a change in certain of their codes which resulted in difficulty in our radio intelligence analysis at that time.

Mr. Gesell. On that date?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Well, I have here a file of ship location reports and on page 30-d of that file—and this comes as an intelligence report from your office, it states:

All orange service radio calls for units afloat were changed at 0000, 1 December 1941.

Does that refresh your recollection on that point?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. It is a fact, is it not, that the Japanese had changed their service calls previously on the 1st of November?

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe so.

Mr. Gesell. And by changing them again so formally within a period of 30 days that was further indication that an emergency situation had arisen?

Admiral Wilkinson. There was every indication from many of those and many others that there was an emergency situation arising.

Mr. Gesell. Now, when did you first learn that the ship location and direction finding people in the Office of Naval Intelligence had lost track of the Japanese carriers?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall particularly. I know that our ship locations were often incomplete. I know it began to be apparent toward the end of November that there were a large number of ships that we could not locate specifically for both battleships and carriers.

Mr. Gesell. Well, it was specifically notable, was it not, that the carriers could not be located and you knew that at the time?


Mr. Gesell. Now, you were also aware, were you not, that shipping had been routed to the south through Torres Straits?

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe I was aware. It was not of my initiation but I believe I was aware of it.

Mr. Gesell. You were aware of the dispatches that directed all shipping to proceed through Torres Straits?

Admiral Wilkinson. I presume so. I do not recall that specifically.

Mr. Gesell. And you were familiar, were you not, with the general term that I think General Miles referred to here, of there being a vacant sea to the north and west of Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Through which there would be no shipping?

Senator Brewster. Will you answer that?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. While you were at Hawaii I presume you had engaged in war games and other maneuvers in which you had anticipated and prepared against an air attack launched against that point from an attacking force coming from the north?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall the maneuvers of an air attack specifically, but I know that we had a large fleet maneuver there in which there were carriers on both sides and the endeavor of the defending fleet was to intercept the attacking fleet before it would have got the air attack launched.

Mr. Gesell. You knew as a naval expert that the Japanese Navy had the striking power and the strength and the fleet to approach Hawaii and execute an attack, did you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. If not protected, yes, or, for that matter, any point in the Pacific, including the Canal.

Mr. Gesell. Well, now, would the factors which I have just—perhaps we should call them facts—which I have just reviewed with you, did it ever occur to you prior to the 6th of December that it would be appropriate and advisable to send some specific direction to Pearl Harbor warning against a surprise air attack?

Admiral Wilkinson. It never occurred to me, first, because from my service out there and from these letters that had been interchanged
throughout the year it was my belief that Hawaii knew the possibility of an air attack. Second, it did not occur to me because it was not within my province to conclude or derive the enemy functions although naturally I was interested in such matters. And, third, it was my own belief that an approaching force would be detected before it could get into attack range.

Mr. Gesell. Well, did you have any information as to whether or not the Army and Navy at Hawaii were in fact conducting long-range reconnaissance?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not. They had done so while I had been there at intervals.

Mr. Gesell. But you had no information in the months or weeks immediately preceding Pearl Harbor as to whether, in fact, the commanders there were or were not taking action which would permit them to pick up the Japanese fleet before it attacked?

Admiral Wilkinson. I had not.

Mr. Gesell. You were fully aware, were you not, as an Intelligence officer that Japan had men and facilities at Hawaii which permitted them to know the state of our garrisons and preparations there and the steps we were taking?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. All the anchorages at Pearl Harbor and Honolulu port and other anchorages in Hawaii were readily susceptible of observation by any elements of the large Japanese population; our communications going out of Honolulu were not censored; and there were other possibilities of espionage and that had been recognized by the three Intelligence agencies there, the agents of the FBI, the Military Intelligence, and our own.

Mr. Gesell. Had there been any discussion of the fact that the fleet, stationed at Hawaii, on the flank of a Japanese movement to the south, constituted a threat unless, by some device or means, the Japanese could knock it out of action temporarily?

Admiral Wilkinson. No discussion like that to which I was a party.

Mr. Gesell. Were you aware of that consideration as a naval expert?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and furthermore, I would anticipate that any Navy anxious to strike a blow or to win a war would naturally be in search of the enemy's navy, irrespective of the strategic considerations of being on the flank.

Mr. Gesell. You have said that your division considered it a possibility, I believe that Pearl Harbor, among other points, might be attacked.

Admiral Wilkinson. Sure.

Mr. Gesell. Did you, yourself, personally expect that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. I thought that the Japanese would proceed to the southward, would carry out their campaign, and I felt, insofar as my own guess was concerned, which was not a very good one, obviously, that they would not make a direct attack on the Anglo-Saxon nations, but they would attempt to see, as they had already for so many years, how far they could go with infiltration methods without precipitating a full-scale war.

Every evidence indicated their movement was down toward those areas. The question of whether the Philippines would be attacked or not, in my own case, I was not certain about it.
Admiral Turner, I know, was not confident it would be attacked. I thought myself, possibly for political reasons, they would avoid the Philippines. I did not think they would attack Hawaii, because I thought, in so attacking, they would expose themselves to great danger to whatever force they brought there, and, furthermore, they would be precipitating a war with the United States, which theretofore they had given every indication of attempting to avoid.

Mr. Gesell. Admiral, in the period from November 27 to the time of the attack, do you recall discussing with anyone the advisability of sending any additional warnings to the theater commanders in the Pacific?

Admiral Wilkinson. On December 1, Captain McCollum prepared a suggested memorandum for me with regard to the situation in the Far East.

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[4651] Mr. Gesell. May I interrupt there? Is that the memorandum dated December 1, captioned "Memorandum for the Director," signed by McCollum, which appears toward the front of Exhibit 81, a memorandum of approximately five pages long, with a covering memorandum to you as Director?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; except that the particular memorandum is only two and one-half pages long. You are confusing the following memorandum with it.

Mr. Gesell. It goes from page 24 to page 27, does it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; 24 is the covering page.

[4652] Mr. Gesell. Right. That is the memorandum you were referring to?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. On receipt of that I went with Captain McCollum to Admiral Stark's office, to discuss it with him, and he called in—if they were not already there—Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Turner, and I think I read the memorandum, or Captain McCollum did.

Mr. Gesell. Out loud, do you mean?

Admiral Wilkinson. Out loud. There was some discussion about the indications there, and a general agreement that there was a very definite advance by Japan into the South China Sea areas, and that the extent of that advance was not as yet apparent, as to the geographic extent, but the numerical extent of the advance was apparent as a very strong movement.

Mr. Gesell. You say that Captain McCollum brought this memorandum to you?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall what your conversation was with him at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. Only that I thought it was very interesting and important, and that Admiral Stark and his people should see it.

Mr. Gesell. Did Captain McCollum give any indication in the memorandum as to what should be done?


Mr. Gesell. It was you who initiated the proposal of a conversation with Admiral Stark?

Admiral Wilkinson. It was Captain McCollum who said that Admiral Stark should see it.
Mr. Gesell. Did you think that the memorandum required some additional warning message to be sent?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any views one way or the other when you went to see Admiral Stark as to whether a warning message should be sent?

Admiral Wilkinson. No warning message had been sent and this was information as to the movement of the fleet in the South China Sea. There was no indication on the face of this evidence that an attack was to be made upon Hawaii, or, for that matter, upon the Philippines.

Mr. Gesell. Captain McCollum concluded, did he not, in his covering memorandum, an eventual control or occupation of Thailand, followed almost immediately by an attack against the British possessions, possibly Burma and Singapore?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. That was his estimate of what the information in the memorandum pointed to?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and it was subsequently proved.

[4654] Mr. Gesell. You concurred in his recommendation?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and it was subsequently borne out.

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion by you, in the presence of Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, and Ingersoll, as to the desirability or appropriateness of sending any further warning message?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall any.

Mr. Gesell. Your discussion with those gentlemen, then, had something to do with the contents of the memorandum?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. This was not the type of memorandum which was sent to the field, was it?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, except a large part of it, if not all, was embodied in the fortnightly summary of that day.

Mr. Gesell. That summary appears in Exhibit 80, does it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure. On page 9 of that memorandum, or page 12, as it has been surcharged in ink later on, you will find the discussion on the Japanese military situation and naval situation, which is very similar, although it does not exist over the whole 2 months, as this particular memorandum does.

Mr. Gesell. I gather from what you have testified that there was no discussion of Hawaii at this time between you [4655] and Captain McCollum, or between you and Admiral Stark and his associates.

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall any other instance where you recommended, in the period from November 27 to December 7, that a message be sent or discussed the possibility of sending a message?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall specifically. Captain McCollum has since told me, and it has aided my recollection vaguely, that he brought a message in to me, that I was concerned about it, in connection with the so-called winds message, and after the discussion with me he took it, by my direction, to Admiral Turner and Admiral Turner showed him the warning message which had gone out and asked him if
he did not think that had covered the situation, and Captain McCollum said it did, I believe.

I have no clear recollection on that.

Mr. Gesell. I want to ask you, Admiral Wilkinson, whether you have any recollection of it yourself?

Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot say I have.

Mr. Gesell. You are simply repeating then what Captain McCollum told you?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. You yourself have no recollection of that incident?

Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot say I do.

Mr. Gesell. You of course saw the code setting up the winds message, did you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Did you at any time ever see or hear any message which implemented that code?

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is I did after the actual attack.

Mr. Gesell. After the actual attack?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. You are referring there to the message that was intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission stating about war with Great Britain?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, I do not recall specifically which message it was, but I understood after the attack, within 24 hours or perhaps 36, that there was a message that was intercepted and translated. You will recall—it is my recollection, at least—in the winds message it was not a question of war, it was a question of strained relations, in the interpretation of it.

Mr. Gesell. Do you have any recollection at all of having heard of or seen any message prior to the attack that implemented that code in any respect?

Admiral Wilkinson. No; and we were very keenly on the lookout for it, and I do not believe, to the best of my knowledge, there was such a message before.

Mr. Gesell. Was your department or division the one responsible for picking up that message, or was that a function of communications?

Admiral Wilkinson. It was a function of communications and such outside agencies, outside the Navy, as they had maybe talked with, the F. C. C. and others.

Mr. Gesell. The Office of Naval Intelligence was not the office concerned with the interception or any implementation that might have been seen?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. We were very much interested in the receipt of such a message if it were sent, and I know of no such implementing message having been sent.

Mr. Gesell. I next want to turn to or to check up with you the question of the events of December 6, and December 7.

Testimony before the committee appears to establish that on December 6 there was available, sometime during the day, a so-called pilot message, in which the Japanese advised from Tokyo that a
reply in 14 parts, to be delivered at a time later specified, was to come in.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. It also appears that 13 parts of that message were intercepted, decoded, and translated on the 6th.


Mr. Gesell. Were you at your office on December 6?

Admiral Wilkinson. I was out in my office, I think, until late before dinner, and before I left the office I saw the pilot message, and that night at home I saw the other.

Mr. Gesell. Did you see any message other than the pilot message before you left the office?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not, none of the 13 parts.

Mr. Gesell. That is what I refer to.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Under what circumstances did you see the pilot message?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think it was brought to me in the normal course of events in connection with the magic book.

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any discussion with anyone concerning it, after you saw it?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, except I said, "We will be on the lookout for the message." I think I told Captam Kramer, "We will be on the lookout for the message when it comes through."

Mr. Gesell. What kind of set-up did you have in your office at the time that you could keep in touch immediately with developments when important messages such as this were coming in?

Admiral Wilkinson. We had normally a 24-hour watch in the domestic branch, and in the foreign branch. Within the last few days of the crisis developing, I had set up a 24-hour watch in the Far Eastern Section alone. I think the day before, when it appeared that the Japanese advance in the China Sea was becoming more and more critical, I had set up, I believe, a watch of the senior officers of the Department, the heads of the branches, and the Assistant Director, to be in the Department.

Captain Kramer was on call, and I myself was on call. As it happened in this particular instance, Captain Kramer received the 13-part about 9 o'clock.

Mr. Gesell. I want to come that in a moment.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. You say you had a 24-hour watch set up in the Far Eastern Section?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Do you mean you had someone in the Navy Department on duty 24 hours a day?

Admiral Wilkinson. No one person, but in rotation, yes.

[4661] Mr. Gesell. Representing the specific interests of the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch?

Admiral Wilkinson. Precisely. There were three officers in there, and they stood watch there in rotation.

Mr. Gesell. Would you mind indicating who these officers were who stood that watch?
Admiral Wilkinson. Captain McCullom, Colonel Boone, and Lieutenant Commander Watts.

Mr. Gesell. They were the three officers standing that watch during the specific time we are talking about?

Admiral Wilkinson. There were three. There may have been two or three more. As I recall, there was Lieutenant Siebold. I cannot remember whether he was on the watch or not.

Mr. Gesell. You had no discussion with anyone other than Captain Kramer concerning the pilot message before you left your office?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not particularly.

Mr. Gesell. What do you mean “not particularly”?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. I think I told him we would be on the lookout for the other. I may have told the watch officer in the Far Eastern Section to be sure it did not get away from us when it came.

I may have told, and probably did tell, Captain Kramer to be sure they saw it in the front office.

Mr. Gesell. That is what I was getting at.

Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot say that I recall specifically that I did, but I feel sure I did.

Mr. Gesell. You don't recall about having given instructions to Admiral Stark or other key officers?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not at this long range.

Mr. Gesell. What time did you leave your office on the evening of the 6th?

Admiral Wilkinson. I have no specific recollection. I would say about 6 o'clock.

Mr. Gesell. You were at home and had a dinner party at your house that night, did you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. A small dinner with General Miles, Captain Beardall, and two French officers, whom, in my duties as Director of Intelligence, and taking care of the attachés, I had asked in.

Mr. Gesell. Now, at what time during that evening, did you learn that the 13 parts came in?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say roughly 9 o'clock. Commander, or Captain, Kramer called me up and said he was going to take this on the rounds and would come out to me later. I told him to go ahead.

Mr. Gesell. Did he discuss with you what deliveries he was going to make and to whom he was going to deliver the 13 parts?

Admiral Wilkinson. He was going to make the normal rounds. I will not say “normal” because it was after office hours, but in view of the importance of it, he was going to leave a copy at the White House, to see the Secretary of the Navy—to see Secretary Knox, and Admiral Stark, and Admiral Turner. He subsequently told me he was unable to reach Admiral Turner and Admiral Stark by telephone because they were out.

Mr. Gesell. Did Captain Kramer at that time discuss with you on the telephone the contents of the message?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. How did he refer to it, if you recall?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think he said, “The message we were waiting for has come in in part.” He obviously could not speak of it on the telephone in detail. It would have been a gross breach of security.
Mr. Gesell. Did he subsequently come to your home?
Admiral Wilkinson. He did.
Mr. Gesell. What happened at that time?
Admiral Wilkinson. He brought the message in, and General Miles and I read it over with him, and I think Captain, or Admiral, Beardall read it likewise.

[4664] Mr. Gesell. Now, what time was that?
Admiral Wilkinson. About 11 o'clock.
Mr. Gesell. You had other guests at your home, Admiral Wilkinson. Did you withdraw to another room to read it?
Admiral Wilkinson. We did.
Mr. Gesell. Did you have all 13 parts?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. You did not have the 14th part, or the 1 o'clock message?
Admiral Wilkinson. No.
Mr. Gesell. Now you went to another room with General Miles and Admiral Beardall and Captain Kramer, and read through the message?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Then what happened?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure of my own recollection. Captain Kramer tells me I went to the phone and called up, apparently, Admiral Stark, or Admiral Turner. I asked Kramer whom he had shown it to, and he said he left a copy at the White House, and had shown it in person to Secretary Knox, who had gone over it, made some telephone calls, and told him to bring it back to the Secretary of State the next morning.

[4665] While Kramer was there, or perhaps after he left—again my recollection is stimulated by him, but it is not very clear—he said I made some telephone calls. I may have attempted to raise Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner again, on the basis of his information that they were not there. However, both General Miles and myself, and to some extent Captain Kramer, felt that this was a diplomatic message; it was a message that indicated, or that resembled the diplomatic white papers, of which we had often seen examples, that it was a justification of the Japanese position.

The strain was largely in the 14th part which we discussed the next morning.

Mr. Gesell. You are discussing what was said at that time, are you, or are you telling what you thought?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am discussing what was said between General Miles and myself, as I recall.
Mr. Gesell. In the presence of Captain Kramer?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think so.
Mr. Gesell. Did Captain Kramer tell you at that time that he had been unable to reach Admiral Stark or Admiral Turner—
Admiral Wilkinson. I believe he did. I do not recall now, but he informs me he did, and I accept his statement.

[4666] Mr. Gesell. I am very anxious, Admiral, not only to get the full story, but I am very anxious to get your own recollection of what happened.
Admiral Wilkinson. I would like to have it myself, sir, but it is not complete.
Mr. Gesell. When you cannot recollect something I wish you would just say so, and then give us your best judgment, if you want to, as to what you think happened, or from what somebody told you.

Admiral Wilkinson. That is what I just said, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Right. Did Captain Kramer give you any information as to what had occurred at Secretary Knox's home?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; he said the Secretary had withdrawn with him and had gone over it with him carefully, and had then made some telephone calls and had directed him to bring the message to the State Department the next morning, from which Kramer inferred that he had called the Secretary of State, and possibly someone else.

Mr. Gesell. Did he say to you that Secretary Knox had called the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it independently.

Mr. Gesell. He told you that he was instructed to deliver the message to the State Department the next morning?

[4667] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; and his assumption was that the Secretary's telephone calls may have been to those people. He did not hear them specifically.

Mr. Gesell. Did he tell you to whom he had delivered the message at the White House?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. Obviously it was not to Captain Beardall, who was at my house.

Mr. Gesell. Did Captain Beardall read the message that evening?

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is he did.

Mr. Gesell. You stated that General Miles and Captain or Admiral Beardall discussed the message and referred to it as more or less a white paper.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Or a diplomatic communication.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; a justification for the Japanese position.

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion of this sentence, which appears as the last sentence in paragraph 5, which is the first paragraph of the thirteenth part, appearing at page 244 of Exhibit 1:

Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I do not recall any specific instruction on that one paragraph, or I do not recall any discussion of that one paragraph. I believe there had been exchanges in almost the same words in the past, however, when a proposal was being made and turned down and then brought up again.

Mr. Gesell. That sentence would indicate that negotiations were going to be broken off, would it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. If taken out of its text, yes.

Mr. Gesell. You did not think negotiations were going to be broken off in the first 13 parts of this message?

Admiral Wilkinson. I was not sure they would be, and I did not think diplomatic relations would be broken. It is one thing to break off current negotiations and another thing to break off diplomatic relations. The same negotiations, I believe, had been broken off earlier and then resumed.

Mr. Gesell. So I gather the impression that you and the others arrived at at your home that evening was that negotiations were going to be broken off?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, not necessarily. That this was a rejoinder on the part of Japan that the last message we sent to them was not acceptable, which, in fact, we had not expected it to be.

Mr. Gesell. Now you said you believed on the basis of what Captain Kramer has told you that you tried to reach Stark and Admiral Turner by telephone. Is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; that would be my natural reaction, when he told me I had not been able earlier to reach them, that I called them then.

Mr. Gesell. Did you do that, Admiral?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. I do not know, except that I would have that natural reaction.

Mr. Gesell. I take it you are quite clear, however, in your recollection that you did not talk to either of those gentlemen on the phone that night, is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall having talked to them, no.

Mr. Gesell. What time did you go to your office the next morning?

Admiral Wilkinson. At about 8:30. Between 8:30 and 9.

Mr. Gesell. Had you received any additional information, by telephone or otherwise, during the night?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. It was Sunday morning, but I came down reasonably early in order to be on hand when the 14th part was received.

Mr. Gesell. You had no telephone call concerning it?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. You do not recall whether anyone told you to come down?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, I came down anyway.

Mr. Gesell. You were on call, I understood you to say, in case anyone wanted to reach you?

Admiral Wilkinson. Ever since I had taken the job.

Mr. Gesell. What happened when you got to your office that morning?

Admiral Wilkinson. I sent for Captain McCollum, who had himself relieved the last man on the night watch shortly before 8 o'clock, and he came in and we talked over this matter, and my recollection is after he came in the fourteenth part was brought up to us.

Mr. Gesell. To you and McCollum?

Admiral Wilkinson. To me and McCollum. It may be he came in with it, I am not sure, or that shortly after he arrived the fourteenth part came in.

Mr. Gesell. About what time was that?

Admiral Wilkinson. About 9 o'clock.

Mr. Gesell. At that same time was there brought to your desk the 1 o'clock message?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. Was there any other message brought to you at that time except the fourteenth part?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not believe so. If so, it was of relatively minor importance and I do not recall it.

Mr. Gesell. So at 9 o'clock on the morning of December 7 you had the fourteenth part in your hand, and do I understand the only other person in your office at that time was Captain McCollum?
Admiral Wilkinson. I believe so. There were other people in the office; yes; but not in my room. I mean the Office of Naval Intelligence has a number of people in it.

Mr. Gesell. I mean the office in the sense of it being in your room.

Admiral Wilkinson. My room; yes.

Mr. Gesell. After having read the fourteenth part your mind was clear as to the breaking off of negotiations, was it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, it was not only clear about that, which was the last clause in the last paragraph, "it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations," but what was more striking to me was the language in which this last part was couched:

Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war.

[4672] In other words, they were fighting words, so to speak, and I was more impressed by that language than by the breaking off of negotiations, which of itself might be only temporary. Those would be hard words to eat. The breaking off of negotiations could be resumed.

Mr. Gesell. They were really doing this in a big way, so you thought it was very serious?

Admiral Wilkinson. I thought it was very serious.

Mr. Gesell. What did you do?

Admiral Wilkinson. I talked to McCollum and we went to see Admiral Stark.

Mr. Gesell. Where was Admiral Stark when you saw him?

Admiral Wilkinson. He was in his office. I think we arrived there about 9:15.

Mr. Gesell. You think you arrived there at 9:15?

Admiral Wilkinson. That is my recollection.

Mr. Gesell. Using "his office" in the sense of "room"?

Admiral Wilkinson. His room.

Mr. Gesell. Who else was in his room with him at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. Ultimately Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Turner were there, but at that moment I do not recall who was there besides himself.

Mr. Gesell. Did you show Admiral Stark the 14th part?


Mr. Gesell. That would be about 9:15?

Admiral Wilkinson. Somewhere around there, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Gesell. What discussions did you have with him concerning the fourteenth part at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I pointed out to him the seriousness of that language that I just mentioned, and I believe that I advised that the Fleet should be notified, not with any question of an attack on Hawaii in mind, but with the question of imminence of hostilities in the South China Sea. My recollection is that Admiral Stark at that time attempted to call General Marshall on the phone.
Mr. Gesell. Well, now, did Admiral Stark have in front of him the 13 parts?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure whether he had them there or whether I brought them all down to him. Either as the result of my coming in or of the earlier receipt, he did have the fourteenth part, I am sure.

[4674] Mr. Gesell. So by 9:15 or 9:30, you are quite clear that Admiral Stark had read the 14-part message?

Admiral Wilkinson. To my recollection.

Mr. Gesell. In its entirety?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Now, when you discussed with him the sending of this message to the fleet, do I understand correctly that you still did not have the 1 o'clock message?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. You say that you believe Admiral Stark tried to call General Marshall at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is that he did, to consult with him about a message of warning.

Mr. Gesell. The telephone calls made from the outside through the White House switchboard on those dates, as set forth in exhibit 58, show that Secretary Knox called Admiral Stark at 10:44 a.m. Do you remember that call?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. They show no calls by Admiral Stark to General Marshall until 12:10.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. They show but two calls by General Marshall to Admiral Stark, one at 11:30 and one at 11:40.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

[4675] Mr. Gesell. Do you believe that sometime around 9:30——

Admiral Wilkinson. It is my impression that Admiral Stark either called General Marshall, or told me he would talk with General Marshall on the subject, and I had thought he actually tried to make the call while I was there.

Mr. Gesell. You think he picked up the phone and tried to make the call?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think so.

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember his talking to General Marshall?

Admiral Wilkinson. No; I am quite sure he did not.

Mr. Gesell. When did the 1 o'clock message turn up?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say roughly about 10:30 or 10:40.

Mr. Gesell. There had been no decision up to 10:30 or 10:40 to send any message to the fleet?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know. I had not been in there all the time.

Mr. Gesell. I want you to straighten me out on that. When did you leave the office?

Admiral Wilkinson. I suppose after Admiral Stark had [4676] read the message.

Mr. Gesell. And you had made your recommendation to him?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. When did you go back to his office?
Admiral Wilkinson. An hour later.
Mr. Gesell. And what was the occasion of your going back to his office?
Admiral Wilkinson. I may have gone back—I am not sure—I may have gone back to give him the 1 o'clock message, or I may have gone back to receive any further information.
Mr. Gesell. The best you can now recall is you went back?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. When, to the best of your recollection, was it that you received the 1 o'clock message?
Admiral Wilkinson. About that time, 10:30 or 10:40. Of course, these intervals of time are just relative. I had no intention of checking the clock at each moment. It was well after the fourteenth part, in other words.
Mr. Gesell. You think it was an hour later?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Gesell. Or an hour and 15 minutes later?
[4677] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, nearly two hours later from the time I first saw the fourteenth part.
Mr. Gesell. You had seen that at 8:30?
Admiral Wilkinson. Between 8:30 and 9:00, yes.
[4678] Mr. Gesell. You are aware that there is quite a conflict of testimony, are you not, Admiral Wilkinson, as to when the 1 o'clock message was delivered to Admiral Stark?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I did not know there was a conflict in when it was delivered to Admiral Stark. I knew there was a conflict as to when it was received in the Department.
Mr. Gesell. Your recollection as to when it was delivered to Admiral Stark is that it was about 10:30?
Mr. Gesell. Either you brought it there or you arrived at the time it got there?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is my recollection.
Mr. Gesell. At that same time was there available the message concerning the destruction of codes, which appears in exhibit 1 at page 249, the first message at the top of the page, which gave the instructions to destroy the remaining cipher machine, the machine codes, immediately after deciphering the fourteenth part?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not believe so. I do not recall its being available at that time.
Mr. Gesell. What discussions took place in Admiral Stark’s office when you arrived there about 10:30?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not remember a discussion [4679] particularly. I think it was noted that this was the presentation period that we were looking for. It was 1:00 o’clock on that day. It was a little sooner than we had expected, because the pilot message said it would be several days, perhaps. That 1:00 o’clock in Washington represented varying times throughout the Pacific and the Philippines.
I do not recall, as I have stated, that any special mention was made that it was daylight, or shortly after daylight, in Hawaii.
Mr. Gesell. You knew that it was, did you not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, yes. It was about two hours after actual daylight. I think you will get the first daylight about 5:30 there this time of the year.

Mr. Gesell. It was 7:30?

Admiral Wilkinson. It was 7:30 actual time, about two hours after daylight.

Mr. Gesell. Do you remember the various times that were discussed throughout the testimony?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think some mention was made, as often occurs among naval officers who are familiar with geographic time figures.

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion had as to the fact that the Japanese had been directed to present, on a Sunday, to the Secretary of State, at 1:00 o'clock, this [4680] message? That was unusual as to time and unusual as to the day, was it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I do not recall any discussion except that it was sooner than we had expected from the pilot.

Mr. Gesell. Who else was in Admiral Stark's office at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Turner, and I believe Captain McCollum.

Mr. Gesell. Anybody else?

Admiral Wilkinson. There may have been. I do not recall.

Mr. Gesell. And what happened after that?

Admiral Wilkinson. I have no recollection. I think I left the office.

Mr. Gesell. When do you think you left the office?

Admiral Wilkinson. Within 10 or 15 minutes.

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion of sending any warning message to the various outposts in the Pacific?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it at the moment.

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion of the fact that the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of War were meeting at the State Department at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall any conversations that [4681] Admiral Stark or anyone else in the room had by telephone with any of those Cabinet officers at that meeting?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. Of any calls that they received from those Cabinet officers?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall.

[4682] Mr. Gesell. Or whether there was any call from the Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Stark?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that specifically.

Mr. Gesell. Were there any telephone conversations had either way between Admiral Stark and anyone else in the office and the White House, President Roosevelt, or anyone else there?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. There were several of us in the room. Admiral Stark may have picked up the phone and talked with someone. At any rate, I do not recall it now.

Mr. Gesell. When you left the office you had no indication that any warning message of any kind was going to be sent; is that correct?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, except that in my earlier discussion with Admiral Stark, I had the definite impression that after discussion with General Marshall, he was going to advise the fleet that the crisis was about to break. That was my impression. Just what caused that, I cannot tell you, except, as I say, I thought I recalled our mentioning it, that he picked upon the phone to call General Marshall, or at least he told me he was going to call General Marshall.

Mr. Gesell. When you saw him the second time, and [4683] he had the 1 o'clock message, he had much more specific information than when you saw him the first time, as to when things were going to happen, did he not?

Admiral Wilkinson. He had the specific information about when the message was to be delivered. He had no indication that anything else was going to happen. It would be inference.

Mr. Gesell. Was there any discussion that it was likely that the Japanese would time some action with the delivery of that note?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall any. It would be possible that they would strike before or after, and at the very moment of delivery it was not too significant. It really looked as though they wanted the thing delivered as soon as they could. They sent it over the wire one day and the next day said, "Turn it over at 1 o'clock."

Mr. Gesell. I understand your testimony to be: when you left, after you had been there the second time, you had no specific statement from Admiral Stark that he was going to send a message to the fleet.

Admiral Wilkinson. I recall an impression. Whether that impression was born in a specific statement, or born because of the atmosphere of the room, or recommendations of other officers, I do not know. I just have an impression [4684] he was going to consult with General Marshall, and advise the fleet, not that an attack was coming on Hawaii, but that something was about to break in the Japanese situation, and that the fleet should be prepared to steam, or whatever would be brought out by the action which, in fact, did result.

[4685] Mr. Gesell. There was no drafting of any message at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; not in my sight.

Mr. Gesell. On the second occasion was there any mention made of Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, except that it might have been mentioned, and I am not sure that it was, that 1 o'clock here was 7:30 there, or something of that sort.

Mr. Gesell. What was your reference to the fleet being prepared to steam?

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, what I meant was that if there was an indication that something was going to break it would be the natural desire of the Chief of Operations to advise the fleet it was about to break so that if there was any immediate departure from port necessary to fend off an attack, to start for some distant position, either to defend it or to intercept some attacking force—at any rate, he should be forewarned so that he could complete any last-needed stores in order to have the fleet immediately ready instead of generally ready.

Mr. Gesell. Now, it is your recollection that you did not have at that time the message telling the Japanese to destroy their codes upon
the completion of the translation of the fourteenth part? When did you get that message?

[4686] Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall. I imagine I got it subsequently because it brings no recollection to me; and, obviously, after the attack became known we wouldn't be interested in the destruction of the machine.

Mr. Gesell. When did you next go back to the office of Admiral Stark?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I was at my office until some time past noon, went to lunch at home, and while at lunch got a telephone call and hurried back.

Mr. Gesell. After you left, that second occasion you were there, you had no further conversations with him by telephone or otherwise?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not until after the attack.

Admiral Gesell. You had no information then that a message was being sent by the Army or what the terms of it were?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Mr. Gesell. The officers were to be advised.

Admiral Wilkinson. Never heard of it for hours if not days.

Mr. Gesell. During this period that we have been talking about, the last month or 6 weeks or 2 months before the attack, Admiral, did you have any means in the Office of Naval Intelligence of keeping posted on diplomatic developments?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. There were several channels by which we had contact with the State Department. I, myself, rarely, if ever, was called to the State Department for a conference, but the Director of the Central Division, Captain Schuirmann, was the Chief of Naval Operations' direct representative with the State Department and he advised me usually of what transpired on the occasions that he was called in conference.

Mr. Gesell. He was not attached to your office?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, he was on the same level, as the head of the Central Division.

Also we had a lieutenant commander, Delaney Hunter, of the Naval Reserve, who was our liaison officer on the lower level, so to speak, and he went over to the State Department daily and searched through the dispatches there, and was shown dispatches from all parts of the world, and made copies of a number of them and extracts of them which because of code security could not be copied direct, and brought those back and gave me every day a list of State Department dispatches which were of interest to us.

Those dispatches, that little paper, usually a dozen pages, was circulated daily within the office of Naval Intelligence and within the office of the Chief of Operations.

Mr. Gesell. Those were diplomatic dispatches?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

[4688] Mr. Gesell. Well, now, did you have any means of knowing what was taking place in the discussions between Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassadors?

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, in the first place, I saw the incoming magic, and usually I saw the outgoing magic, wherein the Ambassador was telling Tokyo what he had been doing. If something, on the other hand, was sent from the State Department to Mr. Grew to pre-
sent over there. I would not see it unless I was told it by Captain Schuirmann.

Mr. Gesell. Or your man went over and read the dispatches?

Admiral Wilkinson. He read only the incoming dispatches. I don’t think he read the outgoing dispatches.

Mr. Gesell. So you knew what Ambassador Grew was reporting?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; in general, yes.

Mr. Gesell. You also knew in a general way what progress was being made and what recommendations were being made in the negotiations with the Japanese Ambassadors here?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. By the way, did you know that Ambassador Grew in February, 1941 had said that he picked up a rumor that there was a likelihood of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

Senator Brewster. Wasn’t it January?

Mr. Gesell. I see the press nodding their heads, so I am sure you are right, Senator.

[4689] Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure whether I knew that at that time or not. I have heard it since, of course.

Mr. Gesell. Of course, that was——

Admiral Wilkinson. It was in line with the fears, the apprehensions of the whole Island, that the primary thing was an air attack.

Mr. Gesell. Of course, that was a message prior to your becoming Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted with respect to the placing of embargoes and freezing orders on the Japanese?

Admiral Wilkinson. I was not consulted and I don’t think Admiral Kirk was.

Mr. Gesell. Did you have anything to do, Admiral, with the joint memoranda which General Marshall and Admiral Stark presented to the President, of November 5 and November 27?

Admiral Wilkinson. No; I wasn’t aware of their existence until quite recently.

Mr. Gesell. Did you receive information from Admiral Stark and Captain Schuirmann, and others who were dealing with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, as to what was taking place at the War Council meetings and at meetings in Secretary Hull’s office?


Mr. Gesell. There was no regular way of your being briefed on what was taking place in those, you might call, policy conferences?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. You see, that links up with that other question, whether I was consulted on the warning messages and so on. Our office was an incoming and receiving office of information from abroad and from the domestic areas. We were not concerned with the outgoing directives for the Fleet nor in fact told of the movements and operations of our own forces. When we got into the war I arranged for the setting up of a war room and thereupon we did to a large degree get the movements of our forces laid out so that we might have a better understanding and interpretation of the information from abroad.
But prior to getting into the war we did not know the United States side of an argument that was going on.

Mr. Gesell. I asked you whether you had anything to do with the joint memorandum to the President of November 5.

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. There is attached to that document some supporting papers, it is exhibit 16 here, a memorandum dated November 1 from Captain Boone of the Far Eastern Section. Have you ever seen that dispatch? I will show it to you.

Admiral Wilkinson. I am sure I did.

Mr. Gesell. That would suggest that perhaps you had some contact with that joint memorandum of the 5th.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, only that this is part of the information that they had at hand.

Mr. Gesell. In other words, that would be written to estimate the specific situation but without regard to the basic matters being discussed in the memorandum?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. This was some of the data upon which they based their decision.

Mr. Gesell. Did you have any detailed knowledge of the Singapore staff conferences and other conferences which had been taking place between the Americans, the British and the Dutch?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, only that they had been held.

Mr. Gesell. Did you know that the Army—rather, did you know that a reconnaissance had been ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations, an air reconnaissance, for the purpose of picking up movements around the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I think I was aware of that.

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted in connection with the ordering of that reconnaissance?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. Did you see the various reports that came in, as are included in Exhibit 78?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think so.

Mr. Gesell. But you had nothing to do with the decision to make the reconnaissance?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. That was a reconnaissance to confirm the evidences which we were getting of a movement south and to determine the precise locations of the Japanese ships and the degree and intensity of the movement. It confirmed the reports which we had received from our various coastal observers.

Mr. Gesell. Did you see a dispatch of December 2 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Hart expressing the President’s desire to set up a so-called defensive information patrol by stationing three vessels in that area for reconnaissance purposes?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don’t recall having seen it.

Mr. Gesell. Do you know whether or not any such patrol was ever in fact established?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, I don’t know.

Mr. Gesell. Do you ever recall seeing the dispatch from Admiral Hart to the Chief of Naval Operations dated December 6 concerning the movement of Japanese vessels toward the Kra Peninsula, which is part of Exhibit 66, which I now show you?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I think I saw that. I note that it has been signed for in my office. Although it does not bear my initials, I presume it was called to my attention.

[4694] Mr. Gesell. Do you recall a discussion of that piece of information on the 6th with anyone?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall the discussion. It had been sent to War Plans and Chief of Operations. So it seems no discussion was necessary. It was an indication that the movement was progressing as anticipated.

Mr. Gesell. You don't recall having any discussion with anyone concerning it?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall having any discussion with anyone concerning the dispatches contained in exhibit 79 relating to the so-called Dutch alert?

Admiral Wilkinson. I recall some of them. I can't say specifically which.

Mr. Gesell. What is your recollection of the incident covered by those dispatches?

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection of both the dispatches and of the contact with the Dutch naval attaché at the time was that the Dutch were seriously worried about the implied threat to the Dutch East Indies possessions by the Japanese movement down through the South China Sea, and that these dispatches had to do with such concern of theirs. It was more confirmatory evidence of the movement which eventually took place.

[4695] Mr. Gesell. That refers to the belief of the Dutch that there were fleet dispositions by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands. I gather from the dispatches that it was not the view of the Office of Naval Intelligence that the forces there were as strong as the Dutch had believed?

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe that was the case, although we had some indications that the Marshall Islands further to the westward Palaus, that there was a force building up there, and the Pearl Harbor unit and the Corregidor unit were both watching for such radio intelligence indications as they could get as to the location of the Japanese ships, and there was a difference between them.

Corregidor, which we believed to be slightly more accurate, felt that there was no pronounced indications of a strong task force in the Marshalls, while the Pearl Harbor unit felt there was, but we didn't believe that there was a large force in the Palaus, as I recall.

Mr. Gesell. Did you ever receive any information from the Dutch, British, or any other friendly nation, which indicated that the Japanese were moving toward Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. That there was likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

[4696] Mr. Gesell. Did you know that the Naval Intelligence officer at Pearl Harbor had discontinued the tapping of a certain telephone of the Japanese consul on the 2d of December?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. I think we were getting information in the last part of that period prior to the attack by such methods, but I didn't know whether it was the district intelligence officer, or the FBI that was getting that.
Mr. Gesell. Did you have any information of the discontinuance of the tapping of the phones by the Naval Intelligence officer?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.

Mr. Gesell. Did you ever receive, prior to the attack, any knowledge of the so-called Mori telephone tap?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure what that is. If that is the one about the flowers—

Mr. Gesell. I will show it to you.

Admiral Wilkinson. About poinsettias—

Mr. Gesell. Yes. You did not know of that in the Office of Naval Intelligence prior to the attack?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. I think perhaps if the committee please, we might designate that conversation Exhibit 84, because there will be other questions concerning it with other witnesses, and I will introduce it at this time.

The Vice Chairman. Exhibit 84?

Mr. Gesell. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 84.")

Mr. Gesell. One final question, which has to do with these messages involving code burning; I neglected to ask you whether you had had any conversations with General Miles concerning the sending of those messages, particularly the message to Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall any. I think it very probable I did.

Mr. Gesell. He stated, at page 2103, that he had conversations with you concerning that.

Admiral Wilkinson. No doubt we did.

Mr. Gesell. Do you recall ever having discussed with him the question of that message sent in such terms that it would also go to the Army as well as the Navy?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, I think that is all the questions we have at this time.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, I would like to ask you a few questions, if I may please, sir.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You were Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence on December 7, 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Did you say you became Chief of ONI—when was it?

Admiral Wilkinson. October 15.

The Vice Chairman. October 15, 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you continued how long?


The Vice Chairman. Did you ever think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. That was possible, but improbable.

The Vice Chairman. How is that?

Admiral Wilkinson. I thought it was possible, but improbable.
The Vice Chairman. Did you ever at any time prior to December 7, 1941, reach the conclusion that an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

The Vice Chairman. Did you ever think such an attack would be made?

Admiral Wilkinson. I had been out there, Mr. Chairman, for nearly 2 years, up until the spring of 1941.

The entire time I was there, I thought it was possible that if any war arose, or should any war be in progress, that an attack on Pearl Harbor was possible; but neither then nor on my—after my departure in May of 1941—nor when I was in Naval Intelligence, did I think it was probable. I always thought it was possible. Almost anything is possible in war, given the tools that can reach the objective.

The Japanese had those tools.

The Vice Chairman. But on up until December 1941, you did not think such an attack would be made?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not think it was probable.

The Vice Chairman. Even though you had examined and were familiar with the 14-part message, the so-called pilot message, or the 1 o'clock message, you still did not think an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable?

Admiral Wilkinson. All of those indicated, Mr. Chairman, that Japan was breaking off the negotiations for the adjustment of affairs in the Pacific.

On the evidences indicated, that she was expanding down through the South China Sea, going into Indochina, Siam, possibly the Kra Peninsula, on the basis of the physical evidences before us and on the basis of the breaking off of the negotiations—and those negotiations, you will remember, were designed to stop the infiltration or the movement of the Japs into Indochina and into those southern areas—on the basis of that, I figured that they were going to stop the negotiations and go on with their nefarious designs down there.

None of those messages gave me any cause to guess—and it would have been a guess only, and I am sorry I didn't guess it—but none of them gave me any suspicion or cause to guess that an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor any more than on any other United States position. In fact, I did not think an attack would be made on any United States objective, but I thought that the Japanese would pursue a course of successive movements, infiltration, trying the patience and temper of the Anglo-Saxon nations without actually urging them into war.

The Vice Chairman. Did you, during that time, Admiral, think that an attack on any other point of the United States positions was more probable than the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. I thought that as one went westward of Pearl Harbor, the probabilities increased. In other words, the Philippines was the most probable, Guam the next, Wake the next, Midway the last, the last before Hawaii.

I did not think an attack on any of those was probable because I did not think there was a probability of an attack on any United States possession to thrust us, invite us, as it were, into war.
I, perhaps, gave the Japanese credit for less boldness and more political canniness—

The Vice Chairman. Or common sense?

Admiral Wilkinson. Than they possessed.

The Vice Chairman. Or common sense?

Admiral Wilkinson. Or common sense, to my mind, yes, sir.

In other words, I thought an attack on any United States possession was not probable but that the degree of probability increased, rather decreased, as you went from the Philippines eastward.

The Vice Chairman. You were familiar and, of course, kept posted with the progress of the negotiations that were then being carried on by our State Department with the Japanese representatives?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

[4702] The Vice Chairman. And still, in view of all of that, and the situation that appeared to be developing, more tense, on reaching a critical stage, you still did not think that war between the United States and Japan was probable?

Admiral Wilkinson. I thought it was probable but not inevitable, and I thought that—in my ill advised opinion—that it would come by easy stages, and that the Japs would try our patience as far as they could to avoid getting into war. They had been successful in Manchuria, China, and Indochina. I had heard of this imaginary line of 100° east longitude and 10° north latitude and I had some doubt as to whether we would be able, in the light of the temper of the country, to back that conclusion up.

As I understand it, the conclusion was, there was actually no promise that we would go to war, but that we would think it was a serious matter if they crossed that line. I had some doubt whether the country would be seriously concerned as to matters in that part of the world, and I thought the Japanese were going to push their luck in that part of the world as far as they could.

[4703] The Vice Chairman. Admiral, did you ever at any time prior to December 7, 1941, reach the conclusion that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I thought that war was becoming increasingly probable, but from all the angles that I saw it from, I did not think it was inevitable.

The Vice Chairman. Now, as I understood you to say, you did not know that the warning message of November 27, 1941, was sent to the commander of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander of the Pacific Fleet for some days after it was sent.

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure whether it was hours or days. I think about 2 days.

The Vice Chairman. It was about 2 days after the sending of that message before you found out that it had been sent?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think so, sir.

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to state that it was not a part of the responsibility of the position that you held to be familiar with messages going from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders of the fleets?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, unless I had had some share in the initiation of them, myself, when, of course, I would want to know whether they had been sent or not.
The Vice Chairman. Am I correct in my understanding that you also state that it was not a part of your responsibility to even keep up with the various locations of the fleets of the United States throughout the world?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. That was another Office of Operations, the so-called Ship Movements office, that had care of that, that took care of that, and we were privileged to inspect their records and their boards but we had no record of that of our own and we were not kept informed of it. Our activities were one-sided in that we were responsible for the information on the foreign navies and the foreign elements but not for our own.

The Vice Chairman. That is what caused me to wonder how you could operate intelligently as the word "intelligence" would imply without knowing where our Fleet units were?

Admiral Wilkinson. It did cause some difficulties at times and ultimately, as I explained, after the war started I got at the information and was able to keep our own boards posted with where our own forces were.

The Vice Chairman. But I believe you had stated that it was a part of your responsibility to keep informed as to the location and movements of potential enemy fleets?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Or the fleets of other countries of the world?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not only of potential enemies but of all countries, yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. The fleets of all other countries?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you state, I believe, that at various times you were not prepared to give information as to the location of various units of the fleets of some of the other countries of the world?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. There were many ways in which we could detect them. First, of course, by actually sighting, whether by our own merchant ships or whether by our naval attaches or naval observers or consuls at the various points.

Then, second, we could detect them by radio bearings. If we got so-called radio direction finders it would indicate that this radio message was coming from such and such a spot or if we could obtain by the call that the ship was using and the message she was sending, whether we could translate it or not, we could identify the call, then we knew that ship was there and perhaps we would add up some other ships that we knew were usually in company with it, but when the actual sightings failed us and when the radio direction finders failed us and when radio indications were no longer of avail, as when a ship went into complete radio silence and they even stopped sending messages to her, why, then she disappeared into the void and we might not pick her up for some little time, that ship or a number of them with her.

The Vice Chairman. You say there was a part of the Japanese fleet that was lost, or not accounted for, for some period of time?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, for some 3 weeks prior to the attack.

The Vice Chairman. For some 3 weeks?

Admiral Wilkinson. Several battleships and several carriers.

The Vice Chairman. How is that?

Admiral Wilkinson. Several battleships and several carriers were lost for some 3 weeks prior to the attack.
The Vice Chairman. Did you receive any information or gain any intelligence from any source about the Japanese task force leaving Japan on about, I believe, November 25th, which was the task force that finally resulted in the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Our only indication was that she was not in other waters, that they were in home waters either close to Japan or somewhere in the sea off Japan where we had no means of detecting them. We did not know that they had actually sailed from Japan. When we knew that they were not down to the south from all we could pick up, they were either based on or leaving Japan proper.

The Vice Chairman. As the situation appeared to grow more critical did you increase your efforts to locate or ascertain the location of the units of the Japanese fleet?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. The Corregidor station, the Pearl Harbor station and ourselves were all anxious to get all the information we could. The commander in chief of the fleet in Pearl Harbor was aware that they were unlocated and he was trying to find them, but there were simply no evidences except the negative evidence that nothing could be learned.

We have had similar experiences, of course, in this last war. Admiral Halsey's fleet has popped up frequently in a very annoying position for the Japanese when they had not been able to locate him.

The Vice Chairman. I thank you. Senator George would be next but he is not able to be present at the moment. Mr. Clark. Mr. Clark of North Carolina will inquire.


Mr. Clark. Admiral, there are just two or three questions in my mind that I would like to have your opinions on. I hope you will not consider this in the nature of cross-examination and I appreciate the difficulty of forming questions and probable replies after the event without being influenced by the event itself.

I want to go back prior to December the 7th and look at the things that are in my mind from that angle, sir, and I want to ask your opinion as to the strength of our military establishment in Hawaii prior to December the 7th, from the standpoint of an attacking force, whether it would be possible to take it, what would be the size of that undertaking and the likelihood of its success, including landing and taking the island?

Admiral Wilkinson. To land and take it I would say it would take a very large force, a force probably larger than the Japanese could muster, of shipping and troops, in view, particularly, of the shipping and troops that they were using in the South China Sea.

Mr. Clark. Well, now, with the expansion going on to the south as it was and did, would there be any slight likelihood of such an attack on the Hawaiian Islands by the Japanese?

Admiral Wilkinson. Very slight, if at all, because of the known limitations of the Japanese shipping to carry the expeditionary force that would be necessary to land and take the island.

Mr. Clark. Yes. Now, aside from that kind of an attack, how would the Hawaiian area be vulnerable?

Admiral Wilkinson. How would it be vulnerable?

Mr. Clark. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. It would be vulnerable, of course, to a hit-and-run raid, which is precisely what it got. The Japanese were very fortunate, I think, that they were able to get in and out without detection.

Mr. Clark. But what they did does demonstrate that that kind of a raid was possible.

Admiral Wilkinson. Was possible and without warning, and even with warning our carrier task forces have made the same raids on the Philippines and on Japan throughout this war.

Mr. Clark. I assume that is why our forces had from time to time gone through what you call war games, in which a surprise attack by air was practiced?

Admiral Wilkinson. I presume so, sir, yes.

Mr. Clark. Now, what about subversive activities?

Admiral Wilkinson. What, sir?

Mr. Clark. It would be vulnerable also from the standpoint of subversive activities?

Admiral Wilkinson. We had always been apprehensive about that because of the large Japanese population. As it happened, that population was in the main very friendly and to the best of my knowledge there was no large-scale sabotage at all.

[4709] Mr. Clark. Now, did you know of the telegram or radiogram, whatever it was, that General Miles in G-2 sent warning against subversive activities?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure that I did. I think I probably did, sir.

Mr. Clark. Did the Navy send any similar communications?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, because it was the Army’s responsibility to control the civilian population.

Mr. Clark. I beg your pardon?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, because it was the Army’s responsibility to control the civilian population.

Mr. Clark. I think it was General Marshall who first suggested here that the Hawaiian Islands and our military establishment there was on the flank of this Japanese movement to the south. What would be the importance of that militarily?

Admiral Wilkinson. Simply this, sir, that if your life line to an objective is longer in time or in distance from your home bases than the enemy is distant from that life line at any point, then you may be subjected to attack and to a severance of that life line.

Mr. Clark. Yes. Now, if our establishment in Hawaii had not been attacked and we had remained in the full control of the whole establishment, naval and air and army, would that [4710] have constituted a serious threat to Japanese movement south?

Admiral Wilkinson. No doubt they would have been much concerned. I do not know whether our forces advancing from that line would have had to pass through the danger of air attack from the mandated islands, the Japanese islands, and it may have been that the damage we would receive from those islands might have beaten off the attack we might have been in the process of making, in other words, defeated the threat, but I can well understand the Japanese might be apprehensive about it.

Mr. Clark. You do not understand the Japanese would be apprehensive about an attack by our entire Hawaiian establishment in this long movement they were making south?
Admiral Wilkinson. I should think they would, yes.
Mr. Clark. Well, wouldn't that be of very great concern to them as a military matter?
Admiral Wilkinson. I should think so.
Mr. Clark. Now, did the Hawaiian Islands in that respect occupy a position any different from the Philippines or the Canal Zone?
Admiral Wilkinson. Only as the geographic distances are involved. They were much less important, much less threatening than the Philippines.
Mr. Clark. I beg your pardon?
[4711] Admiral Wilkinson. They were much less threatening to the Japanese than the Philippines. They were more threatening to the Japs than the Panama Canal military establishment. The Panama Canal was a means of uniting the oceans, of course, but the greatest military and naval threat, I think, to the southern advance, to the southern extension of the Japanese, was the Philippines. Next after that, because the intervening bases of Guam and Wake were inconsequential, and Midway, next after that was Hawaii.
Mr. Clark. Well, now, am I to understand—and my own ignorance of military matters is perfectly complete, sir, so you will have to excuse me if I appear not to understand—
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not profess to know too much, sir.
Mr. Clark. But do I understand from the military viewpoint the threat of the Hawaiian establishment to this Japanese movement south was not serious?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think if the Hawaiian establishment had not been largely depleted that the Japanese would in normal military precautions have had to feel their way to the southward much less rapidly than they did advance. I think they could still have advanced into Indochina and the Kra Peninsula. I assume that they could have gone much more rapidly into Java and into Borneo. It is a question of whether [4712] they could have gone into the Philippines and maintained themselves there. It would doubtless have brought on a fleet battle and our forces, had they advanced across the Pacific, would have been subjected to attacks by air from the Japanese air bases on the islands and they would have been doubtless subjected to attack by the Japanese Fleet. What the outcome of that would have been I do not know. Our navy was much smaller then than it was ultimately, and, in fact, at that time it was smaller than the Japanese Fleet in the Pacific.
Mr. Clark. Well, I am sorry to consume so much time. What is rolling over in my mind is whether Hawaii as it stood before the attack constituted such a threat to the Japanese movement south that an attack or some effort to remove that threat might reasonably have been anticipated on our side of the fence?
Admiral Wilkinson. I see what you mean, sir, and I think that it is a very sound presumption. Against it, perhaps, are the two facts: First, it would require extreme boldness, which they did actually show, because of the risk involved; and, second, it would be a presumption that the Japanese were prepared to attack the United States in a spot which would be certain to plunge them immediately into the war.
[4713] If, as I was mentioning to the chairman, they had determined to feel their way to the southward, to gain as much ground as possible without antagonizing and bringing on their heads the Anglo-
Saxon nations, they would not, of course, have been tempted to dispose of this threat because the threat would not have been operating against them.

Mr. Clark. An attack in force with an attempt to take the islands being pretty inconsistent with their rapid extension south, and they having been warned specifically in Hawaii, our people, against subversive activities, a surprise air attack was the only thing, the only possibility left open, was it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. With respect to Hawaii, yes, sir, and submarines.

Mr. Clark. I am talking about with respect to Hawaii.

Admiral Wilkinson. And submarine attack.

Mr. Clark. Yes. Now, did you or anybody in all of the discussions that you ever heard of this whole situation, ever suggest the likelihood or the probability of a surprise air attack on the Hawaiian Islands and that there should be a specific warning against that, just as there was against subversive activities?

Admiral Wilkinson. For the entire year, sir, there had been discussion in various correspondence and plans laid out [4714], about air attack and I think that was in the mind of everyone there, the very possibility of a surprise air attack.

Mr. Clark. Will you pardon me, sir? I am thoroughly familiar with some correspondence which General Marshall, and perhaps others, had back a good many months prior to that and the message from the Ambassador to Japan which has been referred to.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. What I had in mind in asking you that question was the two or three weeks preceding Pearl Harbor and particularly from the 27th of November to the 7th of December.

Admiral Wilkinson. May I have the concluding part of the question before this interpolation?

Mr. Clark. I do not mind just asking the question again, sir. If you will allow me, I will repeat the question.

Admiral Wilkinson. I wish you would, sir. I was a little confused.

Mr. Clark. As to whether or not, it being pretty generally conceded that Hawaii was right impregnable against an all-out assault for the purpose of taking the islands, and the command at Hawaii having been specifically warned against subversive activities, did anyone in the Navy or the Army or any other person in military life to whom you talked between [4715] the 27th of November and the 7th of December ever suggest specifically the possibility of an air attack and specific warning against that?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think not, sir. The subversive warning, you will recall, was to the Army only and there was a general war warning sent to the Fleet as a whole, but I heard no specific mention as you suggest.

Mr. Clark. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. It is now 4 o'clock and, Admiral Wilkinson, I will ask you to please return at 10 o'clock in the morning and Senator Lucas will be recognized.

The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock in the morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., December 17, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10 a.m., Tuesday, December 18, 1945.)
PEAL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[4716]

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. Gesell. Mr. Chairman, one or two small matters.

From time to time we wish to place in the record evidence that has come along that has been gotten in response to requests. We have three highly significant documents here which I would simply like to have spread on the record. They relate to the meeting at Argentia.

The State Department has delivered to us three memoranda prepared by Mr. Sumner Welles covering his conversations with the President and Prime Minister Churchill at sea on August 10 and August 11. These relate to the so-called parallel action matter and I, simply, without taking the time of the committee to read these memoranda, would like to suggest that they be spread upon the record. They were made available to us yesterday. We had them immediately mimeographed and in view of their importance I wish to place them in the record immediately.

[4717] The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. Gesell. Yes. And they may, I think for convenience, following the suggestion of Senator Ferguson made the other day, be designated 22-B, so that they will run along with Exhibit 22 which contains the other documents relating to this subject.

[4718] The Vice Chairman. These will be designated exhibit 22-B, is that correct?

Senator Brewster. There are several of them. Shouldn't they be B, C, D, and so forth?

Mr. Gesell. Very well. We'll designate the one of August 10, 22-B, the one covering the morning conference of August 22-C and the one covering the afternoon conference of August 11, 22-D.

The Vice Chairman. Very well.
(The documents referred to were marked Exhibits Nos. 22-B, 22-C and 22-D, and follow:)

[4719] DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Sunday, August 10, 1941 At Sea.

Subject: British-American Cooperation.

Participants:
Sir Alexander Cadogan.
The Under Secretary of State.

Copies to:

I accompanied the President this morning to attend the religious services and the lunch which the Prime Minister was giving for the President on the PRINCE OF WALES. Sir Alexander Cadogan told me before lunch that in accordance with the conversation which was had between the President, the Prime Minister, Sir Alexander and myself at the President's dinner last night he had made two tentative drafts covering proposed parallel and simultaneous declarations by the United States and British Governments relating to Japanese policy in the Pacific and of a proposed joint declaration to be made by the President and the Prime Minister when their present meeting was terminated. The two drafts read as follows:

"Draft of Parallel Communications to the Japanese Government.

[4720] "Declaration by the United States Government that:

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power."

"Declaration by His Majesty's Government that:

"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which His Majesty's Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, His Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power."

"Declaration by the Netherlands Government:

[4721] "1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which Her Majesty's Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the Netherlands and Japan.

"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, Her Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power."

Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.

The draft of the proposed joint declaration reads as follows:

"The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together to resolve and concert the means of providing for the safety of their respective countries in face of Nazi and German aggression and of the dangers to all peoples arising therefrom, deem it right to make known certain principles which they both accept for guidance in the framing of their policy and on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

"First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; they are only concerned to defend the rights of freedom of speech and of thought without which such choosing must be illusory;

"Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of
essential produce not only within their territorial jurisdiction but between the nations of the world.

"Fifth, they seek a peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi tyranny but by effective international organization will afford to all States and peoples the means of dwelling in security within their own bounds and of traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless assault or need of getting burdensome armaments."

As I was leaving the ship to accompany the President back to his flagship, Mr. Churchill said to me that he had likewise given the President copies of these documents. He impressed upon me his belief that some declaration of the kind he had drafted with respect to Japan was in his opinion in the highest degree important, and that he did not think that there was much hope left unless the United States made such a clear-cut declaration of preventing Japan from expanding further to the south, in which event the prevention of war between Great Britain and Japan appeared to be hopeless. He said in the most emphatic manner that if war did break out between Great Britain and Japan, Japan immediately would be in a position through the use of her large number of cruisers to seize or to destroy all of the British merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific, and to cut the lifelines between the British Dominions and the British Isles unless the United States herself entered the war. He pled with me that a declaration of this character participated in by the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions, the Netherlands and possibly the Soviet Union would definitely restrain Japan. If this were not done, the blow to the British Government might be almost decisive.

SUMNER WELLES.

[4724]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Monday, August 11, 1941. At Sea.

Subject: British-American Cooperation.

Participants:
The President,
The British Prime Minister.
Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Honorably Harry Hopkins.
The Under Secretary of State.

Copies to:

The President received Mr. Churchill this morning on the Augusta at 11:00 a.m. There were present at the meeting Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry Hopkins and myself.

I

The conference commenced with the subject of Portugal. The President read to Mr. Churchill the letter addressed to the former by the Prime Minister of Portugal. It was agreed by both that the contents of the letter were highly satisfactory and made possible without any difficulty the carrying out of arrangements for the occupation of the Azores as a means of assurance that the islands would not be occupied by Germany.

[Handwritten note: 1 Card for Atlantic Charter.

[4725] Mr. Churchill stated that a highly secret operation had been decided upon by the British Government, namely, the occupation of the Canary Islands during the days immediately after the September full moon. This date, as Mr. Churchill remembered it, would be about the 15th of September. The British Government were undertaking this operation with full knowledge that the islands had been recently heavily fortified and that a very large number of German officers were engaged there in the training and preparation of the Spanish troops. It was undertaken with the further realization that this step would almost inevitably involve a Spanish attack either in conjunction with or upon the instigation of German military forces and that such attack would render untenable by the British Navy the harbor of Gibraltar. The British Government, however, had decided upon the step in view of its belief that the situation in Spain from the
British standpoint was going from bad to worse and that Hitler almost inevitably would undertake the occupation of Spain and Portugal with the subsequent penetration of North Africa if any collapse took place on the part of the Russian Army or even if a winter stalemate resulted. In that event Mr. Churchill stated Gibraltar would be isolated anyway and the occupation by Great Britain of the Canary Islands was of the utmost [4726] importance in guarding a southern Atlantic convoy route into the British Isles.

In view of this operation, the British Government would not be in a position conveniently to carry out the commitment they had made to the Portuguese Government to assist in the defense of the Azores.

In view of the contents of Dr. Salazar’s letter to the President, it was therefore agreed that the British Government immediately upon the return of Mr. Churchill to London would notify Dr. Salazar that the British Government could not conveniently undertake to assist in the defense of the Azores and would further inform Dr. Salazar that they therefore desired him to request the United States for such assistance. It was agreed on the part of the President that immediately upon the receipt of such notification from Dr. Salazar the United States would send the necessary forces of occupation to the Azores and that the Brazilian Government would be simultaneously requested to send at least a token force to take part in the expedition.

The President stated to Mr. Churchill that in view of our present military situation if the United States undertook to occupy the Azores it would not be in a position in the near future at least to undertake the protection of the Cape Verde Islands. Mr. Churchill [4727] stated that the British Government would be in a position to occupy the Cape Verde Islands with the understanding that it would later turn over the protection of those islands to the United States at such time as the United States was in a position to take those measures. Mr. Churchill further stated that during the time that the United States was landing the necessary forces in the Azores, the British Navy would maintain a large force between the Azores and the mainland of Portugal in order to render impossible the sending of any German expeditionary forces should Portugal at that time be already occupied by Germany.

The Prime Minister then said that he desired to discuss the situation in the Far East. He had with him a copy of a draft memorandum, of which he had already given the President a copy and which suggested that the United States, British and Dutch Governments simultaneously warn Japan that further military expansion by Japan in the South Pacific would lead to the taking of counter measures by the countries named even though such counter measures might result in hostilities between them and Japan, and, second, provided that the United States declare to Japan that should Great Britain go to the assistance of the Netherlands East Indies as a result [4728] of aggression against the latter on the part of Japan the President would request from the Congress of the United States authority to assist the British and Dutch Governments in their defense against Japanese aggression.

The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statement handed to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6.

The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the implication was that Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that she would move no further provided the United States would abandon their economic and financial sanctions and take no further military or naval defensive measures and further agree to concessions to Japan, including the opportunity for Japan to strangle the Chinese Government, all of which were particularly unacceptable.

The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, that he felt very strongly that every effort should be made to prevent the outbreak of war with Japan. He stated that what he intended to do was to request Secretary Hull by radio to inform the Japanese Ambassador that the President would return to Washington next Saturday or Sunday and desired to see the Ambassador immediately upon his return. The President stated that in that interview he would inform [4729] the Japanese Ambassador that provided the Japanese Government would give the commitment contained in the first paragraph of the proposal of the Japanese Government of August 6, namely, that the Japanese Government “will not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina will be withdrawn”, specifically and not contingently, the United States Government, while making it clear that the other conditions
set forth by the Japanese Government were in general unacceptable, the United States would, nevertheless, in a friendly spirit seek to explore the possibilities inherent in the various proposals made by Japan for the reaching of a friendly understanding between the two Governments. The President would further state that should Japan refuse to consider this procedure and undertake further steps in the nature of military expansions, the President desired the Japanese Government to know that in such event in his belief various steps would have to be taken by the United States notwithstanding the President's realization that the taking of such further measures might result in war between the United States and Japan.

Mr. Churchill immediately declared that the procedure suggested appeared to him to cover the situation [4730] very well. He said it had in it an element of "face-saving" for the Japanese and yet at the same time would constitute a flat United States warning to Japan of the consequences involved in a continuation by Japan of her present course.

There was then discussed the desirability of informing Russia of the steps which would be taken as above set forth and of possibly including in the warning to Japan a statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan against the Soviet Union.

I stated that in my judgment the real issue which was involved was the continuation by Japan of its present policy of conquest by force in the entire Pacific region and regardless whether such policy was directed against China, against the Soviet Union or against the British Dominions or British colonies, or the colonies of the Netherlands in the Southern Pacific area. I said it seemed to me that the statement which the President intended to make to the Japanese Government might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the Southwestern Pacific area.

The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this and it was decided that the step to be taken by the President would be taken in that sense.

[4731] The question then arose as to the desirability of the President's making reference in his proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador to British policy in the southern Pacific region and specifically with regard to Thailand. The President said that he thought it would be advantageous for him to be in a position at that time to state that he had been informed by the British Government that Great Britain had no aggressive intentions whatever upon Thailand. Mr. Churchill said that in this he heartily concurred.

I asked whether it would not be better for the President to be in a position to state not only that Great Britain had no intentions of an aggressive character with regard to Thailand, but also that the British Government had informed the United States Government that it supported wholeheartedly the President's proposal for the neutralization of Indochina and of Thailand.

Mr. Churchill stated that he agreed that it would be well to make an all-inclusive statement of that character with respect to British policy, that he trusted that the President would, therefore, inform the Japanese Ambassador that he had consulted the British Government, and that the British Government was in complete accord with the neutralization proposal, and that it had likewise informed the President that it would in no event [4732] undertake any initiative in the occupation of Thailand.

It was agreed that Sir Alexander Cadogan, after further consultation with Mr. Churchill, would give me in writing a statement which the British Government was prepared to make with regard to this issue.

The President expressed the belief that by adopting this course any further move of aggression on the part of Japan which might result in war could be held off for at least thirty days. Mr. Churchill felt that if negotiations or conversations actually took place between the United States and Japan on the basis which had been formulated, there was a reasonable chance that Japanese policy might be modified and that a war in the Pacific might be averted.

III

Mr. Churchill then said that he desired to bring up for discussion the proposed joint declaration by the President and himself.

The President said that he believed the best solution of this problem was for an identical statement to be made in London and in the United States, probably on Thursday, August 14, to the effect that the Prime Minister and the President had met at sea, accompanied by the various members of their respective staffs;
that these members of the two Governments had discussed the [4733] question of aid under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act to nations resisting aggression, and that these military and naval conversations had in no way involved any future commitments between the two Governments, except as authorized under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act; that the Prime Minister and the President had between them discussed certain principles relating to a better future for the world and had agreed upon a joint declaration which would then be quoted verbatim.

Mr. Churchill dissented very strongly from the form in which the President had desired to make it clear that no future commitments had been entered into. The President stated that that portion of the proposed statement was of extreme importance from his standpoint inasmuch as a statement of that character would make it impossible for extreme isolationist leaders in the United States to allege that every kind of secret agreement had been entered into during the course of these conversations.

Mr. Churchill said that he understood that side of the question, but that he believed that any categorical statement of that character would prove deeply discouraging to the populations of the occupied countries and would have a very serious effect upon their morale. He likewise made it clear that a similar effect would [4734] be created by British public opinion. He asked if the statement could not be worded in such a way as to make it positive rather than negative, namely, that the members of the staffs of the Prime Minister and of the President had solely discussed questions relative to the furnishing of aid to the countries resisting aggression under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act. The President replied that he believed that the statement could be drawn up in that way and that if he then were queried in the United States he need merely reply that nothing had been discussed or agreed upon other than that which had already been indicated in his public statement.

I then gave the President, Mr. Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan copies of a redraft which I had made this morning of the proposed joint declaration before Mr. Churchill had arrived and had had an opportunity of going over it with the President, and the latter had approved it. Mr. Churchill then commenced to read it. He suggested that there be inserted in the text of the third point before the word "self-government" the words "sovereign rights and". This was agreed upon.

Mr. Churchill then read the fourth point which read as follows: "Fourth, they will endeavor to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without discrimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to [4735] the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."

He immediately inquired whether this was meant to apply to the terms of the Ottawa agreements. I replied that, of course, it did, since the policy which the United States Government had been pursuing for the better part of nine years had been addressed primarily towards the removal of all of those artificial restrictions and controls upon international trade which had created such tragic havoc to world economy during the past generation. I said I understood fully the immediate difficulties which this occasioned him, but I pointed out that the phraseology was "they will endeavor to further" and that this naturally did not imply a formal and immediate contractual obligation on the part of his Government. The President stated that he believed the point was of very great importance as a measure of assurance to the German and Italian peoples that the British and the United States Governments desired to offer them, after the war, fair and equal opportunity of an economic character.

The Prime Minister said that, of course, he was without any power himself to agree upon this point. He set forth in considerable detail the position of the United Kingdom vis-à-vis the Dominions and emphasized [4736] his inability, without the agreement of the Dominions, to enter into the proposed declaration insofar as this point was concerned. He said that insofar as he himself was concerned the issue was one with which his own personal life history was connected. He referred to the days at the outset of the century when Joseph Chamberlain first brought up the proposal for Empire preferences and the predominant part which this issue had played in the political history of Great Britain during the past forty years. He said that he felt that the proposal as now phrased would have the enthusiastic support of all the liberals everywhere. He said that he himself was heartily in accord with the proposal and that he himself had always been, as was well known, emphatically opposed to the Ottawa agreements. He said, however, that it would be at least a week before he could hope to obtain by telegraph the opinion of the Dominions with regard to this question.
Harry Hopkins then suggested that Sir Alexander Cadogan and I be requested to draft new phraseology which would take care of these difficulties and prevent the delay of which Mr. Churchill spoke. He said it was inconceivable that the issuance of the joint declaration should be held up by a matter of this kind.

I said that in my own judgment further modification [4737] of that article would destroy completely any value in that portion of the proposed declaration. I said that it was not a question of phraseology, that it was a question of a vital principle which was involved. I said that if the British and the United States Governments could not agree to do everything within their power to further, after the termination of the present war, a restoration of free and liberal trade policies, they might as well throw in the sponge and realize that one of the greatest factors in creating the present tragic situation in the world was going to be permitted to continue unchecked in the post-war world. I said that the trade policies of the British Empire during the latter portion of the nineteenth century had, I felt, contributed enormously to the same and prosperous condition of the world at that time, and that, of course, I realized that the tariff policies pursued by the United States and many other countries during that period had played an important part in the creation of the evils which had sprung up after the last war. I said, however, that it seemed to be imperative that we try to agree now upon the policy of constructive sanity in world economics as a fundamental factor in the creation of a new and better world and that except through an agreement upon such a policy by our two governments there would be no hindrance whatever to a continuation later [4738] to the present German practices of utilizing their trade and financial policies in order to achieve political ends.

Mr. Churchill agreed very emphatically to this policy. He and Sir Alexander Cadogan both agreed that it was not a question of phraseology, but that they were up against a material obstacle which Mr. Churchill had already indicated. The Dominions would have to be consulted. It might well be that an agreement could not be had from the Dominions and that consequently the proposed joint declaration could only be issued some time after news of the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister had been given out. Mr. Churchill suggested that the inclusion before the phrase "they will endeavor to further" of the phrase which would read "with due regard for our present obligations" might ease the situation.

The President suggested, and Mr. Churchill agreed, that the latter would try and draft some phraseology which would make that situation easier, and it was arranged that I would call later in the afternoon upon the Prime Minister and Sir Alexander Cadogan to go over with them such redraft as they might have in mind.

Mr. Churchill was in entire accord with points five and six. He then read point seven and after discussion at the [4739] meeting of this point it was agreed that the phrase "to use force" be replaced by the word "aggression" in the second sentence of the seventh point.

Mr. Churchill said that, of course, he was heartily and enthusiastically in favor of this point seven, which had been initiated by the President. He inquired, however, whether the President would not agree to support some kind of "effective international organization" as suggested by the Prime Minister in his original draft of the proposed joint declaration.

The President replied that he did not feel that he could agree to this because of the suspicions and opposition that such a statement on his part would create in the United States. He said that he himself would not be in favor of the creation of a new Assembly of the League of Nations, at least until after a period of time had transpired and during which an international police force composed of the United States and Great Britain had had an opportunity of functioning. Mr. Churchill said that he did not feel that he would be candid if he did not express the President's feeling that point seven would create a great deal of opposition from the extreme internationalists. The President replied that he realized that, but that he felt that the time had come to be realistic and that [4740] in his judgment the main factor in the seventh point was complete realism. Mr. Churchill then remarked that of course he was wholeheartedly in favor of it and shared the President's view.

The meeting then broke up and I arranged with the President that I would drop by to see him after my conference later in the afternoon with the Prime Minister. The latter stated that he would not be able to leave until at least 5:00 p.m., tomorrow, August 12 and that as he felt it of importance to reach a complete meeting of minds with the President upon all of the issues involved,
that he would be willing to spend an additional twenty-four hours should that be necessary.

SUMNER WELLS.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Monday, August 11, 1941. At sea.

Subject: British-American Cooperation.

Participants:
Sir Alexander Cadogan.
The Under Secretary.

Copies to:

[474/1] I went by arrangement to see Sir Alexander Cadogan on the PRINCE OF WALES this afternoon. He gave me to read memoranda which he had already completed on the conference between the Prime Minister and the President this morning and, with a few changes which I indicated, they appeared to be a correct presentation of the discussion and of the agreements reached.

With regard to the draft of the joint declaration, Sir Alexander told me that the Prime Minister had already radioed to London the text of the proposed joint declaration incorporating therein modifications of points four and seven. Sir Alexander gave me the revised text to read. Inasmuch as the Prime Minister's draft of point four was far broader and more satisfactory than the minimum which the President had instructed me, after our conference of the morning, to accept, I raised no objection thereto, and with regard to the proposed change in point seven I stated that while it was completely satisfactory to me and entirely in accord with my own way of thinking I had no idea what the President's decision might be. I said that I would have to submit it to him.

Sir Alexander stated that the Prime Minister felt very strongly—perhaps exaggeratedly—the opposition which would be created on the part of a certain pro-League-of-Nations group in England to the contents of point seven declaring for the disarmament of nations which undertook aggression outside of their frontiers. He went on to say that while he believed there would not be the amount of opposition which the Prime Minister anticipated he nevertheless thought that it would be a tragic thing to concentrate solely upon the transition period after the war was ended when some kind of joint police power would have to be exercised by the British and by the United States Governments and omit any reference to the need of the creation of some effective and practicable international organization which would function after the transition period was concluded. I said that as I had already indicated while I was in full agreement with his own views the matter would have to be determined by the President.

We discussed the desirability of informing the Chinese Government of the steps which the United States Government in the person of the President was taking with regard to Japan. I said that while I felt very definitely that every effort should be made to keep China closely informed of what was being done in her interests by Great Britain and by the United States I wondered whether telling China of what the President intended to state to the Japanese Government of this particular moment would not mean that the Government at Chungking for its own interests would make public the information so received. If publicity resulted, I stated I feared that the extreme militaristic element in Tokio and that portion of the Tokio press which was controlled by Germany would immediately take advantage of the situation so created to inflame sentiment in Japan to such an extent as to make any possibility remote, as it might anyhow be, of achieving any satisfactory result through negotiation with Japan. Sir Alexander said he was entirely in accord and would be governed by those views. He said, of course, I realized how terribly persistent the Chinese were and that the present Ambassador in London, Dr. Wellington Koo, would undoubtedly press him day in and day out to know what had transpired at the meeting between the Prime Minister and the President with regard to China. He said that he felt that the best solution was for him merely to say in general terms that the two governments had agreed that every step should be taken that was practicable at this time for China and its defense and avoid going into any details.
I subsequently went to see the President. The President said that he was entirely in accord with the redraft of point four which was better than he had thought Mr. Churchill would be willing to concede. He also accepted without question the amendment made by Mr. Churchill to point seven and the President said that it seemed to him entirely desirable since the amendment made it clear that once the war was over a transition period would have to take place and that the permanent international organization would only be set up after that experimental period had passed. He had jotted down certain minor changes in the text of the proposed joint declaration, most of which were merely verbal changes for the purpose of clarification.

I said I felt it necessary for me to ask him whether he did not believe that a very considerable opposition on the part of extreme isolationists in the United States would result from that portion of point seven which declares in the judgment of the United States that it is essential that aggressor nations be disarmed. I said that if a great Power like the United States publicly declares that something is essential, the inference is that the Power is going to do something itself about it. I said it appeared to me more than likely that the isolationists will insist that this public statement by the President meant that the United States would go to war in order to disarm not only Germany but even possibly Japan and theoretically, at least, even the Soviet Union if that country should later once more embark upon aggression on its neighbors. The President replied that the whole intent of point seven, as he saw it, was to make clear what the objective would be if the war was won and that he believed people in the United States would take that point of view. He further said he felt the realism inherent in article seven was one which would be apparent to the enormous majority of the American people and that they would enthusiastically support the need for the disarmament of aggressor nations.

I said I also had been surprised and somewhat discouraged by a remark that the President had casually made in our morning's conference—if I had understood him correctly—which was that nothing could be more futile than the reconstitution of a body such as the Assembly of the League of Nations. I said to the President that it seemed to me that if he conceived of the need for a transition period upon the termination of the war during which period Great Britain and the United States would undertake the policing of the world, it seemed to me that it would be enormously desirable for the smaller Powers to have available to them an Assembly in which they would all be represented and in which they could make their complaints known and join in recommendations as to the policy to be pursued by the major Powers who were doing the police work. I said it seemed to me that an organization of that kind would be the most effective safety valve that could be devised.

The President said that he agreed fully with what I said and that all that he had intended by the remark he made this morning was to make clear his belief that a transition period was necessary and that during that transition period no organizations such as the Council or the Assembly of the League could undertake the powers and prerogatives with which they had been entrusted during the existence of the League of Nations.

I further said that while from the practical standpoint I was in agreement that the United States and Great Britain were the only Powers which could or would exercise the police trusteeship and that it seemed to me that it would be impossible if such a trusteeship were set up to exclude therefrom the other American republics or for that matter the countries at present occupied such as Norway, the Netherlands, and even Belgium. The President said that he felt that a solution for this difficulty could probably be found through the ostensible joining with Great Britain and the United States of those Powers, but it would have to be recognized that it would be ostensible since none of the nations mentioned would have the practical means of taking any effective or, at least, considerable part in the task involved.

I said that it seemed to me that now that the text of the joint declaration had been agreed upon, since I assumed from what Mr. Churchill had told me that the British Government would support his recommendations with regard thereto, all that was left to do in the way of drafting was the preparation of the brief statement which would be issued simultaneously in London and at Washington announcing that the President and the Prime Minister had met, referring to the discussions under the Lease-Lend Act and the inclusion at the termination thereof of the text of the joint declaration. I said that Mr. Churchill had told me that
he had cabled his Government that he was not leaving Argentia until Wednesday afternoon and said it seemed to me that everything could be definitely agreed upon and cleared up by 1:00 p.m. tomorrow, and I could see no practical reason for waiting another twenty-four hours. The President agreed and said that he would try and get a decision reached in that sense when he saw Mr. Churchill this evening.

**Sumner Welles.**

[4748] Mr. Gesell. Also, we would like to have just to make the record complete, designated Exhibit 8–A, three additional reports received from General MacArthur concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. These simply supplement the information already available but we want to furnish to the committee everything we have received. Perhaps, following Senator Brewster's suggestion, these should be designated 8–A, 8–B, and 8–C.

The Vice Chairman. That is, the 4 December 1945, exhibit 8–A; 29 November 1945, 8–B; and 12 November 1945, 8–C, is that correct?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. That is, the 4 December 1945, Exhibit 8–A; 8–B, and 8–C?"

Mr. Gesell. Now, my attention was also called to the fact that while in the questioning of Admiral Wilkinson, reference was made to the letters from Admiral Kimmel concerning the transmission of information, that I failed to read into the record Admiral Kimmel's request for information and the replies that he received, and with the committee's permission, I would like to get those into the record now.

Some time ago the committee was handed this correspondence between Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark and we do not feel it should be offered at this time, since it relates to [4749] the testimony of those officers when they appear, but I will simply read the pertinent portions relating to this matter of information.

The first is a postscript appearing to a letter of February 18, 1941, addressed to Admiral Stark by Admiral Kimmel which reads as follows:

P. S. We receive through radio and other intelligence rather reliable reports on the positions of Japanese merchant ships, but we have no definite information on the important Japanese trade routes. Can you send us the latest information you have on this? I am initiating separate correspondence on this topic.

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?

To that letter there is a reply of Admiral Stark's [4750] dated March 22, 1941, and I will read the portion relating to the postscript I have just read from Admiral Kimmel's letter. [Reading:]

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CINcUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently,
or sent by despatch. As you know, ONI-40 contains a section devoted to Japanese trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the volume of shipping which moved over each route.

There is then a further memorandum or letter of Admiral Kimmel dated May 26, 1941, which it is my understanding he delivered to Admiral Stark with respect to information. That memorandum under paragraph VII reads as follows:

The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements, and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action, so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Command-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

I am sorry for that long interruption.

The Vice Chairman. That is alright. Does that complete counsel's request?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Just as a matter of information, I notice in addition to the six documents which have already been admitted for the record under the exhibit numbers given there, is a onesheet statement here, "War Plans Division (OP-12)." Is that to be included now, or just for the information of the committee?

Mr. Gesell. No, sir; that is in anticipation of the questioning of Admiral Turner. It relates to the functions of the War Plans Division. We can insert it now, but we thought perhaps the members of the committee wished to see it, for possible use in the examination of Admiral Wilkinson.

The Vice Chairman. Is that all, Counsel?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON
(Resumed)

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have any statements that you desire to make regarding your testimony?
Admiral Wilkinson. There are one or two questions, Mr. Chairman, that were asked me yesterday to which I have, at least, partial information.

One was the number of personnel engaged in the radio intelligence work, including the decrypting, in the fall of 1941. I inquired about that. Although the best witnesses, of course, are the communications authorities, the information [4754] they gave me was that the total radio establishment was 700, including about 80 officers. That embraced the entire world, as far as our radio intelligence activities were concerned. Of this total nearly two-thirds were engaged in direction finding or intercept work; or training for that work, and the remainder, some over one-third of the 700, and including most of the officers, was engaged in the crypt analysis and translation, which was the primary question.

The second question was to locate, if practicable, the incident which I spoke of wherein Lieutenant Commander Okada, the Japanese naval officer, engaged in espionage on the west coast, and had reported the precise location of the ships in the Bremerton Navy Yard. That information I have not found. It is not in the local file, apparently. We have sent a dispatch to the west coast to find the documents that were seized there, and I have an intelligence report from Los Angeles to Tokyo, an intercepted, decrypted, and translated code message, speaking of the movements of several ships, and included in there, that a 55-destroyer squadron was moved from San Diego to presumably San Pedro. The translation is inadequate on the 25 and 2 vessels which were tied up at the Bethlehem and Los Angeles shipyards and repair work was begun.

Then there are further notes as to the movement and prospective movements of other ships.

[4755] In checking my testimony with respect to the distribution of the intercepts in the locked pouches, and in the bags, I find I was in error in my recollection in that the locked pouch was left for the Chief of Naval Operations and separately for the Secretary of the Navy, and a sealed pouch was left at the White House.

I said I thought there was a separate copy there, and one for the War Plans officer. The copy that came to the Far Eastern Section and myself was a folder, and I had erroneously thought that was the same copy that went elsewhere. There were separate copies.

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas from Illinois will inquire.

Senator Lucas. Admiral Wilkinson, on yesterday you gave to the committee certain information about the location of the various fleets of potential enemies throughout the world during the month of November and the first week of December, and you advised the committee that there were many ways in which the Navy could detect these fleets; first by actual sight by our own merchant ships, and second by our own attachés, or the consuls at the various ports.

[4756] Now, let me ask you, insofar as information coming from the Far East is concerned, from whom did you receive such information as to the location of the Jap ships during the months of November and December, 1941.
Admiral Wilkinson. We had reports from the State Department, the consuls, we had reports from our naval attaché in Tokyo, and I do not know whether he was able to detect anything at that particular period.

We had several very pertinent reports from our assistant naval attaché at Shanghai, and our observers in the Chinese ports, one or two, and they also got further reports.

Senator Lucas. Now, are you familiar with the memorandum entitled “Japanese Fleet Locations” from November 4 up to December 1, inclusive?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. I should like to have you, Admiral, look at this document. The document is dated December 1, 1941. I would like to have you tell the committee what the letters “Op-16-F-2” mean at the top there?

Admiral Wilkinson. Operation 16 is the Office of Naval Intelligence, and F-2 is the Far Eastern Section. That is the office that originated the paper, Captain McCullom’s office.

Senator Lucas. That memorandum purports to advise [4757] Naval Intelligence in Washington as to the Japanese Fleet locations as of December 1, 1941; is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. To the best of the knowledge that we could deduct and infer, and actually have from our various stations, they were not only the sightings, but also radio intelligence analyses, the traffic analyses of ship calls, and so on, conducted primarily at Honolulu and Corregidor, and adjusted between the two.

On November 24, we had sent out a message saying we would not expect many more sightings in the open seas because of the ocean traffic falling off, and in consequence we would be more and more reliant on the radio intelligence, and would Com 14, which was Honolulu, and Com 16, which was Corregidor, please make complete analyses of everything that came, and Com 16 would be the record coordinator, because they had more intercepts and larger scouting work.

Senator Lucas. This is the last account received from the Far East in answer to that query?

Admiral Wilkinson. It is the result of what they had had, and what we could pick from our other reports as well, although we had instructed our naval attaches and observers to send reports also to the commander in chief, Asiatic, and commander in chief, Pearl Harbor, so those fellows, in addition to ours, had the benefit of the naval attaches [4758] and observers report. All three officers had the same sources.

Senator Lucas. In answer to the query you also received from Hawaii their best judgment as to the Japanese Fleet location at that particular time?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; and all three officers were aware even before the printing of the data which went into the preparation of this paper.

Senator Lucas. I presume you have made an examination of both of these reports, one received from the Far East and one received from Hawaii at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not quite understand you.
Senator Lucas. I presume you have examined, I presume you did examine at the time, the memorandum that came from the Far East as well as the memorandum that came from Hawaii, with respect to the fleet locations of the Japs?

Admiral Wilkinson. I understand, sir. There was not a specific memorandum as such. There were a series of messages indicating factual data, and they were compiled in the Far Eastern Section.

I myself did not examine the memorandum coming it.

Senator Lucas. Who did examine it?

Admiral Wilkinson. Captain McCollum's section, and I think Lieutenant Commander Watts.

Senator Lucas. Were they under your direct supervision?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. It was the duty of those two officers to examine these memoranda as they came in, and give to you their evaluation, or their best judgment, as to what they meant?

Admiral Wilkinson. To prepare this paper which we have before us, which was not only for me, but after I approved it, was for the benefit of all officers who received it.

Senator Lucas. It is my understanding that the report that came from the Hawaiian-Department indicated definitely that they had lost the fleet completely as of December 1, 1941, that is the fleet that finally struck the Hawaiian Islands, they reported that they knew nothing about that fleet from their own intelligence work that they were doing at that time: is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it specifically, but I think it is not quite correct, because all of us had lost it.

Senator Lucas. That is the point I wanted to make, insofar as the memorandum from the Far East is concerned. You will notice on the first page it states definitely that the battleship *Hiyéi* was located near Sasebo, and the battleship *Kirishima* was located near Kure.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Then on the next page, insofar as the carrier fleet is concerned, you find that the *Akagi* was located near Kyushu, and the *Kaga* near Kyushu, the *Soryu* near Kure, the *Hiryu* near Kure, the *Ryujo* near Kure, the *Zuikaku* near Kure and the *Shogagü* near Kure. It is my understanding that those two battleships and those vessels in the carrier fleet that I have just mentioned, were in the Pacific force that attacked Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. I am just wondering whether or not that was ever called to your attention as being in direct conflict with the report that was made from Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. It is obviously an error. That was the last indication we had gotten on those ships. We had reported in other papers, as I recall, and certainly in conversations to the recipients of this memorandum that some battleships and a number of carriers were unlocated and were believed to be in home waters. Home waters, of course, is an indefinite term, signifying waters near the Japanese coast.
Senator Lucas. Now how would the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Division locate, for instance, the battleship Hiyei as being near Sasebo? How would he get that information?

Admiral Wilkinson. Possibly from radio direction finding on a ship which was sending out a radio message and which was identified, correctly or wrongly, as that particular battleship; possibly from the fact that the radio station at Sasebo was issuing messages apparently directed to that ship and hence she would be in the vicinity of Sasebo to receive those messages.

I am not sure of the other features of radio intelligence, because that is outside my scope, but that is my general naval knowledge as to how one would detect it.

Senator Lucas. Obviously, though, the battleship we are talking about was not near Sasebo at that time.

Admiral Wilkinson. Quite right, sir.

Senator Lucas. And the point occurred to me as to how an intelligence officer could be mistaken about two battleships and a number of carriers in the carrier fleet.

Admiral Wilkinson. They had not been located recently, sir. The statement should have been more correctly made, "Unlocated" instead of which the statement was apparently [4762] made as of the last location in which they had been found and where, pending evidence to the contrary, they were still presumed to be.

Senator Lucas. Which report did the Navy follow, if you remember, with respect to the Japanese Fleet being lost?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not quite understand, sir.

Senator Lucas. Which report did the Naval Intelligence in Washington follow with respect to these ships being lost or being located? One report says they were located and another report says they were lost.

Admiral Wilkinson. We followed the report that we were not at the moment able to locate them, sir.

Senator Lucas. In other words, you did not give any consideration to the Far Eastern report then?

Admiral Wilkinson. We should have checked it and corrected it, but we checked that by our knowledge of unlocated ships. The two are obviously in conflict.

Senator Lucas. Obviously if these two battleships and this great group of ships in the carrier fleet were near Kure on December 1, it would be rather difficult for them to get to Hawaii by December 7.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. I was just wondering whether that was not taken into consideration by those here in the Naval Intelligence [4763] Department, insofar as we assumed there was a failure of a proper warning at the time in Hawaii.

Admiral Wilkinson. There might have been, sir; but I do not think so, because the recipients of this material who, you will note, on the last page were the Chief of Naval Operations OP-12, which was the War Plans, OP-38-W, which was the so-called War Room where the tracks of ships were maintained, and all of them were aware that certain ships had not been located. So that this report erroneously entering the last location where they had been found rather than their present location I do not think was deceptive to the Navy Department,
nor did it go out as such anywhere excepting those officers that I mentioned, as shown on page 4.

It is true, of course, that this data from which this was compiled was also available at Manila and at Pearl Harbor, and the wrong inferences might have been drawn there as to the location of these ships, even though this paper itself did not go there, but I think that all hands were aware that certain ships had not been located, because we have had statements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer that he knew that they were not located, and I believe the same thing is true in Manila.

Senator Lucas. Do I understand from your last statement that the memorandum of Japanese fleet locations that came from the Far East was also available to the Hawaiian Department on December 1, 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. This memorandum was furnished only to those recipients that are listed on page 4, the Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Naval Intelligence, Chief of War Plans Division, the Chief of the office where the tracking of the fleet was carried on, and the head of the Foreign Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The data, however, from which this was compiled was available in both Manila and in Pearl Harbor. It was possible that erroneous deductions might have been made from it, but I do not believe such to be the case, since we have evidence indicating that it was known that those ships were unlocated at both those stations.

[4765] Senator Lucas. Well, the Hawaiian Department definitely informed the Intelligence Department here in Washington, D. C., that they had completely lost the Japanese fleet at that particular time and gave no report to your department such as was found in the Far Eastern report of December 1, with respect to these particular battleships and carriers, the ships in the carrier fleet that I have pointed out?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, they made no such report. This is, I think, erroneous. This is obviously erroneous. I think it was compiled from the last locations at which they had been sighted, and they were by no means certain that they were still there, but that was the last one they had.

Senator Lucas. Was the Japanese fleet ever lost for a period of three weeks before, insofar as the Intelligence Department of the Navy was concerned?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure that the entire Jap fleet had been. I am not sure of any particular large force, but I know that it was impossible to keep track of all the ships and all the forces in any fleet continuously.

I think it probable that large elements were lost from time to time and subsequently recovered in harmless positions. This time it was in a harmful position when it was [4766] found.

Senator Lucas. Do you remember ever losing track of a task force of the size that struck Pearl Harbor at any time previous to December 1?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would not know of my own recollection, and I do not recall having been so told.

Senator Lucas. Was there any reason why this task force should go into hiding if it was going into the China Sea and was on its way to Singapore, we will say, or the Australian section?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; every nation is always desirous of concealing its full plans, and although it was obvious that some strength was going down to the south China Sea, there would be good reasons to hide the fact that their main strength was going there.

Again, they might have been proceeding into the Marshalls, for an attack on New Guinea or on Borneo. They might have been working down to the Marshalls for an attack toward Samoa. It would be desirous of concealing the movements of its main strength forces wherever they were.

Senator Lucas. The only real reason for the concealing of their force was the United States battleships and the fleet at Pearl Harbor; isn’t that true?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say no; no, sir. They [4767] would not want the British at Singapore to know. They would not want the American planes in the Philippines to be ready to attack in case there should be a breach. I think they would not want to disclose their plans no matter where they were.

Senator Lucas. Well, they had not been very secretive about their movements up to the last three or four weeks before Pearl Harbor, had they?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think they were usually pretty secretive, sir. They would start out, as I recall, for maneuvers, and, just as we did, go into radio silence, and they had sent a lot of amphibious vessels and cargo vessels down to the south China Sea, which, since they were loaded in China, could not be hidden, but the movement of their combatant vessels had been pretty carefully screened.

Senator Lucas. England did not have much of a fleet around Singapore at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, not much. She had several ships on the way. I think it was the 5th or 6th of December that the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, that was subsequently ill-fated, that they arrived in Singapore, and, of course, they were on the way.

Senator Lucas. Admiral, passing from that subject——

Mr. Gesell. Senator, may I interpose?


Mr. Gesell. I have not offered these fleet location summaries as an exhibit, and in view of your questioning I think perhaps we should designate this entire folder as an exhibit, which would be exhibit 85, so that it will be easier to follow the examination.

Senator Lucas. All right.

The Vice Chairman. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit 85.”)

Senator Lucas. Admiral, on yesterday you were discussing with counsel and members of the committee the conversations that you had on the morning of December 7, 1941, when you received the 14th part of the message, 13 of which were sent on December 6. You stated you immediately went to Admiral Stark. You also stated that as you construed the message:

* * * They were fighting words. I was more impressed by that language than with the breaking off of negotiations which, of itself, might be only temporary. Those would be hard words to eat. The breaking off of negotiations could be resumed.

There seems to be some conflict in the testimony, according to counsel, as to when this message was delivered [4769] to Admiral
Stark, but according to your testimony, to the best of your recollection, it was somewhere around 9:15 to 9:30?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, did you tell Admiral Stark at the time, that you believed that a proper construction of that message was more than the breaking off of negotiations and that they were really fighting words in your opinion? Do you recall that?

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is that I told him that that was a very strong final part to that message and that I thought that they were going to press on in the direction of the advance which they were then following in the South Sea and that something might be expected in that or other directions, but I think particularly I said that, and I thought the fleet should be advised of the latest development in the nature of this strong language.

Senator Lucas. And what was his reply, if you recall?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think he agreed with me at the time, sir, and my recollection is that I said he made an effort to reach General Marshall, or said that he would make such an effort.

Senator Lucas. Did you have any further conversation with him, with respect to sending a message to Hawaii, to [4770] the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet there?

Admiral Wilkinson. When I said the fleet, I meant the Pacific Fleet. No further conversation.

Senator Lucas. No further conversation?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. But he did not send a message immediately after that conversation?

Admiral Wilkinson. So I understand. He did not while I was there, the few minutes I was there.

Senator Lucas. He had the authority so to do, as Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. If he had seen fit to do so?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. The message that was sent, as I recall, was around 11:30 that morning?

Admiral Wilkinson. So I understand.

Senator Lucas. So there was at least an hour and a half difference between the time the message could have been sent by Admiral Stark, and the time that one was actually sent to the War Department?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Now, you have been to Hawaii, Admiral?

Admiral Wilkinson. I have been where? [4771] Senator Lucas. I say, you have served in Hawaii with the Fleet in the Pacific, as I understand it.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you know how many ships were in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not of my own knowledge.

Senator Lucas. Well, from what you have read, and what you know about the situation, do you know the number that were in there?

It is not so material.
Admiral Wilkinson. I couldn't say. My recollection is about six battleships, six cruisers, and a dozen destroyers, but there may have been more.

Senator Lucas. I was wondering how many battleships and how many destroyers could leave the harbor say in an hour and a half?

Admiral Wilkinson. The usual time of sortie, as I recall, was 10 minutes for a major ship. In other words, one battleship or cruiser per 10 minutes. They would be able to put out one destroyer in between each of the larger ships. If they were pressed, they might be able to get two destroyers between each of the larger ships, but it would not be very desirable as there would be some danger of collision.

[4772] Senator Lucas. They would be pressed on the morning of December 7, if the message had gone?

Admiral Wilkinson. They undoubtedly would have made every effort, but if they tried to put too many ships out, they might have had a collision with the result of the blocking of everyone which would be another story.

Senator Lucas. Of course, any ship that got out of the harbor would be better able to protect itself?

Admiral Wilkinson. It would have been able to maneuver to avoid the bombs or the torpedoes and would have been probably able to man the guns with the entire ship's company immediately, but little sooner, in fact, than they did in port, because the call to general quarters that all battle stations be manned was carried out immediately on every ship, I understand.

Senator Lucas. I think that is correct, Admiral.

Now, Admiral, how long did you serve in the Navy Intelligence after December 6, 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. After December 6?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. Seven months.

Senator Lucas. From there, where did you go, sir?

Admiral Wilkinson. I went to command of battleship division 2 in the Pacific for 5 months, and then to [4773] the South Pacific as deputy commander of the South Pacific under Admiral Halsey. A vacancy occurred some 6 months later in the Amphibious Forces of the South Pacific, and I was made the amphibious commander of the Third Amphibious Force, and remained such.

Senator Lucas. In what sea battles did you participate?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know that I participated in any sea battles, as such.

I ran the amphibious campaign in the South Pacific for a year, and then I was in command of the operations against Palau and Yap. Yap was substituted for Leyte. I went in command of one of the two amphibious forces at Leyte, and then again in command of one of the two amphibious forces at Lingayen and again at the landing on Luzon. In the South Pacific campaign I had perhaps a dozen landings.

[4774] Senator Lucas. Let me ask you, Admiral, as a matter of curiosity, what class did you graduate from at Annapolis?

Admiral Wilkinson. 1909.

Senator Lucas. And what State are you from?

Admiral Wilkinson. Louisiana.

Senator Lucas. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Wilkinson, I have a few questions.

I notice from a study of the messages forwarded by the Navy and received by the Navy, that apparently notice had come into Washington that the Japanese had ordered the various offices throughout the world to destroy their code, but I see no notice whatever from Tokyo to Hawaii to destroy the code there.

Do you know whether or not there was any such message?

Admiral Wilkinson. I presume there was, sir. I don't recall the message proper, but I know the Hawaiian consul burned his code I think the day before the attack.

Mr. Murphy. There have been questions asked here of witnesses and some witnesses have concluded that when word comes about destroying a code that that is a very strong indication of war, and I notice in the messages here word from Admiral Kimmel on December 6, 1941, that the local consul [4775] at Hawaii had commenced destroying his code or was in the actual process of doing so.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. In Navy parlance, what is the significance of that, from the standpoint of expectation of war or trouble?

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, obviously any nation is desirous of protecting its code. Ordinarily, through international courtesy, diplomatic missions and consular missions are proof against search and seizure, and any action of that sort would be a grave international offense.

Now, if any country feared that relations would become so strained with another that the other country would incur the risk of an international offense and would invade the diplomatic mission and seize the codes it would be obviously best to burn them up first.

The significance, in other words, is that they thought relations were going to be pretty tricky and sensitive, even though there might not be actual war.

Mr. Murphy. I notice in Exhibit 37 at page 40 there is a message from Washington to Pacific commanders in which the following is contained:

Highly reliable information has been received that categorical and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore [4776] Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents period

Now, Hawaii is not contained in that message, is it? That is exhibit 37.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Apparently a separate dispatch was sent to Hawaii, which we did not have at hand at that time.

Mr. Murphy. Then I notice on page 41 there is a message as follows:

“Circular 2444 from Tokyo 1 December ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy machine period Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo period December second Washington also directed destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents period British Admiralty London today reports Embassy London has complied period”

Still no message to Hawaii.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, none apparently.

Mr. Murphy. Apparently.
Then I notice on page 42 a discussion of some points throughout the world from the United States to Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, Shanghai, telling our agents there to destroy their machines and codes, but no message to Hawaii.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I think, as I recall, I initiated that message.

Mr. Murphy. I notice on page 43 a message to Peiping and Tientsin.

Admiral Wilkinson. Those were to the marine detachments there.

Mr. Murphy. No message to Hawaii.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Both of those last two were our messages out to exposed positions to destroy their codes and obviously Hawaii was not in danger of capture.

Mr. Murphy. You felt Hawaii was fairly safe at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly not subject to capture.

Mr. Murphy. Right.

Now, then I notice—

Admiral Wilkinson. Without sufficient notice to destroy the codes.

Mr. Murphy. Right.

I notice on page 44 notice being sent to Guam.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Guam was exposed and they were told to destroy everything except what they needed urgently and be ready to destroy that.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, going to page 46, down to page 46, there is no intercept whatsoever obtained, apparently, by our forces, which would indicate that the Japanese had told Hawaii to destroy its code or ciphers; isn't that right?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Then the message that we do get on December 6th comes from Admiral Kimmel himself.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, it comes from Admiral Bloch. Information derived from our district intelligence official and his contacts through Japanese personnel, indicate that he was informed by underground channels that the Consul was burning his stuff.

Mr. Murphy. In that case there would be no need of Washington telling Hawaii because Washington is telling Hawaii about the incident?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, in the Pearl Harbor story as contained in the United States News of September 1, 1945 at page 34 I see a statement under the heading of:

The Navy account of the Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor. Sources of information are Japanese.

The statement is as follows:

The initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at Tankan Bay was about November 22nd and they awaited word to act before the force moved out on the 27-28 of November, 1941.

Where is Tankan Bay?

Admiral Wilkinson. It is on one of the islands of the southern Kuriles just north of Hokkaido.

Mr. Murphy. That is not connected with the Gulf of Tonkins, it is an entirely separate place?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. The Gulf of Tonkin is in the South China Sea.
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. In no way connected.
Mr. Murphy. Tankan Bay is up in the Kuriles?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; southern Kuriles.
Mr. Murphy. Are you familiar with the testimony of Admiral Inglis?
Admiral Wilkinson. Only roughly.
Mr. Murphy. Well, the place he testified the fleet left from was the southern part of the Kuriles.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; southern Kuriles.
Mr. Gesell. Etorofu Jima.
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
Where would that be in connection with Tankan Bay?
Mr. Murphy. Would you have any special knowledge as to the conflict which apparently existed between the Navy and the Army officials at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7 as to whether or not there was a Jap force in the Marshalls?

[4780]
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know that there was a conflict, sir. I know that from radio intelligence, which at the best is analytical and scientific guessing, that the Pearl Harbor Radio Intelligence Center thought that there was a large force in the Marshalls and the Corregidor unit could not confirm that. I understand later that there was a force there of reasonable size.

[4782] Mr. Murphy. I think "conflict" is the wrong word. There was some difference of opinion between the Naval Intelligence and the Army, as I understand it, as to whether there was a force there and as to the size of it.

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall a difference of opinion between the Army and the Navy. All I recall is a difference between the radio intelligence center of the Navy at Corregidor and at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Murphy. That may be.
Admiral Wilkinson. I know there was an airplane reconnaissance ordered to go over the Marshalls to try to photograph the situation, but I do not believe it was ever carried out.

Mr. Murphy. You say you learned about the message of the 27th from Washington to Pearl Harbor either hours or days afterward. Did you ever see a reply from Admiral Kimmel to that message?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Was that unusual?
Admiral Wilkinson. I wouldn't know, sir; and if there had been a reply there was no reason that I should assuredly have seen it.

Mr. Murphy. Was it usual naval practice in a case of [4782] that kind?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not unless requested to report at once. Often, in an important message, the word "acknowledge" is added. I forget whether it was on that one or not. And that is simply an indication that you have received and understand it.

Mr. Murphy. In the message of November 27 some of the language is as follows:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.
That would be the first part of it.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy (reading):

* * * an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thailand, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46X.

Now, at this point, an appropriate defensive deployment, what would that be in regard to the fleet generally?

Admiral Wilkinson. Speaking purely as a naval officer and without connection with this plan, it would be to make such disposition of his air forces and his submarines and [4783] his surface vessels, as he would consider necessary in carrying out the tasks assigned in War Plan 46. I do not recall whether that was the so-called Rainbow Plan or not. I suppose it was Rainbow-5.

Mr. Murphy. I think it was, but it would mean necessarily a change in the status quo until you were prepared to meet that situation, wouldn't it?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not familiar with the status quo. It would require him at least to review his present situation and see whether it was consistent with the war plans. He might find it was consistent, or he might find that changes were necessary.

Mr. Murphy. After that, I find the following:

Inform district and Army authorities.

Admiral Wilkinson. That is Admiral Bloch and General Short.

Mr. Murphy. That would mean that he discussed this message, wouldn't it, with Admiral Bloch and General Short?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. If not discussed, at least informed them of the message.

Mr. Murphy. Of the fact that he received it?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. "A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental districts [4784] Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."

Now, you say you know of no reply from either Admiral Block or Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall any, no sir. As I say, there may have been a reply which I never saw.

Mr. Murphy. Did you feel particularly concerned about sabotage at Hawaii? Would you consider it one of the major problems out there?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, I thing so. We had a very large Jap population, and we knew from our intelligence reports that there were a number of very strongly patriotic Japanese there as well as the general run of Japanese of whom we could not be certain.

Subsequently, a large majority of them were found to be very loyal, and an excellent regiment came from there, as I understand. Our suspect records showed from 300 to 500 Japanese that we regarded as definitely dangerous, and 500 as potentially dangerous.

Then we knew that there were a number of consular agents in the employ of the Japanese Government.

Mr. Murphy. Did you think that the situation at Hawaii was such that the efforts of the authorities there should be concentrated on sabotage to the neglect of [4785] avoiding the danger from air attack and from submarine attack?
Admiral Wilkinson. My judgment would be that nothing should be neglected, that sabotage should be guarded against, but should not be guarded against as the sole objective, although it was the most immediately probable one.

The potential forces were actually present for that.

Mr. Murphy. I have one last question, Admiral.

Did you ever, within a year prior to December 7, 1941, ever hear anyone in the Navy say that the fleet was insecure at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. That the fleet was what?

Mr. Murphy. That the fleet was insecure at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Wilkinson. I was there until May. I saw some of the maneuvers. I myself was not convinced that the antiaircraft defenses provided on the islands would stop a large raid. I was not convinced that they would be adequate. I think there was always the possibility in all of our minds that an attack could be made. I do not know that we could say definitely the fleet was insecure, but that a full and adequate protection, which would, of course, be difficult to achieve to 100 percent was not available to the extent that we would like, either in air [4786] craft to defend the place by counter-attack against air or antiaircraft guns.

Mr. Murphy. Would the fleet have been more secure at Lahaina Roads than it was in the harbor itself?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I would say less secure.

Mr. Murphy. If the fleet had been taken out of the harbor and taken to Lahaina Roads, and we had the same experience in the amount of damage that we had at Pearl Harbor, we would have had more ships at the bottom of the ocean, wouldn’t we?

Admiral Wilkinson. We would have had that and also we would have the exposure to submarine attacks. Pearl Harbor was fairly secure against submarines. Quite secure, in fact.

Mr. Murphy. We would have had the same danger from air attack and less danger from submarine attack by being in the harbor as compared to Lahaina Roads?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say so. The only advantage of Lahaina Roads would be that the ships could get under way and stand out together, whereas they had to do so separately in Pearl Harbor.

On the other hand there would be more exposure to submarines and less protection from antiaircraft guns.

Mr. Murphy. Assuming that the Japanese had been able [4787] to have the same number of carriers and other equipment, the same number of planes, and that the Fleet were at Puget Sound or at San Pedro, and the Japs succeeded in making a sneak attack, would the fleet have been any more secure at either of those places than it was at Pearl Harbor, assuming a sneak attack?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say rather less so. I don’t think the antiaircraft protection, assuming it was in action, was as complete at either of those places.

Of course, the Japanese fleet would have further to go to get there, and at Long Beach the ships would have moved out more readily. Puget Sound, certainly, in Bremerton, they could not.

Mr. Murphy. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster of Maine will inquire.
Senator Brewster. Admiral, how long had Admiral Kirk been in the Intelligence Division before you came in, do you recall?
Admiral Wilkinson. Admiral Kirk?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. I think from March 1 to October 15, of 1941. Senator Brewster. He was just there for practically 6 months?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. Who was there before him?
Admiral Wilkinson. Admiral Anderson had been there and left about the first of January. Captain James, the former assistant director was acting director for 2 months.
Senator Brewster. How long was Admiral Anderson there?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think about 2 years.
Senator Brewster. Had there been any established tour of duty in that position?
Admiral Wilkinson. Not specifically. Usually officers on a shore duty tour will remain in fixed positions from 2 to 3 years. Captain Kirk went to sea before the expiration of his tour in order to obtain an opportunity for a command which was open at the time, and I did not remain similarly. It was wartime, and I had a very promising job.

Senator Brewster. You much preferred to get to sea?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I think that is what most of us would like to do.
Senator Brewster. Officers do not welcome shore duty?
Admiral Wilkinson. Well, I think we are interested in them, but we like to practice our profession at sea.
The Vice Chairman. Would you mind a word, there, Senator? I believe while the Senator had to be away General Marshall testified that everybody in the War Department wanted to get assigned to duty with troops. So I imagine that applied to the Navy, too.
Senator Brewster. I can quite understand that.
Admiral, could you give your estimate of the importance of Naval Intelligence as a function of the Navy?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think it is quite important, sir.
Senator Brewster. I think so, too. I think that all events have demonstrated it. And what impresses one is the change here in this most critical period in our history. Men remained for less than a year and had had, as I understand it, no previous experience in this field.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Senator Brewster. Do you know whether any steps had been taken to see that more trained personnel in the higher echelons were made available in this field?
Admiral Wilkinson. Usually, Senator, officers with considerable previous experience in intelligence were placed there.
Senator Brewster. But that was not true.
Admiral Wilkinson. I cannot account for my having been appointed to it, although I was pleased at the appointment, despite the fact that it took me from my battleship, because I considered it a responsible position, and felt complimented to be chosen for it. But in general the officers who have been there have had duty abroad and in intelligence work. Captain Kirk had been naval attaché in
London, and Admiral Anderson in London and I think somewhere else. And other officers in that position have normally had experience under that office before they became the head of it.

Senator Brewster. But you welcomed the release from those duties yourself, as you have indicated, in your transfer back to your battle-ship assignment.

Admiral Wilkinson. I was interested in both jobs, sir. I was very much interested in the work but I wanted to have a command at sea.

Senator Brewster. Do you know what became of Captain Zacharias?

Admiral Wilkinson. He is—I saw him in Washington a few days ago.

Senator Brewster. I mean at that time, where was he?

Admiral Wilkinson. He was in command of a cruiser, I think, in the Pacific.

Senator Brewster. He had had rather extensive experience in appraising Japanese psychology, did he not?

Admiral Wilkinson. I understand Admiral Kirk made every effort to get him back into Naval Intelligence after Admiral King came to Washington, and he was shortly so ordered.

Senator Brewster. Yes. Had he been at one time Chief of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Brewster. Never had been?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. He had been on duty in the office, however.

Senator Brewster. He spent a great deal of time studying the Japanese situation and was a Japanese language student of rather extraordinary attainment?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure but I think he had been a language student and became naval attaché.

Senator Brewster. And he was used for the Japanese language broadcasts as a result of his familiarity with the language?

Admiral Wilkinson. I understand quite effectively.

Senator Brewster. Now, in the situation at Honolulu there was a great deal of construction work going on during 1940 to 1941, was there not, in the Pearl Harbor base?

Admiral Wilkinson. Quite a little, sir. The navy yard, building of drydocks, and building of quarters.

Senator Brewster. So there were a good many thousands of civilian employees in the Pearl Harbor base day by day, were there not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And who was responsible for screening them to determine as to their reliability?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure of the precise direct responsibility. The commandant of the navy yard and his industrial manager were interested. Our Naval Intelligence, the district of Captain Mayfield, in conjunction with the FBI, were very much interested. And, I fancy, it was those two that were consulted or who checked on the employment of civilian employees.

Senator Brewster. I would rather not have your fancy, but I would rather have what you know as to who was responsible and what steps were taken, if any.
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know. I do know that the FBI and the District Intelligence officer were screening everyone out there.

Senator Brewster. But you do not know who was specifically responsible in the naval establishment or the FBI for that screening?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Brewster. I speak of this from personal experience in visiting there in December 1940 when I was impressed and somewhat amazed at the thousands of Orientals circulating there, particularly in the Pearl Harbor naval base, at which time I asked the contractors what they knew about these people and they said, “Nothing, except that they were supposed to be American citizens.”

It was obvious that unless they had a very considerable staff that it would be difficult to know about this considerable number of people who had complete access to all the Pearl Harbor facilities so far as my observation was concerned. You were serving there during some of that period?

Admiral Wilkinson. I was serving there on ships. I was not detached to shore. It is my recollection that no [4794] employees of Japanese blood were out there in the latter days prior to the attack, were allowed to be employed. I think, however, Chinese were.

Senator Brewster. Well, at what time, if you know, was the ban on people of Japanese extraction imposed?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know. I would recollect it was 6 months to a year prior to the attack.

Senator Brewster. Well, you were not there, were you, after May of 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Brewster. And would not know whether or not it was in effect then?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think it was in effect before May.

Senator Brewster. Will you verify that in the records if possible?

Admiral Wilkinson. If I can, sir.

Senator Brewster. And I would like also to have this information about who was responsible for that screening.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Now, when did you first see the report of General Martin regarding the air defenses of Hawaii, and which I think was concurred in by Admiral Bellinger, that was issued under date of August 20, 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. Very recently.

[4795] Senator Brewster. You never saw that while you were Chief of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Brewster. Wasn’t that rather unusual that it did not come to your attention?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. As I said, the activities relating to our own war plans and our own movements of forces and preparations were not under my division and they were not brought to my attention. There was a good deal of insistence in the department upon the value of security and the knowledge of war plans was closely held and there was no necessity, it was felt, and I agreed, that my division in a large number of people or in a small number should know, and I was sometimes told in conversation, but there was no system set up whereby any documents were sent to my office or even to myself.
Senator Brewster. Well, in a correlation of naval intelligence as to a possible attack wouldn't it be rather essential that there should be pretty complete collaboration between your agency of Naval Intelligence and the other preparations for defense?

Admiral Wilkinson. There would be a desirability that we should know what they were doing or planning to do but the balance between the possible loss of security by extending the knowledge against the necessity of our knowing, was inclined toward not telling us.

You recall Admiral King's favorite maxim that "only those who need to know," and while it would have been desirable, I cannot say that it was necessary.

Senator Brewster. Well, the most valuable possession which we had in the Pacific was the fleet, was it not? You perhaps agree with that as a naval officer.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; because it was not static.

Senator Brewster. Yes. Because the military establishments were primarily for the purpose of defense of the fleet based in the port for security. That is what we got Pearl Harbor for, as a naval defense.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And the defense of Pearl Harbor, it has already been pointed out, was in order to make it possible for the fleet effectively to function in that vast ocean, was it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say certainly 75 to 90 percent of its purpose was that, but it was also, of course, a defensive feature for our own territory. It belonged to us and we would naturally defend it.

Senator Brewster. You knew, in the latter part of November and early December, as Chief of Naval Intelligence, that you had lost contact with important elements of the Japanese fleet?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And yet you had no knowledge as to what steps were being taken by your reconnaissance in the vicinity of this fleet, of the American fleet, to see that these carriers might not be approaching for a strike?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Well, doesn't that impress—it impresses, perhaps I should say, a layman, as a lack of correlation that, here, you as Navy Intelligence, knew you had lost some Jap carriers and yet you had no knowledge as to whether other parts of our services, military or naval, were taking necessary steps to see that our fleet was not exposed to a sneak attack.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. We would have received the information of any discoveries made by searches from any of our operating forces but we were not told of the searches which of themselves were made. In other words, we did not know whether a search was being made from Midway or Johnston or Hawaii, but we would have received information of any discoveries that such searches had made.

Senator Brewster. And in your function to protect the security of this fleet it was not within your function or scope to recommend to anyone that it might be wise to carry out aerial reconnaissance to protect the fleet?

Admiral Wilkinson. My function was to utilize the material which was received. I should have desired to have received more material and I might well have been well advised to urge actual operations to
secure the information although, as a matter of fact, those operations would not be within my province to order, but I might well have urged their being made.

Senator Brewster. That is, you could have——

Admiral Wilkinson. It was not my function, however, to do so but I might well have done it.

Senator Brewster. Yes. You could have volunteered the suggestion but it was not a part of your responsibility or function?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Do you know whether as a result of this experience any steps have been taken to change that system of functioning, as to whether or not Naval Intelligence today would recognize that as part of its responsibility?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not believe they have, sir. I do not know that specifically, I do not know that.

Senator Brewster. Wouldn't Pearl Harbor argue rather persuasively that it might be a good idea and that when they [4799] lose track of an enemy fleet that it might be well to be sure that our fleet was not going to be approached without warning so far as the aerial reconnaissance might disclose?

Admiral Wilkinson. Surely, yes, sir; but you see there is a distinction between the operations of the forces in the field, that is to say, the fleets, and the operations of the officers in Washington. Now, the fleet collects and is normally responsible for what we term combat intelligence; that is to say, sending out a scouting line or sending out a reconnaissance fleet of planes. They collect that information and that is sent to Washington.

Senator Brewster. Let me interrupt you. Would that be true in time of peace?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think that would be true in time of peace, yes.

Senator Brewster. Thank you.

Admiral Wilkinson. And the fleet collects the combat information, or in the absence of combat, the operational intelligence we might call it, and the office at home would not prescribe to the fleet the precise measures to be taken to get that. I think we have sent, not the intelligence of itself, but operations on the recommendations of intelligence have sent information out saying, "Please find out what you can about such a thing," and, in fact, you will recall that operations [4800] told Admiral Hart to please send the scouting fleets over the South China Sea for several days to give us the information.

Now, that is the operational intelligence which is conducted by the forces in the fleet and might be initiated by them or might be initiated by the operational side rather than the intelligence side of the department proper. In that particular instance of the force of planes over the South China Sea, I do not believe I made such a recommendation but I would have been prepared to join in it. I think Admiral Turner probably initiated that.

Senator Brewster. Well, then, as I gather, that would be the responsibility of someone higher up in correlating your reports as to the missing fleet and the protection of our fleet, to see to it that these operational surveys were carried out?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say so, yes, sir, except that I might say, of course, at any time I was free to recommend.
Senator Brewster. Yes. Now, what about the submarine that it has been alleged circulated in Pearl Harbor in the early morning before the attack? What knowledge have you regarding that?

Admiral Wilkinson. None before the attack. I have the information afterward.

[4801] Senator Brewster. I am not asking you before. I am asking you now. What is your information as to what happened there?

Admiral Wilkinson. It is my understanding that submarine contact was made several hours before the attack and that it was in the restricted waters, and that two of our vessels attacked it, and believed that from the absence of subsequent sound indications, believed that they sank it.

Senator Brewster. When you speak of the restricted area, how extensive was that?

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, very limited: I think 5 or not more than 10 miles, at least, off the entrance to Pearl Harbor.

Senator Brewster. I am asking more particularly about another submarine beside the one that you speak of which you think was sunk off the entrance to Pearl Harbor, about one that was supposed to have circulated through Pearl Harbor and gone out, and an officer from which submarine they captured near one of the points in Oahu.

Admiral Wilkinson. I have asked about that, sir, and I think the best opinion now is that that map, that was supposed to indicate that the submarine had been in and come out, was an indication of the chart, of the track that it proposed to follow, and that there was no definite confirmation [4802] in any way that it ever had been in.

Senator Brewster. What became of that Jap officer?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir.

Senator Brewster. Did you ever examine him?

Admiral Wilkinson. The chart?

Senator Brewster. No, the Jap officer who was captured?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not examine him.

Senator Brewster. The Jap officer, as I understood you, that had the chart.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not examine him.

Senator Brewster. Did anyone from Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think he was examined in Hawaii. I am not sure.

Senator Brewster. Did you have a copy of the report on that?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall. I think we did.

Senator Brewster. What did you base your opinion on that this was not an actual chart of an operation?

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, on recent discussion with Captain McCollum, who examined the chart carefully and who had been familiar with the testimony of the officer, I believe.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Counsel, was there a request ever made for a copy of the examination of that Japanese officer?

Mr. Murphy. I believe the record—

[4803] Mr. Gesell. None has been made.

Mr. Mitchell. None has been made that I remember.
Mr. Murphy. I believe the record will show there was a question asked as to whether or not he was available and Admiral Inglis said he would look into it, into the whole matter.

Senator Brewster. Did you mention the examining data?

Mr. Murphy. I don't remember.

Senator Brewster. I think that would be most significant. I would like to have it. I am not prepared to say at this time that we should examine the Jap officer and have him testify, but I think the examination by the Army and Navy Intelligence would be very pertinent.

Mr. Murphy. I don't mean to say that there was a request for him to testify. I asked if he was still alive or what happened to him and I don't know whether I requested the report, but if it is available we should have it.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. If you will permit me, I think the Admiral stated that his opinion at it came from Captain McCollum, and I believe Captain McCollum is listed as a witness. Is that right, counsel?

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, hasn't counsel furnished us with some information on this point? I have made a request and I think they furnished us with information that was very meager.

Mr. Mitchell. There have been so many discussions that my memory fails me. I have no recollection of that at this time.

Senator Ferguson. I think they reported to me that it was very meager, they had no definite information. Isn't that right?

Mr. Gesell. I think that is correct, Senator. We will check it.

The Vice Chairman. And isn't it correct that Captain McCollum is listed as a witness?

Mr. Gesell. Yes; it is.

The Vice Chairman. Well, if he gave the Admiral that information he might be in a position to help us.

Admiral Wilkinson. I think he can tell you on what he based his interpretation that he discussed with me.

Senator Brewster. Is that a matter in which there is complete concurrence between the Army Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, and the FBI as far as you know?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir.

Senator Brewster. Do you know who captured this fellow? That is, was it the Army, or the Navy, or the FBI?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know. My recollection is he landed at Bellows Field, and if that is the same one, he was captured there by the Army.

Senator Brewster. Did you have occasion to look into the communication from the destroyers who sank the submarine outside of Pearl Harbor and communicated this to the shore, did you have occasion to look into that at all to know how long it took?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. I have seen a good many since, subsequently, but I have no direct knowledge.

Senator Brewster. Did you have any contract with any of the fishing fleets operating off of Pearl Harbor there through your Naval Intelligence? Did you have operators in that field?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not understand, sir.
Senator Brewster. The fishing fleets operating off of Pearl Harbor were very extensive.

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, yes. Our District Intelligence officer was very much—was very directly concerned in that fishing fleet and we had laid down a number of restrictions which were carried out by the local Coast Guard, but inspired by us, as to the removal of all Japanese aliens from the boats, the registration of the boats, limiting them to certain hours and certain areas and the removal of radio apparatus. They were under thorough control and restriction for some time prior to the attack.

Senator Brewster. Have you testified as to how many operators you had in Naval Intelligence in Hawaii? Have you given us those figures?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not, specifically. I can readily obtain it. I gave the figures for the fleet as a whole.

Senator Brewster. Yes. Will you give us those that were in Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Senator Brewster. And did I make it clear, that I would like that report of the examination of the Jap submarine officer, if there were any examination, and if it is available.

Did I understand you to say, Admiral, that the Grew message of January 1941, regarding a possible Jap attack on Pearl Harbor, did not come to your attention prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it, sir.

Senator Brewster. That was not a matter of any discussion or concern in the Intelligence Department during the period that you served from October to December?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it. It might have been mentioned.

Senator Brewster. You spoke about the number of consular agents in Hawaii by the Japanese. There were a rather unusual number, were there not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Do you remember how many?

Admiral Wilkinson. There had been quite a discussion about that. There was, of course, a law in effect that all agents in the employ of foreign nations should register and they had not been required to register, and the commandant of the District and our Intelligence officer were very anxious to get them under control, and there had been some correspondence back and forth about it.

Senator Brewster. Do you remember how many there were?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I would say in the order of about 50, perhaps more.

Senator Brewster. Are you sure it was not 150?

Admiral Wilkinson. No; I am not sure; at least 50 of them.

Senator Brewster. I think counsel can inform you that it was more. I think it ran up to an amazing number for so comparatively small an area.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. We were trying to make them comply with the law but there was some instruction put in about any rigid steps conflicting with the efforts made to assure the loyalty of the
remaining Japanese. On December the 6th we said we hoped to get some decision in a month, I believe.

Senator Brewster. Did you have any reason to suspect, during the period between October and December 7, 1941 when you were functioning as Director of Naval Intelligence, that the Japs suspected that we were breaking any of their codes?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. I do not know specifically in that period but there had been a message which I recall somewhere around October, I think, that the Germans had informed the Japs that there were indications that we were breaking some of their codes. Several messages that were sent from Japan indicated that they wished their agents to be particularly careful in their reports to protect their codes.

Senator Brewster. Have you located the messages which contained those references to the German warning?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I can find one, sir.

Senator Brewster. I would like to ask counsel whether they have located those.

Mr. Gesell. No; we have not, the ones I believe the Senator refers to.

Senator Brewster. What steps have you taken?

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I refresh Mr. Gesell’s memory? I had a request in for such information and I am sure that my letter states definitely that there were no such codes—I mean no such messages. Do you recall that, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. Gesell. No; I do not.

Mr. Mitchell. I think there were one or two messages such as the Admiral speaks of in Exhibit 1.

Mr. Murphy. And there is also a reference in Matsuoka’s message to Hitler that might lead to such an inference.

Mr. Gesell. I thought the Senator was referring to ones other than in the exhibit.

Senator Ferguson. I am. The letter maybe might refresh you.

Senator Brewster. Well, I have a letter from Mr. Mitchell saying that there was no evidence that the Japanese had any knowledge that we were breaking their codes or suspected it, and that the evidence was all to the contrary. Do you recall that letter, Mr. Mitchell?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. That is based on a report from the department of whom we made inquiry.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. I did not know it, personally. I forwarded to you their report.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. But I think there are one or two messages in exhibit 1 that makes the same report, that the Japs were at one time fearful of certain ones of their codes being broken.

Senator Brewster. Well, I have one here, and it is dated the 23d day of June 1941, from Tokyo to Mexico. It appears on page 122 of the intercepts, concerning military installations, ship movements, and so forth and it says:

Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their #62* from Panama to me, mentioned the question of a trip, get in touch with them regarding date and time of arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be vigilant. There are also some suspicions that they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any telegrams exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple.)
Now, that, of course, is squarely in conflict with the report which apparently the Navy Department gave you, is it not, indicating that at least the Japanese suspected that we were breaking their code.

Mr. Mitchell. I assume the Navy kept right on cracking them, so we can assume the Japs did not know that. I suppose that is why they made that statement. Obviously that one message contains a suspicion that we might be.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. But we kept right on breaking them, and I assume that, if the Japs had known we had broken them they would have fixed them up.


Mr. Mitchell. Well, you asked me if they were not in conflict?

Senator Brewster. Yes, and you agreed that it is. Now, the intercepts run from July 1 to December 7 and I asked some time ago for the earlier intercepts, after I was refused permission to examine the files, as I was reliably informed that there were five telegrams which made very specific reference to this matter of which the admiral now speaks, that the Germans had apparently discovered something of this kind and communicated it to the Japanese in this interchange of messages between Berlin and Tokyo regarding this and in this matter—I am simply citing reports which the admiral confirms now, or at least intimates in his reference to the Germans, I say I am at least surprised that the Navy would give you the information that there was nothing to indicate this, if there are four or five messages of this character in their files.

Mr. Mitchell. To be specific, do I understand you would like to have any intercepts back to January 1, 1941 of this type that indicate the suspicion, is that what you are interested in?

[\#3138] Senator Brewster. Well, I certainly am, but I also call attention to my letter of November 15, in which I acknowledge the receipt of these intercepts from July 1, to December 8, and added I would greatly appreciate if you would send me another copy of this material, as well as a copy of all such intercepted messages between January 1 and July 1, 1941.

To that, I, as far as I know, have received no reply. That was a month ago.

I think you will remember, Mr. Mitchell, 10 days ago, in executive session, I spoke of this matter as a matter that I thought was of considerable interest, in view of the very great emphasis which had been placed on the complete ignorance of the Japanese of the fact that we were breaking their code.

Mr. Mitchell. I understand what you are especially interested in is the messages that have to do with the question of whether the Japs suspected our cracking the code. It is so much easier to get results if we know what we are after. I am just asking you the question, to get an indication as to what you are really interested in.

Senator Brewster. I think my interest has been made manifest also in a letter to you in which I asked specifically whether there was anything to indicate the Japs had either knowledge or suspicion that we were breaking their codes, and your reply, based on the Navy Department's information, was that there was nothing to indicate either, and your reply was that all the evidence was to the contrary.
Mr. Mitchell. That is exactly the report as it was given to us. I never asked them what their evidence was, but I assumed it was a fact because we kept on breaking the code, indicating that the Japs were not aware of it. I will get from the Navy just what the basis of that report is. I do not know.

Senator Brewster. You just heard Admiral Wilkinson testify that he understood there were indications that Berlin had given the Japanese a tip on this. I think it is unfortunate that the Navy should have given you a report of this character, if what Admiral Wilkinson says now is correct.

Mr. Murphy. That is two or three times that the statement is in the record.

Senator Brewster. I can quite understand the concern of the gentleman over anything which seems in any way to be in conflict here, but I think it is a rather important point, on which great emphasis has been laid, and I would like to know whether or not these messages exist. It is [4814] very significant to me that the intercepts were given us back to July 1 when these messages apparently occurred, in May and June. I have been trying for more than a month to get them. I spoke to counsel about this in the executive session 10 days ago, and now I am advised that they would like to know just what it is I am after.

Mr. Murphy. You are using that microphone rather loudly. This is three times that that statement is in the record now.

The Vice Chairman. I think counsel understand, Senator. I am sure they will continue to cooperate in every way possible.

Are there any other questions of Admiral Wilkinson?

Senator Brewster. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have further questions of Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have a memo that I would like to refer to the counsel, and might refresh their memory. It is dated the 17th of November, and signed by Mr. Mitchell. It was received by me November 17 at 3 p.m.

(The document referred to was handed to Mr. Mitchell.)

Mr. Mitchell. That is the same thing, I think, to which Senator Brewster just referred.

Senator Brewster. You gave me the same answer?


Senator Ferguson. Has this been put in the record?

Mr. Mitchell. No.

Senator Ferguson. I will put this in the record. It is dated November 17, 1945.

Memorandum to Senator Ferguson:

With reference to your letter of November 16th, requesting "all information that any of the Services or the Government had that Japan knew that we had broken their code", there is no information or indication that Japan ever knew it. All information would indicate the contrary.

Now, Mr. Chairman, that indicates that Mr. Mitchell signed it, and the initials in the lower left-hand corner are "WDM/CBN."

That would indicate, Mr. Chairman, it was answered the day following the request for that information. I requested it on the 16th, and the letter came on the 17th.

Mr. Mitchell. I have been sitting here wondering just what the special significance and the importance in this inquiry is the question
of whether prior to June 1941, or at any time, the Japs suspected that we were cracking their code. I confess it would help me a bit to work this thing out, if I knew just what bearing it has on the case.

I am probably dumb about it, but I do not quite grasp it. [4816] I have an idea that maybe that attitude may have had something to do with the fact that maybe I did not follow up your request as diligently as I otherwise would.

Senator Brewster. I should be very happy to give you what is in my apparently simple mentality. The first thing which has interested me a great deal on this particular episode, Mr. Mitchell, is if what Admiral Wilkinson now says is correct, then the Navy has not been giving you complete or accurate information when they tell you there was nothing to indicate that the Japs knew or suspected that we were breaking their codes.

That has been, as you know, a matter in which I had some concern about your previous willingness to submit the data.

As I said to you and others, that was the first point of my interest in this episode.

Mr. Mitchell. You made that request before the Admiral made that statement. I am trying to get back to your point of view as to the materiality of that in this hearing.

Senator Brewster. I am coming to that.

Mr. Mitchell. All right.

Senator Brewster. The second point, I had thought that one of the very outstanding matters that had been [4817] emphasized here, and in fact you yourself examined General Marshall at great length regarding this very matter in connection with the Dewey episode, that a great state secret existing here was magic, and that the Japs had no knowledge or suspicion that we were breaking their codes, and apparently very great importance has been attached to that throughout this hearing.

If there is anything to indicate that is not so, we must all, to some extent, revise our estimate of the situation in the light of that possibility or probability. At least that is my observation in all this evidence. I cannot otherwise reconcile the whole Dewey episode.

Now, if, back in May or June 1941, there were messages indicating that the Japs suspected that this was happening, if it was of great importance, I cannot understand why this has not been developed. I cannot understand why the Navy will tell you there was nothing to indicate it. If it is not of any importance, why do not they just simply give us the facts and the messages, and if it is of importance, and there is any suggestion of concealment, that is something we must take into account.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I might say, the gentleman from Maine has been absent for some days. Yesterday we spent 20 minutes on tirades in connection with the Republican [4818] National Committee, and now we have spent 20 minutes in trying counsel, talking about the Dewey episode. I suggest that we talk about Pearl Harbor; I suggest that we proceed to inquire as to what happened at Pearl Harbor.

The Vice Chairman. I am sure the counsel understand the gentleman’s request now, and I hope we can move along.
Senator Brewster. I certainly will be most pleased to. I am not at all surprised that the gentleman from Pennsylvania is considerably concerned over the necessity of my replying to the question of counsel. I have been rather patient myself, and perhaps it is just as well, and this will clarify it.

The Vice Chairman. I think it does, Senator. I have heard every witness who has testified, and my clear impression is that the remark just made by Admiral Wilkinson is the first intimation that has come out in the course of this hearing that the Japanese had ever suspected that their code might have been broken. I know other witnesses have been asked the question whether there was anything to indicate that Japan had ever suspected that the code had been broken, and their testimony was that there was nothing to indicate it, until just at this moment when Admiral Wilkinson had made the remark in response to the question, and I think that is the first intimation that has come to the committee [4819] that anybody thought Japan might have had any knowledge that the code had been broken.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for that observation, and I hope you agree with me that this does have a distinct relevance in establishing it.

The Vice Chairman. Of course, if the Senator wants information, I am sure counsel will cooperate in every possible way to secure it, and to give it to the Senator when it is secured.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I just say I do not think we have wasted time this morning on this question as to whether or not counsel is able to obtain for us immediately upon our request information material to the matter that we have before us. I think as to whether or not the services are obtaining the information for us is very vital to this hearing. Now, if we have a request in on the 16th day of November for certain material and that is material that is in the files, and then the fact that we get a reply immediately on the 17th of November, and we wait until the 18th day of December and do not have that information, that question is very vital to the thing that we are trying. Are we getting the cooperation of the services or are we merely here taking what the services desire to give us?

[4820] That is the question.
I raised it on the floor and I raise it again here.
That is very vital to this case. Are we getting what they want to give us, when they want to give it to us, or are they going to give it to us because it is material to this issue as we request it?

[4821] Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I interpose for a moment?
The Vice Chairman. Does the Senator yield?
Senator Brewster. Yes, I will yield.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster yields.
Mr. Keefe. About the request for information and the speed with which it has returned, I have asked time and again for information and some of those requests were propounded in the first 2 or 3 days of this hearing.
In one instance it was promised to me in 2 days in respect to one request, and to date I have only received one or two responses of any kind to any request I have made.
You will recall that on the second or third day of these hearings I asked Admiral Inglis in respect to the condition of the fleet, in respect to her fighting ability, on the 7th day of December when it was in the harbor. He told me that the California was practically hors de combat because of an inspection and because of boxed ammunition. The noon hour intervened, and when he came back he said they were investigating it and he would report to me immediately, and to date I have received no report on the ships, except what has come to me from letters from men on the ships, and who know, who were in a position to know, whether their fighting condition was reduced because of open voids and the boxing of ammunition, and the type of inspection that was carried on. That is one thing.

While we were quizzing the Admiral, Admiral Inglis in this room, I made a request on Friday and the material was promised me for Monday, and that request has not been complied with.

I can go on and read the list from my notes—I haven't got my notes here—but I have made at least 25 requests and I am sure only 2 or 3 of which have been complied with. I wanted the information for the purpose of interrogation of witnesses at the proper time.

I have been told that they have liaison committees in the State Department, in the War Department and Navy Department who are standing by all the time to get the information just as rapidly as it is humanly possible to get it. Now one month goes by and although you have made an important request there is no intimation from counsel at all as to whether or not that request had been looked into.

We cannot help but wonder as to what is the cause of this great delay. That has caused me great exasperation and I can only say we have been receiving spoon-fed evidence. If we have the information certainly we will be in a better position to conduct an intelligent cross-examination.

That is all I want to say at this time.

Mr. Mitchell. May I be permitted to say something?

Mr. Mitchell. In regard to your request for the condition of the ships on Pearl Harbor Day, when they were inspected and open and all that sort of thing, I think we have already brought in some data on that. I think it was during your absence within the last few days. The Vice Chairman. Last Saturday.

Mr. Gearhart. I was sick in bed one day. The report came to the committee when I was absent one day. I wonder why that was done.

The Vice Chairman. That was done on Saturday when, unfortunately, the gentleman from California was unavoidably absent, and we regret that. The counsel made a report to the committee, which sat for about an hour longer than we had expected, for counsel to make a report to the committee on various requests that had been made during the hearing by the different members of the committee.

During the course of that report to the committee I recall that quite a number of the things requested by the gentleman from California were presented and included in the record. If the gentleman will examine the record of last Saturday, the day on which he was unable to be here, I think he will find at least responses to many of his requests, and the counsel made the statement that the information that was not being submitted at that time and that had been requested would be submitted as quickly as it could be secured.
The counsel gave us a rather exhaustive report along that line last Saturday. I am sure that many of the requests made by the gentleman from California were complied with in the course of that report.

Mr. Gearhart. May I inquire as to whether or not the chart I requested showing the numerical readiness of the fleet in the Pacific, that I asked of Admiral Inglis, was mentioned?

Mr. Mitchell. There are so many of these that I cannot pick from memory the generality. We have been engaged in the last week checking up from the transcript to be sure that everything that was asked for orally here in the past will be submitted.

Mr. Gearhart. I requested a chart showing the number of ships that were in the Pacific on May 1 and the transfers from that fleet to the Atlantic, and the augmentations from ship construction, and then I also asked for that information for the Atlantic Ocean as well, in chart form, and Admiral Inglis said he would have it 2 days later.

I have been told—information has come to me from reliable sources—that that report has already been submitted to counsel. Can counsel verify it?

[4825] Mr. Mitchell. I have no recollection of seeing it. I will find out during the noon hour if it is in our files.

The Vice Chairman. I do recall, Mr. Gearhart, you made the request about the Boise. That was included in the record last Saturday, and I am sure counsel will have the gentleman’s request checked and every effort will be made to comply with his request.

Senator Brewster. May I just ask that Admiral Wilkinson will check on those cablegrams, the intercepts during the noon hour so we can get this thing clarified?

Admiral Wilkinson. My only recollection was a dispatch from Berlin, I think to Tokyo, indicating that the Germans thought we might be reading the Japanese codes and warning them about it.

Senator Brewster. I understood there were five messages on this subject between Tokyo and Washington. I would like to have a complete file.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, you understand the Senator’s request?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. You will make every effort to comply with it?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record note that not one question was asked the witness in the last half hour.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o’clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[4827] Afternoon Session—2 p. m.

Testimony of Rear Admiral Theodore Stark Wilkinson
(Resumed)

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. Senator Brewster will resume his inquiry.

Senator Brewster. Admiral, were you able to secure those wires during the recess? I think they were radiograms.
Admiral Wilkinson. I have not been able to locate it to date. The liaison officer for the Navy Department has made the specific inquiry for that dispatch. I have talked to my predecessor, Admiral Kirk, who says he recalls it as a message from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to the home office in Tokyo, that the German Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop had advised him that there were indications that the Americans were breaking Japanese codes.

I may state, of course, that there were a number of codes, some of which are relatively simple and can be readily broken, others are more complex, and the very reading of one code would not be any assurance that others or the entire bulk of them were being broken. The only indication would be with respect to such a message that we were at least attacking their codes.

I do know that in the late fall, in the early fall and the late fall, we had some worries about the Japanese finding that out and the Japanese suspicions, although we did not believe from the tenor of their dispatches that they were convinced at all that we were breaking them, and those worries occasioned our tightening up of security concerning intercepts and occasioned our being particularly careful about broadening in any degree the text or even knowledge obtained from the text of such messages.

Senator Brewster. When you say there are different codes, how frequently are they changed ordinarily?

Admiral Wilkinson. Again it is a matter for a communicator to give expert knowledge, but there is in general, I understand, two types of concealed message. One is a code and the other is a cipher applicable to that code. The code is contained in a book and to change it you have to issue another book. The cipher may be changed from day to day and often is.

You must first break the cipher on any message before you can tell what the concealed message is and then you must have the code to know what the words which have now been derived, or the groups which have now been derived, mean under that code.

Answering your question directly then, the ciphers were very frequently changed, sometimes from day to day, and the codes would not be changed so often, perhaps once a month or even a year or more.

Senator Brewster. How many are they likely to have in use at any one time? How many would they be likely to have in use at any one time, of codes as distinct from the ciphers?

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, perhaps 10 or 12: A diplomatic code, a naval attaché’s code, a military, a consular, some very secret codes for each of those and some day to day codes.

Senator Brewster. And the interpretation of any one was dependent either upon breaking it as you did or upon having the code book to enable you to easily translate it?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. And the knowledge that we were attacking a code would not be particularly significant as it is more or less of an international practice. The knowledge that we had succeeded in breaking some of the simpler codes would not be particularly significant. If they knew definitely we had broken their most secret codes it would be a matter of great concern.

Senator Brewster. It is not considered that there is anything particularly reprehensible in this practice, is it? Isn’t it a rather well-
recognized practice in the international code of morality that that is done by all governments in the interest of their national security?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think so. I do not think that governments are particularly desirous to admit it, but I think it has been done in the past, sir.


Admiral Wilkinson. Whether it is being continued today in all countries I do not know.

Senator Brewster. Wasn’t there a rather conspicuous case in our own history during and after the last war about certain translations that were made in time of peace?

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is not authentic at all but I know that in the last war we did have a so-called Black Chamber.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. And that sometime after the last war I believe the then Secretary of State decided that he would abolish it completely and all such activities on our part were then discontinued for a time.

The Vice Chairman. If you will permit me, Senator, you and the Senator were both referring to the last war. You are talking about World War I?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, World War I. This one is too recent to be known as the last war.

The Vice Chairman. Well, both of them are last wars now.

Senator Brewster. Was that discontinued at that time when Henry L. Stimson was Secretary of State?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know.

[4831] Senator Brewster. I think it was.

Now, have counsel been able to secure any further information about these messages? Have they made any inquiries from the Navy Department about it?

Mr. Mitchell. They are hard at work, and so is the Army.

Admiral Wilkinson. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest a change in the stenographic record of yesterday at this point?

The Vice Chairman. Yes, go ahead. That won’t disturb you, will it, Senator?

Senator Brewster. No.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral Wilkinson. On page 4575, referring to the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence regarding probable intentions of the enemy, in the middle of the page, the record shows that my answer to a question was:

I did not so understand, and I have the information, as I said, from my predecessor, my discussion with Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Operations, and just this morning from Admiral Kirk, also my predecessor.

That last phrase should read, “and just this morning I have received a dispatch from Admiral James who was a predecessor in turn of my predecessor, Admiral Kirk, to that effect.”

[4832] The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your correction?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. In connection with the discussion of the answering of the questions, I believe, of Judge Clark, about the threat of
the American Navy on the flank of the Japanese operations, in replying to that you pointed out on page 4712 of your testimony:

Our navy was much smaller then than it was ultimately, and, in fact, at that time, it was smaller than the Japanese fleet in the Pacific.

How long had that condition prevailed so far as you know and on what were the comparisons made?

Admiral Wilkinson. Sir, our navy was smaller than the Japanese fleet in the Pacific. I meant, of course, our force in the Pacific itself.

Senator Brewster. Yes, I understand that.

Admiral Wilkinson. I think that had in general prevailed throughout the year of 1941 and the disparity had been somewhat increased by the necessity of sending ships to the Atlantic, one of which, in fact, was my ship, the battleship Mississippi, in May of 1941.

Senator Brewster. You brought that from Pearl Harbor to New York, or thereabouts?

[4833] Admiral Wilkinson. From Pearl Harbor to the Atlantic, and then I was operating on the Atlantic patrol until I came ashore to the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Senator Brewster. Were there other battleships moved at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Senator Brewster. What were they?

Admiral Wilkinson. The Idaho and New Mexico, as I remember it, one carrier and three or four cruisers and some eight destroyers.

Senator Brewster. And what was the relative rank of the two navies before that transfer, approximately?

Admiral Wilkinson. Of the navies as a whole or of the forces in the Pacific?

Senator Brewster. No; the Pacific Fleet and the Japanese Fleet.

Admiral Wilkinson. I would prefer to refer to Admiral Inglis' testimony on that subject. My impression is that there was a slight disparity against the United States force.

Senator Brewster. Even before that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. Even before that time.

[4834] Mr. Gesell. May I interpose, Senator?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. Congressman Gearhart raised before the recess the question of whether we had received a response to his request for a statement showing the relative strength of naval combatant units of various kinds in the Atlantic and Pacific on May 1, 1941, and December 7, 1941, including a comparison between the strength of our Navy, and, I believe, the Navies of Allied and potential enemy powers.

We have gotten that material. I handed a copy to Congressman Gearhart, and we have one copy for every member of the committee.

I interpose with it now because it relates directly to your question.

Senator Brewster. Would you want to put that in the record now so it may be available?

Mr. Gearhart. I would like to have it included in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Brewster. Will you offer it as an exhibit then?

Mr. Gesell. We will then offer this material as Exhibit 86, and perhaps we better have it spread upon the transcript so it will be available to every member of the committee.

The Vice Chairman. Yes. So ordered.
Senator Brewster. That will appear in the transcript tomorrow morning.

Mr. Gesell. Yes.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 86.")
(Exhibit 86 follows:)

**Naval combatant strength, Atlantic Ocean, May 1, 1941**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Vichy France</th>
<th>Other augmentations</th>
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<td>f 77</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>m 9</td>
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* Includes 2 over-age battleships, Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein.
* Includes damaged Duilio and Cavour, heavily damaged, resting on bottom.
* Includes damaged Bolza.
* Includes 5 ineffective light cruisers.
* Includes 2 ineffective destroyers.
* Includes 8 ineffective submarines.
* Includes 4 damaged or incomplete battleships.
* Included in Martinique.
* Includes 2 interned in Martinique.
* Includes 4 damaged or incomplete destroyers.
* Includes Yugoslavian Dalmacia and Dutch Gelderland.
* Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 1 Greek, and 5 Norwegian destroyers.
* Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 6 Dutch submarines.
* Estimated.

**Naval combatant strength, Atlantic Ocean, May 1, 1941**

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* Includes 3 battle cruisers.
* Includes 6 battleships damaged and under repair.
* Includes 1 escort carrier.
* Includes 1 large carrier damaged and under repair.
* Includes 5 heavy cruisers damaged and under repair.
* Estimated, no accurate figures available at this time.
* Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria.
* Interned at Alexandria.
* Includes 4 incomplete and 3 interned at Alexandria.
* Includes 1 incomplete and 1 interned at Alexandria.
* Includes Greek Georgios Acher.
* Includes Dutch Hoornskerck and Sumatra.
* Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers.
* Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish, and 1 Yugoslavian submarine.
### Naval combatant strength, Pacific Ocean, as of May 1, 1941

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### Naval combatant strength, Atlantic Ocean, Dec. 7, 1941

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- Includes 2 over-age battleships Schlesien and Schleswigholstein.
- Includes carriers heavily damaged but afloat.
- Includes damaged Bolzano and Gorizia.
- Includes damaged D’Aosta, Bande Nere, and Montecuccoli.
- Includes 34 damaged destroyers.
- Includes 20 damaged submarines.
- Includes 3 damaged or incomplete battleships.
- Carried at Martinique.
- Includes 2 carriers at Martinique.
- Includes 7 damaged or incomplete.
- Includes Yugoslavian Dalmacija and Dutch Gelderland.
- Includes 1 Greek, 5 Norwegian, and 3 Yugoslavian destroyers.
- Includes 6 Dutch, and 3 Yugoslavian submarines.
- Estimated.
**PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE**

**ALLIED**

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- Does not include North Carolina and Washington both on trials.
- Does not include Hornet on trials.
- Includes Long Island (escort carrier).
- Includes Jane, Atlanta, San Diego and San Juan carried on Atlantic Fleet lists but were not completed or commissioned and are not included.
- Includes 1 battle cruiser.
- Includes 1 damaged battle ship under repair.
- Includes 2 escort carriers.
- Includes 2 damaged aircraft carriers under repair.
- Includes 5 damaged heavy cruisers under repair.
- Estimated No accurate figures available.
- Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria.
- Interned at Alexandria.
- Includes 4 incomplete, 2 interned and 1 repairing.
- Includes 1 incomplete and 1 interned at Alexandria.
- Includes Greek Georgas Ateror.
- Includes Dutch Heemskerck and Sumatra.
- Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers.
- Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish, and 1 Yugoslav submarine.

**Naval combatant strength, Pacific Ocean, as of Dec. 7, 1941**

<table>
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- Includes Baise which at that time was escorting in Asiatic waters.
- Includes 4 destroyers assigned Fourteenth Naval District.
- Does not include destroyers assigned other west coast naval districts.
- Status of 2 submarines not clear.
- Includes 1 battle cruiser.
- Includes 1 damaged battle ship under repair.
- This aircraft carrier damaged and under repair.
- Estimated, no accurate figures available.
- Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate.
[4841] Senator Brewster. I notice the date is May 1, 1941. Was that before or after you were detached?
Admiral Wilkinson. Immediately before. I left about 2 weeks later.

Senator Brewster. About the middle of May?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Senator Brewster. So that as of May 1 it would show the three battleships and the other units you mentioned in the Pacific Fleet?
Admiral Wilkinson. It should so show.

Senator Brewster. There has been a good deal of discussion about the information which was available to Admiral Kimmel. I think it has appeared rather clearly that under the limitations under which you were operating there was a substantial amount of material bearing on the diplomatic communications which you did not communicate to Admiral Kimmel.

Is that the way I understood your testimony?

Admiral Wilkinson. There was a substantial amount of diplomatic interchange of messages that was not sent verbatim, or even in gist of themselves outside of Washington, either to Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmel, or to the Atlantic Fleet, for instance. The summary of those with respect to the status of the diplomatic negotiations was, however, contained in the fortnightly situation wherein it was stated what the general [4842] progress of the negotiations was.

Senator Brewster. I think in Mr. Gesell's question yesterday, which was gone into rather clearly, whether it was not proper to convey that information, and there was a substantial amount of information bearing on the situation which was not communicated to Admiral Kimmel. I think perhaps you answered that "yes," and you agreed it was a substantial amount but you kind of qualified it somewhat.

Admiral Wilkinson. There was certainly a substantial amount that was not forwarded in detail.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. With respect to the summary, for instance, of the fortnightly summary of November 15, on the first page we find the diplomatic situation, paragraph 1:

(1) Japan.
The approaching crisis in United States-Japanese relations overshadowed all developments in the Far East during the period.
Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, is flying to Washington with compromise Japanese proposals. No one apparently expects his mission to succeed, the Envoy himself reportedly expressing extreme pessimism. American spokesmen, including Secretary Knox, have indicated that the United States will not budge from her position. Prime [4843] Minister Churchill warned that if war breaks out between Japan and America, Britain will declare war on Japan "within the hour". The United States is preparing to withdraw the Marine detachments from China. The Japanese press continued to rail at Britain and the United States.

Now, on December 1, a similar first paragraph:

Unless the Japanese request continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotiations have virtually broken down. The Japanese Government and press are proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work of building the Greater East Asia coprosperity sphere. The press also is criticising Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand.

Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained. Japan signed a 5-year extension of the anticommintern pact with Germany and other Axis nations on November 25.
Those were the diplomatic advices that were furnished to Admiral Kimmel, which are a brief summary of the status of negotiations.

Senator Brewster. You would recognize, would you not, Admiral, that there are very substantial gaps in those summaries, necessarily perhaps, as compared to the information available here in Washington?

Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly. I mean the fact of the [4844] dispatch of the 10-point note from us and the receipt of the Japanese reply was not in it.

Senator Ferguson. There was the conspicuous incident of the charting of the waters of Pearl Harbor, which was the dispatch of September 24, translated on October 9, and which I believe they indicated was not communicated to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor.

Is that your recollection?

Admiral Wilkinson. That is my recollection.

Senator Brewster. With those things in mind, Admiral, I am somewhat puzzled by this statement in your report of December 19, 1941, which was, of course, very near to the event, and I quote from that report—I do not know whether this has been put in evidence as an exhibit or not. It is a memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations from Admiral Wilkinson on December 19, 1941.

Do you know whether that is in evidence?

Mr. Gesell. It is not, Senator. I think, if that is the memorandum given to us, it summarizes a report or reports on his testimony before the Roberts Board.

Senator Brewster. That is right.

Mr. Gesell. That is not in evidence.

Senator Brewster. The subject is the proceedings of the President's Investigating Committee, December 19, 1941. [4845] This was a report from Admiral Wilkinson, reporting his testimony before the so-called Roberts Commission, to whom he stated on page 3, "The Commander in Chief, Pacific, had as much information as we had, but I myself could not expect that he and his staff would infer positively a raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the same information."

That would not be a correct statement of the situation, would it, Admiral?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think if you will read the preceding two sentences, sir, it will make it clearer.

On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1st that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed at Thailand, Burma and the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent developments had proved this to be true. We had not been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference any indication of a raid on Hawaii. The Commander in Chief Pacific had as much information as we had, but I myself could not expect that he and his staff would infer positively a raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the same information.

Perhaps that is not correct in that the earlier dispatches had not been relayed to him specifically.

Senator Brewster. Would not it be a matter of concern, and a matter of considerable interest or significance to the [4846] entire Fleet at Pearl Harbor, to know that the enemy were mapping the location of the fleet day by day, by five sectors in Pearl Harbor? Would not it mean more to the commander in Pearl Harbor than to anyone here in Washington who was less immediately concerned?
Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly it would be of more immediate application to him.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. He was well aware that the fleet was under constant observation from the surrounding hills.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. And that the reports were being made as to them. Whether the geographical designation of the areas by sectors would mean more to him or not I cannot say. Probably it would, yes.

Senator Brewster. If you had been in command of that fleet you would probably lie awake at night trying to figure out just what the significance of that was, would you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Might well have.

Senator Brewster. Now here in Washington you had reports from all over, you had the whole world view, you had Manila, you had all the other departments coming in here, and while you were naturally concerned, you were not immediately responsible for the safety of that fleet, so it might well take \([4847]\) up less of your thought and attention and consideration, I can well understand, than it would in the hands of Admiral Kimmel. That is probably a fair statement, is it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. So that in the light of what we now know it certainly proved unfortunate that it did not prove practical to send in some more information regarding the developments that were going on?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. That again was a question of the security of the code, of which we were becoming increasingly concerned.

\([4848]\) Senator Brewster. In future situations of this character the lessons which we have learned from this will undoubtedly have a substantial bearing on the conduct of our armed services, our intelligence, and our entire arrangements, I assume.

Admiral Wilkinson. I hope so, sir. I hope we profit by all the lessons of the war.

Senator Brewster. I think that is the only justification of this investigation, as a matter of fact.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. One other thing which I did not follow quite through is the matter of the fleet.

Speaking to you now as a naval officer of long experience, when you spoke of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, the American Fleet as being inferior to the Japanese, you meant in the relative strength of battleships, destroyers, carriers, the entire component of the fleet?

Admiral Wilkinson. Including the Naval Air Force; yes sir. That is discounting any superiority of training and matériel, in which we hoped we were a little better off.

Senator Brewster. Yes. Is it not also true that the power of the fleet increased proportionately to its moving from its base?

\([4849]\) Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Senator Brewster. As I remember Admiral Leahy, his testimony before us in 1938, when we were considering expanding the Navy, he estimated we would need a superiority of approximately 2 to 1 in
order to move into the Western Pacific, and take up the Japanese on equal terms.

That involved communication lines and everything else.

Admiral Wilkinson. I think that is more than a fair statement, and when we did finally move into the Western Pacific in this war, we were more than 2 to 1.

Senator Brewster. So when you speak of the fleet as being inferior, our fleet being inferior, you compared the values side by side, rather than the fact that there was four or five thousand miles of water that we had to cover.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; a direct comparison.

Senator Brewster. It is probably useless to contemplate, except as it assists us in this lesson, but the price at Pearl Harbor was not only the price we paid at Pearl Harbor that day, but all the way on from Guadalcanal to Leyte, and even Okinawa, was it not, in the matter of the depletion of our naval strength?

Perhaps I should confine it now to Guadalcanal, where we went to fight on a shoestring, to stop the Japs because we had to stop them right then.

Admiral Wilkinson. I was thinking, Senator, that, of course, we could not say what the course of the war might have been. We might have gone out of Pearl Harbor with what we had in an attempt to relieve the Philippines, which might well have been disastrous in view of the Japanese islands and air fields, and the challenge we would have met from the Japanese Fleet.

The temporary losses at Pearl Harbor, and, of course, the actually complete losses of two battleships, undoubtedly reduced for a time the ratio and we had to wait until that ratio was restored and increased before we could successfully conduct the campaign in the Western Pacific. It is possible, if our losses had not been incurred in Pearl Harbor, other losses might have resulted subsequently, and that those losses might have been more permanent, not readily restored.

I cannot say what it may have been in the course of the war.

Senator Brewster. Well, after this initial upset, we did demonstrate a capacity to beat the Japanese on almost any terms from then on. We had no serious surprises, no serious upsets in our procedure, from then on.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. The first campaign in the South Pacific, in the vicinity of Guadalcanal, was pretty tough fighting. Our losses were heavy, and so were the Japs' losses, we hope, but thereafter we began to have disproportionate losses, comparing the Jap losses with ours.

Senator Brewster. I think it is proper to speak of it now. It is my understanding that in the Naval Affairs Committee I think Admiral Stark, or Admiral King—Admiral King, I think, testified that we had to go into Guadalcanal to stop it; we could not let the Japs go any further, so it was a calculated risk that we felt obliged to take.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Not because we felt it was necessarily easy or feasible, but it just had to be done with insufficient forces because of the losses at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Is that right?
Admiral Wilkinson. In part. The ships that were disabled at Pearl Harbor, the older battleships, would have been strong units in the South Pacific, but they would not have been particularly well adapted to some of the fighting there which required faster vessels.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. Our greatest difficulty, as I recall, in the earlier days of the war, was the lack of [4852] carriers, and, of course, there were no carriers affected at Pearl Harbor.

Senator Brewster. The estimated losses—I recall getting this at that time from Admiral Stark—the losses incident at Pearl Harbor, it was estimated at that time had set us back a year. Did you hear such estimates at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. I defer to his judgment. I made no such estimate.

Senator Brewster. It would be true that if the fleet had remained in being, with the augmentations in the ensuing 12 months, our progress both in the South Pacific and in West Pacific could have been that much more rapid, because of the strength which we would have had if we did not encounter these losses, don’t you think so?

Admiral Wilkinson. I should say so, unless we had undertaken an expedition for the relief of the Philippines in the crisis that was developing there before we were prepared for it, in which case, of course, we might have had heavy losses there, and then been worse off than we were to begin with.

Senator Brewster. I quite appreciate that. That is, if the Japs had not sunk these ships at Pearl Harbor, public opinion might have been for a relief expedition, although [4853] when I was at Pearl Harbor in 1940, the standing joke between the Army and Navy at that time was that the fellows in the Philippines were just out of luck, that we were not going to relieve them. There seemed to be a rather jovial aspect to it. The poor fellows were supposed to hold out for 6 months when they knew the fleet, very well, was not coming, because it did not have the strength to go into the western Pacific until it had the 2 to 1 superiority to the Japs, which it did not have. Did you ever hear such discussions?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. Not authoritatively, not in the sense that they were definitely doomed, but that it was difficult to relieve them.

Senator Brewster. I refer to the captains, not the top command. I refer to the boys down the line who felt they were up against it.

I think that is all that I have.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire.

[4854] Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Wilkinson, during the course of your examination by the gentleman from Pennsylvania you pointed out certain advantages that the fleet had in the harbor at the time of the surprise attack. One of them was that it was practically protected from submarine attack. And, I think you also pointed out, that when the ships were sunk they were sunk in shallow water and you were able to later raise them.

You did not mean to imply that that was a good place to have the fleet if we had been under any impression that an attack was to occur, did you?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I think I was asked in fact whether, as to the contrast between Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Roads, whether
the fact that the water was shallow in Pearl Harbor, and ships were recovered, would not have made Lahaina a worse place to be, if a similar attack with similar effects had taken place, and I think my answer was "yes."

I did not, of myself, I believe, say I would prefer the ships stay in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, as they were lashed together in pairs and in line, that very arrangement of things reduced their fighting capacity, didn't it?

Admiral Wilkinson. It reduced their ability to get out and reduced the arc of fire of the guns of the inner [4855] ship.

Mr. Gearhart. Prevented all maneuverability?

Admiral Wilkinson. The single ship would be unmaneuverable as long as it was tied up. The effect of tying them together was to delay the exit from the harbor in case of necessity of the inner ship and also it massed the guns, the inboard guns, the guns toward each other of the two ships lying side by side.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

In event that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had received information that an attack was imminent, within the range of possibility, those ships wouldn't have been in the harbor at all, would they?

Admiral Wilkinson. Depending on the time of advance notice he got.

Mr. Gearhart. If he had gotten advance notice he would have gotten them out of the harbor as fast as he could?

Admiral Wilkinson. My impression is that he would. I can't speak for his mind.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact they presented a very, very enticing target to the Japanese in the position in which they were moored, did they not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Very much so. That, of course, was a characteristic of the limited mooring in the harbor for [4856] deep-draft vessels. There were not many places we could put them.

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, you were a witness before the Hewitt inquiry?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That occurred in Washington sometime subsequent to the 2d of May of 1945 and the month of August 1945, did it not?


Mr. Gearhart. I will ask you if in that hearing, during the course of that hearing, the following questions were not asked you and to which you gave the following answers—question by Mr. Sonnett:

As to the dissemination of information, Admiral, outside of the Navy Department and to the Pacific Fleet, do I take it then, that it was the responsibility of the ONI to disseminate information on the Japanese situation to the Pacific Fleet?

Answer by Vice Admiral Wilkinson:

That point was never fully determined. We issued the reports and the bi-weekly summary of the situation but I was told that the deductions of future movements were the function of the War Plans, rather than of Intelligence, and this understanding was confirmed by the Assistant Chief of [4856a] Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, when, at one time, I said that I thought it was our responsibility. He told me at that time that the Army system was for Intelligence to prepare the analyses of the enemy's prospective movements, but in the Navy system the War Plans did that.
I told him then that I would prepare an analysis myself, in my office, in order that War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations might use it as they saw fit, and in consequence, such analyses as I made weren't transmitted to the Fleet but were given to the Chief of Operations and to the War Plans.

The same with respect to spot news of the enemy movements. My understanding at the time was, and still is, that I would report to the War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations the latest operational information deduced from all sources and that they would forward to the Fleet such items as they felt should be forwarded.

Mr. Sonnet. Would it be an accurate summary then, Admiral, to state that information in the possession of the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning the Japanese movements, for example, would be disseminated by ONI but the evaluation of the Japanese plans or deductions to be drawn from these movements would be the function of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations?

Answer by Vice Admiral Wilkinson:

[4857] The latter part of your question, yes. The first part, the day by day information of Japanese movements would not, according to my then and present understanding, be sent out by Intelligence, but rather by Operations after their evaluation.

I will ask you if those questions were asked and if those answers constituted the answers you gave to those questions at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. To my recollection, yes.

Mr. Gearhart. At the time you gave those answers in 1945, in June 1945, did you recall or did you have in mind the provisions of Schedule of Organizations, a schedule which bears the date of 23 October 1940, a schedule which I understand was in effect in 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. I had those in mind as modified by the instructions that had been turned over to me by my predecessor and that had been confirmed by my conversation with Admiral Ingersoll to which I testified, I believe, yesterday.

Mr. Gearhart. The document, Schedule of Organizations, is in the nature of a regulational order, is it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, your understanding is quite contrary to what the schedule of Organizations required and [4858] recited; is that not correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. The Schedule of Organizations was prepared and issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. It was subject to change by him orally or otherwise. It had been changed orally by him to Admiral Kirk. It had been changed orally by Admiral Ingersoll, his assistant, and speaking for him, to me.

I considered that the change had been made orally and did not require the textual change in writing.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, are you giving hearsay evidence in reference to verbal changes by Admiral Stark, or are you reciting your own information received from the lips of Admiral Stark?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am giving the hearsay information received officially from my predecessor, and I am giving you information received from Admiral Stark's first assistant, Admiral Ingersoll, who spoke for him.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, regardless of that, the Schedule of Organizations provides that, in respect to both foreign and domestic intelligence, that the ONI should "evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable"?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

[4859] Mr. Gearhart. All right.
I find in the correspondence a letter dated February 18, 1941 from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, to which there is appended a postscript, which I will read:

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander in Chief with the information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers it responsible for furnishing the same type of information to that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander in Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?

I also find Admiral Stark's answer to Admiral Kimmel, dated March 22, 1941, in which he says:

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that [4860] information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant ships is forwarded by air mail weekly to you, and that if you wish this information can be issued more directly or sent by dispatch.

I also find a memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, dated March 11, 1941, signed A. G. Kirk, from the Office of Naval Intelligence, which is apparently the basis for Admiral Stark's answer to the postscript of Admiral Kimmel's letter in which it is stated:

4. The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of this division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States.

Now, with those letters in mind, I will ask you, first, the A. G. Kirk that signed the memorandum of March 11, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations, was then Director of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That is the position you later held?

Admiral Wilkinson. I relieved him directly.

Mr. Gearhart. When you became Chief of Naval Operations, did Admiral Kirk inform you of that correspondence between Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel and of his memorandum [4861] which was sent around?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not specifically.

Mr. Gearhart. When you talked with Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, as you testified in the Hewitt inquiry, and told Admiral Ingersoll in effect that you thought it was your function to evaluate and disseminate the intelligence, did you find and give him these precedents to support your position?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you ever discuss the subject with your senior subordinates in the office?

Admiral Wilkinson. Frequently.

Mr. Gearhart. Some of them had been on duty much longer than you had; had they not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did any of them recall to you the memorandum of Admiral Kirk?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that they did, and do not believe they did, sir. I think it was generally understood that we had the responsibility and I accepted it, of keeping the forces afloat, including the commander in chief, Pacific, of all information, informed of all information except that which through our instructions, was specifically excepted, and if I may, I will read my answer [4862-3] of yesterday:

I said that the text of the regulations which you introduced read "evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable."

I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate and spread abroad all types of basic information, what General Miles had termed static information, such as the defenses of the country, its economics, the diplomatic relations, the characters and activities and previous careers of its military and naval men, the location of its fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and everything other than the enemy's probable intentions, and such specific information as in itself might give rise or might require action by our fleet or by our naval forces.

In the latter case, before dissemination, I would consult higher authority, either the Assistant Chief, the Chief of Naval Operations, or my colleague, Chief of War Plans, in order that this information that I sent out would not be in conflict with his understanding of the naval situation, and the operations for which he was responsible.

That is the end of my answer, sir.

I will explain further that it would obviously be [4864] undesirable for me to send out information which on its receipt would cause the commander in chief to take such action as would be in conflict with the action which was desired by the responsible officer in the Department for War Plans.

Mr. Gearhart. And still Admiral Kirk issues a memorandum in which he says that it is his responsibility, and we have also in the record that Admiral Stark says it was the responsibility of ONI.

Admiral Wilkinson. I think that last sentence of Admiral Kirk's is not as all-embracing as you would have it be, if you would mind reading it again, sir, the last part of Admiral Kirk's letter.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, Admiral Kirk says [reading]:

The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of this Division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That is pretty definite, isn't it?

Let's pursue it a little further. It is an interesting subject.

Admiral Wilkinson. All right.


In this letter there appears under title VII, "Information:"

Information.

(a) The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is as a rule not informed as to the policy or change of policy reflected in current events and naval movements, and as a result is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in some course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.
It is realized that on occasion the rapid development in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and perhaps even the lack of knowledge of the Military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even reorient his possible course of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation where the necessity for intensive training of a partially trained fleet must be carefully balanced against the debility of this training by strategic dispositions or otherwise to meet impending eventualities.

Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island developments, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principal that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur, and by the quickest secure means available.

Did you see this letter after you arrived and assumed the duties as Director of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I am not sure that Admiral Kirk saw it.

Mr. Gearhart. I find that Admiral Stark testified before the naval court of inquiry, and I quote his testimony:

You considered the letter, Exhibit 33, so good, did you not, Admiral Stark, that you caused it to be reproduced and distributed in a restricted area upon its receipt among important offices in the Navy Department?

Answer:

Yes. It was our general custom to do that and I mimeographed this, sent it to all hands who were concerned, followed it up and, as I recall, assembled all concerned for Admiral Kimmel to talk to himself in my office.

Did you see the mimeographed copy that Admiral Stark, according to his testimony, had prepared and distributed to the Navy Department?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did Admiral Stark mention this letter to you after you assumed your duties?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. I find that Admiral Stark testified further before the naval court of inquiry in respect to this letter, and I quote:

Have you any comment on the last sentence in the last paragraph of 7?

Answer:

About being guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions? I have just covered that. You mean the next paragraph?

Yes.

Answer:

(Reading) "It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available." I was in complete concurrence with him on that and that was one of my objectives, yes. You agreed with Admiral Kimmel then that the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet should be, insofar as you were able, immediately informed of all important developments as they occurred, and by the quickest secure means available?

Yes.
Did Admiral Stark tell you after you became Director of Naval Intelligence that one of his objectives was that the commander in chief Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest secure means?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my recollection.

Mr. Gearhart. I find in the correspondence a letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark dated July 26, 1941— by the way, when did you become Director?

Admiral Wilkinson. October 15, 1941.

Mr. Gearhart. This is a quotation of Admiral Stark—pardon me, it is a quotation from Admiral Kimmel’s letter to Admiral Stark of July 26, 1941:

1. The importance of keeping the Commander in Chief advised of department policies and decisions and the changes in policy and decisions to meet the changes in the international situation.

Subparagraph (a):

We have as yet received no official information as to the United States attitude toward Russia’s participation in the war, particularly as to the degree of operation, if any, in the Pacific between the United States and Russia, if and when we become active participants. Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communications systems, and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us which may be fully explored * * *

(and so on.)

Then Admiral Kimmel asked a number of questions:

Will England declare war on Japan.

The answer to 1 is in the affirmative—and so on.

He asked all the questions possible about the situation which might develop in the Pacific.

[4871] Did you know anything about that long letter that he wrote to Admiral Stark?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir. I think normally that would be prepared in the Division of War Plans which has cognizance of the plans you speak of, whether there was coordination between Russia and America, and so on. Anything with regard to our own participation or the participation of other nations in conjunction with us.

Mr. Gearhart. Your answer is interesting in view of Admiral Stark’s answer to Admiral Kimmel, from which I will quote. His letter was dated August 19, 1941. That is getting pretty close up to your tenure, is it not? I will quote a portion:

I can readily understand your wish to be kept informed as to the department policies and decisions and the changes thereto which must necessarily be made to meet the changes in the international situation. This we are trying to do, and if you do not get as much information as you think you should get the answer probably is that the situation which is uppermost in your mind has just not jelled sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative.

Evidently Admiral Stark though that that responsibility was ONI’s, didn’t he?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I should say that a [4872] situation which has not jelled is a matter for the State Department, a matter of international relations. As I heard you, and I may not have understood it, that was a question of a fluid situation, an international situation.
Mr. Gearhart. Then I understand that you still believe that the organizational order of ONI didn’t mean what it said during your tenure as Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson. It meant, as I interpreted it, and as it had been amended to me verbally, and as I mentioned yesterday, there was one whole paragraph with regard to the Division of Public Relations which viewed as it stood would give us authority and instructions as to what to do with public relations, they had been completely lifted out of my office, but the order of over a year’s standing had not been amended, but there was no order, and I don’t know that one was required to show textual changes in each order every time a directive of any sort was issued in modification of it, whether that directive was in text or orally.

Mr. Gearhart. Did Admiral Stark ever call you in and tell you that you should disregard the schedule of organizations in respect to the evaluation of information collected and of disseminating it as was deemed advisable?

Admiral Wilkinson. I never asked Admiral Stark that. [4874] I had the word from my predecessor, and I confirmed it by instructions from Admiral Stark’s responsible assistant.

Mr. Gearhart. Did Admiral Kirk tell you to disregard his memorandum which he had issued just a short time before to the contrary effect?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don’t consider the memorandum is to the contrary effect, sir, if you speak of that letter which you read to me, because that is a broad and all-embracing program, and what he told me was specific orders he had received from Admiral Stark which he stated had been received in the presence of Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Turner.

Mr. Gearhart. Well now, to quote his memorandum again—there is no use disregarding its import—

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, except it is very broad.

Mr. Gearhart (reading):

Naval Intelligence is fully aware it is the responsibility of this Division to keep the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States.

Did Admiral Kirk ever tell you to disregard that memorandum?

Admiral Wilkinson. That is a very broad statement. There were limitations and modifications to it such as I mentioned. Admiral Kirk never told me of the memorandum itself [4875] and, as I mentioned, I never saw the memorandum, but I do recognize that in the broad sense, that is the responsibility of the office, as it may have been amended by instructions received from higher authority, which I mentioned, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Then I will ask you, Admiral Wilkinson, why didn’t you transmit the information that was contained in the intercepts to Admiral Kimmel, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, when the information pointed directly to Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. The information contained in those intercepts pointed to many sources.

Mr. Gearhart. I am not talking about the ones that pointed to Panama or the ones that pointed to any other place, but the ones that
pointed directly to Hawaii. Was not it your duty to transmit the information contained in intercepts that reached your desk which did point directly to Hawaii and did evidence an inordinate interest by the Japanese Intelligence. We did not send this to the Commander Admiral Wilkinson. We did not, perhaps erroneously, recognize that that was an inordinate interest in Hawaii. We had found inquiries and reports of similar investigations in many ports. We considered that those were part, as I have said, of the degree of nicety of the Japanese Intelligence. We did not send this to the Commander-in-Chief, partly in error, perhaps, we didn’t recognize it pointed specifically to an attack on Hawaii, and partly also because we were very jealous at that time of the security of the code and the fact that we were breaking the code, as Senator Brewster has mentioned, they were already suspicious that we were attacking the code, and we continued to discourage that suspicion.

Mr. Gearhart. There were some intercepts which reached your desk which indicated on the part of the Japanese an inordinate interest in conditions existing in Panama?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you inform the Commanding General and the Commanding Admiral at Panama?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Of those messages?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, they were of a special concern to the commanders at Panama?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Why did you not give them that specific information which pointed their way?

Admiral Wilkinson. It was well known that a great deal of espionage activity was going on throughout all of our coastal areas, and our island possessions. That information as to those espionage activities was known and sent by the Office of Naval Intelligence to the district intelligence officers located in those various ports. That information which they received, plus that which we collected on the spot, was conveyed to the local commander in every instance. The commander in chief of Hawaii, the naval commander in Panama, the commander in chief of Manila, were all aware that their forces were under constant espionage. They were so aware because of the activities of the intelligence agencies, and our own representatives there.

These messages that you speak of, which pointed to the desire for information in those various ports, were of themselves but confirmatory of the espionage activities which were already known and which were constantly being kept before the commanders.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the situation still remains that you had information, very much definite information, which you did not transmit to the commanders in the field, that were in command in the areas, that the information you had related to.

Admiral Wilkinson. That information was little more than what they had through their own intelligence agencies, Mr. Congressman. They were aware that they were the subject of constant espionage, that the result of that espionage was being transmitted back to Japan. We knew that photographs were being taken of the fleet in Hawaii.
In fact, we endeavored to secure a law to prevent the taking of photographs and were unsuccessful, and the commanders of the fleet were aware of that, all of that.

The specific inquiry as to the division of Pearl Harbor into several areas and the location of ships in those areas was another refinement on that intelligence, a refinement which we perhaps should have recognized as indicating a possible attack.

It would also be indicated similarly elsewhere, but the fact that a comprehensive espionage was being carried on was, I think, known through the district intelligence officers to the naval commanders in all of these ports, and I know that the time I was in Hawaii, that we were cognizant of that fact, and we were helpless to stop it.

We could not censor the mails. We could not censor the dispatches. We could not prevent the taking of photographs. We could not arrest Japanese suspects. There was nothing we could do to stop it, and all hands knew that espionage was going on all along, and reports were going back to Japan.

Mr. Gearhart. My dear sir, don’t you think that you were assuming a tremendous responsibility in deciding in your mind what Admiral Kimmel knew, and what the Admiral in command at Panama knew?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I think that from the reports that we had sent to our district intelligence officers and those returned by them, we knew they were acquainted with the espionage. But these particular messages, indicating as it has been said, a bombing plan, were not sent out in view of the attempts at security of the code breaking apparatus, code breaking process that we were then maintaining.

Mr. Gearhart. In view of the fact that Admiral Kimmel was writing to Admiral Stark for information, begging for information almost monthly or weekly, don’t you think he was entitled to know that a Japanese intercept had disclosed that the Japanese had divided Oahu into five areas, and that the Japanese were demanding, and their federates on that island were reporting day by day, on the movements of ships into and out of Pearl Harbor—don’t you think that that was information Admiral Kimmel was entitled to have?

Admiral Wilkinson. With the exception of a division of Pearl Harbor into these areas, I think Admiral Kimmel was aware that some such process of survey, espionage, and reports was under way; I think he was aware of that by virtue of his contacts with the district intelligence officer.

Mr. Gearhart. But the point remains you had definite information to the effect that I have just described, and you thought you were fulfilling your full responsibility when you left Admiral Kimmel to guess that they were exercising espionage over his command?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not leave him to guess. Our district intelligence officer and his fleet intelligence officer was aware of the espionage. The only thing he was not aware of was the message dividing the harbor into five parts, which might have been for convenience in locating it on a map, and which probably was, as we now appreciate, information convenient in establishing an attack.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes; and that would indicate to any man that they were dividing that harbor into parts for the purpose of making more convenient a possible attack?

Admiral Wilkinson. Very possible.

Mr. Gearhart. Wouldn't that have been mighty important information for Admiral Kimmel to have?

Admiral Wilkinson. It would have been useful. He had been writing himself of the dangers of an air attack. He had been drawing up plans for protection against an air attack. He was convinced that there was a possibility and a threat of an air attack. It would have been a confirmation of his suspicions.

Mr. Gearhart. And being a confirmation of his suspicions, he probably would have acted, would he not, in the light of that confirmation?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure. The message that arrived was translated on October 9. If he had had the message on October 10, what action he would have taken, I don't know. He couldn't keep the fleet at sea for 2 or 3 months.

Mr. Gearhart. He didn't have to bring them all in at one time, did he?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, he didn't. Ordinarily he had them operating in three sections, as I recall, of which two were at sea at one time.

Mr. Gearhart. Two, less three battleships.

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, that was a particular incident, as you recall, in that period, but the normal schedule called for their operating in three sections, of dividing the battleships, I believe, among two, if not three, and having them at sea, only one in port at any time.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, that information of the division of Hawaii into five areas, supported by six other intercepts, each one reporting in respect to those areas and with respect to the set-up in the harbor, taken all together probably would have a very decided effect upon the mind of the commander in Hawaii, the commander charged with the defense of the fleet and of our military and naval establishments there, would it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. I should think so. What effect it would have I do not know, sir, in view of the relatively protracted length of time that was affected, nearly 2 months, whether he would have kept the fleet at sea continually or would have pursued a rotational plan he had in effect.

Mr. Gearhart. If Admiral Kimmel had been informed by furnishing him either copies of the intercepts or the substance thereof, that the Japanese were constantly calling for further information with respect to ship movements, that would probably have had an effect upon the commander of the island, would it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; further information with respect to the ship movements might well have been desirable for him to know, but I do not think it would have affected the status of the fleet if he had known of these things.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you are giving us an expression of your thoughts now, aren't you?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; that is what you asked me.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you a right to assume that Admiral Kimmel would have thought the same way you do now, or then?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not at all, except as a naval officer, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. As commanding officer he had a right to make those decisions and make whatever conclusions he pleased from the information that you should have supplied him with, is that not correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. He had a right to make any conclusion which he pleased. I am not quite, as yet, in agreement with the fact I should have supplied it to him.

Mr. Gearhart. And by withholding from him that information you withheld from him the right to decide what importance should be attached to those messages, you denied to him the right to evaluate those messages in that way, didn't you, and you denied him the right to act in the light of what information those messages conveyed, didn't you?

Admiral Wilkinson. I denied—in the first place, I am not convinced that it was I who was withholding them. In the second place, whoever withheld them was not denying him these facilities, but not furnishing him the opportunity to work upon them.

[4884] Mr. Gearhart. Yes; now, I have been referring specifically to the messages which appear—

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield at this point because I wanted to complete what I had which bears on this particular point you are discussing, which you just concluded. Are you through with that phase of it?

Mr. Gearhart. I was just going to conclude that phase of it by calling attention to him that I am referring to the messages that appear on pages 12, 13, 14, and 15 of exhibit 2 in this proceeding. Now do you want me to yield?

Senator Brewster. If you will, at that point.

I did not perhaps make it clear, Admiral, as to the purport of my questioning on your testimony before the Roberts Commission which bears, I think, very directly on this point that Mr. Gearhart has been stressing, and I think that in justice to you it ought to be clear.

As I understand now, I did not realize that your testimony was not taken down before the Roberts Commission; that you appeared before them and testified off the record.

Admiral Wilkinson. My testimony was not intentionally off the record, but it was not recorded and reduced except as a summary of the statement, I believe.

Senator Brewster. Yes; so that this record which you made immediately thereafter for Admiral Stark was the only [4885] record, apparently, of your testimony?

Admiral Wilkinson. Apparently and which, of course, was my recollection after the fact.

Senator Brewster. Now, the Roberts Commission, after the preliminaries on the first page, apparently thought it was important—they apparently did attach great importance to this question of information that Admiral Kimmel had received, because at the bottom of the first page you state [reading]:

They then asked me what information and communications had been sent during the months preceding the attack.

And you turned in a full page there of information you furnished and then you say at the bottom of page 2:

Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had assured ourselves that all of this information had either passed through the CINCS Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or, if not, had been furnished them from the Department.
Then came the next paragraph which I have quoted.

The Commander in Chief Pacific had as much information as we had.

I think you have now agreed in both the colloquies with Congress-
man Gearhart and myself that that was not strictly accurate, that
they did not have all of the information which you had here, either
in connection with this particular inter-cept and some
of those that followed it and also as to the broader diplomatic phases
of it, which might be more arguable, but, at any rate, was information
which you had which he did not have.

Now, the point which I was bringing out was this, that the Roberts
committee, which made the reports bearing on the responsibility of
Admiral Kimmel, apparently did that on the basis of your statement
that Kimmel had all of the "information which we had"; that is, the
Department here had. If that is not so it would be possible that
their conclusions might have been very different as to the responsibility
of Admiral Kimmel and any others concerned, if they had had a
more accurate picture of what had been furnished to Kimmel; would
that not be so?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, and thank you for the suggestion. I
had not appreciated that when I was answering Mr. Gearhart, and in
the middle of page you will find, just above that, this statement
[reading]:

We had, on the first of December, drafted a summary of information available
to us at that time, reciting the details of the concentration of Japanese land
forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa, and the several naval preparations,
including:

(a) Reorganization of Japanese Fleets;

(b) Readying for war of Japanese ships by docking, etc.;

(c) Additional naval aircraft to the Mandated Island area;

(d) Establishment of patrol between Marshalls and Gilberts;

(e) The activity of the combined Air Force (patrol planes and tenders) in South
China and the Mandates;

(f) The taking over of many merchant vessels by the Japanese Navy and the
equipment of several antiaircraft ships;

(g) The radio intelligence with respect to the two task groups under the
Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet—Group One operating in the South China area,
and Group Two in the Mandated Islands area. (I stated, however, that nothing
in this item made us forecast a movement as far east of the Mandated area as
Hawaii—whereupon Mr. Roberts asked the distance from Hawaii to the Mandates,
and I told him the easternmost—Jaluit—was about 2,300 miles, and the remainder
extended to the westward about 2,700 miles. Actually the figures are 2,100 and
2,400.)

Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had assured ourselves—that all of this information—

had either passed through the CINCS Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or, if not, had
been furnished them from the Department. In addition, on December 3rd we had
ascertained that Japanese diplomatic and consular agencies had been ordered to
burn all their confidential codes and papers immediately, and we had relayed this
information to CINCS Asiatic and Pacific and to the Commandants of the 14th and
16th Naval Districts, and had also directed our representatives in the Far East
(attachés and observers) to burn their codes and papers.

On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1st that the Japanese
were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed at Thailand, Burma and
the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent developments had proved this to be true.
We had not been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference any indica-
tion of a raid on Hawaii. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific had as much informa-
tion as we had.
I think in speaking of that and bringing it back, I might well have been—I think I was, in fact, referring to the fact that he had as much information as we had on all of that subject I have just read.

[4889] Senator Brewster. Certainly the statement is somewhat broader than that. I think it is. We can now see here that it is perhaps unfortunate that you did not have a complete transcript of your evidence because it might do you more justice than this somewhat sweeping summary by yourself would when you perhaps might not have been thinking of all that was involved.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. Obviously this was prepared by me for the private and personal information for Admiral Stark, which I had made, telling him what I and other officers had told the Roberts Commission.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. That was entirely dependent on my recollection, it had nothing to do with the transcript. I thought notes had been taken. In fact, I thought there was a recorder or stenographer present and I was later to have a record of that but I understand none were taken, I understand none appeared in the record except a two-paragraph statement.

Senator Brewster. This does have the value of having been made contemporaneously.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. This was made——

Admiral Wilkinson. It is my recollection immediately after the event.


Admiral Wilkinson. But I know, for instance, I did not tell them about magic, I did not let them know—I did not tell them about all the diplomatic messages.

Senator Brewster. So that magic, you say, was freely discussed, as you say later on in the memorandum. You mention that on the next page.

Admiral Wilkinson. My hearing was very brief. They were interested in the actual movements of forces and I did not go at any length into the discussion of the diplomatic magic.

Senator Brewster. On page 4 at the bottom you say:

The meeting was discussing the Magic freely but stated they would be most careful that no mention of it would be made.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. So that was apparently one of the topics that was gone into to a material extent.

Admiral Wilkinson. I think the discussion I had with them as to the "magic" was simply as to the 14-part message.

Mr. Gesell. Senator, would it be helpful to put the entire text of the memorandum in the record? We have read different portions, at different times, and to show the relationship of the excerpts wouldn't it be a good idea to put it all in?

[4891] Senator Brewster. I think it would be helpful to put it all in.

The Vice Chairman. You want it included at this point in the record?

Mr. Gesell. Yes. I think it would be a good idea.
The Vice Chairman. It is so ordered.
Mr. GeSELL. If it is so ordered I think it would be helpful.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
(The memorandum above referred to is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:)

Op-16

Secret

December 19, 1941

S-E-C-R-E-T

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Proceedings of President's Investigating Committee, 1000 to 1200, December 19, 1941.

On notification from Admiral Reeves, received at 0915, I reported to Justice Roberts' Commission at ten o'clock in the Munitions Building. General Miles was also there, accompanied by the chief of his Far Eastern Division, Colonel R. S. Bratton; Commander McCallum accompanied me. The Commission stated they wished the Army and Navy Intelligence to [4892] cooperate in their answers; that they would hear General Miles first but might ask me any questions that might arise during his discussion.

General Miles was then questioned, and in the main his testimony was not interrupted by any side questions to me; so that despite the statement of joint questioning the actual effect was complete testimony by General Miles, followed by mine. In fact, General Miles was excused, because of preparations for departure from the city this afternoon on an inspection trip, immediately after his testimony, although Colonel Bratton remained.

They asked General Miles mainly what reports and instructions his office and the command in Hawaii had exchanged for a period of approximately one month prior to the actual attack. He mentioned communications regarding possibilities of sabotage and described at some length the events in General Marshall's office, including the sending of the subsequently delayed dispatch to General Short on the morning of Sunday, December 7th. He mentioned his experience in service in the Islands and said that in the past the concern of G-2 of the Army had been rather in sabotage than in a military raid. He said his studies as war plans officer there had, however, envisaged the possibility of a raid and that he had reached the conclusion that a successful raid was possible against a garri- [4893] son which had not been warned, but was not possible against a garrison which had been warned.

They then asked me what information and communications had been sent during the months preceding the attack. I said that, for an understanding of the picture, I would like to describe our avenues of intelligence, and then mentioned the Naval Attaches we had maintained in the Far East, and the seventeen additional observers and consular shipping advisors we had established in the past year. These informants reported matters which they ascertained either by their own observation or by contacts which they might make. We had in the past had secret agents in Japan but we had none recently since those we had had had not survived. Also a source of information was the radio net and the intercepted dispatches, utilizing the facilities of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts. Information dispatches were received by us and the forces in the field kept informed, and the Chief of Naval Operations had testified as to actual warning dispatches which he had sent in the period immediately prior to the attack. As to the actual interchange of messages with reference to intelligence, in general the sources reported their information to us via the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic and in forwarding it the Commander-in-Chief Pacific was usually advised. We had, on the first of December, drafted a summary of information [4894] available to us at that time, reciting the details of the concentration of Japanese land forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa, and the several naval preparations, including:

(a) Reorganization of Japanese Fleets;
(b) Readying for war of Japanese ships by docking, etc.;
(c) Additional naval aircraft to the Mandated Island area;
(d) Establishment of patrol between Marshalls and Gilberts;
(e) The activity of the combined Air Force (patrol planes and tenders) in South China and the Mandates;
(f) The taking over of many merchant vessels by the Japanese Navy and the equipment of several anti-aircraft ships;

(g) The radio intelligence with respect to the two task groups under the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet—Group One operating in the South China area, and Group Two in the Mandated Islands area. (I stated, however, that nothing in this item made us forecast a movement as far east of the Mandated area as Hawaii—whereupon Mr. Roberts sked the distance from Hawaii to the Mandates, and I told him the easternmost—Jaluit—was about 2,300 miles, and the remainder extended to the west—[4895] ward about 2,700 miles. Actually the figures are 2,100 and 2,400.)

Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had assured ourselves that all of this information had either passed through the CINCS Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or, if not, had been furnished them from the Department. In addition, on December 3 we had ascertained that Japanese diplomatic and consular agencies had been ordered to burn all their confidential codes and papers immediately, and we had relayed this information to CINCS Asiatic and Pacific and to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts, and had also directed our representatives in the Far East (attachés and observers) to burn their codes and papers.

On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1 that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed at Thailand, Burma, and the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent developments had proved this to be true. We had not been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference any indication of a raid on Hawaii. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific had as much information as we had, but I myself could not expect that he and his staff would infer positively a raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the same information. I believed the raid had been aside from the main effort, and to my belief the Japanese striking force [4896] had retired to the westward immediately afterwards. We had no conclusive evidence of any Japanese surface vessels operating thereafter to the eastward of Hawaii, although it was probable that some submarines had come into the eastern Pacific and possibly were still there.

The Commission asked as to the control of fishing boats in the vicinity of Hawaii. I said that I knew that even before I left there in May there had been measures to effectuate control of these boats—first, by denying noncitizens the right to own and use them; and second, by either removing or, in some way I thought, controlling their radio. These efforts were made principally by the Coast Guard as their proper province, although guided by the advice of the Commandant’s office. Such measures as have been taken since the Coast Guard was incorporated into the Navy would, of course, be more directly under his command.

Under the Delimitation Agreement, regarding the special investigatory services, the actual investigations of all civilian population in Hawaii were in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but I knew the military and naval counterintelligence services were closely allied with the FBI, and that I felt sure that with the fishing boats Captain Mayfield and Naval Intelligence gave actual assistance where possible. Mr. Roberts said that they would find out more of [4897] that exact situation when they got out there.

They asked what arrangements we had in the Intelligence branch of the Navy Department as to information during Saturday night (December 6). I said
that responsible officers were on telephone call, but that in addition there was an officer watch in our Foreign Branch, in our Administrative Branch, in our Domestic Intelligence Branch, and that, beginning on Friday night I had set a watch over the week-end in the Far Eastern section itself. I said that Commander McCollum had relieved Lt. Comdr. Watts at 0900 Sunday, that I had arrived at the office at about 0900, and that only then had the last part of the Magic (the meeting was discussing the Magic freely but stated they would be most careful that no mention of it would be made) arrived containing the final instructions to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington to break off negotiations, whereas the previous parts which had been available to us the preceding night had been more argumentative in sense and rather of the type of a "White Paper" designed subsequently for publication.

Sometime after 0900 Sunday the information came that the presentation of the complete message, which was to be withheld until a later dispatch announcing the hour, was not directed to be made at 1300, Washington time. I said I understood by hearsay that the actual call requesting the appoint- [4898] ment was not made until 1800 and that the appointment was granted for 1345— but that the State Department was, of course, aware of these times.

I said that we had reported this information to you, and that while we were discussing it you had talked over the phone with General Marshall, and that I understood you and General Marshall had mentioned (to the Commission) your conversation and the dispatch he sent.

The Commission asked about the RADAR installations on the ships and in Hawaii. I understood that the Army had RADAR on shore, and I knew we had it installed on a few ships. However, it only works on a direct line such as the eye does, and in consequence, the RADAR on the ships so fitted which were in Pearl Harbor could not be effective because of the interposition of the mountains and the hills and the land in general. Some of the ships which were out of port were equipped with RADAR but, as far as I knew, they had not picked up anything on them—again because of the limitations of the device—the curvature of the earth limiting its range.

With regard to the general question of the readiness of the Intelligence Service, I said that on the recommendation of my predecessor, Captain Kirk, as early as last April the Chief of Naval Operations had sent out a dispatch that, because of past experience with reference to the Axis beginning activities [4899] on Saturdays or Sundays or on national holidays, the personnel of the naval intelligence service should be particularly careful on those days. Again in March the Chief of Naval Operations had directed an advanced state of readiness of the District Intelligence organization, had directed the placing of coastal information sections in active status in May, the further expansion of District Intelligence organizations in May; and a complete state of readiness had been directed in July.

After my testimony Lieutenant-General C. D. Herron, who relinquished command in early February in Hawaii, testified mainly about his preparations and his general practice as to alert stations. He said that last winter he had had them in the field for six weeks on the alert, but had subsequently modified that in some degree although he had maintained guns at their field stations. He said his primary plan was to use anti-aircraft for the defense of Pearl Harbor, to use fighting planes to control the air, and to have infantry support covering landing beaches. He said that he considered the most dangerous time to be dawn, particularly because of the possibility of approach during the night of enemy vessels, whether aircraft carriers or an actual raiding expedition.

The Commission asked if he considered Sunday morning the most lax time in the defenses, and consequently the most ad- [4900] vantagous time for an attack. He said that with regard to the reserves. Yes, because they were more likely to be on leave or other privileges, but with regard to the actual stations in the field he considered that they should be as efficient and as fully manned on Sundays as on any other morning. He personally made many dawn inspections on Sundays to check on and insure their readiness.
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, did you ever give any attention or consideration to the possibility of transmitting the substance or the copies of those intercepts that I have directed your attention to?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. As I have stated, my responsibility was limited to sending out, or included what was a limitation, the sending out of all information except that respecting enemy communications and that which might require or involve operational plans and movements. This message was [4901] of that character. I am not convinced that I would have been authorized or permitted to send that out, or whether I should have given it or suggested to another agency that it should send it out, but in any respect, answering your question, I did not consider sending it out because I did not evaluate it, as I had not, as an indication of the detailed intelligence they desired.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, did you consider Hawaii to be beyond possibility of attack?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you think it was beyond probability of attack?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Is that the reason why you did not adequately evaluate those messages concerning ship movements—

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). In and around Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; it had nothing to do with the possibility versus the probability of them.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you refrain from transmitting copies of intercepts for any particular reason?

Admiral Wilkinson. If I considered sending them, which I doubt, I would have refrained from sending copies of them because of danger to the code, the code-breaking activities.

[4902] Mr. Gearhart. What was the practice of your division?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to send copies outside the Navy Department and to limit those very carefully.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you ever send any copies of intercepts?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge and only at the last moment did I send the gist of such an intercept, when we said that the diplomatic agencies have been told to burn their codes.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, by transmitting that information any Japanese who cracked our code would know that we had cracked theirs, wouldn't they?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not only that, but if any widespread conversation or discussion had come to the ears of any Japanese agents, they would have known we had cracked it. I think our code was fairly secure. What we were attempting to avoid was the spread of knowledge that we were engaged in code breaking and had succeeded in breaking their code.

I think I recall that General Marshall testified that he had heard rumors that that knowledge was beginning to leak out.

Mr. Gearhart. You were present when General Marshall wrote out the message on the 7th of December, the one that arrived in Hawaii too late?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

[4902] Mr. Gearhart. You were not among those in that group?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, in that message he tells them that "Tomorrow the Japanese are going to deliver an ultimatum to the State Department" and also that they were going to deliver it at 1 o'clock. He did not hesitate to tell what he had learned through reading the intercepts, did he?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; nor did we in sending out the message about breaking the codes.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, your office had been sending out the substance of intercepts all during the year of 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe not, sir. I think those messages you spoke of were sent out by the communications office.

Mr. Gearhart. What does "OPNAV" stand for?

Admiral Wilkinson. OPNAV? That is Chief of Naval Operations office as a whole. Is there any number, small number on it afterward, Op-13, Op-20, something like that?

Mr. Gearhart. "OPNAV" is the way this reads.

Admiral Wilkinson. That is general operations of the Navy; yes.

Mr. Gearhart. That means the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Wilkinson. Or someone in his office. The actual office number if it is prepared in a subordinate office would be indicated by a number such as OP-200 which would be Communications, or Op-16, which would be Intelligence.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you have looked through these messages that have been sent them by OPNAV, have you not, during the year of 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. I have seen this book. I am not sure that I recall which were sent out by OPNAV and which were otherwise indicated.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, here is one that was sent out on the 7th day of July 1941 to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and for the information of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. This reads:

Tokyo to Washington 1 July 329:
Japan directs eight Marus on east coast United States rush cargo handling and proceed Colon pass through Canal to Pacific between 16 and 22 July on following schedule: 16th Tokai; 17th—

and so forth, naming a lot of dates.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. You have that before you, do you?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Page 6 of Exhibit 37.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

[4905] Mr. Gearhart. That is transmittal of information that was received from intercepts, is it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Turn over to page 7 and you will find another message.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That is a transmittal by OPNAV or whatever you call it of information received from intercepts, isn't it?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Likewise the next, on page 8?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And page 9?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Page 10?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Those were all sent out by the Communications Office and all sent out in July. I am informed that that practice was discontinued after July. In any event, it was not under the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. Gearhart. That was sent out because someone who then had the say-so believed that it was necessary to advise American commanders in the field of information that was received in intercepts?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. There was a balance between the information going out and the security of the code-breaking processes.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. As we have heard a few moments ago, sir, there were rumors of the suspicions as to code breaking and during the summer and fall every attempt was made to tighten up the security. This practice was apparently discontinued and we were constantly being warned by all hands to be careful about how the code breaking was threatened, the knowledge of code breaking was possible of suspicion.

Mr. Gearhart. All right. Now in a lot of those messages that I called your attention to, the ones relating to ship movements and inquiries concerning ship movements, did they take on any greater importance in your mind when the Navy translated this message from Tokyo to Washington, November 5, 1941, translated on November 5, 1941:

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

[4907] This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

Now, when you read that message of a deadline being fixed by Japan for the doing of something, didn't the previous Japanese ship-movement intercepts take on a new and a more important aspect in your estimation?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would not say that it did, sir. That was in the character of prospective diplomatic negotiations that they were anxious to reach a conclusion on. Our war plans people were fully cognizant of it. They were aware of the diplomatic negotiations and, in fact, on October 16 they had sent out a warning message, on November 24 they sent another and on November 27 still another. These messages were in a class affecting the operations of the fleet, which I did not feel was in my province to relay.

Mr. Gearhart. When you read the intercept from Tokyo to Hong Kong dated November 14, 1941, translated November 26, 1941, in which the following is said:

Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

a. We will completely destroy British and American [4908] power in China.
b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.

c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government should it become necessary.

When you read that warlike intercept didn’t the interest in our ship movements in Hawaii take on an added importance in your estimation?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say the interest in our ship movements everywhere did. The interest of the enemy espionage in the movement of our ships and the information they dispatched in conjunction with the messages hitherto were all matters considered by the question of how the fleet would operate and what it would do and were measures under the jurisdiction of the War Plans Section.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, in the light of these last two intercepts that I have called your attention to, intercepts having to do with a dead line and Japan’s martial intentions, after you read them and you say the shipping movement intercepts took on a more important aspect and a greater importance, did you at that time give any considerations to whether or not you should transmit to Admiral Kimmel the substance of the ship- movement intercepts or send him copies thereof?

Admiral Wilkinson. Whether we informed him of the fact that these detailed inquiries as to the locations in Pearl Harbor had come in addition to the regular—I mean aside from the regular espionage that was going on, is that your question?

Mr. Gearhart. I want the question answered.

Admiral Wilkinson. He knew there was a regular espionage.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, as you have testified that the ship-movement intercepts took on greater importance in your mind in the light of the dead-line message I have read you, did you at that time give some consideration to the proposition that you should send Admiral Kimmel the substance of the ship-movement intercepts, or copies thereof?

Admiral Wilkinson. May I ask you, sir, if you meant, should I tell him than in addition to the regular espionage with which he and we were familiar, that there were special messages inquiring as to special information desired from the spies?

Mr. Gearhart. That is right.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, did you give any consideration to the question as to whether or not you should give to Admiral Kimmel the information that you had?


Mr. Gearhart. All right. Then when you encountered this intercept, directing your attention to page 165 of Exhibit No. 1 in this proceeding from Tokyo to Washington, November 22, 1941. [Reading:]

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an under-
standing with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

[4911] Now when you read this intercepted message that the Japanese had fixed a positively unalterable deadline of November 29 at which things are automatically going to happen, after you read that did it not occur to you, Admiral Wilkinson, that you should give to Admiral Kimmel the information that you had?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. If that was information of the character that would influence the operations of the Fleet, whether to move in or out of port, I am not sure that it was within the responsibility or the authority of my office to send that. If, however, it was within that authority and responsibility, I did not consider sending it to him.

Mr. Gearhart. You were charged with evaluating all information that came to you, domestic and foreign. You were charged with the responsibility of disseminating that information. You had the information. Did you go and talk to Admiral Stark about it, or to any other higher officer than yourself?

Admiral Wilkinson. I was charged with evaluating the information, but I had been ordered not to develop the enemy intentions. I was charged with the dissemination of this information "as desirable." I had been restricted as to the dissemination of information of this character. I should perhaps have talked to Admiral Stark, or to Admiral Turner, [4912] about it. I did not. The information, however, was available to all hands, including myself.

Mr. Gearhart. So much for that. Now I want to ask you some more questions about a few intercepts which were not translated until after the 7th.

I notice, by making a rough count of Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 2, that on December 6, 36 or 37 Japanese intercepts were decoded. Without counting them carefully, I notice in these two exhibits that very, very few were decoded on the 5th and very few on the preceding day.

How do you account for the fact that on the 6th day of December our decoders were decoding like lightning and on previous days they decoded very, very few in comparison?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not account for it, sir. That was being done by the War Department Signal Intelligence Service and by the Navy Communications Service. It is possible that the completion of the transcripts were in part done on the 5th and finished on the 6th. It is possible that the key to the code was obtained on the 5th and applied on the 6th, but I haven't any information as to why.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you not consider it regrettable that a message containing this phrase remained undecoded until the 8th of December, a message which was received on December 6, 1941, from Honolulu to Tokyo, "I imagine that in all [4912] probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places," referring to Pearl Harbor? That appears on page 27 of Exhibit No. 2.
Admiral Wilkinson. You ask me if it was not unfortunate that it was not decoded before?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It was tragic that that was not decoded before?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. How do you account for the fact that was not decoded, when the decoders were decoding very rapidly and decoding messages in great number on that day, the 6th?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not account for it, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. How do you account for them picking out the 13-part message to decode on the 6th and ignore this surprise attack message that arrived on the same day?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not account for it. It is possible it came in another code which they could not so readily translate; it is possible that they were primed to get that 14-part message because the pilot message had come before it and they were on the lookout for it and wanted to [4914] tackle it first.

Mr. Gearhart. Was there any special organization of decoders on the 6th day of December 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir. It was not under my knowledge of cognizance. That was in the communications office.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you heard anyone account for the tremendous output of decoding that occurred on that day?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Has it been subject to conversational discussion?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I think I heard Captain Kramer remark that there was a heavy demand for translators that day, but that was, of course, after the decoding work had been done.

Mr. Gearhart. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson, from Michigan, will inquire.

Senator Ferguson. Did you, Admiral, have any conversation with Admiral Kirk about why he had been replaced in a few months?

Admiral Wilkinson. I feel quite sure I did, sir. I know he was not replaced. He went to sea at his own request, in order to take advantage of an opportunity for command.

[4915] Senator Ferguson. Whom would he have to make a request to?

Admiral Wilkinson. The Chief of Naval Operations, I presume, would release him, and the Bureau of Personnel would give him the orders as to his duty.

Senator Ferguson. Had you requested the assignment in there?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. It was a surprise to me. I was in command of a battleship at the time.

Senator Ferguson. You were called from the fleet then?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. To come into Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you briefed on any subject when you came in?

Admiral Wilkinson. I spent some little time going through the Office of Naval Intelligence, spending a few hours in each section and division in order to see what subject they handled and how they han-
dled them. I had intermittent conversations with Admiral Kirk and finally a fairly complete turn-over personally from him orally. I was not briefed by any officer outside of Admiral Kirk and his subordinate divisions.

Senator Ferguson. Were you briefed by Admiral Kirk?

Admiral Wilkinson. In the sense of the usual turn-over, [4916] yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you briefed on the diplomatic messages up to that day?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not specifically. I was in the Far Eastern Division and discussed the general tenor of them; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now who in the Far Eastern Division did you discuss the general tenor with?

Admiral Wilkinson. Captain McCollum.

Senator Ferguson. Captain McCollum?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, the head of the Division. He was a continuing source of knowledge in there, had been in there some little time, and would subsequently find me there as well, and he told me the status up to the moment.

Senator Ferguson. You think you came there the 15th of October?

Admiral Wilkinson. I took over the duties on the 15th of October. This period of briefing I spoke of, I had gone through the various offices, that took perhaps 2 weeks.

Senator Ferguson. Before that time?


Senator Ferguson. So you really came into the Department about the 1st of October?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I spent a time in the [4917] individual offices seeing what they did. I had a fairly complete and informative turn-over.

Senator Ferguson. You mean when you say that the mechanical end of the office you were looking over for 2 weeks?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes. Not the mechanical, I mean each one of the sections, I mean the Domestic Branch, the Foreign Branch, or the Geographic Section, or the methods of counterespionage, suspicion, and so on, in each one of the several offices, of which there were perhaps 20, I spent a few hours.

Senator Ferguson. That would be the administrative end then, that part of it?

Admiral Wilkinson. The operating end entirely. Not purely administrative, the operating end of the office; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. At that time you knew, on the 16th, that there was a change of Cabinet in Japan?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did the Intelligence Branch figure in any way that that was a changing point in our negotiations?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and I think we so reported it [4918] in our fortnightly situation, or fortnightly summaries, as our general understanding of the picture. The Far Eastern Section had considerable information on the make-up of the new Cabinet, that is on the military and naval members of it. We were all cognizant of the
fact that this made a more military tenor in the Japanese Government than had existed before.

[4919] Senator Ferguson. From a diplomatic viewpoint, when you went in, effective on the 15th of October, where did we stand in relation to the negotiations with Japan, as far as you are concerned; what was the diplomatic situation as of that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is that the negotiations, which had been begun the preceding spring, interrupted in the summer, had been resumed, were now being carried on with Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador, as the senior Japanese representative, Mr. Kurusu, had yet to arrive.

Senator Ferguson. At that time, were you familiar with what had taken place about the 17th of August 1941 in relation to our diplomatic situation?

Admiral Wilkinson. With relation to the Argentina Conference, you mean, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, only by newspaper accounts.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell me what the newspaper accounts were at that time, on that question? Tell me what you got from the newspapers.

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not think I got very much more than the "four freedoms," and I think there was a communiqué there, I forget it now.

[4920] Senator Ferguson. Pardon me?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think there was a communiqué issued, but I forget it now, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You say you learned about the "four freedoms" from the newspapers?

Admiral Wilkinson. To my recollection; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that all you knew about that conference?

Admiral Wilkinson. I knew our naval and military staffs had attended, and I knew, in all probability, they had discussed measures of supply of England. The lease-lend, I am not sure whether it was in effect at that moment, but it soon was, and I knew they had probably discussed that and discussed the safety of the Atlantic lanes. I knew nothing of any discussions whatsoever regarding the Far East.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn about the discussions that had taken place there with relation to the Far East?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know that I ever learned, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you were going to make a summary or appraisal of the intelligence that was coming through, isn't that correct?


Senator Ferguson. Have you ever learned about the parallel action of the two countries?

Admiral Wilkinson. Only recently.

Senator Ferguson. Just recently?

Admiral Wilkinson. As I think I have explained, Senator, our interest, responsibilities, and authority were confined to the action of foreign countries, and particularly prospective enemies. Matters on arrangement within our own country and diplomatic, military, and naval plans or arrangements or understandings for cooperation were not given to us.
Senator Ferguson. Then the question, as I understand it, as far as Intelligence was concerned, of what our diplomatic negotiations were, did not concern you; you did not use that in any way to evaluate what the enemy might be going to do?

Admiral Wilkinson. As I could learn and find out matters of that degree, yes, of course, they would be reflected in our interest. There was no machinery set up that I was definitely informed of. I learned a good deal through the translation of these intercepts as to what proposals our State Department had made to Japan which otherwise I would not have known through the machinery existing.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall getting the Winant message in relation to the movement of ships on the 6th of December 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall it specifically, sir, but if I did see it, and I presume I did because it came through the information channels, it was confirmatory of the evidences that we had already had of this advance through the South China Sea.

Senator Ferguson. Had you received Admiralty messages on the same point?

Admiral Wilkinson. I had been informed of them, yes, sir, and I think I had seen them.

Senator Ferguson. What did those two messages mean to you?

Admiral Wilkinson. They meant an attack was coming in the South China Sea area.

Senator Ferguson. It meant an attack was coming on the south? I did not get that?

Admiral Wilkinson. The South China Sea area, if we are speaking of the same message. You are speaking of the Winant message regarding the movement of ships?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. That is the attack which we had foreseen.

Senator Ferguson. What did that mean to the United States?

Admiral Wilkinson. I have my doubts, sir. It might mean we would come into the war in support of Siam, if that country were attacked, or Singapore, if that were attacked; it might mean we would not come into the war.

Senator Ferguson. Why would we possibly come in if Singapore was attacked, in your opinion, as of that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. Only because of two things: First because of our possible relations with England, as had been evidenced by the arrangements for the transfer of food and ammunition to England, the lend-lease, ocean convoys; the second thing, because that was an encroachment, a further advance of Japan, and the policy of our country apparently was directed toward preventing the aggressive moves of Japan extending beyond certain limits.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, I want to get what information you had in relation to the United States policy as far as Japan was concerned, if they moved beyond certain limits, as you now say in your last answer.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was your information along that line?
Admiral Wilkinson. I had the information—I cannot say whether I saw the document, or was told about it—that an advance of the Japanese forces to the westward of the one hundredth meridian or the southward of the tenth parallel of latitude would be a matter of grave concern to both England and America.

Whether that policy, as so indicated, of our State Department would be translated by the Congress and people into not only grave concern, but a resistance by war, I did not know.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you say someone showed it to you, or someone told you about it. Is that true?

Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure which, sir, whether I had heard of it, or I had heard some message to that effect.

Senator Ferguson. Can you recall what kind of message you may have seen along that same line?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I think I have seen some exhibit to that effect now. It may be that that I have seen it.

If the counsel will show me, I can perhaps speak of it.

Senator Ferguson. I want to try and take you back as of the date, rather than what you saw here or heard at the hearing.

Admiral Wilkinson. What I am speaking of now, is what I have seen which embodied those same parallels, those same geographical limits.

As to the time I knew of the geographical limits, I cannot remember whether I knew of them by someone telling me, or whether I knew of them by seeing a paper. You ask me what paper I saw. I saw, if I saw a paper, it was probably this paper you speak of now. I think more probably I was told that by Captain Schuirmann, who was the Director of the Central Division and liaison officer with the State Department.

The Vice Chairman. It is now 4 o'clock. You will require some further time, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. You will return then please, Admiral.

(Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the committee recessed until 10 a.m., the following day, Wednesday, December 19, 1945.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1945

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
Of the Pearl Harbor Attack.
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[4927] The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Yesterday we had up an inquiry made of counsel by Senator Ferguson, I think, under date of November 16, in which he said, "Please obtain for me all information that any of the services or the Government had that Japan knew we had broken their code."

There was a response from me immediately on the 17th, which said:

With reference to your letter of November 16 requesting "all information that any of the services or the Government had that Japan knew we had broken their code," there is no indication that Japan ever knew it. All information would indicate the contrary.

Now, yesterday I made the mistake, without checking up on the fact, of saying or thinking that I had submitted that request to the Navy or the Army, and they had reported and it was on the basis of their report that I made that statement, and as the result of that there were some imputations made on the good faith of the Army and Navy in not producing what we asked for.

I want to say that imputation is not justified because I now find I never did ask for that material, and that this [4928] answer that I made was made based on my own impression of what they were asking, and what the evidence was at that time. I am quite willing to be open to criticism for not having followed it up, although at that time we were pretty busy just getting started, and possibly I might be forgiven for that.

The Vice Chairman. I am sure we all recognize that.

Mr. Mitchell. At any rate, we had the inquiry made. Bear in mind that this inquiry, as I interpret it, I am quite sure referred to what the Japs knew about our breaking the code prior to Pearl Harbor.
I was not thinking of any information about that in 1944 when Marshall wrote his letter, because we had not asked that they produce any of these intercepts at that day, so I was referring to what the conditions were prior to Pearl Harbor, and I also feel quite sure, although the request is not limited to that—

Senator Ferguson. That is all I was referring to, Mr. Mitchell. There is no misunderstanding about that.

Mr. Mitchell. There is no misunderstanding about that.

I also want to say at that time this was in the singular, and I was thinking of the diplomatic code, the magic or the purple stuff, so I wrote and told him I did not know of any evidence of that kind. I should have asked [4929] the Departments for it, but I am glad to make it clear or to get straightened out on it.

Senator Brewster. I think I had some correspondence also. Did you check that?

Mr. Mitchell. Our file clerk was not able to get in from Virginia this morning. She has been ill for a week. She went away yesterday. We will have to let that go, a little.

The Vice Chairman. We will take judicial knowledge of the weather conditions today. All of us had a hard time getting here.

Mr. Mitchell. There is a communication from you, I am quite certain.

Senator Brewster. Yes, along the same line.

Mr. Mitchell. I have not heard from the Navy this morning on this, but the Army comes in, having worked hard on this subject with a number of intercepts during the months of April and May 1941. intercepts of Jap messages between Berlin and Tokyo, Tokyo and Washington is one of them, two, three, four of them. They all indicate a suspicion on the part of Japan that we were cracking one or more of their codes.

Senator Brewster. Can we have those read into the record?

[4930] Mr. Mitchell. I will be glad to read them. It is not always clear what code they are talking about. There are a number of them. The first one is from Tokyo to Berlin.

The Vice Chairman. Pardon me a minute. Senator Brewster and Senator Ferguson had requested some information about whether Japan had suspected or knew we were breaking their code, and had requested some information from counsel, and counsel is giving a report on that now. ¹

The Chairman. I see.

Mr. Mitchell. At the request of counsel, a search was made with reference to the intercepts prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. We have not made any attempt to find out what they suspected later on. It was Marshall's letter. They say they were still cracking. I suppose that is all I know about that.

This message is as follows:

From: Tokyo (Konoe)
To: Berlin
April 16, 1941
Purple
#329 Secret.
Re your #407

We suspect that the several codes P, SO and [4931] OITE⁴ are being cryptanalyzed by foreign powers and today we have none too many code books to spare. Therefore, when it is necessary to send a message, and at

¹ See also Hearings, Part 5, p. 2069 et seq. for additional messages indicating suspicion or knowledge by the Japanese that their codes were being broken.
the same time insure its secrecy, please dispatch them by machine or by TSU * code. In case revelation of the contents are made to foreign powers, take care to paraphrase them from beginning to end. I want you to use OITE* for messages of relatively slight importance.

Relay to Italy and Turkey.

**—S. I. S. #16312—Berlin tells Tokyo that intelligence wires emanating from Japanese offices in the Near East and Egypt to offices in Germany and Italy should be appropriately paraphrased before transmitting their contents to the Germans and Italians in order to avoid giving them clues in decoding Japanese codes. Berlin recommends use of certain codes in this connection.

a—An auxiliary code.

b—P-1.

c—PA-K2.

d—J series codes (J18-K7 now under study).

**ARMY 16407

Trans 4/19/41 (5)

The next dispatch is from Berlin to Tokyo, May 3, 1941, marked “Purple No. 482”.

*From: Berlin (Oshima)*

*To: Tokyo (Matsuoka)*

*3 May 1941*

(Purple-CA)

#482

**STAAAMAA STAHMER** called on me this day (evening?) and stating that this request was to be kept strictly secret, he said that Germany maintains a fairly reliable intelligence organization abroad (or—“in the U. S.”?), and according to information obtained from the above mentioned organization it is quite (or—“fairly”?) reliably established that the U. S. government is reading Ambassador Nomura’s code messages, and then asked that drastic steps should be taken regarding this matter.

There are at least two circumstances substantiating the above (suspicion). One circumstance is that Germany is reading our code messages * * * . Regarding this, during my previous residency here, they were known to have a large scale cryptanalytic organization—

(unfinished—last two-thirds not available)

**JD-1 2369**

(M-A) Navy trans. 6 May 1941

[4933] Senator Brewster. Mr. Counsel, you spoke of two circumstances. Did they give two?

Mr. Mitchell. No. It is a garbled message and there are some dashes after the words “two circumstances,” so we don’t know what it was; and then the message breaks off entirely. They didn’t seem to get it all.

The next one is from Tokyo to Berlin, May 5, 1941:

*From: Tokyo (Matsuoka)*

*To: Berlin (Oshima)*

*5 May 1941*

(Purple-CA)

#370

Please express our appreciation to **STAAAMAA STAHMER** for the information in question and ask him if it is not possible to give us the authority for the statement that it has been fairly reliably established that the U. S. government is reading our code messages, so that we might take appropriate action.

Reply requested.

**JD-1: 2368**

(M*A) Navy trans. 6 May 1941

The next one is from Tokyo to Washington, May 5, 1941, No. 192:

*From: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister).*

*To: Washington (Koshi).*

[4934] 5 May, 1941

(Purple)

#192

According to a fairly reliable source of information it appears almost certain that the United States government is reading your code messages.

Please let me know whether you have any suspicion of the above.

**JD-1: 2346**

(A) Navy Trans. 5-5-41 (S-TT)
The next is from Washington to Tokyo, May 5, 1941, No. 267:

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin).
5 May, 1941
(Purple)
#267
(Most guarded secrecy).
(Foreign Office secret).
Re your #192.*
For our part, the most stringent precautions are taken by all custodians of
codes and ciphers, as well as of other documents.
On this particular matter I have nothing in mind, but pending investigation
please wire back any concrete instances or details which may turn up.

*JD-1: 2346
(M) Navy Trans. 5-6-41 (7)

JD-1: 2367

[4935] The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 7, 1941:

From: Tokyo (Matsnoka)
To: Washington (Nomura)
7 May 1941
(Purple—CA)
#198 Regarding your #267:*
This matter was told very confidentially to Ambassador Oshima** by the
Germans as having been reported to them by a fairly reliable intelligence me-
dium; but to our inquiry they are said to have refused to divulge the basis on
which they deemed it to be practically certain.
JD-1:2367 Nomura requests further details of the basis for the report that
his code msgs are being read by the U. S. government.

**General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin.

JD*-1:2388 (F) Navy trans. 7 May 1941 (S-TT)

The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 7, 1941, No. 1015:

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington, Bangkok, Rome.
7 May, 1941
(Purple)
#1015 (Circular)
Immediately upon receipt of this message, [4936] use 1941 regulations
for A and B code machines until further notice.

16974
JD-1: 2372 (A) Navy Trans. 5-7-41 (S-TT)
I think that refers expressly to the machine type.

The next is from Tokyo to Washington, May 8, 1941, no number:

From: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
May 8, 1941
Purple (CA)
No number.

From Vice Chief OHASI to Minister WAKASUGI.
I want you to leave the custody of the government code in the hands of IGUCHI.
No matter how long the communications are or how hurriedly the code must be
used, there should be no occasion to call upon the services of telegraphic clerks.
Please impress upon all of your secretaries that this is a special regulation.
In view of the importance of the details of our recent exchange of wires, please
(burn?) them immediately.

ARMY 2446 Trans. 5/9/41 (S)

Then there is one from Washington to Tokyo, May 9, 1941, unnum-
bered:

[4937] From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
9 May 1941
(Purple-CA)
Unnumbered

To the Vice Minister*, from Wakasugi.**
I respectfully acknowledge receipt of your telegram.***
Because of various duties at this office it requires a long time for a secretary alone to handle long messages and the increased volume of traffic in connection with this matter. ****

(My message #272**** required 6 men working for 6 hours.)

With the opening of negotiations, the volume of telegraphic traffic is bound to increase tremendously. As time is at a premium in handling these communications, you can well appreciate the inadvisability of having only the secretary handle this work. Furthermore, it goes without saying that the increased traffic will interfere greatly with other duties of this office.

However, fortunately, our communication clerks have been constantly reminded of the necessity of maintaining security, and they have faithfully adhered to this policy in their work.

[4938] Although I appreciate the intent of your telegram *** from the standpoint of security, I, nevertheless request your authorization to enlist the aid of Horiuchi, Hori, and Kazuwaru to handle communication duties under strict supervision.

Also please authorize me to have Kawabata of Chicago come here temporarily to assist us in our communication work. (Bring all codes and do his work in this office).

*Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ohashi.

**Japanese Minister to Washington, under Ambassador Nomura.

***See JD-1: 2446, unnumbered, dated 8 May (Purple-CA), in which Tokyo issues Washington special regulations for custody of the Chief of Mission private code (CA).

****Japanese-American negotiations, being conducted in great secrecy.

JD-1: 2494 (A-M) Navy Trans. 12 May 1941 (7)

The next one is from Washington to Tokyo, May 20, 1941, No. 327:

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
May 20, 1941
Purple (CA)
No. 327.

INTELLIGENCE:
Though I do not know which ones I have [4939] discovered the United States is reading some of our codes.
As for how I got the intelligence, I will inform you by courier or another safe way.

ARMY

Trans. 5/21/41 (7)

The next is from Tokyo to all Japanese merchant vessels:

From: Tokyo.
To: All Japanese Merchant Vessels.
30 May 1941
(NL)
No. 1

The Navy "S" code was seized from one of our merchant ships in a certain foreign port, together with other secret documents in custody of the captain.
The use of the Navy "S" code shall be discontinued except when absolutely necessary for training purposes.
And, as previously instructed, when there is a possibility that official inspection may be made, all secret documents should be promptly burned.

JN-1: 69 (C) Navy Trans. 5-31-41 (M)

That is the last one. The Army reports that they are continuing their search and the Navy reports that it has found some messages which are now being photostated. Whether they are the same or others I do not know yet.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Mr. Counsel?
[4940] Mr. MITCHELL. That is all.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. Very well.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. THEODORE STARK WILKINSON
(Resumed)

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have any statement you want to make before you resume your testimony?

Admiral Wilkinson. With regard to some of the inquiries made of me yesterday to bring information when available:

Counsel has just read the dispatches which I was requested to look up, the second one of which referred particularly to the one I spoke of where Berlin had advised Tokyo that they had information as to breaking the codes.

With respect to the personnel in the district intelligence office in Honolulu at Pearl Harbor time, the nearest date for which we have figures is December 16, at which time there were 41 officers, 60 enlisted men, and 3 civilian agents in that office.

Inquiries are being made as to the surveillance, screening, and general security of the civilian laborers and workmen in the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, as requested by Senator Brewster. I have not the answer on that at present.

The Vice Chairman. Is that all?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Yesterday, Admiral Wilkinson, I was asking you about the knowledge that was given to you at the time you went in in relation to diplomatic negotiations with Japan and also the military and naval knowledge, because you went into the department on the 15th of October.

Now, can you recall that you were briefed on the military situation as far as our forces were concerned, and their forces, so that you would be able to take the knowledge that you were getting and analyze it, so it would be of value to those that you were to give it to?

Admiral Wilkinson. I had general information of our own forces from my previous work at sea and I had a professional interest in where they were acquired before I took over and afterward from the ship movements office and from the War Plans as to the disposition of our forces. I was not formally briefed nor formally informed as to it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When Admiral Ingersoll talked to you—as I understand it, he did talk to you—he told you that your duties would be varied from those that were in writing?

Admiral Wilkinson. I asked him to confirm that specific point only, sir, that I mentioned.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did he give you any reasons why there was to be a change?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. He said that was a naval practice as opposed to the Army practice, that the Army practice was that the so-called G-2 office, which was not only the Military Intelligence Division but also an Assistant Chief of Staff, that that office was charged with preparing the enemy side of the Estimate of the Situation, so-called, which is to say, what can the enemy do, what will he do, and what are his possibilities, that that was assigned to the Army G-2, but that that was not a part of the duties or within the scope of the activities of the Naval Intelligence, that that estimate of
the situation, both the enemy side and our own side was prepared in
War Plans.
That was the only point I asked him about, sir, and that was how
he explained it.
[4943] Senator Ferguson. And he explained it in that way?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You asked him because the instructions in the
manual were direct that you had other duties than what you were
then performing?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I don't think the instructions in the
manual conflicted directly. They said I should get all the facts and
information bearing on the enemy's intentions. They did not tell me
to estimate them, and the instructions in the manual said, "Disseminate
information as desirable," and "desirable" would be such instructions,
or otherwise, as I might receive.
I thought, in other words, that his word to me was consistent with
the manual.
Senator Ferguson. And it made a direct limitation?
Admiral Wilkinson. A direct limitation and an order from an
officer, a responsible officer in the chain of command.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know or did you hear after you came in
that there had been a change in the sending of messages to Admiral
Kimmel in August of that year?
Admiral Wilkinson. I don't recall that I did, sir. I was informed
as to the present status and continued that. I don't know that I was
informed of a prior status [4944] which had been changed.
Senator Ferguson. You just had the present status?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I didn't go into the history of it.
[4945] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Admiral Hart had
his own means on the Philippines of getting his information in the
CINCAP?
Admiral Wilkinson. I knew that both Admiral Hart and Ad-
miral Kimmel had agencies wherein they could get the radio intelli-
gence with regard to the movement of the enemy ships. I knew both
of them had agencies which had some facilities, however slight, for
attacking codes. I do not know that I knew that Admiral Hart was
able actually to solve the purple code.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know that Admiral Hart did have
means of getting diplomatic messages?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that I did; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that Admiral Kimmel did not have any
such means at all?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I do not recall that I did.
Senator Ferguson. You do not recall that you knew that?
Admiral Wilkinson. No. I knew that they both had certain facili-
ties but the extent of them I did not know.
Senator Ferguson. Did Ambassador Grew's messages come to you?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
[4946] Senator Ferguson. Then you did not know——
Admiral Wilkinson. My error, sir. The messages he sent to the
State Department during my tenure of office, my liaison officer over
there picked those up, but not the—I thought for the moment you were speaking of the first message of January.

Senator Ferguson. No.

Admiral Wilkinson. The more recent messages did, yes.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with his message on the third where he said that the Japanese might strike with dramatic suddenness?

Admiral Wilkinson. The message of what date, sir?

Senator Ferguson. November the 3d.

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I probably saw it, sir. I think I did see it because my liaison officer obtained these messages from the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. Did that change your thinking at that time as to whether or not war was near or not near?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes and no, sir. It crept so closely with the movements that they were making into the South China Sea, which were already beginning then and were intensified later, that it probably directed my attention there rather than the possibility of their making a sudden strike against the United States at some other place.

[4047] Senator Ferguson. Now, when you were before the Roberts committee was there a stenographer present?

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is there was, sir.

Senator Ferguson. There was?

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is there was, yes, sir; and I had expected to see it and, in fact, when I came here I looked for that record and found there was no record, only a summary.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he took stenographic notes of what you said?

Admiral Wilkinson. I thought so.

Senator Ferguson. You thought so at the time?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you do not know why, then, they were not transcribed?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You never heard?

Admiral Wilkinson. I never heard.

Senator Ferguson. This paper—

Admiral Wilkinson. I found a precis but not a brief, not a transcription.

Senator Ferguson. You did not prepare this paper then that you brought in yesterday?

Admiral Wilkinson. I prepared that as a memorandum to [4948]

Admiral Stark after the event of what my testimony had been according to my recollection, but it was in no sense a stenographic record of my testimony. It was just for Admiral Stark’s information of what they had asked me and what I had said.

Senator Ferguson. Did the Roberts committee draw up an instrument similar to this?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not to my knowledge. That was my memorandum to Admiral Stark. It was entirely within the office and had no connection with the Commission. Now, the Commission may have made, and I thought they did, an actual transcript by a stenographer, but when their report came in it was only what they called a precis of
testimony of those witnesses they heard before they left Washington to go to Pearl Harbor, among them myself, and the precis with respect to my testimony was about two paragraphs long as I recall.

Senator Ferguson. Has the counsel got that copy of those two paragraphs?

Mr. Mitchell. I think Senator Brewster has that. I would not be able to check it without looking at our files.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I think in the Roberts' report itself you will find a discussion of the procedure they followed. They did not take notes, apparently, in this country on that part of their hearings and later on they went on into a stenographic record, but there is the discussion you want in the report itself.

Senator Ferguson. I just wanted to clear this up this morning as to what took place in that hearing.

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection was that they had a confidential secretary or ship's clerk or someone present taking notes but it may be that he was only taking an abstract rather than taking stenographic notes.

Senator Ferguson. I am going to try and take you back to the morning of the 6th.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. About a certain meeting with Admiral Turner and there was also a meeting with, as I understand it, McCollum and Bratton. Do you recall that meeting?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I have seen some mention of it. I do not recall it. I saw McCollum constantly and occasionally Bratton; not so often Bratton.

Senator Ferguson. Well, on page 998 of the Navy Top Secret Admiral Turner talks about the meeting; at least it relates to the instrument that was drawn.

Do you remember a long document, some 500 words, being drawn up?

Admiral Wilkinson. By whom, sir?

Senator Ferguson. By McCollum.

Admiral Wilkinson. Not as of that date. I remember a December the 1st memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. Let me read this. I will change it. It was not on the morning of the 6th as I see here. There is another meeting that I had in mind on that.

Question No. 48 on page 998 [reading]:

There is evidence before this court that Commander McCollum in the Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence prepared a summary of information on the Japanese-United States relationship over a period some time preceding the third or fourth of December 1941 which was for the information of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Did you have any knowledge of the preparation of such a dispatch?

Answer. Yes. We had discussed the advisability of making such a summary and I had personally discussed with Commander McCollum the details of the various points and the detail of the relationship and their negotiations and so on. We had spent a great deal of time talking the thing over. Then Commander McCollum, I will say we found ourselves in very close agreement, prepared the dispatch, I have forgotten its terms, and brought it to me to check over it, which I did, and found myself in general agreement with it and made suggestions on a few comparatively minor changes. Now, I do not remember just what happened with the dispatch.
Question. Can you recall what happened to the dispatch? Was it ever transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet?
Answer. I do not know. We do not know at this time.

Question. To your knowledge did it ever reach the Chief of Naval Operations?
Answer. I do not know. I think I initialed it and gave it back to McCollum so that the dispatch could be presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Office of Naval Intelligence with my own concurrence. That is my memory of it. It was presented to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson.

Admiral Wilkinson. Is that Colonel Bratton's testimony or whose, sir?
Senator Ferguson. That is Admiral Turner's testimony in the Top Secret of the Navy. I read the direct quote. Have you got it?
Mr. Gesell. No; that is our only copy.

Senator Ferguson. Have you seen it?
Mr. Gesell. I haven't checked that testimony. You are quite right, it is in the Top Secret but I did not recall at this time that that was the testimony.


Admiral Wilkinson. And that is reported as of December 6th, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, he has not given the date there but he has got in the dates over a period some time preceding the third or fourth of December.

Admiral Wilkinson. Preceding the third or fourth?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, over a period some time preceding the third or fourth of December, which was for the information of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you recall that message?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall that as of the morning of the 6th, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, any other time?
Admiral Wilkinson. Or the messages there preceding the third or the fourth. At one time in that interval between the first and the seventh Captain McCollum came to me with a message and I went to see Admiral Turner with him. Now, more recently we have discussed that to endeavor to clear our mutual recollections and the latest recollection which resulted from that discussion that I recall is that Captain McCollum took the message to Admiral Turner and Admiral Turner referred back to the war warning message and discussed with McCollum whether that of itself was not sufficient or whether it was necessary to send any further message, and the result, as I now recall, as I say, of their discussion through this mutual recollection and mutual endeavor to clear our memories, was that Turner and McCollum agreed that it was not necessary to send further information of that sort because it had been covered by the war warning message, but I would like very much, of course, to have Admiral Turner testify to that as well and he, I believe, will be a witness shortly, but I do not believe that there was any such message actually sent. The message may have been in our thought, the message may have been one that we were contemplating with respect to the winds message when there was a false interpretation but that was proved to be false before anything was sent out.
Senator Ferguson. Now, whether or not the message was sent—let us pass that for the moment —
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (continuing): You recall the discussion of getting further information to Kimmel. That is what they are talking about in this, are they not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember that?
Admiral Wilkinson. I remember McCollum discussing with me whether there was anything further that should be sent out on the basis of the information which we had discussed up to the date of the 1st of December with regard to the South China Sea incidents.

Senator Ferguson. Well, it would certainly be after the 27th?
Admiral Wilkinson. It was after the 27th.

Senator Ferguson. So it was information received after the 27th that you had discussed with McCollum?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you discussed as to whether or not that should be sent to the CINCPAC?

Admiral Wilkinson. To the fleet as a whole.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; to the fleet as a whole.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Which would go to the Commander in Chief.
Admiral Wilkinson. And as I recall that discussion it was factual evidence that we had of the further movements in the South China Sea.

Senator Ferguson. Now, can you give us, as near as you can, the substance of what this message was that you now recall was taken up with Admiral Turner, that you say was not sent?

Admiral Wilkinson. My recollection is very hazy but I think it was information with respect to the further developments that had actually been discovered in the South China Sea which were brought up to date by the 1st of December memorandum which is in evidence and which may have occurred in the 2 or 3 days since the 1st of December memorandum and the time we were discussing that message. It wasn’t anything to do with a threatened attack on Hawaii because we had no intention of that whatsoever.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to Admiral Turner as to whether or not he thought of an attack upon Hawaii?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But at least you had no thought of an attack upon Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that continued on until after the attack?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you recall a meeting with any one, particularly with Colonel Bratton, on Saturday morning about further information to be sent to the Army or the Navy at Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You have no recollection at all of that?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. As I say, Captain McCollum was in my office frequently all the time I was on duty there and as the relations became strained and the movements of the Japanese forces to the
south were more and more apparent, he was in my office I would say three and four times a day, sometimes, but rarely, Colonel Bratton would be with him and I recall from time to time in that way seeing Colonel Bratton but I do not recall specifically seeing him on the morning of the 6th. I do recall seeing Captain McCollum several times that morning. It may well be he brought Colonel Bratton in with him.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall any conversation with officers in the Army and/or the Navy in relation to trying to get more information to Hawaii? Would that refresh your memory, whether it was with Bratton specifically on a specific date or just a general conversation with him, or information from him or any of the other officers?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, not specifically, except the 1st of December in Admiral Stark's office we were discussing the general movements of the Japanese, the preparation of this message I just mentioned. The information as to the movements of the Japanese Fleet was being picked up and in fact more or less originated in Pearl Harbor and in Corregidor and was known to both of them. Except for information of an attack on Pearl Harbor, which I did not have, there was nothing particularly for me to send to the fleet.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the message of—if you will take Exhibit 37, page 32. Counsel, could you give the Admiral Exhibit 37?

Admiral Wilkinson. I qualify my last reports, of course, Senator, with respect to the sending of the code messages. I did confer with Admiral Ingersoll about that—first with Captain McCollum and then with Admiral Ingersoll and sent the code message.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the code message, were you familiar with the message being sent to Tokyo to destroy our code?

Admiral Wilkinson. I originated, in fact, a message to Tokyo and several other naval attaches' offices to destroy our codes, yes, sir. I think it was Tokyo as well.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the one that went to Tokyo?

[4957] Admiral Wilkinson. As I recall, it was the same one that went to the other agencies. I was familiar with that and, in fact, originated it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, can you tell us just what caused you to send that message to destroy the code?

Admiral Wilkinson. Because the Japanese had issued instructions to their offices to destroy codes, and we feared that if they anticipated that conditions would be such that their offices would be raided, that certainly they themselves would not hesitate to raid our offices, war or no war, and we did not want to be in a position to have our codes seized by a raid.

Senator Ferguson. Did you believe that war was imminent?

Admiral Wilkinson. Imminent but not inevitable.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the message on page 32, November 24; do you have that before you?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted at all about the sending of that message or its wording?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then your only knowledge came after it had been sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And would you say how long after it [4959] had been sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say a day or two, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And then did you get any instructions on it as to its meaning or effect or why it was sent?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, except I was familiar with the negotiations in process by reason of the broken codes so that I knew the obvious reason for it; similarly with the message of the 27th.
Senator Ferguson. Were you in any way informed that that message was to take care of a surprise attack? For instance, I will read you question 40 on page 996 of Admiral Turner’s testimony before the top secret. It may refresh your memory.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I understand that reference now. I did not understand before what you were reading from.
Senator Ferguson (reading):
This dispatch, exhibit 15, states “a surprise aggressive movement in any direction is indicated.”
And that Exhibit 15 is this same message that I am reading to you.
Admiral Wilkinson. Except the text of the message reads, “is a possibility.”
Senator Ferguson. Yes. [Reading:]
This language is omitted from the dispatch of the [4960] 27th of November, three days later, wherein there is set out certain Japanese objectives in the Far East. Was this omission from the dispatch of November 27th done intentionally?
This is the answer of Admiral Turner:
I would like to invite attention to the difference between the two dispatches. In the one of the 24th it says “a surprise aggressive movement in any direction is indicated.” Now, that “in any direction” could be by naval force, air force, amphibious force or anything else. In this other dispatch we said, “an amphibious expedition is en route.”
That is the one of the 27th. I am inserting that in my own language.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Now, to quote further:
It was moving down the China Sea. Now, those two are quite different. They do not cover the same kind of a subject and they were intended not to cover it. That was information. We knew that the Japanese were on the move in the China Sea. That was a fact. Now, the other was deduction as covering generally not only the movement of an amphibious force but the movement of any force.
[4961] Now, does that refresh your memory?
Admiral Wilkinson. As to what, sir?
Senator Ferguson. As to these two messages, what you were told about.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, I am familiar with both of the messages.
Senator Ferguson. Was that your understanding of the messages that I just read you, what Admiral Turner said about them?
Admiral Wilkinson. Why, I do not know that I developed any particular understanding. My understanding of the first message was a statement that the negotiations were breaking down and that any-
thing might happen anywhere. My understanding of the second message was, so far as I was interested in it—I was not directly affected by it, the second message—that it was a war warning sent to both the Asiatic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet stating, "Look out; negotiations have ceased; an aggressive movement by Japan is expected and here is what has been indicated: We know they are going to do that."

My understanding was, certainly, that that would not be the only thing that might have happened, such as Admiral Turner has said, but that was certainly the one thing that was very evident and, of course, did occur.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have any knowledge that there was a movement that would cause an amphibious landing?

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, yes. I think the basic information under the conditions that existed had been prepared and received in various detail by my office and furnished to him. There were ships and transports and landing boats and men-of-war streaming down the South China Sea.

Senator Ferguson. What was the earliest you remember coming to the conclusion that there would be an amphibious landing?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would say certainly by December 1.

Senator Ferguson. Now, where would this amphibious landing in your opinion be made, would you say?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know, of course. There was a possibility they might be getting around to make an advance base in Indochina, they might be going down to go into Thailand—Siam at that time—and from then to expand their influence into that free country, or they might be making a direct assault on the British territories in the Malay Peninsula.

It integrated with my conception, as I have said earlier, that I felt that they might well be feeling their way southward and by the infiltration method to gain all the ground and solidify their position as far as they could before they made any definite act which would antagonize the British into the war, including certain nations, just as they had done for some years past. If they followed that course they would limit their activities to Indochina and perhaps Siam. If they wanted to make a direct attack, they would go, as in fact they did go, into the Malay Peninsula.

Senator Ferguson. Well, if they went into the Malay Peninsula how would that involve us in war from the knowledge you had?

Admiral Wilkinson. I know that if there was an attack on British possessions, I knew it would involve England in war. I knew that the relations between England and the United States were close, the actual details I did not know, but I knew that we would be concerned and I thought it probable that the Congress would be sufficiently concerned to consider whether it was a cause of war. As far as I knew there were no binding commitments. I did know that there had been the geographical lines set up, the passage of which would be a cause for concern on the part of this country and that the Malay Peninsula was beyond those lines.

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall the three men-of-war memorandum here?

Admiral Wilkinson. I recall it now. I did not see it at that time.

Senator Ferguson. You did not see it prior to the 7th?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am quite sure I did not. It was quite new to me.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me?

Admiral Wilkinson. It was quite new to me when I saw it here. I am quite sure I did not see it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not you ever got any information from those three men-of-war or any one of them?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't think so, sir. I don't think it ever got out of the station. I do know with the aerial patrol that was so. That was established and we got information from it but I doubt if the men-of-war were ever stationed.

Senator Ferguson. Were you getting information from the aerial patrol at the Philippines?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, via the commander in chief of the Asiatic.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did you get any from the aerial patrol at Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you using the aerial patrol at the Philippines as a source of information?

Admiral Wilkinson. I was not using it. I was looking for it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, that is what I mean.

[4965] Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir; I did not order it.

Admiral Wilkinson. It was being used by your office?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know when Singapore actually went on alert?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You did not know that it had gone on alert on the 6th, their 6th?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It would be on our 5th.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I may have seen the dispatches but at what precise moment I did I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the purple code was used for that wind message or was that a minor code that was used on that wind message?

Admiral Wilkinson. Setting it up?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. To set it up was a code. To implement it was in the middle of a weather broadcast as I remember. There is no code that set it up. It might be evident on the face of the dispatch. I would not ordinarily know particularly what code any message came in because they came to me after translation.

[4966] Senator Ferguson. And the name on the code as a rule was not on the translation?

Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly.

Senator Ferguson. When would you say your office was alerted to war, for real war?

Admiral Wilkinson. My office was alerted to the Far Eastern crisis about 10 days or 2 weeks before the 7th of December and my office was not alerted to war as war until it actually occurred, but we were in a crisis condition and standing watches and 24-hour service and responsible officers on call outside of their own office hours.
Senator Ferguson. How much effort did you put in Saturday evening trying to reach Admiral Stark after they delivered those 13 parts to you at your office, or at the moment?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I called him up, sir, and failed to get him. I don't think I put much more effort into it because I thought at the time, and I was in agreement with the people I had been discussing it with, Captain McCollum, General Miles and Captain Beardall, that it was a diplomatic paper, a justification of the position of Japan, a so-called white paper such as governments frequently issue in connection with negotiations which they are conducting. I did not consider it a military paper and it was not until the fourteenth [4967] part came in that I considered it was a final paper. We had sent dispatches of almost that same character, I think, indicating that propositions made by the Japanese were not satisfactory to us and this was one being made by them that our propositions were not satisfactory to them.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you knew about the message of the 26th having been sent?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you knew that we had considered their message of the 20th of November as an ultimatum?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not know that because one does not reply to an ultimatum. I would have considered their message of the 20th, and I do consider it, as a step in the negotiations and ours of the 26th as a further step, although I did not think that they would accept ours of the 26th.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, why did you want to reach Admiral Stark then that evening if this was only an ordinary white paper diplomatic message?

Admiral Wilkinson. Just to tell him that we had it. He had seen the pilot message. To tell him that we had it and as far as we read it there was nothing particularly alarming in those parts and I would show it to him in the morning.

Senator Ferguson. That pilot message said that they were [4968] to get another message as to when it was to be delivered. Was that very significant to you, the placing of a zero time for delivery?

Admiral Wilkinson. The pilot message said two things, sir. It said, "We are going to give you an answer and it is going to be in 14 parts. We will tell you when to deliver that note." The second thing was, "You are going to receive it and you are to dress it up in good language and we will tell you when to deliver it." The fact that there was a certain time for the delivery was not significant to me. Perhaps it should have been. I was not familiar with diplomatic language, that the time of presentation is characteristic of an ultimatum rather than an ordinary note, which would not ordinarily be presented at some certain time. I did not appreciate it if that is the case. In other words, the time element, the fact that they were to deliver it at a certain time, it didn't mean any more to me than as being a time with respect to negotiations and here they said to them to "dress it up and then we will tell you when to present it."

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that was because of or caused by your lack of knowledge of diplomatic procedure?
Admiral Wilkinson. Or my general lack of intelligence or appreciation, sir, I don't know which. I certainly did not appreciate it.

[4969] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, Admiral Beardall was at your office that night?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. He was the President's military aide?

Admiral Wilkinson. Naval aide.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me; naval aide.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And had been familiar with the magic?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So you could properly discuss and freely discuss with Admiral Beardall and General Miles, who was also familiar with magic this question?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, and my recollection is we all agreed that it was a diplomatic justification of their position.

Senator Ferguson. Normally Admiral Beardall would have been the man to receive it for the President, would he not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And Kramer, who had delivered it to you, he delivered it at the White House?

Admiral Wilkinson. He saw that as he was at the White House—he delivered it at the White House.

Senator Ferguson. He advised you of it?

Admiral Wilkinson. It was not necessary for Beardall to take it there.

Senator Ferguson. You were advised of that fact?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he had any discussion with Kramer about it?

Admiral Wilkinson. Whether Beardall had?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. No. Kramer was there with all three of us. I don't remember any particular discussion between those two. Kramer was there during our talk and sat in there with us.

Senator Ferguson. Did he advise you of his conversation with the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. At least that the Secretary of the Navy was going to have a meeting with the Secretary of State and War on the following morning at ten?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; for two reasons: First, because they were to discuss this diplomatic message; and, second, on the presumption that the fourteenth part would be available by then, as in fact it was. In fact, I thought that message was primarily of concern to the State Department rather than the Navy and the Army.

Senator Ferguson. And did you put on any special effort to decode the fourteenth message which you were intercepting, which would have been the one o'clock message?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not myself because that was under Communications but I knew from Kramer that Communications was on the lookout for it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you knew that America was not bluffing in this negotiation?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. We were going to adhere to our principles.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. But I also knew that we were making an effort to delay the break-off of the negotiations and any actual conflict until we got our positions in the Philippines sufficiently garrisoned.

Senator Ferguson. From the intelligence did you think that the Japanese were bluffing or not, from the intelligence that came through your hands?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not think they were bluffing but I did not think they would strike America. I thought, as I have said, that they would confine their efforts to working to the south and possibly appreciating that we did not want to precipitate anything in the temper of our country, that they would try to consolidate their position and gain all they could before they did have to risk a war.

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand that you believed prior to the 7th because of the movement of the troops and the intelligence you had that there was going to be war with Britain but you did not believe that there was going to be war with the United States? Is that a fair summary?

Admiral Wilkinson. I believed there would be war with Britain if the Japs went into the Malay Peninsula. I was not sure they would go there. If there was in that case a war with Britain, I thought there was a possibility that the United States would come into the war but I did not think there would be any certainty of it. I did not think that the Japs would attack the United States direct.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Saturday morning a message came from Admiralty that they were going across the Gulf of Siam, 1½ hours, I think, was the message, from the Kra Peninsula, and the message from our Ambassador Winant to the same effect, which came in at 10:40 Saturday morning. Do I understand that you did or did not get that information?

Admiral Wilkinson. I got it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When did you get it?

Admiral Wilkinson. And my recollection, without checking it, is that that course that they were on was a westerly course, which would be a clear possibility of attacking Siam, which was one of the alternatives I spoke of. I would like to see that dispatch to check that course.

Senator Ferguson. Could you show it to him, both the Winant and the Admiralty message?

While he is looking for it, did you get that Saturday, Admiral, on the 6th?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think so, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So when you got the 13—

Admiral Wilkinson. That is just long range, I am not certain, but I think I did.

Here is one message, sir, again from Cadogan.

"Admiralty conference on information just forwarded, Cadogan attending. They were uncertain as to whether destination of parties"—which is the Japanese force—"is Kra or Bangkok."
Bangkok, of course, was Thailand and Kra was the Malay Peninsula.

The message they referred to was the 3 a.m. this morning and "the parties seen off Cambodia Point sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time."

In that same dispatch from the Admiralty—or from Mr. Winant, I find that:

British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before British have opportunity to guarantee support.

In other words, the British also were in doubt as to whether the attack was to be made on Thai or the Kra Peninsula or not.

[4975] Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you did not even come to the conclusion Saturday that they would attack in such a way that Britain would come into the war?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not come to the firm conclusion, no, sir. I thought they might be working their way to Siam, rather than challenge England immediately. I thought it probable, and almost certain, that Britain would shortly be drawn into the war, but in support of Siam rather than as against a direct attack on them.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, would Senator Ferguson yield to a question?

Senator Ferguson. I will yield to my colleague.

Senator Brewster. It is in connection with this: You reiterated it is your firm opinion that they were likely to move south instead of coming to Hawaii, to attack us. Whether or not the fact that the United States Fleet in the Pacific even at Hawaii was inferior in strength to the Japanese, would not be calculated to incline the Japanese to the opinion that they could move south without any immediate danger of serious interruption from the United States?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not quite understand you. I got the first part.

Senator Brewster. Will the reporter read it?

[4976] (The question referred to, as recorded above, was read by the reporter.)

Senator Brewster. Without any immediate danger of serious interruption from the United States, because of the fact that the fleet, as presumably they knew, was not sent to the western Pacific or moving to the Philippines and striking.

Admiral Wilkinson. They could move southward without immediate danger. There was a risk. The further they extended their lines southward, the more possible a threat from Hawaii would be, because they were more exposed to us. But they could, and did, move south along the China Coast, and into Indochina, with comparative freedom.

Senator Brewster. I assume that probably was one factor in your consideration of the situation, your knowledge of the relative strength of the fleet.

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know that I went into the strategic consideration, so much, sir. The very evident factors were the known presence of the ships moving down there, and then there was, as a background, the knowledge that you have just stated, that the lines of communication were short; they had air fields and harbors and bases on Formosa which they could use in the protection of those lines, and it was, in fact, a Japanese sea, and it would be very difficult for us to interfere with it.
Senator Brewster. If the United States Pacific Fleet had been twice as powerful as the Japanese Fleet, with adequate supply trains, to move promptly to the Philippines, your estimate of the likelihood of the Japanese moving south, rather than moving in our direction might have been materially altered? Would that be a fair statement?

Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly they would have been more reluctant to move in the open sea to the south. They might have moved along the coast. Certainly they would have anticipated our fleet would come into the Philippines and establish its base there and then it would be in a position to cut the water transport, so they would have to work overland.

Senator Brewster. And so they would have materially altered the strategic concept on both sides if that situation had prevailed?

Admiral Wilkinson. Certainly.

Senator Brewster. You did, of course, take all of those factors into account in forming your opinions as to the situation, I assume?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I naturally would, sir, even without formally estimating them. They would influence [4978] me by virtue of my familiarity with naval matters.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, that brings up the question about these lost Japanese carriers. You were quite sure from the intelligence that you received, that these six carriers that were lost could not have been used in the movement south, because you had that covered and had the information on that; isn't that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson. There could not have been any movement of those carriers through the China Sea, or we would have detected it. There might well have been a movement south into the Carolines, the Palaus, Saipan, and Guam; there might have been a movement into the Marshalls, and in fact we had some information from the radio intelligence at Pearl Harbor that they thought there was a force of carriers and submarines into the Marshalls, which would have accounted for them, although Corregidor did not believe it.

Senator Ferguson. Then we find this situation, that at least these six lost carriers could not be used in the movement south in the China Sea, and the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral Wilkinson. They were not there at that time. They might have been home getting ready to start there.

Senator Ferguson. If they were in the Carolines then there was a possibility that they could attack Guam?

[4979] Admiral Wilkinson. If they were where, sir?

Senator Ferguson. If they were in the Carolines, they could have attacked Guam?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then were we, from your evidence, anticipating an attack, an air attack from these six lost carriers at Guam?

Admiral Wilkinson. There was a possibility, if Japan was determined upon war, that they would attack anywhere, if Japan was determined upon opening the war against us. The probabilities, we felt, were most probable, the Philippines, next Guam, next Wake, next Midway, and last Hawaii, because of the distance and the extension of the line, the increased risk of interception by our forces, and the greater boldness required.
Senator Ferguson. When the message was sent on the 27th, the war warning message to the Navy, that was, as I understand it, because of this movement to the south that you knew about?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think everything boiled into that. I did not prepare the message or was not consulted in preparing it, but my assumption would be not only the movement to the south, but also the diplomatic messages and preparation of the fleet. We knew the fleet was getting ready for almost anything.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 22 of Exhibit 2, there is a message that I want to speak to you about. Do you have the book before you?

Admiral Wilkinson. The yellow book, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. That is the one in relation to the lights and want ads and radio.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When did that first come to your attention?

Admiral Wilkinson. Some 3 or 4 days after Pearl Harbor. I note it was translated on the 11th. Whether this was intercepted or not I do not know. It was, however, picked up in code form on the 8th from the cable station in Hawaii, and turned over to the Navy then. I am not sure whether it had been earlier intercepted by an intercept station or not.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, or did you ever hear that it was intercepted here at Fort Hunt in Virginia?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I would not know it, since that was a matter of communications.

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by a code being translated in the rough, or a message being translated in the rough?

[4981] Admiral Wilkinson. In the rough?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. I suppose it is the first draft before they went over it and removed inconsistencies and dug out some of the things that might have puzzled them the first time.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know Dorothy Edgers?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know she was a translator in the ONI, the Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. If this message had been translated in the rough, and put on Kramer’s desk—was it Commander Kramer at that time, or Captain Kramer?

Admiral Wilkinson. Commander then.

Senator Ferguson. Commander Kramer’s desk on the afternoon of the 6th, completed in the early afternoon of the 6th of December 1941, and was brought to the attention of Captain Kramer, I would like to ask why that would not be called to your attention, if your office was alerted on that day? Was it because of this 14-part message?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would have every idea that it would be, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with the Hewitt [4982] testimony, Admiral Hewitt’s testimony?

Admiral Wilkinson. His personal testimony, or the testimony he collected?

Senator Ferguson. Pardon?
Admiral Wilkinson. His personal testimony, or the testimony he collected?

Senator Ferguson. Not his testimony.

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I am only familiar with my testimony. I read none of the others.

Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with the Dorothy Edgers testimony?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I did not know she had testified.

Senator Ferguson. How was that?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know she had testified.

Senator Ferguson. So, if this was translated in the rough and put on Commander Kramer's desk, it should have reached you then on the 6th, even though it was in the rough?

Admiral Wilkinson. If the translation was sufficiently intelligible, yes, sir. Senator Ferguson. Will you look at that message and see whether you see any significance to it in relation to an attack on Pearl Harbor?

[4083] Admiral Wilkinson. I would say certainly it was an indication to vessels lying off Pearl Harbor, presumably submarines, as to the movement of the ships within Pearl Harbor.

I would say probably, without hindsight now, that it would be a substitute for more rapid means of communication, such as radio and cable, if they had been broken, and that this was a last minute or last resort, rather, method of communication where, if they had no other means, they would hang a light in the window, just as we were told Paul Revere did, burning a light in the window to show that ships had left, or by day they could have made some other signal.

[4084] Senator Ferguson. Then this message, even though it had been laid on your desk on the 6th, would not have meant anything to you in relation to an attack, a warning of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. It would have indicated a further interest in the movements in and out of Pearl Harbor, but it would not have meant that an attack was imminent, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you would not have seen, as the intelligence officer, any need, having that message, to send any more information to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. I doubt if I would, except to tell them that the last resort signals were being arranged to take the place of the radio and cable communications, which they had been having theretofore. You know the meaning of these signals is just an indication of what the movements of ships were. It did not give any information as to ships present, only ships that had left. It did not give information as to the locations of ships other than whether they had left or not.

Senator Ferguson. Could I ask counsel whether this has actually been put in the record, this exhibit?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. That particular one?

Mr. Gesell. This whole book is Exhibit 2. I think.

[4085] Senator Ferguson. It was not printed; it is just an exhibit?

Mr. Gesell. I think that is all. It is not in the transcript.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Chairman. Is that all, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Admiral Wilkinson, I understand from your testimony, or I want to ask you whether it is a fair assumption on my part from your testimony that at no time during your service as Chief of Naval Intelligence, from October 15 down to the 7th day of December 1941, did you have any idea or form any conclusion yourself that the Japs intended to attack Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. It was your impression, from the intelligence that you had, that they intended to continue their movement down into the South China Sea, but your personal impression was that they would not attack what you were pleased to call the Anglo-Saxon nations, is that right?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is correct, sir. "Anglo-Saxon" is the common term. I thought England and America were generally understood by that term.
[4986] Mr. Keefe. You meant England and America when you used that term?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. That was purely a personal impression, and of course was erroneous.
Mr. Keefe. It was your personal impression?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, personal impression, and obviously erroneous.
Mr. Keefe. And you came to that conclusion as the result of your review of all the naval intelligence that came to your attention as the Chief of Naval Intelligence?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, plus the history of the Japanese opportunist moves in China and Manchuria in the past few days, plus their negotiations which they had endeavored to stay, that they were going into China and they could not get out of China itself, there was nothing to force an issue there.
Mr. Keefe. You of course were familiar with the entire world situation and the rapidly moving events that were taking place?
Admiral Wilkinson. Roughly, yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. During that period and that which had taken place prior thereto?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So that your personal opinion was arrived at as the result of a survey of the entire situation?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. When you concluded that they would not attack Britain and the United States?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That is correct, is it not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now I assume that, as a naval officer of 40 years' standing, and having been to sea with the fleet for years, and having served in Honolulu, or in Hawaii, as well as in the Far East, that you thoroughly understood that Pearl Harbor was developed as a bastion for defensive and offensive operations in the Pacific area?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Primarily as a base for the fleet, and secondarily as a means for the protection of our territory in the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. Keeffe. It was the cornerstone of our defenses, was it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. In the Pacific; yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. In the Pacific?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And for years maneuvers had been held and plans had been drawn contemplating the possibility that Pearl Harbor might be attacked?


Mr. Keeffe. And Japan was the enemy against whom we were preparing all these years, was it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And you thoroughly understood that?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; in connection with those maneuvers, there had, of course, been countermaneuvers by our fleet, wherein they had obtained contacts, and so on, of Japanese movements.

Mr. Keeffe. Did you agree with the general sentiment that appeared to have been expressed by Mr. Hull and others who have testified here, that the possibility of an attack on the Hawaiian area envisioned fundamentally and primarily an air attack, secondly a submarine attack, as being the most possible means of attack?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes sir; and probably both.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. I thought perhaps a submarine attack was the most probable, because submarines could get there unnoticed and without risk.

Mr. Keeffe. So in your thinking in the years before you became Chief of Naval Intelligence you never ruled out the possibility of attack on Pearl Harbor and Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; while I was there, of course, [4989] we were concerned with that possibility and had maneuvers, as you say, to that effect.

Mr. Keeffe. But you did not consider it probable, although it might have been possible, in 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, for a double reason. I thought, in the first place, that the Japanese would be loath to encounter the hazard of sending a sufficient force into such dangerous waters, and, in the second place, I anticipated such a force would be detected before it arrived at any threatening position.

Mr. Keeffe. Now you were out there with the fleet in 1940, were you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. 1939–41, yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Then you were there in 1940?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And you were familiar with the operations of the fleet in 1940?

Admiral Wilkinson. I was in them, in fact.

Mr. Keeffe. And you were familiar with the liaison that existed between the fleet and the Army in that period?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you recall that the Army was alerted at Pearl Harbor on the 17th of June 1940?
Admiral Wilkinson. I remember it was that summer. I do 
[4990] not remember the date particularly.

Mr. Keefe. You remember there was an all-out alert in June 1940? 
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; I was quite close to General Herron, 
because I was the chief of staff of Admiral Andrews, who had been 
his colleague, until the fleet arrived there in the spring of 1940.

Mr. Keefe. You are familiar with the fact that the Army was 
alerted in Panama at that time, are you not? 
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know Panama had been altered at 
that time. I now know.

Mr. Keefe. Now do you know of any other time prior to that that 
the island garrison at Oahu had ever been alerted? 
Admiral Wilkinson. I did not know specifically, but I know that 
drills and maneuvers were occurring quite frequently, and partial or 
full alerts took place in connection with them, just as on a similar 
ocasion, I think, when the fleet came out in 1934, and I believe I came 
there with the fleet, and the Army was alerted at that time as part of 
the maneuvers. 

[4997] Mr. Keefe. I mean other than mere maneuvers. 
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I do not know of my own knowledge 
of any time that the Army was alerted against an enemy threat. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, this alert in 1940, in June, was a real alert, 
wasn't it. 
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So far as the Army was concerned? 
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. They were alerted against a possible trans-Pacific at-
tack by air? 
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That meant Japan, did it not? 
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So that according to the developments of that particular 
period, the growing tension and strains were such that the chief of 
staff here in Washington, in consultation with his advisors, decided 
that the Army ought to go on an all-out alert against possible attack, 
as early as the 17th of June 1940? 
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; Japan was, of course, not preoccu-
pied with any other movements at that time.

Mr. Keefe. I did not ask you that, Admiral. 
Admiral Wilkinson. It seemed to be a diplomatic situa-
tion that would favor her taking such a step. 

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, will the Congressman yield at 
that point? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Senator Brewster. In connection with this alert matter, I call your 
attention to your own report to the Chief of Naval Operations that 
you put in the record yesterday, on the testimony of General Herron, 
wherein you make the following statement:

After my testimony, Lieutenant General C. D. Herron, who relinquished com-
mand in early February in Hawaii, testified mainly about his preparations and 
his general practice as to alert stations. He said that last winter—
I assume that was the winter of 1941—

he had had them in the field for six weeks on the alert, but had subsequently modified that in some degree, although he had maintained guns at their field stations.

Does that recall to you the matter of the alert during that period? Admiral Wilkinson. I think it does, sir. Of course, it was not the winter alert that Mr. Keefe was speaking of. It was the summer alert. I might have misquoted it, or it might have been mistyped, or General Herron himself might have misstated his recollection by saying winter instead of summer. I think that is the summer alert.

Senator Brewster. That is the summer alert?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Call your attention to the fact that this was given within a very few days after General Herron testified, so I think your recollection would undoubtedly be accurate. This was on December 19, 1941, which must have been within 3 or 4 days of the events.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. As I say, it might have been that I dictated it wrong, or the stenographer might have written it wrong, and General Herron himself might have said it wrong. I left in May, 1941, and I do not think that there was any alert in the winter there of 1940-41, that I knew of, at least.

[4994] Senator Brewster. Was General Herron's testimony taken down, or was that off the record?

Admiral Wilkinson. That was in the same status as mine. I think it preceded me. General Herron was relieved, in fact, on the 7th of February, I think, so that to have the 6-week alert in the winter, it would have been very early in the winter.

Mr. Keefe. May I suggest that the evidence is already in in the form of the order for the alert and all of the reports in reference to it, and it is quite conclusively shown that the alert took place on the 17th of June, 1941. We have all that proof here.

Senator Brewster. I am not questioning that. What I am question- ing is whether there was another alert during the winter as Admiral Wilkinson reported General Herron as testifying. That is why I thought it was pertinent in connection with your question.

Mr. Keefe. I may say I think I have gone into it quite carefully and I think the evidence is quite conclusive there was not an all out alert during that period, and he must have been mistaken as to the time, and that the actual alert took place in June 1940.

Admiral, you, as an officer with the Navy at that time, knew that so far as the Army was concerned, in June, 1940, [4995] they considered the possibility of an air attack upon Hawaii to the extent that an alert was ordered to prepare against it?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir, we didn't know why it was ordered.

Mr. Keefe. You mean the Navy didn't know?

Admiral Wilkinson. I personally didn't know, and I don't think Admiral Andrews knew, and I think that some of the evidence I have seen indicates that Admiral Richardson was not informed and had to ask the Department about it.

Mr. Keefe. I am not talking about the Navy side.

Admiral Wilkinson. I though you were. Excuse me.

Mr. Keefe. You did not know, and you did not know that the Navy was even alerted so far as you were concerned, did you?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. The Navy was not alerted. We made a maneuver toward the southeastward for several days, but we were not alerted for any defense of Panama.

Mr. Keefe. But your connections with General Herron were such that you knew the Army was alerted?

Admiral Wilkinson. I knew the Army was alerted, but I didn’t know why.

Mr. Keefe. You saw the operations order, did you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. It might well have been a maneuver alert.

Mr. Keefe. Did you know that it was a serious alert?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, I did not know.

Mr. Keefe. Then you didn’t know whether it was a real alert or a maneuver alert?

Admiral Wilkinson. No.

Mr. Keefe. Well, the evidence before us now is that it was a real alert. And you so understand that?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You saw the evidences of it out there, did you?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Can you describe what took place under that alert so far as the Army was concerned?

Admiral Wilkinson. Such evidence as came to my notice was that they manned the coast defense guns, moved their anti-aircraft artillery to prepared positions, they had searchlight battery exercises. In fact, I think I went to witness a searchlight battery exercise wherein they flew a plane into the searchlight for test purposes, and I recall I was interested in the working of the mechanical ears in connection with it. They had, in other words, the defense stations manned both against air and against landing expeditions.

Mr. Keefe. At that time did it impress you that in 1940, there must have been some situation developed that indicated the possibility of an attack on Oahu?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I thought it was an excellent maneuver. I thought it was a practice maneuver, and well done.

Mr. Keefe. What was that answer?

Admiral Wilkinson. I thought it was a practice maneuver. I thought it was an excellent maneuver, and well done.

Mr. Keefe: So that as far as the Navy was concerned and speaking for yourself as an individual officer in the Navy, you just thought that it was an excellent practice maneuver.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You didn’t know that it was a real alert?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, Mr. Chairman, may I say to counsel, you will recall that I asked General Marshall when he was on the stand for a statement of the reasons for that alert of June 17, 1940, and upon a number of occasions he referred to the fact that it would be taken up with General Strong, who was Assistant Chief of Staff in the War Plans Division at that time, and that General Strong was preparing a statement of the reasons for the 1940 alert, and on the 18th of December, just yesterday, I was furnished with this statement from General Strong, and I believe, Mr. Counsel, that it would be a
suitable and proper place, in view of the questions asked of the Admiral, to offer it in evidence, so that it will be a part of the record.

Mr. Gesell. You have the only copy we have, so we will have to put yours in.

Mr. Keefe. I shall turn it over to you.

And I would like to read this, if I may, Mr. Chairman, into the record, without all the supporting affidavits, because to me it is rather illuminating.

This is dated December 15, 1945 [reading]:

Memorandum for General Marshall:
Subject: Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940.

1. In connection with your testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, you were asked repeatedly for the reasons which prompted you to alert the Panama and Hawaiian Departments on 17 June, 1940. As your Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division at that time, I was responsible for advising the action you took, and I feel that it may complete the story (in case it is not self-evident to the committee from a review of contemporaneous historical events) if I summarize the situation leading to the alert which I recommended and you approved.

2. You will recall that Axis ascendancy in May and early June of 1940 gave us cause for grave concern. The British had evacuated Dunkirk by 4 June, and on the 17th Petain waited upon the Nazis for surrender terms. Germany had a good chance of acquiring the French Fleet intact. Russia appeared to be cooperating with the Axis; on 12 June she moved in on Lithuania; on 16 June she demanded a change of government in Estonia and Latvia. On 10 June Russia and Japan signed a treaty fixing the Manchuko-Outer Mongolia border, and the inference was that these two had composed their differences with a view to negotiating a neutrality pact. The Japanese Navy would then be free for any adventure. Japanese land forces were concentrating in Hainan, Formosa, and Kyushu, apparently for further aggressive action.

3. You may remember a conference held in your office at 0830 on 17 June 1940, at which I was present, along with General Andrews and General Moore. We believed at that time that German control of the French Fleet would create a very serious situation in the South Atlantic. Should Great Britain fall, a hostile move toward South America was far from unlikely. Anticipating a desperate need for troops in Brazil, and Uruguay, General Andrews and I recommended at this meeting that the National Guard be ordered into Federal Service. That was our frame of mind on 17 June 1940. At the conclusion of the conference, you directed us to consider the questions which had been raised.

4. In looking to our own security I apprehended the most immediate threat to be a raid or major sabotage effort which would effectively close the Panama Canal. Evidence of sabotage plans existed; certain specific evidence is mentioned below. In the event of a raid, a diversionary attack in the Hawaiian area could not be ruled out, since a large part of our fleet was based on Pearl Harbor. Accordingly on 17 June, 1940, I recommended placing these two departments on an alert status. The documents directly bearing on my decision do not tell the story nearly so well as does a vivid recollection of Axis capabilities and American weakness at that time when the collapse of France was imminent, and the fall of Britain by no means impossible. However, I cite and summarize below a few significant papers which reflect those times, and give some indication of what was in our minds during those late spring days of 1940.

Then follows, which I won't take the time to read, a series of messages from Ambassador Grew, two in number, as a matter of fact; some information obtained by Brazilian sailors from the Japanese crew of the Argentina Maru that the Jap ships were to be sabotaged in the canal if they went through and sunk; some information taken from a drunken German sailor out in Eureka, Calif.; and an unused draft of a letter prepared, giving the commanding general of the Panama Department, the reasons and the background for the alert.
The Vice Chairman. Would you yield for a question?
Mr. Keeffe. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. I probably misunderstood you but in the first part of your reading there I understood you to read that the fall of “Bataan” was evident. Is that right?
Mr. Gearhart. Yes, I caught that too.
Mr. Keeffe. The fall of Bataan? No. Petain.
The Vice Chairman. General Petain.
Mr. Keeffe. Yes. Maybe I mispronounced it.
The Vice Chairman. I understood you to read that as “the fall of Bataan was evident.”
Mr. Keeffe. No. “The British had evacuated Dunkirk by 4 June, and on the 17th Petain waited upon the Nazis for surrender terms.”
The Vice Chairman. I thought if Bataan was about to fall then that is something we want to learn about.

(The balance of the memorandum above read is as follows:)

a. State Department 703.94119/640, dated 25 May, 1940. Mr. Grew discusses “a flurry of official activity” in Tokyo. Although he sees no reason to attack on the Netherlands East Indies he acknowledges that preparations for such an attack “would presumably be guarded with utmost secrecy.” (This, to our minds, did not exclude, but rather drew our attention to, the possibilities of attack or raids elsewhere.)

b. State Department 711, 94/1518, dated 3 June 1940. In surveying the Japanese situation Mr. Grew states in diplomatic terms that “a complacent view of the future would no longer be warranted.” He cites the opinion of Japanese militarists that their fleet had nothing to fear from the use of force and expresses his own belief that Japan “may be tempted to resort to desperate courses.”
c. State Department 811 F. 812 PROTECTION/105, dated 10 June 1940. The Navy furnishes information obtained by Brazilian sailors from the Japanese crew of Argentina Maru that all Japanese ships have orders to scuttle if in the Panama Canal when the United States “declares mobilization.”
d. War Department WPD 2730-18, undated. Information from a Navy source describes how a German sailor, under influence of liquor, revealed to an American petty officer on 1 May 1940, at Eureka, California, some specific and detailed plans to blow up the Panama Canal if our entry into the war “became imminent.”
e. War Department WPD 4326, undated. In an unused draft of a letter prepared for your signature at your request, the Commanding General, Panama Department, was informed that “the background of the instructions (for the alert of 17 June) has doubtless been made clear from matters that have appeared in the public press”, and that “the increasing [5004] tension and uncertainty in the world situation, as affecting Canal security, emphasized the necessity of a continuous and vigilant alert basis for some time to come.” (The letter remained unsent on my recommendation, largely because I considered the reasons for the alert to be obvious, as indeed they were.)

I can think of no more conclusive way to summarize the situation as of 17 June 1940 than to point out that the factors which guided my decision in recommending alerting these overseas bases were essentially those which made it necessary for the President of the United States to issue his Confirmation of 27 June 1940 (F. R. Doc. 40-2639), which extended the scope of the national emergency proclaimed 8 September 1939 and gave additional and exceptional authority in regard to safeguarding the Panama Canal.”

(Signed) GEORGE V. STRONG,
Major General, U. S. A. (Retired).

Mr. Keeffe. I have called your attention to this communication, Admiral Wilkinson, because it summarizes what was in the minds of the Army and General Strong, who was Assistant Chief of Staff in the War Plans Division at that time.

Based upon those facts, which involved world conditions, they thought that the possibility of an air attack upon Hawaii
was so probable that they ordered an all-out alert on the 17th of June 1940.

Now, I ask you again, as Chief of Naval Intelligence, with all of the subsequent information which was obtained by you as Chief of Naval Intelligence, you, down to the 7th of December 1940, did not believe that an attack—

The Vice Chairman. 1941.

Mr. Keefe. 1941. You did not believe that an attack on the Hawaiian area was probable?

Admiral Wilkinson. I believed it was possible. I did not believe it was probable. I don't think that one awaits for an attack to be probable before an alert is ordered. An alert is ordered on a possibility of an attack.

You note that General Strong said that a diversionary attack on Pearl Harbor could not be ruled out. That is a very slight phraseology but even on such a slight possibility he ordered an alert.

Now, similarly, on November 27 both the Army and the Navy ordered an alert at Pearl Harbor, again on the possibility of an attack. I contended I was quite convinced there was a possibility of an attack, yes, sir, but I did not believe that there was a probability. I certainly agreed in the desirability of an alert. I agreed in the desirability of full defense measures. But I did not believe from my own [5006] conclusions that there would be—that there was a probability of an attack.

Mr. Keefe. I call your attention to the fact, in view that you have quoted part of this communication, to the fact that—

Admiral Wilkinson. As I understood it.

Mr. Keefe. What Strong released was:

In the event of a raid, a diversionary attack in the Hawaiian area could not be ruled out, since a large part of our Fleet was based on Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I call your attention to the fact that as I recall General Marshall's testimony, and that of other witnesses that have testified here, it was their opinion that Japan would not go on with its movement to the south and leave its flank exposed by the presence of our fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Did you believe that in the summer and fall of 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson. I did not believe that they would attack Pearl Harbor up to the moment they did. I believed that their preoccupation in south China would engage them in a military way and I believed that their political progress would be directed toward, making the greatest advance, consolidating their positions to the greatest degree, [5007] before they were involved in a war with England and America.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I say that I have asked for the log of the Enterprise and I have not had a chance to see it as yet, but I might want to ask Admiral Wilkinson a couple of questions in reference to that, and also a couple of questions with reference to the Lexington, and I understand it will be here at 2 o'clock.

Mr. Gesell. That is correct.

May I ask, Congressman Keefe, if it was your intention that all of the papers relating to this alert from which you read be spread upon the record?
Mr. Keefe. No; just the letter itself from General Strong to General Marshall.

The Vice Chairman. What you read into the record?

Mr. Keefe. Well, the whole letter.

Mr. Gesell. There is part of the letter you didn't read so we will spread it all on the record.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the rest of the documents be made an exhibit.

Mr. Gesell. This document can be designated "Exhibit 87."

Mr. Keefe. May I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania that the documents attached are referred to in the letter and that is the reason I didn't suggest putting them in.

[5008] Senator Brewster. Would that be too extensive to put in the record?

Mr. Keefe. I don't think it is necessary to spread them on the record because they have been condensed in General Strong's report and he simply attaches the photostat copies of the originals.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 87.")

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to advise the members of the committee that immediately upon the recessing of the committee at 4 o'clock the Chair wishes to have an executive session here for the consideration of two or three matters that the committee should consider.

Mr. Keefe. Where will that be, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Right here. We will remain here after the recess after the rest of the people leave.

We will recess now until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 p.m. of the same day.)

[5009] afternoon session—2:00 P. M.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

Mr. Keefe from Wisconsin will resume his inquiry.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK

WILKINSON (Resumed)

Mr. Keefe. I have just one or two questions, Admiral.

Am I correct in my understanding that prior to your assumption of your responsibilities as Chief of Naval Intelligence on the 15th of October 1941, you had had no previous experience or tour of duty in that particular field?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; only attendance at two sessions of the conferences on the limitation of armaments.

Mr. Keefe. You had no previous experience in the field of intelligence, had you, prior to that time?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not specifically under the Office of Naval Intelligence. As Chief of Staff, and again as fleet gunnery officer in a preceding tour of duty at sea I had been concerned with the intelligence at sea, but I had not been under the Office of Naval Intelligence or in it before.

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Mr. Keeffe. You had been essentially a line officer at sea?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Most of your experience has been in that connection?

[5010] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; such shore duties as I had done were not connected with intelligence.
Mr. Keeffe. When did you leave your duties as Chief of Naval Intelligence?
Admiral Wilkinson. The 20th of July 1942.
Mr. Keeffe. So you had an experience in that office which lasted from the 15th of October 1941 to the 15th of July, did you say?
Admiral Wilkinson. 20th of July.
Mr. Keeffe. 20th of July 1942.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; a little over 9 months.
Mr. Keeffe. And you went back to sea?
Admiral Wilkinson. Went back to sea immediately, and I have just returned therefrom.
Mr. Keeffe. That is all.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire?
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, when you did begin as head of Naval Intelligence, was there any change in the staff or the subordinates who were under you?
Admiral Wilkinson. No general change, sir. There are always recurring changes as one officer after another is relieved, but I brought no one in with me and no one left.

[5017] Mr. Murphy. Substantially the same organization as it existed under your predecessors remained under you, except there was a new chief; isn't that right?
Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly.
Mr. Murphy. When you did go there you brought to that office a good many years' experience in the Navy—36, wasn't it?
Admiral Wilkinson. Thirty-six; yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Thirty-six years. Now I would like to direct your attention, Admiral, to page 430 of the Narrative Statement of Evidence at the Pearl Harbor Investigation, Volume 2, and I note there the following—do you have a copy of it available for the Admiral?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. As a preliminary to that, Admiral Wilkinson, will you state for the record the full name of Admiral Newton?
Mr. Murphy. I notice there the following:

Admiral Newton, as stated infra page 578, left Pearl Harbor on 5 December 1941 with a powerful task force including the aircraft carrier Lexington, two cruisers, U. S. S. Chicago and U. S. S. Portland, and five destroyers, on a mission to Midway Island where he was to fly off a squadron of airplanes. Even up to and at the time of his sailing and thereafter he remained in ignorance of the existence of the war warning message of 27 November 1941, as well as the similar warning messages of 24 November and 16 October 1941.

That states that it was taken from the Hart Inquiry at pages 316 and 318.
Do you, Admiral, know of any reason in the world why Admiral Kimmel would not have told Admiral Newton, who was going in the direction of Japan, after he had received a war warning, of the fact that such messages had been sent to him?
Admiral Wilkinson. I know of no reason, sir, but of course I am not a judge.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, if you were Admiral Newton and you were going in the direction of Japan, you would certainly have liked to have had that kind of information, would you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now one question, Admiral.

In Exhibit 8-A, which was introduced in evidence yesterday, and which, for identification, is headed "General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers," and dated 4 December 1945—will you make that available to the witness, please?

Mr. Gesell. He has it.

Mr. Murphy. Now I direct your attention to the page numbered 2, which is actually the third page in the exhibit, [5013] under the heading "A," and preliminarily, as I understand it, this was a statement as explained on page 1:

Since the staff officer connected with the document reporting the above facts has died and the various records have been burned, the foregoing is the conjecture of Commander Tachibana Tomo who worked in the same department at that time.

Now on page 2——

Admiral Wilkinson. And who I imagine, Mr. Congressman, is the same gentleman we arrested on the west coast a few months before. I am not sure, but I think so.

Mr. Murphy. You think he was the same?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think he was the same. He was in intelligence work, and of the same name.

Mr. Murphy. Someone of the same name was arrested on the west coast of the United States some months prior to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir, for espionage on the west coast. I just know it was Commander Tachibana Tomo.

Mr. Murphy. I noticed the following:

American radio broadcasts 5 December 1941 (or 6 December 1941) (American time).

The United States broadcasts of the number of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and others entering (or anchored) in Pearl Harbor was overheard.

[5014] Admiral, so far as any messages that were sent from the United States by the Navy are concerned, they would certainly be in code, would they not, if they were sent to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson. Unquestionably, sir; I see no reason why they would report on the number of battleships, cruisers, and so forth, entering Pearl Harbor. Any message back from Pearl Harbor would certainly be in code.

Mr. Murphy. So far as naval messages are concerned in and out of Pearl Harbor, they would be in code, would they not?

Admiral Wilkinson. On a subject such as this I should be almost certain of it.

Mr. Murphy. Do you have any idea as to what, if any, kind of broadcasts might be referred to there, Admiral Wilkinson?

Admiral Wilkinson. Possibly some local news broadcast speaking of a unit of the fleet coming in for the benefit of the local Hawaiian population. I know there was no censorship going on there. I think they had been requested not to comment on the ships, but there was
no formal censorship. Possibly some amateur radio people talking together.

[5015] Mr. Murphy. But so far as you know, Admiral, was there any official broadcast by the American Government, by the United States Army or by the United States Navy that would contain that kind of information at that particular time?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; I suggest that we make an inquiry, and if the committee so pleases, I will initiate it, of our district intelligence officer out there to see if he knows anything about it.

Mr. Murphy. I would appreciate it if you would take the necessary steps to put such action into motion.

The Chairman. Mr. Clark.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I have been provided with the original log of the Enterprise, and I not having had a chance to see it before, I may have a question of Admiral Wilkinson.

The Chairman. All right. In the meantime Congressman Clark—

Mr. Keefe. I have no questions otherwise until I get a chance to go through this.

The Chairman. All right; Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark. Admiral Wilkinson, on yesterday Senator Lucas, I think, inquired of you as to when you graduated from the Naval Academy. I should like to ask you when you went on active sea duty in this last war?


Mr. Clark. 1942?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Would you state, please, for the record, briefly, your services from then until the close of the war, and also state whether you received any recognition of any kind in connection with your services?

Admiral Wilkinson. From the 15th of August until early January of the following year, 1943, I was commander of battleship division 2, comprising three battleships, and operating in Hawaiian waters, and in the west coast waters of the United States.

In early January I was detached and directed to proceed by air, which, of course, I did, to Noumea to report to Admiral Halsey as his deputy commander. I arrived there in late January and remained as his deputy commander until the end of June, when I reported as understudy to Admiral Turner, in command of the amphibious forces of the South Pacific.

I joined him in time to participate in the attack on New Georgia and relieved him in the later stages of that campaign on the 15th of July, 1943.

From then until the 15th of November of this year, 1945, I was in command of the South Pacific Amphibious [5017] Force which subsequently was entitled the Third Amphibious Force, and remained in command of the Third Amphibious Force when it shifted its operations from the South Pacific into the Western Pacific as a whole.

During this time I was engaged in the South Pacific campaign with the amphibious operations in connection with the later stages of the New Georgia campaign, with the seizure of Vella Lavella, the
capture of the Treasury Islands, and the landing and capture of a portion of Bougainville in November of 1943.

Then in 1944, with the seizure of Green Island and the capture and occupation of Emirau Island in, respectively, February and March.

In June the South Pacific campaign was over and I was transferred to the Pacific as a whole and operated with Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet in the capture of the two islands in the Palau Islands, Peleliu and Angaur, in September, 1944, and in the capture and occupation of the Ulithi atoll.

Immediately after that I was transferred to the Seventh Fleet under Admiral Kincaid for duty with his fleet and General MacArthur’s single command as a whole in the Philippine campaign.

I was in command of one of the two amphibious forces which landed at Leyte on the 20th of October, and was present there, although not actively commanding any combat forces, during the sea battles for Leyte of October 20.

Again I was in command of one of the two amphibious forces which landed at Luzon in Lingayen Gulf on January 9, and initiated the campaign that resulted in the capture of the entire Philippines.

After leaving there, I was—I wasn’t relieved of duty, but most of my ships were then assigned to the Fifth Amphibious Force under the command of Admiral Turner, who then proceeded with his force to the capture of Iwo and Okinawa. I was not concerned in either of those operations except for a visit I made to Okinawa, but was engaged in the planning for subsequent operations under Admiral Halsey.

During the development of the Okinawa campaign, these particular operations which we were planning for were abandoned, and I then fell in with the general plan and began to work up the invasion of Japan with Admiral Turner in command of all the amphibious forces consisting of my own, Vice Admiral Hill’s, and Vice Admiral Barbey.

Upon the surrender of Japan my duties in the invasion were, of course, automatically canceled, and I become an amphibious commander to bring in the Eighth Army under General Eichelberger into Japan from Tokyo, including Tokyo Bay and a short area to the south of it, throughout northern Honshu, and Hokkaido and all of northern Japan, from that line I have spoken of to the southward of Tokyo.

I brought in the first of the major installments of troops on surrender day, the 2d of November, some 25,000 troops of the First Calvary Division and the One hundred and twelfth Calvary Regimental Combat Team, and I supervised the arrival of other divisions in northern Honshu and in Hokkaido, and remained there in Yokohama in general command of reinforcement and supply operations for the Eighth Army until I left there on the 8th of November.

That, I think, sir, is the narrative.

As to any awards, I have been honored by the Distinguished Service Medal of the Navy for the capture of Bougainville, by a second Distinguished Service Medal for the Palau campaign, and by a third for the Philippines campaign.
Mr. Clark. Admiral, this committee, as you understand, is sitting on this inquiry, the ultimate purpose of which is the finding of the facts in regard to the Pearl Harbor incident. Do you know of any other fact or circumstance relating to that or bearing upon it that you have not related that might be helpful to this committee in that connection?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir.

Mr. Clark. That is all.

The Chairman. Are there any further questions?

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman—


Senator Ferguson. Admiral, I have now before me the memorandum on your testimony before the Roberts committee.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Have you got it?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Referring to the bottom of page 12, "Statement by Captain T. S. Wilkinson, United States Navy, Director, Naval Intelligence Division."

Admiral Wilkinson. I beg your pardon. I haven't the Roberts commission report itself.

Senator Ferguson. Will you just look at the testimony.

(Paper handed to Admiral Wilkinson.)

Senator Ferguson. The other part is in the record and I wanted to have you read this in. It is a very short memo.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What you gave to Admiral Stark is already in the record.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. This is headed "Precis of Testimony."

The Chairman. For the record, define that word.

Admiral Wilkinson. It is headed "Precis",—p-r-e-c-i-s.

The Chairman. What does that mean?

Admiral Wilkinson. It means a brief, I think, or summary.

[5021] The Chairman. That is not our language?

Admiral Wilkinson. I believe it is a French word meaning brief.

The Chairman. In other words it means a brief or résumé?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. A summary of whatever it is dealing with?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. All right.

Admiral Wilkinson. The heading is "Precis of Testimony Given Before the President's Investigating Commission." Statements by Admiral Stark and several others.

Turning to the part that Senator Ferguson has spoken of:

Statement by Captain T. S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, Director, Naval Intelligence Division.

In replies to questions, the witness described naval avenues of intelligence, including naval attachés and additional naval observers and consular shipping advisers who had been maintained in the Far East. Frequent reports were received from these officers. The witness mentioned other methods through which the Navy received secret information. Frequent exchange of dispatches had occurred between the Intelligence organization in Washington and in the field.
In general, the sources reported their information to Washington, at the same time informing the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and the Pacific Fleets. Care was taken here to see that these two officers were kept fully advised as to developments.

From the evidence available the Navy had concluded in November that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack. The witness considered that both Commanders in Chief had available to them the same information on which this conclusion was drawn here. Nevertheless, warning dispatches had been sent out.

The witness gave information concerning the control of fishing boats in the vicinity of Hawaii, and described the delimitation of the spheres of activity of the naval and military intelligence services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

[5023] In April, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent out a dispatch indicating from past experience that the Axis could be expected to initiate new activities on Saturdays, Sundays, and national holidays. Steps were taken in March 1941, placing the Naval District intelligence organizations in an advanced state of readiness; coastal information sections were placed in an active status last May. District intelligence organizations were further extended in that month, and a complete state of readiness of the intelligence organizations was directed last July.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, were those the only questions that you had gone into before the Roberts Commission?

Admiral Wilkinson. I should say so, sir. It was a brief hearing, a half-hour only, as I remember.

Senator Ferguson. That is the only time you testified?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that there was a Presidential commission to find all of the facts and that is the only question they went into with you? Was there anything said why they were limiting your scope?

Admiral Wilkinson. I don't know, except that they were in a hurry to get out to Hawaii, I think, and you will note that this is a summary of the statements of Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner and myself, and I think on the same day they questioned me, they also had General Herron and General Miles.

Senator Ferguson. When they got back they didn't go into it any further, they didn't call you?

Admiral Wilkinson. Didn't call me at all, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were here in the Intelligence Branch?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, reading that, I think it is the second or third paragraph, about the knowledge that the Pacific Fleet and the Asiatic Fleet had, do you want to let that stand as your testimony, that they had the same amount as you had here in Washington, or to that effect?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think it is too broad a statement, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It is too broad a statement?

Admiral Wilkinson. They had the same information by reason of their radio intelligence centers which they had there as to the movements of the Japanese vessels, and the position and location of the Japanese fleet; they had the same information as to those factors that we had. They did not have the same information as to the diplomatic negotiations, no, sir, nor as to some of the code messages.

[5025] Senator Ferguson. And some of the other messages?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So you would say that ought to be corrected?
Admiral Wilkinson. It should if it is to be narrowed down and my own statement, my own draft of memorandum for Admiral Stark, mentioned a number of points about the movement of ships, and I said they had that information.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the Sundays and Saturdays, that is in the last paragraph, I wish you would clear up what they had asked you about that.

Admiral Wilkinson. Oh, that, I think, is in one of our exhibits, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Was that your own or were you just telling what General Herron had said?

Admiral Wilkinson. I was telling what my office had done. It was Admiral Kirk's action on the preceding April. Let me have the exhibit.

Senator Ferguson. I notice they questioned both you and General Herron on that same subject.

Admiral Wilkinson. That dispatch is shown on page 1 of exhibit 37 counsel tells me.

Senator Ferguson. Page 1 of 37.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

[5026] Senator Ferguson. Will you just read that?

Admiral Wilkinson (reading)—

1 April 1941

From: Chief of Operations—

but I know this dispatch was initiated by Admiral Kirk.

To: Commandants of all Naval Districts—

which would, of course, include Manila and Hawaii.

NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa.

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis Powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

Senator Ferguson. And had that been called to your attention when you came in?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And then you had that in mind while you were in the office?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That would be true because of a relaxation on that day?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I think the British and America, both countries, paid a good deal of attention [5027] to Saturdays and Sundays.

Senator Ferguson. The same would be true of civilians; the same thing would be true of civilians?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. If you were going to send a message on Sunday or Saturday, would you say that you would be more apt to get better attention from the civilian services or the Army and Navy?

Admiral Wilkinson. Purely as a matter of personal attention, I would say from the Army and Navy because we maintained a regular
24-hour watch. We don't relax established routines on communications on those days.

Senator Ferguson. Would you say then that any Army or Navy establishment that had been alerted, should be alerted on Saturdays and Sundays even more so than on other days, owing to what you stated in your report, or what was stated in this report?

Admiral Wilkinson. This dispatch, sir, was not as broad as perhaps would have been desirable for it to be. It was initiated by Admiral Kirk and sent out as applicable to the service over which he had authority, which is to say the Intelligence Service. This was not warning all the communications services, was not warning all the combat field. It was only applicable to Intelligence Service of itself, which was Admiral Kirk's service and consequently my service.

[5028] Senator Ferguson. In other words, you were specially alerting the intelligence services—they were—on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And I notice that when you gave your résumé as to what you heard before the Commission you gave the—this is already in the record but I want to call it to your attention—the Commission asked if he considered Sunday morning the most lax time in the defenses and, consequently, the most advantageous time for an attack. He said that—

with regards to the reserves, yes, because they were more likely to be on leave or other privileges, but with regards to the actual stations in the field he considered that they should be as efficient and as fully manned on Sunday as on any other morning.

Admiral Wilkinson. I think I was quoting General Herron there, was I not, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson. All right, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, he personally made many dawn inspections on Sunday to check on and insure their readiness.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I had seen him on his return from at least one of those.

[5029] Senator Ferguson. Now, he was a general in the Army. What would you say about that in relation to the Navy at Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would not like to express an opinion on that, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you had been there Saturdays and Sundays and holidays?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what is your opinion?

Admiral Wilkinson. Well, I think stations which were required to be manned would be manned very definitely just as much on Sunday morning or Saturday afternoon as on any other weekday or any other day. There were established watches on all the ships and those watches were maintained regularly regardless of the calendar day or the day of the week or the holiday.

The ships were placed on certain conditions of readiness, of which I think you are already aware. Condition 1 was all battle stations manned; condition 2, half the batteries manned; and condition 3 was a somewhat smaller element of the battery.
Condition 3, as I recall, was the standard condition in which we
would be when in port. That would require a certain number of
guns manned, and I believe from what I have [5030] heard
that that was the case on Sunday morning, that all the ships were
manned in that condition.

Senator Ferguson. That is, No. 3?
Admiral Wilkinson. I would say they would be equally manned
on Sunday morning or Tuesday morning or Monday afternoon, in
that same rotation I mean, that they would be just as carefully
manned then as at any other time.

Senator Ferguson. So, then, you don't think it made any dif-
ference?

Admiral Wilkinson. It did make this difference: that in the nor-
mal work on the ships they would be having a drill for all hands
and all officers in the forenoon, say, of Thursday or Friday and they
would be having inspections on Saturday. All officers and all men
would be required back aboard.

Now, on a Sunday morning, as a matter of a holiday there would
not be these drills and inspections and some officers might be allowed
to return late; some few others—I think there was a limitation to
those who might stay away—some few others might be allowed to stay
away all day Sunday, so there would be that slight difference in that
instead of probably being aboard for the work of the day some few
might have been excused because there was no work of that day.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.


Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Wilkinson, despite the schedule of organ-
izations which is dated October 23, 1940, which requires the Office of
Naval Intelligence in both Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Intelli-
gence to evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advis-
able; despite Admiral Stark's reply to Admiral Kimmel's letter of the
22d of March 1941 which reads as follows:

With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and
responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CINCUS, Kirk informs
me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately
informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and disloyal
elements within the United States. He further says that information concerning
the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly to
you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or sent
by despatch;

and despite Admiral Kirk's memorandum of March 11, 1941, his memorandum reading:

4. The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility
of this Division to keep the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet adequately
[5032] informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations and
disloyal elements within the United States.

you testified in June of 1945 before Admiral Hewitt's special investiga-
tion on the order of the Secretary of the Navy in response to Mr.
Sonnet's questions that I will read:

Would it be an accurate summary then, Admiral, to state that information in
the possession of the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning Japanese move-
ments, for example, would be disseminated by ONI but the evaluation of Japanese
plans or deductions to be drawn from these movements would be the function of War Plans or Chief Naval Operations?

Your answer being:
The latter part of your question "Yes." The first part, the day by day information of Japanese movements would not according to my then and present understanding be sent out by Intelligence but, rather, by Operations after their evaluation.

My statement to this point is correct, is it not?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, I believe that in the closing portion of my examination of you the other day you explained the discrepancies between the schedule of organizations of 23 October 1940 and your conception of your duties by pointing out that you had received verbal orders from someone which [5033] changed your responsibility?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. I forgot to inquire then as to who gave you those verbal orders?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think I stated that I was officially informed by my predecessor as part of my relieving him that he had been orally directed by Admiral Stark to that effect in the presence of Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Turner as well, and that I myself had received verbal instructions from Admiral Ingersoll and the authoritative assistant to Admiral Ingersoll.

Mr. Gearhart. Has that schedule of organization order ever been changed?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. So far as you know it is still in effect?
Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know, sir. I know that frequently papers of that sort are drawn up and modified from time to time and there is no machinery, perhaps, in existence to make sure that each particular modification, such as I said with respect to removing the public relations department from the Office of Naval Intelligence, that there is no machinery set up to keep up these instructions in writing to date.

Mr. Gearhart. As long as you were the Director in the Division of Naval Intelligence you never received from any source a written order changing the schedule of organization to which I have just referred?
Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. I did not feel it was necessary.

Mr. Gearhart. Who was it that issued the written order "Schedule of Organizations"?
Admiral Wilkinson. I am not sure when Admiral Stark assumed office. It was either he or his predecessor, whoever was Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Gearhart. Could it have been—
Mr. Gesell. I can answer that question for you, Congressman Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. I would appreciate it if you would.
Mr. Gesell. Because I have the original memorandum. It was approved by H. R. Stark, October 23, 1940.

Mr. Gearhart. October 23, 1940?
Mr. Gesell. Yes.
Mr. Gearhart. And did Admiral Stark tell you personally that he had changed that order?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. I was satisfied to receive that information from my official predecessor and to receive it from his authoritative assistant.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, drawing upon your experience as a naval officer, if Admiral Stark desired to change that order he would do it himself, naturally, by another and succeeding written order, wouldn't he?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not think so, sir. I think he would tell the man that had charge of it to act otherwise than as was laid out under written order. I do not think Admiral Stark attached perhaps very great importance to the existence of this series of long documents outlining for their guidance the duties of the respective divisions. I think he felt free to add to them or change them orally from time to time as he saw fit.

Mr. Gearhart. Both Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Kirk were of lesser rank than that of Admiral Stark, were they not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, Admiral Stark was their commanding officer, wasn't he?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, and mine as well.

Mr. Gearhart. And yours as well.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. It was not then possible for either Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Kirk to have issued an order contravening an order of a higher ranking officer in writing, was it?

Admiral Wilkinson. For Admiral Kirk, no, sir. For Admiral Ingersoll, yes, if he were acting in his stead.

Mr. Gearhart. But he could only do that while acting in the name of Admiral Stark?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. When people or other officers, associates of yours, come to you and tell you that written orders that are plain on their face in respect to import and meaning—tell you that verbal orders have been issued setting them to one side, do you not at once feel that you are on inquiry that you should make inquiries at the source as to whether or not that has ben done?

Admiral Wilkinson. Not necessarily, sir. If I were relieving an officer of rank and responsibility in command of a ship and there were general orders extant and he said that he had received certain particular orders in variance to those orders, I would accept his statement unless I felt there was something distinctly wrong with them, which I did not in this case.

Mr. Gearhart. And despite the fact that you had before you a written order for your guidance, despite the fact that you had been advised orally that you were not supposed to do the evaluating and not supposed to do the disseminating, you did continue as long as you were the head of the ONI to evaluate and to disseminate didn't you?

Admiral Wilkinson. I had the orders which were applicable except as they were modified. They had been modified in a brief, in a limited way. I continued to evaluate and by "evaluation" I mean
determining the accuracy, the authenticity, and the consistency of information. I do not mean by that the deduction of enemy intentions. I continued to evaluate all information in that sense and for my own satisfaction I attempted to figure out what the enemy intentions were but I did not spread that out because I was ordered not to.

I continued to disseminate in every respect, including a number of papers and articles and publications which I have mentioned, but I did not disseminate information which would immediately affect the operations of the fleet until I had consulted with the War Plans Department about it, because those were the limitations that I felt had been placed upon me.

Mr. Gearhart. Insofar as the receipt of these intercepts, you disseminated them through the agency of your courier, Captain Kramer, did you not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Within the limited distribution that was turned over to me to be carried out.

Mr. Gearhart. And he delivered them in most instances to the White House, to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of State and to the two Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral Wilkinson. They were delivered to those officers, sir. He did not deliver them himself to them, to all of those you mentioned. He delivered them to the Secretary of the Navy, to the White House, and to the Chief of Naval Operations, but not to the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, or the Chief of Staff. That was an Army distribution on that side.

Mr. Gearhart. The Army took care of the Army side?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; and to the Secretary of State.

Mr. Gearhart. That is all.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Mr. Gearhart. First I would like to make a request, if you will yield the floor.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. First I would like to make a request of counsel.

Counsel will recall that I called to the attention of the committee that I had received letters from enlisted men who were serving at Hickam Field, who had reported to me that on the 1st day of December 1941 a formal all-out air alert was ordered, an all-out alert was invoked which required all battle stations to be manned, all men to be in full battle regalia, the mounting of machine guns and the mounting of antiaircraft guns, and I asked you at that time to furnish me with the copies of the orders establishing that alert and the copies of the orders calling off that alert on the afternoon of Saturday, December 6.

Since that time I have received letters from far separated parts of the United States, from other enlisted men advising me that the alert was not confined to Hickam Field but that there was a general all-out alert at other bases in the island. Is there a Wright Field?

Mr. Keefe. Wheeler Field.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes, it is Wheeler Field, which is the combat airfield, or was at that time, in the islands; that an all-out air alert was called on or about December 1 requiring the same activities at Wheeler Field that I have described at Hickam Field, and that that air alert was called off by an order of the afternoon of December 6, 1941, the sus-
pension of the all-out alert, which required the taking down of the machine guns and the antiaircraft guns and the packing of them away in grease and the return of ammunition to the arsenals; and I would like to have copies of the orders establishing the alert at Wheeler and a copy of the orders calling off that alert at the same base, together with any similar orders that were issued at about the same times, creating an air alert upon other bases in the islands and also any orders, if there be any, calling off the alert at those other bases.

Mr. Gesell. We will ask the Army to broaden their request. I might report, Congressman, that at the time you made that inquiry, that initial request, it was necessary for the War Department to direct the inquiry to Hawaii where those orders are if there are any, and they have not yet received a reply from Hawaii.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. We are already at work on that subject.

Mr. Gearhart. I appreciate that. And there is one other thing. If these field orders at Wheeler and Hickam were purely field orders, I would like to have that fact certified. If those orders were inspired from higher authority, I would like to know the history of their issuance.¹

The Chairman. Mr. Keefe, do you want to ask a further question?

Mr. Keefe. Admiral Wilkinson, I have before me now the original log of the aircraft carrier Enterprise and the photostatic copy of the log of the aircraft carrier Lexington.

The log of the Enterprise dates from Monday, November 24, 1941, to December 15, 1941, and the photostatic copy of the Lexington log is for the period December 5, 1941, to December 8, 1941.

Now, purely for information in order to be able to evaluate and understand the language appearing in these logs I ask you as an expert on naval affairs, a log such as that which I have does not show the action or battle action report, does it, normally?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think it would normally, not a full report but it would state whether the ship was engaged or when she had sighted the enemy and what had happened at once. There would be a separate action report in greater detail.

Mr. Keefe. There would be a separate action report?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, I find language in this log which I have some difficulty, due to my inexperience in dealing with those matters, to understand.

For instance, on the 30th of November at 12:45 appears the language: “Sounded flight quarters.” What does that mean?

Admiral Wilkinson. That on a bugle they sounded call to flight quarters, which is to say “stand by the planes, we are ready to launch planes” or “get ready to launch planes” or perhaps “get ready to recover planes.” That is to stand by for flight operations of planes, in other words.

Mr. Keefe. That would mean the planes were either going to take off or land, would it not?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Calling the men to their stations in connection with that operation, that was the purpose.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, I find this: On December 1, 1941, as near as I can make out, the Enterprise at this time was proceeding westward.

¹ See Information submitted by the War Department. Hearings. Part 5. p. 2490 et seq.
It left Honolulu a few days before. It was carrying planes to Midway or to Wake, counsel, do you recall? I think they were going to Midway and perhaps the Lexington was going to Wake at this time. Well, all it says—

Admiral Wilkinson. Excuse me one minute. Senator Ferguson, do you remember what page that was on, that reference to Admiral Newton?

Mr. Murphy. 430.
Admiral Wilkinson. 430? That would give us a clue.
Mr. Keeffe. There appears information of this character, Admiral, as of December 1.
Admiral Wilkinson. You are speaking now of the Lexington or the Enterprise?

Mr. Keeffe. I am speaking now of the Enterprise.

Admiral Wilkinson. She had been with Admiral Halsey.
Mr. Keeffe. Yes.
Admiral Wilkinson. Because the Lexington was with Admiral Newton.
Mr. Keeffe. With Admiral Newton?
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Keeffe. There appears this:

1746 darkened ship: out in the de-Gaussing gear for half hour test. 1746, secured the de-Gaussing girdle.

What does that mean?
Admiral Wilkinson. “Darkened ship” means turn out all lights so the ship cannot be seen after dark. It is usually done at sunset so that there will be ample time to check, probably, before the actual dark sets in and lights could be seen.
Mr. Keeffe. Is that a normal operation?
Admiral Wilkinson. That is a normal operation when cruising at sea and at any times—certainly at any times of danger or crisis and often just for maneuvers.

In the degaussing process that you mentioned, magnetic mines were used to some extent early in this war and the answer to it was found to be putting a magnetic girdle or belt around a ship and when you were in mineable waters, that is to say, where you were not too deep for mines to be em-ployed, the ship would normally cut in the current on this degaussing girdle so that that would counteract the magnetism of the ship and defeat the magnetic mines which otherwise would be affected by the magnetism of the ship.

Mr. Keeffe. I understand that. So that, then, the order to darken ship was either a precautionary measure, to be indulged in by the commander of the ship in the event they were in waters where there might lurk some danger, is that it?
Admiral Wilkinson. I think we were doing it regularly for some time because of the possibility of an attack from Japanese submarines and, of course, if we were showing lights it would be an open invitation to discovery.

Mr. Keeffe. That is just exactly what I thought.
Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.
Mr. Keeffe. That you would darken a ship because you had knowledge or thought, at least, there might be an attack by Japanese sub-
marines and this ship going out there is preparing itself against that particular attack by darkening the ship?

Admiral Wilkinson. I think they had been doing that for some time, sir, in fact.

Mr. Keefe. For some particular time prior to December 1?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes; the darkening of ships at night.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, then, it says:

Set condition of readiness 3, ship control and fire control.

What does "set condition No. 3" mean?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. 3 is to characterize a condition wherein a certain number of guns are manned, but a certain number of others are not manned, so that the crews in rotation can get some rest; roughly about one-third of the guns.

Mr. Keefe. That means they are manning the guns?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; or the guns were manned at all times against a surprise submarine attack when at sea.

Mr. Keefe. Is that the highest condition of readiness?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. The highest condition is all hands at the battle stations, which is condition 1. Condition 2 is about half the battery and condition 3 is from one-third to one-fourth, depending upon the ship.

Mr. Keefe. So that I am to understand that when the log says, "Set condition of readiness No. 3, ship control and fire control," that means that at least a part of the guns of that ship were manned and ready for action?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And what does "ship control" mean and "fire control," what does that mean?

Admiral Wilkinson. Fire control is to say—fire control has to do with the guns. Ship control has to do with the readiness to counteract any damage incurred to the ship and that would mean that they should have certain damage-control parties on at the time, nucleus damage controls. Of course, if all hands were at the battle stations they would have full damage control. This would be smaller and fewer damage-control stations but enough to take action in the event of a surprise attack.

Mr. Keefe. I do not want to appear so naive as my questions might appear, Admiral, but I want this for the purpose of the record.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. Well, I admit they are very technical terms as well.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. All of these things that you have described are conditions of alerting this vessel to prepare it for any possible surprise attack that might be made upon it?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Isn't that true?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So that so far as the Enterprise is concerned, in accordance with the log, this ship as it was proceeding out toward Midway, at least in these days for which the record appears in this log, the commanding officer of that ship was preparing against the possibility of a surprise attack?
[5047] Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir; and doubtless on orders from Admiral Halsey, the commander of that detachment, who had probably had similar practices in all other ships of that detachment.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I find also that planes were constantly being launched into the air for patrol. That would be for the same purpose, wouldn't it?

Admiral Wilkinson. To ascertain if there were any submarines in the path of the ship; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. And then I find as they steamed on that December 3, 1941, appears for the first time this language:

1015 commenced zig-zagging according to plan No. 11.

What does that mean? What was that plan No. 11?

Admiral Wilkinson. One of several plans. In order to have a variety of plans available so that no enemy could determine that we had one single method of zigzagging, we would have a number of plans wherein at different intervals of time we would make different changes of course. Plan No. 11 was just one of those plans. Which one that was I do not know.

Mr. Keefe. Well, in any event if the ship on December 3, 1941, adopted plan No. 11 and commenced zigzagging, it would be quite safe to assume that that action was prompted by the fact that they were in waters where they expected the possibility of submarine attack, isn't that true?

[5048] Admiral Wilkinson. It might, of course—that is very true. It might, of course, have been for a drill that morning as well but it might well be—if it were a drill only it would be indicated by an entry afterward that they ceased zigzagging an hour or two later.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, I am glad you said that because right in the next entry, 1216, appears this:

Changed course to 314 degrees T. and commenced zigzagging in accordance with plan No. 2.

Would that indicate that it was a drill or a maneuver?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir. That would indicate they intended to do it all day.

Mr. Keefe. I beg your pardon?

Admiral Wilkinson. It would indicate they intended to do it all day. They have to stop every ship to change courses and then all ships would resume together and then they would begin zigzagging apparently on another plan.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, the next entry contains this language:

1748 commenced zigzagging according to plan No. 2.

What is plan No. 2? Just another one of these zigzag plans?

Admiral Wilkinson. Just another one. I think we had about 20 at that time.

[5049] Mr. Keefe. That is a different type of zigzag?

Admiral Wilkinson. Slightly different.

Mr. Keefe. Then I find on December 4 the same language, "Zigzagging."

Admiral Wilkinson. The ship's course was west of the Hawaiian Islands and we had had reports of strange submarines being sighted,
I think, in the past few months and the ship was taking no chances, obviously.

Mr. Keefe. Then all of this language that all ships in the task force are steaming darkened, maintaining condition of readiness No. 3, in ship control, fire control, ships zigzagging according to plan No. 11 or plan No. 2 or some other plan, indicated that so far as Admiral Halsey was concerned in going west from Honolulu in this period between, I think, November 26, when he left Honolulu, and the time when he got out to Midway, he was taking the precaution that would normally be taken by the commander of a task force and the commander of this aircraft carrier Enterprise against a possibility of submarine attack, isn't that true?

Admiral Wilkinson. It certainly appears so, sir, and I believe he is to be here and he can further testify directly, but I would certainly say yes.

Mr. Keefe. And if they manned the antiaircraft guns and were in readiness at their stations at the antiaircraft guns [5050] you would consider that that was a precaution and a safety measure against the possibility of a sudden air attack, wouldn't you?

Admiral Wilkinson. What time was that entry about condition 3, sir? If it was at night he might be standing off a night submarine attack, but the guns could be used, of course, against both submarines and airplanes, the antiaircraft guns. Some other guns cannot be used against airplanes.

Mr. Keefe. In your opinion, Admiral, as an expert of 40 years in the Navy, with these entries appearing in this log and also similar entries in the log of the Lexington, and I shall not burden the record with putting them all in at this time, it would appear that so far as the commanders of those two task forces were concerned, Admiral Halsey on the one hand and Admiral Newton on the other, that in carrying out the task assigned to them, which was to deliver planes to Midway and Wake and return, they were doing it under the principle that they might be attacked by Japan either by submarine or by air attack? Isn't that a fair conclusion for me to draw?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I think that the situation was certainly strained and they were not neglecting any precautions. They may not have been expecting it but they were taking precautions against surprise.

[5051] Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, you say they may not have been expecting it?

Admiral Wilkinson. No, sir; but they were taking precautions against surprise.

Mr. Keefe. Do you think they might have had the same idea which you have expressed so frequently here, that you did not think there was any probability of any such attack being made?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. If I was in a similar situation I would not have expected a probable attack but I certainly would have done the same thing with regard to my ships.

Mr. Keefe. You would be ready for it if it came?

Admiral Wilkinson. I would.

Mr. Keefe. Is that right?

Admiral Wilkinson. And I believe I would have done what they did.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in order to clear the record in connection with the questions that have been asked, I would like to read from page 578—

The Chairman. Is that a question?

Mr. Murphy. It is an official record and answers the questions of the gentleman from Wisconsin.

[5052] Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, may I state that the gentleman from Pennsylvania is repeatedly referring to a book that has not been offered here, entitled, "Narrative Statement of Evidence of Pearl Harbor Investigations," which I have a copy of, but which I do not understand has been offered in evidence, is not part of the record in this case and I understand it has a sort of nebulous character from what I have been able to hear about it, and until such time as the full character and background of that instrument has been produced and it appears as part of the record in this case I do not intend to be interrupted, nor do I want to be interrupted by reading from something that is not in the record and may or may not state the facts as they may ultimately develop.

So I do not accept anything that appears in this statement as being of verity nor do I think it will assist me in clarifying anything that I may think in regard to it until it is properly identified.

The Chairman. I think the Chair explained the other day when these documents were furnished that they were prepared by the Navy Department at the request of the Committee on Naval Affairs, possibly before this hearing started, I am not certain about that, but that upon the completion of this narrative story they turned them over to the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs and he turned them over to me for [5053] distribution to the members of the committee, for the information of the committee.

I do not think they were made part of the record or filed as exhibits, but for whatever they might be worth in giving the committee and to the individual members a running story of this Pearl Harbor situation. They are not yet officially parts of the record as the Chair understands it and were not offered for that purpose; that is, not at that time. They might be so made, but have not as yet been made part of the record or filed as exhibits.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I did not mean to interrupt the gentleman. I understood he had concluded.

I want to read from a part of the Hart report, made by Admiral Hart, now Senator Hart, and reported on page 578 of volume 2, precisely along the line of the questions put to the witness and if the questions are pertinent, this is certainly pertinent.

The Chairman. The Chair has inquired whether this was a further inquiry of Admiral Wilkinson? If the committee are through with the Admiral, unless there are some further questions from him, we might excuse him.

Mr. Murphy. Let me just say this, Mr. Chairman: I was about to read into the record the explanation by Admiral Newton as to why he zigzagged, in answer to the question of [5054] the gentleman from Wisconsin. It is at page 578 of the record and there are further references at 430 and 578 and 562 of volume 2, for those who are interested.

The Chair. All right. Are there any further questions of Admiral Wilkinson?
Senator Brewster. I had one or two I wanted to ask him.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. Admiral, on the general questions of your responsibilities and the preparedness to meet it at the time, what, if any, opinion have you formed about the psychological effect of the repeated warnings which had gone out over the course of the past 2 years, in 1940 and 1941? We have seen these warning messages and one of those, at least, if not the two—we do not seem to be clear about the second one—as to the state of mind of commanders in evaluating these warnings in view of the recognized inadequacy of the forces at their command to carry on a continuing state of reconnaissance and alertness; that is, they did not have actual control; as to whether or not it had sort of the effect of hearing a cry of "wolf, wolf" from them every 2 or 3 months or every month or so, with the result that they did not take it as seriously as they would have taken it if they were in the position that you were at Washington, where you knew this time it meant business?

[5055] Certainly the state of tension in Washington and the knowledge of the situation indicated that this was very different from any of the preceding crises that had arisen.

What would be your comment as to the lessons which we all might derive from that experience, looking to the future?

[5056] Admiral Wilkinson. I do not recall, sir, that there were very many alarms sent out there. Up to the time I left in May there had not been an excessive number. We knew that Japan was restless on the other side of the ocean, we knew that difficulties might ensue, and from then on until the actual attack I do not know that very many were sent. I think perhaps the Department refrained from sending an excessive number for that very reason, that they did not want to add up, to produce a wolf-wolf situation.

In answer to your question, I do not believe that there was an allayment or subsidence, you might say, of apprehension because of having received too many warnings.

Senator Brewster. You do not think that the alert they had sent out in June of 1940, when they really put them on the alert—was that about the date?

Admiral Wilkinson. That was the date, I understand.

Senator Brewster. And the earlier episode in keeping the fleet there that Admiral Richardson testified about, his visits and his concern, and then in the winter and spring, 1941, when certain indications were given and the situation was very tense, you felt all of those were not sufficient to in any sense put them to sleep?

Admiral Wilkinson. I do not think so, sir. The Navy, for instance, was not disturbed or concerned in the summer [5057] alert of 1940. The fleet remained out there in the eyes of most of the officers, and it was an idea that it was a good operating ground, good climate, and of course it had the supposed effect upon the Japanese.

Senator Brewster. I think you are not familiar with the testimony on that point. Admiral Richardson testified he was very much concerned about that alert, and he came on to find out whether it was simply an exercise. At first he was told it was an exercise and later he was told it was really a war warning.
Admiral Wilkinson. I thought you were speaking about the effect on the fleet as a whole. Concerning the effect on the commanders, I could not say. Admiral Richardson was concerned in that, but the general effect on the fleet was little, if anything.

Senator Brewster. I am thinking now in terms of the command and what their appraisal would be of these warnings. I think that is one of the questions which demands most consideration, concerning the effect upon these men.

One other question. I think you testified about wanting certain additional legislation to take care of espionage in Hawaii. Did you speak about that yesterday?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir. I said, I think, that the Department had asked for legislation to prohibit the photographing of a naval reservation at Pearl Harbor, and that that legislation, I believe, was introduced by the Navy Department but was not enacted. I mean it was requested by the Navy Department.

Senator Brewster. Question has also been raised about these something over 200—I now have the figure before me—200 consular agents of the Japanese there. I quote now from the Roberts Report as it seems to have pertinence:

In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular agents acting under the Japanese Consul, who was stationed in Honolulu, territory of Hawaii. The Naval District Intelligence Office raised a question with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and with the Intelligence Officer of the Hawaiian Department of the Army, whether these agents should not be arrested for failing to register as agents of a foreign principal as required by statutes of the United States. In conferences respecting this question, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, objected to the arrest of any such persons at least until they had been given notice and an opportunity to register, asserting that their arrest would tend to thwart the effort which the Army had made to create friendly sentiment toward the United States on the part of Japanese aliens resident in Hawaii and American citizens of Japanese descent resident in Hawaii and create unnecessary bad feeling. No action was taken against the agents.

It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage in Hawaii was the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu.

You were familiar with that, were you?

Admiral Wilkinson. Very. We discussed it, General Miles, Mr. Hoover and myself, in one or more of our weekly conferences and we were all concerned about it, and the Department was endeavoring to secure authority or action on that subject. But the Army, the War Department, on the recommendation of the commanding general out there, took the action, or requested the action that he had set, that it would be delayed and they would be given an opportunity to register, in order not to disturb the feeling of loyalty which they were trying to build up among the Japanese.

Senator Brewster. That is as far as that phase of it was concerned, but there was no need for additional legislation, was there? You had all the legal authority that was needed?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, indeed.

Senator Brewster. That is all.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in relation to the one Senator Brewster just asked?

The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I want to read to you, Admiral from page 127 some questions and answers from the Army Pearl Harbor Board record. Your opposite in the Army was General Miles?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I want to read from his testimony:

General Grunert: Did so many things go out at one time that the “low side” might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of saturation that they did not pay much attention to the information they were getting? In other words, “crying wolf! wolf!” so that they became confused, or “fed up”?

General Miles. That could have been, sir.

General Grunert. Do you think that the G-2 message—we call it the “G-2 message” of November 27—and the sabotage message—we call that the “Arnold message”, of the 28th, which was sent out under the Adjutant General’s signature—did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the command “down below” as modifying or changing the Chief of Staff’s instructions of November 27?

General Miles. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of Staff’s message of November 27 was a war warning message, in my mind, all inclusive so far as different forms of attack or dangers might be considered, and my message of the same date in regard to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and overseas department, to that particular form of danger.

[5067] General Grunert. There was no report from the recipients required?

General Miles. There was no report required.

Were you familiar with those messages that went out to the Army?

Admiral Wilkinson. I was not familiar with the Army message. I think I knew General Miles’ message as to sabotage, and I knew that the Army had sent a parallel message to our war-warning message, although I was not familiar with its language.

Senator Ferguson. Would you agree with General Miles there on that one question, No. 135, asked by General Grunert:

Did so many things go out at one time that the “low side” might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of saturation that they did not pay much attention to the information they were getting? In other words, “crying wolf! wolf!” so that they became confused, or “fed up”?

General Miles. That could have been, sir.

Admiral Wilkinson. I could not say as to the Army, sir. I do not think that situation arose in the Navy. I think the Chief of Operations Office was careful not to send too many for that reason.

The Chairman. In other words, taking the alert in the summer of 1940 and the other alerts along in the winter of 1941, even in the summer of 1941, up to the 27th of August, 1941, they did not constitute a sufficient number of alerts as to create the “wolf” sign in the minds of the commanders in the field, so that they would abandon or disregard them as just one more repetition of something which had already happened?


The Chairman. Anything further?

Mr. Gesell. There are two small points that ought to be clarified, Mr. Chairman. It will just take a second.

Admiral. I understand you to state the code designation did not appear on the Japanese intercepted messages. That was an error. The code designation did appear on the top under the name of the sender and addressee.

Admiral Wilkinson. Speaking of what message?
Mr. Gesell. Of the intercepted messages appearing in exhibits 1 and 2 here, these diplomatic and other messages. They do not appear on our copies of the exhibit because, as we advised the committee, we had stricken them off.

Admiral Wilkinson. That is what I was referring to.

Mr. Gesell. That may have misled you?

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. I think the evidence is and the record ought to show that those code designations did appear.

Admiral Wilkinson. On the original draft, yes.

Mr. Gesell. Also I think we neglected to ask you whether or not your December 1 summary was sent to Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Wilkinson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. That is all.

The Chairman. The committee thanks you, Admiral, for your cooperation in eliciting the facts in this inquiry. We appreciate your forthright replies to all questions asked.

Admiral Wilkinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the committee for the courtesy they have shown me.

The Chairman. Who is the next witness, Counsel?

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Turner.

The Chairman. You may be excused, Admiral Wilkinson.

Admiral Wilkinson. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Admiral Turner.

[5064] TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER, UNITED STATES NAVY

Mr. Mitchell. Will you state your present rank, Admiral, and station?

Admiral Turner. My rank is Admiral. My name is Richmond Kelly Turner.

[5065] Mr. Mitchell. You were Chief of the War Plans Section in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations at one time, were you not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, from October 24, 1940, until June 13, 1942.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you state briefly what your service has been since you left that post?

Admiral Turner. I left Washington on June 13, 1942; proceeded to the west coast; had 10 days' leave; went to the South Pacific by air; took command of the Amphibious Force, South Pacific, later the Third Amphibious Force; landed troops at Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, and then continued in command of the operations at Guadalcanal for several months, taking troops and supplies back and forth.

In February of 1943, after Guadalcanal had been secured, we engaged in the occupation of the Russells Islands as a preparatory move for the capture of New Georgia.

On June 30 of 1943, we made the landings at Rendova, and other parts of New Georgia Islands.

On June 15, I was relieved by Rear Admiral Wilkinson. I proceeded to the Central Pacific on August 24, 1943, assumed command of the Fifth Amphibious Force, which was a new force.

We then engaged in the capture of the Gilbert Islands in November, and in the Marshall Islands in February of 1944.
In about the end of March I was promoted to Vice Admiral, and about that same time was given command of the Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, which then comprised only the Fifth Amphibious Force.

In the late spring the Third Amphibious Force was added to the Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet.

In June we began the capture of the Marianas Islands, and after that I returned to Pearl Harbor and turned over all my ships to the commanders of the Third and Seventh Amphibious Forces, which were in the Southwest Pacific under Admiral Kincaid, who was under General MacArthur's command.

In February of 1945, we made the capture of Iwo Jima, and the 1st of April 1945 began the campaign against Okinawa, and I remained at Okinawa for about 7 weeks and then went to Guam and the Philippines to prepare for the Kyushu invasion.

At that time, the Seventh Amphibious Force was made available for use in the invasion.

I was relieved as the Fifth Amphibious Force commander, which I held in addition to the office of commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, by Vice Admiral Hill, in May, and then on August 15, the Seventh Amphibious Force was added to the Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, as an administrative organization, which then comprised the Third, Fifth and Seventh Amphibious Forces.

I organized the movement of ships and troops into Japan for the occupation, and on November 14 of this year, I was relieved and came to shore duty. I was promoted to Admiral on May 14, of 1945.

My present duty, to which I have just been assigned, is the representative of the Chief of Naval Operations on the military staff committee of the United Nations Organization.

Mr. Mitchell. When do you have to leave for that job?
Admiral Turner. About the 29th or 30th of this month.
Mr. Mitchell. If you are finished here?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Will you state, Admiral, what were the functions of the War Plans Division, and War Plans Director in 1941 when you were there?
Admiral Turner. May I quote from the pamphlet which I turned in to the committee?

Mr. Mitchell. I offer in the record at this time, and ask to have it transcribed in the daily transcript, as Exhibit 88, those sections in the document heretofore described as "Organization of the Office of Chief of Naval [5068] Operations, October 23, 1940," which relates to the War Plans Division. The committee has already had as exhibit 82 those sections that prescribed the duties of the Intelligence Division.

The Chairman. It will be ordered printed as part of the transcript. That is Exhibit 88.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 88.")

Admiral Turner (Reading):  

**WAR PLANS DIVISION (OP 12)**

12-1. **DUTIES:**

(a) **Policies and Projects Section:**
(1) Development of policies and projects in support of war plans.
(2) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of current plans for joint action of the Army and Navy, and in the solution of current problems.

(3) Collaboration with other Government departments on policies and projects affecting national defense.

(4) Study of subjects referred to the War Plans Division by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(5) Action in advisory capacity in current [5069] administrative matters referred to the War Plans Division.

(b) Plans Section:

(1) Direction of war planning.

(2) Preparation of designated war plans.

(3) Review of Operating Plans and Principal Contributory Plans.

(4) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of Joint Basic War Plans.

(5) Collaboration with other Government departments on plans affecting national defense.

12-2. The Director of the War Plans Division is a member of the Joint Board (General Order No. 7).

12-3. The War Plans Division has membership on the following committees:

Joint Board.
Joint Planning Committee.
Joint Aeronautical Board.
Joint Air Advisory Committee.
Shore Station Development Board.

12-4. The War Plans Division is non-administrative.

[5070] Also in addition to that, shortly after this order was issued, we established section (c), which was the Pan American Defense Section.

That section had liaison with the military personnel of the other American countries except Canada, and with other agencies of the Government, and War Department, who were interested in the war-making powers and plans of Pan America.

Also in addition to that, and at just about this time, the War Plans Division had membership with two members in the Joint United States-Canadian Defense Committee, which had been established by the President, I think, in July of 1940.

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral, there is one phase of your work that especially interests me, and that is to try and find the line of demarcation between the Office of Naval Intelligence, and Office of War Plans, on the subject of evaluating intelligence information and disseminating it to the field commanders.

Maybe I can approach the thing better by saying we have gone into that subject with the Army, the General Staff, and the impression we have is that General Gerow, head of War Plans, who was your apparent opposite in the Army, War Department, did not issue and was not called upon to issue messages or directions to field commanders unless [5071] they involved some operations.

If it was a mere question of dissemination and evaluation of information about enemy affairs that did not require any operational order or directive, then it was a G-2 function to do that.

Was the situation in the Navy precisely parallel to that, in the Navy Department?

Admiral TURNER. So far as war plans were concerned, I think that both the War Department and Navy Department War Plans Division actually operated in exactly the same way. I have heard General Gerow's testimony, and if you will recall, he said it was his business to issue major evaluations of strategic situations. Those were not his exact words.
It was his business to keep the responsible commanders in the field informed as to prospective operations.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean enemy operations or our operations?

Admiral Turner. Both. That was exactly the same as we had in the War Plans Division. The only difference in practice that I know of is that in the Army, the MID, the G-2, makes the enemy estimate of the situation, which is an over-all estimate of capabilities and probable actions, and keeps that current. In the Navy that is the function of the War Plans Division, to make and keep current the estimate as to the enemy, as well as to our own probable future actions.

[5072] I have heard the testimony here in regard to this subject and I will say now that there was no change ever at any time to my knowledge made in the duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence as set down in the pamphlet. There was an interpretation made before, I think it was during the first part of Captain James’ tenure of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

I conceived it to be the duty of War Plans to be consulted on and to have major advice on the general and major strategic situation of the country and of all other countries.

About that time estimates as to probable actions by foreign powers then at war or not at war started to go in from the Office of Naval Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations not routed by me and giving estimates as to what was going to happen. I was shown some of these by the Chief of Naval Operations and I disagreed with them very much.

So that I talked to Captain James and I later talked to then Captain Kirk on this subject and said that when they prepared any evaluations as to strategic matters to send to the Chief of Naval Operations I would like to have them consult me in advance or if not convenient at least they should be routed by my office so that I could make a comment on them because that was my function, to give major strategic advice.

[5073] We had in our Division officers who were experienced in matters of that character and more experienced than the officers in the Office of Naval Intelligence, who, generally, were more junior, and were trained rather for the collection and dissemination of information, rather than its application to a strategic situation.

Now, there apparently became a misunderstanding of that situation, through, probably, the use of the word “evaluation.” There are several kinds of evaluation of information. One is as to its authenticity, its probability, its probable effect on the future in general terms, the trends which it may indicate. That evaluation was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence and is perfectly properly assigned.

If you will look at the letter—I don’t know whether it has been introduced in evidence or not—of December 12, 1940, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Director of Naval Intelligence, which was prepared by myself, directing that the fortnightly bulletins with fresh information be issued, you will find in there nothing that differs in the slightest degree from the duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence as laid down in the rules.

Frequently they would put in their estimates as to what the meaning of certain types of movements or certain actions by political or
military members of foreign governments mean. They would put in that and it was perfectly proper.

My function was to give the major strategic over-all picture for the use of my superiors and disseminate that. I had no responsibility whatsoever for disseminating information as such and never did at any time, although from time to time I would suggest that the Office of Naval Intelligence should put out certain types of information. But I never initiated anything of that sort. It was not within my function.

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, please refer now to this document marked "Exhibit 88," covering the functions and duties of the War Plans Division, and point out any provision in it which calls upon the War Plans Division to get out these over-all strategic estimates of the situation.

Which one is it that you say covers that?

Admiral Turner. Under the "Plans Section." "Direction of War Planning."

Mr. Mitchell. "Direction of War Planning"?

Admiral Turner. That is correct. The War Planning is a very widespread and complicated matter. One of the important parts of any plan, major operating plan, or a basic plan, is the strategic estimate that goes along with it and forms a part of it.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, these strategic estimates weren't always related to the War Plans, were they? That is, you weren't limiting your strategic estimates to cases where you were developing a war plan. Didn't you make those regularly whether your plans were settled or not?

Admiral Turner. We kept running estimates. We made a basic national policy estimate shortly after I came in the Division which supplanted a long estimate that had been used in the preparation of the Rainbow war plans and from time to time memoranda, letters, and so forth, memoranda, were sent to the Chief of Naval Operations, letters were sent to the Secretary and to the commanders in chief, in development, and so on, of that plan.

Our basic plans were founded on those estimates. They were part of it. You had to make the estimate in order to make the plan.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, if you had your plans, basic plans made, and then from day to day you were watching the situation around the world and making estimates of the probable operations and strategic intentions of possible enemy nations, you weren't doing that with a view to changing the plan, were you?

Admiral Turner. If necessary, to keep the plan alive. We tried to have a realistic plan.

Mr. Mitchell. I am talking more about the question of getting information out to the field commander. You wouldn't have to send them to the field commanders to use those estimates for the basic information, your office, War Plans?

Admiral Turner. I sent no information to any field commander at any time.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am anticipating a little bit, but we are getting down to a specific case here, where on November 27, 1941, what was called a war warning was sent out to the commander of the Pacific
Fleet at Hawaii which warned him that diplomatic relations had been broken, or words to that effect, that a hostile attack might be expected by the Japanese in any direction at any time, and so on.

Now, was it your function to have any part in the drafting of this kind of a document?

Admiral Turner. I drew that document up. That was my conception and the conception of the Chief of Naval Operations and Assistant Chief, that that was exactly the type of thing the War Plans was responsible for preparing.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, didn't that include information about—

Admiral Turner. Only in connection with the change in the strategic situation.

Mr. Mitchell. Did that warning contain any kind of a directive for action?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. What was that?

Admiral Turner. That was putting into effect preparatory measures for the Rainbow-5 War Plan which was then extant.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, we have in that message first a warning that this is a war warning, second a statement of the information on the diplomatic situation, negotiations with Japan have ceased, another warning that a strategic estimate may be that an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next 3 days, and finally an order to do something, to wit, to execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out of the task assigned in WPL-46. There was all sorts of things in there, wasn't there?

Admiral Turner. That is a preparatory order with necessary parts showing reasons for the officers addressed to get ready to execute WPL-46 from a defensive situation.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, was it because that message of that date contained an order or directive to take appropriate defensive action that you came into it?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. I would have come into it in sending out an over-all picture of the strategic situation.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, turning to the part of this Naval regulation which has been labeled "Exhibit 82," which deals with the Intelligence Division, it says:

Secure all classes of pertinent information concerning foreign countries, especially that affecting naval and maritime matters, with particular attention to the strength, disposition and probable intentions of foreign naval forces, evaluate the information collected, and disseminate it as advisable.

Now, will you explain to us just what you understand that required of the Intelligence Division?

Didn't it require everything that you had in your message of the 27th except the order to take appropriate defensive deployment?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; I think not. This says "Secure all classes of pertinent information." It does not say to prepare a strategic estimate of the situation, and to give a strategic estimate to the forces in the field. It says "from pertinent information of all foreign countries," and that comes in from time to time.

One of the usual ways of distributing such information was through the fortnightly summary and to evaluate the matter with respect to
what effect that information has on future intentions. Those are minor matters. If at any time the Office of Naval Intelligence wanted to send out a long estimate, as a matter of fact which they did in a Russian section of the fortnightly bulletin late in 1941, why, that is perfectly all right for them to do that, provided it goes by the War Plans Division so that the Chief of Naval Operations can be given ultimate advice from the War Plans Division as to the strategic situation.

Mr. Mitchell. Then your idea, as I hope I understand it, is that there were certain things the Intelligence Branch was supposed to do, but that you felt that owing to your broader field of operation, and the chance that your strategic estimates and theirs might conflict, you brought about an arrangement by which the Intelligence estimates on their way to the Chief of Naval Operations passed through your office, so that you could make your comment and they wouldn't be confused; is that it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. But, there really was a duplication of function there in a way, was there not?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Let me ask you this question:

a. 1. says:

Intelligence Branch. Secure all classes of pertinent information with particular attention to the strength, disposition, and probable intention of foreign naval forces.

Do you mean that they were to get the information that might bear on the probable intentions, but not state what the intention was, is that it?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. They could do exactly as that is there, if it referred to a major situation, but an over-all picture, then it had to go through War Plans.

Mr. Mitchell. Why wasn't there an over-lap then? I don't understand. They could do it, but merely had to route it through you? Why wouldn't there be both functions performed by both of these divisions with a check-up through your Division?

Admiral Turner. The War Plans Division collected no information whatsoever. We had no agent. We were not an administrative organization. We depended on the Office of Naval Intelligence and through them on the Military Intelligence Department of the Army for all of the information that we got with one or two exceptions.

For example, we got information as to diplomatic activities through Captain Schuirmann of the Central Division. We got information as to the future activities of the British, the United Kingdom, through the British Admiralty delegation which was set up here during the spring of 1941.

We got information as to Canadian activities, and plans directly from the naval attaché, or through the naval attaché at Ottawa.

We got a great deal of information from the newspapers.

That all went into our thinking. But the collection of the information and its effect, general effect, of any particular kind of information was up to ONI.

Mr. Mitchell. Was up to what?
Admiral Turner. Office of Naval Intelligence. It was not their function, and I see nothing in there to show it, to maintain a general estimate of the situation. That was up to War Plans.

Mr. Mitchell. When it says in subdivision 2, after saying the Intelligence Division is to collect information relating to the strength, disposition, and probable intention of the foreign naval forces, in the next sentence when it says "evaluate the information collected," that is evaluate it, the information, as to the strength, disposition, and probable intentions of foreign nations, and disseminate as advisable, do you feel that that does not place upon them any share of the responsibility or duty of making any evaluation available to Intelligence and dissemination of it, which gives anybody in the field any idea of the probable intentions of the possible enemy forces?

Admiral Turner. If their evaluation affects the general situation or affects our view as to the general situation then before they put it out it was customary, and nearly always done, that it was cleared through War Plans. If we objected, why, we would come to an agreement.

Now, they would send their information out weekly or periodically, or something of that sort, and they would collect [5083] certain information, certain classes of information, and as to this class, this one little pigeonhole that they would collect, why, they would give their estimate of what the effect of that particular thing had on the general situation.

Mr. Mitchell. We have arrived at the hour of adjournment. Do you think you could confer with Admiral Wilkinson over the evening and possibly prepare for the committee a very condensed and short statement of the relative functions that you two would agree on under this order?

Admiral Turner. I can't give anything more, Mr. Counsel, than we have here.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I am pinning myself right down on some written document and wondering what the words mean. A lawyer would construe them to mean something. I haven't a clear idea. But if you can't do that, all right.

The Chairman. Think it over, Admiral, and see if you can give more specific answers to the questions.

We will suspend until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

The committee and counsel will remain for a brief session.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., the hearing was adjourned until 10 a. m., Thursday, December 20, 1945.)
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Counsel will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER (Resumed)

Mr. Mitchell. The admiral has some minor corrections in the transcript that he would like to suggest.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral Turner. On page 5067, line 5, the date “November 14” should be “October 14.”

On page 5080, line 12, the word “but” at the end of the line should be changed to “that is,” and the word “but” inserted previously in the same line before the phrase beginning “if it.”

Page 5065, the fourth line from the bottom, insert the word “and” before the words “on August 24, 1943.”

Page 5083, about the middle of the page, Admiral Wilkinson is shown as being the witness and that should be changed to Admiral Turner.

That is all.

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Turner, I think my questions last night about the respective duties of ONI and War Plans Division were couched in general terms. Possibly if I make some, present some specific examples of messages that were sent, we could get a more definite idea of the relations between the two Divisions.

So I will call your attention first to the message of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and others, found on page 32 of Exhibit 37,
Exhibit 37 is the basic exhibit of the Navy dispatches to and from Honolulu.

That message says:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful period. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility period. Chief of staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior army officers their area period. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action period. Guam will be informed separately period.

Now, the record shows that the authorization for the sending of that dispatch was signed by Admiral Ingersoll. Would that be a dispatch that you had a part in preparing or the duty of getting ready or having to do with?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. I prepared that dispatch and after some changes by the Chief of Naval Operations and by the War Plans Division of the War Department that was sent [5087] in that form. It relates to the over-all picture of the situation vis-à-vis Japan which might lead to war and thus invoke our war plans.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, that message did not contain any directive or order for action, did it?

Admiral Turner: No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: So that the War Plans Division had a broader function in participating in the preparation and sending of messages to the fleets involving directions as to operations?

Admiral Turner: Yes, sir. It had to do with the presentation of advice as to the over-all picture of the international situation which might result in war for the United States. And that was my conception of the function of the War Plans Division. That is, to advise the Chief of Naval Operations on matters of that character.

Mr. Mitchell: Well, your function was not to send dispatches direct over your own signature but to take the matter up with the Chief of Naval Operations, make your recommendations and suggest a form of dispatch you ought to send; is that the way it worked?

Admiral Turner: That is correct. We practically never sent a dispatch from War Plans without it having been released either by the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief. [5088] I believe on only about one occasion did I release a dispatch and that was after talking over the telephone to Admiral Ingersoll.

Mr. Mitchell: These dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations to the fleets, none of them seem to bear any signature. That is, we have a record of the officer who authorized the release or sending of the message. In this particular case it was Admiral Ingersoll. When these messages reached the addressees did they bear the signature of the officer who had authorized them, or were they generally messages from the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Turner: Almost invariably the naval practice is to send the dispatch from the official and not the person. We never mention the name of the sender unless there is some special reason, such as a somewhat personal dispatch from one person to another. That differs from the War Department practice.

[5089] Mr. Mitchell: The War Department record shows that some of these dispatches to Honolulu were signed by Marshall, others
by the Adjutant General and some by General Miles, and so on. That was not your custom in the Navy?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. Almost invariably we merely put it as the official, originating from the official.

Mr. Mitchell. That is, when the various persons to whom these naval dispatches were addressed—those in Exhibit 37—received their dispatches there were no person's signatures on them and they came with the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, that was the situation?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, let us pass on to the warning message of November 27 on page 36 of Exhibit 37; that is the message that reads:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning;

and among other things it directed, that the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Asiatic Fleet execute an appropriate defensive deployment.

There we have a warning, plus information, plus a directive. Now, what part did you take in preparing that message?

Admiral Turner. I prepared that message and submitted it in the same manner as the other to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General [5090] Gerow of the War Plans Division of the War Department. That message had some changes made in it and this was the final draft as approved. That was also released by Admiral Ingersoll, but Admiral Stark had approved it himself.

Mr. Mitchell. There is another one on December 3, page 40 of Exhibit 37, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders in chief Asiatic Fleet and Pacific Fleet, commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District at Honolulu and commandant of the Sixteenth Naval District.

That message appears to have been—the sending of it appears to have been authorized by Admiral Wilkinson, initialed by Ingersoll, and that is the one that says that:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Now, that was not an over-all picture, was it?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And it did not require any action, that is, any directive for a movement of the fleet, did it?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; and it did not change the over-[5091] all picture. That was initiated by 16-F-2 in Admiral Wilkinson's division and was shown to me and was released—initialed, that is, by Admiral Ingersoll before sending. It was pure information.

Mr. Mitchell. It was not the type of message that under the arrangements between the War Plans Division and the ONI was your function to prepare?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.
Mr. Mitchell. It is one of the things that passed through your hands so there wouldn’t be any conflict, is that the idea?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, I call your attention next to the subject where a message was not sent. Those were the messages that have been referred to as target area messages in Pearl Harbor in exhibit 2, commencing on page 12 and extending up through page 14, a series of Japanese intercepts, Japanese messages from Tokyo to Honolulu and so on which were intercepted by our agencies and decoded and translated a considerable time before the Pearl Harbor attack.

I am not asking you to express any opinion as to whether that information ought to have been sent at all, but I am just assuming for the sake of argument that those messages were significant and if properly evaluated would have pointed [5092] to the fact that the Japs were doing more than just getting ship movements; they were getting up some kind of a bombing pattern for pin-pointed dive bombing in Pearl Harbor.

Let us assume that for the sake of argument, and let us also assume that if they had been evaluated in that way, the information should have been sent to Honolulu.

Now, whose business would it have been under the system between ONI and the War Plans Division at that time to bring that message and its evaluation to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations and suggest a dispatch to the fleet at Honolulu? Whose function would that have been? Do I make myself clear there?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I conceive that to be the duty and function of the Office of Naval Intelligence. As a matter of fact, I have no recollection of ever having seen that dispatch of the 24th of September until I returned here recently and saw the dispatch in this book. I would never have initiated a dispatch on that subject. However, our relations with ONI and the other divisions were close, and if I had seen that dispatch I surmise that I would have talked it over or brought it specifically to the attention of Admiral Wilkinson. I do not know why I did not see that. I believe that I would have remembered it.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, do you not think that this message [5093] of the 24th of September on page 12 of this book did change the overall picture that we had up at that time, to wit, that there was no definite information of any particular animosity toward Pearl Harbor and this changed the picture—I assume it did—in that aspect, at least, does it not?

Admiral Turner. I think it changed it sufficiently so that if I had seen it I would have taken it up with Admiral Wilkinson or possibly talked it over with Admiral Ingersoll, but I would not have initiated any dispatch on that subject myself.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, as a matter of principle, what would have been the difference between that dispatch and the dispatch about destroying codes of December 3, the destruction of the codes?

Admiral Turner. There is no difference in principle between the two dispatches in my opinion.

Mr. Mitchell. While we are on the subject I will continue with what I was doing on that.
Now the diplomatic intercepts in exhibit 1—there is a whole series of them and I will try and sum up the situation there.

There was a dispatch intercepted from the Japs to their Ambassadors here giving a proposal on November 20, 1941, to our Government, which we received, the gist of which was that [5094] the Japs demanded that we cease our aid—in substance, cease our aid to China, stop our embargoes, the freezing of assets and other economic sanctions, furnish oil to Japan which she would be free to use against China or anybody else, and the record also shows dispatches to their Ambassadors here to the effect that they must by, originally, the 25th of November, and finally on a deadline of November 29, obtain from the United States an affirmative agreement agreeing to these things, and that the British and the Dutch would have to sign also on the dotted line; and that if we did not affirmatively agree to her proposals, the abandonment of China and the furnishing of war materials to Japan, by that date, something was going to automatically happen. And there was a further statement in some of those dispatches that the Ambassadors here were not to allow us to prolong this thing or put them off.

Now, if I have correctly stated the summary of that situation, and I am assuming that it would have been desirable for any reason to send that information to the commander of the fleet at Honolulu, whose function would it have been to frame a message giving the story of that situation and have it sent to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Turner. Those dispatches considered by themselves were informative but all of them entered into the back? [5095] ground from which was derived the reasons for sending the dispatches, first of November 24 and then of November 27. In other words, the detailed information, if it had been desirable to have acquainted the commander in chief with those dispatches, would have been the function of Office of Naval Intelligence. The effect on the international situation, which was very large, would have been treated by the War Plans Division.

I would like to add that it was my belief at that time, and it was Admiral Stark's belief, that all of these major diplomatic messages, at least in the Pacific, were being decrypted by both Admiral Hart and by Admiral Kimmel, and I did not know that Admiral Kimmel did not hold the code for those dispatches until I was so informed at the time of the Navy court of inquiry on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, your answer to my specific question would be that the situation exposed by those diplomatic intercepts I referred to did have a broad effect on the strategic situation, and were a subject which the War Plans Division had a responsibility for, and you supplemented that with the statement here that all of the messages which had been sent on November 24 and November 27, represented your evaluation of that information, and was sufficient, as I understand?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

[5096] Mr. Mitchell. Now we are getting a little bit into the question of having seen these and who delivered them, and so on, and I have been trying to avoid that for the present and stick to our ques-
tion of respective duties between the two divisions. I only have one other question to ask along this line and that is this:

On the 6th and the 7th of December 1941, there came in this 14 parts message and the 1 p.m. message, and I think the record shows now that the 13 parts of the message were decoded on the evening of the 6th and that the fourteenth part definitely breaking off negotiations and the 1 p.m. message which followed it, which set the delivery at 1 p.m., Sunday, came in on Sunday morning.

Now, information of that kind, coming in suddenly and properly evaluated as General Marshall evaluated it, suggesting that there might be a serious significance to the 1 p.m. delivery, whose business was it in the Navy Department, in the Chief of Naval Operations set-up, to get ahold of that message and see that the information about it was dispatched immediately to the fleet at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Turner. I believe that was the duty of the Office of Naval Intelligence. My recollection of the delivery of the 13 parts and of the fourteenth part is not entirely clear, but if you wish I will tell you the story of it.

Mr. Mitchell. No; I will go into that shortly.

Admiral Turner. All right, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I just assumed that the message came in in that way, and my question is whose responsibility was it to act on it by giving the information to the fleet? Whose responsibility was it to bring it to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations, and see that a message was sent promptly to Honolulu?

Admiral Turner. I believe it was the duty of the Office of Naval Intelligence. However, when I saw the 13 parts, which I believe was about 11:30 on the night of December 6, I inquired from the officer who showed it to me and brought it to my house as to who had seen that dispatch, and he informed me that Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Ingersoll and Secretary Knox had all seen it before it had been shown to me. I considered the dispatch very important, but as long as those officers had seen it, I did not believe it was my function to take any action.

The question of the 1 p.m. delivery, I saw that dispatch in Admiral Stark's office about noon, recognized its very great importance, and asked him if anything had been done about it. He told me that General Marshall was sending a dispatch, and I did nothing further about it because I considered that would cover the situation.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, in defining that message—those messages—as something that the Office of Naval Intelligence and not the War Plans Division had any responsibility for, where do you draw the distinction between that type of message and the one about these diplomatic messages, and the dead line that we talked about, which you do think came under the jurisdiction of the War Plans Division, as affecting the overall situation or changing it in some way. How do you draw a distinction between the two types in assigning responsibility back and forth between the ONI and the War Plans?

Admiral Turner. I did not consider that that message and the fact that it appeared to be an ultimatum changed the over-all situation in the least degree, because I was certain in my mind that there was going to be war immediately between the United States and
Japan, and this was merely confirmatory. The full orders, and what I felt was the full picture of the situation had been given to the fleet commanders in the dispatch of November 27, and confirmed definitely by the later dispatches regarding the destruction of the Japanese codes and the Navy Department's orders for our people to destroy codes in exposed positions.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course, the question as to whose responsibility it was would not have any connection with your judgment as to whether or not that responsibility had been discharged. I am not asking about that. Your judgment was that whoever responsibility it was, it was sufficiently taken care of.

Don't you think, Admiral, that the relations between the ONI and War Plans Division, as to the over-all picture and whose responsibility it was, was in a very fuzzy condition at that time?

Admiral Turner. No, sir, I do not. I think the line among staff officers—and that applies to all staff officers—can never be exactly drawn for every particular [5100] and every detail. So long as they have proper relationships with each other and keep each other informed as to matters near the dividing line, which we did, I believe that the instructions were adequate.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you not think that this interpretation of the Intelligence Division rules that we have been told about, without any formal change in the literal terms of the order, was something more than a change in interpretation? Don't you think it was really contrary to the expressed provisions of the orders prescribing the duties of the Intelligence Division?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, I have a statement here, Mr. Chairman, presented by Admiral Wilkinson, which he has asked me to have put in the record, and I will do that, and then I will ask the Admiral to present any further ideas that he has on this picture.

Admiral Wilkinson presents this letter. He says:

In view of the apparent variance in the testimony of Admiral Turner and my testimony with respect to the responsibility for the development of enemy intentions, and the supplying to the staff of information bearing upon and relating to fleet operations, I respectfully suggest, if the committee pleases, the enclosed papers be [5101] read into the record. These papers comprise memoranda from my predecessor, Vice Admiral Kirk, regarding his instructions from Admiral Stark, and two dispatches containing inquiry on this subject from me to Rear Admiral Janes, now in the Mediterranean, and his reply.

Very respectfully.

T. S. Wilkinson, Vice Admiral.

The first thing he presents is a memorandum from Vice Admiral Kirk. I suppose Admiral Kirk can be called directly, but I think there is no impropriety in reading this statement into the record.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell (reading):

Memorandum for Vice Admiral Wilkinson:

1. Confirming my statement to you upon turning over the duties of Director of Naval Intelligence in October 1941, the following represents the gist of the oral decision of the Chief of Naval Operations as to the duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence regarding interpreting and evaluating information concerning intent of possible hostile [5102] nations.
2. On April 1941, following a discussion in the office of Rear Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, with the Director of War Plans, Rear Admiral Turner, and myself, the three of us entered the office of Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, where the points at issue were reviewed.

3. It was maintained by me that the Office of Naval Intelligence was responsible for interpreting possible enemy intentions after evaluating information received from whatever source. Further, that the Office of Naval Intelligence was comparable to G-2 in the War Department General Staff in these respects, and should likewise prepare that section of the formal Estimate known as "Enemy Intentions".

4. This position was contested by Rear Admiral Turner who maintained that the War Plans Division should prepare such section of the Estimate, and should interpret and evaluate all information concerning possible hostile nations from whatever source received. Further, that the Office of Naval Intelligence was solely a collection agency and a distributing agency, and was not charged with sending out any information which would initiate any operations on the part of the fleet, or fleets, anywhere.

5. Admiral Stark then approved the position taken by Rear Admiral Turner.

6. I abided thereby and so advised my principal chiefs and subsequently yourself.

A. G. KIRK,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
CNO

Naval Message
From: COMNAVNAW
Date: 5 Dec. 45
TOR Code Room: 1050
Decoded by: Carroll
Typed by: Curtis
Routed by: Thompson
041134

NCR 3435.

From Admiral James

Refers CNO 031500. Believe information regarding written instructions in error but probably based on following facts. Director War Plans Admiral Turner came to my office and requested that ONI make no estimate of prospective enemy intentions for CNO but furnish information to War Plans who would make the required estimates. Turner was informed that existing printed organization instructions of CNO required Intelligence to make these estimates. McCullum can verify and perhaps elaborate. No written or other instructions of which I have knowledge were issued.

Change action to OP19... Add: OP19... 20-9C... (Per 2-9C 171432) BUPERS... Act.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Naval Message.
From: DCNO.
Released by: L. E. Denfeld:
Date 3 Dec. 45. COMNAVNAW
TOR Code Room: 1632.
Typed by: Poindexter/Grusky.
Routed by Thomsen
031500

NCR 7368

For Admiral James.

"Question arising Pearl Harbor investigation regarding written instructions given ONI early 1941 by CNO not to disseminate any estimates of enemy or prospective enemy intentions. These instructions although recalled by officers of ONI cannot be located. Do you remember incident and can you suggest location of the order or memorandum. Would appreciate your recollection. Request reply care Bupers. Wilkinson."

ADD: 2019C...(PER 20-9C 171432)
ADD BUPERS... (PER BUPERS SVC NO 63)
OP10... ORIG.
[5105] Now, Admiral, did you have a summary of the situation as you saw it, that you wanted to present?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; if I may be permitted to read this memorandum.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; you may read that.

Admiral Turner. My principal point is that I did not consider the oral instructions of the CNO, Chief of Naval Operations to the Director of Naval Intelligence on this subject to be a change in existing orders, but merely an interpretation of them.

The interpretation was that the War Plans Division was responsible for advising the Chief of Naval Operations and preparing papers for dissemination regarding the over-all international situation, which might involve the United States in war, and thus bring the war plans into effect.

It was, of course, essential that communications from the Chief of Naval Operations to the fleets be consistent as regards predictions as to the future involvement of the United States in war, and therefore that estimates which might be prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence should be cleared through the War Plans Division.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, will you please explain to us what the system was in the Navy Department for delivery to you, or your office by the agency in the Communications Division, which I understand was charged with the matter of decoding and translating these Jap messages, delivery to you of copies of those messages? How would that work in your case?

Admiral Turner. The Communications Division delivered copies to the Office of Naval Intelligence. When I first came to the War Plans Division, daily an officer of the Office of Naval Intelligence brought a folder to me, and waited until I had read the various dispatches. As these dispatches increased in number, sometime in the spring, approximately, of 1941, the system was changed, and a daily file of dispatches was delivered to me in a locked pouch.

I would then open that pouch and read the dispatches sometime during the day, and on the following day that pouch would be exchanged for another with that day's dispatches.

In this one folder were Japanese intercepts and intercepts from other countries of all character.

It was customary for the Office of Naval Intelligence to put a paper clip on the dispatches which they considered of importance, because there were many dispatches circularized which had very minor importance. I would always read the ones with the paper clips, and usually would glance through those without paper clips and read those which a glance showed to be of interest.

Mr. Mitchell. In your absence from your office, or being out of the city, who would accept delivery of those documents and make the examination?

Admiral Turner. The senior officer remaining in the War Plans Division.

Mr. Mitchell. You said that you do not remember ever seeing those intercepts on pages 12 to 15 of exhibit 2, what we call the target planning division of Pearl Harbor into areas and location of vessels in each section.
Admiral Turner. I said I did not see the dispatch on page 12. I saw many dispatches concerning the location of ships in Pearl Harbor, and on the movement of the United States war vessels in and out of other ports.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the one on page 12 says:

To divide the waters of the harbor up into areas A, B, C, D, and E, for the purpose of describing the location of vessels.

On page 13 is another message from Honolulu to Washington that sets up a code system for describing each one of these areas. Then there is one on page 14, which was translated very late, it is true, translated December 6, which speaks of areas in the harbor there.

Do I understand you mean it was only the one on page 12 that you failed to see and that you did see the others? [5108]

Admiral Turner. No, sir; I do not remember these specific dispatches as to locations of ships. There were a good many of them. I saw many of them. I definitely fail to remember the dispatch on page 12.

Mr. Mitchell. Might not your failure to remember be due to the fact that under the circumstances under which you examined it, it did not make any definite impression on you as being important? Would not that make you fail to remember?

Is your recollection affirmative that you did not see it, or are you just in a state of mind that you cannot recollect whether you did or not? That is what I am after.

Admiral Turner. It is rather in between. I definitely do not remember seeing it. I think that if I had seen it I would have remembered it, but that is pure surmise.

Mr. Mitchell. I see.

Do you remember having any discussion with Admiral Wilkinson or any other officer, respecting any significance to be attached to this message, and this series of messages about the division of Pearl Harbor into areas?

Admiral Turner. I do not remember ever hearing that discussed.

Mr. Mitchell. Am I right in thinking that Admiral Wilkinson has testified that according to his recollection he did notice such a thing, and had some discussion with you about it. Do you remember his testimony to that effect?

Admiral Turner. I did not hear that. But I have no recollection of such conversation.

Mr. Mitchell. To change the subject, Admiral, I want to go back to this series of joint war plans: One, the American-Dutch-British conversations at Singapore; another, the British-American conversations, called ABC-1 and ABC-2, and the joint Canadian-United States conversations on basic defense plan No. 2.

In order to make it clear just what I am after, I will say what I am interested in is to find out, if I can, from these documents or any other evidence, whether or not anybody representing the United States, from the President down, made any commitment, or promise, to the British or the Dutch to join in a war against Japan before Japan attacked us, and without prior authority from the Congress. That is what I want to know. I am not interested in the plans in any other respect.
[5110] Now you had something to do with all these plans, did you not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Let us take up first the American-Dutch-British conversations. I call your attention to a document dated December 12, 1940, signed by H. R. Stark, directed to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, entitled "Instructions Concerning the Preparation of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet for War under War Plan Rainbow 3."
Would you look at that document?
Admiral Turner. What was the question?
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of that document?
Admiral Turner. I prepared it.
Mr. Mitchell. Would you read it into the record? It does contain the instructions that were sent out to the United States representatives who were planning to take part in that British-Dutch-American conversation at Singapore, is that not true?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Please read it into the record.
Admiral Turner (reading):

Secret. OP-12-Dy

(8c) A16 (R-3)
December 12, 1940.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. 8941.
Subject: Instructions Concerning the Preparation of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet for War under War Plan "Rainbow 3."

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, is informed that a plan designed for governing naval operations in case of war with Japan, Germany, and Italy, and entitled "RAINBOW 3" has been prepared. Two copies of this plan are forwarded to you by special officer messenger. While it is not to be considered as the policy of the United States Government to become involved in war under this plan, such a war appears at this time to be a possible eventuality. You are requested, therefore, to give a high priority to the preparation of your operating plans, and also to the preparation of your vessels, aircraft, and personnel.

2. The officer messenger carrying this plan, Commander J. L. McCrea, U. S. N., is authorized to remain in the Manila area for about nine days. He is prepared to present you the general views of the Chief of Naval Operations as to various political and strategic matters which have influenced the preparation of "RAINBOW 3." You are requested to make a study of the plan and to forward to the Department via Commander McCrea recommendations and suggestions for changes which may appear desirable to you at this time. It may be [5112] stated, however, that it does not seem practicable, under the existing situation, to effect material changes in the Assumptions of the plan.

3. One of the assumptions of the plan is that war would be fought with the United States, the British, and the Dutch Colonial Authorities as Allies. Staff conversations with the British, of a limited nature, have been undertaken in London and Washington, but so far as concerns an allied operating plan and command arrangements in the Far East, the only useful staff conversations would appear those which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet might be able to hold with the British and Dutch Supreme War Commanders in that region. It is believed that you may be able to hold such conversations with the British. There is a considerable doubt as to the extent of the conversations which may become possible with the Dutch, owing to their fear of repercussions in Japan.

4. You are, therefore, authorized to conduct staff conversations with the British and Dutch Supreme Commanders, with the specific understanding that you are in no way committing the United States Government to any particular political or military decisions, and that the purpose of the staff conversations is solely to facilitate joint operations should war eventuate under the approximate conditions shown in the Assumptions of "Rainbow 3." It is requested that these
conversations be conducted in secret; in particular the most extreme care should be taken not to permit the Japanese to become aware of your attempt to establish contact with the Dutch.

5. You will note that "RAINBOW 3" will require agreement between the Commanders-In-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and U. S. Fleet, concerning the routing and protection en route of the Asiatic Fleet Reenforcement. It might be necessary for the Reenforcement to join you via the south of Australia, but this will depend upon the situation at the time.

6. Questions as to special personnel or material which should go forward to you via the Asiatic Fleet Reenforcement should be settled by direct arrangements between you and the Commander-In-Chief, U. S. Fleet. These arrangements should include all questions concerning the cargoes of the two XAF and two XAK which it is proposed to send you from the East Coast via the south of Africa.

7. All matters concerning the logistic supply of your forces should be decided by you, with the understanding that, so far as possible, only personnel and technical materials would be supplied from the United States.

8. It is requested that you take advantage of the presence of Commander McCrea to inform him as to your views concerning various pending matters, and particularly those which require the assistance of the Navy Department in solving the problems which you foresee may arise in war. Specifically, the Chief of Naval Operations desires further light on matters connected with the following:

(a) Your recommendation concerning a further reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet during peace, due consideration being given to political reactions and to the present capability of existing facilities to care for reinforcements.

(b) It is proposed to send you, probably, in February, four "Bird" class minesweepers fitted for both ordinary and magnetic sweeping, and fitted to lay contact mines. Advise as to whether or not these minesweepers should be sent.

(c) Are additional patrol seaplane squadrons desirable, and can they be supported with present facilities?

(d) It is possible the next reinforcement after the 'Bird' minesweepers may be four 1,200 ton destroyers converted to high speed minesweepers fitted for both kinds of minesweeping. Would these ships be desirable?

(e) In view of the fact that the Crete Maersk cannot be purchased or chartered, what is the present situation as regards the support of your submarines? Can six more (or a total of 23) submarines be supported if a cargo ship with spares and supplies is sent from the United States to the Asiatic to augment the Canopus?

(f) Advise concerning sending motor torpedo boats to the Philippines.

(g) There are now in store in San Francisco portable facilities and equipment for establishing advance bases for patrol seaplanes. These facilities are made up in sets capable of supporting either two or four squadrons each. Would you desire to have sent to you one or more sets of these facilities for either two squadrons or four squadrons?

(h) Do you need increases in personnel and material? Under consideration are renewing, or adding to, the machine tool and crane equipment of the Cavite Navy Yard; adding to the facilities of the submarine base; and establishing an airplane overhaul base with a capacity for overhauling two patrol squadrons including engines. Under this heading, would the establishment of minor base facilities for submarines and aircraft in Mariveles Bay in addition to those at Corregidor and Cavite be advisable? Would the establishment of similar facilities near Cebu or Iloilo or elsewhere be desirable?

(i) What is your present view with respect to increases in ammunition, including bombs, mines, and torpedoes? What increase in stowage and upkeep facilities for these items are required?

(j) We desire your recommendations as to booms, nets, loops, etc. This is in connection with your "front door" problems.

(k) Advise as to the location and adequacy of quantity of gasoline, fuel oil, diesel and lubricating oil stowage.

9. The Chief of Naval Operations has under consideration a visit to Australia by two light cruisers, one the cruiser now under your command, and the other the cruiser carrying to Manila the spares and personnel of the patrol squadron.
It may be proposed that the *Marblehead* would return to the Asiatic Fleet after this cruise, provided you consider that you still need her out there. On the other hand, since the *Marblehead* might perhaps be more suitably employed in war in either the Atlantic or the southeastern Pacific, it may be preferable to withdraw her now from the Asiatic. Your advice on these matters is requested.

10. Information is also requested as to whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations should take up with the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, any of the problems affecting the closure of the “back door” referred to in one of your letters.

11. It is recognized that the above list is comprehensive and that you may be unable at this time to furnish answers to the questions involved or to other items you have in mind. If this should prove to be the case, you are requested to forward them by air mail or dispatch as soon as practicable. If it seems advisable, you should forward your recommendations by dispatch in order to save the time involved in Commander McCrea’s return to Washington.

H. R. Stark.

Copy to: Cincus.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Mitchell, that is from the Chief of Naval Operations to whom?

Admiral Turner. To the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart.

Mr. Mitchell. And Admiral Hart it was, I think, that designated the men who went to that conference.

Now, Admiral, you produced a file here from the files of the Navy Department that has something to do with this Singapore business, and I think in that you have a copy of the instructions which the British gave their representatives at that Singapore conference, have you not?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; not at that conference. I have instructions which were given for the conference which was held in Singapore in April.

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, a later one?

Admiral Turner. That is the paper in which the British give instructions to their conferees.

Mr. Mitchell. Now there was an earlier conference prior to April?

Admiral Turner. I think, in answer to that question, the committee might be interested in a brief résumé of all of [5118] the conferences that were held between the American authorities and the British and the Dutch.

The first contact with the British in Singapore was made by our naval attaché, Commander Thomas, who was going to Thailand in October, about the 23d.

The Vice Chairman. What year?

Admiral Turner. October of 1940. That was merely exploratory. On November 11, in response to a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, Captain Purnell, the chief of staff of Admiral Hart, went to Singapore and had exploratory conversations with them, with instructions that no commitments were to be made. There were no written documents issued from those two preliminary conferences.

The next conference that was held—and it was in compliance with the letter which has just been read—was from January 14 to January 16, 1941, at Batavia, between the Commander in Chief of the Dutch Forces and Captain Purnell. We have in this paper a dispatch summary of the result of those conversations, and I have in my possession the minutes of that meeting, which I believe the counsel has not seen, which I just very recently got. It adds nothing particularly.
Then we received word that finally the British and Dutch were going to get together in Singapore in the latter part of February of 1941. Captain Purnell attended this British-Dutch conference and was authorized to agree to tentative methods of command, tentative methods and areas of operations, either jointly or separately, and to exchange of communication facilities and intelligence, but of course under the instructions that there would be no political or definite military commitments.

Nothing very definite came out of that conference.

The next conference—and on which there is another letter directing that this conference be held, and a letter or a dispatch from the British Chiefs of Staff concerning the conference—was held in Singapore about the 19th of April, 1941. Out of that conference was evolved the ADB paper which is here, and which the counsel has just produced.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is is exhibit 50.

Admiral Turner. That paper contained a lot of objectionable features, and the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff in the Army, on July 3, 1941, in a letter to the British Joint Staff Mission here, rejected that paper in toto and requested that additional instructions be issued, so that we could get another agreement.

In brief, the objections were two: First, there were some political implications in the paper which were not acceptable to us, and one of them was this deadline down in the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam. The other objection was that the plan was not very realistic and did not seem to advance in many respects the possible cooperative effort between the different countries.

Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me for interrupting you, but that document that the Admiral just referred to, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff of the British rejecting this Singapore proposal has already been introduced in evidence as exhibit 65.

Go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral Turner. As a result of that rejection, and after considerable conversations between our representatives and the British representatives here in Washington, the British Chiefs of Staff produced a paper which was a proposal for a draft of an agreement, and which had the title “ADB-2.” The date of that is August, 1941. That paper was not entirely acceptable but was closer to our ideas.

Negotiations on the basis of that draft agreement were proceeding rather slowly, until the arrival of Admiral Phillips, the new British Far Eastern Commander in Singapore, in November. Admiral Phillips and some staff officers went to Manila and had conferences there with our authorities, chiefly Admiral Hart, and Admiral Hart on the 6th of December, his date, which would have been the 5th here, sent a dispatch to us concerning arrangements which he had made with Admiral Phillips as to command, and so on, in the war which then was coming, within a day or two.

That agreement, with some slight modifications and remarks, was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, it being only a naval agreement, on the 7th of December, and the dispatch went out on the 8th.

In none of these papers was there ever a political commitment, or a definite military commitment. This was a plan of
action, or these were plans of action based on assumptions that should
the United States enter the war, then these papers would be effective,
provided they were approved by the proper authorities.

None of ADB papers were ever presented to either the Secretary of
the Navy, or the Secretary of War, or to the President, although all
of those officers as well as the Secretary of State were aware that
these conversations were being held from time to time.

Mr. Mitchell. Have you in that file any instructions by the British
about this United States-British-Dutch conference and the powers of
their representatives?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. If you find any clause there stating the limits of
their authority in these matters, will you please read it into the
record?

Admiral Turner. This appears in a note from the British Military
Mission in Washington to the United States Chief of Staff, and trans-
mits a copy of the British instructions to the British representatives
at the forthcoming conference at Singapore.

Mr. Mitchell. What is the date of the note?

[5123] Admiral Turner. The date of the note from the British
Military Mission is April 13, 1941.

Paragraph 7 of the enclosure, which is the British instructions, reads
as follows—I beg your pardon. To make it clear, I will read para-
graph 6 as well.

6. The conference will be in two parts: Part 1 to be British-United States-
Dutch staff conversations; Part 2 to be British-Dutch staff conversations with
the United States representatives attending as observers, should this be desired.

7. In both cases, the following conditions will apply:

a. No political commitment is implied.

b. Any agreement is subject to ratification by the Government’s concerned.

c. Conversations to be conducted in spirit of complete frankness.

Mr. Mitchell. We will offer in evidence at this time and have it
read into the daily transcript, a report from the commander in chief
of the Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations dated Decem-
ber 7, 1941, which I understand is a dispatch report of the discussions
that took place at that earliest conference in Singapore.

Admiral Turner. That is 1941.

[5124] This is the final conference with Admiral Phillips.

Mr. Mitchell. The very last one?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I think that is one of the documents that Senator
Ferguson has asked us to produce.

The other is the reply dated December 7, 1941, released by Admiral
Stark and addressed to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet.

Shall I read those, or do you want them transcribed?

[5125] The Chairman. I think if they are not very long you
might read them.

Mr. Mitchell. No, they are not long. The report dated December
7, 1941, coming from the Asiatic commander states:

This is the first of five parts.

(1) We have met and discussed the problems with which we are faced in
the Far Eastern area.

(2) In the early stages of a war with Japan occurring at the present time,
the initiative must inevitably rest with the Japanese.
(3) It is consequently not possible for us to draw up definite plans to be carried out by all our forces at the outbreak of war, and the most we can do is to decide upon the initial dispositions that appear to us best suited to meet the probable Japanese actions. Plans for submarines and naval aircraft are definite and ready.

(4) We are agreed that it is of great importance to prevent any Japanese movement through the Malay barrier. Part two will follow.

Second part of 970327.

(5) We are agreed on the following initial dispositions:

(A) British battle fleet to be based upon Singapore and operate as required from there as a striking force in connection with any Japanese movement in the China Seas, Dutch East Indies and through the Malay barrier.

(B) Cruiser striking force to be based on East Borneo—Surabaya—Darwin to act as a striking force in connection with air reconnaissance. This force can provide cover, and when necessary, escort, for convoys within the Dutch East Indies and Philippines area or for an occasional important convoy from Australia to Singapore.

(C) The minimum cruiser force should be maintained in the Australia-New Zealand area to deal with a moderate scale of raider attack or escort important convoys.

(D) The minimum cruiser force to be maintained in the Indian Ocean to escort important trade.

(6) The actual dispositions of forces to give effect to “5” are contained in Appendix 1.

(Part Three.)

(7) We consider it very important that action in the Far East area should be co-ordinated with the movements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and we hope we may be informed of the time table visualized for the movement of this Fleet to Truk in accordance with plan “Rainbow V”. The release of cruisers from Australia and New Zealand is intimately connected with the movements of this Fleet.

(8) All operations of U. S. Army aircraft which touch the operation of any naval forces to be co-ordinated through CINCAF.

(9) The setting up and use of a joint headquarters is found impracticable at this time.

(10) Strategic Control. Strategic control as between H. M. and U. S. Forces for the present to remain under respective Commanders in Chief and their operations to be co-ordinated under the principle of mutual co-operation.

(11) Tactical Command. The policy in force in North Atlantic will be followed.

(12) We consider that liaison officers should now be exchanged between the United States Asiatic and British Eastern Fleets, and are taking the necessary action.

(13) We consider that if the above is agreed to in principle by Dutch, Australian and New Zealand authorities in consultation with British Commander in Chief Eastern Fleet, next week, then all that remains to do in the way of conference is the perfection of details by our respective staffs.

Signed THOS. C. HART and TOM S. V. PHILLIPS.

(Part Four) In addition to the items reported in the first three parts we are also agreed as to the following:

—1— With the growth of our forces in the Far East, it will be important to be in a position to undertake more offensive operations. Such operations are not practicable from Singapore, and we consider that it is necessary to have, in due course, a base further north from which to operate.

—2— Manila is the only suitable base available, and we consequently consider that the necessary measures should be put in hand to enable Manila to be used by the British Battle Fleet. The question of just what action is necessary for this purpose will be discussed by our staffs.

—3— We consider that we should aim at having Manila available as a base by the first of April 1942, if this can be done.

(Part 5)—Appendix 1—Singapore; Battleships: PRINCE OF WALES, REPULSE, REVENGE, ROYAL SOVEREIGN; Cruisers: MAURITIUS, ACHILLES, TROMP, DE RUYTER, (AUSTRALIA?) (AND LATER HOBART?) Destroyers: Ten British, 6 Dutch, 4 U. S. (See note.) SOURABAYA—DARWIN—EAST BORNEO. HOUSTON, MARBLEHEAD, CORNWALL, JAVA, 4 Destroyers (U. S. see note). AUSTRALASIA, AUSTRALIA OR CANBERRA, PERTH, LEANDER, THREE AMC, INDIAN OCEAN. EXETER, GLASGOW (20 Knots) Two “E” Class, 3 “D” Class, four “C” Class, 5 AMC.
Footnote: Hart’s understanding is that we build up destroyer force to operate with the British battleships as they increase in number. At present, the two destroyer divisions are deployed with his cruisers, one division being in full readiness at Balik Papan to proceed to Singapore upon declaration of war.

(CINC Eastern Fleet requests above be forwarded First [5129] Sea Lord as personal message from him.)

And the reply from the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Hart, dated December 7, 1941, reads:——

Senator Brewster. Is the time of that shown, the time of day? Was that before the attack or after, does it appear?

Admiral Turner. May I answer that?

Mr. Mitchell. Have you a copy of this?

Admiral Turner. This was actually transmitted on the 7th about 8:00 p. m. It had been written, I believe, late on the 6th or early on the 7th, and would have gone out a little earlier except for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator Brewster. It was prepared then entirely before the attack and was not changed after that?

Admiral Turner. I don’t remember that it was changed. It might have been slightly changed. It was still in the process of drafting at the time of the attack.

Senator Brewster. Excuse me for interposing:

Mr. Mitchell. The original dispatch from the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, bears date December 7, 1941. I will ask you what that date is here and if the hour is noticeable there.

Senator Brewster. That would be the 6th here, wouldn’t it, Admiral?

Mr. Mitchell. We want to know when that message was received in Washington, the original.

[5130] Admiral Turner. It doesn’t show the time of receipt.

That was sent on noon of their 7th which would have been——

Senator Brewster. That would be the 6th here, wouldn’t it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Are there any hieroglyphics on that photostat that would help you state the hour it was received?

Admiral Turner. That would be about 11 p. m. on the 6th, 11 p. m. on the 6th. So we did not see that until the next day. I will modify my other answer. I think that was entirely prepared after the attack in the afternoon of the 7th because I know if it had come there at 11 o’clock at night nothing would have been done on it that night and I think it came to my attention when I came down to the Department the next morning.

So that I believe now that that was prepared in the forenoon of the 7th. Actually our time of 11 p. m., the time of transmission, time of coding out there, time of transmission, decoding, of that long message, it wouldn’t have been available for less than 8 or 9 hours after the date that it was started to be coded.

Mr. Mitchell. This reply to Admiral Hart reads as follows:

The five parts of your dispatch beginning with 070327 approved with comment as follows x Part one approved x [5131] Part two approved but CNO invites attention to possibility that the major Japanese attack against Philippines may come from the eastward and that a Japanese concentration may be established in Halmahera or Mindanao approximately in accord with ideas expressed in WPL44 x Part three approved para seven make arrangements direct x Para
eight approved by CNO and COS x Part four approved when practicable x Regarding paras two and three inform me what additional personnel material and minor forces you require for the projected fleet base in Manila or alternatively in Mindanao x Footnote approved x Question of transfer to you of additional destroyers cannot be decided at this time xx Para 3315 WPL46 provisions are extended to include Army x You are authorized by SECNAV to time charter US and foreign flag merchant vessels of your station as necessary to accomplish this objective suggest possible use of British vessels formerly in service on China Coast x Request prompt information as to loading of supply vessels from US which will be sent you via Indian Ocean approximately in accord WPL44 tables xx Inform Army British and Dutch xx Sent CINCAP for action and CINPAC and SECNAVO for info.

Copy to: BAD
WPD, U. S. Army.

[5132] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, counsel at the beginning, as I understood, said that was a reply of Admiral Hart.
Mr. Mitchell. Reply by Admiral Stark, I mean.
Senator Lucas. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. I misspoke. It is a reply by Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Hart, Asiatic Fleet.

Now, Admiral, you know also about the ABC conversations, British conversations, 1 and 2. The record so far shows that those conversations never were finally approved.

Is that in accord with your recollection? That is, before the war started, anyway. I think there has been correspondence offered here in connection with Rainbow 5, which the President refused to approve, because it was based on the British-American conversations, and they hadn't been approved.

What is your recollection about the conferences between the British and United States staff officers here in Washington, called ABC-1 and 2?

Admiral Turner. It is in accord with the record except for one curious thing, that the British Chiefs of Staff and the war cabinet approved ABC-2, which was an appendix of ABC-1. I had been under the impression that the British War Cabinet had approved both but I can find no record of it and the man, then a clerk, now an officer, who had care of all the papers in connection with that, assured me that ABC-1 was never approved by a war cabinet, by the British nor by the President.

Mr. Mitchell. The other joint war plan of that date was the one arranged with the Canadians for the defense of areas in Canada, Alaska, and the United States in case of an attack on this continent. That is covered by Exhibit 51. That document was approved, was it not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. In all your dealings with these war plans, joint conversations, and so on, did it ever come to your attention that anybody in the services of the United States, in the executive branch, military or civil, had ever assumed to commit the United States to engage in a war with Japan before we were attacked?

Admiral Turner. I know definitely that there never was any such commitment. All instructions that we had from the President and from the Secretary were that, and that was entirely in accord with the views of all of the officers of the War and Navy Departments who were directly concerned, that it was the province of Congress to declare war, and that any agreements that we entered into were pro-
visional, and to a large extent for the purpose of getting our ideas together and for establishing the machinery for [5134] cooperation.

Mr. Mitchell. Turning attention next, Admiral, to Exhibit 44, which is a document containing extracts from various of our war plans, basic war plans, Army and Navy with special reference to the defense of Pearl Harbor against an air attack, you have seen that document, have you not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And you also are familiar with the various basic documents that are listed in the 13 items in the contents?

Admiral Turner. Not with all of them. I was familiar with No. 1 "Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Orange (1938)."

No. 2, "Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 1."

No. 3, "Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5."

No. 4, "Extracts from War Department Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5."

No. 5, "Extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940."

No. 6, "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii."


No. 8, "Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement)." I was not familiar with No. 9, "Five November 1941, Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department." I never saw it until I saw this document.

Mr. Mitchell. You are giving now the list of the ones you were familiar with prior to December 7, 1941, that had come to your attention prior to that date?

Admiral Turner. I beg your pardon. I thought that was what you wanted.

Mr. Mitchell. That is what I do want.

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. No. 9 hadn't come to your attention?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. That would not come to me normally. I never saw No. 10, "Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department."

No. 11, "Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan"—I was familiar with.

Familiar with 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL—41 (Revised)—Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas."

And also No. 13, which was the Operations Plan No. 1—41. [5136] Headquarters, Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District.

Mr. Mitchell. The ones you have specified, you did know about prior to December 7, 1941, are plans that you had directly to do with in the War Plans Division?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. Either joint plans made here or out there, or navy major plans, the basic plans, made here, and major plans which were made out there. Never minor plans, which never even came to the department.
Mr. Mitchell. Recently, in preparation for testifying here, you have examined the items on this list that you did not know about prior to December 7?


Mr. Mitchell. Well, what I am leading up to, is this. I asked General Gerow of the War Plans Division of the War Department to sum up as briefly as he could from these various plans that are listed here, a statement showing the respective responsibilities of the Naval forces and the Army forces at Oahu and in Hawaii in connection with defense against an air raid, limited to that, and he did prepare such a document and it was read into the record here, but I would like to label it Exhibit 89, and have it attached as an exhibit.

The Chairman. That will be ordered.

[5137] (The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 89.")

Mr. Mitchell. In which he made a statement in summary fashion as to the separate and joint responsibilities or respective responsibilities of the Naval forces and the Army forces in connection with defense against an air raid.

Did you examine that before General Gerow presented it here?

[5138] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, and I agreed with it as to the over-all picture.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, getting back to the development of the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands against an air attack, the record shows that on November 22, 1940 that a study of that situation was initiated in a letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson in which he asked Richardson to make a study of the situation. Do you know about that letter, or did you know about it at the time?

Admiral Turner. May I examine the letter?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. I think the first part of it is all that relates to this matter.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I saw that letter before Admiral Stark sent it to Admiral Richardson.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of it or the making of the suggestion?

Admiral Turner. Very little; that was related to matters that had been discussed between Admiral Richardson when he was here in early October, I think, and Admiral Stark. It was before I arrived.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, the record shows that as a result of that letter Admiral Richardson made a study. He went out himself and examined the Army defenses and all that in connection with or in conjunction with Admiral Bloch, who [5139] was commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and it resulted in what is known as the Bloch Report. Did the Bloch Report come to your attention? That is part of Exhibit 9.

Admiral Turner. Mr. Counsel, there is a letter intervening, I believe, of date November 22, an official letter on this subject to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, which gives specific directions for preparing that report. Is that in evidence?

Mr. Mitchell. That is in the file I just handed you, is it?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; I have a copy here.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, Admiral Stark's letter refers to the fact that he previously asked Admiral Bloch for a report, but it was not quite as complete as he wanted and so he asked Richardson to pursue it. That is in the letter of November 22. Do you remember that?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I have a copy of that here, if I may refer to it?

Mr. Mitchell. Surely; what I am trying to find out, Admiral, is how much you personally had to do with the preparation of all these studies and plans for defense against an air attack at the Hawaiian Islands that was generated by this request of Admiral Stark's for an inquiry out there.

Admiral Turner. Admiral Stark started the matter of a better defense of the fleet at Hawaii before I arrived here on October 24 and he had some notes on the matter which he turned over to me with a directive to make the matter official, as he had talked it over orally with Admiral Richardson.

As I recall, I drafted the letter of November 22, at least it was drafted in the War Plans Division. I do not have a copy of that here. That went out and then Admiral Stark decided that Admiral Richardson should take a greater part in the reply to that and I believe that was the occasion for his letter of the 28th, personal letter to Admiral Richardson.

Mr. Mitchell. Is that the 28th or 22nd? That is what puzzles me because the very first letter we found from Stark to Richardson raising this issue was the 22nd.

Admiral Turner. Yes, that is correct. Well, I am a little confused on that other letter——

Mr. Mitchell. Prior to that?

Admiral Turner. No; I thought there was a letter between the letter of about that same date to the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, maybe there was.

Admiral Turner. I think so.

Mr. Mitchell. But it is enough for our present purposes to call attention to that and my last question was whether you saw the Bloch Report in which he made a report about the situation regarding an air attack, dated December 30, in evidence here, and which bears an endorsement by Admiral Richardson of January 7. I think I handed that to you, did I not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I am familiar with it and as a result of these letters here, the one of November 22 and November 28 I started to get information from the War Department and such information as we had here in the Navy Department on that subject. As soon as the letter came from Admiral Bloch with Admiral Richardson's endorsement, I immediately took that material, added some of our own and drafted the letter of January 24th from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War.

Mr. Mitchell. So that this letter, Exhibit 10, written by Knox to Stimson, in which he labels the dangers at Pearl Harbor in their order of importance and probability:

1. Air bombing attack.
2. Air torpedo plane attack.
3. Sabotage.
4. Submarine attack.
5. Mining.
6. Bombardment by gun fire.

You prepared that letter yourself?


Mr. Mitchell. And took it to the Secretary for transmission?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; it was approved by some of the other divisions of operations, approved by Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Stark and then sent to the Secretary because it was an official communication of the greatest importance to the War Department and we felt that it should be taken up in that manner rather than informally.

Mr. Mitchell. You drafted that letter partially on the basis of the result of Bloch's Report, inquiry and report?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, it is obvious if you drafted it you were at that time of the views expressed in this letter about the possibilities or order of importance, and probability of these various kinds of attacks, were you not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; except I was of the opinion that the word "probable" ought to have gone in there instead of "possibility" as to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in advance of a declaration of war. However, it was felt, and I was entirely agreeable, that "possibility" was a perfectly good word.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you see the letter of Secretary Stimson that came back in reply to the Knox letter that you [5143] drafted?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and we made sure that a copy of that letter went to the Commander in Chief.

Mr. Mitchell. I am showing you a letter that came in from Admiral Richardson from Pearl Harbor, dated January 25, 1941, addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations, which has to do with this very problem of defense against an air attack, which is part of Exhibit 9. Did you see that letter when it came in?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I judge from this that you had an active part in what happened from that time on in connection with the working out of any sort of plans for defense against air attack at Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Turner. Not the working out of the detailed plans; the providing of the material and the providing of the necessary units, the improvement in the defenses and general directives as to individual services and joint preparation and training for such an attack—joint training in preparation for such an attack. There is a letter of February 10 in reply to the letter of the Commander in Chief of January 25 which I drafted in addition.

Mr. Mitchell. I am not sure that we have had that, have we?

[5144] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I sent it to the committee some days ago.

Mr. Mitchell. Let me look at it.

Admiral Turner. And received the return of the originals.

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, well Admiral, you took some share in the efforts to obtain the action by the War Department towards increasing its antiaircraft guns and plane equipment?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, and also action by the Navy Department on this question of the study on the subject of protective measures in the waters of the harbor and in the entrance, but the actual prosecution of that project was in the hands of the Naval District’s Division.

There were a number of letters written to the War Department requesting that they increase their antiaircraft defenses and increase their air defenses and we recognized that the War Department had little equipment and did not have many trained men and they were most sympathetic and cooperative in attempting to supply material and formations. We never had any refusals from the War Department to provide defenses out there where, in our opinion, they could have provided them.

Mr. Mitchell. You stated, I think, that you were familiar with the Martin-Bellinger Report, which is contained in [5145] exhibit 44 and in which General Martin, commander of the air force there, and Admiral Bellinger, commander of the air force of the Fourteenth Naval District, made a joint report?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; that is an estimate which they used in drawing up their operating plans, joint operating plans.

Mr. Mitchell. That is the report in which it says:

It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

And then they said:

A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

They said again:

Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise [5146] in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above.

Which is speaking from the Japanese viewpoint.

After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success.

Now, that was a pretty wise report, was it not?

[5147] Admiral Turner. That was, indeed. We agreed thoroughly with it, approved it, and it was very comforting and gratifying to see that officers in important commands out there had the same view of the situation as was held in the War and Navy Departments.
Mr. Mitchell. Turning to another subject, did you know of the diversion of merchant shipping from the northern ship lanes to the Central Pacific area which occurred in October 1941 and later?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; that subject had been under discussion for some little time between Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Brainard, whose business it was, and myself, whose interest was in War Plans, and we were prepared to execute that when conditions became tense and we believed that war was imminent. That was initiated by Admiral Ingersoll, who talked to me about it before it was sent out and I was heartily in favor of it.

Mr. Mitchell. There was a large area up there that even normally had a very slight amount of marine traffic in it, was there not?

Admiral Turner. There was very little marine traffic north of Hawaii, except such as was going to Vladivostok and there wasn’t very much of that. By no means all, but a large proportion of the maritime traffic that was going from the United States or from Panama to the Far East went via Hawaii and thence going to Japan would go north to Midway, and going to China I think also went north of Midway. The other that went to South China and the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines went rather close to Guam. The composite great circle course from Puget Sound or from San Francisco, that goes south of the Aleutians to Japan or to China, runs very close to Japan itself and approximately parallel to the general trend of the land.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that was the traffic that you diverted, was it?

Admiral Turner. We diverted that and also the traffic that went via Honolulu. We sent that down via Torres Straits, so that the track that the Japanese task force actually took would cross the composite great circle course close to Japan and they would be clear of any traffic that would be there in a very short time and that traffic that went on that composite course went through the normal operating areas where the Japanese held their maneuvers.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Counsel, I wonder if we could have one of the maps of the Pacific put up, which would enable us to understand very much better this question of the routes, if that map were put up on one of the standards.

Mr. Mitchell. I will have it set up. It is 12 o’clock now.

The Chairman. We have changed our schedule to 12:30.

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, we have?

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Turner. Those routes illustrate exactly what I have just said.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, on the map that has just been placed on the easel, south of the Aleutians, going from our northern Pacific coast, there are a number of lines drawn from the United States over to the Japanese area. Are those lines representative of the ship lanes, so-called, for that traffic?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. That is what is called the composite great circle course.

Mr. Mitchell. And that is the traffic that by these orders was diverted to a southerly course?
Admiral Turner. It was that traffic and also all of the traffic that went westward, that is, all of the merchant traffic that went westward from Hawaii. Now, from Hawaii all traffic except naval traffic was sent down around, too, in that direction; some of it had to go via Suva and the Fiji to get water—no, it didn’t go that far south. It went through the Solomons. Possibly I had better trace it.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

[5150] Admiral Turner. All of this traffic, this traffic—

Senator Brewster. You will have to identify it a little more because in the record won’t be clear.

Admiral Turner. I beg your pardon. All of the composite great circle routes from San Francisco and from Puget Sound which went to the Asiatic points, either to Japan or to China or even around to the Philippines and Malasia, plus all of the traffic that went from Hawaii to Japan, to China direct, to the Philippines, was diverted south roundabout to go first east—the Puget Sound and San Francisco ships were sent first to Hawaii and then all ships from Hawaii, merchant ships, went approximately west of Howell and Baker Islands, through the Solomons, then west of the Santa Cruz Islands, thence south of New Guinea and through Torres Strait, which is between Australia and New Guinea. We had Australian pilots to take them through there.

We for a time sent some of the naval traffic which had freight for Guam and the Philippines, direct from Honolulu to Guam and thence to the Philippines and that is the traffic that we started escorting at about that time. Shortly before December 7 even that traffic, which included naval freight and freight and passenger vessels, was also sent south and around South New Guinea and thence up to the Philippines.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, there is an area on the map, Ad- [5151] miral, that lies south of this ship lane, of those ship-lane lines from Puget Sound through to Japan and north of the Hawaiian Islands, that does not have any ship-lane lines drawn on that. Is that a part of the ocean that was not generally used?

Admiral Turner. Practically never do any ships go through that part of the ocean.

Mr. Mitchell. Is that term “vacant sea” a recognized maritime expression?

Admiral Turner. I never heard that term before but I think it is a good term.

Mr. Mitchell. So that after that diversion took place, according to the map there, there was practically little or no traffic in the areas followed by the Jap fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor, as shown in red on that map?

Admiral Turner. There was very little traffic there in any case. After the freezing of Japanese assets on July 26, within a short time there was no Japanese shipping between the United States and Japan and the American-flag shipping dropped off to practically nothing. Because those lines are there, it does not show a stream of ships even at any time. When shipping was going full blast even before the war there were very few ships in through there and going between Honolulu and Japan. I have gone that route and the chances [5152] are we didn’t even see a ship there. That was much quicker than these
northern routes. It is very easy to miss a ship if you do not want to be detected because there is only one ship along there every 2 or 3 days and sometimes by shifting your course a few miles every few hours, why, it is practically impossible for merchant shipping ever to detect a naval task force that wants to be undetected.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Mitchell, could I ask the witness a question?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Senator Brewster. What happens to the Russian ships going to Vladivostok that were moving out of Seattle? Was there any change in those?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Senator Brewster. Those continued to move?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Those had been going from Japanese ports, had they not?

Admiral Turner. No, they did not.

Senator Brewster. Did the Japanese have surveillance of those ships?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, but they went through the Kurile Islands. I think they had no patrol, the Japs had no patrol. They had surveillance up there but they did not stop and they would normally have gone through that area up here during the summer. Well, very few of them went into Vladivostok during the winter.

Senator Brewster. Now, could you give an approximate difference in distance, for instance, going from Seattle and San Francisco to the Philippines via the two alternate routes?

Admiral Turner. You mean via the maritime ports?

Senator Brewster. The great circle or the Hawaii-Torres Strait.

Admiral Turner. Oh, I would say roughly 4,000 miles farther.

Senator Brewster. So that this was a very important change when you rerouted these ships?

Admiral Turner. It was extremely important and was taken only because the shipping companies were very much opposed and we ourselves because it meant a longer time to get our production and our material in the Philippines, very much longer.

Senator Brewster. Thank you.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, I call your attention to a dispatch dated July 25, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders in chief of the Pacific and other fleets in the Pacific, found on page 14 of Exhibit 37, that has to do with economic sanctions. That is the dispatch that informed them that

[5154] At 1400 GCT July Twenty Sixth United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan—

and describes them.

Did you have any part in the preparation of that dispatch?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I drafted it.

Mr. Mitchell. It says:

Do not anticipate immediate hostile acts by Japan through the use of military means, but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventuality.

You realized at that time that the imposition of these sanctions and embargoes produced very strained relations?
Admiral Turner. I believed it would make war certain between the United States and Japan.

Mr. Mitchell. When you come to examine the intercepted diplomatic dispatches which showed us Japan was fretting and deteriorating under these embargoes, and her demands and our refusal to remove those embargoes and to keep on furnishing her war materials, what is your judgment as to the extent the embargo and our refusal to stop aid to China and release those embargoes had on compelling Japan to attack us?

Admiral Turner. I think it made sure the fall of the third Konoye Cabinet, which had begun in the middle of July, and I think that it made sure the going in of the militaristic Cabinet. It undermined the Konoye Cabinet which I believe was trying to keep from war with the United States, but not trying to keep out of war with Britain and the Dutch.

Senator Brewster. Could I have the question and answer previous to the last one read, please?

(The question and answer referred to, as recorded above, was read by the reporter.)

Mr. Mitchell. I call your attention to another dispatch dated October 16, 1941, page 18 of Exhibit 37. Did you have any part in the preparation of that? That is the one that refers to the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I drafted that dispatch.

Mr. Mitchell. You say:

There is a strong possibility of hostilities since the United States and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation.

To what did you refer in the words "desperate situation"? Were you referring to her economic condition?

Admiral Turner. Very largely to her economic condition, and to the fact that through our action, her trade had been cut off not only with the United States, but with the British possessions and the Dutch had reduced their commitment to furnish oil, a certain amount of oil annually, to something like one-third, or two-fifths of that. That meant that since the United States and the Dutch possessions were the sources of nearly all of the petroleum products that Japan was using, in a comparatively short time her own large stocks maintained in the Empire would be exhausted. She could not get cotton from India, upon which she depended for a large part of her cotton industry, and she also got rice from the Dutch and India.

It meant, of course, that her trade with the world was practically stopped and that was a very serious matter for an industrial nation.

In addition to that, of course, was her very large extension in China, and the help that the United States and the British were giving to the nationalist government in China.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that message almost amounted to an alert, didn't it? It said the Japs may attack, and "you will take due precautions, including preparatory deployments" and so on.

Was it your judgment at the time that you wrote that dispatch on the 16th of October, that the conditions you had spoken of might result in war in a very short time?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; not a short time. That is relatively. The new Cabinet would have to be formed. It took a cer-
tain amount of time to do that, to make their pronouncement, get the approval of the Emperor, and to issue orders to deploy their forces, and to load their ships. So at that time, so far as the United States and the British and Dutch were concerned, I did not believe that there would be any possibility of war for at least a month.

It was somewhat different with respect to the Russians, because there they were close to the Russians. They already had an army in Manchuria, deployed or not, we did not know.

They had a great part of the Navy in her home waters, so that action against Russia could have been taken at an earlier date possibly.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, I notice in exhibit 38, dated October 18, 1941, it appears that the War Department had their attention called to this message of October 16, 1941, from the CNO to the Pacific Fleet and felt, or maybe gave the impression that the hostilities were very imminent, and so the Army sent this dispatch to their commander out there:

Calling the War Department estimate of the Japanese situation to your attention, tension between the United States and Japan remains strained, but no rapid, no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.

I gather you are really not at all in disagreement with that view, are you?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. I saw that dispatch before it went; I did not have any disagreement with it.

Mr. Mitchell. The Army dispatch I read is dated October 18, 1941. The dispatch of November 24, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets and others, page 32 of Exhibit 37, we have already referred to this morning. That contains the statement:

The chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful—and—

Surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines and Guam is a possibility.

That is the dispatch that you say you initiated and that Admiral Ingersoll authorized, is it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. That was also cleared with Admiral Stark and with General Gerow who cleared it with General Marshall.

I have an impression, not confirmed by the minutes of the Joint Board, that that was discussed at a meeting of the Joint Board before it went out.

May I say this in addition:
Before that went out it was cleared with Mr. Knox, and I think with the President.

Mr. Mitchell. Coming down now to the war warning message of November 27, 1941, appearing on page 36 of Exhibit 37, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, what part did you take in the preparation of that message? Will you state the circumstances as you remember them?

Admiral Turner. The dispatch of the 21st we did not consider required any immediate action, except to get ready plans for putting into effect when we gave them another warning.

As a result of the Japanese intercept which had postponed the final date to the 29th, we felt it necessary to put this dispatch out, because
we could not tell whether the 29th was to be the day that the attack was to take place, or whether it was to be the day when the expeditions would start from their ports.

[5160] So that this gave 2 days for deployments, proper deployments to be made, which was enough. I think that one of the immediate reasons for that was our learning, or my learning on the 26th from Captain Schuirmann, who was the liaison officer with the State Department, that Mr. Hull had decided, or felt, that negotiations were of no further use and that the matter was in the hands of the War and Navy Departments.

My recollection is—I am not too sure on this part—my recollection is that Captain Schuirmann came back from the State Department about 10:30 on the 26th and immediately told me, Admiral Stark, and Admiral Ingersoll about this matter where the State Department had decided not to send the modus vivendi, but he did not know then that they were going to send the note of the 26th.

The scheduled meeting of the Joint Board was for 11 o'clock. That was put off by Admiral Stark until, I think, 11:35, while I drafted this, the original form of this dispatch. And I think, without making any particular change, that that was taken up and discussed in the Joint Board meeting that morning, which General Marshall attended.

There were some objections to the phraseology of the dispatch and it was finally changed almost to this form, partly by the Army and partly by Admiral Stark.

[5161] Now, I believe that either that night or early in the forenoon of the 27th, I am not sure which, that dispatch was then cleared with Mr. Knox and sent to the President and we got it back in the afternoon from the White House.

Now, there is a possibility that it was telephoned to the President, but I believe that Admiral Beardall took it to the President himself.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the Joint Board minutes, the minutes of the Joint Board of November 26, are in evidence, and we don't find anything in them at all that mentioned any discussion whatever of any warning messages going out either from the Army or the Navy.

Admiral Turner. That is correct, and that was rather customary. It mentions a discussion of the Asiatic situation, or the Pacific situation. Dispatch of this character, while it might be discussed in the Joint Board—this may be rather a fine point, but it is, I believe, correct—was not the function of the Joint Board to send. It was the business of Admiral Stark and General Marshall. The Joint Board, which is a constituted body, consisting of eight people, would give their advice, but the action would be by those two officers.

So that customarily, when something of that sort came up that required action, it was not put down in the Joint Board minutes, because then it would look as if the Joint Board had decided to do such and such, which would not be the case.

Mr. Mitchell, I see.

Who was present with you and, I suppose, Admiral Stark, when the terms of this message were finally agreed on, this message of November 27, can you remember who was in the conference?

Admiral Turner. I think after the Joint Board conference, the only people that were then concerned with that after that were Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll, and myself, possible Admiral Brainard.
Mr. Mitchell. On what day was it you met and agreed upon this draft? Was it the 27th?

Admiral Turner. We discussed it several times on both the 26th and the 27th, and this was what emerged. I will say that it had some of the thoughts of the Army in it, because we wanted to always try, in anything of this nature, to take exactly the same action. As we know, that did not occur in this particular case.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that is one of the things I wanted to mention to you. The record shows that when the Army got up their dispatch, Secretary Stimson telephoned Mr. [5163] Hull about whether negotiations were terminated or not, and Mr. Hull said they were terminated to all practical purposes with only a bare possibility that the Japanese Government might come back, and that was the way their message read.

Your message doesn't contain that. It is a flat statement.

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days...

Now, when you drew this dispatch in this form and sent it, did you know that the War Department dispatch had been toned down a little?

Admiral Turner. I knew it before the dispatch went out but our idea was to make this sharp and clear so there was no possibility of misunderstanding.

We also took cognizance of the fact that in one of the magic messages, the Japanese had said even after the 29th to go on and make the motions of continuing to discuss things from the diplomatic viewpoint.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you really then disagreed with the State Department, Mr. Hull's evaluation, if I may use that word, of the state of negotiations, did you? A little bit, I mean?

[5164] Admiral Turner. I felt that for the military personnel, stating the matter, the situation in this way, was necessary and was really factual, and realistic.

Mr. Mitchell. And it was better to give them a stiff jolt than to be easy under the circumstances?

Senator Brewster. You say military personnel?

Admiral Turner. I say for the military personnel this was a much more realistic and direct message.

Senator Brewster. You mean military as distinct from naval?

Admiral Turner. No, no, sir. I beg your pardon. That was a general term.

Senator Ferguson. Will you ask him if he was trying to differentiate between civilian and military in that?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes; I think when you said "military" you used the term in a broad sense to include Navy and Army and everything in the armed services, did you not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. It is now 12:30. The committee will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, the committee recessed at 12:30 p.m., to reconvene at 2 p.m. of the same day.)
Mr. Clark. The committee will come to order. I will take responsibility for calling the committee to order in the absence of the chairman and vice chairman who, I think, were detained on the floor. Counsel will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER (Resumed)

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral, when we recessed we were engaged in making some comparisons between the warning message of November 27 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Pacific commander and the warning message of the same date sent by the War Department to the commanding general of the Army forces at Hawaii.

The first difference is this, your dispatch—withdraw that.

Before you finally settled on the form of your dispatch I imagine you had some preliminary discussions with the Army officers who were engaged on similar work as to the form the dispatch should take?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. They saw our dispatch and I am quite sure before they drafted their final form of their dispatch.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, after you had had that conference you separated, you went to the Secretary of the Navy with yours, and they went to the Secretary of War with theirs; is that the way you understand it?

Admiral Turner. I left the draft of the dispatch with Admiral Stark and, as I understand it, he took that up with Mr. Knox, and I think, sent it to the President by the aide, but he may have talked to the President about it over the White House telephone.

Mr. Mitchell. You don’t know whether the original draft of the Army dispatch contained the words “This dispatch is to be considered a war warning”?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; I do not. I first saw the Army dispatch after it had been drafted when General Gerow came over with it to clear it with Admiral Stark and they called me in and showed it to me.

Mr. Mitchell. That was after General Gerow had had it up with Secretary Stimson?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Your dispatch suggests, or states:

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

The Army dispatch mentions no area in which the attack may come. Do you notice that? The Army dispatch is on page 7 of Exhibit 32.

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Mr. Mitchell. Why did you put in a reference to the Philippines, Thai, or Kra, or Borneo?

Admiral Turner. We wanted to emphasize the fact that this was a very important major effort, that there was an amphibious expedition or expeditions en route. We knew that these ships had sailed in convoy from Shanghai and, I believe, from Hainan, and that they had, some vessels had already arrived in the ports of Indochina.
Also from the locations of Japanese naval vessels there was a definite movement of a fair-sized force down through the China Sea even at this date. There was no definite indication at that time of a movement towards the Philippines. We could get very little information as to intentions toward the Philippines. We expected the attack to come from Formosa, which it did, but we couldn't get any information from there.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the fleet at Hawaii wasn't tied down to the Hawaiian Islands, was it?
Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. It had an interest in the campaign anywhere in the Pacific?
Admiral Turner. Not outside of the provisions of Rainbow [5168]. 5 War Plan, and that did not permit them to go out into the Asiatic without directions from the Chief of Naval Operations.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, coming to the next sentence in your message it says:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46.

What is meant by that? In the first place, what is meant by "appropriate defensive deployment," and next, what was WPL46?
Admiral Turner. Before coming to the meat of the question, I invite attention to the fact that this dispatch has a multiple address. It goes to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action and it goes to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for action. It is as if it were the Army practice, with two dispatches, one addressed to each, but both in identical terms.

A "deployment" is a spreading out of forces. A naval deployment means to spread out and make ready for hostilities. To get into the best positions from which to execute the operating plans against the enemy. The defensive deployment as applied to Hawaii, which is of chief interest, was for the defense of Hawaii and of the west coast of the United States, because one of the tasks of WPL46 is to defend the territory and coastal zones, our own territory and coastal [5169] zones, and to defend our shipping.

Instead of being in a concentrated place, or instead of being off in some distant region holding exercises and drills, it meant that the forces under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could take station for the most probable attack against them or against the Hawaiian Islands, keeping in mind their responsibilities for covering the United States and Panama.

The deployment in the vicinity of Hawaii, if wide enough, would in itself constitute a formidable barrier against any attempt further east, and we definitely did not expect an attack, that is, the Navy did not, an attack on the west coast or in Panama, as is indicated by a dispatch going out the same day to the commandants of districts to take precautions against subversive activities, but we did not tell them to make any defensive deployment.

The deployment from Hawaii might have been made in a number of different ways. Certainly I would expect that in accordance with the plans that should have been drawn up, and they were, that airplanes would have been sent to Midway, if not already
there, to Wake, to Johnston Island, to Palmyra, the reconnaissance planes as well as defensive planes, and that a reconnaissance would have been undertaken. The movement of those planes and forces to those positions constituted part of the defensive deployment.

The battleships, of course, were of no use whatsoever against undamaged fast ships. Naturally, it was not to be expected that the Japanese would bring over slow ships unless they were making their full and complete effort against Hawaii, so that a proper deployment for the battleships would have been in the best position to do what was within their power, which was only to defend Hawaii against actual landings. In other words, if they had been at sea and in a retired position even, such that if actual landings were attempted on the Hawaiian Islands and at such a distance that they could arrive prior to or during the landings, they would have been most useful indeed to have interfered with and defeated the landings.

Since, as has been pointed out previously, the danger zone, the danger position of Hawaii was to the north, because [5171] there were no little outlying islands there from which observation could have been made, since there was no possibility of detecting raiders from the north except by airplanes and ships, an appropriate deployment would have been to have sent some fast ships, possibly with small seaplanes, up to the north to assist and possibly to cover certain sectors against approach, which the long range reconnaissance could not have done. Of course, these ships would naturally have been in considerable danger, but that was what they were there for, because fighting ships are of no use unless they are in a dangerous position so that they can engage the enemy and inflict loss on them.

Another part of a deployment, even where airplanes would not be moved, would have been to put them on operating air fields scattered throughout the islands so that they could be in a mutual supporting position with respect to other fields and to cover a somewhat wider area.

Another part of the deployment would have been to have sent submarines, as many as were available, out into a position from which they could exercise either surveillance or could make attacks against approaching vessels.

It is to be noted that there was no offensive action ordered for submarines. The offensive action, of course, would have been to send them into Japanese waters.

[5172] Mr. Mitchell. Well, can you identify for us WPL-46?
Admiral Turner. WPL-46 was the Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, derived from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, which in turn was derived from ABC-1 and 2, the American-British conversations.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, is WPL-46 involved in any one of these 13 items on Exhibit 44, which lists various war plans?
Mr. Keefe. Is it the same as Rainbow No. 5?
Mr. Mitchell. That is what I am trying to find out.
Mr. Keefe. That is what I would like to get cleared up.
Admiral Turner. Yes. I said that WPL-46 is Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, shown in No. 11, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. That is another name for Rainbow No. 5, is it?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. WPL-46 is a war-plans number.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you are familiar with WPL-46 and Rainbow 5. Can you state in a very brief way what the defensive tasks assigned in that plan were?

Admiral Turner. May I see the tasks assigned to the Commander-in-Chief from Rainbow 5? I do not think they are all in here.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you want the original Rainbow 5, do you, the original document?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I haven’t anything but a summary of certain items. Senator Brewster. You remember that was a question we had when it was up the other day, that that exhibit described the defensive actions but it did not show the affirmative actions of the fleet. I raised that question at the time. I do not know whether we have ever had the complete plan, have we?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. No in evidence. We have it in the office.

Mr. Mitchell. We have it down in the office, all these plans.

Admiral Turner. I believe counsel has that plan, a copy of that plan.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, while we are waiting for it to be brought up I will go on with these questions about this warning message.

Now, there is nothing in this message about the Japanese taking, performing, or committing the first overt act. The Army had that in there “on direction of the President” and I understand that this message of yours went over to the President. I am not sure whether it was before or after it was sent.

Did you have any directions from the President to say anything about Japan committing the first overt act?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. The situation was this: The question was discussed as to whether we would issue an order that if Jap forces came within a certain distance of Hawaii, whether or not we would attack them. Naturally, if strong forces were even within 500 or 600 miles of Hawaii their intention would be very apparent.

The decision as to when and where to consider that they had committed an attack or were about to commit an attack on us was felt to be within the province of the commander in chief and that we should avoid any details at all.

The Army was in a slightly different situation. We felt that the Navy could not afford, if it were possible to prevent it, to let the attack come in and be made without taking action, and I am quite sure that if our deployed ships had encountered an enemy task force there would have been no question whatsoever immediately as to the commission of overt acts by the Japanese. It was not a situation capable of exact definition.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you knew when you drafted the order, I assume, that that desire existed in the administration that Japan should commit the first overt act however you define it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and if they had brought a task force within 500 miles of Hawaii, under the circumstances that most assuredly would have been an overt act.

Mr. Mitchell. I notice here at the end of this dispatch you say:

Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.
Well, did you have an idea at that time that the only danger that Guam and Samoa were under was a sabotage operation?

Admiral Turner. The category of defense of Guam was "E", which meant that no resistance was to be offered; that the only action they would take would be the destruction of military facilities in our possession.

We had no force there except a small number of marines and a small number of naval personnel and the defense of Guam was entirely out of the question. Therefore, in order to avoid too much difficulty for the natives, why, the decision had been made previously that no defense whatsoever would be offered for Guam.

Samoa—I have forgotten their category of defense. I think it also was "E". They had a couple of hundred native troops, I think they had three or four emplaced 6-inch guns, I am not sure as to that, and there was no defense that Samoa could offer that was of any account at all. Therefore, the only measures that they could take effectively were against sabotage.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, on the 27th of November, on page 37 of exhibit 37 there is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandants of all the naval districts except the 14th at Hawaii and—the 16th was in the Philippines?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Which read:

Commandants will take appropriate measures for security against subversive activity and sabotage due to critical status of orange negotiations and imminent probability extension orange operation. Publicity to be avoided.

Why didn’t you warn the commandant of the naval district in Hawaii against sabotage?

Admiral Turner. Because the commandants of the naval districts in Hawaii and in the Philippines were subordinate officers of the two commanders-in-chief and it was the duty of the two commanders-in-chief to issue the necessary instructions to those commandants. Their existing orders in their war plants were all written out and that was one of the tasks of those commandants but there were many other tasks, too.

You will note also that the commandant of the navy yard in Washington and the Governors of Guam and Samoa were also included as action addressees in that dispatch.

The reason we did not send a stronger dispatch to those districts was that we did not expect there anything except possible sabotage and we did not want to spread that other war warning throughout all those districts because it would have been in the newspapers half an hour after it got there, in most of the places probably.

Mr. Mitchell. I notice on November 28, page 38 of exhibit 37, there is a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations for action of the commander-in-chief PNNCP. What is that?


Mr. Mitchell. That is on the mainland?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. For the information of the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet among others.

Admiral Turner. And commander, Panama naval coastal frontier.
Mr. Mitchell. And Panama.
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Mr. Mitchell. There you sent them a copy of the warning dispatch that had just been sent out by the War Department to its commander?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. What was the purpose of that?
Admiral Turner. The purpose was to make sure that those commanders knew what the Army was doing in their districts.

The Chairman. Mr. Counsel, may I at this point make an observation? The first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress is about to come to a conclusion, probably tomorrow. There are important matters of legislation and other matters over there on the floor of the Senate that require my attention in connection with the winding up of this session and I am compelled to go to the floor. I wanted the Admiral to know that my absence is in no sense an indication of my lack of interest in his testimony, but I cannot be in two places at a time and I feel I must be on the floor, so that I am sure you will understand and excuse me if I am not here during the balance of your testimony today.

Admiral Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy in making that statement.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, you had been sending what are called joint messages. If you sent a message to the Navy commander, you might say there "Inform the Army commander," or vice versa. That was a common practice, wasn't it?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Did you have a special reason to fear that the commanders in Hawaii would not get the War Department message? Was that why you adopted a rather unusual way of sending a copy of the War Department message to your commander?
Admiral Turner. I did not know that the War Department had sent that particular dispatch to the commander of the Western Defense Command, for example, as shown on page 8 of the pink book (Exhibit 32). There is nothing in there that tells the Army commanders to disseminate this to the Navy commanders. On the contrary, it says:

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum number of officers.

So I felt it might easily be that the Army commanders would construe that so that the Navy commanders would not know what they were doing, and so, with the concurrence of the War Plans Division, I sent this out. There was also the very minor matter after the end of the quote concerning WPL-52.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, of course the War Department message that you sent copy of to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor contained all of this material about overt act. "Do not disturb the population," and "negotiations appear to be terminated but maybe not quite," and various things that you deliberately cut out, or did not put in your warning message. That is a fact, is it not?

Admiral Turner. It is a fact, and this dispatch was sent to the commander in chief, purely for information, so he would know what
the orders were that were given to the Army. I presumed that General Short already had shown him that, but it was necessary that Admiral Kimmel know that we were sending this information to the frontier commanders, the three frontier commanders, so he would not have to send something himself.

Mr. Mitchell. You would assume that he would naturally obtain, from General Short, the War Department message or the warning to Short, and you would not be adding anything to the possible confusion by sending him a copy direct; is that the idea?

Admiral Turner. That is correct. As I said, the chief reason was so he would know what had been sent to these other officers, because the commanders of the two coastal frontiers immediately WPL-46 came into effect went \[5181\] under the command of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, so far as regards all matters connected with cooperation with the fleet.

5182 Mr. Mitchell. Now regarding WPL-46, we have it here now. It is a voluminous document, but can you briefly state to the committee just what the operation in general called for, so we may know what the preparatory deployment would be referred to in your warning message?

Admiral Turner. The tasks assigned to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet are not very long in number. They are two pages.

Mr. Mitchell. Read them right into the record.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And you can comment on them as you go along, if you like.

Mr. Murphy. Is that section 3212, Admiral?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. Section 3212, WPL-46:

The U.S. Pacific Fleet is assigned the following tasks within the Pacific area:

That limits the area in which he can operate, because the Asiatic area is another area.

Mr. Mitchell. How far out was that line of division?

Admiral Turner. I will look it up in just a minute.

Mr. Mitchell. Go on with your analysis and we will get the other later.

Admiral Turner. It is a little ways to the eastward of the Philippines, about 500 miles, as I recall it, offhand. \[5183\] It included in the Asiatic the Palau Islands, but Guam was included in the Pacific area.

Task A: Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

That meant that we would attempt to raid the lines of supply leading from Japan southward to the Malay Barrier both by submarines and by surface ships, if we could, and also raid the positions in the Marshalls in the hope of drawing enemy air and naval strength in that direction and get them off the backs of the forces in the Far East.

Task B: Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk.

That was a purely preparatory task for the assembly of forces and material. In another part of the plan is the direction that that will
not be undertaken within 6 months, which is allotted for the assembly of material and forces.

Task C: Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

That meant that we would capture or sink enemy vessels, merchant vessels or Government vessels, engaged in carrying troops or material, and we would also do the same for neutral vessels. The only neutral vessels that would be involved might have been some South American-owned vessels which might attempt to carry goods to Japan proper.

Task D: Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as longitude 155° east.

The longitude is along the east coast, or just off the east coast of Australia and includes New Zealand.

That was a long ways away. We did not expect much in the way of Axis effort down there except possibly from raiders. We put that in there so that the New Zealand and Australian Governments would feel free to turn over their cruisers to the British commander in chief at Singapore, so that they could operate there along the Malay Barrier, instead of being kept useless down south.

We expected a very small diversion of our force to that area.

Task E: Defend Samoa in category D.

That was a defense, which I could not remember. It was category D which was to be prepared for rather heavy attacks, but do not expect immediate attempts at occupation.

Task F: Defend Guam in category F.

I think I referred previously to that category as “E” which was in error. Category F is merely to blow up facilities, destroy stores which might be useful to the enemy as we expected the place to be captured.

Task G: Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering and patrolling as required by circumstances and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

That was a matter of protecting our lines of vessels that were supplying our forces, and also to protect the British ships that were going from the west coast to Australia and New Zealand.

We had a plan for joint escort where we would escort ships from San Francisco down two-thirds of the way, for example, to Australia, and then their ships would pick them up, if necessary, and escort them the rest of the way.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, might I ask the counsel whether we have any comparable document? I have here Exhibit 44, which purports to be a copy of defense plans. It is apparently identified as 1938.

I wonder if we have any comparable document?

Mr. Mitchell. The comparable document is Rainbow Five that we are talking about. Is that right?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, item 11. That refers only to matters connected with the defense of Hawaii, as I recall it.
Mr. Mitchell. Exhibit 44, Senator, is extracts directly of portions of all these plans having to do with defenses of Hawaii against air attack, so that the complete basic plan he is now reading is not in Exhibit 44, only the air provisions that are based upon it. So there is no comparable document that has been mimeographed that contains all that this war plan does. There are a mass of them here, that are identified as the items in the index of Exhibit 44, but we never had them mimeographed. They can be made available to the committee, if you want them.

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest on page 103 of volume I the offensive tasks are outlined. It may be of some help.

Senator Brewster. That is the document that we have not had presented in evidence?

Mr. Murphy. That is the document given to us by the Naval Affairs Committee, Senator Walsh.

Senator Brewster. It has not been offered as an exhibit.

The Vice Chairman. Not as an exhibit, but each member was furnished with a copy.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether the testimony now going in is under the instrument of November 27, 1941, page 46 of Exhibit 37, where the task is assigned to WPL-46?

Mr. Mitchell. That is another name for Rainbow No. 5. I have established that a few minutes ago.

The Vice Chairman. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. But that WPL-46 is not in this Exhibit 44, except as it relates to the air defense of Hawaii; is that true?

Mr. Mitchell. That is right.

Admiral Turner. May I make an amendment to that?

The only thing from WPL-46 that is in this exhibit that Senator Brewster has, is assignment of tasks for the naval coastal frontier forces as applied to the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. It is an extract from this full plan, part 3, chapter 2, section 3, and it is only a part of section 3.

It merely shows this task "Defend the naval coastal frontier in category D." That is all it has got.

Senator Brewster. What I have purports to be extract from Joint Army-Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, Section 7, tasks Pacific area, Army tasks 33, 35, Navy tasks, under which there is F, G, H, which letters do not at all correspond with what you have been reading. F is to prepare, capture, establish, control, protect Caroline and Marshall Islands.

"G" is to defend Midway, Johnston, Guam.

I could not reconcile that program under Rainbow No. 5.

Admiral Turner. You cannot reconcile it, Senator. They are from two different documents. What you have there is from the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.

Admiral Turner. What I am reading from is the Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, which is the Navy part of the joint plan.

Senator Ferguson. We have a further over-flow, we have 3233. That is another section?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you have another section, as I understand that you are reading.
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. That 3233 only refers to the task that was assigned by the Department to the commandant of the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier, and is merely a defense plan, to defend in category D.

Senator Ferguson. I see.

Admiral Turner. Now, in addition to that task assigned to Admiral Bloch, since Admiral Bloch was a subordinate officer of Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel could, from his own tasks, and he did, assign additional tasks to Admiral Bloch, but they are different documents. I mean the first part that you read is the joint plan, and this is the Navy plan.

The Vice Chairman. You may proceed, Admiral, from where you left off.

Admiral Turner. "Task H: Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the expansion of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the use of land positions in that hemisphere."

That is the major defensive task of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. Mitchell. And that would include Hawaii?

Admiral Turner. That says "protect the territory of Associated Powers," and we are defined as one of the associated powers.

Mr. Mitchell. Then when you ordered him to "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46," did you mean the commander of the Pacific Fleet should take preparatory deployment measures for all those operations that you just read about, except those that were not to start for 6 months?

Admiral Turner. It says "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment."

Mr. Mitchell. Defensive?

Admiral Turner. Yes. That immediately fixes attention on task H and task G, which is "protect the sea communications."

Mr. Mitchell. Does that include the associated territory?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, your warning message said nothing about reporting measures taken, did it? You did not order him to report what measures he had taken.

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. That was not the naval practice?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. I never had seen it done, unless something has occurred to indicate that you suspect he is not carrying the thing out, and then action will be taken, but in a case of this kind I have never seen a report on measures taken, I have never seen it.

Mr. Mitchell. You did not ask him to acknowledge your message? Or was that a practice that would be expected to be followed? There is nothing said about acknowledge, is there?

Admiral Turner. It is routine always to acknowledge an important operating signal. This hasn't all of the operating procedure on it. I do not see the signal sign for "Acknowledge" here.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral——

Admiral Turner. There are three more tasks.

Mr. Mitchell. I beg your pardon. I thought you had finished them.
Admiral Turner (reading):

Task I. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces.

That means to operate in such position that the weak naval coastal frontier forces if encountered, or if attacked by superior forces, will be driven off by the forces of the fleet.

Task J: Establish fleet control zones, defining their limit from time to time as circumstances require.

That means that in the vicinity, the general area of where the fleet is operating, a zone is established which is under the control of the fleet and into which no vessel of any kind can come, except under rules established by the fleet.

Task K: Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

In other words, the routing generally in the open ocean was done by the commandant of the naval coastal frontiers, but within the fleet control zone it was done by the commander in chief.

That is the end of the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, whether you got an acknowledgment of the receipt of this dispatch of November 27 or not, did you get a report from Admiral Kimmel prior to December 7 as to what, if any, measures he had taken under that?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you have any information prior to December 7 as to whether or not the commander of the fleet at Hawaii had taken any action, or as to what it was?

Admiral Turner. We had none.

Mr. Mitchell. Had you any information as to what, if any, state of alert he placed his forces in?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Had you any information prior to December 7 as to what General Short had done in response to the message sent him by the War Department?

Admiral Turner. I saw the message, his reply. I remember very distinctly seeing that reply about alert against sabotage and liaison with the Navy. We had a regular exchange of messages of that character between the Army and Navy War Plans, and I wondered at it. I thought, without referring to that dispatch, it mentioned the War Department dispatch, that it referred to the order that had gone out regarding sabotage. I rather expected a later dispatch on the subject.

However, that was a matter within the entire province of the War Department, and I did nothing about it.

Mr. Mitchell. How did it happen that you had copies of the reports that these officers in the Army command had sent in in response to the warning messages? Did you receive copies of General DeWitt's report, and one from the Philippines, and the Pacific coast, and so on, that the Army got from their commanders?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Was that a regular practice? You had seen messages of that kind?

Admiral Turner. General Gerow would send to me and I would send to him, on personal initiative, dispatches which we thought we would
be interested in. In addition to that, an officer from my Division would go to the Army War Plans Division daily, look over their dispatches and get copies of any that he thought that we should see, and the Army did a similar thing with the dispatches that came to my Division.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, if in that way you got a copy of General Short’s report and it attracted your attention because of its brevity, and other things, as compared with other reports, what reason was there that you could not call the attention of the Army authorities to it?

Admiral Turner. There was no reason whatsoever. I felt a little hesitancy in doing it.

Mr. Mitchell. Would they feel offended?

Admiral Turner. It did not occur to me to call his attention to it. I felt if anything was wrong it would be attended to. It was only a passing matter, and it then passed out of mind.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the security of your fleet depended somewhat on it, didn’t it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. So it was not purely an Army affair. If the command had been separate from any fleet command I can understand it, but if the security of the Pacific Fleet were in danger, do not you feel you should have called the Army’s attention to what you might have thought was an inadequate response to the warning?

Admiral Turner. I do not know that I went so far as to formulate the idea that it was an inadequate response. I could have done so and I would have done so if I had felt that the matter would not be fully attended to.

Mr. Mitchell. One member of the committee wanted me to ask you what the effect of this diversion of shipping would have been, from the northern lanes down to the southern area, if measured in length of voyages or additional mileage?

Admiral Turner. It probably would increase the time of passage, depending on the speed of the ships, from 9 to 15 days from, say, San Francisco to Manila.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that was a very serious matter with the shortage of shipping, was it not?

Admiral Turner. Extremely serious.

Mr. Mitchell. A measure that would only have been resorted to if you felt there was real danger to that shipping in the old lanes?

Admiral Turner. We were certain there was danger there, and we felt we would rather put the extra time in than lose the ships.

Mr. Mitchell. You sent a message to Hawaii December 3, to the commander there, the Navy commander, about code burning, which is found on page 40 of Exhibit 37. That is a dispatch which read:

Highly reliable information has been received that categorical and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong,

and to different places, including Washington, D. C., and London, to destroy most of their codes. That appears to be initiated by Wilkinson and initialed by Ingersoll. Did you have anything to do with that?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. I saw it. I had a conversation with Admiral Ingersoll on that subject. I do not know whether he brought
up or I did. That was with respect to informing our forces about this code burning, because to me that was a definite indication of immediate war. I entirely approved sending the dispatch, but I did not initiate it.

Mr. Mitchell. There has been put in evidence here a document in the nature of reports on Japanese Fleet locations which were available here in Washington, prepared here in Washington, and in one part of that report it indicates the number of Japanese ships, troop ships, and several carriers that were afterward in the expedition which attacked Pearl Harbor, that had been located, so far as these information sheets are concerned, in various Japanese ports.

Now would these reports have come to your attention at that time? Admiral Turner. They did come to my attention. I saw that and did not believe it.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the record will show—we haven't got to that evidence yet, but it was established, I think, at prior hearings that out in Hawaii, where they had prepared Japanese Fleet location reports, that along about the latter part of November, the 28th or 29th, or the 1st of December, the officers there who were collating the information of this direction finder work found that they lost track of three Japanese carriers, they did not know where they were, they had been silent for days, and the fact that those carriers had been lost track of was brought to the attention of the commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet out there.

Did you know anything more about the failure to locate those carriers during that period than was available to you here? These reports that seem to have been available here purport to locate the carriers at certain Japanese ports because that is where they were last known to be, and they left them there until they found they had moved, but the reports out in Hawaii were a little different, they found they lost track of them, and the fact that they had was noted.

Did you know that fact before December 7, that the carrier had been lost sight of?

Admiral Turner. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. How would you know it?

Admiral Turner. I think I saw the dispatch from the commander in chief stating that fact, or else somebody told me that they had been lost sight of. But there was another very significant—

Mr. Mitchell. Just before you pass that, we have not seen any dispatch from Hawaii reporting to Washington that they had lost track of a carrier. Is your recollection right on that?

Admiral Turner. Maybe I am mistaken. I am not positive.

Mr. Mitchell. When you say somebody told you, are you sure they told you before December 7 or you heard it afterward? I am curious to know how anybody here could have known it if their own ship location reports here did not show it.

Admiral Turner. I was under the impression that they had received that information from the commander in chief, but it is very vague. I am not at all firm on that.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean you were under the impression, prior to December 7, that we had lost track of those carriers?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I will tell you the reason, if you wish.
Mr. Mitchell. I wish you would, now that I have gone into the subject. What was your reason for it?

Admiral Turner. A very significant thing occurred. I have forgotten the date. I think my recollection is around the 25th or 26th of November. For about 3 weeks the traffic level of the Japanese Fleet had been unusually high.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean the radio traffic level, the messages?

Admiral Turner. The number of messages and length of messages had been unusually high and had involved the entire Japanese Fleet and their bases. Suddenly somewhere around the 25th or 26th of November the traffic level dropped very markedly and the Japanese changed their code, or their cipher, and changed their calls. They certainly changed their calls, and I think it changed the cipher.

Well, that was extremely significant that very important operations were contemplated, and it was probable that nearly the entire Japanese Fleet had put to sea.

Well, that outweighed anything of this sort. I thought that besides the ships that were headed down through the China Sea the entire fleet had gone to sea. Well, now, where they were going to go is a matter that could be easily determined. One large part of them were bound to go down with the expeditionary forces in the South China Sea. As a matter of fact I expected more, a stronger force to go down there than actually went, a somewhat stronger force.

Now the rest of the fleet, including the battleships and carriers, could go one of two places: They could either proceed down in the vicinity of Eniwetok, of Kwajalein, or Palaus, or Truk to take up a covering position against any attempt of our fleet to proceed to the Far East—although such a proceeding was out of the question unless we wanted to commit suicide—or the major portion of the force could go to the eastward and attack Hawaii, either for a raiding or for landing operations, which we did not expect in the least degree because we analyzed they wanted the far eastern region and that they would make their major amphibious effort and their shore effort in that direction.

So that the possibility, the percentage chance of whether they would come to Hawaii or go down and take up a covering position in the Mandates, you could put that into anything you wished, depending on the person doing it.

Roughly, I thought the chances, as I had no other definite means, I thought the chances were about 50-50 that we would get a heavy raid in Hawaii or that the Japanese Fleet that would not be used in the China Sea would deploy in the Mandates.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you had an impression then, when you heard of the reports relating to the location of all these carriers and a couple of battleships, you had it in mind that there was a 50-50 chance that Hawaii would be attacked?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; at least.

Mr. Mitchell. And you gained that impression around the 1st of December in connection with these ship location reports?

Admiral Turner. No. That had been the opinion all along, expressed by the Navy Department, expressed in Hawaii, expressed by the War Department, expressed by everybody else, that
there was a strong possibility that there would be an attack, a raid, that is, against Hawaii. That was merely following along the line the Navy officers and Army officers had been thinking about for 25 years or more. There was no change.

Mr. Mitchell. They had been thinking about it hard up to August 1, 1941, as all these plans against an air attack show, but we haven't found any officer here yet, Admiral, that has testified that they had any idea that the chances of a raid at Hawaii were any 50 percent. Some of them thought it was a bare possibility. Some didn't expect it. But they thought it ought to be guarded against, and so on.

Did you stand alone in your rating of the possibility of an air raid? Admiral Turner. No, sir. There were a good many naval officers in the department that felt the same way about it.

Mr. Mitchell. Then at that stage of the game, or on November 27, if the Navy felt that way about the chances of an air raid on the fleet in Pearl Harbor, why didn't they send some further message that at least mentioned the possibility of such a thing?

Admiral Turner. That had been in correspondence right along. The dispatch of November 27 fully covers it, in my opinion. I think on the 5th, the afternoon of the 5th of December, after canvassing the situation with officers in my Division, I went into Admiral Ingersoll's office and we talked for an hour as to what more the Navy Department could do to warn the forces in the field, the fleets, what ought to be done, should we send any more dispatches, or what. We came, both, to the conclusion that everything had been done covering the entire situation that ought to be done and we then proceeded into Admiral Stark's office, discussed the same question with him for 15 minutes, and it was the unanimous decision that the orders that we had sent out for Admiral Kimmel to take a defensive deployment there were sufficient.

What was he going to take a defensive deployment against? Just one thing. That is the meat of that dispatch. It is all in there.

Mr. Mitchell. You think that the defensive deployment referred to is necessarily covered by that provision in the plan which calls for participation in the defense of our territories in the Pacific against—

Admiral Turner. Attack.

Mr. Mitchell. Attack.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, here is a message that says:

This is a war warning.

That is good. It says that—

an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

That is all right.

Number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

Now, there you direct attention to the fact that your best judgment is that the indications are that there will be an expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

Now, we will say that within a few days after that you, or at that time, you thought there was a 50-percent chance that that lost carrier fleet might be headed for Hawaii.
Do you think that this was an adequate warning? You were talking about the possibility of Borneo. Why not say something about the possibility of Hawaii?

Admiral Turner. The major effort, the major war effort, was definitely, or was defined right there, and that was correct. Well, Admiral Kimmel had nothing to do with that except as a later task to attempt to keep as much of the Japanese Fleet in play in the Marshalls as possible to give our resources out there a better chance. So that the order [5203] to him, and I again invite your attention to the fact that this is directed to CINPAC, the order to him is "Execute a defensive deployment."

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the admiral point out on the map the area that the Pacific Fleet was supposed to cover. It is covered at page 107 of volume 1 of this document. And none of those items are in the Pacific Fleet area. It might be good for the committee to understand at this point. It is page 107.

North of latitude 30° North and west of longitude 140° East.

(The witness went to the map.)
Admiral Turner. The longitude was 140°?
Mr. Murphy. North of latitude 30°, north and west of longitude 140° east.
Admiral Turner. Yes. The Far East area runs across here [indicating]. This was the responsibility of Admiral Hart [indicating]. [5204] Senator Brewster. What was that? 144?
Mr. Murphy. 140° east.
Admiral Turner. This is 140 [indicating] 30 is this right here [indicating]. South of KYUSHU. Then all the way down here is the far-eastern area.
Mr. Murphy. That would cut right through Japan, would it not?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; that would cut over here [indicating].
Mr. Murphy. But the 140° line.
Admiral Turner. It wouldn't go any higher than 30 latitude.
Mr. Murphy. It is north of 30 and north and west of 140.
Admiral Turner. Yes.
Senator Brewster. South of the tip of the Japanese Islands?
Mr. Murphy. South. It would be north of the Equator and east of longitude 140° east.
Mr. Mitchell. That line 140° east if projected down through the Japanese Islands, where does it hit in the Dutch East Indies?
Admiral Turner. It didn't go north of——
Mr. Mitchell. I said projected
Mr. Mitchell. Both ways, it goes up through Japan projected.
Admiral Turner. This is longitude 143 [indicating].
Of course this part [indicating] has nothing to do with the definition of the area.
Mr. Mitchell. I didn't say it did, but we are trying to get the general location. As projected in each direction it passes through the Japanese Islands. Where does it land? Down toward Australia, New Guinea?
Admiral Turner. It strikes New Guinea about 1° west of the dividing line between the Netherlands and British New Guinea.
Mr. Mitchell. It was the area west of that, south of 30, that was in the area that these tasks imposed by WPL-46 laid the burden on the fleet. That was the general area in which those tasks were to be performed?

Admiral Turner. It was the area outside of that. This is the far-eastern area.

Mr. Mitchell. It was the area east of that line and south of 30?


Mr. Mitchell. That they were to operate in?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; north of 30 and east of 140 is the Pacific area.

Mr. Mitchell. Does that cover the ground?

Mr. Murphy. No. 2 would be—

north of the equator and east of longitude 140 east.

No. 3:
south of the equator, and east of longitude 180 to the South American Coast, and longitude 74 degrees west.

The Vice Chairman. Let him locate one at a time.

Mr. Murphy. No. 2:

North of the equator and east of longitude 140 east.

Admiral Turner. Here [indicating].

Mr. Murphy. No. 3:

South of the Equator and east of longitude 180 to the South American coast, and longitude 74 degrees west.

That wouldn't all be on that map.

Admiral Turner. Pretty nearly. Across this way [indicating] 180, [indicating] and then over here to the Southeast Pacific area [indicating], which as I recall was along——

Mr. Murphy. 74° west.

Admiral Turner. There is something wrong about that.

Mr. Murphy. 74 is not on the map, is it?

Admiral Turner. There was a line that ran here——

Mr. Murphy. 74 would be to the right.

[5207] Admiral Turner. Yes. I will have to see that book.

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment. While you are at that map, Admiral—does it disturb you General Mitchell if I ask a question at this point?

Mr. Mitchell. Not a bit.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral while you are at the map, please point out the area coming within the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Turner. It was from the China Coast, latitude 30° north, over eastward to longitude 140 east. Everything north of that within the Pacific was under Admiral Kimmel. Then from the point 30—140 south to the Equator, everything east of that was under Admiral Kimmel. Then the line went on along the Equator to 140°. Then everything east of that, and I think that book is wrong—my recollection is to longitude 100, and that was in the Southeast Pacific area under another command.

I know that for a fact. That was under the command of the Southeast Pacific, responsibility starting all the way south, came up along 100 west to about the Galapagos Islands, then over to the boundary between Mexico and Guatemala.
Everything west of the west coast of the United States, Canada, and Alaska.

[5208] So that was the area under Kimmel's responsibility.

In addition to that he had a supporting task in a segment that went down here [indicating].

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, your message suggested movements of the Japanese in certain directions, either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, or Borneo. Which one of those areas, if any, was the area covered by Admiral Kimmel's responsibility?

Admiral Turner. None.

I beg your pardon, it doesn't say movements, it says "amphibious expedition."

Mr. Mitchell. That is right, an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

Now, one of the objectives were within this. Kimmel's area, at all, were they?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

The purpose in that was to indicate to all the addressees the major nature and the direction of the major war effort, of the Japanese.

Mr. Mitchell. I think maybe the committee would like to have you take your seat again.

Thank you, Admiral.

Well, now in these conversations you had with Admiral [5209] Stark and other people in the Navy after December 1, in which you discussed at great length the advisability of sending some additional warning to Admiral Kimmel, did they express the view in your presence that there was a 50-percent chance, or anything like it, of this lost carrier group attacking Hawaii?

Admiral Turner. I would like to correct what apparently was an erroneous impression that I gave.

I wasn't thinking about any lost carrier group in particular. I was thinking about the major portion of the Japanese Fleet which we had not detected going down through the China Sea.

Attention was not centered on any of the six. My attention was not particularly centered on six carriers to the exclusion of others.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then on that basis, what did these other officers say at this conference about the possibility of a raid on Hawaii?

Admiral Turner. I can't remember any of the specific lines that the conversation took. We discussed what we had done and looked over the dispatches, looked over the charts, and just how much attention was paid to the question of a raid on Hawaii, how much of the time on other matters, why, I can't remember, can't recall it.

[5207] Mr. Mitchell. Did you express your opinion to them at that time that these ship location reports that you had available here in the Navy Department at Washington, such as you had, did not, to your satisfaction locate the three carrier divisions?

Admiral Turner. No, I don't think I mentioned that particularly. I think more than likely I mentioned the radio silence which was in effect, and the change of codes.

That would have been the natural thing.

Mr. Mitchell. Bearing in mind all these plans and estimates that had been made over the months during 1941 about an air attack, all of them reached the conclusion that an air attack would be from
a carrier, some specified the direction and some hit within 450 miles of where it came from, they all emphasized the carrier aspect.

Wouldn’t you place special significance on the failure to locate three divisions of carriers as indicating a possibility of a raid on Hawaii, more than you would the failure to locate some battleships and cruisers? Wasn’t there any special significance in that?

Admiral Turner. Well, I think we had failed to locate quite a lot of the rest of the fleet as well. Carriers don’t go out alone, and the whole sum of all of the variables and all of the parts of the situation pointed, as I say, to me, to one of two things, and I believe we discussed the whole thing.

After reading these splendid plans that had been sent in by the commander in chief, and by the Fourteenth Naval District, why, my feeling was that these people knew their business. They knew what to do about it, probably a lot more than I did, or the rest of here, because they were the ones that were on the firing line.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, let’s pass on to something else now.

I want to call your attention to the Japanese diplomatic intercepts setting up what was known as the winds code particularly, circular 2355 on page 154 of Exhibit 1.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. The bottom of the page. Among the Japanese intercepts that were decoded, translated, and given to you, was that among them?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I saw it at the time.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you see the one on the top of page 155 under the same date, establishing a more abbreviated system for the general intelligence broadcasts?

Admiral Turner. That is vaguely familiar. I won’t say specific ally whether I saw it or not. I think I did.

Mr. Mitchell. The one on the bottom of page 154 is [5212] the one that is known as the winds code because some of the words there refer to east wind, west wind, north wind.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you know whether after the receipt of that and translation of that message on page 154, the Navy took any steps to put any monitoring stations on the alert to endeavor to receive that message when it did come, if it did come? Was that in your functions at all?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. Not in the least. It was Communications.

Mr. Mitchell. We have to go to them for the story?

Admiral Turner. I understand it was done, but I know nothing about the details.

Mr. Mitchell. You have no accurate and detailed information as to what monitoring stations were available and whether they had Japanese language representatives?

Admiral Turner. I know several places. I know they had them in Guam, Samoa, Pearl, and Bainbridge Island.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you know whether they had Japanese language men listening on those or whether each was equipped with a Japanese language man, or would I have to go to Communications for that?
Admiral Turner. Well, that would depend on whether this was voice or key procedure. I believe that we did not at that time, at least I had never heard of it. I believe we ourselves did not monitor voice circuits, but depended on the FCC and other services.

That is what I was told.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, we will let that go because we will get the accurate information from Communications.

Now, after this intercept of the 19th of November, translated November 28, was received, and you saw it, did you ever have given to you, prior to December 7, any “execute message” using that code which used the words, east wind rain, or west wind clear, or north wind cloudy, meaning war with the United States, war with Britain, and war with Russia?

Did you ever have a message of that kind given you among the information you received?

Do you understand my question?

Admiral Turner. I understand thoroughly. I would like to start with what happened and then give you a direct answer.

Mr. Mitchell. All right, tell it your own way.

Admiral Turner. On Friday afternoon, I think it was

Mr. Keeffe. What date was that?

Admiral Turner (continuing). Of December 5 Admiral Noyes called me on the telephone or the interphone, I do not know which, and said “The weather message,” or words to this effect, “The first weather message has come in” and I said, “What did it say?” And he said, “North wind clear.” And I said, “Well, there is something wrong about that,” and he said, “I think so, too,” and he hung up.

I never saw a draft of that, I do not know from my own knowledge where he got it from. I assumed until recently that it was an authentic message. From what I can determine since coming back here it was something entirely different, but it was never told to me. If it had come in and had been authentic I am certain that I would have received a copy of it.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, the phrase in English for “War with the United States” which would have been used in such a message was the phrase “East wind rain.”

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Did you ever see that?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. The phrase in case there was war with Russia was “north wind cloudy.”

Admiral Turner. Well, maybe it was “cloudy” instead of “clear” but it was “north wind,” which was ridiculous.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, maybe this will refresh your recollection: In the FCC report of their monitoring station, which will go in evidence here and was offered in evidence in one of the other inquiries, that FCC station record shows that they intercepted a weather broadcast from the Tokyo station transmitted at approximately 2200 Greenwich meridian time December 4, 1941 and the Japanese language man at that monitoring station reported that he had heard words to this effect:

Tokyo today north wind, slightly stronger; may become cloudy tonight; tomorrow slightly cloudy and fine weather.
Now, you will notice that that comes close to the phrase "North wind cloudy," which meant war with Russia, but doesn't quite fit in with the man that picked it up. Could that have been the message?

Admiral Turner. I think it is. It comes even closer to my recollection, which is very distinct, "North wind clear." Now, he was being rather guarded.

Mr. Mitchell. Maybe he is right about that because he said "North wind and may become cloudy," which would indicate [5216] at the time it was clear, would it not?

Now, there is another message that was intercepted by the FCC on December 7th at approximately 2130 Greenwich meridian time—no, I have got that wrong. This is another one, exhibit 3, intercepted 2130 Greenwich meridian time December 5, 1941 and this message says:

Today north wind; morning cloudy; afternoon clear.

and still that was not quite "North wind cloudy." Was that the one?

Admiral Turner. It might have been that message; I do not know. He only called me once and that was, to the best of my recollection, in the late afternoon of the 5th, which would have been about 22 or 23 hundred Greenwich time.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you are sure that was "North wind" and not "East wind," though?

Admiral Turner. I am sure it was "North wind" because I questioned it.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, here is a final report of the FCC station, a message from Tokyo station transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 Greenwich meridian time, December 8, 1941. That would be December 7 here, would it not, Greenwich meridian time, December 8?

Admiral Turner. No; it is 5 hours earlier than that the same date.

[5217] Mr. Mitchell. Five hours earlier?

Admiral Turner. Yes.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, here is the English translation:

This is in the middle of the news but today especially at this point we are giving the weather forecast: West wind clear.

Now, that was the exact phrase set up in the winds code for war with Great Britain and that came in after the attack at Pearl Harbor. Did you ever see or hear of that?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I saw that. That is, I have a strong recollection of having seen that.

Mr. Mitchell. There is some evidence here that Captain McCollum sometime between the 1st of December and the 7th of December indicated or showed a view that some further warning ought to be sent to Pearl Harbor. Do you know anything about that?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and I was here yesterday when Senator Ferguson read my testimony from the Navy court of inquiry, and I was a little confused in that. I had nothing to refer to, I had not received any warning of more than 2 or 3 days about the proceedings and since that time in going over it myself and thinking about it I arrived at what I believe is a correct statement on that subject.

From time to time Captain McCollum would come to me with [5218] drafts of memoranda to the CNO concerning the situation and we would discuss them. I think that he had such a memorandum about the 1st of December but I do not believe that it was intended to
go out as a dispatch but was merely for the information of the Chief of Naval Operations. Now, I have not seen such a memorandum but I have a recollection of that.

Now, about the 1st or 2d of December—and this is sure, I am completely sure of this, I remember it very distinctly—about the 1st or 2d of December Commander McCollum came into my office and handed me a proposed dispatch written on one sheet of paper and approximately the length of the dispatch of November 27 which he proposed that the Chief of Naval Operations send out to the fleets concerning the immence of war. It covered the same ground approximately as the CNO dispatches of the 24th and the 27th.

Now, I know that Admiral Wilkinson and some other officers in ONI had seen those two dispatches and I asked McCollum if he had seen them.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean seen the officers or seen the dispatches?

Admiral Turner. If he had seen the two dispatches of the 24th and 27th, and he said, "No." So I pulled the two dispatches out and handed them to him and said, "Well, read these over and then see if you think your dispatch ought to go."

[5219] He sat down and read them over and handed them back to me and he said, "No," and tore up his proposed dispatch. It had the same general coverage but was not as specific as these two messages.

Mr. Mitchell. Not as specific as those two that were sent?

Admiral Turner. Not quite, no, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Can you give us any more information from your recollection as to what his proposed dispatch contained?

Admiral Turner. I agreed with it entirely, he and I agreed on the situation and he was afraid that a warning had not been sent out and he had prepared himself a dispatch which he wanted to send out to the commander in chief. I did not ask him not to send it but I just merely said, "See if you think it ought to go after you read these dispatches" and he read the two dispatches and he said, "No." He said, "That is enough."

Mr. Mitchell. Now, turning now to the messages that were intercepted between Japan and her ambassadors here in Washington on the day of the 6th and 7th of December 1941, what are known as the pilot message, the fourteen part message and the 1 p.m. message, when did you first have called to your attention or see any part of all of those messages? You know what I am talking about?

[5220] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I think I testified that my recollection is that some time just preceding the 7th, some night, and I now believe it to have been the night of December 6, about 11:30 p.m. an officer came to my house, and I was in bed, and went down and read a long dispatch in several parts. I believe that that was the dispatch in question. I asked the officer to whom he had shown these and he said, "Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, and Secretary Knox" and I did nothing more about it.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, when you say that was the dispatch in question, my question was probably too broad.

Admiral Turner. The first 13 parts.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Admiral Turner. The first 13 parts, I believe.
The **Vice Chairman.** What time did he say he saw it?

**Admiral Turner.** 11:30 p.m.

**Mr. Mitchell.** 11:30 in the evening at his house.

**Admiral Turner.** About 11:30 at night.

The **Vice Chairman.** Of the 6th?

**Admiral Turner.** Of the 6th, yes, sir.

**Mr. Mitchell.** Where had you been at about that time?

**Admiral Turner.** I had been home.

**Mr. Mitchell.** All evening?

**Admiral Turner.** Yes, sir. That is confirmed by a tele-
gram which I just received from my wife as to where we were that
night. She said we were home and that is my recollection.

**Mr. Mitchell.** Well, now, the next day what was the first hour
you say at which you saw the fourteenth part and the 1 p.m.?

**Admiral Turner.** I do not recall seeing the 14th part until after
the attack. I did see the 1 p.m. part.

I had stayed at home Sunday morning and about 10:30, as I recall
it, Admiral Stark called up and said there was a dispatch from Admiral
Hart or a letter, rather, and he wanted me to come down to the office.
I went down to the office, arriving there some time, I believe, about
11:15, it may have been a little ahead of that, and it was quite urgent
that a letter be written to Admiral Hart and he gave me the necessary
information. I went to my office and started writing the reply and
had just about finished and looked over my dispatches for the day and
Admiral Stark called me on the interphone and told me to come to his
office. That, as I recall, was about 12 or 12:15.

He then showed me the 1 o'clock message and I asked him if any
action had been taken on it and he said that he had called General
Marshall or General Marshall had called him and they had discussed
it and at first Admiral Stark had advised against sending
anything further because it might be confusing and then he said
about 3 or 4 minutes later he changed his mind and had called up
General Marshall and had told him that he thought the dispatch should
go and asked him, if he was going to send one, to inform the naval
authorities.

**Mr. Mitchell.** That dispatch he thought should go was one along
the lines that Marshall tried to get through?

**Admiral Turner.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. Mitchell.** Calling attention to the effect of the 1 p.m. delivery?

**Admiral Turner.** Yes, sir; exactly, because it was evidently an ulti-
matum with something very serious attached to it.

**Mr. Mitchell.** During the time that you were at home Sunday
morning did anybody call you from your office to see if anything
should be done about the fourteenth part or the 1 p.m. message?

**Admiral Turner.** No, sir; they did not call me at the house and
I had an officer on watch in the office and he did not report that any-
thing had been sent in there.

**Mr. Mitchell.** And as far as the first 13 parts were concerned you
satisfied yourself the night before that the Secretary of the Navy
knew about it and who else?

**Admiral Turner.** And Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral
Wilkinson. If it had been a change in the situation, why, I might
have called up Admiral Ingersoll and recommended something going in but it constituted no particular change; it was information of value and I presumed that either Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Wilkinson would do what they considered to be necessary in that case.

Mr. Mitchell. The pilot message had not been called to your attention on the afternoon of the 6th?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; I do not remember seeing that until possibly as part of the 13 parts.

Mr. Mitchell. In the ordinary course of business the whole 14 parts and the 1 p.m. would go to your office as soon as translated, would they not?

Admiral Turner. They would come to me.

Mr. Mitchell. They would come to you?

Admiral Turner. They were not delivered—well, they would go to my office but they would not be delivered to anybody else except me.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you did not get to your office Sunday morning until about 10:30?

Admiral Turner. Until about 11:15.

Mr. Mitchell. 11:15?

Admiral Turner. Yes.

[5224] Mr. Mitchell. Were these messages, the translations of the fourteenth part and the 1 p.m., delivered to you then?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. I had seen them. I did not see the fourteenth.

Mr. Mitchell. You had seen the 13 parts you told me.

Admiral Turner. I had seen the 13 parts; yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. They were delivered to your house?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and taken away.

Mr. Mitchell. But the fourteenth part and the 1 p.m. did not even come to you?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; they did not.

Mr. Mitchell. As late as 11:30 Sunday?

Admiral Turner. They had not.

Mr. Mitchell. How do you account for that?

Admiral Turner. I do not account for it.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, did you receive delivery in a locked pouch of the fourteenth part and the 1 p.m. any time on Sunday?

Admiral Turner. I think they came in the locked pouch some time during the afternoon. The only thing that I saw or have a recollection of seeing was the 1 p.m. part, which was Admiral Stark's copy and which he showed to me.

Mr. Mitchell. During this time after around November [5225] 27 to December 7, in all your discussions around the Navy with those in authority was any consideration given to the question of whether the fleet should be moved out of Pearl Harbor and sent to sea?

Admiral Turner. No; there was not that I recall. I assumed that most or all of it would be at sea.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, why did you assume that?

Admiral Turner. Well, that was the place for them under Admiral Kimmel's operating plan for their deployment.

Mr. Mitchell. You mean that that was the place for them under your dispatch of the 27th ordering the preparatory deployment?
Admiral Turner. Ordering a defensive deployment, yes, sir, and the commander's operating plan.

Mr. Mitchell. And you say that prior to the 7th of December you did not know what, if any, state of alertness after the warning messages of the 27th had been established by either the Navy or the Army command?

Admiral Turner. That is correct, for that one dispatch, short dispatch from General Short.

Mr. Mitchell. The committee may inquire.

The Vice Chairman. It is now exactly 4 o'clock. We will recess until 10 o'clock in the morning. You will be here then, please, Admiral.

[5226] Admiral Turner. I will, yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 4 p. m., Thursday, December 20, 1945, a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Friday, December 21, 1945.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1945

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, please. Counsel, I believe, desires to ask Admiral Turner again before turning him over to the tender mercies of the committee.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER (Resumed)

Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral, two points were mentioned toward the end of your testimony yesterday that I would like to inquire about.

One is a statement you made that neither you nor Admiral Stark had any knowledge prior to December 7, 1941, as to what, if any, equipment existed at Pearl Harbor, naval equipment, to decode or decrypt Japanese messages. Had you no information at all about that?

Admiral TURNER. I did not know the details at all of the decryption methods or codes that were employed by the Army and the Navy except in a very general way. On three occasions, I think all three times at Admiral Stark’s initiative, I asked Admiral Noyes as to whether or not Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart were receiving the same decrypted information that we were receiving here. I do not know that I specified diplomatic intercepts.

On each occasion Admiral Noyes assured me that since these dispatches were being intercepted by both Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel, that those officers had the same information that we had.

Now, in the testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry Admiral Noyes states that he knew that the particular codes that we were using for the decryption of the diplomatic messages were not in the possession of either Admiral Hart or Admiral Kimmel and in his testimony he said that he could not understand how he could have given me any such information.
The only conclusion that I can arrive at is that I did not make my question to Admiral Noyes clear and that he misunderstood what I was trying to get at. It was true that Admiral Kimmel's organization and Admiral Hart's were doing the traffic analysis and that they had such codes and ciphers as were in the military's possession concerning Japanese naval codes. We were not doing that type of work here but only, as I understand it now, the diplomatic decryption. It is possible that Admiral Noyes thought I was referring to that type of decryption and not to the—I mean to the tactical type of decryption—and not the diplomatic.

However, as a result of those three conversations at three widely separated times during 1941 I believed and so informed Admiral Stark that those officers were receiving the same information on all decrypted messages, at least concerning the Pacific, that we had here in Washington. I now know that that belief is entirely in error as regards diplomatic codes.

Mr. Mitchell. Admiral Noyes was in charge of what at that time?

Admiral Turner. He was in charge—he was the Director—of Naval Communications.

Mr. Mitchell. And if there was any one man in the Navy Department that knew what the set-up was about intercepting, decoding and translating these Jap intercepts, he would be the man, would he not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And, of course, he knew or must have known when you had any conversations with him just what the situation was?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. And he would not have any object, of course, in deceiving you about it?

Admiral Turner. Not the least. He gave me at all times all information that I requested.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, here is a situation where according to the set-up that you described and the responsibilities of the War Plans Division it was your duty to keep these fleet commanders fully advised and report to them any over-all information that affected the possibilities of war and, of course, it was not possible to discharge that duty if you did not know what means they had of obtaining information of their own. You could not do that unless you knew precisely just what they had and what they needed from you, isn't that so?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; that is not correct. It was not my duty to inform the commanders in chief as to Intelligence, as to information. It was my duty to inform them as to the major aspects of the international situation that might lead to war with the United States or might affect war with the United States. Sending the intercepts or summaries of the intercepts or evaluating them as to authenticity or probability was not War Plans province and we never under any circumstances sent such information out.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, these so-called diplomatic intercepts, this magic code stuff that you were getting here and seeing every day, did bear directly on the over-all situation, did they not?

Admiral Turner. They affected very greatly our estimate as to the over-all situation. I will modify that and say they affected them.
They probably affected them in general terms about 15 percent, because we were gathering information from many other sources and we knew we were not intercepting all of the diplomatic dispatches.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, then, assuming the diplomatic intercepts only affected your estimates to the extent of 15 percent, in judging what you ought to communicate to the fleet commander it was important for you to know whether they already had available that 15 percent through the intercepts and translating of the diplomatic purple code?

Admiral Turner. Yes; that is true.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Admiral Turner. Because they would understand—if they had at least the more important parts of those intercepts—it would certainly influence their understanding of any general estimate that we sent out from the Department.

Mr. Mitchell. Precisely. Now, the situation was, though, as a fact, whatever caused it, that War Plans Division assumed then or believed that at Honolulu the Navy had a system and equipment to decode all that stuff when in truth and in fact it had not; that was the actual situation, wasn’t it?

Admiral Turner. That was the actual situation and I thought and Admiral Stark thought that we had taken due precautions to inform ourselves on exactly that point, but there was apparently a misunderstanding in the conversations. It was all done orally.

Mr. Mitchell. Another question I want to ask you about is with reference to your statement that you submitted this warning message of the 27th and the previous one of November 24, submitted it or transmitted it, to the President. Now, did you do that personally?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. I left those messages with Admiral Stark with the understanding that he would clear them with the Secretary and if necessary with the President. I believe that he did in the case of both of those dispatches, but I have no knowledge except that Admiral Stark on one or both occasions informed me that either one or both dispatches, and my memory is not clear on that, had been approved by the President.

Mr. Mitchell. Before they were sent?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Or after?

Admiral Turner. Before they were sent.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, one of the things that the President was very keen about here was having these warning messages tell the commanders not to commit the first overt act and he brought that to Marshall’s attention and they were careful to weave that into the War Department warning. Here you have a dispatch of the same type sent to the naval commanders and the President, if he saw it, apparently did not say a word about any overt act or anything of that kind.

Admiral Turner. I have no recollection that the President told Admiral Stark or Secretary Knox anything at all concerning any overt act. The fact that the President approved one or both of those dispatches, and I know that he approved them in general terms even if—
Mr. Mitchell. Well, you knew it because somebody told you so, isn't that about all the basis for your knowledge?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. My relations were in these——

Mr. Mitchell. We are going to try to draw a distinction, Admiral, between things that you were told and things that you know from your own personal knowledge or activity.

Admiral Turner. I know from my own personal knowledge that I was never informed that any such warning dispatches should by direction of the President contain any prohibition against any overt act.

Senator Brewster. Did he ever talk to the President about it?

Mr. Mitchell. I am trying to get that clear.

You never did talk to the President, did you, about these messages, these warning messages?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. You never took them personally to him?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. All you did was to leave them with Admiral Stark, with the understanding, as you put it, that he would clear them with the Secretary of the Navy and, if necessary, with anybody else, including the President?

Admiral Turner. With the Secretary of the Navy and the President.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, you said before, "If necessary, with the President."

Now, was it your definite understanding that these messages could not be sent until they had been submitted to President Roosevelt?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. The messages were sent when Admiral Stark released them—gave directions to Admiral Ingersoll to release them.

I know Admiral Stark believed, and I believed, that certainly the President and the Secretary ought to be informed as to any definite war warning and as to any message similar to the one of November 24, because they were extremely important.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, I was not asking you whether you had any instructions from the President about putting something in this message to warn our commanders not to commit the first overt act, my curiosity was aroused by the fact that the President had a good deal of emphasis laid on that, and he insisted that it be put into the War Department dispatch.

I was wondering how it could be that this warning message of the Navy of November 27 went over to the President before it was sent, and he examined it and approved it, and yet the message as drawn does not say one word above overt act. Would not you think, yourself, that if it actually got to the Commander in Chief in that way, and he had been so interested in the overt act business, he would then have made a similar suggestion to you or to the Navy?

Admiral Turner. Well, Mr. Counsel, that would be a pure surmise on my part. I know that I was never informed——

Mr. Mitchell. I think you were right about that.

Admiral Turner. That the President required such a phrase to be put in the Navy's messages, and so far as [5237] I am aware, no evidence that the President directed the Navy to put anything about overt acts, as has been introduced in this inquiry.
Mr. Mitchell. When did you first see the Army warning message that went to the commander of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Turner. It was when General Gerow brought it to Admiral Stark’s office, I think, on the afternoon of November 27.

Mr. Mitchell. Well, that message had a provision in it about overt acts.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. It is from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated November 28, and in it, the statement is made that you undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act—I am mistaken about that. I have missed where the quotation started. The message of November 28, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandant PNNCP, for information to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, quotes the Army message which contains the statement that the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. Then after the quotation is ended, the Savy message goes on and states—

WPL 52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific subarea and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act.

That is not a copy of the Army message, that part. That is an order from the commander in chief, or the Chief of Naval Operations.

I suppose you had something to do with preparing that message. Have you found it? It is on page 38 of exhibit 37.

Admiral Turner. That was sent to the commander in chief for information, so that he would know what orders had been given by the War Department to their subordinate commanders primarily on shore, and so that the commander in chief would know what orders we were giving to those two officers of the Pacific Northern and Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontiers, as to what they should do, since those two officers, as soon as war eventuated, would come under the commander in chief for certain merits [sic].

Now, the overt acts that could be committed by those officers were possibly arrests—

Mr. Mitchell. Well, Admiral, excuse me, but I am afraid I have not made my question clear. I am trying to find out where you got any directions or instructions to put into a Navy command order an explicit direction to undertake no offensive action against Japan until Japan had committed an overt act. It is not the Army dispatch I am quoting from, it is part of your dispatch of the 28th that follows after the quotation of the Army dispatch.

Who told you, or suggested that you give this caution against the first overt act?

Admiral Turner. The commanders of those two naval coastal frontiers—

Mr. Mitchell. That is not my question.

Admiral Turner. I will answer it, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. Mitchell. All right, sir.

Admiral Turner. The commanders of those two naval coastal frontiers were ashore in the United States. Alongside of them were Army commanders who had been given orders to commit no overt act, and it seemed entirely suitable in that case that the orders to the naval officers should be parallel to their associates in the Army.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, on that basis, why, then, in your November 27 warning message, in order to make it parallel with the Army order to Pearl Harbor, did you not notify your commander in chief in Hawaii not to commit the first overt act?

Admiral Turner. The commander in chief in Hawaii was in a very much more exposed position where hostilities were far more likely to ensue than were the commanders of the naval coastal frontiers.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, I will ask you again if you will state to us just who was it? Was it the President, or if not he, who was it that suggested or directed that this warning against committing the first overt act be put in the message from the Chief of Naval Operations on November 28, which I have just read?

Admiral Turner. I drafted that dispatch and put those words in, so that the actions of the commanders of the naval coastal frontiers should be parallel with the actions of the Army commanders who were their associates.

Mr. Mitchell. But you did not want them parallel at Hawaii? Is that the way I understand it; you wanted different orders there? You wanted the Army to look out for the first overt act but the Navy not?

Admiral Turner. The Navy dispatch of the 27th of November was written first. It was cleared and we were agreed on it before any of us ever saw the Army dispatch. I consider that the dispatch to the commander-in-chief of November 27 was couched in the proper terms to meet that particular situation, which was a very dangerous one, with which they were faced.

[5247] Mr. Mitchell. When you saw the draft of the Army dispatch of the 27th and the words that cautioned against overt acts in it, did you inquire why that was there or who had suggested it?

Admiral Turner. We discussed—that is, Admiral Stark, General Gerow and I, discussed—the Army dispatch for a few minutes. I do not recall the nature of the discussion. I do recall feeling, as I probably expressed, that the Army dispatch was not as strong as the Navy's dispatch.

Mr. Mitchell. Now, Admiral, I think you had one or two proposed corrections of the transcript of your evidence that you wanted to mention. Will you please do that now?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. On page 5130, the bottom of the page, I would like to clarify my answer as to the time, the hour of preparation of Admiral Stark's reply to Admiral Hart's dispatch report of December 7 concerning the report of the Hart-Phillips conversations.

From a study of the date and time books of the two dispatches and a knowledge as to times of decoding and coding, and the times of transmission, I believe that I received Admiral Hart's dispatch of his date, December 7, about 11:30 a.m. on the morning of our December 7, and that I prepared a reply to it late in the afternoon of the 7th, after knowing about the attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor.

[5242] Page 5152, the first sentence, change to read "Maritime traffic between Hawaii and Japan ordinarily was much heavier than maritime traffic on the northern great circle routes."

On the same page, line 5, change the word "every" to the words "for a few."
Mr. Mitchell. Did you want to add something about the ship location information?

Admiral Turner. I have a little more.

Mr. Mitchell. Excuse me.

Admiral Turner. Page 5152, the next to the last line, in two places change the words "no patrol" to read "a patrol".

Page 5153, line 7, change "maritime ports" to read "maritime routes".

Page 5153, line 15, insert after the word "because" the words "of necessity", and insert a period after "necessity".

Page 5153, lines 16 and 17, change the word "production" to "troops".

That is all, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. Now did you want to add anything to your testimony about the information available here as to the location of Japanese vessels?

Admiral Turner. It may be that I gave an incorrect impression as to my impressions concerning the Japanese vessels that had been lost sight of by our analysts during the first part of December. I knew that we had not definitely located a considerable number of vessels of the Japanese Fleet. I did not identify them at all as forming any particular task force, but knew that a number of vessels of various classes had not been located.

I said yesterday, and was not too firm on it, that I believed I had seen dispatches or information here in Washington showing that these vessels had not been located, and that I did not agree with the deductions by the Office of Naval Intelligence that these vessels were necessarily in home ports.

A good deal of information was sent to the Navy Department by both the commandant of the Fourteenth and commandant of the Sixteenth Naval Districts, giving analyses of their information as to the location of Japanese naval vessels and the organization of fleets.

I have here two dispatches, one from each of those officers, dated November 26, 1941, which go into considerable detail as to organization and locations. They are not significant of the information that I believe I saw about the 1st of December, but they are indicative of the types of reports that were coming in every day or 2 or 3 days concerning the Japanese Fleet. I think that there were other dispatches than these about the 1st or 2d of December which gave estimates that certain vessels of the Japanese Fleet had not been located for several days.

Mr. Mitchell. That last phrase "for several days" answers the question I was just about to ask you on that. You say "had not been located". Now our understanding from the old records in prior inquiries on the situation at Oahu was that these carrier divisions had been previously located up to about maybe the 25th or so of November, and then had vanished into thin air, and they got no further trace of them, there was absolutely radio silence as to all of them from that time up to the 7th.

So that is a little bit different from the statement that they had not been located. They had been once, and then they had been lost track of for that period.

That is what you mean by saying they had not been located?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell. I think that is all.

[5245] Mr. Keefe. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, as a matter of information, was there a lieutenant commander, or commander, Layton out at Hawaii, who was in charge of this matter of ship locations?

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. He is the man that was sending those reports into Washington. Were you acquainted with him, Admiral?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I know him very well. He is at the present time, or was, Admiral Nimitz's intelligence officer, and during the time that I was out there, why, he was the adviser for Admiral Nimitz.

Mr. Keefe. He was the intelligence officer for Admiral Kimmel, wasn't he, at the time?

Mr. Mitchell. The evidence will show later, Mr. Congressman, that it was Layton who had charge of this ship location business; it was he who reported to Admiral Kimmel, and it was he that noticed and called attention to the fact that the carriers had disappeared.

Mr. Keefe. I merely wanted to identify him in my mind at this time.

Admiral Turner. There is one small point about that, at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the actual mechanical work of decryption was under the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District—

Mr. Keefe. That was Admiral Bloch?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and not directly a part of the staff organization of the commander in chief?

Mr. Keefe. I see. All right.

The Chairman. The Chair at the moment has no questions to ask, because I have missed most of Admiral Turner's testimony. Therefore, he will waive his right.

Mr. Cooper.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Turner, I desire to commend you very highly on the splendid record that you have made during the fighting in this recent war with Japan, as I understand it from the information you gave us. I understood you to indicate that you were engaged in some of the greatest battles in the Pacific area. Is that correct?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; the amphibious operations.

Thank you.

The Vice Chairman. I commend you very highly on that. Any questions I might ask you about the period of time during which you served as Chief of War Plans of the Navy would not in any way reflect on this distinguished record which you have made during the fighting period, but I do want to inquire briefly about some of these matters that have developed during your testimony in connection with the period of time during which you served as Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy. And I may say that my impression is that much of the information you have given us is somewhat in conflict with other information we have received during the hearing.
Naturally, we want to try to reconcile all of these matters as much as we can.

Now, how long have you been in the Navy, Admiral?
Admiral Turner. I entered the Navy as a midshipman of the Naval Academy in June of 1904; graduated in 1908.

The Vice Chairman. From what State did you enter the Academy?
Admiral Turner. California.

The Vice Chairman. Now, during what period of time was it that you served as Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy?
Admiral Turner. From October 24, 1940, to June 13, 1941—1942;

I beg your pardon.

The Vice Chairman. From 1940 in June—

Admiral Turner. October, 1940.

The Vice Chairman. October 1940.


The Vice Chairman. October 1940 to June 1942?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

[5248] The Vice Chairman. What was your rank at that time?
Admiral Turner. I came to War Plans as a captain. In January I was appointed by the President as a rear admiral. That was for the purpose of giving me rank for the ABC conversations. That was not a rank that involved an increase of pay. It was what they call a spot promotion.

In October, I believe, of 1941. I was promoted to the temporary rank of rear admiral, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and in December of 1941 I was made, given the permanent rank of rear admiral.

The Vice Chairman. Well, during this period about which we are inquiring here, you held the rank of rear admiral either temporary or permanent?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, it was your duty and responsibility as Chief of the War Plans Division, to make plans for war in case this country became involved in war?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. And also to direct any operations that might become necessary in connection with those plans?

Admiral Turner. To give the orders for the initiation of operations and to give advice as to major changes or major aspects of the operations. Minor routine operations were taken care of by the Ship Movements Division.

[5249] The Vice Chairman. Well, most of my inquiries are for the purpose of securing information.

Now, would it be fair to assume that from the standpoint of the real effect of operations that the War Plans Division perhaps had the highest responsibility for the advice given to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. The Office of Naval Intelligence was largely charged with the responsibility of disseminating information?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. But your Division, War Plans, was the responsible operations division?

Admiral Turner. So far as regards the major aspects of war.
The Vice Chairman. Now, you were kept fully advised and informed as to the development of all diplomatic relations between this country and Japan and other foreign countries, were you?

Admiral Turner. I was kept advised and I think had fully adequate information. There were lots of details, of course, that I didn't know.

The Vice Chairman. Well, did you reach the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. When did you reach that conclusion?

Admiral Turner. I thought that war with Japan was inevitable for a number of years—for quite a number of years—before the war, that at some time the Nations would clash in war.

I became convinced that war was certain under the conditions that existed in 1941 during June and July of 1941, and that it was only a question of a few months at most before we would be in war with Japan.

The Vice Chairman. During June and July of 1941, you became convinced that war, and you were certain that war between the United States and Japan would occur?

Admiral Turner. Within the next few months.

The Vice Chairman. Within the next few months from June or July of 1941?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You at that time held the position of Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Did you express those views to other responsible and high ranking officers of the Navy Department?

Admiral Turner. I did, and also to officers of the War Department.

The Vice Chairman. Did any of those other high ranking and responsible officers of the War and Navy Departments agree with you in that conclusion?

Admiral Turner. Yes, there were quite a number in the Navy Department that agreed. I am quite sure that Admiral Stark had a strong opinion in that direction. I am sure that Admiral Ingersoll did. And other officers with whom I talked. They felt that the situation was developing so that we would definitely be at war within a few months.

The Vice Chairman. Then you knew that Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll, and perhaps other high ranking officers agreed with you in the conclusion and the conviction that you had that war was inevitable with Japan within a few months from June or July 1941?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I believed that.

The Vice Chairman. Do you know whether or not Admiral Wilkinson agreed with those views?

Admiral Turner. I knew then that Admiral Wilkinson did not agree with them. On December 6 he, much to my surprise, because I had not fully realized his belief before that, he informed me that he felt that I was mistaken, and I asked him, “Mistaken in what?” and he said, “Mistaken that Japan would attack the United States.”
The Vice Chairman. Well, did you have the conviction that Japan would attack the United States?

Admiral Turner. I did.

The Vice Chairman. And that was your conviction, that you have spoken of, that you reached that conclusion along about June or July of 1941, that it would be within a few months?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Did you ever think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I did. I thought that that was a very important part, a fundamental part of a war that we would have with Japan. The Navy generally and the Army generally had thought so for a long time.

Under the circumstances that existed at the time of the outbreak of war, as I testified yesterday, I felt that there was at least a 50-50 chance that we would get a severe attack on, that is, a severe raid, not a landing attack—I did not expect that, because they could not do important operations in the South China Sea and also conduct an amphibious operation against Hawaii simultaneously.

The Vice Chairman. The type of raid of which you speak was what did occur on December 7, 1941, wasn't it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, did you have any conviction in June or July of 1941 that this type of raid would be made on Pearl Harbor within a few months?

Admiral Turner. I don't know that I thought a great deal about it at that time, because we were interested in the general situation, but it was part of our thoughts and part of our plans, I had written the draft of the Secretary's letter of January 24, 1941, which I think brought that matter to the fore, and so that throughout the whole time, and throughout the whole time I was here, up to the time of the war, here was a great effort being put forth by the Navy Department and by the fleet, and by the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare that position and the ships for just such an attack.

The Vice Chairman. And the effort was being made over a period of many months?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. To prepare Hawaii for just such an attack as was made on December 7, 1941?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. Did you consider the fleet in Hawaii prepared for that attack at the time it did come?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, within the limits of the material improvements program, I felt that the fleet was efficient and was ready for war.

The Vice Chairman. You felt confident that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was ready for war on December 7, 1941?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, and further that the district was ready for war within the limits of the material that we had been able to provide. We all had the utmost confidence in the command of the fleet and the command ashore.

The Vice Chairman. Well, it is probably always true, isn't it, Admiral, that the commander in the field, whether it be the Navy
or Army, always wants still more in the way of supplies and equipment and forces, doesn't he?

Admiral Turner. Mr. Congressman, you never have enough, you always want more and you want things to be better.

The Vice Chairman. I think General Marshall conveyed that very clear impression to us and also the impression that he wouldn't be worthy of his command and responsibility unless he did feel that way about it.

Admiral Turner. I agree with that, sir. I will say further—you were speaking of the Navy—

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Turner. Further, I felt from all indications, all my contacts with the Army, that the Army headquarters here and the Army in Hawaii had done everything that they could in the way of preparing for war. They were limited in a great many things but that was due to other conditions.

The Vice Chairman. I remember General Marshall testified that he had stripped practically every other post in the United States of vital aircraft and many other things in order to give it to the Hawaiian Department and that, he gave us the impression that that was the best prepared post in the Army of the United States in December 1941.

Would that probably hold true also as to the Navy?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. If I may say, they had also put a good deal of material, or were putting a good deal of material, in the Philippines and, of course, just by so much was the availability of formations, troops, reduced for Hawaii.

The Vice Chairman. As a senior officer of the United States Navy of long experience and the Chief of War Plans Division of the Navy on December 7, 1941, it was your conviction that the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was prepared for war?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, back for a moment to the question of your views or convictions as to the imminence of war, please, Admiral.

You stated that during June or July of 1941 it was your conviction that war with Japan was imminent within a few months. Then I asked you, did you ever think an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor. I understood you to indicate that your conviction on that point was not quite as definite and certain as that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable within a few months.

Could you help me a little further on that point?

Admiral Turner. I am sorry, I think that is the wrong impression. I was concerned at this time with the over-all picture and not specifically concerned with parts of the picture. Inherent in war with Japan was an attack on Hawaii and all through the entire time I felt that that was a part of it.

The Vice Chairman. But in June or July, Admiral, you had the conviction that war with Japan was inevitable within a few months?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And that Japan would attack the United States?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Where did you think that first attack would come?
Admiral Turner. Well, I thought the major effort, the major part of the attack, would certainly come, I mean, the permanent amphibious, the conquest part, would certainly come in the Philippines and would come either against the Malay Peninsula, Kra Isthmus, or against Borneo, thence Java and thence westward to Singapore. The Japanese were strong enough by that time to launch two major efforts. I believed that they were pretty well convinced, by June or July, that they could not detach the United States, although they continued efforts to do so, from very definite military interest in the Far East.

For example, if they had attempted to go down to the China Sea and to have made a major effort against Malaysia without having a definite assurance from the United States that the United States would not intervene, they couldn’t possibly have gone on down without the capture of the Philippines, because it would leave on their flank an extremely important position, which we could build up and later attack them and cut them off from the south.

So that I believe the whole diplomatic effort during that time, the summer and fall, was toward getting an arrangement with the United States for us to keep out of war while they went after the British and Dutch.

The Vice Chairman. Of course, as subsequently developed, they did make their main effort along the line that you have indicated; is that correct?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Did you ever at any time think there would be a raid on Hawaii?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I thought there was always a strong possibility and even a probability that a raid in Hawaii would precede any declaration of war and would be simultaneous with other operations. I always thought that.

The Vice Chairman. And you thought then that probably the first thrust or the first raid that Japan made, and even before the declaration of war, would be at Hawaii?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; unless we could build up their strength so great that the raid would almost certainly be disastrous in a large way for Japan. We were engaged in building that strength up.

The Vice Chairman. You had that conviction then in June or July of 1941, that such a raid or thrust at Hawaii would come within a few months?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; unless we could be so superior in strength that they would be afraid to take a chance.

The Vice Chairman. You have stated that the Pacific Fleet based at Hawaii was prepared for war on December 7, 1941?

Admiral Turner. That was my conviction.

The Vice Chairman. And was it sufficient at that time to have defeated or greatly reduce the effect of the Japanese raid on Hawaii if it had been fully alerted?

Admiral Turner. I believe so.

The Vice Chairman. And the raid made by Japan on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, could have been defeated or the effect of that raid greatly reduced if proper measures had been taken by the local commander?

Admiral Turner. I believe so.
The Vice Chairman. Now, after seeing these various messages that were intercepted from Japan along during the period immediately preceding December 7, 1941, for a few weeks before that, did your conviction become firmer and stronger that war with Japan was inevitable?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and it was daily approaching the point where it would occur.

The Vice Chairman. And that attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent?

Admiral Turner. Probable.

The Vice Chairman. Now, you say you drafted the war warning message of November 27, 1941, to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Did you consider that that message was adequate and sufficient as a war warning to him?

Admiral Turner. I did, particularly with the addition of the information that was sent later concerning the Japanese destruction of codes.

The Vice Chairman. He was one of the highest ranking officers of the United States Navy at that time, wasn't he?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. He was a full Admiral, wasn't he?

Admiral Turner. He was.

The Vice Chairman. Of long experience?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And regarded as among the best of the senior naval officers in the Navy?

Admiral Turner. Indeed so. I personally had the utmost confidence in him and respect for his ability, and I believe that that was a generally shared opinion in the Navy.

The Vice Chairman. And it is your conviction if he had carried out the order drafted by you and sent to him on November 27, 1941, that the attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor could have been defeated or the effects greatly reduced?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And that he had sufficient equipment, material, and other things necessary at his disposal to have accomplished that result?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, to have inflicted very serious damage on the Japanese Fleet.

The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated yesterday that in your opinion his fleet should not have been concentrated in Pearl Harbor on that Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

Admiral Turner. I did not say that in those words. I said the business of the fleet out there was to be so deployed as best to be able to carry out a defense of the region and to prepare to carry out the other tasks of the war plan. If Pearl Harbor was the best place for them to be to carry out those tasks, why—and it might be a question of judgment on that—then Pearl Harbor was the best place for those ships to be. If it was the best place, if the best place was at sea, why, then, they should have been at sea.

Personally, I would have had them at sea, except those under repair.
The Vice Chairman. You thought then that the ships and naval forces there should have been at sea on that Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you certainly do not think that they should have been tied up two and two in the harbor?

Admiral Turner. Well, two and two was the only way that you could tie them up there, and, as a matter of fact, the antiaircraft fire, development of fire, was nearly as good, not quite, when tied up in that manner and, of course, in addition to that, and this actually occurred on the attack, the inside ships got far less damaged than the outside ships did; that is, the ones toward the water were the ones worst [5263] damaged.

The Vice Chairman. From a naval standpoint, could the fleet be prepared to protect itself, or maneuver or move about so as to not catch the full force and effect of an air raid of that type, tied up and standing still as if it had been out to sea?

Admiral Turner. They could not maneuver, naturally. They did have the advantage that the waters of the locks in Pearl Harbor are very narrow. The torpedo runs were short and difficult. It was a difficult attack to make by torpedoes.

They had, presumably, around them the antiaircraft guns of the Army. And it was far easier to have a combat patrol of airplanes overhead in a defensive position, than it would have been if the ships had been several hundred miles away.

[5263] In that case, you see, it would have been necessary to have given the fighter cover over the fleet from the carriers, and thus take them away from any offensive missions which they might wish to undertake.

So that from many aspects the defense of the battleships primarily had advantages with them in Pearl Harbor over the conditions outside. On the other hand, being at sea offered other types of advantages.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you stated a moment ago that if you had been in command there, you would have had your fleet at sea.

Admiral Turner. I believe so.

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, considering all of these various elements to which you have referred, and considering it from a practical standpoint, it is your view that best over-all results could have been accomplished if the fleet had been at sea?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Just one or two questions, if I may, with respect to this message.

Well, was it solely within the discretion and jurisdiction of the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel, as to whether his ships were all in Pearl [5364] Harbor, as they appeared on December 7, 1941, or were out at sea?

Admiral Turner. It was within his province entirely.

The Vice Chairman. And he was the one that made that decision as to just what he did with his fleet and how he handled it, and used it rather than somebody here in Washington?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, the message of November 27, 1941, which was drafted by you, and sent by the Chief of Naval Operations, is
addressed, and, as I understand, was sent to CINCAF. Is that the commander of the Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And CINPAC. Is that the commander of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. This message was sent to these two commanders who were at that time Admiral Hart, in command of the Asiatic Fleet, and Admiral Kimmel, in command of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Turner. It was sent to them for action.

The Vice Chairman. Sent to them for action?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

[5265] The Vice Chairman. And the word “action” appears on the message?

Admiral Turner. It does.

The Vice Chairman. Now, then “INFO,” does that mean “information”?

Admiral Turner. It does.

The Vice Chairman. To CINCLANT. Who was that?

Admiral Turner. Commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral King.

The Vice Chairman. And SPENAVO. Who was that?

Admiral Turner. That is the special naval observer in London, Admiral Ghormley, who was there acting as the head of our naval mission to the British Admiralty.

The Vice Chairman. Then this action message of November 27, 1941, was sent directly to Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Hart for action on their part, and was sent for information to the commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral King, and the naval observer in London, Admiral Ghormley?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and Admiral Ghormley was directed by the dispatch to inform the British Admiralty.

The Vice Chairman. But that was drawn by you and was sent by Admiral Stark as an action message to Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

[5266] The Vice Chairman. Now, at my request, you have kindly indicated to us yesterday on the map the areas coming within the responsibility of Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel at the time this message was sent.

Now, in this message the following occurs about the middle of the message:

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval Task Forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.

All of those points were within the area coming under the responsibility of Admiral Hart, were they not?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. None of them were within the area coming under the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. Then, Admiral, if you had the conviction at the time this message was sent that at least a 50-50 chance existed
for a raid or a thrust at Pearl Harbor why did not, either in this message or in some subsequent message, you convey some more information to Admiral Kimmel on that point?

Admiral Turner. The message tells Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment. That is [5267] perfectly specific and entirely clear and must be separated from the orders to Admiral Hart that the Pacific Fleet was to execute a defensive deployment. That is to take care of territory and take care of itself.

The Vice Chairman. My purpose is to try to secure information, and I certainly haven't drafted as many naval orders as you have, and I wanted to get your views on that.

Then, if I understand it correctly, the part of this message conveying general information applied to both Admirals Hart and Kimmel?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And the part specifically pointing out these places within the area coming under the responsibility of Admiral Hart were primarily for his attention and only for information to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now then, following the words I have read from the message, ending with the word "Borneo," these words next appear:

Execute an appropriate defense deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.

That part of the message applied with equal force and effect to both Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

[5268] The Vice Chairman. In your opinion, Admiral, did Admiral Kimmel comply with that part of this order?

Admiral Turner. He did not, in my opinion.

The Vice Chairman. If he had complied with that part of this order do you think the disastrous effects suffered by the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, would not have occurred or would have been materially reduced?

Admiral Turner. I think they would have been materially reduced and I believe there would have been a good chance of inflicting considerable damage on the Japanese Fleet. We know from experience now that an offensive raid by carriers against positions and against ships is very difficult to stop and almost always can get in. With the ships in Pearl Harbor, why, no matter what had been done I believe a considerable portion of the attack might have gotten in but it would have been broken up and been of considerably less effect.

We had land-based in Oahu at that time a total of 185 fighter aircraft. The total fighter aircraft that the Japanese had, according to my information, in their fleet was 112 and a portion of those and a portion of their reconnaissance planes were maintained over their carrier group for protection.

Now, if even a considerable portion of our fighters had been in the air and been able to intercept—and that is not [5269] too easy—why, I believe that the Japanese attack would have been very much less severe in its results and I believe then that we could have, with our land-based bombers, done considerable damage to the Japanese carriers.
We know, however, from subsequent experience that high altitude bombers have little chance of doing much damage to maneuvering ships. Our principal possibility of damaging the carriers, as was shown in the Midway Battle, is from the carrier planes that we ourselves have.

The Vice Chairman. Did Admiral Kimmel ever reply to this message of November 27, 1941?

Admiral Turner. He made no reply so far as I know.

The Vice Chairman. Did he ever acknowledge receipt of it?

Admiral Turner. I do not know. That would not come to my attention. Probably he did. We know that it was receipted for by his communications organization. There is a difference between acknowledge and receipt. When an operator finishes sending a dispatch the operator at the other end receipted for the dispatch.

The Vice Chairman. I can understand that.

Admiral Turner. But “acknowledge” means that it has gone to the commander in chief and he has seen it.

The Vice Chairman. I can understand that, Admiral, but here was an important action order drawn by you and issued by [5870] the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander of the Pacific Fleet. Now, did you ever receive any information that he got that message?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. The standing orders at that time were that whenever an operating dispatch went to an officer he was required to acknowledge. Now, that part of it would have come under Communications people to check. I think there is no question but that he did receive it.

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Senator Lucas. May I ask counsel on that point whether or not the record shows that the Admiral did reply?

Mr. Gesell. Yes.

Senator Lucas. That he did reply.

Mr. Mitchell. There is no question but what he got it. We have not put in evidence the receipt for it. He actually got it, there is no question about that.

The Vice Chairman. Do you have any record of any message from him making acknowledgment?

Mr. Gesell. No.

Mr. Mitchell. We haven’t got any of that information. We can look at the communications record; but there isn’t any doubt but what he received it.

The Vice Chairman. I have never understood that there was any question about Admiral Kimmel receiving it.

Mr. Mitchell. No, there is not.

The Vice Chairman. But the point I had in mind in this question, Admiral, was to check you a little bit, as well as Admiral Kimmel. If you drew an important action order to go to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, I was just wondering why you did not have the interest, or even the curiosity, to satisfy yourself as to whether he got that directive order or not.

Admiral Turner. Mr. Congressman, I will agree that the word “Acknowledge” should have been on the end of that message. It would have been a proper thing to do.
The Vice Chairman. You should have included that word "Acknowledgment" at the end of this message you drafted?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I believe so.

The Vice Chairman. But even not having included that word "Acknowledgment" at the end of the message, didn't you have the interest, or at least the curiosity, to satisfy yourself as to whether Admiral Kimmel received it or not?

Admiral Turner. I knew that it had gotten into the Communications organization of Admiral Kimmel because our radio people never quit until they get an "R" for it. Now, the chances of a dispatch like that being lost in the Communications organization without getting to Admiral Kimmel may be [5272] one in a million; I doubt if they are that much.

The Vice Chairman. Well, I can understand that but what I was trying to get at is whether you felt an interest in the matter sufficient to want to satisfy yourself that Admiral Kimmel received it?

Admiral Turner. Oh, I was satisfied he had it, perfectly satisfied.

The Vice Chairman. Without ever inquiring or checking it or indicating any further interest on your part, you were satisfied that he got it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You did not have any information as to what he had done, if anything, after receiving it, did you?

Admiral Turner. None.

The Vice Chairman. Now, if he had complied with this message of November 27, 1941, would his command have been properly alerted? In other words, was this message of November 27 to him sufficient to require the proper alert of his command?

Admiral Turner. I believe it was.

The Vice Chairman. And if he had complied with this message his command would have been on the proper alert?

Admiral Turner. I believe so.

The Vice Chairman. Do you have any knowledge or any [5273] information as to why Admiral Kimmel did not so alert his command?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You have not received any information since then that would indicate to you why he did not alert his command or comply with this order as you had written it and had intended it?

Admiral Turner. I have never seen a report on the subject by Admiral Kimmel. I have not read any of the testimony given before the various courts of inquiry from officers of the fleet or in Hawaii. The only things that I have seen on it are matters that have appeared in the newspapers and reading the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you continued as Chief of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department from December 7, 1941, until June of 1942, didn't you?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. If Admiral Kimmel had made any report or conveyed any information to the Navy Department as to the reasons for his action or lack of action on that it would have come to your attention, wouldn't it?

Admiral Turner. I believe so.

The Vice Chairman. Any you never received any such information?
Admiral Turner. I have no recollection of receiving any explanation at all. We received further dispatches as to action being taken subsequently by Admiral Kimmel but I have no recollection of an explanation.

I read, also, in addition to the other matters I mentioned, I read the report of the Roberts Board.

The Vice Chairman. Well, was it customary in the Navy Department when an exceedingly important order had been issued to a commander of an important part of the fleet, or in this case the Pacific Fleet itself, and that order was not complied with, was it the practice of the Navy Department to call on him for some explanation?

Admiral Turner. The matter was taken out of the Navy Department's hands as regards responsibility by the President's decision to appoint the Roberts Commission and also it was taken out of the Chief of Naval Operation's hands by Mr. Knox's personal investigation at Hawaii.

The Vice Chairman. So that you do not consider that the Chief of Naval Operations, or you as one of the chief divisions under him, which was the Division of War Plans, had any further responsibility to inquire into the reasons or the causes for his failure to comply with your order?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. That was a matter—let me change that Admiral Kimmel was relieved from his command before he could possibly have submitted a formal report to the Department and once it had been put into the inquiry stage, naturally none of the naval officers would have expected him to make any statement to the Department, but only to the various courts.

The Vice Chairman. Well, almost immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, flew out in person, didn't he?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And made an investigation?

Admiral Turner. He did.

The Vice Chairman. Now, if he found out anything about the reason for Admiral Kimmel's failure to comply with this order of November 27 did you secure any such information from him after his return, or anybody else coming from him?

Admiral Turner. Mr. Knox made a report to the President. I do not recall whether or not I ever saw that report, or not. Shortly after Mr. Knox returned he made a very short oral statement to several officers in his office. I was present amongst them.

The Vice Chairman. Well, did that short oral statement which was made in your presence convey to you any information as to why Admiral Kimmel had not carried out the order you had written which had been sent to him by Admiral Stark?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; no reasons.

The Vice Chairman. Now, did you consider the Pacific Fleet as safe at Pearl Harbor as any other place that it could have been based?

Admiral Turner. If I may, Mr. Congressman, before making a specific answer to that, I would like to put some qualifications ahead of it.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could not stop the competition with the witness. I want to hear the witness. There is a terrific noise coming from the left; I do not mean at the table here.
The Chairman. Well, the committee will be in order and also the spectators.

Mr. Murphy. I do not mean the committee. I mean the spectators.

The Chairman. Well, all right, whoever is in disorder will now resume order.

The Vice Chairman. Well, Admiral, I am sorry to have detained you this long, but just as briefly and specifically as you can answer the question, why, that will be sufficient.

Admiral Turner. The reason for the fleet's being in Hawaii was not for its own safety or its own security. The reason was for the security of Hawaii and the security of the United States. Hawaii was, under war conditions, a dangerous place. Any place where fighting is going on is dangerous. The fleet would have been more safe if it had been on the Pacific coast or if it had been in the Atlantic, but it was out there for the purpose of engaging in a fight with the Japanese and winning the fight.

So far as regards its own immediate safety, that is, the battleships, which was of far less importance than of carrying out its tasks against the enemy, there is great disagreement. There are two opinions as to whether it was better in port or at sea. Since then we in the Navy have maintained our ships in port many times against very severe air attacks because we had things to do in port, at other times they have been at sea, and under the conditions which existed at that time I, myself, feel that local safety could have been obtained better if the fleet had been at sea but, certainly, that opinion is subject to challenge.

The Vice Chairman. Well, considering the world condition as it existed at that time did you think it was appropriate and best for the fleet to be based at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Turner. I did.

The Vice Chairman. I thank you.

The Chairman. Inasmuch as I am compelled to go to the floor I would like to ask one question, if it is agreeable, prompted by Congressman Cooper's interrogation.

[5278] Admiral, you sent, or Admiral Stark sent, on the 27th of November this command message to Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. In which you thought you were sufficiently specific, in view of the possible danger, to notify him or any other officer in a similar position that it was essential that all proper steps be taken to protect not only the Navy, but protect whatever the Navy was out there to protect, is that right?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And on the following day you wrote and Admiral Stark sent an additional message in which you specified the Philippines and the Kra Peninsula, I believe Thai and possibly Borneo, as the more imminent objects of attack.

When you sent that message Admiral Hart had jurisdiction over all those places you mentioned in that message of the 28th?

The Vice Chairman. The 27th.

The Chairman. I know the 27th, but I am talking now about the message of the 28th, the next day. You mentioned all those points over which Admiral Hart had jurisdiction and you did not mention points over which Admiral Kimmel had jurisdiction.
Did you give any thought, in view of the previous message of the 27th, did you give any thought to the possibility that the emphasis that you placed upon the Philippines and Borneo and these other places would justify any relaxation on the part of the commander in the Hawaiian area whose area was not specifically mentioned in the telegram of the 28th?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; I did not. You see, that dispatch of the 28th, which transmitted the Army dispatch, was sent for action to the shore-based Navy commanders on the west coast and only for information to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet so that he would know of the several orders we were giving his subordinates.

The Chairman. In view of the command nature and the imperative nature of the message you sent on the 27th, regardless of the fact that you mentioned other points that might appear to you and to Admiral Stark as more imminently in danger, would that have justified a prudent officer in relaxing his effort in that area though it was not mentioned specifically?

Admiral Turner. We did not think so and reviewed that very subject, as I testified yesterday, on Friday afternoon.

The Chairman. Yes. Now, one other question. It is in evidence here that on the 6th day of December there was no reconnaissance of any kind, either Army or Navy, at Pearl Harbor; that the only reconnaissance within that region any— where was from the airplane carrier Enterprise, which was some 200 or more miles west of Oahu.

Would you say that you regarded the failure of any reconnaissance of any character on the 6th, the day before the attack, whatever may have happened between the 28th or the 27th and the 6th, that the failure to have any sort of reconnaissance at Pearl Harbor on the 6th of December was a compliance or a violation of the command order you had sent out on the 27th?

Admiral Turner. It was a violation of it.

The Chairman. That is all I want to ask.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark of North Carolina will inquire at this point.

Mr. Clark. Following up the question that was just touched upon by the chairman, I have no disposition to be super-critical about this message of the 27th. I call your attention to the fact that after referring to cessation of negotiations it says—

An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days.

I am struck by the fact that is limited to the singular, and it continues—

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against the four places you mentioned, all of which were in Admiral Hart’s district.

In fairness to Admiral Kimmel, might he not have assumed reasonably from that that the authorities in Washington were expecting a movement only in the direction of the places indicated and not in his naval district at all?

Admiral Turner. An answer to that, I believe, would be surmise, but I invite attention to the fact that Admiral Kimmel was directed to take an appropriate defensive deployment.
Mr. Clark. I am not speaking of that at all. The thought in my mind is whether he might have been justified in reading this message and giving the words a simple meaning, that it was the opinion of Admiral Stark who sent this message, or in whose name it was sent, that there would be an aggressive movement and in the direction of one of these four places mentioned in the message?


Mr. Clark. One?

Admiral Turner. One. An aggressive movement was intended to include the over-all effort, military effort exerted by Japan. It was that Japan as a whole was making a move. That was the intention there.

Now with regard to the singular, in the next sentence, the opinion was rather generally held here by officers that the amphibious movement, amphibious expedition by Japan, only one at a time could be undertaken in sufficient strength. I personally feel that the dispatch would be improved by saying "The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates one or more amphibious expeditions", but I think the singular in the first part there, as indicating the whole picture, is all right.

Mr. Clark. I am only interested in the impression this might reasonably have made upon Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. You refer here to only one amphibious expedition.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. And you point out the direction that the circumstances indicate it would take. Might that not easily have lulled him into some sense of security as to his district [5283] insofar as the opinion of Washington was concerned?

Admiral Turner. I do not know, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Clark. I believe you testified before this committee that if Hawaii, or our establishment on Hawaii, had not been considerably damaged—if our establishment there had not been quite severely damaged—it would have constituted a serious threat to the Japanese flank as this large movement to the south unfolded. I think you said that in your testimony.

Admiral Turner. No, sir; I beg your pardon. That testimony was given by another witness. I have not made any such statement.

Mr. Clark. I did not want to repeat if you did. What do you say about that now?

Admiral Turner. The threat to the flank would not have been particularly serious for some months. It would, under no circumstances, have affected the Japanese action in the South China Sea and against Malaysia. We could not possibly move the fleet, as it was then constituted or as it would ever be constituted, direct from Hawaii to the Philippines and establish a base and leave all of those Japanese islands in between. We could not have supported the fleet. The only threat to the Japanese flank would be operations against the islands in the way of raids for some months, and that was about the only thing that would be done, the idea being that [5284] we would try to contain the Japanese naval forces and air in the Mandates and take them off the backs of our forces in the Far East.
Mr. Clark. I understood you, Admiral, to say that the only kind of an attack that could be made on Hawaii would be a surprise air attack.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and submarines.

Mr. Clark. And submarines, yes.

Admiral Turner. That is the only kind we anticipated.

Mr. Clark. Now you do agree that a surprise air attack of the character made by the Japanese was a right risky thing for them, was it not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Then why would they undertake that unless Hawaii was a serious threat to their flank?

Admiral Turner. For two reasons. Hawaii was a serious threat to their flank ultimately, not immediately. In other words, with the fleet practically destroyed it meant that any action of ours against the Mandates with the idea of making an advance across the Pacific must be postponed possibly indefinitely, and that would give the Japanese time to get themselves set in a better defensive situation, and it might so discourage the United States—I think that is the second point—that we would be willing to let things go and leave them in possession of their spoils.

Mr. Clark. The only thing I am getting at, in my own thinking, is whether the presence of our establishment on the Hawaiian Islands along during the days from the 27th of November to the 7th of December constituted such a threat to what Japan had in mind doing, that they would have been interested in taking a desperate chance on removing that threat.

Admiral Turner. By all means, Mr. Congressman, from a long-range point of view, not very much from within a few months, or something like that.

But that was very definitely an ultimate threat against their position, because it formed a base from which we could undertake later strong operations.

Mr. Clark. Then, as I understand you, while you expected or thought the chances of a raid on Hawaii were about 50—50 you would not have expected it to come for some months?

Admiral Turner. No, no; I mean that was the time to do it right then. It was unquestionably the time to do it. I am sorry I cannot make myself plain. A raid on Hawaii, from the Japanese viewpoint, if successful might have such tremendous effects as to insure their success not only in conquering these positions but in holding them indefinitely.

Mr. Clark. Well, now, to my mind that seems inconsistent with your statement that Hawaii was not a serious threat to their flank all the time.

Admiral Turner. It was not any particular immediate threat that would prevent their major operations from being successful within a few months. It was a definite threat against their ultimate success in the war and holding their conquests.

In other words, whatever happened there at Hawaii would have very little effect on the operations for the capture of the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies and Malaya.
However, from Hawaii, with an intact fleet built up—as they knew we could—we could, in the course of time, move across the Pacific, as we did, and then threaten their position and relieve them of their conquests.

For the immediate operations, unless we wanted to commit suicide, why, we could not possibly interfere with their success.

Mr. Clark. Would you say the strategic importance of Hawaii increased or diminished or remained static from the 27th of November to the 7th of December, having in mind the movement of the Japanese south?

Admiral Turner. Well, it remained the same. It was a fundamental of our position in the Pacific—for any future offensive it was fundamental that we should hold Hawaii. Probably I did not understand the question.

Mr. Clark. I do not think I made myself clear; I am sorry. I really was thinking of the Japanese point of view when I asked that question. From their point of view, with this rather extensive movement unfolding to the south, did the strategic importance of the Hawaiian set-up to them increase?

Admiral Turner. Oh, no; it was the same, the same as it had always been and the same as it continued.

Mr. Clark. I want to ask you about the diversion of this traffic that you spoke of in your testimony. Was that known to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. All of those dispatches were sent to him.

Mr. Clark. Did that or not enhance the opportunity for the Japanese to make a successful surprise attack along the route they did take?

Admiral Turner. Not in my opinion. I think it made no difference one way or the other. They could have easily avoided any of that traffic. They could pass the trade routes at night darkened and they could send airplanes out to let them maneuver clear, and in fact the route through which they came was a normal operating area, they operated out there for maneuvers and drill a good deal of the time.

Mr. Clark. You don't think the likelihood of the discovery of that expedition would have been greater if traffic had still been moving along normal channels?

Admiral Turner. Not in the least.

Mr. Clark. Now may I ask you one more question about the message that was sent by General Short in response to the message from the Chief of Staff. I believe you said you saw that.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. It had in it I think the phrase "liaison with the Navy".

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Mr. Clark. What did you make of that?

Admiral Turner. Well, I assumed that full arrangements were in effect for the exchange of information and for the issuing of orders by one service to the other in such situations as the one service worked for the other.

For example, we had some fighters on shore and the Army was charged with the fighter defense. I assumed that those communications were set up and functioning and that arrangements had been made for full exchange of information and for putting in, or standing by to put into, effect operating orders for both services with the knowledge of the other.
Mr. Clark. But the words in the preceding sentence of that message indicated that they had become alerted only as to sabotage.

Admiral Turner. That is correct as regards that message.

Mr. Clark. Now applying that same rule, would not you have understood there was cooperation between the two forces as to sabotage only?

Admiral Turner. That conclusion is, I believe, entirely justified. It was not drawn at the time of the receipt of that message, although I distinctly remember the message and thought it was rather queer.

Mr. Clark. I would like to ask you, Admiral, with the greatest respect, what other conclusion could have been drawn from that message?

Admiral Turner. Well, another message had been sent by G-2 with respect to special measures against sabotage, and while I do not recall distinctly my thoughts about that dispatch, my thoughts at that time, I think that I assumed that additional reports would come in as regards the deployment of the troops.

[5290] Mr. Clark. Yes; but that does not really get to my question.

Admiral Turner. Your question is what other conclusion could have been drawn?

Mr. Clark. That is right.

Admiral Turner. I am telling you what conclusion I drew at the time.

Mr. Clark. You concluded that other reports would come?

Admiral Turner. Might come; yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. But as to the meaning of the Short message, when you read it—I am not talking about other reports, I am talking about that particular message, as to its meaning—what other meaning could you draw from it than that which I have just suggested?

Admiral Turner. I think I should have drawn the conclusion that sabotage was the only one that was concerned in it, but I certainly did not draw that conclusion, nor did any of the other officers that saw it draw such a conclusion.

Mr. Clark. Well, I am inclined to agree with you on that, but that still does not answer the question I am asking you.

Admiral Turner. I am not saying we were right.

[5291] Mr. Clark. Did that not raise even a suspicion in your mind that your order of the 27th had not been complied with?

Admiral Turner. I remember the dispatch very well, and I read it over several times and thought it was a rather peculiar dispatch. It certainly did not have any connotation, nor does it now, that the action taken by the Navy was confined to sabotage, not the least, and I cannot see how that conclusion can be drawn, because there were additional orders issued to General Short with regard to sabotage, and knowing the order about sabotage had been issued, I just drew the conclusion that that was the message that related to sabotage.

Mr. Clark. That is all I have to ask, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire, Admiral.
Senator Lucas. Admiral Turner, I want to refer just briefly to this message that was prepared by you and sent out on November 27. The beginning of that message reads:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.

Could there be any question about the interpretation of those words by anyone who was in command of a fleet anywhere in the Pacific or otherwise?

Admiral Turner. I do not see now, and I did not see [5292] then, that there was any possibility of misinterpreting that sentence. Senator Lucas. Well, our main fleet was located at that particular time in Hawaii, was it not?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. You also state:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46X.

Admiral Turner. "X" is a period, Senator.

Senator Lucas. WPL-46, then. I presume counsel will probably ask you what WPL-46 is.

The Vice Chairman. He covered that.

Senator Lucas. You covered that thoroughly, so I will not go into that.

Admiral Turner. That was covered yesterday.

Senator Lucas. Presumably Admiral Kimmel also knew what that was, did he not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, in addition to that warning sent out on November 27, as a matter of precaution I take it, you also sent to Admiral Kimmel, on November 28, a copy of the message that was sent by General Marshall to General Short in Hawaii.

Admiral Turner. The primary reason for sending that [5293] dispatch was to inform the commanders of the Pacific northern and Pacific southern naval coastal frontiers as to what orders had been given to the commander of the Western Defense Command.

Since those two officers, the commanders of those two naval coastal frontiers on the outbreak of war automatically came under Admiral Kimmel’s command for certain purposes, it was appropriate that we should inform Admiral Kimmel what orders the department had given to two of his future subordinates, and that is the sole purpose of that dispatch.

Senator Lucas. That may be the sole purpose of the dispatch, but certainly it also had a significant additional warning, it seems to me, to Admiral Kimmel, in view of the type and kind of message that was sent to General Short. He could not overlook the following day, it seems to me, a message which meant really action. Am I correct in that?

Admiral Turner. I do not believe that had any influence in drafting that dispatch, because we were satisfied, as was the case, that General Short would show to Admiral Kimmel the dispatch which he had received, and which was identical with that.

Senator Lucas. Assuming that he did do that, and I presume General Short did show the warning he received from [5294] General Marshall to Admiral Kimmel, but nevertheless, here was an additional warning to Admiral Kimmel that was sent from the Chief
of Naval Operations from Washington, D. C. There cannot be any question about that even though it may have been, as you have stated, insofar as the northern and southern spots were concerned.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I misunderstood you before.

I agree with that.

Senator Lucas. Now, on December 3, the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington also sent to Admiral Kimmel this message:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London, to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Did you prepare that message?

Admiral Turner. No, sir, that was prepared by a subordinate of Admiral Wilkinson's, but I knew about it, and we talked about it ahead of time, and we all considered that that was an exceedingly important piece of information to send to Admiral Kimmel and to Admiral Hart, because the destruction of codes in that manner and in those places [5295] in my mind and experience is a definite and sure indication of war with the nations in whose capitals or other places those codes are destroyed.

Senator Lucas. Am I correct in my understanding that that is about the last thing a potential enemy does before war is started?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. It indicates war within 2 or 3 days.

Senator Lucas. I am only a layman, but I believe I can understand that, and I could understand that if I were on the ground and knew something about the burning of codes.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And especially in view of the message sent on December 6, which is as follows:

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands—

He is talking about Hawaii there as well as the Philippines, and others, is he not?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; not about Hawaii.

Senator Lucas. It went to the commander of the Pacific Fleet, did it not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, but the "outlying Pacific islands," that was a phrase, while not appearing to be specific in this dispatch, that we used in correspondence and dispatches [5296] and indicated Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake, and Guam.

Senator Lucas. It further says:

You may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

Did you prepare that message in exhibit 37, page 45?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. That was prepared by the Office of Naval Communications, but it was referred to me.

As I recall it, Admiral Noyes and I talked it over before it was sent. We held on as long as we could, and then it was decided that that was the last minute that was proper to send it. But we did not send that
direct to those outlying islands, because it is bad practice to give orders to subordinates.

Senator Lucas. I understand. But this message did go direct to Admiral Kimmel, who was in charge of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Could I ask counsel whether or not the record shows that Admiral Kimmel received all these [5297] messages?

Mr. Mitchell. It may be presumed he received all in this book. There is no question about it, that I know of. We can get the communications record, if you like. Everybody has assumed so, including his own counsel.

Senator Lucas. Then on that same day, on page 46 of that same exhibit, you sent to the commanding officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, a message as follows:

Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included in your eighteen double five of third.

Will you explain to the committee just exactly what that means?

Admiral Turner. That, Senator, is from the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District to operations, and gives us information. Now, it does not show information to the commander in chief, but customarily since they go out through the same offices, why, as the dispatches are customarily delivered to the commander in chief, undoubtedly they knew it.

Senator Lucas. All right. In other words, on the 6th of December, this message came from Admiral Bloch, who was then commanding the Fourteenth Naval District in Hawaii?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

[5298] Senator Lucas. He advised you that the local consul—he means Japan there, does he not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. The local consul of Japan has destroyed all but one system, although presumably not “included in your eighteen double five of third.”

Now, under the arrangement that was had there between the Army and Navy, the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Bloch, had the duty to inform General Short, as well as Admiral Kimmel with respect to this important piece of information?

Admiral Turner. It was.

[5299] Senator Lucas. So the result of all these messages that were sent from November 27 up to December 6 and the message that was received from Admiral Bloch on December 6 by the authorities here in Washington indicated, from the 27th on, that a serious crisis was existing between this country and Japan, and that war was imminent, if not inevitable, between these two nations?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. Now, after all of these messages had gone forward advertising Admiral Kimmel of the situation between these two nations, as the Chief of Naval Operations here saw them, what he did with the fleet upon these instructions was his own responsibility under Navy orders?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. I want to ask you, Admiral Turner, a question which probably is not pertinent or material, but inasmuch as a lot of
questions of that kind have gone into the record, I don’t believe that I am going to be stopped by the chairman if I ask this one question.

Assuming that Japan had not struck Hawaii, assuming they had struck the Philippines, as it seems most Navy officers thought they would if they did attack the United States, what war plans did you have to aid the Philippines in the event that Japan struck them first and made a landing there?

Admiral Turner. It was the same war plan, Rainbow No. 5, WPL46. That was a global plan and included orders to the Asiatic Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, the Atlantic Fleet, all of the naval coastal frontiers and the entire naval department and all of the services in the Navy Department.

Senator Lucas. Assuming that Japan had not destroyed our fleet in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, would it have been possible, in the opinion of naval experts, to have given relief to General MacArthur and his men before they were captured at Bataan in the following spring?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; it would be completely impossible.

Senator Lucas. I gleaned that from your statement a moment ago with respect to the fleet being a threat on the flank of Japan and I wanted to ask that question.

In other words, it has been stated many times—it hasn’t been stated, but it has been questioned—by many people as to why we did not give relief to MacArthur and his forces in the Philippines after the Japanese invaded in December 1941.

It is your studied opinion now that, even though we had not been attacked in the Hawaiians by the Japanese, we still would not have been able to deliver to our forces in the Philippines supplies and support before they were captured?

Admiral Turner. That is correct. It would have been completely impossible. That is, from that direction. Now, we made an effort and got some supplies, small in amount, up from the south, but that had nothing to do with the Pacific Fleet. I believe we sent one or two submarines from the Pacific Fleet, but as far as any material effect on the situation is concerned, why, the Pacific Fleet could not have gone out and relieved the situation.

Senator Lucas. Well, it was my understanding that a certain amount of relief did reach them, but it was only through submarines landing there at night.

Admiral Turner. And a few little, small ships from the south.

Senator Lucas. But so far as taking out the fleet to convoy a group of merchant ships with supplies and men, and so forth, it is your opinion that that could not have been done before we were captured there?

Admiral Turner. It could not. The only way that could be done was the approximate manner in which it was done. That is, step by step, and that took 2 years.

Senator Lucas. You stated in the examination of Congressman Cooper that, in your opinion, war had been more or less inevitable with Japan for many years. Didn’t you say years?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. What factors did you take into consideration when you reached that conclusion years ago?
Admiral Turner. The general national policy of Japan towards expansion in the Far East, starting with, actually, with their war with China in 1893, and the continuation of that; the growth of the militaristic spirit, the increasing education of the Japanese people to be completely submissive to the military leaders; the increased military influence in the Government; their actions in China from the earliest time, toward trying to get advantages of all kinds; their attempt to hold on to Shantung after World War I; the Tanaka Memorial, so-called—that may have been later, it may have been 1925—which, while he died, Mr. Tanaka was the epitome of Japanese aspirations toward military conquest and world conquest; [5303] their moving into China and refusal to make any arrangements, and gradually thereafter the formation of those associations “to bring light and happiness” to the Asiatic people.

Senator Lucas. In other words, it was the aggressive nature of the Japanese to expand that caused you to believe that sooner or later this country would be engaged in war with Japan.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and a definite crossing of our national policy and the threat to the Philippines and our position in the Far East which such aggressive tendencies had.

Senator Lucas. Was there anything during that period, upon the part of any of the officials in the War, Navy or Executive branches of the Government that caused you to reach that decision?

Was there any action or any opinions expressed either in the War, Navy or Executive branches of the Government that influenced your opinion that sooner or later we might get into war with Japan?

Admiral Turner. Yes, and on the part of the American people. The demand generally of the American people that we put an embargo on Japan for some years, and the refusal of American officials to completely back down and let Japan [5304] have their own way.

Of course that is not a criticism of them, naturally, but our adherence to our policy right along in support of China, and in support of the British and our refusal to just let the field, leave the field open to Japan, let them do what they pleased.

Of course, that had a very definite influence.

Senator Lucas. In other words, we would have had to forget completely about our basic and fundamental policies that we had pursued over a long period of years in this country, so far as our foreign policy in the Pacific is concerned?

Admiral Turner. That is my opinion.

Senator Lucas. And we would have had to yield completely to Japan if we wanted to stay out of war with them?

Admiral Turner. I believe so.

[5305] Senator Lucas. Now, do you know of anything in the last 3 or 4 months before December 7, 1941 in the Navy, the War, the diplomatic or any executive branch of the Government that tricked Japan into this war?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; far from it. We wanted to hold them off as long as we could and there was—I knew pretty well what people in all branches of the Government were doing with respect to this matter—and I think there was absolutely complete loyalty on their parts to the Constitution and to our constitutional methods of prosecuting foreign affairs and prosecuting war. There was never the
slightest tendency to do anything but what I believe was honest and sound.

Senator Lucas. That is all.

Mr. Clark. Mr. Murphy has some questions to ask at this time.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Turner, as I understand it, you were very close personally to Admiral Stark prior to December 7, 1941.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I find at one point that before the naval court of inquiry you stated that your duties included being a sort of professional adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations in matters pertaining to military operations and particularly [5306] with regard to preparation for war, to future operations, and also in respect of relationships with the War and State Departments. Would that be an accurate statement?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; not too much with the State Department. I had some direct relations. It was mostly as an adviser on questions that were of concern to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Murphy. Did you state before Admiral Hart that you considered yourself one of Admiral Stark's principal advisers and that you were close personal friends as well as closely associated officially?

Admiral Turner. I did.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, as I understand it you felt that the possibility of an attack on Hawaii was a 50-50 proposition.

Admiral Turner. Approximately.

Mr. Murphy. And you also felt that that would be one of the starting points of the war?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Were you in close contact with Admiral Hart in the month of October 1941?

Admiral Turner. Admiral Hart?

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark. I beg your pardon.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention to the file of [5307] letters between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel and particularly to a letter dated October 17, 1941.

Will you make that available, please? The letter I am referring to is dated October 17, 1941, and at the top of the page it says, "Received 23 October."

Admiral Turner. I have it.

Mr. Murphy. Do you have that letter?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I direct your attention, Admiral, to the second paragraph, a letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel [reading]:

Personally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility." In fact, I tempered the message handed to me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.

Would you say that that was Admiral Stark reflecting a 50-50 possibility of an attack on Hawaii and that war was certain on that date?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. I was very much astonished when I first saw that because I had not and did not later detect any opinion
like that. Of course, with regards to the 50-50 possibility we referred to a time that was about 7 weeks later.

Mr. Murphy. Except that you said that—

Admiral Turner. And I do not believe that Admiral Stark held that opinion around the latter part of November.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you said yesterday before us that you felt that war was certain in July.

Admiral Turner. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. And when do you think the 50-50 possibility arose? Was that before when war was certain?

Admiral Turner. War was certain. I believed war was certain, but in the event of war probably—well, right about the time of Pearl Harbor—I felt that there was at least a 50-50 chance that they would raid Hawaii.

Mr. Murphy. Now, what was there that occurred between July 26, 1941, and December 7, 1941, to change the situation so that it became a 50-50 proposition?

Admiral Turner. I am afraid I did not make myself clear. I was satisfied in July that we would be at war with Japan certainly within the next few months. I believed during the first part of December that the probability of a raid on Hawaii was 50-50. There was no change, Mr. Congressman. I do not know that I evaluated it in July as regards a raid. I was certain there was going to be war.

[5308] Mr. Murphy. I understood you to say that something happened right before December 7 that made you come to the conclusion that a raid on Hawaii was a 50-50 possibility or probability.

Admiral Turner. Nothing occurred to change any relative probability there at all. I said that I felt that there were two methods, two strategic methods that the Japanese Fleet could pursue. One was to go down and base their fleet in the mandates with the hope that our fleet would go after them and they would be in a good position. The other was to make a raid on Hawaii. There were two major methods and without evaluating it too much, too greatly, I thought it was about a 50-50 chance of the raid on Hawaii.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, as I understand it in July you felt that it was certain that we would be at war with Japan in a few months and yet in the month of August you made a report and a forecast that they would attack Siberia, didn’t you?

Admiral Turner. That was a possibility there and was a new development, and I believe that they had taken it in mind. You remember the attack by Germany on Russia was, I think, the 24th of June and by August Russia was in a—had suffered some severe defeats and there were movements up to Manchuria of Japanese troops which started, I think, along in the first part of August and continued on into October.

Mr. Murphy. Do we have here, Admiral—

Admiral Turner. Sir?

Mr. Murphy. Do we have here available your forecast of the Japanese attack on Siberia in August? Do we have that available?

Admiral Turner. Yes, I have that. I think it is the dispatch of the 3d of July, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Murphy. Well, that would be a message from the Chief of Naval Operations to the various outlying theaters, but wasn’t there some fore-
cast made by you to Admiral Stark at that time, a written report or something, upon which this message was based?

Mr. Clark. Mr. Murphy, it is 12:30 and I presume during the luncheon hour maybe you can get that straightened out.

The committee will stand in recess until 2 p.m.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m. of the same day.)

[5311]

AFTERNOON SESSION, 2 P.M.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER (Resumed)

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Murphy will resume his examination.

Mr. Murphy. What was the status of the record at the time of adjournment, Mr. Reporter, please?

(The record was read by the reporter, as follows:)

Mr. Murphy. Do we have here available your forecast of the Japanese attack on Siberia in August? Do we have that available?

Admiral Turner. Yes, I have that. I think it is the dispatch of the 3d of July, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Murphy. Well, that would be a message from the Chief of Naval Operations to the various outlying theaters, but wasn't there some forecast made by you to Admiral Stark at that time, a written report or something, upon which his message was based?)

Mr. Murphy. Do you understand the question now before you, Admiral?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I ask for a moment.

So far as I recall there was no memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations covering the subject matter of the dispatch of July 3, 1941, addressed for action to the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet and for information to a number of addressees. I beg your pardon, I have the incorrect reference. The dispatch I referred to is No. 031939.

Mr. Murphy. It is the dispatch of July 3, 1941, contained on page 4, Exhibit 37.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. So far as I recall there was no memorandum on that subject. It was discussed with various officers, including War Department officers and officers in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Mr. Murphy. I understood your testimony to be that on July 26 war with Japan was certain, and that the probability of an attack on Hawaii was 50-50. Did you have that in mind at the time of the sending of this dispatch of July 3, 1941?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, ultimately, within the next several months. Also at that time, on July 3, owing to troop movements of Japanese troops and through magic intercepts which showed the Germans were urging the Japanese to join in against the Russians, it looked like the first move might have been against Russia instead of to the south, but I felt that that would be succeeded, if successful, by war by the Japanese against the United States; that in any war by the Japanese against the United States, where they initiated it, that there was a very good probability, on the order of 50-50 [5312] that the first move would be accompanied by a raid against Hawaii. That was—
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, can you point out to the committee anywhere, at any time, any single word in writing where you said that anywhere, at any time, to anyone, where you made such a statement in writing?

Admiral Turner. That is the 50-50?

Mr. Murphy. Yes. I am talking now about before December 7. Incidentally, I have never seen a Monday quarterback of a football game. What we want is what happened before December 7, 1941. Now, is there anywhere, at any time, where you said to any person anything like that in writing or to anyone in the Navy Department, any paper that will show it by anyone in the Department?

Admiral Turner. No, not anything on the 50-50, but I invite your attention to the consideration of the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24, to the Bellinger-Martin agreement, to the estimates that were made by the Commander in Chief in his war plan and in his estimate, to letters between the War and Navy Departments as to the strong possibilities that war would be initiated with a raid, an air raid on Hawaii.

Mr. Murphy. That was in the —

Admiral Turner. On the 50-50, I was asked my opinion as to what I thought the chances were, and I said I thought about 50-50. I never put that in writing.

Mr. Murphy. The letter of the Secretary of War and the letter of the Secretary of the Navy spoke about what would happen if there was an attack on Hawaii, but where do you find in either of those letters anything that would indicate that the war would start by an attack on Hawaii?

Admiral Turner. I invite your attention to the wording in the first paragraph of the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 24. The last sentence says:

If war eventuates with Japan it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor.

That is, if a war under any circumstances occurred it would be initiated by such an attack. That is the same thought that is in the Martin-Bellinger agreement, it is the same thought that many, many officers of the Navy Department and the War Department have had for many years, that the war would probably start and be fought generally in the Asiatic lands but it would be accompanied by an air raid and an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Murphy. Now, will you point out anything in your estimate of the situation of July 3, 1941, that would point anything like that out or indicate anything like that? That was a current estimate of the situation, wasn’t it, July 3d?

Admiral Turner. That is correct. As I have mentioned before, this was the major—it was speaking of the major principles—and inherent in any eventual war with Japan was the belief in the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Murphy. Well, is there anything like that in your dispatch of July 3, 1941?

Admiral Turner. That is not mentioned there.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, to page 108 of the Navy's Narrative Statement of Evidence in the Pearl Harbor
Investigation, volume 1. Do you have a copy that the Admiral can use?

Mr. Gesell. No; we do not have a copy.

Mr. Murphy. Does anyone have a copy of volume 1 that he might let the Admiral use?

Admiral Turner. I have never seen that.

Mr. Hannaford. Here it is.

Mr. Murphy. I am referring, Admiral, to page 108, in which is set forth section 1333 of WPL 46 and I will read section 1333:

To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan’s initial action will be toward

[5316] (a) Capture of Guam;

(b) Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea by the establishment of advanced bases and by the destruction of United States and Allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon;

(c) Capture of Northern Borneo;

(d) Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Carolines-Mariannas area, by the use of fixed defenses and by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet;

(e) Reinforcement of the mandate islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces;

(f) Possibly register like stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States possessions.

Now, I am wondering where in there there is anything that would indicate that there was a 50-50 possibility of commencing the war by a raid on Hawaii? That is the alternate plan.

[5317] Admiral Turner. I said that my estimate was 50-50, and that that estimate was shared by other officers. In “f”, which you last read, possibly raids on other outlying United States possessions.

Mr. Murphy. Is there anything in Rainbow 5, section 1333 that agrees with your estimate of the situation?

Admiral Turner. That does.

Mr. Murphy. Where?

Admiral Turner. Possibly raids.

Mr. Murphy. “Raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other outlying possessions.” You mean the 50-50 proposition would be covered in general terms in section F in what Japan would have to accomplish in her initial action, that the 50-50 proposition would be covered in section F, in general terms?

Admiral Turner. This is a Navy Department publication. The WPL46 is a Navy Department publication. While War Plans prepared it, those estimates also reflected the opinion of the War Department, and that is the official publication. I have not said at any time that either the War Department or the Navy Department thought there would be a 50-50 chance of a raid on Hawaii, because I do not believe they did.

Mr. Murphy. Your message, Admiral, of November 27 to Admiral Kimmel tells him “Execute an appropriate defensive [5318] deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46”, and when you go to WPL46, to section 1333, I do not see the name of Hawaii mentioned.

Admiral Turner. Those are not the tasks. The tasks were read yesterday, and the defensive task read yesterday was the task requiring the defense of the Territory of the Associated Powers. This is part of the estimate which is in the front part of WPL 46.
Mr. Murphy. It does say, however, Admiral, "to accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be outlined in these paragraphs," doesn't it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. Those are not the tasks.

Mr. Murphy. Well, the tasks are in section 3212, are they not? The tasks are on page 103, and I find on page 103 of volume 1 of the Narrative Statement of Evidence in the Pearl Harbor Investigations paragraphs A, B, G, H, and I of the Rainbow Plan, or WPL 46, reading as follows:

The U. S. Pacific Fleet is assigned the following tasks Pacific areas, and then there is outlined "A" which pertains to the Malay Barrier. Let me read it exactly:

Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls and through raids on enemy sea communications and [5319] positions.

B. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk.

G. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering and patrolling as required by circumstances and by destroying enemy raiding forces,

H. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of any military power in the Western Hemisphere by supporting land and air forces and denying the enemy the use of such positions in that hemisphere.

And

I. Cover the operations of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

That would cover Hawaii in H and I, would it not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. There are tasks omitted, of course.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. They are in the record as you read them yesterday.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Do you see anything in section 3212 that would make Hawaii a 50-50 proposition for a starting point in case of war?

[5320] Admiral Turner. There is no estimate in there as to a 50-50 chance. It orders him to protect the territory.

Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, I would like to direct your attention to the memorandum that was given to the President of the United States on November 5, 1941, by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations. Will you kindly look at that?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I see it.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention, if you please, to page 13:

The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war in cooperation with the British and Dutch for the defense of the Philippines and British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced.

I assume you are referring there only to the Far East as apart and distinct from the Pacific?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, down below:

The potency of this threat will then have increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the area south and west of the Philippines.
In that memorandum of the 5th of November there is a statement from the Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark to the effect, as I read it, that if we succeeded in building up our forces as expected at that time, that we would deter Japan from going to war. Is that right?

Admiral Turner. That is in there; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And yet you say we were certain we were going to war back in July.

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Well, do you change your estimate now, in view of the memorandum which was prepared by your department, I take it, on the 5th of November 1941?

Admiral Turner. That was prepared in cooperation with the War Department and represents the views held at that time by the War Department and by the Navy Department.

Mr. Murphy. Well, what were your views as to the certainty of war at the time this statement was issued?

Admiral Turner. I believed it was certain.

Mr. Murphy. You did not believe then what was being told the President as the true reflection of the true situation at that time?

Admiral Turner. I thought that the increase of forces in the Philippines as then planned would be a deciding factor in deterring them.

Mr. Murphy. If it did deter them would war be certain? I mean those statements are contradictory, I take it. You said war was certain back in July. On the 5th of November, there is a statement to the President by the leader of each force, the Navy and Army, that we may avoid war by having the necessary forces there, and deter the Japs from going to war, as I read it.

Admiral Turner. That is the statement by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Murphy. Did you agree with that?

Admiral Turner. I did not agree that any plan of reinforcement of the Philippines would be a deciding factor in deterring Japan from making war.

Mr. Murphy. Now, did you ever express yourself in that manner to Admiral Stark?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Is there anything in writing anywhere that will show your attitude at that time as head of the War Plans Division.

Admiral Turner. No, I do not believe there is.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, at that time, 1 month preceding Pearl Harbor, when the Navy and Army were giving the President an estimate of the situation, it was at variance with the opinion of the Chief of the War Plans Division of the Navy; is that right?

Admiral Turner. In that sentence; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, you have stated on the record that you believed that war was certain in July of 1941, and I take it that your reason for stating that was because of these economic sanctions, or was it because of the course of action which Japan had been pursuing ever since 1931?

Admiral Turner. The course of action which Japan had been pursuing, and the course of our diplomatic negotiations with them, and recent statements by the Japanese, because the economic sanctions were not put on until the 26th of July, I think.
Mr. Murphy. The Army witnesses before us testified that they had
given an opinion to their superiors, and to the President in their esti-
mates of the situation, in which they encouraged the placing of eco-
nomic sanctions. Was the Navy ever asked for its opinion and did
they express it?

Admiral Turner. It was asked for its opinion on several occasions.
Admiral Stark was asked for an opinion by either Secretary Hull or
Secretary Knox. I discussed the matter with him several times, and
each time expressed the view that the putting on of economic sanctions
would hasten the war with Japan and make it almost certain.

Mr. Murphy. Well, assuming that we did not put economic sanctions
on, that we would have continued to give them scrap, we would have
continued to give them oil, they would have continued to build up
their war machine, do you believe if we had not put the sanctions on
them that would have resisted the onward advance of their military
forces?

Admiral Turner. I did not say that I opposed putting on the eco-
nomic sanctions. I merely said—which I believed and which is borne
out to be correct—that putting the [5326] economic sanctions
on would hasten war, and I think it had a very decided influence in
hastening the war.

Mr. Murphy. You think then, if we had not put the economic sanc-
tions on, and Japan had built up its forces, that they would have been
law-abiding citizens?

Admiral Turner. I said hastening war. It would not have pre-
vented it at all. The only object that I could see in putting off the
war with Japan was so we could get our war potential higher. We
were improving at a rate considerably greater than the Japanese were
during the fall of 1941.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I take it while you say you felt in time
that war with Japan was certain, you felt it was certain, did you not,
back in January when you prepared that letter for the Secretary of the
Navy?

Admiral Turner. My statement, as I recall it, was not that it was
certain. I said I felt for many years that ultimately war was inevi-
table with Japan and I became convinced in about June and July that
war was imminent within the next few months.

Mr. Murphy. Did you feel that way in January, that we were going
to go to war with Japan, when you prepared that letter for the Secre-
tary of the Navy?

Admiral Turner. I believed it would come at some time.

[5326] At that particular time I felt it might be put off.

Mr. Murphy. How long?

Admiral Turner. No definite term. It might even be put off until
the end of the European war.

Mr. Murphy. What was your opinion in April of 1941?

Admiral Turner. About the same, that it was certainly worth
working for, to put the war off, and it was greatly to our advantage,
assuming that we would be at war with Germany in the course of time,
that we should keep out of war with Japan, if possible until after we
had obtained success in the Atlantic.

Mr. Murphy. Did you make a statement, Admiral, on the 17th day
of April, to the effect, "I do not agree that Japan has decided to strike
even against Indochina"?
Did you make that statement in writing?
Admiral Turner. May I see what document that is from?
Mr. Murphy. Referring to a note on the bottom of the paper headed "Memorandum for the Director," dated April 17, 1941, reading entirely as follows:

I do not agree that Japan has decided to strike, even against Indo-China. See my memo of Feb. 5th. R. K. T.

That would be you, would it not?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; that is my writing. The word "decided" is underlined.

Mr. Murphy. That is right. What did you mean by that?
Admiral Turner. I meant exactly what it said. I did not agree that Japan at that particular time had come to a definite decision to send troops or to make war then against anybody, even against Indochina, that is "decided" as regards any particular date or period.

It was not until June and July and subsequently that I came to the conclusion that war then was imminent. At this time I still believed it might be possible to put it off, to postpone it for some time.

Mr. Murphy. And yet you did prepare the letter for the Secretary of the Navy in January?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. That does not say we were going to have war, that it is immediate.

Mr. Murphy. Now, will you produce that memorandum of February 5, to which you refer? Do you have that, Admiral, or can you get it?

Admiral Turner. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman, I do not know what the reference is.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I was just wondering. You say there "See my memo of February 5th," and I was wondering what that memo would say.

Can you tell me where I could find it?

Admiral Turner. I remember what it was. I have not seen a copy of it since coming back here.

About the time of the starting of the ABC conversations the British sent in a very urgent alarm to us saying that they had very strong evidence that Japan was going to attack Singapore about the 10th of February, and there was considerable excitement about it.

I wrote a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations in which I pointed out that it was not possible for them to strike Singapore on February 10, because they were not deployed for it; they did not have troops deployed to the south, and most of their Navy was in Empire waters, and I discounted the report from the British, I said that they would not strike at any time until they had deployed their troops and had acquired bases in the south.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, I request the liaison officer of the Navy to find the exact memorandum of February 5 of Admiral Turner, so we might have it for the record.1

May I inquire of counsel if this letter of April 17, 1941, has been offered as exhibit 81, but the particular letter and note of Admiral Turner have not been spread in the record?

Mr. Gesell. That is right. The entire exhibit has been introduced.

1 The Navy Department subsequently advised the committee that search of its files failed to disclose a copy of this memorandum. See Hearings, Part 10, p. 5133.
Mr. Murphy. I ask that the memorandum of April 17, 1941, and the note of Admiral Turner be spread in the record at this point.

The Vice Chairman. So ordered.

(The document referred to follows:)

In reply to No.
Op-16-F-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, APRIL 17, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Subject: British-Japanese Crisis.
1. On April 16, 1941, the Domei (Japanese) News Agency reported from Bangkok that repeated attacks by British troops on Thai territory along the Thailand-Malaya frontier caused the Thai Government to lodge a protest with British authorities. Domei said the protest was announced by the Thai Foreign Ministry, and added that no further details regarding these attacks were given.

2. For some months past the Japanese have been concentrating troops at Formosa, Hainan Island and Kyushu. There has been a gradual shortening of lines in Central China, and movement of troops from this area to Formosa and Hainan Island. There has been also a gradual reduction of Japanese troops in North China, which were in some instances replaced by Manchukuo levies. Within the last two weeks some 8,000 Japanese troops, 3,500 of whom had received special instruction in jungle warfare, left Indo-China for unannounced destinations. During about the same period, some 11,000 fresh troops from Japan arrived in Central China, and 11,000 veterans left Central China for Formosa. The Japanese Fleet is in home waters. A strong force is near the Palau Islands. It is probable that in case of a drive on Singapore, a strong flanking force would be maintained in the Palau Island area.

3. A report from the Naval Attaché, Tokyo, states that there are persistent rumors in Tokyo that Japan plans an early attack on Singapore. Although the Japanese deny this, credence is lent the story by the above facts, and by the severe blows suffered by Britain in the Balkans. Britain's merchant tonnage is suffering so heavily that the question of American convoys is coming prominently to the fore. [5330] Some move to keep the American Fleet in the Pacific and thus prevent the diversion of any American strength from the Pacific to convoy duty in the Atlantic would seem logical for the Axis to make at this time.

4. When to all this is added Japan's new position with regard to Russia, whereby she apparently has a Russian guarantee of non-interference in case of a southward drive, it may be that the Domei article is the beginning of a Japanese drive on Singapore. Newspaper attacks have often preceded Japanese military attacks, and newspaper attacks invariably precede the military attacks of her Axis partners.

/S/ A. H. McColllum.
A. H. McColllum.

CC—OP-16-1
OP-16-F

[The following written in longhand:] The Japanese Fleets have been re-organized, also. C. H. C.
I do not agree that Japan has decided to strike, even against Indo-China. See my memo of Feb. 5th.

RKT.

[5332] Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral Turner, there has been some testimony by General Miles to the effect that during 1941 there was an attempt made by the Army and Navy to have the Joint Intelligence Committee set up and there was testimony to the effect that there was a preliminary meeting held but that no actual meeting was
held until after Pearl Harbor, and the reason given by General Miles was that the Navy could not find office space.

Was that the real reason why that was not set up?

Admiral Turner. I can give you the entire history on that, if you will give me a moment or two.

Mr. Murphy. I wish you would.

[5333] The Vice Chairman. You may proceed if you are ready, Admiral.

Admiral Turner. Sometime in the late spring, I think it was about June, there was a proposal made to set up a superintelligence organization under the command of then Colonel Donovan, an organization which developed later into the OSS.

The proposal, as I recall it, was that the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Department, would become integrated into this new office under Colonel Donovan. That proposal so far as relates to those two divisions was opposed by both the War and Navy Departments.

Then there was a proposal made that these two offices would absorb Colonel Donovan’s organization.

On the 16th of July 1941, the joint board considered a memorandum from General Miles dated the 14th of July, the subject Coordination of military and naval intelligence with the office of coordinator of information.

That was the one that wanted to amalgamate them, and put them all directly under the joint board.

And there was a memorandum on the subject also, dated the same date, from the Director of Naval Intelligence.

Now, these papers were read to the board, but the [5334] memorandum I had here, looked up recently, says they were not put in the file. They were summarized in paragraph 1 of Joint Board No. 329, serial 710, a copy of which I have.

Now, a part of the recommendation was that the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, should become members of the joint board and form an organization which would report directly to the joint board. That was referred to the planning committee, and the planning committee made a report to the joint board dated 10 September 1941.

In that report the Planning Committee, by previous or intervening action of the Joint Board, had stricken out the question of bringing Colonel Donovan’s organization and also the Joint Board by an intervening action had decided that they did not want these two officers on the Joint Board because it would make the Board too large.

Mr. Murphy. Did you oppose it personally?

Admiral Turner. Oppose making them members of the Joint Board?

Mr. Murphy. Did you oppose making the Office of Naval Intelligence a member of this board?

Admiral Turner. That was, I believe, unanimous on the part of the eight members.

[5335] Mr. Murphy. Didn’t you express yourself personally on the matter?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Why? Will you tell us what your opinion was and why they shouldn't have this working arrangement, so that Navy and Army Intelligence would report and be a part of the Joint Board, with war certain, in your judgment, at that time?

Admiral Turner. I beg your pardon. I said that these two officers would become members of the Joint Board. That was opposed.

Mr. Murphy. Why did you oppose it?

Admiral Turner. Because the Board would then be too large, and it was agreed to unanimously that we didn't want any more members of the Joint Board.

Mr. Murphy. Why? What harm would there be in having the Army and Navy Intelligence there going over this situation with war, in your opinion, certain, so that you could have the benefit of their judgment and they have the benefit of your judgment, in order to understand the coming of war, which, in your opinion, was certain?

Admiral Turner. They didn't need to be members for us to have their opinion.

Mr. Murphy. Your only objection was that by having these two members additional on the Board it would make the Board too large?

Admiral Turner. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. You were opposed to the Office of Naval Intelligence particularly being on the Board, weren't you?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Didn't you express yourself to that effect?

Admiral Turner. I don't recall saying particularly. I was opposed as the other members were to either one being on the Board.

Mr. Murphy. What were the relations between you and Admiral Wilkinson between the months of September and December of 1941? Were they friendly?


Mr. Murphy. Are they still friendly?

Admiral Turner. They are still friendly. They have always been friendly.

Mr. Murphy. Well, then, when you talked about this decrypting and decoding at Hawaii, and you talked to Admiral Noyes about it, did you talk to Admiral Wilkinson about it?

Admiral Turner. I didn't talk to Admiral Wilkinson about decrypting because he had nothing to do with decrypting.

Mr. Murphy. You said yesterday that you understood that Admiral Kimmel was getting all of this decrypted material and the person who was in charge of Naval Intelligence and the person in charge of distributing it to the various people in Washington, and certainly who knew considerable about it, was the Chief of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson. Don't you think he would have known what they had in the outlying fields?

Admiral Turner. He had nothing to do with the codes and I believe he testified he didn't know what the codes were.

That was exclusively within the Communications organization until it was decrypted here and delivered to the Office of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence.

Mr. Murphy. I don't mean the codes. I am talking about facilities. He testified before this committee that he knew all
about it, told us what facilities they had there. He must have had that information at that time.

Admiral Turner. Decoding facilities, Mr. Congressman?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, decoding and decrypting and translating facilities.

Admiral Turner. I misunderstood that.

Mr. Murphy. Here is a man, an Admiral at the time, the head of one of the Departments in the Navy, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations on a very vital matter, yet no consultation is had between the head of War Plans and the head of Naval Intelligence on that very subject.

Can you explain that?

Admiral Turner. I have already explained it, and I will say again that the Office of Naval Intelligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the technique of decrypting and receiving and intercepting magic messages. The Communications Office did all of that work and after it had been decrypted and translated by either them or MID they delivered the copies in English to the Office of Naval Intelligence for further processing.

Mr. Murphy. And they in turn delivered it to you; that is right, isn't it?

Admiral Turner. Correct.

Mr. Murphy. During this time, from the time you felt that war was certain, did you have staff meetings of Naval Intelligence, of War Plans, of the Chief of Naval Operations, consultations and discussions?

Admiral Turner. There was daily a meeting in the Secretary's office of the heads of the Divisions of the Office of Naval Operations in which the situation was presented by the Director of Naval Intelligence and general discussion was held.

Mr. Murphy. In all those discussions wasn't there any time, in this critical period, when there was some discussion of what kind of material was available to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Turner. The only times that there was any discussion, that I know about. was when I, on my own initiative, took the matter up to inform myself, because that was not within my province to do.

Mr. Murphy. Wasn't it within somebody's province at your staff meetings to discuss what information was available to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet who was about to be confronted with war, wasn't that discussed generally back and forth and each one adding their ideas?

Admiral Turner. Not with respect to the decryption of magic. That was secret, and properly so.

Mr. Murphy. It wasn't secret to any man in the room, because every man in the room was getting it regularly. The Chief of Naval Operations, head of Naval Intelligence, and you, as head of War Plans, each one of you had it each day and had had for months before then.

Why wouldn't you be able to discuss how much of this material, if any, was going to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Turner. The Secretary's meetings were held and were attended by about 25 or 30 officers and civilians. We had no regular meetings of the heads of the Divisions.
Mr. Murphy. You say you never—
Admiral Turner. In the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Mr. Murphy. You say that Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner and Admiral Wilkinson did not sit down together from time to time to discuss the progress of events coming up to a war which you felt was certain, apart from civilians and apart from everyone else?
Admiral Turner. There were many occasions when we held conferences, those three, with others that were interested, in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. There were many occasions when I consulted Admiral Wilkinson in his office or he consulted me in my office or we talked matters over with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

[5341] Mr. Murphy. Were there ever occasions when Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner and Admiral Wilkinson were in the same room discussing the progress of events in the Pacific, and just you three? If not, why not?
Admiral Turner. I don't recall any particular occasions. I remember that there were many times when we were called into Admiral Stark's office and possibly others—
Mr. Murphy. Wasn't—
Admiral Turner. For discussing some particular aspect of the situation.

Mr. Murphy. Wasn't there ever a time that you can recall when the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral Turner and Admiral Wilkinson were together discussing the situation in the Pacific?
Admiral Turner. I recall no specific dates.
Mr. Murphy. But do you recall what occurred between September and December 1941 at any time?
Admiral Turner. I recall no specific dates.
Mr. Murphy. Do you recall any specific meetings?
Admiral Turner. Not about any specific subject. I know that—I am quite sure—that during that time there were many occasions when those officers, plus possibly others, were in Admiral Stark's office discussing various matters with regard to the situation.

[5342] Mr. Murphy. Well, you asked Admiral Noyes about what was available to Admiral Kimmel. Did you ask Admiral Wilkinson what was available to him?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; because it was not within Admiral Wilkinson's province to supply such material and the decryption and translation of that material was a matter of Communications, of which Admiral Noyes had charge.

[5343] Mr. Murphy. Did you ever discuss it in Admiral Wilkinson's presence?
Admiral Turner. I don't remember that I did.
Mr. Murphy. Did you ever tell Admiral Stark that Admiral Kimmel was getting that information?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, on three occasions he requested me—asked me—if Admiral Kimmel was, and I said I would find out, and I asked Admiral Noyes about it and so reported to Admiral Stark.
Mr. Murphy. You were asked three times about it, and not once did you ask the Chief of Naval Intelligence what was available to Admiral Kimmel?
Admiral Turner. Because he had nothing to do with that particular matter.

Mr. Murphy. Yet you were friendly?

Admiral Turner. Entirely.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I come to the next proposition. If you will go back to the exhibit which is before you, Admiral, the memorandum—

Admiral Turner. I have not fully answered your previous question concerning this.

Mr. Murphy. No, you did not. I want you to pursue that, yes.

Admiral Turner. Do you wish the rest of the story?

[5344] Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Admiral Turner. After eliminating those questions about Colonel Donovan’s organization, and the questions about the membership on the Joint Board, the Joint Planning Committee drafted a report in which they were agreed, with one exception, and that exception was that in accordance with previous practice, the Military Intelligence Department wanted to prepare the enemy estimate of the situation.

I beg your pardon. The agreement was to form a joint intelligence committee composed of four members from the Army—three members from the Army—and three members from the Navy intelligence systems, and have additional civilian personnel and to have separate office space, near the joint strategic committee, which had office space in the Navy Department, War Plans Division.

The only point of disagreement was on the preparation of the enemy estimate of the situation.

In accordance with custom, the War Department felt, that is, in accordance with War Department custom, the War Department members of the Joint Planning Committee desired to have the reports of the Joint Intelligence Committee cover the entire estimate of the strategic situation in their reports to the Joint Board.

The custom of the Navy had been, and always has been, that the planning body makes the entire estimate of the situation, our own estimate, and the enemy’s estimate. That still prevails. The report was delayed possibly 2 weeks while settling that point.

Mr. Murphy. When was the first meeting of the Board?

Admiral Turner. The report—

Mr. Murphy. The day after Pearl Harbor, wasn’t it?

Admiral Turner. There are one or two minor matters.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Admiral Turner. The report was sent to the Joint Board on the 10th of September, 1941, was approved about a week after that—I haven’t the date right here, was approved by the Secretary of War on the 29th of September, by the Secretary of the Navy on the 10th of October, and general orders were issued, although that was put into effect immediately, general orders were issued by both the War and Navy Departments the latter part of November.

There was a very great difficulty about setting up this Joint Intelligence Committee because of the lack of space. Everybody was very badly crowded. And the committee, or the Director of Naval Intelligence, took the matter up immediately with the Room Assignments Officer in the Department, but it was not for some considerable time.
Mr. Murphy. They had a meeting, did they not, within 24 hours after war started?

Admiral Turner. They had some meetings before that.

Mr. Murphy. Are you familiar, or can you name the date? General Miles said they had one meeting to organize and then they never functioned until the war was started.

Admiral Turner. The information that I have is somewhat different from the statement of General Miles. We have no record of any meeting of the committee attended by General Miles and Admiral Kirk, or Admiral Wilkinson, because they were not members of the committee.

There was on October 11, in memorandum No. 1, Record of Initial Meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, on October 11, you had a meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee from which was excluded the head of Intelligence of the Army and the head of Intelligence of the Navy?

Admiral Turner. They were not members of the Board. The Joint Intelligence Committee was not composed of those two officers. Those two officers appointed their own people without any interference by anybody else, and they did not appoint themselves as members of that Joint Intelligence Committee.

They had a meeting, an informal meeting, on October 11, at which organizational matters were discussed.

Mr. Murphy. Now, will you give me the date of another meeting, between October 11 and December 8, 1941, if there were any?

Admiral Turner. There was some informal action taken, I don't know whether it was a formal meeting or not; there was a recommendation on October 29 by that committee concerning office space, and final decision on the initial membership.

On November 6, it reports an action of the acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Miles appointing his members of the committee.

Then on November 14, there is further correspondence relating to the question of office space.

December 3 is the next one. A memorandum for the Joint Intelligence Committee, subject "Agenda for first full meeting." It does not give the proposed date of that. It gives the agenda.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate the meeting was held after the war started?

Admiral Turner. I take that back. On December 3, minutes of the first formal meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the committee assembled in room 4548, Munitions Building, at 11:30 a. m., December 3.

Mr. Murphy. What was that?

Admiral Turner. The committee assembled in room 4548 Munitions Building at 11:30 a.m., December 3.

Mr. Murphy. Who was present?


Captain W. A. Heard, U. S. N., Head, Foreign Branch, ONI (for the Director of Naval Intelligence).

The decision was that those heads would not devote their full time to the committee, but only part time.
Present as full-time members were:
Lieutenant Colonel Louis J. Fortier, G. S. C., from M. I. D.
Commander J. H. Foskett, U. S. N., from ONI.
Lieutenant Commander W. T. Kenny, U. S. N., from ONI.
Major Ludwell L. Montague, Cavalry, from M. I. D.

It was noted that a third full-time Army member, Lieutenant Colonel Vincent J. Meloy, G. S. C., designated by the Chief of the Army Air Forces had not yet arrived in Washington for this duty.

Mr. Murphy. Will you state what business was transacted at that meeting, if any?

Admiral Turner. Colonel Kroner was recognized as Chairman of the committee, and Captain Heard as vice chairman.

Mr. Murphy. Will you state, in substance, without burdening the record, if you can state in substance, what did occur.

Admiral Turner. It was decided to organize the committee into a Secretariat and four geographical sections, and there was a decision that this subdivision was for internal convenience only; the committee would act as a unit; assignment of officers to those sections; discussion of space assignments; establishment of the Secretariat in the War Department, pending acquisition of space in the Navy Department.

Mr. Murphy. You say they did have space then?

Admiral Turner. Assignment of the Secretariat in a room in the War Department until they had ample space.

There were several trial runs of a daily summary of military intelligence, that matter was considered.

All formalities necessary to the establishment of vacancies for the planned civilian personnel had been completed.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, on December 8, they met and did some business, didn't they?

Admiral Turner. I have no record here—oh, yes. Here is a paragraph:

The Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee was not fully activated until 9 December 1941 because, until that date, the Head Foreign Branch, ONI, was unable to obtain agreement within the Navy Department as to the office space to be provided. Except for this difficulty, the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee might have been activated by 1 November 1941.

That is a statement by the former Secretary of the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee, Colonel Ludwill Montague, dated 21 November 1945.

Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, if you will come back with me for one more question to the memorandum to the President of November 5, 1941, and referring to page 4 of that memorandum—do you have it?

Admiral Turner. I have it.

Mr. Murphy. Paragraph B, reading as follows:

War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territory whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies.

Did you also disagree with that portion of the memorandum to the extent that you felt war could not be avoided and that it was certain?

Admiral Turner. I didn't agree with that at all.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I direct your attention to a paper which was presented by you at the convening time at 2 o'clock.
Congressman Cooper questioned you this morning as to whether or not there had been received a report from Admiral Kimmel, and as I understand it that paper—which I think should be marked as an exhibit—is the report from Admiral Kimmel, immediately after December 7, or on December 8, 1941?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I saw this at the time. I have not read it today.

Mr. Murphy. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that that should be spread on the record at this point.

The Vice Chairman. Suppose we have the Admiral read it now.

Mr. Murphy. Will you read it please, Admiral?

Admiral Turner. From CINCPAC, Action, to OPNAV, priority, dated December 8, 1941, No. 080450 [reading]:

In spite of security measures which were in effect surprise attack by Japanese bombing and torpedo planes damaged all battleships except Maryland. Damage to Tennessee and Pennsylvania was moderate. Arizona a total wreck. West Virginia resting on bottom. Still Burning Oklahoma capsized. Honolulu, Hel- ena, Raleigh damaged and unfit for sea. Vestal damaged and beached. Curtiss moderately damaged. Destroyers Shaw, Cassin, Downes in drydock complete wrecks. As result of attack army airplane losses severe. There remain thirteen Baker Seventeen, nine Baker Eighteen, and about twenty pursuit planes. Approximately ten patrol planes remain available. Oahu, one patrol squadron at Midway. Recommend all available army bombers be sent to Oahu. Fire was opened promptly by all ships and number of enemy aircraft were destroyed. One enemy submarine was sunk. Possibly two more. Two carriers, seven heavy cruisers, three squadrons destroyers and all available planes search for enemy. Personnel behavior magnificent in face of furious surprise attack. Personnel casualties believed to be heavy in Oklahoma and Arizona.

The Vice Chairman. Was that report from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark?

Admiral Turner. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. On December 8, 1941?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Turner, as I understand your testimony, you felt that inasmuch as there had been a message sent out on November 27 to the effect that "this is a war warning" that Admiral Kimmel was told to prepare a defensive deployment, you felt there should be no more warnings, or additions sent to that, because that was sufficient?

Admiral Turner. I would like to say that that dispatch, neither that dispatch nor any other single dispatch concerning the military situation, certainly back as far as the one of October 16, should be considered alone.

Beginning October 16, that was the time of the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, a series of dispatches relating to the war or the pending war were sent. They included the one of the 24th. They included several others that went out. They also included the matter about the codes.

Looking at the matter as a whole, as Admiral Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and I did on December 5, we felt that they were adequate to give all necessary directions to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention to page 64 of the United States News. Do you have a copy of that available?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. I read from that the following from the Navy Board of Inquiry:

The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were drawn with [5354] this as a premise.

Is that true?
Admiral Turner. It is true that the plans were drawn with that as a premise.

Mr. Murphy. Well, if that is so, and you sent your message of the 27th, wouldn't it be important if you could supplement your message of the 27th with an additional memorandum which would narrow the time limit and give some indication of the immediacy of the attack?
Admiral Turner. That was done with the dispatches concerning the destruction of Japanese codes.

Mr. Murphy. The 1 o'clock message was also important?
Admiral Turner. Very.

Mr. Murphy. Why was there a reluctance in the Navy Department to send word about that?
Admiral Turner. I don't think there was—oh, you mean Admiral Stark's first decision not to send it and then his change. Why, he told me that he had told General Marshall that he felt nothing further was necessary.

Mr. Murphy. But if this is true, that they wanted to have it down within narrow limits, the 1 o'clock message is in the Navy Department several hours before General Marshall sees it, why didn't someone in the Navy Department send it to Admiral Kimmel?

[5355] Admiral Turner. I didn't know it was in the Navy Department several hours. As I recall Admiral Wilkinson's testimony, he showed it to Admiral Stark about 11:15. That is my recollection.

Mr. Murphy. I don't think so.
Admiral Turner. The 1 o'clock message?

Mr. Murphy. The 1 o'clock message was translated and available for distribution about 9:30. I don't want to misspeak. What is the correct time?

Mr. Gesell. My recollection of Admiral Wilkinson's testimony is that at 9:30 he showed the 14th part and about 10:30 the 1 o'clock message.

Mr. Murphy. But it was available for distribution long before that.
Mr. Gesell. As to 10:30 he is not clear as to whether he took the 1 o'clock message to Admiral Stark, or whether Admiral Stark had it earlier. I believe that is his testimony.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, Admiral, you were the Head of War Plans. You felt from July that war was certain, on the night of the 6th you have 13 parts and it is apparent that another part is coming, or if it is apparent that more is coming, yet you didn't arrive at your office until about 11:30 that morning?


Mr. Murphy. You would have been the person to prepare the additional message in order to give notice of the exact time to Admiral Kimmel, wouldn't you?
Admiral Turner. No, sir. That message did not change the situation in the least degree. It was a matter of information as to the
time, and it was not my business to send that dispatch out. I consider that that was entirely the province of the office of Naval Intelligence, to send out information.

It was no evaluation whatsoever. My office never sent out information.

Mr. Murphy. Well—
Admiral Turner. Except in connection with operations.
Mr. Murphy. Well, who was it that sent out about the codes?
Admiral Turner. That was sent out by Communications. One of them was sent out by communications, one by Office of Naval Intelligence. I have photostat copies of those here.
Mr. Murphy. Page 40 says "From OPNAV." Who would that be?
Admiral Turner. The photostatic copy says it originated by OP-16, F-2, from OPNAV, released by TS. Wilkinson's [5357] signature isn't there.

Admiral Ingersoll's initial is. And they get—OP 16, which is Admiral Wilkinson, gets back the original.
Mr. Murphy. Would that have to go over your desk before it could be sent?
Admiral Turner. That has a note, it hasn't my initials, but it says "OP-12 has seen."
Mr. Murphy. Didn't that have to go over your desk before it could be sent?
Admiral Turner. It did not have to, no, sir.
Mr. Murphy. What about the one on page 41?
Admiral Turner. The one on page 41 was released by J. R. Redman, who was the assistant to the Director of Naval Communications.
Mr. Murphy. Did that go over your desk?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; it did not. It was not necessary.
Mr. Murphy. Now, you say that the fourteen-part message would not be your particular function to handle, and yet I see on page 64:

The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were drawn with this as a premise.

[5358] Would not that tend to indicate that the time was getting short, the fact that they had severed relations and particularly in view of the fourteenth part of the message?
[5359] Admiral Turner. Those plans referred to were local plans drawn up in Hawaii with respect to the reconnaissance solely of airplanes, not with respect to anything else. The other plans which were drawn by the Commander in Chief and by the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District did not have to have any such affair. In addition to that, the security order, as I recall it, of the Commander in Chief did have a certain air condition where additional reconnaissance was to be made without respect to the war plans.
Mr. Murphy. Well, you were familiar, were you not, with the Martin-Bellinger report?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And that was the report that would require—the plans under that report would require time in order to figure out as closely as possible when the attack would occur, isn't that right?
Admiral Turner. I did not agree particularly with that. That was unnecessary. Since that time and before that time, as a matter of
fact, we have maintained reconnaissance with that types of planes for months on end.

Mr. Murphy. It is a fact, sir, is it not, Admiral, that if you have so many planes that you can use in the air and you might have to use them, and you gave out a warning on October 16 and another warning on November 24 and an- [5360] other warning of November 27, that it would have been of great assistance to the Admiral in control of the Pacific to have something that would point to a certain time or to an approaching time so that he could accelerate his reconnaissance and do whatever he thought necessary under the circumstances, isn't that so?

Admiral Turner. There was only one war warning and that was on the 27th of November. Of course, it would have been highly desirable for the Commander in Chief to have known exactly when the attack was coming and he certainly should have had at least a summary of the first thirteen parts and also the fourteenth part and have known about the other matter. Remember that from my standpoint I was under the impression that he was getting that.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, if there was anybody to send it out in Washington it was not your department, is that right?

Admiral Turner. It was not my department. That was information.

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now, Admiral, I direct your attention to page 65 of the United States News, the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, column 2, and right at the end of Section 12 I read the following:

The attack of 7 December 1941, on Pearl Harbor [5361] delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable. When it would take place was unpredictable.

Do you agree with that?

Admiral Turner. I agree with the first sentence. In think the exact date possibly was unpredictable, although after we got the 1 o'clock message it looked like that day.

Mr. Murphy. Well, do you agree that the attack was unpreventable and rest on that statement? I understood you to say that while it was not preventable, that is, to prevent it entirely, that if some things were done it would have been considerably mitigated in its effect.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, that is correct, but I believe that I also said that an attack of that nature is most difficult to stop entirely.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention to page 67, section 15 [reading]:

The greatest damage to ships resulting from the attack of 7 December was that inflicted by torpedoes launched from Japanese torpedo planes.

Whose function was it in Washington to keep Admiral Kimmel informed as to the progress made with torpedo planes in the European war?

Admiral Turner. The Office of Naval Intelligence would [5362] provide him, and I think did, with such information, technical information as they could obtain with regard to the use of torpedoes. A great deal was sent out on that. I think also the Bureau of Ordnance sent out Ordnance bulletins from time to time giving the latest information they had on that.
Mr. Murphy. Well, if the situation was such at Hawaii that they were proceeding on the theory that torpedo planes would not be particularly effective because of the shallowness of the water and if they were going on that premise, would the War Plans have something to do with changing the situation so that they would be ready for torpedo planes in shallow water?

Admiral Turner. Nothing whatsoever. We had nothing to do with material, except from an advisory viewpoint.

Mr. Murphy. I am talking about——

Admiral Turner. That matter was under the Bureau of Ordnance.

Mr. Murphy. But I am not talking about the supplying of them. I am talking about the effectiveness and the kind of a defense to have to meet it. Wouldn't that be War Plans?

Admiral Turner. Oh, yes. That was initiated by War Plans in a letter of January 24, 1941 and in memoranda and consultations with the Naval Districts Division which had all defenses, water defenses and fixed defenses, under [5363] their cognizance which were in the districts.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you think then that War Plans did all it should in order to apprise Admiral Kimmel as to the danger from that kind of attack?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. This Naval Districts Division took the matter up and there was correspondence with the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District concerning the use of nets and barriers and also sending them information on two occasions regarding the probable effectiveness of torpedoes in water of the depths in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, Admiral, the position of the ships at Pearl Harbor on December 7 was as a result of an order of Admiral Kimmel dated in September of 1941. Was there ever any order out of Washington by anybody in authority which changed the order of September 1941 of Admiral Kimmel's?

Admiral Turner. The order of September 21, if that is it, had three conditions. It had an enclosure (b) which on the date of September 21 gave the conditions that would be effective until further orders. In case of worse conditions expected it was the intention, which is evident from reading the order, to change those conditions and put other conditions into effect that would deal with the worse situation. That was Admiral Kimmel's order.

[5364] Mr. Murphy. Did anyone in Washington ever advise or command, either one, Admiral Kimmel to change his order of September 1941?

Admiral Turner. No. Under the conditions that would exist up to the time of sending out the dispatch of 27 November that situation covered—the conditions prescribed by that order were entirely adequate.

Mr. Murphy. But the defensive order in the message of the 27th was still within the discretion of Admiral Kimmel as to what particular defensive deployment there should be, isn't that right?

Admiral Turner. Entirely; entirely so.

Mr. Murphy. Now, was there ever any order from anyone in Washington that necessitated having more ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7 than were the direct result of the orders of Admiral Kimmel himself?

Admiral Turner. Not that I know of.
Mr. Murphy. Now, there is one thing that concerns me a little bit, Admiral. In your message of the 27th it states:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46.

As I understand it, WPL 46 itself would not come into effect until there was an order from Washington to put it into effect, is that right?

[5365] Admiral Turner. That is correct, modified by the understood condition of all military forces at all times, in all circumstances, to defend themselves if attacked.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, under section 0211, under the heading, "Execution of the entire plan," I see the following:

(a) Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV dispatch the naval establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, including acts of war. "Execute Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5."
(b) The date on the above dispatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise designated.

Do I understand that in the event of an attack such as had occurred, there would be no necessity whatever for the message from Washington to execute Rainbow 5?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. We sent out such a dispatch very shortly after we got the news of the attack but that did not affect the prior defense matter.

Mr. Murphy. Now, there has been some discussion about whose particular duty it was to estimate enemy action and I find some conflict in the record on that point. I would like to direct your attention to the testimony of Captain Glover on page 11 of volume 1 of the Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigation.

[5366] Captain Glover was assigned at that time, was he not, to War Plans Division?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I notice that he says on page 12, and I am now quoting from testimony by Captain Glover before Admiral Hart in the Hart hearings at page 174, under the heading (c):

The continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice may be given in regard to the composition and distribution of forces, operations, and other matters in relation to the execution of the plan.

Do you find that? That is under subheading (c).

Admiral Turner. I see it, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, as I understand it, Captain Glover's impression was that that was his job and his duty. Was that your impression?

Admiral Turner. Yes, that was his duty.

Mr. Murphy. Well, in other words, your Department had to make continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice may be given in regard to the composition and distribution of forces, operations, and other matters in relation to the execution of the plan?

Admiral Turner. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you give information from November 27 to December 7, 1941 as to the composition and distribution of forces? I assume that would be enemy forces, wouldn't it?

Admiral Turner. No, that is in regard to the composition and distribution of our forces. That is what that means. I assume that is
what he means. Those are his words, the composition and distribution of our forces, boat operations and other matters in relation to our execution of the plan.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I will go into that further in connection with the testimony before Admiral Hart. My impression is, however, that he is referring to enemy forces.

Now, then, I see on page 12 under subhead 4 Captain Glover states, and this was before Admiral Hart, page 176:

Referring again to the order of August 21, 1941, signed by the head of the Plans Section, War Plans Division, one paragraph of this order designated Commander Ansel, in collaboration with Captain Wright, to draft daily and submit to the Director (Admiral Turner) a short strategic summary of the international and political situation. Commander Ansel, in preparing these summaries, had made available to him dispatches of Military Intelligence Division, Naval Intelligence Division, the State Department, and the press.

And I am wondering if we have available those daily estimates which would cover your feeling that it was a 50–50 proposition and that war was certain; I mean if there was anything like that.

Admiral Turner. I do not know. Those were Commander Ansel’s estimates. I do not know whether they were saved or not. They were drawn up and circulated within the division. I do not know who else had copies. There might still be copies in the War Division files.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at a time of crisis like this daily estimates of that kind would be highly important papers to keep, would they not?

Admiral Turner. I have no doubt they were kept; they were filed, I think, probably; I am not sure, I wouldn’t say.

Mr. Murphy. Well, counsel, will you make those papers available, or try to make those papers available? [5365] Now, you have said that Captain McCollum came to you with a proposed message which he felt should be sent out to the forces in the Pacific and you said that the language of Captain McCollum’s report was substantially in the same language as the one that had gone out and you said that you did not find any particular—you said, “No, I did not ask him not to send it.”

If Captain McCollum’s message was in substantially the same language as the one that you had sent on the 27th wouldn’t he be infringing on your department and wouldn’t you tell him not to send it if it was in effect an operational order?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. In the first place, in my testimony I said that it covered the same ground but the language was not considered as firm and specific as the language in the dispatches of November 24 and 27. By no means would I have told him not to send it. As I have testified before, when the Office Of Naval Intelligence wanted to send out material even if it included strategic estimates and they cleared the matter with me and I felt it ought to go out, I would certainly approve sending it out. The decision not to send it was made entirely by Captain McCollum.

Mr. Murphy. Now, as I understand it, on Sunday morning, December the 7th, despite the fact that the 14 parts of the message were in and despite the fact that the 1 o’clock message was in, you received no word at your office and no word at your home that they were available?

Copies of the estimates were subsequently furnished to Representative Murphy. See Hearings, Part 10, pp. 5133-5134.
Admiral Turner. I did not. As I recall it, I saw the pouch with them in during the middle of the afternoon. The first I saw of the 1 o'clock message was, as I recall it, when I went to Admiral Stark's office the second time about 12 o'clock. He did not show it to me when I got into his office the first time at 11:15, I am quite sure.

Mr. Murphy. Wouldn't that 1 o'clock message be [5370] important to you in connection with this paragraph, page 64 again of the United States News:

The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were drawn with this premise.

That would be important, that 1 o'clock message, wouldn't it?

Admiral Turner. That 1 o'clock message would have been exceedingly important and when I saw it I asked Admiral Stark what had been done about it and he said that General Marshall was sending a dispatch out to the Army and was telling the Navy what had happened.

Mr. Murphy. Did you inquire in your Department as head of War Plans from those in the several departments as to why that had not been delivered to you before the time that it was?

Admiral Turner. No, I did not.

Mr. Murphy. Well, it was important and it would have been a big help in Hawaii, would it not?

Admiral Turner. It would not have been delivered to me much in advance—or it would not have been delivered to me in advance of the time Admiral Stark got it. It was customary for them to start with him and then go to Admiral Ingersoll [5371] so I was in my office from about 11:15 until 12 or possibly 12:15 and so far as I can recall no dispatch came in my office during that time.

Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, then, the Navy had a 1 o'clock deadline, they had seven copies of the message and even with the 1 o'clock deadline the Navy went step by step over the same routine as they would day after day before that instead of making it available to each one of you as quickly as possible, is that right?

Admiral Turner. I did not see the dispatch until it was shown to me by Admiral Stark.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I understood you to say that you spent an hour with Admiral Ingersoll discussing messages, discussing the message of the 27th of November and you spent 15 minutes with Admiral Stark discussing the message and you also say that it was the duty of the Naval Intelligence to send out any additional information. Did you discuss the message with Admiral Wilkinson and whether or not something in addition should be sent out?

Admiral Turner. My statement was that we discussed the whole situation, reviewed all the messages relating directly to it and canvassed to see whether or not we should send anything else out to the Commander in Chief that would help them in the present situation.

[5372] Mr. Murphy. Did you, Admiral, have Admiral Wilkinson present at any of those discussions?

Admiral Turner. I did not.

Mr. Murphy. Why?

Admiral Turner. I went to talk to my superior and he did not send for Admiral Wilkinson.
Mr. Murphy. Well, was Admiral Wilkinson consulted by anybody that you know on the sufficiency of the message of November 27?

Admiral Turner. Not by me.

Mr. Murphy. Do you have any reason that you can give the committee why Admiral Wilkinson, the head of Naval Intelligence, was not called into those discussions if it was his duty to send out the information, if any was available?

Admiral Turner. This was a matter which related to the major strategic situation. I do not know why he was not consulted during the two days that was under discussion. I do not know why I did not consult him. It was initiated with a discussion between—well, at different times the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief, Captain Schuirmann and myself.

Mr. Murphy. My last question is this: Did you at any time during the week of December preceding Pearl Harbor have a meeting at which time you and Admiral Wilkinson discussed the situation in the Pacific?

Admiral Turner. I saw Admiral Wilkinson several times and discussed the situation in the Pacific with him. As I testified, he told me on December 6 that he considered my report and that Japan was not going to attack the United States.

Mr. Murphy. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

[5374] The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster of Maine will inquire, Admiral.

Senator Brewster. Admiral, in connection with the point about overt act, I was interested in your commentary about that. I found in the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, headed by Admiral Murphy and Admiral Andrews, this statement, on which I would like your comment, at the bottom of page 64, referring to Admiral Kimmel:

Therefore, he had issued, on his own responsibility, orders that all unidentified submarines discovered in Hawaiian waters were to be depth-charged and sunk. In so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority and ran the risk of committing an overt act against Japan, but did so feeling that it is best to follow the rule “shoot first and explain afterwards.”

That seemed to me to be somewhat in conflict with your idea that he was not ordered not to do such a thing. What is correct on that?

Admiral Turner. He was never—pardon me. Let me consult the dispatch of November 24.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Turner. He was never ordered, so far as I know, not to commit an overt act, and I am glad this point came up because that may be the key to the reason he was not. The fleet was operating around in that area and for 16 or 17 months we had been operating under an order very similar to that one of the 21st of September. That was the second revision. The first had been issued about June of 1940 by Admiral Richardson, and we were taking the precautions—with the purpose of taking precautions—against some irresponsible Japanese in a submarine around our areas.

Now at a number of times during that 16 months they thought they had detected submarines and investigated, but could not find them. So that a few days before Pearl Harbor, why, this order was issued, and the Chief of Naval Operations was informed, and I knew it.
Senator Brewster. Now, Admiral, if you will confine yourself right to it, that is a statement of the Naval Board, that in so doing he exceeded his orders from higher authority.

As I understand you, you do not agree that that statement is correct. Admiral Turner. There were no orders from higher authority whatsoever to Admiral Kimmel not to commit an overt act.

Senator Brewster. And you know of no basis for that statement of the Court?

Admiral Turner. Other than a possible confusion with the Army dispatch.

Senator Brewster. All right. Now on the matter of the [5376] estimate in Washington, on page 72, the first column,

It is quite clear from the evidence that the responsible officials of the Navy Department had evaluated the information available to them in Washington to mean that a hostile move by the Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian area, except by submarines, but rather against Guam, the Philippines, and British and Dutch possessions in the Far East.

Now I had not supposed there was any question that you were a responsible official at that time in the Navy Department. You would come under that category, would you?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I was Staff Officer to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Brewster. You would not agree with that statement. That was the statement of the Judge Advocate General T. L. Gatch.

Admiral Turner. I do not agree with that.

Senator Brewster. Now they go on, and I quote again:

Those witnesses who, on 7 December 1941, held positions in the Navy Department which qualified them to speak authoritatively as to the prevailing opinion theretofore prior to the attack, are all in substantial accord that the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants had not deduced or inferred that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. On the contrary, the consensus in the Navy Department was that [5377] any attack would probably come in the Far East, and the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was given a comparatively low probability rating.

As I understand it, you would not agree with that.

Admiral Turner. No. There were a good many officers who felt that the attack was coming, and that there was a good possibility that Pearl Harbor would be involved. However, there were a great many officers here in the Department that did not think so, did not even think there was going to be war.

Senator Brewster. Could you name any of the responsible officers who agreed with you at that time in your estimate?

Admiral Turner. I cannot remember any of the senior officers that made a definite statement that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked. There were not too many of them that had the information that was held by the Chief of Naval Operations.

I believe that Admiral Stark thought there was a good possibility, and I believe that Admiral Ingersoll did. I think that Admiral Towers was of the opinion that an attack on Pearl Harbor was a good possibility.

Senator Brewster. I think that covers it, Admiral.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. He goes on with the further statement, and I quote again:

[5378] Those witnesses who stated that the information available to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference and deduction, that an attack on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers who were not on duty in the Navy Department at that time, or occupied subordinate positions.

That, too, you would not think was a warranted statement?
Admiral Turner. No, it was not warranted, Senator, as far as I was concerned, and these other officers. There were subordinate officers that considered the attack was probable.

Senator Brewster. Now I quote this opinion of an Army officer, a General at the time, and I ask your comment on it. He is referring to these various intercepts, and he says this:

The sequence of messages referred to, had they been known to a competent intelligence officer, with battle order and tactical background, beginning with November 14, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclusion, that Pearl Harbor naval installations were a target for attack, with November 25 or November 29 as the deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was involved, for some sort of naval seaborne sortie.

What would be your comment on that expression of opinion?
Admiral Turner. I believe if those dispatches had been adequately analyzed that his conclusion is correct.

[5379] Senator Brewster. Now, about the matter of the defense of the island. I understand you to say with the facilities there they could have done a much better job than they did. I guess that is about the way you put it.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. What would you say as to the contention which I find running through these reports, that while it was quite correct that they had enough facilities there to have possibly detected this approach of carriers, if they knew within narrow limits of time it was coming, that they had a warning as far back as October 24, they had an alert there, the Army had, a year earlier, there were a good many communications along this line, there were several warnings that they did not have the air reconnaissance facilities to maintain at all continuous control day by day?

They had the primary responsibility of having the fleet ready to function?
I call your attention to what Admiral Kimmel said in his letter to Admiral Stark on page 69, which perhaps puts it as well as it can be put, on this point, although it is referred to several times, where Admiral Kimmel is seeking much fuller information about what is going on. and he said he needed this information in order to estimate, and he said,

This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific [5380] situation where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities.

As I understand, in commenting on that, very serious weight was attached to that position of Admiral Kimmel, in view of this warning, and the question of whether or not he exercised proper judgment in deciding that he would not allocate the reconnaissance planes which he had available for aerial patrol.

What is your view as to balancing those two responsibilities?
Admiral Turner. I do not consider the dispatch of October 16—you said October 24. I think you are referring to the one about the fall of the cabinet, and to take proper deployment measures.

Senator Brewster. I think there was a letter of Admiral Stark on the 24th. Perhaps that was what I was confused with.

Mr. Murphy. Translated on the 23d.

Senator Brewster. What is that?

Mr. Murphy. Translated on the 23rd.

Admiral Turner. The first dispatch of that series that is the fall of the Konoye Cabinet was dated on October 16. Neither that, in my opinion, nor the dispatch of November 24 required any immediate action of a tactical nature in general.

The one of October 16 was to get his forces put out in the islands, and so on. It was only the war warning of the 27th.

Now as regards an effective patrol, he had 82 planes, I believe, some of which, of course, were under overhaul. Over a long period of time, under more severe conditions than he had there in Pearl Harbor or Kaneohe, I operated patrol planes directly against the enemy, from the open sea, sheltered, and have been able to get up daily from between one-third and one-fourth of the planes. That is as good as you can do.

Now I say he could have, from the 27th on, could have had in the air for an all-day flight, at least one-fourth of the planes and continued on indefinitely for months.

Senator Brewster. Yes. Now how much of a sector could that have covered?

Admiral Turner. Assuming that he would have available 60 planes, that would be 15 planes which, 50 miles apart, would cover a front at the north 750 miles long.

Senator Brewster. At a 700-mile quadrant, how many degrees would that cover?

Admiral Turner. I do not know. You take the length of the arc.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Turner. 50 miles apart—and you could have them a little farther apart—50 miles apart with 15 planes in the air is a total arc 750 miles in length.

Senator Brewster. Yes, but that is not the way they conduct it, is it? Don't they have each plane go out from the base and they cover so many degrees of the arc?

Admiral Turner. That is correct. I will have to do a little figuring.

Senator Brewster. Was not it about 4° to the 700-mile limit that they covered? Are you familiar with the August 24 report of Admiral Bellinger?

Admiral Turner. I saw it. I never had a copy of it.

Mr. Mitchell. That is Exhibit 13. Do you want to look at it?

Admiral Turner. That is roughly pretty closely 60° of arc, is a 700-mile radius for 15 planes.

Senator Brewster. That is 4°.

Admiral Turner. 700 miles.

Senator Brewster. That is a 700-mile radius. Admiral Richardson had considered the southwest sector the most dangerous, and he con-
ducted his patrol in that area. That was, I take it, the Mandated Islands.

Admiral Turner. Southwest?

Senator Brewster. Southwest; yes.

Admiral Turner. Well, there was a different situation then, than there was under Admiral Kimmel, because when I was originally there the naval air stations at Johnston Island and at Midway were not activated.

Now a smaller number of planes at those radii, you see, could cover a far greater arc. I always considered, and have expressed at various times, much the more dangerous sector was directly to the north where there were no outlying islands.

Senator Brewster. Then your estimate would have been, if you could only patrol a certain area, you would have gone into the northwestern sector, north and northwest, covering 60°, with possibly a variation from day to day?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; and I would have taken some of those planes—probably not covered the 60°—I would have taken a few of those planes and sent them to Midway and possibly Johnston Island, possibly some at Palmyra, although I doubt it.

Senator Brewster. On the Winds message, I wanted to clear up a little of your testimony from your former statement.

At that time you said in your examination, Admiral Turner, if I may quote from the questions which were asked you on page 1006:

In this information which you received from Admiral Noyes as to the receipt of the execute signal of the Winds code system, was it your understanding it referred to United States-Japanese relations?

Your answer at that time was, “Yes”.

As I understand now, you feel you got it somewhat clearer.

Admiral Turner. Was that before the Navy Court of Inquiry, Senator?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Admiral Turner. That is correct, because, up until the time I returned to San Francisco about 2 months ago, I thought the entire thing in that Wind message was authentic and that they had merely made a mistake about that “North Wind so-and-so”.

On talking to some of the officers who had gone into it in San Francisco, why, they said it had been found out later that that was a false broadcast picked out of the ordinary news, but it was news to me at that time.

Senator Brewster. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire.

Mr. Gesell. May I interpose a moment, Mr. Chairman?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Gesell. A question was raised by Senator Brewster having to do with the submarines being bombed by Admiral Kimmel, and I wanted to call attention to a letter of Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which appears in that folder of correspondence dated September 23, 1941, in which Admiral Stark states, among other things, “The existing orders were not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defense of sea areas.”
I thought perhaps those were the orders you referred to, that he subsequently violated. I believe you will find in Admiral Kimmel's letter, or Admiral Kimmel's correspondence, a letter to Admiral Stark saying he had decided to bomb.

I just wanted to call attention to that. I do not know what the significance of it is.

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Turner, when I heard you state that you believed the conflict with Japan was inevitable and that you had believed it for a long time, I said to myself, "Spoken like a true Californian." It is because that belief has been shared for many years in the West that nearly all of us are big Navy men and efficient Army advocates. That is why I voted for more money for national defense ever since I have been in Congress, when the President asked for it.

While you believed that war was inevitable for a great many years, our relations with Japan began to deteriorate rapidly about the middle of 1941, is that not correct?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. They had been deteriorating ever since Matsuoka came in there and had the Axis enter the Tripartite Pact. Beginning in the middle of 1941 it went down much more rapidly.

Mr. Gearhart. And because it was apparent from the information that you were receiving that there was an increasing rapidity in that deterioration you began to give closer attention to the activities of the Japanese and to the intercept messages that were coming over your desk?

Admiral Turner. Yes. We put in an organization in War Plans that would follow the affairs much more closely than they had before.

I personally continued to follow them in about the same way as I previously had.

Mr. Gearhart. When you began to see messages like this one that appears on page 100 of Exhibit 1, reading, "Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month," when the idea of the deadline began to appear over and over again in the dispatches that were being intercepted, you began to think there was some probability of imminent action by the Japanese, did you not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And that was further intensified when you received the message which is reported on pages 137 and of the same exhibit, containing this phrase, "I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my No. 736, and there will be no change." That, too, had its effect upon your mind?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Then when the message came through that is recorded on page 105 of the same exhibit containing this phrase, "This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen," that further had an effect upon your mind?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I saw those.

Mr. Gearhart. With respect to the imminency of war?

Admiral Turner. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Then I find one occurring at page 173 of the same exhibit, reading as follows, "That time limit set in my message No.
812 is in Tokyo time?" that and all the other messages I have just ad-verted to served to impress upon your mind that the Japs, for one reason or another, were determined upon a course which was going to go one way or another depending upon what happened in their relations with the United States?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. Now you knew from those messages, you knew from conferences in regard to negotiations between the Japanese and the Americans, the outcome of which the Japs hoped would be an agreement which would be acceptable to them, you knew about that, did you?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you hear about the offer of an agreement which the Japanese made to our Government on the 20th of November, 1941, and which appears in Foreign Relations, volume II, at page 755?

Admiral Turner. Yes. Yes; I knew that they had made an offer. I have forgotten whether I had seen it in these intercepts or I saw a draft which was brought back from the State Department by Captain Schuirmann, but sometime about that time I saw this offer, which I felt would certainly never be accepted by the United States.

Mr. Gearhart. That is the message which Mr. Hull in his testi mony has referred to as an ultimatum by the Japanese to the United States. You recall that, don't you?

Admiral Turner. I do not recall that he had referred to it as an ultimatum, but I recall having seen the message. I do not recall all the terms of it at the moment.

Mr. Gearhart. In view of the fact that the acceptance of the Japanese tender of agreement would have required the United States to have scrapped the so-called Nine Power Treaty and torn up the Kellogg Peace Pact, abandoned the John Hay Open-Door Policy, the very fact that it would have been necessary for the United States to have done those things made the acceptance of their agreement utterly impossible, unless we were willing to abandon all the principles for which we had stood for years and years; is that not correct?

Admiral Turner. I believed so.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, the acceptance of the Japanese program would have been a complete humiliation to the United States, would it not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now with the Japanese deadline messages and agreements in mind, what was the reaction within your mind when you heard of this tender of agreement by the Japanese, in the light of all of these deadlines?

Admiral Turner. Well, I though the deadline meant definitely war, that we were going to be attacked by Japan either on that date or within a very short time after that.

Mr. Gearhart. But the problem which you had, a problem which was shared by the Army, was one of gaining time, is that not correct?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. Our defenses were beginning to come in. The Army was beginning to get some things, some troops. If we could, put it off for even 3 months, why, we would have gained a decided advantage. In addition, the British Fleet,
which they had agreed to send to the Far Eastern area, part of that fleet was en route, but it would take time to get them ready.

We felt 3 or 4 months would be of immense advantage to the United States.

[5391] Mr. Gearhart. Now that you had learned that the Japanese had served upon us an ultimatum, what did you do about it or what was done in which you participated to obtain that very much needed time?

Admiral Turner. The memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff to the President, of date, I think, November 26, was a last attempt to gain time. I don't believe we had much hope that it would be effective. We had said and advised right along, that is, Admiral Stark and General Marshall, had advised Mr. Hull and the President, that we wanted time in the Pacific.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, that message——

Admiral Turner. And there wasn't very much more that we could do about it.

Mr. Gearhart. That message, which is dated November 27, was prepared a day before that, was it not; or do you know?

Admiral Turner. The preparation of that started, as I recall, immediately after the Joint Board meeting on November 24, and it took a day or two to get that up and to get an agreement and perfect it in that form.

Mr. Gearhart. Who were present at that Joint Board meeting?

I am referring to Exhibit 17.

Admiral Turner. Which is Exhibit 17, sir?

Mr. Gearhart. The document to which we are now referring is Exhibit 17 in this proceeding. That is the letter of November 27, 1941.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I have the joint board minutes. No; there was no meeting on November 24.

I suppose it probably was drawn up with relation to the dispatch of November 24 and to our knowledge of the proposed modus vivendi and the ultimate terms of settlement which were being considered by the State Department.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you attend any meetings between—say the 23d, 24th, 25th or 26th—at which the Secretary of State was present?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you have any discussions with Admiral Stark or General Marshall after they had had conferences with the Secretary of State, in reference to his intended action toward the Japanese?

Admiral Turner. I think every time Admiral Stark attended one of those meetings he would call me in and acquaint me with the pertinent facts, and every day I would talk to Captain Schurmann as to the latest development in the situation. He would go over there once a day or twice a day.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of the letter of November 27, 1941, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

[5393] Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; that was jointly written by General Gerow and myself. That was typed in my office. I think there is a stenographer's initials up there that I recognize.

Mr. Gearhart. Did the fact that Secretary Hull had delivered the Japanese a notice or tendered agreement on the 26th day of November have anything to do with inspiring this message, Exhibit 17?
Admiral Turner. No, sir, because we didn't know at the Navy Department until we got it through magic on the 28th.

Mr. Gearhart. On the 28th you learned that Mr. Hull had delivered a strong note to the Japanese?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, that note was practically the opposite of what the Japanese had tendered as an agreement, was it not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. It would have required the Japanese to reaffirm their allegiance to the Nine Power Treaty?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And would have required the Japanese to again acknowledge the Kellogg Peace Pact which they had disregarded when they started the trouble in the East?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. It would have required the Japanese to recognize the Nationalist Government of China?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. And it would have required the Japanese to withdraw their armies from China, from Indochina, from Manchuria, and cease to use force and violence as a means of achieving nationalistic ends, would it not?

Admiral Turner. In general terms; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, those are principles to which the United States was firmly committed, are they not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Those are principles from which the United States could not withdraw without humiliation; is that not correct?

Admiral Turner. I agree.

Mr. Gearhart. What was your opinion in reference to the propriety of serving upon the Japanese such a drastic memorandum at that particular time, or was that discussed among the higher ranking officers of the Army and Navy?

Admiral Turner. I didn't hear the question as to propriety discussed. I think we, all of us closely connected with the on-coming operations, were convinced that our note would have no possible chance of acceptance by the Japanese.

Mr. Gearhart. Then the handing of that note in effect and in your opinion marked the end of negotiations, actual negotiations, between the two countries?

Admiral Turner. Well, they had stopped, they had practically stopped; there was no progress being made.

I personally think that that note had no effect whatsoever on the situation.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, the situation had jelled before the note was handed to the Japanese?

Admiral Turner. I believe so; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. The Japanese war fleet left the Japanese islands on their fateful mission on the 27th and 28th of November, did they not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And they were under steam and on their way before the Japanese could have possibly analyzed what the Hull message was of November 26?

Admiral Turner. I think so.
Mr. Gearhart. It probably had one effect, did it not, Admiral? It convinced the Japanese that there would be no occasion for sending a note to their fleet to return to their home ports?

Admiral Turner. It might have had that effect.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, I am one that doesn’t deprecate that November 26th message. I think it is one of the glorious diplomatic documents of American history, and it is going to be so regarded, despite the Secretary’s inclination to treat it lightly. It is America’s declaration to the world that we stand, still, for principle. Regardless of whether the war was inevitable, and whether the Japanese force was on its way to strike us down, it is very, very [5397] fortunate that that great message to the world, and to the Japanese in particular, was given before the strike at Pearl Harbor.

I believe that is all.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire, Admiral.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, what time did you get the information from Admiral Noyes for Admiral Stark that Kimmel was getting all magic and decoding it there?

Admiral Turner. Senator, I can’t remember definitely. I have a vague recollection that I discussed it first with Admiral Noyes about January 1941. Then in the summer, July or August, about the time of the embargo or freezing of assets, and then sometime in the early part of November.

Those are only approximate.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account then, for these letters that were put in the record the other day where Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark on February 18, 1941:

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander in Chief with information of secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed any-[5398] thing, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep Commander in Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet will you kindly fix the responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding.

Then a letter back on March 22:

With reference to your postscript on the subject of trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CINCAF, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States.

How do you account for that letter if you had told Stark in January that they had the means of getting all of this secret information?

[5399] Admiral Turner. I do not believe that that word “secret” refers or relates exclusively to this magic at all. I think that it relates to secret information, of which we were getting a great deal from other sources. The totality of the information that we got was several times as great from all sources as from the magic. That implication never occurred to me until you bring it up now, that that related to the ultra.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, Admiral, did you approve the message sending the information that the codes were being destroyed? Did you send that?
Admiral Turner. No, sir, I did not send it. I saw one of them.

Senator Ferguson. You approved it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why would you send that if you thought that they had a code there and were getting the same messages that you were sending them? If you thought they were getting the information, why would you send that information that came to you by virtue of magic? They would already have seen it and had it.

Admiral Turner. That is true, but this was for the purpose of centering attention on that particular thing and I did not know—I do not believe I knew—whether that in-formation had come—just exactly how that information had come. I had seen some dispatches, it is true, from Tokyo ordering the destruction of codes. I cannot explain to you how the mistake about—the misunderstanding—on the code occurred. It is just a mystery to me.

Senator Ferguson. Those two things seem to be contradictory to that idea that was in the first message and the fact that you sent these other out, isn’t that true?

Admiral Turner. They seem to be, yes.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Admiral, you had a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on July 21, 1941, at your home. Do you recall that?

Admiral Turner. I recall several conversations I had with Mr. Nomura, Ambassador Nomura.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why you were speaking on these subjects that you were talking to him on?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why?

Admiral Turner. I knew his—it is a rather long story—I had known his naval attaché when I went to Japan in 1939. He came here about the same time I did and I became aware very shortly after I arrived that this attaché was trying to make contact with me for the sake of pumping me and so I permitted him to do it and informed the Director of Naval Intelligence and Admiral Stark.

Shortly after Admiral Nomura came in February he asked me to come to his house and have a talk with him. That talk, I think, occurred about the 1st of March, and he wanted to discuss the whole general situation. I went back and wrote a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations covering this matter and said it put me in a rather embarrassing position but I felt that I ought to continue the talks for what I could get from it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, on the one that I am talking about, July 21, 1941, your memoranda was transmitted to President Roosevelt and to the Secretary of State by Admiral Stark?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You knew that?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever get any reactions from those two sources or from Admiral Stark that they did not believe, or did not want to back up, what you were saying?

Admiral Turner. They never gave me any such indication at all.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I want you to read, if you will, the last sentence of 12 on page 519 of Foreign Relations, Volume 2.
Admiral Turner (reading):

Furthermore, anything that affects the future security of the United Kingdom, in any part of the world, also is of interest to the United States from the defensive viewpoint.

13. The occupation of Indochina by Japan is particularly important for the defense of the United States since it might threaten the British position in Singapore and the Dutch position in the Netherlands East Indies. Were they to pass out of their present control, a very severe blow would be struck at the integrity of the defense of the British Isles, and these Isles might well then be overcome by the Germans. It can thus be seen what a very close interest, from a military viewpoint, the United States has in sustaining the status quo in the southern portion of the Far East."

That was expressed to him as a personal opinion of my own.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, that was your personal opinion.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But you also transmitted it to the President after you told it to the Ambassador, is that true?

Admiral Turner. I gave it to Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Turner. And I believe he sent it to the President.

Senator Ferguson. Well, that is what it says in the book.

Now, you were of the opinion at that time that if the Japanese took Singapore or Burma it was self-defense as far as we were concerned—that is the word you used, isn't it—and therefore we would go to war?

Admiral Turner. I was of the opinion—

Senator Ferguson. You made it clear to the Ambassador.

Admiral Turner. I told the Ambassador that I believed that Congress would declare war if they attacked either the Dutch or the British in Malaya.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did you know about the parallel action to be taken by the President and Mr. Churchill? You were at the—no, you were not at the—

Admiral Turner. Yes, I was at the Argentina conference.

Senator Ferguson. You were?

Admiral Turner. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Then did you know about the parallel action?

Admiral Turner. No, sir; I knew nothing about it at all until about a month or 2 months later, when it was brought up before the Joint Board by Captain Schuirmann. Now, others here in the Department knew about that at the time. I did not because I stopped in Connecticut for about a week or 10 days leave on the way back from Argentina, so I was not here when the thing occurred.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, on the 17th of August 1941, page 556 Foreign Relations, volume 2, this, among other statements, was told to the Japanese Ambassador [reading]:

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.
Now, how much different is that than what you told the Ambassador on the 20th of July?

Admiral Turner. I told him as a personal opinion that I believed that the United States would declare war against Japan if they went against the British in Singapore, as a matter of opinion.

Senator Ferguson. Now, how much does yours differ from [5405] that? In what way does your statement differ from what the President said?

Admiral Turner. I expressed an opinion and that is an expression of policy of the Executive.

Senator Ferguson. But do they amount to practically the same in effect? That is what I am trying to get at.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; I think so.

Senator Ferguson. Very close.

Admiral Turner. Very close I agree.

Senator Ferguson. And you referred in this Exhibit 16 to some information from Captain Schuirmann. You say that is the first that you knew about it. He used this language:

"He pointed out that on August 17th"—I will read back what this is so that you will know it. It is not in that book. [Reading:]

Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China.

At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November the 1st, at which a discussion was held of the Far Eastern section.

Do you recall that?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

[5406] Senator Ferguson. And then he said among other things:

He pointed out that on August 17th, following the President’s return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression.

Admiral Turner. I remember the occasion and that statement.

Senator Ferguson. Was that discussed? Was that your understanding or—

Admiral Turner. It was not my understanding that it was an ultimatum.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to Admiral Stark about it?

Admiral Turner. I do not believe I ever discussed that note of August 17 with anyone, except very shortly with Captain Schuirmann.

Senator Ferguson. And when you discussed it with Schuirmann, did you and he disagree on it?

Admiral Turner. I did not consider it an ultimatum.

Senator Ferguson. Did he?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know where he said he got his information or idea that it was an ultimatum?

[5407] Admiral Turner. I think that he got that—he used that word himself. I have talked to him recently about it and he says that that is his word, as I recall it, and he still thinks it is an ultimatum.

Senator Ferguson. He still thinks so?

Admiral Turner. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, with that in mind, on the 27th—well, this is on the 5th of November you heard this discussed and then knew that the President had sent this note. Now, did it mean anything to you when you discovered that the ships were going down to attack the Malay Peninsula? What did that mean to you after having this knowledge?

Admiral Turner. Well, it meant that Japan was on the move and going to attack the Dutch and British and also, because they had not obtained an agreement with us, that they were going to attack us in the Philippines; that is what it meant.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did it mean war?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And then on the 6th, the morning of the 6th at 10:40, a note came from Winant confirming what you had had other information on, that the Japanese were moving in violation of what you had told them back in July would mean war, that was your opinion to the Ambassador?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you had the idea then on the 5th that the President had given them official notice to the same effect?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then as far as you were concerned this meant war on the 6th? You had confirmation that we were in war, going to War?

Admiral Turner. No—well, I believed that we would be attacked, definitely—

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Turner (continuing). In the Philippines and if we were attacked in the Philippines I knew it would be war. I thought it would be war if we were not attacked, I thought it would be war if they attacked the British and the Dutch, but there would have been some delays possibly.

Senator Ferguson. All right. In other words, if they attacked the British and the Dutch alone you thought it meant war and you make a distinction that if they attacked the Dutch, the British, and the Americans at the Philippines it did mean war?

Admiral Turner. Definitely; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That was the distinction you made?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, there would have had to have been a Congressional act, a declaration of war, if they would have only attacked the two places?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, were you familiar with the so-called men-of-war, the three small ships being sent out there?

Admiral Turner. Yes, I knew about that.

Senator Ferguson. Did you draft that message?

Admiral Turner. I did not. That was drafted by Admiral Brainard and was at the direction of the President.

Senator Ferguson. A special direction of the President?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted on that matter?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, how did you account—how do you now account for those three ships going out to get information of the movement south, but no specific orders to go out to get information around Hawaii? How do you account for that? Here were these three men-of-war sent out to go over to Camranh Bay to see whether these ships were going across into the Kra Peninsula, and not one sent out specifically around Hawaii. How do you account for that?

Admiral Turner. We informed—the Chief of Naval Operations informed—the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in at least three official communications during 1941 that it would be desirable to use ships to the northward and on one occasion to the southward of Hawaii for detecting approaching raiders, in addition to the use of airplanes, and we had endeavored to get small craft to send out and be on look-outs. One of these letters suggests the use of five sampans that had just been condemned by a court out there and the use of yachts which we were trying to get to them.

Senator Ferguson. Why didn’t we use those then?

Admiral Turner. I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why didn’t you give special notice, just like the President did, about sending these three men-of-war out if you thought war was coming as close as you thought it was and you were the man in War Plans to execute this action? Why didn’t you send some out around Hawaii?

Admiral Turner. I never would have sent or requested that those three craft would go up in the China Sea.

Senator Ferguson. I understand that.

Admiral Turner. We had never suggested to Admiral Hart that he send any out previously. We had suggested to Admiral Kimmel that he employ, when necessary employ, small craft out there as look-outs on three different occasions.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, in your message of the 27th you say this:

"Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory"—not actual, but preparatory—"to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46."

Now, there was nothing in WPL 46 about sending small boats out around Hawaii, was there?

Admiral Turner. No, not at all, but there were around in the—certain small craft in the—14th Naval District which were patrol craft and the Commander-in-Chief had been informed or directed in two letters at least during the latter part of 1941 that he would have to supply any patrol craft to the 14th Naval District and this deployment meant that he would have certainly put his ships out in such a manner as best designed to effect the defense of Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, Admiral, you have told me that you did not have really anything to do with the President’s message about the three craft.

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. But you knew it went out and it went out about the third?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, knowing that, that the President had personally intervened to send that out to ascertain if
there was going to be an attack to the south, didn't you think it
would be essential, you realizing that they were going to attack
the Philippines and we had a fleet on their flank, that something
ought to be done specifically to look out around Hawaii?

Admiral Turner. I never would have sent that dispatch, if left
to my own initiative, to Admiral Hart; I thought it was unnecessary,
that he was competent to take care of the situation with the forces
at his disposal.

Senator Ferguson. But when the President of the United States
thought otherwise and sent the message, didn't it make you feel that
you should do something specifically about this fleet that was on the
flank?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It did not occur to you?

Admiral Turner. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, was there any other way to put Rainbow
5 into effect than the wording on page 6, "Execute Navy basic war
plan Rainbow No. 5?" Would there have been any other message
to put that into effect?

Admiral Turner. Nothing except giving words that meant the
same general thing.

Senator Ferguson. The same thing, yes. So when you sent these
other messages, the one to the Army being described [5413]
as a do-don't message, you were not attempting to put this plan
into effect?

Admiral Turner. Not at all. We were out there until an overt
act was committed against us and then automatically we would de-
fend ourselves and then the matter would go into effect, but is was
important to prevent any damage from it.

Senator Ferguson. But now do you say that first there had to
be an overt act? I understand you to say that the Navy was not
concerned with the overt act idea.

Admiral Turner. No, that was a misunderstanding I think, Sen-
ator. I said, what I intended, that if the Japanese fleet came within
somewhere around 500 miles of Hawaii that we were justified in
considering that an overt act and attack them.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, I want to know whether you
ever sent a message to Admiral Kimmel defining to him that if they
came within 500 miles that would be an overt act and we would attack
them?

Admiral Turner. We did not because, as I said in my testimony
yesterday, we considered that trying to define in specific details a
situation that might be so varied in so many ways would have ham-
pered him rather than to help him and that the best way, and that
is the usual way that the Navy has performed, is to give the greatest
possible leeway to the sub-

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the 30th of November in a message from
the—it is: "Subject: Threat of Japanese attack in South Pacific area,"
from the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador, on page —
the pages are not numbered. It is on page 6 of Exhibit 21 [reading]:

R. A. F. are reconnaissing on arc of 180 miles from Teda Bharu for three
days commencing November 29th and our Commander in Chief, Far East has
requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air recon-
aissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days.

Did you know about that?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did the Asiatic commander in chief do that?
Admiral Turner. He did, on the order of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Ferguson. Had you been requested by the British to do that?
Admiral Turner. We had.
Senator Ferguson. Do we have that request, counsel, where the
British requested us to have the commander in chief of the Asiatic put this reconnaissance out?

Mr. Gesell. I do not believe we do, Senator.
Mr. Mitchell. We never heard of it.

Admiral Turner. If it was not, it might have been oral, Senator.

Sometimes we would get a written request from the Joint Staff mission over here, and sometimes they would bring down a paper such as they had there from their authorities and show it to us, and ask for action, but we definitely got a request to perform that scouting.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, as I understand it we had a working plan with the British. They could do it very easily either orally or in writing prior to the 7th and we would put an action on, such as we did here, a reconnaissance.

Admiral Turner. That is not a war action.

Senator Ferguson. No. It is a reconnaissance action, is that true?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what was that reconnaissance action for, that specific action?

Admiral Turner. That was to detect the movement south of the amphibious expeditions for attack.

Senator Ferguson. Now, having lost sight of, here, of six carriers and another part of the fleet, can you tell me why specific orders were not sent out to Kimmel to make a reconnaissance such as you sent out to Hart here about the 30th?

Admiral Turner. We would not have sent those orders to Admiral Hart except at the request of the British, because we would have left it exclusively to his own judgment, and he sent reconnaissance planes out. As a matter of fact, we have gotten into trouble for going over Formosa. He had planes going out, they were performing their scouting, and we assumed that that was occurring also in Hawaii.

When you give a major order for a subordinate to carry out, it is considered very bad practice, not only then, but now, to go and put a lot of details that state how that officer is going to carry out his duty.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, here is a question on November 30, 1941, put to Mr. Hull by Lord Halifax. Here is the question:

He was desirous of ascertaining what the United States Government would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus. (Exhibit 21, p. 4)

Did you ever as the head of War Plans have an answer to that? Do you understand the question?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I understand and I remember the occasion and I do not remember that the British were ever given [5417] a definite answer on that.

Senator Ferguson. Well, were you given a definite answer? What would you have done? What was Hart to do? What was America to do?

Admiral Turner. The recommendation had been made to the President about that time that he issue a warning, with such backing as he believed politically necessary, that crossing that line would mean war with the United States, but that recommendation was made with the full understanding that it would be necessary to get the support of Congress for any such warning.

Senator Ferguson. Well, was any such warning ever sent?
Admiral Turner. Not to my knowledge. I know it was not.
Senator Ferguson. Whom did you discuss that with?
Admiral Turner. That particular warning?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Turner. I discussed it with the Army. The British asked us to join in that tripartite affair and to give them definite assurance that we would. Our reply was that we could not give them any such definite assurance but that we would take the matter up with the President and make a recommendation to see if the Government was willing to make that a cause of war.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, was that the reason [5418] that you sent the recommendation, Exhibit 17, the letter of November the 27th? Are you familiar with that?
Admiral Turner. Yes. That part containing crossing that line was that occasion; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That was the occasion?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

[5419] Senator Ferguson. That was the occasion. So it came from the British to you and you made this recommendation to the President?

Admiral Turner. That a warning be issued?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, that a warning be issued in relation to Thailand. I want to call to your attention the last paragraph. It does not relate to the line that was drawn about the notice. Have you got your copy?
Admiral Turner. I think so.
Senator Ferguson. Have you got it now, Admiral?
Admiral Turner. No, sir; I am afraid not.
(Exhibit 17 was handed to Admiral Turner.)
Admiral Turner. The first one of those three subparagraphs, Senator, covers United States, British and Dutch territory. Then, because Thailand is not one of the three, that is put in as a separate matter. But it covers the whole thing. It is the entire line.

Senator Ferguson. Let me go up a paragraph:

After consultation with each other, United States, British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counter-action against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or [5420] should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° east or south of 10° north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.
In other words, they are saying that we had agreed, and you recommended, that in case they moved into Thailand west of 100° east or south of 10° north, that we were to take action.

Now down in the next to the last paragraph you say this:

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand—

that is not west of 100° East, but just in Thailand—

Japan be warned by the United States, the British and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken.

Now am I clear in this, that this recommendation has two parts? In the one case you recommend that if they cross this line that you set up, 100° east or south of 10° north, Portugese Timor, New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands, that action is to be taken, but in case they go into any other part of Thailand you want a notice given, is that correct?

Admiral Turner. That is correct, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct.

Admiral Turner. But with regard to that second paragraph it says, you see, "after consultation with each other, United States, British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East" [5421] agreed" on certain things.

Now, that was never approved by either the Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations, or anybody in Washington, nor by the British Chiefs of Staff, but that was taken as a basis for this paper here, which was a new thing to fit the exact situation here.

Senator Ferguson. But then when the Ambassador of Britain was asking the United States Secretary of State for an answer to this question he was very desirous of ascertaining what the United States Government would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus? That is a specific question.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now would not that have been a violation of the thing that you had in mind here, moving across this line 100° west?

Admiral Turner. It certainly would have been a violation if the British had gone in there.

Senator Ferguson. If the British had gone in?

Admiral Turner. Yes. They had a proposition that they wanted to go in. That was opposed. We refused to support it, either the State Department or the military.

Senator Ferguson. You oppose that?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; because that would have taken [5422] out the whole basis of our nonaggression.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, if they would have gone in first to protect that, that would have been against nonaggression, is that right?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That would have been a violation of the first overt act proposition, would it not?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And we were doing everything we could to avoid the first overt act?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, we were watching the Jap ships going in and as soon as they crossed the line that was the overt act on their part?

Admiral Turner. That is right. We wished to define it as that.

Senator Ferguson. That is why we had scouts out and patrols, and so forth, to see whether or not they were going over that line and committing that overt act, is that right?

Admiral Turner. That was way south of any place our people were in. We were over there merely to look and see the size of the forces, and to see how much they could undertake at one time.

Senator Ferguson. You said one of our scouting planes was in trouble over Formosa. When was that?

Admiral Turner. That was about the 2nd or 3rd of December, or even a few days before that. Planes had gone up in that general direction and apparently one of our planes had gotten over or close to Formosa, because it got a protest from the Japanese about it.

Senator Ferguson. Got a protest?

Admiral Turner. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. On the 30th of November, 1941, from OPNAV, action: CINCAF, and information: CINCPAC, I want to read this to you:

Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition. In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila-Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this despatch. Instruct planes to observe only. They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked.

In other words, they were armed, is that true?

Admiral Turner. That is correct, they were armed with machine guns and ammunition.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Understand British Air Forces will search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus near Singora. If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur. British mission here informed.

Now is that the message that was sent out, that the British had asked for, here where I read the Commander-in-Chief Far East has requested the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air reconnaissance on the line Manila and Camranh Bay on the same days?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, that is the message.

Senator Ferguson. That is the message sent out. Now here is the wording, “Understand British Air Forces will search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across Kra Isthmus”. How do you account for that in line with what you told me before, that that would be an act of aggression by the British?

Admiral Turner. My recollection of the position of Singora is, it is just outside the nearest town to the northern border of the British territory, and that they were going to move troops to that northern border.
Senator Ferguson. They were not going to cross the line, in other words?

Admiral Turner. I believe so. I believe that is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Did you believe that the Tanaka memorial was an actual instrument, or did you have any ideas [5425] on that?

Admiral Turner. Well, I do not believe I ever formed any definite opinion as to whether it was authentic or not. I always felt that it expressed generally the Japanese militaristic viewpoint.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert in the record, where I read the statement that the Admiral had made to the Japanese Ambassador, I would like to put into the record the whole statement, because I think it will make better sense in the record and explain what we were talking about.

The Vice Chairman. So ordered.

Mr. Mitchell. Would you mind identifying that for the reporter by volume, book and page?


(The document referred to is as follows:)

[5426] The Director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department (Rear Admiral Turner) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Stark) . . . (Transmitted to President Roosevelt and to the Secretary of State by Admiral Stark).

Op–12–CTB
(SC)EF
Serial 083412
Memorandum

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1941.

1. On July 20, 1941, about 3 p.m., Ambassador Nomura called on me at my residence. After some general conversation, he informed me that on Friday or Saturday (July 18–19, 1941) he had gone to Virginia Hot Springs [White Sulphur Springs] to call on Mr. Hull, but the latter's physician had not permitted an interview. Subsequently, as I understand, Ambassador Nomura had a conversation with Mr. Welles. Prior to coming to my residence, he had called at Admiral Stark's house, but he had not found him in. He did not say whether he had then tried to get in touch with Admiral Ingersoll [Rear Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations]. I understand the latter was not at home at that hour.

2. Ambassador Nomura indicated that he desired to have a conversation with Admiral Stark as soon as convenient; he intended to go to New York the 21st or 22d but will return shortly. I informed the Ambassador that I would convey his request to Admiral Stark, and assured him that the latter [5427] would be glad to talk with him.

3. The Ambassador then explained at considerable length what he proposed to discuss with Admiral Stark. He said that he is not a professional diplomat, and is occupying his present position because none of the trained diplomats in whom the government had confidence had been willing to accept the Washington Mission; he had demurred for a considerable period, and had accepted the duty only after great insistence by his friends, particularly high ranking naval officers and the more conservative groups of Army officers. He noted that Admiral Toyoda, now Foreign Minister, had been more than insistent that he accept the mission; it was evident that he felt he had a greater measure of Toyoda's confidence than of Matsuoka's. He stated that he particularly wished to discuss the international situation with Admiral Stark because, if the United States and Japan could not remain at peace, it was obvious that a devastating naval war would ensue.

4. Ambassador Nomura stated that for some weeks he had had frequent conferences with Mr. Hull, in an endeavor to seek a formula through which the United States and Japan could remain at peace. He no longer hoped for 100 percent agreement on all points, but would be content if a partial agreement
could be reached which would prevent war between the two countries. Such an
agreement would necessarily be informal, since Japan is now committed by
treaty to Germany, and this treaty could [5428] not be denounced at
this time. However, he noted that the decision as to when the military clauses
of the treaty would come into effect lies entirely in Japan’s hands, and that
these would be invoked only if Germany were to be the object of aggression
by another power. He stated that Japan entered the Axis solely because it
seemed to be to Japan’s interest to do so. Japan’s future acts will be dom-
ninated solely by Japan, and not by any other power. Whatever military action
Japan takes will be for her own ultimate purposes.

5. He then talked at length on the points which Japan considered essential
for an agreement between the United States and Japan. The fundamental basis
of such an agreement necessarily would be that either Power would be free
to take such steps as seem to be required by its own responsibility for self-
defense. He mentioned that, owing to export restrictions against Japan by
the United States and the Philippines, and owing to a reduction in shipping
 tonnage available for trade, Japan’s present economic position is bad and
steadily getting worse. It is essential that Japan had uninterrupted access to
necessary raw materials, particularly iron ore and iron products, oil, rubber,
cotton and food. There are other important items as well.

6. The second point is that the United States is constantly providing greater
support to China. If China is left without industrial and military support, it
will not be long before the [5329] Chungking regime will be unable to
continue the present “China incident”; Japan will then be able to withdraw
from the greater part of China. However, Ambassador Nomura noted that the
United States is improving the Burma Road, and is supplying airplanes and
pilots to be sent to Chungking. He understands that there are over a hundred
American pilots now en route, who have been supplied from the armed forces
of the United States. Japan must make some arrangement through which sup-
port of this nature will be reduced, rather than increased. The British are also
contributing more and more to measures designed to sustain the Chungking
regime.

7. The third point which the Ambassador mentioned as essential for Japan’s
security is the more or less permanent stationing of Japanese troops in Inner
Mongolia in order to break the connection between Russia and China, and in
order to suppress the extensive Chinese Communist elements in that general
region. Japan has an agreement with Wang Ching Wei which will permit
Japanese forces to remain in Inner Mongolia; how long such measures will
continue necessary can not be foretold. I inferred that, were this agreed to,
Japanese troops would be withdrawn from the greater part of China.

8. He then informed me that within the next few days Japan expects to occupy
French Indochina. How the occupation would be made he is not informed; presumably, it would be chiefly by an over-land march from Hanoi southward, but on a [5430] this he is not yet informed. In any case, for the immediate
future security of Japan, both against a possible attack from the south and for a
better control over the activities of Chungking, this occupation has become essen-
tial.

9. It was evident that Ambassador Nomura had some apprehension that the
United States would take further action against Japan, either economically or
militarily, as soon as Japanese troops were known to be occupying French Indo-
China. He anticipates an intensification of the present press campaign against
Japan in the United States. It seems, though he did not so state categorically,
that Japan contemplates no further move to the south for the time being. He
made no mention of possible activity against Siberia.

10. Ambassador Nomura indicated that these points were essential to any
informal agreements which might be made between the United States and Japan.
Rather cautiously he conveyed the impression that were the United States to
accept these conditions, any action it might take in the Atlantic would not be a
matter of great concern to Japan. The one great point on which agreement might
be reached, he again emphasized as the inherent right of self defense.

11. The Ambassador set forth all the foregoing without interruption on my part.
I informed him that I would present these points to Admiral Stark’s attention.
However, I desired to point out one important thing to him, speaking solely
[5431] from a personal viewpoint, and as one naval officer to another, on a
certain broad strategic aspect of the situation which I envisaged. I agreed that
there would be a decidedly adverse reaction in the United States to Japanese
occupation of Indochina. Entirely aside from matters of policy, it would be evident to him that this move had an important bearing on the strategic position of the United States.

12. I pointed out that, speaking from the standpoint of self defense, the greatest danger to the United States in the future lies in the continued military success of Germany. The United States has been able to live in peace because powerful military nations in Europe have checked each other and prevented a military penetration by any of them in the Western Hemisphere. If Great Britain were to collapse, German military power might very well be directed against South America, and such moves would cause great difficulties for the United States. So long as the United Kingdom continues to exist as a military and naval power, the problems of the United States as regards its security will not be very great. Therefore, aside from racial and social ideals, it is decided against the military interests of the United States to permit the United Kingdom to be overcome by Germany. For this reason any action which the United States could take against Germany is necessarily one of self defense and could never be considered as aggression. Furthermore, anything that affects the future security of the United Kingdom, in any part of the world, also is of interest to the United States from the defensive viewpoint.

13. The occupation of Indochina by Japan is particularly important for the defense of the United States since it might threaten the British position in Singapore and the Dutch position in the Netherlands East Indies. Were they to pass out of their present control, a very severe blow would be struck at the integrity of the defense of the British Isles, and these Isles might well then be overcome by the Germans. It can thus be seen what a very close interest, from a military viewpoint, the United States has in sustaining the status quo in the southern portion of the Far East.

14. I suggested that Japan really has very little to fear from American, British or Dutch activities in the Far East. It might well be, were these Powers to be displaced, Japan would find Germany facing her in that region, which would put an entirely different complexion on the military situation there.

15. Ambassador Nomura stated that, regardless of his own personal opinions in the matter (which were clearly sympathetic to the above point of view) he was bound to support the policies of his government, which at present include collaboration with the Axis.

16. The interview then closed after the Ambassador again reiterated his desire to discuss these matters with Admiral Stark.

R. K. Turner.

[5434] Senator Ferguson. At that time, as I recall it, he was telling you that they were going into Indochina.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir:

Senator Ferguson. And you were attempting to tell him, and I think in no uncertain language, just how you felt about it.

Admiral Turner. It was on that occasion that I became convinced, after discussing the matter with him, that the future diplomatic effort they would make with us would be to keep us out while they attacked Britain and the Netherlands East Indies.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, did you have, after the conversation that you had, any definite ideas that we were going to get into a war with Japan? Could that have changed your thinking, that conversation?

Admiral Turner. I think that had a very decided effect. My recollection of that conversation is that it was the latter part of June. Now this was, as you have it there, in July, but I remember it as the latter part of June.

Senator Ferguson. This is dated July. It says he was over to Hot Springs to see the Secretary of State and could not see him on the 20th of July 1941, and he apparently came back to see you.

Admiral Turner. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now does that refresh your memory?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I thought it was June, when I said I might have been influenced in June or July, because that had a very decided influence.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, I want to call your attention to pages 200 and 202 of exhibit 1. Do you have exhibit 1 there?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is a message intercepted from Berlin, dated November 29, 1941, translated by the Navy on December 1, 1941, in which the Ambassador of Japan was telling Von Ribbentrop that he had no official word on the status of the American-Japanese negotiations and that he could make no definite statement, since he was not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan.

Now on the next day, on the 30th—and I want to call your attention to the fact that they had extended the time from the 25th to the 29th, and you are familiar with those deadlines, are you not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That on the next day, on pages 204 and 206, another message from Tokyo to Berlin, on just the following day, November 30, 1941, in which the Japanese Government instructed its Ambassador in Germany to tell Hitler and Von Ribbentrop that American-Japanese negotiations [5436] stood ruptured, broken, and that an American-Japanese war "may come quicker than anyone dreams."

Now did those facts mean anything to you? Here on the one day they are telling the Germans they do not know a thing, on the day following the 29th, which was the deadline—and, by the way, that is exactly the deadline, because there is a message on that in here saying that it was Japanese time—they tell them that the negotiations are ruptured and that "war may come quicker than anyone dreams."

Did that mean anything to you?

Admiral Turner. The dispatch of the 29th of November is from Berlin, from the Ambassador.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Admiral Turner. The dispatch of the 30th is from Tokyo. It is evident that the Berlin Ambassador had not received news as to the intentions of the government and he was just giving them some double talk on this matter, and then he was instructed in the matter on the 30th.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, he gave them some double talk on the 29th and then they instructed him on the 30th, which was the very day of the deadline, and the troops were going south, that they were ruptured and war may come quicker than anyone thought.

Did not that mean something to your intelligence brains? [5437] If they had evaluated that would not they have found that the Japs were making a move, and that that meant war?

Admiral Turner. That was the conclusion I drew from it.

Senator Ferguson. You did draw that conclusion from it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then I am wondering—the question that Congressman Murphy asked—you had sent a message on the 27th, your plans were in flux, and here you had new information which really meant war at that time, why did not you give them more information?

Admiral Turner. I do not understand, Senator, what you mean when you say "your plans were in flux."
Senator Ferguson. Well, the Congressman read to you, and he will be able to find that part in that report. Do you remember the part where it was a live subject? You read it out of the United States News. I wish you would read that again.

Mr. Murphy [reading]:
The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time and the plans were drawn with this as a premise.

I was reading from column 1, paragraph 2, page 64 of the full text of the official report, United States News, Naval Court of Inquiry.

[5438] Admiral Turner. These dispatches that you have just referred to, of the 29th and 30th of November, relate to the over-all picture of the war. They added nothing to the warning that we had given on the 27th, just 3 days before. There was no development here with respect to Hawaii any more than with respect to the Far East.

Senator Ferguson. Now you have a ship movement plan, do you not? Did you not send out on the 30th, did I not read this message that you sent out for the 70 scouting planes when you said one got into trouble over Formosa?

Admiral Turner. Oh, yes.

Senator Ferguson. So you did take action in the Asiatic?

Admiral Turner. At the request of the British, in order to coordinate for 3 days the scouting that they were doing in those 3 days, to find out the movement of a definite force some place, that we knew something about.

Senator Ferguson. But here, Admiral, we have many carriers that were out of our sight, out of our hearing, we did not know where they were. We knew at least they were not down in the Kra Peninsula because we had that one sighted, and the British come along and ask us to make a specific reconnaissance at a specific time, which is after the 27th, and we do that and find this fleet going into the Kra Peninsula, but no specific orders to see if they were taken out to Hawaii. How do you account for that?

Admiral Turner. I account for that by what I said previously, that the commanders in chief had been given a large definite order, and giving them specific orders as to how they were going to do it, or take details of how they were going to do it, is very bad military command practice.

[5440] Senator Ferguson. Well, it could not have turned out any worse than it did, could it?

Admiral Turner. Not very well.

Senator Ferguson. Not very well, but it was the duty of your office, as I understand you to say, to alert any and all naval posts of the Government of the United States in the event that a war involving the United States was imminent. That was your job and duty, was it not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And when you received this information after the 27th, you did not so alert Hawaii, did you?

Admiral Turner. We had already alerted Hawaii. We reviewed the matter daily. We felt that nothing further was necessary, and I
still hold to the same opinion, up to the point where the matter of the 1 p. m. deadline came up, which was very unfortunate.

Senator Ferguson. I am not trying to change your opinion. I am just trying to get what the facts were, and what you had in mind at that time.

Now, Admiral, when did you first hear there was a pilot message in relation to the 13 parts message?

Admiral Turner. I think the same time that I got the 13 parts. I have no recollection of seeing it at any other time.

[5441] Senator Ferguson. And at that time you thought that was so important that a new information bulletin should go to Hawaii; is that right?

Admiral Turner. I did not think it important enough without the 14th part to have interceded in the matter.

I knew Admiral Wilkinson knew about it, and Admiral Ingersoll did.

Senator Ferguson. But, Admiral, at that time, you thought that Admiral Kimmel was getting the 13 parts?

Admiral Turner. That is correct, and the 14th part.

Senator Ferguson. And the pilot message as quickly as you did?

Admiral Turner. Well, I do not know about "as quickly." Of course, those things are delayed, and you do not know just how long it is, how long it might be. There might be some of those things that would be delayed somewhat. Something urgent, why, it might be sent, or a dispatch sent "Have you seen such and such series?"

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, you and Admiral Wilkinson differed on one point, as to whether or not they were going to attack the United States.

Admiral Turner. We differed on that point.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether you and Admiral Kimmel disagreed on that point?

[5442] Admiral Turner. No, sir; I do not. I saw Admiral Kimmel when he was in Washington sometime during the summer and discussed with him and other staff officers, his situation in case of war with Japan.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, you have mentioned the so-called reply of General Short, a very short message.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with the wording of it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And, as I understand it now, all the officers in Washington misunderstood it.

Admiral Turner. All that saw it.

Senator Ferguson. All that saw it. You saw it; General Marshall saw it; General Gerow saw it; General Miles, and who else?

Admiral Turner. Bundy.

Senator Ferguson. Bundy. Who else in your department?

Admiral Turner. I think that Captain Hill, who was my first assistant, saw it, customarily. There may have been somebody else. I think probably Captain Glover saw it, because I showed him all those things.

Senator Ferguson. The Secretary of War saw it?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the Secretary of the Navy saw it?

Admiral Turner. I think not.

Senator Ferguson. Now, all you gentlemen not understanding his message, my question is, how do you account for the fact that none of you can see, at least you do not see, how he could have misunderstood your message?

Admiral Turner. If you are comparing the two messages as to clarity and meaning—

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Turner. Why, then I will say it does not follow that the two points of view are analogous.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, your message is perfectly clear?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And his message is fuzzy and cloudy?

Admiral Turner. That is correct.

[5444] Senator Ferguson. That is what you want to tell us?

Admiral Turner. Exactly.

Senator Ferguson. So that is the reason you can say that reasonable men can differ on his message but reasonable officers would not differ on your message, is that what I understand?

Admiral Turner. Those words are not my words, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I do not want you to let me put any words in your mouth. What is your answer to that?

Admiral Turner. My answer is that the Short message can be interpreted and was interpreted by a number of persons as applying to a partial situation and did not apply at all to the general situation in which General Short found himself. I have no idea that he meant he was only taking sabotage precautions, in view of the specific orders in the War Department dispatch, which is perfectly clear to do certain things.

Senator Ferguson. You had an operational room in the Munitions Building, did you not, a ship board?

Admiral Turner. In the Navy Department?

Senator Ferguson. In the Navy Department.

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How far was that from your office?

Admiral Turner. I had one of strategic movements; there was one of general information and all foreign merchant ship movement in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and I know there was a big one in two rooms, in Ship Movements, that showed the movements of all our forces and all shipping of the United States and Great Britain.

Senator Ferguson. Well, Admiral, you had access to a ship movement board that showed all the ships in Pearl Harbor daily? When a ship went out you could see, if you looked at your board, isn't that true?

Admiral Turner. I think not. I do not know whether they kept the information as to whether the ship was in Pearl Harbor or outside of Pearl Harbor. They did keep information showing what ships were in that vicinity.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then after the 27th there were two orders issued to Admiral Kimmel, were there not, sending two carriers in two different deployments, one to Midway and the other to Wake?
Admiral Turner. That is correct, they issued those orders.

Senator Ferguson. And that would appear on your board?

Admiral Turner. I do not know whether that movement would appear or not. Presumably it would. It would not appear on my board.

Senator Ferguson. Did not the orders come from your [5446] office to do that?

Admiral Turner. No.

Senator Ferguson. Whom did they come from?

Admiral Turner. I beg your pardon. No; I think the orders actually went from Ship Movements to do that. We had an arrangement for them to take those planes out there, and there was some delay, and there was a longer delay out there, due to uncontrollable factors, than we expected.

[5447] Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, these two movements were after the 27th, were they not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what effect do you think that had upon the commanding officers at Pearl Harbor, after the 27th, the so-called warnings I am talking about, as far as an attack is concerned, at Pearl Harbor, of sending two carriers with planes, taking them from the Pearl Harbor district, as to whether or not there was going to be an attack at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Turner. I think it would have had no effect whatsoever, because we also had to defend these other places, and the attacks would, if they were made on Pearl Harbor, would probably be made on the other places too, which they were, except not by airplanes at Midway.

Senator Ferguson. Did I understand you to say some time in your testimony that we didn't intend to defend Guam?


Senator Ferguson. Midway and Wake we did intend to defend?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did we have an attack on the 7th at Midway and Wake?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

[5448] Senator Ferguson. The same day?

Admiral Turner. By night, by two destroyers at Midway and, I believe, the next day by destroyers on Wake, and I think on the 7th by airplanes at Wake.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if we expected an attack on the 27th, up to the 30th, and we were routing our ships, how do you account for sending these two carriers with planes to Wake and Midway, if we actually expected an attack?

Admiral Turner. I haven't those dispatches ordering that movement. My impression is that the orders from the Department were issued prior to the 27th. However, even so, it was necessary to increase the defenses on those two islands, and we—I agree that it was proper to go ahead with the plan up until the time it was pretty definite that an attack was imminent and that ships ought not to go out.

I call your attention to the fact that, with most of the planes on those two carriers, they left few back at Pearl, and their western
position put them actually in quite a good position from which to counterattack from the north on Oahu.

Senator Ferguson. Is this true; that left no carriers at Pearl Harbor, so that Admiral Kimmel could take his battleships out and have air protection if he wanted to take them out?

Admiral Turner. That is correct. If he had taken them out, in order to get fighter protection, he would have had to keep pretty close to land.

Senator Ferguson. Then, when you said this morning that if you had been in his place, you would have taken your planes out when you got the warning message—let’s say he had the orders to take carriers and go to Wake and Midway. That left him without any air support at all for eight or nine battleships that he had and the cruiser.

Admiral Turner. That is correct—No. The cruiser, that is a somewhat different matter. But by moving the eight or nine battleships down to the southeastward, 200 or 300 miles, why, they wouldn’t need any protection, off down there. Carriers act on the offensive.

Senator Ferguson. Did he know which way the attack would come from? You say go south that many miles.

Admiral Turner. Southeast.

Senator Ferguson. Southeast. How did he know the attack wouldn’t come from there?

Admiral Turner. The probability of its coming from that direction, Senator, was, I think, extremely small.

Senator Ferguson. But there was a probability from the [5450] north in the vacant sea.

Admiral Turner. That was the much more likely place; that is well recognized.

Senator Ferguson. What is the difference between an alert message and a war warning?

Admiral Turner. We don’t use the term, ordinarily, alert; at least we didn’t at that time. The only time we use the term “alert” in the Navy is referring to, ordinarily, to an air attack, and the orders were never issued in those terms anyway. That is, we have conditions of readiness which mean alert 1, 2, or 3, and various subsequent ones.

Senator Ferguson. On the 24th is that an alert, or a war warning?

Admiral Turner. Neither. An estimate of the major strategic situation. And it doesn’t give, and is not intended to give, to put them on the alert, except to start getting ready for it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the war warning message of the 27th, I just want to ask you a few questions in relation to that.

Do you, in the Navy, in drawing an instrument such as this, when you use specific terms and then have a general term, does it relate to specific terms of the same nature? I am trying to put this in a layman’s language and not in a [5451] lawyer’s language.

Admiral Turner. Could you illustrate that, please, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

You say here:

An aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines— you expressly name them—

Thai, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.
You have got three definite places, either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, and then one possibility, Borneo.

Now, doesn't that exclude others?

Admiral Turner. It excludes others against which an amphibious expedition will be launched within the next few days.

Senator Ferguson. Doesn't the fact that you mention an amphibious expedition reject other kinds of expeditions, because you specify amphibious and do not say anything about the others? Wouldn't an ordinarily prudent naval officer read it that way?

Admiral Turner. We said in the dispatch of the 24th [5452] that a surprise aggressive movement might be expected in any direction. In this case, the amphibious expedition is the major effort by the Japanese war machine, and it does not mention the many, many other types of activities.

For example, it doesn't mention submarines, but it is obvious that submarines will go out and raid our trade as they did, and it doesn't mention raids against our trade by surface vessels which we expected. It doesn't mention expansion of the area occupied by Japan in the Mandates, down in the little islands, which is certainly to be expected.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, we had all our merchant ships in convoys and had battleships with them?

Admiral Turner. No. I beg your pardon, we did not.

Senator Ferguson. We did not?

Admiral Turner. No, sir. Many of them were entirely single. There were only one or two convoys. Most of them were alone.

Senator Ferguson. You didn't expect Admiral Kimmel to take care of these single ships on the ocean, did you?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; by covering the patrol areas and general covering operations.

Senator Ferguson. But you knew he wasn't doing any of that, if you looked at the ship board you could have told he had the ships still in the Pearl Harbor district. You [5453] said you knew he wasn't doing that; is that true?

Admiral Turner. I don't know whether he would have made the reports as to the movements of those ships or not.

Senator Ferguson. On page 996 of the record of the Navy top secret, I want to read this question and this answer:

Q. This dispatch, Exhibit 15, states "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction is indicated."

That is the one of the 24th, is it not?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

This language is omitted from the dispatch of 27 November, three days later, wherein there is set out certain Japanese objectives in the Far East. Was this omission from the dispatch of 27 November done intentionally?

Here is your answer:

A. I would like to invite attention to the difference between the two dispatches. In the one of the 24th, it says, "a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is indicated." Now, that movement in any direction could be by naval forces, air forces, amphibious forces, or anything else. In this other dispatch, we said "an amphibious expedition is enroute." It was moving down the China Sea.

Now, those two are quite different. They don't cover [5454] the same kind of a subject, and they were intended not to cover it. That was information. We knew that the Japanese were on the move in the China Sea. That was a fact.
Now the other was deduction as covering generally not only the movement of amphibious forces, but the movement of any forces.

Do you stand by that answer now?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, I do; and also I stand by the answer I gave previously, that all of these dispatches that were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations, certainly as far back as October 16, should be considered as a whole, as forming a single series, and they related to the same subject, and the ground covered in any one is not intended to be the entire ground.

Senator Ferguson. All right, but on the 24th, you sent the message.

Now, what happens between the 24th and the 27th to send this other message?

Admiral Turner. It is getting closer to the deadline of the 29th. We waited as long as possible. We also find out the final breakdown, practical breakdown of negotiations.

Senator Ferguson. Then, if we could have drawn here in Washington the conclusions from the 13 parts and the [5455] pilot message that there was another deadline of the delivery of that message, that would have made a change so that another message should have been sent?

Admiral Turner. I agree that a message should have been sent about the 1 o'clock note.

Senator Ferguson. Can you account for why you didn't send it, whose province it was to send it?

Admiral Turner. Because when I first saw it, I was informed that the War Department was already sending it and that Admiral Stark had taken action.

Senator Ferguson. Then the delay was in getting the action to you, the message to you?

Admiral Turner. I think there was very little delay in getting it to me.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, suppose it is 2 hours.

Admiral Turner. I was in my office from about 11:15.

Senator Ferguson. Was your office alerted for war on the 6th and the 7th?

Admiral Turner. I had an officer on watch and a stenographer in there that day.

Senator Ferguson. Was it alerted for war on the 6th and the 7th?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir; it was alerted so far as anything that we had to do. There was an officer in there [5456] and I could always be gotten.

Senator Ferguson. Was there anybody there to take action?

Admiral Turner. There were officers there who could get me on the phone at once, and there was an officer there, a duty officer, who could take it up with me, or with the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever made an investigation to see why the messages didn't get to you quicker than they did?

Admiral Turner. I have not, because I believe that they got to me as fast as they customarily did.

Senator Ferguson. That is all. I want to thank the committee for staying on. And if my voice was loud, Admiral, it was because I was hurrying to get through.

The Vice Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I have just one concluding question.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, in Exhibit 1, on page 72, in a message from Nomura at Washington to Tokyo on October 16, 1941, in subparagraph C, is the following:

It is urgent that a formula be drawn up on the basis of a 50-50 compromise between Tokyo and Washington (Turner [5457] does not think that we are compromising).

Did you at any time leave any inference that you thought there should be a 50-50 compromise with Japan?

Admiral Turner. No, I did not.

I thought that was the only possible basis for continued negotiations.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. I would like to make a request. I was wondering if during the interim I would be permitted to inspect all of the original intercepts which bear the date of December 6, regardless of the date upon which they were decoded. I would like to make a comparison.

[5498] Mr. Mitchell. What is the request?

Mr. Gearhart. I wanted to be permitted to inspect all of the original intercepts that bear the date of December 6, regardless of when they were decoded, that appear in Exhibit 1 and the first 30 pages of Exhibit 2.

Mr. Mitchell. Do you want the photostats or the originals?

Mr. Gearhart. The photostats would do but I want all of the markings upon them.

Mr. Mitchell. I don't see any reason why we can't get those into your hands.

Mr. Gearhart. During the interim.

Mr. Mitchell. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, there is one other question that I want to ask the Admiral.

Admiral, I would like to have you look at page 22 of Exhibit 2. That is a message of the 3d of December 1941 and it shows it was translated on the 11th of December.

Are you familiar with that message?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if that message was translated by 1:30 or 2 o'clock on the day of the 6th as shown by the record of Admiral Hewitt, and in the Navy Department, on Kramer's desk, in the rough, would that have made any difference in your planning to send notices, and so forth, [5499] so far as Hawaii was concerned?

Admiral Turner. I think I would certainly have taken it up with the Office of Naval Intelligence to find out what had been done about it, to send a check—at least a check—message out there to see if they were familiar with that.

Senator Ferguson. That would have meant that there could be an attack on Pearl Harbor and they wanted this information for that purpose?

Admiral Turner. It could be, but it also could easily be what actually occurred at a later time when Japanese submarines made contact with the people on shore and exchanged signals with them both by day and night.
Senator Ferguson. But it was an important message?

Admiral Turner. Quite.

Senator Ferguson. And normally would have come to you?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Turner, is there any other statement or any further information that you desire to give to this committee on the subject here under investigation?

Admiral Turner. No, sir, there is not.

The Vice Chairman. Is there anything else you think the committee ought to know about this that you are prepared to tell us?

[Page 5460]

Admiral Turner. No, sir; there is not.

The Vice Chairman. We desire to thank you for your appearance, for the information you have given to the committee, your cooperation at this hearing, and to assure you that we feel that you have endeavored to cooperate fully, and we appreciate the assistance you have given us in the testimony presented.

Admiral Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I thank the members of the committee and counsel for their courtesy and kindness to me in this hearing.

(The witness was excused.)

The Vice Chairman. The Committee wishes the press and all others who have worked with us a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, and the committee now stands adjourned until December 31, at 10 a. m.

(Whereupon, at 5: 40 p. m., December 21, 1945, a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Monday, December 31, 1945.)

Part 5—December 31, 1945, and January 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946—follows.

X